###### 2019 ## D E F E N S E O F J A PA N D E F E N S E O F J A P A N 2 0 1 9 ----- ###### 2019 ## D E F E N S E O F J A PA N ----- On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2019 Minister of Defense **KONO Taro** My name is Taro Kono. I took office as the Minister of Defense on September 11, 2019. In order to ensure that the new Reiwa era will be a peaceful period, I will do my utmost to defend Japanese national’s life and property by maintaining Japan’s peace and security and by contributing to the effort to secure the peace and stability of the international community. During the period covered by the 2019 version of the Defense White Paper, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) made new developments related to defense policy, including the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), and dealt with various incidents under the leadership of former Minister of Defense Takeshi Iwaya. Therefore, he was also invited to offer his words on the publication of this white paper. We hope that Japanese nationals will take a look at the Defense White Paper and feel more familiar with the MOD/SDF. Former Minister of Defense **IWAYA Takeshi** On May 1 this year, the Reiwa era began. This year not only marks the beginning of a new era; it is important for the MOD/SDF, as we will start to develop defense capabilities for a new age based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP) that were formulated in December last year. The MOD/SDF will continue to make every possible effort to perform tasks in order to preserve the peace and independence of Japan in this new era. The security environment surrounding Japan is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than we expected. One particularly prominent change is the rapid expansion of the military ----- use of domains such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. As a result of technological innovation in recent years, these domains are gaining as much importance as the conventional domains of land, sea and air. As for the regional situation, China is expanding and stepping up its activities in the seas and airspace neighboring Japan, with more and more fighters and bombers advancing to the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean. North Korea still maintains hundreds of ballistic missiles which cover the whole of Japan within their range in combat deployment. The series of short-range ballistic missile launches into the Sea of Japan since May indicates North Korea’s intent to advance relevant technologies even after the US-NK leaders met three times, which we cannot overlook. The most important point in preserving the peace and independence of Japan in this severe security environment is our own effort. Under the NDPG and the MTDP, we will fundamentally strengthen our own defense structure. In doing so, we intend to develop a “multi-domain defense force” that fusesthe new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum with the traditional domains of land, sea and air. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, along with Japan’s own defense system, forms the cornerstone of Japan’s security. The range of fields where Japan and the United States should cooperate with each other is expanding in accordance with the changing security environment. Since becoming Minister of Defense, I have had five Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings, where we had candid discussions. By deepening cooperation at all levels, from the summit level to the working level, we must strive to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. At the same time, we will make efforts to mitigate the impact of bases on Okinawa and other host communities while maintaining the deterrence capability of the U.S. Forces in Japan. In addition, in order to realize the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision, it is important to further strengthen security cooperation with other countries while working together with the United States. We intend to promote multi-faceted, multi-layered security cooperation among Australia, India, ASEAN countries and others in a strategic manner. At the beginning of the Defense White Paper for this year, a feature article titled “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)” provides explanations, using pictures and charts, concerning the security environment and the strengthening of the defense system described in the NDPG. In order to help readers deepen their understanding, the main body of the white paper includes column articles providing clear explanations, in addition to a detailed description of the overview of the NDPG and the MTDP. At the beginning of the Reiwa era, looking back at the Heisei era, it was a period when the security environment surrounding Japan changed dramatically. For example, Japan experienced the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the era, followed by a series of natural disasters, the increased tension over North Korea’s situation, the simultaneous terrorist attacks in the United States and the rise of China. In this situation, we evolved the defense policy through such measures as participating in peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and elsewhere, developing the Contingency Legislation, dispatching SDF personnel to Iraq, and developing the Legislation for Peace and Security. For this year’s Defense White Paper, we have prepared an opening feature titled “MOD/SDF in the Heisei Era: A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years” which helps readers to look back at the activities conducted by the MOD/SDF during the Heisei era. I hope you will enjoy it. ----- **2019** **DEFENSE OF JAPAN** Contents **Special Feature** **1** **National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)** ………………………… 001 **2** **Defense Chronology** ……………………………………………………………………………………… 005 **3** **MOD/SDF in the Heisei Era: A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years ………………… 007** **Digest …………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 017** **ⅠPart** **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** **Chapter 1 Overview** Section 1 Characteristics of Current Security Environment ··········································· 041 Section 2 Military Trends in the Neighboring Countries of Japan ··································· 043 **Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries** Section 1 The United States···························································································· 047 1 Security and Defense Policies ················································································ 047 2 Military Posture ···································································································· 054 Section 2 China ··············································································································· 057 1 General Situation ·································································································· 057 2 Military Affairs ······································································································ 058 3 Relations with Countries and Regions ···································································· 081 4 Military Capabilities of Taiwan ················································································ 087 Section 3 Korean Peninsula ···························································································· 091 1 North Korea ·········································································································· 092 2 The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea ···················································· 112 Section 4 Russia ············································································································· 117 1 General Situation ·································································································· 117 2 Security and Defense Policies ················································································ 118 3 Military Posture and Trends ··················································································· 120 4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan ··································································· 123 5 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories ························································ 126 6 Relations with Other Countries··············································································· 128 Section 5 Oceania ··········································································································· 133 1 Australia ·············································································································· 133 2 New Zealand ········································································································ 138 Section 6 Southeast Asia ································································································ 139 1 General Situation ·································································································· 139 2 Security and Defense Policies of Each Country ······················································· 139 3 Military Modernization in the Region ······································································ 145 4 Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation ····································································· 146 Section 7 South Asia ······································································································· 147 1 India ···················································································································· 147 2 Pakistan ··············································································································· 149 Section 8 Europe ············································································································ 151 1 General Situation ·································································································· 151 2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks················································ 151 3 Security / Defense Policies of European Countries ·················································· 155 **Chapter 3 Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space, Cyberspace,** **and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Relevant Challenges Facing the** **International Community** Section 1 Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology······································ 158 1 Military Science and Technological Trends ······························································ 158 2 Trends Concerning Defense Technological and Industrial Bases ······························· 160 Section 2 Trends in Space Domain ················································································· 162 1 Space Domain and Security ·················································································· 162 2 Various Countries’ Outer Space Initiatives ······························································· 163 Section 3 Trends in Cyber Domain ·················································································· 167 1 Cyberspace and Security ······················································································· 167 2 Threats in Cyberspace ·························································································· 167 3 Initiatives against Cyber Attacks ············································································· 169 Section 4 Electromagnetic Domain Trends ····································································· 173 1 Electromagnetic Domain and Security ···································································· 173 2 Each Country’s Electronic Warfare Initiatives ··························································· 173 Section 5 Maritime Trends ······························································································ 176 1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” ··························· 176 2 Addressing Piracy ································································································· 177 3 Trends in the Arctic Ocean ····················································································· 178 Section 6 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ··························· 180 1 Nuclear Weapons ································································································· 180 2 Biological and Chemical Weapons·········································································· 181 3 Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles ······································································· 182 4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies 183 5 Iran’s Nuclear Issues ····························································································· 184 Section 7 Trends in International Terrorism and Regional Confl icts ······························· 185 1 General Situation ·································································································· 185 2 Trends surrounding International Terrorism ····························································· 187 3 Current Situation of Regional Confl icts and the International Response (mainly in the Middle East and Africa)····································································· 190 ----- **ⅡPart** **Japan’s Security and Defense Policy** **Chapter Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense** Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security ···························································· 197 Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy ················································· 198 1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense ····························································· 198 2 The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution ··········································· 198 3 Basic Policy ·········································································································· 200 Section 3 Outline of the National Security Strategy ······················································· 201 1 National Security Council ······················································································ 201 2 National Security Strategy ····················································································· 201 **Chapter 2 Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense** **Forces (SDF)** 1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability ·········································· 203 2 Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces ··············································· 204 3 Central Organization Reform of the Ministry of Defense ··········································· 206 **Chapter 3 New National Defense Program Guidelines** Section 1 Features of the Past NDPGs ············································································ 208 1 1976 NDPG ········································································································· 208 2 1995 NDPG ········································································································· 208 3 2004 NDPG ········································································································· 209 4 2010 NDPG ········································································································· 209 5 2013 NDPG ········································································································· 209 Section 2 Content of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (2018 NDPG) ··································································································· 211 1 Background of Review of the 2013 NDPG ······························································ 211 2 Basic Approach—Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force ······································ 211 3 NDPG’s Objective·································································································· 212 4 Security Environment Surrounding Japan ······························································· 212 5 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy ················································································ 214 6 Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability ························································· 219 7 Organization of the SDF ························································································ 222 8 Elements Supporting Defense Capability ································································ 223 9 Points of Attention ································································································ 226 **Chapter 4 New Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP), etc.** Section 1 Outline of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) ··························································· 227 **ⅢPart** **Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)** **Chapter 1 Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** Section 1 Truly Effective Defense Capability ·································································· 269 1 Signifi cance and Necessity of Defense Capability ···················································· 269 2 Truly Effective Defense Capability—Multi-domain Defense Force ····························· 269 Section 2 Role that Japan’s Defense Forces Have to Fulfi ll ··········································· 270 1 Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations ················································· 270 2 Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands ······················································· 277 3 Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum ····· 289 4 Response to Large-Scale Disasters ········································································ 297 **Chapter 2 Japan-U.S. Alliance** Section 1 Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ·········································· 304 1 Signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ············································ 304 2 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance ····················································· 306 3 Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation ································ 307 4 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States ······································ 312 Section 2 Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats ··· 321 1 Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains ······························································ 321 2 Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense ································································· 322 3 Bilateral Training and Exercises·············································································· 322 4 ISR Activities ········································································································ 323 5 Maritime Security ································································································· 323 6 Logistics Support ·································································································· 323 7 Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan ··································· 324 Section 3 Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas ··········· 325 1 Creation of a Desirable Security Environment ························································· 325 2 Initiatives for Leveraging Capabilities ····································································· 326 Section 4 Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning the USFJ···························· 327 1 Stationing of the USFJ··························································································· 327 1 Background of Formulation of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)····································· 227 2 Signifi cance of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) ·························································· 227 3 Program Guidelines ······························································································ 227 4 Reorganization of the Major SDF Units ··································································· 228 5 Major Programs regarding the SDF’s Capabilities ···················································· 231 6 Quantities of Major Procurement ··········································································· 237 7 Expenditures ········································································································ 237 8 Other ··················································································································· 237 Section 2 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2019 ······················································ 238 Section 3 Defense-Related Expenditures ······································································· 240 1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures ····························································· 240 2 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures·························································· 241 3 Initiatives for Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement ············································ 243 4 Comparison with Other Countries ·········································································· 243 **Chapter 5 Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the SDF** **Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement** Section 1 Background to the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security ········· 245 1 Background to the Development of Legislation ······················································· 245 2 Background and Signifi cance of the Development of Legislature ······························ 245 Section 2 Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security ································································· 248 1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations ······ 248 2 Responses to Situations that Will Have an Important Infl uence ································· 252 3 Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed Attack ······································································································· 254 4 Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others ···································································· 258 5 Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community ··· 258 6 Other Amendments in the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security ····· 263 Section 3 SDF Activities since Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security ······· 265 1 Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security ········································································································· 265 2 Dispatch of Staff Offi cers to the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) ··················· 265 3 The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2) ······ 266 4 Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. ACSA ································································ 267 5 Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO ············································· 267 **Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)** 2 Progress of the Realignment of the USFJ ······························································· 330 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa ································································ 333 4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa ··································· 345 5 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ ······················ 350 6 Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas ································ 350 **Chapter 3 Security Cooperation** Section 1 Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation ····· 353 1 Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges ·················································································· 353 2 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges ················································· 356 3 Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation ························································ 377 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Initiatives ····································· 382 5 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Assistance ·························· 383 Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security ············································································ 386 1 Counter-Piracy Operations ···················································································· 386 2 Training-Centered Initiatives ·················································································· 389 3 Cooperation in Maritime Security ··········································································· 389 Section 3 Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains ·········································· 391 1 Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain ································································ 391 2 Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain ································································ 392 Section 4 Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation ··················· 393 1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and NonProliferation·········································································································· 393 2 International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ······ 395 Section 5 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities ························ 396 1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities ······································ 396 2 Initiatives to Support UN PKO, etc. ········································································· 397 3 International Disaster Relief Activities ····································································· 403 ----- **ⅣPart** **Core Elements Comprising Defense Capability, etc.** **Chapter 1 Human Resource Base and Medical Functions that Sustain the** **Defense Capability** Section 1 Reinforcing Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability ····· 405 1 Recruitment and Employment ················································································ 405 2 Daily Education and Training ·················································································· 409 3 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources ····························· 411 Section 2 Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation Capability ··· 414 1 Working Style Reform ··························································································· 414 2 Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care ············ 415 3 Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel ·········································· 415 Section 3 Enhancement of Medical Functions ······························································· 418 1 Enhancing Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture ····································· 418 2 SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions ······································· 418 3 Strengthening the Function of the National Defense Medical College ························ 419 4 Enhancement of Education of Medical and Nursing Offi cers ···································· 419 5 Enhancement of Capabilities to Treat War Injury ······················································ 420 6 Developing Conditions Necessary for International Cooperation ······························· 420 **Chapter 2 Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology** Section 1 Reviewing Equipment Structure ····································································· 421 1 Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure ·································· 421 2 Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Manpower Saving and Automation) ······································································· 422 Section 2 Reinforcing Technology Base ·········································································· 423 1 Necessity of Reinforcing Technology Base ······························································ 423 2 Defense Technology Strategy and Related Documents ············································ 423 3 Initiatives for Research and Development ······························································· 424 4 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology ··································································· 425 Section 3 Optimizing Equipment Procurement ······························································· 428 1 Project Management throughout Its Life Cycle ························································ 428 2 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters ······································ 429 3 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives ························································································ 431 4 Promoting Initiative towards Streamlining of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement ········································································································ 432 Section 4 Strengthening Defense Industrial Base ·························································· 432 1 Current Situation of Japan’s Defense Industrial Base··············································· 432 2 The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases ································· 433 3 Initiatives Based on the 2018 NDPG ······································································ 434 Section 5 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation··········································· 437 1 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology ························· 437 2 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation ························································································ 438 3 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation ································ 440 4 Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use ·························································· 443 5 Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions ···································· 443 6 Public-Private Defense Industry Forum ··································································· 444 7 Preventing Leakage of Advantageous Technologies for Defense Equipment ·············· 444 **Chapter 3 Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** 1 Military Intelligence Collection ··············································································· 445 2 Initiatives towards Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities ············································· 445 **Chapter 4 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens** Section 1 Collaboration with Local Communities ··························································· 447 1 Supporting Civilian Life ························································································· 447 2 Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF ···· 447 3 Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents ···································································································· 450 4 Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas ·· 450 5 Other Initiatives ···································································································· 451 Section 2 Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives Management, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities ··············································· 453 1 Various Public Relations Activities ·········································································· 453 2 Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure ·················· 455 3 Initiatives for Policy Evaluation ··············································································· 456 **Reference ……………………………………………………………………………………458** **Defense Chronology …………………………………………………………………………548** **Insert …………………………………………………………………………………………560** Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces Location of Principal SDF Units (image) (As of March 31, 2019) Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2019) Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2019) ----- **Column** **ⅠPart** **ⅢPart** **Chapter 2 Defense Policies of Countries** **Chapter 1 Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **column Chinese Modernization of Missile Forces …………………………… 064** **column Establishment of the Airborne Warning and Control Wing …………… 279** **column Chinese Civil-Military Fusion ……………………………………… 081** **VOICE** Toward Training of V-22 Pilots in Command ………………………… 279 **column Status of North Korea’s Denuclearization and Its Nuclear and Missile** **column Participating in a Multinational Tabletop Exercise Schriever Wargame … 293** Capabilities ……………………………………………………… 093 **VOICE** Participating in Disaster Relief Activities following the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern **column Vostok 2018 …………………………………………………… 127** Iburi Earthquake ………………………………………………… 299 **column Starting Operation of a New Government Aircraft …………………… 303** **Chapter 3 Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space,** **Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Relevant** **Chapter 2 Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Challenges Facing the International Community** **column Exchange between U.S. Forces and Local Residents ………………… 351** **column Space Security Trends …………………………………………… 163** **Chapter 3 Security Cooperation** **column Electronic Warfare ………………………………………………… 175** **column Deepening Cooperation between MSDF and Indian Navy …………… 360** **Part** **VOICE** Progress in Japan-U.K. Defense Cooperation – Participating in an Exercise with British Army ……………………………………………………… 368 **Ⅱ** **column** Transportation of Donated Goods to the Republic of the Marshall Islands … 375 **VOICE** Practical Initiatives Toward Enhancement of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Capabilities of ASEAN ……………………………… 385 **Chapter 3 New National Defense Program Guidelines** **column Indo Southeast Asia Deployment …………………………………… 390** **column “Gray-Zone Situations” and “Hybrid Warfare” ……………………… 213** **VOICE** Strengthening Cyber Collaboration with NATO ……………………… 392 **column Cross-domain Operations ………………………………………… 216** **column Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) ……………………… 394** **column Refurbishment of Izumo-class Destroyers ………………………… 220** **VOICE** Dispatch to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai … 399 **VOICE** Engaging as the Chair Country in the Revision of the UN Peacekeeping **Chapter 4 New Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP), etc.** Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual …………………………… 402 **column Establishment of a Space Domain Mission Unit ……………………… 229** **column Establishment of a Cyber Defense Unit …………………………… 229** **Part** **columncolumn Strengthening Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain …………… 229 Constructing a Fighter System …………………………………… 232** **Ⅳ** **Chapter 5 Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the** **SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement** **Chapter 1 Human Resource Base and Medical Functions that Sustain the** **Defense Capability** **column The Relationship between the Legislation for Peace and Security and the** Constitution ……………………………………………………… 247 **VOICE** Outstanding Performance by a SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and a Business **column Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and** Owner Who Works with SDF Ready Reserve Personnel as His Employees … 408 Maritime Security Operation ……………………………………… 255 **VOICE** Success of Female Personnel – the First Female Fighter Pilot of ASDF … 416 **column Duties of the Self Defense Forces ………………………………… 264** **Chapter 2 Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology** **VOICE** Thoughts of a Researcher Working on a Research Program Supported by the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program …… 426 **VOICE** Defense Industry Supporting Development of Defense Capabilities …… 436 **Chapter 4 Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens** **VOICE** Making a Connection with the Local Community …………………… 448 **column Initiatives taken by local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities … 452** **VOICE** Self-Defense Force Athletes Aiming to Compete at the Tokyo Olympics … 455 **column Establishment of Chief Record Offi cer (CRO of each ministry/agency) … 456** **Please help fi ll out a questionnaire on Defense of Japan!** The Ministry of Defense wants to hear your views on Defense of Japan 2019. Please fi ll out the questionnaire on the Defense of Japan website. We will use this to further improve future editions of Defense of Japan. **Defense of Japan 2019 questionnaire:** **https://sec.mod.go.jp/mod/j/hakusho/form_e_2019.html** ----- **National Defense Program Guidelines** **Feature1** The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to maintain Japan’s peace and security, to ensure its survival and to defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property and territorial land, waters and airspace. This is the foremost responsibility that Japan must fulfi ll as a sovereign nation. Carrying out this responsibility by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative is at the very heart of Japan’s national security. Japan’s defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security and the clear representation of the unwavering will and ability of Japan as a peace-loving nation. And maintaining Japan’s peace and security is an essential premise for its prosperity. **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** At present, security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speeds. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air. **Situations in the Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum** **[AFP/Jiji]** **[Jiji]** Chinese space operations control station Threat message from the WannaCry malware attack, which caused huge damage worldwide Russian Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system thought to have disrupted North Atlantic Treaty **[Jane’s by IHS Markit]** O i ti (NATO) f ’ d d t l d d biliti i S i **[Jane’s by IHS Markit]** ----- **for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)** Qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build up and increase in military activities. **Expansion and Intensifi cation of Chinese Military Activities** ■ **High-level growth of defense expenditures (See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2)** ■ Expansion and intensifi cation of activities by the Chinese Navy and **Air Force** (100 million yuan) 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 |on yuan)|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||(approx. 20.2279 trillion yen)| Su-30 fi ghter H-6 bomber Approx. 1.1899 trillion yuan (approx. 20.2279 trillion yen) Japan’s defense-related expenditures in FY2019: 5.007 trillion yen (FY) **Enhancement of Ballistic Missiles by North Korea** Washington D.C.(approx. 11,000 km) 10,000km **[Korea News Service/Jiji]** London (approx. 8,700 km) Los Angeles (approx. 9,600 km) ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” 5,500km Range: more than 5,500 km (July 2017) Moscow (approx. 6,400 km) 5,000km Anchorage (approx. 6,000 km) Hawaii (approx. 7,400 km) Pyongyang **[Korea News Service/Jiji]** New-type, ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” Guam (approx. 3,400 km) Range: more than 10,000 km* (November 2017) **[Jiji Press]** Image publicly released by North Korea when it Note 1: The fi gure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can launched an IRBM-class ballistic missile (presumed) reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience. (September 15, 2017) Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. Japan, amid the dramatically changing security environment, needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding roles Japan can fulfi ll. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries are critical to Japan’s national security, and this cannot be achieved without Japan's own efforts The international community also expects Japan to play roles that are commensurate with its national power ----- **National Defense Program Guidelines** **Special** **Feature1** **Strengthening Japan’s Defense Capability** Japan must squarely face the realities of national security and ensure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a new defense capability by a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past. In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains (Multi-Domain Defense Force), Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air. **Strengthening Capabilities in the New domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum** In order to realize cross-domain operations, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. **Electromagnetic domain** **Space domain** **Cyber domain** X-band defense communications satellite (image) Cyber Competition Improvement of electronic warfare capabilities of fi ghters (F-15) (image) **Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains** The SDF will enhance capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in the new domains. **Capabilities in maritime and** **air domains** **Stand-off defense capability** Destroyer JS “Izumo” JASSM (image) **Comprehensive air and** **missile defense capability** **Maneuver and** **deployment capability** A i A h (i ) T t i ft (C 2) ----- **Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency** To be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF will promote measures necessary for enhancing sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support. Equipment maintenance Equipment for restoring damaged runways On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with declining birthrates and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past. **Reinforcing Human Resource Base** The MOD/SDF will make efforts to secure human resources for and improve the ability and morale of SDF personnel, which constitutes the core element of defense capability. **Reviewing Equipment Structure** The MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from a joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure. First Female Fighter Pilot Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missiles In strengthening defense capability, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation. **Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Cooperation** The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan's own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. Japan's fulfi llment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfi ll its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance’s ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacifi c. The 18th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Di l ) (J 2019) Visiting Destroyer JS “Kaga” by Prime Minister Abe and President Trump (M 2019) **[Photo: courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat** **Public Relations Office]** ----- **Defense Chronology** **Feature2** - China has continued to reinforce its military capabilities both in quality and quantity. It has also continued its attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas, including the Senkaku Islands, which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, and has intensifi ed its activities in the Pacifi c Ocean and the Sea of Japan. - The second U.S.-North Korea summit was held, but there has been no change in the situation that North Korea possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching every part of Japan. North Korea also continues illegal transfers of goods at sea (so-called “ship-toship transfer”) through increasingly sophisticated methods in such areas as the East China Sea. - Russia carried out “Vostok 2018” in the Eastern Military District. The United States and Russia remained far apart regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; following the United States’ announcement of withdrawal, the treaty lost effect in August 2019. **U.S. Vice President Mike Pence’s speech concerning** **China (October)** **[Photo: U.S. White House]** **[Jane’s by IHS Markit]** The exercise was conducted on the largest scale since 1981, with Vice President Pence indicated a recognition that China wants “to push the United States of **Russia’s military exercise “Vostok 2018”** **(September)** **[AFP/Jiji]** participation of nearly 300,000 soldiers, including those from the Chinese America from the Western Pacifi c,” citing such incidents as a Chinse military vessel’s coming in and Mongolian militaries. near collision with a U.S. military vessel in the South China Sea in September. - Russia’s deployment of Su-35 - Near collision of U.S. and Chinese - First ASEAN (Association of - (from October) NATO’s exercise - U.S. President Trump ordering fi ghters to Etorofu Island military vessels in the South China Southeast Asian Nations)-China Trident Juncture conducted on the establishment of a U.S. Space Sea joint maritime exercise largest scale in recent years Command **JULY** **AUGUST** **SEPTEMBER** **OCTOBER** **NOVEMBER** **DECEMBER** **2018** **2018** **2018** **2018** **2018** **2018** - Heavy rain in July 2018 (call-up of Ready - Telephone Call between Defense - Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake - Japan-Australia “2+2” meeting - Formulation of the NDPG and the Reserve Personnel) Minister Onodera and U.S. Defense (call-up of Ready Reserve - Japan–U.S. Defense Ministerial Medium Term Defense Program (FY - Japan-Russia “2+2” meeting Secretary Mattis Personnel) Meeting 2019 – FY 2023; MTDP) - Signing of the Japan-France Acquisition - ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting- - Disaster relief in response to hog and Cross Servicing Agreement Plus (ADMM-Plus) cholera (until June) (Japan-France ACSA) **Indo Southeast Asia Deployment (ISEAD)** **(August to October)** **The ISEAD Task Group conducting training with Philippine Navy aircraft C-90** Toward realizing a “free and open Indo-Pacifi c,” the SDF conducted joint training with the navies of the countries in the region and reinforced cooperation with them. **Disaster relief in response to the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi** **Earthquake (September to October)** **Search and rescue operations by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)** The GSDF conducted lifesaving operations, water and food supply assistance, and bathing assistance engaging approximately 25 000 personnel nine vessels and 46 **International disaster relief activities in Indonesia** **(October)** **The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) (C-130H transport aircraft)** **transporting displaced persons** An air transport unit was dispatched in response to the earthquake and tsunami that occurred near Sulawesi Island, and transported relief materials and affected people. **Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (October)** **Japanese Defense Minister Takeshi Iwaya and** **Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe** The Japan-China defense ministerial meeting was held for the fi rst time in three years, and the ministers agreed on early establishment of a hotline concerning the Maritime and ----- **Continued acts suspected as** **“ship-to-ship transfers” (January)** Acts suspected as “ship-to-ship transfers” were confi rmed 20 times in total from 2018 to the end of June 2019. **The second U.S.-North Korea summit (February)** **[AFP/Jiji]** The second U.S.-North Korea summit was held in Hanoi, but ended without reaching any agreement. **China’s international fl eet review (April)** **[Jane’s by IHS Markit]** China, which aims to beef up its military capacity, unveiled its new 10,000-ton class Renhai-class destroyer at an international fl eet review. **China Coast Guard vessels repeatedly intruding into Japan’s** **territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands** **[Photo: Japan Coast Guard]** Chinese government vessels have continuously intruded into Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands in spite of Japan’s strong protests. - U.S. release of the Missile Defense - U.S. announces withdrawal from - U.S. declaration of liberation of - China’s international fl eet review - North Korea fi res short-range - U.S. Department of Defense Review (MDR) the INF Treaty ISIS-controlled territory in Syria ballistic missiles releases Indo-Pacifi c Strategy and Iraq Report **JANUARY** **FEBRUARY** **March** **APRIL** **MAY** **JUNE** **2019** **2019** **2019** **2019** **2019** **2019** - Japan-France “2+2” meeting - Grant of UH-1H parts and - Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting - Memorandum on the orientation of - Shangri-La Dialogue - Meeting between Defense Minister maintenance equipment to the - Meeting between Defense Minister promotion of defense industry cooperation - Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan - Philippine Air ForceDeployment of GSDF units to Amami Oshima Island and Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan - signed between the Japanese and Vietnamese defense authoritiesVisiting Destroyer JS “Kaga” by Prime Minister Abe and President Trump - Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense ShanahanEntering into force of the Miyakojima Island - Japan–Russia “2+2” Meeting Japan-France ACSA - U.S. release of the Missile Defense Review (MDR) - U.S. announces withdrawal from the INF Treaty **The United Nations (UN) Project for Rapid Deployment** **of Enabling Capabilities/Asia and the surrounding** **regions (November to December)** **GSDF personnel giving a lecture on how to operate heavy equipment** While the SDF had already been conducting the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities in Africa, it carried out the project in Asia and the surrounding regions for the fi rst time. **Dispatch of personnel to the Multinational Force &** **Observers (MFO) (April)** **Japanese offi cers serving on the MFO Headquarters** In the fi rst deployment under the system of “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security,” personnel began to be dispatched as staff offi cers to the MFO. - In Japan, the SDF conducted activities in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake and other natural disasters. In addition, it promptly responded to disasters outside Japan, such as transporting relief materials as the Japan Disaster Relief Team when an earthquake and tsunami occurred in Indonesia. - As the fi rst “Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security,” the deployment of two personnel dispatched as staff offi cers to the MFO, which monitors the ceasefi re between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai Peninsula, began in April 2019. - In line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the SDF actively engages in defense cooperation and exchanges, leveraging its defense capability, such as conducting joint training and exercises with and providing capacity building assistance to the countries within the region. ----- **MOD/SDF in the Heisei Era:** **A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years** **Feature3** April of this year marked the end of the Heisei era (the imperial era that lasted from 1989 through 2019). The Defense White Paper for the fi rst year of the new Reiwa era introduces the history of the MOD/SDF during the Heisei era. **Beginning of the Heisei era and the start** **of the post-Cold War world** **[AFP/Jiji]** **Local people rejoicing at the fall of the Berlin Wall** **[dpa/Jiji Press Photo]** **Abandoned tank near a burning Kuwaiti oil well** **Gulf War (1991)** **[dpa/Jiji Press Photo]** **Abandoned tank near a burning Kuwaiti oil well** **Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989)** **[AFP/Jiji]** **Local people rejoicing at the fall of the Berlin Wall** The Berlin Wall, which had been a symbolic marker of the Cold War between the East and Iraq invaded Kuwait. The multinational forces decided to use armed forces in order to evict West fell. Subsequently, the end of the Cold War was declared between the United States and Iraqi troops from Kuwait and restore peace and stability in the Gulf region, and the Gulf War the Soviet Union. started. **Dispatch of minesweeper units to the Persian Gulf (1991)** **PKO in the Golan Heights** **(1996–2013)** **A diver attaching an explosive to dispose of a sea mine** After the Gulf War, a large number of mines laid by Iraqi troops remained in the Persian Gulf. In order to secure the safe navigation of Japanese vessels, a minesweeper unit of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was dispatched. This was the SDF’s fi rst international cooperation since its establishment. **Relief operation for Rwandan refugees (1994)** **PKO in Mozambique** **(1993–1995)** **At the camp** The SDF engaged in such operations as medical care, disease control, water supply, and airlift in order to provide relief to refugees resulting from civil war in Rwanda . This was Japan’s first international humanitarian relief activity. ----- **Security environment and the SDF’s initiatives** **Ⅰ** **Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (1995)** **GSDF personnel engaged in search operations** Up to about 19,000 SDF personnel per day engaged in disaster relief operations over a period of approximately 100 days from the occurrence of the earthquake. Based on the lessons learned through this activity, the disaster relief readiness was enhanced through measures including amendment of various laws and strengthening of coordination with local governments. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Cold War, which lasted for more than 40 years, ended. The conventional structure of the East-West military confrontation centering on the United States and the Soviet Union was dissolved and the international situation took a signifi cant turn. Under such circumstances, the SDF responded to large-scale disasters, such as the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, and also engaged in international peace cooperation activities, such as PKO activities in Cambodia. The SDF increased its reputation in and outside Japan and the roles of its defense capabilities expanded. **Tokyo subway sarin gas attack (1995)** **GSDF personnel conducting decontamination work in a subway train** An indiscriminate murder case using sarin gas in Tokyo subway stations and subway trains occurred. Chemical protection units of the GSDF were dispatched to detect and decontaminate the toxic gas at Kasumigaseki and Hibiya stations. **Establishment of Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) (1995)** **The total return of MCAS Futenma stipulated in the SACO Final Report.** The Japanese and U.S. governments agreed to establish the SACO in order to discuss various issues concerning the facilities and areas of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) located in Okinawa Prefecture. SACO compiled the fi nal report in 1996, and agreed to return approximately 21% of the facilities and areas of the USFJ located in Okinawa Prefecture at the time. **Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (1996)** **[Jiji]** **Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (April 1996)** The Japanese and U.S. governments had close discussions on the signifi cance and roles of the post-Cold War Japan-U.S. Alliance, and announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security as the result of the discussions. In response to this, in 1997, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation providing for **Peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Cambodia (1992–1993)** **GSDF personnel constructing a new bridge over a river where a bridge was destroyed** The SDF conducted activities in Cambodia as its fi rst United Nations peacekeeping operations. The activities included repair of roads and bridges and ceasefi re monitoring. The SDF’s repairs amounted to a total of about 100 km of roads and about 40 bridges. Becoming an SDF that actively conducts operations in the international community ----- 3 **A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years** **MOD/SDF in the Heisei Era:** **A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years** **Special** **Feature3** **Ballistic missiles and international terrorism** **—heightening of new threats** **Suspicious Boat Incidents off Noto Peninsula (1999)** **A suspicious boat that appeared off the coast of the Noto Peninsula** In order to deal with two suspicious boats discovered in Japan’s territorial waters, an order for Maritime Security Operations was issued for the fi rst time. MSDF destroyers gave orders to halt and fi red warning shots, and P-3C aircraft dropped bombs as a warning. Later, the suspicious boats were concluded to be North Korea’s spy boats. **North Korea’s ballistic missile fi ring (1998)** **[AFP/Jiji]** **Missile presumed to be Taepodong-1** North Korea fi red a ballistic missile (presumed to be Taepodong-1) without advance warning. A part of the missile fl ew over Japan and fell in to the Sanriku offshore waters. This fact revealed that North Korea had gained the technology to manufacture missiles capable of reaching every part of Japan. **Activities to support actions against terrorism (2001–2007)** **Supply ship JS “Hamana” (left) replenishing a U.S. Naval ship at sea.** In order to respond to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and to contribute to initiatives of the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism, the SDF’s replenishment ships and destroyers were dispatched. The dispatched units engaged in activities such as replenishing U.S. Navy vessels. **Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction** **assistance in Iraq (2003–2009)** **SDF personnel supervising a local contractor’s road repair work** **9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (2001)** **[EPA/Jiji]** **World Trade Center tower in fl ames** The 9/11 terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States in the wake of the 21st century produced a tremendous shock throughout the world The SDF was dispatched to Iraq following the collapse of the Hussein administration to provide relief for war victims and conduct reconstruction support activities and engaged in ----- **Security environment and the SDF’s initiatives** **Ⅰ** In the mid-Heisei era, dramatic changes occurred to Japan’s security environment. In particular, activities of international terrorist organizations became serious, as represented by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In addition, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles became proliferated more widely, and response to new threats and diverse situations posed challenges. The SDF conducted replenishment activities on the Indian Ocean in order to deal with international terrorism as a member of the international community. The SDF also engaged in activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, and international peace cooperation activities came to be positioned as one of the SDF’s inherent duties along with the defense of Japan and the sustaining of public order. In response to the threat of ballistic missiles, the SDF launched development of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system. **Enactment of laws under the armed attack situation** **response law (2003–2004)** **GSDF personnel participating in a civil protection exercise (Fukui Prefecture)** **Decision to introduce the BMD (2003)** **Firing moment of SM-3** **PAC-3 deployed at the Iruma Air Base (Saitama Prefecture)** As legislation necessary for responding to armed attacks against Japan, three laws related to emergency legislation, including the armed attack situation response law, which has the character of a fundamental law, were established in 2003, and seven laws related to emergency legislation, including civil protection law, were established in 2004. **Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting (2005)** **Japanese and U.S. ministers at a Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting** The Japanese and U.S. governments indicated the concrete direction concerning the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives of the two countries, and agreed to locate the MCAS Futenma In light of the increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, Japan’s original ballistic missile defense system was put in place as a result of the start of deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units and the success in the Standard Missile (SM-3) launch tests by Aegis destroyers in 2007. **North Korea’s nuclear test (2006)** **The ASDF’s T-4 training aircraft collecting fl oating dust** **in the air in response to the nuclear test** North Korea fi red seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan and announced that it had conducted its fi rst nuclear test. In order to respond to such new threats, actions were taken to establish a response framework including development of the BMD system. ----- 3 **A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years** **MOD/SDF in the Heisei Era:** **A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years** **Special** **Feature3** **Late Heisei period** **(2008–2019)** **The SDF’s operations continuing to increase, with military** **activities of surrounding countries becoming increasingly active** **and disasters of an unprecedented scale hitting Japan** **Counter-piracy operations (2009–present)** **Destroyer JS “Sawagiri” escorting a private vessel in the Gulf of Aden** Piracy incidents were frequent and surging in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In order to protect Japan-affi liated vessels from piracy, an order for Maritime Security Operations was issued, and MSDF destroyers and aircraft were dispatched. After that, the Anti-Piracy Measures Act was established, and not only Japanese vessels, but also foreign vessels became subject to protection. **Great East Japan Earthquake (2011)** **GSDF personnel engaged in search operations** **U.S. Forces personnel conducting disaster relief activities with GSDF personnel** The Great East Japan Earthquake caused devastating damage in a vast area centering on coastal areas in the Tohoku region. The MOD/SDF engaged in activities including lifesaving operations, livelihood support, and response to nuclear disaster, with more than 100,000 personnel at the peak. At that time, the U.S. Forces conducted large-scale support activities, mobilizing up to about 16,000 personnel. (“Operation Tomodachi”) **Establishment of the National Security Council (2013)** **[Photo: Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce]** **A National Security Council meeting** The National Security Council was established as the control tower for Japan’s diplomatic and defense policies. In addition, Japan formulated a National Security Strategy for the fi rst time as its basic policy concerning national security. **Developments concerning areas surrounding the Senkaku** **Islands becoming active (2012–present)** **Chinese government vessels intruding into Japan’s** **[Photo: Japan Coast Guard]** **territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands** Following the Japanese government’s acquisition of ownership of three Senkaku islands, activities of Chinese military vessels and government vessels rapidly expanded and became active, such as Chinese government vessels intermittently intruding into Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. **Implementation of capacity building assistance (2012)** **GSDF personnel briefi ng the outline of vehicle maintenance in East Timor** The MOD/SDF started initiatives to provide capacity building assistance for facilitating the recipient country’s military to appropriately perform its roles for international peace and regional stability, and for creating a desirable security environment for Japan. ----- **Security environment and the SDF’s initiatives** **Ⅰ** In the late Heisei era, Japan’s security environment became increasingly severe due to changes in the balance of power associated with the growth of China and India, and other reasons. Subsequently, various security issues and destabilizing factors became more visible and aggravated. As China’s military activities became active, and North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles progressed, the SDF came to prepare against unexpected contingencies by conducting persistent warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace around Japan, and deploying ballistic missile defense units. In addition, in order to respond to global issues that are diffi cult to address by a single country alone, the SDF also began to carry out international activities, such as dispatching counter-piracy units and providing capacity building assistance to other countries’ military. On the other hand, inside Japan, large-scale disasters, including the Great East Japan Earthquake, occurred in succession, and the SDF engaged in rescue operations and livelihood support for victims. **Announcement of new Guidelines (2015)** **Establishment of the Legislation for Peace and Security (2015)** **Training for the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations** At the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting held in the year marking 70 years after World War II, new “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” (new Guidelines) refl ecting the changes in the security environment and reinforcement of Japan-U.S. coordination in the fi eld of security and defense was announced. **Progress of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development (2016–2017)** **Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched three Scud ERs (presumed)** **(September 2016) [Jiji]** North Korea conducted three nuclear tests and launched as many as 40 ballistic missiles from 2016 to 2017. With the establishment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, “survival-threatening situation” was newly added to the situations to which Japan is to respond, and provisions were introduced to enable “rescue of Japanese nationals overseas,” “protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries,” and the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo.” **Events indicating expansion and intensifi cation of the Chinese** **military’s activities (2017–2018)** **Chinese submarine navigating within** **Chinese fi ghter advancing into the airspace** **the contiguous zone** **over the Sea of Japan for the fi rst time** **Aircraft carrier “Liaoning” conducting takeoff and landing of aircraft presumed to be a** **carrier-based fi ghter for the fi rst time on the Pacifi c Ocean** A submerged submarine of the Chinese Navy entered the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese Navy’s vessels and air force are expanding and intensifying their military activities in the Pacifi c Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In December 2018, in order to respond to the new era, the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (2018 NDPG)” was formulated as new guidelines defi ning how Japan’s national defense ought to be to form the foundation of Japan’s future. ----- **MOD/SDF in the Heisei Era:** **A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years** **Feature3** Regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and beyond (1995 NDPG; approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995) **In light of the post-Cold War situation, achieving** **1995** **more compact and higher-quality defense** **NDPG :** **capabilities, and adding new roles** - Japan formulated its fi rst NDPG in 1976. The 1976 NDPG adopted the concept of the Basic Defense Force, which aimed to maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation, preventing a power vacuum that would destabilize the region surrounding Japan, under the Cold War structure. - Although the Cold War ended in the beginning of the Heisei era, the international situation was still fraught with factors of instability and uncertainty, and public expectations for international cooperation and disaster relief also grew. Based on such background, the 1995 NDPG were formulated. - While basically following the concept of the Basic Defense Force, the 1995 NDPG aimed to promote more rational, effi cient, and compact defense capabilities, and to achieve enhancement of necessary functions and qualitative improvement of defense capabilities. In addition, “dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to building a more stable security environment” were added to the roles of defense capabilities alongside the “defense of Japan.” Introduction of support fi ghter F-2 (fi rst deployed in October 2000) Renewal of a helicopter destroyer (DDH) (March 2009; Destroyer JS “Hyuga” entering service) **Training of candidates** **for SDF Reserve Personnel** **Training of Ready Reserve Personnel** Reducing the GSDF quota and introducing Ready Reserve Personnel (March 1998) Establishment of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters Intelligence Headquarters (January 1997)(January 1997) Reorganization into brigades (starting in March 1999) Introduction of the system of candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel (March 2002) Establishment of the Special Forces Group (March 2004); reorganization into the NBC Weapon Defense Unit (March 2007; fi rst reorganization) **Special Forces Group establishment ceremony** ----- Ⅱ Regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and beyond (2004 NDPG; approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) **Shift from deterrence-oriented policy to a policy** **2004** **emphasizing response capabilities in order to deal** **NDPG :** **with new threats and diverse situations** - The 2004 NDPG were formulated in view of the need to respond to the progress in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, activities of international terrorist organizations and other new threats, and diverse situations, as represented by the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States and North Korea’s ballistic missile development. - The 2004 NDPG shifted from the conventional policy attaching importance to the deterrence effect to a policy emphasizing response capabilities. The Guidelines set forth that a “multifunctional, flexible, effective defense force” would be built in order to be able to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations and engage in international peace cooperation activities independently and proactively. Meanwhile, the Guidelines maintained effective aspects of the concept of Basic Defense Capability. Equipping an Aegis destroyer with ballistic Introduction of missile response surface-to-air capabilities (November missile PAC-3 (fi rst 2008; Destroyer JS deployed in March “Chokai”) 2007) **Development of a Ballistic Missile Defense system** Introduction of Type 12 surface-to-ship missiles (fi rst deployed in August 2016) Establishment of the Joint Staff Offi ce (March 2006) Introduction of patrol aircraft P-1 (fi rst deployed in March 2013) Shift from the Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (January 2007) Establishment of the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit (March 2009) Establishment of the Central Readiness Force; establishment of the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (March 2007) ----- **MOD/SDF in the Heisei Era:** **A Look Back on Activities over the Past 30 Years** **Special** **Feature3** Regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond (2010 NDPG; approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) **Developing a Dynamic Defense Force with focus on** **2010** **“operation” of defense capabilities based on the** **NDPG :** **new security environment** - The 2010 NDPG were formulated based on the new security environment in which changes were occurring to the global balance of power, with countries such as China gaining national strength, and in which the military situation in the region surrounding Japan, including the military movements of North Korea and China, were becoming ever more complicated. - Rather than the conventional concept of the Basic Defense Force, which emphasized deterrence based on the existence of the defense force, the 2010 NDPG aimed to develop a Dynamic Defense Force focusing on “dynamic deterrence” whereby the State’s will and high defense capabilities are indicated by conducting various activities in an appropriate and timely manner in peacetime. In that process, drastic efficiency improvement and rationalization were to be achieved through fundamental review of equipment, personnel, organization, deployment, etc. Defense posture buildup in the southwestern region Establishment of one airborne early warning squadron (April 2014) Relocation of one airborne squadron to Naha; establishment of the 9th Air Wing (January 2016) Introduction of F-35A (fi rst deployed in January 2018) Establishment of a Senkaku IslandsSenkaku Islands security unit on Miyakojima Island (March 2019) Yonagunijima IslandYonagunijima Island Ishigakijima IslandIshigakijima Island Establishment of the Yonaguni coast observation unit Miyakojima (March 2016) Island **[Photo: Mitsubishi Heavy** **Industries/Japan Aerospace** **Exploration Agency]** Construction of an X-Band communications satellite network (satellite “Kirameki 2” launched in January 2017) Relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota (March 2012) Increase in the number of submarines (16 → 22 submarines [target]) ----- Ⅱ Regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (2013 NDPG; approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) **Developing dynamic defense capabilities through** **2013** **joint operations, in light of the increasingly severe** **NDPG :** **security environment** - The 2013 NDPG were formulated along with Japan’s first National Security Strategy in light of Japan’s increasingly severe security environment, with North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles posing a serious and imminent threat, and China’s military activities expanding and intensifying, and based on the lessons learned from the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake. - The 2013 NDPG aims to build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which enables conducting activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand through joint operations, by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities, such as securing maritime supremacy and air superiority, and by also enhancing the logistic support foundation. Reorganization into rapid deployment divisions/brigades; introduction of mobile combat vehicles (starting in March 2018) Introduction of long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle Global Hawk (to be deployed in FY2021) (photo: a model of the same type) Tanegashima Island Tanegashima Island Yakushima Island Yakushima Island Amami Amami Oshima IslandOshima Island Introduction of amphibious vehicles; establishment of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (March 2018) Okinoerabujima Okinoerabujima Island Island Main island of Kumeshima Main island of Okinawa Kumeshima Island Okinawa Island Establishment of a security unit and surface-to-ship missile units on Amami Oshima Island, and relocation of the surfaceto-air missile units (March 2019) Establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (October 2015) Establishment of the Ground Component Command (March 2018) Introduction of new destroyers (to enter into service in FY2021) ----- Security Environment ##### Ⅰ Surrounding Japan **Chapter 1** **P.41** **Overview** **Characteristics of Current Security Environment** **P.41** As uncertainty over the existing order is increasing, inter-state competition is becoming prominent across the political, economic and military realms. Gray zone situations are becoming persistent over a long period of time. “Hybrid warfare,” a method of altering the status quo that intentionally blurs the boundaries between the military and non-military realms, is sometimes adopted. Technological progress is about to fundamentally change how security should be managed. Importance of domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum; and game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare Security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone, are prominently emerging. Security of maritime traffi c; securing stable use of new domains: space and cyberspace, response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and response to regional confl ict and international terrorism **Military Trends in the Neighboring Countries of Japan** **P.43** The United States possesses the world’s largest comprehensive national power. The United States engages in rebuilding of its military power, strengthens alliances and partnerships, and frames the Indo-Pacifi c as a priority region. China is strengthening capabilities in the domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum in addition to nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Such Chinese military developments represent a serious security concern. North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all WMDs and ballistic missiles in a complete, verifi able and irreversible manner: there has been no essential change in the country’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Such military trends in North Korea pose a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. Russia’s military activities are trending upward in the Far East. Continued attention needs to be paid to Russian military development. Recent Security Related Issues around Japan (image) North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile Intensification of Russian military activities development North Korea’s continuous ship-to-ship Normalization of advancements to the transfer Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan by the China’s military China’s broad and rapid reinforcement of military forces China’s rapid expansion/intensification of activities in the East China Sea Main sea lanes leading to Japan Changes in the China-Taiwan military balance (in favor of the Chinese side) Tendency toward increase in and prolongation of China’s rapid expansion/intensification gray-zone situations of activities in the South China Sea 500km ----- 日本の防衛Defense White Paper防衛白書 D I G E S T ダイジェスト **Chapter 2** **P.47** **United States** **Overview** **P.47** The United States recognizes that the primary concern in U.S. security is strategic competition with China and Russia, which are revisionist powers. Especially, the United States is sharpening its deterrence stance against China. - As an initial response to China’s continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacifi c Exercise (RIMPAC). - The U.S. forces carried out repeated Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, transit through the Taiwan Strait, and bomber fl ights over the South China Sea. - The United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese military organ and a leader. - The Unites States imposed tariffs on Chinese hi-tech products, heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, and charged espionage agents. In a speech about the United States’ policy towards China, Vice President Mike Pence mentioned an incident in which a Chinese naval vessel approached abnormally close to a U.S. Navy vessel conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations. He went on to say that the U.S. Navy will continue to fl y, sail, and operate wherever international law allows and U.S. national interests demand. The Trump administration’s stance on China has bipartisan support in Congress, which appears likely to be maintained going forward. Under the recognition that North Korea’s nuclear capabilities constitute a threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the **[Photo: courtesy of White House]** denuclearization of North Korea, maintaining fi rm military readiness including through U.S. Forces in Korea Vice President Mike Pence making a speech about China **[Photo: courtesy of White House]** **Trends in Security and Defense Policies** **P.47** The United States has positioned the Indo-Pacifi c region as a priority region, and maintains a forward military presence in the region.In June 2019, the United States released the Indo-Pacifi c Strategy Report (IPSR), indicating its policy to ensure combat-credible forces to be forward–postured in the region, and reinforce and expand its alliances and partnerships, and evolve them to be networked. The United States has been making efforts to maintain military advantages to deter and defeat aggression by great powers, requesting the largest research and development budget in 70 years, and a 15% and 10 % year-on-year increase in the space-related budget and in the cyber-related budget, respectively. Regarding nuclear power, the United States released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in February 2018. It indicates the policy that, in order to deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad (submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and strategic bombers), the United States will modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option. In addition, the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019, claiming Russia’s material breach. President Trump also mentioned the need for arms control involving China, which has beefed up medium-range missile capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty. Regarding missile defense, the Missile Defense Review (MDR) was published in January 2019. It notes that North Korea has the ability to threaten the U.S. homeland with its nuclear missiles. It also pointed out that Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles that challenge existing missile defense systems. Under this recognition, the MDR sets out a policy of expanding and modernizing existing systems, and promoting development of new technologies taking advantage of space. President Trump instructed the Department of Defense (DoD) to start the necessary processes to establish the Space Force. The DoD forwarded to Congress a legislative proposal to create the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force. MDR l d b th U it d St t **[Photo: courtesy of DoD]** ----- **Ⅰ** Surrounding Japan **Chapter 2** **P.57** **China** **Rapid Military Modernization** **P.58** **1** In order to fully transform the people’s armed forces Changes in China’s Defense Budget into world-class forces by the mid-21st century, (100 million yuan) budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval 10,000 and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance 8,000 to strengthening its operational capabilities in order to steadily acquire information superiority, and also 6,000 enhanced its capabilities in the domains of space, 4,000 |lion yuan)|Col2| |---|---| ||Approx. 1.1899 trillion yuan| |(approx. 20.2279 yen)|(approx. 20.2279 yen)| ||| ||| ||| |Japan’s defense-related|| |expenditures in FY2019: 5.7 trillion yen|| “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities (100 million yuan) 14,000 Approx. 1.1899 trillion yuan 12,000 (approx. 20.2279 yen) 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 Japan’s defense-related 2,000 expenditures in FY2019: 5.7 trillion yen 0 (FY) further afi eld. **3** While implementing a policy of civil-military fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in various fi elds, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes, and improve its operational capabilities. Chinese small UAV (unmanned “swarm” technology [Jane’s by IHS Markit] **Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan** **P.70** **1** The Chinese Navy and Air Force have expanded and intensifi ed their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. They are also conducting activities based on a unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities have been seen, creating a situation of great concern to Japan. **2** China is likely planning to make such activities routine, given that the Chinese Navy and Air Force are more frequently advancing to the Pacifi c Ocean and Sea of Japan in recent years. It appears that China continues to improve the quality of its activities, and efforts can be seen to build practical joint operational capabilities. **3** In the South China Sea, China is moving forward with militarization, as well as expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains by deploying aircraft. China continues unilateral efforts to change the status quo by coercion to create a fait accompli. **[Jane’s by IHS Markit]** A Renhai-class destroyer appeared in the international naval review (April 2019) Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft confirmed for the first time within Japan’s Air Defense Identification ----- D I G E S T People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image) Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF) Legend Sea power Air power Shang-class submarine Aircraft carrier “Liaoning” H-6 bomber Su-30 fighter Advancement of a bomber all the Frequent advancements way to the area off the Kii Peninsula into the Pacific Ocean (August 2017) passing between Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Flight of a carrier-based Tokyo fighter (presumed) in the Pacific Ocean (April 2018) Amami Oshima Island Okinawa Sea of Japan Miyakojima Island Yonagunijima Island The PLA Navy and Air Force’s Senkaku Islands activities in the Taiwan East China Sea China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea Active advancement of air power into the Sea of Japan Underwater submarine and destroyer’s intrusions into the 2017” Ningbo contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands (January 2018) China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea 2019” Qingdao 500km *Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates. **Activities in Distant Seas** **P.77** China is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years. While it is thought that the “Belt and Road” Initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its infl uence in the region, it is possible that the construction of infrastructure based on the initiative will further promote the activities of the PLA in the Indian Ocean, Pacifi c Ocean and elsewhere. Furthermore, the Chinese military is possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and joint exercises. **Relations with Countries and Regions** **P.81** While the United States has been toughening its stance on China, China has maintained an uncompromising stance on its “core interests.” Concerning trade and military issues, developments feeding mutual antagonism emerged between the United States and China. - Raising of import tariffs by China as countermeasures against the same measures by the United States - Abnormally close approach by a Chinese naval vessel to a U.S. Navy vessel conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, etc. It has been confirmed that regarding military exchange, which has remained stable in recent years, there are activities indicating a possible change. [Jane’s by IHS Markit] Moves to review projects have been seen among some countries cooperating in the “Belt and Road” Initiative, due to such factors as their deteriorating fi nancial Abnormal approach by a Chinese naval vessel to a U.S. Navy vessel, reportedly [Jane’s by IHS Markit] occurred in the South China Sea situation. Regarding Taiwan, since the inauguration of the Tsai administration, fi ve countries severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, while they established relations with China. While the United States has continued and reinforced its engagement in Taiwan, China has repeatedly expressed its strong protest against Taiwan’s independence. The overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. ----- **Ⅰ** Surrounding Japan **Chapter 2** **P.92** **North Korea** **Overview** **P.92** North Korea has repeatedly expressed the intention to work towards denuclearization at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June 2018 and other occasions. North Korea has announced the suspension of nuclear tests and test-fi ring of ICBMs, and publicly destroyed the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. Moreover, North Korea announced that it will dismantle the missile engine test site and launch platform in the Tongch’ang-ri district in the future, and that it will close the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon if the United States lifts sanctions. On the other hand: - It is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fi t ballistic missile warheads; - North Korea possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching, every part of Japan and - North Korea continues to possess capabilities for conducting surprise attacks against Japan utilizing a Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TEL) and submarines. In light of the above, there has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Military trends in North Korea continue to pose a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan. It is now necessary to keep close watch on what kind of concrete actions North Korea will take towards the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and missiles. **[AFP/Jiji]** **[Korean News Service/Jiji]** **Current Status of the Nuclear and Missile Development** **P.94** The possibility cannot be discounted that the sixth nuclear weapons test in September 2017 was of a hydrogen bomb. Given the technological maturity obtained through the past six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. In May, July and August 2019, North Korea launched a new type of short-range ballistic missiles (presumed) and others nine times toward the Sea of Japan. Regarding ballistic missiles, North Korea aims to: 1. increase the fi ring range of ballistic missiles; 2. enhance the accuracy and operation capabilities necessary for saturation attacks; 3. improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks; and 4. diversify the forms of launches. **Ship-to-Ship Transfer** **P.108** North Korea is presumed to be evading the United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers in the high seas, which are forbidden under the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions. It is pointed out that illegal ship-to-ship transfers of oil products and coal by North Korea were increasing rapidly. A North Korean-fl agged tanker strongly suspected of engaging in ship to ship transfers (March 2019) ----- D I G E S T **Chapter 2** **P.117** **Russia** **Trends in the Vicinity of Japan** **P.125** Russia appears to be stepping up military activities not only in the Arctic, Europe, areas near the United States, and the Middle East, but also in the Far East, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required. The number of scrambles against Russian aircraft in the Far East has remained high. In addition, Russian aircraft intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace in June and July 2019. Regarding the Northern Territories, Russia announced that it deployed surface-to-ship missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands in 2016. It is reported that three Su-35 fi ghter aircraft were deployed in Etorofu Island in 2018, showing a military build-up by Russia. In the large-scale Vostok 2018 exercise, in addition to units of the Eastern Military District, units of the Central Military District and the Northern Fleet participated. Notable features of this year’s exercise were that the size was considered the largest since the time of the Soviet Union, and that China and Mongolia participated for the fi rst time. An Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate: confi rmed for the fi rst time by the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) (April 2019) Vostok 2018, a military exercise by **[AFP/Jiji]** Russia (September) Russia (September) **Modernization of Nuclear Forces and Development of New Weapons** **P.120** In order to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces and to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States, Russia has prioritized the modernization of nuclear forces. Under the recognition that the United States’ installation of missile defense systems both at home and abroad undermines the balance of nuclear forces, Russia is moving forward with the development of new weapons such as the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating the systems. The United States provided notice of its intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty, and announced its intention to develop surfacelaunched intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying conventional warheads. In response, Russia announced plans to **[Jane’s by IHS Markit]** 9M729 d l h d i i il il d b R i ----- |Col1|i|l| |---|---|---| **Ⅰ** Surrounding Japan **Chapter 3** **P.158** **Military Science and Technology** Major states endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare. States are developing autonomous drones equipped with artifi cial intelligence (AI). The United States indicates that Russia and China are developing advanced hypersonic missile capabilities that challenge existing missile defense systems. Reports have been published of successful tests and planned deployment of electromagnetic railguns and high-power laser weapons that are expected to provide more effective fi repower. CH-7 “Caihong-7,” stealth unmanned aircraft developed by Chinadeveloped by China **[Jane’s by IHS Markit]** **Chapter 3** **P.162** **Space Domain** **1** Major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) functions. **2** In outer space, various countries are rapidly developing their capabilities to ensure their military superiority. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to impede the United States and its allies from using outer space. **3** In order to respond to these threats, the United States is considering creating a space force with status equal to that of the army, the navy and the air force. Launch of BeiDou 42 and 43, a Chinese satellite positioning system by China on November 19, 2018 **[Avalon/Jiji Press Photo]** **Chapter 3** **P.167** **Cyber Domain** **1** Information and communications technology (ICT) advancements are further enhancing the dependence of military forces on information and communications networks. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. Many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. **2** It has been pointed out that China and Russia are bolstering the offensive cyber capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the network of military forces and destroying infrastructure. **3** Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries. Government agencies such as those in Russia, China, and North Korea are suspected of engaging in some cyber attacks. Threat message from the WannaCry malware attack, hi h d h d ld id **[Jiji]** ----- D I G E S T **Chapter 3** **P.173** **Electromagnetic Domain** **1** Securing use of the electromagnetic spectrum is indispensable for the operation of communication equipment and radar systems. Major countries have recognized electronic attacks for interrupting adversaries’ use of electromagnetic spectrum as a means to effectively hamper adversaries’ military performance, enhancing electronic warfare capabilities. **2** It is reported that China routinely conducts jamming operations against communication and radar systems and GPS satellite systems in exercises. **3** It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine and Syria to interrupt adversaries’ command and control traffi c and radar systems, improving electronic warfare **[Jane’s by HIS Markit]** Krasukha-4, an electronic warfare system Russia reportedly used in Syria **Chapter 3** **P.176** **Maritime Domain** **1** In the waters and airspace in the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international order. **2** Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffi c. The international community is collectively conducting counterpiracy operations. **3** The Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It is therefore considered that the region could be used for maneuvering military forces in the future. **Chapter 3** **P.180** **WMDs** **1** The transfer and proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a signifi cant threat since the end of the Cold War. **2** In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs. Additionally, the proliferation of ballistic missiles has the risk of leading to the destabilization of that region. **Chapter 3** **P.185** **International Terrorism and Regional Confl icts** **1** Confl icts or disputes concerning racial, religious, territorial, resources and other issues are occurring or continuing at various locations in the world. **2** International terrorist groups’ activities have remained a grave challenge for the international community. Terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversifi cation of terrorist attacks and others. **1** **2** ----- Japan’s Security and Defense Policy ##### Ⅱ **Chapter 1** **P.201** **National Security Strategy (NSS)** The NSS developed in December 2013 specifi es, as Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, that Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while committed to continuing the path as a peace-loving nation, and seeking its own security as well as peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region from the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fi scal year budget Basic Policy on National Security, centered NSS around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame) Based on NSS Prescribes future defense force and target NDPG levels of defense force that Japan should Achieve target defense achieve (approx. 10-year time frame) capabilities prescribed Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures MTDP and quantity of major equipment Appropriate budget, develop specific projects Examine based on the current situations, Annual budget appropriate annual budget as necessary **The National Defense Program** **Chapter 3** **P.208** **Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (NDPG)** The NDPG was approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2018. The NDPG establishes the posture of Japan’s defense forces and the level to achieve, envisioning approximately 10 years **[Courtesy of the Cabinet** **Secretariat Public Relations Offi ce]** Advisory Panel on Security and Defense Capabilities **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** **P.212** - Changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order. - Rapid expansion in the use of the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in the domains of land, sea and air. In addition, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in increase in military activities. **Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** **P.214** The following are set forth as national defense objectives: - to create, on a steady-state basis, a security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; - to deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be diffi cult and consequential; and - should a threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage. Under the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. **1** **Strengthening Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** - Under the recognition that defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid a security environment that it has never faced before, Japan will strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative. Study Committee on Future Defense Capabilities - As a truly effective defense capability, Japan will build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force.” → For details see “Special Feature 1” ----- **Defense White Paper** D I G E S T **2** **Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance** - Japan will press ahead with such efforts as bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats, enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas, and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. **3** **Strengthening Security Cooperation** - In line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacifi c, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account the characteristics and situation specifi c to each region and country. **Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability** **P.219** In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible. **1** **Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations** - Strengthening capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum - Strengthening capabilities in traditional domains, namely capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability - Strengthening sustainability and resiliency by taking necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure **2** **Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability** - Strengthening core elements of defense capability by reinforcing the human resource base, technology base, and defense industrial base, reviewing equipment structure, etc. **Organization of Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **P.222** **1** **Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations** - Maintaining units in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains; strengthening other postures; building comprehensive air and missile defense capability; maintaining a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit **2** **Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)** - The GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units furnished with advanced mobility and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers. - To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense. **3** **Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)** - The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including a new type of destroyers (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units, and will organize surface units. The MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. - By introducing a test-bed submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. - In order to conduct wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fi xed-wing patrol aircraft units. **4** **Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)** - The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacifi c side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective airborne warning, surveillance and control during “gray zone” and other situations with heightened tensions. - The ASDF will maintain fi ghter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fi ghter aircraft, and aerial refueling and transport units. - The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions. ----- p y y **Ⅱ** **Elements Supporting Defense Capability** **P.223** **1** Training and Exercises: the SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. **2** Medical Care: The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF will strengthen the posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and fi nal medical evacuation destinations. **3** Collaboration with Local Communities: The MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities, and will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities. **4** Intellectual Base: The MOD/SDF will promote security-related education at educational institutions. In order to achieve both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the MOD/SDF will facilitate the NIDS’ collaboration with the policy-making sector. **Chapter 4** **P.227** **Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019–FY2023; MTDP)** - The MTDP sets forth the policy for the build-up of defense capability, the amount of major equipment to be procured, and the amount of expenditure for the fi ve-year period from FY2019 to FY2023. - In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations, the SDF will conduct reorganization of its major units. - The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen capabilities in both new and traditional domains. - The SDF will conduct programs to strengthen core elements of defense capabilities, including reinforcement of the human resource base. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units Ballistic Missile Defense Unit Transform into Rapid Deployment Unmanned Aerial Divisions/Brigades Vehicle Unit Patrol Vessel Unit Space Domain Mission Unit Cyber Defense Unit Cyberspace Unit and Electromagnetic Operation Unit < Deployment of tanks > Air Warning andControl Unit Structure by the end of 2018 Structure by the end of 2023 Surface Unit In Hokkaido, deploy in Rapid Deployment Divisions/Brigades Aerial Refueling/ Transport Unit Concentrate into direct command of Western Army Transportation UnitMaritime Structure by the < Deployment of howitzers>Structure by the end of 2018 end of 2023 Area Security Unit Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Unit Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Unit Concentrate into direct command of the respective regional armies **Chapter 4** **P.238** **Build-up of Defense Capability in FY2019** - In FY2019, which is the fi rst fi scal year for implementing the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will steadily build up its defense capability as a truly effective defense capability towards building a Multi-domain Defense Force. Main Projects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities in FY2019 |Category|Main programs|Col3| |---|---|---| |Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations|Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum|●Acquisition of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System ●Enhancement and strengthening of Cyber Defense Group ●Enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-15) ●Acquisition of the network electronic warfare system, etc.| ||Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains|●Construction of destroyers and submarines ●Acquisition of fi ghter aircraft (F-35A) ●Upgrade of fi ghter aircraft (F- 15) ●Research and studies for refurbishment of Izumo destroyers ●Acquisition of stand-off missiles ●Research on hyper-velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands ●Procurement of a land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore)| ||Enhancing sustainability and resiliency|●Procurement of ammunition (anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes) necessary for ensuring air and maritime superiority, etc.| |Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability|Reinforcing human resource base|●Promotion of measures for securing excellent personnel, encouraging women’s participation, and achieving a work-life balance, etc.| ||Reinforcing technology base|●Promotion of research and development towards early practical use of equipment| ||Enhancing intelligence capabilities|●Enhancement of the defense attache system, etc.| Category Main programs - Acquisition of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System ●Enhancement and strengthening of Cyber Defense Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in domains of space, Group ●Enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-15) ●Acquisition of the network cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum electronic warfare system, etc. - Construction of destroyers and submarines ●Acquisition of fi ghter aircraft (F-35A) ●Upgrade of fi ghter aircraft (F- Priorities in strengthening 15) ●Research and studies for refurbishment of Izumo destroyers ●Acquisition of stand-off missiles ●Research on capabilities necessary for Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains hyper-velocity gliding projectile intended for the defense of remote islands ●Procurement of a land-based Aegis cross-domain operations system (Aegis Ashore) - Procurement of ammunition (anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes) necessary for ensuring air and maritime Enhancing sustainability and resiliency superiority, etc. - Promotion of measures for securing excellent personnel, encouraging women’s participation, and achieving a Priorities in strengthening Reinforcing human resource base work-life balance, etc. core elements of defense Reinforcing technology base - Promotion of research and development towards early practical use of equipment capability Enhancing intelligence capabilities - Enhancement of the defense attache system, etc. ----- D I G E S T **Chapter 4** **P.240** **Defense-Related Expenditures** **Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures** **P.240** In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. To this end, in light of the NDPG and the MTDP, defense-related expenditures for FY2019 were increased by 68.2 billion yen from the previous fi scal year to 5.007 trillion yen (an increase of 1.4% from the previous year). Change in Defense-Related Expenditures (Past 15 years; Original Budget Basis) (100 million) 51,000 **50,070** 50,000 **48,996** 49,000 **49,388** **48,607** **48,297** **48,221** 48,000 **47,815** **47,838** **47,903** **47,426** **47,028** 47,000 **46,826** **46,453** **46,804** **46,625** 46,000 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 (FY) Note: The fgures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: 4,856.0 billion yen in FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen in FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen in FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen in FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen in FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen in FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen in FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen in FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen in FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen in FY2014, 4,980.1 billion yen in FY2015, 5,054.1 billion yen in FY2016, 5,125.1 billion yen in FY2017, 5,191.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 5,257.4 billion yen in FY 2019. **Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and** **Chapter 5** **P.245** **the SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement** **SDF Activities since Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security** **Dispatch of Staff Offi cers to the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO)** In April 2019, Japan decided to dispatch personnel to the MFO headquarters. **P.265** **Training and Exercises Related to the Legislation for Peace and Security** Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF has been conducting various training and exercises for new missions. The following training and exercises were conducted for approximately the past one year. - Exercises on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 18 (June 2018, and June 2019) - Joint training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (September and December 2018) - Training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 (January 2019) ----- ##### Ⅲ (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense)Three Pillars of Japan s Defense **Chapter 1** **P.269** **Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations** **P.270** **Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Area Surrounding Japan** **1** The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. **2** As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of June 2019, the SDF has confi rmed 20 observations of North Korean vessels strongly suspected **Ansan 1** **Small ship** of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers, and made public announcement on the subject. **3** In response to these illicit maritime activities including transshipments, the United States, **Ansan 1** **Small ship** A North Korea-fl agged tanker (left) and a small ship of unidentifi ed Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and France carried out early warning surveillance nationality strongly suspected of engaging in a ship-to-ship activities using aircraft based at the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan. transfer on the high seas of the East China Sea (January 2019) In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Marine Corps, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France carried out early warning surveillance activities in sea areas surrounding Japan. **4** In December 2018, Gwanggaeto, the Great class destroyer of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy, directed a fi re control-radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities off the coast of Noto Peninsula (within Japan’s exclusive economic zone). The Ministry of Defense (MOD) published its final statement, compiling objective facts, and has been urging the Korean side to take recurrence prevention measures. The MOD will expend all possible means to monitor the situation and gather intelligence. **[Courtesy of Ministry for the Armed Forces of France]** **[Courtesy of Ministry for the Armed Forces of France]** surveillance operations against ship-to-ship transfers **Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace** **P.273** The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) detects and identifi es aircraft fl ying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fi ghters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confi rm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In FY2018, ASDF aircraft scrambled 999 times, which is the 2nd highest number. Breaking this fi gure down, aircraft scrambled 638 times in response to Chinese aircraft, an increase by 138 times compared with the previous fi scal year, and 343 times to Russian aircraft, a decrease by 47 times from the previous fi scal year. Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War (Times) 1,200 1,168 999 1,000 943 944 873 904 812 810 800 464 851 600 567 415 571 500 638 400 386 425 306 311 299 96 156 200 220 158 19738 264 247 248 359 473 288 301 390 343 124 0 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (FY) Note:Peaked during the Cold War Russia China Taiwan Others Total ----- **Defense White Paper** D I G E S T **Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands** **P.277** **Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands** **1** In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures. **2** For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) deployed some units, including an area security unit in Amami Oshima, and an area security unit in Miyakojima Island, in March 2019. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit and other units also in Ishigakijima Island. Amphibious vehicle training landings in Iron Fist 19 (from January to February 2019) **3** The SDF started research and development on technologies required for new anti-ship missiles and Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles (HVGPs) for the defense of remote islands to take all initiatives necessary to defend the islands since FY2018. **4** In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Landing Ship, Tank; and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft. **Response to Missile Attacks** **1** Currently, Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). **2** The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis system, Aegis Ashore, will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but from land. **3** In order to counter increasingly complex and diverse airborne threats and minimize damage, the SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, including those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment, and thereby provide persistent nation-wide protection from peacetime. It will also enhance its comprehensive air and missile defense capability so that it can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. **Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum** **P.289** **Responses in Space Domain** **1** The MOD aims to establish Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by 2022, and is also working to deploy radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites, such as space debris, and its operating system. **2** Based on the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), the MOD/SDF will work to enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in use of space. The efforts include; (1) establishing an SSA system; (2) improving various capabilities that leverage space domain including informationgathering, communication and positioning capabilities, and; (3) building the capability to disrupt C4I (command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence) of opponents. Initiatives for the Development of the SSA System SSA operational system Space debris etc. Satellite MOD MOD’s SSA system Conduct satellite control Radar Optical Operation system U.S. Forces’ sensors Radar telescope Radar Information sharing Optical telescope Satellite operators JAXA Analysis system Informationgathering Information SSA satellite sharing Warning Each SDF’s system Link  Gather Japan’s SSA information U.S. Strategic  Share information with the U.S. Command ・JADGE Forces that have a global SSA (CSpOC) ・Each SDF service’s command system, etc. network U.S. Forces ----- **Ⅲ** (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Response in Cyber Domain** **1** The MOD/SDF has taken comprehensive measures to ensure the safety of information and communication systems and respond to cyber attacks by a specialized unit, etc. **2** In addition to these initiatives, based on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG), the SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including the capability to disrupt, during an attack against Japan in armed contingencies, the opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. **3** The Cyber Defense Group will be expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 220 in FY2019. **Response in Electromagnetic Domain** MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks 2) Responses by special units to cyber attacks 1) Ensuring safety of information systems - 24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as advanced measures against cyber attacks (virus analysis) by the Cyber Defense Group (Joint Units), System Protection Unit - Introduction of firewall and virus detection software (GSDF), Communication Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF) - Separation of the network into the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) open system and closed system - Implementation of system audit, etc. 3) Development of a response posture to cyber attacks - Establishment of security measures criteria of information systems Internet - Establishment of security measures with which MOD/SDF staff should comply - Development of response posture at the time of cyber attack attacker Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) occurrence The Six Pillars of Comprehensive Defensive Measures against Cyber Attacks 6) Coordination with other 4) Research of cutting-edge technology organizations and agencies - Research on technology to develop the cyber - Information sharing with the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed Forces, and other relevant nations training environment (• Allows for counter-cyber attack training in a simulated environment) 5) Development of human resources - For the purpose of human resources development, implementing studying abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, as well as education at professional courses at the SDF - For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at workplaces and professional education at the National Defense Academy **1 With the development of the technology, the use of electromagnetic spectrum has expanded** in range and purpose, and it is now recognized as a major operational domain in today’s warfare. **2 The MOD/SDF will;** (1) enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum; (2) strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture; and (3) strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan. **Response to Large-Scale Disasters** **P.297** **Response to Natural Disasters, etc.** communications of an opponent **1** The SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or ships or aircraft in distress, and preventing epidemics. In FY2018, the SDF conducted 443 disaster relief operations. **2** The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas. In FY2018, out of a total of 443 cases of disaster relief, 334 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients. Flooding Disaster (July 2018) using a police dog in the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in emergency patients (October 2018) 2018 (September 2018) ----- D I G E S T **Chapter 2** **P.304** **Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **P.304** - 1 The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. - 2 The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a signifi cant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacifi c region and the international community. **Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense** **Cooperation** The Guidelines manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. **Policy Consultations between Japan and the United** **States** **1** **Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting)** On April 19, 2019, the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting was held in Washington, D.C. Both side shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. **2** **Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting** Since October 2018, on various occasions, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meetings, Japan and the United States have confi rmed the following points: - Need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum; - Cooperation with the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacifi c; - Continuation of ensuring full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifi able and irreversible manner; and - Close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko **[Photo: courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Offi ce]** Visiting Destroyer JS “Kaga” by Prime Minister Abe and President Trump (May 2019) Joint press conference at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting (April 2019) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 2019)Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 2019) **Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats** **P.321** In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, in order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, Japan is promoting cooperation with the United States in various fi elds, including “cooperation in space and cyber domains,” “comprehensive air and missile defense,” “bilateral training and exercises,” “ISR activities”, “maritime security,” “logistics support,” and “Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in ----- **Ⅲ** (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas** **P.325** In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities on “capacity building assistance,” “humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR),” and “trilateral and multilateral training and exercises,” and promote “defense equipment and technology cooperation,” “joint/shared use of facilities and areas,” and others. **Signifi cance of the Presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)** **P.327** **1** It is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and Changes in the Number and Area of USFJ agile actions in case of emergency, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance functions enough as a Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and 400 the region. 350 353 Area (km[2]) **2** Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the US forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security 250 249 242 235 Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. 200 185 |353|Area (km2)| |---|---| ||Facilities/Areas| |278 249 242|| |235|| |185 144|| |83|| |46 43|| |38 31|| the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 Report (1996) January 2019 of Okinawa **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** **P.333** **1** Approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to continue to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact. **2** Regarding distribution of functions offered by MCAS Futenma, the development of facilities is being promoted to transfer the function of accepting transient aircraft in contingencies to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base. **3** A land-fi ll operation for the Futenma Replacement Facility has started in the waters south of Camp Schwab. ４ The following progress has been made involving the return of USFJ land: Osprey landing on the Aibano Maneuver Area (Shiga Prefecture) - March 2015: West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (February 2019) (approximately 51 ha) was returned. - December 2016: A major portion of the Northern Training Area (approximately 4,000 ha) was returned. This is the largest of its kind since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland. - July 2017: A portion of MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha along Ginowan City road 11) was returned. - March 2018: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 3 ha of land to expand Route 58) was returned. - March 2019: A portion of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (approximately 2 ha of land near Gate 5) was returned. **5** Relocation of training of U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys, etc. to outside Okinawa has been conducted. **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa** **P.345** In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities, such as realignment of USFJ and its facilities and areas. **Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas** **P.350** Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations, and an accident or incident must not occur. Both Japan and the United States cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring the safety. ----- D I G E S T **Chapter 3** **P.353** **Security Cooperation** The MOD/SDF will create a security environment desirable for Japan by promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation. thereby promoting stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region as a whole **Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation Overview** Enhance connectivity between Asia and Africa through achieving a free and openIndo-Pacific, P.353 Diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map Free and Open Indo-Pacific Diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation Being home to more than half of the world’s population, the Indo-Pacifi c region is one of the most vital areas in the world. It is important to establish this region as a free and open global commons to secure peace and prosperity in the region as a whole. Pursuing the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacifi c, the MOD/SDF has promoted defense cooperation and exchanges, and other efforts with countries in this region. **Promotion of Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges** Free and Open Indo-Pacific Two continents: Rapidly growing Asia and Africa with significant potential Two oceans: Free and open Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean The MOD/SDF’s Efforts for a Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c (image) Initiatives of the MOD cooperation with countries inDefense exchange and Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Europe and the Middle East (high-level exchange, etc.) Defense exchange and cooperation with South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka (service-to-service exchange, bilateral training Counter-piracy operations of and exercises, etc.) the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Middle East Asia Contribution to the RDEC in Asia and surrounding areas Africa cooperation with ASEAN countries Defense exchange and Pacific Ocean (capacity building assistance, etc.) Contribution to Bilateral training and exercises, Capacity building assistance to Pacific the RDEC in Africa visits of vessels and aircraft to ports and airports island countries, visits to ports and airports Defense cooperation with Indian Ocean Australia, etc. (bilateral training and exercises, etc.) - Further strengthen strategic collaboration with India, which has had historical connections with East Africa, the United States as an ally, and Australia to materialize the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific **Australia: The Japan-Australia “2+2” and a Defense Ministerial Meeting were held in October** 2018. Defense Ministerial Meetings were also held in January and June 2019. The Ministers agreed to deepen and expand bilateral defense cooperation. **India and Sri Lanka: At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in October 2018, Japan and India agreed** to establish Japan-India 2+2 Ministerial dialogues, and to commence negotiations on the JapanIndia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The GSDF and the Indian Army, and the ASDF and the Indian Air Force had their fi rst bilateral exercises in November and December 2018, respectively. Meanwhile, in August 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera made the fi rst visit to Sri Lanka as a Japanese Defense Minister. **Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states: Under “Vientiane Vision,” as a** guideline for the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks in addition to bilateral cooperation efforts. A Japan-Philippine Defense Ministerial meeting was held in April 2019, and a Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting and a Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting were held in May 2019. **ROK: Concerning negative actions by the ROK side related to the fl ag of the MSDF, and an incident** of a destroyer of the ROK Navy directing its fi re-control radar at SDF patrol aircraft, the MOD/SDF will continue to call on the ROK side to appropriately deal with these matters. In addition, in August 2019, the Government of the ROK announced its intention to terminate the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The Minister of Defense made a statement that it was “extremely regrettable,” and that Japan urges the ROK side to wisely respond to secure appropriate cooperation between Japan and the ROK, and between Japan, the United States and the ROK. **European countries: The Japan-France “2+2” Meeting was held in January 2019. In October** 2018, the GSDF and the British Army held their fi rst bilateral exercise in Japan. **China: In October 2018, the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting was held for the fi rst time in** three years. In April 2019, an MSDF destroyer visited China for the fi rst time in about seven and a half years. **Russia: In July 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera became the first Japanese Minister of** Defense to pay a visit to Russia. He joined the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting and the Defense Ministerial Meeting. These Meetings were held in Tokyo in May 2019. **Pacifi c Island countries: At the Pacifi c Alliance Leaders Meeting held in 2018 and in the NDPG** published in the same year, Japan referred to its intention to promote cooperation and exchanges with the Pacifi c island countries. Japan-Australia “2+2” (October 2018) between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy Concerning Deeper Cooperation at the Japan-India Summit Meeting (October 2018) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 2018) ----- **Ⅲ** (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation** **1** Multilateral framework initiatives, such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have made steady progress and served as an important foundation for discussion and cooperation and exchange in the security fi eld in the Asia-Pacifi c region. **2** Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region by holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum annually. As the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation program, Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program (May 2018), the Japan-ASEAN Symposium on International Law (November 2018), and the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR (January 2019) were conducted. **Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Assistance** **1** Since 2012, the MOD/SDF has provided capacity building assistance in such areas as HA/ DR, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and maritime security to 15 countries and one organization in the Asia-Pacifi c and other regions. **2** Specifi cally, Japan supported the establishment and training of the military band of the Papua New Guinea Defense Force. The band gave an excellent performance in front of national leaders at the Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India (January 2019) 2018. Other programs that have thus far been conducted include seminars on air rescue, PKO, and submarine medicine in Vietnam, and seminars and fi eld training on aviation meteorology for the establishment of a weather services unit of the Myanmar Air Force. In addition, programs have been conducted in Mongolia, Timor-Leste, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Laos, and Djibouti. GSDF personnel watching the military band in Papua New Guinea preparing for its stage at APEC 2018 (November 2018)preparing for its stage at APEC 2018 (November 2018) ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting (October 2018) Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India (January 2019) **Ensuring Maritime Security** **P.386** For Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. The SDF has been dispatching the Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, and the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement since 2009 in order to protect vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. In addition to strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacifi c region through exercises and port calls, the MOD has been implementing capacity building assistance in maritime security of coastal countries, and working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus. Bilateral exercise with the Philippine Navy on the Indo Southeast Asia Deployment **Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains** **P.391** Regarding cooperation in the use of space domain, the MOD/SDF has taken part in the annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise (Global Sentinel) and the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise on space security, hosted by the U.S. Forces. Regarding cooperation in the use of cyber domain, the MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and others. With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Japan has participated in international conferences, and in a cyber defense exercise as an observer. In addition, the MOD has dispatched personnel to the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) since March 2019 ----- D I G E S T **Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** **P.396** The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes of confl icts, terrorism and other problems. **Dispatch to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)** **1** In April 2019, a Cabinet Decision was made to dispatch staff offi cers, and subsequently Japan started to dispatch 2 staff offi cers to the MFO Headquarters as the fi rst international peace cooperation activity. **2** The two officers are engaging in liaison and coordination between governments of the Egypt and Israel or other relevant organizations and the MFO as a Deputy chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Officer at the MFO Headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Shinai Peninsula. **3** These activities express Japan’s commitment to more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. It is also Staff offi cers in the MFO Headquarters expected to promote collaboration with the other countries dispatching offi cers, including the United States, and create new opportunities for human resource development. **United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan** **(UNMISS)** **1** The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in Africa as a whole, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Staff offi cer (database offi cer) **2** After the engineering unit’s withdrawal, Japan has continued dispatch in UNMISS Headquarters engineering officer, and aviation operations officer) to the UNMISS security sector by phone headquarters, and will contribute to the activities of UNMISS. **Support to the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of** **Enabling Capabilities** **1** Japan has been dispatching GSDF personnel to the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya, as instructors since the trial GSDF personnel training in September 2015. Training regarding the operation of heavy providing training on providing training on equipment has been provided in seven sessions to date for a total of operation of heavy operation of heavy equipment as a part of equipment as a part of 211 members from eight African countries. the UN Project for the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Rapid Deployment of **2** Considering that more than 30% of PKO personnel are from Asia, Enabling Capabilities in Enabling Capabilities in Japan decided to implement the project for the fi rst time in Asia and Vietnam Vietnam the surrounding region. In 2018, trial training took place in Vietnam for (November 2018) 16 personnel from nine Asian and the surrounding regions. **Revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military** **Engineer Unit Manual** **1** The MOD/SDF served as chair of the working group on the engineer unit manual since 2013 with the aim of supporting the development of UN Military Unit Manuals and contributed to the completion of the manual. **2** The UN asked Japan to serve as chair of the working group again for revision of the manual, and as chair, the MOD/SDF held the fi rst expert meeting in Tokyo in December 2018. The MOD/SDF will continue to work for the revision of the manual and support for its dissemination. (December 2018) ----- Core Elements Comprising Defense ##### Ⅳ Capability, etc. **Chapter 1** **Human Resource Base and Medical Functions that** **P.405** **Sustain the Defense Capability** **Reinforcing Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability** **P.405** The National Defense Program Guidelines for Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) specifi es that securing Number of people (thousand people) human resources for Self-Defense Force (SDF) 21,000 About 18.81 **Raise of Upper Age Limit** 5,000 - The upper age limit of general candidate for 4,000 SDF personnel was raised from “under 27” to 1,0000 Number of people (thousand people) 21,000 About 18.81 20,00019,000 million peopleAbout 17.43 million people million peopleAbout 17.5 The number of 18-32 year-olds (thousand people)The number of 18-26 year-olds (thousand people) 18,000 About 15.63 The number of 18 year-olds (thousand people) 17,000 million people 16,000 About 13.73 15,000 million people 14,000 million peopleAbout 12.41 13,000 10,00012,00011,0009,000 million peopleAbout 11.05 million peopleAbout 10.02 million peopleAbout 8.97 million peopleAbout 7.81 About 7.2 8,000 million people 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 About 1.84 2,000 million people million peopleAbout 1.21 million peopleAbout 1.06 million peopleAbout 0.91 million peopleAbout 0.83 million peopleAbout 0.75 1,000 0 93 94 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 (FY) - Also regarding SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Data from FY2016 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.Affairs and Communications. Ready Reserve Personnel, recruitment and appointment were expanded, and the upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower personnel was raised. **Effective Use of Human Resources** The mandatory early retirement age will be raised by one year during the period of the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP) from 2020, and another one year during the period of the next MTDP in stages for each rank in order to ensure further utilization of older human resources who have rich knowledge, skills, and experience. **Improvement of Living and Work Environment and Treatment** In order to secure readiness, the SDF will steadily renew aged everyday life/workplace fi xtures, and secure the necessary quantities of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing. **Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation** **P.414** **Working Style Reform** With the increase of personnel facing time/commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/SDF is promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave so that every member can exert his/her full potential. **Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care** For MOD/SDF staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing care, the MOD/SDF is setting up workplace nurseries, and encouraging its male staff to take childcare leave. SDF personnel leaving his child at the nursery at Iruma Air Base **Enhancement of Medical Functions** **P.418** **Enhancing Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture** The MTDP states that, in order to respond to various emergency situations, the MOD/SDF will enhance a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the frontline to the fi nal transport destination, while considering joint operation. On this occasion, in light of the geological characteristics of Japan, the MTDP places a special focus on the enhancement of medical functions in the southwestern region. **Securing of Medical and Nursing Offi cers/Enhancement of Education and Research** The NDPG, etc. state that the SDF will endeavor to secure high-quality talents by improving the operations of the National Defense Medical College and enhancing its research functions, as well as striving to better secure medical offi cers. Also, in order to improve capabilities to treat combat injuries, the SDF will promote development of necessary medical training infrastructure common to all SDFs. ----- **Defense White Paper** D I G E S T **Measures on Defense** **Chapter 2** **P.421** **Equipment and Technology** **Reinforcing Technology Bases** **P.423** Review of the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook is now underway in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority in the strategically important equipment and technology fi eld, including technologies pertaining to new domains and other potentially game-changing important technologies. The MOD published the “Research and Development (R&D) Vision—Toward Realization of Multi-Domain Defense Force and Beyond,” which presents principles on R&D, technological challenges, and a roadmap of the technologies required for our future defense capability. **Optimizing Equipment Procurement** **P.428** **1** The MOD has been promoting effective and effi cient equipment acquisition by selecting 17 items for major programs designated for project management. At the same time, the MOD strives to cut equipment procurement costs by making bulk orders utilizing long-term contracts. **2** Efforts for streamlining of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procurement include cost reduction through striving to acquire equipment in coordination with the U.S. Forces by synchronizing the timing of procurement and adjusting specifications, and improvement in cost transparency and enhancement of execution management through close Japan-U.S. consultations. **Strengthening Defense Industrial Base** **P.432** In order to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, the MOD will work on the following initiatives: (1) reforming the existing contract system towards creating a competitive environment among companies; (2) strengthening risk management of supply chain for defense equipment; (3) further participation of Japan’s defense industry in sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment, etc.; and (4) promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** **P.437** Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace and international cooperation. - Transfer of parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters to the Philippines started in March 2019 after the signing of an arrangement between the defense offi cials. - From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation, the MOD has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions, and held the Public-Private Defense Industry Forum with Italy and other countries. Turnover ceremony for the parts and maintenance equipment **Interaction with** of UH-1Hs (March 2019) **Chapter 4** **P.447** **Local Communities and Japanese Citizens** **Collaboration with Local Communities** **P.447** The MOD/SDF conducts various cooperation activities to support the lives of citizens, including the disposal of unexploded ordnance and underwater mines. On the other hand, amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation from local governments and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to support the re-employment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a relatively young age. **Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** **P.450** In order to promote harmony between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas, the MOD is taking measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by the establishment/operation of airport and other defense facilities in the surrounding area. **Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure** **P.455** Public records are intellectual resources shared by the people in supporting the basis of sound democracy, and it is an important responsibility to manage them appropriately and respond to the public’s information disclosure requests properly. The MOD is implementing various initiatives for management of public records and ----- # ⅠPart Security Environment Surrounding Japan **Chapter 1** **Overview** **Chapter 2** **Defense Policies of Countries** **Chapter 3** **Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space,** **Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Relevant** **Challenges Facing the International Community** ----- **Overview** ### 1 **Chapter** **Section** **1** **Characteristics of Current Security Environment** What is notable about the current security environment is fi rst of all that interdependency among countries is further expanding and deepening. On the other hand, thanks to further growth of the national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging is inter-state competition across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their infl uence. Such inter-state competition occurs on a continuous basis. In conducting inter-state competition, states leverage various means such as undermining another country’s sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating a foreign country’s public opinion by exploiting social media. In the competition, methods employed to alter the status quo, such as “hybrid warfare,” that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms is sometimes adopted. These methods combine operations using anonymous units concealing their nationality, cyber attacks against communications and critical infrastructure, and information manipulation campaigns through distribution of false information via the internet and other media. The methods are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones. Also, as a result of the use of various methods, including hybrid warfare, so-called gray-zone situations, which are neither purely peacetime nor contingency situations, are becoming persistent over a long period of time, playing out as part of inter-state competition. They may possibly further increase and expand. Such gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. Secondly, technological progress is about to fundamentally change how security should be managed. Against the backdrop of the advance of military technology due to rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fi elds, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability and acquire asymmetric military capability that effectively prevents opponents with superior overall military capability from exercising their strengths, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in new domains. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cuttingedge, potentially game-changing technologies that could drastically change the conduct of future warfare. Specifi cally, major powers such as the United States, China and Russia are believed to be focusing on the research and development of unmanned technologies, artifi cial intelligence (AI) technologies, hypersonic technologies that are necessary for the development of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGV) and Hypersonic Cruise Missiles (HCM), and high-power laser technologies, among other technologies. Meanwhile, nonstate actors and countries without advanced technologies may be attempting to develop and acquire means for asymmetrical attack, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and cyber capabilities, and obtain the technologies of developed countries through illicit means in order to make up for their disadvantages. Progress in military technology relies heavily on the development of civilian technologies as well as technological development in the military fi eld. It is believed that the development and international transfer of civilian technologies will have a major impact on improvements in the military capabilities of each country. Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it diffi cult still to foresee future warfare. Thirdly, expanded and deepened interdependency among countries are raising the risk that a confl ict or other security issue in a country or region will soon grow into a destabilizing factor that could affect the entire international community. The following security challenges, which cannot be dealt with by a single country alone, are prominently emerging. **(1) Security of Maritime Traffi c** In the maritime domain which has been regarded as a ----- foundation for supporting international trade, there have been cases where a country unilaterally claims its entitlement and takes actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, thereby unduly infringing upon the freedom of navigation in high seas and of overflight. In addition, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world. In response to these situations, the international community has been taking various measures, such as collaborating to protect the existing international order based on law including a free and open maritime order, and implementing initiatives designed to avoid and prevent unexpected situations in the maritime domain and airspace. In addition, the international community is continuing to conduct anti-piracy operations in Asia and Africa. **(2) Securing Stable Use of New Domains: Space and** **Cyberspace** Recently, securing the stable use of new domains such as space and cyberspace, in addition to the conventional domains of the land, sea, and air, has become an important challenge for the security of the international community. The further development of military technology along with significant advancements in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has increased the dependence of social infrastructure and military activities on space and cyberspace. On the other hand, the development of anti-satellite weapons by countries and the great occurrence of cyber attacks with suspected government involvement have exacerbated the risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace. In recent years, countries are moving ahead with specific efforts aimed at acquiring the capabilities to monitor threats to space assets such as satellites and a reinforcement of their ability to combat cyber attacks, including private sector companies. There are also moves seen in the international community to promote the rule of law in space and cyberspace, including an establishment of certain norms of behavior. a Russian-made military-grade nerve agent, was used, and that it was highly likely that Russia was responsible for the attack on a former Russian intelligence agent that occurred in the United Kingdom in March 2018. Concerning the situation in Syria, in April 2017, the United States determined that the Assad regime used chemical weapons in an attack on a region in the south of Idlib Governorate in northwest Syria controlled by anti-government forces, and in response launched a missile strike on Shayrat Airbase, the base of the planes used in the Assad regime’s attack which is believed to be housing chemical weapons. Furthermore, in April 2018, the United States, United Kingdom and France determined that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians once again in Eastern Ghouta on the outskirts of Damascus, the capital of Syria, and in response they launched a missile strike on three chemical weapons-related facilities, demonstrating resolve to stop the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. In addition, there are continuing concerns about the acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations. In this regard, the international community continues to pursue efforts to counter terrorism activities that utilize nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. **(4) Response to Regional Conflict and International Terrorism** There are underlying differences in the nature of conflicts occurring around the world. In the case of prolonged conflicts, it is believed there is a rising possibility that human rights violations, refugees, starvation, and poverty occurring as a result of conflict will affect a much broader area than the countries involved. Meanwhile, mainly in the Middle East and Africa, there are prominent examples where geographic blind spots without government control in vulnerable nations with unstable political situations and weak governance capabilities have become a hotbed for the activities of international terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations are carrying out activities across national borders while obtaining personnel, weapons and financial resources by taking advantage of vulnerable border controls. Also, in European and North American countries, there is growing concern over the threat of terrorism posed by persons who sympathize with violent extremist thoughts propagated by international terrorist organizations or by persons returning to their home country after fighting in conflict zones. Taking into account that the extremist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has repeatedly cited that Japanese nationals are a target of its terrorist attacks, and that Japanese nationals died in the **Chapter** **(3) Response to Proliferation of WMDs** The proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs is still viewed as a significant threat to the international community, including East Asia. As for chemical weapons, the Malaysian police announced that VX, a chemical whose production and use is banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was detected from the body of Kim Jong-Nam following his assassination that occurred in Malaysia in February 2017. Additionally, the then U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May made a statement which said that it was clear that Novichok, ----- terrorist attack on a restaurant in Dhaka, Bangladesh, that occurred in July 2016 as well as the large-scale bombings in Sri Lanka that occurred in April 2019, the threat of international terrorism must be considered a problem facing Japan, too. In this manner, there is a growing risk that the impact of regional conflict and threat of terrorism will spread as a factor of instability affecting the entire international community, not just a single country or single region. It is important for members of the international community to review approaches to international frameworks and their involvement based on their respective characteristics and to seek out appropriate responses. As for regional conflicts, the mission of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations has expanded to a wide range of fields including civilian and policing activities: supervision of disarmament, security **Section** **2** **Military Trends in the Neighboring Countries of Japan** Qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities. The Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, abounds in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity. Also, views on security and perceptions of threats are different by country. Therefore, a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized, and longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to remain in the region. In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues between the military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. Furthermore, with regard to Japan, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. On top of this, recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray-zone” situations—which are neither purely peacetime nor contingency situations— as part of state-to-state competition, and it is possible that those situations may increase and expand. The gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. force reforms, election and government monitoring, and humanitarian assistance such as refugee repatriation. In particular, there is growing importance placed on missions for protecting civilians and women and for peace building. Additionally, there are examples in which multinational forces and regional institutions authorized by the UN Security Council are working for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In terms of international counterterrorism, there is growing importance for international cooperation due to the spread of activities by terrorist organizations across international borders. At present, in addition to the use of military means, the entire international community is taking initiatives to block sources of financing for terrorist organizations and to prevent the international transfer of terrorists. state competition in a range of areas prominently emerging, has acknowledged that a particularly important challenge is strategic competition with China and Russia, who attempt to alter global and regional order. To rebuild its military power, the United States is engaged in such efforts as maintaining military advantage in all domains through technological innovations, enhancing nuclear deterrence, and advancing missile defense capabilities. The United States upholds defense commitments to allies and partners, and maintains forward force presence, while calling on them to share greater responsibility. The United States frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority region where it adopts a policy of strengthening alliances and partnerships. Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), including the United States, are reviewing their strategies to deal with coercive attempts to alter the statusquo as well as “hybrid warfare.” In view of changes in the security environment, NATO member states have been increasing their defense expenditures. **Chapter** **(2) China** With an aim to build “world-class forces” by the mid21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of defense expenditures with continued lack of transparency. China has engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. China is also strengthening capabilities in new domains that are essential for modern military operations, including space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. China is also **(1) The United States** While remaining to possess the world’s largest comprehensive national power, the United States, with inter ----- improving missile defense penetration capabilities and amphibious landing capabilities. China is also improving missile defense penetration capabilities and amphibious landing capabilities. Such capability enhancement serves to improve the so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial (“A2/AD”) capabilities—capabilities to deny access and deployment of foreign militaries to one’s surrounding areas and to disrupt their military operations therein—as well as to build capabilities with which to conduct military operations over greater distances. In addition, China is promoting CivilMilitary Fusion policy in areas of national defense, science & technology and industry, and actively developing and acquiring cutting-edge technologies of potential military utility. China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent part of Japanese territory, despite Japan’s strong protests, Chinese government vessels continually violate Japanese territorial waters, and Chinese naval ships continuously operate in waters around the Islands. China has already been indicating its policy of strengthening cooperation between the navy and the maritime lawenforcement division in order to protect its maritime interests. As an example of the strengthening of the cooperation, in July 2018, the China Coast Guard to which Chinese government vessels repeatedly intruding into Japanese territorial waters belonged were integrated into the People’s Armed Police, which are under the unified command of the Central Military Commission. China is also expanding its military activities in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In particular, the Chinese military in recent years has frequently advanced to the Pacific, with its navigation routes and unit composition becoming more diverse. In the South China Sea, China has forcibly conducted large-scale, rapid reclamation of maritime features, which are being converted into military footholds. China in the South China Sea is also expanding and intensifying its maritime and air activities. Such Chinese military and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments. China is eagerly expected to play active roles in a more cooperative manner in the region and the international community. **(3) North Korea** North Korea in recent years has launched ballistic missiles at unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational capabilities, such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. Given technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed as having already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. Although North Korea expressed its intention for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and blew up its nuclear test site in public, it has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner: there has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea is assessed as possessing large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. North Korea also retains large-scale special operation forces. Such military developments of North Korea pose serious and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Also, through UN Security Council resolutions, the international community made it clear that North Korea’s nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities constitute a clear threat to international peace and security. As for North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, the utmost efforts continue to be made to realize the return of all abductees to Japan as quickly as possible by close cooperation with related countries including the US. **Chapter** **(3) Russia** It is deemed that Russia has promoted the strengthening of the readiness of its Armed Forces and the development and acquisition of new equipment, while giving priority to modernizing its nuclear force from the viewpoint of making up for its disadvantage in terms of conventional weapons in **KEY WORD** “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities Anti-Access (A2) is a concept introduced by the United States. It refers to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Area-Denial (AD) refers to capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing force’s freedom of action within the operational area. Weapons used for A2/AD include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons, air-defense systems, submarines, and mines. ----- addition to securing its international position and maintaining the nuclear power balance with the United States. Russia’s military activities are trending upward in the Arctic Circle, Europe, areas around the United States and the Middle East, as well as in the Far East, including Japan’s Northern Territories. Specifically, Russia changed the status quo using force by engaging in so-called “hybrid warfare”[1] in Ukraine, which Russia regards as a part of its sphere of influence. Therefore, this is recognized as not only a strong concern for European countries, but also a global issue that could potentially engulf the entire international community, including Asia. Russia is also appearing to be expanding its influence internationally, including through its involvement in the Syria Civil War as a supporter of the Assad regime. In the Far East, the number of scrambles by Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) aircraft against aircraft of the Russian Armed Forces has remained at a high level, and in this region, the Russian Armed Forces have conducted large-scale exercises. Russia has unveiled the deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles in the Northern Territories, and there have been media reports about the start of the deployment of fighter aircraft on Etorofu Island, indicating Russia’s efforts to enhance armaments in the region. Therefore, continued attention needs to be paid to Russian military development in the Far East, including the Northern Territories. As seen above, in the Asia-Pacific region, where the security environment has increasingly grown severe, the presence of the U.S. Forces remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability. Accordingly, Japan and other countries, such as Australia and the ROK, have established bilateral alliances and partnerships with the United States, and allow the stationing and rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces in their territories. In regard to the responses to the unilateral changes in the status quo by force or coercion based on unique assertions, it is important for the international community centered around countries in the region to make concerted efforts to protect the existing international order based on law. Meanwhile, countries in the region have made efforts to enhance and strengthen specific and practical intraregional coordination and collaboration with a particular focus on non-traditional security fields such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region have increased in recent years. Multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), conferences hosted by nongovernmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, and bilateral and multilateral exercises are held. Promoting and developing such multilayered approaches among countries is also important to ensure stability in the region. See Fig. I-1-2-1 (Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region [Approximate Strength]) **Chapter** Asymmetrical military capabilities, in this context, refer to means of attack different from those of an opponent with superior conventional military capabilities. Such measures are exploited t t f di d t i ti l d t E l i l d WMD b lli ti i il t i d b tt k ----- **Fig. I-1-2-1** Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength) |Taiw|an| |---|---| |90,000 tro 10,000 m 390 vesse 205,000 t 520 aircra|ops (15) arines (3) ls - ons ft| **80,000** **260 vessels -** **350** **Russian** troops (12) **640,000 tons** aircraft **Far East** **China** **1,100,000 troops (33)** **780 vessels -** **550 aircraft** **North** **111,000 tons** **Korea** **Chapter** **980,000 troops (209)** **25,000 marines (7)** **ROK** **1** **490,000 troops (54)** **29,000 marines (3)** **760 vessels - 1,899,000 tons** **240 vessels -** **217,000 tons** **640 aircraft** **2,890 aircraft** **Japan** **U.S. Forces in the ROK** **140,000 troops (15)** **18,000 troops (5)** **135 vessels -** **488,000 tons** **80 aircraft** **400 aircraft** **U.S. Forces in Japan** **23,000 troops (1)** **150 aircraft** **Taiwan** **90,000 troops (15)** **U.S. 7th Fleet** **10,000 marines (3)** **30 vessels -** **390 vessels -** **400,000 tons** **205,000 tons** **50 (carrier-based)** **520 aircraft** aircraft 500km Notes: 1 Source: “The Military Balance 2019,” documents published by the U.S. DoD, etc. 2 Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2018; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding Taiwan includes military police as well. |,000 260 vessels - 350 ps (12) 640,000 tons aircraft 1,100,000 troops (33) 780 ves North 111,00 Korea ROK 490,000 troops (54) 29,000 marines (3) ons 240 vessels - 217,000 tons 640 aircraft U.S. Forces in the ROK 18,000 troops (5) 80 aircraft Taiw 90,000 tro 10,000 m 390 vesse 205,000 t 520 aircra alance 2019,” documents published by the U.S. DoD, etc. cate the strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2018; the MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only). ound forces in Japan and the ROK are those of the Army a e Navy and Marine aircraft. show the total number of central units, such as divisions ry police as well. h Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forw|sels - 550 aircraft 0 tons Japan 140,000 troo 135 vessels - 488,000 tons 400 aircraft U.S. Forces in J 23,000 troop 150 aircraft an ops (15) U.S. 7th Fle arines (3) 30 vessels - ls - 400,000 tons ons 50 (carrier-ba ft aircraft 50 number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft ( nd Marine Corps personnel combined. and brigades. That of North Korea shows only divisions. ard-deployed in Japan and Guam.| |---|---| |raft of the U.S. Forces, Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet includ Naval vessels Combat aircraft (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft)|e only fighters.| |Naval vessels Combat aircraft (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft)|| ||| Legend: ----- **Defense Policies of Countries** ### 2 **Section** **1** **The United States** **1** **Security and Defense Policies** **Chapter** It has been pointed out that the Trump administration, which was inaugurated in January 2017, has signifi cantly changed the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world under the “America First” policy. On the other hand, it can be considered that while the United States is focusing on global competition, the United States has been continuing to play a role for world peace and stability with its comprehensive national power, the largest in the world, based on its belief that the values and infl uence of the United States, bolstered by its power, would make the world freer, safer, and more prosperous. In fact, the United States has clarifi ed its stance that it will emphasize the security of the Indo-Pacifi c region and has clearly indicated its willingness both to build new and stronger bonds with nations that share its values across the region and to maintain a forward military presence in the region, in order to advance the U.S. vision of a free and open Indo-Pacifi c. After positioning China as a revisionist power and strategic competitor in a strategy document outlining the administration’s national security and national defense policy, the United States disinvited China to the Rim of the Pacifi c (RIMPAC) exercise. It is reported that U.S. naval vessels carried out repeated “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South China Sea and transit through the Taiwan Strait, and that the United States imposed sanctions on a Chinese military organ and a leader. The United States is also sharpening its deterrence stance against China through such moves as imposing tariffs on Chinese hi-tech products, heightening scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, restricting exports of U.S. technologies to Huawei, which is a major Chinese communication equipment maker, charging espionage agents, and tightening measures aimed at preventing technology theft and ensuring competitiveness in fi elds where there is a risk of technology being diverted to military uses. As can be seen from the fact that the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 include a prohibition on participation by China in RIMPAC unless China ceased all land reclamation activities and removed all weapons from land reclamation sites, in the South China Sea, and a prohibition on executive agencies from using or procuring telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei Technologies company or other major Chinese telecommunication manufacturers, the Trump administration’s stance on China has bipartisan support in Congress, which appears likely to be maintained going forward. Under the recognition that North Korea’s actions and policies to pursue nuclear and missile programs constitutes an extraordinary threat to the United States, it has maintained sanctions and continues its efforts to pursue the complete denuclearization of North Korea (see 1-3 of this Section). While the United States has also been dealing with security issues outside of the Indo-Pacifi c region, moves to withdraw or reduce troops have been seen in some regions since December 2018. In response to the offensive from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other organizations in Iraq and Syria since 2014, the United States, since August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes. In December 2018, President Trump expressed his intention to carry out a slow and highly coordinated withdrawal of U.S. Forces deployed in Syria, but, after the voicing of fear and opposition both at home and abroad, subsequently hinted in February 2019 at the possibility that a small force might remain stationed there. In August 2017, the United States announced its strategy on Afghanistan and South Asia which made clear its continuous involvement with Afghanistan, and in September 2017, it disclosed that reinforcements of over 3,000 U.S. military personnel would be sent to Afghanistan. However, it is believed to have shifted to a policy of seeking a direct talk with the Taliban sometime before July 2018 and in January 2019, it was reported that the United States had reached an agreement in principle with the Taliban on a draft peace pact ----- that includes the withdrawal of U.S. Forces.[1] Furthermore, the United States has been increasing pressure on Iran from many aspects, stating it is to bring Iran to the negotiation table to conclude a comprehensive deal that addresses activities that destabilize the Middle East region, including the nuclear program.[2] In these circumstances, in June 2019, the United States revealed that Iran shot down a U.S. drone, which drove the United States to the brink of retaliatory strikes in response. In this way, tensions between the United States and Iran are increasing.[3] The United States says that, although it does not want a war with Iran, the United States has been ready to defend its forces and interests in the region, warning Iran not to mistake U.S. restraint for weakness. In addition, when commercial vessels, including one related to Japan, were attacked near the Straits of Hormuz in May and June 2019, the United States pointed out that Iran or its proxies conducted the attacks. The United States proposed efforts by like-minded countries to secure international waterways in the region, indicating its intension to develop them.[4] The United States has positioned anti-Russian deterrence alongside anti-Chinese deterrence as a priority in its national defense strategy. In December 2018, immediately after Russia’s capture of Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait and the detention of their crew members, the United States conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations in the vicinity of Peter the Great Gulf, which was the first time of the operation in those waters since 1987. In light of Russian actions concerning Ukraine, in order to strengthen involvement in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security and deterrence, the investment for the European Deterrence Initiative[5] has been set at US$5.9 billion in the FY2020 Department of Defense (DoD) budget request. On the other hand, in its security policies, the United States considers that certain allies which are pointed out as bearing only a small burden of cost and enjoying security guaranteed by the United States should shoulder their fair share of responsibility. Under such a perception, the United States has requested NATO member states to swiftly meet their commitments to increase their national defense spending to 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Two years have passed since the inauguration of the Trump administration and attention will focus on how the divided Congress resulting from the mid-term election—which left the Republicans holding a majority in the Senate and the Democrats a majority in the House of Representatives—will affect U.S. security and defense policies. 1 Perception about Security Environment The National Security Strategy (NSS)[6] released in December 2017 indicates that changes in a regional balance of power can have global consequences and threaten U.S. interests. It mentions the three main sets of challengers against the United States and its allies and partners, which are the “revisionist powers” of China and Russia, the “rogue states” of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, including jihadist terrorist groups. Of these, China and Russia are said to challenge American power, influence, and interests and attempt to erode American safety and prosperity, while North Korea and Iran destabilize regions and threaten the United States and its allies. In addition, the National Defense Strategy (NDS)[7] published in January 2018 points out that the primary concern in U.S. security is not terrorism but rather long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. It also mentions that China and Russia are undermining the free and open international order constructed by the United States and its allies, and it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model. Furthermore, regarding the military actions[8] carried out with the United Kingdom and France after determining **Chapter** It has been reported that, after reaching a fresh agreement on a withdrawal on condition that the Taliban does not allow Al Qaeda or ISIL to use Afghanistan’s territory, the United States and the Taliban broadly agreed that foreign troops, including U.S. Forces, would withdraw from Afghanistan within 18 months. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad stated in December 2018 that there had been significant progress on vital issues in this regard, while Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted that the United States was serious about pursuing peace and bringing troops home. In May 2019, the United States announced that, in order to respond to threats from Iran to the U.S. forces and interests, the United States was additionally deploying an aircraft carrier strike group, a bomber task force, an amphibious transport dock ship and a Patriot battery to the U.S. Central Command, as well as approximately 1,500 troops comprised of additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft including unmanned drones, and a fighter aircraft squadron. In addition, in June 2019, the United States announced that it was sending approximately 1,000 additional troops to the Middle East in response to a request from U.S. Central Command. President Trump revealed that the United States had been prepared to retaliate against three different sites in Iran in response to Iran’s shooting down of a U.S. drone over international waters. However, on hearing a report by a General estimating that the number of Iranian deaths would be about 150, the president thought it disproportionate to the shooting down of an unmanned drone, so 10 minutes before the strike, he stopped it. However, the United States reportedly carried out cyber attacks on Iran, instead. Remarks by then Acting Defense Secretary Esper at NATO Headquarters (June 2019) This initiative reassures allies and partners of NATO that the United States is committed to their security and territorial integrity by increasing the presence of the U.S. Forces in Europe, conducting further bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with NATO allies and other countries, and strengthening the prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe. Until recently it was called the European Reassurance Initiative, but the name was changed to the European Deterrence Initiative in the FY2019 Budget Blueprint. The NSS comprehensively indicates political, economic, military and diplomatic policies aimed at protecting U.S. for national security interests and achieving goals. The NDS affords the president and secretary of defense the utmost strategic flexibility, decides the force structure to meet needs, and supports the latest national security strategy. On April 13 Eastern Standard Time (on April 14 Japan time), the United States together with France and the United Kingdom conducted strikes against three chemical weapons-related facilities of the Syrian administration. The U.S. DoD announced that it believed that all 105 cruise missiles used hit their targets. Of these, the U.S. Forces fired 30 tomahawk missiles from t d t 30 i il f i d i i il f l b i ll 19 JASSM f t B 1B t t i b b ----- that Syria s Assad regime had used chemical weapons in April 2018, President Trump stated that establishing strong deterrence against the production, proliferation, and use of chemical weapons is an important interest for the national security of the United States. In consideration of this recognition, the United States deems as security threats nations and organizations that attempt to undermine the interests of itself and its allies and threaten the international order. The Trump administration is addressing threats posed by China and Russia with particular emphasis as priority issues and appears to be continuing a policy of dealing with threats posed by North Korea, Iran, radical terrorist groups, and production, proliferation, and use of weapons of mass destruction. 2 Security and National Defense Strategy The NSS developed by President Trump is rooted in the America First policy and realism in which power plays a central role in international politics, and stresses the need to rethink the policies of the past 20 years that were based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in the international community would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. Moreover, the NSS sets up a strategic policy to protect four vital interests in this competitive world: (1) Protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life; (2) Promote American prosperity; (3) Preserve peace through strength; and (4) Advance American influence. Furthermore, in addition to rebuilding the U.S. military to the strongest armed forces and strengthening capabilities in many areas including space and cyberspace, the United States is also striving to leverage the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Moreover, while recognizing that allies and partners are a great strength of the United States and close cooperation is necessary, the United States has demanded that its allies and partners demonstrate the will to confront shared threats and contribute the capabilities. It is also pointed out that although the United States is responding to the growing political, economic, and military competition throughout the world, by ensuring American military power is second to none and fully integrating with its allies all instruments of power, the United States will seek areas of cooperation with competitors from a position of strength. The NDS drawn up by Secretary of Defense Mattis (then) based on the NSS considers the long-term competitions with China and Russia as the principal priorities of the DoD because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity and the potential for the threats to increase. Moreover, to expand the competitive space, the following three lines of effort are raised: (1) Building a more lethal Joint Force; (2) Strengthening alliances and attracting new partners; and (3) Reforming the DoD for greater performance and affordability. Among these, (1) Building military power prioritizes preparedness for war and in order to defeat aggression by a major power and deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere, it advances building flexible theater postures and force deployment that have mobility, resilience, and modernize key capabilities such as nuclear forces, space and cyberspace, C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), missile defense, advanced autonomous systems, etc. Further, although indicating its commitment to deter aggression, it also demonstrates the stance that dynamic military force employment, military posture, and operations must introduce unpredictability to adversary decision-makers. For 2. Strengthening alliances, the following three matters are emphasized: i. Uphold a foundation of mutual respect, responsibility, priorities, and accountability, ii. Expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning, and iii. Deepen interoperability. On the other hand, there are expectations that allies and partners contribute an equitable share to mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing their defense capabilities. 3 Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region The Trump administration has positioned the Indo-Pacific region as a priority region for the United States and has shown a stance of placing importance on the region through the United States’ commitment to the region and strengthening its presence. During his November 2017 trip to Asia, in consonance with Japan’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, President Trump expressed his intention to emphasize compliance with principles such as respecting the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and that he would promote a free and open IndoPacific region, as well as strengthen alliances in the region. In relation to this, the NSS emphasizes that China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region and reorder the region in its favor, as well as having mounted a rapid military modernization campaign to limit U.S. access to the region and to provide itself a freer hand there. Moreover, as part of its Indo-Pacific region strategy, while reinforcing its commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law, the United States will seek to increase **Chapter** ----- partners is a force multiplier to achieve peace, deterrence and interoperable warfighting capability, the IPSR states that the United States will reinforce its commitment to established alliances and partnerships while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners. The IPSR also indicates that the United States will evolve U.S. alliances and partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order. In May 2018, regarding China’s maritime expansion, the U.S. DoD stated that China had deployed anti-ship missiles and surface-to-air missiles to the features in the Spratly Islands, and pointed out that the placement of these weapon system was only military use. As an initial response to China’s continued militarization of areas in the South China Sea, the United States disinvited the Chinese navy to the multilateral Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in 2018. In a speech about the United States’ policy towards China in October 2018, Vice President Mike Pence remarked that China’s aggression had been exposed when a Chinese naval vessel came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur as it conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea, forcing the U.S. Destroyer to take action to avoid a collision.[9] He went on to say that, despite such reckless harassment, the U.S. Navy will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows and U.S. national interests demand, and that the United States will not be intimidated and will not stand down. It is reported that, under the Trump administration, the U.S. Forces have conducted Freedom of Navigation Operations[10] within 12 nautical miles of the islands and reefs in the South China Sea claimed by China on 13 occasions up to May 2019, and have made ten bomber flights over the South China Sea. Based on such a perception of China and regional strategy, it can be considered that the United States is advancing efforts rooted in the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific region. In addition, as part of its activities around strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region, in January 2017, the U.S. Forces deployed Marine Corps specification F-35B fighters to MCAS Iwakuni. In October 2017, 12 Air Force specified F-35A fighters were deployed at Kadena Air Force Base for the first time ever in the Asia-Pacific region. Also, in January 2018, nuclear-capable B-2 bombers and B-52 bombers were Vice President Pence making a speech about the United States’ policy towards China at a research institute on October 4, 2018 [courtesy of the White House] quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and develop a strong defense networks with its allies and partners. In the same way, the NDS points out that China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage and is seeking regional hegemony. It emphasizes that a free and open Indo-Pacific provides prosperity and security, and that the United States will strengthen its alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific to a networked security architecture capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains. Under this strategic policy, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced at the August 2018 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) that the United States intends to provide nearly US$300 million in security assistance to improve security relationships across the Indo-Pacific region. Meanwhile, the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) of the U.S. DoD, which was released in June 2019, fleshes out this policy in accordance with the characteristics of the IndoPacific region while retaining the strategic directions of the NSS and the NDS. Noting first of all that it is necessary to establish a force that is prepared to win any conflict from its onset in order to achieve peace through strength, the IPSR states that the United States will ensure that combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the Indo-Pacific region and will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against highend adversaries. Next, arguing that the network of allies and **Chapter** 9 Noting China’s military expansion, attempts to push the United States from the western Pacific Ocean, routine patrol around the Senkaku Islands, and militarization in the South China Sea, Vice President Mike Pence stated that China was engaged in forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft, and that its security agencies have masterminded the wholesale theft of technology including military technology. Citing examples of China’s use of debt diplomacy to expand its influence, he mentioned the possibility that a port in Sri Lanka for which China provided investment might become a Chinese forward naval military base as Sri Lanka’s could not afford its payment. Vice President Pence also highlighted the fact that China had convinced three Latin American nations to sever ties with Taiwan and recognize the Chinese government, and stated that the United States condemns these actions, which he said threaten the stability of the Taiwan Strait. He made clear that, even as it hopes for improved relations with China, the United States will continue to stand strong for its security and economy, and will continue to assert U.S. interests across the Indo-Pacific. 10 It is regarded that the Trump administration implemented the Freedom of Navigation Operations in May, July, August, and October 2017; January, March, May, September, and November 2018; January, February and May (twice) 2019. Th Ob d i i t ti i l t d th F d f N i ti O ti i O t b 2015 J M d O t b 2016 ----- deployed to Guam, and in place of the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard, the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp that is capable of carrying F-35B fighters arrived in Sasebo.[11] Furthermore, in March 2018 the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson made the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier in over 40 years in Vietnam. In addition, the United States reportedly deployed two naval vessels on passages through the Taiwan Strait in July, October, and November 2018, and January, February, March, April and May 2019. At the same time, under the policy to continue sustaining maximum pressure on North Korea, which was continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile development, the Trump administration was exhibiting its recognition that a military option plays an important role in backing up diplomatic efforts, and also was clearly showing its readiness to respond with overwhelming power in retaliation to any attack by North Korea. In an historic first, a U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting took place in June 2018. Both leaders clearly indicated willingness for jointly making efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and based on the reaffirmed commitment expressed by Chairman Kim toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both leaders confirmed that follow-on negotiations would continue. Responding to this discussion, the U.S. DoD suspended the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) command and control exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian scheduled for August and two Korean Marine Exchange Program[12] training exercises. It subsequently suspended the scheduled Vigilant Ace U.S.-ROK bilateral annual flying exercise, and then decided in March 2019 to conclude the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle series of exercises usually held by the United States and South Korea every spring. Then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expressed a willingness to maintain U.S. Forces in South Korea, stating that close coordination between the military activities of the United States and South Korea will continue to support diplomatic efforts and that the two countries were committed to ensuring the continued combined defense posture of U.S.-ROK combined forces and maintaining firm military readiness. The second U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting was held in February 2019, and an agreement between the U.S. and North Korea could not be reached. Amid a gap between the two sides over denuclearization, North Korea sought the lifting of all sanctions, but President Trump said he could not give up all of the sanctions, and indicated his intention to maintain them. In addition, when President Trump visited the ROK in June 2019, he met the leader of North Korea at Panmunjom, and they agreed to proceed with dialogue at the working level. (See Section 3-1-5 (1) Relations with the United States) 4 Innovation Initiatives in the National Defense Field Although the Trump administration has stopped using the name Third Offset Strategy,[13] which was touted by the Obama administration, DoD innovation initiatives are positioned as one of the top priorities. In fact, the NSS outlines a policy that the United States must harness innovative technologies that are being developed outside of the traditional defense industrial base. The NDS also states that the DoD needs innovation to surpass revisionist powers, and calls for extensive investment in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages. In February 2018, the DoD established the new post of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in charge of furthering the nation’s military superiority through advanced technology and innovation, and decisionmaking on game-changing investment. Giving testimony before Congress about innovation in April 2018 after being appointed to this post, Under Secretary of Defense Michael Griffin demonstrated the recognition that, while U.S. Forces are still the most technologically advanced in the world, they are losing their supremacy and need to re-establish and maintain that technological advantage. The DoD, he said, continues to push the envelope with research into new technologies such as autonomous and unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, machine learning, biotechnology, space technology, microelectronics and cyber, both offense and defense. In June 2018, the department established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to accelerate the delivery of AI-enabled capabilities and the DoD Artificial Intelligence (AI) Strategy published in February 2019 positions JAIC at the focal point of the department’s AI strategy. **Chapter** 11 In April 2019, the U.S. Navy announced the deployment in Sasebo of USS America, an amphibious assault ship which can operate F-35B as a ship-borne aircraft, and USS New Orleans, an amphibious transport dock ship. It was also announced that USS Wasp, an amphibious assault ship deployed in Sasebo, and USS Stethem, a destroyer deployed in Yokosuka, would return to the U.S. mainland for maintenance and refurbishment, respectively. 12 The Korean Marine Exchange Program (KMEP) is an annually-held joint exercise between the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa and the ROK Marine Corps. 19 exercises were planned under the KMEP in 2018, and 11 exercises had been carried out as of June 22, 2018. 13 The United States’ Third Offset Strategy is based on the concept of offsetting the capacity of the adversary by acquiring asymmetrical means that differ from the capacity of the adversary. There were two previous offset strategies as follows: (1) the nuclear deterrent of the 1950s; and (2) precision-guided missiles and stealth aircraft technologies of the 1970s. In November 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel (then) announced the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) that aimed to achieve military superiority through innovation, and stated the expectation that this ld d l i t th Thi d Off t St t ----- 5 Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in February 2018 stated that, although the United States had reduced the role and number of nuclear weapons based on the aspiration that if the United States took the lead in reducing nuclear arms, other states would follow, the global threat conditions have worsened markedly since the most recent NPR[14] released in 2010 and there now exist unprecedented threats and uncertainty, as China and Russia have expanded their nuclear forces and North Korea continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Given these circumstances, the following were raised as the roles of U.S. nuclear forces: (1) Deterrence of nuclear and nonnuclear attacks; (2) Assurance of allies and partners; (3) Achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; and (4) Capacity to hedge against an uncertain future. Also, while the United States would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners, the NPR clearly states that extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic attacks against the United States and its allies, and a “no first use” policy is not justified today. It also indicates that the United States remains the policy to retain some ambiguity regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a U.S. nuclear response. Furthermore, it also revealed that the United States would apply a tailored approach to deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats and contexts, and in addition to that, it would ensure effective deterrence by enhancing the flexibility and range of its nuclear capabilities through nuclear modernization and the development and deployment of new capabilities. Specifically, in addition to sustaining and replacing the nuclear triad,[15] as new capabilities, in the near-term, the United States would modify a small number of existing SLBM warheads to provide a low-yield option,[16] and in the longer term, pursue a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), leveraging existing technologies, as well as incorporate nuclear capability onto the President Trump making a speech on MDR at DoD on January 17, 2019 [APF/Jiji] forward-deployable, nuclear-capable F-35 as a replacement for the current aging dual-capable aircraft (DCA). Also, the United States has shown its commitment to extended deterrence for its allies and, if necessary, maintaining the forward-deployed capability with DCA and nuclear weapons in regions outside Europe, including Northeast Asia. In October 2018, President Trump expressed his intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia, due to Russia’s material breach, and in February 2019, the United States provided Russia with formal notice that the United States would withdraw from the treaty. The United States also expressed that if Russia does not return to full and verifiable compliance with the treaty in six months, the treaty would terminate.[17] On August 2, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the U.S. withdrawal pursuant to Article XV of the treaty took effect that day because Russia failed to return to full and verified compliance. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Esper announced that the DoD will fully pursue the development of intermediate-range, conventional, ground-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems whose test launches, production and possession have been restricted by the treaty. On August 18, 2019, The United States conducted a flight test of a conventionally-configured ground-launched cruise missile with a range of more than 500 km (See Section 4-3-1).[18] President Trump has mentioned the need for arms control involving China, which has beefed up medium-range missile **Chapter** 14 The NPR released in 2010 called for a world without nuclear weapons, with goals that included reducing the role of the U.S.’s nuclear weapons and maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels. 15 The nuclear triad consists of Minuteman III ICBM, Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) armed with Trident II D5 SLBM, and strategic bombers B-52 and B-2. 16 The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration announced in February 2019 that it had completed production of the first W76-2 low-yield nuclear warheads to be carried by SLBMs. The initial operational capability of the warheads is due to be achieved and delivered to the Navy by the end of fiscal 2019. 17 In June 2019, then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper remarked that should Russia refuse to return to compliance with the INF Treaty by August 2, 2019, the Treaty will cease to exist. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries covered by the treaty have increased: the countries covered at present are the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Under Article 15 of the INF Treaty, notification of withdrawal must be made to all signatory countries of the treaty. 18 On August 2, 2019, Secretary of Defense Esper stated that the United States commenced Treaty-compliant research and development efforts focused on mobile, conventional, groundlaunched cruise and ballistic missile systems beginning in 2017, and that those programs were in the early stages. Meanwhile, it was reported in March 2019 that the DoD had announced that it would commence fabrication activities on components to support developmental testing of conventional, ground-launched missiles, and test launches of conventional cruise missiles with a range of about 1,000 km and conventional ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000 to 4,000 km—both of which were restricted under the INF Treaty— are reportedly planned for August and November 2019, respectively. In addition, in August, Secretary of Defense Esper remarked that it was going to take a few years to actually have newly developed groundl h d i d b lli ti i il t b bl t d l ----- capabilities outside the scope of the INF Treaty. At the same time, the Missile Defense Review (MDR)[19] published in January 2019 noted that North Korea continues to pose an extraordinary threat to the United States and, with its nuclear missiles, has the ability to threaten the U.S. homeland, as well as U.S. territories, U.S. Forces, and allies in the Pacific Ocean. It also pointed out that Russia and China are developing advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles that challenge existing missile defense systems. The MDR sets out three principles governing U.S. missile defense: (1) homeland missile defense will stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats; (2) missile defense will defend U.S. Forces deployed abroad and support the security of allies and partners; and (3) the United States will pursue new concepts and technologies. It cited the elements of missile defense strategy as (1) comprehensive missile defense capabilities; (2) flexibility and adaptability; (3) tighter offense-defense integration and interoperability; and (4) importance of space. The MDR then presented a policy of adopting a balanced and integrated approach based on a combination of (1) deterrence; (2) active and passive missile defenses; and (3) attack operations. Under this policy, the United States plans to expand investment in expanding and modernizing U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities by such means as deploying an additional 20 ground-based interceptors by 2023, improving and deploying radar systems, and pursuing efforts to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) using SM-3 Block IIA. For regional defense, on the other hand, the United States will procure additional interceptor missiles for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot systems, as well as increasing the number of Aegis BMDcapable ships[20], and equipping Aegis Ashore sites with the SM-3 Block IIA. Regarding the pursuit of new technologies, the MDR sets out a policy of developing the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle[21] (MOKV) to improve the ability to engage ICBM warheads and decoys, as well as undertaking research and development focused on (1) directed-energy weapons; (2) space-based interceptor systems; and (3) interceptor missiles with which F-35 fighters can be equipped, to enable spacebased sensors to be deployed and interception to be carried out in the boost phase, with a view to countering advanced threats, including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles. As far as collaboration with allies and partners is concerned, the MDR indicates a willingness to focus on deepening interoperability, expanding burden sharing, and encouraging investment by allies in missile defense capabilities that are interoperable with those of the United States. 6 FY2020 Budget As the budget deficit of the U.S. Government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 stipulated a significant cut in government spending by FY2021.[22] Also, in March 2013, the sequestration of government spending including defense expenditure was started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. However, after this, sequestration was eased for the budgets from FY2014-FY2017 due to the bipartisan acts passed twice.[23] Furthermore, amid the Trump administration’s policy to end the sequestration of defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military, the Bipartisan Budget Act was passed in February 2018, and a defense budget framework was approved that drastically raised the limit set by the sequestration for FY2018 and 2019.[24] In these circumstances, the defense budget request in the FY2020 Budget Blueprint submitted to Congress in March 2019 allocated US$718.3 billion for the base budget,[25] representing about a 4.9% increase over the previous year.[26] In this, the DoD has positioned the purpose of its main budget as deterring or defeating great power aggression through (1) investment in the space and cyber warfighting domains; (2) modernization of capabilities in the aerial, marine, and land warfighting domains; (3) more rapid innovation; and (4) building on readiness gains. In addition, as well as requesting the largest research and development budget in 70 years and the largest ship building budget in 20 years, the department **Chapter** 19 The Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) that President Trump had directed to be formulated alongside the NPR was drawn up as the Missile Defense Review (MDR), in light of the growing threat from not only ballistic missiles, but also advanced cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, among others. 20 The MDR states that the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships will be increased from 38 to 60 by 2023. 21 Together with increasing object identification capability, the MOKV development program improves interceptor missile performance by developing the capability to destroy multiple objects through enabling one interceptor missile to load multiple kill vehicles. 22 In January 2012, the DoD announced that the specific national defense annual expenditure reduction based on the enacted act would amount to roughly US$487 billion over the 10 year period between FY2012 and FY2021 (roughly US$259 billion during the five year period between FY2013 and FY2017). 23 Through the passing of the 2013 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised by US$22 billion and US$9 billion in FY2014 and FY2015 respectively. Through the passing of the 2015 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$25 billion and US$15 billion in FY2016 and FY2017 respectively. 24 Through the passing of the 2018 Non-Partisan Budget Act, the national defense budget limit was raised to US$80 billion and US$85 billion in FY2018 and FY2019 respectively. 25 The breakdown is as follows: a base budget of approximately US$544.5 billion, approximately US$97.9 billion for overseas contingency operations for the base budget, approximately US$66.7 billion for overseas contingency operations, and approximately US$9.2 billion for emergencies. This represents an increase of about US$33.3 billion from the FY2019 enacted budget level. 26 The total sum of the FY2020 national defense budget request was roughly US$750 billion, including defense-related budget requests from other departments of roughly US$31.7 billion (such th D t t f E ’ l l t d ) d th hl US$718 3 billi f D D b d t t ----- **Fig.I-2-1-1** Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget Defense budget (in $1 billion) Year-on-year growth rate (%) ($1 billion) (%) 8,000 20 7,000 (*Estimate) 15 6,000 10 5,000 4,000 5 3,000 0 2,000 -5 1,000 0 -10 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (FY) Notes: 1 Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on historical tables (outlays). 2 The amount for FY2019 is an estimate. has asked for year-on-year increases of 15% in the spacerelated budget and 10% in the cyber-related budget, to make the necessary investment in next-generation technologies, space, missiles, and cyber. Also, the goals for military end strength and procurement were represented in the FY2020 budget request, such as securing 1,339,500 personnel, **Chapter** adding 6,200 more troops to the services’ end strength, and procuring 165 upgraded M-1 tanks (135 tanks in the previous year), 14 battleships (10 in the previous year), and 78 F-35 fighters (77 in the previous year). See Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget) See **2** **Military Posture** (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.7million tons. The 6th Fleet is responsible for the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Second Fleet was reestablished in August 2018 to take responsibility for the U.S. East Coast and North Atlantic Ocean. The U.S. air forces have roughly 3,520 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK. In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States under the former Obama administration proceeded with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In March 2019, it announced that its deployed strategic warheads[27] stood at 1,365, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 656.[28] The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability 1 General Situation The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it is operated under the command of the Unified Combatant Commands, composed of forces from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unified Combatant Commands consist of four commands with functional responsibilities and six commands with regional responsibilities. The U.S. ground forces have about 460,000 Army soldiers and about 190,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. Along with a shift from the Obama administration’s policy reducing soldiers to a policy of increasing them, in order to deter enemies and achieve battle victories when necessary, the Army has been making efforts to maintain the world’s leading ground force capability through necessary investment in ensuring readiness. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces. The U.S. maritime forces have about 970 vessels 27 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead). 28 Th fi f M h 1 2019 ----- to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.[29] Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November in the same year. Furthermore, in May 2018, the Cyber Command, which was previously a subunified command under U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unified combatant command. Furthermore, in June 2018, President Trump instructed the DoD to immediately start the necessary processes to establish the Space Force as the sixth branch of the Armed Forces, and subsequently directed the department to establish a U.S. Space Command as a unified combatant command that December (See Chapter 3, Section 2-2). In February 2019, in response to a directive signed by President Trump that month, the DoD forwarded to Congress a legislative proposal to create the Space Force within the Department of the Air Force. See Fig. 1-2-1-2 (Structure of the Unified Combatant Command) **Fig.I-2-1-2** Structure of the Unified Combatant Command |President Functional command Geographic command U.S. Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Special U.S. Strategic U.S. Transportation U.S. Cyber Operations Command Command Command Command *|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Functional command Geographic command|Col8| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |U.S. Africa Command|U.S. Central Command|U.S. European Command|U.S. Northern Command|U.S. Indo-Pacifi Command|cU.S. Southern Command||U.S. Space Command| *Established in August 2019 as a unified geographic combatant command **Chapter** in Japan, such as I Corps (Forward) and the Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan Command.[30] The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet mainly consists of a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. An aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers and destroyers among others are assigned to the 7th Fleet. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 21,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific.[31] The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK. See Fig. I-2-1-3 (U.S. Forces Development Status and Their Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region) See 2 Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by placing the Indo-Pacific Command, a combatant command integrating the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps in the region. The Indo-Pacific Command is a geographic combatant command which is responsible for the largest geographical area, and its subordinate unified commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii. The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,700 personnel to commands 29 The concept is designed to cripple the A2 capabilities of an adversary and promptly strike a target anywhere in the world using non-nuclear long-range guided missiles that hit targets with high accuracy. 30 The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2018), and could change according to unit deployment. 31 S f t t 30 ----- **Fig.I-2-1-3** U.S. Forces Development Status and Their Involvement in the Indo-Pacific Region (image) **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19|Col20|Col21|Col22|Col23|Col24|Col25|Col26|Col27|Col28|Col29|Col30|Col31|Col32| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |m v|y: app y: app|rox. 2 rox. 8|6,000 ,000 p|perso erson|nnel nel||||||||||||||||||Army: a||U.S. pprox|Forces . 473,|000 p|erson|nel||| |r F ar|orce: ines: a|appro pprox|x. 29, . 3,00|000 p 0 per|erson sonne||nel l||U.S. Co||||||||||||||Navy: a Air Forc Marines||pprox e: app : appr|. 326, rox. 32 ox. 18|000 p 2,000 4,000|erson perso perso|nel nnel nnel||| |||||||||||U.S. Co||European mmand|||||||||||||||||||| |ta|l: app|rox. 6|6,000|perso|nnel||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |ta|l in 198|7: appr|ox. 354|,000 p|ersonn||el)||||||||||||||||Total: a (Total in 1||pprox. 987: a|1,30 pprox. 2|4,000 ,170,00|perso 0 pers|nnel onnel)||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||U.S. C||entral||||||||||Asia|-Pacifi|c Reg||ion||U.|||rn d|||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||U.|S. Northe Comman|rn d|||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||Com|Com|mand|||||||||A N A|rmy: a avy: a ir Forc|pprox pprox e: app|. 37,0 . 39,0 rox. 2||00 pe 00 pe 7,000|rsonnel rsonnel person|nel||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||M|arine|s: app|rox. 2||8,000|personn|el||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||U||U|.S. Indo-Pa|cific Comm|and|T (T||otal: a otal in|pprox 1987: a|. 131, pprox.||000 p 184,00|ersonnel 0 personn|el)||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||a d||||||||||||||||||||||||thern and|||| ||||U.S. Afric Comman|a d|||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||U.S. Sou Comm|thern and|||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| European Region U.S. Forces Army: approx. 26,000 personnel Navy: approx. 8,000 personnel Army: approx. 473,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel Navy: approx. 326,000 personnel Marines: approx. 3,000 personnel U.S. EuropeanCommand Air Force: approx. 322,000 personnelMarines: approx. 184,000 personnel Total: approx. 66,000 personnel Total: approx. 1,304,000 personnel (Total in 1987: approx. 354,000 personnel) (Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 personnel) Asia-Pacific Region U.S. Northern Command U.S. CentralCommand Army: approx. 37,000 personnel Navy: approx. 39,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 27,000 personnel Marines: approx. 28,000 personnel U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Total: approx. 131,000 personnel (Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel) U.S. Africa Command U.S. Southern Command Notes: １ Source: Documents published by the DoD (as of December 31, 2018), etc. ２ The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam. **【Japan】** ・Deploys MV-22 Osprey and F-35B **【ROK】** ・Additionally deploys Aegis BMD destroyers Deploys THAAD ・carrying F-35Bs.Deploys amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, capable of 【India】 ・Deploys F-22, RQ-4 and F-35A **・Provided Apache Longbow attack helicopters,** and C-17 transport aircraft 【Taiwan】 ・Decided to sell arms ・Two U.S. vessels passed through the Taiwan Strait. ・The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act contains provisions concerning (i) assistance for arms procurement, (ii) consideration of U.S. vessel visits to Taiwan, (iii) U.S. participation in training in Taiwan, and **【Vietnam】** (iv) encouragement of exchange of high-level officials. **・A U.S. aircraft carrier visited the** Da Nang Port (for the first time ・since the end of the Vietnam War).U.S. Navy vessels visited the Cam **【Guam】** Ranh Port. ・Rotationally deploys bombers **【Singapore】** ・Rotationally deploys Littoral **【Philippines】** Combat Ships (LCS) ・Rotationally deploys P-8 ・・Provides anti-terrorism equipment to the PhilippinesLanding training in multilateral exercise (Balikatan) ・In June 2017, then Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that 60% of Navy vessels, 55% of the Army, and approximately 2/3 of the Fleet Marine Force are deployed in the area for which the then Pacific Command is responsible and that 60% of overseas tactical air assets **【Australia】** will be deployed there. In May 2018, these forces were renamed the ・Rotationally deploys marines “Indo-Pacific Command.” ・Increases rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force ・In August 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced a policy to aircraft provide approximately 300 million US dollars as security assistance to improve security relationships across the Indo-Pacific region. ----- **Section** **2** **China** **1** **General Situation** China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline shared with 14 countries as well as a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization. China’s pride in its unique history and semicolonial experience in and after the 19th century are driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism. In recent years, China has increased its presence in the international community. For example, China takes a proactive stance towards efforts in nontraditional security areas, making personnel and financial contributions to United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and continuously sending its ships for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, China has participated proactively in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. These activities have been highly appreciated by the international community. There continues to be high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues. China faces various problems domestically including human rights issues. Among the problems emerging are the spread of bribery and corruption among the central and local leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and issues triggered by China’s rapid economic growth, such as regional disparities between urban and rural areas, and between coastal and inland regions, as well as disparities within cities and environmental pollution. More recently, the pace of China’s economic growth has slowed[1] and the country is also expected to face issues associated with the rapid aging of the population, including problems related to pensions and other aspects of the social security system. The range of factors potentially destabilizing to government administration has thus been expanding and becoming increasingly diverse. Amid these circumstances, the Chinese Government has been tightening its control over society, but it has been suggested that controlling activities of the masses is becoming increasingly difficult with advances in the Internet and other areas of information and communications technology (ICT). However, others have noted that China is leveraging the recent rapid developments in ICT as a means of social control. Additionally, ethnic minorities in China have been staging protests and carrying out campaigns in pursuit of separation and independence in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. Since 2014, China enacted laws that covers not only security from external threats, but also includes culture and society as a part of security. Those laws include the Anti-Spy Law in November 2014, a new National Security Law in July 2015, an Anti-Terrorism Law in January 2016 to strengthen state control, a strengthened Law on Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations in January 2017, and the National Intelligence Law in June 2017 to strengthen domestic espionage prevention mechanisms under its “holistic view of national security.” The “anti-corruption” movement following the launch of the Xi Jinping leadership has made inroads under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “flies,” the purpose of which is considered as prosecuting both dominant figures and junior officials, with severe charges of “corruption” on people including current and past prominent leaders of the Party and military. In his remarks at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, General Secretary Xi spoke about “strict governance over the Party,” stating that “corruption is the greatest threat our Party faces,” which suggests that he will continue to crack down on corruption within the Party and the military. President Xi Jinping making a speech at an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” (January 2019) [EPA/Jiji] **Chapter** According to an announcement by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, the growth rate of the GDP for the full year of 2018 was 6.6% compared to the previous year. The figure d d th t t f “ d 6 5%” t b th Chi t b t i d l i il t th i 2017 h th th t k d 6 8% ----- Through these developments, the Party has demonstrated a growing willingness in recent years to further bolster the power base of General Secretary Xi in the CCP. For example, it was decided at the 19th National Congress to incorporate the “thoughts,” namely the political philosophy, under the name of General Secretary Xi Jinping into the Party constitution as a guideline. This was the first time since President Mao Zedong that a leader had their name in a guideline before **2** **Military Affairs** 1 General Situation For more than 30 years, China has sustained high-level growth of its defense budget without transparency, engaging in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In doing so, it has attached importance to strengthening its operational capabilities in order to steadily acquire information superiority as a means of both enhancing operational capabilities throughout the Chinese military and gaining asymmetrical capabilities to effectively impede enemies with overall military superiority from exerting their strength. Specifically, China has been increasingly emphasizing endeavors to achieve dominance in new domains. It has been rapidly expanding its capabilities in the cyber domain, enabling it to disrupt enemy communications networks, and in the field of electromagnetic spectrum, which offers the potential to render enemy radar and other equipment ineffective, thereby hampering their ability to exercise their military might. In addition, it continues to build capacity in the space field, which will make it possible to restrict enemies’ use of space. Bolstering these capabilities will reinforce China’s “Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD)” capabilities and lead to the establishment of operational capabilities further afield. China is also prioritizing efforts to increase joint operational capabilities through military reforms. Additionally, while implementing a policy of civilmilitary fusion across the board, with the aim of promoting two-way links between military and civilian resources in technology development and various other fields, China is striving to develop and acquire cutting-edge technologies that can be used for military purposes. Along with these efforts to reinforce its operational capabilities, China is engaging in unilateral and coercive retirement. Moreover, at the first plenary session of the 13th National People’s Congress held in March 2018, a resolution was adopted to revise the constitution and abolish term limits for China’s presidents, which indicates that Xi Jinping is further consolidating power as president. Impacts on the military of these actions and future relevant developments are to be watched for. attempts to change the status quo based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order,[2] and has been expanding and intensifying its military activities in maritime and aerial domains, notably in the East China Sea. China, particularly regarding maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, which includes dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. Additionally, China continues to demonstrate its willingness to realize its unilateral assertions without making any compromises, steadily moving forward with efforts to change the status quo by coercion and to create a fait accompli. The Chinese military leadership has emphasized to continue to improve the Chinese military’s operational capabilities, exhibiting the results of its activities such as the “struggle” against the Senkaku Islands, which is an inherent territory of Japan, the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ),” and its Navy and Air Force’s “regular patrols.”[3] Although it is not necessarily clear what activities these examples indicate specifically, there is a high probability that it is not only planning to make such activities routine, but also further expand and intensify them both qualitatively and quantitatively, given that the Chinese military is rapidly expanding and intensifying activities including in the areas surrounding Japan, such as the East China Sea, Pacific Ocean and Sea of Japan. Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea areas and airspace. China has been observed to be making steady, rapid progress with the military reforms in which it has been engaged since late December 2015 as part of its military modernization efforts to strengthen practical operational capabilities. In conjunction with this, it has been working to accomplish law-based governance over the military and **Chapter** For example, regarding the so-called “nine-dash line” asserted by China in the South China Sea, “historic rights” claimed by China were rejected by the Philippines-China arbitration (July 2016). Also, in recent years, some point out that China is drawing a basal line in the South China Sea that does not go in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by using its own interpretations of the treaty and other laws. Th ti l bli h d i th P l ’ D il N b 14 2017 b CMC Vi Ch i X Qili ----- improve joint operational capabilities through practical training and human resource development. The policy stated at the 19th National Congress in October 2017 to speed up by 15 years the achievement of the third stage of the “threestage development strategy” declared in the past, can be considered a decision based on development exceeding China’s own assumptions on the pace of the modernization of the military. It is possible that military modernization efforts to strengthen the practical operational capabilities of the military will be further accelerated, considering General Secretary Xi Jinping’s strengthening of his power foundation within the and further strengthening of his authority as the head of the Central Military Commission of the CCP. The regional and international communities, including Japan, therefore have strong security concerns about the trends including aforementioned rapid strengthening of operational capabilities by China and its expansion and intensification of activities in areas surrounding Japan, coupled with its defense policy and lack of transparency in its military affairs. Accordingly, it is necessary to pay close attention to the issues. 2 Defense Policies China regards that the buildup of strong defense capabilities and powerful military forces constitutes a strategic mission to modernize the state, and that it ensures the security of the state under “peaceful development.” China considers the main goal and mission of national defense policies as: to adapt to the new changes in security environment; to accomplish the strategic guideline of active defense[4] to realize the CCP’s goal of building a strong military; to accelerate the modernization of national defense and the military forces; to firmly protect its national sovereignty, security, and interests as a result of development; and to provide strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great revival of the peoples of China. China contends that these defense policies are defensive in nature.[5] Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — as part of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of close coordination of military struggle with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors. China has employed a policy to ensure to establish the “system of modern military power with Chinese characteristics,” aiming at informatizing the military based on its military strategy to follow the development trend of the military all over the world observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and so on, and to win informatized local wars. Dealing with a Taiwan contingency is believed to be a top priority in China’s efforts to strengthen the military forces; more specifically, improving its capabilities to deter the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for it. Furthermore, in recent years, China has been steadily enhancing operational capabilities in more distant waters to protect its expanding overseas interests. As for future indicators of the modernization of the military, in his remarks to the 19th National Congress in October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping proclaimed the goals of seeing that mechanization is basically achieved, IT application has come a long way and strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement by the year 2020, that by 2035 the modernization of its national defense and its forces is basically completed, and that by the mid-21st century the people’s armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces. These goals are said to be ahead of the target of the third stage of the “Three Stage Development **KEY WORD** Three Warfares China amended the Regulations of the PLA on the Political Work in December 2003 to add Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfares to the PLA’s mission. They are collectively referred to as the “Three Warfares.” U.S. DoD explains these warfares as follows: (1) Media Warfare is aiming at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests; (2) Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military and supporting civilian personnel; and (3) Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible repercussions of China’s military actions. **Chapter** **KEY WORD** Central Military Commission (CMC) The guidance and command institution of the PLA. Formally, there are two CMCs—one for the CCP and another for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the military forces. The strategic concept of active defense is seen as the essence of the CCP’s military strategic concept. It upholds the principles of defense, self-defense, and “post-emptive strike” (suppress the adversary after it attacks), and maintains that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” S th d f hit “Chi ’ N ti l D f i th N E ” (J l 2019) ----- Strategy, namely the basic modernization of the national defense and the forces by the middle of the 21st century, and it is expected that further acceleration of development of operational capabilities will be seen as China’s power grows. 3 Transparency Concerning Defense Policy and Military Capability China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. Moreover, China has not disclosed specific information such as possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of its national defense budget.[6] China had released defense white papers including “China’s National Defense” nearly every two years since 1998. China released white paper titled “China’s Military Strategy” in May 2015, but no more until July 2019, when it released a defense white paper titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” for the first time in approximately 4 years. In China’s defense white papers released in 2013 and 2015, the contents included limited topics and made no reference to national defense spending that was described in previous white papers. The overall description also decreased. Although the paper published in 2019 resumed referring to national defense spending, China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible nation in the international community. Incidents have been occurring that incite concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions.[7] For example, details have yet to be disclosed regarding the causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged navigation in Japan’s territorial waters in November 2004 although it constitutes a breach of international law. The submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this.[8] In recent years, amid the significant changes in the environment surrounding the military, including advances in specialization of the military and diversification of missions associated with strengthening of operational capabilities, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have become increasingly complex. Others opine that the military’s influential power on foreign policy decisions has been changing. Attention is to be paid to such situations also in terms of crisis management. Explanations that stoke concerns about Chinese military decision-making and actions are also evident in comments about the South China Sea,[9] where China is seeking to unilaterally change the status quo and to create a fait accompli. At the press conference after the U.S.-China Summit Meeting in September 2015, President Xi Jinping stated, “China does not have any intention to pursue militarization” in the South China Sea, but in February the following year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the facilities in the South China Sea as “necessary self-defense facilities” that China was developing in accordance with international law. In 2017, reports in official media asserted that China had rationally expanded the area of its islands and reefs in the South China Sea, to “strengthen the necessary military defense.” At the same time, China engages in a number of dialogues with the defense authorities of foreign countries. **10 Furthermore, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of** National Defense has held a press conference every month since April 2011 and spokesperson posts were established at such departments as the PLA Navy, PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and then-PLA Second Artillery Corps in November 2013. While China’s release of defense white papers and dialogue with the defense authorities of other countries help to increase transparency about defense policy and military capability, such actions are also regarded as moves to bolster the country’s media warfare. China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily. In order to allay their concerns over China, it is becoming more important for China to explain its military activities according to the facts and improve the transparency of its national defense policy and military capabilities. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific and accurate information. **Chapter** 6 The defense white papers “China’s National Defense in 2008,” “China’s National Defense in 2010” and “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (2019) provided a breakdown of personnel expenses, training and maintenance costs, and equipment costs for the limited FY2007, FY2009 and FY2010-2017 defense budget expenditures respectively (furthermore, those for FY2007 and FY2009 were divided into costs for active force, reserve force and militia). 7 For example, with respect to the incident of a Chinese naval vessel directing its firecontrol radar at a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer in January 2013, both the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave explanations which were inconsistent with the facts; in this case they have denied the use of the radar itself. With regard to the incident in which Chinese fighters flew abnormally close to MSDF and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) aircraft (May and June 2014), the Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave explanations that were contrary to the truth; it claimed that Japanese aircraft “entered the airspace for the Chinese drills without reporting to China and conducted dangerous acts.” Furthermore, in 2016, China repeatedly made claims that are contrary to the fact. In the case where Self-Defense Forces (SDF) aircraft scrambled against Chinese aircraft, China claimed that the SDF aircraft “conducted interference at close distance and shot IR flares, endangering the safety of the Chinese aircraft and its crew.” 8 When asked about the submerged navigation of a submarine at a regular press conference held by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 16, 2018, the spokesperson replied, “I do not have information about the circumstances of submarines.” 9 See Chapter 1, Section 2-6 (4) and Chapter 3, Section 5-1 (2) 10 S P t III Ch t 3 S ti 1 2 6 f l f di l ith J ----- **Fig. I-2-2-1** Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget 12,000 40 11,500 11,000 10,000 8,000 7,000 6,500 5,500 5,000 4,000 3,500 2,500 2,000 1,000 500 |on yuan)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Defense budget (in 100 million yuan) Year-on-year growth rate (%)||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 (FY) Note: This basically shows the defense budget within “the central government’s general public budget,” which had been named as “the central fiscal expenditures” prior to FY 2014. Year-on-year growth rate compares the budget of a given year against the initial budget of the previous year. Note that FY2002 defense budget was calculated based on the increased amount from the defense budget in the previous FY because only the amount and rate of growth were released. For FY 2016, FY 2018 and FY 2019, the amount of “the central government expenditures,” which are part of the central government’s general public budget, are used because only the central government expenditures were announced. **Chapter** In addition, it is noted that the amount of the announced defense budget is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures.[14] For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include foreign equipment procurement costs and research and development (R&D) expenses. See Fig. I-2-2-1 (Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget) 4 National Defense Budget China announced that its national defense budget for FY2019 was approximately 1,189.9 billion yuan.[11] This initial budget amount represented a growth of approximately 7.5% (approximately 82.9 billion yuan)[12] compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. China’s announced national defense budget has increased at a rapid pace every year since FY1989.[13] The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has grown approximately 48-fold in the 30 years since FY1989 and approximately 2.5fold in the 10 years since FY2009. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China continues to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. Attention is to be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth affects China’s national defense budget. 5 Military Posture China’s armed forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP),[15] and the militia.[16] It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA is defined as a people’s force created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Rocket Force, etc. 11 China’s national defense budget for FY2019 is equivalent to approximately 20,227.9 billion yen when it is mechanically converted using a rate of 17 yen per yuan (FY2019 rate that the Japanese Government uses for official purposes). 12 As in FY2018 figures for the FY2019 national defense budget were published only as part of the basic expenditures of the central government (which show the sum remaining after local transfer expenditures and other expenses have been deducted from central government expenditure). 13 China’s announced national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures achieved double-digit growth on the initial-budget basis every year from FY1989 to FY2015 except in FY2010. 14 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2019) estimates China’s military-related spending as having been at least US$200 billion in FY2018. 15 According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2002,” “(PAP) is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.” Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. The CCP Party and State Institutional Reform Plan released in March 2018 stated it would aim to reorganize the PAP by the end of the year based on the principle that “the military is the military, police are the police, and civil is civil” and that the postreorganization PAP will “mainly carry out patrols, respond to sudden emergencies, engage in counter-terrorism, protect China’s interests and undertake law enforcement at sea, and implement emergency relief and defense operations.” 16 The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities but has a duty to provide logistics support for combat operations in wartime. The defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2002” explains, “[u]nder the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief ff t d i t i i i l d ” A di t PLA D il ti l d t d O t b 9 2012 “Chi h i illi i iliti b ” f 2010 ----- **(1) Military Reform** China is currently carrying out reforms of the PLA which are seen as the largest in the country’s history. In November 2015, President Xi unveiled China’s official position on a specific direction of the military reforms for the first time, announcing that the military reforms would be carried out by 2020, which would include: establishment of “theaters” and a command structure for joint operations as well as reduction of troops by 300,000 personnel. Military reforms have rapidly taken shape. By the end of 2016 from what are called the “neck up” reforms, namely the center of the military level up, are reported to be basically complete. Specifically, they abolished the PLA’s seven Military Regions[17] and created five new theaters with primary responsibility for command of operations, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater. In addition, they also formed the PLA Army (PLAA) Headquarters,[18] Rocket Force (PLARF),[19] Strategic Support Force (PLASSF),[20] and Joint Logistics Support Force.[21] Moreover, the four general departments that were the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistic Support Department, and Equipment Development Department. Since 2017, military reforms have been making steady progress with the start of what are called full-scale “neck down” military reforms, namely the field level. For example, the expansion of the organization of the Navy Marine Corps, whose mission include amphibious landing operations, the unification of PAP leadership and command system under the CMC, and the reorganization from 18 Group Armies to 13. In March 2018, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that a reduction of 300,000 personnel had been basically completed. It is considered that these series of reforms are designed to build military forces that can fight and win wars by improving their joint operational capabilities and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the development of military capabilities and organizational management from peacetime.[22] In addition, it has been noted that the reorganization of the headquarters is a means of tackling corruption at the center of the military by strengthening the direct leadership of the CMC and its Chairman and decentralizing the leading organs. The total number of members of the CMC was reduced from the number sustained until recently,[23] with seven newly elected members including Chairman Xi at the 19th National Congress in October 2017. Since it has been noted that many people who have deep connections to Chairman Xi were appointed, it is thought that Chairman Xi’s command of the CMC, and thus the PLA, is to be further strengthened. While China is expected to continue these reforms, there are views that dissatisfaction is growing within the military because of the rapid military reforms.[24] Attention will focus on the outcomes of these military reforms, as the reforms will be completed by 2020. **(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces** China has made efforts to independently develop nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities since the mid-1950s, seemingly with a view to ensure deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintain its voice in the international community. It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter a nuclear attack on its territory by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a limited number of targets such as cities in the adversary’s country, should China be subject to nuclear attack.[25] The PLARF was newly established with equal status as the Army, Navy, and Air Force as part of the ongoing military reforms, suggesting that China will continue to attach importance to its nuclear and missile forces. China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: ICBM; SLBM; Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)/Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM); and Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability **Chapter** 17 Shenyang Military Region, Beijing Military Region, Jinan Military Region, Nanjing Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, and Lanzhou Military Region. 18 The PLA was considered a large organization of the Army, and therefore, a headquarters of the Army as a service did not exist. The ongoing reforms have given the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force the same status as the Army. 19 The new establishment of PLARF is seen as a de facto elevation of the Second Artillery Force. 20 PLASSF is identified as a new force for maintaining national security. Reportedly it is in charge of cyber, outer space, and electronic warfare capabilities. 21 The Joint Logistics Support Force is considered to be the first Chinese command dedicated to joint logistics support for the armed forces. 22 The report “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation” (February 2015) by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and the RAND Corporation identifies the weaknesses of the PLA as the following: (1) organizational structure (e.g., party-military relations); (2) organizational culture (e.g., corruption); (3) force structure (size of the PLA, recruitment system, veteran’s benefits); (4) command structure (e.g., military regions); and (5) human capital (e.g., decline in the quality and mindset of new soldiers stemming from the one-child policy, etc.). 23 There were 11 members in both the 17th (2007-2012) and 18th (2012-2017) CMC. 24 Veterans and others held demonstrations in front of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in October 2016 and near the building that houses the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in February 2017. Further demonstrations by them have taken place in several cities since June 2018. While a Ministry of Veterans Affairs was established under the auspices of the State Council in April that year to improve the treatment of veterans, some view these demonstrations and dissatisfaction with the military reforms as being interrelated. 25 In February 2018, in response to the announcement of the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States, the Chinese Defense Ministry stated that “China adheres to the policy of no-firstuse of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstance. Under no circumstances will China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.” On the other hand, the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2019) t t th t th i bi it th diti d hi h Chi ’ “ fi t ” li ld ld t l ----- and readiness. Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase performance by such means as extending ranges, improving accuracy, employing Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) and Multiple Independently targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV). China’s main ICBM, strategic nuclear asset, had been the fi xed-site liquid-propellant DF-5 missile. However, China has in recent years deployed the DF-31, which is a mobiletype ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a transporter-erectorlauncher (TEL), as well as the DF-31A, a model of the DF-31 with extended range, and it has been suggested that China will increase the number of DF-31A in particular. China is also viewed as developing a new ICBM known as DF-41. With regard to SLBM, it is considered that Jin-class SSBNs to carry the JL-2, whose range is expected to be approximately 8,000 km, are operational. It is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve signifi cantly by nuclear deterrence patrols using the Jin-class SSBNs.[26] Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China is also developing an extended-range SLBM, called JL-3, and a new SSBN to carry the SLBM. As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacifi c region including Japan, China has the mobile solid propellant DF21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, deploying the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) carrying conventional warheads, which could be used to attack overwater ships including aircraft carrier.[27] The DF-26,[28] which has a range including Guam, is considered a “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of the DF-21D, and it was announced in April 2018 that it had “formally joined the order of battle.” In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China possesses the CJ-20 (CJ-10), a long-range land-attack cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6, a bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles complement ballistic missile forces, covering the AsiaPacifi c region including Japan. China is likely operating these ASBMs and long-range cruise missiles to strengthen its “A2/AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF11, and they are deployed facing Taiwan. It is believed that their ranges also cover a part of the Southwestern Islands including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan. Furthermore, China is believed to be rapidly developing several hypersonic glide vehicles in order to acquire strike capability that will be able to penetrate missile defenses; these include a model called the WU-14 on a ballistic missile for launch.[29] In August 2018, China is believed to have tested a hypersonic glide vehicle featuring the “waverider” design. Moreover, it has also been pointed out that progress is being made on the development of the DF-17 missile capable of carrying hypersonic glide vehicles.[30] These are said to be more diffi cult for missiles to intercept, because they fl y low at very high speeds and are highly maneuverable. China is also thought to be devoting energies to the development of missile defense technology. It is believed to have conducted several tests on midcourse missile interception technology since 2010.[31] Given that ballistic missile defense technology has the potential to be applied to missiles capable of destroying satellites, attention will focus on future Chinese ballistic missile defense trends. See Fig. I-2-2-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)) **Chapter** See **(3) Ground Forces** China has the third largest ground forces in the world, following India and North Korea, with approximately 980,000 personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its military by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems through reforms, including those currently being implemented, in order to improve operational capabilities while pursuing **H-6 bomber** < Specifi cations, performance> Maximum speed: 1,015 km/h 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Main armament (H-6K): Air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum fi ring range 1,500 km) Indigenous strategic bomber. The H-6K, its latest version, can carry cruise missiles (CJ-20) that can be loaded with nuclear warheads. 26 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2019) indicates that “China continues to produce the JINclass SSBN, with four commissioned and two under rig” and that the SSBNs, which are equipped with JL-2 SLBMs, “are the country’s fi rst viable sea-based nuclear deterrent.” 27 DF-21D is called the “carrier killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]). 28 DF-26 is called the “Guam killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]). 29 China reportedly conducted total seven fl ight tests of its WU-14 from January 2014 to April 2016. Some reports refer to it as DF-ZF. 30 DF-17 fl ight tests were reported to have been conducted on November 1 and 15, 2017. 31 China claims that these tests were missile interception technology tests. However, it is pointed out that this was actually an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test. (See Chapter 3, Section 2-22 ) ----- **Chapter** **Chinese Modernization of Missile Forces** China has rapidly modernized its missile forces in recent years. Apparently symbolizing the modernization is the upgrading of the Second Artillery Corps as the core component of China’s missile forces to the Rocket Force at the end of 2015. In the modernization of nuclear forces, it is said that China has implemented initiatives to ensure nuclear counterattack capability to maintain nuclear deterrence, on the premise of strict political control over the capability. For example, China has been switching from liquid-fuel missiles to solid-fuel ones and from fi xed launching sites to road-mobile launchers to enhance the survivability and readiness of its nuclear forces. China has also been modernizing its naval and air nuclear weaponry. Since 2007, China has commissioned four Jin-class SSBN to carry the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) with an estimated range of about 8,000 km. It is pointed out that China has been planning and developing the longer-range JL-3 SLBM and a new SSBN. It is also pointed out that China has been developing nuclear-capable air- launched ballistic missiles. In the modernization of conventional missile forces, China has been enhancing its so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/ AD) capabilities to win a limited local war by developing the capability to conduct precision attacks while forestalling enemy attacks. China has also been improving precision guidance capabilities for ballistic and cruise missiles and extending cruise missile range. For example, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, “the aircraft carrier killer,” is viewed as capable of attacking overwater moving targets with competent terminal guidance technology. It is estimated that the CJ-20 long-range land-attack cruise missile with an estimated range of about 1,500 km can be mounted on the H-6K bomber to attack Guam and other targets within the Second Island Chain. China’s missile forces are put outside the framework of the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. China has deployed numerous ground launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 km that would be subject to dismantlement under the INF Treaty, prompting the United States to assert that another framework is required to control missile forces, including those of China. It is also believed that China gives priority to capabilities to break through enemy missile defense systems. China is thought to continue efforts to improve its capability of maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) and multiple independently- targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and, in addition, to develop hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and other so-called game- changing technologies. Relevant future efforts are attracting attention. Jin-class SSBN H-6K bomber with CJ-20s mounted DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile [Jane's by IHS Markit] [Jane's by IHS Markit] [Jane's by IHS Markit] Changes in number of ballistic missile launchers possessed by China 500 450 ICBM 400 ICBM DF-5/A/B IRBM 350 ICBM DF-31/A/AG 300 IRBM DF-4 250 MRBM IRBM DF-26 200 MRBM DF-3/A MRBM DF-21/A/B/C/D/E 150 SRBM DF-16 100 SRBM SRBM DF-15/A/B 50 SRBM DF-11/A 0 1991 2001 2011 2019 - The numbers of launchers, missiles, and warheads of ballistic missiles possessed by China are not publicized. - This data classifies the number of launchers possessed by China into ICBM, IRBM, MRBM, and SRBM according to the general standard based on “The Military Balance” of each year. ----- **Fig. I-2-2-2** Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) (image) the downsizing, multifunctionality, and modularization of New York Washington D. C. Chicago 11,200km Los Angeles 13,000km London San Francisco Paris 5,500km Anchorage 5,000km Moscow 2,800km 2,150km Hawaii Beijing Pyongyang New Delhi Tokyo Okinawa 2,150km Maximum range of DF-21, DF-21A/B/C/D/E Guam 2,800km Maximum range of DF-3, DF-3A 5,000km Maximum range of DF-26 5,500km Maximum range of DF-4 Jakarta 11,200km Maximum range of DF-31, DF-31A/AG 13,000km Maximum range of DF-5, DF-5A/B Canberra - The figure above is for illustrative purpose, showing the range of each missile from Beijing. military units. Specifically, it is believed to be improving mobility using measures such as switching from the past regional-defense model to a full mobile model, and working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. China is also believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force), amphibious forces,[32] special operations forces, and helicopter units. China is undertaking efforts to build a command system for improving its joint operational capabilities and operational efficiency, as well as carrying out reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. China has annually conducted maneuver-exercises that cut across multiple regions such as Stride, Firepower, and Sharp Sword. They are aiming at verifying and improving the capabilities necessary to deploy army troops to remote areas, such as long-distance maneuvering capabilities of the army, and logistical support capabilities that include mobilizing militias and public transportation. Furthermore, China has conducted combined military branch and service exercises under Joint Action since 2014, while a Central Theater Command Army brigade and the PLA Strategic Support Force reportedly have carried out joint training in **Chapter** October 2018. These suggest China’s intentions to improve its joint operational capabilities as well. See Fig. I-2-2-3 (Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army) **(4) Naval Forces** The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet; East Sea Fleet; and South Sea Fleet. The Chinese Navy has approximately 760 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.9 million tons. China’s naval forces are rapidly modernizing, and the Chinese Navy promotes the mass production of its indigenous Yuan-class submarines with superior quietness, as well as surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities. The Navy is also developing Renhai-class destroyers, the largest in the Navy, which are said to be equipped with a vertical launch system (VLS) capable of launching long-range land-attack cruise missiles and YJ18 anti-ship cruise missiles with a supersonic terminal attack capability.[33] It has also been noted that China is developing submarines capable of carrying land-attack cruise missiles. In addition, the Navy is increasing the number of large landing 32 The Navy Marine Corps, whose duties are thought to include amphibious assault and the defense of bases in the South China Sea, is also being enhanced. In its annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China” (May 2019), the U.S. DoD states that China’s Navy Marine Corps will be increased in strength to 30,000 personnel by 2020 and sees it likely that this force will also undertake expeditionary operations overseas. 33 It was reported in June 2017 that China launched the first Renhai-class destroyer, and had launched a total of four vessels by July 2018. The first one, “Nanchang,” appeared at the I t ti l Fl t R i i A il 2019 ----- **Chapter** **Fig. I-2-2-3** Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army (image) Central Theater (Headquarters: Beijing) Northern Theater (Headquarters: Shenyang) Shijiazhuang Jinan Qingdao Lanzhou Western Theater (Headquarters: Chengdu) Ningbo Southern Theater Fuzhou Eastern Theater (Headquarters: Guangzhou) (Headquarters: Nanjing) Nanning Zhanjiang 500km Notes: 1. ●Theater headquarters Theater Army organization Theater Navy headquarters Notes: 2.Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on DoD reports, media reports, etc. China Taiwan (Reference) Total military forces Approx. 2 million troops Approx. 0.16 million troops Ground troops Approx. 0.98 million troops Approx. 0.09 million troops Ground forces Type-99/A, Type-98/A, Type-96/A, M-60A, M-48A/H and others Tanks, etc. Type-88A/B and others Approx. 6,300 vehicles Approx. 1,200 vehicles Warships Approx. 760 vessels 1,899,000 tons Approx. 390 vessels 205,000 tons Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates Approx. 80 vessels Approx. 20 vessels Maritime forces Submarines Approx. 60 vessels 4 vessels Marines Approx. 25,000 troops Approx. 10,000 troops Combat aircraft Approx. 2,890 aircraft Approx. 500 aircraft J-10 × 426 Mirage 2000 × 55 Su-27/J-11 × 349 F-16 × 143 Su-30 × 97 Ching-kuo × 127 Air forces Su-35 × 24 (Fourth generation fighters (total): 325) Modern fighters aircraft J-15 × 20 J-16 × 60 J-20 × 12 (under tests) (Fourth and fifth generation fighters (total): 988) Population Approx. 1.39 billion Approx. 24 million The last conscripts were enlisted before the end Reference of 2018. However, the obligation to undergo four Term of service 2 years months of military training is being maintained for those born in or after 1994. Note: Data from “The Military Balance 2019,” etc. ships and supply ships. After September 2017, fast combat support ships (comprehensive supply ships) pointed out to be for supplying the aircraft carrier group were commissioned. With regard to aircraft carriers, following the commission of the first aircraft carrier Liaoning in September 2012, it appeared that China was continuing to conduct takeoff and landing tests and training using domestic J-15 carrier-based fighters mainly in the Bohai and Yellow Seas.[34] In December 34 In November 2013, the “Liaoning” advanced to the South China Sea for the first time and conducted test navigation there. The carrier is said to have advanced into the South China Sea b t J d J l 2017 d J 2018 ----- **Chapter** **Yuan-class submarine** < Specifi cations, performance> 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Water displacement: 3,600 tons Speed: Unknown Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring range 40 km), torpedoes New type of domestic submarine adopting air independence propulsion (AIP) technology, which provides long-distance submerged navigation and high degree of quietness. More of this type of submarine are under construction. 2016, the Liaoning participated in its fi rst comprehensive live action, live fi re exercise in the Bohai Sea with other vessels, including live fi ring by carrier-based fi ghters. Furthermore, later in the same month, it was confi rmed that the carrier advanced, together with multiple vessels, to the Pacifi c Ocean and the South China Sea. It was announced that the “Liaoning” advanced to the Pacifi c Ocean and conducted force-on-force training including carrier-based fi ghters from March to April 2018 after its participation in a naval review in the South China Sea. These activities are believed to indicate a further expansion of the distant deployment capability of the Chinese Navy. An indigenous aircraft carrier thought to be an improved version of the “Liaoning” with a ski-jump fl ight deck was launched in April 2017 and has been engaged in pre-commissioning sea trials since May 2018. Furthermore, China is reportedly building its second indigenous aircraft carrier, and it is suggested that this carrier is possibly equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system.[35] In view of these developments concerning the naval forces, China appears to be steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense.[36] It is pointed out that, among the militia, whose status is China’s armed force other than the military, the so-called **Renhai-class destroyer** < Specifi cations, performance> Full load displacement: 12,000 tons Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h) 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Main armament: Ship-to-surface cruise missiles, ship-toship missiles (maximum fi ring range of approximately 540 km), ship-to-air missiles (maximum fi ring range 150 km) Because it is the largest 10,000 ton-class destroyer in the PLA Navy, it is also referred to as a cruiser. It is currently being developed and its production is being expanded. **J-15 carrier-based fi ghter** < Specifi cations, performance> Speed: Unknown Main armament: Air-to-air 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 missiles, air-to-ship/ surface missiles (estimate) Carrier-based aircraft on the aircraft carrier Liaoning. It has many features in common with the J-11 and Su-33 fi ghters. maritime militia is playing the role of the front guard for supporting China’s maritime interests.[37] The maritime militia is said to operate in the South China Sea, etc.[38] and consist of fi shermen and residents of isolated islands. However, the details of the maritime militia have not been revealed. Given the China’s emphasis on the necessity of “fully exerting the overall power of the military, police and militia” on the seas,[39] attention is to be paid to these asymmetrical forces, too.[40] **(5) Air Forces** The Chinese Navy and Air force have approximately 2,890 combat capable aircraft in total. As for the fourth generation 35 It is suggested that China is conducting research on the electromagnetic aircraft launch system in order to overcome the limitations of the ski-jump confi guration, namely, few weapons and little fuel can be carried on the carrier-based fi ghter and fi xed-wing early warning aircraft cannot be operated. Additionally, in February 2018, major Chinese conglomerate China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation announced for the fi rst time the construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in its development strategy outline on its website, but later deleted the text. 36 China’s defense white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (July 2019) identifi es that the PLA Navy “has a very important standing in the overall confi guration of China’s national security and development,” as well as “is speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas” “so as to build a strong and modernized naval force.” 37 In April 2013, when Chairman Xi Jinping visited the maritime militia of Hainan Province to give encouragement, he reportedly gave instructions to the maritime militia to collect information on distant seas and actively conduct island construction activities and stated, “you are playing the role of the vanguard in protecting our maritime interests.” 38 For example, when Chinese naval and other vessels obstructed the U.S. Navy surveillance ship Impeccable on the high seas on the South China Sea in March 2009, maritime militia were said to be aboard the fi shing boat that tried to take away a sonar from Impeccable. It is also pointed out that when the deep-water drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 conducted prospective drilling to the south of the Paracel Islands from May to July 2014, steel-hull fi shing boats maned by maritime militia also arrived as an escort fl eet. 39 Instructions by Defense Minister Chang Wanquan (then) when he made an observation tour of the maritime militia equipment in Zhejiang Province in August 2016. 40 The status of China’s maritime militia under international law is said to be unclear. On the other hand, when asked in November 2018 about China’s maritime militia, Assistant Secretary of D f R d ll S h i t dl id “ ’ l i t t d i th l f th h ll th th ti it d th ti ” ----- fi ghters, China has imported from Russia the Su-27 fi ghter and the Su-30 fi ghter having anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities. In November 2015, China reportedly signed an agreement with a Russian state-run military company to purchase 24 Su-35 fi ghters, considered the newest fourth generation fi ghter, and is believed to have already taken delivery of all 24 fi ghters. China is also developing its own domestic modern fi ghters. China also has started the mass production of the J-11B fi ghter, which is allegedly a copy of the Su-27 fi ghter, and the domestic J-10 fi ghter. China’s domestic J-16 fi ghter, thought to be a copy of Russia’s Su30 fi ghter, has been put into deployment as combat-ready. China’s domestic J-15 carrier-based fi ghter thought to be modeled on Russia’s Su-33 carrier-based fi ghter is carried on the aircraft carrier “Liaoning.” Additionally, China is considered to have started deploying the J-20 fi ghter, said to be the fi fth-generation fi ghter, to operational units, and is also developing the J-31 fi ghter.[41] China is also continuing the modernization of its bombers with ground attack capabilities, and the Chinese Air Force has increased the number of H-6K bombers, which are believed to be capable of carrying land-attack cruise missiles with nuclear capability. The Chinese Air Force is believed to be developing new stealth bombers including a long-range one called the H-20. China is also making continuous efforts to improve capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air forces by introducing the H-6U and the IL-78M tanker and KJ-500 and KJ-2000 early warning and control aircraft.[42] Furthermore, in July 2016, China started the deployment of the indigenously developed Y-20 large cargo aircraft in order to enhance its transportation capability. China is also rapidly developing a variety of domestic unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),[43] including those capable of long-duration fl ights at high altitude for reconnaissance and other purposes (high-altitude long endurance [HALE]) and those capable of carrying weapons including missiles. Some of these are deployed and are actively exported. In fact, it is suggested that the Chinese Air Force has created an unmanned aerial vehicle unit with an attack role. In addition to the frequent use of UAVs for reconnaissance and other purposes in its surrounding sea areas and airspace, domestically, it is noted that China is improving “Swarm” technology[44] to operate a large number of low-cost UAVs. **J-10 fi ghter** < Specifi cations, performance> 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Maximum speed: Mach 1.8 Main armament: Air-to-air missiles (maximum fi ring range 70 km), air-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring range 120 km) China’s main fi ghter produced domestically. First deployed in 2003, and it is reportedly in mass production. **Chapter** **J-20 fi ghter** < Specifi cations, performance> Maximum speed: 3,063 km/h 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 A fi fth-generation stealth fi ghter jet. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced in February 2018 that the J-20 has started to be delivered to operational units. **KJ-2000 AWACS** < Specifi cations, performance> Details unknown 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Early warning and control aircraft. A Russian IL-76 strategic airlifter mounted with a radar dome. **Y-20 large cargo aircraft** < Specifi cations, performance> Maximum cruising speed: 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 796 km/h Maximum payload: 66,000 kg (estimate) Large multipurpose cargo aircraft independently developed by China. Deployed to military units in July 2016. Reportedly used as a development-base for assets such as air-refueling aircraft. Judging from the modernization of the Navy Aviation and the Air Force, it is believed that China is not only improving its defense capabilities for its national airspace, 41 It is suggested that in the future, the J-31 fi ghter could be turned into a carrier-based fi ghter or be exported. 42 The AG-600—the largest amphibious aircraft in the world, which China is developing indigenously—made its fi rst fl ight in January 2018 and is believed to have carried out its fi rst take-off and landing on water that October. Although it is claimed that it will be used for civilian purposes such as natural resource research, the possibility of its conversion to military use has been pointed out and some take the view that it will facilitate swift transport of personnel and supplies to the South China Sea. It has also been reported that China and Ukraine signed an agreement for consultations concerning the large transport aircraft An-225 for export to and production in China. 43 UAVs being developed by China include the HALE UAV “Xianglong” (Soar Dragon), considered the “Chinese Global Hawk;” the BZK-005, a UAV that can be used for multiple purposes, such as reconnaissance, communications relay, and signals intelligence; the GJ-1 “Wingloong” attack UAV; the CH-4 “Caihong;” and the CH-7 “Caihong.” 44 S Ch t 3 S ti 1 f “S ” t h l ----- **Fig. I-2-2-4** Major Chinese Navy and Air Forces |44|66| |---|---| **Chapter** Modern submarines Modern destroyers and frigates (Number of vessels) (Number of vessels) 6161 50 60 4646 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 [0] 0 [0] 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 - Total number of Jin-class, Shang-class, Song-class, Yuan-class and Kilo-class submarines *1 Total number of Luhu-class, Luhai-class, Sovremenny-class, Luyang-class and Luzhou-class destroyers, and Jiangwei-class and Jiangkai-class frigates *2 Additionally, China also has 40 Jiangdao-class corvettes (2019). Fourth and fifth generation fighters (Number of aircraft) 988 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 0 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19 Su-27 (J-11) Su-30 Su-35 J-10 J-15 J-16 J-20 (under tests) **(6) Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Spectrum Capabilities** Information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, increasingly rely on satellites and computer networks. As such, China stated that “outer space and cyberspace have become new commanding heights (capture point) in strategic competition among all parties,” and seems to recognize the importance of taking an information mastery in wartime, when it must protect its own information systems and networks while neutralizing those of its adversaries at the same time. China is considered to be emphasizing operational capabilities for information operations.[46] In fact, China established the PLASSF at the end of 2015 with a mission pointed out to be responsible for outer space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare. China is said to have developed its space program in Chinese small UAV drones using “swarm” technology [Jane’s by IHS Markit] but also making steady efforts to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in further distant areas and for long-range transportation.[45] See Fig. I-2-2-4 (Major Chinese Navy and Air Forces) 45 The defense white paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (July 2019) identifies “building airspace capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations” as a strategy for enhancing the military capabilities of the Air Force. 46 While the definition of information operations differs depending on the country, the PLA internally uses the definition of “actions using comprehensive electronic war, computer and network ti h l i l ti d th t tt k ’ b h i t tt k ith i t ” ----- **(7) Efforts to Develop Joint Operational Capabilities** In recent years, initiatives have been under way to improve joint operational capabilities. The CMC Joint Operations Command Center is believed to have been established as part of the initiatives for the CCP to carry out decision making at the highest strategic level. These actions have also been continuing during the current military reforms, and five new theaters, joint operation headquarters, were established in February 2016. Furthermore, as in January 2017, Vice-Admiral Yuan Yubai became the first non-army theater commander, it is assumed that progress is being made towards joint operations from the viewpoint of human resources. Given also that General Secretary Xi Jinping spoke about developing “strong and efficient joint operations commanding institutions for theater commands” and enhancing joint operational capabilities at the Party’s 19th National Congress in October 2017, these developments are thought likely to progress further. Moreover, in recent years, China has demonstrated a powerful awareness of practical warfare, conducting exercises with the aim of enhancing joint operational capabilities, such as the three services’ joint exercise held in 2018 for the second consecutive year. 6 Waters and Airspace Activities **(1) General Situation** Recently, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace. China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the maritime and aerial domains using its naval and air powers. Specifically in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan, Chinese naval vessels, and navy and air force aircraft have been observed conducting training and information gathering activities, as well as naval vessels heading for distant waters such as Indian Ocean. A large number of Chinese government ships that belong to maritime law enforcement agencies and their aircraft have been observed engaging in monitoring activities for the protection of its maritime rights and interests. These activities include: intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters by Chinese government vessels; intrusions into Japan’s airspace; and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, including a Chinese vessel’s direction of a fire-control radar at an Maritime SelfDefense Force (MSDF) destroyer, the flight of Chinese military fighter jets abnormally close to an Self-Defense the shortest time in the world. In December 2016, China published the white paper “China’s Space Activities,” which emphasizes the peaceful use of outer space but does not deny its use for military purposes.[47] In addition, it has been pointed out that public sector and state-owned enterprises involved in the use of space in China have close ties with the military, and it is considered that China is planning to improve its military operational capabilities in space.[48] Examples of China’s projects include the launch of the “BeiDou” positioning satellites to form a global satellite positioning system referred to as the Chinese version of GPS; this system is believed to have gone into operation worldwide in late 2018. Another example is a launch of an Earth observation satellite that is suggested to possibly be a reconnaissance satellite for military purposes. Moreover, China is thought to be developing weapons including antisatellite weapons using missiles and laser equipment, as well as killer satellites,[49] in order to restrict and interfere with the use of space-based assets by adversaries in wartime. China has also announced that it will “improve capabilities in support of the awareness of the state of cyberspace, cyber defenses, national cyberspace warfare.” It has been noted that current major military training always contains cyber operations such as both attack and defense of command systems. Cyber attacks on enemy networks are likely to bolster China’s “A2/AD” capabilities. It has also been pointed out that the Chinese military routinely conducts various force-on-force exercises in an electronic warfare environment. In addition, the presence of aircraft with electronic warfare capability has been noted. Not only Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft, which frequently fly near Japan, but also J-15 fighters and H-6 bombers that appear to be equipped with electronic warfare pod systems giving them electronic warfare capabilities are pointed out. A close watch on developments will continue to be required, because strengthened capabilities in the new domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum will not only result in greater operational capabilities throughout the Chinese military, but also lead to improved asymmetrical capabilities to effectively impede enemies from exerting their strength. See Chapter 3 Section 2 (Trends in Space Domain) Chapter 3 Section 3 (Trends in Cyber Domain) Chapter 3 Section 4 (Electromagnetic Domain Trends) **Chapter** 47 “China’s Space Activities 2016” states the objective of space exploration as utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes to promote human civilization and social progress and provide benefits to all humankind. At the same time, it also includes references to the demands of national security. 48 The Worldwide Threat Assessment (January 2019) by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence pointed out that China is continuing to improve its military and intelligence capabilities in space. 49 The Worldwide Threat Assessment (January 2019) by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence pointed out that China is training and equipping its military space forces and fielding new ti t llit (ASAT) t h ld US d lli d i t i k ----- entry into the Pacifi c Ocean and waters surrounding Japan.[50] At the same time, it appears that China continues to improve the quality of its activities, and efforts can be seen to build practical joint operational capabilities. **a. Activities in the East China Sea (including the Areas** **around the Senkaku Islands)** Chinese naval vessels have been conducting operations in the East China Sea continuously and actively.[51] Stating its own position regarding Japan’s Senkaku Islands, China alleges that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifi able and lawful. Chinese naval vessels have recently expanded the sea area of their regular activities to the south, and are continuously operating in the area near Japan’s Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate of the Chinese Navy entered Japan’s Forces (SDF) aircraft, and activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overfl ight, such as the establishment of the “East China Sea ADIZ.” Also in the South China Sea China is moving forward with militarization, as well as expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains. It is strongly expected that China will act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law, and that it will play active roles in the region and the international community in a more cooperative manner. See Chapter 3, Section 5 (Maritime Trends) See **(2) Military Developments in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and** **Airspace** The Chinese Navy and Air Force have in recent years expanded and intensifi ed their activities in the surrounding sea areas and airspace of Japan, including the area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. They are also conducting activities based on a unilateral claim on the Senkaku Islands, and cases involving the one-sided escalation of activities have been seen, creating a situation of great concern to Japan. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has continued to make frequent scrambles against Chinese aircraft, having reached an all-time high of 851 times in FY2016. It is thought that China intends to make a regular occurrence of the navigation of waters surrounding Japan by naval vessels making forays to the Indian Ocean and other distant waters, and of activities that appear to be Navy and Air Force exercises which accompany **KEY WORD** Government ships that belong to maritime law enforcement agencies Surveillance and other activities at sea used to be conducted by “Maritime Police” (Haijing) of the Ministry of Public Security, “China Maritime Surveillance” (Haijian) of the State Oceanic Administration of the Ministry of Land and Resources, “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” (Yuzheng) of the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture, “Maritime Safety Administration (Haixun)” of the Ministry of Transport, and the maritime anti-smuggling force of the General Administration of Customs, all of which were under the State Council. In March 2013, China decided to reorganize the four agencies, excluding “Maritime Safety Administration,” into the new “State Oceanic Administration” and that the new organization would carry out surveillance and other activities under the name of “China Coast Guard” (Zhongguo Haijing) under the guidance of the Ministry of Public Security. From July 2018, these maritime security units were placed under the command of the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and ultimately the Central Military Commission as the People’s Armed Police Coast Guard, but maintained the original name of China Coast Guard. **Chapter** **Shang-class submarine** < Specifi cations, performance> Full load displacement: 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 6,096 tons Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h) Main armament: 37 mm autocannons and 14.5 mm machine guns A new type of nuclear-powered attack submarine. In January 2018, one passed submerged through Japan’s contiguous zone around Miyakojima Island and the Senkaku Islands. **Dongdiao-class intelligence gathering vessels (AGI)** < Specifi cations, performance> Water displacement: 6,096 tons Speed: 20 knots 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 (approximately 37 km/h) Main armament: 37 mm and 14.5 mm autocannons In June 2016, one navigated through Japanese territorial waters near the Kuchinoerabujima and Yakushima Islands, subsequently navigated within the contiguous zone of Kitadaitojima Islands, and fi nally navigated back and forth east-west outside the contiguous zone off the south of the Senkaku Islands. It also navigated back and forth outside the contiguous zone off the southeast of the Boso Peninsula in February 2016 and other occasions. 50 Concerning the PLA, there is a view that by turning exception into normality through combining peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, China attempts to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international community tolerate and accept changes in the situation (Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report). 51 For example, a China Military Online article (October 21, 2015) reported that in recent years, the average number of days in a year that all major combatants in the East Sea Fleet of the Chi N d t d ti d d 150 d ----- contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. This was the first time a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, in January 2018, a Shang-class submerged submarine and a Jiangkai II-class frigate passed into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on the same day. This was the first time a submerged Chinese submarine was identified and announced as transiting through these contiguous waters off the Senkaku Islands.[52] In recent years, Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs) have also been found conducting multiple activities. A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly navigated back and forth outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015. In June 2016, the same type of AGI sailed in Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabujima Island and Yakushima Island, and then sailed within Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaitojima Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducted eastwest passages outside the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. This was the first navigation by a Chinese Navy vessel in approximately 12 years in Japanese territorial waters .[53] China’s air forces are also actively conducting activities in the East China Sea on a routine basis. Their activities include warning and surveillance, Combat Air Patrols (CAP), and training. PLA aircraft have been expanding their areas of activity eastward and southward in recent years. As a result of this incremental expansion, PLA aircraft have recently been confirmed conducting activities actively in airspace closer to the main island of Okinawa and the rest of the Southwestern Islands. The intent of the expanded activities of PLA aircraft may be to operate the “East China Sea ADIZ.”[54] In May and June 2014, incidents occurred where two PLA Su-27 fighters came abnormally close to MSDF and ASDF aircraft that were conducting normal warning and surveillance activities in the East China Sea[55]. In addition, in July 2017, two PLA J-10 fighters reportedly intercepted a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic reconnaissance aircraft. These are dangerous acts that may have unintended consequences. And in April 2018, an unmanned aerial vehicle presumed to be a Chinese BZK-005 unmanned reconnaissance vehicle was confirmed to be flying over the East China Sea. Regarding Japan’s airspace over and around the Senkaku Islands, territorial airspace intrusion by a fixed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Association (SOA) in December 2012 marked the first such instance by a Chinese aircraft. Subsequently, aircraft of the SOA were frequently observed flying near the airspace up through March 2014.[56] Recently, the scope of the activities of PLA aircraft near the Senkaku Islands has been expanding in the southward direction. In June 2016, ASDF fighters scrambled against PLA aircraft that flew southward closer to the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense released an official announcement that ran contrary to the facts, stating that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against the PLA aircraft. However, SDF aircraft conduct scrambles in accordance with international law and the SDF Law, and it is never true that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against PLA aircraft. **b. Advancements into the Pacific Ocean** Chinese Navy combatant vessels continue to transit the waters near Japan to advance into the Pacific Ocean and return to base with high frequency.[57] The advancement routes are multiplying. Chinese naval vessels have been confirmed transiting the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and have been found passing through the Osumi Strait, sea area between Yonagunijima Island and Nakanokamishima Island near Iriomotejima Island, the sea area between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island, Tsugaru Strait, and Soya Strait. By diversifying routes in this manner, China appears to be aiming to enhance its deployment capabilities to the open ocean, and considering remarks from high-ranking government officials, it is thought that China is also planning to make deployments to the Pacific Ocean sailing through waters near Japan regular activities.[58] Furthermore, considering the nature of the activities it is conducting in distant areas, China is presumably aiming to enhance operational capabilities on the open ocean. In December 2016, the aircraft carrier Liaoning navigated the East China Sea together with other vessels and passed the sea area between the main island of **Chapter** 52 In June 2018, a Japan Coast Guard patrol ship confirmed that the Chinese Navy Anwei-class hospital ship navigated the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands. 53 In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine conducted “submerged passage through the territorial sea of another country” in Japanese territorial waters in violation of international law. 54 In November 2016, a spokesperson of the PLA Air Force stated that the PLA Air Force had been continuously conducting patrols of the “East China Sea ADIZ”. See Chapter 3, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”) 55 See Chapter 3, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”) 56 For example, on March 7, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above water around MSDF Destroyer JS “Samidare,” which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On April 12, 2012, a Y-12 aircraft believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 50 m and as low as approximately 50 m above water around MSDF Destroyer JS “Asayuki.” 57 The number of times Chinese Navy combatant vessels have been active in the waters around the Southwestern Islands, Soya Strait and Tsugaru Strait since 2008 is: 3 times (2008), 2 times (2009), 4 times (2010), 5 times (2011), 13 times (2012), 21 times (2013), 14 times (2014), 12 times (2015), 15 times (2016), 12 times (2017), 15 times (2018), and 8 times (as of the end of June 2019, based on SDF announcements). 58 In March 2017, when Japan announced the transit of Chinese naval vessels between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, a Chinese Ministry of National Defense k id “All J d t d i t d t th f t th t ill th h ti i th f t ” ----- Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to advance to the Pacific for the first time. In April 2018, the aircraft carrier Liaoning and a number of vessels participated in a naval review and training in the South China Sea, and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that they passed through the Bashi Channel to advance to the Pacific and conducted forceon-force exercises that included carrier-based fighters. At that time, the MSDF, conducting warning and surveillance, confirmed for the first time the vessel used by what are presumed to be carrier-based fighters for take-off and landing on the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the aircraft carrier Liaoning advanced to the Pacific Ocean through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima island in June 2019, together with vessels such as a fast combat support ship pointed out to be for supplying the aircraft carrier group. The activities are worthy of attention as an indicators of the enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces, including aircraft carriers, and enhancement of its force projection capabilities to distant areas. With a Chinese Navy Shang-class submarine passing submerged from the Pacific Ocean toward the East China Sea from Japan’s contiguous zone northeast of Miyakojima Island in January 2018, it is thought that submarines also conducted some activities in the Pacific. In addition, in July 2017, a Chinese Navy Dongdiaoclass AGI sailed through Japan’s territorial waters southwest of Matsumae-kojima Island in Matsumae, Hokkaido, and subsequently sailed eastward through Tsugaru Strait and advanced to the Pacific Ocean. Regarding the advancement of air forces into the Pacific Ocean, the advancement of a PLA Navy Y-8 early warning aircraft into the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, was confirmed for the first time in July 2013. The advancement of Air Force aircraft into the Pacific was also confirmed in 2015. Since 2017, advances into the Pacific Ocean via this airspace have become more active, with flights totaling 18 passages in 2017, and 10 in 2018. This is a significant increase from the five flights confirmed in 2016.[59] The types of aircraft passing through the airspace are also diversified year by year. The H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighters were confirmed by 2016 and the first Y-8 EW aircraft in July 2017. It was confirmed by sight that at least one of the H-6K bombers that flew in September 2016 carried objects in the form of missiles.[60] Flight patterns have also been changing. Flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and from the direction of the Bashi Channel to the Pacific Ocean, both with the return trips on the same shuttle routes, have been repeatedly made. Since November 2016, H-6K bombers and other aircraft were frequently confirmed to be flying from the south of the Sakishima Islands to the East China Sea, passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and from the East China Sea toward the Bashi Channel passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island.[61] In August 2017, H-6K bombers advanced to airspace off the Kii Peninsula after advancing to the Pacific Ocean via passage between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island. Through the conduct of frequent long-distance flights of bombers and other aircraft, and the advanced flight paths and composition of military units, China is thought to be demonstrating its presence around areas including those surrounding Japan, and planning further enhancements to more practical operational capabilities. With regard to SDF aircraft scrambles against PLA aircraft advancing into the Pacific Ocean in October and December 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made false announcements that SDF aircraft shot IR flares, endangering the safety of the Chinese aircraft.[62] However, there is absolutely no truth to these announcements; SDF aircraft conducted scrambles in accordance with international law and the SDF Law. Additionally, activities considered to be planned to improve the capability to carry out sea and air joint operational capabilities, such as activities like air-to-ship attack drills when entering the Pacific Ocean, have also been seen in recent years.[63] China’s naval and air activities in the Pacific Ocean will be expanded and intensified further, and continued attention is to be paid for related trends. **c. Activities in the Sea of Japan** While the Chinese Navy has been active in the Sea of Japan during training and on other occasions for some time, its Air Force activities in the area have also intensified of late. “Force-on-force exercises” in the Sea of Japan by Chinese Navy forces were announced for the first time in August 2016, during which three aircraft participated in the exercise, including two H-6 bombers that passed through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan. In January 2017, naval **Chapter** 59 Since 2013, air forces have passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to advance to the Pacific Ocean 5 times (2013), 5 times (2014), 6 times (2015), and 5 times (2016). 60 The U.S. DOD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (August 2018) states that the H-6K bomber’s ability to carry the CJ-20 (CJ-10) land attack cruise missile, which allows for more long-distance attacks, allows China to target as far as the second island chain including Guam. It then pointed out that the Chinese military appears to be actually carrying out training in which the United States and its allies and partners are the targets. 61 When flights of this nature were confirmed in December 2017, a Chinese Air Force spokesperson stated that they were “‘island (Taiwan) encirclement’ drills.” 62 See Section2-2-6 (4); Chapter 3, Section 5-1 (2) 63 For example, when H-6 bombers and Su-30 fighters made forays into the Pacific Ocean via the Bashi Channel in December 2018, two combatant vessels were also navigating waters in th i i it l di t t k th i th t th d i j i t ti ----- vessels and aircraft were said to have carried out joint forceon-force exercises in the same area, in which eight aircraft, including six H-6 bombers passed through the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan. The Chinese Air Force flew through the Tsushima Strait for the first time in December 2017 to advance to the Sea of Japan. This passage included the simultaneous transit of the H-6K bombers and Su-30 fighters, and were the first Chinese fighter aircraft to advance into the Sea of Japan. In addition, the Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft that entered the Sea of Japan in February 2018 flew through the Western Channel (the strait between Tsushima in Nagasaki Prefecture and the Korean Peninsula) of the Tsushima Strait, and was the first time for a flight through the channel.[64] Activities in the Sea of Japan involving passages through the Tsushima Strait intensified further in 2018, with 17 passages by the Navy and eight overflights by the Air Force confirmed over the course of the year. This marks a substantial increase from the numbers confirmed in 2017 (four passages and two overflights). **[65] It is considered that** the PLA will continue to expand and intensify its activities in the Sea of Japan. **(3) Activities of Chinese Government Vessels Especially** **Around the Senkaku Islands** In December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance vessels hovered and drifted inside Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. These are not permitted under international law. Since then, China Maritime Surveillance and China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command vessels have intensified their activities in the aforementioned territorial waters. Such activities have been intensified greatly after September 2012, when the Japanese Government acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsurishima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). Since October 2013, Chinese government vessels have repeatedly intruded into these territorial waters, and the posture of the intrusions have become more reinforced.[66] China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Chinese government vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. For example, since December 2015, Chinese government vessels carrying weapons that appear to be cannons have begun to repeatedly intrude into A vessel of the CCG repeatedly intruding into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands [Courtesy of the Japan Coast Guard] Japan’s territorial waters. Additionally, government vessels deployed to seas near the Senkaku Islands are increasingly larger in size, with at least one of the government vessels intruding into Japan’s territorial waters being a 3,000 tons or larger-class vessel since August 2014. Since February 2015, three 3,000 tons or larger-class government vessels have been confirmed entering Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously multiple times. China is also presumed to operate two of the world’s largest 10,000 ton-class patrol vessels.[67] It appears that the operational capabilities of Chinese government vessels in the sea areas around Japan are also improving. In early August 2016, approximately 200-300 Chinese fishing boats advanced to the contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands. At that time, as many as a maximum of 15 Chinese government vessels were confirmed in the contiguous zone simultaneously, and later for five days a large number of Chinese government vessels and fishing boats repeatedly intruded into territorial waters. It was confirmed that the government vessels that advanced into those waters included many armed vessels.[68] This case appears to indicate that China has the capability to simultaneously inject a large number of government vessels including armed vessels in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands. These activities of Chinese government vessels in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands are attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by coercion. China’s actions to escalate the situation are totally unacceptable. In May 2017, it was confirmed that an object that appeared to be a small drone was flying above a Chinese government vessel intruding into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight also constitutes an invasion of **Chapter** 64 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that the PLA aircraft carried out “unusual reconnaissance activities” within South Korea’s ADIZ. 65 In 2016, the PLA Air Force flew over the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan three times, while the number of instances of its Navy sailing through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan each year since 2008 is as follows: 1 in 2008, 0 in 2009 and 2010, 2 in 2011, 0 in 2012, 2 in 2013, 1 in 2014, 2 in 2015, and 6 in 2016. 66 While with some exceptions, Chinese government vessels often intrude into Japan’s territorial waters two to three times a month from around 10 a.m. for about two hours. The number of vessels had been two to three until August 2016. Since then, four vessels often intrude into territorial waters in a group. 67 “China Coast Guard 2901” and “China Coast Guard 3901” are also reportedly conducting test navigation. These government vessels allegedly carry a 76 mm cannon. 68 Th ft f id A t fi d f ti it h i t i i t t it i l t b Chi t l t d t b t th l l b f l A t ----- **Fig. I-2-2-5** PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image) Examples of the PLA Navy and Air Force confirmed around Japan (photos: MSDF/ASDF) Legend Sea power Air power Shang-class submarine Aircraft carrier “Liaoning” H-6 bomber Su-30 fighter Advancement of a bomber all the Frequent advancements way to the area off the Kii Peninsula into the Pacific Ocean (August 2017) passing between Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Flight of a carrier-based Tokyo fighter (presumed) in the Pacific Ocean (April 2018) Amami **Chapter** Oshima Island Okinawa **2** Sea of Japan Miyakojima Island Yonagunijima Island The PLA Navy and Air Force’s Senkaku Islands activities in the Taiwan East China Sea Active advancement of air China-Russia joint naval Underwater submarine and power into the Sea of Japan exercise “Joint Sea destroyer’s intrusions into the 2017” Ningbo contiguous zone off the Senkaku Islands (January 2018) China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea 2019” Qingdao 500km *Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates. Changes in the Number of Scrambles against government vessels were confi rmed to be passing through **Fig. I-2-2-6** Chinese Aircraft (Times) 900 850 800 750 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (FY) territorial airspace and represents a unilateral escalation of the situation. Besides the waters around the Senkaku Islands, Chinese government vessels were confi rmed to be passing through the territorial waters of Japan around Tsushima (Nagasaki Prefecture), Okinoshima Island (Fukuoka Prefecture) and the Tsugaru Strait in July 2017. The same vessels were also confi rmed to have sailed in Japan’s territorial waters from Sata Cape to the Kusagakiguntou Islands (both in Kagoshima Prefecture) in August that year. Retired Navy vessels are believed to have been handed over to the China Coast Guard (CCG),[69] that was formally launched in July 2013. It was reported that the Navy and the CCG conducted a coordinated drill. It appears that the Navy is supporting maritime law enforcement agencies on both the operations and equipment fronts. In July 2018, the CCG was incorporated into the PAP under the centralized leadership and command of the Central Military Commission. The way of the military and the CCG cooperation in the future is worthy of attention.[70] See Fig. I-2-2-5 (PLA’s Recent Activities in the Surrounding Sea Area and Airspace of Japan (image)) Fig. I-2-2-6 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft) 69 It has been suggested that in 2015, Jiangwei I-class frigates and in 2012, Luda-class destroyers were handed over from the Chinese Navy to the CCG. 70 In December 2018, Rear Admiral Wang Zhongcai was reportedly appointed to the vacant position of commander of the CCG. This is expected to lead to stronger cooperation between the ilit d th li ----- **(4) Trends in Activities in the South China Sea** China has also been intensifying its activities in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some ASEAN member states. Since 2014, on seven features in the Spratly Islands,[71] China pressed ahead with large-scale and rapid land reclamation works.[72] The Philippines-China arbitration award issued in July 2016 denied the “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has made it clear that it would not comply with the award and is currently continuing to militarize the features, with the development of military facilities, such as batteries, and various kinds of infrastructure that can be used for military purposes including runways, ports, hangars, and radar facilities.[73] During the 19th National Congress in October 2017, General Secretary Xi reported the progress of the land reclamation work in the South China Sea as one of the accomplishments of economic development. In Fiery Cross Reef, a large harbor capable of receiving surface combatants was constructed. In January 2016, China declared completion of a 3,000 meter-long runway which fighters and bombers can take off from and land on, and aircraft test flights were conducted willfully against the protests from countries in the area.[74] In April 2016, a Navy patrol aircraft flying over the South China Sea landed at Fiery Cross Reef to evacuate emergency patients. At Subi and Mischief Reefs, in July of the same year, China conducted aircraft test fights willfully for two straight days on a runway where large aircraft can take off and land.[75] In January 2018, Y-7 transport aircraft were reported on Mischief Reef, and Y-8 special mission aircraft were confirmed on Subi Reef later in April that year. It has been noted that batteries capable of being equipped with anti-aircraft guns, missile shelters, underground facilities which are pointed out to be ammunition storages, are being built on these features. It has also been noted that the construction of this infrastructure has been completed. Additionally, in April 2018, it was reported that anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-surface cruise missiles were deployed in Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief Reefs as part of a military training, and that radar jamming systems were deployed on Mischief Reef. On the other four features, it is pointed out that the construction of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, has made progress and that what appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and close in weapon systems (CIWS) may have already been deployed. If these features are used for full-scale military purposes, it could significantly change the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. China has similarly carried out militarization of the Paracel Islands before its militarization of the Spratly Islands. China has extended the runway on Woody Island since 2013. In October 2015 and October 2017, China was reported to deploy J-11 and other fighters, and in February 2016 and January 2017, the existence of equipment likely to be surface-to-air missiles was confirmed. It has been noted that the takeoff and landing training of the H-6K bombers in the South China Sea announced by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in May 2018 was carried out on Woody Island. In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. It is pointed out that new land reclamations in the shoal might be seen in the future.[76] It is also pointed out that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities, runways, and other infrastructure in Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability to track the situation and power projection capabilities in the surrounding sea area and ultimately enhance its operational capabilities throughout all the areas of the South China Sea. Attention must continue to be paid to the situation going forward. The activities of the PLA in sea areas and airspace are expanding and intensifying as well. In March 2009, December 2013 and September 2018, Chinese naval and other vessels approached and intercepted a U.S. Navy vessel navigating in the South China Sea. In May 2016, February 2017 and May 2017, a PLA fighter allegedly flew close to U.S. Forces **Chapter** 71 The seven features are: Johnson South Reef; Cuarteron Reef; Gaven Reefs; Hughes Reef; Fiery Cross Reef; Mischief Reef; and Subi Reef. 72 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) notes that China added over 3,200 acres of land in the Spratly Islands by late 2015 and completed the land reclamation. 73 The international community also has repeatedly suggested that China is militarizing its activities in the South China Sea. For example, the U.S. DOD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (August 2018) states “The United States opposes further militarization of disputed land features,” recognizing that “China’s reclamation activities have far surpassed that of other claimants.” In June 2018, then Secretary of Defense James Mattis said, “China’s militarization of artificial features in the South China Sea includes the deployment of anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, electronic jammers, and more recently, the landing of bomber aircraft at Woody Island.” 74 China is believed to have conducted three test flights at Fiery Cross Reef on January 2, 3, and 6 of 2016. In response, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam expressed strong opposition on January 2, and the Philippines protested in writing on January 8. 75 On July 14, 2016, the spokesperson of the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that it was an infringement on Vietnamese sovereignty. 76 In March 2016, with regard to China’s activities near Scarborough Shoal, U.S. Chief of Naval Operation John Richardson stated, “I think we see some surface ship activity and those sorts of things, survey type of activity, going on. That’s an area of concern...a next possible area of reclamation.” Moreover, in November 2018, it was reported that China installed a facility of what appears to be an information collection sensor on the Bombay Reef in the Paracel islands without undergoing massive reclamation. The possibility of China conducting the same type of t ti ti iti i t ti t i i i l ti i th S b h Sh l h b i t d t ----- Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia); Chapter 3, Section 5 (Maritime Trends) **(5) Trends in the Indian Ocean and Other Seas** The Chinese Navy is considered to be shifting its naval forces towards “protection missions on the far seas,” and is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years. For example, since December 2008, Chinese Navy vessels sail in the Indian Ocean to the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to take part in international counter-piracy efforts. Activities of Chinese Navy submarines are also beginning to be confirmed continuously in the Indian Ocean. In 2014, a Song-class submarine reportedly called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice in the same year. This marked the first time that a Chinese submarine entered a foreign port. It is reported that in May 2015 and May 2016, a Yuan-class submarine and a Shang-class submarine respectively called at a port in Karachi, Pakistan, and in January and September of 2017, a Song-class submarine and another submarine reported to be a Yuan-class submarine called at a port in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Besides the Indian Ocean, in September 2015, five Chinese vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas in the Bering Sea and sailed in U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands. Moreover, in January 2018, China published a white paper entitled “China’s Arctic Policy,” which mapped out a policy of active involvement in Arctic initiatives, including efforts to build a “Polar Silk Road” through the development of Arctic sea routes. Additionally, China has been remarkably trying to secure overseas bases such as harbors, which would help support its operations in far seas. For example, in August 2017, China began operation of “support base” for logistics support of the PLA in Djibouti, a strategic point in East Africa facing the Gulf of Aden, and it has been ascertained that a pier has been constructed on the coast adjoining the base facilities since April 2018. As observers have pointed out that 48,000ton supply ships — the largest available class of the PLA — can be accommodated at this pier, there is a possibility that this facility will substantially increase the Chinese military’s aircraft, etc. In July and August 2016, after the PhilippinesChina arbitration award was rendered, PLA Air Force H-6K bomber aircraft conducted “combat air patrol” in the airspace close to Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that this patrol would “become normal.”[77] In September of the same year, the China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea 2016” was conducted for the first time in the South China Sea. A field training exercise by naval vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” and a naval review ceremony, regarded as the largest since the founding of China, was conducted in the same area from the end of March until April 2018. It is also reported that Chinese naval vessels are constantly active in some waters of the South China Sea.[78]There was an event where Chinese government vessels fired warning shots at fishing boats of neighboring countries. In this manner, it appears that China seeks to expand its military and other forms of presence and enhance its operational capabilities in the South China Sea.[79] Such activities by China unilaterally change the status quo and further advance its efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States.[80] In response to the growing international concerns over the development on the features, China asserts that some of the ASEAN member states including the Philippines and Vietnam are illegitimately occupying features of the Spratly Islands and carrying out large-scale construction work to build fixed facilities such as airstrips.[81] However, China’s development work on the features is of a scale incomparable to the activities carried out by other countries and is conducted at a rapid pace.[82] In any case, the issues over the South China Sea are of concern to the entire international community due to their direct implications for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Countries concerned, including China, are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law. See Fig. I-2-2-7 (China’s development on the features of the Spratly islands) **Chapter** 77 There are reports that Chinese H-6 bombers flew along the “nine-dash line” in March 2015 and December 2016. Also, in December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that its Air Force aircraft carried out “flight training and other activities around the islands.” 78 In November 2017, it was reported in a local newspaper that Delfin Lorenzana, Secretary of National Defense of the Philippines said that Chinese warships were constantly active near Sandy Cay in the Spratly Islands. In addition, in April of 2018, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) pointed out that the Chinese Navy and CCG Ships regularly visited the artificial islands in the Spratly Islands. 79 China is reportedly constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point out that the base is in a strategically important location that secures access to the South China Sea as well as the Pacific, and that China is advancing construction work in order for the base to play a role as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, including for the deployment of aircraft carrier. 80 As a concern from the United States, for example, in May 2018, the U.S. DOD canceled the PLA’s invitation to RIMPAC stating, “China’s continued militarization of disputed features in the South China Sea only serves to raise tensions and destabilize the region.” As regards the concerns of the international community, for example, at the G7 Taormina Summit held in May 2017, the Leaders’ Communique stated that “[w]e remain concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and strongly opposed to any unilateral actions that could increase tensions.” 81 Remark by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on April 29, 2015. 82 The U.S. DoD’s “The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” (August 2015) states, “As of June 2015, [China] had reclaimed more than 2,900 acres of land” and “China has now reclaimed 17 ti l d i 20 th th th th l i t bi d th t 40 ti f i t l 95% f ll l i d l d i th S tl I l d ” ----- **Fig. I-2-2-7** China’s development on the features of the Spratly islands |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Example of militalization ruary 2010 February 2016 Hughes Reef Radar and Artillery communications facilities batteries Aircraft hangars and runway August 2014 March 2017 Fiery Cross Reef urces) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / Digital Globe| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||||||| ||||Image|of the S|outh Ch|ina Sea|||||| ||||||||||||ruary 2010| ||||P||||||Feb|Feb|| |||||aracel Is|lands||||||| ||||||||||||| |||Woody|Island||Scar|boroug|Philip h Shoal|pines|||| |L|aos||||||||||| |||Vietna|m|Spr Gaven|atly Is|lands|es Reef||||Aircraft hangars| ||||||Reefs|Hugh|||||| ||Fi|ery Cro|Subi ss Reef|Reef||Mischi|ef Reef||||| |||Cuartero|n Reef|||Johnso|n South|Reef|||| ||||||||||||| ||South|Luconia|Shoal|Br|unei||||||| |“|Nine-|dash li|ne” Mala|ysia|||||||| ||500|km|||In|done|sia||||| |* im|age||||||||(Photo so||| ||||||||||||| Example of militalization Image of the South China Sea February 2010 February 2016 Paracel Islands Woody Island Philippines Scarborough Shoal Laos Hughes Reef Vietnam Spratly Islands Radar and communications facilities Artillery batteries Gaven Reefs Hughes Reef Subi Reef Aircraft hangars Fiery Cross Reef Mischief Reef and runway Johnson South Reef Cuarteron Reef South Luconia Shoal Brunei “Nine-dash line” August 2014 March 2017 Malaysia Indonesia 500km Fiery Cross Reef - image (Photo sources) CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / Digital Globe logistical support capabilities. In recent years, China has been promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative[83] whose main purpose is advertised as establishing an economic zone in regions including the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counterterrorism capabilities in coastal states through joint exercises. Furthermore, while it is thought that the initiative includes a strategic intention to expand its infl uence in the region, it is possible that the construction of infrastructure based on the initiative will further promote the activities of the PLA in the Indian Ocean, Pacifi c Ocean and elsewhere. For example, by supporting the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and other Indian Ocean countries, it is possible that China attempts to secure ports to call, and further improve the operational capabilities of the PLA Navy in the further waters such as the Indian Ocean. |Example of militalization|Col2| |---|---| ||February 2016| **Chapter** in defense white papers, China’s geographical location and globalizing economy, the water and airspace activities of the Chinese Navy, Air Force and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives. The fi rst is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territory, territorial waters and territorial airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology. The second is to develop capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unifi cation of China. To ensure the prevention **KEY WORD** “Belt and Road” Initiative A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping. The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are collectively referred to as the “Belt and Road” Initiative. **(6) Objectives of Activities in Waters and Airspaces** Taking into consideration such factors as the development and activities of Chinese naval and air forces, statements 83 China is collaborating on port development projects and other programs with local governments at such ports as Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong P t i B l d h ----- of foreign intervention in the Taiwan issue, China needs to enhance its operational capabilities at sea and airspace as Taiwan is surrounded by the sea in all directions. The third is to weaken the control of other countries and to strengthen the claim through various surveillance activities and use of force, at sea and in airspace surrounding the island to which China claims territorial sovereignty. The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying in the East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that in addition to the existing 4 platforms, China is building 12 new offshore platforms on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013.[84] In late June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface vessel radar and a surveillance camera was confirmed on one of the platforms. Attention is to be paid to developments of the platforms by China, including the purpose of such equipment. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such work.[85] The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential for the globalizing Chinese economy. The specific areas of its sea lanes which the Chinese Navy deems to defend depend on such factors as the international situation at the time. However, given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they have been developing a capacity to defend areas past China’s near seas to more distant seas. Given these objectives in China’s water and airspace activities and recent trends, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its water and airspace activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea areas and airspace. For example, in April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) member states have unexpected encounters. Also, in June 2018, Japan and China started implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between the Defence Authorities of JapanChina to avoid unexpected situations between SDF and PLA vessels and aircraft.[86] 7 International Military Activities In recent years, the PLA has been emphasizing nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster rescue, and counterpiracy. In order to carry out these missions, it has actively dispatched its units overseas. It is believed that in the background of the PLA’s stance on international military activities is the expansion of China’s national interests beyond its national borders, which in turn increased its necessity to protect and promote its national interests overseas, as well as China’s intent to raise its stature by demonstrating its will to fulfil its responsibilities to the international community. China vows to consistently support and actively participate in UN PKO. According to the Ministry of National Defense of China, it has sent more than 37,000 military personnel to it.[87] According to the United Nations, as of the end of April 2019, China has a total of 2,497 troops, civilian police and military observers — the largest number of peacekeepers among any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council — engaged in UN peacekeeping activities, including the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). China has also largely increased its UN budget allocation for PKO.[88] China has a growing presence in UN PKO. It is deemed that underlying China’s proactive attitude towards UN PKO is China’s wish to strengthen its relations with the regions where PKO are conducted, particularly with African nations, by way of these activities. Moreover, China has been actively participating in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. In 2011, in view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China carried out a military evacuation of Chinese **Chapter** 84 On November 1, 2016, Foreign Minister Kishida (then) revealed that additional gas field drilling was taking place in that sea area and stated that “it is extremely regrettable that [China] is continuing with acts towards unilateral development.” 85 With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, in September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan for implementing the so-called “June 2008 Agreement.” While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out that China is highly likely carrying out gas production in the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) and elsewhere. Meanwhile, China’s SOA announced that the “Haiyangshiyou 981” oil rig succeeded in its first drilling in the South China Sea in May 2012. 86 See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2 6 (China) 87 According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense website (May 2019). In September 2017, China announced that it had registered 8,000 troops under the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System. 88 China’s share of the UN PKO budget was approximately 6.6% in 2015, ranking it sixth. It then increased significantly in 2016, exceeding Japan and ranking China second after the United St t It h i 2018 i i t l 10 2% Chi ’ t ib ti t th UN R l B d t i 2019 d 2020 i d l t th t f th U it d St t t ki J ----- nationals for the first time. In 2015, based on the worsening situation in Yemen, the Chinese Navy’s counter-piracy forces evacuated foreign nationals, including one Japanese national, living in Yemen. More recently, when a dam in Laos collapsed in July 2018, the PLA, which was conducting a joint medical rescue exercise with the Laotian military at the time, engaged in rescue operations at the request of Laos. While these activities have received international praise, it has been pointed out that, through such activities, China aims to build a pacifist and humanitarian image of its military forces and demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, its intent to place priority on military operations other than war. It is also suggested that China hopes to test its ability to promptly project its military power to distant locations. 8 Education and Training In recent years, the PLA has promoted practical exercises including large-scale ones such as joint exercises led by theater commands, force-on-force exercises, landing exercises, and exercises that step across military regions and theaters, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. President Xi repeatedly stating the goal of “being able to fight and winning battles” is construed as evidence that the PLA is promoting the implementation of more practical exercises. The new military training regulations in effect since January 2018 referred to the execution of joint and full-spectrum operation based on network information systems, in addition to the definite implementation of practical training as a rule. Moreover, the trial regulation on the supervision of military training that took effect in March 2019 is regarded as China’s first attempt to put in place a system that prescribes measures to rectify practices that are inconsistent with the requirements of actual combat and criteria for identifying malpractice and discipline violations during military training. In the education spectrum as well, the PLA aims to train soldiers who have the ability to execute joint operations. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint and informatized operations, and of building joint and informatized armed forces. It was reported in 2017 that the PLA National Defense University began training to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations. On the other hand, in recent years, a variety of issues have been raised in relation to benefits, including remuneration, and the personnel development system. China outlined the promotion of “rule of law” at the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2014, and it is thought that the PLA will also be required to thoroughly implement the “rule of law.” One example is Chairman of the CMC Xi Jinping’s comment at the 90th anniversary commemorating the formation of the PLA held in August 2017 that the “military be controlled by law.” Additionally, in October of the same year, Miao Hua, Director of the Political Work Department, and Zhang Shengmin, Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, were selected as members of the 19th Central Military Committee, the supreme decision-making body in the military. China has been developing wartime mobilizations systems in order to effectively utilize private resources in case of emergencies, including wars. In 2010, China enforced the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization into effect. The “civil-military fusion” policy that China is currently promoting is believed to have its sights set on the routine military use of civilian resources. For example, civilian vessels have recently been observed transporting military equipment and it is possible that such activities will continue to be proactively implemented going forward. 9 National Defense Industry Sector While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed that China places emphasis on enhancing its military industrial sector including the advancement of producing indigenous equipment to modernize its military. It has been pointed out that China is acquiring such equipment not only through an ambitious program of technology research and development, along with foreign direct investment, but also via illegal means, in the form of cybertheft.[89] The civil-military fusion strategy, which President Xi views significant as a national strategy, is also being promoted in the field of defense technology,[90] and reform in the Chinese defense industry is under progress. Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China has formed 12 group corporations to develop **Chapter** 89 The U.S. DOD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2019) notes that China uses cyber technology and other means to acquire foreign sensitive, military and dual-use technologies. In November 2018, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Chinese intelligence officers on suspicion of having used cyber attacks and other means to steal aviation technology from private companies in other countries. 90 As a specific example, in the field of engine development and manufacturing for aircraft, where the progress of proprietary development is limited, when a state-owned enterprise i li i i i t bli h d i A t 2017 P id t Xi Ji i h i d th “ l f i f ilit d i il d l t ” ----- **Chapter** **Chinese Civil-Military Fusion** China in recent years has promoted Civil-Military Fusion (CMF) as a national strategy in addition to the traditional development of national defense mobilization for the military use (including requisition) of civil resources in emergency. CMF is viewed to include not only the national defense mobilization system in emergency but also the promotion of the military use of civil resources in peacetime and in times of emergency as well as the transfer of military technologies to the private sector. The promotion of CMF is expected to allow the PLA to improve the efficiency of military force enhancement, taking advantage of civilian technologies, including high technologies. In fact, President Xi Jinping has reportedly emphasized initiatives in maritime, space, cyber, artificial intelligence and other “emerging areas for China” as the CMF priorities at such occasions as the first meeting of the Central Commission for Integrated Civil-Military Development in 2017. In addition, standardized commercial products in the production stage for potential requisition will be more suitable for actual requisition. Accordingly, the future effects of CMF on PLA operational capability improvement are attracting attention. and produce nuclear weapons, missiles, rockets, aircraft, vessels, and other conventional weapons. In doing so, China promotes, in particular, two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy, and, in turn, civilian technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national defense. As a result, specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, **3** **Relations with Countries and Regions** 1 General Situation China, particularly regarding maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order, including attempting to change the status quo by coercion. China remains poised to fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise, which has included making steady efforts to turn its acts into faits accompli. It has advocated building a “community of shared future for mankind”[91] and, while referring to promoting the building of a “New Model of Major Country Relations” based on mutual respect, equitable justice, cooperation, and “win-win,” is promoting its “Belt and Road” Initiative as a national strategy. Furthermore, there have also been moves the aviation industry, and the shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, China encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries. China is thus thought to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries. There is a possibility that the modernization of the PLA will be further pushed forward by proactively introducing advanced technologies from overseas in this way. toward creating its own international order, including the establishment of a China-led multilateral mechanism,[92] and it has been noted that China has tried to influence political decisions in other countries through efforts such as winning over foreign politicians.[93] On the other hand, moves to review projects have been seen among some countries cooperating in the “Belt and Road” Initiative, due to such factors as their deteriorating financial situation. At the same time, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, China proactively carries out military exchanges in its relationships with other countries. In recent years, China has been engaged in dynamic military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring 91 General Secretary Xi, at a Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in June 2018, underlined the “thought on socialism with Chinese characteristic for a new era,” specifically, the enforcement of the building of” a community with a shared future for humanity,” the progress of “Belt and Road” Initiative, the development of global partnerships and leading the reform of global governance systems. 92 China seeks to implement its own initiatives in the security realm; at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), China criticized military alliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people of Asia.” In the international finance domain as well, China plays a leading role in establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 93 In submitting an amendment to national security legislation to the Parliament of Australia in December 2017, then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull said in his speech, “Media reports have suggested that the Chinese Communist Party has been working to covertly interfere with our media, our universities and even the decisions of elected representatives right h i thi b ildi W t k th t i l ” ----- countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the objectives of China’s promotion of military exchanges are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China’s infl uence in the international community, securing stable supplies of natural resources, and building foreign bases. China is believed to position military exchanges as a strategic means to safeguard its national interests. 2 Relations with Taiwan See 4-1 of this section (Relations with China) Abnormal approach by a Chinese naval vessel to a U.S. Navy vessel, reportedly occurred in the South China Sea [Jane’s by IHS Markit] grounds of China’s unfair trade practices over many years. China has also responded with countermeasures such as the phased raising of import duties. **[95] Furthermore, the United** States regards China as one of the “revisionist states” trying to shape the world along its own authoritarian model, and has indicated that the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition by these revisionist powers is a central challenge to its prosperity and security. With this as a backdrop, the United States recognizes that China is pursuing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacifi c in the near future through the modernization of its military and other efforts.[96] Additionally, in the MDR published in January 2019, the U.S. DoD indicated that it perceives the missile capabilities of China and other states as a threat to the military forces of both the United States and its allies. China has strongly opposed such a perspective by the United States. Regarding the Senkaku Islands, the United States has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the islands. This was confi rmed in a document between the Japanese and U.S. leaders for the fi rst time in February 2017, in the joint statement from the fi rst Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting since the inauguration of the Trump administration, which explicitly referred to the application of Article 5 of the Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. China has shown strong protest to these views. With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in sea lanes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China to comply with international norms, and has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and **Chapter** See 3 Relations with the United States There are various issues between the United States and China, such as trade issues, issues concerning the South China Sea, the Taiwan issue, and human rights issues in China. However, China deems its relationship with the United States as one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships and appears to be aware that a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential in enhancing its national power, including the development of its economy. Accordingly, while demonstrating an uncompromising stance on its “core interests and major concerns,” China is trying to further develop relations with the United States through mutual respect and “win-win” cooperation.[94] Although China and the United States are thought to want stable bilateral relations to continue going forward, the recent movements of both countries keeping each other in check are attracting great concern. Since the start of the Trump administration, the United States has made frequent statements on the necessity of cooperation between the United States and China on issues such as North Korea. At the same time, it also called on China to uphold international rules and norms on global issues, including international trade and maritime security. Amid this situation, the Trump administration has been toughening its stance on China since June 2018 through such measures as the phased raising of import duties, on the 94 Then Vice President Xi Jinping fi rst used the “New Model of Major-Country Relations” in talks with then U.S. President Obama during his visit to the United States in 2012. China explains that the concept is based on: (1) no confl ict, no-confrontation; (2) mutual respect; and (3) win-win cooperation. However, it is said that President Xi Jinping made no mention of it when he met with U.S. President Donald Trump after April 2017. 95 For example, the United States has expressed criticism of China’s “Made in China 2025” hi-tech industrial development policy of subsidies and other measures, on the grounds that it involves unfair business practices that improperly disadvantage the economies of the United States and other countries. China’s foreign investment law was passed at the second annual session of the 13th National People’s Congress, which took place in March 2019. While the law includes provisions banning forced technology transfer from foreign companies and imposing legal liability in respect of infringements of intellectual property rights, some have questioned its effectiveness. 96 U it d St t N ti l D f St t (J 2018) ----- assertive actions.[97] And the United States also implements the Freedom of Navigation Operation[98] in the South China Sea to counteract excessive claims to maritime interests by other countries such as China. In May 2018, DoD disinvited China to RIMPAC held in that year because of “China’s continued militarization of islands in the South China Sea.”[99] That September, a Chinese naval vessel came within 45 yards (about 41 meters) of US Destroyer Decatur when it was conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea. Embracing these differences, it can be seen that both the United States and China have continued military exchanges in a relatively stable manner.[100] A hotline between the defense authorities of the two countries was set up in April 2008. In November 2014 and September 2015, the United States and China announced that they agreed on confidencebuilding measures aimed at reducing the risk of unintended encounters. China has also dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint exercises have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on the occasions of mutual port visits. In addition, the U.S. and Chinese militaries have engaged in annual humanitarian and disaster relief exercises since November 2013. After the inauguration of the Trump administration, both countries frequently mentioned the importance of bilateral military exchanges, and a series of new dialogue frameworks were launched. For example, in April 2017, it was decided at the U.S.China Summit Meeting that the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue would be established as part of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue, and the first meeting was held in June of the same year and the second meeting was held in November 2018.[101] Also in 2017, the U.S.-China Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism was established and the first dialogue was held in November of the same year. However, there are movements which indicate change in the military exchanges that have transitioned rather stably in recent years. The second dialogue under the Joint Staff Dialogue Mechanism, which was due to take place in September 2018, was reportedly postponed. Moreover, the Defense Authorization Act for FY2019, which includes a clause to prohibit inviting China to RIMPAC until the demilitarization of the South China Sea is achieved, was approved in the U.S., and the U.S. also decided not to send its vessels to the International Fleet Review that China hosted in April 2019. While wanting a better relationship with China, the United States has demonstrated an uncompromising stance on matters concerning its own security and economy. Developments in U.S.-China relations will continue to require close monitoring with keen interest. 4 Relations with Russia Ever since the so-called China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of GoodNeighborliness and Friendly Cooperation[102] was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order, and have further deepened their relations. On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China.[103] Meanwhile, their trade amounts are said to be declining in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China; however, it is suggested that China still shows strong interest in continuing to import Russia’s advanced equipment. For example, as well as introducing what are believed to be the latest fourth generation Su-35 fighters, China signed a contract in 2014 to purchase S-400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia. Delivery of these missile systems began in 2018 and the Chinese military is reportedly testing them. At the same time, it is pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia and of differentiating the performance of the weapons it exports. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing **Chapter** 97 See footnote 80. 98 See Chapter 2 Section 1-1 for the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” conducted by the U.S. in the South China Sea. 99 Chinese naval vessels participated in the same exercise conducted in 2014 and 2016. 100 There were instances in the past, when the U.S. DoD notified Congress of the sale of weapons to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010, where China notified the United States to cancel the major military exchanges with them. However, in cases of recent notices, although China vigorously protested, it has made no remarks about canceling military exchanges with the United States, and has taken a more restrained approach than in the past. 101 It was reported that, at both 1st and 2nd meetings, consultations were held on the issue of North Korea, the South China Sea, and U.S.-China military exchanges, among other matters. 102 Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace. 103 A di t St kh l I t ti l P R h I tit t (SIPRI) R i t f 70% f Chi ’ i t f 2014 t 2018 ----- with China in arms exports.[104] Military exchanges between China and Russia take place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and joint exercises. For example, in 2018, China participated in the Vostok 2018 exercise, which is said to have been one of the largest Russian military exercises since the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the two countries have held the large-scale naval joint exercise “Joint Sea” since 2012,[105] and held it, for the first time, in the Baltic Sea and Sea of Okhotsk in 2017. In 2016 and 2017, the two countries held “Aerospace Security,” a joint missile defense computersimulated exercise. China likely regards these exchanges as an opportunity to learn about the operating methods of Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces, which have combat experience. Furthermore, China holds the joint counter-terrorism exercise “Peace Mission” between China and Russia or among the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO; established in June 2001) member countries including China and Russia.[106] In addition, China and Russia made a bombers’ flight, in which they gathered in the Sea of Japan, to the East China Sea in July 2019 with China’s announcement of “the first time joint strategic flight.” 5 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries** As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, reciprocal summit-level visits and other activities continue to be carried out actively. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China, the ROK) and AARF. In November 2018, Premier Li Keqiang attended multilateral meetings in Singapore including the ASEAN Plus One Summit. Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations through infrastructure development support, etc. under the “Belt and Road” Initiative. On the military front, China has made efforts toward military confidence building, such as the first ASEAN China Maritime Field Training Exercise, which took place in October 2018, following on from a tabletop exercise held that August. In September 2017, a submarine identified to be a Yuan-class submarine also visited Malaysia. These efforts can also be considered to have the objective of securing bases for the activities of the PLA Navy in the distant sea areas of the Indian Ocean. Some ASEAN member states are likely to have concerns about China’s advance into the South China Sea, but in 2018, no conflicts between China and these countries over territorial rights in the South China Sea have apparently intensified. The Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings[107] against China regarding their disputes over the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In July 2016, a final arbitration was made where most of the content of the allegations were accepted. However, against the backdrop of China providing the Philippines with substantial economic support, the Philippines is said to have refrained from referring to the ruling.[108] The statement at the 31st ASEAN Summit in November 2017, when the Philippines held the chair, mentioned improved relations between China and ASEAN, and did not express any concerns about the situation in the South China Sea.[109] However, concerns about the situation in the South China Sea were expressed anew in the Chairman’s Statement of the 32nd ASEAN Summit (April 2018), which was chaired by Singapore. At the same time, in July 2017 and March 2018, the Vietnamese government reportedly made foreign companies engaged in oil drilling in the South China Sea with the permission of the Vietnamese government cancel the drilling under the pressure from China. This is regarded as an example of China flexing its muscles with its unilateral demands. Additionally, China and ASEAN are continuing to discuss the formulation of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC) and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced in November 2018 that he hoped to complete negotiations within three years. See Chapter 3 Section 5 (Maritime Trends) **Chapter** 104 It is suggested that China is plagiarizing, copying, and reverse-engineering military science technologies, including redesigning its own J-11B fighter based on the Russian-made Su-27 fighter. Feeling strong discontent and casting doubts over China, it is suggested that Russia is cautious about supplying state-of-the-art equipment to China, such as the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 surface-to-air missile. For example, Russia has allegedly requested that the agreement regarding the supply of Su-35 fighters requires the payment of a vast amount of compensation if China produces copied fighters. It has also been noted that Russia may supply only the S-400 missiles with relatively short ranges. 105 Joint Sea was held in April 2012, July 2013, May 2014, May and August 2015, and September 2016 in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok, northern East China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Peter the Great Gulf, and the South China Sea, respectively. Although it did not take place in 2018, it was held from April to May in 2019 off the coast of Tsingtao and within Chinese territorial waters. 106 The Peace Mission exercise was held among China and Russia in August 2005, July 2009, and July to August 2013, and among the SCO member countries including China and Russia in August 2007, September 2010, June 2012, August 2014, September 2016, and August 2018. 107 See Chapter 3, Section 5-1. 108 It had been pointed out that over the last several years China had been dispatching maritime law enforcement vessels appearing to belong to the CCG around Scarborough Shoal to interfere with Philippine fishing boats approaching the Shoal. According to CSIS/AMTI, it was confirmed that Philippine fishing boats were operating around Scarborough Shoal even after the Philippines-China Summit Meeting in October 2016. In November of the same year, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the matter of Philippine fishermen conducting fishing was dealt with appropriately based on friendship.” 109 Thi th fi t ti th t b t th it ti i th S th Chi S t ti d i th Ch i ’ t t t t th ASEAN it i M 2014 ----- **(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries** The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders, and there are lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations, such as terrorism by Islamic extremists in Central Asian states. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s engagement in SCO. Some note that China has recently been beefing up its involvement in efforts to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Moreover, China is strongly interested in the abundant natural resources of Central Asia, with a view to diversify its supply source and procurement methods of these resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations. **(3) Relations with South Asian Countries** China has traditionally maintained a particularly close relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their summit leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in the military sector, including exporting weapons and transferring military technology, is also considered to be deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China accordingly, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a development plan for power facilities and transportation infrastructure in the region stretching from the Port of Gwadar, where China is assisting construction, to Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, is a flagship project of the “Belt and Road” Initiative. While some have pointed out that the project has run into difficulties due to Pakistan’s deteriorating financial situation, the project’s progress is expected to increase China’s influence in Pakistan.[110] China and India have undemarcated border areas.[111] Additionally, China and Bhutan, which has close relations with India, claim territorial rights over the Doklam Plateau, and the area saw a standoff between Chinese and Indian military forces that lasted from June to August 2017. On the other hand, China has recently striven to improve its relationship with India, while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan.[112] Because China identifies the relationship with India as a strategic partnership, the leaders of the two countries actively conduct mutual visits. As a background to progress the relations with India, there seems to be an emphasis on economic growth of the two countries, and a response to closer US-India relations. In recent years, China has also been deepening its relations with Sri Lanka. Initially after taking office, President Maithripala Sirisena, who had campaigned to shift from a diplomacy oriented towards China to ominidirectional diplomacy and won the election in January 2015, suspended the Colombo Port City development projects financed by China. However, he subsequently announced the resumption of the projects in January 2016, and new development projects with China are also showing progress. In July 2017, an agreement was reached to lend interests to Chinese enterprises at the Port of Hambantota, which is being constructed with Chinese loans. Some have noted that these moves constitute what has been described as a “debt trap.” Additionally, China is deepening its relations with Bangladesh, such as by developing the harbor in Chittagong where a naval base is located and exporting arms.[113] With regard to military exchanges, China has conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003, including joint naval search and rescue exercises and counter-terrorism exercises. In December 2018, China and India resumed their joint “Hand-in-Hand” counter-terrorism exercise, which had been interrupted by the Doklam standoff. **(4) Relations with European Countries** For China, the European Union (EU) countries are now as an important partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargo against China which has been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.[114] EU member countries possess more advanced military related technologies than China or Russia regarding information communication technology, avionics, and air independence propulsion (AIP) systems for submarines and other areas. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were **Chapter** 110 China announced that it would invest US$46 billion in CPEC. Although China is reported to have increased the sum it plans to invest to US$62 billion, it has been noted that some individual projects have been subject to delays and cancellations. 111 They include the Kashmir region and the state of Arunachal Pradesh. 112 At the meeting with Prime Minister Mohdi of India in September 2017, President Xi Jinping is reported to have stated that “China and India must adhere to the basic judgment that they will regard each other as chances for development and not pose a threat to each other.” 113 According to SIPRI, Bangladesh accounts for 16% of China’s arms exports from 2014 to 2018, which is the second largest share. 114 For example, in November 2010, then Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, and on this occasion, China and France announced a joint statement that included text supporting the lifting of the arms embargoes against China. It is deemed that some EU countries have positive opinions about the lifting of their arms embargoes against China. In its December 2018 li th EU t Chi t th t th b b lift d t l d t ----- lifted, the weapons and military technologies of EU countries could transfer to China and be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. Although it was explicitly stated in the EU’s strategy against China, which was adopted for the first time in 10 years in July 2016, that the position concerning the arms embargo against China remains unchanged, there is still need to pay continuous attention to future discussions within the EU. Additionally, China and Ukraine have close ties in the field of arms procurement, as indicated by China’s purchase of the unfinished Ukrainian Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Varyag,” which was the basis of the aircraft carrier “Liaoning.” Therefore, the relationship between these two countries will attract attention going forward.[115] **(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, Pacific** **Island countries, and Central and South American** **Countries** China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm, including providing active assistance for their infrastructure development and investment in their resource and energy development, and has been further expanding its influence in the region. In recent years, not only are there intensive interactions among state leaders and senior military officials, but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted. China also actively dispatches personnel to undertake UN PKO in Africa. Some view that underlying these movements could be China’s aim to ensure a stable supply of natural resources and to secure overseas bases in the future. In December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, followed by Burkina Faso in May 2018, while re-establishing relations with China. In terms of China-Australia relations, a Chinese company’s agreement with the Northern Territory Government of Australia to lease Darwin Port raised debates over security.[116] China has also been boosting its relations with the Pacific island countries. Its activities in Papua New Guinea include resource development and it has signed an agreement on military cooperation with the country. Though proactive and continuous economic assistance has also been implemented in other islands, Australia and other countries have also expressed their concerns over these activities by China.[117] Furthermore, moves to bolster military-related ties with Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga are also being seen. China has been striving to further deepen its relations with Central and South American countries. For example, Chinese senior military officials have continuously visited countries, such as Argentina and Brazil and ministerial meetings between China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) have taken place since 2015. In June 2017, Panama severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, followed by the Dominican Republic and El Salvador in May and August 2018, respectively, while establishing relations with China. 6 International Transfer of Weapons The total of China’s arms exports have surpassed the total of imports since 2013. China has been expanding provision of weapons such as small arms, tanks, aircraft, and UAVs to developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas. Specifically, it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya, to Central and South American countries including Venezuela, and to Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Iran. Some claim that China transfers weapons in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with friendly nations, enhance its influence in the international community, and secure natural resources. China does not participate in some of the frameworks of international arms export control, and some point out that there is proliferation of missile-related technology and others from China.[118] Attention will be paid to whether China will increase the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community. **Chapter** **KEY WORD** Arms embargo against China EU countries announced the suspension of arms sales to China as a measure against the suppression of human rights in China during the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. However, the actual embargoed items are ultimately left to the interpretation of the individual member countries. China continues to seek the lifting of the arms embargo against China, and there are movements towards reconsideration within the EU. 115 China appears to be continuing its development of the engine for its fifth-generation fighter aircraft and, through stock acquisition and the establishment of a joint venture, is reportedly trying to promote cooperation with Ukrainian company Motor Sich, which has advanced engine manufacturing technology. 116 In November 2015, at the U.S.-Australia Summit Meeting in Manila, then U.S. President Obama reportedly told his counterpart that the United States would have liked a “heads up” about Australia’s lease of Darwin Port to a Chinese company and to “Let us know next time.” 117 In January 2018, Australia’s Minister for International Development and the Pacific, Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, was reported to have said that China’s investments in infrastructure in several Pacific island countries were “basically white elephants” and that “we don’t know what the consequences are when [nations] have to pay back some of these Chinese loans.” 118 For example, China does not participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and some observers point to proliferation of Chinese missile-related technology to P ki t d th t i ----- **4** **Military Capabilities of Taiwan** actions, claiming them to be “actions taken by China that compress the international space of Taiwan.” At the same time, China also announced preferential measures to encourage people to move from Taiwan to China to study or work and, among other remarks,[125] General Secretary Xi stated at the 19th National Congress in October 2017 that China “would like to share the development opportunities on the mainland with our Taiwan compatriots.” In a January 2019 speech at an event commemorating the 40th anniversary of China’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” General Secretary Xi Jinping advocated a fivepoint proposal for managing relations with Taiwan,[126] stating that “Our compatriots in Taiwan will not be absent from the process as the Chinese people head toward our great rejuvenation” and “The specific form of the ‘one country, two systems’ model in Taiwan will give full consideration President Tsai Ing-wen observing an exercise by the Army with President Benitez of Paraguay (October 2018) [AFP/Jiji] 1 Relations with China China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic one. China maintains that the “one-China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for dialogue between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unification, and expresses that it would take up policies and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and to protect their due authority. Meanwhile, China is strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unification of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and on this basis, China has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force.[119] “The Anti-Secession Law,” enacted in March 2005, also clearly lays out the nonrenunciation of the use of force by China.[120] In her inaugural address upon taking office in May 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party did not outline a clear stance regarding the “1992 Consensus,” which China positions as the political foundation of crossStrait relations and which exemplifies the “One China” policy.[121] China responded by criticizing the speech as an “incomplete test paper” and announced that it had already suspended exchanges with Taiwan.[122] Also, before and after the inauguration of President Tsai, Taiwanese delegates were refused attendance to or had their invitations deferred to meetings held by international organizations.[123] Since the inauguration of the Tsai administration, five countries severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, while they established relations with China.[124] Taiwan is strongly protesting these **Chapter** 119 At the January 2019 event to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, General Secretary Xi Jinping said, “We make no promise to renounce the use of force.” 120 The law stipulates, “[in] the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 121 In May 2016, President Tsai said in her inaugural address that she “respect[s] this historical fact,” referring to the fact that China and Taiwan had, in 1992, “arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings” through communication and negotiations. However, in January 2019, responding to General Secretary Xi’s major speech at the event commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, President Tsai explained Taiwan’s position, stating, “we have never accepted the ‘1992 Consensus.’” 122 In June 2016, a Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council spokesperson announced that the exchange mechanism had already been suspended since May 20. 123 Recently, Taiwan was unable to participate in the May 2019 World Health Organization (WHO) annual meeting for three consecutive years, which it had attended as an observer since 2009. Taiwan claims that this was due to Chinese lobbying. According to an announcement by Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after a request from China, Nigeria forcibly closed Taiwan’s mission in July 2017, and the governments of Ecuador, Bahrain, Papua New Guinea, Jordan and other countries asked Taiwan to remove “Republic of China” and “Taiwan” from the name of its missions and replace it with “Taipei.” 124 In December 2016, São Tomé and Príncipe severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan, followed by Panama doing so in June 2017, the Dominican Republic and Burkina Faso in May 2018 and El Salvador in August 2018, while they established relations with China. Taiwan currently has diplomatic relations with 17 countries. 125 In February 2018, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council announced 31 preferential treatment measures including enrollment in schools and support of employment from Taiwan. That September, the Chinese government began issuing residence cards to residents of Taiwan who have resided in mainland China for at least six months. The card reportedly makes enrolling in social insurance, using public facilities, and accessing financial services more convenient for the holder. 126 At the commemorative event, General Secretary Xi advocated the following principles: (1) working together to realize reunification; (2) exploring a “one country, two systems” approach suitable for Taiwan; (3) insisting on the “one China” principle; (4) deepening cross-Strait development with a view to reunification; and (5) fostering a common spirit among the ----- to the situation in Taiwan, and declared that the political discrepancy between China and Taiwan “must not be passed down for generations to come.” On the same day, President Tsai responded with a statement firmly rejecting the “one country, two systems” model and called for negotiations between “government-authorized agencies.” However, President Tsai resigned as chair of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) after the ruling party was defeated in the combined local elections held in November 2018. Per the election, attention focused on the victory of Kuomintang candidate Han Kuo-yu in the mayoral election for the southern Taiwanese city of Kaohsiung, which the DPP had consistently won for the previous 20 years. Han stood on a platform of improved relations with China to promote regional economic revitalization. Initiatives associated with the Xi administration’s policy on Taiwan and the direction of Sino-Taiwanese relations will be a focus of attention ahead of the next presidential election in 2020. Both China and Taiwan have put forth their own assertions regarding the Senkaku Islands, but Taiwan has a negative attitude toward cooperating with China.[127] 2 Military Capabilities of Taiwan Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has put forth a vision such as: a military strategy of “resolute defense, multidomain deterrence;” “Cultivation of a Professional Military;” and “Strengthening of information, communications, and electronic warfare capabilities.” In December 2017, Taiwan published its first national defense report under the Tsai administration. The report changed the existing force concept from “victory on beach areas,” to “preservation of warfighting capability, pursuing decisive victory in the littoral area, and annihilating the enemy in the beach area,” and made its first mention of military cooperation with the United States and insisted that their cooperation made a progress both qualitatively and quantitatively. The United States has started to approve the sale of weapons to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act[128] and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which was signed into law in December 2018, mentions regular arms sales to Taiwan and the encouragement of visits to Taiwan by high-level U.S. government officials. Aside from the purchases from the United States, Taiwan is moving forward with the development of its own equipment, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (2017 QDR) published in March 2017 emphasizes Taiwan’s willingness to promote the development of the defense industry, especially indigenous production of weapons and equipment. For example, in June 2016, the Taiwan Navy announced a policy to switch over major ships, including submarines, to an indigenous shipbuilding program. Taiwan adopted conscription in 1951, but it has been switching to a volunteer system to improve the expertise of its military personnel, among other objectives, and the last of the conscripts were enlisted before the end of 2018. However, the obligation to undergo four months of military training is being maintained and Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense describes the Taiwanese system of military service as a dual-track mix of conscripts and volunteers. [129] With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 93,000 personnel. Other than this, it is believed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses the indigenously built “Tuo Chiang” stealth corvette, among other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters,[130] Mirage **KEY WORD** Message to Compatriots in Taiwan These open letters to Taiwan published by the Chinese side (such as the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress) are regarded as Chinese policy documents on Taiwan. Five of these letters have been published to date (one in 1950, three in 1958, and one in 1979); and as the one published by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in 1979 included references to ending the cross-Strait military confrontation and expanding exchanges between China and Taiwan, it is described as the document in which China changed its Taiwan policy from armed liberation to peaceful unification. **Chapter** 127 Taiwanese vessels intruded Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands three times in 2012. Taiwan’s foreign minister issued a statement on the Senkaku Islands in February 2013 titled “Our Position on Not Cooperating with Mainland China.” 128 The U.S. administration notified Congress in September 2018 that it intended to sell fighter aircraft parts and other arms worth approximately US$330 million (approximately 37.3 billion yen) to Taiwan; in April 2019, the administration notified Congress that it intended to sell fighter training programs and other arms worth approximately US$500 million (approximately 55 billion yen); in July 2019, the administration notified Congress that it intended to sell M1A2T tanks and other arms worth approximately US$2.2 billion (approximately 242 billion yen); in August 2019, the administration notified Congress that it intended to sell F-16C/D Block70 and other arms worth approximately US$8 billion (approximately 880 billion yen). This marks the fifth arms deal with Taiwan under the Trump administration, following on from the sale of arms in June 2017. In April 2018, the U.S. government reportedly gave U.S. companies permission to engage in business talks with Taiwan about building submarines. 129 In February 2019, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense issued a press release stating, “Reports that the conscription system will be ended are incorrect,” noting that a four-month period of military training would continue to be imposed. 130 The Taiwan Air Force is moving forward with the upgrade of its F-16A/B fighters to F-16V fighters with enhanced radar performance, etc. It was reported that the first four aircraft h d d t th Ai F t th d f M h 2019 d th t th di d f bi h t f ll 144 i ft l t d f l ti b 2023 ----- 2000 fi ghters, Ching-kuo fi ghters, and other assets. 3 Military Balance between China and Taiwan While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a signifi cant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget has remained mostly unchanged for nearly 20 years. China’s offi cial military budget in 2018 was roughly 16 times the amount of Taiwan’s.[131] Amid this situation, President Tsai has ordered an increase in Taiwan’s defense budget.[132] In the “National Defense Report 2017,” Taiwan acknowledged rapid growth in China’s military capabilities along with signifi cant advances in military reforms, integrated operations, weapons development, and overseas base construction and pointed out that “the military threat is growing for Taiwan.” It also mentions that Chinese military fi ghters and destroyers are active around the island, fl aunting the country’s military capabilities to Taiwan.[133] While the PLA proceeds to expand its missile, naval, and air forces, it still remains to be the Taiwan military’s challenge to modernize its equipment. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows: 1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, their capability of landing and invading the island of Taiwan is limited at this point in time.[134] However in recent years, China has been steadily improving its landing and invasion capabilities, such as building large amphibious ships. 2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been rapidly strengthening its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan used to have superiority over China.[135] 3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has been strengthening its ballistic missile defense, including upgrading PAC-2 to PAC-3 and newly introducing PAC-3. However, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles and other assets with ranges covering Taiwan. Taiwan is deemed to lack effective countermeasures. Comparison of military capabilities should be made based not only on the performance and quality of the military **Chapter** **Fig. I-2-2-8** Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget performance> (100 million Taiwan dollars) (%) Speed: 43 knots 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 3,000 20 (approximately 80 km/h) 2,500 15 Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring 2,000 10 This is Taiwan’s indigenously built corvette. With its 500 -5 stealth design that leaves it relatively undetectable to 0 -10 warfare capability that could strike landing ships and Source: Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan’s “National Defense Reports” and the Defense budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars) Year-on-year growth rate (%) (100 million Taiwan dollars) (%) 4,000 30 3,500 25 3,000 20 2,500 15 2,000 10 1,500 5 1,000 0 500 -5 0 -10 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 (FY) Source: Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan’s “National Defense Reports” and the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan **Corvette “Tuo Chiang”** < Specifi cations, performance> Full load displacement: 567 tons 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Speed: 43 knots (approximately 80 km/h) Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring range 200 km), torpedoes This is Taiwan’s indigenously built corvette. With its stealth design that leaves it relatively undetectable to radar, the corvette is regarded as a form of asymmetrical warfare capability that could strike landing ships and major naval vessels. 131 This figure was obtained by comparing China’s announced FY2018 defense budget of approximately 1,106.951 billion yuan and Taiwan’s announced FY2018 defense budget of approximately 323.1 billion Taiwan dollars by converting them into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for FY2018 released by the Central Bank of Taiwan (US$1 = 6.611 yuan = 30.156 Taiwan dollars). China’s actual defense budget is reportedly larger than the amount announced, and therefore, the actual difference in the defense budgets of China and Taiwan could be greater. 132 At a ceremony held at the Navy Command Headquarters in August 2018, President Tsai highlighted the indigenous development of equipment and the improvement of defense capability, before stating that she had ordered an increase in defense expenditure “to meet the needs of national security,” stressing that the budget increase is an expression of Taiwan’s resolve in regard to national defense. In the 2016 general election, President Tsai made a commitment to increase defense expenditure to 3% of GDP. 133 Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels appeared not to have been active in the vicinity of Taiwan after late June 2018, but military aircraft activity around Taiwan reportedly resumed from December that year. The Taiwanese military suggested that the temporary suspension of Chinese military activity around Taiwan was possibly due to the weather or “verifi cation (by China) following the end of the phased training.” 134 In August 2018, it was reported that the unpublished annual report on China’s military power sent by the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense to the Legislative Yuan stated that the Chinese military did not have the proper operational capabilities for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, as it still lacked a means of transport for landing and logistical support capabilities. 135 China has 988 fourth and fifth-generation fighters, whereas Taiwan has325. In addition, China has 78 destroyers and frigates and 64 submarines, whereas Taiwan has 24 and 4, ti l F th Chi i i d th i ft i Li i d l h d i di i ----- **Fig. I-2-2-9** Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan **Chapter** (Number of Aircraft) 1,000 950 900 China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, Su-35, J-10, J-15, J-16, J-20) 850 800 Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage2000) 750 700 650 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 (Year) Source: “The Military Balance” (of respective years) capability and equipment, but also on various factors such as the purpose and aspects of the assumed military operations, the operational arrangements, the skill level of the personnel, and the logistics. Nevertheless, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be growing year by year. Going forward, attention is to be paid to trends such as the strengthening of Chinese and Taiwanese forces, the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the United States, and Taiwan’s development of its own main military equipment. See Fig. I-2-2-8 (Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget) See Fig. I-2-2-9 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan) ----- **Section** **3** **Korean Peninsula** On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the ROK and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.6 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia. See Fig. I-2-3-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula) See **Chapter** |3-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Gen Nav Pyo U. U.S.||||nt dquarters Kaecho rs P ampo Hwan Sagot-ri orces rters uarters Ku|Toksan n Taejo yongyang Chunghwa gju Panmunjom Seoul Suwon Osan Pye Pyeongtaek Taeg nsan Kwangj Mokpo||Or Chaho Mayangdo Mukho U.N Hea U.S ongtaek u Chinhae u Busan||ang|||| |||eral Staff Departme y Headquarters ngyang Defense Hea||nt dquarters||||||||| |||||||||||||| |||Air Force Headquarte||||||||||| |||N||||||||||| |||S.-ROK Combined F Command Headqua||orces rters||||U.N Hea U.S|. Command Headq dquarters of U.S. F . 2nd Infantry Divisi|uarters orces Korea on Headquarters||| |||7th Air Force Headq||uarters||||||||| |||||||||||200km||| |||||North Kore|a||R||OK||U.|S. Forces in Korea| |Total armed forces|||Approx. 1.28 million personnel|||Approx. 625,000 personnel|||||Approx. 26,000 personnel|| |Army|Ground troops||Approx. 1.1 million personnel|||Approx. 490,000 personnel|||||Approx. 18,000 personnel|| ||Tanks||T-62, T-54/-55, etc. Approx. 3,500|||M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Approx. 2,510|||||M-1A2SEPv2|| |Navy|Naval vessels||Approx. 780 111,000 tons|||Approx. 240 217,000 tons|||||Supporting corps only|| ||Destroyers Frigates Submarines||4 25|||12 13 14||||||| ||Marines|||||Approx. 29,000 personnel||||||| |Air Force|Combat aircraft||Approx. 550|||Approx. 640|||||Approx. 80|| ||Third and fourth generation fighters||Mig-23 × 56 Mig-29 × 18 Su-25 × 34|||F-4 × 60 F-16 × 163 F-15 × 59|||||F-16 × 60|| |Reference|Population||Approx. 25.38 million|||Approx. 51.42 million||||||| ||Term of service||Men: 12 years Women: 7 years|||Army: 18 months Navy: 20 months Air Force: 22 months||||||| Note: 1.Data from “The Military Balance 2019,” etc.; Data for the troop strength of the U.S. Forces Korea from DoD information (December 2018) 2.ROK is reducing the mandatory military service period in stages from 2018 to 2021. ----- **1** **North Korea** his policy of concentrating on economic development. In addition, at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2019, Chairman Kim expressed his intention to continue to concentrate on economic development. Moreover, he stated at the same assembly that the national defense capabilities will constantly be improved, indicating that North Korea will continue to make efforts to maintain and enhance its military capabilities and combat readiness under “the new strategic line”.[4] According to the official announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2019, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2019 national budget was 15.8%. However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction of the real defense expenditures. Furthermore, North Korea has continued to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation capabilities, including by conducting six nuclear tests so far and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles in recent years at an unprecedented frequency. In addition, North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. It also retains largescale special operation forces. In addition, North Korea has repeatedly used provocative rhetoric and behavior against **KEY WORD** Ballistic missiles A ballistic missile is a rocket engine-propelled missile that flies on a parabolic trajectory. It is capable of attacking distant targets. Ballistic missiles are generally categorized according to the following table. 1 General Situation North Korea has been advocating the building of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy,[1] and it adopts “military-first (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. “Military-first (Songun) politics” has been defined as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of military first, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.[2] In fact, leader Kim Jongun, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission,[3] who is in a position to control the military, noted: “It is necessary to uphold the military-first revolutionary path as the constant strategic path.” In addition, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) in March 2013, Chairman Kim Jong-un adopted the “Byungjin line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development, asserting that even if North Korea does not increase defense spending, it would be able to concentrate on its economic development and on improving the people’s livelihood while increasing the effectiveness of its war deterrent and defense force as long as nuclear deterrence is robust. At the Seventh KWP Congress in May 2016, he made it clear that he would uphold the “Byungjin line” as well as the “Songun politics.” On the other hand, it is said that Chairman Kim Jong-un is giving the party the central role in running the state, as evidenced by the fact that he convened the KWP Congress in May 2016 for the first time in 36 years. Furthermore, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim declared that the “Byungjin line” had been successfully carried out as the development of the state nuclear force had been completed. He also announced that the KWP’s “new strategic line” was that the whole of the party and the whole of the state will fully concentrate efforts on the construction of a socialist economy, indicating **Chapter** |Description|Range| |---|---| |Short Range Ballistic Missile, SRBM|Under approx. 1,000 km or less| |Medium Range Ballistic Missile, MRBM|Approx. 1,000 to under approx. 3,000 km| |Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, IRBM|Approx. 3,000 to under approx. 5,500 km| |Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, ICBM|Approx. 5,500 km or more| Ballistic missiles launched from submarines are collectively referred to as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while a ballistic missile that has a precision guidance system on its warhead necessary to attack aircraft carriers and other vessels is called an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). North Korea used to insist that it would open the door to a “powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)” in 2012, which marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il-sung. Recently, however, North Korea has been using mainly the expression, “powerful and prosperous country (Kangseong Kukka).” Written decision of the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016). At the Supreme People’s Assembly in June 2016, the National Defense Commission was renamed the State Affairs Commission, presided over by Chairman Kim Jong-un. For consistency purposes “Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un in this white paper. I hi “N Y ' Add ” i 2019 Ch i Ki J l d hi i t ti t ti t i th ti l d f it t th t f ld’ d d t i ----- **Chapter** **Status of North Korea’s Denuclearization and Its Nuclear and Missile Capabilities** North Korea has expressed the intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at the U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in June 2018. It has announced the suspension of nuclear tests and test-firing of ICBMs, and publicly destroyed the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, announced that it would take additional measures, including the dismantlement of a missile launch pad and engine test stand in Tongchang-ri, and pledged to dismantle a nuclear facility in Yongbyon in exchange for the United States’ partial lifting of sanctions. However, the second U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement. North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner . The suspension of nuclear tests and ICBM firings and the open destruction of the nuclear test site do not change the existing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities that North Korea acquired through repeated nuclear tests and missile launches. In other words, it remains that North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads, possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching every part of Japan and continues to possess capabilities for conducting surprise attacks against Japan utilizing transporter-erector launchers and submarines and for simultaneous launches of several ballistic missiles and thus there has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Meanwhile, North Korea has never mentioned the declaration or dismantlement of existing nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles for delivering weapons of mass destruction, or relevant facilities. While it is pointed out that an uranium enrichment facility not disclosed exists in addition to the disclosed facility in Yongbyon, North Korea has never mentioned the presence or dismantlement of such facilities. Given these points, the Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces will continue close watch on what kind of concrete actions North Korea would take towards the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, as well as collecting and analyzing necessary information and engaging in warnings and surveillance on North Korea’s military trends in close cooperation with the United States and other countries. Photo: (Nodong [Korea News Service/ Jiji]) Photo: (2nd U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting [AFP/Jiji]) relevant countries, including Japan.[5] Such military trends in North Korea pose a grave and imminent threat to the security of Japan and seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. At the same time, sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea. Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them. For example, North Korea insisted “Japan will not be spared a merciless retaliatory attack by the North Korean forces” as a measure to “hold it totally accountable for all its vices” (July 2010). In addition, it stated that “not only Yokosuka, Misawa, Okinawa, and Guam but also the U.S. mainland are within our range” (March 31, 2013, Rodong Sinmun), “none of Japan’s territories shall be spared from being the target of our retaliatory attack” (listing the names of Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kyoto in this context) (May 29, 2009, Korean Central News Agency; April 10, 2013, Rodong Sinmun), etc. More recently, the Korean Central Broadcasting Station stated on September 13, 2017, that, “the Japanese archipelago will be sunk into the sea by a nuclear bomb,” and the October 9 edition of the Rodong Sinmun stated that, “If the flames of war break out on the Korean Peninsula, Japan can never be safe. Everything in J th t i bili d f ill b l i d t i t thi f th b i J f U S i i ” ----- about 50 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces. The Air Force has approximately 550 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces. In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations force whose size is estimated at 100,000 personnel.[8] In recent years, North Korea is seen to be placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces.[9] See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-2-3 (North Korea) 2 Military Posture **(1) General Situation** North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).[6] North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly 1.28 million. While North Korea’s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, most of its equipment is outdated. Meanwhile, North Korea has forces such as large-scale special operations force that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military related installations across its territory. **(2) Military Capabilities** The North Korean Army comprises about 1.10 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as main battle tanks and multiple rocket launchers.[7] The Navy has about 780 ships with a total displacement of approximately 111,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, **Chapter** See 3 WMD and Ballistic Missiles While North Korea continues to maintain largescale military capabilities, its conventional forces are considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea. This is the result of a variety of factors, including decreases in military assistance from the former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War regime, limitations placed on North Korea’s national defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the rapid modernization of the ROK’s defense capabilities. It is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to compensate for this shortfall. In recent years, North Korea has launched ballistic missiles at an unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational capabilities, such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. In addition, given the technological maturity The Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth KWP Central Committee in 1962. North Korea reportedly continues to develop and produce modified tanks, such as the Pokpung-ho, the Ch’onma-ho and the Songun. (Furthermore, the Defense White Paper 2014 that the ROK Ministry of National Defense released in January 2015 refers to North Korea’s development of a new 300 mm multiple rocket launcher, as well as the significant increase in the number of tanks, armored cars, and multiple rocket launchers in North Korea’s possession. Furthermore, the Defense White Paper 2018 pointed out additional production of a new type of tanks and the development of special shells, including precision-guided shells, by North Korea. North Korea allegedly fired several rounds from the 300 mm multiple rocket launcher on three instances in March 2016 and launched a new short-range surface-to-air missile in April 2016. In addition, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted test launches of a new type of surface-to-air missiles and a new type of surface-to-ship cruise missiles on May 28 and June 9, 2017, respectively. It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the KWP. However, it has been reported that these organizations were consolidated in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the military forces. The existence of the bureau was officially confirmed in March 2013 when Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported General Kim Yong-chol as the Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Moreover, James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White Paper 2018 notes, “Special operation forces are currently estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.” The white paper pointed out that North Korea’s special operations force has become an independent military branch. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 notes, “North Korea probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support its political objectives.” The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” released in May 2018, states, “North Korea probably views cyber operations as an appealing, cost-effective, and deniable means by which to collect intelligence and cause disruption against its highly networked adversaries, notably the ROK, Japan, and the United States.” According to the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018, North Korea is operating approximately 6,800 cyber warfare personnel and is continuing efforts to strengthen cyber warfare capability, including training of personnel with expert skills. Regarding North Korean cyber attacks, see Ch t 3 S ti 3 ----- obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to have already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. These military trends in North Korea, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, and North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles pose a grave and imminent threat to the security of Japan and seriously undermine the peace and security of the region and the international community. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the nonproliferation of weapons, including WMDs. On the other hand, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP held on April 20, 2018, decisions were made to discontinue “nuclear test and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire,” and to dismantle the northern nuclear test ground. In the subsequent inter-Korean summit meeting held on April 27 and in the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on June 12, North Korea expressed its intention to work towards denuclearization. Then, on May 24, international press representatives were invited to witness the destruction of the northern nuclear test ground. However, as North Korea has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, there has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Looking to the future, it will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor moves by North Korea, including what kind of concrete actions it will take towards the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. **(1) Nuclear Weapons** **a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program** Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments, and considering North Korea has already conducted six nuclear tests including the nuclear test in September 2017, it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons,[10] North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances.[11] As for recent activities, in September 2015, North Korea announced that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor and the reprocessing facility, the disablement of which was agreed upon at the fifth and the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in February and September 2007, respectively, had been readjusted and had started normal operation.[12] Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, those activities are causes of great concern. As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. In November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in August 2013; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.[13] Regarding these nuclear-related activities, activities that are inconsistent with a “commitment to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which North Korea insists it upholds, have been pointed out. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeio testified in the Senate in July 2018 that North Korea was continuing to produce nuclear fuels. In addition, at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Amano pointed out in March 2019 that the IAEA continued to observe signs of North Korea using the enrichment facility at nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. **Chapter** 10 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%). 11 North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 estimates that North Korea possesses around 50 kg of plutonium, retaining the assessment given in the Defense White Paper 2016. 12 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2016 notes, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that the reactor was restarted at the end of August 2013. It has been noted that if the reactor is restarted, North Korea would have the capability to produce enough plutonium (approximately 6 kg) to manufacture approximately one nuclear bomb in one year. 13 The ROK Defense White Paper 2018 assesses that North Korea possesses a substantial amount of highly enriched uranium (HEU). It has been noted that a uranium enrichment facility diff t f th i Y b i t i K ” ----- With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in October 2006,[14] May 2009,[15] February 2013,[16] January 2016,[17] September 2016,[18] and September 2017.[19] It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests. It is believed that North Korea seeks to miniaturize nuclear weapons and develop them into warheads that can be mounted on ballistic missiles, as part of its nuclear weapons program. On September 3, 2017, it was announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had visited North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute and had seen a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM,[20] in addition to which, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test that was forced through on the same day, North Korea announced that it “successfully carried out a test of H-bomb for ICBM.” In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering, for example, that the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as well as the technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.[21] Furthermore, the yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted that the test was of Object claimed to be a hydrogen bomb capable of being loaded into an ICBM [Korean News Service/Jiji] a hydrogen bomb.[22] In any case, related developments need to be monitored carefully. North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that are the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses a serious and imminent threat to the security of Japan, and seriously undermines peace and security of the region and international community. Therefore, it can never be tolerated. **b. Background of the Nuclear Program** As regards the objective of North Korea’s nuclear development, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime in light of the following: North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing **Chapter** 14 On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as Japan’s own careful examination of the U.S. and ROK analyses, the Japanese Government arrived at the judgment that the probability of North Korea conducting a nuclear test was extremely high. 15 The Japanese Government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on this day, given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, and in light of the Japan Meteorological Agency’s detection of seismic waves with a waveform that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. 16 On February 12, 2013 at around 11:59 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a nuclear test. On this basis, the Government of Japan verified the facts in coordination with other relevant parties, including the United States and the ROK. Based on a comprehensive consideration of the aforementioned information, the Japanese Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. North Korea announced that it “succeeded in the third underground nuclear test,” “the test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power,” “physically demonstrating the good performance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.” 17 On January 6, 2016 at around 10:30 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test. Based on a comprehensive consideration of this and other information, the Japanese Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. 18 On September 9, 2016 at approximately 9:30 a.m., the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. Based on a comprehensive consideration of all the information including this, the Government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. 19 At around 12:31 p.m. on September 3, 2017, the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. Based on comprehensive considerations, including the information from the JMA, the Government determined that the earthquake occurred as a result of a nuclear test by North Korea. 20 On September 3, 2017, in a report on a visit by Chairman Kim Jong-un to North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that North Korea is able to conduct an “ultra-powerful electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack over a wide area.” 21 Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons seems to have reached a considerable level.” 22 The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 noted that the explosive yield of the sixth nuclear test was approximately 50 kt, significantly larger than the yield of the past tests and that this was assessed to be a hydrogen bomb test. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test i ti t d t 6 t 7 kt it i diffi lt t i th t thi h d b b t t ll d fi d ----- regime;[23] North Korea considers that it needs its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear threat of the United States[24] and is in no position at least in the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK; North Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed and that Syria was attacked by U.S. Forces in April 2017 due to their lack of nuclear deterrence;[25] and North Korea has reiterated that nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations. In fact, North Korea has repeatedly claimed to the international community that it was a “nuclear weapons state.”[26] In March 2013, North Korea adopted the “new strategic line” (so-called “Byungjin line”) policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development. At the Seventh KWP Congress and also in the “New Year’s Address” of January 2018, it made clear that it would remain steadfast to this policy. At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, in addition to declaring the “Byungjin line” was successfully carried out, North Korea declared that among other things, it had determined to “concentrate all efforts on building a powerful socialist economy and markedly improving the standard of people’s living through the mobilization of all human and material resources of the country.” With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, recently, at the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting held on June 12, 2018, Chairman Kim Jongun made clear his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States. Furthermore, in Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 that was agreed upon at the inter-Korean summit on September 19, 2018, North Korea expressed its intention to permanently close the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon if the United States takes corresponding measures. In addition, in his “New Year’s Address” in 2019, Chairman Kim Jongun expressed his intention to neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them.[27] However, Chairman Kim is presumed to have done so on the premise that North Korea would continue to possess a nuclear arsenal. Moreover, North Korea has repeatedly insisted that it will not agree to unilateral denuclearization. In addition, it has been noted that even after announcing a commitment to full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has continued nuclear development[28] and that a uranium enrichment facility not disclosed by North Korea exists. In light of the above, it is now necessary to keep a close watch on what kind of concrete actions it will take towards the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. **(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons** North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons.[29] Possession of sarin, VX, mustard and other chemical weapons, and of anthrax, smallpox, pest and other biological agents that could be used as biological weapons have been **Chapter** 23 U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” February 2016. 24 For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014, alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people. 25 For example, a comment in the Rodong Sinmun dated December 2, 2013, contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability. In addition, the “Statement by the Spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” dated April 8, 2017, states with regard to the U.S. attack on Syria two days earlier on April 6 as follows: “Swaggering as a superpower, the US has been picking only on countries without nuclear weapons and the Trump administration is no exception.” 26 North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state” in 2012 in its revised constitution. In April 2013, after conducting its third nuclear test in February, North Korea adopted the Law on Consolidating the Position of Self-Defensive Nuclear Weapons State. During the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un delivered a report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, setting out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state,” and stating, “We will consistently take hold on the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity.” 27 It has been noted that this argument is based on the premise that North Korea will continue to own nuclear weapons for the moment. 28 For example, the National Threat Assessment, released by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence in January 2019, pointed out as follows: “We continue to observe activity inconsistent with full denuclearization.” In addition, the final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee, released in March 2019, pointed out that nuclear facilities in Yongbyon were continuing to operate. 29 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2018 points out that, following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500-5,000 tons of various chemical weapons stored. It also notes that North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, and pests. Moreover, the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of May 2018 points out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.” North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not d d t th Ch i l W C ti ----- pointed out.[30] The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical weapons on warheads. **(3) Ballistic Missiles** As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency,[31] in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. The ballistic missiles currently deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea are the following.[32] Japan falls within this range. In addition, North Korea is developing a ballistic missile that appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile. This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, 2017, and is presumed to have flown approximately 400 km and fallen into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A day after the launch, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a newly developed ballistic rocket incorporating a precision navigation guidance system. In addition, while the images released by North Korea show that the ballistic missile was launched from a continuous track TEL and had what appears to be small wings[34] on its **KEY WORD** Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) The signs of a launch from a fixed launcher are easy for the adversary to detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was developed mainly by the former Soviet Union among others in order to make the detection of launch signs more difficult and increase survivability. According to the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of May 2018, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Scuds, 50 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (Musudans). The type of TEL differs according to the length and weight of the ballistic missile. The Scud, Nodong and Musudan are mounted on a four-, five-, and six-axle wheel drive TEL respectively. The new type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile launched on July 4 and 28, and the KN-08/14 are mounted on an eight-axle wheel-drive TEL, and the intercontinental-range ballistic missile believed to be a new type that was launched on November 29 appears to have been mounted and transferred on a nine-axle wheel-drive TEL. The ballistic missile modified from the SLBM launched on February 12 and May 21, and the ballistic missile modified from the Scud missile launched on May 29 of the same year appear to have been launched from a continuous track TEL. Generally, a continuous track TEL is adapted to operating on uneven ground but is not adapted to long distance transportation compared to the wheel-drive TEL. As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed difficult to detect individual specific signs in advance concerning the detailed location and timing of the launch. This is because it is operated by being mounted and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related underground facilities are thought to exist nationwide. Along with activities related to the development of ballistic missiles, developments related to the building of TELs require close watch as they concern the operational capabilities of ballistic missiles by North Korea. **Chapter** See Fig. I-2-3-2 (Ballistic Missiles developed/Possessed by North See Korea) Fig. 1-2-3-3 (Range of North Korea's Ballistic Missiles (image)) Fig. I-2-3-4 (Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea to Date) **a. Types of Ballistic Missiles Possessed or Developed by** **North Korea** **(a) Toksa** Toksa is a short-range ballistic missile with a range estimated to be approximately 120 km. It is mounted on a TEL. It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile possessed or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant.[33] **(b) Scud** The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended range, are short-range ballistic missiles with ranges estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively. It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and deployed them, and has exported them to the Middle East and other countries. The Scud ER (Extended Range) is a ballistic missile that has an extended range due to the extension of the Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km, and it appears that a part of 30 In principle, the ballistic missile defense system is also used to handle ballistic missiles carrying biological or chemical weapons. With regard to the damage on the ground in the case where a ballistic missile carrying a biological or chemical weapon is destroyed by a Patriot missile PAC-3, etc., there is no single answer to the question since the damage varies according to the various conditions such as the type, performance, intercepted altitude and speed of the ballistic missile, and the weather. However, in general terms, the biological or chemical weapon will likely be neutralized by the heat, etc. at the time of the destruction of the ballistic missile, and even if it retains its potency it will disperse during the freefall stage. Thus, it is believed that the ballistic missile will be unable to demonstrate its prescribed effectiveness. 31 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson on December 13, 2002) At the same time, it is pointed out that North Korea’s ballistic missile exports have been set back by increasing pressure from the international community. 32 According to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in May 2018) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles. 33 A small vehicle-mounted missile that was displayed in a military parade in February 2018 is said to be a new type of short-range ballistic missile propelled by solid fuel. 34 It i ll id th t ll i th h d h th f ti f t bili i d i i ti d i fli ht d h i i i ----- **Fig. I 2 3 2** Ballistic Missiles developed/Possessed by North Korea |Col1|Toksa|Scud B, C, ER, Modified|Nodong Modified|SLBM|SLBM modified for ground launch|Musudan|IRBM- class|ICBM- New class ICBM|type, Taepodong-2 -class variant|KN-08/KN-14| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Range|approx. 120 km|Approx. 300 km/ Approx. 500 km/ Approx. 1,000km/ Under analysis|Approx. 1,300 km/ Approx. 1,500 km|1,000 km or more|1,000 km or more|Approx. 2,500- 4,000 km|Approx. 5,000 km|5,500 km 10,0 or more or|00 km 10,000 km more* or more|5,500 km or more (ICBM reportedly)| |Fuel|Solid|Liquid|Liquid|Solid|Solid|Liquid|Liquid|Liquid Li|quid Liquid|Liquid| |Operation platform|TEL|TEL|TEL|submarine|TEL|TEL|TEL|TEL|TEL launch site|TEL| (m) 30 Made by MOD based on Note: North Korean Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, etc. names given in blue. Hwasong-15 20 Hwasong-14 08 Hwasong-12 14 Modified ER Modified B, C Pukkuksong-2 10 Pukkuksong SLBM Scud B, C, ER, Nodong modified IRBM- ICBM- New type, Taepodong-2 Toksa SLBM Musudan KN-08/KN-14 Modified Modified for ground class class ICBM-class variant launch Approx. 300 km/ Approx. approx. Approx. 500 km/ Approx. 1,300 km/ 1,000 km 1,000 km Approx. 5,500 km 10,000 km 10,000 km 5,500 km or more Range 2,500120 km Approx. 1,000km/ Approx. 1,500 km or more or more 5,000 km or more or more* or more (ICBM reportedly) 4,000 km Under analysis Fuel Solid Liquid Liquid Solid Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid Operation TEL TEL TEL submarine TEL TEL TEL TEL TEL launch site TEL platform Note: Regarding short-range ballistic missiles launched by North Korea on May 4, May 9, July 25, August 6, and August 24, 2019, - Based on warhead weight, etc. analyses are now being conducted. **Fig. I-2-3-3** Range of North Korea's Ballistic Missiles (image) **Chapter** Taepodong-2 Variant New type of New York Washington D. C. intercontinental-range ballistic missile “Hwasong 15” (Range: 10,000km Chicago more than 10,000km*) *Depends on weight of the warhead, etc. London Paris Los Angeles San Francisco 5,500km Moscow Anchorage 5,000km 4,000km 1,500km Hawaii New Delhi Pyongyang 1,300km 1,000km Intercontinental-range ballistic Beijing Tokyo missile “Hwasong 14” (Range: more than 5,500km) Okinawa Guam IRBM “Hwasong 12” (Range: approx. 5,000km) Musudan (range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km) Jakarta Nodong (range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km) Canberra Scud-ER (range: approx. 1,000km) Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience. Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea ----- **Fig. I-2-3-4** Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea to Date **Chapter** |2015 and earlier|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |1993.05.29|Nodong (possible)|Unknown|Unknown|Approx. 500 km| |1998.08.31|Taepodong-1|1|Taepodong Area|Approx. 1,600 km| |2006.07.05|Scud and Nodong|6|Kittaeryong Area|Approx. 400 km| |2006.07.05|Taepodong-2|1|Taepodong Area|Unknown, presumed to have failed| |2009.04.05|Taepodong-2 or variant|1|Taepodong Area|3,000 km or more| |2009.07.04|Scud and Nodong|7|Kittaeryong Area|Maximum approx. 450 km| |2012.04.13|Taepodong-2 or variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Unknown, presumed to have failed| |2012.12.12|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)| |2014.03.03|Scud|2|Near Wonsan|Approx. 500 km| |2014.03.26|Nodong|2|Near Sukchon|Approx. 650 km| |2014.06.29|Scud|2|Near Wonsan|Approx. 500 km| |2014.07.09|Scud|2|Approx. 100 km south of Pyongyang|Approx. 500 km| |2014.07.13|Scud|2|Near Kaesong|Approx. 500 km| |2014.07.26|Scud|1|Approx. 100 km west of Haeju|Approx. 500 km| |2015.03.02|Scud|2|Near Nampo|Approx. 500 km| |2016|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |2016.02.07|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)| |2016.03.10|Scud|2|Near Nampo|Approx. 500 km| |2016.03.18|Nodong|1|Near Sukchon|Approx. 800 km| |2016.04.15|Musudan (indicated)|1|East coast area|Unknown, presumed to have failed| |2016.04.23|SLBM “Pukkuksong”|1|Off the coast of Sinpo|Approx. 30 km (ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff)| |2016.04.28|Musudan|2|Near Wonsan|Unknown, presumed to have failed| |2016.05.31|Musudan (possible)|1|Near Wonsan|Unknown, presumed to have failed| |2016.06.22|Musudan|2|Near Wonsan|First: Approx. 100 km (maximum); Second: Approx. 400 km| |2016.07.09|SLBM “Pukkuksong”|1|Off the coast of Sinpo|A few kilometers (ROK media reports)| |2016.07.19|Scud and Nodong|3|Near Hwangju|First: Approx. 400 km; Third: Approx. 500 km| |2016.08.03|Nodong|2|Near Unnyul|Approx. 1,000 km (the first exploded right after launch)| |2016.08.24|SLBM “Pukkuksong”|1|Near Sinpo|Approx. 500 km| |2016.09.05|Scud ER|3|Near Hwangju|Approx. 1,000 km| |2016.10.15|Musudan|1|Near Kusong|Unknown, presumed to have failed| |2016.10.20|Musudan|1|Near Kusong|Unknown, presumed to have failed| |2017|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |2017.02.12|Ground-launched ballistic missile modified from SLBM “Pukkuksong-2”|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 500 km| |2017.03.06|Scud ER|4|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Approx. 1,000 km| |2017.03.22|Under analysis|1|Near Wonsan|Exploded within seconds of launch, presumed to have failed| |2017.04.05|Under analysis|1|Near Sinpo|Approx. 60 km| |2017.04.16|Under analysis|1|Near Sinpo|Exploded right after launch, presumed to have failed| |2017.04.29|Under analysis|1|Near Pukchang|Fell inland approx. 50 km away, presumed to have failed| |2017.05.14|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 800 km| |2017.05.21|Ground-launched ballistic missile modified from SLBM “Pukkuksong-2”|1|Near Pukchang|Approx. 500 km| |2017.05.29|Ballistic missile modified from Scud missile|1|Near Wonsan|Approx. 400 km| |2017.07.04|ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 900 km| |2017.07.28|ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”|1|Near Mupyong-ri|Approx. 1,000 km| |2017.08.29|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Sunan|Approximately 2,700 km| |2017.09.15|IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”|1|Near Sunan|Approximately 3,700 km| |2017.11.29|New-type, ICBM-class “Hwasong-15”|1|Near Pyongsong|Approx. 1,000 km| |2019|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance| |2019.05.04|Short range ballistic missile|2|Hodo Peninsula|Approx. max. 250 km| |2019.05.09|Short range ballistic missile|2|Near Kusong|1st: approx. 400 km, 2nd: approx. 250 km| |2019.07.25|Short range ballistic missile|2|Hodo Peninsula|Approx. 600 km| |2019.08.06|Short range ballistic missile|2|Near Kwail|Approx. 450 km| |2019.08.24|Short range ballistic missile|2|Near Sondok|Approx. 350 to 400 km| - Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. ----- Although the details of Nodong s performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. In this regard, it had been suggested that there is a type of Nodong aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of the warhead). Against this backdrop, the launch of this type of ballistic missile was confirmed for the first time in the images published by North Korea a day after the launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19, 2016. **(d) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)** It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry the SLBM (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong”). Since it announced in May 2015 through its media that it conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM, it has made public SLBM launches on four occasions.[36] Judging from the images and footage that it has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded in operating the “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, in the launches in April and August 2016, it appears, based on observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, that the militarily superior solid fuel propellant system was adopted.[37] A ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM has been confirmed in flight in the direction of Japan, launched from the vicinity of Sinpo, on the east coast of North Korea, on August 24, 2016. The SLBM flew approximately 500 km. Considering that this was its first SLBM to fly approximately 500 km, the possibility cannot be denied that North Korea had striven to solve the problems through the preceding launches and achieved certain technological progress. Furthermore, it is predicted that the ballistic missile presumed to be the SLBM that was launched at this time flew on a somewhat higher than nominal trajectory. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory the firing range is expected to surpass 1,000 km.[38] It is assessed that North Korea’s SLBMs are launched from a Gorae-class submarine (displacement 1,500 tons). Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched four Scud ERs (presumed) (March 2017) [Korean News Service/Jiji] **Chapter** Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched a ballistic missile modified from the Scud missile (presumed) (May 2017) [AFP/Jiji] warhead, i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length are similar to existing Scud missiles. Another similarity is that it can be confirmed that the missile has straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine. It has also been noted that this ballistic missile is equipped with a MaRV.[35] Given that North Korea announced that Chairman Kim Jong-un had ordered the development of ballistic missiles capable of precision attacks on enemy ships and other individual targets, the intent appears to be to enhance the accuracy of ballistic missile attacks. **(c) Nodong** The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, reaching almost all of Japan. 35 For example, according to “Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in May 2018), the launch on May 29, 2017, was presumed to have been the first launch of a short-range ballistic missile based on a Scud missile, equipped with a MaRV, suggesting that North Korea has made advances in its precision guidance systems. 36 On May 9, 2015, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in a test launch of an SLBM. On January 8, 2016, it released footage of an SLBM test launch that appears to be different from the one unveiled in May 2015. On April 24 and August 25, 2016, it again announced that it had succeeded in SLBM test launches. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) predicts that North Korea also launched one ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM on July 9, 2016, although North Korea has not made an announcement about the launches. 37 It has been pointed out that North Korea’s SLBM is an improved version of the former Soviet Union’s liquid fuel propelled SLBM “SS-N-6,” similar to the Musudan. 38 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station on August 25, 2016, North Korea announced that this test launch “was successfully conducted without any negative effects on the f t f b t i ” b d th “hi h l l h t ” hi h bl “l ft d t j t ” ----- **(f) Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)** To date North Korea has launched three liquid fuel-propelled IRBMs (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-12”). This ballistic missile was launched on May 14, 2017 and is presumed to have reached a height of over 2,000 km and flew a distance of approximately 800 km for about 30 minutes. Based on this flight pattern, it is presumed that the ballistic missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. Had it been launched on a nominal trajectory, the maximum firing range is assessed to be close to approximately 5,000 km. In addition, the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine can be confirmed from the images released by North Korea a day after the launch, suggesting that the ballistic missile uses liquid fuel. On August 29 and September 15, 2017, single missiles of this class were launched and flew over Japan’s territory in the vicinity of the Oshima Peninsula and Cape Erimo. The ballistic missile launched on August 29 flew at an altitude of approximately 550 km over Japanese territory, and is presumed to have flown a total distance of 2,700 km. The ballistic missile launched on September 15 is presumed to have flown over Japanese territory at an altitude of between 700 and 800 km, flying for a total distance of approximately 3,700 km. These launches were the first cases of North Korea launching what it calls ballistic missiles that flew over Japan’s territory. In view of their flight paths, these missiles appear to demonstrate a certain level of function as an IRBM. Also, the fact that missiles that overflew Japan were launched in succession in a short time period would suggest that North Korea is steadily improving its ballistic missile capabilities. Furthermore, although at the time of launches in May and August 2017 the missiles were confirmed to have been launched after being separated from the wheel-drive TEL, at the time of the September launch the missile was confirmed to have been launched while still attached to the wheel-drive TEL. Considering this point, together with North Korea’s claims at the time of the launch that it was for the purposes of “confirming practical operational procedures” and “realize the potential of the ‘Hwasong-12’” there is a possibility that North Korea is improving its practical operational capabilities. In 2016 North Korea conducted repeated launches of an IRBM that is presumed to be the Musudan,[40] but although the missile launched in June flew for a certain distance on a lofted trajectory, the fact that there were two successive launch failures in October would suggest that there may still Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched a ballistic missile modified from the SLBM (presumed) (February 2017) [AFP/Jiji] North Korea has one such submarine. It is also pointed out that North Korea seeks to develop a larger submarine to launch SLBMs.[39] It is deemed that through developing the SLBM and a new submarine to carry it, North Korea intends to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and improve survivability. **(e) Ballistic Missile Modified from the SLBM** North Korea launched a ballistic missile on both February 12 and May 21, 2017, both of which appeared to be a modified version of the SLBM for ground launch (referred to by North Korea as “Pukguksong-2”). This ballistic missile is estimated to have flown approximately 500 km on both occasions, on somewhat higher trajectories than normal. If it were launched on a nominal trajectory, the firing range is assessed to surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch on February 12, North Korea named the ballistic missile that was launched “Pukguksong-2” and announced that it was developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also announced a day after the launch on May 21, 2017 that it had again successfully conducted the test launch of the Pukguksong-2 and that Chairman Kim Jongun had authorized its “operational deployment.” Moreover, the launch by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuous track TEL, and the characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines, can be confirmed from each of the images that North Korea released. It has the characteristics of appearing to be using “cold launch system” and solid fuel propellant engines in common with the SLBM. Given that North Korea has made references to its deployment for operational deployment, there is a possibility that North Korea will newly deploy a solid fuel propellant engine that includes Japan within its firing range. **Chapter** 39 Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 2018-2019 40 With a range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, it has been suggested that all parts of Japan and Guam may fall within the Musudan’s firing range. Similar to its Scud and Nodong counterparts, it is liquid fuel-propelled and is loaded onto a TEL to transport and operate. It has been noted that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that North K i d i th l 1990 ----- system is conical; and (3) the straight-line flame of liquidpropulsion systems can be confirmed. Based on these facts and the respective ranges that can be estimated for the missiles, the possibility can be deduced that the ICBM that were launched on July 4 and 28 were developed on the basis of the new-type IRBM that had been launched on May 14. Also based on images published by North Korea, it can be confirmed that the ballistic missiles that were launched on July 4 and 28 had been mounted on the wheeled eight-axle TEL similar to KN-08/14 (see (j) below). However, it can be confirmed from the images at the time of the launches that they were launched from simplified launch pads, not TELs. Furthermore, the images suggest that the missile was of twostage construction. **(h) New Type of Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile** (Launched on November 29, 2017) On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched a single missile that is presumed to have been a new type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-15”) different to the missiles described in (g) above. The missile reached a height of well over 4,000 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately 53 minutes, covering a distance of approximately 1,000 km before falling into Japan’s EEZ. From this flight pattern it is presumed that the missile was launched on a lofted trajectory. On the day of the launch, North Korea made an “government statement,” declaring that it had successfully conducted a test launch of the “Hwasong-15,” a newly developed type of ICBM with the capability to strike all areas of the U.S. mainland, and asserting that it had now completed development of its state nuclear force. The following points would suggest that this missile is a new type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile, different from the two ICBM launched in July 2017: (1) its flight distance and altitude; (2) the fact that North Korea announced the successful test launch of a new type of ICBM, the “Hwasong-15;” (3) the fact that the missile was deployed on a previously unseen nine-axle wheel-drive TEL; and (4) that the nose of the warhead was more rounded than previous missiles. In addition, according to images released by North Korea, the missile was of a two-stage design, and it can be confirmed that it was removed from the TEL prior to launch and that its straight-line exhausts are characteristic of a liquid fuel propelled engine. Furthermore, based on the flight altitude, distance flown and released images, it can be assumed that this missile could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an IRBM (presumed) (September 15, 2017) [Korean News Service/Jiji] be obstacles remaining towards the operationalization of the Musudan and that North Korea may be concentrating on the development and operationalization of the “Hwasong-12” as an IRBM instead. **(g) Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile (ICBM)** (Launched on July 4 and 28, 2017) To date North Korea has launched two intercontinentalrange ballistic missiles (ICBM) (referred to by North Korea as “Hwasong-14”). One such ballistic missile was launched on July 4, 2017, reaching a height well over 2,500 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately 40 minutes. It flew approximately 900 km and is estimated to have fallen into Japan’s EEZ. Another missile that was launched on July 28 reached a height of well over 3,500 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately 45 minutes, covering a distance of approximately 1,000 km before falling into Japan’s EEZ. From this flight pattern it is presumed that the two ballistic missiles were launched on a lofted trajectory. If they were to have been launched on a normal trajectory it is estimated that they would have a maximum range of at least 5,500 km. On July 4, the day of the launch, North Korea made an “important announcement,”[41] announcing that it had successfully conducted a test launch of a new type of ICBM. Furthermore, on the day following the July 28 launch, North Korea announced that the “nuclear bomb detonation device” had functioned normally, emphasizing that the safety of the warhead in an atmospheric reentry environment had been made maintained. This suggests that North Korea is aiming to operationalize long-range ballistic missiles. Based on images released by North Korea, the ballistic missiles launched on July 4 and 28 have the following in common with the IRBM launched on May 14: (1) the engine system consists of one main engine and four auxiliary engines; (2) the shape of the lower part of the propulsion **Chapter** 41 In addition to this announcement, the announcement that North Korea had succeeded in its first hydrogen bomb test (January 6, 2016) and the announcement that it had succeeded in the l h f th th b ti t llit K 4 (F b 7 2016) h b i d “i t t t ” ----- Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an ICBM (presumed) (July 2017) [AFP/Jiji] of the warhead deployed, etc., thus renewing concerns over the increasing ranges of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. In addition, although the wheel-drive TELs possessed by North Korea are thought to be modified versions of Russian and Chinese TELs, it is noteworthy that North Korea has claimed to have developed its own TEL. **(i) Taepodong-2** Taepodong-2 are long-range ballistic missiles launched from fixed launch pads.[42] Taepodong-2 is believed to use in its first stage, four engines, each of which is developed based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately 1 ton. Taepodong-2 missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five times so far. Most recently, in February 2016, North Korea conducted a launch of a missile disguised as a “satellite” from the Tongch’ang-ri district in the northwest coastline of North Korea using a Taepodong-2 variant, a type similar to that of the previous ballistic missile launch in December 2012, after notifying international organizations.[43] It is assessed that North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that (1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost Image publicly released by North Korea when it launched an ICBM presumed to be a new type (November 2017) [AFP/Jiji] the same way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit around the Earth.[44] Accordingly, it is believed that these test launches of longrange ballistic missiles can contribute to the development of shorter-range missiles in such ways as increasing the range and payload capability and improving the circular error probability (CEP). Also, related technology such as the separation technology of multi-stage propelling devices and the technology of posture control and thrust modulation of long-range ballistic missiles can be applied to other middle-range and long-range ballistic missiles that North Korea is newly developing. Therefore, the launch may lead not only to the improvement of other types of its ballistic missiles including Nodong but also to the advancement of North Korea’s entire ballistic missile program including the development of new ballistic missiles and diversification of attack measure.[45] In Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 that was agreed upon at the inter-Korean summit in September 2018, North Korea announced that it will permanently dismantle the missile engine test site and launch platform in the Dongchang-ri district under the observation of experts from relevant countries. Regarding these facilities, it has been pointed out that some parts of the satellite launch platform has been rebuilt after the dismantlement. **(j) KN-08/KN-14** The details of the new missile “KN-08” which was **Chapter** 42 There is also Taepodong-1, which may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2. Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range of at least approximately 1,500 km. Taepodong-1 was launched from the Taepodong district on North Korea’s northeastern coastline in 1998, and it is presumed that part of it flew over Japan and fell in to the Sanriku offshore waters. 43 The objects which were found to have washed ashore at a seashore in Tottori Prefecture in June 2016 were determined by the MOD to be parts of the fairing at the top end of the Taepodong-2 variant missile launched in February 2016. The fairing is partially different from the ones that are usually used by rocket developer countries such as the United States and European countries. Although the fairing is considered to possess the strength and heat resistance necessary for atmospheric entry, it was confirmed that weight reduction had not been thoroughly pursued. 44 Articles dated October 1 and July 29, 2014 published on the website (38 North) of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University in the United States point out that analyses of satellite images of the Tongch’ang-ri district show that the launch tower was raised to 55 meters, enabling launches of rockets up to 50 meters in height, larger than the Taepodong-2 variant (total height approx. 30 m) which was used in December 2012. 45 Furthermore, as launches from fixed launch pads are vulnerable to external attacks, North Korea may seek resiliency and survivability through building underground or silo launch facilities d l hi f TEL ----- showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an ICBM.[46] At the military parade in October 2015, a new missile thought to be the “KN-08” was showcased with a different-shaped warhead from the previous version.[47] The new missile, considered a variant of the “KN-08,” is called the “KN-14.” The “KN-08” and “KN-14” are carried by a TEL, making it difficult to detect signs of their launch in advance, and is likely intended to increase survivability. **(k) Short-Range Ballistic Missiles, etc. Launched in 2019** North Korea launched short-range ballistic missiles presumed to be new types and others toward the Sea of Japan nine times in total during May, July and August 2019. (1) Short-range ballistic missiles launched on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6, 2019 North Korea launched short-range ballistic missiles (North Korea referred them as “new type of tactical guided weapon”) on May 4 and 9, July 25, and August 6. They are all presumed to have the same system, and are of a new and different type from existing missiles such as Nodong and Scud. On each day above, two missiles were launched, and flew approximately 200 to 600 km. Judging from the images released by North Korea, it can be confirmed that the missiles were launched from the wheel-drive or continuous track TEL. The characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines can also be confirmed from each image. In addition, the launched missiles have a shape similar to that of Russian short-range ballistic missile “Iskander,” which can fly at a lower altitude than conventional ballistic missiles and on an irregular trajectory. (2) Short-range ballistic missiles launched on August 24, 2019 North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles (North Korea referred them as “super-large multiple rockets launcher”) on August 24, 2019. These missiles are of a new and different type from the above (1), and are presumed to fly approximately 350 to 400 km. Judging from the image released by North Korea, it can be confirmed that the missiles were launched from the wheel-drive TEL. The characteristic radial exhausts of solid fuel propellant engines can also be confirmed from the image. (3) Projectiles launched on August 10 and 16, 2019 North Korea launched some projectiles on August 10 and 16, 2019. As their characteristics are different from the missiles launched so far, including their shape, the possibility that they might be a new type of short-range ballistic missiles different from the above (1) and (2) needs to be taken into account. In addition, North Korea seems to have launched some kind of projectile on July 31 and August 2, 2019. In light of repeated launches, it is deemed that North Korea is promoting the sophistication of relevant technology and improvement of capabilities related to ballistic missiles, so it is necessary to continue to carefully monitor trends. **b. Major Trends in Ballistic Missile Launches** North Korea has repeatedly launched various types of ballistic missiles. In particular, since 2016 it has conducted as many as 50 ballistic missile launches, including launches of what appear to be new types of missiles. As for trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile launches, the following characteristics have been observed. Firstly, it appears that the country seeks to increase the firing range of ballistic missiles.[48] In February 2016, it launched a longrange ballistic missile (a Taepodong-2 variant) which was disguised as a “satellite,” and in the same year repeatedly launched the Musudan, considered to have Guam in its range. As for the IRBM that was launched in 2017, it is expected to reach a maximum firing range of approximately 5,000 km. Furthermore, in July, ICBM were launched, followed by another intercontinental-range ballistic missile launch in November, which is considered to have been a new type of missile that could have a range in excess of 10,000 km, depending on the weight of the warhead deployed,etc.[49] Although it is considered necessary for the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles to further verify technology for protecting the re-entry vehicle from the ultrahigh temperature that is generated during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead part, North Korea announced in March 2016 that it had successfully conducted a “mock ballistic missile atmospheric re-entry environment test”[50] and announced that it had demonstrated atmospheric reentry technology for warheads at the time of the launch in July 2017. In addition, with announcements such as the one in November 2017 on the day of the launch of what is believed to have been an **Chapter** 46 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of February 2015 notes that, “[North Korea] has publicly displayed its KN-08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although the system has not been flight-tested.” 47 Jane’s Defence Weekly dated October 13, 2015 notes that the “KN-08” showcased at the military parade on October 10, 2015 had a larger third stage than the earlier version, and therefore, could have an extended range. It also suggests that low quality ablative materials cannot withstand high temperatures during re-entry, and thus, a blunter shape warhead may have been developed to reduce speed to protect the warhead. 48 North Korea is thought to have started developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. 49 KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un's January 2017 “New Year’s Address” announced that the test launch of an ICBM had entered the final stage of preparation. 50 According to images released by North Korea, the aim of the test appears to be to conduct a test that simulates the high temperature that occurs during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by firing the engine of the ballistic missile at the test object installed on a fixed platform. Generally, it is difficult to recreate the circumstances of the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by the emission from the engine alone. It is necessary to conduct technology verification by flight tests to conduct an accurate demonstration including the impact of the airflow, ----- intercontinental-range ballistic missile, claiming that it had re-verified warhead reliability in a reentry environment,[51] North Korea is displaying an intention to seek to secure and enhance technology aimed at the operationalization of longrange ballistic missiles.[52] Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance the accuracy and operation capabilities necessary for saturation attacks with regard to ballistic missiles already deployed. As for the Scud and Nodong, which are already deployed, launches had been confirmed when Kim Jong-il was the Chairman of the National Defense Commission. Since 2014, they have been launched eastward from unprecedented locations in western North Korea, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers. This indicates that North Korea is capable of launching Scuds and Nodongs from any place and at any time, from which it is deemed that it has increased confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles. As for Scuds and Nodongs, since 2016, there have been launches where it is presumed that warheads fell in Japan’s EEZ, posing a major threat to Japan’s security. The ballistic missile launched on August 3, 2016, that appears to be a Nodong flew approximately 1,000 km, with its warhead predicted to have fallen into the Japanese EEZ for the first time. The three ballistic missiles launched on September 5 of the same year, apparently Scud ERs, were launched simultaneously and are all estimated to have fallen in more or less the same place in Japan’s EEZ after flying approximately 1,000 km. Moreover, the four ballistic missiles, apparently Scud ERs, launched on March 6, 2017, were launched simultaneously, three of which are predicted to have fallen within Japan’s EEZ and the other near the EEZ, after flying approximately 1,000 km. It is possible that through these launches, North Korea’s intentions are not only research and development of ballistic missiles but also the enhancement of their operational capabilities. Since Chairman Kim Jong-un has repeatedly instructed the military troops to reject formality and conduct practical training, it can be considered that these instructions underpin the launches of ballistic missiles that have already been deployed. North Korea also has claimed that a new type of ballistic missile which appears to have been modified from the Scud missile launched in May 2017 is a ballistic missile that incorporates a precision navigation guidance system,” and it has also been noted that this missile is equipped with a maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MaRV). It is deemed that North Korea is aiming to enhance the accuracy of attack by upgrading ballistic missiles that have already been deployed. Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy and instantaneity to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch. Using a TEL or submarine, a ballistic missile can be launched from any point, making it difficult to detect signs of a launch in advance. North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles from TELs and SLBMs. In addition, the SLBMs repeatedly launched in 2016 and the ballistic missile presumed to be modified from the SLBM as a groundlaunched type and launched in February and May 2017 appear to use solid fuel. It is thus possible that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles.[53] Generally solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are pre-loaded with solid fuel, and therefore, they can be launched instantly and the signs of their launch are more difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded more quickly, and they are relatively easier to store and handle in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles. In this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily. From these factors, North Korea is deemed to be aiming to enhance its surprise attack capabilities. Fourthly, North Korea may be attempting to diversify the forms of launches. It has been confirmed that at the June 22, 2016, Musudan launch and the May 14, July 4, July 28, and November 29, 2017, launches of the ballistic missile, socalled lofted trajectories, in which missiles are launched at higher angles than nominal to high altitudes, were utilized. Generally, when a launch is made on a lofted trajectory, interception is considered to be more difficult. Should North Korea make further progress in the development of ballistic missiles, including the verification of reentry technologies, it may come to have a one-sided understanding that it has secured strategic deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea have such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan. **Chapter** 51 Further analysis is necessary to determine whether North Korea was able to demonstrate the warhead protection technology during atmospheric re-entry necessary for the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles by the November 29, 2017, launch. In any case, by repeatedly launching ballistic missiles, North Korea is believed to be accumulating relevant technology. 52 North Korea announced the implementation of the ground test for a “new type of large-output generator (engine) for ICBMs” in April 2016, the implementation of the ground test for a new type of large-output generator (engine) for satellite-launch rocket launchers in September 2016, and the ground test for a new type of “large-output engine” in March 2017. 53 In addition, in images released together with reports by North Korean media about the visit of Chairman Kim Jong-un to the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science on August 23,. 2017, a panel could be seen featuring the name “Pukguksong-3,” which, in view of the name “Pukguksong,” has led some people to speculate that North Korea is d l i t f lid f l ll d b lli ti i il ----- **c. Future Outlook for Ballistic Missile Development** In his “New Year’s Address” in January 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un declared the historic accomplishment of perfecting the national nuclear forces, and called for “mass-production of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, the power and reliability of which have already been proved to the full, to give a spur to the efforts for deploying them for action.” North Korea’s development of long-range ballistic missiles has also been covered in other publications, including the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the United States announced in February 2018, in which it was noted that “North Korea may now be only months away from the capability to strike the United States with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.” The Missile Defense Review (MDR), released in January 2019, noted that North Korea already possesses the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland with missile attack. At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un announced the suspension of ICBM test launches. Then, at the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June, he clearly expressed the intention to work towards denuclearization. On the other hand, as North Korea has done nothing more than announce the suspension of test-firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, it has been noted that its nuclear and ballistic missile plans remain intact.[54] Given these points, it will be necessary to continue to carefully monitor trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile development program. 4 Domestic Affairs **(1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime** After the demise of Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il in 2011, Kim Jong-un became the de facto head of the military, party, and the state by assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the KPA, First Secretary of the KWP, and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in a short period of time. Since the transition to the new regime, there has been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions, and in May 2016, the Seventh KWP Congress was held for the first time since the last Congress in October 1980, 36 years earlier. These developments suggest that the state is run under the leadership of the party. At the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un expressed his intention to fully concentrate efforts on economic construction. In addition, at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2019, Chairman Kim expressed his intention to continue to concentrate on economic development. For example, he emphasized the importance of economic independence and stated that North Korea will “solidify the material foundations of socialism by concentrating all national resources on economic construction”. Following the change in regime, Chairman Kim Jongun has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, including reshuffles of the top three military posts of the Director of the General Political Bureau, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. In turn, individuals whom Chairman Kim Jong-un selected were assigned to the key party, military, and cabinet posts. In addition, in December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission and Chairman Kim Jong-un’s uncle, was executed for “plotting to overthrow the state.” It is believed that through such measures, the Chairman endeavors to strengthen and consolidate a monolithic leadership system.[55] Meanwhile, the North Korean media began to report the activities of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior member of the KWP.[56] She also attended meetings such as inter-Korean summit meetings. At the KWP Congress held in May 2016, Kim Jong-un was named to the new post of KWP Chairman. In his report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, the Chairman set out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state,” and said the country would consistently uphold the “Byungjin line” policy of economic development and the building of nuclear force as well as further boost its self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity. In this manner, the Chairman demonstrated, both to those in and outside of the country, North Korea’s readiness to continue with its nuclear and missile development. Prior to the Congress, North Korea conducted provocations at unprecedented frequency and content, including the launch of ballistic missiles. **Chapter** 54 Regarding North Korean ballistic missiles, the final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee, released in March 2019, pointed out that North Korea has a consistent tendency to disperse its assembly, storage and test locations. 55 Following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, the North Korean media repeatedly calls for the strengthening of the “monolithic leadership system” and “single-minded unity.” For example, an editorial in the Rodong Sinmun dated January 10, 2014, urged the people to stay cautious even of trivial phenomena and elements which erode North Korea’s single-minded unity. In May 2015, it was suggested that Hyon Yong-chol, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, may have been executed on charges of treason. In July 2015, the North Korean media introduced Pak Yong-sik, previous Deputy Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, with the title, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. 56 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, Kim Yo-jong was elected a member of the KWP Central Committee at the KWP Congress held in May 2016. At the Second Plenum of th S th KWP C i O t b 2017 Ki Y j l t d lt t b f th P liti l B f th C t l C itt ----- is still forced to rely on food assistance from overseas.[59] Following North Korea’s various provocations including the nuclear test in January 2016 and launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “satellite” in February 2016, the ROK decided to completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which makes up over 99% of inter-Korean trade. Furthermore, the strengthening of sanctions by countries including Japan and the United States, and the sanctions of the related UN Security Council resolutions in response to the implementation of nuclear tests and missile launches can be assumed to have had a certain effect, when considered together with the severe economic situation of North Korea. Accordingly, if China, North Korea’s largest trading partner, and other relevant countries continue to rigorously implement sanctions an even more severe economic situation could beset North Korea. To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has made attempts at limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems,[60] and promotes the establishment of economic development zones[61] and the enlargement of the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans.[62] Furthermore, at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP in April 2018, in addition to declaring the “Byungjin line” was successfully carried out, North Korea declared that among other things, it had determined to “concentrate all efforts on building a powerful socialist economy and markedly improving the standard of people’s living through the mobilization of all human and material resources of the country.” These all suggest that North Korea is placing importance on rebuilding its economy. Nonetheless, North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, and thus, various challenges confront the fundamental improvement of its current economic situation. North Korea is presumed to be evading the UN Security Council sanctions by conducting ship-to-ship transfers in the The holding of the KWP Congress may be an indication that North Korea has shifted into high gear by establishing the state-run governance system centered on the party and led by KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un, in terms of its organization, personnel, among other dimensions, both in name and in substance.[57] At the Supreme People’s Assembly session convened in June 2016, it was decided that the National Defense Commission would be turned into the State Affairs Commission, and KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un was named Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, the new “highest position” of the “state” replacing First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. These changes are also likely to be manifestations of the governance system moving into full swing.[58] Furthermore, Chairman Kim pointed out that the role of the party organization should be decisively enhanced in order to implement the “new strategic line,” which fully concentrates efforts on economic construction. This indicates that the importance of the party in politics continues to grow. However, with senior officials unable to dispute the decisions of Chairman Kim Jong-un due to an atrophy effect created by the frequent executions, demotions, and dismissals of senior officials, it is believed that there is growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of North Korea turning to military provocations without making adequate diplomatic considerations. In addition, it has been suggested that there is declining social control caused by widening wealth disparities and information inflow from other countries. In this regard, attention will be paid to the stability of the regime. **(2) Economic Conditions** In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Especially for food, it is deemed that North Korea **Chapter** 57 Elections for members and alternate members of the KWP central leadership agencies (e.g., KWP Central Committee and KWP Politburo) were held during the KWP Congress. Pak Pong-ju, Premier, and Choe Ryong-hae, KWP Secretary (the title was changed from KWP Secretary to Vice Chairman of the KWP Central Committee at the KWP Congress), were newly elected as KWP Politburo Standing Committee members to form a five-member Standing Committee including: Kim Jong-un, KWP Chairman; Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and Hwang Pyong-so, Director of the General Political Bureau. None of the five members of the KWP Politburo Standing Committee are genuine military personnel. Furthermore, the ranks of military personnel have fallen within the KWP Politburo, and Premier Pak Pong-ju has been added as a member of the KWP Central Military Commission. It is pointed out that these aspects show that a KWP-led governance system is shifting into high gear. 58 After the Supreme People’s Assembly session in June 2016, the media introduced the “Minister of the People’s Armed Forces,” who is considered equivalent to the minister of defense, as the “Minister (Secretary) of the People’s Armed Forces,” raising the possibility that the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces has been reorganized into the Ministry (Department) of the People’s Armed Forces. 59 In a report released in December 2018, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) classified North Korea as a country requiring external assistance for food and cited a shortage of agricultural machinery and fertilizer as a factor preventing North Korea from resolving its food shortage. 60 For example, North Korea conducted a currency revaluation (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009. The currency revaluation led to economic disorder, such as price escalation due to shortfall of supply, which in turn increased social unrest. 61 During the plenary meeting of the KWP Central Committee on March 31, 2013, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the establishment of economic development zones in each province. Pursuant to these instructions, the Economic Development Zone Law was enacted in May of that year. To date, 21 economic development zones have been established. 62 While the details of the policy are not necessarily clear, it is understood that in the industrial sector, entities would be able to independently make production decisions and conduct sales outside the scope of the national plan, as well as determine employee remuneration and benefits based on the situation of the entities. In the agriculture sector, an autonomous business system would be introduced at the household level. It has been said that 1,000 pyeong (1 pyeong = approx. 3.3 m2) of land would be allocated per person, with 40% of the agricultural d t i t th t t d 60% i t i di id l ----- high seas, which are forbidden under the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions.[63] The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee, released in March 2019, pointed out that illegal ship-to-ship transfers of oil products and coal by North Korea were increasing rapidly. See Fig. I-2-3-5 (Sanctions based on UN Security Council See Resolutions against North Korea) exercise, which is usually held in November-December. On the other hand, North Korea has repeatedly insisted that it cannot accept the United States’ demand for unilateral denuclearization and that the U.S. side should also take “corresponding measures.” North Korea is also calling for the relaxation of the sanctions based on the Security Council resolutions. The second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two countries. At the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2019, Chairman Kim Jong-un indicated his stance of continuing dialogue with the United States for a while. For example, he stated that he was ready to hold a third U.S.North Korea summit meeting on the condition that the United States find out “with a proper attitude a methodology that can be shared with us” and that North Korea would wait for a courageous decision from the U.S. till the end of this year. In addition, when President Trump visited the ROK in June 2019, he met the leader of North Korea at Panmunjom, and they agreed to proceed with dialogue at the working level. However, no concrete progress has yet been observed in the North Korea’s dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. **(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea** The administration of President Moon Jae-in inaugurated in May 2017 has expressed its position on North Korea that, while putting emphasis on inter-Korean relations through dialogue, it also indicated a stance of responding resolutely through sanctions and pressure to provocations by North Korea. In fact, in December 2017, the Moon administration announced a new set of ROK sanctions against North Korea. North Korea also continued to engage in repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior against the ROK, including a statement in October that if war were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, the entire ROK would be reduced to ashes. These events caused inter-Korean tensions to rise. On the other hand, in his “New Year’s Address” in January 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un indicated North Korea’s desire to participate in the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games and demonstrated a willingness to improve interKorean relations. Following this, preparations were made for North Korea to participate in the Winter Olympic Games. During the Games, Kim Yo-jong visited the ROK, which 5 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with the United States** The U.S. Trump administration announced that it would deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue based on the concept of “all options are on the table” and adopted the policy of exerting pressure on North Korea to abandon plans to develop and proliferate nuclear weapons and missiles by strengthening economic sanctions and diplomatic measures. In response, North Korea repeated its previous assertions that developing its own nuclear deterrent capability was necessary in order to respond to the nuclear threat posed by the United States, and continued to engage in provocative rhetoric and behavior,[64] coupled with military provocations such as ballistic missile launches.[65] In June 2018, the historic first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting was held and both sides confirmed that they would join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Chairman Kim Jongun made clear his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and confirmed that negotiations would continue with the United States. Later, in July 2018, Secretary of State Pompeio visited North Korea and held a working-level meeting. Secretary Pompeio visited North Korea again in October of the same year, held a meeting with Chairman Kim, and discussed a second U.S.North Korea summit meeting. In addition, Chairman Kim invited inspectors to visit a nuclear test ground that North Korea blew up in public in May 2018. Thus, the U.S.-North Korea negotiations continued. Moreover, in order to support the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic process, the United States took such measures as cancelling regular U.S.-ROK joint military exercises, including the Freedom Guardian exercise, which was scheduled for August 2018, and the Vigilant Ace **Chapter** 63 Between the beginning of 2018 and the end of June 2019, MSDF patrol aircraft have observed 20 cases in which a North Korean-flagged tanker and a foreign-flagged vessel were anchored side-by-side in the high seas. As a result of comprehensive judgment by the government, there are strong suspicions that the observed vessels were engaging in illegal ship-toship transfers. For details of these cases and information about Japan’s response, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2. 64 For example, on August 8, 2017, a spokesperson for the KPA Strategic Rocket Forces announced that North Korea was carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire in the areas around Guam with its “medium- to long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12.” In addition, in a statement by the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission on September 22, Chairman Kim Jong-un noted that he was “giving serious consideration to exercising the highest level of hardline countermeasures in history.” 65 O thi i t R d Si d t d M h 24 2017 t t th t “ St t i F h l ti i d b lli ti k t l h i ” i t th U S ROK j i t i ----- **Fig. I-2-3-5** Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea |Main content|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Items|Sanction content|Related resolution| |Crude oil|Restriction of annual supply to 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons|No. 2397 (December 2017)| |Petroleum refi ned products|Restriction of annual supply to 500,000 barrels|No. 2397 (December 2017)| |Coal|Total ban on imports from North Korea|No. 2371 (August 2017)| |Ship offloading|Banned|No. 2375 (September 2017)| |Date|Resolution|Catalyst event|Main content| |---|---|---|---| |2006.7.16|No. 1695|Seven ballistic missile launches (2006/7/5)|Request transfer prohibition on related goods and funds for nuclear and missile plans| |2006.10.15|No. 1718|First nuclear test (2006/10/9)|Prohibition on export and import of weapons of mass destruction related goods and large weapons| |2009.6.13|No. 1874|Taepodong 2 launch (2009/4/5), second nuclear test (2009/5/25)|Adoption of financial regulations| |2013.1.23|No. 2087|Taepodong 2 launch (2012/12/12)|Addition of six organizations and four individuals to sanctions| |2013.3.8|No. 2094|Third nuclear test (2013/2/12)|Tougher financial regulations and obligation to conduct inspections of goods on ships suspected of transporting banned goods within one’s own territorial waters| |2016.3.3|No. 2270|Fourth nuclear test (2016/1/6), Taepodong 2 launch (2016/2/7)|Ban on air fuel exports and supply and ban on coal and iron ore exports by North Korea (excluding those for personal livelihood or unrelated to North Korea’s nuclear and missile plans)| |2016.11.30|No. 2321|Fifth nuclear test (2016/9/9)|Establishment of an upper limit on coal exports to North Korea (roughly $400 million/7.5 million tons a year)| |2017.6.3|No. 2356|Ballistic missile launches since 2016/9/9|Addition of four organizations and 14 individuals to sanctions| |2017.8.6|No. 2371|Intercontinental-range ballistic missile launch (2017/7/4 and 7/28)|Total ban on coal imports, total ban on iron and iron ore imports, and establishment of an upper limit on the total number of work permits for North Korean workers for the first time| |2017.9.12|No. 2375|Sixth nuclear test (2017/9/3)|Addition of oil to supply restrictions for the first time, addition of textile products to the import ban, and ban on work permits for overseas workers| |2017.12.23|No. 2397|New type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile launch (2017/11/29)|Further supply restrictions in the oil area, expansion of the scope of bans on trade (exports/ imports) with North Korea bans, and return of North Korean workers to North Korea| Summary of recent UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against North Korea was followed by a meeting in March between a delegation headed by a special envoy from the ROK and Chairman Kim Jong-un,[66] which served to facilitate preparations for the inter-Korean summit meeting. The inter-Korean summit meeting was held in April, resulting in the issuance of the Panmunjom Declaration, which confirmed among other matters that the two countries agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, and confirmed the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In addition, in another inter-Korean summit meeting held in May, Chairman Kim Jong-un reiterated his desire for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, at the inter-Korean summit meeting in **Chapter** September, Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, which referred to an ending of military hostilities, was issued. In addition, the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” which prescribed concrete measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions, was signed. In 2018, North and South Korea conducted activities related to the implementation of the measures[67] based on these documents. The Panmunjom Declaration also notes that the two countries will aim to declare an end to the Korean War,[68] and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 notes that Chairman Kim Jong-un will visit Seoul soon. Future developments in interKorean relations will be closely watched. 66 According to an announcement by the ROK, in the meeting North Korea agreed to hold an inter-Korean summit meeting at the end of April and establish a hotline between the two leaders. In addition, it was reported by the ROK that North Korea had indicated that it would have no reason to keep nuclear weapons if the military threat to the North was eliminated and its security guaranteed, that it was prepared to engage in dialogue with the United States towards denuclearization and with a view to normalizing relations, and that while dialogue is ongoing it would not resume provocations such as nuclear or missile tests. North Korea was also reported as expressing understanding for the regular U.S.-ROK joint military exercises. 67 According to an announcement by the ROK government, in October 2018, the demilitarization of the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom was completed based on the Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain. Since November 1, 2018, such measures as the suspension of various military exercises (by both countries) around the DMZ and the establishment of a no-fly zone in airspace over the DMZ have been implemented. In addition, consultations are ongoing with respect to the activity of the InterKorean Military Committee, which will hold consultations on large-scale military exercises and arms buildup. 68 The Korean War began in June 1950 and in July 1953 an armistice agreement was concluded. In the Panmunjom Declaration, the two countries announced that they would engage in lt ti ith i t d l i d t th W b th d f thi hi h i th 65th i f th A i ti d t i th i ti i t t t ----- **(3) Relations with China** The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force.[69] In addition, China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2017, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for approximately 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK),[70] suggesting North Korea’s dependence on China. With regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and solving problems through dialogue and consultations. While it has endorsed the series of UN Security Council Resolutions, which strengthen sanctions on North Korea.[71] It has also stated that sanctions alone will be unable to achieve a fundamental solution to the nuclear issue and that a solution should be found through dialogue and consultations. In this respect, China has expressed support for the U.S.-North Korea dialogue, including U.S.-North Korea summit meetings. China, as well as North Korea and Russia, insists that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be gradual and simultaneous, with relevant countries taking corresponding measures. China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on the country. Although it has been noted that China-North Korea relations had deteriorated because North Korea did not necessarily take actions that were in accordance with China’s position. For example, North Korea repeatedly conducted nuclear and ballistic missile tests despite opposition from the international community including China. However, in March 2018 the first-ever China-North Korea summit meeting under the leadership of Chairman Kim Jong-un was held,[72] in which the two leaders agreed to further develop bilateral relations and also for President Xi Jinping to make a visit to North Korea. Chairman Kim Jong-un made another visit to China in May and June and held meetings with President Xi, in which they reportedly exchanged opinions on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the outcomes of the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting. Moreover, in January 2019, Chairman Kim visited China again and held a meeting with President Xi, in which they reportedly exchanged opinions on such issues as the policy for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In addition, President Xi visited North Korea in June 2019 for the first time since he was appointed President, and held a meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un. They reportedly had discussion on the development of the relationship between two countries and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. **(4) Relations with Russia** Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Following the sixth nuclear test conducted by North Korea in September 2017, Russia condemned North Korea’s nuclear test for violating UN Security Council Resolutions, but also stated that measures that would escalate tensions should be avoided. Nonetheless, Russia approved UN Security Council Resolution 2375, which was adopted in September 2017. Furthermore, although Russia endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 2397, adopted in December 2017, it emphasized that pressure on North Korea should make way for dialogue and negotiations. Following the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in June 2018, Russia has continued to demonstrate an active stance in supporting political and diplomatic processes in the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula and has called on relevant countries to give consideration to consultations in a multilateral format. As for recent activities, in April 2019, Chairman Kim Jong-un visited Vladivostok and held a meeting with President Putin to exchange opinions on the development of the bilateral relationship and the Korean Peninsula situation. In addition, President Putin is said to have accepted Chairman Kim’s invitation to visit North Korea. **Chapter** **(5) Relations with Other Countries** Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries[73] and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer. In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be strengthening 69 It includes a provision that if either of the signatories (China and North Korea) is attacked and enters into a state of war, the other would make every effort to immediately provide military and other assistance. 70 According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA). 71 On January 5, 2018, the Ministry of Commerce of China announced that based on UN Security Council Resolution 2397, China would implement measures from January 6, including restrictions on export of crude oil to North Korea and restrictions on export of refined petroleum products. 72 According to a statement released by China, in the China-North Korea summit meeting Chairman Kim Jong-un stated that the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could be realized if the ROK and the United States would take phased measures in step with North Korea in order to realize peace and reconciliation. This visit to China was the first overseas visit made by Chairman Kim Jong-un since assuming the leadership of North Korea. 73 F l th U it d Ki d d G t bli h d di l ti l ti ith N th K i 2000 d 2001 ti l ----- its relations with African countries, with North Korean senior officials paying visits to African countries.[74] The underlying purposes for enhancing relations with these countries include the usual objective of deepening political and economic cooperation. In addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military cooperation with African countries – activities which are becoming increasingly difficult due to sanctions based on UN Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in the Middle East. It is actually the case that transactions that violate the terms of UN Security Council Resolutions have been observed,[75] and the possibility that North Korea’s illegal activities could provide a funding source for nuclear **2** **The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea** 1 General Situation With regard to its North Korea policy, the Moon Jae-in administration, which was inaugurated in May 2017, is placing emphasis on improving the inter-Korean relationship and easing tensions based on the Panmunjom Declaration, issued at the inter-Korean summit meeting in April 2018 and Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, issued at the inter-Korean summit meeting in September in the same year. How the North Korea policy of the Moon administration will impact inter-Korean relations will continue to require close attention. The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces Korea have been playing an important role in securing peace and stability of the region such as playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of largescale armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. and ballistic missile development is a cause for concern. Following the adoption of the series of UN Security Council Resolutions in 2017, various countries in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia are reviewing their diplomatic and economic relations with North Korea.[76] On the other hand, recently, North Korea has been strengthening diplomatic relationships with other countries. For example, Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho visited Vietnam, Syria, China and Mongolia in November-December 2018, and Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, visited Cuba, Venezuela and Mexico in November-December. 2 Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unification, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy” or state that “the North Korean regime and its armed forces…will remain as our enemies.[77] In the ROK Defense White Paper 2018, published in January 2019, while continuing to describe North Korea’s WMDs as a threat to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, the designation of the country as an enemy was eliminated. Instead, the white paper states as follows: “The Republic of Korea’s armed forces regard any forces that threaten and encroach upon our sovereignty, territory, people and assets as our enemies.”[78] In addition, the white paper emphasizes the importance of omni-directional response to security threats. **Chapter** 74 For example, in May 2016, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam attended the inauguration ceremony of the President of Equatorial Guinea. He held talks with the President, as well as with the leaders of the Republic of Chad, the Gabonese Republic, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Republic of Guinea, and the Republic of Mali who were attending the inauguration ceremony. 75 The final report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee released in March 2019 points out that North Korea has attempted to supply small arms and other military equipment to Houthi rebels in Yemen as well as to Libya and the Sudan through intermediaries. 76 For example, in September 2017, Spain recalled its ambassador to North Korea, and Italy followed suit in October. In September the Philippines announced that it would cease trading with North Korea. Furthermore, in November Sudan announced that it had ceased all transactions with North Korea and in October Uganda announced that it had expelled all persons related to the North Korean military or weapons-related companies. 77 The Defense White Paper described North Korea as an enemy under some ROK governments in the past and did not do so under others. However, the wording “North Korean regime and its armed forces…will remain as our enemies” had been retained since the ROK Defense White Paper 2010, released in December 2010 under the administration of President Lee Myungbak. 78 Regarding North Korea, the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2018 notes as follows: “Although South and North Korea have alternately engaged in military conflict and in reconciliation and cooperation, they have created a new security environment favorable for full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the maintenance of permanent peace, as three inter-Korean summit meetings and the first U.S.-North Korea summit meeting have been realized in 2018. [Omitted] However, North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction are posing a threat to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. Our armed forced will provide military support for efforts for full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the maintenance of permanent d ill th hl f ll it ti ” ----- The ROK has continued to undertake reforms of its national defense.[79] In recent years, in August 2012, in light of the sinking of the ROK patrol boat and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (20122030) was released by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK,[80] which included enhancing deterrence capabilities against North Korea and making the military even more efficient. In March 2014, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014-2030) was unveiled,[81] which included in its scope the long-term development of defense capabilities in order to respond to potential threats after the unification of the Korean Peninsula while securing response capabilities against the threat from North Korea. In February 2017, it announced the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014- 2030) (rev.1), which, while maintaining the objectives and underlying tone of Defense Reform Basic Plan (2014-2030), emphasizes having readiness capability for simultaneous local provocations and all-out war, while giving top priority to bolstering the organization and military power for responding to nuclear, missile and other asymmetrical threats from North Korea. In July 2018, the ROK released the “Defense Reform 2.0,” which has set the following three main goals: making omni-directional response to security threats, enhancing military power based on advanced science and technology and developing armed forces appropriate for a developed country. This plan calls for continued promotion of efforts to secure combat capabilities necessary for responding to the threat from North Korea and also includes the reduction of the troops and the mandatory military service period.[82] 3 Military Posture of the ROK The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and 2 marine divisions, totaling 520,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of 240 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 217,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 640 combat aircraft. The ROK has been modernizing its military forces— not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force—in order to establish an omnidirectional defense posture to deal with future potential threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35A as a next-generation fighter with stealth property. In November 2017, the ROK Government announced a revision of its missile guidelines, which stipulate the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision included the elimination of warhead weight limit restrictions on ballistic missiles, in order to enhance the deterrence against military provocation by North Korea.[83] Furthermore, to address North Korean nuclear and missile threats, in addition to expanding the missile capabilities of the ROK Forces,[84] the ROK is engaging in efforts to build a Korean-type three-axis system, comprised of the following elements: a system known as “Kill Chain” to conduct swift preemptive strikes using missiles and other assets,[85] the indigenous missile defense system (Korea Air and Missile Defense [KAMD]),[86] and the Korea Massive **Chapter** 79 Under the Act concerning National Defense Reform passed in 2006, the Defense Reform Basic Plan must analyze and evaluate changes in the situation and the results of the promotion of national defense reform and be revised and supplemented, even after its establishment. 80 The ROK Ministry of National Defense states that in order to convert the ROK Forces into an “order-made military structure” that matches the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula, it will significantly expand response capabilities in the Northwestern Islands area, reorganize the senior command structure in preparation for the transfer of wartime operational command, gradually proceed with the reduction and reorganization of the troops, and significantly expand response capabilities against missiles and cyberwarfare, etc. In order to build a “high-efficiency developed country-type national defense operation structure,” it will also promote efficiency, reorganize the human resources control structure, enhance the welfare of the military, and improve the military service environment of the troops. 81 The ROK Ministry of National Defense plans to introduce an additional three Aegis-class cruisers, develop next-generation destroyers and submarines, and introduce medium- and highaltitude reconnaissance drones and multipurpose satellites in order to secure response capabilities against existing and potential threats. 82 The troops are planned to be reduced from the current level of 618,000 personnel to 500,000 personnel. The mandatory military service period is planned to be reduced from 21 months to 18 months for the Army and the Marine Corps, from 23 months to 20 months for the Navy, and from 24 months to 22 months for the Air Force. In the past, the Defense Reform Basic Plan repeatedly made a reference to the reduction of the troops. 83 The missile guidelines were established to restrict the range and warhead weight of ballistic missiles possessed by the ROK and were agreed by the governments of the United States and the ROK in 1979. They were subsequently revised in 2001 and 2012. In the previous guidelines, which were last revised in 2012, provisions included, for example, that ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 800 km should have a maximum warhead weight of 500 kg. 84 Regarding ballistic missiles, the Hyeonmu 2a, with an estimated range of 300 km, Hyeonmu 2b, with an estimated rage of 500 km, and the Hyeonmu 2c, with an estimated range of 800 km, are considered to be in operational deployment, for example. In addition, the ROK is considered to be developing a new ballistic missile following the abolition of the limits on the weight of warheads due to the revision of the missile guidelines in 2017. Regarding cruise missiles, surface-to-surface cruise missiles, such as the Hyeonmu 3a, with an estimated range of 500 km, the Hyeonmu 3b, with an estimated range of 1,000 km, and the Hyeonmu 3c, with an estimated range of 1,500 km, are considered to be in operational deployment, for example. In September 2018, the ROK held a launching ceremony for the Dosan Ahn Changho, a 3,000-ton class new submarine. It has been reported that this submarine will be installed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the future 85 The ROK Ministry of National Defense explains that the system is capable of detecting and identifying signs of missile launch, determining attack, and actual attacking instantaneously. In the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016, it is explained that in order to construct the “Kill Chain,” in addition to enhancing monitoring and surveillance capabilities through the use of highaltitude reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles and military reconnaissance satellites, the ROK is enhancing strike capacity by securing extra surface-to-surface missiles, long-range air-to-surface missiles, and Joint Attack Direct Munitions (JADM). 86 The ROK Ministry of National Defense has denied participation in the U.S. missile defense system, and has underscored that the ROK was creating its own indigenous systems. The t d i l d diff i th t ti b t th U it d St t d th ROK Chi b kl h d t ff ti ----- Punishment & Retaliation (KMPR) concept.[87] At present, the three-axis system has been reconfigured into a “strategic strike system,” which integrates the Kill Chain and KMPR, and a “Korean missile defense system.” The focus of defense has also changed from response to the threat of North Korean missiles to omni-directional response to security threats. In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted equipment export, which reached approximately US$3.2 billion on a contract value basis in 2017. Since 2006, the amount has increased by nearly 13-fold in 11 years. It is reported that export items have diversified to include communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels.[88] Defense spending in FY2018 (regular budget) increased by about 8.2% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 46.6971 trillion, marking the 20th consecutive year of increases since 2000. According to the Defense Reform 2.0, the ROK will increase the defense budget 7.5% on an annual average. See Fig. I-2-3-6 (Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget) Meeting (SCM) in October of the same year.[90] At the 46th SCM in October 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in November 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved.[91] Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January 2016, the United States and the ROK officially decided to deploy THAAD[92] to U.S. Forces Korea in July 2016, concluding the temporary deployment of it in September. In addition, in a U.S.-ROK summit meeting also held in September, the enhanced deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and around the ROK on a rotational basis was agreed. Furthermore, it was reported that in the regular U.S.-ROK joint military exercise conducted in April 2018, around 300,000 ROK Forces personnel and around 23,700 U.S. Forces personnel participated, as well as amphibious assault ships and F-35B fighters. In June the two countries announced that the U.S.-ROK joint military exercise “Freedom Guardian” planned for August had been suspended, along with two U.S.-ROK Marine Exchange Program training exercises scheduled to occur within the next three months. In October, they announced the cancellation of the Vigilante Ace, a regular air force exercise conducted in NovemberDecember in usual years, in order to provide every possible opportunity to continue the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic process. Furthermore, in March 2019, they announced the “conclusion” of the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercise, which has been conducted in March-April in usual years, and the implementation of Alliance (Dong Maeng), a combined command exercise.[93] At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal with such issues as the transition of operational control **Chapter** See 4 U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years. While regularly confirming the strengthening of the U.S.ROK Alliance at the summit level, as specific undertakings, the two countries signed the U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s provocations in March 2013,[89] and approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy, designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at the 45th Security Consultative 87 The ROK Ministry of National Defense website states that “KMPR, the third axis, is a Korean-type massive retaliation concept, a system in which counterattacks are conducted by directly aiming at the North Korean leadership including its war command headquarters, in the case where North Korea threatens with its nuclear weapons,” and “missile and other strike forces capable of delivering simultaneous and massive precision strikes and elite professional special operation forces, etc. will be operated for this purpose.” In December 2017 it was reported that a 1,000 personnel “special duties brigade” had been newly formed, which would be tasked with the duty of eliminating the North Korean leadership, and was expected to form a major element in the KMPR concept. 88 Since the 1970s, the ROK has devoted efforts to the development of the defense industry, and since the 2000s, it has expanded exports of defense equipment. The Moon Jae-in administration is placing emphasis on the enhancement of the defense industry as a new driving force of economic growth and as a means of job creation. As for exports in recent years, in 2014, the ROK concluded a contract to export 12 FA-50 light attack aircraft to the Philippines. Among other contracts concluded in recent years are a contract in 2016 to export a frigate to the Philippines, a contract in 2016 to export a supply vessel to New Zealand, contracts in 2017 to export the K-9 self-propelled artillery to Finland, Norway and India, and a contract in 2018 to export trainer aircraft to Indonesia. 89 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint responses in the event of a North Korean provocation. However, the details of the plan have not been made public. 90 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK to maximize their deterrent effects. However, the details have not been made public. 91 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 46th SCM, the “Concepts and Principles” are designed to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy missile threats including nuclear and biochemical warheads. However, the details have not been made public. Furthermore, according to the “Strategic Digest 2015” of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, the “Concepts and Principles” apply from peacetime to war, and will guide operational decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and acquisitions. 92 A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 regarding the ballistic missile defense system. 93 Alth h bi d d i l i l t d i A t 2019 it i t d th t th “Alli ” ld t b d ----- **Fig. I-2-3-6** Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget Defense budget (in 100 million won) Year-on-year growth rate (%) (100 million won) (%) 500,000 20 450,000 400,000 15 350,000 300,000 250,000 10 200,000 150,000 5 100,000 50,000 0 0 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 (FY) Notes : ROK Defense White Paper 2016 for FY2009 to FY2016. The Ministry of National Defense website for FY2017 to FY2019 (OPCON) to the ROK[94] and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. The ROK plans to develop core military competencies for deterrence against and response to the threats from nuclear weapons and missiles, which are required for the transition of OPCON, by 2023. At the 50th SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the transition of OPCON, an ROK military officer will serve as commander of the U.S.ROK Combined Forces, replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer serving as the commander. It was also decided that regarding the ROK Forces’ operational capabilities, their IOC will be assessed in 2019. In August **Chapter** 2019, an IOC assessment was carried out during a combined command exercise for the transition of OPCON.[95] With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea,[96] an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: the relocation to the Pyeontaek area being delayed due to logistical reasons such as increases in relocation costs; in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was decided that the counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. In July 2017 the U.S. Eighth Army headquarters relocated to the Pyeontaek area, and in June 2018 the headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea and United Nations Command also relocated to the same area. The realignment of U.S. Forces Korea could have a significant impact on U.S. and ROK defense postures on the Korean Peninsula, and as such it will be necessary to follow future developments closely. 94 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency. 95 An opening statement made by Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeongdoo at the U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting held on August 9, 2019 96 The United States intends to consolidate and relocate the bases of the U.S. Forces Korea which are scattered across the ROK, in order to ensure stable stationing conditions for U.S. Forces Korea and a balanced development of ROK land. The agreement between the United States and the ROK include: (1) an agreement to conduct the relocation to south of the Han River in two stages (June 2003); and (2) the withdrawal of 12,500 of the nearly 37,500 personnel out of the ROK (October 2004). The United States has thus been transforming its posture in accordance with these agreements. However, at the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in April 2008, the two countries agreed to maintain the current 28,500 as the appropriate troop level. Since th th t t i h ti d t ffi th t i t i i thi t l l ld b i t ----- well as vitalizing high-level strategic dialogue. The ROK Defense White Paper 2018 also makes clear that the ROK will strengthen strategic communication with China. **(2) Relations with Russia** Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high-ranking military officials. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. In March 2012, the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security. In June 2018, President Moon Jae-in visited Russia as a state guest, becoming the first ROK president to do so in 19 years. In August 2018, defense strategic dialogue was held, and it was agreed that the dialogue will be upgraded to the vice minister level and that a hotline will be established between the two countries’ air forces. On the other hand, Russia opposes the deployment of THAAD by U.S. Forces Korea for the reason that it is part of the U.S. missile defense network and harms the strategic stability of the region. 5 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with China** China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. Meanwhile, outstanding issues have emerged between China and the ROK. The “ADIZ” issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ. Furthermore, it included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the exclusive economic zone. Against this backdrop, the ROK Government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month. The ROK is protesting that Chinese aircraft are repeatingly intruding into the ROK’s ADIZ.[97] China has protested that the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea would undermine China’s strategic security interests. On this point, in October 2017 the governments of China and the ROK announced that they had agreed to utilize military channels to reach a mutual understanding relating to China’s concerns about THAAD. In December 2017 President Moon Jae-in made his first visit to China since his inauguration and the two leaders agreed to establish a hotline and continue to maintain close communication, as **Chapter** 97 For example, in November 2018, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that it had lodged a protest with China over several cases of intrusion by Chinese aircraft into the ROK’s Ai D f Id tifi ti Z l ti ith t i ti i th b i i f th d h d t l ll d Chi t t k t t i il i id t ----- **Section** **4** **Russia** **1** **General Situation** President Vladimir Putin, who has been seeking the revival of Russia as a strong and influential power, successfully achieved reelection in 2018. In his inaugural address in May of that same year, President Putin stated that Russia is a strong, active and influential participant in international life, and that the country’s security and defense capability are reliably secured. He also stated that quality of life, wellbeing, security and health were his main goals, and that Russia has risen like a phoenix a number of times throughout history and would achieve a breakthrough again. At the annual presidential address to the Federal Assembly of Russia in March of that same year, held prior to the presidential election, President Putin said, “Russia ranks among the world’s leading nations with a powerful foreign economic and defense potential.” At that same time, President Putin talked about modernizing Russia’s military equipment, including its strategic nuclear forces, and emphasized that Russia would be developing new nuclear weapons as a measure in response to the deployment of missile defense systems by the United States domestically and abroad. President Putin also expressed the recognition that Russia’s military power helped maintain strategic parity in the world, and remarked that Russia is prepared to negotiate toward construction of a new system for international security and sustainable development of civilization. In response to the United States’ February 2019 notification of its intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty, Russia announced in March that it had notified the United States that it would suspend implementing its obligations under the treaty. With regard to the situation in Ukraine, ever since the efforts to implement ceasefire agreements (Minsk Agreements)[1] in the destabilized region of eastern Ukraine following the illegal “annexation” of Crimea by Russia, there have been no major developments in particular. The West has alleged that Russia attempted to change the status quo by **Chapter** Ukrainian naval vessels seized and tied up in a port in Crimea (November 2018) [SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo] force by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” and it is increasing its sense of caution toward Russia.[2] Russia and Ukraine continue to have a tense relationship, as demonstrated by such developments as Ukraine’s temporary imposition of martial law in November 2018, following the seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels by the Coast Guard of the Border Service of Russia. In addition, Russia has been conducting military intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has indicated that it has the ability to continually and swiftly deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring bases in Syria. At the same time, it is thought that Russia considers the intervention as an opportunity to test and demonstrate its equipment. As well as hosting Syrian peace talks brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, while continuing the fight against ISIL and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) (formerly known as Al-Nusra Front), Russia has signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey on the establishment of a demilitarized zone around the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib, which is a stronghold for the remaining rebels. Russia’s growing involvement in the Syrian situation will attract attention as a move aimed at expanding its influence in the Middle East. The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local selfgovernment in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations. Then, the Minsk Memorandum was signed in September 2014, and the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreement was signed on February 2015. These are collectively called the Minsk Agreements. Due to the complex nature of hybrid warfare that combines economic, intelligence operation, and diplomatic aspects, some suggest that the rising threat of hybrid warfare will drive closer ti b t NATO hi h i ilit lli d th EU hi h i i f i it it d d f i iti ti ----- See Chapter 3, Section 7 (Trends in International Terrorism and See Regional Conflict) While Russia faces severe economic conditions, forecasts indicate that following the recovery in oil prices, a major export product, the country will maintain positive economic growth in 2019.[3] Under these circumstances, attention is being paid on how President Putin, while maintaining his power base, will deal with Russia’s diplomatic isolation from Europe and the United States, and economic situation, as well as promote economic structural reforms and modernization of Russia’s military forces, and its effort to expand international influence. **Chapter** President Erdoğan (left) and President Putin (right) shaking hands after agreeing on the establishment of a demilitarized zone around the Syrian province of Idlib (September 2018) [AFP/Jiji] **2** **Security and Defense Policies** risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); formation of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia. The doctrine positions nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and military conflicts that use conventional weapons, and states that Russia will maintain an adequate level of nuclear deterrent capability. Additionally, it states that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation not only for the use of nuclear or other WMDs, but also in the event of invasion using conventional weapons, where the survival of the country itself is imperiled. In its assessment of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear capabilities in the Nuclear Posture Review published in 2018, the United States stated that Russia recognized that its diverse and more numerous non-strategic nuclear weapons systems could overpower an opponent in a low-intensity conflict and believed that limited first-strike use of nuclear weapons — including the use of low-yield nuclear weapons — could give the country the upper hand over the United States and its allies. Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime. As for Russia’s defense budget, the executed FY2017 budget registered a year-on-year decrease of around 25% compared to the amount spent in the previous year, while the amounts executed for FY2011-FY2016 showed year-onyear double-digit growth. Although Russia faced a difficult fiscal situation in 2015 and 2016, including declines in 1 Basic Posture Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” revised in December 2015. The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region for undermining global and regional stability. In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfilled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military conflict by maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capability and the Russian armed forces (RAF). The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defining the following as new military Th I t ti l M t F d (IMF) di t d th t R i ’ GDP th t f 2018 ld b 1 7% d ld i t 1 8% i 2019 ----- economic growth, it is said that the country has worked to secure a budget for national defense in order to achieve the goal of modernizing its equipment by 2020 and other targets. However, having used up the reserve fund[4] set aside for fiscal replenishment, it is deemed that since 2017, Russia’s national defense budget has been allocated based on the amount of economic growth achieved.[5] See Fig. I-2-4-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget) **Fig. I-2-4-1** Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget (100 million rubles) (%) 40,000 50.0 35,000 40.0 30,000 30.0 25,000 20.0 20,000 10.0 15,000 0.0 10,000 -10.0 5,000 -20.0 0 -30.0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 (FY) Defense budget (in 100 million rubles) Year-on-year growth rate (%) Note: The Information on Execution of Budgets of the Russian Federation announced by the Russian Federal Treasury (figures for FY2010-FY2018 are expenditures and figures for FY2019 are the budget amount). 70%, and it announced in December 2018 that it had increased said proportion to approximately 61.5%. Within the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2018-2027,[9] it is said that Russia will continue to invest 19 trillion rubles over ten years to update equipment and an additional 1 trillion rubles to develop infrastructure needed for the deployment of that equipment. It is expected that Russia will continue modernization efforts in the future. Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system (for noncommissioned officers and soldiers) which selects personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the first time, and in the future the percentage of contract servicemen is set to increase further.[10] See 2 Military Reform **Chapter** Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” that was approved by President Dmitry Medvedev (then) in September 2008, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based command structure to a brigade-based one[6]), strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the RAF such as the development and introduction of new equipment. Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that RAF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016.[7] Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational.[8] Regarding the modernization of the military forces, Russia is working to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 4 In order to replenish funds for the government budget lost due to a fall in oil prices, Russia set aside a portion (the surplus) of governmental income received from oil production and exports. 5 According to the Russian Federal Treasury, the initial FY2019 defense budget increased by 10.1% from the initial budget of the previous fiscal year to 3.1134 trillion rubles, marking a 5.4% increase compared to the budget spent in the previous fiscal year. 6 The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command– brigade. Although this was said to be completed in December 2009, in May 2013 the Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifle Division and the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, which had been reorganized into brigades under then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov, were reactivated and participated in a victory parade. Furthermore, in the January 25, 2016 edition of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), a newspaper of the military, Gen. Oleg Salyukov, Ground Forces Commander, stated that four divisions were scheduled to be established in 2016 based on the existing brigades. 7 It was decided that the total military force would be one million personnel as of 2016 by an executive order of December 2008 (the strength was approximately 1.13 million as of 2008). According to TASS, an Executive Order issued by the President of Russia in July 2016 calls for the number of military personnel to be kept at one million. 8 The Northern Joint Strategic Command is a unified force led by the Northern Fleet and consists of fleets, ground forces, and air forces. Its area of operation covers the seas and remote islands extending from the Barents Sea to the East Siberian Sea, and the Arctic coast. 9 The GPV was reportedly approved by President Putin by February 2018. While details have not been released, it is believed that, under the GPV, Russia will continue to prioritize the updating of its nuclear capability and that 70% of the Russian military’s armaments are due to be modernized by 2021. 10 Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease in the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (since January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). In March 2019, according to the Russian military newspaper Red Star, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated th t t t d ldi t t l d i t l 394 000 ----- In the context of the increase in diffi culties in securing the defense budget due to the recent severe economic situation, attention will be paid to the trends related to Russian efforts to **3** **Military Posture and Trends** Russia’s military forces are comprised of forces such as the RAF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation. The RAF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Forces; Navy; Aerospace Forces; Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces. improve the capacity of conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence capability provided by nuclear weapons. of modern weapons in Russia’s nuclear triad had reached 82%. Talking about priorities for 2019, he mentioned the need for modern strategic nuclear forces with enhanced missile defense system penetration capabilities, as well as laying emphasis on future mass production of the HGV “Avangard”. That February, President Putin ordered that half-yearly progress reports be provided on the development and deployment of new weapons, including the “Avangard” HGV, the “Sarmat” ICBM, and the “Kinzhal” air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). Additionally, he revealed for the **Chapter** See Fig. I-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military) See 1 Nuclear Forces Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness. Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) comparable to the United States in scale. Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States.[11] Russia is working on accelerating the development and introduction of new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its GPV. In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of RS24, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM.[12] Since December 2012, three Boreyclass SSBN vessels, which carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” were commissioned. There are plans to deploy four such vessels each to the Northern Fleet and Pacifi c Fleet in the future. In October 2018, fi ring training took place using an SLBMs from a SSBN in the Okhotsk Sea and a SSBN from the Barents Sea. Cruise missile fi ring training also took place using long-range bombers. President Putin, at the Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board held in December 2018, noted that the share 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles unveiled by Russia (January 2019). The launch canisters for the missiles (foreground) and the transporter-erector launcher (background) [Jane’s by IHS Markit] **Borey-class submarine** < Specifi cations, performance> Water displacement: 19,711 tons 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Maximum speed: 25 knots (approximately 46 km/h) Main armament: SLBM Bulava (maximum fi ring range 8,300 km) torpedoes Russian Navy’s new type of strategic nuclear-powered submarine carrying ballistic missiles, the fi rst ship being commissioned in 2012. It can carry 16 SLBMs. It has been deployed with the Pacifi c Fleet since 2015. 11 In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and the treaty came into force in February 2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. The United States announced that as of March 2019 the United States had 1,365 deployed strategic warheads and 656 deployed delivery platforms, and Russia announced that as of March 2019, it had 1,461 deployed strategic warheads and 524 deployed delivery platforms. 12 In addition, it is believed that Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM “Sarmat” (RS-28) that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and be equipped with many warheads, a light-weight bil lid f l ICBM “R b h ” (RS 26) ll h d i d t h i th bilit t t t MD ----- **Fig. I-2-4-2** Location and Strength of Russian Military (image) |(Northern Joint Strat Baltic Fleet (HQ: Severo Kaliningrad Northern Fleet Severomorsk Western Military District Black Sea Fleet (Western Joint Strategic Command Sevastopol (HQ: Saint Petersburg) (in Ukraine) Central Mili (Central Joint Str (HQ: Yekat Southern Military District Caspian Flotilla (Southern Joint Strategic Command Astrankhan (HQ: Rostov-on-Don) Total military forces Ground troops Ground forces Tanks (Not inc Warships Aircraft carriers Cruisers Maritime forces Destroyers Frigates Submarines Marines Combat aircraft Modern fighter aircraft Air forces Bombers Population Reference Term of service 1 year|egic Command) morsk) ) Eastern Military District tary District (Eastern Joint Strategic Command) ategic Command) (HQ: Khabarovsk) erinburg) ) Pacific Flotilla Vladivostok Russia Approx. 900,000 troops Approx. 330,000 troops T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,800 luding mothballed tanks. Approx. 13,000 including mothballed tanks) Approx. 1,119 vessels Approx. 2,075,000 tons 1 vessel 4 vessels 13 vessels 14 vessels 75 vessels Approx. 35,000 troops Approx. 1,516 aircraft 142 MiG-29 aircraft 133 Su-30 aircraft 124 MiG-31 aircraft 17 Su-33 aircraft 199 Su-25 aircraft 112 Su-34 aircraft 144 Su-27 aircraft 73 Su-35 aircraft (4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 944) 16 Tu-160 aircraft 60 Tu-95 aircraft 63 Tu-22M aircraft Approx. 142.12 million (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system)| |---|---| Source: “The Military Balance 2019,” etc. Ground troops include 280,000 ground force personnel and 45,000 airborne unit personnel. **Chapter** first time that Russia was developing the “Zircon”, a sealaunched hypersonic missile that is believed to have a firing range of over 1,000 km and be capable of speeds up to approximately Mach 9. As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the INF Treaty with the United States, and the following ----- year removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels for storage onshore. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces and has in recent years been moving forward with deployments of the “Iskander” groundlaunched ballistic missile system, which is believed to be capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warheads, and the “Kalibr” sea-launched cruise missile system. As well as commenting on Russia’s breaches of the INF Treaty since May 2013 and repeatedly demanding that the country return to compliance with the treaty, the United States announced that Russia had deployed GroundLaunched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), which violate the treaty. On the other hand, Russia has consistently denied violating the treaty and has criticized the United States, saying that it is itself in breach of the INF Treaty, on the grounds that Aegis Ashore is equipped with a system capable of launching Tomahawk missiles. Thus, the United States and Russia remain as far apart as ever on matters concerning the treaty. Amid this situation, the United States provided notice in February 2019 of its intention to withdraw from the treaty within six months and announced its intention to develop surface-launched intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying conventional warheads. Russia adopted a response that was both symmetrical and asymmetrical, announcing **KEY WORD** Russian ground-launched cruise missiles deemed by the United States to violate the INF Treaty The United States fi rst offi cially referred to the existence of Russian groundlaunched cruise missiles that violated the INF Treaty in July 2014; subsequent references were made to what the United States and others called the “SSC-8” and Russia called “9M729” and, by the latter half of 2018, the United States announced that several of these missile battalions had been deployed. While the United States has not revealed such details of the missiles as their range, it has pointed out that they were developed on the basis of the Kalibr sea-launched anti-surface cruise missiles, which are believed to have a range of 2,000 km. In January 2019, Russia unveiled the 9M729 claimed by the United States as being in violation of the treaty and again denied that the missile breached the treaty, claiming that it was an improved version of the SSC-7 (called the 9M728 in Russia) cruise missile carried by the Iskander surface-to-surface missile system and had a range of 480 km. plans to develop a ground-launched adaptation of the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile system, along with hypersonic ground-launched cruise missiles and, that March, notifi ed the United States that it was suspending its own participation in the treaty. Russia confi rmed that the treaty ceased to have effect due to the United States’ complete withdrawal, and criticized the United States by saying that all the responsibility for escalating tensions across the world will rest with Washington. Furthermore, Russia stated that it is essential to resume full dialogues to safeguard strategic stability and security, and that Russia is open to that. 2 Conventional Forces and Other Issues Russia is developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. Close attention will need to be paid to Russia’s development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the “Su-57”[13] currently under development as the so-called “fi fth generation fi ghter” and the T-14 Armata tank,[14] in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fi ghter and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.” Along with carrying out a range of exercises,[15] since February 2013, the RAF has been conducting surprise inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. since the collapse of the Soviet Union.[16] These inspections are contributing to the improvement of long-distance mobilization capability of the **Chapter** **Su-35 fi ghter** < Specifi cations, performance> Speed: Mach 2.25 Main armament: RVV-BD air-to-air missiles (maximum fi ring range 200 km), Kh-59MK air-to-ship 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 missiles (maximum fi ring range 285 km) New type of multipurpose fi ghter of the Russian Air Force, it has been deployed in the Far East since 2014. 13 In August 2018, the Russian military ordered two Su-57 fi ghter aircraft with interim engines; some have noted that this fi ghter is due to enter mass production in 2023. 14 A new tank fi tted with an unmanned turret that was unveiled for the fi rst time during the Victory Day Parade on May 9, 2015. In addition to this tank, Russia is currently developing a family of crawler and wheeled infantry fi ghting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, and so on. A contract for 100 tanks was concluded in 2016, with the delivery of the tanks scheduled to occur in 2020. 15 As it proceeds with its military reform, Russia has conducted large-scale exercises for verifi cation and other purposes in recent years. Among them are large-scale annual exercises covering all aspects of combat training, which are held in a round-robin format involving all military districts Russia plans to hold the Tsentr 2019 exercise this year. (Exercises from the previous four years included: Tsentr 2015 [Central Military District], Kavkaz 2016 [South Military District], Zapad 2017 [West Military District], and Vostok 2018 [East Military District].) 16 Surprise inspections were conducted at the Central and Southern Military Districts in February 2013, Southern Military District in March 2013, Western Military District in May 2013, Eastern and Central Military Districts in July 2013, strategic nuclear units in October 2013, and Western and Central Military Districts from February to March 2014. In September 2014, a i i ti f th E t Milit Di t i t d t d hi h t iti d t th V t k 2014 l l i ----- RAF.[17] Furthermore, outside of Russia, the RAF have been deploying vessels mainly formed of the Black Sea Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea.[18] In September 2018, the Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla gathered off the coast of Syria, east of the Mediterranean Sea, and conducted a major joint exercise that also involved aircraft. A plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfi elds in the Arctic, and between August and October 2018, a fl otilla mainly comprising Northern Fleet Udaloy-class destroyers took part in various landing drills during ocean navigation from the Kola peninsula to the eastern Arctic.[19] Additionally, some fl eets advanced into the Bering Strait as part of the large-scale Vostok 2018 exercise. The RAF has been conducting activities including not only such deployment and exercises of naval vessels and resumption of military facility operation, but also strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol fl ights by long-range bombers. Particularly **4** **Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan** 1 General Situation Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010. Land Forces, the Pacifi c Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unifi ed operation of these services. The current presence of the RAF in the Far East region is signifi cantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity, including the trend related to deployment of new units and military facility development. Given that the RAF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with confl icts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the RAF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions. in 2018, Tu-95 long-range bombers fl ew to western Alaska in September, and Tu-160 long-range bombers fl ew more than 10,000 km to Venezuela over the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Caribbean Sea in December. In addition, the RAF continues to operate two permanent bases within Syria, though in December 2017 it largely terminated the military operations that it had conducted in Syria since 2015. Russia thus appears to be stepping up military activities not only in the Arctic, Europe, areas near the United States, and the Middle East, but also in the Far East, so close scrutiny of developments in this regard will be required.[20] In addition, as Russia’s levels of economic and social development going forward and trends in its diplomatic relations with European and other countries will infl uence the future of the RAF, continuous attention should be paid to its movements. **(1) Nuclear Forces** As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, three Delta III-class SSBNs and two Borey-class SSBNs equipped with SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk, and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed in Ukrainka. Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying four Borey-class **Chapter** **Tu-95 long-range bomber** < Specifi cations, performance> 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Speed: 924 km Maximum radius of action: 6,398 km Main armament: Kh-101 air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum fi ring range 4,500 km) Produced between 1956 and 1994, the fi nal version is currently under refurbishment for modernization. Capable of carrying eight air-to-surface cruise missiles (conventional or nuclear warhead). 17 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the surprise inspections held fi ve times a year on average would enable the commanders of every military district and military service as well as staff to mobilize long distances and execute tasks in unknown regions. 18 Russia’s naval fl eet in the Mediterranean which is said to have completed its formation on June 1, 2013, is considered a permanent operational force. 19 Among the military installations being developed in the Arctic, it is believed that the bases under construction on Alexandra Island in the Franz Joseph Land and Kotelny Island in the Novosibirsk Islands will house 150 and 250 personnel each and have enough supplies to continue operations without assistance for a period of 18 months. In addition, the Northern Fleet has conducted long distance navigation to the Novosibirsk Islands every year since 2012. 20 It is deemed that the RAF intends to maintain and enhance their combat readiness, as well as use diversionary approach towards the West and other countries in connection with the it ti i Uk i d d R i ’ i fl ----- Bal and Bastion surface-to-ship missiles, and the S-400 surface-to-air missile system. **(3) Naval Forces** The Pacifi c Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fl eet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 640,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 310,000 tons. It also plans on deploying four multipurpose Steregushchiy-class frigates,[21] and the “Gremyashchiy” — an improved version of the Steregushchiy-class frigate that could be deployed as early as 2019 — is believed to be the fi rst vessel in the Pacifi c Fleet to be armed with Kalibr cruise missiles. SSBNs to the Pacifi c Fleet by 2020. **(2) Ground Forces** As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be reorganizing the command structure from a division-based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of ten brigades and two divisions with approximately 80,000 personnel in total as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, **Chapter** In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately **Surface-to-ship missile Bal** < Specifi cations, performance> Maximum fi ring range: 130 km Surface-to-ship missile 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it has been deployed to the Pacifi c Fleet since 2016. An improved missile with a maximum range of 260 km also exists (the 3M-24U). Maximum fi ring range: 300 anti-ship missiles (with a maximum fi ring range of 130 km km (or 260 km for the improved version)), 9M96 ship-to coastal defense, etc., it 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 The Russian Navy’s new type of frigate, the fi rst of which has been deployed to the Pacifi c Fleet since 2014. was commissioned in 2007. The Russian Ministry of **Surface-to-ship missile Bastion** < Specifi cations, performance> Maximum fi ring range: 300 km Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 has been deployed to the Pacifi c Fleet since 2014. **Steregushchiy-class frigates** < Specifi cations, performance> Full load displacement: 2,235 tons Speed: 26 knots 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Main armament: SS-N-25 anti-ship missiles (with a maximum fi ring range of 130 km (or 260 km for the improved version)), 9M96 ship-toair missiles (maximum fi ring range 60 km) On-board aircraft: One helicopter (Ka-27) The Russian Navy’s new type of frigate, the fi rst of which was commissioned in 2007. The Russian Ministry of Defence is scheduled to deploy Sovershennyy (fourth ship), Gromkiy (seventh ship), Alda Tsydenzhapov (11th ship), and Rezkiy (12th ship) to the Pacifi c Fleet. Main armament: RVV-BD air-to-air missiles (maximum This missile has the capability to intercept ballistic fi ring range 100 km), Kh-59ME air-to-surface missiles pointed out that a missile with a maximum range of 400 New type of fi ghter-bomber of the Russian Air Force, it **Anti-air Missile system S-400** < Specifi cations, performance> Maximum fi ring range: 250 km (anti-aircraft), 60 km (anti-ballistic missile) 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Maximum height: 27 km This missile has the capability to intercept ballistic missiles and act as an air-defense missile. It was deployed in the Eastern District in 2012. It has been pointed out that a missile with a maximum range of 400 km also exists (the 40N6). **Su-34 fi ghter-bomber** < Specifi cations, performance> Speed: Mach 1.6 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Main armament: RVV-BD air-to-air missiles (maximum fi ring range 100 km), Kh-59ME air-to-surface missiles (maximum fi ring range 200 km) New type of fi ghter-bomber of the Russian Air Force, it has been deployed in the Far East since 2016. 21 Th fi t f th th S h i i d i J l 2017 d th d th G k i i d i D b 2018 ----- Changes in the Number of Scrambles against **Fig. I-2-4-3** Russian Aircraft (Times) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 (FY) of Defense as having transited this strait at the same time since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, ten or more Russian naval vessels have passed through the Soya Strait one to three times a year.[23] Additionally, survey activities have taken place on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands, with the objective of studying the feasibility of deploying Pacific Fleet’s forces there in the future, and it is said that a new runway has been completed on that island as well.[24] It is also pointed out that bases will be constructed on Matsuwa Island as well as Paramushir Island, located in the north of Chishima Islands, and that there are plans to deploy Bal and Bastion surface-to-air missiles there. Attention must be paid to movement towards the construction of a coastal defense system covering the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands. Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long-range bombers. Also, there were flights of Tu-95 long-range bombers refueled in midflight and supported by A-50 early warning and control aircraft and Su-27 fighters as well as flights of Tu-160. Russian aircraft were particularly active in FY2014 during the height of tensions in Ukraine, and in April the same year when eastern Ukraine began to destabilize, unusual flights took place with Tu-95 long-range bombers conducting flights around Japan on four occasions in one month. On two of these 350 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. Existing models are being modernized and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters and the Su-34 fighter-bombers, are being introduced[22] to improve their capabilities. 2 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan In the vicinity of Japan, the RAF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform. In September 2018, Vostok 2018, considered the largest since 1981, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. According to a Russian Defense Ministry announcement, approximately 300,000 personnel, 36,000 tanks and other vehicles, 80 vessels, and 1,000 aircraft participated in the exercise. The participating units undertook long-distance maneuvers over distances of up to 7,000 km, while vessels of the Northern Fleet sailed up to 4,000 nautical miles. The Chinese and Mongolian militaries also participated in the exercise. Vostok 2018 is positioned as an annual strategic military exercise hosted in turn by each of four military districts and is regarded as an initiative aimed at giving the participating military forces the capacity to engage in largescale conflicts with military superpowers over a short period and the ability to wield influence over potential enemies. Notable features of this year’s exercise were the size of the units deployed and the participation of countries other than Russia’s allies. The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing. With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, various exercises and long distance voyages have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels, along with assigned missions involving operations in Syria and patrols by nuclear-powered submarines. In September 2018, 28 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait. This was the largest number of vessels announced by the Ministry **Chapter** 22 According to “The Military Balance 2019,” in addition to 34 Su-35 fighters, 26 Su-34 fighter-bombers have been deployed to the Eastern Military District (11th Army of Air and Air Defence Force). 23 The number of cases of the Russian naval fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and released in FY2018 is as follows: 17 cases in the Soya Strait (12 in FY2017, 18 in FY2016, 22 in FY2015); 0 case in the Tsugaru Strait (1 in FY2017, 1 in FY2016, 0 in FY2015); and 4 cases in the Tsushima Strait (3 in FY2017, 7 in FY2016, 4 in FY2015). 24 In May 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that under the command of Vice Admiral Andrei Ryabukhin, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet that arrived in Matsuwa Island, an expedition comprised of approximately 200 personnel including representatives from the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Russian Geographical Society, the Eastern Military District, and the Pacific Fleet began conducting survey activities. Colonel-general Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Eastern Military District, stated at a military meeting of the district that six Pacific Fleet vessels and over 200 personnel participated in an expedition by the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Geographical Society to Chishima, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands, and that its primary objective was to study the feasibility of establishing a Pacific Fleet base in the future. Furthermore, it was announced that three ships of the Pacific Fleet and around 100 personnel arrived on Matsuwa Island in June 2017 in order to conduct a secondary survey. Sakhalin.info reported in October 2017 that a new runway had been completed on Matsuwa Island, and that it was accepting aircraft landings around the clock. In March 2018, the Russian military newspaper Red Star reported that Russia’s Pacific Fleet is currently d l i ilit i t th i l d th t h th it t i ilit li ht t t i ft d t ft ----- occasions, a total of six Tu-95 flew on the same day.[25] While the number of scrambles against Russian aircraft fell from the previous year, Russian aircraft continued to be active in FY2018, as shown by the flights by Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft around Japan in September 2018. In June 2019, two Tu-95 long-range bombers flew around Japan, and intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when they flew northward over the Pacific Ocean. In July last year, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out “first Russia **5** **Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories** Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and antiair missiles are deployed.[27] After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island for the first time as head of state in November 2010, Russian ministers and others have made repeated visits to the Northern Territories. In the recent past, Prime Minister Medvedev visited Etorofu Island in August 2019.[28] Also, Russia is proceeding with the development of military facilities in the China joint air patrol with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-rage bombers[26] intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. See Fig. I-2-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against See Russian Aircraft) **Chapter** Northern Territories.[29] In November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands.[30] In January 2018, the new civilian airport built in 2014 in Etorofu Island in addition to Tennei military airfield was opened up to joint military and civilian use, with three Su-35 fighter aircraft reportedly deployed to the new airport in August 2018. Russia also continues to carry out military exercises on islands that can include the Northern Territories and announced in April 2018 that it had conducted a military exercise that involved more than 2,500 personnel, along with multiple rocket launchers, tanks, and helicopters. As described above, Russia continues to station RAF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, 25 The number of times Russian military aircraft flew around Japan since FY2013 was: one time in FY2013; six times in FY2014; two times in FY2015; one time in FY2016; one time in FY2017; and one time in FY2018. 26 According to Russian reports, at a briefing held on July 23, Lieutenant-General Kobylash, commander of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation announced that the first Russia-China joint air patrol on the same day was backed up by aircraft of the combat forces, a Russian A-50 and a Chinese KJ-2000 early warning and control aircraft. 27 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which is comprised of two regiments, is one of the few division units making up the RAF since most divisions were transformed into brigades due to military reform, and is stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands to prevent landings. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500. At the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov revealed that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo. In February 2011, a senior official of the General Staff was said to have stated that troops on the Northern Territories would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel in the process of reorganizing divisions into brigades. However, the total number of troops on the Northern Territories is believed to have increased, due to the deployment of a naval surface-to-ship missile unit announced in November 2014 and an air force fighter unit reported in August 2018. 28 Visits to the Northern Territories by Russian government dignitaries are as follows (titles shown are those at the time): - December 2010: First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov (Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island) - January to February 2011: Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin (Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island) - January 2011: Deputy Minister of Defence Dmitry Bulgakov (Kunashiri Island and Etrofu Island) - February 2011: Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov (Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island) - May 2011: Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov (Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island) - September 2011: Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev (Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands) - July 2012: Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers (Kunashiri Island) - September 2012: Minister of Agriculture Nikolai Vasilyevich Fyodorov (Etorofu Island) - July 2015: Minister of Healthcare Veronika Skvortsova (Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island) - August 2015: Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers (Etorofu Island) - September 2015: Minister of Agriculture Alexander Tkachev (Etorofu Island), and Minister of Transport Maksim Sokolov (Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island) - September 2017: Minister of Natural Resources and Environment Sergei Yefimovich Donskoi (Etrofu Island) - February 2019: Special Presidential Representative Sergei Ivanov and Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media Konstantin Noskov (Shikotan Island) - August 2019: Prime Minister Medvedev and two ministers (Etorofu Island) 29 At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence of Russia in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that a total of 392 buildings and facilities are actively being built in the military facility areas on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. In December 2018, the Eastern Military District Commander inspected dormitories on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands and announced plans to develop two new dormitories on Etorofu and one on Kunashiri in 2019. 30 In March 2016, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that it planned to deploy surface-to-ship missiles “Bastion” and “Bal” to the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands before the end of the year. In November 2016, Boyevaya Vakhta, a newsletter published by the Pacific Fleet, mentioned that a “Bastion” coastal missile unit is being rotated to Etorofu Island and a “B l” t l i il it t K hi i I l d i till d ----- **Chapter** **Vostok 2018** Russian Forces conduct a large-scale strategic military exercise as a climax of annual exercises alternately in four military districts – Eastern, Central, Southern and Western – and call the four exercises Vostok (east), Tsentr (central), Kavkaz (Caucasus) and Zapad (west), respectively. The annual climax exercise is reportedly designed for the General Staff to accomplish presidential missions to (1) plan and verify the transition of Russia, including the Ministry of Defense and other government agencies and private enterprises, from peacetime to wartime and (2) test a setup for a large-scale severe war that requires national response. Vostok 2018, conducted mainly in the Eastern Military District, was announced as the largest exercise since 1981, mobilizing about 300,000 troops, about 36,000 battle tanks and other vehicles, about 80 ships, and about 1,000 aircraft from the Central Military District and the Northern Fleet as well as the Eastern Military District. The disclosed number of 300,000 participating troops is viewed as covering all participants in the main exercise during the disclosed exercise period of September 11-17 and various preparatory activities from July (such as long-range unit deployment drills, logistic and combat support drills and surprise drills for checking readiness), with the main exercise participants limited to less than 100,000 troops, or as exaggerating the number of participants to demonstrate a strong military presence. At a drill site close to the border with China and Mongolia, about 3,200 servicepersons, about 900 tanks and other vehicles, and about 30 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft from China conducted a joint drill with Russian Forces. A ChinaRussia-Mongolia military parade was conducted at the site, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian and Chinese defense ministers visiting the site. Although Russia and China earlier conducted naval and other joint drills, Vostok 2018 was the first Russian annual climax exercise in which China participated. Earlier, Russia conducted annual climax exercises alone or jointly with some allies (Belarus and Kazakhstan among the members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization). Vostok 2018 attracted attention as China emphasized that it participated in the Russian exercise by dispatching the largest number of troops abroad in history and as it was pointed out that China and Russia could have been further promoting their military cooperation to check the United States. Vostok 2014, conducted four years ago, was also a large-scale exercise with about 155,000 troops participating. While the exercise centered on Far Eastern and Arctic coastal zones and islands, including the Kamchatka Peninsula that the Russian defense minister visited during the exercise, Vostok 2018 featured dominant inland drills, including those at the site visited by the Chinese and Russian defense ministers, with coastal and island drills limited to those by the Northern Fleet in Arctic coastal zones and islands and in the Bering Sea. Military parade conducted in Vostok 2018 by Russia, China, Mongolia Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu (right foreground) and President Putin (September 2018) [AFP/Jiji] (left), and Chinese Defense Minister Wei (center in the back) observing Vostok 2018 (September 2018) [AFP/Jiji] and has recently been increasing the RAF’s activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.[31] During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial 31 In Soviet Military Power 1989, the U.S. DoD refers to “Bastion” as the activity area of SSBN to be protected by land, sea, and air assets while utilizing topography in the territorial waters of the former Soviet Union. It was assumed that in the Pacific region, the former Soviet Union had set up a “Bastion” mainly in Okhotsk Sea. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy stated th t l l t t l f SSBN hi h tl t il d i th f S i t U i ld b t t d i 2012 ----- Meeting (2+2) held in May 2019, Japan stated that the military build-up in the Northern Territories by RAF is inconsistent with Japan’s legal positions. In addition, Japan expressed a concern about the vigorous activities of Russian **6** **Relations with Other Countries** 1 General Situation Russia considers the realization of its national interests as a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the multipolarization of international relations, the shift of global power to the Asia-Pacific region, and the growing importance of force in international relations.[32] Moreover, based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world.[33] For this reason, Russia has been working on deepening its economic partnerships with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)[34]. Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacific countries, seen as drivers of the global economy, and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India as countries with which to strengthen bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the possibility of cooperation with other countries towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL. Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy with Russia’s politics and diplomacy including security in order to develop its relations with other countries. military aircraft around Japan and called for a calm response from Russia. Closer attention must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories. 2 Relations with Asian Countries Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and considers it strategically important to strengthen its status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic development in Siberia and the Far East, and security.[35] To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and also intends to assign an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India.[36] Russia continues to advance close military cooperation with China. Export agreements on new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 fighter jets were concluded in 2015, and since 2012, Russia and China have been conducting joint naval exercise “Joint Sea.” In July of this year, two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers flew with two Chinese H-6 bombers from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. Russia and China called this joint flight the “first Russia-China joint air patrol” conducted in line with the annual military cooperation plan between the two countries.[37] This indicates progress in the military cooperation between Russia and China. In 2018, Russia concluded agreements to supply India with new armaments such as the S-400 surface-to-air missile system and Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates. The two countries have completed joint development of the “BrahMos” **Chapter** 32 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (November 2016). 33 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “With a view to protecting its national interests Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy ruling out futile confrontation (including a new arms race). (Abridged) The Russian Federation’s objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world.” 34 In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement. 35 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in November 2016). Under this policy, Russia has participated in various frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region. Since 2015, the Eastern Economic Forum has been held in Vladivostok for accelerating the economic development of Eastern Russia and expanding international cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the East Asia Summit (EAS; since 2011). 36 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “The Russian Federation will develop its comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with the People’s Republic of China as a key factor for maintaining global and regional stability. The Russian Federation will assign an important role to the privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India.” 37 According to Russian reports, on July 23, Lieutenant-General Kobylash, commander of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation held a briefing on the joint air patrol on the same day, and announced that the air group composed of two Tu-95MS bombers of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation and two Chinese H-6 bombers, had flown along a pre-planned route over neutral waters of the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. The commander also stated that the flight was performed in line with the international military cooperation plan of the Armed Forces of the Russian F d ti f 2019 ----- supersonic cruise missile and are now jointly developing the hypersonic cruise missile “BrahMos-II.”[38] Another example of the ongoing wide-ranging military cooperation between Russia and India is the joint exercise “INDRA,” which has been taking place since 2003 with the involvement of the armies and navies of both countries, with their air forces also taking part in recent years. Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security. 3 Situation in Ukraine As antagonism between Ukraine and Russia has continued since 2014, Ukraine has shifted away from non-alignment policy that Ukraine once held and is pursuing efforts to join NATO. In March 2018, then President Petro Poroshenko stated that Ukraine would participate in a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP).[39] Sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces continue in the eastern part of the country, with over 10,000 people reported to have died since April 2014. Furthermore, the political processes set out in the Minsk agreements seem to have stalled, including the holding of local elections and allowing more autonomy in the areas controlled by separatists. The unstable situation in eastern Ukraine and the Russian “annexation” of Crimea have taken on aspect of being entrenched. In November 2018, there was an incident in which the Coast Guard of the Border Service of Russia seized three Ukrainian naval vessels near the Kerch Strait, a channel — over which Russia has built a bridge to provide an overland link between the Crimean Peninsula and mainland Russia — connecting the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Ukraine declared martial law in response to this incident. While then President Poroshenko criticized the move as a Russian attempt to take possession of the Sea of Azov, following on from its seizure of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, President Putin hit back, calling the response a provocation aimed at increasing popular support immediately before the Ukrainian presidential election. and Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria, the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using fighter-bombers and long-range bombers as well as red cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. In December 2016, a nationwide ceasefire agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect between the Assad administration and opposition forces. While Russia has continued to fight ISIL and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS; formerly the “al-Nusra Front”) since January 2017, it has also held Syrian peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan together with Syria and Iran. Russia has been increasing its presence in the Middle East by promoting initiatives that aim for political resolutions in the future. In December 2017, President Putin visited a base in Syria, where he announced that the fight against terrorism in the country had been largely resolved, that Russia would continue to operate two permanent bases within Syria, and that he had decided that most of the Russian forces in Syria would be redeployed back to Russia.[40] Russia is working to bolster its naval forces and enhance their cooperation with its air force in Syria. For instance, in September 2018, Russia mustered 26 naval vessels from the Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla in the eastern Mediterranean off Syria and held the first major joint exercise involving the navy and air force, in which 34 aircraft — including strategic bombers — took part. See Chapter 3, Section 7 (Trends in International Terrorism and Regional Conflicts) **Chapter** The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, operations in Syria using cruise missiles and strategic bombers have provided the ideal setting to demonstrate Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of 4 Situation in Syria Since September 2015, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base 38 Aside from this cooperation, it has been noted that India is considering the lease of another nuclear-powered attack submarine to replace the Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine that it began leasing from Russia in 2012. 39 The NATO MAP is a NATO program to offer advice and support to countries wishing to join NATO. However, participation in a MAP does not mean that the country will decide to participate in NATO in the future. 40 In December 2017, at an Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, it was announced that since the start of its military operation in Syria, Russian air units have launched approximately 34,000 strikes, damaging or eliminating approximately 8,000 armored vehicles, 718 weapons and ammunition production facilities, and 60,318 combatants. At the December 2018 Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, it was announced that armaments not included in the reorganization of the Knmeimim and Tartus bases had been d d th b f l d d d th t fli ht b i f it i il b i d t d f i ----- Russia s military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey and Iran, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on the political settlement process cannot be neglected. 5 Relations with Commonwealth of Independent States Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as one of its most important foreign policy objectives. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS, and deploys its troops in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transnistria[41]), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009.[42] Through the conclusion of an alliance and strategic partnership treaty with Abkhazia in November 2014, the conclusion of an alliance with South Ossetia in 2015, and other efforts,[43] Russia has been working to ensure its military influence.[44] Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[45] Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.[46] President Putin once remarked, “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century,” and he has been working to unify and strengthen the sphere of the former Soviet Union through such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015. In addition, out of concern that the worsening security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries support Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen the security of the Afghan border.[47] 6 Relations with the United States President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.” Feeling that the United States’ installation of missile defense systems both at home and abroad — including in Europe and the Asia-Pacific — undermines global and regional security, Russia has criticized these moves for upsetting the strategic balance. Russia is also moving forward with the development of new strategic weapons that are said to be capable of reliably penetrating missile defense systems. While expressing concerns about preemptive and spacebased missile defense in response to the MDR published by the United States in January 2019, Russia stated that dialogue between the two countries needed to resume. However, following Russia’s actions in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the United States announced suspension of the military exchanges with Russia in March 2014.[48] In addition, the United States dispatched a missile destroyer to the Black Sea and provided nonlethal weapons **Chapter** 41 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but it was never recognized as such by the international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and then President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria. 42 After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. 43 Russia’s “Military Doctrine” revised in December 2014 states that Russia would promote cooperation with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia aimed at shared defense and security. 44 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. In addition to Georgia which has already withdrawn from CIS and Ukraine which is announcing plans to withdrawal, countries such as Azerbaijan and Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time. 45 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Toshkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization. 46 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, Vzaimodeistvie (cooperative operation), has been implemented every year since 2009. 47 In February 2018, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ISIL presence in northern and eastern Afghanistan had become serious, with thousands of combatants active there. However, the U.S. commander of the NATO mission stationed in the country to train Afghan security units said that Russia was exaggerating the ISIL threat to justify its provision of military assistance to the Taliban. 48 Following the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, then U.S. DoD Spokesperson Kirby announced in March 2014 that the United States would cease all military exchange with R i i l di j i t i ith th RAF lt ti d t ll ----- to the Ukrainian Government.[49] In regard to the situation in Syria, there were some positive developments, including the recognition of the importance of U.S.-Russia cooperation to eliminate ISIL, a U.N.-led political resolution to the conflict, and provisional safe zones as shown in a joint statement released at the U.S.Russia Summit Meeting held in November 2017. However, antagonism between the two countries has continued, with both the United States and Russia criticizing each other over the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in April 2017, and also the missile strikes against Syria by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in April 2018. At the U.S.-Russia summit meeting held in July 2018, disarmament issues as well as international affairs including North Korea and Syria were discussed based on the recognition of a need to improve U.S.-Russia relations, which have deteriorated. At the U.S.-Russia foreign ministers’ meeting held in May 2019, both countries expressed their interest in having many more opportunities for conversation on arms control and multiple strategic security issues between the two countries. Furthermore, at the U.S.-Russia summit meeting held in June 2019, the leaders agreed to continue discussion on a “21st century model of arms control.” Although a U.S.-Russia deputy-ministerial strategic security dialogue was held in July of the same year, no concrete result was confirmed. See Chapter 3, Section 7 (Trends in International Terrorism and Regional Conflict) meetings.[50] Additionally, NATO and European countries have maintained a severe diplomatic stance towards Russia while working together with the Ukrainian Government. At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010 prior to the suspension of working level cooperation, Russia and NATO would work towards building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They have continued searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in fields such as MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counterterrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation, no progress was made on Russia-NATO relations. For example, the talks at the meeting of NR defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for each country’s responsibility under a unified MD system of NATO and Russia. Meanwhile, there remains an unsolved issue between Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.[51] Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has represented existing threat to NATO’s eastern border for the first time since the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s member states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor national security concerns. For this and other reasons, NATO continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of its collective defense.[52] Russia revealed that it has deployed two army divisions near the border with Ukraine, and one army division near its border with Belarus, and Russia conducted the strategic command and staff exercise Zapad 2017 in its Western Military District and Belarus in September 2017.[53] That exercise was brought up at the NATO-Russia Council meeting held in October of that same year, where it was pointed out that the number of actually participating soldiers and the area used for the exercise were larger than indicated in the announcement made by Russia prior to the exercise. However, there were no invasions into other countries by Russia, and no Russian units stayed in Belarus following the **Chapter** 7 Relations with Europe and NATO Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of common interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level 49 The United States provided non-lethal weapons such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, counter mortar radars, uniforms, first aid equipment, and other related items to Ukraine. In March 2018, following the U.S. State Department’s announcement to Congress that it had approved the sale of anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry attacked the decision, stating that the sale of the missiles would not resolve the conflict in Ukraine. 50 NATO issued a statement condemning Russia over the situation in Ukraine, and has deployed additional military forces to countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. However, there are discrepancies among NATO’s member states in their responses to Russia. 51 At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, an agreement was reached on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and on complying with the current CFE Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty comes into effect. Russia was dissatisfied with the fact that despite its ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty, NATO member states refused to ratify the Treaty on the grounds that the RAF were not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova. Therefore, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this treaty. Presently, only four countries have ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has not yet come into effect. In addition, Russia has proposed dissolving the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region. 52 See Chapter 2, Section 8 for more about NATO’s initiatives. 53 A di t R i D f Mi i t t i t l 12 700 l 10 hi 70 i ft d h li t d 250 t k ti i t d i thi i ----- exercise, which were points of concern. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced in November 2016 states that containment policies of the United States and its allies undermine regional and global stability, and Russia would maintain its negative perspective towards NATO expansion. In December 2018, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that the establishment of NATO’s new headquarters would enable units to be deployed more rapidly from the United States to Europe and within Europe to areas close to Russia’s border, and that NATO was beefi ng up its military capacity, with members in the process of achieving the goal of dedicating 2% of GDP to defense spending. The minister then emphasized that Russia was prepared to counter both current and future threats with its modern, agile, compact and effective military. 8 Exportation of Arms Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profi t, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country s export value has been increasing in recent years.[54] In January 2007, the Russian Government granted the exclusive authority to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev. Russia exports equipment such as fi ghters and vessels to countries including India, China, Algeria, ASEAN member states, and Venezuela.[55] Russia concluded an agreement with China to sell new Su-35 fi ghters and the S-400 surface-toair missile system. All the 24 Su-35 fi ghters[56] agreed on had been delivered by 2018, with the fi rst delivery of the S-400 reportedly due to take place that year. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profi t through arms exports.[57] In recent years, Russia has been aggressively marketing its arms to allies and partners of the United States, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, in addition to traditional export destinations. In particular, the export of S-400 to Turkey,[58] a member country of NATO, has met with strong opposition from the United States. **Chapter** **KEY WORD** While there are no clear standards for demarcating fi ghter generations, it is pointed out that a fifth generation fighter has more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth. **Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov** < Specifi cations, performance> Full load displacement: 59,439 tons 【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h) On-board aircraft: Maximum 20 fi ghters and attack aircraft Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring range 550 km) Commissioned in 1990, it is currently the only aircraft carrier that the Russian Navy possesses. Carrier-based aircraft take off by the ski jump method. Scheduled to begin refurbishment in 2021. 54 According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2014 and 2018 decreased by 17% compared to that of the period between 2009 and 2013. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports in the world (21%) after the United States. 55 Russia has delivered to Indonesia 5 Su-27 fi ghters and 11 Su-30 fi ghters. Furthermore, it was reported in 2016 that Russia signed an agreement to sell 11 Su-35 fi ghters to Indonesia. To date, Russia has delivered 18 Su-30 fi ghters to Malaysia and 12 Su-27 fi ghters and 36 Su-30 fi ghters to Vietnam. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam for Kilo-class submarines. All six of these submarines were delivered to Vietnam by January 2017. With regard to India, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which had been refurbished in Russia, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya in November 2013, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, to date, Russia has delivered to Algeria 52 Su-30 fi ghters and to Venezuela 24 Su-30 fi ghters. Russia’s exports to China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fi ghters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. With regard to Iran, Russia started exporting the “S-300” surface-to-air missile system in April 2016. Russia plans to supply the S-400 system to India, in addition to China and Turkey, and is believed to be engaged in ongoing discussions concerning an agreement to supply the system to Saudi Arabia, as well. 56 According to reports, contracts have been concluded to export 24 Su-35 fi ghter jets for approximately USD 2 billion and to export 32 S-400 missile launchers for approximately USD 3 billion. 57 In September 2015, President Putin responded in an interview with news agencies that, “Russian-Chinese ties have now probably reached a peak in their entire history and continue developing.” 58 Russia and Turkey made an export contract for S-400 in 2017. The fi rst delivery of the S-400 was reportedly completed in July 2019. In particular, regarding the export of S-400 to Turkey, a member country of NATO, the United States expressed concern that some intelligence on the F-35 would leak to Russia via S-400, as a result of which, Turkey was unable to participate i th F 35 d l t ----- **Section** **5** **Oceania** **1** **Australia** a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy defines four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment. On this basis, the Strategy outlines the following priorities for the next five years: (1) enhanced engagement in the Asia-Pacific region;[2] (2) integrated cyber policy and operations;[3] and (3) effective partnerships.[4] The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 presents[5] an outlook of Australia’s security environment over the next two decades. It then outlines the direction of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing with this environment, and the development of the defense force pursuant to this strategy. Specifically, the white paper maintains that while there is little prospect of a military attack on Australian territory in the period to 2035,[6] Australia will face new complexities and challenges. Based on this understanding, three strategic defense interests are identified, namely: a secure, resilient Australia (including the security of sea lanes); a secure nearer region; and a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rulesbased global order. Additionally, the following three strategic defense objectives are given: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests; (2) Make military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island countries to build and strengthen their security; and (3) Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. To maintain the ADF’s high level of capability 1 General Situation Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic interests, respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy. It is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the ROK. The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 states that over the next two decades, the Australian Government will make important investments to maintain the high level of capability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), setting out a plan to continue to increase the troop strength and acquire high performance equipment. The white paper states explicitly that defense funding would be increased over the next decade, setting a specific target of 2% of Australia’s GDP to be reached by 2020. With regard to Australia’s international relationships, the white paper sets forth that Australia would aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, while continuing to give highest priority to its alliance with the United States. To achieve its strategic defense objective of contributing military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order, Australia makes proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the international community through the deployment of ADF to overseas operations, among other efforts. On May 18, 2019, a general election took place, and the ruling conservative coalition (Liberal Party and National Party) gained a victory. 2 Security and Defense Policies The Australian Government launched its first National Security Strategy in January 2013.[1] The Strategy provides **Chapter** This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National Security Community. Specifically, this includes: (1) deepening the Australia-U.S. Alliance; )2) enhancing bilateral cooperation with influential regional countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, and India; and (3) promoting the superiority and effectiveness of multilateral forums. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) integrates the capabilities of Australia’s Department of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, and Federal Police and the cyber-related personnel of the Australian Crime Commission. This includes sharing information securely and quickly with domestic and international partners and strengthening information sharing between government and business. The Defence White Paper of Australia presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 (Hawke Labor Party administration), 1994 (Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 (Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 (Rudd Labor Party administration), 2013 (Gillard Labor Party administration), and 2016 (Turnbull Liberal Party administration) a total of seven times. The white paper identifies six factors that will shape the security environment of Australia over the next two decades: (1) the roles of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region and the relationship between them; (2) challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order; (3) the threat of terrorism to Australians at home and abroad; (4) state fragility caused by uneven economic growth, crime, social, environmental and governance challenges, and climate change; (5) the pace of military modernization and the development of more capable regional military forces; and (6) the emergence of new complex, non-geographic threats (e.g., cyber threats). With regard to (5), the white paper notes that in the Indo-Pacific region, half of th ld’ b i d t l t h lf f th ld’ d d b t i ft ill b ti d t i i b lli ti i il t h l ----- needed to achieve these objectives, the Government will make important investments. In addition to increasing the troop strength by approximately 4,400 personnel,[7] Australia will acquire high performance equipment, including 12 new submarines,[8] 3 air warfare destroyers (Aegis vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and 7 MQ4C unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia will seek to strengthen intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and cybersecurity capabilities, as well as strengthen the functions of its bases in northern Australia and elsewhere. To support these programs by funding, the white paper also presents the concrete target of increasing defense funding to reach 2% of GDP by 2020. In addition, with North Korea continuing to make repeated, provocative actions unlike any seen in the past, then Prime Minister Turnbull announced in October 2017 that Australia would be equipping nine of the future frigates of the Royal Australian Navy with a ballistic missile defense system (the Aegis system), stating, “A number of states, notably of course, North Korea, are developing missiles with advanced range and speed. We must have the capability to meet and defeat them.”[9] 3 Relations with Other Countries In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia subscribed to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity are directly linked to the development of the nearer region, the IndoPacific region, and the global strategic environment. Based on this view, Australia will build and maintain international security relationships to achieve its strategic defense objectives. In particular, Australia will aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo Pacific region, including Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and China, while continuing to give the highest priority to its alliance with the United States. On November 2017, Australia published the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper for the first time in 14 years.[10] See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia) See **(1) Relations with the United States** In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS)[11] is based on shared values and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s defense policy. Australia notes that the United States, which remains the preeminent global military power over the next two decades, will continue to be its most important strategic partner, and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. On the operational front, the two countries have made efforts to increase interoperability through joint exercises, including Exercise Talisman Saber.[12] Since April 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps have conducted rotational deployments to northern Australia.[13] On the equipment front, the two countries have been simplifying the export procedures associated with equipment deals pursuant to the Australia-U.S. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty that entered into force in May 2013. In addition, the two countries are considering the joint **Chapter** 7 According to the white paper, over the next decade, the number of active duty ADF personnel would be increased to approximately 62,400 personnel from the current approximately 58,000 personnel. If this is realized, the ADF would return to its largest size since 1993. 8 The Defence White Paper refers to the submarines to be acquired as “regionally superior submarines.” It explains that Australia would select the submarine classification by the end of 2016, and that the first submarine would begin entering service in the early 2030s. Japan, Germany, and France participated in the submarine Competitive Evaluation Process. In April 2016, the Australian Government announced that the French company DCNS was chosen as the partner for building the submarines. In August 2016, it was found that confidential DCNS documents on its submarine order for the Indian Navy had leaked, resulting in rising calls in Australia for a review of the deal. Prime Minister Turnbull emphasized that the submarines being built for Australia are a different type than the one leaked, refuting the need for a review. 9 Following statements made by then Foreign Minister Bishop in April 2017 to the effect that “the United States Administration did say that all options are on the table” and suggesting that Australia supports this. In regard to North Korea, a spokesperson for the North Korean Foreign Ministry criticized Australia, saying, “If Australia persists in following the US' moves to isolate and stifle North Korea … this will be a suicidal act of coming within the range of the nuclear strike of the strategic force of North Korea.” 10 The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper recognizes that it is in the national interest of China to increase its influence, and concludes that there are instances in which Chinese influence is indeed greater than U.S. influence in parts of the Indo-Pacific. Beyond that, it points out that Australia will expand strategic relations with democratic states that share similar aspirations with Australia, while also ensuring the deepening of the Australia-U.S. Alliance. The White Paper also emphasizes that Australia will strengthen relationships, keeping in mind the “quad” states (Japan-U.S.-India-Australia) with the aim of ensuring stability and growth from Asia to Africa in particular. 11 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand. 12 Exercise Talisman Saber, started in 2005, is a biennial combined U.S.-Australia training exercise designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability. About 33,000 U.S. Forces and ADF personnel participated in the exercise held from June to July 2017. Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) also participated in this exercise in 2015 and 2017, strengthening its relationships with the United States and Australian forces. 13 By way of the Force Posture Initiatives of November 2011, the United States and Australia announced that the U.S. Marine Corps would conduct rotational deployments approximately every six months to Darwin and northern Australia. Accordingly, approximately 200 U.S. Marines were deployed in 2012 and 2013, 1,150 Marines in 2014 and 2015, approximately 1,250 Marines in 2016 and 2017, approximately 1,600 Marines in 2018, and approximately 2,500 Marines in 2019. The Defence White Paper 2016 set out that the size would be increased to approximately 2,500 Marines by 2020. In addition, under this same initiative, access to Australian military facilities and areas in northern Australia by U.S. Air Force aircraft was set to be d d t th ith t iti f j i t i d t i i A di l i F b 2017 12 F 22 fi ht i ft d l d t A t li ----- development of the F-35 and missile defense cooperation.[14] Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is being advanced in areas such as ISR, space,[15] and cyber.[16] In August 2014, the two sides signed the Force Posture Agreement which provides a legal framework for the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps. From October 2014, the ADF participated in the combat mission of the U.S.-led operation against ISIL. In July 2015, the two countries conducted training in which B-52 strategic bombers of the U.S. Forces were flown from the U.S. mainland to drop bombs on an air weapons range in Australia and then returned to the United States. Under the Turnbull administration, at the AUSMIN in October 2015, the two sides signed a joint statement on defense cooperation[17] to serve as a guideline for future defense cooperation, and reaffirmed their strong bilateral cooperation. In their joint statement at the AUSMIN held in July 2018, the United States and Australia made their commitment to work together to shape an “Indo-Pacific that is open, inclusive, prosperous, and rules-based,” welcomed the recent U.S.Australia-India-Japan consultations on the Indo-Pacific, reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen trilateral dialogue with Japan, and highlighted their commitment to raising the number of Marines rotating to the full complement of 2,500 as soon as practicable, the achievement of which was announced in the AUSMIN in July 2019. At the AUSMIN 2019, serious concerns about continued militarization in the South China Sea and the Pacific were also expressed. In addition, both sides emphasized the importance of AustraliaU.S. defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, indicating the policy to deepen cooperation with Japan, India, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other countries. Furthermore, they committed to further support Southeast Asian and the Pacific Island countries, and cooperation to maintain pressure on North Korea. **(2) Relations with China** In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its relationship with China is crucial in different ways from its relationship with the United States, and that it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and the opportunities bringing for Australia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. It goes on to say Australia is committed to continuing the development of Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency, and build trust. Based on such policy, Australia and China continuously hold dialogues among their defense authorities,[18] along with exchanges to develop the cooperative relations between their defense forces, including joint exercises and mutual visits by vessels.[19] Meanwhile, Australia has been showing its wariness toward China, by, among other ways, making Australia’s position on China very clear. The Australian government expressed strong concerns over China’s recent land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea, and called on all claimant states to halt militarization, while also clearly expressing its intention to continue to exercise its rights to free navigation and flight.[20] Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper contained statements to the effect that China is challenging the position of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, the most important region for Australia. People within and outside Australia expressed their concerns over the acquisition by Chinese businesses of Australian facilities, including Port Darwin, a port that has been used by Australian and the United States fleets among **Chapter** 14 While Australia considers that the threat of an ICBM attack on Australia is low, it deems there is a possible threat of an attack on Australian territory by a long-range or submarine-launched ballistic missile or cruise missile, as well as attack on the deployed ADF by a short-range ballistic missile or cruise missile. To counter such threats, Australia and the United States have launched a working group to study options that could contribute to missile defense in the region. 15 Since signing the Space Situational Awareness Partnership in November 2010, Australia and the United States have promoted space cooperation, including the relocation of the U.S. C-band ground-based radar system and the Space Surveillance Telescope to Australia. 16 At the AUSMIN in September 2011, the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace and confirmed that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would consult together and determine appropriate options to address threats in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the United States. 17 The statement envisions that greater competition for resources and territorial disputes will increase the possibility of miscalculation and the potential for conflict in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, and states that the two countries would further deepen their defense relationship to deal with this. Specifically, the statement sets forth the following: deeper interoperability; strengthened policy and intelligence cooperation; increased collaboration in science and technology, capability development, and defense industry engagement; and coordinated multilateral engagement. 18 Australia and China have regularly convened a Defence Strategic Dialogue since 1997. At the 21st Dialogue held in October 2018, Secretary of the Department of Defence Greg Moriarty and Chief of the Defence Force Angus Campbell visited China and had a meeting with Chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission Li Zuocheng. 19 With an aim to build teamwork, goodwill, and trust between the Australian and Chinese forces, Australia annually conducts Exercise Pandaroo (since 2015) and KOWARI, survival training among the United States, China, and Australia (since 2014). In August and September 2018, PLA Navy vessels joined multiple maritime exercise Kakadu for the first time. Also, in September, Australian Navy vessels visited Zhanjiang, China for a joint cruising exercise with the PLA Navy. 20 In response to China’s announcement of the “East China Sea ADIZ” in November 2013, then Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop issued a statement saying Australia has made clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea. The Joint Statement of the AUSMIN in October 2015, referring to China by name, expresses strong concerns over recent land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea, and calls on all claimant states to halt militarization. When the United States conducted the Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea in the same month, then Minister for Defence Marise Payne of Australia issued a statement expressing strong support for rights to freedom of navigation and overflight under international law. In July 2016, then Minister for Foreign Affairs Bishop announced, with regard to the final ruling by the Arbitral Tribunal on the case between the Philippines and China, that Australia would support the rights of all countries that resolve disputes peacefully following international law, including the UNCLOS, and that A t li ld ti t i it i ht l t d t th f d f fli ht d th f d f i ti t t i t ti l l ----- others.[21] In January 2017, the federal government of Australia announced the establishment of a dedicated center within the Attorney General’s Department, which will identify facilities requiring surveillance and carefully manage the risks for advising related institutions in order to block the sale of important infrastructure related to national security, including specific ports and harbor facilities, to companies from other countries.[22] With China’s perceived influence on Australia growing larger,[23] the Australian Parliament passed a bill to prevent interference in domestic affairs by foreign actors.[24] The Australian government announced the cancellation of its contract on a submarine cable project with Chinese telecommunication company Huawei and decided to let an Australian company undertake the work with its support.[25] Moreover, in August 2018, Huawei revealed that the company and ZTE were banned from bidding in an Australian 5G (advanced telecommunication system) network project by the Australian government.[26] **(3) Relations with India** In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the IndoPacific region, and that it sees India as a key security partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its defense relationship with India in support of their shared strategic interests. The Australia-India relationship was elevated to a strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. In November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks between each of their military services. Since then, mutual exchanges between Australia and India have steadily progressed through such initiatives as mutual visits of naval ships and joint navy training exercises. See Chapter 2, Section 7-1-2 (Military Affairs of India) See **(4) Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island Countries** In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia regards a secure nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and South Pacific as its strategic interest. In particular, Australia considers that instability and conflicts in Southeast Asia have the potential to threaten Australia’s security and economic relations with countries. Furthermore, Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asian countries and maritime trade that transits Southeast Asia. In this regard, Australia perceives that the security of these sea lanes must be ensured alongside freedom of navigation. Based on this understanding, Australia seeks to make military contributions to support the maritime security of Southeast Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island and other countries in building and strengthen their security. Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to a strategic partnership in March 2010, and the conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement in September 2012.[27] The two countries’ cooperative relations in the security and defense fields have stalled intermittently.[28] However, since mutual visits by ministers and higher-level **Chapter** 21 Opposition parties and think tanks raised concerns over the fact that this Chinese company is thought to have close ties with the Communist Party of China and the PLA, and over the fact that the U.S. Forces that utilize Port Darwin were not consulted in advance. According to press reports, then President Barack Obama requested then Prime Minister Turnbull to provide advance notice. Additionally, the Chinese company in question is currently expressing interest in a port near Adelaide where future submarines are slated to be built, raising further concerns. 22 The Government of Australia has struck down the acquisition of a farming company, S. Kidman & Co., which owns land equivalent to about 1% of Australia’s landmass and the acquisition of major power company Ausgrid by Chinese companies due to reasons of national security. The established Critical Infrastructure Centre is viewed as supporting the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), which screens individual projects and advises the Government. 23 According to Australian media reporting, it is clear that China has meddled in domestic affairs through large-scale political contributions and bribes from at least five Chinese people. 24 The law requires the registration of the representatives of foreign governments or foreign companies doing lobbying activities in the Australian parliament, and imposes imprisonment in the event that someone does make calls to action or influence the policymaking process without registering. 25 The Solomon Islands government and Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei once signed a deal to build an undersea communication cable between Australia and the Solomon Islands. However, then Australian Prime Minister Turnbull announced in June 2018 that an Australian company would undertake the project instead to build cables among Australia, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. 26 On August 23, 2018, regarding 5G technology, the Government of Australia announced that companies that are likely to be subject to illegal directions from a foreign government were posing a risk to national security. In the announcement, the Government of Australia did not cite the name of any country or company, and it stated that the announcement was not targeted at any particular country. 27 The Lombok Treaty is a security cooperation framework that espouses wide-ranging cooperation in the defense field. It entered into force in February 2008. The Defense Cooperation Arrangement covers strengthened cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security. 28 In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and others. The Indonesian Government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian Government. The Government also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia. In April 2015, two Australians were executed in Indonesia f h l i t l d d th A t li G t t l t t d i t I d i ----- officials resumed in the second half of 2015, the bilateral relationship has been improving through many initiatives, including regular Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meetings (2+2) and the signing of an agreement on maritime security and terrorism, and of a Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action in 2018. With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and other areas under the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.[29][, ] **[30] Australia considers that Singapore is** its most advanced defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. Defense cooperation is also deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of understanding concerning military training and training area development in Australia under the comprehensive strategic partnership in October 2016. As regards Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean.[.][31] Australia plays a leading role in assisting Pacific Island countries, and Timor-Leste in fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural disasters, and maritime patrol.[32] In particular, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. In addition, in June 2014, Australia unveiled a plan to replace the 22 patrol vessels it provided to these countries in the past and add Timor-Leste in the list of the recipient countries.[33] In November 2018, Australia announced its largest ever financial package of up to AUS$3 billion for infrastructure development in Pacific Island countries, with the intent of further strengthening relations. In May 2019, immediately after forming his Cabinet following the general election, Prime Minister Scott Morrison expressed his intention to continue active engagement with the Pacific Island countries, called “Pacific Step UP”. He made his first official trip overseas after the cabinet forming to Solomon Islands in June 2019, showing his stance of placing importance on the Pacific Island countries. See Chapter 2, Section 5-2 (New Zealand) See Chapter 2, Section 6 (South East Asia) **(5) Overseas Activities** In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia identifies the following strategic defense objective to contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line with this objective, as of June 2019, about 2,400 of Australia’s approximately 57,050 force strength[34] are deployed and are conducting operations overseas. Australia joined the airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq in October 2014. Today, it is engaged in advising and assisting, as well as providing capacity building assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front.[35] In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately 1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually in reconstruction assistance activities and the training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). After the completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about 300 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist NATO-led Afghan forces. The term of these activities has been extended to the end of 2020. Since 2018, the ADF engaged in patrolling and monitoring activities against illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean ships, which is prohibited under the UNSCR. **Chapter** 29 See Chapter 2, Section 6, Footnote 4 30 In Exercise Bersama Shield held in April 2018, approximately 440 personnel, vessels and patrol aircraft of the ADF, participated. In October 2016, Exercise Bersama Lima was held in Malaysia, Singapore and South China Sea in which approximately 750 personnel, vessels, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated. 31 In December 2015, the Australian Department of Defence admitted that as part of these activities, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft conducted patrol activities in the South China Sea from November to December. This was preceded by BBC’s release of the content of the radio communications that allegedly took place between RAAF aircraft and the PLA Navy, claiming that Australia was carrying out “freedom of navigation” flights in the South China Sea. 32 Australia has extended proactive assistance for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the momentum for independence heightened in Timor-Leste. The ADF led the International Stabilization Force (ISF) since 2006, and with the stabilization of the security situation in Timor-Leste, the withdrawal of the ADF was completed in March 2013. In the Solomon Islands, the ADF extended assistance for their stabilization since July 2003 through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ADF withdrew from the country in August 2013, when the military activities of RAMSI were completed. 33 The Australian Department of Defence plans to provide 21 Guardian-class patrol boats to the Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste by 2023. 34 According to “The Military Balance 2019.” The breakdown by service is as follows: approx. 29,000 Army personnel; approx. 13,650 Navy personnel; and approx. 14,400 Air Force personnel. 35 Following the Declaration of victory over ISIL by the Prime Minister of Iraq in December 2017, that same month, Australia announced that it would be halting air strikes. Accordingly, the Australian Government withdrew six F/A-18 fighter jets back to Australia on January 2018. However, the E-7A early warning and control aircraft and KC-30A refueling aircraft remain t ti d i th Middl E t ----- **2** **New Zealand** In July 2018, the coalition government of the Labour Party and the New Zealand First Party, which is led by Prime Minister Ardern, announced a new defense policy, the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018.[36] This document refers to major changes in the strategic environment since the publication of the previous Defence White Paper in 2016, including intensifying competition among powers, climate change, and cyber and space. The Statement then presented New Zealand’s security objectives, specifically, ensuring public safety, preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity, protecting lines of communication,[37] strengthening international order, sustaining economic prosperity, maintaining democratic institutions and national values, and protecting the natural environment. In order to achieve these objectives, New Zealand prioritizes the securing of operational capabilities in the primary operation area that stretches from the South Pole to the Equator. The country believes that challenges to the existing order of the Asia-Pacific region could impact its security and prosperity and that it is important to have defense capabilities that can globally support the maintenance of the international rule-based order. The Statement also mentioned other priorities, including capabilities to operate effectively with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada,[38] and the maintenance of the scale and quality of New Zealand’s military contributions. Moreover, the Statement was the first document that mentioned the impact of climate change and the role of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) regarding this issue, which reflects the new administration’s commitment to support the Pacific Island countries that have been exposed to increasing disasters.[39] As for the issues in the South China Sea, New Zealand had refrained from referring to China by name in order to maintain its neutral position in this matter. However, in the Statement, the country made a comment on China’s militarization in the South China Sea, stating, “China’s more confident assertion of its interests has at times raised tensions with neighboring states and with the United States.” As for diplomatic relations, New Zealand has maintained close relationships with the United States and Australia based on the ANZUS Treaty. In particular, New Zealand sees Australia as its closest partner. The United States has suspended its defense obligation to New Zealand since 1985, when New Zealand refused the entrance of a U.S. fleet following New Zealand’s ban on nuclear weapons. Yet, the two countries have strengthened their relationship in the diplomacy and defense fields through the Wellington Declaration (2010)[40] and the Washington Declaration (2012),[41] establishing the United States as a very close strategic partner. While New Zealand has deepened its relationship with China through such initiatives as cooperation for the Belt and Road Initiative and joint air exercises, it also looks at China with a cautious eye as shown in the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018.[42] The NZDF has 9,000 personnel.[43] It has contributed to regional peace and stability through such activities as using patrol aircraft to conduct patrolling and monitoring of illegal maritime activities by North Korea, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korea-flagged ships, which are prohibited under the UNSCR, and dispatching its personnel to the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) in the ROK, and to other operations in the Middle East and the South Pacific. In June 2019, the New Zealand government published “Defence Capability Plan 2019,” which sets out planned investments of NZ$20 billion until 2030. Investments under the Plan are: strengthening of the relationship with the Pacific Island countries; response to the climate crisis; and acquisition of vessels, helicopters, transport aircraft and others to strengthen the maritime surveillance capability. **Chapter** 36 This statement reviews the previous Defence White Paper published in 2016 and clarifies the national defense policies and strategies proposed by the new administration. 37 According to the statement, they also include lines that allow for trading and engaging globally, in addition to communicating. 38 New Zealand also attaches importance to cooperation with these four partners in the space field. 39 In March 2018, the Arden Administration published a new package titled Pacific Reset, which aims to strengthen New Zealand’s relationships with the Pacific Island countries. In May 2018, the administration announced additional funding of NZ$714 million over the next four years to the Official Development Assistance (ODA) budget, which represents about a 30 percent increase in the past four years. Furthermore, in November 2018, the administration announced the establishment of a NZ$100 million fund. 40 The main content of this declaration is the strengthening of the strategic bilateral partnership in the diplomacy and defense fields. 41 The main content of this declaration is defense cooperation. 42 Spark New Zealand, New Zealand’s major telecommunication company, revealed that the New Zealand's Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) rejected the company’s application to use Huawei’s technology to deploy its 5G network, citing national security risk. 43 A di t “Th Milit B l 2019” ----- **Section** **6** **Southeast Asia** **1** **General Situation** Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan, which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. The countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. In late 2015, the establishment of the ASEAN Community was declared as an outcome of the strides made in ASEAN cooperation towards its integration. **2** **Security and Defense Policies of Each Country** 1 Indonesia Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia, with the world’s largest Muslim population. At the same time, as it is the largest archipelago country in the world, it has vast land and territorial waters and strategic importance for maritime traffic. This unique geographical position, located between two oceans and two continents, places Indonesia centrally amongst its ten neighboring countries’ sea and land borders. Because of this position, Indonesia sees itself as vulnerable to security threats, which requires the country to strategize its position carefully. Under the banner of the maritime nation concept, President Joko Widodo, who first took office in October 2014 and was reelected in the presidential campaign in April 2019, strives to revive maritime culture, address territorial disputes through maritime diplomacy, and build maritime defense power supported by satellite technology and drone systems. As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to meet the requirements for minimum defense capabilities— what it calls “Minimum Essential Force (MEF).” However, Indonesia has indicated that its maritime defense capabilities, in particular, are still very much inadequate. Accordingly, Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents, such as piracy, by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. Recently, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, mainly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities. Indonesia has announced a defense budget increase as well as a policy to bolster its deployment of assets to the Natuna Islands, in the South China Sea, and other locations.[1] Concerned about the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, which overlaps with Indonesia’s EEZ in the vicinity of the Natuna Islands, Indonesia has enhanced its patrol activities in the area. In December 2018, it was reported that Indonesia deployed an army composite battalion, Indonesian National Air Defense Forces Command’s radar squadron, and Indonesian Marines composite battalion on the Natuna Islands for an opening ceremony of a military base with piers which can also accommodate submarines, and hangars for unmanned vehicles. Indonesia faces internal concerns, including the activities of Islamic extremists, such as supporters of ISIL and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and secession and independence movements in Papua Province. In May 2018, there were a series of terrorist attacks that have been reported as linked to Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a terrorist organization which supports ISIL. With increasing public demand for stronger counter-terrorism measures, Indonesia expanded its Police’s investigatory powers and enhanced Indonesian National Armed Forces’ counter-terrorism initiatives. Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast **Chapter** It is believed that in December 2015 Minister of Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu unveiled a plan to deploy a fighter squadron and small vessels to the Natuna Islands as well as increase the number of troops stationed there from the current 800 to around 2,000, including the special operations force of the Air Force, for the purpose of “being prepared for a range of threats h ill l ti d illi it i t i ” ----- Asian countries, and adopts a free and active foreign policy. In relation to this, President Joko Widodo advocates Indo-Pacific Cooperation Concept, which is focused on the centrality of ASEAN. With the United States, it is strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fields as military education and training and military equipment procurement, and is carrying out joint training, including “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)”[2] and the “Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)”[3] exercises. Indonesia has broadly positive relations with China based on economic ties, although the territorial dispute in the waters near the Natuna Islands has long been an issue that could raise tension between the two countries. See Chapter 2, Section 5-1-3 (4) (Relations with Southeast Asia See and the Pacific Island Countries) Malaysia and the United States hold joint exercises such as CARAT and SEACAT, and promote military cooperation including capacity-building in the maritime security field. Despite competing claims over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and other matters, Malaysia and China have strong ties, especially their economic relationship, and mutual visits by dignitaries take place frequently. In November 2016, Prime Minister Najib visited China and reached an agreement on economic cooperation and the purchase of naval vessels. Furthermore, in November 2015, it is said that the two countries agreed on making use of the Port of Kota Kinabalu for port calls by Chinese Navy vessels. In January and September 2017, a Chinese submarine made a port call. On the other hand, the Mahathir administration formed in May 2018 has been pushing forward reconsiderations of large-scale infrastructure projects as a part of fiscal reconsolidation efforts. During his visit to China in August 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad expressed his support for the Belt and Road Initiative. However, he also informed China that Malaysia would cancel or postpone the long-distance railway project that started in August 2017 with China’s cooperation.[5] As for North Korea, following the murder of Kim Jongnam at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in February 2017, Malaysia virtually closed its embassy in North Korea, and the relations between the two countries have deteriorated. However, Prime Minister Mahathir expressed a flexible position by saying that Malaysia would reopen its embassy in Pyongyang. 3 Myanmar Myanmar shares borders with China and India and is a gate to the Indian Ocean. In light of these factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic significance. In Myanmar, the armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the West, coupled with isolation from the international community, transition to civilian rule based on the road map to democracy was completed.[6] Including the release of political prisoners and ceasefire **Chapter** 2 Malaysia Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast Asia, perceives that its foreign policy is largely influenced by its strategic location in Southeast Asia, its attributes as a trading nation, and its unique demography. Moreover, while Malaysia is currently experiencing political stability and economic growth, it sees that current issues, particularly non-conventional security issues, are beginning to shape and influence the nature of threats to national defense and security. Malaysia places importance on “Independence,” “Total Defence,” “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA),”[4] “Cooperation with the UN for World Peace,” “Measures against Terrorism,” and “Defence Diplomacy” in its defense policy. On the other hand, in connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese government vessels around South Luconia Shoal, over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would defend its sovereignty. Along with this strengthening of its maritime defense force, Malaysia also has striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia, constructing a new naval base in April 2017 in Bintulu, close to James Shoal and South Luconia Shoal. A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements. In April 2019, Malaysia and China agreed to resume the construction of a long-distance railway project, reducing the cost of the construction. Malaysian and Chinese companies also signed a supplementary agreement. The National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi won the general election in November 2015. However, Aung San Suu Kyi was not eligible for the position of President according to the Constitution, as some of her family members have foreign citizenship. Therefore, she has led the administration as the newly created State Counselor and as Minister of F i Aff i ----- agreements with ethnic minorities,[7] the Government of Myanmar has actively taken steps toward democratization.[8] The international community has shown some level of appreciation for these steps, with the West, including the United States, successively easing economic sanctions on Myanmar. Meanwhile, regarding the situation in Rakhine State,[9] Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed in October 2018 to commence the return of the refugees to Myanmar in November of the same year. However, their return has not been realized yet. In terms of foreign policy, Myanmar continues to uphold a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, while for its national defense policy, continues to emphasize the three national causes of Non-disintegration of the Union, Nondisintegration of National Solidarity, and Perpetuation of Sovereignty, as well as resolutely repelling foreign invasions and interference in domestic matters. China is thought to be an important partner to Myanmar since its period of military rule. China is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. Myanmar has maintained a cooperative relationship with Russia in the military field, including during the military regime, and Russia has been a destination for students from Myanmar and a supplier of major defense equipment. As for India, since the transition to civilian rule, Myanmar has deepened cooperative relations in the fields of the economy and military, which has developed into defense cooperation and exchanges such as the hosting of various seminars and friendly visits to Myanmar by Indian naval vessels. Cooperative relations with North Korea, including weapons trades, were maintained under Myanmar’s military regime. Following the transition to democracy, although Myanmar denies that it has military ties to North Korea, the report issued by the Panel of Experts of the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea in March 2018 reported that the country has received a ballistic missile system and other conventional weapons from North Korea. 4 The Philippines The Philippines considers that its archipelagic attributes and geographic location are a source of both strength and vulnerability. Moreover, the country sees that its strategic location and rich natural resources have also provided a strong temptation to expansionist powers. Based on this perception, although resolving internal armed conflicts remains its top security concern, rising tensions in the South China Sea have prompted the Philippines to give the same attention to territorial defense as it does to internal security threats. As regional security uncertainties evolve, the Philippines, strategically straddled between the bitterly contested South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, where competing interests of superpowers and other countries converge, is aware that it needs to chart its role in an increasingly multipolar global order.[10] As regards domestic security issues, over the last approximately 40 years, armed conflicts have repeatedly broken out between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Following the progress of the peace process,[11] the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was enacted in July 2018, making an important step towards the establishment of a new autonomous government in Mindanao. In January and February 2019, referendums on participation in the autonomous government were held. As a result, the participation of all but a few regions was decided.[12] It has been reported that there are some forces opposing the autonomous government led by the MILF, which may cause disturbance in the future peace process. There were bombings[13] in Jolo, Sulu, soon after the announcement of the **Chapter** 7 About 30% of Myanmar’s population is made up of ethnic minorities, some of whom demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In the 1960s, the Government of Myanmar implemented oppressive policies involving human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed conflicts with armed groups of ethnic minorities. 8 The Myanmar government has been in peace talks with insurgent groups since 2011 for a ceasefire agreement. The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was signed with eight groups in October 2015 and two more groups in February 2018. In December 2018, the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) declared the cessation until the end of April 2019 of all military campaigns against the insurgent groups in northeastern Myanmar that have not yet signed the ceasefire agreement, in order to have talks with them towards ceasefire. 9 Following an attack on the police by Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), the Tatmadaw and other forces launched a clearance operation in August 2017. This resulted in more than 600,000 citizens (mainly Muslims) fleeing to the neighboring country, Bangladesh, in two months. The international community denounced Myanmar for the purported massacre and human rights violation by the Tatmadaw. The Myanmar government denies the citizenship of Muslims residing in northern Rakhine State. The lack of citizenship of the refugees is making the matter even more complicated. 10 According to National Security Strategy 2018 11 In October 2012, the Framework Agreement for the realization of a final agreement on the Mindanao peace process was signed. In January 2014, the Government of the Philippines and MILF signed the Annex on Normalization. The goal of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed in March 2014 was to launch an autonomous government in 2016 after formulating the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, holding a referendum in order to demarcate a jurisdictional domain, abolishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and establishing the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA). 12 The voting was held on January 21 and February 6. Based on the results of the referendum, five states, one city, and 63 villages decided to participate in the autonomous government. In Sulu, the state where Abu Sayyaf Group, who took an oath of loyalty to ISIL and is against the peace process, is based, the majority voted in opposition to participation in the autonomous government. However, since the majority of voters in the ARMM (which also includes Sulu) voted in favor of participation, it was decided that Sulu would also participate in the autonomous government. 13 On January 27, 2019, a bombing occurred at a cathedral in Jolo, Sulu, leaving more than 20 people dead and more than 100 people injured. Although ISIL claimed responsibility for this i id t th li b li it d t d b Ab S f G h th f l lt t ISIL ----- results of the referendums, which killed more than 20 people, although their connection with the referendums has not been confirmed. In May 2017, security forces clashed with the Maute group, an Islamic extremist organization that pledges allegiance to ISIL and had occupied the city of Marawi by taking hostages. The enduring battle resulted in fatalities and injuries, causing public safety in the city to deteriorate. As a result, martial law was declared in Mindanao. The military operations resulted in the killing of core members and fighters of the Maute group, leading President Duterte to declare the liberation of Marawi City from terrorists in October of that same year. On the other hand, the declaration of martial law was extended until the end of 2019, to quell the continuing rebellion in the region. Moreover, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an Islamic extremist group, has orchestrated a number of kidnappings for ransom in the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea. Given this situation, in June 2017, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia announced that they had launched a trilateral maritime patrol in the region of the Sulu sea. Air patrols were also started by each country in October of that year. The Philippines, with a historically close relationship with the United States, has maintained a cooperative relationship with the United States under their mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992.[14] The two countries are conducting joint exercises, including the large-scale military exercise Balikatan. In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five locations for carrying out defense cooperation under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)[15] they signed in April 2014 for strengthening their cooperation on such areas as the capacity enhancement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and disaster relief.[16] During his visit to the Philippines in March 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made it clear that the South China Sea is part of the Pacific Ocean and thus any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defense obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and Scarborough A church damaged by bombing in Jolo in Sulu province in the Philippines on January 27, 2019 [AFP/Jiji] **Chapter** **2** Shoal in the South China Sea. Seeking a settlement under international law, in January 2013, the Philippines launched arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, a final award was rendered, accepting nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affirms its respect for the decision. Also, President Duterte stated in his State of the Nation Address held in the same month that the Philippines would strongly affirm and uphold the award handed down for the arbitration case between the Philippines and China. However, when President Duterte visited China in October 2016, a joint statement was announced that included infrastructure investment, drug enforcement cooperation, coastal security cooperation and military cooperation but did not make reference to the tribunal’s award in the case involving the Philippines and China. Also, in May 2017, President Duterte visited a PLA Navy vessel that made its first port call at the port in Davao, where the president grew up, and received rifles and other defense counter-terrorism equipment from China in June for the combat with the Islamic extremists in Malawi. In November 2018, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Xi Jinping visited the Philippines to meet President Duterte. They signed a memorandum on energy resource development and agreed on maritime cooperation in resources exploration. 14 In 1947, a military base agreement was concluded that allows the U.S. Forces to use Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station for 99 years. A military assistance agreement was also concluded in 1947, followed by the mutual defense treaty in 1951. With the revision of the 1966 military base agreement, the time limit for the stationing of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station were returned in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Subsequently, the two countries concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, establishing the legal status of U.S. Forces personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines. 15 The EDCA is designed to enable the U.S. Forces to utilize and develop facilities in the Philippines, preposition equipment, among other activities. It was agreed that the bases in the Philippines to be utilized by the U.S. Forces would be decided through consultations after the EDCA was concluded and would be stated in an annex to the agreement. After the signing in 2014, the consultations regarding the annex had been suspended as litigation procedures were instituted in the Philippines on the grounds that the EDCA was unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines handed down a ruling in January 2016 that the EDCA is indeed constitutional. 16 At the 2+2 talks held on January 12, 2016 (EST), the ministers welcomed the decision that the EDCA was constitutional, and reaffirmed their commitment to continue strengthening their alliance in terms of ensuring both countries’ mutual defense and security as well as jointly contributing to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity. On March 17-18, 2016 (EST), a strategic dialogue among foreign and defense authorities was held in Washington, D.C. The two sides agreed on the following five EDCA Agreed Locations: Antonio Bautista Air Base, Basa Ai B F t M L bi Ai B d M t B it Eb Ai B ----- On the other hand, in April 2019, the Philippines criticized China when it confirmed the presence of more than 200 Chinese vessels near and around Thitu Island (Filipino name: Pag-asa Island), which is occupied by the Philippines. Attention will be paid to further action by the two countries moving forward. See Chapter 3, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the See Freedom of the High Seas”) 6 Thailand Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry. Attacks and bombing incidents by Islamic extremists seeking secession and independence have become a frequent occurrence in southern Thailand. The Government identifies the swift restoration of peace and security of the lives and property of the people in southern Thailand as an urgent task. In addition, undemarcated border issues exist between Thailand and neighboring countries, including Myanmar and Cambodia. The submission of an amnesty bill intended to pave the way for the pardon and return of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra by ruling parties to the National Assembly in 2013 exacerbated domestic disorder. In May 2014, then Commander-in-Chief Prayut Chan-o-Cha of the Royal Thai Army issued a declaration of martial law nationwide, and then seized power via the National Council for Peace and Order, which mostly comprises the Thai military. Subsequently, under the interim administration led by Prayut, who was selected as interim Prime Minister, the government worked towards a transition to a new administration based on the road map to civilian rule. The new constitution was promulgated and entered into force in April 2017. In March 2019, a general election was held for the first time in approximately 8 years.[19] Under its flexible omnidirectional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries. The U.S.Thailand joint exercise “Cobra Gold”, which has been implemented since 1982, is currently one of the largest multilateral exercises in the Southeast Asia. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and its ally the United States[20] have maintained a cooperative relationship. However, following the coup d’état in 2014, the U.S. suspended some military aid. After the coup, the U.S. scaled down the size of the U.S. forces participating in Cobra Gold. However, this was restored under the Trump Administration. In addition, 5 Singapore Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-fifth of its national budget. Singapore identifies deterrence and diplomacy as twin pillars of its national defense policy. Because it is a very small country, Singapore’s armed forces make use of the training facilities of other countries, including the United States and Australia, while continually dispatching military personnel to take part in training exercises overseas. Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA,[17] and has concluded defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. Since 2013, U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments. In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the first time. The two countries have committed to continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely.[18] In addition, Singapore conducted joint exercises with the United States, such as CARAT and SEACAT. Singapore has strong economic ties with China. Both countries also conduct joint naval exercises. On the other hand, diplomatic relations with China have been strained partly due to Singapore’s belief in following the arbitration award when it comes to the resolution of the South China Sea disputes and partly due to Singapore’s defense relationship with Taiwan. **Chapter** 17 See this Section, Footnote 4 18 In December 2015, Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen of Singapore visited the United States. The two sides signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and concurred that in accordance with this Agreement, they would strengthen their defense cooperation in the five areas of military, policy, strategy, technology, and the non-traditional security area of piracy and terrorism. 19 Neither the pro-military Palang Pracharat Party nor the pro-Thaksin Pheu Thai Party won a majority in the election. 20 Th il d d th U it d St t h lli b d th S th t A i C ll ti D f T t M il P t f 1954 d th R k Th t i é f 1962 ----- the two countries have continued their bilateral naval training CARAT and counter-piracy and trafficking exercise SEACAT. Thailand and China have also promoted military exchanges, conducting joint exercises such as Blue Strike among their marines and Falcon Strike among their air forces. It has been pointed out that Thailand’s military relationship with China has become closer after the freezing of U.S. military assistance following the coup. 7 Vietnam Vietnam perceives that it faces diverse and complex security challenges. It considers that the issues in the South China Sea have serious impacts on the maritime activities of Vietnam, and non-traditional threats, such as piracy and terrorism, are matters of concern. Based on its viewpoint that the sea is closely associated with the national construction and defense, Vietnam establishes an objective to become a strong marine country, particularly prioritizing the modernization of its military forces and law enforcement forces at sea as well as ensuring the capacity to properly handle sea situations, maritime independence, sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea. During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union provided the most significant assistance to Vietnam. Until 2002, Russia had a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations with other countries, including establishing diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and seeks to actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries. In March 2016, an international port opened in the key strategic position of Cam Ranh Bay, and since then a number of navy vessels, including some from Japan, have made calls to the new port. Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years. This has taken such forms as joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In 2017, mutual visits were conducted by the leaders of both countries, and an agreement was reached on the deepening of defense cooperation. March 2018 marked the first port call by a U.S. aircraft carrier to Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam war. Vietnam depends mostly on Russia for its defense equipment, and the two countries continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense. In March 2013, Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed to jointly construct vessel replenishment facilities along Cam Ranh Bay. In 2014, Russian IL-78 aerial refueling tankers landed at Cam Ranh International Airport for the first time for the refueling flights for Russia’s Tu95MS strategic bombers.[21] As these examples demonstrate, the two countries have been carrying out new military cooperation. In recent years, the two countries have also promoted cooperation in the energy sector, such as nuclear power generation. See Chapter 2, Section 4-6-2 (Relations with Asian Countries) **Chapter** See Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively conduct exchanges among their senior government officials. However, the two countries have competing claims concerning issues such as sovereignty over the South China Sea. In summits and many other occasions, the two countries have agreed to process the differences in their opinions on maritime issues and to refrain from activities that would complicate the matters. However, they have disputes regarding resources development and the operation of fishing boats. Vietnam and India have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and economy. In the area of defense cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels make friendly visits to Vietnam. Furthermore, when then Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh visited India in May 2015, the two sides signed the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Cooperation for the period 2015-2020.[22] In September 2016, Prime Minister Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Vietnam in 15 years. During the visit an agreement was reached on raising the status of the bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, while an announcement was made concerning a loan of US$500 million for deepening defense cooperation. Cooperation in the area of energy between India and Vietnam is also deepening, with a joint development program for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. See Chapter 3, Section 5-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”) 21 In March 2015, it was reported that U.S. DoD authorities, while stating the relevant facts, requested Vietnam to prevent the recurrence of this activity. In addition, a senior official of the U.S. Pacific Command allegedly stated that the Russian military aircraft that received refueling from the aerial refueling tankers arriving from the Cam Ranh base conducted provocative flights. In January 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that Russian aerial refueling tankers (IL-78) used Cam Ranh Bay in 2014, enabling the refueling of strategic fighters. 22 The statement was agreed upon in May 2015, when Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh of Vietnam visited India and held talks with Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. While the content of the Joint Vision Statement has not been disclosed, it is said to cover the period 2015-2020, with maritime security cooperation constituting the main pillar. On the same day, th t id l i d M d f U d t di (MOU) t th i th ti b t th i t d ----- **3** **Military Modernization in the Region** In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces, focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and fighters, including fourth-generation modern fighters. The underlying factors noted are increases in defense spending, the relationship between Southeast Asian countries in the sense that they react to neighboring states’ development of military capabilities, response to the expansion of China’s influence, and the inadequate role of regional security organizations to nurture relationships of trust.[23] Many Southeast Asian countries procure much of their defense equipment from a wide range of countries. As such, there are perceived difficulties in achieving consistent operations and maintenance in the respective countries. Indonesia had introduced a total of 16 Russian Su-27 fighters and Su-30 fighters by 2013. In 2011, an agreement was reached regarding the U.S. provision of 24 F-16 fighters, and these have been successively delivered since July 2014. In addition, in February 2018, Indonesia concluded an agreement to purchase an additional 11 Su-35 fighters from Russia. With the ROK, Indonesia concluded an agreement in December 2011 to purchase three ROK-made 209-class submarines, of which one was delivered in August 2017, and another was delivered in April 2018. The two countries also discussed joint development of the 4.5 generation KF-X/IF-X fighter, and they concluded an agreement which sets forth the details of their cost sharing and bilateral cooperation in January 2016. In addition, Indonesia is domestically building two frigates based on the Dutch Sigma-class Frigate 10514 vessel. The first of these vessels was delivered in April 2017, and the second was delivered January 2018. As of 2011, Malaysia had purchased 18 Su-30 fighter jets from Russia. In addition, that same year, Malaysia introduced two Scorpène-class submarines (jointly developed by France and Spain) as its first submarines. In November 2014, Malaysia reportedly concluded an agreement to purchase six corvettes from the ROK. Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous LCSs. The first of these vessels was launched in August 2017. Furthermore, in November 2016, Malaysia concluded an agreement with China to purchase four littoral mission ships (LMS). The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea. After the F-5 fighters were decommissioned in 2005, the Philippines did not have any fighters for some length of time. However, between November 2015 and May 2017, the Philippines successively introduced 12 FA-50PH light fighters purchased from the ROK. As for naval forces, the Philippines received three Hamilton-class frigates from the United States by 2016. The Philippines introduced two Indonesian-made landing dock vessels by 2017. In October 2016, the Philippines concluded an agreement to purchase two frigates from the ROK. Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. Today, it is one of the largest arms importers in the world. It introduced 24 U.S.-made F-15 fighters by 2012 and also participates in the F-35 JSF Program. As for naval forces, Singapore had introduced two Archer-class (Västergötland-class) submarines from Sweden by 2012. Also, in December 2013, Singapore concluded an agreement to purchase two German 218SG-class submarines (with plans to introduce them from 2021). By May 2017, Singapore ordered additional two units of the same submarine from Germany. With regard to Singapore’s current plans to build eight indigenous patrol vessels, five such vessels came into service as of September 2018, and the country aims to have all vessels in operation by 2020. As for Thailand, in July 2014, the country established the Submarine Squadron Headquarters, and started evaluation work to procure submarines. In April 2017, the Royal Thai Navy drew up a plan to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from China over the next 11 years, and the Thai Cabinet approved the purchase of one vessel.[24] In addition, the Cabinet approved in September 2012 a plan to introduce two frigates. The first frigate was received from the ROK in December 2018. In addition, by 2013, Thailand has introduced 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters. By January 2017, Vietnam successively introduced six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines. By February 2018, Vietnam started the operation of four Russian-made Gepardclass frigates. As for its air force capabilities, Vietnam started to successively introduce Russian-made Su-30 fighters in 2004, and to date, the total number of delivered Su-30 fighters came to 36. **Chapter** 23 Based on International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)’s “The Military Balance” and other sources. 24 The plan to purchase Chinese-made submarines for the Royal Thai Navy approved by Thailand’s cabinet on April 18, 2017, first calls for purchasing one vessel in installments appropriated over the budgets from 2017 to 2023, and then procuring a total of three vessels over the next 11-year period. On May 5, a contract was concluded on the purchase of one of these three ----- **4** **Intra-and Extra-Regional Cooperation** ASEAN member states utilize ASEAN as the multilateral security framework of the region. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as the ARF and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM), which provide opportunities for dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has made efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds the ADMM-Plus, a platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM, under which humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) exercises have been conducted. With China, ASEAN held the first naval table-top exercise in August 2018, and the first naval field training exercise in October 2018. In relation to this, it was reported that China requested during the meeting for the formulation of the COC of Parties in the South China Sea to include a clause on regular implementation of ChinaASEAN joint military exercises and a clause stating that no military exercises shall be held jointly with countries from outside the region, unless the parties concerned are notified beforehand and express no objection. Meanwhile, ASEAN **Chapter** Representatives from the navies of each country attending the closing ceremony of a naval field training exercise between ASEAN and China on October 27, 2018 [courtesy of the Ministry of Defense, Singapore] has been working to achieve a balanced relationship with nations outside region, such as its intention to conduct the ASEAN-United States Maritime Exercise in 2019, which was announced at the ADMM in October 2018. Moving forward, ASEAN member states are expected to further develop initiatives to build trust with non-ASEAN countries, in accordance with the principle and concepts of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). [25] 25 The ASEAN Community was established on December 31, 2015. It consists of the following three communities: Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-Cultural Community. Among them, the APSC aims to build upon the political and security cooperation accumulated through the past ASEAN initiatives and to work to ensure the peaceful survival of the region in h d i d ith th i i l f d ----- **Section** **7** **South Asia** **1** **India** 1 General Situation 2 Military Affairs With a population of more than 1.3 billion on its vast land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has significant influence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. With the permeation of the concept of “Indo-Pacific” in the international community, India has increased its presence as a geopolitical player, while the international community in return has increasingly high expectations for the country’s role. India has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and languages,[1] and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed across the India-Pakistan border. On the diplomatic front, the Modi administration that was inaugurated in May 2014 has maintained the neighborhood first policy, which emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external relations to the Asia-Pacific region, in accordance with the “Act East” policy.[2] In addition, the administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, Europe, among other areas. In the defense domain, maintaining preparedness at its land borders and addressing the threat of terrorism remain major concerns. At the same time, the administration has also recently attached importance to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian Ocean, and deepened collaboration with other countries. With the increasing uncertainties and challenges in the international security environment, India considers it needs to actively commit to defense and security cooperation with its partners in order to fulfill the domestic public demand for security and expectations from the region and the international community. As a part of the efforts to modernize its naval and air forces, India is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them, and has emerged as the world’s largest arms importer.[3] Furthermore, under the “Make in India” initiative, the administration is promoting expansion of foreign companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry and the domestic production of equipment through enhancing technological cooperation with other countries. With respect to its naval capabilities, India introduced the Russian-built conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in November 2013, and is also building one indigenous conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikrant with aid from France and Italy. With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russianbuilt Akula-class nuclearpowered attack submarine INS Chakra in April 2012 under a lease arrangement. It reportedly placed into service its first indigenous ballistic missile and nuclear submarine INS Arihant, which was built with support from Russia, in August 2016. Furthermore, in January 2019, India announced its collaborative project with a foreign company to domestically build six conventional submarines. Furthermore, in 2009, India concluded an agreement with the United States to purchase eight P-8I patrol aircraft. India has so far deployed all eight aircraft to a base in southern India facing the Bay of Bengal, and in July 2016 it concluded a purchase agreement for an additional four P-8I patrol aircraft. With respect to its air force capabilities, India is refurbishing its existing fighter aircraft. Moreover, it signed an agreement to purchase 36 Rafale fighter aircraft from France in September 2016 as part of India’s plan to introduce **Chapter** The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country’s population is Hindu. It is regarded that based on the progress of the “Look East” policy intended to strengthen India’s relations with ASEAN, the “Act East” policy which advocates a more practical approach has been adopted since the inauguration of the Modi administration. A di t th t ti ti f 2013 t 2017 i SIPRI YEARBOOK 2018 dit d b SIPRI ----- medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA).[4] With Russia, India concluded an agreement in December 2012 to purchase 42 additional Su-30 fighters. With the United States, India concluded an agreement in 2010 to purchase ten C-17 transport aircraft and had introduced all of these aircraft by 2014. See Fig. I-2-7-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan See (approximate)) **Fig. I-2-7-1** Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate) |[Leg 5 Notes:|Col2|,000 troops vessels 000 tons aircraft|Col4|Col5|n troops s ns t| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Approx. 560 Approx. 70 Approx. 94, Approx. 450||||| ||Pakistan||||| ||||App App App App|rox. 1.24 millio rox. 320 vessel rox. 478,000 to rox. 930 aircraf|n troops s ns t| ||||India alance 2019,” e craft.|tc.|| ||end] Ground forces ( Naval vessels ( Combat aircraft|200,000 troops) 100,000 tons) (200 aircraft)|||| |||on “The Military B t include naval air|||| ||||||| **Fig. I-2-7-1** Pakistan [Legend] 500km nearly three years, but then India annulled this agreement, denouncing the Pakistani militant group that crossed the border and abducted and murdered three Indian police officers. Dialogues have been suspended ever since. In February 2019, a Pakistan-based terrorist group committed a suicide bombing in Jammu and Kashmir, a region occupied by India, killing 40 personnel of India’s Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). Following this incident, Indian aircraft trespassed on Pakistan’s airspace and conducted air strikes. In return, Pakistani aircraft crossed LOC and conducted air strikes on the Indian side. Other than that, some exchanges of fire have also taken place along LOC. The tension between the two countries is intensifying in Kashmir. Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India adheres to the following policies: credible minimum deterrence, the nofirst-use nuclear policy, no use against non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998. India promotes the development and deployment of various ballistic missiles. India conducted the seventh test launch of “Agni 5” in December 2018 and reportedly started developing “Agni 6,” which is alleged to have a range of up to 10,000 km. It is deemed that the country aspires to extend the ranges of ballistic missiles and make other performance improvements. In regard to cruise missiles, India jointly develops “BrahMos” with Russia and deploys them. India is also developing a ballistic missile defense system.[5] 3 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with Pakistan** India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir,[6] and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been in contention between India and Pakistan, with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending due to frequent crossborder attacks along the Line of Control (LOC). In December 2015, the foreign affairs ministers of the two countries agreed to resume the dialogue. However, this effort was failed by subsequent cross-border attacks. Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan, who took office in August 2018, sent a letter to Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi to call for the recommencement of dialogues. They once agreed to hold the first foreign affairs ministers’ meeting in **Chapter** **(2) Relations with the United States** India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. In line with the expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India, the United States is also promoting engagement with India. It sees India as a partner that shares universal values and strategic interests with the United States in the region. The two countries conduct joint exercises, such as Malabar[7] with Japan taking part, on a regular basis. In addition, in recent years, the United States has become one of India’s major Since 2007, India has been implementing a project to introduce 126 MMRCA. In 2012, India announced that it selected the French Rafale aircraft. In April 2015, during his visit to France, Prime Minister Modi expressed India’s intention to swiftly purchase 36 Rafale aircraft. It is believed that a purchase agreement was signed in September 2016 and discussions are still ongoing regarding the model of the remaining 90 aircraft. Reports specify these missiles as follows. Agni 5: a mobile, three-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 5,000-8,000 km. Agni 6: a three-stage solid/liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 8,000-10,000 km. BrahMos: a solid/Ramjet supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 300-500 km. Also, India is reportedly developing a ballistic missile defense system. According to reports, it is a two-stage intercept system consisting of a missile for high altitude interception (PAD) up to 80 km in altitude and a missile for low altitude interception (AAD) up to 30 km in altitude. India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance towards the resolution of the dispute. The Malabar was initially a bilateral naval exercise between the United States and India. Japan has participated in the Malabar since 2007, and Malabar 17 and Malabar 18 were conducted t il t l i J th U it d St t d I di ----- equipment procurement destinations.[8] At the Summit Meeting in January 2015, two leaders agreed that they would expand technology cooperation to include codevelopment and co-production of equipment. The leaders also affirmed that they would deepen cooperation in the field of maritime security, and agreed that cooperation between their navies would be expanded, including upgrading their bilateral naval exercise Malabar. Furthermore, at the Defense Ministerial Meeting in December 2015, the two sides held talks on strengthening various defense cooperation, and confirmed the progress made in the technology cooperation consultations related to aircraft carriers and jet engines conducted by their joint working group. In such ways, their cooperation in the field of security has expanded. In addition, when Prime Minister Modi visited the United States in June 2016, the United States recognized that India is a “Major Defense Partner.” In August 2016, in a joint statement of the U.S. and Indian defense ministers, the United States agreed to elevate defense trade and technology sharing with India to a level commensurate with its closest allies and partners. Also, a memorandum was signed concerning logistics **2** **Pakistan** 1 General Situation Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically significant and complex position. In particular, Islamic extremists conduct activities across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Pakistan’s attitude towards the war against terrorism draws much attention from the international community. While supporting the United States’ war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan has been struggling as its domestic security situation has worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment and retaliatory terrorism by Islamic extremists. Although the Pakistan Armed Forces’ reinforced operation to crackdown on militant groups has reportedly drastically decreased terrorism, terrorist attacks have continued to occur sporadically. Against such backdrop, the Pakistani government has continued its counter-terrorism operation, “Radd-ul-Fasaad,” support cooperation. In June 2017, Prime Minister Modi visited the United States. At his first summit meeting with President Trump, the two sides agreed to continue to strengthen their strategic partnership. In the area of security, they underscored the importance of Malabar, and furthermore, the United States proposed the sale of unmanned aerial systems, attack helicopters, and C-17 transport aircraft. In September 2018, the first U.S.-India “2+2” Meeting was held. In this meeting, the two countries signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), which aims to promote access to advanced defense systems and ensure the optimal use of a U.S.-made platform owned by India, while also agreeing to conduct tri-service bilateral exercises. **(3) Relations with China** **Chapter** See Chapter 2, Section 2-3-5 (3) (Relations with South Asian See Countries) **(4) Relations with Russia** See Chapter 2, Section 4-6-2 (Relations with Asian Countries) See since 2017, while also working on the construction of fences and guarding stations along the border with Afghanistan to prevent the entrance of extremist groups. In December 2018, Prime Minister Khan announced that Pakistan had helped in the U.S.-Taliban dialogue, and that the country would do everything within its power to further the peace process in Afghanistan. 2 Military Affairs Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. In the past, the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclearrelated materials and technologies.[9] Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted a number of test launches in recent years. In 2015, Pakistan conducted two test launches of the ballistic missile “Shaheen 3” in March and December, and a test launch from an aircraft of the cruise According to the statistics from 2013 to 2017 in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2018 Pakistan is believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s and conducted its first nuclear test near the Changai District of the Balochistan Province in 1998. In 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. Khan and other scientists, who had led the l i P ki t ----- missile Raad in January 2016. Pakistan also conducted its first test launch of the ballistic missile “Ababeel,” which is capable of delivering multiple warheads, using MIRV technology, in January 2017. Like it did in the previous year, it conducted another test fire of submarine launched cruise missile “Babur” in March 2018. It is deemed that Pakistan is steadily increasing the military capabilities of its missiles.[10] Pakistan is the world’s ninth largest importer of weapons, and it is pointed out that 70% of its weapons are imported from China.[11] Pakistan purchased four Sword-class frigates from China, while at the same time it has engaged in the joint development of the JF-17 fighter aircraft with China and has introduced 85 aircraft through indigenous production. It is reported that Pakistan has also agreed to purchase four additional frigates from China, while also planning to purchase eight submarines, of which four will be built in China and the other four will be built in Pakistan. Although Pakistan introduced 18 F-16C/D fighter jets received from the United States by 2011, due to the recent degradation of the Pakistan-U.S. relationship, it has been pointed out[12] that weapon imports into Pakistan seem to be on the decline. 3 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with India** The two countries conducted strategic dialogues from 2010, and the United States provided Pakistan with military support. However, these were suspended after U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated as a consequence of the then Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation conducted by the U.S. Forces in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011. In October 2013, dialogue was resumed after summit meetings were held between then President Obama and then Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan, and in January 2014, Pakistan and the United States held their first strategic dialogue in three years. Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan Government has protested repeatedly. The United States, on the other hand, has condemned Pakistan for allowing Islamic extremists in Afghanistan to take haven, which poses a threat to the United States. In August 2017, “No partnership can survive a country’s harboring of militants and terrorists who target U.S. Service members,” President Trump said. The same month, the United States announced the suspension of $205 million in Foreign Military Assistance to Pakistan, which was provided by the Department of State (DOS). Following this, it also announced the suspension of DOS’ security assistance to Pakistan in January 2018 and the suspension of $300 million of the Coalition Support Funds in September 2018. These measures will not be lifted until the Pakistani Government takes decisive action against terrorist groups, including the Afghan Taliban. Attention will be paid to further action by the two countries moving forward. **(3) Relations with China** **Chapter** See Chapter 2, Section 7-1-3 (1) (Relations with Pakistan) **(2) Relations with the United States** Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Recognizing the efforts of Pakistan, the United States designated it as a “major non-NATO ally” in 2004. See Chapter 2, Section 2-3-5 (3) (Relations with South Asian Countries) 10 Reports specify these missiles as follows. Shaheen 3 (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km. Ababeel: a new ballistic missile with a range of about 2,200 km. Raad (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km. Babur (Hatf 7): a supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 750 km. 11 According to the statistics from 2013 to 2017 in SIPRI YEARBOOK 2018 12 A di t SIPRI YEARBOOK 2018 ----- **Section** **8** **Europe** **1** **General Situation** With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize the need to address diverse security challenges, such as outbreaks of regional conflicts within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and an increasing number of cyber threats. At the same time, these countries had recognized that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries had disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening of tensions in Ukraine in February 2014, there is a growing need to revisit existing strategies and plan new concepts in order to deal with Russia’s changes to the status quo with force in the background and “hybrid warfare.” With regard to international terrorism, the incidents of terrorism occurring within European nations have made counterterrorism efforts an urgent task.[1] In addition, border security problems remain a challenge, including those regarding refugees and migrants that have rapidly increased due to Middle East turmoil such as the prolonged civil war in Syria. To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand[2] multilateral frameworks, such as NATO and the EU. At the same time, **2** **Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks** 1 NATO Founded for the core task of collective defense among member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities outside the European region. Moreover, steps are taken at the national level by reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral[3] and multilateral[4] defense and security cooperation. Further, in light of changes in the security environment, the downward trend of defense expenditure, and the expanding gap of defense expenditure between the United States and other member states, NATO member states in 2014 agreed on the goal to allocate 2% or more of their GDP to national defense spending by 2024.[5] Regarding the matter, U.S. President Trump at the NATO Summit in July 2018 strongly demanded defense spending expansion by member states failing to attain the goal, emphasizing a feeling of unfairness about larger defense spending as a percentage of GDP in the United States than in other NATO member states.[6] See Fig. I-2-8-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States) **Chapter** See the Cold War. In the NATO Summit in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept[7] for the first time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next decade for the creation of a more efficient and flexible alliance. The document cites major threats such as proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, Recently, a man attacked passersby with a knife at a station in the United Kingdom (December 2018), a man raided passersby with a gun and a knife near a Christmas market in France (December 2018), and a man assaulted shoppers with a knife at a supermarket in Germany (July 2017). European countries are now reviewing their security systems and tightening immigration controls, among other measures. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 7 NATO has continued expanding towards Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of stabilizing the entire European and Atlantic regions. In February 2019, North Macedonia was approved as a new NATO member, leading NATO members to take ratification procedures for the first new NATO member since Montenegro’s accession to the alliance in 2017. For example, the United Kingdom and France signed the Treaty between the United Kingdom and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation and the Treaty between the United Kingdom and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities at a bilateral summit meeting held in November 2010. At a summit in January 2019, the two countries signed the Aachen Treaty on cooperation in enhancing European integration. The treaty aims to further enhance military cooperation, implement joint exercises and deployment, and create a joint force to stabilize third countries. In June 2018, for example, nine European countries—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, and Portugal—launched the European Intervention Initiative with a common firm intention to promote the revitalization of Europe in the strategic field. At a ministerial meeting of the 10 countries, including Finland, which had joined the initiative in November 2018, they approved a political guideline as the base for their future operational work. The initiative pursues visible achievements including building capacity to jointly address natural disasters and enhancing capabilities to conduct high-intensity military operations. However, details are still under consideration. In 2018, only seven member states (the United States, Greece, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania) achieved the standard. On the other hand, the declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in July 2018 indicated that some two-thirds of the NATO members had national plans in place to spend 2% or more of their GDP on defense by 2024. In this respect, reports said U.S. President Trump doubted the necessity of the military alliance and discussed the United States’ possible withdrawal from NATO with senior government officials before and after the July 2018 NATO Summit. At a press conference after the summit, the President indicated his idea that NATO members’ defense spending should finally reach 4% of their respective GDP. The Strategic Concept is an official document defining the objectives, characteristics, and basic national security responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been formulated seven ti (1949 1952 1957 1968 1991 1999 d 2010) ----- **Fig. I-2-8-1** Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||NATO (29 countries)|| Current members Expansion situation of the member states NATO (29 countries) U.K. [Note 1. ] France Germany Italy U.S. Belgium Netherlands Canada Austria Luxembourg Spain Norway Finland Portugal Greece Iceland Sweden Czech Republic Hungary Turkey Ireland Poland Denmark Albania Malta Slovakia Lithuania Montenegro Cyprus Estonia Latvia Romania Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 Joined the EU in May 2004 EU (28 countries) (*As of May 2019) Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the EU in July 2013 Original NATO members Joined NATO by 1982 Joined NATO in 1999 Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO in April 2009 Joined NATO in June 2017 Note 1. The United Kingdom officially notified the EU of its intention to leave on March 29, 2017. 2. Accession talks between North Macedonia and the EU are expected to be commenced within 2019. 3. In February 2019, NATO and North Macedonia signed a protocol to officially approve the accession of North Macedonia. North Macedonia is expected to be officially approved as a new NATO member within 2019. terrorism, confl ict or instability beyond NATO borders, and cyberattacks, and prescribes three core tasks as follows: (1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO Treaty; (2) crisis management including confl ict prevention and post-confl ict stabilization and reconstruction assistance; and (3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Following Russia’s “hybrid warfare” as well as the frequent “unusual fi ghts” of Russian Armed Force aircraft over the European front, including three Baltic states, NATO and member states reaffi rmed the threat posed by Russia. In April 2014, they suspended practical cooperation with Russia and took other steps, including expanding its Baltic air policing mission, which had taken place from 2004 when the three Baltic nations joined NATO.[8] Additionally, at the NATO Summit in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation” of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) for enhancing existing readiness forces.[9] This plan was created in order to deal with the infl uence of Russia and threats from the Middle East and North Africa. Based on this plan, NATO has continued to maintain its presence in eastern allies, while steps have been taken to signifi cantly improve the readiness **Chapter** of the existing multinational NATO Response Force (NRF) and create the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized within two to three days.[10] Furthermore, the declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in July 2016 cited Russia’s aggressive actions and terrorism by ISIL as threats. At the meeting, a decision was reached to deploy four battalions to the three Baltic nations and Poland on a rotational basis, which became fully operational in 2017. The declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in July 2018 cited the following: (1) the establishment of the Joint Force Command Norfolk in the United States, the headquarters aimed at strengthening the defense of Atlantic Ocean sea lanes that link the United States and Europe, (2) the establishment of the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, the headquarters aimed at expediting transport of troops and equipment within and outside Europe, and (3) the arrangement of the Readiness Initiative called the “Four Thirties” by 2020 to maintain a situation in which 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels can be ready to be used within 30 days or less. From October to November 2018, NATO implemented the “Trident Juncture 2018,” one of the largest NATO drills in recent years, to train the readiness and joint operations 8 NATO has conducted air policing on a rotational basis since 2004. The missions involved patrolling by one country with four aircraft, but since the crisis in Ukraine, the missions were enhanced, shifting to patrolling by four countries with 16 aircraft. In September 2015, the missions were reduced. Currently, NATO air policing is being conducted over Slovenia, Iceland, Albania, and Montenegro in addition to the three Baltic nations. 9 The RAP was approved as one of the concrete efforts of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). The CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint exercises and drills among member states. Furthermore, it is designed to strengthen joint drills among member states and with partner countries, enhance interoperability, and make use of advanced technology. 10 Th NRF i t f 40 000 l d th VJTF i lti ti l f i ti f i t l 20 000 l f th NRF (i l di 5 000 l d f l) ----- prevention over intervention, NATO has affirmed that it would activate its collective defense if any member state were attacked by ISIL. Furthermore, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué of July 2016 set forth the decision to dispatch early warning and control aircraft forces to fight against ISIL. Under the decision, NATO surveillance and reconnaissance missions started October 2016. NATO announced the commencement of the new NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) at the NATO Summit in July 2018, providing training and capacitybuilding support for Iraqi security forces. NATO is also carrying out missions in Kosovo and other countries.[13] 2 EU The EU seeks to enhance its security initiatives under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),[14] and in June 2016, Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy detailing the EU’s fundamental approach to foreign and security policy was adopted by the European Council for the first time in approximately 10 years. This document calls for initiatives towards enhancing the EU’s internal and external resilience against threats to order in Eastern Europe, and the threat of terrorism or other events in the Middle East and Africa, in accordance with the principles of rules-based order and democracy.[15] In November 2016, the European Commission released an action plan for reinforcing defense cooperation in Europe, including the establishment of the European Defence Fund. In December 2017, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was launched as a defense cooperation framework for 25 countries among the member countries. Under this framework, the participating countries finance and cooperate in joint projects including the joint development of equipment and infrastructure that will contribute to developing readiness. It is expected that the framework would strengthen the EU’s defense capabilities. In this way, the EU is trying to enhance capabilities for undertaking security and its strategic independence. Trident Juncture 2018, a NATO drill implemented from October through November 2018 [courtesy of the Ministry of Defense, Norway] against every potential threat, enhancing its defense efforts. Views on Russia differ between NATO member states against the backdrop of their different geographical distances from Russia. While taking measures to address Russian influence, NATO members have maintained opportunities for dialogue to narrow their differences in views about Russia and increase their predictability.[11] In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force has been deployed to the Aegean Sea since February 2016 due to the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal immigrants and shares information with Turkey, Greece, and other countries. Also, in November 2016, Operation Active Endeavor, focused on collective defense held since 2001, was succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian, focused on crisis management, resulting in a wider array of missions including counterterrorism and capacity-building assistance, among others. Since January 2015, NATO has been leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), whose primary tasks are to provide training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). At the NATO Summit in July 2018, NATO decided to maintain its presence in Afghanistan until seeing signs of changes in the local situation and enhance support for Afghanistan by extending financial assistance for ANDSF until 2024. It has stationed 17,000 personnel in Afghanistan.[12] With regard to ISIL, while taking the stance of emphasizing **Chapter** 11 For example, France held talks with President Putin of Russia following the terror attacks in November 2015, and the two sides agreed to exchange intelligence between their military forces. The United Kingdom, in its strategy document SDSR2015, states that the issues of Ukraine would significantly change the rules-based international order, while it also states that the country would seek ways to cooperate with Russia on the issues of ISIL topping the list. Germany, too, has stated the need for deterrence and dialogue with Russia in its white paper on national defense published in July 2016. Additionally, in April 2016, NATO held a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, a dialogue framework, in Brussels for the first time in almost two years. So far, nine meetings of the council have been held. 12 As of February 2019, U.S. participants numbered 8,475, accounting for approximately 50% of the total. 13 In Kosovo, NATO has carried out its mission within the framework of the Kosovo International Security Force since 1999. Today, NATO provides recommendations, training, and capacitybuilding assistance to the Kosovo Security Force. 14 The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the CFSP, which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP. 15 In November 2016, an agreement was reached on the execution of this strategy, with priority given to responding to conflict and crises outside of the EU, capacity building of partners, and t ti EU iti f t i d th th t It l i d i i i it t biliti d d i l ti b t t ----- the area and conduct surveillance in these waters. In addition, those vessels and aircraft conduct joint exercises with SDF units.[20] 3 Cooperation between NATO and the EU Advancements have been seen in cooperation between NATO and the EU in addressing unprecedented challenges efficiently. At the NATO Summit in July 2016, a joint declaration was released citing hybrid threats, cybersecurity and other fields in which NATO and the EU should prioritize cooperation. The NATO Summit in July 2018 issued a joint declaration that identified substantial progress in NATO-EU cooperation and cited the mobility of military forces, counterterrorism and other fields for further cooperation. Based on these declarations, NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian and the EU’s Operation Sophia are now mutually collaborating through information support in the Mediterranean. The EU’s PESCO includes a project for developing arrangements for smooth movement of military personnel and assets inside and outside the EU and is expected to contribute to NATO’s quick military deployment in emergency. In this way, NATO and the EU are advancing their cooperation in a manner to complement each other for the purpose of enhancing security initiatives. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has condemned the military measures of Russia and implemented economic sanctions against Russia.[16] In addition, to support the economic and political reforms in Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in nonmilitary affairs, including the provision of large-scale financial assistance to Ukraine. To deal with the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacitybuilding assistance in counterterrorism measures, among other activities. In November 2015, in accordance with a request from France after the terror attacks in Paris, the EU, for the first time, activated the “mutual assistance clause”[17] stipulating a mutual defense obligation, and EU member states provided their support to France.[18] In May 2015, the EU started Operation Sophia conducted by European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFORMed) due to the surge of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. The operation’s main mission is to block smuggling and human trafficking, with its adjunctive mission being to train the Libyan Navy Coast Guard and enforce the UN arms embargo on the high seas. At its meeting in July 2017, the EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed to expand the operation by adding new missions including reconnaissance on illegal transactions in crude oil exported from Libya and information sharing with relevant organizations on human trafficking. In 2003, the EU led peacekeeping operations for the first time in Macedonia (then) by using NATO’s equipment and capabilities. Since then, it has been actively committed to the operations in crisis management and maintenance of peace and order[19] by, for example, sending troops to BosniaHerzegovina, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Mali, Central Africa, and Somalia. Also, the EU has been conducting Operation Atalanta, the first maritime mission to combat piracy off the Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008. Under this mission, vessels and aircraft dispatched from each country protect ships in **Chapter** Signing of a joint declaration on cooperation between NATO and EU by President Tusk of the European Council, Secretary General Stoltenberg of NATO, and President Juncker of the European Commission [courtesy of NATO] 16 The EU takes measures, such as capital regulations and ban on exports of equipment and dual use goods, along with asset freezes and travel bans, and extends its expiry date every six months. 17 Article 42, Paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a mutual defense obligation, where if an EU member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. 18 On November 17, 2015 after the terror attacks, then Minister for Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian of France requested the application of the “mutual assistance clause” at the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The application was agreed upon unanimously. Based on the application of the clause, France requested other EU member states to: (1) contribute to counter-ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria; and (2) help reduce the military burden of France by contributing to France’s counter-terrorism operations in Mali, Central Africa, and other areas. Nevertheless, the extent of cooperation has remained relatively small, except for that from the United Kingdom and Germany. 19 These are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of: (1) humanitarian assistance and rescue mission; (2) peacekeeping mission; and (3) combat mission in crisis management, including peacemaking. In January 2014, for example, the EU decided to dispatch a security force to the Central African Republic, which was plagued with turmoil. The security force launched its operations in April 2014 and ended them in March 2015, when the European Union’s Military Advisory Mission (EUMAM) was launched to support preparations for reforming the security sector of the Central African Republic. In July 2016, the EUMAM was succeeded by the European Union’s Training Mission (EUTM). In July 2018, the EU decided to extend ETUM operations until September 2020, continuing training for the modernization of the Central African Republic forces. 20 To tackle piracy in this area, the EU has undertaken “European Union Training Mission-Somalia” and “European Union Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia,” in addition to Operation Atalanta. Based on a comprehensive approach, the EU not only implements piracy countermeasures, but is also working to develop and strengthen its coastal policing and j di i l t biliti ----- **3** **Security / Defense Policies of European Countries** airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition, it carries out ISR activities using unmanned aerial vehicles, provides education and training to forces engaged in ground warfare such as the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian assistance to refugees. Furthermore, following the terror attacks in Paris, the United Kingdom decided in December 2015 to extend the scope of the airstrikes from Iraq to Syria, and commenced airstrikes in Syria on the day after the Parliament gave its approval.[23] In the NSS-SDSR2015, the United Kingdom recognizes the Asia-Pacific region as offering significant economic opportunities for the country and as exerting considerable influence on the future integrity and credibility of the rulesbased international order, indicating its commitment to attaching importance to working with security partners in the region. In particular, the United Kingdom considers Japan as its closest security partner in Asia, conducting joint exercises with Japan.[24] It has also participated in the multilateral joint exercise RIMPAC and deployed naval ships in the region, enhancing its engagement in regional security. In February 2018, the Rt Hon Gavin Williamson, Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, noted that the British Royal Navy Frigate HMS Sutherland would be sailing through the South China Sea and that the Royal Navy has a right to such sailing. In early May 2018, in order to contribute to international efforts to monitor prohibited trading at sea by North Korea, the HMS Sutherland conducted information gathering activities regarding ships suspected of conducting “ship-to-ship transfers” in the high seas surrounding Japan.[25] Further, in April 2018, the Secretary of State for Defence announced that the Royal Navy’s landing ship HMS Albion[26] was dispatched to the Asia-Pacific Region. In September 1 The United Kingdom After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, perceiving that there is no direct military threat against the country, has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on improving its overseas deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and proliferation of WMDs. Against this backdrop, in November 2015, the Cameron administration released the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (NSS-SDSR2015) in the face of destabilization in the Middle East, including the rise of ISIL, the crisis in Ukraine, and the threat posed by cyber-attacks. Recognizing that the United Kingdom confronts threats from both states and non-state actors, the NSS-SDSR2015 sets out the challenges that the United Kingdom should address in the coming decade as follows: terrorism and extremism; resurgence of state-based threats; technological developments including cyber threats; and the erosion of the rules-based international order. While the previous SDSR2010 committed to cutting the troop strength, reducing key equipment, and reviewing procurement plans due to pressure to decrease defense spending, the NSS-SDSR2015 calls for ending the defense spending cuts and explicitly proposes to increase the defense force in order to develop capacities to address the entire list of expanded threats.[21] The NSS-SDSR2015 lays out that the United Kingdom would continue to be a key player in the international community, and promote procurement of equipment and formation of units with high readiness and mobility, in view of dealing with threats such as terrorism and cyber security.[22] Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has conducted **Chapter** 21 The “NSS-SDSR2015” will maintain the size of the Armed Forces personnel and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by 700 personnel combined. It also decided to build two aircraft carriers, introduce nine new maritime patrol aircraft, and maintain a fleet of four strategic nuclear submarines. Underpinned by a stable economy, the NSS-SDSR2015 is to maintain defense expenditure amounting to 2% of GDP which is the NATO’s target and to further increase defense spending, especially equipment procurement spending. 22 The NSS-SDSR2015 is to add two Typhoon squadrons, establish a F-35 squadron capable of operating from new aircraft carriers, create two strike brigades of up to 5,000 personnel, and have a system that can deploy an expeditionary force of around 50,000 personnel overseas by 2025. 23 Since 2014, the United Kingdom has conducted over 1,600 aerial bombings, held training for over 70,000 Iraqi military soldiers, and dispatched over 1,400 United Kingdom military personnel. 24 From October to November 2016, Typhoon fighters visited Japan to conduct a Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise. In April 2018, the Royal Navy frigate HMS Sutherland conducted a bilateral exercise with MSDF, including Destroyer JS “Suzunami.” In August 2018, the Royal Navy landing ship HMS Albion conducted a joint exercise with the MSDF transport ship JS “Shimokita”. In September 2018, the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll conducted a joint drill with Destroyer JS “Kaga” and other MSDF ships. From September to October 2018, a bilateral exercise was conducted in Japan between the army service branches of both countries. In December 2018, the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll conducted a joint exercise with MSDF and the U.S. Navy. In March 2019, the Royal Navy frigate HMS Montrose conducted a joint drill with MSDF and the U.S. Navy. 25 Furthermore, warning and surveillance operations were conducted in Japan’s periphery, including the East China Sea, by the Royal Navy landing ship HMS Albion from late May to early June 2018 and in mid-June 2018, by the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll in mid-December 2018 and early January 2019, and by the Royal Navy frigate HMS Montrose from late February to early March 2019. From the viewpoint of enhancing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan and the United Kingdom engaged in cooperation activities, including information sharing. In March 2019, a strongly suspected case of a ship-to-ship transfer between the Saebyol, a North Korea-flagged tanker, and a small ship of unidentified nationality, was confirmed and announced based on the sharing of information between a MSDF supply ship and a Royal Navy frigate that were engaging in patrol and monitoring activities. 26 In August 2018, the Royal Navy landing ship HMS Albion was reported as sailing around the Parcel Islands in the South China Sea. In response, China’s Ministry of National Defense d it t di t t ith d l t iti t th ti ----- 2018, the Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll made a port call in Pakistan before being deployed in the region. The Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom noted that the deployment of these three ships meant that the Royal Navy would have an almost unbroken presence in the Asia-Pacific region throughout 2018. In addition, the Royal Navy dispatched the HMS Montrose frigate to the region in October 2018 for operations to help stabilize the region and develop relations with the region. Such Royal Navy deployment in the AsiaPacific region is viewed as unprecedented since the Korean War. Future relevant developments will attract attention, including the dispatch of the aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth to the region.[27] In March 2017, the United Kingdom officially informed the EU of its intention to leave the union. In November 2018, draft exit agreements were approved at a special meeting of the European Council. Later, however, the U.K. Parliament voted against the agreements three times with the result that the deadline for the exit has been pushed back until October 31, making the future course of the exit uncertain. Even after the exit from the EU, the United Kingdom is expected to retain the recognition of NATO as the cornerstone of security in Europe and pursue new security relations with the EU in which it would participate in the PESCO permanent EU defense cooperation framework open to non-EU countries if cooperation in research and development is concluded as benefiting both the country and the EU. Given the notion that the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU would reduce the EU’s influence on security, attention will be paid to the degree of the United Kingdom’s engagement in EU security initiatives and its relations with the United States and other friendly countries outside Europe. 2 France Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by streamlining and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future. The Defence and National Security Strategic Review announced by the Macron administration in October 2017 states that the threats that France faces, including domestic terrorism, the refugee issue, and the Ukraine crisis, are diversifying, increasing in complexity, and rapidly becoming more violent, and amidst the increasingly multipolar international system, competition is intensifying among major military powers and the danger of escalation is growing. Under these conditions, France will fulfill its duties within NATO, including for collective defense and contributing to security, and will take a leading role in efforts to strengthen the EU’s defense capabilities. In June 2018, the Military Planning Law for 2019-2025 was enacted, consisting of four pillars –human resources, equipment modernization, contributions to Europe’s strategic independence, and technological innovation – to materialize the national security strategy given in the Strategic Review. The law confirms a plan to allocate a total of approximately 300 billion euros to defense by 2025 to fulfill President Macron’s commitment to the goal of raising defense spending to 2% of France’s GDP by 2025. France has been conducting airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since September 2015.[28] Following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, France declared a state of emergency, and decided to deploy 10,000 military personnel to maintain domestic security and suspend troop reductions. The country enhanced its airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and deployed mobile units including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Mediterranean Sea. France has continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees. Since France has territories in the Indo-Pacific region, it places importance on its commitment to the region.[29] The Strategic Review points out the potential for a threat to interests, such as the freedom of navigation, due to the worsening strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific region, and clearly states that France will maintain its stance of protecting the sovereignty of its overseas territories in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. France has cited Australia and India as major strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region.[30] During his visit to Australia in May 2018, President Macron stated that the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis is absolutely key for the Indian-Pacific region. In addition, France has proactively organized the multilateral exercises Croix du Sud and Equateur in the South Pacific. In February 2018, France had the Floréal class frigate Vendémiaire make a port call in Japan and conduct joint exercises with the MSDF. In March 2019, **Chapter** 27 In February 2019, Defence Secretary Williamson announced that the United Kingdom would deploy the aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth in the Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and Pacific regions. 28 As of July 2018, France had mobilized 1,100 personnel, 10 Rafale fighters, 1 frigate, among other assets. 29 As of June 2018, France had at least 200,000 of its citizens in the Indo-Pacific region, stationing about 7,000 soldiers in the region. 30 I dditi t A t li d I di J Si M l i I d i d Vi t ifi d t t i ----- a carrier strike group including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle left France, and conducted a multilateral exercise with Australian, U.S. and Japanese ships including MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo” in May, when the group was deployed in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, France dispatched Falcon 200 reconnaissance aircraft to support measures to implement UN Security Council resolutions related to North Korea, conducting warning and surveillance operations against ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korean ships. In 2019, the frigate Vendémiaire conducted patrol and monitoring activities in the seas around Japan, including the East China Sea. From the viewpoint of enhancing the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, Japan and France engaged in cooperation activities, including information sharing. 3 Germany While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its armed forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the UN. However, following a worsening in the security environment, in May 2016 Germany changed policy and announced that it would increase military personnel by around 7,000 by 2023.[31] The country’s defense white paper released in July 2016 for the first time in about 10 years explains that Germany’s security environment has grown more complex and unstable, causing gradually rising uncertainty, citing specific threats such as international terrorism, cyberattacks, interstate conflict, and the influx of refugees and immigrants. The white paper also states that Germany would continue to emphasize multilateral cooperation and cross-government approaches, while striving to realize rules-based international order. Furthermore, with regard to the number of military personnel, the white paper notes that although an upper limit was in place following the end of the Cold War and Germany has continually worked to reduce personnel, it would shift to a policy with no upper limit and perform regular reviews of its military force plan to adjust the number of personnel flexibly. In Iraq, Germany has provided education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces since 2015. In December 2015 following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, Germany expanded logistics support missions, such as reconnaissance and aerial refueling, for the Coalition that was conducting counter-ISIL military operations. [32] With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, Germany considers it to be important from the standpoint of its large population and economic strength, and expresses the view that the region plays a central role in international politics. However, Germany has allocated most of its military assets for NATO and EU missions outside the Asia-Pacific region and limited its military engagement in the region to disaster relief missions and goodwill visits, failing to participate in joint exercises involving naval ships in the region. Given that Germany is attempting to enhance its naval power by launching four new frigates by 2020, the German Navy’s future engagement in the regional will attract attention. **Chapter** 31 Germany decreased its military personnel strength which was once more than 500,000 at the time of its reunification to 250,000 by 2010. In 2016, personnel were cut further back to 177,000. However, since July 1994, when the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions under multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and NATO was constitutional, Germany has gradually expanded dispatch of its federal forces to participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. 32 The decision was made on the following commitment during the 12-month period from early January to end of December 2016: (1) dispatch the frigate Augsburg to escort the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle; (2) deploy Tornado fighters (up to six fighters) and aerial refueling aircraft to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; and (3) deploy up to 1,200 personnel to areas of ISIL’s operations in Syria, their airspace, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea to collect intelligence using reconnaissance satellites and share this intelligence with relevant countries. This decision also added the dispatch of personnel to NATO’s AWACS (early warning and control aircraft) unit to the mission. Furthermore, Germany strives to reduce the ti l b d f F b i i th b f G l ti i ti i th UN PKO i M li (MINUSMA) d t i i l i I ----- **Outer Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic** **Spectrum, and Relevant Challenges Facing the** ### 3 International Community **Section** **1** **Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology** **1** **Military Science and Technological Trends** equipped drones have the potential to conduct fl exible operations with AI recognizing adversary actions and battle condition changes, they are expected to exert a great infl uence on the military sphere. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing AI-equipped unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including small UAVs that are air-launched, recovered and reused for swarm fl ights for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions,[6] as well as drone ships[7] for fi nding submarines. The U.S. Air Force is developing autonomous UAVs to support manned aircraft. In addition, in “2018 DoD Artifi cial Intelligence (AI) Strategy” released in February 2019, the DoD indicates that it will articulate its vision and guiding principles for using AI in a lawful and ethical manner. The Chinese government released “Next Generation Artifi cial Intelligence Development Plan” in 2017, expressing its intention to become a global AI innovation center by 2030.[8] In June 2017, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation displayed a swarm fl ight of 119 fi xedwing UAVs equipped with AI. In May 2018, it successfully performed a swarm fl ight of 200 drones, demonstrating its advanced technology to allow numerous UAVs to fl y while keeping a distance from each other. The Caihong-7 (CH-7), of which a prototype was exhibited at the Airshow China 1 General Situation Recent developments in science and technology have impacted a variety of areas, triggering signifi cant and revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle. The military sphere is no exception. Major countries place emphasis on developing weapons utilizing cutting-edge technologies, such as unmanned technology (e.g., drones),[1] autonomous technology leveraging artifi cial intelligence (AI), big data analysis,[2] and hypersonic technology.[3] Recently, reports have been published of successful tests and planned deployment of electromagnetic railguns[4] and high-power laser weapons[5] that are expected to provide more effective fi repower than existing weapons, such as artillery, in terms of cost per fi ring, range, precision, promptness, and other aspects. Further technological innovation is expected to dramatically change battle scenes in the future. 2 High-tech Weapon Development Trends **(1) AI Autonomous Drones** The United States, China and Russia are developing autonomous drones equipped with AI. Given that AI **Chapter** Drones developed for military use include unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), and unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV) (UMVs may be classifi ed into unmanned surface vehicles [USV] and unmanned underwater vehicle [UUV]). In the “Third Offset Strategy,” the United States has given the example of “deep-learning machine” technology using AI, which can analyze big data for indications and warning of cyber attacks. For example, in the United States, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force are engaged in joint research and development of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC), aiming to apply the technology to hypersonic missiles, etc. in the future. Unlike cruise missiles that use jet engines to fl y at subsonic speed, HAWC uses the technology of the scramjet engine, which enables hypersonic fl ight by taking in air at hypersonic speed and burning it without reducing the speed to below the speed of sound. The electromagnetic railgun is a weapon that shoots projectiles by using the magnetic fi eld generated from electric energy instead of gunpowder. The U.S. Forces are developing a railgun with a range of about 370 km, or about ten times that of the existing 5-inch (127 mm) gun. A single railgun shot reportedly costs 1/20th to 1/60th the price of a missile. The U.S. Forces are developing laser weapons to strengthen low-altitude air defense capabilities against small boats and drones. Tests have been carried out to shoot down unmanned aircraft by using lasers in efforts to put the technology to practical use. DARPA has announced plans to carry out fl ight tests in 2019 with the aim of testing the airborne launch and recovery of unmanned aircraft. The Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) (“Sea Hunter”) is capable of navigating several thousand kilometers for months without crewmembers on board through constant remote supervision by humans. In August 2016, this vessel allegedly completed its initial sea trials. “Next Generation Artifi cial Intelligence Development Plan” sets goals of AI development by 2030 according to three steps. At the fi rst step by 2020, “overall AI technology and application reach a globally advanced level”; at the second step by 2025, “some technologies and applications achieve a world-leading level”; and at the third step by 2030, “AI theory, technology and li ti h l b ll d d l l Chi b l b l AI i ti t ” ----- international aerospace show in November 2018, is described as a fi ghter UAV that can perform advanced autonomous fl ights.[9] Russia is developing a nuclear-powered underwater drone (named Poseidon) that can carry nuclear warheads, claiming that the drone has been tested successfully. In addition, a test fl ight of Okhotnik, an unmanned stealth fi ghter jet pointed out to be operated in coordination with manned aircraft, was conducted in August 2019. The Russian government has published a video of the fl ight. Some have argued that drones with AI and autonomous functions could develop into so-called Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), discussion on LAWS is continued from the perspectives of their characteristics, human element, and international law. Meanwhile, some people indicate that UAVs would not become as autonomous as human pilots until 2040. **(2) Hypersonic Weapons** The United States, China and Russia are developing hypersonic weapons, including hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that would be launched from ballistic missiles, maneuvered to glide at hypersonic speed (Mach 5 and above) after their entry into the atmosphere, and hit targets, as well as hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs) using scramjet engines and other technologies that enable hypersonic fl ight by utilizing incoming supersonic airfl ow to be maintained at the speed of sound or faster for combustion. It is suggested that hypersonic weapons would fl y in lower orbits longer and be more maneuverable than ballistic missiles, being more diffi cult to detect or intercept. The United States in its Missile Defense Review (MDR) (January 2019) indicates that Russia and China are developing advanced hypersonic missile capabilities that challenge existing missile defense systems.[10] China has been developing multiple models of HGVs since 2012.[11] It is suggested that these HGVs would be deployed as early as 2020. On the other hand, Russia has claimed that it has developed an HGV called “Avangard”[12] and would deploy it within 2019. It has asserted that existing and future missile defense networks would fail to counter the Avangard. Russia is also developing a hypersonic cruise Caihong-7, a prototype of which was exhibited at the Airshow China international aerospace show in 2018 [Jane’s by IHS Markit] **Chapter** CG of an HGV contracted by the U.S. Air Force [Jane’s by IHS Markit] missile called “Zircon.”[13] **(3) Electromagnetic Railgun** The United States and China are developing electromagnetic railguns that use electromagnetic fi elds generated from electric energy to launch projectiles. Unlike missiles, projectiles for electromagnetic railguns have no propulsion systems and are smaller, less costly and stored in smaller space. If electromagnetic railguns are made available for intercepting missiles, they may reportedly be able to effi ciently counter numerous missiles. The United States achieved a range of 185 km and a projectile impact speed of Mach 5 in tests in December 2010, planning to mount electromagnetic railguns on warships by 2025. It plans to use electromagnetic railguns not only for anti-ground and anti-ship attacks but also for anti-aircraft attacks. 9 It is pointed out that China plans to introduce not only drones but also a decision-making support system using artificial intelligence for supporting nuclear-powered submarine commanders. 10 The United States is developing an HGV called Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW). In October 2017, it conducted an improved version’s fl ight test in which the AHW fl ew about 3,700 km and hit a target. 11 Multiple fl ight tests have been conducted. 12 In a fl ight test conducted in December 2018, the Avangard fl ew over an estimated distance of 6,000 km and hit a target. 13 In the State of the Union address in February 2019, the Zircon was described as capable of fl ying at the maximum speed of about Mach 9 to hit a maritime or ground target more than 1,000 ----- Peresvet laser weapon system[16] and developing a megawattclass chemical laser weapon system for attacking satellites. **(5) Quantum Science & Technology** Quantum science and technology is positioned as an important technology to innovate society by applying quantum mechanics that differs from familiar physics that people sense every day. For example, quantum cryptographic communications use quantum cryptographic technology taking advantage of quantum characteristics for cryptographic communications that cannot be deciphered by third parties. It is pointed out that quantum radar may be able to neutralize the stealth of stealth aircraft by utilizing quantum characteristics. China developed the approximately 2,000 km-long, world’s longest quantum cryptographic communications network between Beijing and Shanghai. In addition, in August 2016, China launched “Mozi,” the world’s first satellite to test quantum cryptographic communications. In January 2018, China said that it succeeded in using Mozi for long-distance quantum cryptographic communication between China and Australia. In the United States, DARPA is conducting research and development on quantum cryptographic communications and quantum laser technologies. Going forward, new technologies such as quantum cryptography communications could potentially be applied to the military field in various countries. It is pointed out that China has tested its railguns at sea and would deploy them by 2025. **(4) High-power Laser Weapons** The United States, China and Russia are developing highpower laser weapons to destroy targets with laser energy. Laser weapons are expected as an effective and less costly means to intercept attacks by multiple small drones and boats.[14] Given the speed of light and the absence of constraints on ammunition, laser weapons, if strengthened enough to intercept missiles, could be able to efficiently counter massive missile attacks. The United States has tested a 30 kW ship-based solid laser weapon system (LaWS) to counter small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Persian Gulf since 2014, planning to test mount an Aegis ship with the 100 kW HELIOS solid laser weapon system available for countering projectiles by 2020. It has also indicated the effectiveness of using a highpower laser weapon system to intercept a ballistic missile in the boost phase,[15] assessing technology for mounting drones with laser weapon systems. China exhibited the 30-100 kW “Silent Hunter” laser weapon system, capable of countering small UAVs, at the IDEX 2017 international defense exhibition. It is pointed out that China is developing higher-power laser weapon systems to attack satellites. It is suggested that Russia is test deploying the 10 kW **Chapter** **2** **Trends Concerning Defense Technological and Industrial Bases** In recent years, Western countries in particular have continued to face difficulties in increasing defense budgets significantly. On the other hand, the sophistication of military science and technology, and the greater complexity of equipment have escalated development and production costs and have raised unit prices for equipment procurement. Under these circumstances, many countries are taking on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense technological and industrial bases. Western countries have set a target to increase competitiveness through realignment of their defense industry, based on the aforementioned situation related to national defense budgets. The United States has experienced repeated mergers and integrations among domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced cross-border mergers and integrations of the defense industry, especially in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. In response to the escalation of development and production costs, Western countries are promoting joint development and production and technological cooperation related to equipment among their allies and partners. This move aims for (1) splitting development and production costs, (2) expanding demand in all countries participating in joint development and production, (3) mutual complement of technologies, and (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining the latest technology. For example, the joint development and production of the F-35 fighter jet led by the United States is the largest joint program. At present, there is anticipated demand for more than 3,200 aircraft.[17] This project will have impacts 14 For terrorists’ use of UAVs, see Part I, Chapter 3, Section 7 15 It is pointed out that a ballistic missile in the boost phase before taking anti-interception measures could be the most vulnerable to interception. 16 In the State of the Union address in February 2019, it is explained that the Peresvet laser weapon system would enter full operation in late 2019. 17 There are nine countries involved in the joint development and production of the F-35 fighter jets: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The other countries acquiring them are Israel, the ROK, and Japan, whose defense technological and industrial bases is involved in their production and maintenance. H ft T k h d R i S 400 i il t th U it d St t d id d i J l 2019 t i iti t th t f ll T k f th j i t ----- on the defense technological and industrial bases of the countries involved, through the operation, sustainment and maintenance stages of the aircraft. The European Union (EU) has created the European Defence Fund (EDF)[18] to provide funding for joint research and development by the EU member states in order to promote their cooperation in developing and acquiring defense equipment and facilitate the efficient production of state-of-the-art and interoperable equipment. There is an increasing number of cases where governments are providing funding for national defense-related research and development conducted by the private sector. In the United States, for example, approximately US$3.44 billion in research and development funding was requested for FY 2019 for DARPA,[19] whose mission is to make investments in breakthrough technologies that will contribute to national security. The U.S. defense authority has long provided substantial funding for the research conducted by companies and universities. In some other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, responding to the utilization of dual-use technologies in defense equipment development, the governments have launched initiatives to provide funding for private sector research and development on innovative technologies in order to acquire advanced civilian technologies.[20] Countries have exported equipment overseas since the Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms **Fig. I-3-1-1** Export (2014 - 2018) Cold War era, and still today, many countries are taking measures to promote exports. While Western countries exporting advanced equipment have remained as leading defense equipment exporters, countries such as China, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Turkey have been expanding exports of affordable equipment along with the development of the manufacturing bases required for production of equipment with the past imports of equipment and the improvement of capabilities in science and technology. Defense equipment imports by Asian and Oceanian countries have continued an uptrend in recent years, underpinned by economic growth in the region as well as the expansion of Chinese influence, the existence of territorial disputes, and responses to the military buildup in neighboring countries. Some of defense equipment importing countries adopt offset policies[21] in order to keep a good balance between improving defense capabilities through imports and developing domestic defense technological and industrial bases by requesting domestic companies’ participation in parts production as a condition for procuring equipment and services from abroad. See Fig. I-3-1-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional See Arms Export (2014-2018)); Fig. I -3-1-2 (Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional Arms in the Asia and Oceania (2014-2018)) **Chapter** Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional Arms in **Fig. I-3-1-2** the Asia-Pacific Region (2014-2018) |Country / Region|Col2|Import values ($ as billion), 2014 – 2018|Comparison with 2009–2013 import values (%)| |---|---|---|---| |1|India|138.76|-24| |2|Australia|67.93|+37| |3|China|61.03|-7| |4|Republic of Korea|44.92|-9| |5|Viet Nam|42.40|+78| |6|Pakistan|40.12|-39| |7|Indonesia|35.90|+86| |8|Taiwan|24.26|+83| |9|Japan|21.00|+15| |10|Singapore|18.57|-63| Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” The top 10 countries by import value between 2014 - 2018 are listed. |Country / Region|Col2|Global shares in defense equipment export (%), 2014 – 2018|Comparison with 2009 – 2013 export values (%)| |---|---|---|---| |1|United States|36|+29| |2|Russia|21|-17| |3|France|7|+43| |4|Germany|6|+13| |5|China|5|+3| |6|United Kingdom|4|+6| |7|Spain|3|+20| |8|Israel|3|+60| |9|Italy|2|-7| |10|Netherlands|2|+16| Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” The top 10 countries by export value between 2014 – 2018 are listed (decimals are rounded). 18 The EDF was founded in June 2017 to reduce duplication in the member states’ spending on defense research, development, and acquisition and to achieve efficiency while their defense budgets are reduced. It plans to finance 90 million euros for joint defense research in three years from 2017 and invest 500 million euros for joint development in 2019 and 2020. The funding from 2021 is anticipated to be scaled up. 19 DARPA is a Department of Defense (DoD) agency in which approximately 100 program managers, who are hired for three to five years, oversee around 250 research and development programs. It does not have its own research and development facilities. 20 In 2016, the United Kingdom launched the Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) to build an innovation network of government, private sector and academics and created a fund to provide about 800 million pounds for innovative research over 10 years. In the same year, Australia established a Next Generation Technologies Fund (about Australian $730 million over a decade) for emerging technologies as well as a fund (about Australian $640 million over a decade) for innovative technology development. 21 Offsets in defense trade are defined as encompassing a range of industrial and commercial benefits, such as co-production, licensed production, subcontracting, technology transfer, and i t i h d t di t “Off t i D f T d T t Fi t St d ” b th U S D t t f C B f I d t d S it ----- **Section** **2** **Trends in Space Domain** **1** **Space Domain and Security** Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into outer space for the first time in the history of mankind. In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has been applied to various areas. While no state is allowed to own outer space, all countries can use it freely. Major countries thus make proactive efforts to use outer space.[1] For example, Earth observation satellites, such as meteorological satellites, are used to observe weather as well as land and waters; communication and broadcasting satellites are used for the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning satellites for global positioning systems are used to navigate aircraft and ships. These satellites have widely prevailed in social, economic, scientific, and other areas as essential infrastructure for the public and private sectors. In the security field, military forces in major countries are actively involved in outer space activities and utilize a variety of satellites. There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication at, and positioning on any area on the Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR functions.[2] Such satellites include image acquisition satellites for reconnoitering military facilities and targets, early warning satellites for detecting the launch of ballistic missiles, satellites for gathering radio signals, communication satellites for communications between military units, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems. In outer space, various countries are thus rapidly developing their capabilities to ensure their military superiority. From the viewpoint of ensuring their military superiority, various countries are also rapidly developing their capabilities to impede each other’s use of outer space. In January 2007, China conducted a test to destroy its aging satellite with a ground-launched missile. The resulting space debris[3] spread across the satellite’s orbit, and came to be seen as a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by various countries.[4] Furthermore, countries including China and Russia are thought to be also developing an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) that does not directly hit and destroy a satellite by a missile, thus creating less space debris. For example, it has been noted that ASATs under development include a “killer satellite” to approach a target satellite and utilize a robot arm to capture the target and disable its functions. On this point, it has been noted that China has carried out experiments in outer space in which they have mobilized satellites close to other satellites to simulate the movements of a killer satellite. The United States has claimed to have confirmed very unnatural moves of a satellite launched by Russia in 2017 for checking space systems, indicating concerns about the satellite. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that China and Russia are developing not only missiles and killer satellites but also jammers for interfering with communications between target satellites and ground stations, and laser weapons for attacking target satellites with directed energy. It has also been noted that China and Russia have been enhancing capabilities to operate these anti-satellite capabilities and impede the United States and its allies from using outer space.[5] As the above illustrates, the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges for countries, thus it has become necessary to deal with this risk effectively in an effort to ensure stability in the use of outer space. Against this backdrop, the existing international agreements, such as the Outer Space Treaty (the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that prescribes the exploration and use of outer space, do not have direct provisions on prohibiting the destruction of space objects and refraining from actions triggering space debris. Discussion on guidelines has been under way recently by the United Nations Committee on the **Chapter** The Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that came into force in October 1967 defines such matters as the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the freedom in principle of exploration and use of outer space, and the prohibition of ownership. According to one of the concepts, outer space is considered to be the airspace more than 100 km above the Earth’s surface. However, no clear international agreement has been reached on the definition of outer space. The term “C4ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1991 Gulf War is considered “the first high-tech war conducted in outer space in the history of mankind.” Unnecessary artifacts orbiting around the Earth, including satellites no longer in use, and launch vehicles’ upper stages, parts, and fragments. According to an April 2018 issue of the Washington Times (National Digital Edition) of the United States, China carried out an experimental launch of an anti-satellite missile in February 2018. Moreover, it was reported that Russia also carried out an experimental launch of an anti-satellite missile in March 2018. S “W ld id Th t A t” b th U S Di t f N ti l I t lli i J 2019 ----- **Chapter** **Space Security Trends** As there is no concept of national borders in outer space, **Laser laboratory aircraft (A-60)** artifi cial satellites can be used to collect information from and conduct communications and positioning at any location on the earth, prompting countries to use satellite-based space systems as military infrastructure. [Jane’s by IHS Markit] Specifi cally, military forces of the United States and other major countries use reconnaissance satellites for The A-60 is a Russian aircraft mounted with a high-power collecting image and radio data, positioning satellites laser weapon that reportedly test emitted laser beams for fi nding accurate locations and guiding missiles, early aimed at a satellite in 2009. warning satellites for detecting ballistic missile fi rings, and communications satellites for enabling communications between distant units. As military forces grow dependent on space systems, some countries are developing and improving anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in order to prevent enemies from working effectively in military operations by depriving their satellite of function. For example, it is pointed out that China and Russia are continuing to develop and test “ASAT missiles” launched from the ground or aircraft for physically destroying satellites, “killer satellites” for directly colliding with other satellites or using robot arms to catch other satellites and deprive them of function, “directed-energy weapons” for emitting high-power laser beams to deprive satellites of function or directly destroy them, and “jammers” for disrupting communications between satellites and ground stations. Under such situation, the U.S. Department of Defense has recognized that China and Russia are considering counterspace capabilities as a means to weaken the military effectiveness of the United States and its allies, promoting initiatives to maintain relative advantages in space, including a bill sent to Congress to create a space force as a new military service. Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) and the InterAgency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).[6] Moreover, countries are working on Space Situational Awareness (SSA) by monitoring the solar activity with a potential impact on satellites and electronic equipment on **2** **Various Countries’ Outer Space Initiatives** 1 The United States The United States launched its fi rst satellite, Explorer 1, in January 1958, following the satellite launches by the former Soviet Union. The country has since then proceeded with a variety of space activities in fi elds including military, science, and resource exploration, such as launching the world’s fi rst reconnaissance satellite and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the world’s leading space power. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize the importance of the Earth, and threats caused by meteors reaching Earth, in addition to threats posed by anti-satellite weapons and space debris to space assets. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3-1 (Responses in Space) outer space for their actions, and on this point, actively utilize outer space for security purposes. In June 2010, the United States released the National Space Policy that presents the country’s basic guidelines for space policy. The National Security Strategy (NSS) revealed in December 2017 points out that many countries are said to have purchased satellites to back up their strategic military activities, and some countries even pursuing a variety of ASATs on the basis of belief that the capability to attack assets in outer space will give them asymmetrical advantages. But having noted In 2007, the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) proposed to discuss “the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in relation to civil space activities, for the purpose of defi ning risk reduction for long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. Based on this proposal, discussions have taken place towards working out some guidelines. Among other international discussions on the use of outer space, there are talks on the development projects of the WOOMERA Manual on the International Law of Military Space Operations as well as the Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space (MILAMOS) that discuss new legal problems di t ----- that, the United States indicated that unlimited access to and freedom in activities in outer space were vital interests of the United States, and that the long-term goals in outer space were given consideration by the National Space Council in an effort to develop strategies. The National Space Strategy was announced in March 2018, which demonstrated its recognition that their adversaries had turned space into a warfighting domain, and that the United States would seek to deter, counter, and defeat threats in the space domain that are hostile to the national interest of the United States and its allies. Based on these strategic guidelines, the U.S. DoD has set the goal of maintaining and strengthening U.S. space superiority for security purposes, recognizing that the United States needs to prepare for the possibility of conflict extending into outer space. In this regard, President Donald Trump directed the DoD in June 2018 to build a space force that would be separate from the other military branches such as the army, the navy and the air force, and ordered the Pentagon in December 2018 to establish the United States Space Command as a unified combatant command.[7] In February 2019, the DoD submitted a proposal to Congress that would see the creation of the space force within the Department of the Air Force. Among U.S. government organizations, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) under direct control by the President is responsible mainly for non-military space development, while the DoD undertakes military research, development, and operation of observation and reconnaissance satellites. 2 China China began working on space development in the 1950s, and in April 1970, the county launched its first satellite “Dong Fang Hong I,” mounted on the transportation launch vehicle “Long March 1,” using technology enhanced through its missile development. China has thus far conducted activities such as manned space flight and lunar rover launches. It is speculated that China’s space development is intended to enhance national prestige and develop space resources. China’s defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) states that outer space is a commanding position Launch of BeiDou 42 and 43, a Chinese satellite positioning system by China on November 19, 2018 [Avalon/Jiji Press Photo] in strategic competition among all nations. Meanwhile, China asserts that its activities in outer space constitute “peaceful use of outer space,” and underscores that China is “opposed [to] the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and [will take] an active part in international space cooperation.” China also commits to “[keep] abreast of the situation of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets.” In addition, “China’s Space Activities in 2016,” China’s white paper on space activities released in December 2016, presents a vision to “build China into a space power” and for “the realization of the Chinese Dream.” It also presents a schedule of space vehicle launches[8] up to 2020. While traditionally emphasizing international cooperation and the peaceful use of space, China has fallen short of denying its military use of space and proactively used space for military purposes, including information collection, communications,[9] and positioning. In fact, it is pointed out that China launched 29 military satellites as of November 2018, exceeding six for the United States and eight for Russia.[10] Furthermore, as described earlier, China continues to develop ASATs. In January 2007, China conducted a test using a ground-launched missile for destroying its own satellite. In July 2014, China implemented an anti-satellite missile test that was not accompanied by the destruction of any satellite.[11] It is also suggested that China is developing killer satellites, jammers, and directed-energy weapons,[12] including laser beams. **Chapter** 7 At present, the Joint Force Space Component Command under the control of the U.S. Strategic Command operates the U.S. Forces’ outer space capabilities. 8 The paper cites not only a lunar rover but also the launch of worldwide services using the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, Mars exploration, asteroid exploration, and Jupiter exploration. As for space exploration, it was announced in January 2019 that China’s Chang’e 4 became the world’s first vehicle to land on the moon’s far side. 9 In August 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum science satellite, called Mozi, which will be carrying out a proof-of-concept mission for quantum communication between space and a ground station. 10 Source: “Union of Concerned Scientists” 11 The February 2015 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence notes that in July 2014, China tested an anti-satellite missile without destroying a satellite. 12 According to the “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” published by the U.S. DoD in May 2018, China continues to develop directed-energy weapons, electronic countermeasure systems (jammers), and a variety of capabilities, including the capability to counter satellites, designed to limit or block the f t b d i d i i i fli t ----- It is reported that China is developing and operating satellites that can be used for both military and civilian purposes. For example, the possibility of military use of the BeiDou satellite positioning system[13] has been pointed out, as it has been reported that the purpose of the launch of global service in 2018 was to satisfy military needs. A Chinese state-owned corporation, which develops and produces satellite carrier rockets, has claimed to continue the launch of new rockets in the Long March series and develop a launch vehicle that can carry a large satellite.[14] However, the corporation has been reported to have been developing and producing ballistic missiles as well, indicating that the development of satellite carrier rockets is applicable to that of ballistic missiles.[15] China is thus expected to focus on space development through close cooperation between government, military, and private sectors. China is considered to have become one of the space powers through investments, research and development, and the introduction of technologies from the United States and other countries. It has been suggested that China could threaten U.S. superiority in outer space in the future.[16] Among organizations, the Strategic Support Force, established in December 2015 as a force under direct control by the Central Military Commission, is pointed out as being in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare, while the details of its missions and organization have not been published. The Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission is believed to be in charge of launching, tracking and controlling satellites and conducting manned space programs. The State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which belongs to the State Council’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, works out and implements spacerelated programs. The China National Space Administration takes charge of civilian programs and represents the Chinese Government externally by concluding international agreements. 3 Russia Russia’s space activities have been continuing since the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union successively launched multiple satellites after it launched the first satellite in the history of mankind, Sputnik 1, in October 1957, and had the largest number of launched satellites in the world until the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The satellites included many military satellites, and progress was made in the use of space for military purposes by the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Russia’s space activities have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country has recently started to expand its space activities once again. Regarding the country’s trends in security, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, approved in December 2015, states that the opportunities for maintaining global and regional stability are shrinking significantly with the deployment of the U.S. weapons in outer space. In response to the United States’ release of the annual MDR in 2018, Russia expressed concern that the implementation of plans in the MDR would launch an arms race in space with hugely negative consequences for world peace and stability. In March 2016, Russia released the Federal Space Program for 2016-2025 as a specific future guideline for space activities, including the development and deployment of domestic space satellites and manned flight programs. Meanwhile, Russia has taken advantage of its space capabilities for military operations. In its air assault operation in Syria in 2015, Russia reportedly used a total of 10 satellites, including image gathering satellites as well as data relay satellites (a kind of communications satellites), to ascertain Syrian domestic conditions. It is also pointed out that Russia has repeated tests to fire ground-launched anti-satellite missiles and has been developing anti-satellite missiles to be launched from Mig-31 fighter jets. In the Russian Far Eastern city of Vostochny, Russia has almost completed its space center and is reportedly constructing a new launching site. Future moves, including the military’s engagement with the center, are attracting attention.[17] From an organizational perspective, the Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientific and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space **Chapter** 13 BeiDou offers not only positioning services but also interactive short message services. It is suggested that the services allow naval ships using the BeiDou system to identify locations of foreign ships and other information and provide the information to other BeiDou-using ships on a real-time basis, contributing to improving maritime and other information gathering capabilities. 14 As for the Long March 9 rocket (for launching very large satellites), which can lift a satellite of up to 140 tons into a low orbit and is reportedly planned for launching such vehicles as manned lunar landers, its developers said in October 2018 that the first Long March 9 would be launched between 2028 and 2030. 15 Moreover, it is regarded that China is focusing also on the development of satellite earth stations and operating a space base for civilian use in Patagonia, Argentina. Furthermore, the country has launched a manned space program with the aim of constructing its own space station. 16 According to the annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of November 2015. 17 Th l h it h b b ilt t l th R i l d B ik C d i K kh t ----- activities for security purposes. The Russian Aerospace Force[18] conducts actual space activities for military purposes, manages facilities for launching satellites, among other activities. 4 Europe Regarding European outer space activities, the EU, the European Space Agency (ESA)[19], and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are cooperating with each other to implement space activities.[20] France succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1965, and the United Kingdom in 1971. Italy and Germany used launch vehicles developed by the United States to own satellites in 1964 and 1965, respectively. Meanwhile, the ESA launched its first satellite in 1979. The ESA signed a “framework agreement” with EU in 2004 to prescribe that they will coordinate on proceeding with space development and hold regular minister-level council meetings. The joint council meeting held by the ESA and the EU in 2007 approved the European Space Policy. The European Space Policy mentions improving synergy effects between space activities for civil and defense purposes, and the importance of implementing space activities based on coordinated efforts among member states and ensuring an internationally competitive space industry. The policy identifies security as one of its areas of priority. The EU and ESA are planning a satellite positioning system “Galileo” and an Earth observation program “Copernicus,” and European Defense Agency (EDA)[21]is implementing a reconnaissance satellite project “Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS).”[22] It is believed that in the future these initiatives will be utilized for the security field in Europe. positioning and observation satellites. At the end of January 2019, it released a space mission calling for promoting research and development on a manned space initiative by 2020.[23] India is believed to have operated a positioning satellite that can position locations around India[24] and launched an Earth observation satellite, which is believed to be also used for security purposes. In February 2017, India successfully launched a satellite launch vehicle loaded with 104 satellites at low cost,[25] marking the largest number ever carried on a single rocket in the world, which indicates its high technological capabilities. In March 2019, Prime Minister Modi announced that the country successfully tested a missile to shoot down a low-orbit satellite. Among organizations, the Space Agency oversees the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), which implements space development policy, develops and launches launch vehicles, and develops and manufactures satellites. 6 The ROK The ROK is considered to have started full-scale space development from the latter half of the 1990s. Current space development is promoted based on the Third Basic Space Development Promotion Plan announced by the Moon administration under the Space Development Promotion Act implemented in 2005. The plan proposes a vision towards 2040, giving priority to (1) the establishment of its own launch vehicle technology, (2) the advancement of satelliteusing services and satellite development, (3) the initiation of space exploration, and (4) the development of the Korean Positioning System (KPS). In November 2018, the ROK, which had traditionally depended on other countries for launching satellites, announced that it successfully tested the Nuri domestic launch vehicle under development. Among organizations, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute leads research and development as an **Chapter** 5 India India has promoted programs to develop communications, 18 According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Aerospace Forces were created by merging the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces, and started performing its tasks in August 2015. The tasks of the Aerospace Forces include: (1) providing focused combat command to the air force; (2) conducting aerial and missile defense; (3) launching and controlling satellites; (4) warning about missile attacks; and (5) monitoring outer space. 19 The ESA was established in May 1975 based on the ESA Convention targeting to establish a single European space organization focusing on the peaceful use of space research, technology, and application areas. The organization was formally established in October 1980. 20 In September 2000, the European Commission (EC) and the ESA created the European Strategy for Space, which committed to pursue Europe’s coherent and effective space activities. The strategy envisioned that the EC would make political and strategic decisions on space policies and that the ESA would function as the implementing organization. For the satellite positioning system “Galileo” currently in operation and the environmental and security monitoring program “Copernicus,” the EU and ESA are complementing each other in carrying these projects forward, with the former mainly taking charge of the policy dimension and the latter the technical dimension. 21 The EDA was established in 2004 to improve Europe’s defense capabilities for crisis management purposes and to execute and maintain security and defense policies. 22 The MUSIS was started by Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and Spain. The organization was joined later by Poland in December 2010. This is a joint project succeeding such projects as “Helios 2” (a French military reconnaissance satellite), “Pleiades” (a French Earth imaging satellite used for military and civilian purposes), “SAR-Lupe” (a German group of military radar satellites), “COSMO-SkyMed” (an Italian constellation of Earth observation satellites), and “Ingenio” (a Spanish optical satellite). 23 In December 2014, the ISRO succeeded in the test launch of a large launch vehicle carrying an unmanned capsule. 24 In April 2016, India succeeded in launching the seventh satellite constituting the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS). 25 All 104 satellites were launched and placed into polar orbit at the same time. They comprised India’s roughly 700 kg Cartosat-2D Earth observation satellite and 103 small satellites i hi l th b t 10 k h (1 h f I l K kh t th N th l d S it l d d th U it d A b E i t (UAE) 2 f I di d 96 f th U it d St t ) ----- implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and **Section** **3** **Trends in Cyber Domain** **1** **Cyberspace and Security** Owing to the advancement of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, information and communications networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. Therefore, cyber attacks[1] against information and communications networks have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals. Types of cyber attacks include functional disruption, data falsification and data theft caused by unauthorized access to information and communications networks or through the transmission of viruses via e-mail, functional impairment of the networks through simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data, and attacks intended to shut down or take over a system belonging to critical infrastructure, such as power systems. Also, Internet-related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks becoming more and more advanced and sophisticated by the day.[2] For military forces, information and communications capability form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, ICT advancements are further enhancing the dependence of military forces on information and use of various satellites. communications networks. Furthermore, in some cases, military forces need various critical infrastructures, including electricity, to execute their missions. Accordingly, cyber attacks against such critical infrastructures could become a major impediment to their missions. For this reason, cyber attacks are recognized as an asymmetrical means to impede the military activities of adversaries at low cost. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. It has been pointed out that China and Russia in particular are bolstering the offensive cyber capabilities of their militaries for the purpose of obstructing the networking of military forces and destroying infrastructure.[3] In addition, actors (including non-state actors) attempting to cause harm to nations, etc. are likely to realize that attacking through cyberspace is often easier than attacking directly by physical means.[4] Moreover, it is said that the information and communications networks of countries are being compromised for the purpose of gathering intelligence. As more confidential information is stored in cyberspace, information theft through cyber attacks is causing more serious damage. **Chapter** **2** **Threats in Cyberspace** Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries.[5] Government agencies are suspected of engaging in some cyber attacks. Military forces in China, Russia, and North Korea are believed to be enhancing their cyber attack capabilities. The targets of cyber attacks are wide-ranging. Beginning with large targets, they range from global-level targets, including inter-state targets, as well as national and government institutions, local communities, business communities and, infrastructures, companies, and individuals. As such, it is said that measures to counter cyber attacks need to be optimal relative to the size of the target. In the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD)’s “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace” of September 2012, cyber attacks are characterized as follows: (1) diversity: cyber attacks involve diverse actors, methods, objectives, and context; (2) anonymity: actors can easily conceal and disguise their identity; (3) stealth: some cyber attacks are difficult to identify and can take place without causing any realization of damage; (4) offensive dominance: attack tools are easy to acquire depending on the tool, and it is difficult to completely eliminate software vulnerabilities; and (5) the difficulties of deterrence: retaliatory strikes and defensive measures have minimal deterrence effect. According to the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” by the Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (March 2018). According to the “Cybersecurity National Action Plan” unveiled by then U.S. President Obama in February 2016. According to the annual report presented to Congress by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget based on the Federal Information Security Management Act, the number of cybersecurity incidents reported to federal offices in FY2017 in the U.S. was 35,277. Moreover, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of January 2019 by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence names China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as those that pose the greatest cyber threats to the United States. It also indicates (1) that China presents a persistent cyber espionage threat and a growing attack threat to U.S. core military and critical infrastructure systems, (2) that Russia poses a cyber espionage, influence, and attack threat to the United States and its allies, (3) that Iran presents a cyber espionage and attack threat, and (4) that North Korea poses a significant cyber threat to financial institutions, remains a cyber espionage th t d t i th bilit t d t di ti b tt k ----- conducted extensive cyber attacks on private enterprises, academic organizations and other targets over a long term. 2 Russia It has been revealed that the Russian military has its own cyber commando unit, which is believed to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities,[11] including inserting malware into command and control systems of adversaries.[12] It is pointed out that Russia has taken advantage of cyberspace for intelligence operations to challenge democratic processes,[13] and has been involved in the following incidents. - In 2014, more than 500 million user accounts were leaked from a major U.S. Internet company. In March 2017, the U.S. government indicted four hackers, including two officers of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), for their alleged cyber attack on the company.[14] - In December 2015, a cyber attack triggered a large-scale power outage in Ukraine. It was reported that military forces of Russia confronting with Ukraine over the Crimea annexation and other issues were suspected of having contributed to the cyber attack. - Cyber attacks to affect the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential election.[15] - In June 2017, cyber attacks using the so-called NotPetya ransomware occurred in Ukraine and other countries. In February 2018, the U.S. and U.K. governments attributed the attacks to the Russian military. - In October 2018, the U.S. and U.K. governments announced that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces was responsible for cyber attacks on the World Anti-Doping Agency, the 1 China According to China’s defense white paper called “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015),[6] China will expedite the development of a cyber force. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that cyber warfare units have been formed under the Strategic Support Force that was created as part of China’s military reforms[7] in late December 2015. The units are estimated to consist of 175,000 troops, including 30,000 for cyber attacks, indicating that China is enhancing its military’s cyber warfare capabilities. China is suspected of conducting cyber attacks to steal confidential information even in peacetime.[8] For example, its involvement in the following incidents has been pointed out. - In June 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) became a target of a cyber attack in which, as it later came to light, personal information of about 22 million people, including U.S. federal employees and U.S. Forces personnel, were stolen.[9] - In January and February 2018, Chinese government hackers hacked a U.S. Navy contractor, leading to a leak of classified information on supersonic anti-ship missiles mounted on submarines.[10] - In December 2018, such countries as the United States announced that the APT10 cyber group related to China’s Ministry of National Security conducted cyber attacks on intellectual and other properties in at least 12 countries. The United States pointed out that the APT10 group implemented cyber attacks on government agencies of these countries and stole defense, space, aviation, resources development, and other information from U.S. companies. Even in Japan, it has been confirmed that the APT10 group **Chapter** 6 The defense white paper notes that “cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security,” that “as international strategic competition in cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces,” and that China is “one of the major victims of hacker attacks.” 7 While the details of the Strategic Support Force’s tasks and organization have not been revealed, it is suggested that it is in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2 regarding the Strategic Support Force. 8 According to the DoD Cyber Strategy released in September 2018, Chinese cyber attacks involve a range of organizations, including the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), intelligence agencies, security agencies, private hacker groups, and companies. The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2016) notes that China carries out cyber espionage led by the Ministry of State Security and military organizations as well as cyber espionage led by China’s many non-state actors targeting the United States. These actors include hackers contracted by the government, civilian “patriotic hackers,” and criminal organizations. 9 See the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015). In addition to this attack, the report states that a U.S. airline company was attacked by the same method as that used in the attack against the U.S. OPM. 10 The United States deems that China continues to conduct cyber-enabled theft targeting a broad set of U.S. interests ranging from national security information to sensitive economic information and U.S. intellectual property. While the United States and China have agreed to refrain from cyberespionage of intellectual property, it has been pointed out that cyber espionage by China still continues unimpeded. 11 According to a statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu during a briefing for the lower house in February 2017, the Russian military has a cyber command for the defensive purpose of countering political propaganda in Russia’s ongoing information war with Western countries. It is pointed out that the number of Russia's cyber troops comes to approximately 1,000. 12 According to then U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015. 13 According to the “DoD Cyber Strategy” released in September 2018. 14 There was another cyber attack on this Internet company in 2013, resulting in the leaking of information on approximately 3 billion people. 15 According to the joint statement issued in October 2016 by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the director of National Intelligence of the United States, and the joint report issued in December of the same year by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the FBI concerning Russian cyber attacks on the United States, as well as the U.S. intelligence community report on Russia’s cyber attacks on the U.S. presidential election released in January 2017. Moreover, during the 2017 presidential campaign in France, Macron, known as a hardliner on Russia, was reportedly a target of a cyber attack, as well as a widespread fake news story about having hidden assets in a tax haven. After being appointed president, in a joint f f th F h d R i id t M iti i d R i di tl t b f i t th f l i d ----- Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the U.S. Democratic convention, and other targets. 3 North Korea It has been pointed out that the North Korean authority trains hackers [16] and has intensively built up cyber units operating some 6,800 personnel.[17] North Korea is believed to have been developing capabilities to steal money and secret military information through cyber attacks and inflict such attacks on key foreign infrastructure. It is suspected of having been involved in the following incidents. - In September 2016, cyber attacks occurred in the internal network of the ROK Armed Forces. In May 2017, the ROK Ministry of National Defense was reported to have concluded that the cyber attacks had been conducted by what was believed to be a North Korean hacker group.[18] Moreover, it has been pointed out that documents containing military secrets were stolen through the cyber attacks. - In May 2017, a cyber attack used a malware called WannaCry to encrypt and neutralize electronic data held by hospitals, schools, businesses, and other entities in more than 150 countries. The Japanese, U.S., and U.K. governments blamed North Korea for the attack.[19] It has been pointed out that this cyber attack succeeded in collecting 140,000 dollars in Bitcoins. - In September 2017, multiple U.S. electric power utilities were inflicted with cyber attacks using spear phishing emails. In October 2017, FireEye, a U.S. cybersecurity company, announced that the attacks had been conducted by a cyber threat group allegedly affiliated with North Korea. - In February 2018, according to the ROK National Intelligence Service, North Korea has repeatedly hacked the ROK exchanges for the purpose of stealing virtual currencies, and it has succeeded in acquiring the equivalent of several dozen billion won (several billion yen). - In March 2019, a final report by an expert panel of the United Nations Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee pointed out that North Korea conducted at least five cyber attacks on virtual currency exchanges in Japan and other Asian countries between January 2017 and September 2018, stealing a total of 571 million dollars (about 63 billion yen). 4 Trends Concerning Other Threats Supply chain risks, including products embedded with deliberately and fraudulently altered programs, and the existence of advanced malware designed to attack industrial control systems are also pointed out. In this respect, the U.S. Congress in August 2018 passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019 including provisions prohibiting government agencies from using products of major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers, such as Huawei Technologies Co. The United States has provided its allies with information about risks accompanying Chinese communications equipment and urged them not to use such equipment. In response, Australia has banned China’s Huawei and ZTE Corporation from taking part in its 5G next-generation mobile network development project. Cyber attacks on telecommunication networks of a government and military forces or on critical infrastructure could have a serious effect on the security of states, and it is believed that state-sponsored cyber attacks have been on the rise in recent years. Given this situation, there is a need for continuous monitoring of trends in the threats in cyberspace. **Chapter** **3** **Initiatives against Cyber Attacks** Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way.[20] A number of issues have been raised that need to be dealt with to enable an effective response to be taken to cyber attacks. It is regarded that the international community has diverging views concerning the fundamental matters of 16 According to the “2016 Defense White Paper” published by the ROK in January 2017, it is said that North Korean cyber-related organizations are linked to the authority, and spot talented human resources from all over the land, giving them special training to develop cyber forces. 17 According to the “2018 Defense White Paper” published by the ROK in January 2019. In November 2013, it was reported that Kim Jong-un, then First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party of North Korea, stated, “Cyber attacks are omnipotent swords with their power paralleled with nuclear power and missiles.” 18 According to the digital ROK National Defense Report in May 2017. Furthermore, the report revealed that some of the IP addresses (Internet addresses) used in the attacks were identified as those in the Shenyang region of China, known to have been used by existing North Korean hackers. 19 Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand issued a statement of condemnation. Moreover, according to JPCERT/CC, over 2,000 devices at 600 locations in Japan are said to have been infected. 20 Generally, the trends at the governmental level are thought to include the following: (1) organizations related to cybersecurity that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being integrated, and their operational units are being centralized; (2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, creating new research divisions and enhancing such functions; (3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and (4) more emphasis is being given to international cooperation. At the level of the defense ministry, various measures have been taken, such as establishing a new agency to supervise cyberspace military operations and positioning the effort to deal with b tt k i t t t t i bj ti ----- cyberspace, including how international law applies. For instance, the United States, Europe, and Japan have called for maintaining a free cyberspace, while Russia, China, and most emerging countries sought to strengthen state control on cyberspace. Against this backdrop, there has been a movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the international community. For instance, discussions are being held on the establishment of international rules within the framework of global conferences on cyberspace.[21] See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3-2 (Response in Cyber Domain) See U.S. Army Cyber Command [Jane’s by IHS Markit] in and through cyberspace that pose long-term strategic risk to the United States as well as to its allies and partners.[23] The strategy presents such approaches as (1) the acceleration of cyber capability development, (2) defense to counter and deter malicious cyber activity, and (3) the promotion of cooperation with U.S. allies and partners. In April 2019, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (two-plustwo) convened, where the two countries agreed to enhance cooperation on cyber issues and affi rmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The U.S. Forces include Cyber Command, which was elevated to a unifi ed combatant command in May 2018, to control cyberspace operations. The Command consists of the Cyber Protection Force, which operates and protects the information infrastructure for the cyber forces of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and for the DoD, the National Mission Force, which supports U.S. defense against national-level threats, and the Combat Mission Force, which supports the operations conducted by unifi ed combatant commands on the cyber front (these three forces are collectively referred to as the Cyber Mission Force[24]).[25] 1 The United States In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting Federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and the Department’s Offi ce of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) works to protect the networks of government agencies.[22] The U.S. National Security Strategy (December 2017) points out that many countries now view cyber capabilities as tools for projecting infl uence and that cyberattacks have become a key feature of modern confl ict. It also notes that the United States would deter, defend, and when necessary defeat malicious actors who infl ict cyber attacks on the United States. To this end, the U.S. strategy came up with policy (1) to improve ability to attribute cyberattacks and allow for rapid response, (2) to enhance cyber tools and expertise to protect U.S. government assets, critical infrastructure, and information, and (3) to improve the integration of authorities and procedures across the U.S. government so that cyber operations against adversaries can be conducted as required. The U.S. DoD in its National Defense Strategy (January 2018) described a policy of investing in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations. Furthermore, the DoD Cyber Strategy (September 2018) points out that the United States is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, and that China and Russia have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns **Chapter** 2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, and its action plan, which 21 Global conferences on cyberspace have been held since being proposed by the then U.K. Foreign Secretary Hague in 2011, and the series of conferences has been called the “London Process.” The conferences have been attended by the governments, international organizations, groups from the private sector, NGOs, etc., of over 100 countries, and comprehensive discussions are held on various issues regarding cyberspace. They are high-level, large-scale global conferences, and the most recent one was held in November 2017. 22 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced a cybersecurity strategy in May 2018. More than 20 billion devices are expected to become connected to the Internet by 2020, and this is also said to increase the risks. 23 The DoD Cyber Strategy indicated a view that, while China is eroding U.S. military overmatch and economic vitality by exfi ltrating sensitive information from U.S. public and private sector institutions, Russia has used cyber-enabled information operations to infl uence the U.S. population and challenge U.S. democratic processes. 24 According to the DoD, the Cyber Mission Force has 133 teams (13 National Mission Teams, 68 Cyber Protection Teams, 27 Combat Mission Teams and 25 Support Teams), comprising 6,200 persons. 25 U.S. Cyber Command, which had been subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command, was elevated to a unifi ed combatant command in May 2018, allowing the CYBERCOM commander to report directly to the U.S. Secretary of Defense as is the case with other unifi ed combatant command commanders. In announcing the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a combatant command, the U.S. DoD has stated that the domain of cyberspace is just as important for military operations as land, sea, and air, and that operational capabilities in cyberspace are indispensable for ilit Th D D i di t d th t th f t i ill b th b l t i f b b d f d th l d biliti f b l ----- were adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify the political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would provide assistance to member states to develop their cyber defense, and provide assistance to member states if they are subject to cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles on cooperation with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in September 2014, agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks against member states. On the organizational front, in November 2017, an agreement was reached on the creation of a new Cyber Operations Center and the integration of NATO member countries’ cyber defense capabilities into NATO missions and operations. The Cyber Operations Center located in Belgium is expected to be fully operational with cyber attack capabilities by 2023. Furthermore, NATO has conducted cyber defense training exercises annually since 2008 to heighten cyber defense capabilities. In addition, NATO has expanded cooperation with the EU in the fields of cybersecurity and cyber defense.[26] In 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was authorized to serve as a research and training institution,[27] and was established in Estonia’s capital of Tallinn. CCDCOE carries out research on the relationship between cyber activities and international law, creating the “Tallinn Manual.”[28] In February 2017, “Tallinn Manual 2.0” was published as the second edition of the previous manual based on a review of broad discussion points, from peacetime legal regimes, such as laws on state responsibility, human rights, aviation, space, and maritime affairs, to contingency legal regimes, such as laws on armed conflict. 3 The United Kingdom The United Kingdom, in its “NSS- SDSR2015” released in November 2015, committed to investing £1.9 billion over the next five years in increasing its cyber defense capabilities to strengthen the functions for identifying and analyzing cyberspace threats. In November 2016, the country announced a new “Cyber Security Strategy” that presents a vision for the United Kingdom, which is to be secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous and confident in the digital world. To achieve this vision, the Strategy requires the United Kingdom to deter cyber threats by having effective defensive and offensive means and to “develop” cuttingedge technologies. On the organizational front, in October 2016, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to promote public-private partnerships for responses to national cyber incidents. 4 Australia In its first “National Security Strategy” published in January 2013, Australia positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top national security priorities. In April 2016, a new “Cyber Security Strategy” through 2020 was released, which provides that Australia will ensure the safety of the people, that private companies will participate in cybersecurity, and that threat information will be shared. On the organizational front, cybersecurity capabilities across the government were converged to establish the Australian Cyber Security Center (ACSC), which addresses major cybersecurity issues related to government agencies and critical infrastructures.[29] In July 2015, the ACSC issued its first report on cybersecurity,[30] which contends that the number, type, and sophistication of cyber threats to Australia are all increasing. Moreover, cyber forces were established within the military in July 2017 to strengthen the Department of Defence’s cyber capabilities and systems.[31] **Chapter** 5 The ROK The ROK formulated the “National Cyber Security Master Plan” in August 2011, which clarifies the supervisory functions of the National Intelligence Service[32] in responding 26 In July 2016, NATO and the EU signed a Joint Declaration with the aim of expanding cooperation in dealing with new issues, such as those involving terrorism, refugees and immigrants, including the cybersecurity issues. They have been strengthening cooperation, for example, by exchanging information on cyber defense. 27 In June 2013, the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting placed cyber attacks at the top of the agenda for the first time. They agreed to establish an emergency response team and to implement a cyber defense mechanism on a full scale by October 2013. 28 The “Tallinn Manual” and the “Tallinn Manual 2.0” are both considered independent outputs of the members that participated in the project (Professor Michael N. Schmitt of the U.S. Naval War College served as project leader; members included professionals, scholars on international law, and experts in cyber technology in the West and other areas), and not the official view of NATO. 29 The ACSC, comprised of staff from the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate, and the Australian Federal Computer Emergency Response Team, and the Defence Intelligence Organisation, analyzes cyber threats and responds incidents in both private and public sector. 30 According to the report, malicious actors in cyberspace targeting Australia are: (1) foreign government-sponsored adversaries; (2) serious and organized criminals; and (3) groups motivated by certain issues and individuals with personal grievances. 31 According to “International Cyber Engagement Strategy” announced in October 2017, the country’s offensive cyber capability in support of military operations will be deployed through the Signals Directorate in cooperation with the Australian Force. 32 Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and i i ti l b it t t di ti l t d li i d l i tit ti d d lib ti d li i l t d t id ti l d ----- to cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis on strengthening the following five areas: prevention, detection, response,[33] systems, and security base. In the national defense sector, the Cyber Measures Technology Team was established by the Ministry of National Defense to respond to cyber and hacking threats. The sector has also worked out procedures for quick response to cyber crises under the “National Cyber Security Strategy and the National Cybersecurity Crisis Response Manual.” In 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff centralized the cyber attack tactical system mainly around the Joint Chiefs of Staff by newly establishing the Cyber Tactics Department, assigning control authority concerning cyber tactics to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and issuing a field manual on “joint cyber tactics.” **Chapter** 33 I F b 2014 th ROK Mi i t f N ti l D f t dl b i f d th N ti l A bl th t it l d t d l b f tt ki th t i ----- **Section** **4** **Electromagnetic Domain Trends** **1** **Electromagnetic Domain and Security** Electromagnetic spectrum represents the spectrum that are propagated by the oscillations of electric and magnetic fi elds. In everyday life, they are used for various purposes ranging from television and mobile communications to positioning information through global positioning systems. In the defense fi eld, electromagnetic spectrum is used for command and control communications equipment, radar systems for detecting enemies, missile guidance systems, and other equipment. Securing superiority in the electromagnetic **2** **Each Country’s Electronic Warfare Initiatives** 1 The United States and Europe The United States has committed to expanding electronic warfare training and equipment, and to enhancing cooperation with its allies under an initiative to aggressively achieve its dominance in the electromagnetic domain. Major U.S. electronic warfare units include the Navy’s 13 electronic attack squadrons armed with EA-18G electronic warfare aircraft as well as Marine and Air Force fl ight squadrons with electronic warfare aircraft. The Army plans to deploy electronic warfare units in the future. The U.S. Forces used EA-18G aircraft for military operations in Libya in 2011 to jam the Libyan government domain is indispensable for modern operations. See Figure 1-3-4-1 (How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in See the Defense Field) Therefore, major countries have recognized electronic attacks for interrupting adversaries’ use of electromagnetic spectrum as an asymmetric means similar to cyber attacks to effectively hamper adversaries’ military performance, giving priority to and enhancing electronic warfare capabilities, including electronic attacks. **Chapter** forces’ ground radar and prevent Libyan attacks on NATO aircraft. Many other NATO member countries are also developing equipment for severe electronic warfare environments and allegedly conducting electronic warfare-oriented exercises with Russian forces’ electronic warfare equipment in mind.[1] 2 China China has set an initiative to put cyber warfare and other electronic elements, and physical destruction and other non-electronic elements under unifi ed control.[2] Under the initiative, China has conducted exercises to effectively accomplish missions in complicated electromagnetic **Fig. I-3-4-1** How to Use the Electromagnetic Domain in the Defense Field |Radio waves Microwaves|Infrared rays|Visible light Ul|traviolet rays|X-rays, γ-rays, etc.| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| |AAccccuurraattee gguu aann iinnffrraarree|iiddaannccee bb dd sseennssoorr| |---|---| Frequency: Low Electromagnetic waves Frequency: High Wavelength: Long Wavelength: Short 3GHz 30GHz 300GHz 400THz 790THz 30PHz 3EHz Radio waves Microwaves Infrared rays Visible light Ultraviolet rays X-rays, γ-rays, etc. Lasers (amplification and radiation Radio waves: Communications, radars Infrared rays: Guidance of missiles Visible light: Reconnaissance satellites of electromagnetic waves) Information sharing through Information sharing through satellite communicationssatellite communications Monitoring of space through laser distance measurementlaser distance measurement Ascertaining of circumstances by by an optical satellitean optical satellite Accurate guidance of missiles Accurate guidance of missiles through through laser irradiationlaser irradiation Detection of enemies by a radar Accurate guidance by an infrared sensoran infrared sensor According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defense Review, April 2018 A di t “Th Milit B l 2019” b th U K I t ti l I tit t f St t i St di ----- EA-18G Growler【Jane's by IHS Markit】 Krasukha-4【Jane's by IHS Markit】 environments, improving practical capabilities. The new Strategic Support Force, created for improving overall military operational capabilities, may be responsible for such domains as electronic warfare, cyber and space. It is reported that PLA electronic warfare units routinely conduct jamming operations against communication and radar systems and GPS satellite systems in exercises.[3] China’s TU-154 electronic intelligence and Y-8 electronic warfare aircraft have been seen fl ying around the Nansei Islands and the Sea of Japan in the vicinity of Japan. It is also reported that China has mounted electronic warfare pods for jamming missions on J-15 fi ghters, H-6 bombers, and other aircraft, and deployed a jamming system on Mischief Reef of the Spratly Islands.[4] 3 Russia Russia, in its federal Military Doctrine, positions electronic warfare equipment as important equipment in modern military confl ict. It is pointed out that Russian forces have positioned electronic warfare as part of offensive means and improved practical electronic warfare capabilities in recent years.[5] Russia’s electronic warfare force reportedly has fi ve brigades led mainly by the Army.[6] It is reported that Russia used various electronic warfare systems in eastern Ukraine to block Ukrainian forces’ command and control traffi c and jam GPS waves to interrupt their drone operations, affecting Ukraine’s military performance.[7] It is also reported that Russia used Krasukha-4 and other electronic warfare systems in Syria to interrupt NATO forces’ command and control traffi c and radar systems.[8] In the vicinity of Japan, Russian electronic reconnaissance aircraft’s long-range fl ights over the Sea of Japan have been seen. **Chapter** According to “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2018” by the U.S. DoD According to “An Accounting of China’s Deployments to the Spratly Islands” by the U.K. International Institute for Strategic Studies in May 2018 According to “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025” by the Estonian Ministry of Defense According to “All quiet on the eastern front: EW in Russia’s new-generation warfare,” Jane’s International Defense Review, April 2018 “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025” by the Estonian Ministry of Defense cites 10 electronic warfare systems as used by Russia in Ukraine, including the RB-341V Leer-3. A di t “All i t th t f t EW i R i ’ ti f ” J ’ I t ti l D f R i A il 2018 ----- **Chapter** **Electronic Warfare** Electronic warfare generally represents battles in which **Laser weapon system** radio and other electromagnetic waves are used. In general, the warfare is divided into three categories – electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. An electronic attack emits more powerful or deceptive radio waves toward adversaries’ communications and radar systems to jam radio waves from these systems so as to reduce or neutralize adversaries’ communications 【Jane’s by IHS Markit】 and search capabilities. It includes not only such jamming but also physical target destruction using high-power Capable of using high-power laser beams to destroy electromagnetic waves (including high-power laser small unmanned aircraft, etc. beams and high-power microwaves) such as the U.S. laser weapon system and the Russian Peresvet. **Giraffe 8A** See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-1-2 (4) (High-Power Laser Weapons) Electronic protection includes making defense equipment too stealthy to be detected and reducing or neutralizing adversaries’ electronic attacks by changing electromagnetic wave frequencies or enhancing electromagnetic wave power in response to an electronic attack on communications and radar systems. For example, 【Jane’s by IHS Markit】 Sweden’s Giraffe 8A air surveillance radar is said to be able to automatically select the most invulnerable The Giraffe 8A of Sweden’s Saab AB can automatically frequencies in response to jamming and maintain its air select frequencies that are the most invulnerable to surveillance radar function. jamming. Electronic warfare support means collecting adversaries’ electromagnetic wave data. To implement effective electronic attack or protection, it is required to recognize and analyze electromagnetic waves used by adversaries’ communications, radar systems and electronic attack aircraft and how these waves are used under normal circumstances. In electronic warfare, it is desirable to implement effective electronic protection even without adversaries’ jamming waves recognized or analyzed in advance. In this respect, using artifi cial intelligence technology for defense equipment is under consideration to immediately analyze jamming waves and automatically select frequencies that are the most invulnerable to jamming. ----- **Section** **5** **Maritime Trends** Japan is a maritime nation surrounded by sea, and depends on maritime transportation for importing energy resources. In this sense, securing maritime traffic safety is vital for the nation’s existence. At the same time, ensuring the stable use of the maritime domain as infrastructure supporting international logistics is recognized as a primary concern for the international community. **1** **Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas”** The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)[1] provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom of overflight. Nevertheless, in the waters and airspace in the periphery of Japan, especially the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their own assertions which are incompatible with the existing international order. This has caused situations of undue infringement upon such principles. Nevertheless, some countries unilaterally claim their rights or take actions based on their own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order, leading the principle of the freedom of the high seas to be violated unduly. On the other hand, piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffic. China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it would require aircraft flying in the zone to follow their instructions and warned that China’s armed forces would adopt “defensive emergency measures” in the event that aircraft refuse to follow the instructions. Japan is deeply concerned about such measures, which are profoundly dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the freedom of over flight. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that could go against the principle of freedom of over flight. The United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and the EU, too, have expressed concern about China’s establishment of such zone. Increased activities by Chinese military aircraft have been confirmed in recent years in the airspace close to the various southwestern islands of Japan, including the main island of Okinawa, and the expansion of these activities may be an attempt to enforce ECS ADIZ. Moreover, in May and June of 2014, fighters of the PLA flew abnormally close to aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF, which were flying over the East China Sea.[3] **Chapter** **(1) East China Sea** Numerous cases of acts which go against the principles of freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight have been recently seen in the East China Sea. For example, there was the case in January 2013, when a Chinese naval vessel directed its fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer navigating on the high seas (30th), and another case in which a Chinese naval vessel is suspected to have directed its fire-control radar at a helicopter carried onboard an MSDF destroyer (19th). The directing of a fire-control radar is generally an act carried out prior to using firearms, and directing it at an opponent is a dangerous act that may have unintended consequences.[2] On November 23, 2013, the Chinese Government announced that it would establish “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIZ),” including the Senkaku Islands as if they were a part of China’s territory. **(2) South China Sea** Such actions have also been seen frequently in the South China Sea. Chinese naval vessels have obstructed the The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted as a comprehensive treaty on the law and order of the seas in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan concluded it in 1996). Regarding this issue, the U.S. issued statements saying “actions such as this escalate tensions and increase the risk of an incident or a miscalculation, and they could undermine peace, stability, and economic growth in this vital region (February 5, 2013, Department of State Daily Press Briefing)” and that “we were briefed by our Japanese allies on the incident and we’ve satisfied ourselves that it does appear to have happened (February 11, 2013, Department of State Daily Press Briefing).” Other than that, there were multiple incidents in March 2011 of Chinese helicopters and other aircraft apparently of the State Oceanic Administration flying close to Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance in the East China Sea. Moreover, in June 2016, a Chinese fighter is speculated to have conducted a dangerous act by approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea, and in May 2017 an incident allegedly occurred where Chinese fighters b t t d th t f i ft f th U S F ----- navigation of U.S. naval vessels[4] and Chinese aircraft have also obstructed the flight of U.S. military aircraft.[5] In December 2016, an unmanned underwater vehicle belonging to the U.S. Navy was momentarily seized in the South China Sea by a vessel of the PLA Navy. These cases are dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. Additionally, China has gone ahead with land reclamation on seven features on a massive and rapid scale on the Spratly Islands since 2014. In July 2016, the “historical rights” asserted by China as the basis of the “nine dash line” were denied in the arbitration award between the Philippines and China, and the illegality of China’s reclamation activities was acknowledged. However, China has clearly stated its intention not to comply with the award, and continues militarization of the features by developing batteries and other military facilities and various infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, such as runways, harbors, hangars and radar facilities. Moreover, in July and August 2016 after the arbitration award between the Philippines and China was rendered, an H-6K bomber of the PLAAF conducted combat air patrols in the airspace around Scarborough Shoal, with China’s Ministry of National Defense announcing that it would conduct these patrols regularly from now on. This shows the PLA has been intensifying its operation in the South China Sea. Under these circumstances, a further increase in China’s aerial presence in the area could lead to the establishment of a “South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” in the future. Furthermore, Chinese government vessels have obstructed fishing and other vessels of other countries approaching the features, etc. by ring warning shots and water cannons at the vessels. Claimants as well as the international community including the United States have repeatedly said they are deeply concerned about China’s unilateral changes of the status quo, further advancement of efforts to create a fait **2** **Addressing Piracy** Piracy seen at various locations has become a threat to maritime traffic. The number of maritime piracy and armed robbery incidents (hereinafter referred to as piracy incidents) in the world[7] came to a peak of 445 in 2010, 439 in 2011, and 197 in 2012, indicating a downtrend (the number stood accompli, and assertive and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. **(3) Unintended Contingency Avoidance Initiatives** Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent years progress has been made on efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies. First, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting held on May 9, 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish a “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between Japan-China Defense Authorities” with the aim of avoiding unintended confrontations between the naval vessels and aircraft of the SDF and PLA. As for multi-national initiatives, in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).[6] CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and communication method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of each country. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification of military activities, together with rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have been held between on the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international order, and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the rule of law. **Chapter** at 201 in 2018). The decline has depended heavily on the fall in the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden rose rapidly from 2008 In March 2009, Chinese ships, including a naval vessel, a maritime research ship of the SOA, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries’ patrol ship, and fishing vessels, approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations, while in December 2013, a Chinese naval vessel cut across the bow of a U.S. Navy cruiser operating in the South China Sea at point blank range. In August 2014, a Chinese fighter is speculated to have flown abnormally close to and obstructed a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft over the South China Sea. Furthermore, in May 2016, Chinese fighters are speculated to have flown abnormally and dangerously close, to within around 15 meters, of a reconnaissance aircraft of the U.S. Navy over the South China Sea. This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties. Th b f i i id t it d i th i t t b d t b th I t ti l M iti B f th I t ti l Ch b f C ----- to 218 in 2009, 219 in 2010, and 237 in 2011, following a persistent uptrend, accounting for more than a half of the global total and attracting great international concern as a threat to safe navigation. In the recent years, however, the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low as a result of various initiatives taken by the international community including Japan (the number stood at three in 2018; see Part III for Japan’s initiatives). The international counterpiracy initiatives in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden include counterpiracy operations by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF151), a multinational force that was created in January 2009 by the U.S. Force-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF)[8] based in Bahrain. So far, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan and other countries have participated in the CTF151, conducting zone defense operations to counter piracy. The EU for its part has conducted Operation Atalanta to counter piracy since December 2008. In the operation, naval vessels and aircraft dispatched by EU member countries escort ships and monitor the waters off the coast of Somalia. It has been decided that the operation will continue until the end of 2020. In addition, some countries have conducted their exclusive operations outside the abovementioned frameworks. Since December 2008, for example, China has deployed naval vessels for counterpiracy operations in waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. **3** **Trends in the Arctic Ocean** The area north of latitude 66 degrees 33 minutes is called the Arctic Region. The Arctic Region includes Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. These eight are called Arctic countries. In 1996, the Arctic countries established the Arctic Council to promote cooperation in their common challenges, including sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic Region. In recent years, moves towards the utilization of transArctic navigation routes and the development of natural resources in the Arctic Ocean have gained momentum in line with a decline in sea ice. From the perspective of security, the While the number of piracy incidents in waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has remained low thanks primarily to such international initiatives, Somalia’s unstable security and poverty as fundamental factors behind piracy have not been resolved. Meanwhile, in Africa, piracy incidents occurred in the Gulf of Guinea (the number of incidents was 82 in 2018). The international community has continued counterpiracy initiatives in this region. The number of piracy incidents in Southeast Asian waters came to 60 in 2018. Traditionally, maritime armed robbery incidents, including the theft of cash, crewmembers’ belongings, ship equipment and other items, have accounted for most of piracy incidents in the waters. In recent years, however, they included grave incidents in which crewmembers were kidnapped for ransom purposes in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea off the Philippines. Counterpiracy measures in Asia include international information sharing and cooperation based on the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),[9] which was worked out at Japan’s initiative and put into force in 2006. In addition, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca Strait Patrols.[10] The cases of abduction for ransom have been confirmed in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. In order to respond to this, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines began sea patrols in the area in June 2017, and air patrols in October of the same year. Arctic Ocean has traditionally been used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. With the decrease in sea ice in recent years, ships have been able to navigate for a longer period of time and more extensively than before. It is therefore considered that the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces in the future. In this situation, moves to deploy new military capabilities in the ocean are seen. In the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy revised in December 2015, Russia continues to maintain that it would secure its interests in resource development and use of the sea route. **Chapter** 8 CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 32 countries participate in CMF, and the CMF Commander concurrently serves as the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter-piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The Japan Self-Defense Forces deploy units to CTF-151. 9 The contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands; Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; the United Kingdom; the United States; and Vietnam. 10 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004; aircraft patrol activities which commenced in 2005; and information sharing ti iti hi h d i 2006 ----- Russia has been developing natural gas on the Yamal Peninsula. In 2018, liquefied natural gas produced on the peninsula was transported to China for the first time via an Arctic Ocean route. As for military arrangements, Russia has set up a joint strategic command for each of the four military districts to unify all of ground, maritime, air and other forces. In 2014, Russia created the Northern Joint Strategic Command reportedly to integrate the Northern Fleet with ground and air forces and cover waters, remote islands and the Arctic coast between the Barents Sea and the East Siberian Sea. In the Arctic Region, Russia is constructing 10 airfields. As for military operations, the Northern Fleet has annually conducted a long-distance navigation to the Novo Sibirski Islands since 2012. Russia has intensified other Arctic military operations including SSBN submarines’ strategic nuclear deterrence patrols and long-range bombers’ patrol flights. In its Arctic Strategy published in 2019, the U.S. DoD expressed their concern against actions of China and Russia in the Arctic region,[11] and the DoD would form the basis for a mutual approach to maintaining a secure and stable Arctic region. In the Arctic Strategy released by the U.S. DoD in 2013, the United States expresses its desire for the Arctic to become a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. The United States reportedly plans to increase the number of U.S. Marines in Norway on a rotation basis from about 300 to about 700 from 2017. In October 2018, it sent an aircraft carrier to the Arctic Region for the first time in 27 years for air drills in the Norwegian Sea ahead of the NATO exercise “Trident Juncture 2018”. In December 2016, then U.S. President Obama decided to ban new drilling for oil and natural gas in a majority of U.S. territorial waters in the Arctic to protect marine resources, showing a negative stance towards resource development. However, President Trump signed an executive order repealing this decision of then U.S. President Obama in April 2017.[12] Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 13 countries including Japan, China, the ROK, the United Kingdom, Germany and France have observer status in the Arctic Council. Notably, China has shown active involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying the polar research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean for nine times since 1999.[13] In January 2018, they published a white paper titled “China’s Arctic Policy” in which they claimed to be one of the geographically closest states to the Arctic Circle with rights pertaining to the development of resources. They also announced their intention to build a “Polar Silk Road.” In September 2015, it was reported for the first time that five Chinese naval vessels sailed in the Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacific and sailed in the U.S. territorial waters near the Alewtian Islands. Focus will be on whether or not such activities would have any relation to the PLA Navy’s future advancements into the Arctic Ocean. **Chapter** 11 As for Russia, the U.S. DoD points out in its Arctic Strategy that Russia is strengthening its presence above the Arctic Circle by deploying Arctic units and establishing new military bases. Moreover, Russia has reportedly threatened to use force against vessels that fail to abide by Russian regulations. The DoD pointed out that Russia could utilize its military capabilities in an effort to deny access to disputed Arctic waters or resources. As for China, the DoD pointed out in its strategy that its operations of icebreaking vessels and civilian research activities could support a future Chinese military presence in the Arctic Ocean including deployment of submarines to the region, and also pointed out that it was attempting to gain a role in the Arctic in ways that may undermine international rules and norms, and there is a risk that its predatory economic behavior globally may be repeated in the Arctic. In May 2019, during his visit to Finland, Secretary of State Pompeo made a speech concerning Arctic policy, in which he stated that all relevant parties should follow the same rules and expressed caution against efforts by China and Russia to expand into the Arctic region. 12 As regards activities of other coastal nations, Canada states that the Arctic is a priority region under its policies in Canada’s Northern Strategy (released in 2009), and in December 2016 Canada announced a moratorium on the development of oil and natural gas in its territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean. Denmark and Norway have also developed the Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (released in 2011) and the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy (released in 2006), respectively, which outline their stances of attaching importance to the Arctic, including the perspective of security. 13 In 2012, Xue Long became the first polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, a cargo vessel Yong Sheng became the first Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean. Canadian scientists took part in Xue Long’s voyage to the Arctic Ocean in 2017, and they succeeded for the first time in trial navigation of the Arctic Northwest Passage (along the th t f C d ) C tl Chi i b li d t b b ildi it d l h l ----- **Section** **6** **Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of **1** **Nuclear Weapons** During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in or before 1966[1] from having nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through two-way negotiations.[2] The NPT is currently signed by 191 countries and regions.[3] While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons,[4] India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. Meanwhile, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, and declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons.[5] The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released by the Trump administration in February 2018 states that the United States “remains committed to its efforts in support of the ultimate global elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.” It also confirms that NPT is a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and that the United States continues to abide by its obligations under the NPT and will work to strengthen the NPT regime. The Trump administration has expressed its intention to continue to implement the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty[6] that was signed by the presidents of the United States and Russia in April 2010 and took effect in February 2011. However, it has not clarified what to do with the treaty after its scheduled expiration in 2021, including whether to extend it. The United Kingdom stated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 that the country the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs. would decrease the number of its nuclear warheads, and the NSS-SDSR 2015 released in November 2015 confirmed that there is no change in this policy to reduce the number of nuclear warheads. In the area of “nuclear security” which addresses terrorist activities that utilize nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Nuclear Security Summit that commenced at the proposal of then President Obama has been held on four occasions. The fourth Nuclear Security Summit that was held in Washington, D.C. in March-April 2016 adopted a Communiqué, which shared the recognition that the threat of nuclear terrorism remains an imminent challenge to the international community, and which outlined the need for continuous efforts to prevent nuclear materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors even after the summit.[7] The Trump administration has indicated it will promote cooperation with allies, partners and international institutions to combat nuclear terrorism. In February 2019, the Trump administration vowed to suspend the United States’ obligations under the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (which is a treaty that was concluded between the United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics to abolish intermediate- and short-range missiles) with Russia and secede from it in six months for the reason of Russia’s violation of the treaty. Following the announcement of withdrawal by the United States, in March 2019, Russia revealed that it announced to the United States the suspension of Russia’s obligations under the INF Treaty. On August 2, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the U.S. withdrawal pursuant to Article XV of the treaty took effect that day because Russia failed to return to full and verified compliance. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Esper announced that the DoD **Chapter** The United States, the then Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China acceded to the NPT in 1992. Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith. As of May 2019 South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus After North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, it announced that it would temporarily suspend the validity of that announcement. However, in January 2003, North Korea gave a notice of the termination of the suspension. In the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted in September 2005, North Korea pledged to return to the NPT at an early date. Nonetheless, North Korea subsequently announced the implementation of six nuclear tests. The treaty stipulates that each country would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 in seven years following the treaty’s entry into force. Both the United States and Russia have claimed that they accomplished the reduction target by February 2018. As of March 2019, the United States had 1,365 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 656 deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia had 1,461 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 524 deployed delivery vehicles. At the Nuclear Security Summit, it was confirmed that the IAEA would play a central role in international nuclear security initiatives. Accordingly, the IAEA hosted the International C f N l S it i Vi A t i i D b 2016 hi h tt d d b th 2 000 l f 130 t i d 17 i t ti l i ti d ----- will fully pursue the development of intermediate-range, conventional, ground-launched cruise and ballistic missile systems, whose test launches, the production and possession have been restricted by the treaty Meanwhile, Russia confirmed that the treaty ceased to have effect due to the United States’ complete withdrawal, and criticized the United States by saying that all the responsibility for escalating tensions across the world will rest with Washington. Furthermore, Russia stated that it is essential to resume full dialogues to safeguard strategic stability and security, and that Russia is open to that. The future course of the bilateral New Strategic Arms **2** **Biological and Chemical Weapons** Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. For example, water purification equipment used to desalinate sea water can be exploited to extract bacteria for the production of biological weapons, and sodium cyanide used for the process of metal coating can be abused for the production of chemical weapons.[10] Biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states and non-state actors, such as terrorists, seeking asymmetric means of attack.[11] Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon.[12] As has been pointed out, advancements in life science could be misused or abused for the development of biological weapons. In view of these concerns, in November 2009, Reduction Treaty scheduled to expire in 2021 is still uncertain. In this situation, nuclear control and disarmament trends regarding the United States and Russia will have to be watched carefully.[8] Meanwhile, China is deemed to have increased its inventory of nuclear warheads as well as developed and deployed their means of delivery,[9] and thereby, continued to enhance the capability of its nuclear force. In the future, it may be important to launch some international arms control and disarmament initiative in a manner to include not only the United States and Russia but also China and others. the United States established guidelines[13] on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. The guidelines set out that the United States would take measures to ensure the thorough management of pathogens and toxins.[14] As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun, and sarin[15] in the Iran-Iraq War.[16] It is believed that other chemical weapons[17] that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds.[18] In August 2013, sarin was used in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, where Syrian troops clashed with antigovernment groups.[19] The Syrian Government denied using chemical weapons, but entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in line with an agreement between the United States and Russia. Subsequently, international efforts were undertaken for the overseas transfer of chemical agents and other measures based on the decisions made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)[20] and a UN Security Council resolution.[21] In June 2015, the operation to destroy Syria’s sarin, VX gas, and other chemical weapons on the U.S. Navy transport vessel **Chapter** 8 In May 2019, at a joint press conference after the U.S.-Russia foreign ministers’ meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo stated that the United States and Russia had agreed to hold consultations on arms control in a broader range of fields in addition to the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. At the U.S.-Russia summit meeting held in June 2019, the leaders confirmed that the two countries will continue discussion to establish a new framework for disarmament. It is reported that President Trump insisted that China should join the framework. 9 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 for China’s ballistic missile development 10 The export of related dual-use items and technologies that can be used to develop and produce these biological and chemical weapons is controlled by the domestic laws of member states, including Japan, pursuant to the framework for international export control of the Australia Group. 11 They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks 12 Then Japan Defense Agency, “Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons” (January 2002). 13 In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released. It presents guidelines on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. In the State of the Union Address in January 2010, then President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to respond promptly and effectively to bioterrorism and infectious diseases. 14 U.S. Executive Order (July 2, 2010) 15 Mustard gas is a slow-acting blister agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents. 16 In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds. In particular, it has been reported that a chemical weapons attack against a Kurdish village in 1988 killed several thousand people at once. 17 A weapon in which two types of relatively harmless chemicals that serve as ingredients for a chemical agent are contained separately within the weapon. It was devised so that the impact of the firing of the weapon or other action mixes the chemical materials in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and thereby synthesis of the chemical agent. Binary rounds are easier to store and handle than weapons containing chemical agents from the outset. 18 Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February 2009 19 “United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Final Report” (December 12, 2013). 20 (The 33rd and 34th) meeting of the Executive Council of OPCW. 21 UN S it C il R l ti 2118 ----- Cape Ray was completed.[22] In August 2015, in order to identify users of chemical weapons in Syrian civil war, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution that establishes a Joint Investigative Mechanism of the UN and OPCW, and investigations under this mechanism have been carried out. In November 2016, the term of this investigative mechanism was extended for one more year, and efforts have continued to be made to ensure that chemical weapons would not be used ever again by identifying those responsible for the use of chemical weapons. This joint investigation mechanism has specified persons responsible for six incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. It has been reported that four of these are attributed to the Syrian Army, while the remaining two incidents were initiated by ISIL.[23][, ][24] In particular, the report published in October 2017 finds that the Syrian government was responsible for the use of sarin once again in Khan Sheikhun, Syria in April 2017. This investigative mechanism ended its activities in November 2017 after the UN Security Council failed to adopt a resolution to renew its mandate. Meanwhile, even after this, there continues to be incidents where chemical weapons were used in Syria, as suspicions have been pointed out that chemical weapons were used in Eastern Ghouta in April 2018.[25] In the same month, the United States, United Kingdom and France launched missile strikes on chemical weapons related facilities in Syria after they determined the Assad regime had used chemical weapons.[26] **3** **Ballistic Missiles and Other Missiles** Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Once launched, ballistic missiles follow an orbital flight trajectory and fall at a steep angle at high speed. As such, effectively countering them requires a highly accurate interceptor missile system. The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where armed conflict is under way runs the risk of intensifying or expanding the conflict. Additionally, it has the risk of further heightening tension in a region where military confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of North Korea is an example of an actor that is still presumed to possess these chemical weapons and which has not entered into the CWC. In addition, the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained in a mail item in February 2004, showed that the threat of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities. Furthermore, the Malaysian police announced that a VX nerve agent whose production and use are banned by the CWC was found on the body of Kim Jong-nam who was assassinated in February 2017. The United Kingdom criticized Russia over its highly likely involvement in the use of Novichok, a military-grade chemical weapon developed by Russia, in the attack on a former Russian intelligence agent that occurred in the United Kingdom in March 2018. As punishment, countries including European countries and the United States expelled Russian diplomats. In September 2018, the United Kingdom released its joint statement with the United States, France and Germany, emphasizing Russia’s involvement in the attack anew by contending that two suspected participants in the attack were identified as officials of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Administration and that the attack could have been approved by top Russian government officials. attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces. In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and which has the potential for proliferation.[27] Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in flight.[28] Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a **Chapter** 22 According to OPCW, 600 tons of Category 1 extremely toxic chemical materials, including sarin and VX gas, were disposed of (August 19, 2014, Statement by the OPCW Director-General). In January 2016, OPCW reported that destruction of all of the chemical weapons reported by the Syrian Government was completed. 23 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 7 for ISIL. 24 In a report by the joint investigation mechanism (JIM) involving the UN and OPCW, it was determined that the Syrian Government used chlorine gas in Talmenes (April 2014), in Sarmin (March 2015), and in Qmenas (March 2015), and also used sarin in Khan Sheikhun (April 2017). The report also found that ISIL used mustard gas in Marea (August 2015) and in Umm Hawsh (September 2016). The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 referred to ISIL’s contribution to this incident, and assessed that non-state actors are using chemicals in warfare in Syria. 25 The draft Security Council resolution to establish a UN independent investigative mechanism for identifying users of chemical weapons, proposed by the United States on April 10, 2018, was vetoed by Russia. 26 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 7 for general information about the Syria situation, including military actions taken by the United States, United Kingdom and France. 27 In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six anti-ship cruise missiles among other items on cargo ships subject to inspection. 28 U it d St t C i l R h S i “C i Mi il P lif ti ” (J l 28 2005) ----- if they carry WMDs in their warheads.[29] **4** **Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies** respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North Korea’s Nodong missiles. Furthermore, North Korea is alleged to have provided conventional arms and ballistic missiles to the Houthis of Yemen, have sent ballistic missile engineers to Syria, have transferred special tiles used for chemical weapon production facilities to Syria, and have continued military relations with Myanmar, including ballistic missile system trade.[33] North Korea has made rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches. It is believed that an underlying factor of this fact was North Korea’s imports of various materials and technologies from outside of the country. It is also noted that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missile airframes and related technologies, and that it promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation.[34] The international community’s uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of WMDs and other technologies has put significant pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of them to accept inspections by international organizations or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether.[35] Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states in which proliferation is a concern have sustained their proliferation activities by averting international monitoring, through illicitly exporting WMDs and other technologies overseas by falsifying documentation, diversifying transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies and intermediaries. Additionally, intangible transfer of technology has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely, those states have obtained advanced technologies which could be adapted for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies via their nationals—researchers and ship to secretly approach a target, and present a serious threat **4** **Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies** Even weapons that were purchased or developed for selfdefense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their countries. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase. Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty bomb[30] as a means of terrorist attack so long as they gain access to radioactive materials. Nations across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors.[31] The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For example, in February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. It has also been suggested that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear activities.[32] Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, **Chapter** 29 The MDR 2019 released by the DoD vowed to counter threats posed by ICBM missiles under development by North Korea as well as Russian and Chinese ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons and cruise missiles to the United States and its allies. 30 Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive materials. 31 Based on these concerns, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which sets forth the decision that all UN member states would refrain from providing support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use WMDs and their means of delivery, as well as adopt and enforce laws that are appropriate and effective for prohibiting these activities. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007. 32 DNI “Worldwide Threat Assessment” from January 2014 states, “North Korea’s assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North’s proliferation activities.” The IAEA report of May 2011 states that the destroyed building was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared to the IAEA. 33 Reports released by the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in March 2018 and March 2019 34 In addition, concerning the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities.” Moreover, the report titled “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was submitted by the U.S. DoD to Congress in May 2018, pointed out that missile and other weapon sales have become a key foreign currency revenue source and that North Korea uses various techniques to circumvent measures taken by each country on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, including sending cargo through multiple front companies and intermediaries. 35 Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 among Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom. In December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its WMDs and to accept inspections by an international organization. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. Meanwhile, after the military campaign against Libya by a lti ti l f i M h 2011 N th K d d th ilit tt k i t Lib i th t tt ki ft di t “ d i i ” ----- academic institutions in developed countries.[36] **5** **Iran’s Nuclear Issues** In addition, the EU terminated some of its sanctions, and the sanctions imposed by previous UN Security Council resolutions concerning the nuclear issues of Iran ended, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Subsequently, the IAEA has repeatedly confirmed that Iran is complying with the agreement. However, in May 2018, President Trump pointed out that with the current agreement, Iran can still be on the verge of a nuclear breakout in a short period of time even if Iran fully complies with the agreement, and also the agreement fails to address Iran’s development of ballistic missiles. He then announced that the United States will withdraw from the agreement. In November 2018, the Trump administration resumed all sanctions that had been lifted under JCPOA[39] and emphasized its readiness to cut a more comprehensive deal with Iran, urging Iran to sit down on the negotiating table. Meanwhile, Iran opposed the sanction resumption by the United States and announced in May 2019 that it would not observe some of the obligations under JCPOA, while denying an intention to withdraw from JCPOA. In response, the United States made clear its intention to impose new sanctions against Iran in fields such as steel and aluminum. In the same month, in order to respond to threats from Iran to the U.S. forces and interests, the United States deployed an aircraft carrier strike group, a bomber task force, and others to the U.S. Central Command, which raised tensions between the two countries.[40] In this situation, the EU, the United Kingdom, Germany and France urged Iran to avoid further steps away from JCPOA, and to keep compliance with JCPOA. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abe visited Iran from June 12 to 14, 2019. He had meetings with President Rouhani and Supreme Leader Khamenei, and encouraged them to ease tensions and stabilize the situation. It is necessary to keep a close watch on future developments regarding the Iran situation. students who have been dispatched to leading companies and **5** **Iran’s Nuclear Issues** The nuclear issues of Iran are a serious challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. In 2002, it was revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. Since 2003, Iran has continued with its uranium enrichment activities despite resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council urging Iran to stop its uranium enrichment and other activities. However, with Hassan Rouhani winning the presidential election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions with the E3+3 (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, China, and Russia) were advanced, resulting in the announcement of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2013. The execution of the first step measures of the JPOA commenced in January 2014.[37] On April 2, 2015, consultations held in Lausanne, Switzerland, resulted in an agreement regarding the key parameters of the final agreement. On July 14, 2015, the final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was announced in Vienna. Following this, on July 20, 2015, UN Security Council Resolution 2231 approving the JCPOA was adopted. In the agreement, it was decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S. and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions.[38] On January 16, 2016, the IAEA released a report confirming Iran’s completion of the necessary preparatory steps to start the implementation of the JCPOA. Accordingly, the United States suspended its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. **Chapter** 36 The February 2016 report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council DPRK Sanctions Committee states that over the past 20 years since 1996, North Korea has dispatched more than 30 engineers to the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific, which receives technical support from the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs. These engineers participate in research programs concerning topics such as satellite communications, space science and atmospheric chemistry, and satellite navigation systems. The report notes that such knowhow regarding space science and satellite systems contributes to improving North Korea’s ballistic missile technology. 37 First step measures include the limited relaxation of sanctions by the E3+3, provided that for six months, Iran: (1) retains half of its existing uranium enriched to approximately 20% as oxide and dilutes the remaining half to less than 5%; (2) does not enrich uranium over 5%; (3) does not advance activities at uranium enrichment facilities and heavy water reactors; (4) accepts enhanced monitoring by the IAEA. 38 The major nuclear-related restrictions on Iran in the JCPOA include the following: with regard to uranium enrichment, limiting the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to 5,060 or less, keeping the level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and restricting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg; and with regard to plutonium production, redesigning and rebuilding the Arak heavy water reactor to not produce weapons grade plutonium, and shipping spent fuel out of Iran, and not engaging in reprocessing spent fuel including R&D and not constructing reprocessing facilities. According to then U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, with this agreement Iran’s breakout time (the time it takes to manufacture nuclear fuel for a single nuclear weapon) will be extended from 90 days or less before the JCPOA to a year or more. Furthermore, the JCPOA is an agreement pertaining to nuclear issues and does not suspend or lift sanctions related to international terrorism, missiles, human rights, among other issues. In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, in his address to the UN General Assembly in October 2015, strongly criticized the Iranian nuclear agreement for making war more likely. In the United States, while the Republican Party that makes up the majority of Congress had been opposed to the agreement, the motion of disapproval was not supported by two-thirds majority vote of both the House of Representatives and the Senate necessary to override the President’s veto. Thus, the disapproval of the agreement was avoided. 39 The sanctions include a ban on the Iranian government’s purchases of U.S. dollars, a prohibition on purchases of oil, petroleum products and petrochemical products from Iran, and a ban on transactions with Iranian financial institutions, including the central bank. In May 2019, Significant Reduction Exceptions, which relate to a ban on some countries and regions’ purchase of Iranian oil, etc., were also abolished. 40 In June 2019, commercial vessels, including one related to Japan, were attacked near the Straits of Hormuz. While the United States pointed out that Iran or its proxy was responsible for the attacks, Iran denied it. In the same month, a U.S. drone was shot down by an Iranian surface-to-air missile over the Straits of Hormuz. The United States insisted that the drone was h t d i t ti l i hil I i i t d th t th d i t d d i t I ’ t it i l i ----- **Section** **7** **Trends in International Terrorism and Regional Conflicts** **1** **General Situation** In such situation, we Japanese must face up to the threat of international terrorism as our own problem. 2 International Community Initiatives It has become increasingly important that the international community should examine the shape of tailored international frameworks and involvement measures and seek out appropriate responses to these complicated and diverse destabilizing factors. Amid these situations, in recent years, mandates of the UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)[2] have come to include a wide range of areas, including not only traditional roles like the monitoring of a ceasefire or military withdrawal but also activities by civilians and police such as the monitoring of disarmament, security sector reform, the monitoring of elections and administrative activities, and humanitarian assistance (e.g., return of refugees to their homeland). This also suggests that the importance of the roles related to the protection of civilians and peace-building missions, in particular, has been growing. 1 Recent Trends In a global security environment, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a destabilizing factor that could affect the entire international community. Conflicts or disputes concerning racial, religious, territorial, resources and other issues are occurring or continuing at various locations in the world. Particularly, there are cases where power struggles accompanying regime changes trigger or add fuel to racial, religious or partisan disputes that are prolonged or escalated against the backdrop of citizens’ discontent with economic or social disparities or high unemployment rates. Human rights violations, refugees, famine, poverty, or any other consequences of conflicts or disputes can have impacts on not only parties to the conflicts or disputes but also a wide range of other countries. There are prominent cases where power vacuums in some countries with political instability or weak governance have become a hotbed for activities of international terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and ISIL. These organizations are leveraging inadequate border control to obtain personnel, weapons and money, and to send fighters to various locations to carry out organized terrorist attacks or give some instructions to local individuals or groups, expanding and stepping up their operations across national borders. In recent years, they have also been spreading their violent radical beliefs through the Internet and other means across the world. As a result, there were cases where young people in Western and other developed countries felt sympathy for the violent radical beliefs due to their social discontent, participating as fighters in international terrorist groups and carrying out terrorist attacks in their home countries. In this way, international terrorist groups’ activities have remained a grave challenge for the international community. There were incidents where Japanese citizens were killed in Syria and Bangladesh, indicating that Japanese citizens have become targets for terrorist attacks.[1] **Chapter** See Fig. I-3-7-1 (Peacekeeping Operations Currently Underway) In addition to the UN PKO framework, multinational forces and regional organizations authorized by the UN Security Council have engaged in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In Africa, regional organizations such as the African Union (AU)[3] undertake their activities based on UN Security Council resolutions, and their activities are sometimes handed over to UN PKO later. The international community also offers recommendations and training assistance and supplies equipment, from a long-term perspective, prompting African nations self-help efforts to enhance local government organizations and improve the capabilities of their military and security organizations. Concerning international counterterrorism measures, international cooperation has grown even more important as terrorism threats have diffused and deepened on the diversification of terrorist attacks and the improvement of In early 2015, ISIL murdered Japanese nationals in Syria, clearly declaring to subject Japanese nationals to terrorism. Furthermore, the seventh issue of the ISIL propaganda magazine Dabiq published in February 2015 included descriptions of the murder of the Japanese nationals in Syria and renewed a call for terror attacks on Japanese nationals and interests. In September of the same year, the 11th issue called for terror attacks on Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The 12th issue (published in November 2015) described the murder of a Japanese national in Bangladesh in October 2015 and warned again that Japanese nationals and Japanese interests would be the targets of terror attacks. As of the end of March 2019, 14 UN PKO were operating globally, including about 88,480 military and police personnel and about 12,930 civilian personnel from 122 countries. Out of these UN PKO, there were 10 operations in the Middle East and Africa (See Fig. I -3-7-1). The AU is one of the world’s largest regional organizations, consisting of 55 countries and regions in Africa. The AU has established the Africa Standby Force (ASF) for peacekeeping operations, developing an ASF brigade for each of Africa’s five component regions. In 2016, the AU declared the acquisition of complete ASF capabilities for the four regions excluding the th i H ASF ti h b i l t d ----- **Fig. I-3-7-1** Peacekeeping Operations Currently Underway |Africa|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Mission|Date Established| |①|United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)|Apr 1991| |②|African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)|Jul 2007| |③|United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)|Jul 2010| |④|United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)|Jun 2011| |⑤|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Jul 2011| |⑥|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)|Apr 2013| |⑦|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)|Apr 2014| ⑬ ⑫ ① ⑩ ⑨ ⑭ ⑪ ⑧ ⑦ ② ④ ⑥ ⑤ ③ Note: According to the United Nations (as of the end of March 2019). Africa Middle East Mission Date Established Mission Date Established United Nations Mission for the Referendum in United Nations Truce Supervision ① Apr 1991 ⑧ May 1948 Western Sahara (MINURSO) Organization (UNTSO) African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation United Nations Disengagement ② Jul 2007 ⑨ Jun 1974 in Darfur (UNAMID) Observer Force (UNDOF) United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon ③ Jul 2010 ⑩ Mar 1978 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) (UNIFIL) ④ United Nations Interim Security Force Jun 2011 Asia for Abyei (UNISFA) Mission Date Established United Nations Mission in the Republic ⑤ of South Sudan (UNMISS) Jul 2011 ⑪ United Nations Military Observer Group Jan 1949 in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated ⑥ Apr 2013 Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Europe/CIS United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Date Established ⑦ Apr 2014 Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus ⑫ Mar 1964 (UNFICYP) United Nations Interim Administration Mission ⑬ Jun 1999 in Kosovo (UNMIK) The Americas Mission Date Established United Nations Mission for Justice Support ⑭ Oct 2017 in Haiti (MINUJSTH) terrorist groups’ attack capabilities. Currently, countries are cooperating not only in military measures but also in initiatives in various other fields to cut off funding sources **Chapter** |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |⑧|United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)|May 1948| |⑨|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)|Jun 1974| |⑩|United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)|Mar 1978| |Asia|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Mission|Date Established| |⑪|United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)|Jan 1949| |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |⑫|United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)|Mar 1964| |⑬|United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)|Jun 1999| |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |⑭|United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJSTH)|Oct 2017| for terrorist organizations and prevent the international movement of terrorists and the diffusion of violent radical beliefs.[4] In September 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. The resolution requested member states to make exits from their countries for the purpose of executing acts of terrorism punishable under domestic laws. The resolution also includes measures obligating member states to prevent entry or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that state has credible information that demonstrates reasonable grounds for believing that the individual is attempting to enter or transit through its territory for the purpose of participating in acts of terrorism. In addition, at the G7 Summit held in Germany in June 2015, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to effectively implement the established international framework for the freezing of terrorists’ assets. In June 2017, four major U.S. information technology companies including Facebook Corp. and Mi ft C d th f ti f f t t th d f i l t di l b li f ----- **2** **Trends surrounding International Terrorism** **(2) Progress in Military Operations against ISIL and the** **Current Status of ISIL** ISIL expanded its presence from 2013 in Iraq and Syria, which had been destabilized through religious disputes and civil war, and took control of northern and eastern Syria and northern Iraq from January 2014. In response to the expansion of ISIL’s reach, the Coalition forces led by the United States have been conducting air strikes in Iraq and Syria since August and September of the same year, respectively.[10] The coalition forces have also engaged in education and training of local forces, supply of weapons, and rescue of hostages by the special forces. In cooperation with such military operations, the Iraqi Security Forces (including paramilitary troops and police in addition to Iraqi government forces) and the Peshmerga military organ of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) tried to recapture key cities from ISIL. As a result, the Iraqi Government announced in December 2017 that all Iraqi territory had been liberated from ISIL. In Syria, meanwhile, the Syrian Democratic Forces, composed mainly of local Kurd and Arab forces, recaptured Raqqa, the putative capital of “Islamic State,” and other ISIL bases in the northern and eastern parts of the country with support from the United States and other countries. As the Syrian Democratic Forces took control of ISIL’s last base in eastern Syria in March 2019, U.S. President Trump in his statement declared that the United States and other Coalition countries had liberated all ISIL-controlled territory in Syria and Iraq. Russia launched its military operations in Syria in September 2015 with the purpose of the survival of the Assad administration and protection of Russian bases in Syria.[11] In the military operations, the Russian forces carried out air strikes and launched cruise missiles from the sea, dropped precision satellite-guided bombs from strategic bombers, and temporarily deployed an aircraft career to conduct air strikes.[12] With this support from Russia, the Assad administration conquered ISIL strongholds mainly 1 Trends in ISIL-related International Terrorist Organizations **(1) Organizational Objectives and Overview** The objective of ISIL as an organization is to outright reject the conventional system of national governance in the region and claim the establishment of the caliphate based on its own interpretation of Sharia law and the protection of Sunni Muslims. In June 2014, ISIL unilaterally declared the establishment of the “Islamic State” with its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as “caliph,”[5] and effectively controlled certain areas spanning Iraq and Syria through its well-developed organizational structure and the issuance of its own currency. ISIL has used social media and other means under a sophisticated public relations strategy taking advantage of cyberspace to skillfully issue propaganda for the organization and recruit fighters. As a result, it has been noted that more than 40,000 people, including foreign fighters, moved to Iraq and Syria from other countries in response to ISIL propaganda. ISIL is believed to have seized weapons and ammunition from Iraqi military and other facilities it occupied and obtained others through illegal trafficking and looting. Furthermore, it has been noted that ISIL has also begun producing and modifying weapons. It has been pointed out that they are manufacturing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from chemicals obtained through legal channels and using them in suicide bombings.[6] It has also been pointed out that ISIL has utilized drones. The terrorist organization has apparently modified small commercial drones so that they can carry hand grenades and the like.[7] ISIL has published videos claiming that drones were used for dropping explosives on enemy vehicles.[8] It has been noted that ISIL attempted to expand damage by using camera-equipped drones to skillfully guide suicide-attack vehicles.[9] **Chapter** 5 The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term has been used to refer to those who led the Islamic community. Since then, a number of the heads of hereditary dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title. 6 It has been noted regarding the IEDs that ISIL used between July 2014 and February 2016 that parts and components manufactured and/or exported by approximately 50 firms in 20 countries fell into the hands of ISIL, who used them within a year after it acquired them. 7 In recent years, drone terrorist attacks (including attempted ones) have occurred. In November 2018, for example, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) reportedly attempted drone attacks on multiple government facilities in southeastern Turkey. Research and development on technologies to counter such threats are recognized as important for the future. To counter threats from small UAVs, for example, radar systems capable of detecting and identifying small UAVs are under development. The U.S Army is testing laser and jamming systems to intercept small UAVs. 8 It has been noted that the purpose is to destroy some vehicles and force them out of the frontlines through such attacks. 9 It has been noted that ISIL amplifies the effect of its attacks by using drones to find targets from the air and providing instructions to suicide bombers at the ready on the ground and instructing optimal paths for them. 10 As of August 2017, the Coalition had conducted 13,331 and 11,235 air raids in Iraq and Syria respectively. 11 Tartus is the only Russian naval base facing the Mediterranean Sea in Syria, reportedly having a dockyard that can provide fuel and food to and repair military ships. 12 It is pointed out that the series of military actions by Russia was intended to display its military capabilities and to demonstrate those capabilities through operations. Some note that the t t f th ilit ti i t ISIL b t th iti f f ti th A d d i i t ti ----- **Fig. I-3-7-2** Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Islamic Hay’at Tahrir al-S da (AQIM) ISIL Libya Province Algeria Liby Mali Nigeria slam wa ISIL West Africa NIM) Province (Boko Haram) group ated group ggested involvement with Al-Qaeda lamic extremist terrorist groups|ham (HTS) Hezbollah Hamas Egyp a ISIL Sina Province Multi||The Isla and t Syria Lebanon Palesti t i|mic State of Iraq he Levant (ISIL) Taliban Afghanis Iraq ISIL Khorasan Province ne Saudi Arabia Tehrik-i-Talib Yemen Somalia Al-Qaed Peni ISIL Somalia Province Al-Shabaab (A ce: Worldwide Threat Assessment 2019 and co terrorism for 2017 prepared by the U.S. Sta| |||Multi|ple ISIL provinces|| ||||Sour|| |||||| **Fig. I-3-7-2** Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Al-Qaeda (AQIM) ISIL Algeria Province Mali Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) ISIL affiliated group Al-Qaeda affiliated group Group with suggested involvement with Al-Qaeda Other major Islamic extremist terrorist groups Taliban Al-Qaeda Afghanistan Pakistan ISIL Khorasan Province Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ISIL Yemen Province Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) ISIL Somalia Province Al-Shabaab (AS) Source: Worldwide Threat Assessment 2019 and country-specific reports on terrorism for 2017 prepared by the U.S. State Department. in southern and eastern Syria. In December 2017, Russia declared that Syria’s entire territory had been liberated from ISIL and announced that it would pull out some of its troops deployed in Syria while maintaining its bases there. While anti-ISIL military operations have made progress, it is believed that thousands of ISIL fighters remain in hiding, mainly around the Iraq-Syria border.[13] In this regard, terrorist attacks believed to be conducted by ISIL are occurring in various regions of Iraq and Syria, targeting security forces, the Coalition forces,[14] citizens and others, indicating that ISIL remains still active. **(3) Dispersion beyond Iraq and Syria** After ISIL declared the establishment of the “Islamic State,” multiple “provinces” have been established outside of Iraq and Syria as the “Islamic State” territories, and these “provinces” have been conducting terrorist acts in various regions. See Fig. I-3-7-2 (Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East) In Afghanistan, particularly, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province has conducted frequent terrorist attacks in its capital Kabul and elsewhere.[15] The Islamic State-Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for a raid on a military parade in southwestern Iran in September 2018 and a suicide bombing attack on a market in northwestern Pakistan in November 2018. Terrorist attacks for which ISIL “provinces” have claimed responsibility have also been confirmed in Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and elsewhere. It is believed that the threat of terrorist acts by such organizations will continue in the future. Furthermore, organizations supporting ISIL exist in Southeast Asia and have conducted terrorist attacks targeting security forces and citizens. In the Philippines in May 2017, organizations pleading allegiance to ISIL occupied part of the city of Marawi on the island of Mindanao. In October of the same year, the Philippine Government declared an end to 13 According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment announced by the U.S. Director of Intelligence in January 2019, ISIL still has thousands of fighters in Iran and Syria. 14 In Syria, for example, ISIL claimed responsibility for suicide bombing and other attacks in the southern province of Suwayda in July 2018, which killed 221 people. ISIL also claimed responsibility for a vehicle bomb explosion in the northern Iraqi province of Nineveh in December 2018. 15 ISIL-Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for suicide bombings on House of Representatives election candidates’ campaign meetings and election committees in October 2018, as well f li t i t tt k t i b li i th Shiit d th li i d ti f iliti d th ----- its fighting with them. However, the search for individuals connected to the organizations has continued. ISIL claimed responsibility for an attack on government forces in November 2018 and a bombing on a church in January 2019 in the southern Philippines. As for Indonesia, ISIL claimed responsibility for serial family suicide bombings in May 2018 in Surabaya, East Java Province. There is concern that the threat posed by ISIL is permeating Southeast Asia as well.[16] Moreover, in April 2019, large-scale explosions occurred simultaneously in Sri Lanka, a South Asian country, claiming the life of a Japanese national. The Sri Lanka authority exposed a local Islamic extremist organization as the perpetrator while referring to possible support for the organization from a foreign terrorist organization. The United States points out that the terrorist attacks may have been inspired by ISIL. **(4) Foreign Fighters** It is believed that the number of foreign fighters flowing into Iraq and Syria in response to the rise of ISIL since 2014 has been falling, in line with a decline in ISIL’s strength.[17] Meanwhile, it has been a concern that foreign fighters who have accumulated combat training and experience would return to their countries and conduct terrorist attacks there. It is believed that at least 5,600 foreign fighters had returned from Iraq and Syria to their home countries by October 2017.[18] Terrorist attacks in which ISIL fighters with fighting experience in Syria have allegedly engaged have taken place in Europe, including simultaneous attacks in Paris in November 2015 and serial bombings in Belgium in March 2016.[19] The international community is required to continue to take various initiatives going forward in order to prevent such terrorist acts by foreign fighters. that it continues its activities as a core organization such as issuing instructions and recommendations to its affiliates in North Africa and the Middle East. In addition, its current leader Zawahiri has repeatedly issued statements calling for terrorist acts against the West.[20] The possibility of Al Qaeda attacks has not disappeared. **(2) Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)** Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), a Sunni extremist organization based in Yemen, is active mainly in south Yemen, continuing their fight against the Yemeni security forces and the opposition insurgent group Houthis. The United States has continued air strikes using UAVs[21] and killed many AQAP leaders. However, AQAP has taken advantage of the instability in Yemen to maintain a certain level of force there. It also spreads violent extreme ideology utilizing propaganda videos and magazines. **Chapter** **(3) Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)** Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a Sunni extremist organization based in Algeria and also active in Mali, Tunisia, and Libya has mainly conducted terrorist attacks and kidnapping against Algerian security forces, and European and U.S. nationals.[22] Although it is believed that the frequency and scales of AQIM terrorist attacks have been declining due to the French-led military intervention from 2013 and Algerian authorities’ enhanced crackdown, AQIM affiliates have conducted terrorist attacks in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cote d’Ivoire. **(4) Al-Shabaab** “Al-Shabaab,” a Sunni extremist organization based in Somalia, has continued terrorist acts against Somali military forces and police, mainly in the Somalian capital of Mogadishu, as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the peacekeeping forces stationed for the purpose of stabilizing the situation in Somalia after the civil war. As indicated by an attack on a hotel in neighboring Kenya’s capital of Nairobi in January 2019,[23] Al-Shabaab has conducted terrorist acts against foreigners and other targets, posing threats not only to Somalia but also to its neighboring 2 Trends of Al Qaeda-related International Terrorist Organizations **(1) Al Qaeda** Al Qaeda is believed to have weakened as the group’s previous leader Osama Bin Laden as well as many executives were killed in U.S. operations. However, it is considered 16 It is believed that Indonesians and Malaysians as well as Filipinos participated in an organization supporting ISIL in the fighting in the city of Marawi. 17 In an October 2017 press conference, the spokesperson for the Coalition expressed the understanding that there were virtually no foreign fighters flowing into Iraq and Syria at the time. 18 According to the Soufan Center, the numbers of foreign fighters returning to their home countries are approximately 800 in Tunisia, 760 in Saudi Arabia, 425 in the United Kingdom, approximately 300 in Germany, 271 in France, and so on. 19 It is pointed out that participants in terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 included those who took advantage of refugee and immigrant flows to enter Europe. It is also noted that participants in serial terrorist attacks on an airport and a subway station in the Belgian capital of Brussels in March 2016 consulted about the attacks with an alleged commander in Syria. 20 On September 11, 2018, it published a statement calling on Muslims to attack the United States as 17 years passed since Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States on the same day of 2001. 21 The U.S. Central Command announced that it conducted 10 air strikes on AQAP and ISIL targets in Yemen in January 2018 and 26 air strikes on AQAP targets between February and September. 22 The January 2013 terrorist attack in Algeria resulting in victims of Japanese nationality is believed to have been executed by the “Masked Brigade,” which had broken away from AQIM. In 2015, the Brigade merged with other organizations to form “Al-Murabitoun” and returned to the AQIM fold. Furthermore, in 2017, the Brigade merged with yet other organizations to form Jama Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM; literally, protector of Islam and Muslims). 23 M lti l J i h d ffi i b ildi t th tt k d h t l it b t J ti l i ti i d ----- mainly in northeastern Nigeria,[26] which continues to be a matter of security concern in Nigeria. 4 The Threat of “Home-grown” Terrorism Terrorist organizations such as ISIL and Al Qaeda have been using propaganda magazines and other means to introduce specific methods for terrorist acts to their supporters, urging them to conduct terrorist acts. For example, ISIL gives detailed examples of specific methods and targets for terrorist acts using knives and vehicles in its magazine Rumiyah and others. Al Qaeda also has used its magazine to publish how to make a bomb using materials close at hand. In such situation, what is called “home-grown” terrorism, in which residents are inspired by violent extremism spread by terrorist organizations to conduct terrorist attacks at home, continues to be a threat. In recent years, particularly, “lonewolf” terrorist attacks, planned and committed by individuals or groups who have no official relations with international terrorist organizations but have become influenced by them in some ways, have occurred in Western and other countries. “Lone-wolf” terrorist attacks characteristically use knives, vehicles and guns that are easy even for individuals to acquire, as indicated by an attack in the Australian city of Melbourne in November 2018 and a raid on a Christmas market in France in December 2018.[27] These attacks are also difficult to anticipate or forestall. countries. 3 Trends of Other International Terrorist Organizations **(1) Taliban** The Taliban, a Sunni extremist organization based in Afghanistan, substantially reduced its strength temporarily due to mop-up operations launched by the United States in 2001. After the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ended its mission in Afghanistan and withdrew from that country in December 2014, however, the Taliban has been stepping up its offensive again and expanding its control within Afghanistan.[24] Even during talks with the United States since July 2018, the Taliban bombed and raided Afghan military facilities in eastern Afghanistan in January 2019,[25] indicating that the possibility of the Taliban continuing suicide bombing and shooting attacks on the Afghan Government and foreigners cannot be denied. **Chapter** **(2) Boko Haram** Boko Haram is a Sunni extremist organization based in Nigeria, pleading allegiance to ISIL, part of which is conducting activities as the "ISIL’s West Africa Province." Boko Haram might have lost most of the areas under its control due to mop-up operations by Nigerian forces cooperating with neighboring countries. However, it has repeated terror attacks on citizens and government troops **Current Situation of Regional Conflicts and the International Response (mainly in the Middle East** **3** **and Africa)** 1 Situation in Syria Violent clashes in Syria since March 2011 pit four parties, the Syrian government forces, opposition forces, Islamic extremist forces, and Kurdish forces against each other. However, government forces have gained the upper hand overall with support from Russia, recapturing Aleppo, which was once the largest stronghold of rebel forces, the suburbs of the Syrian capital of Damascus and areas close to the Syria-Jordan border. In August 2018, Syrian government forces launched shelling and other attacks on Idlib, a rebel stronghold even at present, leading to concern that large-scale military attacks there could be conducted. In September 2018, however, Russia, which had been supporting Syrian government forces, and Turkey, which had been backing up rebels, agreed to establish a demilitarized zone around Idlib and withdraw heavy artillery and rebels from the zone, averting large-scale military attacks for the immediate future. However, extremist rebels have yet to withdraw from the zone, while relevant countries have continued talks to stabilize Idlib. The peace talks have so far made little progress. The talks have been conducted between the government and opposition forces under UN auspices since January 2016. However, fighting has failed to abate on either side, forcing the talks to make a rough going. Under these circumstances, peace talks led by Russia, Turkey, and Iran have continued in Astana, Kazakhstan, since January 2017. In January 2018, the Syrian National Dialogue Congress was held in Sochi, Russia, 24 The Taliban has been expanding its control, mainly in the northern and southern parts of Afghanistan, conducting terrorist attacks throughout the country. 25 While the United States held talks with the Taliban between January 21 and 26, 2019, the Taliban attacked a military base in central Afghanistan on January 21, killing more than 100 people. 26 Attacks came on a military base and citizens in northeastern Nigeria in November 2018. An attack on citizens in a town of the region in February 2019 killed more than 60 people. 27 In one of the recent “lone-wolf” terrorist attacks, a vehicle hit pedestrians in front of the Houses of Parliament Building in London in August 2018. In November 2018, a knife attack d b i M lb A t li I D b 2018 h ti i id t d t Ch i t k t i t F ----- agreeing to establish a constitutional committee towards the enactment of a new constitution. In December 2018, Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to hold the first meeting of the committee as early as possible in 2019. However, as there are some points regarding which no agreement has been reached among relevant parties, including the selection of committee members, no schedule has been set for the meeting. Furthermore, disputes between relevant forces over the status of Kurds in Syria have been emerging. Kurds expanded their control mainly in northern Syria through anti-ISIL operations. In reaction, Turkey, which sees Kurds’ Democratic Union Party (PYD) as a terrorist organization, carried out military operations in northwestern Syria to block Kurds’ expansion, stationing Turkish forces in the area and indicating the possibility of expanding military operations to Kurd-controlled areas in northeastern Syria. In response, the United States, which supported Kurds in anti-ISIL operations, agreed with Turkey in June 2018 to withdraw Kurds from Manbiji in northern Syria and implement joint patrol there. They launched the joint control in November 2018. In December 2018, however, Turkish President Erdogan claimed that Kurds had not withdrawn from Manbij, announcing his intent to launch military operations in northeastern Syria within a few days. In response, the United States has continued talks with Turkey. While Turkey has not launched military operations, the different stances on Kurds between the two countries remain unresolved. In such situation, Syrian government forces expanded into suburban Manbiji at the request of Kurds, indicating cooperation between Kurds and the Syrian government in countering Turkish military operations. Moreover, concerning Iranian presence in Syria, confrontation between Iran and Israel has come to the surface. In January 2019, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced an attack on a weapon storage facility at Syria’s Damascus Airport, expressing his determination to take resolute actions against Iranians in Syria. It is a concern that the escalation of confrontation between Israel and Iran would affect Syrian and regional stability. Amid the still unstable situation in Syria, in December 2018, U.S. President Trump announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country, declaring that ISIL had been toppled. As for potential implications of the withdrawal of U.S. troops under the current circumstances, some pointed out the possibility of ISIL’s resurgence, Iran’s expansion of influence in Syria, and Turkey’s attacks on Kurds, about which concerns were expressed inside and outside the United States. In January 2019, ISIL conducted multiple terrorist attacks in northern Syria, the victims of which included U.S. military personnel. Under the circumstances, the situation regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops will continue to attract attention. As shown thus far, relations between various forces over the Syrian situation have been complicated, with peace talks being stalled. Further initiatives from the international community towards the stabilization of Syria are required. 2 The Situation Surrounding Middle East Peace Since the foundation of Israel in 1948, there have been four wars between Israel and Arab countries. The 1993 Oslo Agreement was signed between Israel and Palestine and a peace process made temporary progress but has fallen short of achieving peace.[28] In the Palestinian territories, the moderate Fatah, which governs the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Islamic fundamentalist Hamas, which effectively controls the Gaza district, are in conflict, splitting the area. Since October 2017, the Fatah and Hamas have continued direct negotiations on the transfer of the administrative control of the Gaza Strip to the Fatah under Egyptian auspices, but the talks have remained stalled.[29] In such circumstances, the U.S. Trump administration announced its recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017 and moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018. In reaction, protests have been repeated mainly in Gaza, with protesters killed and injured through their clashes with Israeli forces. Tensions have increased intermittently as Israel carried out air strikes on Gaza to counter rocket attacks from Gaza. In addition, in March 2019, the Trump administration recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, drawing criticism from various Middle Eastern countries. While the United States is reportedly working out a new Middle East peace proposal,[30] future developments regarding the Middle East peace process, including the United States’ engagement, will attract attention along with the fate of negotiations on the transfer of **Chapter** 28 Between Israel and Palestine, a peace process through full-fledged negotiations started through the 1993 Oslo Agreement. In 2003, both Israel and Palestine accepted a roadmap for realizing a peace initiative featuring the peaceful coexistence of two countries. However, its implementation has made little progress. Later, following rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces launched large-scale military actions from late 2008 to early 2009 that included airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and the mobilization of ground forces. In November 2012, Israeli forces again conducted airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. By 2012, Israel thus conducted two major military operations against the Gaza Strip. In both cases, fighting ceased under mediation by Egypt and others. 29 In September 2017, the Hamas announced its intent to accept the administrative control of the Gaza Strip by the Fatah. In October of the same year, direct negotiations were held through the mediation of Egypt, in which the two parties agreed on the transfer of the administrative control by December 1 of the same year. However, their negotiations have been stalled over the transfer of the security control of the Gaza Strip and other issues. 30 In September 2018, U.S. President Trump vowed to release a Middle East peace proposal within four months. In January 2019, however, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Friedman said that the l ld b d l d f l th O th th h d th U it d St t d i t l f th P l ti i titl d “P t it ” ----- the administrative control of the Gaza Strip. 3 Situation in Yemen In Yemen, following anti-government protests that occurred from February 2011 and international pressure afterward, the then President Ali Abdullah Saleh agreed to resign in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative. Through the election held in February 2012, the then Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi was elected new President. Meanwhile, the confrontation intensified between the government and the opposition insurgent group Houthis, based in northern Yemen. As the Houthis invaded the Yemeni capital of Sana and the southern Yemeni city of Aden to which President Hadi evacuated, the president requested support from Arab countries. In response, in March 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia began air strikes against the Houthis. A series of peace talks mediated by the UN took place between April and August of the same year, but no final peace agreement was reached, with the talks suspended. Peace talks in September 2018 were planned but failed to be implemented with the Houthis refusing to participate. In December 2018, however, peace talks were held in Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, leading to the signing of an agreement on a ceasefire in Hodeidah, which has the biggest port in the country, and the exchange of prisoners. In January 2019, the UN Security Council decided to send a ceasefire monitoring group to Hodeidha. Despite the progress in the peace talks, negotiations on specific measures toward the ceasefire made a rough going, with the terms of the agreement, including the ceasefire in Hodeidah, failing to be implemented. Military clashes between the legitimate government troops and the Houthis, and air strikes by the coalition forces have continued. In addition, attacks by the Houthis with drones and ballistic missiles on Saudi Arabia have frequently occurred.[31] In January 2019, for example, the Houthis conducted a drone bombing attack on a Yemeni military parade in suburban Aden. In May 2019, Saudi Arabia announced that a crude oil pipeline located in the middle of the country had been attacked by drones, and the Houthis claimed responsibility for it. In the following month, the Houthis intermittently conducted missile attacks on civilian airports in southwestern Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and others have repeatedly Yemen peace talks held in Sweden [courtesy of the Government of Sweden] criticized Iran for providing ballistic missiles, drones and other goods to the Houthis. Indications are that no plans have been made for any nationwide ceasefire in Yemen or a final peace agreement. **Chapter** 4 Situation in Afghanistan In Afghanistan, the Taliban intensified its offensive as the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) launched education, training and advice for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in the wake of ISAF’s withdrawal in December 2014. Meanwhile, the ANDSF faces challenges regarding logistics, morale, air capabilities, and troop-commander leadership, allowing the Taliban to expand its control in Afghanistan. Furthermore, ISIL has established “Khorasan Province” and sustained terrorist attacks mainly in the capital city of Kabul and eastern Afghanistan since 2015. As a result, suicide bombing and other attacks in which the Taliban or ISIL is believed to be involved have occurred one after another across the country, leaving Afghanistan in an unstable security situation. According to a report released by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in October 2018, the areas controlled or influenced by the Afghan Government accounted for approximately 55.5% of Afghan territory, the lowest since December 2015, when the survey started. The first peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban were held in May 2015, but have been suspended due to the subsequent change in the supreme Taliban leadership. Since July 2018, the Taliban has continued talks with senior U.S. officials. In January 2019, it was reported that they broadly agreed to withdraw U.S. and other foreign troops from Afghanistan and prevent Al Qaeda, ISIL and other terrorist organizations from using Afghan territory for 31 Since June 2015 when the Houthis and military forces supporting former President Saleh fired a Scud missile at Khamis Mushait in southern Saudi Arabia, ballistic missile attacks have reportedly been repeated on the region. While the Houthis reportedly fired ballistic missiles at the Saudi capital of Riyadh from November 2017, Saudi Arabia claimed that it intercepted th i il M hil it h b t d th t t f th Y i f t d ith th H thi i i H thi ilit ti i l di i il fi i ----- other terrorist attacks in such cities as Tripoli, the capital,[32] indicating that terrorist attacks may continue in the future. 6 Situation in Egypt In Egypt, where then President Mubarak, who had been serving as the president for approximately three decades, resigned in 2011, and then President Mursi, who had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood,[33] was inaugurated. However, in June 2013, large-scale protests of the people occurred amidst the poor economic situation and the deterioration of security. The military intervened in response and dismissed the president. In May 2014, then Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was inaugurated as president. Since its inauguration, the el-Sisi administration has undertaken economic reforms including a shift to a floating exchange rate system and the abolition of subsidies. However, enhancing domestic security measures is still a major challenge. In particular, the country’s mainland was subject to sporadic large-scale terrorist attacks from 2013, when political turmoil took place, to 2017, and in November 2018, a terrorist attack occurred in the central part of the country, targeting Egypt’s minority Coptic Christians.[34] Moreover, in the Sinai Peninsula, terrorist attacks on military and police forces have occurred sporadically mainly in the northern part, while the southern part is overall peaceful. Since February 2018, Sinai 2018, a counter-terrorism operation conducted by the Egyptian Armed Forces, has been underway in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. their strongholds. However, challenges remain, including different views between the United States and the Taliban on a timetable for the withdrawal. Future talks between the United States and the Taliban will attract attention along with moves towards the resumption of peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban. 5 Situation in Libya In Libya, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, elections for a General National Congress were held in July 2012, establishing a congress consisting mainly of Islamists. In June 2014, elections for a Council of Representatives were held to establish a new congress to replace the General National Congress. However, since secularists became the majority, the confrontation between Islamic and secular groups intensified, and consequently, Libya became fragmented between east and west with two assemblies existing in parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National Congress based in the capital city of Tripoli and the secular groups’ Council of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern Libya. In December 2015, the UN mediated a political agreement for Libya and a national consensus government was established in March 2016. However, as Islamic groups took control of the new government, secular groups turned their back and refused to join the national consensus government. As a result, Libya remains divided between the east and the west. Furthermore, militias supporting either the east or the west have continued sporadic military clashes. In September 2018, militias active in the west clashed, leading to an emergency declaration. In April 2019, Commander Hafter’s troops, the largest forces in eastern Libya, marched into a suburb of the capital city of Tripoli and clashed with militias subordinate to the unified national government in western Libya, leading to an exchange of air strikes. Under these circumstances, there are no prospects for establishing domestic governance or security. Furthermore, ISIL, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations are taking advantage of the unstable situation to expand into Libya, clashing with militias across the country. In particular, ISIL is believed to have been divided into small groups and in hiding, conducting suicide bombing and **Chapter** 7 Situation in South Sudan **(1) Political Turmoil** The North-South civil war in Sudan, which had continued since 1983, came to an end in 2005 with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was separated and gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan. At the same time, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established.[35] After the independence, a political confrontation emerged between a mainstream faction led by President Salva Kiir 32 For example, ISIL claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing attack on the Foreign Ministry in the Libyan capital of Tripoli in December 2018, which killed at least three people. 33 A Sunni political organization established in Egypt in 1928 as a public organization seeking to “revive Islam.” In the 1950s, it became a target of a clampdown for plotting the assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, by the 1970s, the organization became moderate to the extent of conducting political activities through parliament. Meanwhile, extremist organizations were derived, with Muslim Brotherhood serving as the parent organization. 34 ISIL claimed responsibility for a shooting attack on buses on their way to a Coptic Christian monastery in central Egypt, which killed seven people. 35 The UNMISS mandate had initially covered peacebuilding, nation-building and enhancing national functions. In 2014, however, the mandate was changed to cover protecting civilians and fostering an environment for human rights protection and humanitarian aid. In December 2015, support for the implementation of the conflict resolution agreement was added to the mandate, and the March 2019 resolution includes the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict and support for implementing the peace process. As of April of the same year, UNMISS i t d f b t 16 740 ilit d li l f 71 t i ----- Mayardit, a Dinka, and a nonmainstream faction including Vice President Riek Machar, a Nuer.[36] In July 2013, President Kiir dismissed Vice President Machar and all other cabinet ministers. In December 2013, clashes that broke out between the government and the pro-Machar faction in the capital city of Juba and violent acts targeting specific ethnic groups spread to different areas of the country in a short span of time, resulting in a large number of casualties, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD)[37] assisted by the UN and the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable their reconciliation. In January 2014, the government and the pro-Machar faction signed an agreement on ceasing hostile activities. In August 2015, the government, the pro-Machar faction and others reached the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS), the key elements of which include the establishment of a transitional government. In April 2016, the Transitional Government of National Unity was established, in which Mr. Kiir serves as president and Mr. Machar as first vice president. In July 2016, a shooting occurred in Juba between the security forces of President Kiir and First Vice President Machar. After First Vice President Machar fled the country, and President Kiir dismissed First Vice President Machar, clashes started to occur again between the government and the Machar faction. In response to the situation, in August 2016, the UN Security Council created the Regional Protection Force (RPF)[38] for the purpose of maintaining security in Juba and surrounding areas. The RPF launched its operations in April 2017. In December 2017 and February and May 2018, the High-Level Revitalization Forum[39] was held under the leadership of IGAD, where the government agreed with the pro-Machar faction and others on the cessation of hostilities. As a result of the efforts, in June 2018, President Kiir, former First Vice President Machar and others signed the “Khartoum Declaration of Agreement on South Sudan,” which includes a permanent ceasefire. They agreed on security arrangements in July 2018 and on provisional government arrangements in August, before signing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan” in September. Although a new provisional government was to be established by May 2019, the government and representatives of the pro-Machar faction agreed on the extension of the pre-transitional period by six months. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 5-2-3(United Nations Mission in See the Republic of South Sudan) 8 Situation in Somalia Somalia plunged into anarchy on the collapse of its government in 1991,[40] facing a serious humanitarian crisis with massive refugees generated. In 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated through the intermediation of the neighboring countries. In 2012, a unified government was established for the first time in 21 years. Even after the establishment of the unified government, Somalia has faced two major issues—terrorism and piracy. AlShabaab, a Sunni extremist organization based in the central south, has repeatedly conducted terrorist attacks against the government and other targets. In 2007, the AMISOM[41] was established with the approval of the UN Security Council. As a result of attacks by the AMISOM forces and the Somali government forces under reconstruction with support from Western countries, Al-Shabaab lost its control on major cities and weakened to some extent. However, its threat has still existed. Al-Shabaab frequently stages attacks against the bases of the Somali and AMISOM forces and terrorist attacks within Somalia and in AMISOM member countries.[42] It has been pointed out that ISIL fighters have been flowing into Somalia in recent years. Since March 2017, counterterrorism operations by U.S. forces have intensified. In Somalia, especially in its northeastern part, there are believed to be outposts of pirates who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The international community has continued anti-piracy operations and implemented a series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia based on the perception that instability of Somalia has caused the piracy issue. As a result, the number of reported pirate attacks has remained low. **Chapter** 36 Hereinafter, the anti-mainstream faction and anti-government forces formed around Machar is referred to as the pro-Machar faction. 37 IGAD was established in 1996. Its members are the eight East African nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea, and South Sudan. 38 The RPF is authorized to use all necessary means to achieve the following three mandates: (1) facilitation of conditions for safe and free movement in Juba and its vicinity; (2) protection of the airport and key facilities; (3) engagement in any actor that is credibly found to be preparing attacks, or engagement in an attack against UN protection-of-civilians sites or civilians, etc. 39 It was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, bringing together the various factions in South Sudan, to revitalize the 2015 Agreement on The Resolution of The Conflict. 40 In 1991, “Somaliland” located in the Northwest declared its independence. In 1998, “Puntland” located in the Northeast declared the establishment of an autonomous government. 41 Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia supply most of the troops. Security Council Resolution 2372 (August 2017) determined that the troops would be reduced from 22,126 members to 21,626 by December 31, 2017 and further reduced to 20,626 by October 31, 2018. 42 In October 2017, a terrorist attack using a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) occurred in Mogadishu, killing more than 500 people. In January 2019, a terrorist attack came h t l i i hb i K ’ it l f N i bi killi 21 l ----- In 2018, Eritrea resumed diplomatic relations with Ethiopia[43] and Somalia[44], indicating signs of stabilization in the Horn of Africa. It is hoped that Somalia will stabilize its situation with further support from neighboring countries. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Counter-Piracy Operations) See **Chapter** 43 Ethiopia and Eritrea severed their diplomatic relations due to their armed conflict over their border demarcation issue in 1998 but signed a joint declaration in July 2018 to terminate their war and normalize their relations. 44 Since gaining independence in 1993, Eritrea had no diplomatic relations with Somalia, but the two countries signed a joint declaration in July 2018 to establish bilateral diplomatic l ti ----- # ⅡPart Japan’s Security and Defense Policy **Chapter 1** **Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense** **Chapter 2** **Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/** **the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **Chapter 3** **New National Defense Program Guidelines** **Chapter 4** **New Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP), etc.** **Chapter 5** **Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and** **the SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement** ----- **Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense** ### 1 **Chapter** **Section** **1** **Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security** The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. In addition, peace and security are essential for the people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats before they occur, through diplomacy. Prime Minister Abe inspecting the troop review (October 2018) [courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Offi ce] Nevertheless, the reality of the current international community suggests played by defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from efforts as a member of the Asia-Pacifi c region and the the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as international community. diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were to Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat. aims to ensure national security as well as bringing peace and Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate guarantee of safety to the Asia-Pacifi c region, and eventually to the entire security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign world through making its utmost efforts in a variety of fi elds. invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means. For this reason, Japan is striving to develop appropriate defense capabilities to protect the life and properties of its nationals and to defend the territorial land, sea, and airspace of Japan. At the same time, it is strengthening the Japan– U.S. Alliance[1] with the United States, which shares basic values and interests with Japan. This underlines that the peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan and preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role 1 In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and t l l i f i it liti d i ----- **Section** **2** **Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy** **1** **Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan’s **2** **The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution** 1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the required minimum self-defense capability. The specific limit is subject to change according to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget and other deliberations by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit. The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country is not permissible under any circumstance as it would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers. inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets this as a constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively defense-oriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations. there are no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and (3) When the use of armed force is confined to be the minimum necessary level. However, it has been concluded in the Cabinet’s decision made on July 1, 2014, “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,”[1] that “the use of force” should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense when the following “Three New Conditions” are met: (1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; (3) Use of force to the minimum extent necessary. The following is the interpretation of the measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution defined in the abovementioned Cabinet decision. The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. **Chapter** 2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution In the past, the Government had interpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force could be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions were met: (1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan; (2) When 1 S Ch t 5 S ti 1 1 ----- Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councillors on October 14, 1972. This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution. To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc. Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has reached a conclusion that although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution, only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan. 3 Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense May Be Exercised The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation. Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense. **Chapter** 4 Right of Belligerency Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible. ----- **3** **Basic Policy** Under the Constitution, Japan has efficiently built a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three NonNuclear Principles. 1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. 4 Securing Civilian Control Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military in a democratic state or democratic political control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious reflection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution.[4] Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people. The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) /the SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet as a general administrative function. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervises over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security. Minister of Defense Iwaya inspecting the Special Guard of Honor upon his appointment as the Minister of Defense (October 2018) **Chapter** 2 Not Becoming a Military Power There is no established definition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense. 3 Non-Nuclear Principles The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy. Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law.[2] In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a nonnuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.[3] At the MOD, the Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters concerning national defense, and Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.” Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes...not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...” Th C bi t’ t l ilit tt t i tl li it d ----- as the competent minister also manages and operates the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense.[5] In addition, the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense provides the Minister of Defense with advice on important affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian officials and uniformed SDF **Section** **3** **Outline of the National Security Strategy** **1** **National Security Council** As the security environment surrounding Japan grows increasingly testing, Japan faces mounting security challenges that it needs to address. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to carry forward the policies pertaining to national security from a strategic perspective under strong political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For this reason, the National Security Council was established in the Cabinet in December 2013 to provide a platform to discuss important matters with regard to Japan’s security. Since its establishment, the Council has met 194 times (as of the end of June 2019) and has been serving as a control tower for foreign and defense policies. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) are also deliberated and approved in this National Security Council. The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The Secretariat is also tasked with planning and designing, and overall coordination of basic guidelines and important matters with regard to personnel deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways, the MOD aims to further ensure civilian control. As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people. foreign and defense policies pertaining to national security. Administrative organs that are deeply involved in policies support the Secretariat with both personnel and information. The Secretariat has many civilians and uniformed personnel of the MOD with concurrent posts, who are engaged in the planning and designing of policies, as well as the utilization of respective specialized knowledge. In addition, global military trends and other information are shared in a timely manner. The enhanced ability to formulate national security policies has led to the systematic alignment of Japan’s national security, and to the provision of a direction for policies with regard to new security challenges. Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated and efforts to accelerate decision-making are made based on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security Council, and this is contributing significantly to improved development and implementation of policies within the MOD. **Chapter** See Fig. II-1-3-1 (Organization of the National Security Council) **2** **National Security Strategy** which had served as the basis for Japan’s defense policies theretofore. The NDPG, which was established based on the NSS, defines basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specific SDF equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a mediumto-long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense equipment and the establishment of troop operational systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires many years 1 Japan’s National Security Policy Framework The NSS approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December of 2013 represents Japan’s first ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS defines approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy on National Defense, 5 S Ch t 2 S ti 1 ----- **Fig. II-1-3-1** Organization of the National Security Council |Structure to Support the National Security Council (Image)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |National Security Council||| |4-Minister Meeting|9-Minister Meeting|Emergency Situations Minister Meeting| |Serves as a control tower for foreign and defense policies concerning national security|Maintains the civilian control function of the former Security Council|Strengthens the response to serious emergencies| **Chapter** |Provide data, information and personnel|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Related Ministries and Agencies||| |Ministry of Defense|Ministry of Foreign Affairs|etc…| Structure to Support the National Security Council (Image) National Security Council Emergency Situations 4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Minister Meeting Serves as a control tower for Maintains the civilian control Strengthens the response to foreign and defense policies function of the former Security serious emergencies concerning national security Council Support Other Agencies within National Security Secretariat within the Cabinet Secretariat the Cabinet Secretariat Situation response / Functions as a secretariat to provide constant support to the National Security CouncilPlanning and designing, and overall coordination of coordinationClose crisis managementNational Center of basic guidelines and important matters pertaining to Incident Readiness and foreign and defense policies with regard to national Strategy for Cybersecurity security Provides necessary advice when responding to Cabinet Intelligence contingencies from a national security viewpoint and Research Office etc… Provide data, information and personnel Related Ministries and Agencies Ministry of Defense Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc… of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly designed for the next decade or so. The Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023) (MTDP) specifies a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent five-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defined in the NDPG. The fiscal year budget is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and the necessary expenses for each fiscal year will be appropriated based on relevant situations. To date, the NDPG has contained mention of nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries great meaning as the definitive statement of the Government’s basic policy on national security, with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. 2 Outline of the National Security Strategy: Proactive Contribution to Peace Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in international politics and business, it also seeks its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of a Proactive Contribution to Peace. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community. In achieving the aforementioned fundamental principle of national security, the NSS makes national interests and goals clear, and demonstrates a strategic approach that needs to be employed. See  Reference 5 (National Security Strategy [Outline]) ----- **Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/** **the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** ### 2 **1** **Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability** General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureaus, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who is in charge of defense equipment administration, support the Minister of Defense in accordance with their respective responsibilities, by providing assistance from a policy perspective – namely, to ensure that the affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD are properly carried out in accordance with laws and regulations in order to accomplish the duty of the MOD. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services. In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective are provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a cart, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions. This existing concept regarding the support system for the Minister of Defense has been made even more explicit by Article 12 of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act, which has been amended to stipulate that the support for the Minister of Defense provided by the Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau as well as the Commissioner of ATLA shall be conducted in cooperation with the support for the Minister by each Chief of Staff, since 2015, when the Act was amended for the establishment of ATLA and the reorganization of Joint Staff, etc., as part of an initiative for the MOD reform.[2] 1 Organization of the MOD/SDF To fulfi ll their mission of defending Japan, the MOD/ SDF[1] consists of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces. See Fig.II-2-1 (Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense) See Fig.II-2-2 (Outline of the Ministry of Defense) **Chapter** 2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense The Minister of Defense takes charge of and manages the matters related to the defense of Japan as the competent minister, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Law. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on basic principles concerning affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs. Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint Staff, Ground Staff Offi ce, Maritime Staff Offi ce, Air Staff Offi ce, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), as an external bureau, have been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF. The DirectorGeneral of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors The MOD and the SDF form a single organization. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, the term “SDF” refers to the operational aspects of the organizations whose mission is the defense of Japan. The Government has made replies regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating: “Civilian control means prioritizing politics over the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees, such as the State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by the Minister of Defense. The role of civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus in civilian control is to support the Minister of Defense, and there is no l ti hi i hi h i ili ffi i l f th I t l B i d t it ” ----- Fig.II-2-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense |Cabinet|Col2| |---|---| |Prime|Minister| |Minister|of Defense| |---|---| |State Minist|er of Defense| |---|---| |Minister’s Secretariat|Bureau of Defense Policy|Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning|Bureau of Personnel and Education|Bureau of Local Cooperation|SDF Ethics Review Board|Central Council on Defense Facilities|Defense Personnel Review Board|National Defense Academy|National Defense Medical College|National Institute for Defense Studies| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Units and organizations of the Maritime Self-Defense Force|Units and organizations of the Air Self-Defense Force|SDF Intelligence Security Command|Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Supervised Units of Communication Systems| |---|---|---|---| Cabinet Prime Minister Minister of Defense National Security Council State Minister of Defense Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people) Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense Internal BureausInternal Bureaus Councils, etc. Institutions Attached Organizations Units and Organizations Cooperative Units Cooperative Organization *Excluding temporary or special positions. 3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch in charge of comprehensive defense administration. In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the **Chapter** |Defense Council|Joint Staff|Ground Staff Office|Maritime Staff Office|Air Staff Office|Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |SDF Physical Training School|SDF Central Hospital|SDF Regional Hospitals|Provincial Cooperation Offices| |---|---|---|---| impact on local communities hosting bases and inspecting equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents towards the MOD/SDF activities. See Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1 (Collaboration with Local Communities) **2** **Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces** In order to rapidly and effectively fulfill the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. Furthermore, in the future, it will work toward building an architecture that is capable of realizing crossdomain operations[3] including new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. 3 S P t II Ch t 3 S ti 1 1 Outline of Joint Operations System **(1) Role of Chief of Joint Staff** a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective. ----- Fig.II-2-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense **Chapter** |Organization|Outline| |---|---| |GSDF*|●Ground Component Command Assumes unifi ed nation-wide command over GSDF troops. ●Regional Armies ・Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups) ・There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ●Divisions and Brigades Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others| |MSDF*|●Self-Defense Fleet ・Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of f ixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force ・Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations ●Regional Districts There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet| |ASDF*|●Air Defense Command ・Composed of four air defense forces ・Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ●Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)| |National Defense Academy of Japan (Yokosuka, Kanagawa)|●An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel ●Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master’s degree| |National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama)|●An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses ●An institution for the cultivation of future SDF offi cers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel ●Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine| |National Institute for Defense Studies (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|●Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense ・Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF ・Conducts research and compiles data on military history ・Educates SDF personnel and other senior officials ・Manages books and documents of historical value| |Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)|●Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects, analyzes and reports on information related to national security ・Collects various military information including signals and imagery intelligence and information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides intelligence to related organizations within the ministry ・Consists of one headquarters and six communication sites| |Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|●Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position| |Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)|●Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement of equipment| |Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)|●Extra-ministerial organization that integrates and consolidates the departments within the Ministry of Defense related to procurement, research and development, etc.| *See “Location of Principal SDF Units” at the end of the book. b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff, and orders concerning operations of the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders are delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force[4] is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond. **(2) Relationship between Chief of Joint Staff, and Other Chiefs** **of Staff** The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training. This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual d t t b d A ti l 22 h 1 d 2 f th SDF L d f t it d f th t it f th GSDF th MSDF th ASDF ----- Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Fig.II-2-3 Self-Defense Forces **Chapter** |mmand for affairs operations|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations (such as human resources, education, training,* buildup of defense capabilities) Force provider||| |Chief of Staff, GSDF|Chief of Staff, MSDF|Chief of Staff, ASDF| |Ground Staff Office|Maritime Joint Staff Staff Office|Air Staff Office| |Mobilization unit|Col2| |---|---| |Joint Task Force Commander|The Commander of the Ground Component Command, Commanding General, Army and Others| |Commander, Self- Defense Fleet and Others|Commander, Air Defense Command and Others| Prime Minister Minister of Defense Chain of command for affairs Chain of command for operations other than operations Responsibilities for force Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations operations (such as human resources, education, training,* Force user buildup of defense capabilities) Force provider Chief of Joint Staff Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, GSDF MSDF ASDF Joint Staff Maritime Ground Staff Air Staff Joint Staff Office Office Staff Office Basic Rule for Joint Operation - The Chief of Joint Staff solely assists the Minister of Defense on Close coordination among SDF operations from a military Mobilization unit the Chiefs of Staff expert’s viewpoint - The Minister of Defense commands Joint Task Force The Commander of the Ground Component Command, - Chief of Joint Staff clearly indicates the SDF operations through the Chief Commander Commanding General, integrated policies for rear support and of Joint Staff Army and Others other relevant activities - The Minister of Defense’s orders to Commander, Self- Commander, Air - Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, the SDF are executed by the Chief Defense Fleet Defense Command MSDF and ASDF assists in rear support of Joint Staff and Others and Others and other activities during operations *The Chief of Joint Staff is responsible for joint training the Administrative Vice Chief of Joint Staff, a Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level post for civilian officials, and the Joint Staff Councilor, a post for civilian officials at the level of a division director and department director general have been established to conduct external coordination duties, etc., taking advantage of the expertise of civilian officials concerning actual operations of the units. See Next section (Central Organization Reform at the MOD) See Fig. II-2-3 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the See Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces) 2 Strengthening Integrated Operational Functions **(1) Past Initiatives** In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and to make the process swifter, in October 2015, the Bureau of Operational Policy was abolished and some of its functions, such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to unit operations, were transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to unite affairs concerning actual operations of the units into the Joint Staff. This change has made the Joint Staff assume work that the Internal Bureaus had previously conducted, such as external explanations, including replies at the Diet, and communication and coordination with related ministries and governmental agencies. Regarding this work, therefore, **(2) Future Initiatives** In order to realize cross-domain operations, the Joint Staff’s posture designed for efficient SDF operations and for new domains will be strengthened, thereby enabling swift and effective exercise of the SDF’s total capabilities. In addition, the future framework for joint operations will be examined. See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 1-4 (Reorganization of the Major SDF Units, etc.) **3** **Central Organization Reform of the Ministry of Defense** incidence of scandals within the MOD/SDF, and the “Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense,” which was held at the Prime minister’s office in 2007, put together the report t i i i t th i id f d l 1 Background and Direction of the MOD Reform The MOD reform started in response to the frequent ----- and central organization reform. Based on the report, the establishment of the Defense Council under law, the abolition of the post of the Director of Defense and the establishment of the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (presently the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense) were implemented on the basis of the report in order to strengthen support for the Minister of Defense and to ensure civilian control thoroughly in 2009. Following this, in the “Direction of the MOD Reform” arranged at the “Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform,” established in the MOD in 2013, it was determined that full-fledged reform based on following four main points would be undertaken: (1) mutual posting of civilian officials and uniformed personnel; (2) total optimization of the building-up of defense capability and the strengthening of equipment acquisition functions; (3) strengthening of integrated operational functions, and (4) strengthening of policymaking functions and public relations capability. 2 Specific Initiatives on the Reform of the Ministry of Defense In accordance with the “Direction of the MOD Reform,” the MOD has fostered a greater sense of unity by promoting mutual posting of civilian officials and uniformed personnel. In October 2015, in addition to the previously mentioned reorganization at the Joint Staff, a large-scale reorganization was implemented, which included the establishment of the ATLA by bringing together and consolidating the departments of the MOD that had been related to procurement in order to accurately respond to the extending equipment administration. By conducting duties at these new organizations, the MOD/SDF will ensure that this reform will be firmly established, while assisting the Minister of Defense both from a policy perspective of the Internal Bureaus and from a military expert’s perspective of each Staff Office, with each of them playing a role like the two wheels of a cart. Record Officer, a position at the rank of deputy director general, as a person who is practically responsible for the MOD’s document management and information disclosure, and also established the Public Records Management Office for conducting unified and appropriate document management. **Chapter** 3 Main Initiatives in FY2019 A certain level of achievement has been realized regarding the reorganization of the MOD central organization based on the “Direction of the MOD Reform.” Meanwhile, in response to the series of issues concerning public records, it was set down in the “Measures for Ensuring Appropriate Management of Public Records”[5] that each ministry should independently develop a system for appropriately managing public records. Accordingly, the MOD introduced Chief 5 Ad t d b th Mi i t i l C il th M t f Ad i i t ti D t d R l t d M tt J l 20 2018 ----- **New National Defense Program Guidelines** ### 3 The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) is a “grand design” to ensure the peace and security of Japan, which establishes the posture of Japan’s defense capability and the level to achieve based on the security environment and the changes in military situation surrounding Japan. The NDPG has squarely faced the reality of the security **Section** **1** **Features of the Past NDPGs** **1** **1976 NDPG** Formulated against the backdrop of the détente[2] of the 1970s, the 1976 NDPG[3] was based on an awareness that (1) in general, a full-scale military clash between East and West would be unlikely to occur, and (2) in the vicinity of Japan, the balanced relationship between the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union, and the existence of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, would continue to play a substantial role in preventing a serious invasion of Japan. Taking that into consideration, with regard to Japan’s defense capability, the 1976 NDPG stipulated that it should (1) be furnished with the various functions required environment at all times and set forth the defense capability which is truly needed to protect the Japanese nationals. Since it was fi rst formulated in 1976, the NDPG has been established six times. The current NDPG for FY2019 and beyond (2018 NDPG) was decided in 2018.[1] for defense and (2) be in a balanced posture in terms of organization and deployment, including logistic support, (3) take an adequate surveillance posture in peacetime, (4) effectively cope with a limited and small-scale invasion, and (5) be capable of shifting smoothly to a new posture regarding defense capability when required due to an important change occurring in the situation. The concept of Basic Defense Capability introduced by the 1976 NDPG attached importance to deterrence, emphasizing measures to prevent an invasion of Japan. **Chapter** **2** **1995 NDPG** The 1995 NDPG[4] was formulated with consideration to the change of the international security environment, such as the end of the Cold War, and increasing public expectations for the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in the wake of the United Nations peacekeeping operations and response to the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake. The 1995 NDPG pointed out that previous defense buildup policies were based on the concept of the Basic Defense Force, which aimed to maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a power vacuum that would destabilize the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan, and basically followed the same approach. At the same time, in terms of the content of Japan’s defense capability, the 1995 NDPG was characterized by its emphasis on the further utilization of SDF capabilities not only in the defense of Japan but also in response to large-scale disasters and various other situations, and in contributions to a more stable security environment, as well as reviewing the scale and function of the defense force. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 18, 2018) The situation where the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were in a confl ict referred to as “the Cold War” at the time, began to be eased, prompted by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It ended with the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on October 29, 1976) N ti l D f P G id li f FY1996 d b d ( d b th N ti l S it C il d th C bi t N b 28 1995) ----- **3** **2004 NDPG** Amid the emergence of new threats and the challenges of such diverse situations as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and the activities of international terrorist organizations, the 2004 NDPG[5] was formulated on the decision that new guidelines for the approach to the national security and defense capability were necessary. The 2004 NDPG established two security goals: (1) preventing direct threats from reaching Japan and, in the event that one does, repel it and minimize any damage, and (2) improving the international security environment, so as **4** **2010 NDPG** The 2010 NDPG[6] was formulated in light of the recognition that (1) large-scale military capacity, including nuclear capability, still exists in the surrounding region, with many countries modernizing their military forces and intensifying various activities; (2) dramatic progress in such fields as military science and technology has shortened the time between the first signs of a contingency and its development, making a seamless response necessary; and (3) many security issues extend across national borders, making partnerships and cooperation between countries important from times of peace, so the role of military forces is diversifying and it is becoming common to continuously operate military forces, to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. To this end, the 2004 NDPG set an integrated combination of three approaches, (1) Japan’s own effort, (2) Japan-U.S. Arrangements, and (3) Cooperation with the international community. Accordingly, in terms of the concept of defense capability, the 2004 NDPG stipulated that a “multifunctional, flexible, effective defense force” was necessary to address new threats and diverse situations, with emphasis on response capabilities, while maintaining effective aspects of the concept of Basic Defense Capability. in peacetime. Accordingly, the 2010 NDPG focused on SDF operations, rather than the Basic Defense Force Concept, which emphasized the existence of the defense force; as such, the 2010 NDPG stipulated that it was necessary to ensure that future defense capability be dynamic and can proactively conduct the various activities required to be fulfilled. Therefore, the 2010 NDPG prescribed the development of a Dynamic Defense Force that demonstrates readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, underpinned by advanced technical capabilities and intelligence skills, in light of trends in the level of military technology. **Chapter** **5** **2013 NDPG** The 2013 NDPG[7] was formulated in light of the fact that the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of the defense force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily sufficient, even though the number and the duration of situations, including so-called gray-zone situations, which require the SDF’s commitment, were both increasing amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. The 2013 NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, called for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities adequate in terms of both quality and quantity that underpin various activities. To this end, Japan was to conduct capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to the SDF’s total functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized. The 2013 NDPG made it possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and efficient defense capability build-up, based on the results of these capability assessments. Additionally, the 2013 NDPG required the build-up of the most effective operational posture, by further strengthening a wide-ranging logistics support foundation. In this manner, the 2013 NDPG set forth that Japan would develop a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force,” which would provide an effective defense that enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand. See Fig.II-3-1-1 (Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability) National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) N ti l D f P G id li f FY2014 d b d ( d b th N ti l S it C il d th C bi t D b 17 2013) ----- Fig.II-3-1-1 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability **Chapter** Background 1976 NDPG - Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG (October 29, 1976, - Balanced relationship among the United States, China, and the ・The concept of Basic Defense Capability the National Defense Soviet Union in the vicinity of Japan ・Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation preventing a Council/Cabinet Meeting) - Need to show the target of defense force buildup power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military 19 years threat to Japan Background 1995 NDPG - The end of Cold War Basic ideas in 1995 NDPG (November 28, 1995, the - International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty ・Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability Security Council/Cabinet - National expectations to international contribution ・“Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing to Meeting) building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation” 9 years Background 2004 NDPG - New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile Basic ideas in 2004 NDPG (December 10, 2004, the attacks ・Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international Security Council/Cabinet - Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and Meeting) - Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on deterrence diverse contingencies 6 years to handling the situation ・Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of basic defense capability Background 2010 NDPG - Change in global power balance Basic ideas in 2010 NDPG (December 17, 2010, the - Complex military situation surrounding Japan ・Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic Defense Security Council/Cabinet - Diversification of the military role in global society Capability) Meeting) ・Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security 3 years environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security environment in a dynamic manner Background 2013 NDPG - Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly Basic ideas in 2013 NDPG (December 17, 2013, the severe ・Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force National Security - U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region ・Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which Council/Cabinet Meeting) - Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience of the enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security environment Great East Japan Earthquake and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air 5 years superiority, seamlessly and flexibly Background 2018 NDPG Basic ideas in 2018 NDPG - Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly (December 18, 2018, the severe and uncertain at extremely high speeds ・Development of “Multi-domain Defense Force” National Security - Rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, ・Truly effective defense capability that enables cross-domain operations organically Council/Cabinet Meeting) cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum fusing capabilities in all domains by strengthening not only those in traditional - Clear trends observed in further military build-up and increase in domains—land, sea and air—but also those in new domains, which are space, military activities cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum ----- **Section** **2** **Content of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and Beyond (2018 NDPG)** **1** **Background of Review of the 2013 NDPG** Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the 2013 NDPG was formulated. In light of such circumstances, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced at his policy speech to the 196th session of the Diet in January 2018 that the 2013 NDPG would be reviewed, while maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy as given. Based on this policy, related ministries and agencies, such as the National Security Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held repeated discussions in close coordination. In addition, Prime Minister Abe set up the Advisory Panel on Security and Defense Capabilities in which experts from various specialized fields conducted intense discussions. The Advisory Panel held seven meetings from August to December of 2018. In August of the same year, the MOD established the Study Committee on Future Defense Capabilities, chaired by the Minister of Defense, with an aim to set up a crossministerial study framework and conduct in-depth study. The Committee met six times and held intensive study on matters including the approach to strengthening defense capabilities and the structure of the SDF. **2** **Basic Approach—Building a Multi-Domain Defense Force** So far, Japan has built a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” which enables the SDF to conduct dynamic and sustainable activities through joint operations based on the 2013 NDPG. Meanwhile, Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the 2013 NDPG were formulated. On such basis, the 2018 NDPG indicate that Japan will build a truly effective defense capability that has honed the attributes of a “Dynamic Joint Defense Force.” Specifically, Japan will build a “Multi-Domain Defense Force” with a truly effective defense capability that: (i) can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains, including not only traditional domains—land, sea and air—but also new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—, to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength; (ii) is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during Advisory Panel on Security and Defense Capabilities [Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office] Defense Minister Iwaya present at the Study Committee on Future Defense Capabilities **Chapter** all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies; and (iii) is capable of bolstering the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats and promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation. In particular, as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, substantially enhance the military’s overall capabilities to conduct operations, states are exerting efforts to improve capabilities in these fields. Japan will also focus on enhancing such capabilities as well as capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships, and missiles in combination therewith, and enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of defense capability, including logistics support. ----- **3** **NDPG’s Objective** Japan’s national defense cannot be carried out by the MOD/ SDF alone, and it is essential to gain the understanding and cooperation of each individual Japanese national concerning defense policy. From such viewpoint, the 2018 NDPG succinctly indicates its goals and awareness of issues in the part “NDPG’s Objective” in a simple manner which is easy to understand for nationals. Specifically, the 2018 NDPG first sets forth that Japan will vigorously march forward as a peace-loving nation even while the security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain, with changes in the balance of power in the international arena accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order increasing, and the existing paradigm of national security being fundamentally changed through rapid expansion in the use of the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Then, it goes on to state that, to do so, Japan needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, the life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding the roles Japan can fulfill. In addition, it sets forth that, while no country can preserve its security by itself alone, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries, which is critical to Japan’s national security, cannot be achieved without Japan’s own efforts, clearly expressing Japan’s attitude to make efforts on its own accord and initiative. In this regard, the past NDPGs have also been formulated based on the recognition that Japan’s own efforts serve as the basis of the security policy, but the 2018 NDPG has included this statement with an aim **4** **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** 1 Characteristics of Current Security Environment In order to formulate a new NDPG, it is necessary to make in-depth analysis of the realities of the security environment surrounding Japan, which lies in the background. The 2018 NDPG analyzes the characteristics of the current security environment as follows. In the international community, thanks to further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing to put it down expressly. On such basis, the 2018 NDPG states as follows. In strengthening its defense capability, Japan must squarely face the realities of national security and ensure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past. In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in the new domains, of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains, Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional divisions among land, sea, and air. On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with a declining birthrate and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past. In this manner, the 2018 NDPG emphasizes that Japan needs to build defense capability at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past and to allocate resources without adhering to traditional ways of thinking . Moreover, the 2018 NDPG states that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan’s own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s national security, and that Japan’s fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance’s ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. order. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging is inter-state competition across the political, economic, and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage. This inter-state competition occurs on a continuous basis: In conducting inter-state competition, states leverage various means, such as undermining other country’s sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating foreign country’s public opinion by exploiting social media. Also, the so-called gray-zone situations may possibly increase and expand, and they harbor the risk of rapidly **Chapter** ----- developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In addition, methods employed to alter the status quo, such as “hybrid warfare,” that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones. Driven by rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fields, military technologies are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea, and air but also the new domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. States are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in the new domains. Due to advances in military technologies, a variety of threats can now easily penetrate national borders. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cuttingedge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it difficult still to foresee future warfare. In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. With respect to space and cyber domains, establishing international rules and norms has been a security agenda. In the maritime domain, there have been cases where a country unilaterally claims its entitlements or takes actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order. These have generated undue infringement upon freedom in high seas. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles, as well as worsening international terrorism remain grave challenges for the international community. Against such background, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities. 2 Situations by Country and Region The 2018 NDPG analyzes the military trends of the international community, particularly core countries that form the security environment surrounding Japan, as follows. The United States, with inter-state competition in a range of areas prominently emerging, has acknowledged that a particularly important challenge is strategic competition with China and Russia, who attempt to alter global and regional order. To rebuild its military power, the United States is engaged in such efforts as maintaining military advantage in all domains through technological innovations, enhancing nuclear deterrence, and advancing missile defense capabilities. With an aim to build “world-class forces” by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of defense expenditures with continued lack of transparency. China has engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with a focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In so doing, China is ensuring superiority particularly in new domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, and also **Chapter** **“Gray-Zone Situations” and “Hybrid Warfare”** The so-called gray-zone situations simply represents a wide range of situations that are neither peacetime nor wartime. In a gray-zone situation, for example, a country that confronts another over territory, sovereignty or maritime and other economic interests uses some forceful organization to demonstrate its presence in the relevant disputed region in a bid to alter the status quo or force other countries to accept its assertions or demands. The so-called hybrid warfare represents methods to alter the status quo while intentionally blurring the boundaries between the military and non-military realms, forcing affected actors to take complex measures that are not limited to military actions. The means of hybrid warfare include operations using military units of unidentified nationality, cyberattacks to affect communications and other critical infrastructure, the spread of false information through the internet and the media, and other influential operations. The combination of these measures is considered as amounting to hybrid warfare. Amid emerging inter-state competition, hybrid warfare and other various measures tend to cause gray-zone situations to last for a long period of time. ----- community. Russia is enhancing its military posture by continuing force modernization efforts with a focus on nuclear forces. Russia’s military activities are trending upward in the Arctic Circle, Europe, areas around the United States and the Middle East, as well as in the Far East, including Japan’s Northern Territories. Close attention therefore needs to be paid to its developments. 3 Characteristics of Japan The 2018 NDPG describes the characteristics of Japan as follows. For Japan, a maritime nation, fundamental to its peace and prosperity is to ensure the safety of maritime and air traffic by strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans.” Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population and information infrastructure concentrate in Japan’s urban areas, and a large number of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas. In addition, Japan is undergoing population decline and ageing with a dwindling birthrate at an unprecedented pace. Chinese government vessels conducting activities around the Senkaku Islands [courtesy of Japan Coast Guard] improving missile defense penetration capabilities and others. China also engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Such Chinese military and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments. Although North Korea expressed its intention for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner: There has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea is assessed as possessing large-scale cyber units, developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure. North Korea also retains large-scale special operation forces. Such military developments of North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly undermine the peace and security of the region and the international **5** **Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** 1 Basic Policy Based on the NDPG’s objective and the security environment as mentioned above, the 2018 NDPG clarifies Japan’s basic defense policy as follows. First, in line with the National Security Strategy and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also promoted cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. **Chapter** 4 Summary In light of the foregoing, the 2018 NDPG states that while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries remains low, Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the 2013 NDPG was formulated. On that basis, the 2018 NDPG specifies that, to prevent threats to Japan from materializing to menace life and peaceful livelihood of its nationals, it behooves Japan to take measures that are in line with these realities. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of a security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the National Security Strategy—defend to the end Japanese nationals’ lives, persons and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. ----- Under such circumstances, the 2018 NDPG sets forth (i) the creation of a security environment desirable for Japan, (ii) deterrence, and (iii) countermeasures as national defense objectives. Specifically, they are as follows: first, to create, on a steady-state basis, a security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; second, to deter threats from reaching Japan by making opponents realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and finally, should a threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage. Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the JapanU.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and flexibly in order to deal with increasingly complex security environment that is changing at an accelerating speed. In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and enhance its credibility. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts, including comprehensive air and missile defense as well as civil protection. At the same time, towards the long-term goal of bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan will play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The three approaches indicated as basic policy in the 2018 NDPG—Japan’s own architecture for national defense, the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and international security cooperation— are explained below. 2 Strengthening Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense **(1) Building Comprehensive Architecture for National Defense** What kind of national defense architecture should Japan build in order to squarely address the realities of a security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives? The NDPG first indicates that Japan will, in all phases, integrate the strengths at the nation’s disposal, enabling not only the MOD/SDF efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts, as well as cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, the NDPG clearly states that Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fields as space, MSDF Destroyer JS “Inazuma” conducting a goodwill exercise with the Singaporean Navy (October 2018) cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also states that Japan will promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace. Japan will further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications[1] by systematically combining all available policy tools. In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray-zone” situations, Japan has been strengthening its posture under the principle of civilian control of the military. Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by an enhanced support mechanism. In addition, Japan will also strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, build a posture prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and to ensure their safety, and promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives, such as electricity and communication, as well as to protect cyberspace. **Chapter** **(2) Strengthening Japan’s Defense Capability** **a. Significance and Necessity of Defense Capability** The NDPG defines defense capability as Japan’s will and ability to defend to the end Japanese nationals’ lives, persons and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, which at the same time, is essential for Japan to play, on its initiative, its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries. On such basis, it emphasizes that defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained Communications made with the international community, not only through words, but also by combining activities of SDF units, etc., such as joint training or port visits by SDF ships, if i t i d t t d i bl it i t f J ----- existence as a sovereign nation amid a security environment that it has never faced before, and that Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative. **b. Truly Effective Defense Capability—Multi-Domain Defense** **Force** As for the specifi c ideal form of defense capability, the NDPG sets forth that Japan will newly aim to build a “Multi-domain Defense Force,” given that Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably fast speed. The Multi-domain Defense Force is specifi cally as follows. To deter and counter qualitatively and quantitatively superior military threats, it has become vitally important to adapt to warfare that combines capabilities in new domains— space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum—and traditional domains—land, sea, and air. Japan needs to develop, while qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing capabilities in individual domains, a defense capability that can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished. At the same time, it is also important for Japan to be able to seamlessly conduct activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. In recent years, however, SDF’s activities, such as maintaining its presence in peacetime, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, which are increasing in scope and frequency, are causing a chronic burden on its personnel and equipment, generating a concern that the SDF may not be able to maintain the profi ciency and the volume of its activities. Japan needs to: improve the quality and quantity of capabilities that support the sustainability and resiliency of various activities; and develop a defense capability that enables sustained conduct of fl exible and strategic activities commensurate with the character of given situations. Further, Japan’s defense capability needs to be capable of strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats as well as promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation. In light of the foregoing, the NDPG states that Japan will henceforth build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace **Chapter** **Cross-domain Operations** Contemporary warfare combines the traditional domains Cross-domain operation (air defense operation) Past joint operation: Air defense units in each domain individually counter threats of land, sea, and air with new domains such as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum against the [Air domain] backdrop of technological advances. For example, modern military activities depend on the use of outer space to the extent in which satellite- based communications between units and satellite-using [Sea domain] [Land domain] positioning are indispensable for smooth functioning of forces on land, sea and air. These operations also heavily Cross-domain operation: Air defense units in all domains are integrated into a single air defense system to counter threats depend on information and communication networks Finding enemy threats Reconnaissance satellite Communications satellite [Space domain] using cyberspace. positioning satellite測位衛星 Guiding interceptor missiles Unmanned aircraft Collecting and In such situation, it is essential to use such new sharing information Interception [Electromagnetic domain] domains as space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic [Air domain] spectrum to prevent and eliminate attacks so as to effectively deter and counter threats. Cross-domain [Cyber domain] operations that organically fuse capabilities in the new domains and the traditional domains of land, sea, and Interception Ground sensors [Sea domain] Interception [Land domain] air have thus become vitally important. Cross-domain operations generate synergy to amplify the overall strength to overcome any inferiority in individual domains, obtain overall superiority, and accomplish national defense. ----- Committee for Building Multi-Domain Defense Force hosted by State Minister of Defense MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft conducting early warning surveillance activities Harada **b. Attack against Japan including Its Remote Islands** and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained Japan possesses numerous islands, and it is an important conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases role of defense capability to respond to attacks on Japan’s from peacetime to armed contingencies. national territory, including these remote islands. The Based on this, in order to promote the building of Multi NDPG specifically indicates as follows regarding this point. Domain Defense Force, the MOD established the Committee In response to an attack on Japan, including its remote for Building Multi-Domain Defense Force in March 2019. islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite Chaired by State Minister of Defense, the committee carries units to block the access and landing of invading forces out studies under a cross-ministerial structure. while ensuring maritime and air superiority.[2] Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, **(3) Roles that Defense Capability Should Play** the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing Defense capability plays various roles to protect the life from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals. The NDPG territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all specifically indicates the roles of defense capability as necessary measures. follows. Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, the SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying **a. From Peacetime to “Gray-Zone” Situations** optimal means and minimize damage to maintain the SDF’s Defense capability is not only utilized in armed attack capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such situations, that is, armed contingencies, but is also utilized capabilities are employed. for deterrence in peacetime and for preventing the situation In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations from deteriorating in gray-zone situations. The NDPG states forces, the SDF will protect critical facilities including that the SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, nuclear power plants, and will search for and destroy promote strategic communications such as active joint infiltrating forces. training and exercises and overseas port visits, and prevent occurrence or escalation of emergencies by leveraging its **c. Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Domains during** capabilities to conduct wide-area, persistent ISR activities **All Phases** around Japan, and by employing deterrence activities In the new domains such as space, cyberspace, and (“flexible deterrent options”) and other measures according electromagnetic spectrum, which countries are pursuing to to situation. Moreover, leveraging its posture in place for take technical advantage to increase their military capability these activities, the SDF will, in coordination with the police to prevent any actions that impede their activities, the NDPG and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures states that the SDF will conduct on a steady-state basis in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty, persistent monitoring as well as the collection and analysis including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters. of relevant information. In case of such event, the SDF will The SDF will provide persistent protection against take such measures as damage limitation and recovery. incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize In case of an armed attack against Japan, the SDF will, damage should it occur. on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyberspace, and 2 A situation of having superior maritime/air capabilities than the opponent in waters/airspace, and being capable of conducting operations without receiving substantial damage from the **Chapter** ----- electromagnetic domains. In addition, in light of the society’s growing dependence on space and cyberspace, it also pointed out that the SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations. **d. Large-Scale Disasters** Defense capability also plays a signifi cant role when incidents that have an enormous impact on people’s daily lives, such as large-scale disasters, occur. The NDPG states that, in case of disasters, the SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. At the same time, the SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments, and engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnerships and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments, and the private sector. Then Defense Minister Onodera giving instructions and encouraging SDF personnel on Destroyer JS “Ikazuchi” visiting a port in Sri Lanka during a dispatch as a counter-piracy unit (August 2018) 3 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance The NDPG states that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. While based on the conventional recognition that the Japan-U.S. Alliance plays a signifi cant role for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan, but also the region and the international community, it also specifi cally indicates that Japan's fulfi llment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation, through Japan's efforts to strengthen its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative, is the very way to fulfi ll its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance’s ability to deter and counter threats. On such basis, it clearly states as follows. First, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen the relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests, and the United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important. In other words, the importance of the alliance has increased for both the countries. Next, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” as the security environment **Chapter** **e. Collaboration with the United States Based on the Japan-** **U.S. Alliance** The NDPG indicates that it is an important role of defense capability to effectively conduct bilateral activities with the United States by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance in all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, in line with the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.” **f. Promotion of Security Cooperation** The NDPG clearly states that it is one of the roles of defense capability to actively engage in efforts for enhanced security cooperation by, for example, strategically promoting defense cooperation and exchanges, such as joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and serviceto-service exchanges, in accordance with policies that are tailored to individual regions and countries. X b d d f i ti t llit (i ) R b b it (i ) I t f l t i f biliti ----- surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at a remarkably fast speed. Furthermore, Japan needs to press ahead with such efforts as bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats, enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas, and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. 4 Strengthening Security Cooperation The NDPG places more importance than before on security cooperation with other countries utilizing defense capability. Specifically, it clearly states as follows. In line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account the characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and service-toservice exchanges. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global security challenges. The NDPG states that, in implementing these initiatives, Japan should position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy. **6** **Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability** also build a structure to conduct persistent space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, the SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities, including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information. In doing so, it will make efforts to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies and with the United States and other relevant countries, set up a unit that specializes in space domain missions, and develop human resources. **Chapter** 1 Guiding Thoughts In formulating the NDPG, it was provided that Japan will build a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past, in order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment. While clearly indicating priority capability areas in strengthening defense capability, the NDPG sets forth that Japan will develop those areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms. The priority capability areas specified in the NDPG are as indicated below. 2 Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations **(1) Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities in Space,** **Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Domains** In cross-domain operations, capabilities in the new domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum are essential through focused resource allocation and utilization of Japan’s superb science and technology. The NDPG clearly states that the SDF will strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains and will implement initiatives as follows. **b. Capabilities in Cyber Domain** In order to prevent attacks against the SDF’s information and communications networks, the SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring as well as for damage limitation and recovery in case of attack. In addition, the SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. In doing so, the SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills and contribute to whole-of-government efforts. **c. Capabilities in Electromagnetic Domain** The SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. The SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent’s electronic jamming. In addition, the SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of an opponent who intends to invade Japan. In order to smoothly perform these activities, the SDF will enhance its **a. Capabilities in Space Domain** The SDF will further improve capabilities that leverage the space domain, including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. The SDF will ----- **Refurbishment of Izumo-class Destroyers** Foreign countries have remarkably modernized their respective air forces in recent years and fi ghters and bombers have increasingly fl own beyond Japan’s southwestern island chain into the Pacifi c Ocean. Military aircraft activities have rapidly expanded and intensifi ed their fl ights in the Pacifi c. This situation had not been seen until after the formulation of the 2013 NDPG, and such activities are expected to further expand and intensify in the future. In expending all possible means to defend Japan in such situation, it is very important to ensure the fl exibility of fi ghter operations by making more air bases available for high-performance fi ghters to be used for seamlessly securing air superiority. Given that available runways are limited in our small country, fi ghters capable of Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) on destroyers would further contribute to improving the fl exibility of fi ghter operations and to facilitating air defense in the Pacifi c, where Japan has only one air base (Iwo To) and where the SDF has limited operational infrastructure. **Chapter** |Hyakuri Nyutabaru Naha Iwo To|(ima Minamitorishima island| |---|---| ||Territorial sea EEZ| ||500km| From this viewpoint, it is essential to refurbish Izumo-class destroyers to make take-off and landing of STOVL fi ghters possible out on the sea so that, dealing with the new security environment, Japan secures its sea and air defense, including the vast Pacifi c side, while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel. This is the minimum necessary measure for Japan’s selfdefense. The Izumo-class destroyers are multi-function destroyers capable of helicopter, antisubmarine, command central, personnel and vehicle transportation, medical and other operations. Even after the STOVL aircraft operation function is added, they will continue to be utilized as multi-function destroyers, and will operate STOVL aircraft when necessary such as in response to air attacks in time of emergency, and for ISR, training, and disaster response. ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum. **(2) Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains** The NDPG states that the SDF will enhance capabilities in traditional domains to effectively counter attacks especially by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic domains. operational capabilities, including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). By taking measures such as developing a fi ghter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fi ghter aircraft which bring operational fl exibility, the SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacifi c side of Japan, where the number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. In so doing, as the number of air bases that allow for take-off and landing of fi ghters is limited, Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fi ghter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required, in order to further improve fl exibility in fi ghter operations while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel. **a. Capabilities in Maritime and Air Domains** The SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan. The SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater ----- **b. Stand-Off Defense Capability** The SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan, including remote islands, from the outside of their threat envelopes. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies. **c. Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability** In order to counter diverse airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, the SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. The SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats. 3 Priorities in Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability The NDPG sets forth that the SDF will develop thorough structure for Japan’s national defense, and enhance personnel, industries, technologies, and information that serve as the basis, in order to conduct sufficient activities. **(1) Reinforcing Human Resource Base** In light of the rapid progress of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates, the SDF needs to work even further to reinforce human resource base that sustains SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF will promote efforts in order to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people. These efforts include: various recruitment measures such as cooperation with local governments and other entities; diversifying the applicant pool; and expanding women’s participation. The MOD/SDF will also promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence. To enable all SDF personnel to fully exercise their ability under high morale, the MOD/SDF will improve living and work environments and promote work style reforms at the MOD/SDF to ensure proper work-life balance. Furthermore, through such efforts as enhancing joint education and research, the MOD/SDF will enrich education and research. The MOD/SDF will also enhance education for organization management skills. **Chapter** **d. Maneuver and Deployment Capability** In order for requisite SDF units to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis and to maneuver and deploy according to the situation, the SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities. In addition, to enable swift and large-scale transport, the SDF will strengthen joint transport capability, including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities, tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. The SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis. **(3) Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency** It is important to be able to secure and supply sufficient ammunition and fuel and to achieve prompt recovery from any damage caused to facilities when various situations occur. The NDPG places importance on this point, and states as follows. The SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, the SDF will improve sustainability of activities through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. The SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery from damage, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for the SDF operations, including defense-related facilities. Further, the SDF will ensure high operational availability by reviewing equipment maintenance methods. **(2) Reviewing Equipment Structure** The MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from a joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure. In so doing, while giving due considerations to the capabilities each SDF service requires for its operations, the MOD/SDF will: develop equipment with multiple functional variants; optimize and standardize specifications; jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services; reduce types of aircraft; suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased; and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness. **(3) Reinforcing Technology Base** The MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in important technologies, including artificial intelligence and other potentially gamechanging technologies. The MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development timelines by streamlining research and development (R&D) processes and procedures. In addition, the MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at fostering of innovative, emerging technologies by actively ----- leveraging commercial technologies through such efforts as technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities, and utilizing think tanks. **(4) Optimizing Equipment Procurement** In order to implement thorough cost management and reduction, the MOD/SDF will promote active use of systematic acquisition methods which facilitate efficient procurement, streamlining of equipment maintenance, and competition among domestic and foreign companies. Moreover, in order to efficiently procure U.S.-made high-performance equipment, the MOD/SDF will promote rationalization of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procurement[3] and further strengthen efforts on project management throughout the entire life cycle of defense equipment. system to create a competitive environment for companies, the MOD/SDF will work to reduce equipment costs and improve industrial competitiveness, thereby striving to build a resilient defense industrial base. **(6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** The MOD/SDF will strengthen capabilities for each stage of information collection, processing, analysis, sharing, and protection so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to indications of various situations and also take requisite measures based on medium- to long-term military trends. In so doing, the MOD/SDF will strengthen capability and posture for the collection of SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT and others. The MOD/SDF will also enhance collaboration with relevant domestic agencies, including the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center which operates Information Gathering Satellites, and with allies as well as with other parties. **(5) Strengthening Defense Industrial Base** Through measures including reform of the existing contract **7** **Organization of the SDF** The NDPG states that, in order to realize cross-domain operations, including in the new domains of space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, the SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop the organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. **Chapter** The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units, the MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers, the ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile unit, and the SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets. The SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and be deployed in joint operations. 2 Organization of the GSDF In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. The GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains. The GSDF will maintain half of its rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido. The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including persistent steady-state maneuvers; and stationing of units in remote islands hitherto without SDF presence. See Fig. II-3-2-1 (Annex Table of the 2018 NDPG) Fig. II-3-2-2 (Transition of NDPG Annex Tables) 1 Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations In order to further promote joint-ness of the Ground SelfDefense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) in all areas, the SDF will implement such measures as strengthening the Joint Staff Office’s necessary posture. With regard to the space domain, the SDF will maintain an ASDF unit that specializes in space domain missions, and strengthen its posture for joint operations. As for the cyber domain, the SDF will maintain a cyber defense unit as a joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability. In respect to the electromagnetic spectrum domain, the SDF will strengthen the posture of the Joint Staff Office and of each SDF service. A U.S. security program through which the U.S. government provides defense equipment, etc. to U.S. allies and others for value based on the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), not for the f i i i fit b t t f it it li ----- To be able to counter an invasion of remote islands, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense. With respect to basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones, the GSDF will review their organization and equipment with a focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. With respect to units under the direct command of regional armies, the GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial firepower. The GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet the conditions and characteristics of each region. The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at 159,000. 3 Organization of the MSDF The MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities (FFM), minesweeper units, and embarked patrol helicopter units. The MSDF will organize surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, the MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. In order to effectively conduct steady-state, widearea underwater ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units. By introducing a test bed submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, the MSDF will maintain fixedwing patrol aircraft units. 4 Organization of the ASDF The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of ground-based warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective, sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control during “gray zone” and other situations with heightened tensions. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft. In addition, the ASDF will maintain reinforced aerial refueling and transport units. The ASDF will maintain air transport units which enable it to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces. The ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units which enable it to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions. **Chapter** **8** **Elements Supporting Defense Capability** The NDPG sets forth that the following initiatives will be emphasized as elements supporting defense capability, in order for Japan’s defense capability to demonstrate its true value. 1 Training and Exercises The NDPG states that the SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. In so doing, the SDF will develop and utilize domestic training areas, such as those in Hokkaido as well as fine training environments overseas; facilitate joint/ shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas; facilitate use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas; and more actively introduce training simulators and others. The SDF will also actively utilize training and exercises to constantly examine and review various plans for emergencies. 2 Medical Care The NDPG states that, in order to protect the lives of SDF personnel to the maxim extent possible, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. Taking into account the conditions and characteristics of each region, the SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of the SDF in Japan’s southwestern region. The SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. In order to secure medical personnel in operation units, the SDF will: improve the management of the National Defense Medical College; and enrich and enhance education and ----- Fig.II-3-2-1 Annex Table of the 2018 NDGP |（Annex Table）|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Joint Units|Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units||1 squadron 1 group| |GSDF|Authorized Number of Personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major Units|Rapid Deployment Units|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Regional Deployment Units|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units|2 battalions| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |||Ballistic Missile Defense Units|2 squadrons| |MSDF|Major Units|Surface Vessel Units Destroyers Destroyer and minesweeper vessels Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units|4 groups (8 divisions) 2 groups (13 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Patrol Vessels Combat Aircraft|54 (8) 22 12 Approx. 190| |ASDF|Major Units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 groups (24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron| ||Major Equipment|Combat Aircraft Fighters|Approx. 370 Approx. 290| Note1: The current numbers of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2018) are respectively approx. 600 and approx. 500, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future. Note2: Fighter Aircraft Units (13 squadrons) includes STOVL Units. **Chapter** research, such as that for improving medical care capabilities for combat injury. 3 Collaboration with Local Communities The NDPG states that the MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of the SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, the MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures, include noise mitigation. The MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, police and fire departments, in order to enable the SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations. The MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of ----- Fig.II-3-2-2 Transition of NDPG Annex Tables **Chapter** |Col1|Category|Col3|1976 NDPG|1995 NDPG|2004 NDPG|2010 NDPG|2013 NDPG|2018 NDPG| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Joint Units|Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units|||||||1 squadron 1 group| |GSDF|Authorized Number of Personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||180,000|160,000 145,000 15,000|155,000 148,000 7,000|154,000 147,000 7,000|159,000 151,000 8,000|159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major Units|Regional Deployment Units1|12 divisions 2 combined brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Rapid Deployment Units|1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division Central Readiness Force|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|||||5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units||||||2 battalions| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |||Ballistic Missile Defense Units||||||2 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Tanks2 Artillery (Main artillery)2|(approx. 1,200) (approx. 1,000/vehicle)|approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)|approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)|approx. 400 approx. 400/vehicle|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)| |MSDF|Major Units|Destroyers Destroyer and minesweeper vessels For mobile operations7 Regional deployment7 Submarine Units Minesweeper Units Patrol Aircraft Units|4 flotillas (Regional units) 10 units 6 divisions 2 flotillas (Land-based) 16|4 flotillas (Regional units) 7 units 6 divisions 1 flotilla (Land-based) 13|4 foltillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 foltillas (8 divisions) 4 flotillas 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 foltillas (8 divisions) 6 flotillas 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 groups (8 divisions) 2 groups (13 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers Submarines Patrol vessels Combat aircraft|approx. 60 16 approx. 220|approx. 50 16 approx. 170|47 16 approx. 150|48 22 approx. 150|54 22 approx. 170|54 22 12 approx. 190| |ASDF|Major Units|Air Warning & Control Units|28 warning groups 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons)| |||Fighter Aircraft Units Fighter-Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units|10 squadrons 3 squadrons|9 squadrons 3 squadrons|12 squadrons|12 squadrons|13 squadrons|13 squadrons6| |||Air Reconnaissance Units|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron||| |||Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|2 squadrons 3 squadrons|2 squadrons 3 squadrons| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|6 fire groups|4 frie groups (24 frie squadrons)| |||Space Domain Mission Units||||||1 squadron| |||Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units||||||1 squadron| ||Major Equipment|Combat aircraft (Fighters)|approx. 430 (approx. 350)3|approx. 400 approx. 300|approx. 350 approx. 260|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280|approx. 370 approx. 290| |Major Equipment/Units That May Also Serve for BMD Missions4||Aegis-equipped Destroyers|||4 ships|6 ships5|8 ships|8 ships| |||Air Warning & Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|||7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups|11 warning groups/units 6 groups||| ----- Notes: 1. Units that were categorized as those deployed in a steady state (peacetime) until 2010 NDPG Notes: 2. Data on tanks and artillery were not included in 1976 NDPG, 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG, but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2010 NDPG. Notes: 3. Data on fighters were not included in 1976 NDPG but are shown here for making comparisons with Annex Tables for 1995 NDPG up to 2018 NDPG. Notes: 4. Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions were included in MSDF’s major equipment or ASDF’s major units in 2004 NDPG and 2010 NDPG, but those newly procured are included in the categories of Aegis-equipped destroyers, Air Warning & Control Units, and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units in 2013 NDPG and 2018 NDPG. Notes: 5. In 2010 NDPG, Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD functions were allowed to be additionally procured within the limited number of destroyers above, when separately determined in light of the progress in BMD technologies and financial circumstances. Notes: 6. Including Fighter Aircraft Units consisting of STOVL aircraft Notes: 7. Destroyers were expressed as Anti-submarine Surface Units (for mobile operations) or Anti-submarine Surface Units (regional units) in 1976 NDPG, as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional units) in 1995 NDPG, and as Destroyers (for mobile operations) or Destroyers (regional deployment) in 2004 NDPG. operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. At the same time, in administering garrisons and bases, the MOD/SDF will give due considerations to their contributions to local economies. 4 Intellectual Base The NDPG states that, in order to facilitate understanding of security and crisis management among the populace, the MOD/SDF will work to promote security-related education at educational institutions. In order to achieve at high levels both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the MOD/SDF will facilitate the NIDS’ collaboration with the policy-making sector. The MOD/SDF will further enhance its defense research regime with the NIDS playing central roles. In so doing, the MOD/SDF will promote systematic collaboration with other research and educational institutions within the Government, as well as with universities and think-tanks of excellence both at home and abroad. **9** **Points of Attention** In addition, considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and the importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, the MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development to curb costs. The MOD/SDF will work to ensure that defense capability can smoothly and fully perform its functions while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government. **Chapter** Japan’s defense capability which the NDPG set forth envisions approximately 10 years. The National Security Council will conduct periodic, systematic evaluations throughout the course of implementation of various measures and programs. At the same time, the MOD/SDF will conduct verifications regarding capabilities required for Japan’s defense in the future. When major changes in situation are anticipated during evaluation and verification processes, the NDPG will be amended as necessary after examining the current security environment and others. ----- **New Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP), etc.** ### 4 **Section** **1** **Outline of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023)** **1** **Background of Formulation of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)** As the term of the MTDP (FY2014–FY2018)[1]was to end in FY2018, discussions on formulating a new MTDP were held in parallel to discussions on the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG). **2** **Signifi cance of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023)** While the build-up of defense capability is ultimately conducted according to the budget of each fi scal year, it needs to be conducted continuously and systematically based on a specifi c, medium-term outlook, given that national defense forms the basis of the nation’s existence and that activities such as research and development (R&D) and introduction of equipment, establishment of facilities, education of military personnel, and training of SDF units cannot be accomplished over a short term. Accordingly, since FY1986, the Government has On December 18, 2018, the Government formulated, at the National Security Council and the Cabinet, the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023)[2] in order to systematically build a Multidomain Defense Force in accordance with the NDPG. formulated medium-term defense programs targeting each fi ve-year period, and has conducted the build-up of defense capability for each fi scal year based on the relevant program. The MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) is the fi rst MTDP to be implemented under the NDPG, and sets forth the policy for the build-up of defense capability and the amount of major equipment to be procured for the fi ve-year period, in order to realize the Multi-domain Defense Force specifi ed by the NDPG. **Chapter** **3** **Program Guidelines** The MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) indicates that the SelfDefense Forces (SDF) will endeavor to build up defense capability based on the following basic policy, in accordance with the NDPG. 1 Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities Essential for Realizing Cross-Domain Operations In order to realize cross-domain operations, the SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, and strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information (C4I) capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. In addition, the SDF will enhance capabilities in traditional domains, such as capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability. Furthermore, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support will be enhanced. 2 Improving the Effi ciency of Acquisition of Equipment and Reinforcing the Technology Base In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF will effi ciently secure defense capability in necessary and suffi cient “quality” and “quantity”. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strive to Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) M di T D f P (FY2019 FY2023) (A d b th N ti l S it C il d th C bi t D b 18 2019) ----- reduce the life-cycle costs and improve cost-effectiveness by reinforcing project management. Moreover, the MOD/ SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in cutting-edge technologies. The MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures. 3 Reinforcing Human Resource Base The MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women’s participation and leveraging SDF Reserve Personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment, etc. Cooperation. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacifi c, to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, Japan will promote defense cooperation and exchanges which include joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. 5 Greater Effi ciency and Streamlining in the Build-Up of Defense Capability With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, the SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills, by achieving effi ciency and rationalization. In addition, considering increasingly severe fi scal conditions and the importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, the MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater effi ciency and streamlining in defense force development while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government. 4 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Cooperation Japan will further promote a variety of cooperative activities and consultations with the United States, in a wide range of areas under “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense **4** **Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** The MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) indicates that the SDF will conduct reorganization of its major units and others as described below. **Chapter** The SDF will establish 1 squadron of Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) space domain mission unit for conducting persistent monitoring of situations in space, and ensuring superiority in use of space. The SDF will establish 1 squadron of cyber defense unit as a joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capabilities. The SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from an integrated perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum, and advance efforts to enhance defense capability related to the use of electromagnetic spectrum in each SDF service. In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) will establish 2 squadrons of ballistic missile 1 Joint Operation to Realize Cross-Domain Operations In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations, the SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of the SDF’s capabilities. For the future framework for joint operations, the SDF will consider how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the new domains are operated unitarily, and consider how the integrated structure should be during steady-state to appropriately execute instructions from the Minister. Improvement of electronic warfare biliti f fi ht (F 15) (i Th t t t bl f t (i ) C b C titi (i ----- **Establishment of a Space Domain Mission Unit** The space domain has become vital for the defense of Japan in various aspects, including the early detection of ballistic missile launches, guiding of antiballistic missiles, communication between SDF units, and information gathering. In response, an ASDF space domain mission unit will be established in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in outer space, and to ensure superiority in this domain at all stages, from peacetime to armed contingencies. The space domain mission unit is scheduled for establishment as a unit responsible for the space situation monitoring system of Japan to be established by FY2022. The ASDF will also establish new speciality dedicated to the space domain. **Chapter** **Establishment of a Cyber Defense Unit** Today’s military activities heavily depend on information communication networks. In armed contingencies, it is highly probable that command and communications systems will become targeted by cyber attacks aimed at the weakening of operation execution capabilities. Furthermore, attackers have a huge advantage over defenders in the cyberspace. In light of this situation the NDPG aims to fundamentally strengthen the cyber defense capabilities of the MOD/SDF. To this purpose, the MTDP will establish a cyber defense unit as a joint unit. Currently the Cyber Defense Group that is a joint unit of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF is under the SDF C4 Systems Command. This structure will be reviewed by FY 2023 to newly establish a cyber defense unit as a joint unit directly under the Minister of Defense, the primary duty of which will be cyber defense. The new cyber defense unit will have the capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, an opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack and to train relevant personnel in addition to provide protection against cyber attacks. **Strengthening Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain** The MOD/SDF will strengthen its capabilities in the electromagnetic domain. It is not enough to simply strengthen electronic warfare capabilities (see p.175 “Column: Electronic Warfare”). It is also necessary to acquire and enhance electromagnetic spectrum management capabilities. In modern combat scenes, the electromagnetic spectrum including radio waves is used in various fields, including detection and search for opponent by radar, communication between units, and precise missile guidance. If the use of the electromagnetic spectrum is disrupted, the SDF will not be able to execute its operations appropriately, leading to grave consequences. Causes of obstruction of electromagnetic spectrum use may include weather conditions, interference with the electromagnetic spectrum used by other SDF units, and jamming by opponents. In order to reduce the impact of these factors, it is necessary to grasp the electromagnetic spectrum frequencies available for each SDF unit, correctly instruct which frequencies to use to prevent interference and weather influence and, when disturbed by an opponent, switch to a spectrum less affected by the jamming. Appropriate implementation of these responses is called electromagnetic spectrum management. Electromagnetic spectrum management capabilities are essential for appropriate execution of an electronic warfare. The MOD sets up dedicated departments at the Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning and the Joint Staff Office to accelerate discussions for strengthening of the electromagnetic domain, including electromagnetic spectrum management capabilities. ----- defense (BMD) units. In addition, the ASDF will reorganize surface-to-air guided missile units from 6 fire groups to 4 fire groups while maintaining 24 fire squadrons. The SDF will establish 1 group of maritime transportation unit as Joint Unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy at all stages. 2 GSDF In order to strengthen operation capabilities in new domains, the GSDF will establish cyberspace units and electromagnetic operation units as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command. In order to respond swiftly, and to deter and counter effectively and swiftly with various situations, the GSDF will transform 1 division and 2 brigades respectively into 1 rapid deployment division and 2 rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent steady-state maneuver. In addition, the GSDF will strengthen its defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region by continuing to establish area security units in charge of initial response activities, surface-to-air guided missile units, and surface-to-ship guided missile units. Furthermore, the GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVGP) units for the defense of remote islands. The GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with mobile combat vehicles and disuse of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into newly organized field artillery units under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, the GSDF will reduce its combat helicopter units under the direct command of the respective regional armies and consider the review of their deployment to operate them effectively and efficiently. 3 MSDF For effective prosecution of persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities (ISR), antisubmarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, the MSDF will maintain 4 groups mainly consisting of 1 helicopter destroyer and 2 Aegis-equipped destroyers, and maintain 2 groups consisting of new type of destroyers (FFM) with improved multi-mission capabilities and minesweeping vessels. The MSDF will newly establish surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, the MSDF will establish patrol vessel units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR. Furthermore, by introducing a test submarine, which the type will be changed from an existing submarine, the MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. The MSDF will continue to take measures necessary to increase the number of submarines. **Chapter** New type of destroyer (3,900-ton class) (image) 4 ASDF In order to enhance the air defense posture and operate effectively in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, the ASDF will reorganize 8 warning groups and 20 warning squadrons to 28 warning squadrons and establish 1 airborne early warning (AEW) wing as part of air warning and control units, and take necessary measures to establish 1 squadron of fighter aircraft units. he ASDF will disband 1 squadron of tactical reconnaissance Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Yamada handing over the Regiment Flag to the unit with the retirement of its reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4), d f th 22 d R id D l t R i t (M h 2019) ----- and will establish 1 squadron of aerial refueling/transport units. In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, the ASDF will establish 1 squadron of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit. **5** **Major Programs regarding the SDF’s Capabilities** The MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) states that the SDF will push forward various programs, such as procurement of equipment, according to the matters indicated in the “Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability” in the NDPG as follows. Fighter aircraft (F-35A) **(B) Capabilities in Cyber Domain** The SDF will persistently ensure sufficient security against cyber attacks, and will acquire and strengthen capabilities to disrupt opponent’s use of cyberspace in the event of attack against Japan. See Fig. II-4-1-1 (Programs Related to the “Priorities in See Strengthening Defense Capability”) 1 Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations **(1) Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities in Space, Cyber** **and Electromagnetic Domains** **(A) Capabilities in Space Domain** The SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities necessary for conducting persistent space monitoring and ensuring superiority in use of space. **(C) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain** The MOD/SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities necessary for effective and efficient use of electromagnetic spectrum in the MOD/SDF and for enhancing information gathering and analysis capabilities concerning electromagnetic spectrum and developing an information sharing posture. **Chapter** Fig. II-4-1-1 Programs Related to the “Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability” |Category|Col2|Main Programs| |---|---|---| |Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains|Space domain|○Creation of units specializing in space ○Development of the Space Situational Awareness System| ||Cyber domain|○Enhancement of systems for Cyber Defense Group, etc. ○Improvement of the survivability of SDF’s command and communications systems and networks| ||Electromagnetic domain|○Establishment of new specialized units in internal subdivisions and the Joint Staff Office ○Installation of electronic data collectors and ground radio wave measuring apparatuses| |Traditional domains|Maritime and air domains|○Procurement of new types of destroyers (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH-60K, SH-60K with improved capability), and carrier-borne unmanned aerial vehicles ○Increase of F-35A, introduction of STOVL aircraft, refurbishment of Izumo-type destroyers, and enhancement of abilities of F-15| ||Stand-off defense capability|○Procurement of stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM, and LRASM) ○Promotion of R&D concerning hyper velocity gliding projectiles intended for the defense of remote islands| ||Comprehensive air and missile defense capability|○Procurement of Aegis Ashore ○Enhancement of abilities of Aegis destroyers and Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles| ||Maneuver and deployment capability|○Procurement of transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA), and introduction of new utility helicopters ○Promotion of efforts to obtain cooperation from related local governments for smooth deployment of GSDF Osprey aircraft (V-22)| |Strengthening sustainability and resiliency|Securing continuous operations|○Preferential procurement of anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes, stand-off firepower, and interceptor missiles for ballistic missile defense ○Promotion of efforts for dispersion, recovery from damage, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for the SDF operations| ||Ensuring the operational availability of equipment|○Securing of a sufficient budget for maintenance of equipment ○Expansion of PBL (Performance Based Logistics) and other umbrella contracts| ----- **(2) Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains** **(A) Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains** The SDF will strengthen capabilities necessary for strengthening the posture of persistent ISR and for establishing and maintaining maritime and air superiority. **(B) Stand-Off Defense Capability** The SDF will procure stand-off missiles, which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and will proceed with R&D of equipment such as HVGP intended for the defense of remote islands. **(C) Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability** The SDF will strengthen capabilities for establishing a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of the respective SDF services to counter increasingly diverse and Destroyer JS “Izumo” Stand-off missiles (image) Aegis Ashore (image) **Constructing a Fighter System** Amid the rapid progress of air-capability modernization in other countries, the SDF will build a fighter system to enhance air defense in the airspaces around Japan, including the vast airspace on the Pacifi c side. The following initiatives will be implemented: - Continued procurement of the F-35A in response to the retirement of the F-4 - Replacement of the F-15 (not modernized) by the F-35A and fi ghters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) in order to improve operational fl exibility - Upgrading of the F-15 (modernized), including the enhancement of its electronic warfare capabilities, mounting of stand-off missiles, and strengthening of response to cruise missiles - Launching of a Japan-led development project of future fighters (F-2 successors) at an early timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight **Chapter** |F-|15 (upgraded)| |---|---| |FY|2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043 2048|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |34 F-4s (*1) 102 F-15s (modernized) (*2) 99 F-15s (not modernized) (*3) 91 F-2s|||Number of procu (Procurement was de F-|red: 42 fighters cided in FY2011) 15 (upgraded) “Change 18, 2018 ・F-35A ・42 of th and ver → As ST|||||mber ff| ||||||“Change 18, 2018 ・F-35A ・42 of th and ver → As ST|in the number of pro ) procurement: change em can be replaced tical landing (STOVL) OVL fighters, F-35B w|cured F-35As” (Cabin d from 42 to 147 (incr by fighters that are ca as selected on Augu|et approved on Dece ease by 105) pable of short take-o st 16, 2019|mber ff| ||||||||||| |||||||“Launch a Japan- with the possibi|Future fighte led development p lity of internationa|rs roject at an early t l collaboration in si|iming ght”| Number of procured: 42 fighters (Procurement was decided in FY2011) F-15 (upgraded) “Change in the number of procured F-35As” (Cabinet approved on December 18, 2018) ・F-35A procurement: changed from 42 to 147 (increase by 105) ・42 of them can be replaced by fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) → As STOVL fighters, F-35B was selected on August 16, 2019 Future fighters “Launch a Japan-led development project at an early timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight” *1 F-4s are to retire in 2020. *2 Including eight non-modernized fi ghters *3 Fighters not suitable for modernization ----- Logistics support vessels (LSV) (image) Landing craft utilities (LCU) (image) Type-16 mobile combat vehicles complex airborne threats, thereby providing nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and for simultaneously dealing with multiple, complex airborne threats. **(D) Maneuver and Deployment Capability** The SDF will strengthen capabilities necessary for securing capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations for a wide variety of situations and for improving effective deterrence and counter capabilities. In addition, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to command and coordinate the transport capabilities of each SDF service unilaterally from a steadystate. personnel. The MOD/SDF will raise the early retirement age for SDF personnel, expand reenrollment and promote the utilization of the skills of retired SDF personnel. **(C) Improving Living and Work Environment** The MOD/SDF will strive to make improvements by such means as promoting the securing, reconstruction, and measures against aging and earthquake resistance for barracks and housing, as well as renewing aged daily life/ workplace fixtures and steadily securing the necessary quantities of daily necessities. **Chapter** **(D) Promotion of Work Style Reforms** The MOD/SDF will promote initiatives for ensuring proper work-life balance as well as measures supporting families of military personnel. **(E) Enhancing Education** The MOD/SDF will strive to enhance the content and organizational structure of the education and training at each SDF service and the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ), and take necessary measures after considering the ideal education and research regarding joint operations. In order to further promote mutual reinforcement between each SDF service, the MOD/SDF will strive to standardize the curriculum. **(3) Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency** **(A) Securing Continuous Operations** In order to be able to operate units continuously at all stages, the SDF will promote measures necessary for securing ammunition and fuel and protecting infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. With regard to ammunition, the SDF will prioritize to procure the required ammunition while taking account of the needs of joint operation. (B) Ensuring the Operational Availability of Equipment In order to be able to swiftly and effectively respond to various situations, the MOD/SDF will promote measures for ensuring high operational availability of procured equipment. 2 Priorities in Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability **(1) Reinforcing Human Resource Base** **(A) Enhancement of Recruitment Initiatives** The MOD/SDF will proceed with measures towards expanding the recruitment of non-fixed term enlisted personnel and expanding the source for prospects including university graduates. The MOD/SDF will also enhance recruiting advertisement and recruiting systems. **(F) Improving Treatment and Re-employment Support** The MOD/SDF will promote improving measures concerning honors and privileges and welfare of SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by such means as promoting the further utilization of retired SDF Personnel in the disaster preventionrelated departments of local governments and others while expanding vocational training subjects. **(G) Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel including Candidates** **for SDF Reserve Personnel** The MOD/SDF will promote the use of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel in broader areas and opportunities. In addition, the MOD/SDF will also increase **(B) Effective Utilization of Human Resources** The MOD/SDF will promote women’s active participation and proceed with the establishment of the foundations for the education, living and work environment for female SDF ----- the number of enrollees as Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel. **(2) Reviewing Equipment Structure** The MOD/SDF will strengthen the functions of the Joint Staff in order to build an effective and rational equipment structure from a joint operation perspective. The MOD/SDF will also develop equipment with multiple functional variants, optimize and standardize specifications of equipment, jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services, reduce types of aircraft, suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness. In order to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost, the MOD/SDF will actively promote initiatives towards automation and manpower saving through such means as the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) in various fields, the procurement of UAVs, R&D of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and streamlining in design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines. undertake more appropriate cost calculation. The MOD/SDF will also conduct the procurement of information systems at appropriate price levels. The MOD/SDF will also promote the utilization of a planned acquisition method that contributes to effective procurement, efficient sustainment and maintenance, including the expansion of PBL and other umbrella contracts, competition among domestic and foreign companies, and initiatives towards the streamlining of procurement through Foreign Military Sales (FMS procurement). **(5) Strengthening Defense Industrial Base** The Government will actively take measures such as introducing the competition principle to Japan’s defense industry, which is in a poor competitive environment, incorporating the knowledge, expertise, and technology of the civilian sector, and strengthening the supply chains of equipment. Meanwhile, in order for the Government as a whole to promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, the Government will take various measures, such as making necessary improvements in implementation or related rules, promoting public-private partnerships, and strengthening technology control, intellectual property management, and information security measures. In addition, the MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process efficient and thorough cost reduction, and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures. **Chapter** **(3) Reinforcing Technology Base** The MOD/SDF will make focused investments in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing cutting-edge technologies. In addition, the MOD/SDF will significantly shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its process such as for HVGP for the defense of remote islands, etc. The MOD/SDF will work actively to leverage potentially dual-use, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. **(4) Optimizing Equipment Procurement** The MOD/SDF will enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment lifecycles through efforts, including application of a competitive bidding process and more rigorous cost management, and expand items subject to project management while promoting proper criteria to examine the specifications and project plans and their application in order to further facilitate effective and efficient acquisition of equipment. Regarding the cost estimation of equipment without market prices, the MOD/SDF is eager to develop and place human resources for appropriate assignment by making use of human resources from the private sector, and promote development of a database of cost and such in order to **(6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** The MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing Information Gathering Satellites and commercial satellites, and using new equipment such as long-endurance UAVs. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will also strive to effectively develop and connect systems that will promote information sharing. The MOD/SDF will promote securing and training of highly capable personnel handling information collection and analysis. The MOD/SDF will make every effort to ensure information security, and will strengthen counter-intelligence capability within the MOD/SDF. ----- 3 Large-Scale Disasters 6 Elements Supporting Defense Capability **(1) Training and Exercises** The SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan and conduct effective training and exercises. The SDF will also facilitate to expand joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with the SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the United States and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-ofgovernment approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. **(2) Medical Care** In order to respond to various situations, the SDF will strive to enhance the capacity to rapidly deploy medical bases and conduct Damage Control Surgery (DCS) to stabilize the symptoms of patients, and the capacity to manage patients being sent back as part of strengthening the system to seamlessly cover the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations including the perspective of joint operations. In order to conduct the control and coordination regarding medical operations of the SDF on a steady-state basis, the SDF will strive to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff. The SDF will further promote the upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions, and will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to better secure the number of medical officers. In addition, the MOD/SDF will proceed with the establishment of hygienic education and training foundations common to each SDF service that are necessary to improve medical care capabilities for combat injuries. The SDF will promote measures to strengthen the response posture including the deployment of drones for disasters, a helicopter satellite communication system (HeliSat), lifesaving systems, and emergency power sources. 4 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance Japan will continue to promote cooperation in space and cyber domains, comprehensive air and missile defense, joint training and exercises and joint ISR activities. Japan will also further deepen Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in various areas such as formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In order for Japan and the U.S. to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will advance efforts for standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, sharing of various networks, building capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment and initiatives for intelligence cooperation /information security. To efficiently improve Japanese and the U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S equipment through optimized FMS procurement and Japan-U.S. joint R&D. Furthermore, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use of SDF and U.S force facilities, and efforts for improved resiliency. In order to make the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily secure Host Nation Support (HNS). **Chapter** 5 Strengthening Security Cooperation In line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In particular, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues and exchanges among military branches, in order to improve interoperability with relevant countries and to strengthen Japan’s presence, Japan will appropriately combine and strategically implement specific initiatives such as joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and capacity building assistance, while taking characteristics and situation specific to each region and country into account. **(3) Collaboration with Local Communities** The MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities, and will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities. Upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases, the MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics, so as ----- Fig. II-4-1-2 Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023) and Unit Prices of the Equipment Items Listed on the Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023) |Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)|Col2|Col3|Unit Prices of the Equipment Items Listed on the Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)| |---|---|---|---| |Service|Equipment|Quantity|Unit prices| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles New Utility Helicopters Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore) Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|134 29 34 3 3 companies 5 companies 2 30 40|Approx. 0.8 billion yen (*2) Approx. 1.8 billion yen Approx. 8.9 billion yen Approx. 5.6 billion yen (*4) Approx. 14.3 billion (*4) yen Approx. 122.4 billion yen Approx. 1.5 billion yen Approx. 0.7 billion yen| |MSDF|Destroyers Submarines Patrol Vessels Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability)) Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)|10 5 4 4 23 (Approx. 66,000 tons) 12 13 3 1|Approx. 47.6 billion yen Approx. 64.7 billion yen (*2) (*5) ― ― Approx. 22.1 billion yen Approx. 7.3 billion yen (*2) (*2) Approx. 7.3 billion yen| |ASDF|Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-2D) Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Upgrade (F-15) Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A) Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)|9 45 20 4 5 4 groups (16 fire squadrons) 1|Approx. 26.2 billion yen Approx. 11.6 billion yen Approx. 3.5 billion yen Approx. 24.9 billion yen Approx. 22.3 billion yen Approx. 4.5 billion yen (*6) Approx. 17.3 billion (*7) yen| 1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the “NDPG for FY2019 and beyond”, but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the “MTDP (FY2019-FY2023).” 2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs. **Chapter** *1 Prices are on a contract basis (prices for FY2018) and are the MOD’s estimates as of the time of establishing the MTDP. *2 Information on equipment items under development and equipment items, etc. subject to model selection (including STOVL fighter aircraft) is not disclosed, as information disclosure may affect the proper acquisition of these equipment items in the future. *3 The quantity of surface-to-ship guided missiles includes that of improved ones under development. *4 Regarding surface-to-ship guided missiles and mid-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the maximum unit prices are indicated, as unit prices vary by acquisition year due to differences in components. *5 Other ships are minesweeping vessels, ocean surveillance ships, and oceanographic research ships, and their unit prices are approximately 16.2 billion yen, 22.1 billion yen, and 20.3 billion yen, respectively. *6 Assembly cost for 16 fire squadrons is scheduled to be allocated during the period of the MTDP. The unit price above is for one fire squadron. *7 Assembly cost for one Global Hawk is scheduled to be allocated during the period of the MTDP. to be able to gain the understanding of the local governments and residents. **(4) Intellectual Base** The MOD/SDF will strive to dispatch instructors to educational institutions and hold public symposiums so as to enable the public to recognize knowledge and information about securities policies accurately, and will also endeavor to provide efficient and highly trustworthy information. The MOD/SDF will also expand networks and institutional collaboration with research and education organizations, universities, and think-tanks in Japan and abroad in order to ----- further strengthen the research system of the MOD/SDF with roles. the National Institute for Defense Studies playing central **6** **Quantities of Major Procurement** The Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in 5 above. **7** **Expenditures** The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in the MTDP (FY2019– FY2023) amount to approximately ¥27.47 trillion in FY2018 prices. For the duration of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023), in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this MTDP is expected to be around approximately ¥25.5 trillion over the next five years. Concerning the budgetary process for each fiscal year, in order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from See Fig. II-4-1-2 (Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023) and See Unit Prices of the Equipment Items Listed on the Annex Table of the MTDP (FY2019-FY2023)) the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue flexible and swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fiscal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fiscal conditions among other budgets. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this MTDP will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17,170 billion in FY2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project efficiency such as maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately. The MTDP (FY2019–FY2023) will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions. **Chapter** **8** **Other** In “Other” section of the MTDP (FY2019–FY2023), it is stipulated that Japan will steadily implement specific measures stipulated in “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” and other SCC (Security Consultative Committee) documents and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa while maintaining U.S. Forces deterrence. ----- **Section** **2** **Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2019** In FY2019, which is the first fiscal year for implementing the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will steadily build up its defense capability as a truly effective defense capability toward building a Multi-domain Defense Force. In particular, in order to realize cross-domain operations, the MOD/SDF is acquiring and strengthening capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. In addition, the MOD/SDF is enhancing capabilities in maritime and air domains, standoff defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability, and maneuver and deployment capability, in order to effectively deal with various situations by employing them in combination with the capabilities in the new domains. Moreover, in addition to enhancing the sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support, Japan gives priority to reinforcing the human resource base in light of the aging population with a declining birth rate and reinforcing the technology base due to advances in military technologies. The MOD/SDF is also strengthening the JapanU.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries in view of changes in the security environment. At the same time, in this process, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past and by allocating resources flexibly and intensively. Furthermore, the MOD/ SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding a stove-piped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment. In addition, considering the increasingly severe fiscal conditions and other factors, Japan will strictly work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining. See Fig. II-4-2-1 (Main Projects of Build-up of Defense See Capabilities for FY2019) **Chapter** ----- Fig. II-4-2-1 Main Projects in Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2019 X-band defense communications satellite (image) Enhancement and strengthening of a cyber system (image) **Chapter** Enhancement of electronic warfare abilities of fi ghter aircraft (F-15) Fighters (F-35A) Izumo-type destroyer Gliding warhead Rocket motor Hyper velocity gliding projectiles intended for the defense of remote islands (image) |Category|Main Programs|Col3| |---|---|---| |Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations|Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in domains of space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum|● Acquisition of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System; ● Utilization of satellite communications including the improvement of X-band satellite communications functions; ● Utilization of commercial imaging satellite and weather satellite information; ● Enhancement and strengthening of Cyber Defense Group; ● Development of Defense Information Infrastructure (DII); ● Procurement of cyber information collection devices; ● Enhancement of electronic warfare abilities of fi ghter aircraft (F-15); ● Acquisition of the Network Electronic Warfare System; ● Sharing of electronic warfare information from the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) and enhancement of the system’s information processing capacity| ||Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains|● Construction of destroyers and submarines; ● Acquisition of long-endurance UAVs (Global Hawk); ● Acquisition of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D); ● Organization of new AEW wings; ● Acquisition of fighter aircraft (F-35A); ● Enhancement of abilities of fighter aircraft (F-15); ● Research and studies for refurbishment of Izumo-type destroyers; ● Acquisition of stand-off missiles; ● Research on hyper velocity gliding projectiles intended for the defense of remote islands; ● Procurement of a land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore); ● Acquisition of SM-3 Block IIA and SM-3 Block IB; ● Refurbishment to enhance abilities of Atago-type destroyers; ● Refurbishment, etc. of the Patriot System; ● Acquisition of type-16 mobile combat vehicles; ● Acquisition of new utility helicopters (UH-X)| ||Strengthening sustainability and resiliency|● Procurement of ammunition (anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes) necessary for ensuring air and maritime superiority; ● Acquisition of equipment necessary for enhancing abilities to restore damaged runways; ● Procurement of oil carriers; ● Renovation of old SDF facilities; ● Ensuring of a steady budget necessary for maintenance| |Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability|Reinforcing human resource base|● Promotion of measures for securing excellent personnel, encouraging women’s participation, and achieving a work-life balance; ● Strengthening of education and research systems for National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ), and National Defense Medical College, etc.; ● Reinforcement of medical functions| ||Reinforcing technology base, etc.|● Promotion of R&D toward early practical use of equipment; ● Promotion of intensive research in promising technology fields for ensuring technological superiority; ● Implementation of initiatives for strengthening project management in consideration of joint operation and development of product families; ● Promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation; ● Promotion of measures for strengthening and maintaining Japan’s defense production and technology infrastructure| ||Enhancing intelligence capabilities|● Enhancement of the defense attache system; ● Strengthening of information gathering and analysis capacity; ● Development of a common base for the intelligence headquarters| |Responses to large-scale disasters||● Strengthening and maintenance of functions of SDF garrisons and bases, which serve as response bases upon a disaster; ● Training for fostering SDF personnel’s abilities to respond to large-scale and extraordinary disasters; ● Acquisition of equipment for disaster response measures| |Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance and measures concerning U.S. bases in Japan||● Steady implementation of measures for relocation of U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam and realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan; ● Promotion of measures targeting areas near U.S. bases and measures for ensuring smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan| |Reinforcement of security cooperation||● Promotion of initiatives, such as joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchanges in order to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, in line with the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacifi c| |Actions based on the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience||● Procurement of SDF’s disaster prevention-related equipment; ● Measures against aging and earthquake resistance for SDF facilities| |Initiatives for increasing the effi ciency of procurement||● Reduction of the budget for equipment procurement by around 415.9 billion yen through promoting various measures for further streamlining and increasing effi ciency of the procurement process as a whole| |Other||● Organization of new AEW wings; ● Increase of the actual number of SDF personnel; ● Establishment of new position of Public Records Management Offi cer (provisional), etc.| ----- **Section** **3** **Defense-Related Expenditures** **1** **Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures** Defense-related expenditures include expenses for improving defense capabilities and maintaining and managing the SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the implementation of measures against neighborhood affairs in the vicinity of defense facilities. In comparison with the previous fiscal year, defense-related expenditures for FY2019 were increased by 68.2 billion yen to 5.007 trillion yen, rising for the seventh consecutive year. When including expenses related to SACO and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/ reduction, and national resilience, defense-related expenditures were increased by 66.3 billion yen from the previous fiscal year to 5.2574 trillion yen. Additionally, the first supplementary budget for FY2018 contains an appropriation of 54.7 billion yen as necessary expenses for the SDF’s disaster relief and necessary expenses for restoration of SDF facilities, in response to the heavy rain in July 2018. Meanwhile, the second supplementary budget contains an appropriation of 399.8 billion yen as expenses, including those for securing stable operations of the SDF in order to deal with the security environment surrounding Japan and frequent natural disasters. See Fig. II-4-3-1 (Comparison Between FY2018 Budget and See FY2019 Budget) Fig. II-4-3-2 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial Budget] Over the Past 15 Years) Fig. II-4-3-1 Comparison Between FY2018 Budget and FY2019 Budget (100 million yen) |Category|Col2|FY2018|FY2019 Fiscal YOY growth (▲indicates negative growth)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||Fiscal YOY growth (▲indicates negative growth)| |Annual expenditure (note)||49,388|50,070|682 （1.4％）| ||Personnel and food provisions|21,850|21,831|△19 （△0.1％）| ||Material expenses|27,538|28,239|701 （2.5％）| |Future obligation (note)||49,221|51,627|2,406 （4.9％）| ||New contracts|19,938|24,013|4,074 （20.4％）| ||Existing contracts|29,283|27,615|△1,668 （△5.7％）| Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expense for the introduction of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft), and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience. If these are included, the figures are 5,191.1 billion yen for FY2018 and 5,257.4 billion yen for FY2019; and for future obligation, 5,076.8 billion yen for FY2018 and 5,361.3 billion yen for FY2019. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding. **Chapter** Fig. II-4-3-2 Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures [Initial Budget] Over the Past 15 Years (100 million) 51,000 **50,070** 50,000 **48,996** 49,000 **49,388** **48,607** **48,297** **48,221** 48,000 **47,815** **47,838** **47,903** **47,426** **47,028** 47,000 **46,826** **46,453** **46,804** **46,625** 46,000 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 (FY) Note: The fgures above do not include SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expenses for the introduction of new government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience. Including these expenses, total defense-related expenditures were as follows: 4,856.0 billion yen in FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen in FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen in FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen in FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen in FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen in FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen in FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen in FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen in FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen in FY2014, 4,980.1 billion yen in FY2015, 5 054 1 billion yen in FY2016 5 125 1 billion yen in FY2017 5 191 1 billion yen in FY2018 and 5 257 4 billion yen in FY 2019 ----- **2** **Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures** Defense-related expenditures are broadly classifi ed into “personnel and food provision expenses,” which covers items such as wages and meals for SDF personnel, and “material expenses,” which fi nance the repair and maintenance of equipment, the purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel and the procurement of equipment and others. Material expenses are further classifi ed into “obligatory outlay expenses,”[1] which are paid based on contracts concluded in previous fi scal years, and “general material expenses,” which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as “program expenses,” and since general material expenses include repair costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of fuel, they are referred to also as “activity expenses.” The MOD terms this classifi cation method as “classifi cation by expenses.” Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. The remaining 20% of the budget includes spending for repairing equipment and for implementing measures to alleviate the impact on local communities hosting U.S. bases Fig. II-4-3-3 Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Concerning New Contracts FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 **Chapter** FY2015 FY2016 |Contract|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||| ||| |F|F|FY 201|19|Col5|FY 2020|FY 2021|FY 2022| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Co O exp G|Co|ntract|||||Payment ↓ Obligatory outlay xpenses paid in part (6 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses| |||||ex|↓ Obligatory outlay penses paid in part e (1 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses|↓ Obligatory outlay xpenses paid in part e (2 billion yen) Obligatory outlay expenses|| |||||||bligation (9 billion|| ||||||Future o mount of contract (||| |||A||||10 billion yen)|| |Contract|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||OObbllii|| |||| Personnel and foodand food provisionsprovisions expensesexpenses （（43.643.6％）％） Amount of future obligation When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond under such contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years. FY 2019 FY 2020 FY 2021 FY 2022 Contract Payment ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay expenses paid in part expenses paid in part expenses paid in part expenses paid in part (1 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (2 billion yen) (6 billion yen) General material Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay expenses expenses expenses expenses Future obligation (9 billion yen) Amount of contract (10 billion yen) outlayoutlay FY2017 FY2018 Existing contracts New contracts |Contract|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||eexxppee|| |||| |||| Future obligation |Contract （（3366|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||..88％％））| ||| ContractContract GeneralGeneral materialmaterial expensesexpenses (activity(activity Material expenses on contract basis expenses)expenses) （（19.619.6％）％） |Personnel and food provisions expenses|Col2|Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement allowance, meals in barracks, etc.| |---|---|---| |Material expenses (program expenses) Obligatory outlay expenses General material expenses (activity expenses)||Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan| ||Obligatory outlay expenses|Expenses paid in FY2019 based on contracts made before FY2018| ||General material expenses (activity expenses)|Expenses paid in FY2019 based on contracts made in FY2019| Structure of Defense-related Expenditures Annual expenditure Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses and material expenses (program expenses). Personnel and Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement food provisions expenses allowance, meals in barracks, etc. Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; facilities Material expenses improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and (program expenses) supplies; technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan Obligatory Expenses paid in FY2019 based on contracts made outlay expenses before FY2018 General material expenses Expenses paid in FY2019 based on contracts made in (activity expenses) FY2019 Some projects for build-up of defense capabilities extend over multiple years. In these cases, the fi scal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fi scal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, the future maximum obligation is allocated to the budget as a contract resulting in a Treasury obligation (type of budget that only grants an authority to incur obligations; the contracts can be concluded, but the payment cannot be made). Based on such budgeting, in the fi scal year in which the construction is completed or the equipment is procured, expenses necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure, in principle (type of budget that grants authorities to incur obligations and make payment; the contracts can be concluded and the payment can be made). Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fi scal years is called “obligatory outlay expenses,” while expenditure for future fi scal years is termed “future obligation”. For cases where a continued project over multiple years is necessary, there is also a system of continuing expenditure as a means to grant the authority to incur obligations and make payment over multiple years by obtaining a resolution of the Diet integrally for the total cost and the amounts f l i t ll t f th j t i d ----- Fig. II-4-3-4 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2019) R&D 2.6％ Other 1.4％ Facility development 2.8％ Base measures Personnel and 8.9％ food provisions 43.6％ By purpose Procurement of equipment, etc. of use 16.6％ Other General materials19.6％（9,808） Maintenance, etc.24.0％ 16.7％（8,361） GSDF ［△1.4％］ 36.8％（18,450） Personnel and By By expense food provisions organization 43.6％（21,831） ASDF ［△0.1％］ 22.0％（11,012） Obligatory outlays 36.8％（18,431） MSDF ［4.8％］ 24.5％（12,247） Notes: 1 ( ) is the budget amount; unit: 100 million yen. 2 The above figure does not include SACO-related expenses (25.6 billion yen), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (167.9 billion yen), expense for the introduction of new government aircraft (6.2 billion yen), and expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience (50.8 billion yen). 3 Figures in square brackets [ ] indicate year-on-year growth rate (%). **Chapter** in Japan. As such, a high percentage of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes. For this reason, the breakdown of the defense-related expenditures cannot be easily altered in a significant manner on a single-year basis. See Fig. II-4-3-3 (Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Concerning New Contracts) such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Consequently, for such items, a procedure is undertaken whereby a multi-year contract is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the contract that payments will be made in the following fiscal year and beyond (within five years, in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following fiscal year and beyond, based on such a multi-year contract, is called the amount of future obligation. The amount of future obligation concerning new contracts arising in FY2019 increased from the previous fiscal year by 407.4 billion yen (20.4%). Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis,[3] which shows the scale of operations, there is an increase from the previous fiscal year of 393.4 billion yen (13.2%). See Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (Project Management Throughout Its Life-Cycle) Personnel and food provision expenses were decreased by 1.9 billion yen from the previous fiscal year, while obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased by 84.1 billion yen. General material expenses decreased by 14.1 billion yen from the previous fiscal year.[2] See Fig. II-4-3-4 (Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2019)) Reference 12 (Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures [Original Budget Basis]) In addition to the annual budget expenditure, the amount of future obligations concerning new contracts also indicates payments for the following year and beyond (the amount of future obligation arising in the applicable fiscal year). In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings 2 The comparison with the previous year concerns expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses, the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities), expense for the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft, and expenses for the three-year emergency measure for disaster prevention/reduction, and national resilience. The same applies hereinafter in regard to this section. 3 The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (program expenses) that are to be t t d i th li bl fi l d t b id i th fi l d b d Th t i 3 3821 t illi i FY2019 ----- **3** **Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement** Under the former MTDP, the MOD achieved cost reduction of approximately 771 billion yen from FY2014 to FY2018 through the following measures: (1) utilization of long-term contracts; (2) review of maintenance methods; (3) use of civilian goods and review of specifications; (4) bulk purchase of equipment; and (5) scrutiny of the prime cost. In order to achieve further streamlining and rationalization in the build-up of defense capability, the current MTDP sets forth that the MOD will also carry out (6) suspension of the use of equipment whose importance has decreased and review of projects of low cost-effectiveness, in addition to the five measures above. In the FY2019 budget, the MOD aims to realize a cost reduction of approximately 415.9 billion yen by implementing the aforementioned streamlining measures. Concrete initiatives introduced in the FY2019 budget are as follows. - A reduction of approximately 35.6 billion yen by making over five-years long-term contracts of bulk-purchase of PAC-3 missile components (procured over ten fiscal years) and bulk-procurement of nine E-2D airborne early warning aircraft (procured over seven fiscal years). - A reduction of approximately 15.3 billion yen through review of maintenance methods, such as consolidating hardware and software. - A reduction of approximately 33.8 billion yen by using civilian goods and reviewing specifications of equipment from the viewpoint of cost-effectiveness, such as developing digital learning materials for education to be used in place of learning materials using actual equipment. - A reduction of approximately 16.3 billion yen through bulk purchase of equipment in a single fiscal year, which could **4** **Comparison with Other Countries** It is not possible to accurately compare the amounts of defense expenditures of countries due to a number of factors: there is no internationally unified definition of defense expenditures in the first place; even if defense expenditures were publicly disclosed, their overall amount or their breakdown is sometimes unclear; and the budget system varies by country. On such basis, if Japan’s defense-related expenditures and those of other countries officially published by each government were converted into dollar amounts, using the purchasing power parity[4] of each country reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the results would be as shown in Fig. II-4-3-5 (The Fig. II-4-3-5 The Defense Budgets of Major Countries (2018) (100 million USD) Defense budgets as % of GDP 8,000 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 |Col1|Defense budgets (100 million USD) Defense budgets as % of GDP|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Japan|U. S.|China|Russia|ROK|Australia|UK|France|Germany| |Defense budgets|494|6,007|3,098|1,085|506|253|523|558|513| |Defense budgets as % of GDP|0.90|2.93|1.25|2.77|2.42|1.91|1.70|1.82|1.14| |(Reference) Percentages of GDP based on defense budgets published by NATO|‒|3.39|‒|‒|‒|‒|2.15|1.82|1.23| Notes: 1. Defense budgets are based on those officially published by each country and are in US dollars while referring to each country’s purchasing power parity for FY2018 as published by the OECD (officially published rate as of June 2019). 1 US dollar = 100.074597 yen, 3.572570 yuan, 26.059744 rubles, 852.694385 won, 1.434276 Australian dollars, 0.688818 pounds, 0.765686 French euros, and 0.751570 German euros 2. The percentage of GDP is calculated based on defense budgets officially published by each country (in local currency) while referring to the GDP of each country published by the IMF (in local currency). 3. As defense budgets published by NATO (which include pensions for retired veterans, etc.) may differ from those officially published by each country, the percentage of GDP based on defense budgets published by NATO (in March 2019) does not necessarily coincide with the percentage of GDP calculated based on defense budgets officially published by each country. lead to a reduction in the total expenses. - A reduction of approximately 112.9 billion yen by pursuing cost reduction through initiatives such as scrutinizing the cost of major equipment, etc. by verifying the appropriateness of the material costs and man-hours involved. - A reduction of approximately 202 billion yen through review of acquisition methods, such as importing completed F-35A aircraft. **Chapter** Defense Budgets of Major Countries). See Part I, Chapter 2 (Defense Policies of Countries) Reference 13 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries) In addition, Fig. II-4-3-6 (Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of Japan’s neighboring countries over the past ten years. A gauge that measures each country’s ability to purchase goods and services by taking into account their respective price levels. Although there also exists a method of converting their defense expenditures into dollar amounts at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense expenses calculated in this way do not necessarily reflect the precise value based on h t ’ i l l ----- Fig. II-4-3-6 Changes in Defense Budgets in Major Countries Over the Past Ten Years (Times) 3.50 Japan 3.00 U.S. Russia Russia2.62 times 2.50 China ROK China2.52 times 2.00 Australia ROK1.61 times Australia1.45 times 1.50 Japan1.06 times 1.00 U.S.1.02 times 0.50 0.00 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Notes: The ratios (rounded to two decimal places) of respective countries’ officially publicized defense budgets for FY2010 onward when considering their defense budgets for FY2009 as 1 **Chapter** ----- **Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and** **the SDF Activities since Legislation’s Enforcement** ### 5 **Section** **1** **Background to the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security** **1** **Background to the Development of Legislation** The security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly severe, and we are now in an era where threats could easily spread beyond national borders, and no country can maintain its own security only by itself any longer. Against this background, it is first and foremost important to advance vibrant diplomacy in order to maintain peace and security of Japan, and ensure its survival, as well as to secure its people’s lives. However, at the same time, it is also necessary to prepare for the worst-case scenario. Specifically, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts beforehand and prevent threats from reaching Japan by appropriately developing, maintaining and operating Japan’s own defense capability, strengthening mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan’s ally, and other partner countries, and in particular, further elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the peace and stability of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihoods of its people under any situation and **2** **Background and Signifi cance of the Development of Legislature** Following the aforementioned Cabinet Decision, a legislation drafting team was launched under the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat. In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Force (SDF) established “The Study Committee on the Development of Security Legislation” with the Minister of Defense as its Chairman, and conducted the deliberations towards the development of security legislation. The deliberations in the contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses. In May 2014, following a report submitted by the Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security[1] In May 2014, following a report submitted by the Advisory Panel on the Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security1 and in accordance with the basic orientation for the way that further deliberations would take place as presented by Prime Minister Abe, discussions were held in the ruling parties and studies were also conducted by the Government. Following this, in July 2014, a Cabinet Decision was made on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” which set forth the basic policy for the development of legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations. See Reference 14 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People) **Chapter** Government were conducted based on the discussions at a total of 25 meetings in the ruling parties, and, on May 14, 2015, the Government made Cabinet Decisions on two bills, the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security[2] and the International Peace Support Bill.[3] The two bills were then submitted to the 189th ordinary session of the Diet on May 15, 2015. These two bills enable seamless responses to any In February 2013, Prime Minister Abe resumed the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, which had been held during the fi rst Abe Cabinet. Following a total of seven meetings, the Advisory Panel submitted its report to Prime Minister Abe in May 2014. Bill for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community Bill Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for Peace and S it ----- Fig. II-5-1-1 Layout of the Legislation for Peace and Security **Peace and Security Legislation Development Act** （Bundling together partial amendments to the existing laws） **Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security: Law Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for** Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community 1. Self-Defense Forces Law 2. International Peace Cooperation Act Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations 3. Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan → Changed to Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security 4. Ship Inspection Operations Act Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations 5. Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation 6. U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Act → Changed to the U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation 7. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities Law Concerning the Use of Specific Public Facilities and Others in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs 8. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation 9. Prisoners of War Act Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation 10. Act for Establishment of the National Security Council **New enactment (one)** **International Peace Support Act: Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International** Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security situations, from the protection of assets including weapons of units of the U.S. Forces and armed forces of foreign countries during peacetime, support activities to armed forces of foreign countries, etc., in situations that have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security and situations that the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security, to the limited use of the right of collective self-defense as a measure for self-defense to the minimum extent necessary to defend Japan when the “Three New Conditions”[4] are satisfied. They are essential for Japan to secure the lives and peaceful livelihoods of its people. Following the longest extension of a Diet session in the postwar, the longest Diet debate of security-related bills in the postwar period was conducted, constituting about 116 hours of debate in the House of Representatives and about 100 hours of debate in the House of Councillors, totaling about 216 hours. As a result, the two bills were passed at a plenary session of the House of Councillors and enacted on September 19, 2015, upon formation of a broad consensus, with approval of not only the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and Komeito but also the three opposition parties of the then Assembly to Energize Japan, the then Party for Future Generations and the then New Renaissance Party (altogether five parties out of the ten political parties). 4 S Ch t 1 S ti 2 Just before the passage, these five parties reached the “Agreement Concerning the Legislation for Peace and Security” (the “Five-Party Agreement”), which include matters that should be taken into consideration in judging the applicability of the Three New Conditions related to the recognition of a “survival-threatening situation,” and committed them to obtaining a conclusion on the shape of a Diet organization for the constant surveillance and post— verification of SDF activities based on the Legislation for Peace and Security, and the strengthening of the Diet’s involvement. The Government also made a Cabinet Decision to the effect that the Government will respect the Five-Party Agreement and handle these matters appropriately. The Legislation for Peace and Security was put into force on March 29, 2016. With the security environment surrounding Japan becoming increasingly severe, the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security has a historical significance. The legislation, which enables the SDF to provide protection and logistic support to U.S. naval vessels engaged in ballistic missile defense, helps strengthen the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, thereby further ensuring the peace and security of Japan through making more proactive contributions to the peace and **Chapter** ----- **Chapter** **The Relationship between the Legislation for Peace and Security and the** **Constitution** The “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution **●When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close** relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; **●�When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its** people; and **●�Use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary,** only when the Three New Conditions above are satisfied. Even for the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions, the basic logic of the constitutional interpretation presented in the Governmental view of 1972 (below) has not changed: **●�** The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit the “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of all peoples of the world) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all of the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of selfdefense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. **●Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful** situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, the “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted.  Furthermore, the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions remains within the scope of the Supreme Court decision on the Sunagawa Case. The Supreme Court decision states that **●“it must be pointed out that it is natural for Japan, in the exercise of powers inherent in a state, to take measures for** self-defense that may be necessary to maintain its peace and security, and to ensure its survival.”  In other words, the decision can be interpreted as recognizing that Japan should be able to take “measures for selfdefense” to maintain its peace and security and ensure its survival after stating that Japan has the right to self-defense, without making a distinction between the right to individual self-defense and the right to collective self-defense.  As the Legislation for Peace and Security, which reflects the Three New Conditions described above in just proportion, maintains the basic logic of the constitutional interpretation hitherto presented by the Government and remains within the scope of the Sunagawa Case decision by the Supreme Court, the only institution endowed with the power to finally determine the constitutional interpretation, it is consistent with the Constitution. stability of the region and the international community. The Legislation has been highly appraised around the world.[5] This fact clearly shows that the Legislation contributes to the peace and stability of the region and the international community. See Fig. II-5-1-1 (Structure of the Legislation for Peace and Security) The Legislation for Peace and Security has been drawing understanding and support not only from Japan’s ally, the U.S., but also from Australia, countries of the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, th Middl E t Af i d S th A i ll A i ti f S th t A i N ti (ASEAN) th E U i (EU) d th U it d N ti (UN) ----- **Section** **2** **Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security** This section gives an outline of a full picture of the framework for the Government’s responses to various contingencies as well as the main operations of the SDF including the new activities the SDF can now engage in after the streamlining **1** **Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations** The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation[2] specifies items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) regarding responses to Armed Attack Situation and Anticipated Armed Attack Situation, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations as well as the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack. Previously, the aforementioned legislation stipulated responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc. However, considering the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, a “Survival-Threatening Situation” was newly added to the situations to which Japan is to respond as an armed attack since even if it occurs against a foreign country it could threaten Japan’s survival as well, depending on its purpose, scale and manner. Following this, the SDF Law was also amended to define responses to such a situation as one of the SDF’s primary duties as unavoidable self-defense measures for Japan’s defense along with some other changes. of the Legislation for Peace and Security.[1] See Reference 15 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) See Reference 16 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units of occurrence of an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that support this confirmation b. When the situation is confirmed as an Armed Attack Situation, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the reason why there are no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation **(2) An Overall Plan to Respond to the Armed Attack Situations,** **etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation** **(3) Important Matters Related to the Response Measures** See Fig. II-5-2-1 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack See Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation) **Chapter** **KEY WORD** Armed Attack Situation and Anticipated Armed Attack Situation - An armed attack situation means a situation where an armed attack against Japan from outside has occurred or an imminent and clear danger of the armed attack against Japan is acknowledged. - An anticipated armed attack situation means a situation where an armed attack has yet to occur, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is anticipated. (These situations are referred to as “Armed Attack Situation, etc.” collectively.) **KEY WORD** Survival-Threatening Situation A Survival-Threatening Situation means a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses a clear risk of threatening Japan’s survival and of overturning people’s rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness fundamentally. 1 Armed Attack Situations, etc. and Survival-Threatening Situations **(1) Basic Response Plan etc.** In situations such as an Armed Attack Situations, etc., or a Survival-Threatening Situation, the Government is required to adopt the Basic Response Plan, which includes the following items, and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, once the Basic Response Plan is adopted, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, to implement these measures. **(1) The Following Items concerning Situations that Need to** **Be Dealt with:** a. Sequence of the event the situation, the confirmation In addition to the ones explained in this section, see Reference 17 for the other conditions in which inflicting injury on a person is permitted. Following the addition of a Survival-Threatening Situation, the title of the Act was revised from the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, t d S i l Th t i Sit ti ” ----- Fig. II-5-2-1 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation **Chapter** Occurrence of armed attack, etc. Creation of a draft basic response plan (1) Formulation of the draft basic response plan by the Prime Minister The Government National Security Council (2) The draft basic response plan sent to Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Consultation the National Security Council for deliberation (3) Recommendation by the National Security Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning Recommendation Council to the Prime Minister concerning Specialized assistance to National Security Council the draft basic response plan Cabinet decision on the basic response plan (4) Cabinet decision on the basic response plan The Diet Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc. (note) Request for the approval of the Diet (5) Approval of the basic response plan by Diet (Task Force Chief: Prime Minister) Approval Rejection - Comprehensive promotion of response measures - Formulation of usage guidelines for specific public Terminate immediately facilities, etc. Response according to the basic Designated government institutions Local governments Designated public institutions response plan and usage guidelines Note: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for the comprehensive promotion of measures to respond to armed attack situations or a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival **(2) Diet Approval** In principle, the prior Diet approval is required to issue a Defense Operation order to the SDF to respond to an Armed Attack Situation or a Survival-Threatening Situation. **(3) Response Measures** In responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., or SurvivalThreatening Situations during the period for which the Basic Response Plan is valid, the designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions are to implement the required measures based on legal provisions during the period between the formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan. See the reference below for the measures to be implemented. Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and a Survival-Threatening Situation. See Fig. II-5-2-3 (Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments, etc.) **(5) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures** Following the adoption of the Basic Response Plan, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, which consists of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of States. The Prime Minister is to be appointed as the Chief, and some of the Ministers of States and to be appointed as the Deputy Chief. If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies or properties of the people, or to eliminating an armed attack, and particularly when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, the Prime Minister may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary response measures. In circumstances where the necessary response measures are not implemented or if there are obstacles to protecting the See Fig. II-5-2-2 (Measures to Be Implemented by Designated Administrative Institutions, etc.) **(4) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments** See the reference below for the responsibilities of the national and local Governments, etc. as defined in the Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the ----- Fig. II-5-2-2 Measures to Be Implemented by Designated Administrative Institutions, etc. Fig. II-3-2-2 Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by armed attacks, in order to bring an armed attack situation, etc., to an end Survival-Threatening Situations in order to bring the situation to an end (1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the (1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the SDF necessary to repel an armed attack SDF necessary to repel an armed attack against a foreign country that is in (2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures a close relationship with Japan which as a result threatens Japan’s survival implemented so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1), actions taken and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the people’s right to by the United States Armed Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (a survival-threatening armed attack) necessary to repel an armed attack, and actions taken by armed forces of (2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures implemented other foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel an so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1) and actions taken by armed armed attack can be conducted smoothly and effectively forces of foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel (3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above an armed attack against a foreign country that results in threatening Japan’s survival can be conducted smoothly and effectively (3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from an armed attack, or minimize the impact of an armed attack on the people’s Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from a lives and the national economy implemented according to changes in survival-threatening armed attack, or minimize the impact of a armed attack situations, etc. survival-threatening armed attack on the people’s life and the national economy implemented according to changes in a situation where an armed (1) Measures to announce warnings, give instructions on evacuation and the attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival rescue of injured parties, measures for the restoration of facilities and equipment, and other measures (2) Price stabilization and distribution of daily necessities etc., and other - Measures to ensure the security of public facilities and secure the stable measures supply of daily necessities, etc. notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals. **(6) Report to the United Nations Security Council** In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the UN, the Government shall immediately report the measures it has taken to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the UN Security Council. Responsibilities of the National and Local Fig. II-5-2-3 Governments, etc. |Subject|Responsibility| |---|---| |Government|•Have a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people •Respond to armed attack situations, etc., and Survival- Threatening Situation by taking every possible measure and using all organizations and functions •Implement all possible measures as a whole nation| |Local Government|•Have responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, bodies, and properties of the residents •Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc., in mutual cooperation with the national government, other local governments and other institutions| |Designated Public Institutions|•Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc., in the scope of their work, in mutual cooperation with the national government, local governments, and other institutions| |Nationals|•Strive to provide necessary cooperation when the designated administrative institutions, local governments or designated public institutions implement response measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc.| lives, bodies and properties of the people or to eliminating an armed attack, and emergency responses are required in light of the situations, the Prime Minster may implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, or may have the Ministry of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasures implement these measures after **Chapter** **(7) Revisions to Other Relevant Legislation** **a. Act Related to the Actions of the U.S. Forces and Others[3]** Before the revision, the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Act specified measures, etc., to be taken to ensure smooth and efficient operation of the U.S. Forces necessary to terminate an armed attack in Armed Attack Situations, etc., based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition to support for the U.S. Forces responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., support operations for the armed forces of foreign countries other than the United States in Armed Attack Situations, etc., as well as support operations for the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries in Survival-Threatening Situations were added in the revision. **b. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act[4]** The previous Maritime Transportation Restriction Act had provided procedures for stopped ship inspections and taking ship measures conducted by the Maritime Self-Defense Force Following the addition of Survival-Threatening Situations, the title of the Act was revised from “Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with the U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to “Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations.” Following the addition of Survival-Threatening Situations, the title of the Act was revised from “Law Concerning the Restrictions of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to “Law Concerning the Restrictions of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and S i l Th t i Sit ti ” ----- (MSDF) to control maritime transportation of weapons, ammunition and military personnel, etc., to armed forces, etc., of foreign countries making armed attacks against Japan in Armed Attack Situations. The revision Act added the provisions to control maritime transportation in SurvivalThreatening Situations. Furthermore, the waters in which the MSDF can take these measures. According to the revised law the MSDF can control maritime transportation in Japan’s territorial waters, territorial waters of foreign countries (only when their consent is obtained) and the high seas, although it was previously restricted to Japan’s territorial waters and the high seas surrounding Japan. **c. Prisoners of War Act[5]** The Prisoners of War Act previously specified items necessary for the detention, internment and other forms of treatment of prisoners of war, etc., in Armed Attack Situations in order to ensure the appropriate practice of the International Humanitarian Law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, etc. The provisions were added for the application of the Prisoners of War Act in Survival-Threatening Situations as well. **d. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities[6]** To ensure the appropriate and rapid operations of the SDF and the U.S. Forces and measures vital to the protection of the people, the Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities provides for procedures to be taken for comprehensive coordination of the use of specific public facilities (ports, airports, roads, waters, air zones and radio waves) in Armed Attack Situations, etc. The operations of the armed forces of foreign countries other than the U.S. Forces in Armed Attack Situations, etc., were added to the scope of coordination of the use of specific public facilities. 2 Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations other than an Armed Attack Situation and Survival-Threatening Situations in order for the Government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.[7] 3 Responses of the SDF **(1) Positioning as the Mission of the SDF** The primary duty of the SDF had been to “defend Japan against direct or indirect aggression.” Now since the purpose of the SDF’s operation in Survival-Threatening Situations stemming from an armed attack on a foreign country is also to defend japan as well, the revised legislation stipulates this is one of the SDF’s primary duties. **(2) Defense Operation** Although an Armed Attack Situation, had been the only situation in which a Defense Operation order may be issued, the revised legislation newly added Survival-Threatening Situations to this category. Following this revision, the Prime Minister can now issue a Defense Operation order to the whole or part of the SDF when it is deemed necessary for the defense of Japan in Armed Attack Situations and Survival-Threatening Situations. As it had been before the law revision, prior Diet approval is required for a Defense Operation order in principle. The SDF under Defense Operation duty is allowed to exercise the use of force only when the “New Three Conditions” are satisfied.[8] **(3) Others** Among the provisions setting forth a variety of authorities and special measures, etc., necessary for SDF operations on a Defense Operation order, those whose purpose is entirely to respond to direct armed attack on physical damage against Japan are not to be applied to Survival-Threatening Situations.[9] **Chapter** Following the addition of Survival-Threatening Situations, the title of the Act was revised from “Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to “Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situations.” The official title of the Act is the “Law Concerning the Use of Specific Public Facilities and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” A contingency situation other than an Armed Attack Situation and a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in a threat to Japan’s survival that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people, including an emergency response situation (a situation where actions that may kill or injure many people by using methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state). In general, the “use of force” in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution means the act of combat by Japanese physical and personnel organizations as part of an international armed conflict. In contrast to this, the “use of weapons” as referred to in the SDF Law, etc., means the use of equipment and machinery, etc., designed to directly kill or harm people, or to destroy things as a means of armed fighting, in accordance with their original usages. While the “use of force” in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution is the idea related to resorting to force, including the “use of weapons,” all types of the “use of weapons” do not necessarily fall under the category of the “use of force” prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. The “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution only in cases where the New Three Conditions (See Page 166) are satisfied. The examples of application in Survival-Threatening Situations include the organization of special units, and the defense call-up of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel, etc., while the examples of non-application, which mean the examples of application only in Armed Attack Situations, etc., in other words, include measures for the construction of defense f iliti th th it t i t i bli d i ti f li d d t f d ti t ----- armed attack induced disasters in order to protect the lives, bodies and property of the people and to minimize influence on its livelihood in the case of Armed Attack Situations, etc., or emergency response situations. If the Minister of Defense finds it unavoidable after receiving a request from prefectural governors,[11]or receives a request from the Task Force Chief, upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense can issue civil Protection Dispatch Order to the SDF units, etc. to civil protection dispatch to conduct civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures (including assisting the evacuation of residents, providing relief to the evacuees and immediate restoration). See Fig. II-5-2-4 (Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches), Part See III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-5 (Initiatives for Civil Protection) Fig. II-5-2-4 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches Municipal mayors Ask for dispatch Communication (When a dispatch request cannot be sought) request Notes: Prefectural governors Task Force Chief[1] 1. Armed Attack Situations, etc. Task Force Chief or Request Notification Ask for dispatch Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief for dispatch Report (When communication is established by municipal mayors) Report Minister of Defense Prime Minister Approve Issue an order to Issue an order for civil gather for civil protection dispatches protection, etc.2, 3 Notes: SDF Ready Reserve 2. If it is particularly necessary to respond Personnel 3. Ready reserve personnel and reserve SDF Reserve Personnel personnel will be called on if necessary upon the approval of the Report for duty Prime Minister Units 4 Civil Protection **(1) Outline of the Civil Protection Act and the Civil** Protection Dispatches The Civil Protection Act[10] stipulates the responsibilities of the national and local governments as well as measures for evacuation, relief, and response to **(2) Relationship between Survival-Threatening Situations** **and Civil Protection Measures** The Civil Protection Act, stipulates necessary measures, including issuance of warnings and measures for the evacuation and relief of residents from the perspective of protection of the people and their livelihood from a direct attack against Japan and physical damage. A situation in which the rules of Survival Threatening Situations are applicable and warning issuance and evacuation and relief of residents are required is nothing less than a situation where an armed attack against Japan is anticipated or imminent. In such a case, it is recognized as Armed Attack Situations, etc., and necessary measures are to be implemented under the Civil Protection Act.[12] **2** **Responses to Situations that Will Have an Important Influence** surrounding Japan. In accordance with the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, the law revision deleted “in areas surrounding Japan” from “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security in areas surrounding Japan” and changed the name of situations from “situations in areas surrounding Japan” to “situations that will **Chapter** Previously, the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan had stipulated rear area support,[13] rear area search and rescue operations[14] and ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law) conducted by Japan as measures to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security in areas 10 The official title of the act is the Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc. 11 The Prime Minister assumes the position of the Director of the Crisis Management Headquarters, but these positions are regulated as separate entities. 12 In the case that an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is not regarded as an armed attack situation, etc., a series of measures are to be implemented to ensure the stability of the people’s livelihood, including a stable supply of daily necessities, based on a variety of existing laws and regulations, taking thorough response measures to protect people’s livelihood without invoking the Civil Protection Act. 13 Rear area support under the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to the U.S. Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. 14 Rear area search and rescue operations under the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat and were stranded in rear areas (including transportation of those d) ----- have an important influence, **[15] and also extended the scope** of militaries that the SDF can support and add new types of response measures as follows. 1 Militaries that the SDF Supports On top of the existing “U.S. Armed Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” the revised law added “armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter” and “other similar organizations” on the armed forces, etc., responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, which the SDF is allowed to support. - The SDF does not conduct activities in the scene where a combat is actually taking place.” Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when stranded personnel have been located and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities as long as the safety of these units is ensured. - The commanding officers, etc., of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities, etc., if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. - The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. 4 Diet Approval As before the law revision, prior diet approval is required, in principle, and ex-post facto approval is also allowed in emergency. 2 Response Measures to Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security The revised law sets out measures to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security as (1) logistics support activities, (2) search and rescue activities, (3) ship inspection operations, and (4) other measures necessary to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, and added “lodging, storage, use of facilities and training services” as the types of goods and services provided by the SDF in (1) logistics support activities, on top of the “supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, and base services” previously. While the provision of weapons is not included, as before, the revised law allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.” The revised law made it possible to implement response measures in foreign territories, but only when the foreign country concerned consents. 3 Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force The revised law sets forth the following measures in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel: 5 Authority for the Use of Weapons When engaged in logistics support activities or search and rescue activities in the event of a situation that will have an important influence on Japan, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons if necessary in order to protect oneself or other SDF members who are at the same scene, or those under the supervision of oneself (so-called “the use of weapons of self-preservation type”). In addition, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons jointly with members of the armed forces or other organizations of foreign countries in order to protect the lives and bodies of those stationed at the camps (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defense and aversion of clear and present danger in “the use of weapons of self-preservation type”). 16 6 Ship Inspection Operations **(1) Outline[16]** **Chapter** 15 Previously, “situations in areas surrounding Japan” was understood to be an idea that focuses on the nature of situations, not a geographical idea. In light of the changes in the security environment in recent years, however, the definition was revised since it is not appropriate to use an expression that could be interpreted as geographically limiting areas where situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security may arise. In association with this, the title of the Law was amended from the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” to the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.” 16 Inspection of ships in the case of a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s Peace and Security is conducted based on the “Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations (Ship Inspection Operations Act).” See Article 5 of this section (Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community) for ship inspection operations in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international it i ll ti l dd i ----- Ship inspection operations mean operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change **KEY WORD** Situations that Will Have an Important Influence Situations that will have an important influence Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, including situations that, if left unattended, could result in a direct armed attack on Japan of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on the UN Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state.[17] **(2) Authority for the Use of Weapons** The so-called “the use of weapons of self-preservation type” is permitted. **Maintenance of Public Order and Responses to Aggression that Do Not Amount to an Armed** **3** **Attack** 1 Public Security Operations 2 Maritime Security Operations **(1) Public Security Operations by Order** In the event of an indirect aggression or another emergency situation, the Prime Minister can order the whole or part of the SDF to deploy if it is deemed impossible to maintain public security with the general police force. In principle, the Prime Minister must bring the order to the Diet for deliberation, and request for its approval within twenty days from the day the order has been given. **(2) Public Security Operations by Request** Upon consulting with the Public Safety Commission of the prefecture concerned, the governor of that prefecture can request the Prime Minister to dispatch units, etc., of the SDF if it is deemed unavoidable as the situation will have a serious influence on public security. Following such a request, the Prime Minister can order the SDF to mobilize when a situation calls for such action. **(1) Outline** When there is a special need to protect lives or property or maintain public security at sea, the Minister of Defense can order SDF units to take necessary actions at sea upon approval by the Prime Minister. **(2) Authority for the Use of Weapons** The provisions of Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel, permitting them the use of weapons. In addition, partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law[21] allows SDF personnel to exercise authority such as requesting nearby persons or ships to cooperate or boarding on other ships for inspection. The use of weapons is also permitted in order to stop a ship when certain conditions are met. **Chapter** See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1-2 (Measures in Response to Actions that Violate Japan’s Sovereignty) 3 Counter-Piracy Operations **(1) Outline** When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to conduct operations at sea against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister. **(3) Authority for the Use of Weapons** Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel, permitting SDF personnel the use of weapons.[18] Moreover, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonable depending on the situation when certain conditions are met.[19][,][20] See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-3 (Response to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces, etc.) 17 The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 18 Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act (Use of Weapons) permits the use of weapons if deemed reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation. However, causing harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate self-defense or evasion of clear and present danger. 19 The “certain conditions” defined herein apply to cases such as when SDF personnel reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement, or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons exist. 20 Article 16, 17-1, 18, and Article 20-2 of the Japan Coast Guard Law applied mutatis mutandis to public security operation. 21 A ti l 16 17 1 18 d A ti l 20 2 f th J C t G d L ----- **Chapter** **Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and** **Maritime Security Operation** Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies (the so-called gray zone situations) are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In order to respond promptly to such situations of infringement that do not amount to an armed attack, and ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts, the Government made cabinet decisions regarding the acceleration of procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations, etc., in May 2015, particularly in the following three cases: **●** Responses to foreign naval vessels making maritime navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under the category of innocent passage under international law **●** Responses to the unlawful landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group **●** Responses to acts of infringement when SDF ships or aircraft detect foreign ships committing said acts against Japanese private ships on the high seas Specifically, when an urgent decision is necessary concerning the issuance of orders for public security operations, etc., but it is difficult to promptly convene an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone and other means. Any Minister of State who could not be contacted in advance shall be notified of the cabinet decision ex post facto. Cabinet decision to accelerate procedures to issue orders for public security/maritime security operations in the following three cases, referring to Cabinet Decision on Government Responses when there is a Risk of Large-Scale Terrorism (November 2, 2001): Responses to Foreign Vessels Making Maritime Navigation that Does Not Fall Responses to Illegal Landing on Remote Responses to Foreign Vessels Infringing under the Category of Innocent Passage Islands by Armed Groups on Japanese Commercial Vessels on the High Seas under International Law Responses are made by SDF units under When armed groups or groups that are When Japanese commercial vessels are orders for maritime security operations highly probable to be armed are likely to actually subject to infringement activities, in principle. illegally land or actually land on remote It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of islands, to issue orders for (urgent) counterForeign Affairs and the Japan Coast It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting piracy operation or maritime security Guard promptly and expeditiously share to issue orders for maritime security operation. information, coordinate and cooperate. operations/public security operations. It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting to issue orders for maritime security operation. When an urgent decision is necessary but it is difficult to promptly convene an adhoc cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers by telephone and other means (any Minister who could not be contacted in advance shall be notified of the cabinet decision ex post facto). **(2) Authority for the Use of Weapons** SDF personnel may use weapons in executing duties under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act. When there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of a ship perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a nonmilitary ship, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Counter-Piracy Operations) 4 Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles In case ballistic missiles[22] or other objects launched at Japan as an armed attack against Japan or a Survival-Threatening Situation, and the New Three Conditions are simultaneously met, the SDF would cope with the situation by a Defense Operation order. On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are flying towards Japan, but the situation cannot be acknowledged as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can take the following measures: (1) When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles or other 22 B lli ti i il th bj t t i ft th t b li d t d t h li t h th f ll t th ----- objects are flying towards Japan and it is deemed necessary to take measures to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory if they fall to the ground, upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense may order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles in airspace over Japan’s territory or high seas once they have actually been launched towards Japan. (2) Also, besides the case of (1), the Minister of Defense may not have enough time to get approval by the Prime Minister when the situation unfolds rapidly such as the cases when there was no warning prior to the launch. In preparation for such case, the Minister of Defense may create an emergency response guideline and get approval by the Prime Minister in peacetime. Based on this emergency response guideline, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects in the airspace over Japan’s territory or high seas in advance for a certain period of time once they have actually been launched towards Japan. See Fig. II-5-2-5 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles or Other See Objects), Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-2 (Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks, etc.) bodies, and rescue of Japanese nationals, etc. overseas involving the use of weapons was not allowed even in cases of terrorist attacks. In light of these circumstances, the newly established provisions enable the units of the SDF to take “rescue” that go beyond transportation and include guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals, etc. overseas whose lives or bodies could be harmed in emergency situations when the following requirements are satisfied:[24] **(1) Procedures** Upon a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and after subsequent consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Defense issues an order following approval by the Prime Minister. **(2) Requirements for Implementation** When all of the following conditions are satisfied, the rescue measures may be implemented: a. It needs to be confirmed that in the areas where the rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are maintaining public safety and order at the time, and no act of combat will be conducted; b. The country concerned[25] consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and c. It is expected that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers. **(3) Authority for the Use of Weapons** In carrying out their duties to implement the rescue measures, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary, depending on the situation when there are adequate grounds to recognize the compelling need to use weapons to protect the lives and bodies of Japanese nationals and others or themselves, or to eliminate actions that obstruct their duties (including the permission to resort to the so-called “use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate.”[26] However, causing harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate self-defense **Chapter** 5 Measures against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace The Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take necessary measures to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons,[23] etc.) when a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law, the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1-2 (Measures in Response to Actions that Violate Japan’s Sovereignty) 6 Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas24 Previously, operations to protect Japanese nationals, etc. overseas in emergency situations were limited to transporting to safe places those who need protection of their lives or 23 Although there is no clear provision regarding the use of weapons, it is interpreted to be included in the “necessary measures.” 24 The MOD/SDF has conducted the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas in four cases. Responding to the kidnapping of foreigners and Japanese in Iraq, 10 Japanese were evacuated to Kuwait by ASDF C-130H plane in April 2004. In January 2013, a government aircraft was deployed to bring seven Japanese nationals and the remains of a further nine nationals back to Japan following the kidnapping in Algeria. With respect to the terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, the bodies of Japanese victims (seven nationals), their families, and other involved parties were transported to Japan by government aircraft. In relation to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H transported four embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti. 25 It includes an organization, if any, that administers the said country in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN. 26 While the so-called “right to use weapons of self-preservation type” permits the use of weapons only for the protection of oneself and others (oneself, SDF members who are at the same scene as oneself, or those under the supervision of oneself), the so-called “right to use weapons in defense of the mission mandate” allows the use of weapons beyond self-preservation, f l t t t th li d b di t f th l t l b t ti f th f f d ti f SDF l ----- Fig. II-5-2-5 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles If armed attack is recognized Not recognized as armed attack (Declared intent to attack, imminent missile launch) When the possibility that ballistic Although the ballistic missiles are not expected to missiles may fly toward Japan is fly over Japan, a rapid change in circumstances acknowledged may create an emergency situation which makes it difficult to obtain an approval from the Prime Minister in time Minister of Defense orders destruction Minister of Defense orders destruction measures An armed attack situation is measures upon approval of in advance as provided in the emergency response recognized and a defense operation the Prime Minister procedure (approved by the Cabinet in 2007) order is issued Take measures in the framework SDF takes measures on the order SDF takes measures on the order of defense operation of the Minister of Defense of the Minister of Defense Article 76 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 1) Article 82-3 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 3) (Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) (Destruction measures against ballistic missiles) Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military - Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles fl ying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specifi c situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies. - In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can suffi ciently fulfi ll their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defi ned with a provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet. or evasion of clear and present danger.). See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4-2 (Response to Rescue and See Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas and Others) When a request is made by the United States Forces, etc., and only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary, SDF personnel provide asset protection. **(3) Authority for the Use of Weapons** In protecting weapons and other equipment described in (1) above as part of their duties, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to use weapons to protect persons, weapons, and other equipment (however, causing harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate self-protection or evasion from present danger). **Chapter** 7 Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries The newly added provisions, Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, enable SDF personnel to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries that are in cooperation with the SDF and are currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan. In December 2016, the National Security Council approved “The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law,” which sets out the basic principles of the article and the Cabinet’s involvement in the operationalization of the article, etc. **(1) Coverage** Weapons, etc. of the units of the United States Forces, armed forces of other foreign countries and other similar organizations, that are, in cooperation with the SDF and are, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding activities in the scene where the combat activities are actually being conducted). See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4-2 (Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.) 8 Expansion of the Provision of Supplies and Services to the U.S. Forces Regarding the provision of supplies or services to the United States Armed Forces, the scope of the U.S. Forces and the scope of supplies covered were expanded as follows with the revised legislation: **(1) Scope of the U.S. Forces Covered** a. The scope extended to the United States Armed Forces that are on field sites along with the units of the SDF carrying out the following actions or activities and engaged in **(2) Procedures, etc.** ----- activities similar to those of the SDF units: - Guarding of facilities and areas of bases, etc. of U.S. Forces Japan - Counter-piracy operations - Operations necessary to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles, etc. - Removal and disposal of mines or other explosive hazardous objects - Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. in emergency situations in foreign countries - Activities to gather information by ships or aircraft about the movements of the armed forces of foreign countries and other information that contributes to the defense of Japan **4** **Disaster Relief Dispatches and Others** 1 Disaster Relief Dispatches In principle, Disaster Relief Dispatch is conducted as follows: prefectural governors or other officials ask the Minister of Defense, or an officer designated by the Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc., in the event of a natural disaster; the Minister or the designated officer will dispatch the units if it is deemed necessary for the SDF to respond to the disaster.[27] This procedure is based on the idea that prefectural governors and other officials should grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities first, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. b. The scope extended to the U.S. Forces participating in multilateral exercises of three or more countries, including Japan and the United States, in addition to the U.S. Forces participating in Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises c. The scope extended to the U.S. Forces that are in field sites along with SDF units temporarily staying at facilities of the U.S. Forces for day-to-day operations, in addition to the U.S. Forces temporarily staying at SDF facilitie **(2) Scope of Supplies to be Provided** Added ammunition (weapons remain excluded) See Section 3-4 of this Chapter (Conclusion of the New Japan See U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)) 2 Earthquake Prevention Dispatch and Nuclear Disaster Relief Dispatch When a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for LargeScale Earthquakes[28] or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order dispatching units upon a request of the Director of the Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters or the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister). See Fig. II-5-2-6 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal) Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4 (Response to Large-Scale Disasters) **Chapter** **5** **Framework for Contributing to the Peace and Stability of the International Community** cooperation and support operations for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for international peace and security in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing. Previously, the Japanese Government has enacted special measures laws, such as the Act on Special Measures against terrorism /Replenishment Support Special 1 Response to Situations Threatening the International Peace and Security that the International Community Is Collectively Addressing The International Peace Support Act was newly enacted in the recent legal revision in order to ensure peace and security of the international community, enabling Japan to conduct 27 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Office may request a disaster relief dispatch. With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may take measures (Article 4 of the Police Duties Execution Law) such as evacuation based on Article 94 of the SDF Law (Authority in Disaster Relief Dispatch, etc.); (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary. 28 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction was reported by the Director-General of the Japan M t l i l A (JMA) d h it i d d t tl i l t th k di t ti ----- Fig. II-5-2-6 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal Fig. II-3-2-6 |Municipal mayor|Col2| |---|---| ||| Outbreak of a disaster In case of particular urgency with no time to wait for a request from prefectural governors Ask the prefectural governor to submit a request - Prefectural governors Request for withdrawal - Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard - Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Municipal mayor Headquarters 1) Procedure for request - Director of the Airport Administrative Office Direct notification - Normally requested in written (In case asking request is not possible) Request for dispatch form - Requested verbally or by The Minister of Defense or the individuals designated by the Minister telegram or telephone in case of emergency (a written Order to dispatch Order to dispatch Call up[1] request should later follow) 2) Content of request Dispatch of units Dispatch of units Call up in such cases as - Conditions of the disaster and (discretionary dispatch) disasters reasons for the request SDF ready reserve - Desired duration for dispatch personnel - Desired area for dispatch SDF reserve personnel and desired activities - Other items for reference Disaster relief operations - Disbandment of call up[2] - Order for withdrawal Disbandment of call up[2] Withdrawal of units Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary with the approval of the Prime Minister. 2. Disbandment of call-up of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense. Measures Law,[29] and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq,[30] in order to conduct operations such as at-sea replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean, and humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq. However, from the perspective of enabling seamless responses to any situation, rather than developing new legislation in response to every emergence of a specific need in the future, the International Peace Support Law, enacted as general law, enables Japan to conduct support operations more expeditiously and effectively for the military forces of foreign countries operating for international peace and security, making it possible to proactively contribute to international peace and security on Japan’s own initiative. **(1) Requirements** The requirement for Japan to offer cooperation and support to the operations of foreign armed forces is the issuance of one of the following UN resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council). a. Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize the country, which is subject to Japan’s support operations to respond to situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community b. Other than (a), resolutions that regard the situations as a threat to peace or a breach of peace and call on UN member states to respond to the situations concerned **(2) Response Measures** The following response measures can be implemented in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing. **a. Cooperation and Support Activities** Supplies and services to armed forces of foreign countries (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, base **Chapter** **KEY WORD** Situations Threatening the International Peace and Security that the International Community Is Collectively Addressing These refer to situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, and the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the UN Charter to remove the threat; Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities 29 The official title of the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act is the “Special Measures Law Concerning Measures Taken by Japan in Support of the Activities of Foreign Countries Aiming to Achieve the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations in Response to the Terrorist Attacks Which Took Place on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America as well as Concerning Humanitarian Measures Based on Relevant Resolutions of the United Nations,” and the official title of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Act is the “Special Measures law Concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation.” 30 Th ffi i l titl i th A t S i l M i H it i R li f d R t ti W k d S it A i t i I ----- services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and construction) are to be provided. While the provision of weapons is not included as in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, the revised law now allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.” **b. Search and Rescue Activities** **c. Ship Inspection Operations (Those Set Forth in the Ship** **Inspection Operations Law)** Ship inspection operations were only permitted to be performed in situations in areas surrounding Japan.[31] However, in light of the increased cases of maritime inspection as countermeasures against global threat such as the transnational transfer of weapons of mass destruction and weapons for international terrorism organizations in the international community since 2000, which is when the Ship Inspection Operations Act was enacted, the SDF can carry out ship inspection operations in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing as defined in the International Peace Act. **(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force** The following measures are set forth in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel: - Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where a combat is actually taking place. However, when the personnel having been stranded have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, the SDF units are allowed to continue search and rescue activities concerning them as long as the safety of these units is ensured. - The commanding officers of the SDF units, etc., order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. - The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. **(4) Diet Approval** Prior Diet approval required without exception, and each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts towards decisions within 7 days (excluding any period when the Diet is in recess). In addition, re-approval is required in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of the response measures. **(5) Authority for the Use of Weapons** SDF personnel engaged in cooperation support activities or search and rescue activities in a situation threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing are permitted the socalled “right to use weapons of self-preservation type.” In addition, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons with members of the armed forces and other organizations of foreign countries in order to protect the lives and bodies of those stationed in the camps. 2 International Peace Cooperation Activities The International Peace Cooperation Act, enacted in 1992, set forth a framework to operate appropriately and quickly in the following three operation categories namely UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and International Election Observation Operations, and urged the Japanese government to take measures to provide contributions in kind for those operations, thereby enabling Japan to actively contribute to international peace efforts centering upon the UN. The law also stipulates a set of basic guidelines, or the so-called “Five Principles for PKO Participation” for Japan’s participation in these activities. At the time of the enactment of the Act, it was assumed that Japan was to cooperate with the ceasefire monitoring in conventional conflicts between states within the framework of UN PKO under the control of the UN. However, the nature of conflicts that the international community faces has transformed into intra-state conflicts or a combination of inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Therefore, support for the nation building of state parties to conflict and the creation of a safe environment necessary to achieve this end have become important tasks in international peace cooperation activities. Furthermore, there is a wide range of international peace cooperation activities that have come to be implemented outside of the UN frameworks.[32] **Chapter** 31 At the time when the Ship Inspection Operations Law was enacted, the conduct of ship inspection operations in situations other than situations in areas surrounding Japan was positioned as a separate issue on the agenda (an answer given by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono at a meeting of the House of Councillors Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense on November 28, 2000). 32 These activities include the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), implemented at the request of the European Union, and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), i l t d t th t f th t i t hi h th h th ti t b d t d b l ith th t f th UN S t G l ----- Given the diversification and qualitative change of the international peace cooperation activities, through the recent legal revision, Japan, in order to contribute further to peace and stability of international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, has expanded the scope of tasks that can be implemented in UN PKO and reviewed the authority to use weapons, and also introduced new provisions to allow for active participation in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, safety-ensuring, and other non-UN-led operations (“Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security”). **(1) Requirements for Participation** **a. UN PKO** While maintaining the framework of the Five Principles for Participation, the new law stipulates that the consent of acceptance of countries to which the areas where these operations are conducted belong needs to be recognized as being stably maintained throughout the period of the operations if the SDF conducts so-called “safety-ensuring” operations or so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations. **b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and** **Security** Besides the existing three types of operations (UN PKO, International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and International Election Observation Operations), Japan is now is satisfied, in addition to the fulfillment of the Five Principles for Participation. 1. Based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Economic and Social Council of the UN 2. At the requests of any of the following international organizations: - The UN - Organs established by the UN General Assembly or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the UN such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order - Regional organizations, as prescribed in Article 52 of the UN Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties, acknowledged as having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities of Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security such as the European Union or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order 3. At the requests of the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the UN as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter). **(2) Description of Tasks** In addition to ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for afflicted persons, the following tasks have been added and expanded to tasks in UN PKO, etc. - Addition of monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspections at checkpoints and security escort for the protection of safety of specified areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and property of local population, afflicted persons and other populations requiring protection (so-called “safety-ensuring” operations) - Addition of protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for those operations, in response to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related to operations occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations) - Expansion of tasks such as provision of advice or guidance related to works for the purpose of assisting in establishing or re-establishing organizations of the Government relating to national defense or other organizations - Expansion of tasks conducted at organizations for supervision and coordination of tasks to include planning, drafting, coordination or collection and updating of information in Headquarters Office or coordination offices conducting UN PKO and Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, for the implementation **Chapter** **KEY WORD** So-called “Five Principles for Participation” in PKO (1) Agreements on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the Parties to Armed Conflict; (2) Consent for the conduct of UN PKO as well as Japan’s participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belongs as well as from the Parties to Armed Conflict; (3) The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, and not favor any of the parties to the armed conflict; (4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may terminate the International Peace Cooperation Assignments; and (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessity for the protection of the lives of personnel dispatched, in principle. Following the latest amendment of the Act, additional condition, “when the consent for acceptance is deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate is allowed for implementation of so-called ‘safety-ensuring’ operations and the so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request) operations as the use of weapons beyond self-preservation and Article 95 of the SDF Law (the use of force for protection of weapons, etc.)” has been added to (5) of the Five Principles for Participation. able to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, when any of the following conditions ----- of tasks (of mission headquarters operations) **(3) Authority to Use Weapons** **a. Expansion of the Authority to Use Weapons for Self-** **Preservation (Joint Protection of Camps)** Camps of UN PKO, etc., are the bases where personnel of participating countries spend their time when not conducting operations outside camps, and the last bastion, so to speak, to secure the safety of lives and bodies of those inside. Thus, in the case of unexpected situations, such as attacks against camps, it is essential for SDF personnel stationed in the camps, even if they are not the direct target of such attacks, to coordinate with the personnel of other countries and protect each other and deal with the common danger. In light of this, the use of weapons for the purpose of protecting individuals jointly stationed in the camps are allowed as the use of weapons for self-preservation according to the revised legislation.[33] **b. The Authority to Use Weapons in the So-Called “Kaketsuke-** **Keigo” Operations** In carrying out so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations, uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or bodies of themselves or individuals related to operations that they intend to protect (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defense or aversion of clear and present danger). **c. The Authority to Use Weapons for So-Called “Safety-** **Ensuring” Operations** In carrying out so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies or properties of themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate obstructive behavior for their duties (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defense or aversion of clear and present danger). called safety-ensuring operations, in addition to ceasefire monitoring, in principle (ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives is dissolved). **(5) Ensuring the Safety of SDF Personnel** The provision for ensuring the safety of the personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps was added, while the measures for ensuring the safety of the personnel were incorporated into the matters to be stipulated in the Implementation Procedures. **(6) Other Key Points of Amendment** - Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN (dispatch of Force Commanders of UN PKO) The Act was amended to make it possible to dispatch uniformed SDF personnel and have them engage in the tasks of the UN and those concerning overall management of tasks implemented by units of the SDF, etc., or units of armed forces of foreign states participating in UN PKO, at the request of the UN, with the consent of the Prime Minister.[34] - Provision of supplies and services to the Armed Forces of the United States, etc., for their operations to cope with large-scale disaster[35] The Act was amended to make it possible for the SDF to provide the U.S. Forces or the Australian Defence Force with supplies or services when they request the provision and are located in the area together with the units of the SDF, etc., and is undertaking operations to cope with large-scale disasters, so far as it does not hinder the performance of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., of the SDF.[36] 3 International Disaster Relief Operations When large-scale disasters occur in regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions, and the governments of the affected countries or international organizations request assistance, the Minister of Foreign Affairs shall consult with the chief of relevant administrative agencies including the Ministry of Defense as well as the National Public Safety Commission regarding the details of such request if dispatch is deemed appropriate. Following such consultation, the Ministry of Foreign **Chapter** **(4) Diet Approval** Diet approval is necessary prior to the commencement of so 33 The authority to use weapons for self-preservation is allowed in view of the existence of particular circumstances, whereby armed personnel, who protect camps which are the last bastions of safety, are in the relationship of mutually dependent upon each other in dealing with situations. 34 The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent of the countries hosting the UN PKO for which the dispatched uniformed SDF personnel will conduct operations and of state parties to the conflict regarding the implementation of the UN PKO (when the state parties to the conflict are nonexistent, the consent of the countries where the UN PKO is to be conducted) is deemed to be stably maintained throughout the duration of the dispatch and where circumstances that lead to the suspension of the dispatch are deemed unlikely to occur. 35 The MOD/SDF participated in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) following the major earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, but was unable to provide supplies and services to the U.S. Forces engaged in disaster relief operations in Haiti outside the framework of UN PKO, due to the absence of necessary domestic legislation. 36 Th i i f th I t ti l P C ti A t i J 2017 dd d th A d F f th U K t th ll ----- Affairs may consult with the Minister of Defense to ask for cooperation with regard to operations of SDF units if there is a special need. The Minister of Defense can order units of the SDF to carry out rescue and medical activities as well as transportation of personnel and supplies based on the consultation above.[37] **6** **Other Amendments in the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security** etc.) who are to be engaged in supervisory duties for operations conducted by units of countries participating in UN PKO - Implementation of rescue, including guarding, of Japanese nationals overseas and others 1 Revision of the Act for the Establishment of the National Security Council Responses to a Survival-Threatening Situation and responses to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing were added as the items for deliberation, and items for deliberation regarding “situations in areas surrounding Japan” were changed to items for deliberation regarding “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.” Furthermore, the following items (all items are related to the stable maintenance of the consent of acceptance of hosting countries) were specified as the items that the National Security Council must deliberate without fail. - Regarding international peace cooperation operations, decisions on and changes in plans for the implementation related to the implementation of the so-called safetyensuring operations or the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations - Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel (force commanders, See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3-1 (National Security Council) See 2 Establishment of Provisions for the Punishment of Those who Commit Crimes Overseas Since the duties of the SDF overseas are to be expanded under the latest legal revisions, it is necessary to more adequately ensure the discipline and control of the activities of the SDF overseas. For this reason, provisions were established for the punishment of those who commit crimes overseas such as the following: (1) Colluded defiance of superiors’ official orders and unlawful command of units, and (2) defiance of and disobedience to superiors’ orders by those given defense operation orders. **Chapter** 37 The Japan Disaster Relief Team is not to be dispatched if the use of weapons is recognized to be necessary in order to protect the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief operations or transport, and equipment necessary for such operations due to apparent danger in accordance with the level of security in the disaster-affected country. Therefore, members of the team will not carry weapons in the country concerned for the purpose of protecting the lives and bodies of people engaged in international disaster relief ti d i t f h ti ----- **Chapter** **Duties of the Self Defense Forces** The Ministry of Defense and Self Defense Forces are national administrative entities and obviously require a legal basis in carrying out their respective duties. The Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense defines the administrative scope of the Ministry of Defense, and Article 5 of the Act states that the Self Defense Forces Law determines the duties, actions, and authority of the Self Defense Forces. The Self Defense Forces Law provides a list (similar to an index) of what the Self Defense Forces are allowed to do in accordance with specified procedures to address various situations. Article 3 in the Self Defense Forces Law divides the duties of the Self Defense Forces into main duties (item 1 of the same article) and secondary duties (items 1 and 2 of the same article). Defense actions to defend Japan correspond to main duties, and only the Self Defense Forces carry out these duties. Secondary duties consist of “duties for maintaining public order as necessary” (secondary duties under item 1) and duties defined by other laws “to an extent that does not interfere with performance of the main duties” (secondary duties under item 2). The former includes public order actions that police entities cannot handle alone, maritime guarding actions, measures to destroy ballistic missiles and other weapons, and measures to deal with airspace intrusions. The latter covers actions conducted in response to important impact situations (logistical assistance), international peace cooperation activities (international peace cooperation operations and international disaster relief operations), and activities related to international peace joint action situations (cooperative assistance, etc.). These main and secondary duties are jointly known as “inherent duties.” Activities handled by the Self Defense Forces on the basis that it is appropriate to utilize skills, experience, and organizational functions cultivated by the Self Defense Forces over many years are known as “additional duties” (separate from inherent duties). These include transportation for national guests, education and training consignments, and cooperation with athletic events. **Overview of the Self Defense Forces’ duties** Defense of Japan Main duty (Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s peace, independence, and national security) Sustaining public order (Activities by the Self Defense Forces that directly ensure Japan’s public peace and protects the lives and assets of Japanese Duties for the Self people (including mine removal and protection measures and Defense Forces in transportation for Japanese people in other countries)) ensuring Japan’s peace, independence, Responding to important impact situation and national security (Inherent Duties) (Activities that contribute to Japan’s peace and security through Secondary duties responses to important impact situations) International peacekeeping activities Responding to international peace joint operations (Activities that contribute to maintaining peace and security in international society, including Japan, through promotion of international cooperation) ----- **Section** **3** **SDF Activities since Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security** **Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and** **1** **Security** From July to August 2017, the SDF participated in multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 17 to improve various capabilities through conducting exercises on the UN PKO based on the International Peace Cooperation Act. In June 2018, moreover, the SDF participated in multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 18 and conducted training related to the “joint protection of camps” and so-called “kaketsukekeigo” (coming to the aid of a geographically distant unit or personnel under attack) as well as “safety-ensuring operations” based on the International Peace Cooperation Act. Also in June 2019, the SDF participated in multilateral exercise Khaan Quest 19 and conducted training related to “kaketsuke-keigo” and “safety-ensuring operations.” In September 2018 in Djibouti, and in Japan in December, the SDF conducted a training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas provided in SDF Law Article 84-3 to improve its joint operation capabilities and to strengthen cooperation with the relevant organizations. Between January and February 2019, the SDF participated in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 19 and conducted training on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to improve its joint operation capabilities. In Staff Exercise, the SDF also conducted activities including training on cooperation and support activities under the International Peace Support Act. **2** **Dispatch of Staff Officers to the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO)** See Section 2-5-2 of this Chapter (International Peace Cooperation Activities) Part III, Chapter 3, Section 5-2-2 (Dispatch to the Multinational Force & Observers [MFO]) 1 Promotion of Various Preparations Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security on March 29, 2016, the MOD/SDF has undertaken various preparations for a variety of new missions based on the Legislation for Peace and Security, such as activities to raise awareness of legal systems and intra-unit rules that were established, education of SDF personnel, as well as development of educational materials necessary for the actual training of various units and the nurturing of instructors. In August 2016, as these preparations were all but completed, each unit of the SDF sets out to implement necessary training in connection with the Legislation for Peace and Security. Between Japan and the United States, and other bilateral and multilateral joint training, Japan started to conduct necessary training related to the Legislation for Peace and Security after coordinating with the countries concerned. 2 Training and Exercises In July 2017, the SDF conducted the first exercise on the protection of U.S. vessels based on SDF Law Article 95-2 with the intention to enhance the relationship with the U.S. Navy. **Chapter** In April 2019, Japan decided to dispatch personnel to the MFO headquarters, which conducts activities, such as monitoring of the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai Peninsula. In making this decision, in accordance with the International Peace Cooperation Act, careful study was made on whether the MFO’s activities satisfied the Five Principles for Participation and whether the activities constituted Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security under the Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations. As a result, since the MFO’s activities were determined to satisfy the Five Principles for Participation and constitute Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, the dispatch of personnel was decided. ----- **The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the** **3** **Armed Forces of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2)** etc. and that the SDF personnel never respond to any combat activities by the use of weapons pursuant to the Article. The SDF personnel thus never conduct use of force and this prevents the situation from evolving into combat activities as a result of the use of weapons under the provision of the Article. This use of weapons does not fall under “use of force” which is banned in Article 9 of the Constitution. **b. Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan** “Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” in the Article may include mainly the following ones, while the Government of Japan is to examine each activity on a case-by-case basis: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities including ballistic missile alert; (2) transportation and replenishment activities in “situations that will have an important influence”; and (3) joint exercises to enhance capabilities required for defending Japan **c. Judgment on Whether or Not to Conduct Asset Protection** When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister subjectively should judge whether the activities conducted by the units of the U.S. Forces, etc. in cooperation with the SDF are “activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether asset protection by the SDF personnel is necessary, by considering the objective and content of the activities, capability of the unit, types of weapons, etc. of the unit and surrounding circumstances including possibility of combat activity as well as the impacts on performance of the SDF’s regular operations. **(2) Involvement of the Cabinet** Requests from the U.S. Forces, etc. based on Paragraph 2 of the Article should be deliberated in the National Security Council (NSC) before the Minister of Defense judges on conducting asset protection if the Minister receives requests in the following cases. However, in case there is no time for dealing with an urgent request by the U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister should promptly report to the NSC regarding judgment of providing asset protection. (1) The U.S. Forces, etc. makes a request for the first time after the operationalization of asset protection. (2) The request is made for asset protection in the territory of a third country. (3) The request is recognized as peculiarly important, although not falling under the above two categories. In addition, in case asset protection under the situations that 1 Background Since the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, the MOD/SDF have been explaining to and coordinating with the United States and also engaged in the work to develop necessary rules and regulations in order to ensure appropriate operation of the system for the protection of weapons, etc., of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries (SDF Law Article 95-2). Upon completion of these works, in December 2016, at the National Security Council the Government decided on the Implementation Guidelines concerning Article 95-2 of the SDF Law, and the Article became ready to be applied to the U.S. Forces operations. This operationalization helps to further strengthen coordinated surveillance between the SDF and the U.S. Forces and also to further enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. 2 The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law set forth the Government’s basic understanding on the article as well as basic principles on the involvement of the Cabinet and disclosure of information in implementing the article. An outline of the guidelines is as follows: **Chapter** **(1) Basic Principles of Implementing Article 95-2** **a. Purpose of Article 95-2** This Article is to enable SDF personnel to carry out very passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment (“the weapons, etc.”) of units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries or other similar organizations (“the U.S. Forces, etc.”), that are concurrently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring) in cooperation with the SDF, from infringements which do not amount to an armed attack, because the weapons, etc. can be regarded as an important material means which constitute the defense capability of Japan. Through the provision of Paragraph 1 of the Article that “excluding activities conducted in places where combat activities are actually occurring,” it is ensured that asset protection is not to be, nor to be legally regarded as being integrated (“ittaika”) with the use of force of the U.S. Forces, ----- will have an important influence (*) is requested, the Prime Minister should clearly state it in the Basic Plan and should ask for a Cabinet decision on it after deliberations in the NSC. (*) “Situations that will have an important influence” is provided in Article 1 of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, Act No. 11 of 1999. The National Security Council Board is to be held flexibly and support the full National Security Council. In addition, the relevant ministries and agencies are to share information on requests for protection and closely cooperate with each other. **(3) Disclosure of Information** In the implementation of Article 95-2, if an unusual event occurs in conducting asset protection operation, the Government promptly discloses such an event, and releases a basic plan that specifies matters concerning the implementation of asset protection operations in a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The Government also strives for appropriate disclosure of information in light of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Act No. 42 of 1999). 3 3 Track Record of Asset Protection Operations in 2018 In 2018, during ISR activities including ballistic missile alert, SDF vessels conducted asset protection for U.S. military vessels three times, and during joint exercises, SDF vessels conducted asset protection for U.S. military vessels three times and SDF aircraft for U.S. military aircraft ten times, totaling 16 times. See Section 2-3-7 of this Chapter (Protection of Weapons and See Other Equipment of the Units of the U.S. Forces and the Armed Forces of Other Foreign Countries) **4** **Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. ACSA** In September 2016, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to Japan signed the Japan-U.S. ACSA. ACSA was approved by the Diet and took effect in April 2017. The ACSA was prepared as a new agreement to replace the previous Japan-U.S. ACSA to enable the application of existing settlement procedures to the provision of supplies and services from the SDF to the U.S. Forces that become possible under the newly enacted Legislation for Peace and Security. The new ACSA enables the smooth and expeditious provision of a broad range of supplies and services between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, thereby raising the levels of **5** **Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO** Japan deployed engineering units to the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) from January 2012 to the end of May 2017. Following the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, after a comprehensive consideration in light of the local situation and the training for the new additional mission, the Government decided to assign the duty of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” to the 11th Engineering Unit to be deployed to UNMISS, as well as the duty of joint protection of camps. Following the approval obtained at the 9-Minister Meeting of the National Security Council, the Cabinet approved the revision of the Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation specific on-site cooperation between them. Japan also signed ACSAs with the U.K and Australia other than the United States in light of the Legislation for Peace and Security, etc., which obtained Diet approval along with the Japan-U.S. ACSA and took effect in the same year. Subsequently, Japan signed ACSAs with Canada and France, both of which obtained Diet approval in May 2019. The Japan-France ACSA and Japan-Canada ACSA took effect in June and July 2019, respectively. See Section 2-3-8 of this Chapter (Expansion of the Provision of � Supplies and Services to the U.S. Forces) Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2-6 (Logistics Support) **Chapter** Assignment for UNMISS on November 15, 2016. ----- # ⅢPart Three Pillars of Japan’s Defense (Means to Achieve the Objectives of Defense) **Chapter 1** **Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** **Chapter 2** **Japan-U.S. Alliance** **Chapter 3** **Security Cooperation** ----- **Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense** ### 1 The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)[1] reflects the recognition that Japan, even amid the realities of security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the National Security Strategy—defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. Based on that recognition, the NDPG identifies national defense objectives and the means to achieve them. To this end, the NDPG defines national defense objectives as follows: first, to create, on a steady-state basis, security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; second, to deter **Section** **1** **Truly Effective Defense Capability** As described below, concerning the strengthening of Japan’s own architecture for national defense, the NDPG identifies the significance and necessity of defense capacity, and states threat from reaching Japan by making opponent realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and finally, should threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage. Furthermore, the NDPG provides that Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation, which are three pillars of Japan’s defense. Part III explains initiatives by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) based on these three pillars of Japan’s defense. that Japan will build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force.” **Chapter** **1** **Signifi cance and Necessity of Defense Capability** Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace. At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. **2** **Truly Effective Defense Capability—Multi-domain Defense Force** To be able to deter and counter qualitatively and quantitatively superior military threats in increasingly testing security environment, it has become vitally important to adapt to warfare that combines capabilities in new domains–space, Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries. Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self-sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative. cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum–and traditional domains–land, sea and air. Japan needs to develop, while qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing capabilities in individual domains, a P t II Ch t 3 S ti 1 F t t 1 ----- defense capability that can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains, such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished. In order to ensure national defense in increasingly uncertain security environment, it is also important for Japan to be able to seamlessly conduct activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. To date, Japan has endeavored to develop a defense capability that allows to engage in diverse activities in a swift and sustainable manner. In recent years, however, the SDF has had to increase the scope and frequency of its steady state activities such as maintaining presence, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities: This is exacting a chronic burden on its personnel and equipment, generating a concern that the SDF may not be able to maintain proficiency and the volume of its activities. Japan needs to: improve quality and quantity **Section** **2** **Role that Japan’s Defense Forces Have to Fulfill** The NDPG states that, in order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan’s defense capability must be able to serve the following roles in a seamless and combined manner: (1) response from peacetime to “gray-zone” situations; (2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands; (3) response in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains during all phases; (4) response to large-scale disasters, etc.; (5) cooperation with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. of capabilities that support sustainability and resiliency of various activities; and develop a defense capability that enables sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities commensurate with the character of given situations. Further, Japan’s defense capability needs to be capable of strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats as well as promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation. In light of the foregoing, Japan will henceforth build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the 2013 NDPG.[2] Alliance; and (6) promotion of security cooperation. In particular, in view of protecting the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan’s defense capability to fulfill diverse roles on a steady-state basis. **Chapter** See Reference 15 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 16 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units) **1** **Response from Peacetime to Grey Zone Situations** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(1) response from peacetime to ‘gray-zone’ situations” is as follows. The SDF will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, joint training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and capability. The SDF will, in close integration with diplomacy, promote strategic communications, including the aforementioned activities by SDF units. The SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as “persistent ISR”) activities around Japan. The SDF will prevent the occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent 2 S P t II Ch t 3 S ti 1 F t t 7 options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, the SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty, including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters. The SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur. Initiatives carried out based on this role are explained below. See Section 2-2-2 of this Chapter (Response to Missile Attacks) Chapter 3 Section 1 (Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation) ----- GSDP personnel engaged in warning and surveillance activities Warning and surveillance activities around a maritime platform in the East China Sea (photo from an MSDF P-3C) Warning and surveillance activities on an ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control aircraft **Chapter** Minamikojima Island, and Kitakojima Island), Chinese government vessels carried out intermittent intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.[3] In June 2016, a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands for the first time. Chinese Navy vessels continue their activities in the sea areas surrounding Japan, and six vessels including the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier “Liaoning” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and entered the western Pacific in December 2016. This was the first time that the entry of this aircraft carrier into the Pacific Ocean was confirmed.[4] In July 2017, a Chinese naval intelligence collection ship entered Japanese territorial waters southwest of Kojima (Matsumae, Hokkaido) passing east through the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean for the first time. In January 2018, the SDF confirmed that a Chinese submarine and warship had been navigating through the Japanese contiguous waters of the Senkaku Islands on the same day. Furthermore, in April, in waters some 350 km south of Yonaguni Island, a number of (presumed) fighter jets were observed taking off from the aircraft carrier Liaoning for the first time. Also in June 2019, the SDF confirmed that six vessels, including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” passed through the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and entered the Pacific. It has been pointed out that North Korea is attempting to evade United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions through smuggling. As part of its regular warning and surveillance activities in Japanese territorial waters, the SDF is carrying out information gathering on vessels suspected of violating the UN Security Council sanctions. During the period from 2018 to the end of June 2019, SDF patrol aircraft have confirmed 20 observations[5] of seaborne rendezvous between North Korean tankers and foreign-flagged tankers in the East China Sea. The information was shared with 1 Persistent ISR in the Area Surrounding Japan **(1) Basic Concept** Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest[1] territorial waters (including inland waters) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) patrols the areas such as the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea from peacetime, using patrol aircraft and other aircraft. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, and early warning and control aircraft amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace. These activities of the MSDF and ASDF are done 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and other assets.[2] Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the flexible use of destroyers, aircraft, and so on as required. The information obtained through such surveillance activities is shared with the relevant ministries and agencies, including the Japan Coast Guard, in order to strengthen coordination. To show an example of the events that were reported from SDF’s surveillance, following September 2012 when the Government of Japan acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Excluding overseas territories. The EEZ is the eighth largest in the world if overseas territories are included. Article 4(1)18 of the Act for Establishment of the MOD (Investigation and research required for the performance of duties within jurisdiction) provides the legal basis for early warning surveillance activities by the SDF. Since December 26, 2015, Chinese government vessels equipped with weapons, which appear to be machine guns, have intruded into the territorial waters of Japan. Activity associated with the passage of Chinese naval vessels through the Ryukyu Islands between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island was confirmed 15 times in 2018. F ifi l th MOD b it (htt // d j /j/ h/d f / d i/i d ht l) ----- relevant agencies and ministries. In a comprehensive judgment across the government, the vessels concerned are strongly suspected of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers with the North Korean vessels, which is prohibited by UN Security Council resolution. Japan reported this to the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea, shared the information with relevant countries, gave information to the relevant countries regarding the tankers concerned and made public announcements on the subject. In response to these illicit maritime activities including transshipments with North Korean vessels prohibited under the UN Security Council resolution, the United States and other concerned countries are carrying out early warning surveillance activities using aircraft based at the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan.[6] Australian, Canadian, New Zealand and French aircraft made patrol flights over a one-month period starting late April 2018. In addition, naval vessels of the U.S. Marine Corps, the United Kingdom, Canada,[7] Australia and France carried out early warning surveillance activities[8] in sea areas surrounding Japan. The MOD/SDF intend to continue their close cooperation with concerned countries to ensure compliance with the UN Security Council resolution. In December 2018, Gwanggaeto, the Great class destroyer of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy, directed a fire control-radar at a MSDF patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance activities off the coast of Noto Peninsula (within Japan’s exclusive economic zone).[9] Taking the incident seriously, in January 2019, the MOD published its final statement,[10] compiling objective facts, and has been urging the Korean side to take recurrence prevention measures. The SDF patrol aircraft was flying while keeping sufficient altitude and distance, and did not fly in a way that could have threatened the Korean navy vessel. The MOD will expend all possible means to monitor the situation and gather intelligence. **Chapter** **Ansan 1** **Small ship** A North Korea-fl agged tanker and a small ship of unidentifi ed nationality confi rmed by an MSDF vessel, which are strongly suspected of engaging in a ship-to-ship transfer on the high seas of the East China Sea (January 2019) Falcon 200, a French reconnaissance aircraft conducting warning and surveillance operations against ship-to-ship transfers [Courtesy of Ministry for the Armed Forces, France] See Fig. III-1-2-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-12-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 (Military Affairs); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (North Korea) Reference 17 MOD’s Final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fi re-control radar at an MSDF patrol aircraft 6 Australia and Canada conducted early warning surveillance activities using aircraft based at the United States Kadena Air Base in Japan for about one year from late April 2018, followed by Australia, Canada and New Zealand for about one and half months from mid-September of the same year, Australia for about a week from early December of 2018, France for about three weeks from March 2019, and Australia for about a month from May 2019. In addition, Canada has been conducting early warning surveillance activities using aircraft since early June 2019 (as of the end of June 2019). 7 At the Japan-Canada Summit Meeting held on April 28, 2019, Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, indicated that Canada will extend the period for dispatch of aircraft and vessels for conducting warning and surveillance activities against ship-to-ship transfers of cargo by two years, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his gratitude. 8 A number of vessels of the U.S. Navy, the United Kingdom’s naval frigate HMS Sutherland, Argyle and Montrose and a landing ship Albion, Canadian Navy’s frigate Calgary, Australian Navy’s frigate Melbourne and French Navy’s frigate Vendémiaire conducted early warning surveillance activities in the waters around Japan, including East China Sea. In addition, Canadian Navy’s frigate Regina and its supply ship Asterix have been conducting early warning surveillance activities in the waters around Japan, including the East China Sea since mid-June 2019 (as of the end of June). 9 Upon analysis by the MOD of the radar waves directed at the MSDF P-1, the MOD has confi rmed that the P-1 was continuously irradiated for a certain period, multiple times, by the fi recontrol radar of the ROK destroyer. After being irradiated by the fi re-control radar, the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft called out using three different frequencies, but there was no response at all from the ROK destroyer. In addition, according to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), a code adopted in 2014 by navies and self defence force from 21 countries including Japan and the ROK, aiming fi re control radars is considered a simulation of attack, and is stipulated as an action a commander should avoid. 10 To read the MOD’s fi nal statement, look at photos taken by the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft, and listen to the radar dictation, etc., see the MOD website (https://www.mod. j / /d t/ d /i d ht l) ----- **Fig. III-1-2-1** Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan **Chapter** Etorofu Island E-2C Airborne E-2C Airborne Early Warning AircraftEarly Warning Aircraft Fixed-wing patrol aircraft E-767 Airborne WarningE-767 Airborne Warning SDF: Coast observation unit and Control System and Control System SDF: Rader site (FPS5 BMD response) TakeshimaTakeshima SDF: Radar site (BMD response) SDF: Radar site Hachijo Island Fixed-wing Fixed-wing Ministry of Defense patrol aircraftpatrol aircraft ※ Only a schematic image of a surveillance range. Not an exact representation of the actual range. Destroyer Senkaku Ogasawara Islands Islands Minami Torishima Yonaguni Island Okidaitojima Territorial waters Okinotorishima Extended continental shelf EEZ public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Law. **b. Response by the MOD/SDF** The ASDF detects and identifies aircraft flying in airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control radars as well as early warning and control aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fighters and other aircraft scramble to approach them in order to confirm the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace would be issued, among other responses. In FY2018, ASDF aircraft scrambled 999 times, which was an increase by 95 times compared with the previous fiscal year. This is the 2nd highest number of times since 1958, when scrambles commenced and the number continues to be kept relatively high. Breaking this figure down, planes were scrambled 638 times in response to Chinese aircraft. Chinese aircraft continue to be highly active, as this is the 2nd highest figure since the number of scrambles by country and region was Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast Guard Ships **Fig. III-1-2-2** (Number of times/ships) 60 52 50 44 48 46 40 38 35 31 31 30 25 27 20 15 11 10 11 11 12 12 12 10 7 8 8 3 0 Jan.-Apr. May-Aug.Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. 2016 2017 2018 2019 Number of times Number of ships 2 Measures against Violation of Japan’s Sovereignty **(1) Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in** **Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace** **a. Basic Concept** Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain ----- **Chapter** An ASDF pilot running up to an F-15 fi ghter aircraft on receiving an order to scramble As a distinctive example, in September 2018, a Su-35 fighter jet was for the first time recognized over the Sea of Japan. In June 2019, two Tu-95 long range bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Minamidaitojima Island (Okinawa Prefecture). One of them further intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Hachijojima Island (Tokyo). Japan lodged protests against the Russian government through diplomatic channels. Due attention needs to be paid to the activities of Russian aircraft. In July 2019, two Chinese H-6 bombers and two Russian Tu-95 long-range bombers carried out long distance joint flights from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea. In addition, one Russian A-50 early warning and control aircraft allegedly supporting Tu-95 long-range bombers intruded into Japan’s airspace above the territorial waters of Takeshima Island in Shimane Prefecture. A Korean fighter fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft. Japan lodged protests against the Russian government which intruded into Japan’s airspace and against the Korean government which fired warning shots to the Russian aircraft through Russian Tu-95 long range bombers intruding into Japan’s airspace (June 2019) first made public in 2001. A distinctive example arose in May 2017 when a drone caused an airspace violation as it flew above a Chinese naval vessel entering Japanese territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands. Japan lodged protests against the Chinese government through diplomatic channels. In August that year, six Chinese military bombers were observed in an unprecedented flight from the East China Sea over the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northeast across the Pacific to an area off the Kii Peninsula before returning. Then in December, five aircraft including two fighter jets flew over the Tsushima Strait and entered the Japan Sea airspace.[11] Then in April 2018, a (presumed) unmanned Chinese aircraft flew across the East China Sea. With these kinds of acts, China is expanding and intensifying the activities of its air force inside Japanese airspace and one-sidedly escalating its actions in some cases. It is a troubling situation. Planes were scrambled 343 times in response to Russian aircraft, a decrease of 47 events compared to the year before. **Fig. III-1-2-3** Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War (Times) 1,200 1,168 999 1,000 943 944 904 873 812 810 800 464 851 638 567 500 600 415 571 425 386 400 306 311 299 96 156 220 200 158 38 264 247 248 359 473 288 301 390 343 197 124 0 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (FY) Note:Peaked during the Cold War Russia China Taiwan Others Total 11 Thi th fi t ti th t Chi fi ht h b fi d t i th J S i ----- **Fig. III-1-2-4** Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded (image) **Chapter** FY2012 FY2018 Flight paths taken by Chinese aircraft Flight paths taken by Russian aircraft Flight paths taken by Chinese aircraft Flight paths taken by Russian aircraft - Comparison with the flight patterns in FY2012, when scrambles against Chinese aircraft increased significantly. to Which Scrambles Responded); Fig. III-1-2-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone [ADIZ] of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries/Regions); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-2 (Military Affairs), Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-4 (Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan); Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-3-5 (Measures Against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace) **(2) Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s Territorial** **Waters** **a. Basic Concept** With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters,[12] an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and **Fig. III-1-2-5** Those of Neighboring Countries and Regions (image) See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-3-2 (Maritime Security Operations) **b. Response by the MOD/SDF** The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and continued to track the Northern Territories Japanese territorial airspace ROK ADIZ Takeshima “East China Sea ADIZ” - Japan ADIZ Ogasawara Islands Senkaku Islands Taiwan ADIZ Yonaguni Island 500km - The ROK expanded its ADIZ in December 2013 Philippines ADIZ [ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone] diplomatic channel. Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD/SDF has implemented warning and surveillance activities as before in the East China Sea, including the zone in question, and has continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan. The MOD/SDF also engages in strict airspace antiintrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Law. See Fig. III-1-2-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War); Fig. III-1-2-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft 12 Th t “t it i l t ” l i l d i l ----- submarine with MSDF vessels until it entered the high seas. MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft and others also confirmed observation of submerged submarines navigating through the Japanese contiguous zones in May 2013 in waters south of Kumejima Island, in March 2014 off the east coast of Miyakojima Island and in February 2016 in waters southeast of Tsushima Island. Further, in January 2018, a submerged submarine was spotted by MSDF assets including a destroyer moving through Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. The submarine was then observed surfacing in international waters of the East China Sea flying the Chinese flag. This was the first time that a Chinese naval submarine has been observed operating in the Japanese contiguous zones of the Senkaku Islands. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a posture to appropriately deal with such activities. **(3) Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels** **a. Basic Concept** The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard. **b. Response by the MOD/SDF** In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF have been making various efforts. In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following steps: (1) deployment of Patrol Guided Missile Boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit;[13] (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells);[14] (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that as a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Sea,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force. The third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy[15] was given Cabinet approval in May 2018. Taking a broad view of ocean policy from the perspective of security on the ocean, the Plan states that the government will act as one in undertaking “comprehensive maritime security.” For this purpose, the government will undertake securing of the national interest in the territorial water of Japan and stable use of its important sea lanes. Furthermore, the government will further strengthen its efforts toward enhancement of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) that collects and summarize a variety of maritime information from ships, aircraft, etc. in order to use the information for measures regarding the sea. **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** In order to maintain the order of “Open and Stable Seas” and contribute to comprehensive maritime security, the MOD/ SDF is enhancing warning and surveillance activities on important remote islands and their surrounding sea areas and conducting counter-piracy operations to secure stable use of sea lanes. Within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), the MSDF has been engaged in initiatives such as cooperation in the establishment of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).[16] In September 2018, three MSDF destroyers, including Destroyer JS “Kaga,” five carrier aircraft, and submarine “Kuroshio” conducted an anti-submarine warfare exercise in the South China Sea. At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in October 2018, Minister of Defense Iwaya raised an objection to attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the Indo Pacific and spoke of the importance of consolidating order based on the principles of international law. **Chapter** See Chapter 3, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security) 3 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security **(1) Basic Approach by the Government** 13 A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations. 14 A non-bursting shell launched from the 76-mm gun equipped on destroyer, the flat front nose of which keeps it from bouncing. 15 The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy is set forth by the government in order to ensure comprehensive and plan-based promotion of measures concerning the ocean. 16 This standard of behavior adopted in 2014 stipulates procedures for safety, communication methods and other matters in the event of an unplanned encounter at sea by naval vessels d i ft f th b t i f th WPNS ( ith t l l bi di f d d t id i t ti l i ti l ti ti ) ----- **2** **Defense of Japan including its Remote Islands** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(2) countering attacks against Japan, including its remote islands” is as follows. In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, the SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime[17] and air[18] superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures. Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, the SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF’s capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed. In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, the SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces. In responding to such attacks, the SDF will implement cross-domain operations that organically fuse capabilities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains to block and eliminate attacks. In view of protecting the life, person and property of the nationals, the SDF will implement measures for civil protection. Initiatives carried out based on this role are explained below. 1 Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands **(1) Basic Concept** Japan possesses numerous remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, it is important to station units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to maneuver and deploy them according to situations on a steady-state basis. It is also important to ensure maritime and air superiority by detecting signs at an early stage through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF. If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be maneuvered and deployed in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and block access and landing of invading forces. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, the SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, the SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures such as bringing the enemy under control by ground fire from aircraft and vessels, and then regaining the territory by the landing of GSDF forces. See Fig. III-1-2-6 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Remote See Islands) **Chapter** **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, the ASDF established the 9th Air Wing in January 2016 and newly formed the Southwestern Air Defense Force in July 2017. The GSDF, in addition to the Yonaguni coast observation unit formed in March 2016 and other newlyformed units, established the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade with full-fledged amphibious operation capabilities in March 2018. Moreover, the GSDF deployed some units, including an area security unit in Amami Oshima, and an area security unit in Miyakojima Island, in March 2019. The GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial response and other units also in Ishigaki Island. As part of measures to enhance the persistent ISR posture, the SDF has acquired a new type of destroyer (FFM) and E-2D airborne early warning aircraft. The Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP)[19] plans to establish one airborne early warning (AEW) wing and one squadron of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) units in the ASDF in addition to the development of new fixed air defense radar and strengthening of over-the-horizon radar capabilities. In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel, the SDF procured stand-off missiles which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and started Research and Development (R&D) on technologies required for new anti-ship missiles and HVGPs (Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles) for the defense of remote 17 Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force. 18 Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a significant level of obstruction by the opposing force. 19 S P t II Ch t 4 S ti 1 F t t 2 ----- **Fig. III-1-2-6** Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Remote Islands **Chapter** Imagery satellite Positioning satellite Secure and maintain maritime and air superiority Overall air defense Aerial refuelingAerial refueling Surface vesselsSurface vessels Maritime air supportMaritime air support Deployment of units to remote islands Mine deployment Mine deployment warfarewarfare Anti-surface warfareAnti-surface warfare Operation to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion SDF troops are to be swiftly deployed in an area expected to Close air supportClose air support be attacked, ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and Landing Landing the troops try to block access and landing of invading by aircraftby aircraft forces. Response in the waterResponse in the water Landing byLanding by amphibious vehicleamphibious vehicle Anti-submarine warfare Landing by boat Submarine Anti-mine warfareAnti-mine warfare MinesweepingMinesweeping Enemy submarineEnemy submarine by shipby ship Amphibious vehicle training landings in Iron Fist 19 (from January to February 2019) aircraft. In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT was the best airfield to be used as their deployment site due to positional relationships with the amphibious deployment brigade and relevant units in joint operations, the length of the runway, and potential use as relocation destination of JGSDF Camp Metabaru. In August 2018, the Governor of Saga prefecture expressed their acceptance. The MOD/SDF will continue to work to gain understanding on deployment at the airport from the relevant local authorities Commander of the GSDF Miyako Gurad handed over the Unit Flag from Defense Minister Iwaya (April 2019) islands to take all initiatives necessary to defend the islands since FY2018. R&D on hypersonic weapons is also planned in the MTDP and necessary expenses are included in the FY2019 budget. Also, in order to secure capabilities for swift and largescale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Osumi class LST (Landing Ship, Tank); and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys and C-2 transport ----- **Chapter** **Establishment of the Airborne Warning and Control Wing** The Airborne Early Warning Group is the only unit that has airborne warning and control systems (E-767) and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) equipped with airborne radar. Since its establishment in 1986, the group has been conducting warning and surveillance in airspaces difficult to survey by warning and control radar on the ground during steady state. In recent years, in addition to the expansion of Chinese military aircraft to the western Pacific and long-range flights by Russian military aircraft near Japan, other military activities by neighboring countries have been rapidly expanding and intensifying near the islands on the Pacific side, where units in charge of warning and surveillance have not been deployed. The importance of warning and surveillance using airborne warning and control systems is increasing in these air spaces. In response to this situation, the Airborne Warning and Control Wing will be established by upgrading the Airborne Early Warning Group in FY2019 in order to strengthen the posture for effective operation of airborne warning and control systems, etc. The establishment is expected to enhance the SDF’s air defense posture in the airspace around Japan, including the vast airspace on the Pacific side. The ASDF has been sequentially upgrading airborne warning and control systems and other equipment owned by the Airborne Early Warning Group. It will further upgrade such aircraft and other equipment, including by introducing E-2Ds that are new airborne early warning aircraft and by conducting avionics improvement necessary for retrofit of the current central computing device of E-767 and installation of electronic warfare support measures. **Toward Training of V-22 Pilots in Command** **Major Akira Takeuchi, U.S. Training Team Leader of the 1st Helicopter Brigade, GSDF** Since 2016, the GSDF has been training personnel in the United States who will play central roles in the introduction of the V-22. I earned the qualification of V-22 copilot at the Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, the United States, in March 2018 and have been participating in the training of V-22 pilots in command there since March 2019. Here, about 30 GSDF personnel join U.S. marines on a steady basis to undergo training in accordance with their respective strengths and have been steadily improving their skills to become leading GSDF V-22 experts. Capable of vertical take-off and landing, the V-22 drastically excels in range, speed and load. This is a dream aircraft that can change not only future aircraft operations but also the operation modalities of the entire SDF. After piloting a V-22 I found the both helicopter flight mode and fixed-wing flight mode amazingly easy, and the operations for mode conversion are also smooth. Equipped with many fail-safe devices, this is truly a state-of-the-art and the most reliable aircraft. During the pilot training, I will improve my skills for safer flight of V-22s and study their effective and efficient operation tailored to the characteristics of Japan so that they will manifest their fighting strength promptly after introduction. The author undergoing training using GSDF V-22 and others.[20] Meanwhile, in May 2019, the MOD explained their intention to temporarily deploy V-22 Ospreys at Camp Kisarazu, since there is the prospect that the deployment at KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT will take a certain period of time. The MTDP also stipulates that, in order to strengthen the transport function to remote islands, the SDF will introduce logistics support vessels (LSV) and landing craft utilities (LCU), establish 1 group of maritime transportation units as a Joint Unit and consider new vessels necessary to smoothly 20 At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V 22 O d i t l 50 h li t t f d f C M t b t d t b d l d ----- **Fig. III-1-2-7** Deployment Status of Major Units in the Southwestern Islands (image) **Chapter** The same scale as that of the main island of Japan - GSDF Amami Guard, etc. Amami Oshima - MSDF Amami Naval Base Facility - ASDF Amami Communication Squadron Okinoerabujima Island ASDF 55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc. ASDF 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc. Main island of Okinawa - GSDF 15th Brigade Kumejima Island - MSDF Fleet Air Wing 5 Senkaku Islands Approx. 430 km - ASDF Southwestern Air Defense Force, etc. Approx. 310 km Approx. 210 km Approx. 150 km Ishigakijima Yonagunijima Island Miyakojima Island Island Approx. 130 km Approx. 120 km - GSDF Miyako Guard - ASDF 53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc. GSDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit (As of April 1, 2019) [Legend] GSDF Units MSDF Units ASDF Units 100km implement amphibious and other operations in the future. Meanwhile, various types of training to increase the capacity for amphibious operations are being undertaken. The SDF endeavored to increase its capacity through multilateral joint training RIMPAC 2018 in the United States conducted from June to August of 2018, joint amphibious operation training in October 2018 and field training Iron Fist 19 with the U.S. Marines Corps in the United States from January to February 2019. The MTDP sets forth that the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of one amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will conduct persistent steady-state maneuvers, such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. See Fig. III-1-2-7 (Deployment Status of Major Units in the Southwestern Islands (image)) 2 Response to Missile Attacks **(1) Japan’s Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability** **a. Basic Concept** Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in July 2005, and in December of the same year, the Security Council (then) and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).[21] Currently, Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-layered defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).[22] The upcoming introduction of the land-based Aegis system, Aegis Ashore, 21 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other targets, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles. 22 JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radar installed nationwide, and it provides fighters instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and d t i t b lli ti i il ----- will enable our forces to intercept missiles in the upper tier not just from Aegis destroyers but from land. Today airborne threats to Japan are increasingly complex and diverse, including ballistic missiles equipped with multiple/maneuverable warheads, high-speed and longerrange cruise missiles, and stealth and multi-role aircraft. In order to effectively and efficiently counter these airborne threats by optimum means and minimize damage, it is necessary to establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection from peacetime and also enhancing the comprehensive air and missile defense capability that can simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, the SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses, including their maintenance and replenishment systems. In case ballistic missiles or other objects are launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, when such situation is not yet acknowledged as an armed attack, Japan will take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles. As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of a fallen ballistic missile. See Fig. III-1-2-8 (Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense (image)) Fig. III-1-2-9 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image)) Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-3-4 (Destruction Measures Against Ballistic Missiles) Reference 18 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan) summit held in February 2019 ended without any agreement and North Korea has not dismantled all its weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Taking into consideration the facts that North Korea is believed to have achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and have developed nuclear warheads through repeated nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches to date, that it possesses and deploys several hundred ballistic missiles capable of reaching almost every part of Japan, and that it has pursued enhancement of the operation capabilities necessary for saturation attacks and its ability to conduct surprise attacks, there is no change in North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles capability. The MOD/SDF continues to carefully monitor the concrete actions of North Korea toward the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and conducts the necessary intelligence, warning and surveillance activities, and other necessary activities while closely cooperating with the United States and other countries. Further cooperation with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting). Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)[23] from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces. Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. Since FY2010, BMD special exercises have been held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships and other equipment via a network to conduct a simulation of response to ballistic missiles. In 2018, the ASDF participated in this exercise, and the GSDF joined in 2019. The exercise is conducted as a joint Japan-U.S. air defense/missile defense exercise aimed to improve tactical skills and strengthen cooperation. Beyond Japan-U.S. cooperation, there is also a need to bolster cooperation between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In January, March, October and December 2017, trilateral ballistic missile information sharing exercises were held in waters off Japan with the objective of strengthening coordination **Chapter** **b. Response by the MOD/SDF** Since 2016, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests and 40 ballistic missile launches. These military actions by North Korea are a severe and imminent threat to the safety of Japan. North Korea expressed its intention to fully denuclearize the Korean Peninsula at the North Korea-United States summit held in June 2018, and disclosed destruction of its nuclear test ground. However, the second North Korea-United States 23 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and d t th SDF b th U S F i h t i d f ti ft th l h (Th SDF t t d t i th i f ti i A il 1996 ) ----- **Fig. III-1-2-8** Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense (image) - Establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces for air defense of each SDF service, not limited to those for missile defense - Ascertain the status of operations in common by linking to JADGE* via a network - Simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats under unified command and control (allocation and direction of optimal means for interception, etc.) through JADGE Aegis Ashore AWACS Fighters E-2D MIMO radar FPS AWACS Enemy fighters Enemy cruise missiles Aegis destroyers Air refueling aircraft Radar network without any blind spots Air-to-air Ship-to-air Surface-to-air E-2D Enemy fighters Enemy cruise missiles Enemy cruise missiles Aegis Ashore FPS Aegis destroyers Short range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) Base air defense SAM PAC-3 Middle range SAM *JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment) is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and it provides fighters with instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in response to ballistic missiles. **Fig. III-1-2-9** Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image) **Chapter** **Mid-course phase** In this phase, the rocket engine burns out and the missile is flying in outer space (exoatmosphere) inertially **Boost phase** **Detection/Discrimination/** In this phase, the **Tracking** **Terminal phase** rocket engine is This phase covers burning and atmospheric re-entry accelerating the missile to impact **ASDF air control and** **ASDF** **warning radar** **Patriot PAC-3** **(FPS-5, FPS-3** **Ballistic missile** **Upgraded, FPS-7)** **GSDF** **Aegis Ashore** **JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense** **Ground Environment)** **MSDF Aegis** **BMD destroyer** **Commander, Joint Task Force-BMD** Commander, Air Defense Command ----- With respect to the sharing of finely detailed information related to ballistic missiles, etc. with relevant countries, including the United States, the passage of the Specially Designated Secrets Act in December 2014 (Law no. 108, 2013) has established the basis for protection of highly confidential information related to national security. This has promoted increased sharing of information not just within the government but with the United States and other relevant countries. In addition, the Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)[24] entered into effect on November 2016. GSOMIA serves as a framework for protecting various confidential information, including information regarding North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, shared between Japan and the ROK, which will be required for practical and effective responses to various situations. However, in August 2019, the Government of the ROK notified the Government of Japan of its intention to terminate the GSOMIA in writing. The MOD/SDF will expend all possible means to monitor the situation and gather intelligence in order to avoid causing any deficiency in the defense of Japan. The SDF engages in various training on a daily basis to improve its capability to counter ballistic missiles. It has been conducting PAC-3 maneuver deployment training from June 2017 in an effort to strengthen the SDF’s capability to counter ballistic missiles and generate a sense of safety and security among the public. It has conducted 22 training sessions as of the end of June 2019 including deployments to U.S. Forces Japan’s facilities. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-1 (North Korea); Chapter 3, Section 1-2-4 (Republic of Korea); Reference 18 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan) **Chapter** Aegis Destroyer JS “Atago,” refurbished to give ballistic missile defense capability and conducting a test launch of SM-3 BLK IB (September 2018) equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities from the present six to eight by FY2020. Meanwhile, Japan and the United States are jointly developing advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), which will be the successor to SM-3 Block IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, and promoting the project to its deployment, in order to deal with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missile attacks. At the National Security Council 9-Minister Meeting in December 2016, a decision was made to transition to joint production and the deployment phase. Since the FY2017 budget, SM-3 Block IIA acquisitions are ongoing. Acquisition and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA are planned to be implemented in FY2021. In comparison with the previous SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA will have not only extended interceptable altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced defeating capability and simultaneous engagement capability. In addition, it is expected that the interception capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA will be enhanced against ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched with an intention to avoid being intercepted by taking a higher than nominal trajectory (lofted trajectory).[25] With regard to Patriot PAC-3, necessary expenses have been appropriated in the supplementary budgets for FY2016 and FY2017 to enable the acquisition of the enhanced capability type, PAC-3 (MSE) (Missile Segment Enhancement). Introduction of PAC-3MSE will realize the extension of interception altitude from less than 20 km to tens of km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will expand more than twice compared with the current PAC-3. In this way Japan is taking measures necessary to strengthen its protection structure and plans to continue the **c. Initiatives towards Strengthening of the BMD System** Currently the SDF maneuvers and deploys according to situation Aegis-equipped destroyers for defense of the entire territory of Japan and PAC-3, which is deployed across the country for the defense of stationing locations. On that premise, the SDF has worked to increase the number of Aegis BMD destroyers. Of the six MSDF Aegis-equipped destroyers that are present, the MOD completed refurbishment of two without BMD capabilities, “Atago” and “Ashigara,” to give them BMD capabilities by December 2018. The MOD also decided to acquire two additional Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD capabilities using the FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. These projects will increase the number of Aegis 24 The official name is the “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classified Military Information,” which was signed by Nagamine, Ambassador of Japan to the ROK, and Han Min-goo, then Minister of National Defense of the ROK, in Seoul, ROK, on November 23, 2016. 25 By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable efficient flying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum b t th f lli d f th i il b f t ----- efforts.[26] **d. Introduction of Aegis Ashore** In the past, the BMD of Japan was based on deploying Aegisequipped destroyers, etc. in preparation for interception for a required period of time after early detection of signs of missile launch. Under the past posture regarding a possible missile attack on Japan, the MOD has believed that protection of the entire territory of Japan was possible if about two of the destroyers continued BMD missions in the sea for a certain period of time with a system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers. Meanwhile, North Korea has improved its practical launch capability using a transporter erector launcher (TEL) and developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), which makes it difficult to grasp signs of launch at an early stage. In light of the changing situation, it is necessary to maintain a persistent 24-hour, 365-day deployment of Aegisequipped destroyers for a long period of over one year. This fact triggered a review of the past Japanese ballistic missile defense posture itself. Furthermore, under the current Aegis equipped destroyer system that requires frequent long-term deployment, the working environment for crew onboard these destroyers is extremely severe. The service requires high level of concentration day and night to cope with ballistic missiles that can be launched anytime. Under these circumstances, with North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles posing a severe and imminent threat to the safety of our country, Japan must work to drastically upgrade its ballistic missile defense capabilities in order to ensure constant and sustained protection from peacetime. At meetings of the National Security Council and Cabinet in December 2017, a decision was made to purchase two Aegis Ashore units, to be retained by the GSDF. Aegis Ashore refers to a missile defense system that consists of radars, a command communication system, a vertical launch system (VLS), etc. similar to Aegis-equipped destroyers but deployed on the ground. Aegis Ashore intercepts ballistic missiles flying in space outside of the Earth’s atmosphere from the ground. It is a piece of equipment with parts other than the ship hull of an Aegis-equipped destroyer on the ground in a fixed position. The introduction of two units of Aegis Ashore would enable seamless defense of the entire territory of Japan 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, and the burden on personnel is anticipated to be lifted significantly. Under the system of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers, about two of them had to focus on BMD mission only in the sea in order to protect the entire territory of Japan. Once Aegis Ashore is deployed, the Aegis-equipped destroyers can be used for missions ensuring maritime security, conducting training to maintain these skills, and ensuring sufficient change of crewmembers, which will be connected to further strengthen Japan’s deterrence capability as a whole. The radar units to be mounted on the Aegis Ashore are state-ofthe-art high-performance radar units called Lockheed Martin Solid State Radar (LMSSR). This radar will drastically enhance Japan’s capabilities to respond to ballistic missiles, and includes enhancement of the capability against lofted trajectory launches and response to simultaneous majority attacks compared with Aegis-equipped destroyer of the MSDF. Since GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture were selected as candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore, the MOD has repeated briefing sessions for local governments and residents and provided explanations on the necessary survey and the need for the deployment. However, there has been much inappropriate conduct, such as mistakes in briefing material and behavior showing a lack of respect by a defense official at the briefing session. The MOD sincerely reflects on our past conduct. In order to prevent a similar incident from occurring and to fundamentally strengthen the internal study framework, the MOD established “Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Headquarters” in June 2019, with the State Minister of Defense as the head of the office. Regarding Aegis Ashore, the MOD believes that the basic premise is to deploy and operate it without impact on residents. Residents have voiced, to the MOD, various doubts and concerns about the need for and safety of the deployment, and the ministry will continue to provide explanations on them in a concrete and easy-to-understand manner with the best of intentions. **(2) Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD** **Technical Cooperation** **a. Missile Defense of the United States** The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our **Chapter** 26 The FY2019 budget includes expenses necessary for upgrading renovations to enable Atago-type Aegis ship to launch SM-3 Block IIA. ----- country in a step-by-step manner.[27] **b. Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.** The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the Security Council (then) and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of protection[28] and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks. In February and June 2017, Japan and the United States conducted tests of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor in waters off Hawaii. Analysis of the test data confirmed that it meets all performance requirements. Currently, as part of development work, the United States is carrying out validation of the data connection between the Aegis system and the SM-3 Block IIA, and between radars. Japan continues to cooperate as required. 3 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others In Japan, where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. These cases refer to various mode and forms including illegal activities by infiltrated foreign armed agents[29] etc., and sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces, which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan. case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confirmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order. **(2) Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations** **Forces** Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries. In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF responds with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destruction of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, and the necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infiltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them. The MTDP states that in order to enhance the ability to respond effectively and efficiently, the SDF will improve its ISR posture and its ability to protect key facilities, including nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units. **Chapter** **(1) Basic Concept** In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can be dealt with by the general police force, various forms of assistance such as transportation of police officers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the See Fig. III-1-2-10 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces) **(3) Response to Armed Agents** **a. Basic Concept** While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. 27 Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014. In addition, BMD-capable Aegis ships of the U.S. Forces were deployed at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018. 28 With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles. 29 R f t itti ill l t h b i ti iti i J hil i ith i ifi t di d killi ----- **Fig. III-1-2-10** Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces **Chapter** Patrol helicopter Enemy aircraft Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Search and Observation helicopter destruction at sea Reconnaissance aircraft by MSDF and ASDF DestroyerDestroyer Submarine Depot ship Guerillas andGuerillas and Enemy submarineEnemy submarine Base for underwater vehicles special forces landingspecial forces landing used in landing operations Underwater scooters Search and Warning and used in landing operations destruction at surveillance the water’s edge Light armored vehicle Reconnaissance Protection of Air important defense unit facilities Infantry unit Mobile Search and destruction in Combat Vehicles Short range Tanks Obstacle mountainous areas Fighting helicopter surface-to-air Multipurpose helicopter missiles Base Search and destruction Shovel in urban areas car Tank[Mobile Combat Vehicle] Bulldozer Mortar Establishment Consequencemanagement Infantry unit Wheeled armored vehicle of positions BaseBase Leading local residents for evacuation, etc. Police NBC attack NBC reconnaissance Special Howitzer vehicle Rescuing hostage operations unit Mortar Decontamination vehicle When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement[30] concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.[31] See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-3-1, (Public Security Operations) suspicious vessels are also continuously conducted between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard. **(4) Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons** In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack[33] on the Tokyo subway in March 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used. **a. Basic Concept** In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way **b. Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** The GSDF has been conducting field training exercises nationwide with the police of each prefecture, in an effort to strengthen such collaboration by, for example, conducting field exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012.[32] Furthermore, joint exercises in dealing with 30 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000). 31 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents. 32 The GSDF also conducted exercises on the ground at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015, at Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2016, at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant (Shizuoka Prefecture) and Shiga Nuclear Power Plant (Ishikawa Prefecture) in 2017, and at Genkai Nuclear Power Plant (Saga Prefecture) in 2019. 33 An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination ti th t i d t ti ll t d li f i ----- ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained. In the event of a military attack on Japan, the SDF will respond with defensive mobilization. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. **(1) Air Defense Operations** Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars,[34] it is expected that Japan will be repeatedly hit by rapid and surprise aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. Operations for aerial defense[35] aim to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to inflict significant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack difficult. **Chapter** Policemen of Yamagata Prefectural Police and GSDF personnel conducting training according to the joint guideline under the order of Public Security Operations (February 2018) that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief and civil protection dispatches. **b. Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as well as increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. **(2) Defense Operations Protecting Waters Surrounding Japan** If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities. **(3) Operations Protecting the Land** In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air. For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be 4 Readiness against Invasion The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large 34 Aerial attacks are important elements influencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations. 35 A special characteristic of operations for aerial defense is that initial response is critical and can influence the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a i k i iti l i b i i ti l l ll t i f ti d idl d h i l t b t biliti f th t t f ti ----- difficult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage. **(4) Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation** Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack, etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF combines various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol,[36] defend SDF ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes[37] to directly defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from fighter jets and other aircraft is provided as required. **Chapter** GSDF personnel doing a transportation task in cooperation with relevant organizations in civil protection training conducted in Aichi Prefecture (January 2019) **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF to Facilitate Measures for** **Civilian Protection** **a. Civil Protection Training** For sound and expeditious implementation of measures to protect civilians, it is important to conduct training on a regular basis to ensure effective and efficient collaboration with concerned ministries, agencies and local governments. The MOD and the SDF hold exercises in cooperation with concerned ministries and agencies and with the participation of local governments and others. They also participate and cooperate in civil protection exercises held by other ministries, agencies and local governments. For example, civil protection training was hosted by the central government (Cabinet Secretariat and the Fire Defense Agency) and local governments (Aichi prefecture and Toyota City) in Toyota City, Aichi in January 2019. The GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and JSDF Aichi Provincial Cooperation Office also participated in the training in preparation for an incident during an international sports event. 5 Initiatives Related to the Protection of Civilians **(1) Basic Policy on the Protection of Civilians and the Role of** **the MOD/SDF** In March 2005, based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act, the government established the Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the People. It anticipates four types of armed attack: 1) a land invasion, 2) an attack by guerrillas or special forces, 3) a ballistic missile attack, 4) an air attack and points to consider in taking measures to protect civilians depending on the type of attack. The MOD/SDF, based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Guidelines, have developed a Civil Protection Plan of the MOD and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency. This plan stipulates that in a situation where Japan is under attack, the SDF would make utmost efforts to fulfill its basic task of repelling the attack It also states that, within the scope of no hindrance to the task, the SDF would do as much as possible to protect civilians through support on evacuation and disaster relief. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-1-4 (Civil Protection) See Reference 19 (Participation of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies [2018]) **b. Ongoing Collaboration with Local Governments** The MOD and the SDF are establishing liaison departments in Regional Armies and Provincial Cooperation Offices to ensure ongoing and close collaboration with local governments and other bodies. Civilian protection councils are also being established in local governments for comprehensive implementation of measures to protect civilians. Representatives of each branch of the SDF and Regional Defense Bureau officials have been appointed to the councils. Moreover, local governments are recruiting retired SDF 36 The act of systematically monitoring a specific area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force. 37 R l ti l f i d fi d t bl th t t ti f hi Th l ti d idth f l h d di th it ti f ifi th ----- officers to serve as crisis managers. For example, they act as coordinators with the MOD/SDF, as well as developing and **3** **Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(3) response in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains during all phases” is as follows. In order to prevent any actions that impede its activities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains, the SDF, on a steady-state basis, conducts persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In the event of such an event, the SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as damage limitation and recovery. In case of an armed attack against Japan, the SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains. Furthermore, in light of society’s growing dependence on space and cyberspace, the SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations. Initiatives carried out based on this role are explained below. implementing joint action plans and exercises. bases. Amid rising dependence on space systems and increasing threats and risks in space, “mission assurance” initiatives are underway to ensure stable space operations including detection and avoidance of threats and risks, increased survivability of the systems themselves and early recovery of functionality. Responding to Japan’s progress in development and use of outer space, the Diet approved the Act on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote Sensing Data (Remote Sensing Data Act) and Act on Launch of Artificial Satellites and Launch Vehicles and Control of Artificial Satellites (Space Activities Act) in November 2016, and the Remote Sensing Data Act and part of the Space Activities Act went into effect in November 2017. The Space Activities Act fully went into effect in November 2018. The Space Activities Act stipulates matters necessary to secure public safety and provide prompt protection of the victims from damages in Japan’s space development and use, such as a launch permit system, obligation for reparation, and government compensation. In addition, the Remote Sensing Data Act established (1) a license pertaining to use of satellite remote sensing instruments, (2) a certification of persons handling satellite remote sensing data and (3) a system that enables the Prime Minister to issue an order to a satellite remote sensing data holder to prohibit provision of data under certain occasions. **Chapter** 1 Responses in Space Domain **(1) The Whole-of-Government Approach** The Office of National Space Policy[38] established in the Cabinet Office in July 2012 engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to the Government’s development and use of space. In light of the environmental changes surrounding space policy and the new security policies stated in the NSS that was approved by the Cabinet in 2013, the Basic Plan on Space Policy[39] was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development which was established within the Cabinet in January 2015. This Basic Plan was prepared as a 10-year development plan focusing on the next approximately 20 years to improve the predictability of industries’ investments, and strengthen the industrial base, and has the following goals: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Promoting the use of space in the civilian sector; and (3) Maintaining and strengthening of space industry and scientific/technological **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** Effective use of satellites for such purposes as informationgathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to the stable use of space are increasing. The MOD/ SDF has sought to ensure effective and efficient use of space by strengthening information gathering, C2 (command & control) and communication capabilities by using satellites and through Space Situational Awareness (SSA). In addition to these initiatives, based on the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will work to enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. The efforts include (1) establishing an SSA system in order to secure the stable use of space; (2) 38 In April 2016, the Office of National Space Policy was reorganized into the National Space Policy Secretariat. 39 C bi t d i i A il 1 2016 ----- **Fig. III-1-2-11** Use of Space in the Security Field (image) **Chapter** [Communications satellite][Communications satellite] [Early warning satellite][Early warning satellite] For communicating with For communicating with [Positioning satellite][Positioning satellite] For early detecting launches For early detecting launches troops at a long distancetroops at a long distance ・・For ascertaining exact For ascertaining exact of ballistic missilesof ballistic missiles locations and guiding locations and guiding missiles, etc.missiles, etc. Geostationary orbit ・・For synchronizing time for For synchronizing time for Altitude: approx. 36,000 the systemthe system [Meteorological satellite][Meteorological satellite] km (remain stationary to For ascertaining and predicting For ascertaining and predicting the earth) weather conditionsweather conditions Distance to the Altitude: approx. 20,000 km moon: approx. 380,000 km Approx. 36,000 [Imagery satellite][Imagery satellite] km (approx. For conducting warning and For conducting warning and 1/10 of the surveillance operations and surveillance operations and distance to the gathering informationgathering information moon) Altitude: up to 1,000 km improving various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities, and; (3) building the capability to disrupt C4I (command, control, communication, computer, and intelligence) of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain. In so doing, the SDF will (4) work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies, including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and with the United States and other relevant countries. The SDF will also engage in such organization building as the creation of units specializing in space and a dedicated career field, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space domain. See Fig. III-1-2-11 (Use of Space in the Security Field (image)) approaches a target satellite to disturb, attack, and capture it, is underway, increasing the threat to the stable use of outer space. That is why the MOD, based on the Basic Plan on Space Policy and through cooperation with relevant domestic institutions, such as the JAXA, and the U.S., aims to establish SSA by 2022 to monitor and maintain an accurate picture of conditions in space. It is also working to deploy radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites, such as space debris, and its operating system for information gathering, processing and sharing. The SDF will establish one squadron of the ASDF space domain specialized unit to operate the system and new specialty dedicated to the space domain. For this to happen, the government agencies and ministries concerned need to work together to build an effective operating system. On this point, JAXA is devising a plan to deploy radar able to monitor low Earth orbit (at altitudes of up to 1,000 km) and a ground-based optical telescope to monitor geostationary orbit (at altitudes of around 36,000 km). Combined with the radar of the MOD that will principally be dedicated to geostationary orbit monitoring, Japan is planning an effective SSA program. For its operation system, necessary adjustment is in progress to link the system to the **a. Development of the SSA System** When using outer space, it is necessary to ensure its stable use. However, there has been a rapid increase in the volume of space debris in outer space, raising the risk of significant damage to satellite functions caused by collision between debris and satellite. In addition, it is speculated that the development and verification test of a killer satellite, which ----- **Fig. III-1-2-12** Initiatives for the Development of the SSA System **Chapter** SSA operational system Space debris etc. Satellite MOD MOD’s SSA system Conduct satellite control Radar Operation system U.S. Forces’ sensors Optical Radar telescope Radar Information sharing Optical telescope Analysis system JAXA Satellite Information SSA satellite operators gathering Information sharing Warning  Gather Japan’s SSA information Each SDF’s system Link U.S. Strategic  Share information with the U.S. Command ・JADGE Forces that have a global SSA (CSpOC) ・Each SDF service’s command system, etc. network U.S. Forces U.S. Forces’ system in addition to JAXA by FY2022. For the future, in addition to radar to monitor threats to Japanese satellites such as space debris as mentioned above, the MOD will introduce SSA satellites that are space-based optical telescopes and ground-based SSA laser ranging devices to measure distance from low earth-orbit satellites. The expenses for study of their costs, functions and performance are included in the FY2019 budget. See Fig. III-1-2-12 (Initiatives for the Development of the SSA System) intelligence and surveillance capabilities through multilayered acquisition of satellite images using Information Gathering Satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites, including microsatellites. It will also continue to use images from the satellite operated by JAXA (ALOS-2) and information from Automatic Identification System, etc., and conduct research on dual wavelength infrared sensors.[40] Regarding communications, the MOD/SDF launched an X-band defense communications satellite called Kirameki-2 in January 2017 and Kirameki-1 in April 2018, owned and operated by the MOD for the first time, to be used for the communications, which is essential for command and control in unit operations. Going forward, in light of the future increase in communication requirements, the MOD will conduct steady development of Kirameki-3 to realize integrated communications as well as high-speed and large capacity communications, thereby aiming for the early realization of a three-satellite constellation with all of the three X-band defense communications satellites. The **b. Improving Various Capabilities to Leverage Space Domain** **Including Information-Gathering, Communication and** **Positioning Capabilities** The MOD/SDF has conducted information-gathering, communication and positioning using satellites, but in order to fulfill its missions effectively and efficiently it is necessary to further enhance these capabilities. For this purpose, the MOD/SDF will strengthen its 40 Research is underway to mount dual wavelength infrared sensors with excellent detection and identification performance on the Advanced Optical Satellite planned at JAXA and activate them in the space environment. ----- ministry will also conduct research and surveys on the next defense communication satellites. With regard to positioning, the MOD/SDF has mounted GPS receiving terminals on a large number of equipment and used them as important means to support troop movement, including highly accurate self-positioning and improvement of missile guidance. In addition to these efforts, the QuasiZenith Satellite System (QZSS) of the Cabinet Office started service in November 2018. With this in mind, the MOD/SDF will continue considering the securing of redundancy by using multiple positioning satellite signals, including QZSS, while considering its cost effectiveness. **c. Enhancing Capabilities to Ensure Superiority in Use of** **Space** Utilization of satellites plays a vital role as the basic infrastructure for security, while some countries appear to be developing anti-satellite weapons, including killer satellites and anti-satellite missiles. In this context, the MOD/SDF needs to improve the resilience of the X-band defense communications satellite and other satellites. To this purpose, the SDF will newly introduce training devices to study and train responses to the vulnerabilities of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. Expenses for study and research[41] necessary for this purpose are included in the FY2019 budget. The SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in coordination with the electromagnetic domain. **d. Enhancing Cooperation with Relevant Agencies and with** **the United States and Other Relevant Countries** For the MOD to promote space development and use effectively, it is essential to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies with advanced knowledge, including JAXA, and with the United States and other relevant countries. Currently the MOD and JAXA are cooperating in the development of SSA described above and technical demonstration of dual wavelength infrared sensors. In addition, the ministry exchanges human resources, including the dispatch of ASDF personnel to the JAXA Tsukuba Space Center. Also, from the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space field between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the two countries established the “Japan-US Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 and so far held five meetings. The SCWG continues to promote consideration in broader fields such as: (1) promotion of space policy-related consultation, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation for training and securing space experts, and (4) continued participation to tabletop exercises. As part of such initiatives, the MOD has taken part in the annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise hosted by the U.S. Strategic Command since 2016 with the purpose of acquiring knowledge related to the SSA operation as well as of strengthening cooperation with the United States and other partner countries. These efforts to enhance the SSA capabilities also contribute to enhancing deterrence against new threats in outer space. In October 2018, the MOD took part for the first time in the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise hosted by the U.S. Air Force Space Command to deepen space cooperation with participating countries and to think about its further space polices. Japan engages in space security dialogues not only with the United States but also with France, the European Union (EU), and India. See Chapter 3,Section 3-1 (Cooperation in the Use of Space See Domain) **Chapter** 2 Response in Cyber Domain **(1) The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other Initiatives** With regard to cybersecurity, the number of cases that were detected as suspicious communication to Japanese governmental organizations and required confirmation as to whether or not they need coping, there were 111 suspicious malware infections and 66 targeted attacks in FY2018. This is a situation which requires sufficient and continuous attention.[42] In order to deal with the increasing threat to cybersecurity, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic Act was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cybersecurity. In response to this, in January 2015, the CyberSecurity Strategic Headquarters was established in the Cabinet, and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cyber 41 The following study and research for enhancement of C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) functions using space are included in the budget: (1) study and research on posture to monitor electromagnetic spectrum in space; (2) study and research on vulnerability of satellites and countermeasures, and; (3) study and research pertaining to stable use of the outer space. 42 Cybersecurity 2019 (approved by the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters on May 23, 2019). ----- **Chapter** **Participating in a Multinational Tabletop Exercise Schriever Wargame** In October 2018, the MOF/SDF together with other space-related organizations of Japan (National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency [JAXA]) and other countries participated in multinational tabletop exercise named the Schriever Wargame, hosted by the U.S. Air Force Space Command. This was the first participation in the exercise from Japan. The Schriever Wargame is a multinational tabletop exercise involving wide-ranging discussions from strategy to operation level on responses to various situations in outer space, which are anticipated to arise in about ten years from now. This time, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, France and Germany also participated in the exercise in addition to the United States. In recent years, space debris, anti-satellite weapons, and other risks that could interfere with the stable use of outer space have been growing. In this context it is vitally important to respond to these risks effectively in cooperation with relevant ministries and the international community in order to ensure security. In the Schriever Wargame we were able to have wide-ranging discussions on cooperation with the United States and other partner countries in the new domain, space. The MOD/SDF will continue to take similar opportunities to further strengthen cooperation with relevant countries in the new domains. Schriever Wargame participants from Japan Security (NISC)[43] was established in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cyber security-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. Furthermore, in September 2015, the Cybersecurity Strategy was formulated for the comprehensive and effective promotion of measures pertaining to cybersecurity, with the aims to create and develop free, fair and safe cyber space to enhance the vitality of the economy and society and realize their sustainable development, to realize a society in which citizens can live safely and with peace of mind, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the international community as well as the security of Japan. Furthermore, in July 2018 the strategy was reviewed to promote cybersecurity for sustainable development and initiatives from three perspectives ((1) mission assurance by service providers, (2) risk management, and (3) participation, cooperation and collaboration), while sticking with the basic position of the strategy. **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** Information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace form a foundation for the SDF’s activities in various domains, and any attack against them would seriously disrupt the organized activities of the SDF. The MOD/SDF has engaged in holistic measures including the following: introduction of intrusion prevention systems, in order to ensure the safety of information and communication systems; development of defense systems, such as the security and analysis devices for cyber defense; monitoring of MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock and response to cyber attacks[44] by the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command and others; enactment of regulations[45] stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks; research on cutting-edge technology; development of human resources, and collaboration with other organizations. In addition to these initiatives, based on the NDPG, the SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including the capability to disrupt, during an 43 With the enactment of the Basic Act on Cybersecurity in January 2015, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). The NISC is responsible for the planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cybersecurity incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. 44 Illegal intrusion, information theft, alteration or destruction, operation stop/malfunction of information system, execution of unauthorized program, DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks, etc. which are made through cyberspace by abusing information communication networks, information systems, etc. 45 Th di ti l ti t th i f ti f th MOD (MOD Di ti N 160 2007) ----- **Fig. III-1-2-13** MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks **Chapter** 2) Responses by special units to cyber attacks 1) Ensuring safety of information systems - 24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as advanced measures against cyber attacks (virus analysis) by the Cyber Defense Group (Joint Units), System Protection Unit - Introduction of firewall and virus detection software (GSDF), Communication Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF) - Separation of the network into the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) open system and closed system - Implementation of system audit, etc. 3) Development of a response posture to cyber attacks - Establishment of security measures criteria of information systems Internet - Establishment of security measures with which MOD/SDF staff should comply - Development of response posture at the time of cyber attack attacker Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) occurrence The Six Pillars of Comprehensive Defensive Measures against Cyber Attacks 6) Coordination with other 4) Research of cutting-edge technology organizations and agencies - Research on technology to develop the cyber training environment (• Allows for - Information sharing with the National center of Incident counter-cyber attack training in a simulated readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed environment) Forces, and other relevant nations 5) Development of human resources - For the purpose of human resources development, implementing studying abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, as well as education at professional courses at the SDF - For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at workplaces and professional education at the National Defense Academy **a. Establishing an Environment for Ensuring Cyber Security** **(a) Expanding the Structure of Cyber Defense Group and** **Other Units** “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 Systems Command in March 2014. In order to appropriately deal with cyber attacks that are becoming more sophisticated and skillful day by day, the Cyber Defense Group was expanded from approximately 110 to 150 personnel in FY2018 to strengthen the posture. For the future, the group will be further expanded by about 70 personnel to approximately 220 in FY2019. Furthermore, the structure of the SDF C4 Systems Command will be reviewed and a cyber defense unit will be newly established as a joint unit by FY 2023. **(b) Strengthening Capabilities of Information Gathering,** **Research and Analysis** In order to secure functions of the system and network of the MOD/SDF under any circumstance, it is necessary to strengthen the capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and develop a practical training environment. To this end, the MOD/SDF will continue initiatives such as (1) upgrade of information gathering devices for indications and techniques of cyber attacks, (2) enhancing functions of analysis devices for cyber protection, and (3) development of an environment for cyber exercises carried Member of Cyber Defense Group responding to increasingly sophisticated, skillful cyber attacks attack against Japan in time of emergency, the opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. Specifically, the MTDP stipulates (1) establishment of the necessary environment for ensuring cybersecurity, (2) keeping abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, (3) development and securing of human resources, and (4) contribution to the whole-ofgovernment initiatives. See Fig. III-1-2-13 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks); Reference 20 (Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity) ----- out as competition between an attacking team and a defense team. **b. Keeping Abreast of the Latest Information Including Risks,** **Counter Measures and Technological Trends** In order to respond to cyber attacks in a swift and appropriate manner, it is necessary to keep abreast of the latest information, including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, joint exercises and other opportunities with allies and other parties. For this purpose the MOD/SDF will effectively cooperate with private companies and foreign countries, including the United States, which is Japan’s ally. **(a) Cooperating with Private Companies and Others** In Japan, in July 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cybersecurity. The MOD/SDF and the defense industry have made efforts to deal with cyber attacks through joint exercise and other initiatives. **(b) Cooperation with the United States** Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including joint response, between Japan and its ally the United States is vital, the two countries set up the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States. Under this framework, meetings have been held six times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts. Moreover, in May 2015, the two countries announced a joint statement on the specific future direction of the cooperation. In addition, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened by such means as participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding of the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the defense authorities since 2002, and dispatching liaison officers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution. **(c) Cooperation with Other Countries etc.** Japan has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of the United Kingdom, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and others. Furthermore, Japan has participated as an observer in cyber defense exercises organized by NATO or the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). In addition, the IT Forum has been held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and other countries to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology. See Chapter 3,Section 3-2 (Cooperation in the Use of Cyber See Domain) **Chapter** **c. Development and Securing of Human Resources** In order to strengthen the cyber defense capability of the SDF, it is necessary to secure human resources who have advanced and broad-ranging knowledge on cybersecurity. To this end, the MOD/SDF will work to (1) implement common cyber education;[46] (2) send personnel to study at colleges, etc. in Japan and abroad; (3) ensure appropriate treatment for security and IT human resources who work as a bridge between highly professional human resources and general administration departments in the MOD;[47] and (4) consider the utilization of external human resources through a public-private personnel exchange system to employ people with practical experience in private companies as well as contracts for service, for example. **d. Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach** Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the five government agencies that are members of Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters, participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC as well as sending personnel to the Cyber incident Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT). The MOD is considering applying the knowledge and experience of the SDF to penetration tests of the IT systems of government ministries and agencies conducted by NISC. 3 Response in Electromagnetic Domain Electromagnetic spectrum[48] has been used for command/ communication, and warning/surveillance. With the development of the technology, its use has expanded in range and purpose, and it is now recognized as a major operational domain situated on the frontline of the offense-defense 46 Common cyber security education provided for graduates of an IT-related program that is provided by each SDF service 47 Measures based on the Comprehensive Policy for Enhancing the Development of Security and IT Human Resources at Governmental Organizations (Approved by the Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters on March 31, 2016) 48 C ll ti t f di i f d i ibl t ----- **Fig. III-1-2-14** Electronic Warfare Capabilities and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities (image) **Chapter** Electronic warfare Electromagnetic spectrum capabilities management capabilities - Electronic warfare refers to operations to ensure the use and effect of - As each SDF unit uses electromagnetic spectrums independently in electromagnetic spectrum while interfering with the use and effect by their theater, respectively, it is necessary to prevent mutual radio an enemy (image below) wave interference among SDF units. - Accordingly, capabilities to properly manage electromagnetic spectrums need to be developed for the purpose of centrally ascertaining wave frequencies and status of use and effectively making coordination with relevant departments and divisions and Use of stealth aircraft allocating available frequency resources to units. (image below) Information collection Coordination with relevant departments and divisions (as necessary) Defense using chaff and flare [List of the status of use of electromagnetic spectrums] Interference to communication networks Ascertain the status of use of Allocate frequency and units of an enemy electromagnetic spectrums resources dynamic in today’s warfare.[49] In response, the SDF, based on the NDPG, etc., will (1) enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum, (2) strengthen information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetic spectrum, and develop an information sharing posture, (3) strengthen capabilities to neutralize the radar and communications of opponents who intend to invade Japan, and thereby acquire and enhance capabilities to ensure superiority in the electromagnetic domain.[50] **(1) Enhancing the Ability to Appropriately Manage and** **Coordinate the Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum** In order to gain an advantage in warfare by using electromagnetic spectrum proactively and effectively, it is necessary to build capabilities to manage electromagnetic spectrum by centrally grasping and coordinating wave frequencies and status of use, and appropriately allocating frequency resources to units, etc. in addition to electronic warfare capabilities to ensure the use and effect of electromagnetic spectrum while interfering with the use and effect by an enemy. For this purpose, the FY2019 budget includes (1) establishment of “Electromagnetic Spectrum Policy Office” in the Information and Communications Division, Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning to enhance the planning function for appropriate utilization of electromagnetic domain and the function for coordination with other ministries and agencies; and (2) establishment of “Electromagnetic Domain Planning Section” in the C4 System Planning Division, C4 Systems Department in Joint Staff, for planning and study pertaining to electromagnetic capabilities to ensure smooth joint operation of the SDF. The new offices specialized in electromagnetic domain will lead capacity building in electromagnetic management. See Fig. 1-2-14 (Electronic Warfare Capabilities and Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Capabilities [image]) **(2) Strengthening Information Collection and Analysis** **Capabilities Related to Electromagnetic Spectrum, and** **Building an Information Sharing Posture** In order to gain an advantage in electromagnetic warfare, it is important to gather and analyze information on electromagnetic spectrum at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies and appropriately share the information among SDF units. To this end, the MOD/SDF plans to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities through the procurement of electromagnetic information gathering aircraft and ground-based SIGINT sensors, and establish electromagnetic operation units to gather information regarding electromagnetic spectrum as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command. In order to share the 49 One of the attacks using electromagnetic waves is electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, which place an extreme burden on electronics by generating instantaneous powerful electromagnetic waves through nuclear explosions and other means leading to their malfunctioning or destruction. This type of attack would impact not just the defense fi eld but Japanese people’s lives in general. The Government of Japan as a whole will deliberate on necessary countermeasures. 50 In addition, the MOD/SDF is advancing the multiplication of the communications network required for information sharing among the services, and conducting research in light of the i i t f EMP t ti ----- information among SDF services while ensuring security of the information, the SDF will promote the upgrade of the JADGE system, the connection of each SDF service’s systems, including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and the improvement of each SDF service’s data links. **(3) Strengthening Capabilities to Neutralize Radar and** **Communications of an Opponent who Intends to Invade** **Japan** Neutralizing use of electromagnetic spectrum, including radar and communications of an opponent who intends to invade Japan based on information gathering and analysis in peacetime is effective as a means for the defense of Japan so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished. For this purpose, the SDF will proceed with capability development through the procurement of fighters (F-35A) superior in electronic countermeasures for self-protection and network electronic warfare devices, installation of new electronic warfare equipment on fighters (F-15), expansion of the frequency band that utility aircraft (EP-3) can gather, and enhancement of the capability of utility aircraft (UP-3D) to simulate an electronic warfare environment. **Chapter** A Network electronic warfare device that can disable radar or communications of opponents Furthermore, the SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of (1) standoff electronic warfare aircraft for jamming from outside of the threat envelopes of the opponent, (2) high-power electronic warfare devices, (3) high-power microwave devices that can instantaneously disable a large number of drones, etc., and (4) Electronic Magnetic Pulse (EMP) bombs that can instantaneously generate strong electromagnetic radiation to disable electronic devices temporarily or permanently. **4** **Response to Large-Scale Disasters** The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.” See Fig. III-1-2-15 (State of Readiness for Disaster Relief [Standard]); Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-4 (Disaster Relief and Others) 1 Response to Large-Scale Disasters When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with local governments, engaged in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or ships or aircraft in distress, controlling floods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. **(1) Basic Concept** Among the roles that must be served by Japan’s defense capability as set forth in the NDPG, the idea of “(4) response to large-scale disasters, etc.” is as follows. In the event of a major disaster, all possible measures will be taken to rapidly transport and deploy the SDF units required and if necessary, to sustain the mobilization for a long period. Not only will the SDF units respond to the needs of affected residents and local authorities through care, proper collaboration and cooperation, but they will also be engaged with institutions concerned, local authorities and the private sector to save lives, achieve urgent rehabilitation and provide livelihood support. **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** **a. Response to Natural Disasters, etc.** **(a) Disaster Relief in Response to July 2018 Flooding Disaster** In July 2018, record levels of rain fell across a wide swath of Japan from east to west, causing rivers to breach their banks and multiple large scale flooding and landslide events. In response to disaster relief requests from the governors of Kyoto Prefecture, Hyogo Prefecture, Okayama Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture, Yamaguchi Prefecture, Kochi Prefecture, Ehime Prefecture and Fukuoka Prefecture, around 300 liaison officers were sent to coordinate closely with local governments in up to 74 locations to save lives, rescuing stranded residents, supplying water, providing bathing facilities and meals, distributing goods, preventing water intrusion, clearing roads and removing rubble. As part ----- **Fig. III-1-2-15** State of Readiness for Disaster Relief (Standard) Common to All The state of readiness with which SDF troops can begin gathering information immediately after an earthquake of seismic intensity fivelower or higher occurs. - When an earthquake of seismic intensity five-upper or higher occurs, information is to be collected by using aircraft. FAST-Force (GSDF) First response units throughout Japan (about 3,900 personnel, about 1,100 vehicles, and about 40 aircraft) are on standby around-theclock and will be deployed in an hour upon receiving an order as a standard procedure. Various units including helicopters (video transmission), chemical protection units, and bomb disposal units are on standby in each regional army. FAST-Force (MSDF) Vessels on standby: Designate one response vessel in each regional district Aircraft on standby (about 20 aircraft): Deploy in 15 minutes to two hours in each base as a standard procedure FAST-Force (ASDF) Standby for aircraft rescue and emergency transport duties (about 10-20 aircraft): Deploy within 15 minutes to two hours in each base as a standard procedure Aircraft on standby may commence information gathering as necessary for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace. of assistance, the MOD used a private boat Hakuou under a contract with the ministry to provide bathing facilities in Hiroshima and Okayama Prefectures. In addition, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up with 311 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaging in daily support of survivors at its peak. This mission involved approximately 33,100 personnel, 28 boats (including the private boat Hakuou) and 38 aircraft. In total, 2,284 people were rescued, 18,973 tons of water were supplied, 94,119 people were provided with bathing facilities, and 20,590 meals were provided. **(b) Disaster Relief in Response to the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi** **Earthquake in 2018** In September 2018, a magnitude 6.7 earthquake with epicenter at the central eastern part of Iburi, Hokkaido occurred, which caused landslides and a massive blackout in Abira, Atsuma and Mukawa towns, and other places. In response to disaster relief requests from the governor of Hokkaido, liaison officers were sent to closely coordinate with local governments in up to 29 locations to save lives, clear roads, supply water, provide bathing facilities and meals as well as transport goods including equipment for restoration of power supply, and install water gauges and remove driftwood, etc. to prevent collapse of Atsuma dam due to precipitation and sediment. In addition, the private boat Hakuou under a contract with the ministry was used to provide bathing facilities in Tomakomai City, Hokkaido. Furthermore, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up with 251 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaging in relief activities at its peak. This mission involved approximately 25,100 personnel, 9 vessels (including the private boat Hakuou) and 46 aircraft. In total, 46 people were rescued, 1,186 tons of water was supplied, 24,091 people were provided with bathing facilities, and 166,963 meals were provided. In this disaster relief mission, drones for disaster were used for the first time. They were used for speedy collection of information in places and directions where human access **Chapter** GSDF personnel conducting rescue activities in July 2018 Flooding Disaster (July 2018) ASDF personnel and a police dog searching for missing people in the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in 2018 (September 2018) was difficult in order to help rescue activities by disaster relief units. Furthermore, while many hospitals did not function due to massive blackout or other reasons, SDF Sapporo Hospital, which had been rebuilt with a design of a disaster resilient hospital (opened in 2015) was able to maintain its functions intact and carry out treatment just after the disaster. **(c) Disaster Relief in Response to Water Supply Relief** In October 2018, water supply failure continued in SuoOshima Town, Yamaguchi Prefecture, because a water pipe fell off when a foreign vessel struck Oshima Ohashi bridge ----- In response to disaster relief requests from the governor of the prefecture, the SDF provided relief supplies of purified and other water. These missions engaged around 500 personnel, some 170 vehicles, generated approximately 94 tons of water, and supplied approximately 490 tons of water in total. **(d) Disaster Relief in Response to Swine Fever Outbreak** Between December 2018 and the end of June 2019, the occurrence of swine fever was confirmed in Gifu, Aichi, and Nagano Prefectures. As prompt epidemic prevention measures, including slaughter of hogs, were required, the SDF assisted with the slaughter and other measures in response to disaster relief requests from the governors of the prefectures. These missions engaged around 8,000 personnel and some 1,200 vehicles. **(e) Disaster Relief in Response to Forest Fire** Over the period from July 2018 to the end of June 2019, local authorities conducted firefighting operations against fighting forest fires in Nagano Prefecture, Gunma Prefecture, Saitama Prefecture, Wakayama Prefecture, Tochigi Prefecture, Hiroshima Prefecture, Shizuoka Prefecture, Fukushima Prefecture, Aomori Prefecture, Yamagata Prefecture, Hokkaido, Tokyo, and Kochi Prefecture but were unable to settle the situation despite their efforts. Based on requests issued by the governors of these prefectures, the SDF contributed to aerial firefighting and other resources. The SDF dispatches were conducted 21 times in total, including a total of some 9,400 personnel, around 700 vehicles and some 230 aircraft. Approximately 4,300 tons of water was applied on 1,000 occasions. See Fig. III-1-2-16 (Record of Disaster Relief [FY2018]); Reference See 21 (Record of Disaster Relief [Past Five Years]) **b. Transportation of Emergency Patients** The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2018, out of a total of 443 cases of disaster relief, 334 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases. In addition, the SDF carries out sea rescues upon requests by the Japan Coast Guard on such occasions as transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range and emergencies of vessels due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing. Furthermore, the SDF conducts wide-area medical transport operations for serious-case **Chapter** **Participating in Disaster Relief Activities following the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi** **Earthquake** **Leading Private Ryosuke Hariyamaza, Gunner, 2nd Firing Battery, 1st Artillery Battalion, 7th Artillery Regiment** **(Chitose Ciry, Hokkaido)** During disaster relief following the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, I participated in rescue activities conducted at Yoshino District, Atsuma Town, which was the territory of my battalion. I had never been a part of disaster relief before and the only knowledge and images I had were from television and newspapers. Arriving at the disaster area, I saw cruel sites beyond my imagination and felt the importance of SDF missions. In the area of our battalion, houses were swept away dozens of meters by a landslide accompanying the earthquake. On piled up fallen trees and soil we searched for the missing by hand following clues of scattered beds and clothes. The nightlong rescue in the rain in a highly time-sensitive situation was very severe but we were able to complete the mission with the desire to rescue people as soon as possible and the strength and energy we had cultivated through our daily training. Through the disaster relief activities, I strongly felt people’s expectations of the SDF and a sense of mission to meet the expectations. I will continue to push forward with my duties with pride as SDF personnel. Atsuma Town rescue activities (Sept. 8, 2018) ----- **Fig. III-1-2-16** Record of Disaster Relief (FY2018) **Chapter** MSDF US-2 landing on water near a vessel to transport emergency patients in an area of ocean far from the mainland (October 2018) **e. Exercises Involving the SDF** In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese Government or local governments and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments. **(a) Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)** In June 2018, the SDF conducted a comprehensive disaster drill including a field exercise in preparation for an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo area. In addition, in May 2019, the SDF carried out a disaster drill concerning its command and staff activities and its coordination with relevant organizations, U.S. Forces, etc. in the event of occurrence of an earthquake directly hitting the Tokyo area during the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games. In this manner, the SDF carried out initiatives to maintain and enhance the SDF’s earthquake response capability. **(b) Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster** **Response Exercise with U.S. Forces** In October 2018, joint exercises were held with U.S. Forces stationed in Japan in the scenario of a Nankai Trench earthquake. The purpose of the exercise was to maintain and enhance earthquake disaster handling capabilities in collaboration between the SDF and U.S. forces and to strengthen cooperation with relevant local authorities. **(c) Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX)** In September 2018, the SDF participated in a general disaster prevention training planned and organized by Okinawa Prefecture and conducted a field training exercise to deal with sudden large-scale disasters in a remote island to maintain as well as enhance the SDF’s ability to respond to disasters in remote islands and strengthen collaboration with relevant local authorities. **(d) Other** In November 2018 GSDF North Eastern Army implemented |Description|Number of dispatches|Total number of personnel|Total number of vehicles|Total number of aircraft|Total number of vessels| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters|4|1,291|332|24|0| |Transporting emergency patients|334|1,693|2|357|0| |Search and rescue|17|6,638|1,094|99|9| |Assisting firefighting|49|5,512|374|124|0| |Other|26|7,531|1,288|40|2| |Total|430|22,665|3,090|644|11| |July 2018 Flooding Disaster|12|Approx. 957,000|Approx. 49,500|Approx. 340|Approx. 150| |Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in 2018|1|Approx. 211,000|Approx. 17,800|Approx. 230|Approx. 20| - Figures concerning the July 2018 Flooding Disaster and the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in 2018 are not included in the record for FY2018. patients, by the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H utilizing its mobile medical units in certain occasions. Furthermore, in FY2018, the SDF carried out 49 dispatches of firefighting support, with 37 cases responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities. **c. The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster** In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments, and nuclear operators, to confirm the effectiveness of municipal governments’ evacuation plan and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in a nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October 2014, SDF personnel (five personnel as of April 1, 2019) were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet Office as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear disaster response capabilities. **d. Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters** Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters in the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized units in their initial response. By establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD/ SDF will ensure that it is able to sustain a well-prepared condition for a longterm response. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters. The MOD/SDF formulates various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan to respond to such earthquakes. ----- Michinoku ALERT2018 for a field exercise in preparation for Sanriku offshore and other earthquakes to enhance the SDF’s ability to respond to disasters in the Tohoku area in collaboration with relevant local authorities, ministries and agencies. They also took part in the Ministry of Defense Disaster Management Headquarters drill, the comprehensive disaster prevention drills on Disaster Prevention Day, and more.[51] **f. Collaboration with Local Governments and Other Relevant** **Organizations** It is important for the MOD/SDF to strengthen collaboration with local governments and other relevant organizations under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Assignment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments. As of the end of March 2019, as many as 495 retired SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and other sections in 348 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening collaboration between the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was confirmed through the experiences of the Great East Japan Earthquake and other disasters. In particular, each GSDF regional Army establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other officials from local governments and share information and exchange opinions to strengthen collaboration with those local governments. In the event of a disaster, liaison officers are sent quickly and effectively from the units to the local municipalities in order to ensure smooth coordination.[52] See Fig. III-1-2-17 (List of the Three-Year Emergency Measures for Disaster Prevention/Reduction and National Resilience [MOD]) **Chapter** RIDEX: Transport of Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) to the MSDF transport ship “Osumi” by ASDF CH-47J (September 2018) **g. Measures Based on the 3-Year Emergency Countermeasures** **for Disaster Prevention/Mitigation and National Resilience** In December 2018, the 3-Year Emergency Countermeasures for Disaster Prevention/Mitigation and National Resilience[53] were approved by the Cabinet. Under the measures, the MOD is focusing on emergency measures for concrete block walls, etc. of SDF facilities, for SDF facilities and SDF equipment related to disaster prevention, from the perspective of maintaining functions including important infrastructure for disaster prevention. See Fig. III-1-2-17 List of the Three-Year Emergency Measures for See Disaster Prevention/Reduction and National Resilience [MOD] 2 Response to Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc. **(1) Basic Concept** In the event of natural disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order SDF units to rescue or transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to guard, rescue or transport Japanese nationals overseas, etc. and upon subsequent consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article 84-3 (rescue Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) or Article 84-4 (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) of the SDF Law. **(2) Initiatives of the MOD/SDF** For prompt and appropriate implementation of rescue or transport of Japanese nationals overseas, the SDF is prepared to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifically, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating 51 In addition, the following drills were conducted and participated in, in 2018: 1) government tabletop drills, 2) the Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill, 3) the large tsunami disaster prevention drill, 4) the drill for medical treatment activities following a large-scale earthquake, 5) a drill related to the Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Drill of Nine Prefectural and City Governments, 6) a drill related to the joint disaster drill among the Kinki prefectures, 7) comprehensive disaster prevention drills conducted by local governments or other bodies. 52 Based on the “Examination Report on the Initial Response to the Heavy Rain in July 2018” (November 2018), in order to rescue and support more victims in the event of a large-scale disaster and considering possible confusion of the local authorities, the MOD/SDF will not only wait for request from the authorities but also actively propose specific support activities by the SDF. 53 In recent years, the Heavy Rain in July 2018, Typhoon No.21 in 2018, Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake in 2018 and other natural disasters caused function loss of important infrastructures necessary for living and economic activities of the people, which had a major effect on the activities. Learning from the experience, the Emergency Countermeasures stipulate physical and non-physical measures that individual ministries and agencies should implement intensively for the period of three years from the perspective of maintaining f ti i l di i t t i f t t f di t ti d i t t i f t t ti th ti l d l ’ li ----- **Fig. III-1-2-17** List of the Three-Year Emergency Measures for Disaster Prevention/Reduction and National Resilience [MOD] **Chapter** |Emergency measures|Outline of the measures|Period| |---|---|---| |Emergency measures for concrete block walls, etc. of SDF facilities|After the Osaka Earthquake in 2018, safety inspections were conducted with regard to concrete block walls, etc. on the borders of the SDF facilities adjacent to private properties and public roads and it was found that there are approximately 110 old concrete block walls and other structures that do not comply with the current Building Standards Act and pose safety risks. Therefore, the MOD will take emergency measures, such as removal of such dangerous walls and installation of new fences.|By FY2020| |Emergency measures for SDF facilities|After the Osaka Earthquake in 2018, emergency inspections were conducted for the SDF’s significant disaster response bases regarding their resilience to earthquakes, deterioration levels and the status of installation of power generators, and some of these facilities were found likely to cause hindrance to the SDF’s prompt and appropriate performance of duties. Therefore, the MOD will take seismic reinforcement measures for around 10 facilities, countermeasures against deterioration for around 40 facilities, and measures to enhance power supplying capability for around 30 facilities.|By FY2020| |Emergency measures for SDF equipment related to disaster prevention|As it is urgently necessary to develop equipment required for the SDF’s relief activities upon a disaster from the perspective of preventing functional failures due to deterioration and of strengthening such relief activities, the MOD will take emergency measures for securing necessary equipment, communication devices, and vehicles for camps nationwide where old dysfunctional equipment was found.|By FY2020| a helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch. Since these activities require close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, the MOD/SDF constantly conducts joint exercises. In September 2018, the exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas was conducted in Djibouti with the aim of enhancing overseas deployment and activity capabilities and strengthening cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. In December 2018, the SDF carried out an exercise in Japan for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to practice the whole process of the actions and coordination with related organizations for the rescue in order to enhance integrated operational capabilities and strengthen coordination with related organizations. Furthermore, in January and February 2019, the MOD/SDF also took the opportunity of the annual multilateral exercise Cobra Gold taking place in Thailand to conduct an exercise for the series of activities to protect Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of Japan in Thailand. With the participation of Japanese nationals overseas, the exercise strengthened the collaboration between the MOD/SDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The MOD/SDF has conducted the transportation of Japanese nationals in four cases. Responding to the kidnapping of foreigners and Japanese in Iraq, 10 Japanese evacuated to Kuwait by an ASDF C-130H plane in April 2004. In January 2013, a government aircraft was deployed to bring seven Japanese nationals and the remains of a further nine nationals back to Japan following the kidnapping in Algeria. With respect to the terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, the bodies of Japanese victims (seven nationals), Cobra Gold: GSDF personnel protecting Japanese nationals overseas boarding on an ASDF C-130H in an exercise for rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (February 2019) their families, and other involved parties were transported to Japan. In relation to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H transported four embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-3-6 Rescue and Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseast ----- **Chapter** **Starting Operation of a New Government Aircraft** With the retirement of the B-747 that had been used as the government aircraft, the MOD decided to introduce a B-777 as a new government aircraft in August 2014 and started its operation in April 2019. Since 1993, when the B-747 started its operation as the first government aircraft, it was used for overseas visits by leading figures, including their Majesties the Emperor and Empress, their Imperial Highnesses the Crown Prince and Princess, and 15 Prime Ministers from Miyazawa to Abe. The aircraft was also used for UN PKO, emergency international disaster relief operations and other international cooperation activities by the MOD and for TJNO (Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas). The new government aircraft B-777 has better fuel efficiency and a longer maximum range compared with the B-747. Its interior was also changed completely for more comfortable flight experience. It has become more environment-friendly and more comfortable aircraft. A government aircraft that carries the leading figures of Japan is indispensable for “ Diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map.” It is also an important aircraft for security cooperation of the MOD. The realization of peace and security in Japan through the creation of a desirable security environment for Japan is extremely important. The MOD will continue to support these activities through the operation of the government aircraft. New Government Aircraft B-777 Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki attending the ceremony to replace the aircraft ----- **Japan-U.S. Alliance** ### 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)[1] states that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security, and that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the IndoPacific region and the international community. The NDPG explains that, as inter-sate competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests, and that the United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important. On that basis, the NDPG provides that, while the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for JapanUS Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds. At the same time, the NDPG provides that, in further **Section** **1** **Outline of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **1** **Signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** 1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security In the current international community, a robust defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons, to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. **Chapter** President Trump and Prime Minister Abe shaking hands at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (May 2019) [Courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Offi ce] strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthens its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ). This chapter explains activities related to the enhancement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking account of the concept of the NDPG. However, it is difficult even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be difficult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability. Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the P t II Ch t 3 S ti 1 F t t 7 ----- world s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy as well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties. Specifically, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks. Japan intends to create a seamless posture and secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military together with Japan’s own national defense architecture. 2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region surrounding Japan Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East is the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the USFJ. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs. In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition, uncertainty over the existing order is increasing due to changes in the balance of power. The so-called grayzone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In such a security environment, the military presence of USFJ provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of Japan and the United States but also providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfilling a role as public goods. Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the JapanU.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the region. 3 Responding to Global Issues The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including the promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations. Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are difficult for any single country to tackle alone, including risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, the acts of piracy, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and international terrorism, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges. In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of global collaboration such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by advancing initiatives for resolving global issues in cooperation with the United States, which has remarkable operational capabilities, Japan will be able to further ensure its security and prosperity. **Chapter** ----- **2** **Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance** Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, and the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country of liberal democracy and contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan. Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the importance of the JapanU.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines[2] and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War. In light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held workinglevel and other consultations as a part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confirmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and finalization of the United StatesJapan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in May 2006. See Reference 22 (United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation [tentative translation]) Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009. At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities. In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced the decision to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of 2006, considering significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the AsiaPacific region. See Reference 23 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (tentative translation) (April 27, 2012) **Chapter** Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplified by anti-piracy activities, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions. Based on this background, both governments decided at the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 to revise the 1997 The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to d tt k i t J d (3) i it ti i di J Th l ti l t d th t th ld i th G id li i ti l d i t ----- **Fig. III-2-1-1** Major Milestones concerning Japan-U.S. Alliance 1951 The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed 1952 Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty The treaty enters into force 1958 Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty) **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |1960|Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty||The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force| |1968 1969 1972 1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines|||(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan) Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan) (Okinawa is returned to Japan) (Agreement on the establishment of the Sub-Committee-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)| |1978 and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation|||Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)| |1991 1996 End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines 1997 2001|||(Collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War) Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks) SACO Final Report Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.| |2003 Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 2006 terrorist attacks in the United States|||The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks) Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. 2003 The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks) Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 2006 Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation terrorist attacks in the United States The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks) The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks) 2007 Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks) 2010 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 2012 Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks) 2013 Agreement on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) 2014 The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks) 2015 New security environment Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks) and the establishment of the new Guidelines Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New Guidelines) 2017 Japan-U.S. Joint Statement (Abe-Trump) Guidelines until the end of 2014. The new Guidelines were review between the two governments. approved at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015 after a vigorous See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Milestones concerning Japan-U.S. Alliance) **3** **Content of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. See Reference 24 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation [April 27, 2015] [tentative translation]) Fig. III-2-1-2 (Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation) 1 Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines The Guidelines newly specified the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. ⃝ In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous AsiaPacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: - seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; - synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; - a whole-of-government Alliance approach; - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance ⃝ The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly. ⃝ The Guidelines provide the general framework and ----- policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. ⃝ The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. 2 Basic Premises and Principles The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below: ⃝ The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged. ⃝ All actions and activities undertaken under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law. ⃝ All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. ⃝ The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures. the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and globally; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. Governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a largescale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels. Since the establishment of the mechanism, Japan and the United States have been utilizing the mechanism to coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands. See Fig. III-2-1-3 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination See Mechanism [ACM]) **Chapter** **(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination** Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. **(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism** Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security. In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism. See Fig. III-2-1-4 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism [BMP]) 3 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance **(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism** In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments established the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) in order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response. Based on the framework shown in Fig. III-2-1-3, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is ----- **Fig. III-2-1-2** Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Self-Defense Forces (SDF)|United States Armed Forces| |---|---|---|---| ||Operations to Defend Airspace|Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan|| |||Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| ||Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks|Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan|| |||Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| ||Operations to Defend Maritime Areas|Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication|| |||Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| ||Operations to Counter Ground Attacks|Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces|| |||Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations| |Item|Outline| |---|---| |See the main text for I. “Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines” and II. “Basic Premises and Principles.”|| |III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination|Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism In order to address issues seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. B. Enhanced Operational Coordination The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. C. Bilateral Planning In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through the Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be refl ected appropriately in the plans of both governments.| |IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security|● The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. ● The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as fl exible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels. A. Cooperative Measures during Peacetime • The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan- U.S. Alliance. • The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; . B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security • The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defi ned geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. • In addition to continuing cooperative measures during peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to: . C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs • Principles for Coordinated Actions The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF. • Concept of Operations Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan Operations to Defend Have primary responsibility for conducting air Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF Airspace defense operations while ensuring air superiority operations Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan Operations to Counter Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF Ballistic Missile Attacks missile defense operations to defend Japan operations Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication Operations to Defend Have primary responsibility for the protection of Maritime Areas major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other operations associated operations Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces Operations to Counter Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel Ground Attacks ground attacks, including those against islands, Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF and have primary responsibility for conducting air operations defense operations while ensuring air superiority| ----- |Col1|Col2|Outline|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |||Self-Defense Forces (SDF)|United States Armed Forces| |ISR Cross- Space / Domain cyberspace Operations Special operations Strike operations||Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks|| ||ISR|In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets|| ||Space / cyberspace|Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains|| ||Special operations|Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate|| ||Strike operations|May provide support, as necessary, for the strike operations of the United States Armed Forces|Involve the use of strike power, to support and supplement SDF| **Chapter** |Item|Outline| |---|---| |IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security|Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of ISR intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets Cross- Space / Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains Domain cyberspace Operations Special Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate operations Strike May provide support, as necessary, for the strike Involve the use of strike power, to support and operations operations of the United States Armed Forces supplement SDF • Operational Support Activities The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection. D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan • When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. • The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. • Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support. E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan • When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. • The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.| |V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security|● In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacifi c region and beyond. ● When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. A. Cooperation in International Activities • The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. • Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistics support. B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promote cooperation based upon international law and standards.| |VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation|A. Cooperation on Space • The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. • The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. • The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications. B. Cooperation on Cyberspace • The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions. • The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to all Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises. • In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.| |VII. Bilateral Enterprise|The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security C. Educational and Research Exchanges| |VIII. Processes for Review|Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.| ----- **Fig. III-2-1-3** The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) Higher levels between the two nations including the Minister/Secretary level As needed **Chapter** |Joint Committee (JC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Side Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Representative)|U.S. Side Deputy Commander of USFJ (Representative)| |Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement|| |Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Director General-level|Japan Side Representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat (including the National Security Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed|U.S. Side Representatives from the National Security Council,* Department of State,* American Embassy in Japan, Office of the Secretary of Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) * U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed| |Director-level||| |Action Officer level||| |Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.||| |Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2| |---|---| |Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)|| |Japan Side Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service|U.S. Side Representatives from USINDOPACOM and USFJ| |Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of the SDF and U.S. Armed Forces|| |Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2| |---|---| |Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)|| |Japan Side Representatives from each component of the SDF|U.S. Side Representatives from each component of the U.S. Armed Forces| |CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination. As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.|| **Fig. III-2-1-4** The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) Prime Minister President **Bilateral Planning Mechanism** |Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2”|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Foreign Minister|Security Consultative Committee (SCC)|State Secretary| |Defense Minister||Defense Secretary| |Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan DG: North American Affairs Bureau MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD Joint Staff|U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, USINDOPACOM| |Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters|| |Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Representatives of the Cabinet Secretariat, NSS, MOFA, MOD|U.S. Representatives of the U.S. Embassy JP, USINDOPACOM, USFJ| |Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by RMAs, provision of additional information etc.|| |Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Representatives of JSDF|U.S. Representatives of USINDOPACOM, USFJ| |Conduct Bilateral Planning|| Prime Minister Interagency Coordination as necessary Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF) Japan U.S. Representatives of Representatives of Defense Minister Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Japan DG: North American Affairs Bureau MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD Joint Staff and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters Coordination Command under the BPM JSDF/USF chain of command President ----- to develop and enhance bilateral enterprise through defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as intelligence cooperation and information security for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. Many of these items are incorporated into the NDPG to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas.” See Section 2 (Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to See Deter and Counter Threats) Section 3 (Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas) 4 Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation The Guidelines define that Japan and the United States will work on a variety of measures from peacetime, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, training and exercises, asset protection, and logistics support, and cooperate in such activities as response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security. The Guidelines also require both countries to cooperate in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation for regional and global peace and security; to make cooperation on space and cyberspace; and **4** **Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States** 1 Various Policy Consultations Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Indo-Pacific region. Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss **Chapter** issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security. In addition, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD officials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have working-level meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of Chief of Joint Staff Yamazaki exchanging opinions with Admiral Davidson, Commander of U S I d P ifi C d i H ii (A il 2019) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Takahashi receiving a courtesy call from Vice Ad i l F d f th U it d St t C t G d P ifi A (F b ----- **Fig. III-2-1-5** Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues |Consultative Forum|Participants|Col3|Purpose|Legal Basis| |---|---|---|---|---| ||Japanese Side|U.S. Side||| |Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting)|Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense|U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense1|Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security|Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty| |Security Subcommittee (SSC)|Participants are not specifi ed2|Participants are not specifi ed2|Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States|Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others| |Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)3|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff|Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, USINDOPACOM|Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies|Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996| |Japan-U.S. Joint Committee|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of the Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others|Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others|Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement|Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement| Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacifi c Command before December 26, 1990. 2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level offi cials of the two Governments, such as offi cials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary. 3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996. **Chapter** the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives. See Reference 25 (Japan-U.S. [Minister-Level] Consultations [Since 2016]) Fig. III-2-1-5 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning JapanU.S. Security Issues) 2 Recent Major Policy Consultations **(1) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (September 26, 2018)** **(Security Field)** At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in the United States, Prime Minister Abe and President Trump, based on their discussion at the dinner meeting on September 23, closely aligned their future policies concerning the issue of North Korea once again, following the most recent Inter-Korean, U.S.-ROK, and Japan-ROK Summit Meetings. The two leaders confirmed their shared goal of achieving the full implementation of the relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, and reaffirmed that Japan and the United States as well as Japan, the United States, and ROK, would continue to closely coordinate their policies. In addition, the two leaders once again shared the view that Japan and the United States would continue working together to resolve the abductions issue. The two leaders praised the concrete cooperative projects in third countries to advance their shared vision to maintain and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, and reaffirmed their strong determination to further enhance cooperation in wide-ranging areas in the Indo-Pacific region. **(2) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (October 19, 2018)** Defense Minister Iwaya and then Secretary Mattis took the opportunity of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting. **a. Free and Open Indo-Pacific** The Ministers, taking into account the then Minister of Defense Onodera's visit to India and Sri Lanka in August 2018 and the U.S.-India 2+2 Dialogue held for the first time in September 2018, exchanged their views, shared the understandings about the importance of the free and open Indo-Pacific, and confirmed the significance of cooperation between Japan and the United States and with various partners. From this point of view, the Ministers welcomed the development of the regional multilateral security cooperation and dialogue under the framework of the ADMM-Plus, and agreed to strengthen the cooperation with partner countries in maintaining basic international principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation and in implementing measures for peace and stability such as capacity building assistance. ----- **b. Regional Affairs** The Ministers, taking into account that China continues unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, confirmed that the two countries work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea, and it is important for both countries to be engaged in the South China Sea. The Ministers confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles of all ranges. As part of efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, the Ministers additionally confirmed the importance of working with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea, and welcomed the monitoring and surveillance activities taking place since September with the participation of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and agreed that the two countries conduct the operation in cooperation with like-minded countries. The Ministers confirmed that U.S. Forces in ROK is a stabilizing force in the region, and that no change in U.S. Forces in ROK has been considered. The Ministers also agreed to work together to reinforce the deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises steadily as planned. **c. National Defense Program Guidelines, etc.** Defense Minister Iwaya explained the current status of the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the formulation of the Mid-Term Defense Program for the next term, and the Ministers concurred to continue to closely exchange information. The Ministers confirmed to work together to improve efficiency regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Japan's buying U.S-made defense assets. **d. U.S. Forces in Japan** The Ministers reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. The Ministers confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. Defense Minister Iwaya requested for cooperation with efforts to secure the understanding from the local communities, and to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces. **(3) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (November 30, 2018) (Security** **Field)** Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Trump in the Argentine Republic, which he visited to attend the G20 Summit. Prime Minister Abe and President Trump once again confirmed their recognition that under the robust relationship of trust between the two leaders, the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before, and shared the view that they will continue to strive to strengthen the Alliance. The two leaders closely aligned their policies with regard to the issue of North Korea, and confirmed that Japan and the United States, as well as Japan, the United States, and the ROK, will continue to coordinate closely. In addition, the two leaders shared the recognition that the full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions continues to be necessary towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the two leaders confirmed that they will continue to cooperate closely to address illicit ship-to-ship transfers prohibited by the UN Security Council resolutions. Prime Minister Abe explained his visit to China last month, and the two leaders shared the view that it is important for Japan and the United States to work closely together on encouraging China to play a constructive role. **(4) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting** **Secretary of Defense Shanahan (January 16, 2019)** Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan held a meeting at the U.S. Department of Defense. **a. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** Both sides exchanged opinions based on the NDPG and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP) formulated last December. Acting Secretary Shanahan supported the NDPG and the MTDP, and welcomed that Japan expressed its strong resolve to enhance its defense architecture and to play a larger role in accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP. In regards to the current security environment, both sides shared views that competition among states is becoming more apparent. They also agreed that gaining technological superiority in new domains such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly important. Both sides also confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made pursuant to Japan’s NDPG and MTDP, and the United States’ National Defense Strategy (NDS) respectively, as well as to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond following the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. With the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific in mind, they agreed to work together to shape a desirable security environment with Japan-U.S. alliance being the cornerstone of cooperation with other nations. Furthermore, both sides confirmed to strengthen and expand cooperation in wide range of fields including the **Chapter** ----- following: - Promote Japan-U.S. cooperation in the “new domains,” including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. The United States welcomed Japan’s first participation in the Schriever Wargame. - Closely coordinate in joint exercises and capacity building assistance, taking into account increasing both nations’ presence in the Indo-Pacific. - Welcome and even make progress in the two countries’ cooperation in the operational field following Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines (e.g. U.S. Forces asset protection mission conducted by the SDF, provision of supplies and services). - Make continued effort in streamlining FMS process, while welcoming the recent progress and improvements in issues related to FMS. Cooperate in ensuring cost transparency, improving late case closure, strengthening activities to realize and promote multi-year procurement. - Continue cooperation to realize Japan’s smooth and prompt introduction, including cost management of U.S.made advanced defense equipment such as Aegis Ashore, E-2D and F-35. - Enhance cooperation in defense equipment and technology as well as promoting Japan-U.S. joint development and researches. **b. Regional Affairs** Both sides exchanged opinions on the recent developments on issues on North Korea, and confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the UNSC resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter North Korea’s illicit “ship-to-ship” transfers of refined petroleum products and other materials. Furthermore, both sides confirmed that deterrence through Japan-U.S. Alliance and U.S.-ROK Alliance is essential in maintaining the security of the region, and agreed that both countries will steadily implement Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises. In regards to the East and South China Seas, both sides affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established. Both sides also reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea. **c. U.S. Forces in Japan** Both sides affirmed the recent progress in the construction project of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), and reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. Defense Minister Iwaya requested for cooperation with efforts to mitigate impact on the local communities including Okinawa. Both sides confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives and training relocation. Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces. **(5) “2+2” Meeting (April 19, 2019)** On April 19, 2019, the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting was held in Washington, D.C. The meeting was attended by Foreign Minister Kono and Defense Minister Iwaya from the Japanese side and by Secretary of State Pompeo and then Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan from the U.S. side. The following is a summary of the meeting. **a. Overview** The Ministers exchanged candid views in light of an increasingly complex security environment and mainly confirmed the following three major points. The Ministers shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a “free and open IndoPacific.” To this end, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will jointly increase their presence in the region, while collaborating with partners in the region through joint exercises, port calls, and other activities. The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, including Japan’s NDPG. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as **Chapter** U it d St t S it C lt ti C itt (“2 2” M ti ) (A il 2019) ----- space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Ministers shared the view that they will seek to achieve North Korea’s abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions, including combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers. The Ministers also reaffirmed that U.S. force stance in the region would remain robust, and shared the view on deepening consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also shared the view that they will continue to engage in close cooperation between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK. Furthermore, the Ministers shared the view on calling upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately. **b. Regional Security Environment** The Ministers exchanged candid views regarding the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, and expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. **c. Strengthening Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation** (a) The Ministers highlighted the importance of cooperation for cross-domain operations. The Ministers confirmed that they will deepen cooperation on space capabilities, and shared the view on promoting cooperation for enhancing space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities through Japan’s development of a Deep Space Radar and hosting of U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan’s Quasi Zenith Satellite System. In addition, the Ministers shared the view on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues. They affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. (b) The Ministers confirmed that it is important to develop defense capabilities efficiently and effectively in order to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will cooperate to introduce advanced weapon systems to Japan and to further streamline the FMS process. (c) The Ministers affirmed the importance of information security, and shared the view on the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance. (d) In order to improve Japan-U.S. Alliance readiness, the Ministers shared the view on further deepening operational cooperation, such as mutual asset protection, logistical support, and joint ISR operations. **d. U.S. Forces in Japan** The ministers shared the view that they will steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. In particular, the Ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FRF and reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids its continued use. Foreign Minister Kono conveyed to the U.S. side that it is important to mitigate the impact on the local people, including making progress, one by one, on the issues surrounding the operation of U.S. forces and the SOFA, while steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces. Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of U.S. forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft. The two ministers also requested the U.S. side to prevent incidents and accidents. See Reference 26 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) [tentative translation] (April 19, 2019)) **Chapter** **(6) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting U.S.** **Secretary of Defense Shanahan (April 19, 2019)** Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan held a meeting at the U.S. Department of Defense. **a. General Statement** The Ministers welcomed the successful holding of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting and affirmed that the defense authorities of Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate with each other to strengthen the JapanU.S. Alliance. **b. North Korea** The Ministers affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea. The Ministers also agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. They affirmed the ----- importance of deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance and agreed to steadily conduct Japan-U.S. joint exercises. **c. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** The Ministers agreed to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations and affirmed that the two countries will further promote cooperation in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the United States will further streamline the foreign military sales process and agreed to strengthen defense equipment and technology cooperation by promoting Japan-U.S. joint research and development. **d. U.S. Forces in Japan** The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. **(7) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 26, 2019) (Security** **Field)** Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump in Washington, D.C. The two leaders affirmed that Japan and the United States will conduct careful policy coordination concerning the North Korea issue in light of the most recent developments related to North Korea, including the second U.S.-North Korea summit and the Russia-North Korea summit, and that close cooperation will be maintained between Japan and the United States and between Japan, the United States and the ROK toward full denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Prime Minister Abe once again expressed his appreciation to President Trump for having raised the abduction issue for the second time at the second U.S.-North Korea summit, and the two leaders affirmed that they will continue to closely cooperate with each other toward early resolution of the abduction issue. President Trump firmly pledged to continue to provide full support on this issue. The two leaders welcomed the results of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” Meeting) held on April 19 and agreed to continue to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. They also reaffirmed that they will further strengthen cooperation toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. In addition, the two leaders welcomed economic development based on fair rules intended to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Abe stated that President Trump’s and the first lady’s visit to Japan as the first state guests after the enthronement of Prince Naruhito as emperor in May would symbolize the rock-solid bond of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and expressed his wish to internally and externally demonstrate through the visit that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is its strongest ever. In response, President Trump said he was looking forward to visiting Japan. The two leaders agreed to continue to strengthen the bilateral relationship through exchange of high-level officials. **(8) Meeting between Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga and Acting** **Secretary of Defense Shanahan (May 9, 2019)** Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga held a meeting with then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan in the United States. a. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga explained the current status of the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, where U.S. military facilities and areas are concentrated. In order to mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two officials affirmed that Japan and the United States will steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ and impactmitigation measures, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko. b. The two secretaries exchanged opinions on the North Korea situation and agreed to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga requested cooperation from the U.S. Government in resolving the abduction issue early, and the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will maintain close cooperation. In light of North Korea’s launch of projectiles on May 9, which followed the launch on May 4, the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate with each other at every level, including with respect to analysis and response. c. The two secretaries also affirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate with each other toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. **Chapter** **(9) Meeting between Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga and U.S.** **Vice President Pence (May 10, 2019)** Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga held a meeting with Vice President Pence at the White House during his visit to the United States. a. The two secretaries exchanged opinions on the North Korea situation and agreed to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga requested cooperation from the U.S. Government in resolving the abduction issue early, and the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will maintain close cooperation. In light of North Korea’s launch of projectiles on May 9, which followed the launch on May 4, the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United ----- States will closely cooperate with each other at every level, including with respect to analysis and response. b. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga described activities conducted by the Government of Japan with respect to the realignment of the USFJ in order to mitigate the impact on Okinawa and other local communities while maintaining the deterrence capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and the two secretaries affirmed that Japan and the United States will maintain cooperation. c. The two secretaries affirmed that the Governments of Japan and the United States will closely cooperate with each other in order to internally and externally demonstrate that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is its strongest ever by making a success of President Trump’s visit to Japan as a state guest in late May following Prime Minister Abe’s successful visit to the United States in April. The two secretaries also affirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate with each other toward realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific. **(10) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (May 27, 2019) (Security** **Field)** Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President Trump, who was paying a state visit to Japan. **a. Japan-U.S. Relations** Prime Minister Abe wholeheartedly welcomed the visit by President Trump and Mrs. Trump to Japan as the first State Guests. In response, President Trump stated that it was his honor to make the first State Call on Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan in the new era and expressed his gratitude for the welcome by the Japanese people. The two leaders shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance is stronger than ever before and is now the closest alliance in the world, thanks to the recent measures to strengthen the Alliance, including Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security as well as the strong personal relationship between the two leaders. The two leaders also confirmed their determination to continue to further strengthen the unwavering bond between Japan and the United States and to lead the peace and prosperity of the region and international community as true global partners in the new era. **b. North Korea** The two leaders closely coordinated their policies in light of the recent developments surrounding North Korea, spending adequate time. The two leaders reconfirmed that Japan and the United States completely share their position including the need to ensure the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. Prime Minister Abe expressed his gratitude to President Trump for meeting once again with family members of the victims abducted by North Korea following the last meeting which took place during President Trump’s previous visit to Japan (November 2017). Prime Minister Abe expressed his determination to meet face to face with Chairman Kim Jong-Un towards the resolution of the abductions issue. Prime Minister Abe stated that he would like to meet with Chairman Kim Jong-Un without attaching any condition and talk candidly and frankly. In response, President Trump expressed his full support for Prime Minister Abe’s determination. **c. China** The two leaders affirmed the importance of continuing constructive dialogue with the Chinese government, including in the area of security and economy. **d. Regional Affairs** The two leaders discussed regional affairs, and reaffirmed the importance of U.S. presence in the region based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance, as well as of U.S. engagement and commitment in the region. Both leaders expressed concern regarding the current situation in the East and South China Sea, and that Japan and the United States would continue to coordinate together on this issue. The two leaders agreed to continue to strengthen and expand efforts to build a regional network between allies and friendly nations, including between and among Japan-U.S.-India, Japan-U.S.-Australia, as well as Japan-U.S.-Australia-India. **e. Free and Open Indo-Pacific** The two leaders welcomed the steady progress of cooperation between Japan and the United States towards the realization of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” in sectors including energy, digital and infrastructure. The two leaders reaffirmed their intention to vigorously promote such cooperation towards the realization of this shared vision of Japan and the United States hand in hand. **f. Space** The two leaders confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation on the issue of space in areas including security, exploration, and industry. In addition, the two leaders shared the view to accelerate discussions on cooperation regarding moon exploration. **(11) Visit to Destroyer JS “Kaga” by Prime Minister & Mrs.** **Abe and President & Mrs. Trump (May 28, 2019)** Prime Minister Abe and Mrs. Akie Abe, together with President Trump and Mrs. Melania Trump, who were making a state visit to Japan, visited Destroyer JS “Kaga,” which was at anchor in the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) **Chapter** ----- Visiting Destroyer JS “Kaga” by Prime Minister Abe and President Trump (May 2019) [Courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office] Yokosuka District.[3] Prime Minister Abe and President Trump gave remarks to encourage members of the Japan SDF and the USFJ. Leaders affirmed the ironclad bond of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and that they will cooperate closely to contribute to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 2019) States. The Ministers affirmed the importance of cooperating with diverse partners. **c. Regional Situation, etc.** The Ministers discussed the regional situation and other matters in light of the discussions held at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue. Regarding North Korea in particular, they exchanged opinions in light of the recent situation surrounding the North Korea issue. They affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and they also confirmed that Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation will be maintained. **d. U.S. Forces in Japan** Defense Minister Iwaya requested cooperation toward mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa. The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko. Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of the U.S. Forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft. The Ministers affirmed the importance of ensuring safe operation of the U.S. Forces. **Chapter** **(12) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting U.S.** **Secretary of Defense Shanahan (June 4, 2019)** Defense Minister Iwaya and then Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan held a meeting at the Ministry of Defense. **a. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** Defense Minister Iwaya welcomed the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, which has recently been released by the United States. Regarding activities to be conducted by Japan and the United States based on the two countries’ strategic documents, including those described in this report, the two ministers affirmed that they will closely cooperate with each other in line with the policy confirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting. The Ministers affirmed the need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. They affirmed that they will promote JapanU.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations, including in strengthening operational cooperation through improvement of interoperability and verifying the guidelines for bilateral cooperation through various exercises. **b. Free and Open Indo-Pacific** The Ministers once again shared the view on the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Defense Minister Iwaya expressed Japan’s hope to cooperate with the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific as indicated in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of the United **(13) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (June 28, 2019) (Security** **Field)** Prime minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Trump, who visited Japan to attend the G20 Osaka Summit. The two leaders shared the view that the Japan-U.S. It th fi t ti th t th l d f J d th U it d St t k t th t b f th J SDF d th USFJ ----- Alliance is stronger than ever before, as evidenced by their frequent mutual visits in a short time, such as the visit by Prime Minister Abe to the United States in April, the visit by President Trump and Mrs. Trump to Japan as State Guests in May, and the revisit this time by President Trump to Japan. They also agreed to continue to further strengthen the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance. In addition, the two leaders confirmed that they will continue close cooperation between Japan and the United States towards the resolution of issues surrounding North Korea, such as the abduction, nuclear, and missile issues. Moreover, the two leaders exchanged opinions on regional affairs, including the situation in the Middle East, and confirmed close cooperation between Japan and the United States. **(14) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 7,2019)** Defense Minister Iwaya and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper held a meeting at the Ministry of Defense. **a. Regional affairs** The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. Also, the Ministers confirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established. The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability in the East China Sea. **b. Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. Also, they confirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process. **c. U.S. Forces in Japan** The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. Minister Iwaya requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. Minister Iwaya also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities including noise of transient aircrafts and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces. **Chapter** ----- **Section** **2** **Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to Deter and Counter Threats** The NDPG provides that, for strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats, in all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security. For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen **1** **Cooperation in Space and Cyber Domains** 1 Cooperation on Space With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in the area of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies. Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole-of government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis. Moreover, based on the instructions given by the JapanU.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG has held five meetings in total since its establishment in October 2015 (the most recent meeting was in January 2019). Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to cooperation in: space and cyber domains; comprehensive air and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral flexible deterrent options. Japan will also promote development and update of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft. develop and secure experts, and (4) continued participation in tabletop exercises. **Chapter** See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Cooperation in the Use of See Space Domain) 2 Cooperation on Cyberspace Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the DoD to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation. The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate establishment of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. Governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited. Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain) ----- **2** **Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense** Regarding the response to airborne threats coming to Japan, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and aircraft, JapanU.S. bilateral response capabilities have been enhanced by sharing operation information and establishing response procedures. For the repeated ballistic missile launches by North Korea, Japan and the United States have conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and **3** **Bilateral Training and Exercises** Bilateral training in peacetime not only contributes greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities by improving interoperability including mutual understanding of tactics and mutual communication, but is also beneficial for improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities. In addition, conducting bilateral training at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises. Bilateral training has been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units there. Ongoing efforts are being made to enhance interoperability and Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities at the military branch and unit levels, including the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special antisubmarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress. In January 2019, the United States released its Missile Defense Review (MDR) in which it clearly indicated the importance of cooperation with allies, including Japan. See Part III Chapter 1, Section 2-2-2 (Response to Missile Attacks) See **Chapter** combat training. Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise. From January to February 2018, command post exercises were conducted at the Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya. Also, from October to November of the same year, a Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise (field training) (Keen Sword 19) was carried out in the water areas and airspace around Japan and in areas including Guam of the United States, with approximately 47,000 personnel, 20 vessels, and 170 aircraft taking part from Japan’s Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF). As for recent training and exercises, the SDF participated in the multilateral exercise “Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise (RIMPAC) 2018” organized by the United States Navy from June to August 2018, and conducted anti-submersible warfare training and amphibious training as well as training in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR). In the exercise, the GSDF held its first bilateral anti-ship exercise with the U.S. Army and the MSDF using the Type 12 surface-to-ship missile system. Japanese and U.S. vessels and aircraft participating in the FY2018 Japan-U.S. Bilateral J i t E i (fi ld t i i i ) (N b 2018) Planning meeting held at Orient Shield, field training with the U.S. Army (from August to S t b 2018) ----- Meanwhile, Japan and the United States have conducted bilateral training in various waters and airspace. In October 2018, vessels including MSDF Destroyer JS “Kirisame” and U.S. aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan carried out JapanU.S. bilateral training from around the Bashi Channel to the area south of Kyushu through the waters to the east of Okinawa. In June 2019, as part of Indo-Pacific Deployment, vessels including MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo” and U.S. aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan carried out Japan-U.S. bilateral training in the South East Sea. Since 2017, the ASDF has conducted various training with U.S. Air Force strategic bomber B-52 in airspace over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. In addition, from May till June 2019, the ASDF participated in “RED FLAG-Alaska,” an exercise conducted by the U.S. Air Force in Alaska, and conducted training on air defense combat operation training, etc. The Japan-U.S. bilateral training was conducted with the aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It is believed that bolstering Japan-U.S. collaboration and demonstrating **4** **ISR Activities** With regard to bilateral ISR activities, it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries. The expansion of these ISR activities will function as ASDF F-15s and U.S. Air Force B-52s conducting bilateral training (July 2018) bilateral ties as an outcome has the effect of further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall JapanU.S. Alliance and demonstrating Japan’s determination and high capacity towards stabilizing the region in an increasingly severe security environment for Japan. In recent years, the USFJ have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments. See Reference 27 (Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises See in FY2018) **Chapter** deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. **5** **Maritime Security** as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary. In accordance with the Guideline and others, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, **6** **Logistics Support** Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistics support based on the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement[1] (ACSA) signed in 1996 and revised in 1999 and 2004. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, UN PKO, international disaster relief activities, The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and S i b t th S lf D f F f J d th A d F f th U it d St t f A i ----- **Fig. III-2-2-1** Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where units of allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations. Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Image of the circumstances and preconditions for the situations |Disaster relief|Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.| |---|---| |International disaster relief activities|| |U.S. Forces staying temporarily at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties|| |Guarding operation|Counter-piracy operations| |Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc.|Removal of underwater mines| |Protection of Japanese nationals overseas|Warning and surveillance activities| |U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties|| |Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security|Armed attack situations| |---|---| ||Situations in which an armed attack is anticipated| ||Survival-threatening situations| Japan-U.S. bilateral drills Multilateral drills with Japan & U.S. participation Armed attack situations Disaster relief Transportation of Japanesenationals overseas, etc. International disaster relief activities Situations in which an armed U.S. Forces staying temporarily Situations that will have attack is anticipated at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties an important influence on Japan’s peace and security Guarding operation Counter-piracy operations Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc. Removal of underwater mines Survival-threatening situations Protection of Japanese Warning and nationals overseas surveillance activities U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties Peace Keeping Operation Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security Situations threatening international peace and security that the international International humanitarian assistance community is collectively addressing From SDF conducting international peace cooperation operations to U.S. Forces responding to disasters *1 : Activities that came under the scope of the agreement due to the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. *2 Provision of ammunition for all activities and situations other than armed attack situations, etc., falls under the scope of the new agreement. **Chapter** situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.[2] Following the passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015, the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016, ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into force on April 25. This has enabled the same framework as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA, such **7** **Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale Disaster in Japan** In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through Operation Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation Tomodachi involved the as settlement procedures, to be applied to the provision of supplies and services that had become possible under the Legislation for Peace and Security, so that since April 2017 food and fuel have been provided to U.S. Forces engaged in information collection and other activities. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-3-8 (Expansion of the Provisions of Supplies and Services to the United States Armed Forces) Part II, Chapter 5, Section 3-4 (Conclusion of the New JapanU.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement [ACSA])  Fig. III-2-2-1 (Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement [ACSA]) deployment of a large-scale force at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft, resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for the USFJ. On the other hand, some issues have emerged, such as The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and iti ( l i d tt k it ti d ti i t d it ti ) (P i i f i t i l d d) ----- clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism. In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries have conducted several bilateral comprehensive disaster prevention exercises aimed at maintaining and enhancing earthquake disaster handling capabilities to be demonstrated **Section** **3** **Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas** **1** **Creation of a Desirable Security Environment** The NDPG provides that in order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities. through collaboration between the SDF, USFJ, related ministries and agencies, and related local governments in the event of occurrence of a Nankai Trough earthquake. In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22) of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Office locally established by the joint task force organized for the earthquake response. international peacekeeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan and the United States worked closely together at local multilateral coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison officers to the U.S. Africa Command in October 2014, coordinating efforts and collecting information with relevant countries including the United States, for close cooperation. **Chapter** 1 Maritime Security Both Japan and the United States have made efforts as maritime nations to maintain and develop “open and stable seas” according to fundamental rules such as securing the freedom and safety of navigation, and the rule of law including peaceful dispute resolution based on international law. For example, they have participated in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 for countering piracy and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise Pacific Shield 18, hosted by Japan, in July 2018. The two countries have also been working closely together on providing multilateral capacity building assistance in the maritime domain to countries including those along the sea lanes. See Part III, Chapter 1 Section 2-1-3 (Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security) Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security) Part III, Chapter 3, Section 4-2 (International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) 3 Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises The Guidelines enable Japan and the United States to promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating in trilateral (e.g., Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States. Aircraft and the personnel of Japan, the United States and Singapore participating in ltil t l i RED FLAG Al k (J 2018) 2 Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief The SDF has conducted activities in close cooperation with the United States and other participating countries through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special M A t i t ti l di t li f ti iti d ----- **2** **Initiatives for Leveraging Capabilities** The NDPG provides that in order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security. 1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the mutual cooperation principle from the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America, while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and industrial bases. In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America.[1] In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America[2] was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums. At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in June 2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP MOU).[3] The MOU promotes measures concerning the procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense authorities based on reciprocity (providing information necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other country, protecting submitted corporate information, waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the other country, etc.). Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 5-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains initiatives for the common maintenance base for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the V-22 Osprey deployed by the GSDF as well as initiatives for the maintenance capability (regional depots) in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35 fighter aircraft. See Reference 28 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development See Projects) Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 5-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **Chapter** 2 Joint/Shared Use The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises, and expands the scope and raises the frequency of activities such as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the USFJ in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training and exercises and increased interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in case of a disaster. Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, the development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration. See Part IV, Chapter 3, Section 2 (Initiatives towards Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities) Official title: Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America Official title: Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America The official title is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal D f P t ----- **Section** **4** **Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning the USFJ** Under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the presence of USFJ functions as deterrence, while on the other hand, given the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the living environment of the local residents, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of each area in order to mitigate the impacts. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ is a very important initiative for mitigation of the **1** **Stationing of the USFJ** 1 Significance of the Stationing of the USFJ Given the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary to maintain the presence of the USFJ and its readiness to make rapid and agile actions in case of emergency in Japan and the surrounding areas even in peacetime, so that Japan-U.S. Alliance based on Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements functions enough as a deterrent power that contributes to the peace and stability of the defense of Japan and the region. Therefore, Japan accepts the stationing of the US forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and it is a cornerstone of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Also, it is essential to realize the stable stationing of the USFJ in order to make a swift joint response to an armed attack to Japan based on Article 5 of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In addition, the actions of U.S. forces for the defense of Japan are conducted not only by the USFJ but also by timely reinforcements. The USFJ is supposed to be the basis for them. While Article 5 of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the duty of the U.S. to defend Japan, the U.S. is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan based on Article 6 for the purpose of maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East. Therefore, though the duties of each side are not the same, they are balanced overall. impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa, and maintaining the deterrent capability of the U.S. Forces. Therefore, the MOD will advance the realignment and other initiatives and make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas. and areas and the status of the USFJ, including the furnishing of facilities and areas for use by the USFJ (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the USFJ. In addition, the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment enhances cooperation for environmental stewardship relating to the USFJ, and the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component intends to clarify the scope of the civilian component, etc. **Chapter** **(1) Furnishing of USFJ Facilities and Areas** Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas under the provision of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the Governments of Japan and the United States. The Government of Japan concludes lease contracts with owners of private and public lands on which USFJ facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of these facilities and areas. However, should the Government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it shall acquire title[2] under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release,[3] compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process. **(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ** The SOFA stipulates that the manpower (labor) required by the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan. As of the end of FY2018, there were 25,842 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as clerks at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, 2 Measures concerning the Stationing of the USFJ The SOFA[1] stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities The official title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. The term “title” means a legal cause that justifies a certain act. The official title is the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the U it d St t f A i R di F iliti d A d th St t f U it d St t A d F i J ----- members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They support the smooth operations of the USFJ. The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc. **(3) Supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of** **Environmental Stewardship** In September 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed and effectuated the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the USFJ, supplementary to the SOFA. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning the issuance and maintenance of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) and the establishment and maintenance, etc. of procedures for access to USFJ facilities and areas. This agreement was the first of its kind created to supplement the SOFA since the SOFA had entered into force and has a historical significance that differs essentially in nature from conventional improvements in the operations of the SOFA. procedures for access to the site by GOJ and USG officials in the event of off-base U.S. military aircraft accidents that occur in Japan, and so on. The major changes include clarification of expeditious early entry into the inner cordon (restricted area) designated in the event of an accident. The revised guidelines also stipulate that entry into the site will be made with priority given more clearly to validated USG and GOJ representatives with responsibilities associated with accident site mitigation to include hazardous material observation, the aircraft accident investigation, or claims investigations; the U.S. Forces will provide Japanese authorities with relevant information especially on hazardous materials as soon as practically possible after an accident; in removing wreckage that has the potential to affect the condition of the underlying Japanese property significantly and negatively, the U.S. Forces will coordinate with the landowner through the Regional Defense Bureau of the Ministry of Defense except when the situation otherwise dictates; and that when the U.S. authorities, GOJ authorities, or local authorities conduct environmental surveys, the results will be shared within the Joint Committee framework. These changes enable more effective, expeditious and proper response to future U.S. military aircraft accidents. 3 Costs Associated with the USFJ Various costs associated with the USFJ include the costs of stationing USFJ, costs for implementing the stipulations of the SACO Final Report for mitigating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Forces. **Chapter** **(4) Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component** In January 2017, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component, which came in to force on the same day. The agreement clarifies the scope of the civilian component, which is addressed only by a general provision in SOFA, develops criteria used in evaluating contractor employee positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the civilian component, and stipulates the procedures for notification and review, etc. together with the exclusion of ordinary residents from the civilian component. The initiative to formulate the Supplementary Agreement on Civilian Component is the second case, following the creation of the Supplementary Agreement on the Environment that supplements the SOFA. See Section 4-6 (Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas) See Fig. III-2-4-1 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (budget for FY2019)) 4 Host Nation Support (HNS) HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, it started to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP). Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, the **(5) The Revision of the Guidelines Regarding Off-Base U.S.** **Military Aircraft Accidents** In July 2019, the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed on the revision of the Guidelines Regarding Aircraft Accidents in Japan.[4] This revision aims at further refining the 4 Th ffi i l titl i th G id li R di Off B U S Milit Ai ft A id t i J ----- **Fig. III-2-4-1** U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2019) |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Total: ¥| |---|---|---|---|---| |Burden from||th|e Special Measures Agreement (¥16|0.3 billion)| |||||| Costs for Stationing of USFJ SACO-related costs Realignment-related (MOD-Related Budget: ¥388.8 billion (1)+(2)) (¥25.6 billion) costs (¥167.9 billion) Cost sharing for the stationing - Projects for land returns - Relocation of the U.S. Marines - Costs for taking measures to improve the living environment of USFJ (¥197.4 billion (1)) - Projects for training improvement¥12.1 billion in Okinawa to Guam ¥21.9 billion - Projects for realignment in Okinawa in areas surrounding ¥1.5 billion the USFJ facilities ¥60.1 billion - Costs for Facility - Projects for noise reduction ¥87.5 billion - Projects for the relocation of Carrier Air Wing - Rent for facilities ¥101.9 billion Improvement Program ¥20.7 billion ¥30 million ¥0.7 billion - Relocation, etc. ¥0.7 billion - Project for facilitating SACO - Projects for contingency use - Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.) - Other costs ¥27.0 billion ¥10.7 billion ¥1.3 billion (compensation for fisheries, etc.) - Projects for training relocation ¥28.7 billion Total: ¥47.7 billion Total: ¥24.3 billion (Local task force-related cost) ¥ 80 million Total: ¥191.4 billion (2) - Projects for facilitating realignment nitiatives ¥47.2 billion Total: ¥158.5 billion Non MOD-related budget - Expenditures borne by other ministries Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥160.3 billion) (base subsidy, etc.) - Labor costs (basic salary, etc.) - Training relocation costs: ¥1.2 billion - Training relocation costs ¥126.9 billion - Estimated costs (one of the projects aimed ¥9.4 billion - Utilities costs ¥21.9 billion of government ownedland provided at enhancing training) for use as USFJ facilities[3] - Training relocation costs (NLP) - Artillery live-fire training - Aviation training relocation ¥0.9 billion over Highway 104 as part of realignment initiatives Total: ¥149.7 billion - Parachute training Note 1: Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs. 2: The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refer to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately. 3: The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥38.1 billion, FY2018 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥164.0 billion, FY2018 Estimated Costs). 4: Numbers may not add up due to rounding. **Chapter** employment stability of the employees would be influenced adversely, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the USFJ. Therefore, in 1987, Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)[5] as exceptional, limited and provisional measures under the cost principle in the SOFA. Based on this agreement, Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs shared by Japan expanded to cover labor costs including base pay, and utilities costs from FY1991, and training relocation costs from FY1996. Japan has been reviewing HNS, paying full attention to its tight fiscal conditions, and as a result, HNS has been on a steady decline after peaking out in the FY1999 budget on an expenditure basis. 5 Current Special Measures Agreement As the former SMA was effective up until March 2016, the current SMA was intended to “open discussions pertaining to future arrangements for an appropriate level for sharing of the costs of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan” based on the “2+2” agreement of April 2015. Following this agreement, Japan and the United States held consultations on a new SMA, and in December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States reached agreement as follows: Subsequently, after the new SMA was signed in January 2016 and approval by the Diet, the new agreement took effect in April of the same year. The key points of the new SMA are as follows: **(1) Effective Period** Five years (from FY2016 through FY2020) **(2) Cost Sharing** Japan shall bear all or part of the labor costs, utilities costs, and the costs incurred in training relocation. - Labor Costs The upper limit of the number of workers at welfare, recreation, and morale facilities to be funded by Japan will be reduced from 4,408 to 3,893, while the upper limit of the number of workers engaged in activities such as maintenance of assets and administrative works to be funded by Japan, will be increased from 18,217 to 19,285. As a result, the The official title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of M t l C ti d S it b t J d th U it d St t f A i R di F iliti d A d th St t f U it d St t A d F i J ----- upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be increased from the current 22,625 to 23,178. These adjustments will be phased in over the new SMA period from FY2016 to FY2020. - Utilities Costs Over the new SMA period, the share of utilities costs to be shared by Japan for each fiscal year is reduced from the current 72% to 61%, with the upper limit for utilities costs to be funded by Japan set at approximately 24.9 billion yen. - Costs for Facilities Improvement Program The amount of costs for the FIP will not fall below 20.6 billion yen in each fiscal year during the new SMA period. For the period of the previous SMA, any amount of reductions in the labor costs and the utilities costs was to be appropriated for an increase in costs for the FIP. But such appropriation will not be made during the new SMA period. **(3) Scale of HNS** The amount of HNS in FY2020, the final fiscal year of the new SMA period, will be approximately 189.9 billion yen, with the average amount for each fiscal year during the same period coming to approximately 189.3 billion yen (any change in wages based on recommendations by the National Personnel Authority will be reflected appropriately in labor costs for each fiscal year). **(4) Cost-Saving Efforts** It is clearly stipulated that the United States will make further efforts to economize the above-mentioned expenditures. 6 USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Communities The social conditions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas have changed significantly, including, for example, through urbanization over the past several decades. For USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities and be genuinely accepted by the Japanese people, it is vital to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible and secure the understanding and cooperation of the local communities in light of such changes. Japan’s national land is narrow with limited plains, and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas, and the takeoffs and landings of the U.S. Forces aircraft have considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to mitigate the impact in a way that is responsive to the circumstances of each area. **2** **Progress of the Realignment of the USFJ** but at the “2+2” Meeting on April 27, 2012, the United States decided to alter the composition of the units and to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistics support elements— in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). **Chapter** “The United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May 2006. Subsequently, the following factors were set forth: 1) The necessity of implementing measures to realize visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa promptly and steadily; 2) The necessity of balancing the realignment package and the strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and 3) The reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam demanded by the U.S congress. Full-fledged consultation on the coordination of the realignment package took place between the two countries in light of those factors. The achievements thereof were announced as part of the Joint Statements of the “2+2” Meeting and through other means. The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, See Reference 23 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee [tentative translation] [April 27, 2012]) Fig. III-2-4-2 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”-1) ----- Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Col3|plementation”-1|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||he Kanto Area he bilateral joint operations coordination Yokota Air Base rspace, (returned on September 25, 2008) SDF air traffic controllers besides the Yokota cility (started on May 18, 2007), etc. Tokyo vilian-military dual-use of Yokota conditions and modalities are en Japan and the U.S.) eral Depot] Sagamihar cilities due to the realignment of U.S. uarters (Facilities including the Training of the Training Center started in August Zama t of the Training Assistance Center e land in front of JR Sagamihara Statio Kanagaw pen-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) n December 2, 2015) Legend: Implemented 20km|[Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command] ○ Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012 Fuchu [Camp Zama] ○ Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (Reorganized at the end of September 20 ○ Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force a Headquarters (then)(Completed on March 26, 20 ○ Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on March 26, 2013) ○ Release of portions (5.4 ha) of housing area and others (Land return completed on February 29, 2016) a Continuing|) 08) 13) rn| |1||Realignment in t|||| ||||||| |[Yo||kota related]|||| |○ ○||Establishment of t center (BJOCC) at Partial return of ai and placing the JA Yokota RAPCON fa|||| |○||Deliberation on ci Air Base (specific considered betwe|||| ||||||| |[U.S. F ○ ○ ○ (||orces Sagami Gen Establishment of fa Army Japan Headq Center)(Operations 2011. Developmen completed.) Return of part of th pprox. 17 ha) Joint use of West O Joint use started o|||| ||||||| ||||n Okinawa Legend:||| |2||Realignment i||Six candidate facilities for land retu Implemented Continuing located south of Kadena Air Base|| ||||||| |[Joi|||||| |||||cated are based on the consolidation plan. See Fig. III-2-4-9 for the current status on g of land south of Kadena Air Base)|| 1 Realignment in the Kanto Area [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command] [Yokota related] - Relocation of the Air Defense Command - Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination and relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012) center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base - Partial return of airspace, (returned on September 25, 2008) and placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Yokota RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc. Yokota - Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Tokyo Fuchu [Camp Zama] Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are - Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army, considered between Japan and the U.S.) Japan (Reorganized at the end of September 2008) - Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force [U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot] Sagamihara Headquarters (then)(Completed on March 26, 2013) - Establishment of facilities due to the realignment of U.S. - Joint/shared use of heliport Army Japan Headquarters (Facilities including the Training (Joint use started on March 26, 2013) Center)(Operations of the Training Center started in August 2011. Development of the Training Assistance Center Zama - Release of portions (5.4 ha) of housing area and others (Land return completed on February 29, completed.) 2016) - Return of part of the land in front of JR Sagamihara Statio pprox. 17 ha) Kanagawa - Joint use of West Open-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) (Joint use started on December 2, 2015) Legend: Implemented Continuing 20km 2 Realignment in Okinawa Legend: Six candidate facilities for land return Implemented Continuing [Joint/Shared Use] located south of Kadena Air Base (Areas indicated are based on the consolidation plan. See Fig. III-2-4-9 for the current status on - Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training the returning of land south of Kadena Air Base) - Implemented on March 17, 2008 - JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities [Land Returns] SDF bases in mainland, etc. - Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) for returning of significant land area south of Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa - Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013 Camp MCAS Futenma (total return, about 481 ha) Schwab [Relocation within Okinawa Prefecture] Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 Camp Replacement Transport capabilities using helicopters (total return, about 16 ha) Hansen Facility Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Naha Port (total return, about 56 ha) [Relocation of operations outside A replacement facility will be Kadena Air Base Okinawa Prefecture] constructed in the Urasoe-Pier district - Operations of air-refueling aircraft under the Naha Port and Harbor Plan Replacement → MCAS Iwakuni Facility - Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed on August 26, 2014 Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return, about 274 ha) MCAS Futenma - Contingency use - Return of north access road → Tsuiki/Nyutabaru Air Base, etc. (approx. 1 ha) on August 31, 2013 To Guam, etc. - Return of lands along eastern side - Return of part of the land (approx. 4 ha) on July 31, 2017 (approx. 3 ha) on March 31, 2018 - Return of area near Gate 5 Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) [Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps] (approx. 2 ha) on March 31, 2019 (partial return, about 153 ha+ ) III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), about 8,000 personnel and about 9,000 of their dependents will relocate to Guam *“2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states that about Camp Kuwae (Lester) - Return of West Futenma Housing 9,000 personnel and their dependents would be relocated Area outside of Japan and the authorized strength of U.S. Marine (total return, about 68 ha) (approx. 51 ha) on March 31, 2015 Corps in Guam will be about 5,000. 20km ----- |Relocation of contingency u|the functions of aircraft for se to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru| |---|---| |The KC-130 squadron w on a rotational basis to Kanoya Base and Guam|ill deploy MSDF| |---|---| |Relocation (Relocatio|of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni n completed in August 2014)| |---|---| Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment **Fig. III-2-4-2** Implementation”-2 3 Relocation of Aircraft, etc. TPY-2 Rader: deployment of so-called “X-band Radar System” (Deployment completed in June 2006) The relocation of flight training activities from Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to ASDF bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Chitose Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, as well as to Guam. Legend: The relocation to Guam, etc., was agreed Shariki Implemented upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in Misawa January 2011. Deployment of a TPY-2 radar Continuing (Deployment completed in December 2014) Relocation of carrier-based aircraft Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons to Iwakuni Kyoga squadrons and other units from (Relocation completed in March 2018) Tsuiki Iwakuni misaki Komatsu Hyakuri Iwakuni toAtsugi(“2+2” Joint Statement in 2013 confirmed the continued deployment Nyutabaru of these units in Iwakuni Air Base) Atsugi Kanoya Relocation of training of MV-22 Osprey, etc. (Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of September 2016) Kadena Futenma Relocation of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni Relocation of the functions of aircraft for (Relocation completed in August 2014) contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru The KC-130 squadron will deploy on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam Part of future civilian aviation facilities were established within MCAS Iwakuni Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam Saipan (Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened (Japan and the United States confirmed that the CH-53D squadron December 2012) will be relocated to the U.S. mainland and then to Guam.) Guam (Relocation to the U.S. mainland completed) 500km *JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee **Chapter** ----- **3** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the same time has the advantage of having a certain distance from these areas that would not heighten military tension there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a large number of small islands, is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent. Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa, including the U.S. Marine Corps, which can deal with a wide range of missions with high mobility and readiness and is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies, with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as air bases, maneuver areas and logistics facilities. As of January 1, 2019, approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture and approximately 14% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints. See Fig. III-2-4-3 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the See Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa (image)) **Chapter** |Fig. III-2-4-3 The Geopolitical|Positioning of Okinawa and the Signi|ficance of the U.S. Mar|ine Corps Stationed in| |---|---|---|---| Okinawa holds a position of great strategic importance Geographical Advantage of Okinawa - The main island of Okinawa is located roughly in the center Beijing of the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes (*1) for Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the perspective of Japan’s security. - Okinawa is located close (but not overly so) to potential Seoul conflict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. → Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible Access from continental to expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at Tokyo the same time has sufficient distance so as not to heighten Asia to the Pacific military tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms Izu Islands of protecting units. - In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s location is Approximately 1,250 km strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent. Approximately *1 Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least Hong Kong Taipei 650 km Ogasawara Islands 99% of the total volume of its trade. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Approximately 3,200 km Marine Corps in Okinawa It is essential to maintain defense capabilities for the area of Japan’s sea lane the Southwestern Islands in the main island of Okinawa, which is important as a strategic location for Japan for the security of Japan. The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps (*2), Manila which is capable of rapid response and high mobility and Approximately 2,750 km also has readiness for a wide variety of missions ranging from Saipan armed conflicts to natural disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical advantages plays an important role in ensuring not only the security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia. Guam *2 The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements 500km (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of any kind of situation. ----- Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report **Fig. III-2-4-4** (image) Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield Northern Training Camp Hansen Area Senaha Communication Station Aha Training Area Sobe Communication Site Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Offshore Camp Schwab Torii Communication Gimbaru Training Area Station Kin Blue Beach Training Area Kadena Air Base Camp Zukeran Camp Kuwae MCAS Futenma Makiminato Service Area :Facilities and areas involved in land return Naha Port Facility :Facilities and areas involved in land return (Cancellation of joint use) :Destination sites of other facilities relocation programs Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities **Fig. III-2-4-5** and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa 1 Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km2 for exclusive use by the U.S. Forces. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture. Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to the strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required coordination and procedures toward the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues,[6] including the return of Naha Port (Naha City). Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996. See Reference 29 (Outline of 23 Issues) **Chapter** 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 |353|Area (km2)| |---|---| ||Facilities/Areas| |278 249 242|| |235|| |185 144|| |83|| |46|| |43 38 31|| Right before May 1972 End of End of the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 of Okinawa SACO Final As of Report (1996) January 2019 See Reference 30 (The SACO Final Report [tentative translation]); Reference 31 (Progress of the SACO Final Report); Fig. III-2-4-4 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report (image)); Fig. III-2-4-5 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas [Exclusive Use] in Okinawa) 3 Return of a Major Portion of the Northern Training Area The condition for returning the Northern Training Area was to relocate seven helipads in the area to be returned to the preexisting training area. However, the Government of Japan reached an agreement with the U.S. side to give considerations for the natural environment and to relocate not all seven but the minimum number of six helipads necessary, and proceeded with the construction work. The relocation of the helipads completed in December 2016, and on December 22 of the same year, the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a 2 Outline of SACO Final Report The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, noise reduction, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the SOFA procedures, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km2) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km2. The Three Okinawa Issues refer to the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live fire training over Highway 104. The relocation (distribution and implementation) of artillery live fire training over Highway 104 in FY2019 is planned for Yausubetsu Maneuver Area, Ohjojihara Maneuver Area, North Fuji M A d Hij d i M A ----- major portion of the Northern Training Area located in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved based on the SACO Final Report. The returned land accounts for approximately 20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa. The return is the largest one since the reversion of Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an issue for 20 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996. Based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces, the MOD took measures to remove obstacles (such as soil contamination survey, etc.) so that the landowners, etc. can use returned lands effectively and appropriately, and transferred the land to the landowners on December 25, 2017. 4 Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma Along with the initiatives set forth in the roadmap related to the realignment of the U.S. Forces, measures have been implemented to alleviate the impact on the local communities while maintaining the deterrence capabilities. The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture, and considers that this is a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area (Nago City) and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Government of Japan plans to make further efforts to achieve the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa, including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 476 ha with a land area 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome). living in the vicinity. In the SCC (“2+2”) document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in ‘L’-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was approved. However, since this L-shape meant that U.S. military aircraft would fly over settlements in Nago City and Ginoza Village, a request was submitted to avoid flights over these settlements. In light of this, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shape configuration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” With regard to construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and the then Minister of State for Defense Nukaga in May 2006. After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and decided that a study by experts regarding the replacement facility's location, configuration and construction method would be completed promptly. The two sides also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape. During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that, from a security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of Japan, cannot be lessened while there remains instability and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia. Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions of the U.S. Marine Corps such as mobility and readiness would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture. Also at the “2+2” Meetings in April 2012, October 2013, April 2015, August 2017, and April 2019, and in other instances including the joint statement issued at the first Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting during the Trump administration in February 2017, the Governments of Japan and the United States confirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only **Chapter** **(1) Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility** Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made towards realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern of the residents ----- **Chapter** |Item|Area|Runway| |---|---|---| |Replacement A facility|pprox. 160 ha (landfill area) (1 Approx.|Approx. 1,200 m,800 m including overrun)| |MCAS A Futenma|1/3 pprox. 476 ha|2/3 Approx. 2,740 m| Replacement facility Camp Schwab (Henoko Cape) N Runway Henoko Nagashima Toyohara Birajima オーバーランOverrun Naha N Okinawa Item Area Runway Replacement Approx. 160 ha Approx. 1,200 m facility (landfill area) (1,800 m including overrun) Approx. 1/3 2/3 MCAS Approx. 476 ha Approx. 2,740 m Futenma MCAS Futenma solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. See Reference 32 (Background of the Futenma Replacement See Facility); Reference 33 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena); Fig. III-2-4-6 (Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma (image)) in MCAS Futenma to be moved outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also led to the relocation of approximately 870 USFJ personnel, civilian employees, and dependents. Moreover, the function of (3) “accepting a large number of transient aircraft in contingencies” will also be transferred to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base. In October 2018, Japan and the United States agreed on developing facilities that would be necessary for relocating the function, and related work such as design of the facilities has been carried out. **b. Reduction in Area** The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is approximately 160 ha, less than one-third of the approximately 476 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the new facility will be equipped with a significantly shorter runway at 1,200 m (1,800 m including the overruns) compared to the current runway length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma. **c. Reduction in Noise and Risks** Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for both takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks. For example, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF This means that the noise **(2) Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the Impact** **on Okinawa** The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it involves reduction in the base’s functions and area in Okinawa, and contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. **a. Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma** MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa: (1) Operation of the Osprey and other aircraft; (2) Operation of air refueling aircraft; and (3) Accepting a large number of transient aircraft in contingencies. Of these three functions, only (1) “operation of the Osprey and other aircraft” will be relocated to Camp Schwab. As for (2) “operation of air refueling aircraft,” all 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft were relocated to MCAS Iwakuni (in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in August 2014. This marked the completion of a task that has remained unresolved for 18 years since the SACO Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of fixed-wing aircraft located ----- levels experienced by all households will comply with the environment criteria applied to exclusive housing areas. In the case that an aircraft encounters any contingency, safety on the ground can be ensured by diverting the aircraft offshore. **(3) The Necessity of Constructing the Futenma Replacement** **Facility within Okinawa Prefecture** The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements is indispensable for U.S. Marine Corps operations characterized by great mobility and readiness, so the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotarywing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise work on a regular basis. of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture.[7] Under these circumstances, the court came up with a settlement recommendation, and the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a court-mediated settlement agreement in March 2016. In the settlement, the Government of Japan and Okinawa mutually affirmed that after the final judicial ruling is handed down by the Supreme Court, they would abide by the ruling and take steps in line with the spirit of the text of the ruling and the reasons conducive to the text, and continue to take responses in good faith by cooperating with each other in accordance with the purpose of the ruling. Pursuant to the provisions of the settlement agreement, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau immediately suspended the land-fill work while the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued an instruction for correction based on the Local Autonomy Act to then Governor Onaga to repeal the revocation of the land-fill permit. Subsequently, in December 2016, after examination by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and deliberation by the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch, the Supreme Court set forth the decision that the revocation of the land-fill permit by then Governor Onaga was illegal. **b. Judgment of the Supreme Court** In the judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was not illegal. The court stated that no circumstances could be found indicating that then Governor Nakaima’s decision that the landfill was in compliance with the condition in Article 4 (1) (i) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “that it is appropriate and reasonable as the use of national land,” had no foundation in fact, or clearly lacked reasoning under socially accepted conventions. The reasons given by the court include: (1) the area of the replacement facilities and the landfill area will be significantly reduced from the area of the MCAS Futenma facilities, and (2) aircraft flying over residential areas can be avoided by the land-fill in the coastal area that puts the runway extension out to the sea, and the replacement facilities will be installed using part of Camp Schwab, which is already provided to the U.S. Forces. Moreover, regarding whether the construction of replacement facilities takes environmental protection and other considerations into adequate account, the Supreme Court, finding that construction methods, environmental protection measures and countermeasures that can conceivably be taken at this point in time have been taken and that there is **Chapter** **(4) Completion** **of** **Environmental** **Impact** **Assessment** **Procedures** The MOD sent the environmental impact assessment scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and other parties. After the MOD worked on revising the document based on the opinions provided by the governor, the MOD completed the environmental impact assessment procedures by sending the revised assessment document to related parties including the governor in December 2012, while making the assessment document available for public review. Throughout these procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on six occasions, made all the required revisions, and reflected them in the content of the environmental assessment. In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with relevant laws, asked opinions and ideas from Okinawa Prefecture over a sufficient period of time, and reflected them in the assessment. **(5) Promotion** **of** **the** **Futenma** **Replacement** **Facility** **Construction Project** **a. Suits over the Revocation of the Land-Fill Permit** The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the land-fill permit request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013. However, then Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the land-fill permit by then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima in October 2015, leading to the filing of three suits over the revocation of the land-fill permit between the Government (1) The suit, filed by the Government of Japan as plaintiff based on Article 245-8 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking a court ruling instructing a retraction of the revocation of the land-fill permit by Governor Onaga (the so-called subrogation suit); (2) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 251-5 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend the validity of the revocation of the land-fill permit (the decision to stay execution) by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as the illegal “involvement of the state”; and (3) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to stay execution by the Minister of Land, I f t t T t d T i ----- sufficient consideration for disaster prevention, determined that it cannot be said that then Governor Nakaima’s decision was illegal. The court did not find that there was anything particularly unreasonable in then Governor Nakaima’s decision-making process and the content of the decision that the construction met the condition of Article 4 (1) (ii) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “the land-fill gives sufficient consideration to the protection of the environment and prevention of disasters.” **c. Retraction of the Revocation of the Land-Fill Permit** Following this Supreme Court ruling, on December 26, 2016, then Governor Onaga retracted the revocation of the land-fill permit and the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the replacement facilities construction project the following day. On April 25, 2017, it started the construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation. **d. Lawsuit Related to Damage to the Reefs on the Seafloor,** **Etc.** On July 24 of the same year, Okinawa Prefecture filed suit in the Naha District Court, requesting that this seawall construction not be allowed to damage the reefs on the seafloor, etc., without permission from the Governor of Okinawa based on the regulations of Okinawa Prefecture. Subsequently, the district court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s claim on March 13, 2018, and the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s appeal on December 5 of the same year. On December 19, Okinawa Prefecture filed a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court, but withdrew the petition on March 29, 2019. **e. Situation Surrounding the Land-Fill Work** On August 31, 2018, Okinawa Prefecture revoked the landfill permit on the basis of problems concerning environmental protection measures and the soil foundation of the land-fill area. On October 17 of the same year, the Okinawa Defense Bureau filed a request for review and a petition for a stay of execution under the Administrative Complaint Review Act against the revocation of the permit, and the stay of execution was upheld on October 30. Following the ruling, the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the land-fill operation on December 14 of the same year in the waters south of Camp Schwab . On April 5, 2019, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism determined that the revocation of the land-fill permit by Okinawa Prefecture should be repealed. The Government of Japan is going forward with the relocation to Henoko in order to achieve the total return of MCAS Futenma. In implementing the relocation, the MOD has conducted environmental impact assessment for about five years, and given the utmost consideration for the natural environment. Throughout the procedures, the MOD received more than 1,500 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on six occasions, all of which the MOD reflected in the content of the environmental assessment. If the waters are enclosed by the seawall, the coral will be isolated from the surrounding sea with the flow of seawater shut down, a situation which will affect the coral habitat. Therefore, corals living in the land-fill area on the southern side, which were designated for conservation, were transplanted before the area was enclosed. The standard for conservation of corals is stricter than the standard that was applied to the land-fill related to the second runway of Naha Airport.[8] Regarding coenobita, which are nationally designated protected species, and the shellfish and crustaceans designated as endangered species, relocation from the seashore and seafloors in the construction area on the southern side to other areas is also being appropriately implemented based on instructions and advice from experts. Regarding the soil foundation of the land-fill area, as a result of a study conducted on the stability of seawalls and other structures in the waters north of Camp Schwab in light of the results of a boring survey, it has been confirmed that although the work to improve the soil foundation is necessary, it is possible to implement the construction of seawalls and land-fill while ensuring the required stability through prevailing and adequately proven construction methods.[9] Going forward, the Okinawa Defense Bureau will conduct a study on such matters as a concrete design related to the work to improve the soil foundation. In February 2019, Okinawa Prefecture held a referendum on whether or not to support the land-fill work related to the relocation of MCAS Futenma to the Henokosaki area in Nago City. As a result, 114,933 voters voted for the work, 434,273 voters voted against it, and 52,682 voters voted neither (the total number of votes cast was 605,385 and the voter turnout was 52.48%). The present situation in which U.S. bases are concentrated in Okinawa is in no way acceptable, and it is a grave responsibility of the government to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. **Chapter** Specifically, in relation to the construction of the second runway of Naha Airport, around 37,000 clusters of small corals were transplanted. If the same standard as the one applicable to the construction of the alternative facility was applied, the number of clusters of small corals transplanted would have been around 170,000. The standard methods are the sand compaction method and the sand drain method. Among examples of projects in which these methods were used is the construction work to expand T k I t ti l Ai t (H d Ai t) ----- The government takes the results of the prefectural referendum seriously and continues to do its utmost to mitigate the impact of bases on Okinawa. It is imperative to prevent MCAS Futenma, which is surrounded by houses and schools and which is said to be the most dangerous base in the world, from continuing to be used indefinitely and to pose a danger. The government believes that this view is shared by the local residents. The relocation to Henoko does not mean that all functions of MCAS Futenma will be relocated there. Of MCAS Futenma’s three functions, two will be moved out of Okinawa while the remaining one will be relocated to Henoko, resulting in the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma. Indeed, from the viewpoint of sharing the impact, progress is being made in implementation of measures to realize the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma based on understanding and cooperation by local public entities outside Okinawa. The measures include the relocation of air refueling aircraft to Yamaguchi Prefecture and the relocation of the function of accepting transient aircraft in contingencies to Fukuoka and Miyazaki Prefectures. Although more than 20 years have passed since Japan and the United States agreed on the total return of the site of MCAS Futenma, it has not been achieved yet. The MOD believes that the return must not be postponed any longer. The MOD intends to continue making efforts to secure the understanding of local residents through years of persistent dialogue, and do its utmost to achieve the total return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible. 5 Force Reduction and Relocation to Guam Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa. Kadena Air Base from the progress on the FRF and the United States reviewed the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam. As a result, the MAGTF is to be stationed and deployed in Guam, Japan, and Hawaii, approximately 9,000 personnel are to be relocated to locations outside of Japan (about 4,000 of whom are to be relocated to Guam), the authorized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately 5,000 personnel, and the end-state for the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap. Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to promote the implementation of the consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa of April 2013. **(2) Costs of the Relocation** Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s long-term funding for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions. As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Japanese Government has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the projects for which Japan has provided financial support since FY2009.[10] Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were revised and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in **Chapter** **(1) Timing and Size of Relocation** The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III MEF and approximately 9,000 dependents would be relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of 10 As for projects for which Japan provides financial support, cash contributions of approximately 208.5 billion yen have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2018 ----- **Fig. III-2-4-7** Progress of the Guam Relocation Project (image) |Relocation Project Areas|Status of Progress of GOJ Funded Projects| |---|---| |Andersen AFB|On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress.| |(2) Andersen South Area|Training areas (*2) project is in progress.| |Naval Computer and Telecommunications tion Finegayan|On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress.| |Naval Base Guam in Apra|On-base infrastructure project (*1) is complete.| ||Headquarters building (*3) project is in progress. Medical Clinic project (*4) is in progress.| (3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Finegayan (4) Naval Base Guam in Apra Progress of the project to establish the infrastructure in Finegayan (1) Andersen Air Force Base (2) Andersen Air Force Base Andersen South 10km As of the end of February 2019 Progress of the project to develop the Headquarters building in the Naval Base Guam in Apra area. Relocation Project Areas Status of Progress of GOJ Funded Projects (1) Andersen AFB On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress. (2) Andersen South Area Training areas (*2) project is in progress. (3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress. Station Finegayan On-base infrastructure project (*1) is complete. (4) Naval Base Guam in Apra Headquarters building (*3) project is in progress. Medical Clinic project (*4) is in progress. *1 On-base infrastructure project includes site preparation and development of roads, water supply and sewerage system and telecommunication system for construction of facilities such as offi ce buildings for the Marines. *2 Training areas project is to develop facilities for the Marines to conduct basic training such as military operations in urban terrain and driver convoy course. *3 The headquarters building project is to develop a headquarters building for the Marines. *4 Medical clinic project is to develop a medical clinic for the Marines. Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement.[11] It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized. Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana **Chapter** Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown. At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training 11 In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on S th I l t ti f th R li t f U it d St t F i J b li h d b t i i t f th t t th t t d M h 31 2017 ----- areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Both countries also completed the process of creating a detailed breakdown of required costs. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for U.S. Fiscal Year 2015 was enacted in December 2014, which lifted the freeze on the use of funds for the relocation to Guam imposed by the U.S. Congress in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012. **(3) Completion** **of** **Environmental** **Impact** **Assessment** **Procedures** As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam, the required procedures were conducted to reflect the revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed in August 2015. Furthermore, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), is now being implemented. (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad. **(1) Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa** Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of land areas south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City of which Okinawa has particularly made a strong request for the return and coordination with the United States. As a result, both countries announced the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specific years of return. The return of all land according to the plan will enable the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha, the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of six USFJ facilities for exclusive use[12] located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. In the Consolidation Plan, both sides confirmed that they would implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan will continue to work with all its strength so that land areas south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible date. Furthermore, following the announcement of the Consolidation Plan, consultations have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau in a bid to contribute to the promotion of the effective and appropriate use of West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran, and the MOD has also been providing necessary cooperation.[13] **Chapter** **(4) Progress of the Guam Relocation Project** While the environmental impact assessment for Guam was being conducted, the Government of the United States implemented infrastructure development projects at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the assessment. The U.S. Government is currently implementing relocation construction work in all project areas, following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act and the completion of the environmental impact assessment for Guam. See Fig. III-2-4-7 (Progress of the Guam Relocation Project) 6 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air base The Roadmap stated that following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely **(2) Progress in the Return of Land** Efforts have been made to enable the early return of land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed (shown in red in Fig. III-2-4-9), since the announcement of the Consolidation Plan in April 2013. These efforts resulted in the realization of the return of the north access road of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August 2013, West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) at the end of March 2015 transferred to the landowners at the end of March 2018, and the area near Gate 5 of Makiminato 12 Naha Port, Makiminato Service Area, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, Camp Kuwae, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 13 I dditi t th Mi i t f D f th Mi i t f F i Aff i (Oki Offi ) d th C bi t Offi l ti i t i th lt ti ----- Service Area (approximately 2 ha) at the end of March 2019. Additionally, in December 2015, Japan and the United States agreed to such measures as the early return of partial land at MCAS Futenma (approximately 4 ha) for a municipal road, and the early return of partial land at Makiminato Service Area (approximately 3 ha) for the purpose of widening National Route to reduce traffic congestion, for which there had been particularly strong demand for return among local people, and the former return was realized at the end of July 2017, whereas the latter return was realized at the end of March 2018. Furthermore, such measures as relocation to Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Chibana Area), Torii Communication Station, Camp Hansen and Camp Zukeran have been implemented to advance the land return. All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the Consolidation Plan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa as early as possible, and also to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. See Reference 33 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities See and Areas South of Kadena) Fig. III-2-4-8 (Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa) Fig. III-2-4-9 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (image)) **Fig. III-2-4-8** Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa **Chapter** **2** (Unit: ha) 1,500 1,491ha Six U.S. facilities for exclusive use located Decrease by south of Kadena in around 70% 1,000 densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa* 500 492 January ha－α 2013 0 At the time of At the time of making the completing the Consolidation Plan Consolidation Plan - Six U.S. facilities: Naha Port, Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster), Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester), and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 specified for U.S. Air Force, would be deployed to Yokota Air Base (which encompasses Fussa City, Tachikawa City, Akishima City, Musashi Murayama City, Hamura City and Mizuho Town of Tokyo Prefecture). A total of 10 CV-22 Ospreys are scheduled to be deployed in stages by around 2024, with the first five CV-22s deployed to Yokota Air Base on October 1, 2018. The CV-22 deployed to Yokota Air Base plays a role in transporting personnel and supplies of the special operation units of the U.S. Forces to address crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region, including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters. As Japan faces the increasingly severe security environment, the deployment of high-performance CV-22 is supposed to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to the defense of Japan and the stability of the region from the perspective of the commitment by the U.S. to the Asia-Pacific region and the building-up of readiness by the United States. 7 Deployment of Osprey to Japan by the U.S. Forces **(1) Deployment of U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa** Osprey is an aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff/ landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft and the flight speed and range of fixed-wing aircraft. As a primary asset of the marine air unit, the MV-22, specified for the U.S. Marine Corps, plays an important role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including transportation of personnel and supplies. The U.S. Marine Corps replaced aged rotary-wing aircraft (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior basic performance. In September 2013, all the 24 CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma were replaced by MV-22s. The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft compared with the CH-46: on its flight speed, payload and flight range. Its deployment to Okinawa strengthens the deterrence of the overall USFJ and greatly contributes to the peace and stability of the region. **(2) Deployment of CV-22 Osprey by the U.S. Air Force to** **Yokota Air Base** In May 2015 the United States announced that CV 22 **(3) Safety of Osprey** Prior to the deployment of MV-22s to MCAS Futenma in 2012, Japan established an analysis and assessment team composed of aircraft pilots and experts from inside and outside the Government and confirmed the safety of MV22 by conducting its own survey, etc. In addition, when Japan made the decision to introduce Ospreys in 2014, the Government reconfirmed their safety by collecting and analyzing all kinds of technical information. Regarding the recent accidents involving the MV-22 that occurred in Okinawa and Australia, the U.S. indicated that there was no structural problem with the aircraft, and that necessary measures have also been taken after the accidents to prevent recurrence. Thus, Japan evaluates that there is no ----- **Fig. III-2-4-9** Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base (image) **Chapter** Army POL Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 Camp Kuwae Camp Zukeran FY2025 or later 68ha (Lower Plaza Housing Area) FY2022 or later 16ha FY2024 or later 23ha Camp Zukeran (A portion of the warehouse area of Facilities and Engineering Compound) Camp Zukeran FY2019 or later 11ha[Note 5] (A part of Kishaba Housing area) - JC reached Agreement of Return on September 19, 2013 FY2024 or later 5ha Makiminato Service Area Camp Zukeran (The remainder) (Industrial Corridor, etc.) Camp Zukeran (Additional elements) FY2024 or later 142ha FY2024 or later 62ha α ha [Note 3] Makiminato Service Area Camp Zukeran (West-Futenma Housing Area ) (Area near Gate 5) Returned on Returned on March 31, 201551 ha Note 4 March 31, 2019 2ha Makiminato Service Area (north access road) Futenma Air Station (eastern side) Makiminato Service Area(Area along Route 58) August 31, 2013Returned on 1ha Returned on July 31, 2017 4ha Futenma Air Station March 31, 2018Returned on 3ha (Elements of MSA, including the Makiminato Service Area FY2022 or later 476ha preponderance of the storage area) Legend FY2025 or later 126ha Returned or immediate return (72ha) Return after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (834 ha) Naha Port Return after the relocation of U.S. Marine Crops forces to locations outside of Japan (142 ha + more) FY2028 or later 56ha Total: 1,048ha＋α Notes: 1. The timing and year are based on the best case scenario, the timing may be postponed depending on the progress of the efforts, including relocation to outside of Japan. 2. Land area of each area is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys, etc. 3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns. 4. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (West-Futenma Housing area) was listed as 52 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 51 ha according to actual measurements. 5. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, etc.) was listed as 10 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 11 ha based on the area to be returned in the JC agreement of September 2013. 6. JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee problem with the safety of the MV-22. Additionally, the CV-22 has the same propulsion system as the MV-22 and the structure of both aircraft is basically in common; therefore, the Government of Japan considers the safety of both aircraft to be at the same level. Japan considers that ensuring safety is of prime importance in operations of the U.S. Forces, and on various occasions, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2018, Minister of Defense requested Secretary of Defense and other high-ranking officials to give consideration to local communities and ensure safety. The Government of Japan will continue to ask for the maximum consideration for safety. See Reference 34 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) part of the Philippines in November 2013, [14] MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for search and rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the ROK. Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies. In Japan, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily necessities to the disaster stricken areas. In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities **(4) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in Case of** **Disaster** In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central 14 In March 2013, a subcommittee was established under the Okinawa Policy Council in order to address issues concerning mitigation of the impact relating to U.S. bases and Okinawa ----- **Fig. III-2-4-10** Usability of Osprey Aircraft (image) |■ Comparison of Basi|ic Performance MV-22|CH-46| |---|---|---| |Maximum speed|Approximately 520 km/h About two times the App|roximately 270 km/h| |Cruising speed|maximum speed Approximately 490 km/h App|roximately 220 km/h| |Range|Approximately 3,900 km App|roximately 700 km| |Radius of action|Approximately 600 km About four times the Appr (With 24 troops on board) radius of action (Wit|oximately 140 km h 12 troops on board)| |Number of troops carried|24|12| |Number of crew|3–4|3–5| |Cargo (inside)|Approximately 9,100 kg App|roximately 2,300 kg| |Cargo (outside)|Approximately 5,700 kg About three times App the payload|roximately 2,300 kg| |Rotor diameter|Approximately 11.6 m App|roximately 15.5 m| |Angle of flight|Approximately 7,500 m App|roximately 3,000 m| |Own weight|Approximately 16,000 kg App|roximately 7,700 kg| |Measurement|MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. 6.7m 5.1m 17.5m 25.7m|| 3000km 2000km Beijing 1500km SeoulSeoul Tokyo 1000km Izu Islands ShanghaiShanghai CH-46 radius of action MV-22 range Approximately 140 km Approximately 3,900 km Hong KongHong Kong Taipei Ogasawara IslandsOgasawara Islands MV-22 radius of action Approximately 1,100 km OkinotorishimaOkinotorishima (1 aerial refueling) Saipan CH-46 range ManilaManila GuamGuam Approximately 700 km MV-22 radius of action Approximately 600 km (no refueling) ■ Comparison of Basic Performance MV-22 CH-46 Maximum speed Approximately 520 km/h About two times the Approximately 270 km/h maximum speed Cruising speed Approximately 490 km/h Approximately 220 km/h Range Approximately 3,900 km Approximately 700 km Approximately 600 km About four times the Approximately 140 km Radius of action (With 24 troops on board) radius of action (With 12 troops on board) Number of troops carried 24 12 Number of crew 3–4 3–5 Cargo (inside) Approximately 9,100 kg Approximately 2,300 kg Cargo (outside) Approximately 5,700 kg About three times the payload Approximately 2,300 kg Rotor diameter Approximately 11.6 m Approximately 15.5 m Angle of flight Approximately 7,500 m Approximately 3,000 m Own weight Approximately 16,000 kg Approximately 7,700 kg MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. Measurement 6.7m 5.1m 17.5m 25.7m immediately and over a large range when large-scale disasters occur because of its high performance and multifunctionality. It has also been used for disaster prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two MV22s participated in the comprehensive disaster prevention drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and conducted delivery drills for isolated islands. Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities including search and **Chapter** rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster. As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well. See Fig. III-2-4-10 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft (image)) ----- Vice Governor of Okinawa, was established with the purpose of holding consultations on measures for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa and measures for Okinawa’s development. In the meetings that have been held three times since January 2016, discussion took place on issues such as the relocation of MCAS Futenma and the suspension of its operation within five years and the return of more than half of the Northern Training Area. 9 Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces The Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces stipulates various measures concerning lands in Okinawa provided for use by the USFJ (“USFJ Land”) agreed to be returned. The MOD mainly conducts the following initiatives, and will continue its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with related ministries, the prefectural government and local municipalities. The MOD: (1) conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys, etc., to be implemented by the prefectural government and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are agreed to be returned; (2) conducts measures applying to all the returned lands to remove obstacles for use such as soil contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces, before handing over the land to the owners and (3) provides financial benefits to alleviate the impact on the owners of the returned lands and to promote use of the land. 8 Consultation Structures for Mitigating the Impact on Okinawa Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain in Okinawa because of the long U.S. occupation of Okinawa and the slower progress of return of USFJ facilities and areas compared to other areas of Japan even after the occupation ended. In order to mitigate the concentrated impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been implementing initiatives towards the realization of the SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is committed to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa through the Okinawa Policy Council, its subcommittee and other means, while listening to the opinions of the local residents.14 At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting in December 2013, then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima presented several requests, including cessation of the operation of MCAS Futenma within five years and its early return, the re-deployment of about twelve MV-22s to bases outside of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service Area within seven years. The Japanese Government as a whole is addressing the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa by establishing the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan. The MOD also created the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa headed by the State Minister of Defense in January 2014 to continually work on the reduction of the impact on Okinawa. The Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (administrative) and the Governor and **4** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa** In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. **Chapter** on the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004. However, more than 10 years have passed since the initial agreement, and Japan’s security environment has become increasingly severe. Therefore, there have been changes in the U.S. Navy’s posture and capabilities, as represented by the increased operation of U.S. vessels at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. In light of such circumstances, the following were agreed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee meeting in November 2018: (i) development of facilities for satisfying the U.S. Navy’s facility requirements; (ii) start of 1 Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture With regard to the realignment of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture, etc., the return of facilities and areas including the Kamiseya Communication Station and the Fukaya Communication Site has already been realized based ----- **Fig. III-2-4-11** Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture (image) **Chapter** |Number|Name|Location|Area (ha)|Plan for land return, etc.| |---|---|---|---|---| |①|Koshiba POL Depot|Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 53 ha|Returned in December, 2005| |②|Tomioka Storage Area|Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 3 ha|Returned in May, 2009| |③|Fukaya Communication Site|Izumi Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 77 ha|Returned in June, 2014| |④|Kamiseya Communication Station|Seya Ward and Asahi Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 242 ha|Returned in June, 2015| |⑤|Negishi Dependent Housing Area|Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 43 ha|To be returned when the construction of family housing etc. is completed at Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex| |⑥|Detached part of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Kanazawa Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 1 ha|Return procedures to begin upon completion of the current use| |⑦|Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Yokohama City Area|―|Construction of family housing, etc.| |Number|Name|Location|Details| |---|---|---|---| |⑧|Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka|Yokosuka City|Bachelor enlisted quarters| |⑨|Urago Storage Area|Yokosuka City|A wharf| |⑩|Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Zushi City Area|Living support facilities, fitness center, maintenance shop and fire station| |⑪|Tsurumi POL Depot|Tsurumi Ward, Yokohama City|A fire station| |Number|Name|Location|Area|Details| |---|---|---|---|---| |⑤|Negishi Dependent Housing Area|Naka Ward, Minami Ward and Isogo Ward, Yokohama City|Approx. 43 ha|A Japan-US consultation concerning joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area will commence with the aim of promptly carrying out site restoration work. Consultation on the specific return date will be held between the two governments depending on the progress of the site restoration work.| |Number|Name|Location|Details| |---|---|---|---| |⑦|Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Yokohama City Area|Cancellation of construction of family housing, etc.| Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of October 2004 Area Name Location Plan for land return, etc. (ha) ① Koshiba POL Depot Kanazawa Ward,Yokohama City Approx.53 ha Returned in December, 2005 Kanazawa Ward, Approx. ④ ② Tomioka Storage Area Yokohama City 3 ha Returned in May, 2009 Fukaya Izumi Ward, Approx. ③ Communication Site Yokohama City 77 ha Returned in June, 2014 Seya Ward and Kamiseya Approx. ④ Communication Station Asahi Ward, 242 ha Returned in June, 2015 Yokohama City Kanagawa PrefectureYokohama City, ③ Naka Ward, To be returned when the construction of family ⑪ ⑤ Negishi DependentHousing Area Minami Ward andIsogo Ward, Approx.43 ha housing etc. is completed at Ikego Housing Area and Navy Yokohama City Annex Asahi Ward ⑤ Detached part of Return procedures to begin Seya Ward ⑥ Ikego Housing Areaand Navy Annex Kanazawa Ward,Yokohama City Approx.1 ha upon completion of the current use Minami Ward Naka Ward ⑦ Ikego Housing Area Yokohama City Area ― Construction of family Izumi Ward and Navy Annex housing, etc. ② Totsuka Ward Isogo Ward Returned ① Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement of November 2018 [Development of facilities] ⑥ Number Name Location Details Kanazawa ⑦ Ward ⑧ Activities, YokosukaCommander Fleet Yokosuka City Bachelor enlisted quarters ⑨ ⑨ Urago Storage Area Yokosuka City A wharf ⑩ Living support facilities, Ikego Housing Area ⑧ ⑩ and Navy Annex Zushi City Area fitness center, maintenance shop and fire station Zushi City Tsurumi Ward, ⑪ Tsurumi POL Depot Yokohama City A fire station [Joint use and return] Number Name Location Area Details Yokosuka City A Japan-US consultation concerning joint Naka Ward, use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area Negishi Minami Ward will commence with the aim of promptly ⑤ DependentHousing Isogo Ward,and Approx.43 ha carrying out site restoration work. Consultation on the specific return date will Area Yokohama be held between the two governments City depending on the progress of the site restoration work. [Cancellation of construction] Number Name Location Details ⑦ Ikego Housing Areaand Navy Annex YokohamaCity Area Cancellation of construction of family housing, etc. negotiation on joint use of the Negishi Dependent Housing Area to conduct site restoration works; and (iii) cancellation of the plan to construct family housing in the Yokohama City area of the Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. See Fig. III-2-4-11 (Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture (image)) 2 Current Situation regarding the Realignment of the USFJ as Stipulated in the Roadmap **(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control** **Capability** The headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City and Zama City in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) in December 2007 and the reorganization took place at the end of September 2008. In order to make close communication and adjustments ----- **Fig. III-2-4-12** Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact |Time|Improvement| |---|---| |December 2007|Reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) at Camp Zama| |June 2008|Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot| |September 2008|Reorganization of the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward)| |August 2011|The operation of the Mission Command Training Center commenced| |October 2011|Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama| |June 2012|Agreed on the shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City| |March 2013|The GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF Camp to Camp Zama| |September 2014|Partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot| |December 2015|The shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) commenced| |February 2016|Partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama| in peacetime and to be able to promptly respond to various situations, the headquarters of the Ground Component Command of the GSDF has set up the Japan-U.S. Joint Headquarters at Camp Zama and has strengthened coordination with the headquarters of USARJ. In February 2016, the partial release of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama was realized and Zama General Hospital was established on the returned site in April 2016. In addition, in December 2015, the shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (Sagamihara City in Kanagawa Prefecture) (approximately 35ha) with Sagamihara City was realized. In other areas, the realignment projects associated with the improvement of U.S. Army Japan command and control capability have been undertaken as shown in Fig. III2-4-12. See Fig. III-2-4-12 (Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact) enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD. **b. Yokota Airspace** To facilitate the operations of civilian aircraft in Yokota airspace, where the U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control, measures have been taken since 2006 to temporarily transfer the responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, to deploy ASDF officers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON), and to reduce the airspace by about 40% (i.e., the release of air traffic control from USFJ). **c. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base** At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The Governments of Japan and the United States are also conducting a study on the specific conditions and modalities, with the understanding that both countries will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. **(3) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Commander Fleet** **Activities, Yokosuka** The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet. The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to ensure that all of its forward-deployed nuclear-powered vessels, including **(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace** **a. Commencement of the Operation of the Bilateral Joint** **Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) and the Relocation** **of ASDF Air Defense Command Headquarters (HQ)** Enhancement of coordination between the headquarters of both countries, combined with the transition to joint operational posture, is highly important to ensure a response with flexibility and readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. Therefore, at the end of FY2011, the BJOCC commenced its operations at Yokota Air Base and the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ and its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base.[15] These arrangements have made it possible to 15 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between th J d U S h d t ----- **Fig. III-2-4-13** Measures Related to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc. |Measure|Status of Progress, etc.| |---|---| |Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni|After explanation in January 2017 to Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities that the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni would commence in the latter half of 2017, etc., Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities expressed their approval by June 2017. Started relocation in August 2017. Completed relocation in March 2018.| |Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc., from MCAS Iwakuni to Naval Air Facility Atsugi|Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense system, Japan and the United States confirmed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni.| |Relocation of the KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni|Relocation completed in August 2014.| |Kotational deployment of the KC-130 to Kanoya Air Base and Guam|○ In October 2015, Kanoya City expressed its understanding for rotational deployment of the KC-130 to MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture). ○ Japan and the United States are currently holding consultations over the specific timing of the commencement of rotational deployment. ○ Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, training commencement confirmed.| |Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam|Japan and the United States confirmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam.| Implemented Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation **Chapter** USS Ronald Reagan,[16] while anchored at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repairing and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety. **(4) Measures Relating to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS** **Iwakuni** **a. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft** Since Naval Air Facility Atsugi (Ayase City and Yamato City in Kanagawa Prefecture) is located in an urban district, the noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular had been a problem for a long time. Thus, after the completion of the runway relocation project at MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture), which made aircraft operations possible with less impact on the living environment of the surrounding communities, it was decided that CVW-5 squadrons would be relocated from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni. The relocation began in August 2017 and completed in March 2018.[17] As a result, the noise in areas around Naval Air Facility Atsugi was alleviated to a significant extent, while maintaining the forward deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier and carrierbased aircraft. This would not have been possible without the understanding of residents of Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City. In order to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the relocation, the related measures listed in Fig. III-2-4-13 have been implemented. If all of these measures are fully implemented, the noise problems are expected to be mitigated from the current situation, with the area requiring residential noise-abatement work, or the so-called first category area, decreasing from approximately 1,600 ha to approximately 650 ha. See Fig. III-2-4-13 (Measures Related to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc.) **b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)** The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June 2011, it was confirmed that the Government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima Island is considered to be the candidate site for a new SDF facility. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations, including large-scale disasters, as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that the U.S. Forces will 16 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities. 17 A j t t l t th f MCAS I k i b i t l 1 000 t th t ( ff h ) i t th t f I k i Cit t ----- continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent training facility is identified. **c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni** Considering that the local public entities, etc., including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working together to request the resumption of civil aviation operations, it was agreed in the Roadmap that “portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened in December 2012, resuming regular flights of civil aviation aircraft for the first time in 48 years. **(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)** In June 2006, an AN/TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Radar Site (Tsugaru City, Aomori Prefecture).[18] Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base (Kadena Town, Okinawa City and Chatan Town in Okinawa Prefecture) and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Yomitan Village, Okinawa City, Kadena Town, Onna Village and Uruma City in Okinawa Prefecture). In December 2014, the second TPY-2 radar in Japan was deployed to the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyotango City in Kyoto Prefecture). The United States deployed Aegis destroyers with BMD capabilities to Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka in October 2015, March 2016 and May 2018. A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey flying to the Aibano Maneuver Area (Shiga Prefecture) for training (February 2019) Furthermore, in March 2014, both governments at the Joint Committee agreed to add air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture). This agreement resulted in air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-toGround Range in June 2014. The training relocation contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. In addition to assisting the USFJ, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local community, such as the establishment of a liaison office, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and response to requirements from the local community. These efforts have been contributing to successful training relocation. **b. Relocation of Training for MV-22** The Government of Japan and the United States Government decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October 3, to utilize the opportunities to participate in various operations in mainland Japan and across the region to reduce the amount of time that MV-22s are deployed and used for the training in Okinawa so that training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan, can be increased while maintaining the deterrence of the Alliance. Based on this, both the governments have been moving forward with the training outside of Okinawa Prefecture, etc. for the MV-22 deployed at MCAS Futenma. On September 1, 2016, it was agreed at the Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of Tilt-Rotor / Rotary Wing aircraft, such as the AH-1 and CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently deployed at MCAS Futenma out **Chapter** See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-(1) (Japan’s Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability) **(6) Training Relocation** **a. Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)** Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas—Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni— would participate for the time being in bilateral training with the SDF at SDF facilities, training relocation has been underway since 2007. The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation.[19] In January 2011, at the Joint Committee, based on the achievements at the “2+2” Meeting in 2010, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training. After that, the relocation of training to Guam and other locations was realized, and a series of training sessions have been conducted at the relocation sites. 18 The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site. 19 USFJ i ft d t bil t l i t SDF f iliti ----- promote training outside of Okinawa and mitigate the impact of training activities on Okinawa. Three training relocation programs were planned for FY2018. The training was held in Oita Prefecture in December 2018, and in Shiga Prefecture in February 2019 as Japan-U.S. joint training (field training between the GSDF and the U.S. Marine Corps). Meanwhile, the Japan-U.S. joint training to be conducted in Hokkaido in September 2018 was **5** **Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ** In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the USFJ based on the Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act) was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law. During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle),[20] realignment grants will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects[21] which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities affected by the realignment,[22] and to stimulate local industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress made in the steps of U.S. Forces realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment. As of April 2019, 9 defense facilities in 14 municipalities are eligible to receive Earthquake, which occurred on September 6 of the same year. The MV-22’s amount of time deployed and training in Okinawa will continue to be reduced by relocating exercises in which MV-22 participate to the mainland of Japan and Guam, and the Government will continue to promote initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa. the grant. In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since these developments may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment. The Realignment Special Measures Act was supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017. However, since there remain realignment projects that require implementation, an act revising part of the Act including a ten-year extension of the time limit of the Act to March 31, 2027 was enacted. **Chapter** See Reference 35 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan) **6** **Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas** on this announcement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been enhanced. The MOD has been working with relevant ministries and agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS)[24] compiled by the USFJ, exchange information on the environment, and deal with environmental pollution. Furthermore, in September 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States signed and effectuated the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the USFJ, supplementary to the 1 Initiatives to Conserve the Environments around USFJ Facilities and Areas At the “2+2” Meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles.”[23] To follow up 20 Approximately 6.7 billion yen in the FY2018 budge. 21 Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with U.S. air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the USFJ. 22 The specific scope of projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects. 23 Consisting of four items: (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information sharing and access, (3) response to environmental contamination, and (4) environmental consultation. 24 JEGS is an environmental standard compiled by the USFJ. In order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect the natural environment and health of people, it stipulates the h dli f i t l ll t t d t th d ithi th f iliti d ----- SOFA. This supplementary agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth provisions concerning issuance and maintenance of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) and establishment and maintenance, etc. of procedures for access to USFJ facilities and areas. 2 Ensuring Safety of Operations of the USFJ Ensuring the safety of local residents is of prime importance in USFJ operations, and an accident or incident must not occur. Both Japan and the U.S. cooperate with a prime focus on ensuring the safety. Despite such circumstances, a CH-53E helicopter assigned to MCAS Futenma made an emergency landing at Higashi Village in Kunigami District and burned into flames in October 2017, and a window of another CH-53E assigned to MCAS Futenma fell onto the playground of Futenma Daini Elementary School in December 2017. Then in 2019, there have been precautionary and emergency landings of U.S. military aircraft on civilian airports, etc. Regarding these accidents and incidents, Japan has clearly conveyed its position to the U.S. side and requested preventive measures to avoid reoccurrence especially at summit and ministerial levels, in light of anxieties and concerns of local communities. Causes of these accidents and incidents may vary depending on the case, but the Government of Japan has determined the rationality of the causes by not only hearing the results of investigations and preventive measures on the U.S. side but also confirming with SDF expertise. Additionally, the MOD has strongly requested the U.S. side to provide information regarding the accidents and incidents, and explained the information obtained from the U.S. side to the relevant local authorities in a timely manner. 3 Other Measures The Government of Japan has been taking measures for the improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications also provides municipalities with base **Chapter** **Exchange between U.S. Forces and Local Residents** The understanding and cooperation of local people are indispensable for the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ). The MOD holds a Japan-U.S. exchange program every year to deepen mutual understanding between Japan and the United States with the understanding and cooperation of the local governments and USFJ. Under the program, residents living near USFJ facilities and areas together with USFJ personnel enjoy sports, music and cultural exchanges. In FY2018, for example, the MOD hosted a Japan-U.S. Sports Festival for elementary school children of the U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture) and Yokosuka City. During the festival, the children participated in long-rope jumping in Japan-U.S. combined teams, a chasing ball-toss game, tug-of-war, Japan-U.S. pairing game, and Yokosuka trivia quiz. Around Iwakuni Air Base (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture), the MOD held a Japan-U.S. Sports Exchange for elementary school children in the base and Iwakuni City. Exchanges are deepened through a sports class of three field and track events – high-hurdle race, long jump, and throwing – given by former athletes and other instructors. After the class, Japan-U.S. combined teams participated in relays and played dodge ball. The MOD believes that many years of exchange will foster a trusting relationship between local people and the USFJ and will continue to hold Japan-U.S. exchange programs with the understanding and cooperation from the local governments and the USFJ. Chasing ball-toss game by Japan-U.S. combined teams Exchange through a pairing game Relay by Japan-U.S. combined teams (Iwakuni City) (Yokosuka City) (Yokosuka City) ----- grants, which have alternate features in terms of municipal tax on real estate. Moreover, in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. Forces personnel and others have affected local areas and their residents, so the Government of Japan has requested the USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan is cooperating with the USFJ in these prevention measures; at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incidents and accidents. The United States has also taken measures for its part, putting in place its guidelines for off-duty action (liberty policy), including measures such as nighttime alcohol restrictions as well as curfews applying to U.S. Forces personnel ranked below a certain rank. See Reference 36 (Agreement between the Government of See Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan) **Chapter** Meanwhile, the Government of Japan prepared Crime Prevention Measures in Okinawa in June 2016 under the understanding that it is necessary for the Government to promptly promote measures to deter crime and ensure the safety and security of the people of Okinawa. The pillars of the Measures consist of bolstering crime prevention patrol operations and the establishment of a safe and secure environment. The MOD is participating in the Okinawa Local Safety Patrol Corps established in the Okinawa General Bureau and will continue to cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies to ensure the implementation of effective measures. See Part IV, Chapter 4, Section 1-4 (Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas) ----- **Security Cooperation** ### 3 In situations where the need and potential for international cooperation in the security and defense areas are increasing unprecedentedly, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SelfDefense Forces (SDF) is required to actively contribute to ensuring the security of Japan, the peace and stability of the region, and the peace, stability, and prosperity of the entire international community from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. In line with the free and open Indo-Pacific vision, and in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG),[1] Japan will strengthen bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges as part of multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, while paying attention to its partner nations’ regional characteristics and situations. Japan will also actively advance its efforts to solve global security issues, including securing the freedom and safety of navigation **Section** **1** **Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation** **Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and** **1** **Exchanges** 1 Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation, and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges **(1) Signifi cance of Security Cooperation, and Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges** The peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region is closely related to Japan’s security. In addition, with increasingly changeable and complicated global power dynamics, and escalation of political, economic, and military inter-state competition, they are also becoming a more important issue for the international community. While nations with largescale military power concentrate in the region, no framework for regional security cooperation has been sufficiently institutionalized. As national political, economic and social systems differ widely in the region, visions of security vary from country to country. Furthermore, there have been an increasing number of unilateral actions attempting to change and overflight, coordination and cooperation with relevant countries in relation to the use of the space and cyber domains, international peace cooperation activities, arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These efforts will be promoted mainly under the framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and in close coordination with countries that share the same universal values and security interests as Japan. Japan intends to create an ideal security environment through these steady-state efforts. The MOD/SDF has already been conducting activities to promote security cooperation. The MOD/SDF further intends to create a security environment desirable for Japan by engaging in the routine activities indicated in the NDPG. This chapter explains activities related to the enhancement of security cooperation while taking into consideration the concept of the NDPG. **Strategic Promotion of Multi-Faceted and Multi-Layered Defense Cooperation** **Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue, and Defense Cooperation and** the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. The issues involving the South China Sea, in particular, cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, freedom of navigation and overflight, and the stability of the Southeast Asian region. Thus, responses to these issues have become an important challenge to ensure the regional stability. In order to build mutual trust among nations and establish a foundation for cooperation for solving regional security issues, Japan will strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation, while taking into account the international situation, regional characteristics, and situations and security issues other nations are faced with. **(2) Forms and History of Security Cooperation and Defense** **Cooperation and Exchanges** Defense cooperation and exchanges have been delivered **Chapter** P t II Ch t 3 S ti 1 F t t 1 ----- in the forms of high-level dialogues and exchanges, joint training and exercises, capacity building cooperation for recipient countries (such as human resources development and technical assistance in the security and defense fields), and defense equipment and technology cooperation aimed at ensuring Japan’s security and promoting international peace and cooperation. The MOD/SDF has long strived to alleviate any conditions of confrontation and tension, and to foster a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through bilateral dialogues and exchanges. In addition, recognizing the increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means, including joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and the development of institutional frameworks such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA). In addition, multilateral regional security cooperation and dialogue are in the process of evolving from those that focus on dialogue to those that focus on cooperation that seeks to build regional order. It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multilayered, practical manner in order to create an ideal security environment. See Reference 37 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of See Agreements) Reference 38 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record [Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2018]) Fig. III-3-1-1 (Relationship between Security Cooperation and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) Fig. III-3-1-2 (Number of high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations (June 2018–June 2019)) Fig. III-3-1-3 (Defense Cooperation and Exchange (image)) **Chapter** **Fig. III-3-1-1** Relationship between Security Cooperation and Defense Cooperation and Exchange |Col1|Classifi- cation|Col3|Type|Significance|Major initiatives| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Security cooperation|Defense cooperation and exchange|Bilateral|Exchange between Defense Ministers and high-level officials|Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through frank exchange of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are important common interests to both sides, as well as enhancing the following defense exchange|●Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries ●Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Chief of Joint Staff, Officers at the GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Chief level| ||||Regular consultation between defense officials|Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchange through continuous and direct exchange of views between national defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries|●Consultations between Director-General-level officials, Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their counterparts ●Dialogues between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries.| ||||Bilateral training and exercises|Aiming to enhance interoperability and strengthen relationships through bilateral training and exercises|●Japan-U.S. bilateral joint field training and command post exercises ●Bilateral training between GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and relevant countries| ||||Defense equipment and technology cooperation|Aiming to strengthen and maintain not only Japan’s defense industrial base, but also the capabilities of recipient forces, as well as mid- to long-term relationships with recipient countries|●Cooperative research and development ●Transfer of defense equipment ●Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions ●Holding of the Defence Industry Business Forum ●Consultation with respective countries’ officials in charge of equipment| ||||Assistance for capacity building|Offering cooperation to countries in the Indo-Pacific region to help with the steady development of their own capacity building initiatives, and enabling recipient countries’ forces to play adequate roles in maintaining international peace and regional stability|●Programs in which the MOD/SDF fully utilize their own capabilities and contribute to concrete and steady capacity building of recipient countries| ||||Service-to-service exchange (including exchange for fostering human resources)|Aiming to enhance and strengthen mutual trust and cooperative relationships through exchange events (in exchange events for fostering human resources, aiming to contribute to deepening understanding of recipient countries’ defense policies and actual conditions of their forces and enhancing mutual trusting relationships, not limited to achieving educational objectives, and also aiming to build human networks)|●Mutual visits of vessels of training squadrons and aircraft ●Mutual acceptance of students ・National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan National Defense Academy, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff College, Joint Staff College ●Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations| |||Multilateral|High-level exchange, regular consultation between defense officials, multilateral training and exercises, capacity building assistance, service-to-service exchange (the significance and initiatives are similar to those for bilateral cooperation and exchange)||| ||||Seminars|Aiming to share awareness and enhance and strengthen mutual trust and cooperative relationships through seminars|●Holding of seminars on international law, disaster relief, minesweeping, submarine rescue, etc.| ||||Security dialogues|Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of situations and on security policies among related countries as well as exchanging views and discussing a wide range of multilateral issues|●Dialogues at the ADMM-Plus, and ARF ●Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the MOD ●Multilateral dialogues held by Defense Authorities ●Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors| ||Maritime security||||| ||Collaboration and cooperation in use of space and cyber domains||||| ||Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation||||| ||International peace cooperation activities||||| ----- **Fig. III-3-1-2** Number of high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations (June 2018–June 2019) More than 5 exchanges More than 3 exchanges 2 exchanges 1 exchange *NATO (3 exchanges) Sweden Finland Russia United Netherlands Estonia Canada Kingdom Lithuania Germany Ukraine France Bulgaria Spain Italy Turkey United States Israel Greece Bahrain China Qatar Egypt India Myanmar Republic of Korea UAE Vietnam Laos Philippines Thailand Republic of Sri Lanka Brunei South Sudan Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Papua New Guinea Singapore Australia New Zealand - “High-level” refers to Minister, State Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chief of Staff of each SDF branch. **Fig. III-3-1-3** Defense Cooperation and Exchange (image) **Chapter** 2 Efforts under the Vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Defense - Exchange of students, research and education exchange The order of free and open oceans, which relies on the rule exchange - High-level and working-level exchange among defense officials of law, is the foundation for the stability and prosperity of - Service-to-service exchange among units, mutual visits to the international community. Being home to more than half of the world’s population, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the most vital areas in the world. It is important to establish cooperation - Capacity building assistance this region as a free and open global commons to secure - Cooperation in non-traditional security areas peace and prosperity in the region as a whole. Pursuing the [Example]・ADMM-Plus and ARF field training exercises, joint vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific,[2] the MOD/SDF has promoted defense cooperation and exchanges with countries cooperation (such as the ACSA and Information Security With Australia, Japan has worked to improve - Defense equipment cooperation interoperability through joint training of the ground, - International cooperation in humanitarian assistance, disaster maritime, and air forces, based on the ACSA. The bilateral cooperation will be further enhanced into the future through the expansion of joint training and other activities. With Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises) India, Japan has conducted close maritime exchanges, while also promoting exchanges between the ground and |Stage|Concrete initiatives| |---|---| |Defense exchange Defense cooperation|○ Exchange of students, research and education exchange ○ High-level and working-level exchange among defense officials and service-to-service exchange ○ Service-to-service exchange among units, mutual visits to vessels and aircraft ○ Goodwill training ○ Memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange ○ Capacity building assistance ○ Cooperation in non-traditional security areas (including joint training) [Example]・ADMM-Plus and ARF field training exercises, joint search and rescue exercises with respective countries ・Pacific Partnership, cooperation with other countries and organizations in counter-piracy operations ○ Conclusion of various agreements in relation to defense cooperation (such as the ACSA and Information Security Agreement) ○ Defense equipment cooperation ○ International cooperation in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and PKO ○ Formulation of a joint response plan, etc. ○ Joint training on the premise of joint response (such as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises) ○ Joint response in the event of a contingency for Japan| air forces, and expanding bilateral defense equipment and technology cooperation. Japan intends to further In his keynote speech at the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD Ⅳ) held in Kenya in August 2016, Prime Minister Abe referred to the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In the Japan-U.S. Summit in November 2017, the United States expressed its support for the above vision presented by Japan. The leaders of the two countries urged all ti t t th f d f i ti d fli ht d th l f l d d t b ild lti l d l ti hi ith t i th t t thi h ----- **Fig. III-3-1-4** MOD/SDF’s Efforts for a Free and Open Indo-Pacifi c (image) Overview Enhance connectivity between Asia and Africa through achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific, thereby promoting stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region as a whole Diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map Free and Open Indo-Pacific “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on Two continents: Rapidly growing Asia and Africa with significant potential the principle of international cooperation Two oceans: Free and open Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean Initiatives of the MOD cooperation with countries inDefense exchange and Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Europe and the Middle East (high-level exchange, etc.) Defense exchange and cooperation with South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka (service-to-service exchange, bilateral training and exercises, etc.) Counter-piracy operations of the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Middle East Asia Contribution to the RDEC in Asia and surrounding areas Africa cooperation with ASEAN countries Defense exchange and Pacific Ocean (capacity building assistance, etc.) Contribution to Bilateral training and exercises, Capacity building assistance to Pacific the RDEC in Africa visits of vessels and aircraft to island countries, visits to ports and airports ports and airports Defense cooperation with Indian Ocean Australia, etc. (bilateral training and exercises, etc.) - Further strengthen strategic collaboration with India, which has had historical connections with East Africa, the United States as an ally, and Australia to materialize the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific promote various cooperative activities with India. With the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, Japan has carried out capacity building cooperation in the sea domain, joint training and exercises, and defense equipment and technology cooperation, in accordance with the Vientiane Vision, a guiding principle for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation. Japan will continue to promote various specific cooperative activities with ASEAN. Moreover, Japan has continually held high-level exchanges and unitto-unit exchanges with such countries as Canada and New Zealand, which have significant influences in the western Pacific, as well as the United Kingdom and France, which have considerable international political influences and normative power. Japan intends to work further to enhance its relationships with these countries. With the Pacific Island **Chapter** countries, Japan has been deepening bilateral exchanges by visiting their ports and airports during overseas flight training and at other opportunities. In addition to the above, Japan has contributed to the maintenance of maritime order through its anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and through Indo-Pacific Deployment of Maritime SelfDefense Force (MSDF). Japan will continue to deepen cooperative relationships with other countries to bring about the order of free and open oceans, which relies on the rule of law, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. See Fig. III-3-1-4 (MOD/SDF’s Efforts for a Free and Open IndoPacifi c (image)) **2** **Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** In promoting security cooperation and exchanges, it is important to enhance bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges using optimal combinations of various cooperative means, taking into account regional situations, the situations of recipient countries and their relationships with Japan. 1 Australia Australia is a “Special Strategic Partner” for Japan in the IndoPacific region as both Japan and Australia are allied with the United States and share not only universal values[3] but also strategic stakes and interests. In recent years, particularly, U i l l Th N ti l S it St t ti l t “f d d t f f d t l h i ht d th l f l ----- the ADF conduct operations together due to the further advances in their defense cooperation and exchanges, and the development of the Legislation for Peace and Security in Japan. The agreement was approved by the National Diet in April 2017 and put into force in September 2017. Relevant domestic laws were developed then. Japan will continue deepening its cooperative relationship with Australia, a “Special Strategic Partner” that has both the intention and ability to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region jointly with Japan. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** In the eighth Japan-Australia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations and the Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2018, the Ministers agreed to further enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation as special strategic partners that have shared fundamental values and strategic interests concerning various issues faced by the Indo-Pacific region. They also agreed to pursue stronger and more concrete bilateral cooperation between the two defense authorities in such areas as training, capacity building, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. Moreover, the two countries also reconfirmed that they will collaborate in tackling North Korea-related issues, including illicit shipto-ship transfers involving North Korean-flagged vessels, which have been banned under the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions. The Ministers also expressed their serious concerns about coercive unilateral actions that have been taken to seek to alter the status quo in the East and South China Seas. In addition, they confirmed their commitment to the earliest possible conclusion of negotiations on the Reciprocal Access Agreement, which would reciprocally improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises, acknowledging its important role in further deepening the bilateral security and defense cooperation. In January 2019, then Australian Minister for Defence Marise Payne visited Japan to have a Defense Ministerial Meeting. During the meeting, Minister of Defense Iwaya welcomed the third dispatch of Australian patrol aircraft to address illicit ship-to-ship transfers, which took place in December 2018. Moreover, the two Ministers welcomed the steady progress in bilateral and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training of the ground, maritime, and air forces as well as the progress in coordination and staff meetings for further joint Japan-Australia “2+2” (October 2018) Japan and Australia as responsible countries in the IndoPacific region are strengthening mutual cooperation focused on areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities and cooperation in capacity building assistance. Defense cooperation between Japan and Australia started with cooperation in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The two countries have built up cooperation since then through the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and various international disaster relief operations. When the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in March 2011, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) dispatched three out of its four transport aircraft (C-17) to Japan to engage in a disaster relief mission. Against the background of the deepening defense cooperation between Japan and Australia, the two countries in March 2007 announced the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, Japan’s first such joint declaration focusing on security with a country other than the United States. Japan and Australia have also developed the foundation for cooperation such as the ACSA, the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement, and the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology . Regarding the Japan-Australia ACSA,[4] a new agreement for expanding the situations in which the provision of goods and services is possible was signed by the two countries in January 2017, followed by the establishment of relevant laws and regulations. The new agreement was concluded in light of the expansion of cases in which the SDF and **Chapter** Official title: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defense Force. In addition to the activities this agreement currently applies to, the following activities and situations will also be newly subject to the agreement: (1) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security; (2) Situations threatening international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing; (3) Perilous situations; (4) Armed attack situations, etc.; (5) Activities in situations threatening survival; (6) Rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas; (7) Counter-piracy ti iti (8) Eli i ti f i d th d bj t d (9) I t lli th i ti iti ----- training. They also agreed to continue to deepen bilateral defense cooperation in a concrete and practical manner. On the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2019, Defense Minister Iwaya held the first Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting with Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds. Regarding bilateral defense cooperation, the Ministers reviewed recent activities in such fields as joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building assistance. They also affirmed that in order to maintain and strengthen a free, open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific, the defense authorities of the two countries will continue to make efforts to further deepen and expand bilateral defense cooperation. In June 2019, the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting was held. In regards to realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific, the Prime Ministers agreed to further collaborate in the field of aid for capacity building in maritime security and others in Southeast Asia as well as the Pacific Island countries. Furthermore, the leaders exchanged views on the promotion of security cooperation, and regional issues such as North Korea, and shared the view to continue their close collaboration. As for bilateral service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, a Japan-Australia bilateral cruising exercise was held in the northern waters of Australia in September 2018. In January 2019, the MSDF Chief of Staff visited Australia to meet Chief of Navy Michael Noonan. In the meeting, they reconfirmed that they pursue the same values, including the freedom of oceans, and maintenance of international order by the rule of law. They also agreed on further enhancement of maritime exchanges, including mutual visits of naval ships. In February 2019, the Chief of Joint Staff made an official visit to Australia and met Chief of the Defence Force Angus Campbell . They exchanged their opinions regarding the free and open Indo-Pacific vision as well as SDF’s efforts for the peace and stability of the region, which will contribute to the above vision. In February 2019, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) Chief of Staff attended the Australian International Airshow and met Air Marshal Leo Davies, Chief of Air Force, Royal Australian Air Force, to talk about the regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In addition, the ASDF sent an ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to the Airshow, holding this aircraft’s first overseas exhibition flight. See Reference 39 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia [Past Three Years]) and share universal values. They cooperate closely to resolve the various challenges facing the Asia-Pacific region and the international community. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is important for Japan and Australia to proactively promote trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability. The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), a Director General-level meeting among the three countries of Japan, the United States and Australia, has met ten times since April 2007. At an SDCF meeting held in October 2016, the three countries’ defense authorities signed a Trilateral Information Sharing Agreement to expedite their sharing of classified information for cooperative activities regarding joint exercises and operations among the three countries. They plan to utilize this agreement to further deepen their collaboration. In June 2019, Defense Minister Iwaya held a Japan-U.S.Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting with then acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan and Australian Minister for Defence Reynolds on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the three Ministers were united in shared commitment to do more together in support of the Indo-Pacific region. The three Ministers also agreed on the Strategic Action Agenda, which articulates their shared long-term vision for trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan, the United States and Australia have also carried out trilateral exercises by service branch. In May 2019, for example, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) participated in the field training Southern Jackaroo with the United States and Australia in Australia. In November 2018, the MSDF hosted a Japan-U.S.Australia trilateral exercise (a special mine warfare exercise) with three minesweepers from the United States and Australia in waters east of Japan’s Kyushu Island. In August 2018, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand held a cruising exercise in Guamanian and Australian waters. The ASDF participated in Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise “Christmas Drop” in the Federal States of Micronesia in December 2018. From February to March 2019, the ASDF cohosted a Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise “Cope North Guam” and a trilateral HA/DR exercise. Through various training and exercise opportunities, Japan will continue its efforts to improve mutual understanding and interoperability among Japan, the United States, and Australia. In addition, Japan will also work to promote quadrilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. **Chapter** **(3) Cooperative Relationship Etc. between Japan, the United** **States, and Australia** Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States ----- GSDF personnel participating in a field training on counter-terrorism operations with the Indian Army in the Japan-India bilateral exercise Dharma Guardian (November 2018) 2 India, etc. See Reference 40 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with India and Sri Lanka [Past Three Years]) ASDF personnel boarding an Indian Air Force aircraft in the Japan-India bilateral exercise SHINYUU Maitri (December 2018) as the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information in December 2015, further solidifying the institutional basis of Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. These agreements have strengthened the relationship between the two partners, which are capable of dealing with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation of this partnership. **b. Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in October 2018, Japan and India agreed to further deepen bilateral security and defense cooperation, to tap into new consultation frameworks, such as Japan-India 2+2 Ministerial dialogues, in addition to existing ones (such as annual Defence Ministerial Dialogues), and to commence negotiations on the Japan-India ACSA, which will contribute to the strategic enhancement of bilateral defense cooperation. Moreover, in October 2018, the MSDF and the Indian Navy exchanged the signed Implementing Arrangement between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy Concerning Deeper Cooperation to promote maritime security cooperation (including information sharing), with the attendance of the leaders of the two nations. In the Japan-India Annual Defence Ministerial Meeting held in August 2018, the Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the security and stability of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific in achieving the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. Based on this shared understanding, they agreed to cooperate with each other in ensuring maritime security and in helping other countries in the region with capacity building, and to promote bilateral service-to-service cooperation and exchanges in a more concrete and effective manner. As for defense equipment and technology cooperation, Japan and India launched the Cooperative Research on the Visual **Chapter** **(1) India** **a. Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with** **India** India is growing more influential against a backdrop of its population—the world’s second largest—, its high economic growth, and its latent economic power. Located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, India is an extremely important country geopolitically for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India share universal values as well as common interests in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, and have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have promoted cooperation in maritime security and various other areas, while utilizing some frameworks including the “2+2” dialogues. Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and India have steadily deepened since October 2008, when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Meetings and consultations at various levels such as the ministerial and Chief of Staff levels, as well as service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises, have been regularly conducted. Moreover, the two countries signed the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of India in September 2014 and saw the conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology as well ----- **Chapter** **Deepening Cooperation between MSDF and Indian Navy** Japan depends on seaborne trade for the majority of its economic activities, including the import of itemsnecessary for people’s lives. The stability of the Indo-Pacific, with its major sea lanes of communication (SLOC), is especially vital for Japan. Looking at the Indian Ocean in particular, it is becoming more important day by day for Japan to strengthen coopration with India, which is a major power in the region, with its increased presence in terms of economy and security. The MSDF has strengthened its cooperative relationship with the Indian Navy through Japan-U.S.-India joint exercise Malabar, Japan-India bilateral exercise JIMEX,* and other initiatives. In recent years the scope of cooperation has been expanding to include port calls of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to India for a joint anti-submarine exercise. In light of the situation, in order to further enhance information sharing and joint exercises, the MSDF developed the Implementing Arrangement for Deeper Cooperation between the MSDF and the Indian Navy with the aim of promoting and developing broad maritime security cooperation. The agreement was signed at the time of the Japan-India Summit Meeting in October 2018. The MSDF and the Indian Navy will pursue further strengthening of their cooperative relationship under the agreement. The deepening of the cooperation will directly contribute to the maintenance and enhancement of a free and open IndoPacific and eventually will lead to further stability and prosperity in Japan. *JIMEX: Japan-India Maritime Exercise P-1 crew of the MSDF and P-8 crew of the Indian Navy in the pre-flight Then MSDF Chief of Staff Murakawa and then Indian Anbassador to briefing for joint anti-submarine exercise Japan H.E. Chinoy exchanging a document of the Implementing Arrangement in front of Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers SLAM Based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV[5]/ Robotics in July 2018. In September 2017, Japan and India held the first Japan-India Defence Industry Business Forum. As a follow-up to this event, Japanese companies visited the Indian national defense industry in August 2018. In February 2019, the second round of the Forum was held. As for service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff attended the Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India in January 2019. At this forum, he explained the importance of international cooperation based on universal values (such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation) in achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific. In December 2018, Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa, Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force, visited Japan to meet the Chief of Air Staff to exchange opinions on a wide range of topics, including the situation of the region and bilateral 5 “UGV” t d f “U d G d V hi l ” defense cooperation and exchanges. Japan and India have also expanded service-to-service exchanges through training and exercises. In November 2018, the GSDF and the Indian Army had their first bilateral exercise, Dharma Guardian 2018, with a focus on counterterrorism operations. In December 2018, the ASDF dispatched transport aircraft to its first bilateral exercise with the Indian Air Force, SHINYUU Maitri 18. Having completed these exercises, Japan and India have now conducted bilateral exercises for all of the three military services, which helped not only to improve the forces’ tactical skills but also enhance mutual understanding and trust between the two countries and strengthened the Japan-India relationship. As trilateral initiatives among Japan, the United Sates, and India, the MSDF joined the training for anti-air and anti-sea operations in Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise Malabar ----- 2018 conducted in the waters and airspace surrounding Guam in June 2018. The three countries also conducted an exercise (anti-mine operations and minesweeping special drills) in Mutsu Bay in July 2018. In December 2018, the ASDF joined the U.S.-India bilateral exercise Cope India for the first time as an observer. Following the first Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting held in December 2018, the second Japan-U.S.-India Summit Meeting was held in June 2019, and the leaders reaffirmed the critical importance of their trilateral cooperation in efforts to maintain and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region, sharing their understanding of an increasingly complex security situation. Furthermore, the three leaders confirmed their views to further promote the trilateral cooperation in various fields, such as maritime security, space and cyberspace. **(2) Sri Lanka** In the similar manner as India, Sri Lanka is a country of great geopolitical importance. In recent years, Japan has proactively worked to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with Sri Lanka. In November 2017, Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense Ruwan Wijewardene visited Japan and paid a courtesy call on then Defense Minister Onodera, exchanging their views on cooperation in the improvement of maritime surveillance capabilities and in search and rescue operations. In August 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera made the first visit to Sri Lanka as a Japanese Defense Minister. He met Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. In these meetings, he agreed to further strengthen the bilateral partnership with Sri Lanka as an important maritime nation located on the Indian Ocean sea lanes. He also toured the Port of Colombo and the Port of Hambantota. During this visit, the first-ever Defense Ministerial Meeting between the two countries was also held between then Defense Minister Onodera and Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense Ruwan Wijewardene, in which they exchanged their opinions on maritime security and safety. The Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense also expressed the country’s hope to improve the capabilities of the Sri Lanka Armed Forces as a whole through capacity building of the three military services in the HA/DR field, for which then Defense Minister Onodera expressed his support. As for service-to-service exchanges, the MSDF and the Sri Lanka Navy held a goodwill training at the Port of Colombo and in its surrounding sea and airspace in October 2018 as part of MSDF Indo Southeast Asia Deployment. As for capacity building assistance, the SDF held a seminar for Sri Lankan Navy medical officers in June 2018 to explain its training for medical officers. In October 2018, the MSDF held a seminar on search and rescue operations when it visited the Port of Colombo during the abovementioned deployment. After that, the MSDF conducted the Ship-Rider Cooperation Program for young Sri Lankan officers on the way to Visakhapatnam. Furthermore, the MSDF and the Sri Lanka Navy conducted goodwill training on search and rescue operations at the Port of Colombo and in its surrounding waters and airspace. By combining these seminars and training exercises, the MSDF effectively contributed to the improvement of the practical search and rescue capabilities of the Sri Lanka Navy. In February 2019, the MOD invited the Sri Lanka Air Force to Japan and provided training for the air rescue unit and others. 3 Association of South-East Asian Nations(ASEAN) ASEAN member states, which continue to experience high economic growth and gather international attention for their potential as an open growth center of the world, and Japan have been traditional partners sharing a history of exchanges and a close economic relationship over the past nearly 50 years. ASEAN nations, located in geopolitically important areas occupying strategic points on sea lanes of Japan, are also playing an important role in ensuring the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as the entire region. Therefore, it is important for Japan to strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas and promote confidence with ASEAN member states, while supporting their efforts to enhance the centrality and unity of ASEAN, which is the center of regional cooperation. Based on this principle, Japan is promoting confidencebuilding and mutual understanding through high-level and working-level exchanges as well as practical cooperation, such as capacity building assistance, joint training, and defense equipment and technology cooperation with ASEAN member states. In addition to bilateral cooperation, Japan has strengthened cooperation under multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMMPlus) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in Laos in November 2016, then Defense Minister Inada announced the “Vientiane Vision” as a guideline for the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation going forward. The vision provided an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of defense cooperation with ASEAN as a whole in a transparent manner for the first time and was welcomed by all ASEAN member states. From the viewpoint of actively promoting such bilateral **Chapter** ----- and multilateral cooperation and stabilizing the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, Japan strives to strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges with ASEAN member states. See Section 1-3 (Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation) See Section 1-5 (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Assistance) Reference 41 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states [Past Three Years]) a guideline in further promoting Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges into the future. In the meeting, concerning the regional situation, both ministers exchanged opinions and called for self-restraint on militarization and other unilateral actions to change the status quo made in the South China Sea, and agreed on the importance of the peaceful conflict resolutions based on international law and the conclusion of an effective Code Of Conduct in the South China Sea at an early time. In May 2019, Defense Minister Iwaya visited Vietnam as Japanese defense minister for the first time in about three and a half years. In addition to a Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial meeting, he paid a courtesy call to Prime Minister Phuc and exchanged opinions with the Commander of the Navy. At the Defense Ministerial meeting, the Ministers shared the policy to promote Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation in a broad range of fields based on the Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation, which was announced last year. Regarding the regional situation, they agreed to cooperate toward denuclearization of North Korea, shared concerns about the unilateral moves to change the status quo and establish the change as a fait accompli, and agreed that Japan and Vietnam should closely work together on these issues. In addition, a memorandum on the orientation of promotion of defense industry cooperation was signed by the defense authorities of Japan and Vietnam at the vice-ministerial level. The two countries agreed to promote bilateral cooperation on defense equipment and technology based on this memorandum. Furthermore, at the Japan-Vietnam Leaders’ Working Lunch held in July 2019, the leaders agreed on commencing negotiations for an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology. As for service-to-service exchanges, JS “Kuroshio” paid a goodwill visit to the Cam Ranh International Port in September 2018. In addition, a ship of the Vietnam People’s Navy stayed in Japan from September to October 2018. During this period, goodwill events were held at the Port of Yokosuka and the Port of Sakai. In January 2019, the ASDF Chief of Staff visited Vietnam to meet Lieutenant General Lê Huy Vịnh, Commander, the Vietnam People’s Air Force. During the meeting, they agreed to further strengthen the relationship between the air forces of the two countries. The ASDF provided capacity building assistance in the field of air rescue in June and October 2018, the GSDF in the field of peacekeeping operations (PKO) in August 2018 and in the field of cybersecurity in March 2019, and the MSDF in the field of submarine medicine in March 2019. It remains vital that Japan and Vietnam strengthen their relationship in order to achieve more concrete, practical **(1) Indonesia** Indonesia conducts active defense cooperation and exchanges with Japan. During the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in March 2015, Prime Minister Abe and President Joko agreed to strengthen their Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy and reaffirmed their intention to hold a JapanIndonesia “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting. At the first “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo in December of the same year, the two countries agreed to start negotiations on an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, actively participate in a multilateral naval exercise (Komodo 2016), and further advance capacity building assistance. The Joint Statement of a Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in January 2017 confirmed the importance of continuing dialogues between their foreign and defense authorities at various levels, including the regular JapanIndonesia “2+2” Meeting and foreign and defense authorities’ meetings, in order to further promote close cooperation in the security and defense fields. Similarly, at the working level, exchanges at various levels have been carried out, including consultations between the diplomatic and defense authorities of both countries, consultations between the respective defense authorities, and various educational and academic exchanges. **(2) Vietnam** With Vietnam, which is a coastal country facing the South China Sea with a population of approximately 90 million, Japan has developed cooperation and exchanges between their defense authorities. At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting held in March 2014, the two leaders agreed to elevate the relationship between the two countries to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting in May 2018, both countries confirmed that they would strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas. At the Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2018, then Defense Minister Onodera and Defense Minister of Vietnam Lich signed the “Joint Vision Statement on Japan-Vietnam Defense Cooperation,” which serves as **Chapter** ----- MSDF Chief of Staff Yamamura giving a lecture at IMDEX (May 2019) cooperation, based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. President Duterte boarding Destroyer JS “Kaga” and exchanging opinions with then Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono (September 2018) **(3) Singapore** In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia to sign a memorandum on defense exchanges with Japan. The year 2019 marks the 10th anniversary of the signing of the memorandum. Since then, the cooperative relationship, including port calls, has been progressing steadily based on the memorandum. Singapore and Japan have so far conducted 15 regular meetings between their defense authorities. Moreover, the two countries actively conduct high-level defense exchanges as Japan’s Minister of Defense attends the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) almost every year to explain Japan’s security policy. In May 2019, the Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting was held with Minister for Defense Ng Eng Hen to exchange opinions on the progress of the regional situation, including North Korea issues, and bilateral/mulitilateral and Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation. As for service-to-service exchanges, as part of the Indo Southeast Asia Deployment in October 2018, MSDF Destroyers JS “Kaga” and JS “Inazuma” visited Singapore during the ADMM-Plus and held an onboard reception and a goodwill training. In February 2019, MSDF Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” had goodwill training with the Singaporean Navy’s landing platform dock ship RSS Endeavour in waters off the west coast of Kyushu. In May 2019, the MSDF Chief of Staff participated in the International Maritime Defense Exposition (IMDEX) upon invitation from the Commander of Singapore’s Navy. At the International Maritime Security Conference (IMSC), which was held on the sideline of IMDEX, the MSDF Chief of Staff promoted mutual understanding, built a trusting relationship, and introduced the MSDF’s activities through information sharing and exchange of views with senior naval officers from other countries **Chapter** ASDF Chief of Staff Marumo holding a meeting with Lieutenant General Briguez, Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force (March 2019) Additionally, MSDF vessels have made port calls in Singapore during international cooperation operations, such as UN PKO and counter-piracy activities. Also, service-toservice exchanges have been actively conducted. **(4) The Philippines** Between Japan and the Philippines, mutual visits by naval vessels, working-level exchanges including consultations between their defense authorities, and service-to-service exchanges have been frequently conducted along with highlevel exchanges. At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting held in January 2015, the two ministers signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. This memorandum shows the intention of the two countries to conduct cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as maritime security, in addition to defense ministerial meetings and vice-ministerial consultations on a regular basis, reciprocal visits between the SDF Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the each SDF Service, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commander of each service, and participation in training and exercises. At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in November 2015, the two leaders of both countries reached a consensus ----- in principle on the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology, which was signed in February 2016. At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in September 2016, Prime Minister Abe and President Duterte agreed on the transfer of MSDF TC-90 training aircraft to the Philippines in order to enhance its capabilities in HA/DR, transportation, and maritime situational awareness. At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in January 2017, the two countries agreed that they would promote defense cooperation in various fields such as capacity building assistance, defense equipment cooperation, and training and exercises. In March 2017, two MSDF TC-90 training aircraft were transferred to the Philippine Navy in March 2017. At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting in October 2017, Japan announced that the mode of transfer of TC90 would be changed from lease to grant. In March 2018, the remaining three TC-90 aircraft were transferred to the Philippine Navy, completing the grant of a total of five TC90 aircraft. This transfer also covers training for Philippine Navy pilots and maintenance support for Philippine Navy maintenance personnel. Moreover, at the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting held on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Japan confirmed that it would grant GSDF’s decommissioned UH-1H parts and maintenance equipment to the Philippine Air Force. In March 2019, the turnover of the parts and maintenance equipment commenced with the transfer ceremony attended by StateMinister of Defense Harada. At the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2019, the two Ministers welcomed the progress in cooperation, including the grant of TC-90s and UH-1H parts and maintenance equipment, and its contributions to the improvement of HA/DR and surveillance capabilities of the Philippines. They also confirmed the progress in JapanPhilippines defense cooperation, including port calls, in a broad range of fields and agreed that the two countries will further strengthen defense cooperation in the future. High-level exchanges between Japan and the Philippines have also been deepening. Following his boarding on Destroyer JS “Izumo” in June 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte came aboard Destroyer JS “Kaga” during a call at the Port of Subic in September 2018 to meet Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Ono and exchange opinions on the bilateral relationship. As for recent service-to-service cooperation and exchanges, three MSDF destroyers, which were on the Indo Southeast Asia Deployment, conducted a bilateral exercise (search and rescue exercise) with the Philippine Navy in the waters and airspace surrounding Palawan, the Philippines, in September 2018. In addition, GSDF units participated in the U.S.-Philippines joint exercise Kamandag 18 conducted on the Philippine island of Luzon in September and October 2018. In March 2019, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited the Philippines to meet Commanding General of the Philippine Army Macairog Alberto and Commandant of the Philippine Marine Corps Alvin Parreño. The three leaders agreed to further strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges between the GSDF and the Philippines Army and Marine Corps. In the same month, Lieutenant General Rozzano D. Briguez, Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force, visited Japan to meet the ASDF Chief of Staff and exchanged opinions on various topics, including regional situations and defense cooperation and exchanges, deepening the mutual understanding between the air forces of the two countries. Furthermore, in June 2019, the ASDF Chief of Staff visited the Philippines to participate in the Air Force Symposium hosted by the Philippine Air Force. He had talks and opinion exchanges with military personnel including Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force, and promoted bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges with the Philippine Air Force. Moreover, the MSDF provided capacity building assistance concerning ship maintenance in September 2018. See Part IV Chapter 2 Section 5-3 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **Chapter** **(5) Thailand** With Thailand, Japan has a long history of defense cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, including the commencement of the dispatch of Defense Attachés and consultations between their defense authorities at an early stage. As for the acceptance of foreign students at the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became the first one to be accepted in 1958. Since then, Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students to the academy. Since 2005, the MOD/SDF, has been participating in the multilateral exercise Cobra Gold cohosted by the United States and Thailand. In January and February 2019, an exercise on rescue of Japanese nationals overseas was conducted to enhance joint operation capacities during Cobra Gold 19. Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Japan Sonoura reviewed Cobra Gold 2019. At the same time, a staff exercise on cooperation and assistance under the International Peace Support Act was conducted. As for recent service-to-service exchanges, the ASDF Chief of Staff visited Thailand in September 2018 to meet the then Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Air Force Johm Rungswang who is a graduate of the National ----- Defense Academy of Japan and the Air Command and Staff College of Japan. In the meeting, they agreed to strengthen the relationship between the air forces of the two countries. In May 2019, Air Chief Marshal Chaiyapruk Didyasarin, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Air Force, visited Japan to meet the ASDF Chief of Staff and exchanged opinions on various topics, including regional situations and defense cooperation and exchanges, deepening the mutual understanding between the air forces of the two countries. As for capacity building assistance programs, the ASDF has implemented seminars on aviation safety and international aviation law for Thailand since 2016. In March 2018, the GSDF conducted a seminar for the Royal Thai Army planning to send a unit to the UNMISS, which covered the characteristics of the UNMISS Command, engineering missions, and other matters. Through the seminar, the SDF shared its experiences and the lessons learnt with the Royal Thai Army over five years of deployment to UNMISS. In June 2018, the GSDF engineering unit supported the Royal Thai Army’s preparation for PKO through training on the maintenance and management of the water purification system, which the GSDF transferred to the UN at no charge when it withdrew from the UNMISS. In March 2019, the ASDF provided capacity building assistance in the field of aviation safety. **(6) Cambodia** In 1992, Cambodia became the first country to which Japan sent an SDF unit for UN peacekeeping operations. As indicated by Japan’s capacity building assistance for Cambodia since 2013 and other programs, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have made steady progress. At the Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to a “strategic partnership.” After the summit, then Defense Minister Onodera signed the Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defense of the Kingdom of Cambodia. In September 2017, then Defense Minister Onodera held a ministerial meeting with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense Tea Banh. They talked on the regional situation and gave high appreciation to progress in the Japan-Cambodia defense cooperation, including capacity-building assistance and service-to-service exchanges. The GSDF has worked to enhance bilateral cooperation through capacity building assistance programs, including training on road construction, which had been conducted from before, and education programs on engineering activities (to foster land survey instructors) for the engineering unit of the Royal Cambodian Forces, which were held in July 2017, May 2018, and June 2019. **(7) Myanmar** Japan has been promoting exchanges with Myanmar since Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic government in March 2011, including the first visit to the country by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense and the invitation of Myanmar to participate in multilateral conferences hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the two countries’ defense authorities held their first consultation in Myanmar’s capital of Naypyidaw, exchanged opinions on how to proceed with their future defense exchanges and agreeing to further promote exchanges. In November 2014, then Defense Minister Eto held a meeting with then Defense Minister Wai Lwin of Myanmar and they confirmed their intention to promote defense exchanges, while visiting Myanmar for the Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Roundtable Meeting chaired by Myanmar. Under the Japan-Myanmar Military Officials Exchange Program sponsored by the Nippon Foundation since 2014, general officers in Myanmar have been invited to visit SDF facilities in Japan. In August 2018, ten senior Myanmar military officials visited Japan under the program, paying a courtesy call on then Defense Minister Onodera. The ASDF supported the establishment of a weather services unit within the Myanmar Air Force through a capacity building assistance program in the field of aviation meteorology, which was held in October 2018 and January 2019. In December 2018, Japan held a capacity building assistance program on underwater medicine for the Myanmar Navy. In May 2018, Japan started to assist the establishment of a learning environment of the Japanese language for the Japanese Language Department of the Defense Services Academy of Myanmar. **Chapter** **(8) Laos** Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Laos have made gradual progress since 2011, when the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was appointed concurrently as Defense Attaché to Laos. In April 2013, the National Defense Academy accepted students from Laos for the first time. In August 2013, the first Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. Since 2014, Japan and Laos have served as co-chairs of the EWG on HA/DR of the ADMM-Plus meeting, while the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities has made significant strides through cooperation under multilateral frameworks. In November 2016, then Defense Minister Inada became the first Japanese defense minister to visit Laos, exchanging views with Minister of National ----- Defense Lieutenant General Chansamone regarding policies for further defense cooperation, such as high-level exchanges and capacity building assistance, and agreeing with him to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. The two countries also agreed on the signing of a memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges between the defense authorities. In December 2018, then Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Mabe visited the Lao Ministry of National Defense to meet Permanent Secretary of Defense Khamsy Vongkhamsao. In this meeting, they agreed to work together for an early signing of the memorandum. As for capacity building assistance, the GSDF provided the engineering unit and medical unit of the Royal Lao Army with practical training on HA/DR in November 2018. **(9) Malaysia** Japan signed the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with Malaysia in April 2018. In September 2018, Minister of Defense Mohamad Sabu visited Japan and signed with then Minister of Defense Onodera the memorandum on Japan-Malaysia defense cooperation and exchanges. In the Defense Ministerial Meeting held after the signing, the two Ministers confirmed their intention to promote defense cooperation in various fields to include based on the memorandum. In July 2018, KC-767, which was on a counter-piracy mission, called at Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia, for a unit-to-unit exchange. In January 2019, KC767, which was on a counter-piracy mission, called at Penang International Airport, Malaysia, for a unit-to-unit exchange. At the Langkawi International Maritime & Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA), which was co-organized by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport of Malaysia and EN Projects in Langkawi in March 2019, MSDF Destroyer JS “Asagiri” participated in the fleet review, and the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) set up the booth. Special Adviser to the Prime Minister Sonoura also visited LIMA and met Prime Minister Mahathir, Minister of Defense Sabu and other officials to exchange opinions on the Japan-Malaysia relationship and defense cooperation and exchanges. ADMM-Plus meeting held in Brunei in August 2013, then Defense Minister Onodera held talks with then Brunei’s Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views on the ADMM-Plus initiatives. In February 2019, the MSDF Chief of Staff visited Brunei to meet commander of the Royal Brunei Navy Norazmi Pengiran Haji Muhammad. The two leaders agreed to further strengthen the navy component relationship through mutual visits of naval ships and other activities. Moreover, the Sultan of Brunei granted a commander emblem to the MSDF Chief of Staff in appreciation for his efforts to promote the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific and strengthening naval cooperation between Japan and Brunei. 4 Republic of Korea (ROK) **(1) Significance of Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** Both Japan and the ROK confront wide-ranging complex security challenges, including response to the nuclear and missile issues of North Korea, response to large-scale natural disasters, counterterrorism measures, counter piracy measures, maritime security, and peacekeeping operations. The MOD/SDF plans to continue defense cooperation with the ROK, including in a broad range of fields, and to make efforts to establish a foundation for mutual coordination in order to effectively address the above security challenges. On the other hand, negative actions by the ROK side are affecting Japan-ROK defense cooperation and exchange. As an example, the ROK’s action related to the flag of the MSDF[6] at the time of an international fleet review held by the ROK in October 2018 can be cited. It is legally prescribed[7] that usually, MSDF ships should display a flag of the MSDF at their stern. However, the ROK, as the host of the fleet review, indicated a unilateral rule prohibiting the display of a flag at either the bow or the stern, which cannot be accepted under Japanese law. Despite repeated requests for a revision of the rule from Japan, the ROK side refused to revise it. As a result, Japan had to refrain from participating in the international fleet review. In addition, in December 2018, there was an incident in which a destroyer of the ROK Navy directed fire control radar at a SDF aircraft.[8] The MOD/SDF will continue to call on the ROK side to appropriately deal with these matters. In addition, in August 2019, the Government of the ROK announced its intention to terminate the Japan-ROK General **Chapter** **(10) Brunei** Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei, during the Second As for MSDF’s ship flag, see the MOD website (https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/net/shiritai/flag/index.html) Article 102 of the SDF Law prescribes that SDF ships should display an SDF ship flag. Moreover, Article 15 of the MSDF Flag Insignia Regulation prescribes that SDF ships should display an SDF ship flag at their stern. S Ch t 1 S ti 2 1 f th i id t f ROK l l di ti it fi t l d t MSDF t l i ft ----- Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Considering more severe circumstances surrounding Japan, such as repeated missile launches by North Korea, cooperation between Japan and the ROK, and between Japan, the United States and the ROK is important. Nevertheless, the Government of the ROK made such a decision, and regarding this, Minister of Defense stated that he “can’t help but feel disappointed, and it is extremely regrettable.” He also said that regarding issues that call for cooperation, including North Korea issues, Japan strongly urges the ROK side to wisely respond to secure appropriate cooperation between Japan and the ROK, and between Japan, the United States and the ROK, even after this decision. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation and** **Exchanges** **a. Overview** Since 2015, Japan’s defense cooperation and exchanges with the ROK have been implemented at various levels, including ministerial and other high levels and unit levels. In October 2018, Minister of Defense Iwaya met ROK Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-doo at the fifth ADMM-Plus. In this meeting, they agreed to together collaborate with the United States and the international community according to the UN Security Council Resolutions in order to pullout further actions from North Korea. **b. Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information** **Agreement (GSOMIA)** Based on the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea signed in December 2014, the defense authorities in Japan and the ROK have exchanged and shared classified information regarding North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles via the United States. In light of the increasingly serious situation surrounding North Korea with its frequently repeated ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, in November 2016, the GSOMIA was concluded between Japan and the ROK to further promote bilateral cooperation. This agreement serves as a framework to appropriately protect classified information shared between the Japanese and ROK governments. However, in August 2019, the Government of the ROK notified the Government of Japan of its intention to terminate the GSOMIA in writing.[9] Exchanges [Past Three Years]) **(3) Japan-U.S.-ROK Cooperative Relationship** Since Japan, the United States, and the ROK share common interests pertaining to the peace and stability of this region, it is important for the three countries to seize opportunities to promote close cooperation in addressing various security issues, including those regarding North Korea. Japan, the United States, and the ROK have conducted a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. In June 2019, Defense Minister Iwaya, ROK Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeongdoo, and U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan convened the Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting. The three Ministers recognized the international community’s shared goal of North Korea’s full compliance with its international obligations in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, which call for North Korea’s complete denuclearization in a verifiable and irreversible manner. They underscored commitment to cooperation and coordination with the international community for fully implementing UN Security Council Resolutions, including sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate North Korea’s illicit ship-to-ship transfers. Regarding regional security issues, the Ministers reaffirmed that freedom of navigation and overflight must be ensured, and that all disputes should be resolved in a peaceful manner in accordance with the principles of international law. Based on this view, they shared the recognition of strengthening security cooperation between Japan, the United States and the ROK. At the working level, the three countries have coordinated with each other while closely sharing information through such opportunities as Director-General and Director level meetings, video conferences, and chief-of-staff level meetings based on the framework of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT). In May 2019, a Director-General-level plenary session was held in Seoul. The three representatives engaged in consultations on regional security issues including North Korea. They committed to further trilateral security cooperation and affirmed that they will promote information sharing, high-level policy consultations, and combined exercises. At the chief of staff level, the Chief of Joint Staff visited the United States in October 2018 to participate in the Japan **Chapter** See Reference 42 (Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and The provision of the GOSMIA on termination of the agreement is as follows: ARTICLE 21 ENTRY INTO FORCE, AMENDMENT, DURATION AND TERMINATION (excerpt) 3. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of one year and shall be automatically extended annually thereafter unless either Party notifies the other in writing through the diplomatic channel ninety days in advance of its intention to terminate the Agreement. ----- **Chapter** **Progress in Japan-U.K. Defense Cooperation – Participating in an Exercise with** **British Army** **First Lieutenant Nobuaki Fujiwara, Leader of Scouting Team, Reconnaissance School Unit of Fuji School Brigade** **(Oyama Town, Suntou County, Shizuoka Prefecture)** As the leader of a scouting team of the GSDF Reconnaissance School Unit, I participated in Vigilant Isles, the first field training with the British Army carried out on Japanese soil, from late September to early October 2018. The exercise was divided into two parts: training by function to improve the tactical techniques of individual members, and comprehensive training to carry out reconnaissance activities under specific conditions during about six days, joint guided fire power, and other activities. The first part was implemented at GSDF Fuji School (Shizuoka Prefecture) and North Fuji Maneuver Area (Yamanashi Prefecture), while the comprehensive training was conducted in Ojihara Maneuver Area (Miyagi Prefecture). The exercise was highly visibly reported in the media both in Japan and abroad. Because this was the first bilateral exercise with a foreign army other than the United States on Japanese soil and also because I was not familiar with exercises with foreign forces, I had difficulty with the arrangement of the daily exercise. However, we completed the exercise successfully thanks to flexible responses by the members of the British Army. During the exercise, we conducted various exercises, including infiltration into objective areas, reconnaissance/ surveillance, and joint guided fire power. These were very fruitful exercises where we learned many things. At the final stage of the exercise, Japanese and British participants opened up to one another. After completing the exercise, we exchanged personal items to commemorate our friendship and communicated with each other using gestures. It was a very impressive exercise. I will continue to make efforts to improve the skills of our unit by utilizing what I learned through the exercise. GSDF personnel (right) and British Army personnel (left) before infiltration GSDF (left) and British Army (right) boarding a transport helicopter U.S.-ROK chiefs of staff meeting. At this meeting, the Chief of Joint Staff, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Park Han-ki discussed trilateral defense cooperation from the viewpoint of promoting the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. The Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperative relationship has been transforming into a more substantive relationship. The three countries need to enhance their security cooperation in various areas into the future, taking advantage of various available opportunities. 5 European Countries, Canada, and New Zealand European countries, Canada, and New Zealand share universal values with Japan and play a central role in initiatives to address common challenges to global security, with a primary focus on non traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating illicit ship-to-ship transfers, as well as international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with these countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges and is important for all of Japan, European countries, Canada, and New Zealand. See Reference 43 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries, Canada and New Zealand [Past Three Years]) **(1) The United Kingdom** The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important ----- allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation with the United Kingdom by working together on global issues, such as international peace cooperation activities, counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations and by exchanging information on regional situations. With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United Kingdom, the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation was signed in June 2012. Following this, Agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology came into effect in July 2013 and the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement entered into force in January 2014, leading to the development of a foundation for defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as information sharing between the two countries. At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in May 2014, prime ministers of both countries agreed to hold a Japan-U.K. “2+2” Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting and begin negotiations on the ACSA in order to enhance bilateral cooperation in the security field. Following this, the first Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting was held in January 2015. During the second Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in January 2016, the two countries agreed to promote joint exercises, cooperate in the defense equipment and technology areas and in capacity building assistance for Southeast Asian countries, and confirmed that they would aim to conclude an ACSA as early as possible. In January 2017, the Japan-U.K. ACSA[10] was signed. After the approval by Japan’s National Diet in April 2017, the ACSA entered into force in August. At the same time, relevant domestic laws were developed. The effectuation of the Japan-U.K. ACSA enables the two countries to implement the mutual provision of goods and services, such as water, food, fuel and transportation, between the SDF and the British Armed Forces through unified procedures in joint exercises and large-scale disaster relief operations, further facilitating and strengthening the Japan-U.K. strategic partnership. The Japan-U.K. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, issued during the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in August 2017, stipulated that the two countries agreed to develop an action plan with specific measures relating to bilateral security cooperation between the relevant authorities. At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in January 2019, the leaders reaffirmed the above Declaration and confirmed that the bilateral relationship had entered the next phase. At the third Japan-U.K. “2+2” Meeting in December 2017, the two countries issued a joint statement, which referred to bilateral exercises between the GSDF and the British Army, British naval ships deployment to the Indo-Pacific region and joint exercises with the SDF, and progress of the joint research on new air-to-air missiles, demonstrating that bilateral security cooperation was steadily deepening. At the working level, U.K. Minister of State for Defence and Deputy Leader of the House of Lords the Rt Hon. Frederick Curzon visited Japan and paid a courtesy call to Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fukuda in September 2018. As for service-to-service exchanges, the GSDF and the British Army held the first bilateral exercise between the army branch in Japan, Vigilant Isles, in September 2018 to improve their tactical skills and bilateral coordination. The MSDF engaged in a bilateral exercise with the Royal Navy’s amphibious ship HMS Albion in the waters south of the main island of Japan in August 2018, and another bilateral exercise with the Royal Navy’s frigate HMS Argyll in the waters and airspace west of Sumatra in September 2018. In December 2018, a Japan-US-UK trilateral exercise was held with the participation of the Royal Navy’s frigate HMS Argylle and the MSDF destroyer JS "Izumo," and in March 2019, another trilateral exercise was held with the participation of the Royal Navy’s frigate HMS Montrose and MSDF Destroyer JS “Murasame”. The ASDF transport aircraft C-2 joined the airshow RIAT (Royal International Air Tattoo) held in the United Kingdom in July 2018. **(2) France** France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also around the world. Having its overseas territories across the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, France is the only European country that maintains a constant military presence in the Indo-Pacific region. It also historically has had a close relationship with Japan and is positioned as Japan’s special partner. The first Japan-France “2+2” Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in Paris in January 2014, followed by the visit of French Minister of Defense Le Drian to Japan in July of the same year when the Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. The second Japan-France “2+2” Meeting was held in Tokyo in March 2015, the third Meeting in Paris in January 2017, and the fourth Meeting in Tokyo in January 2018. At these meetings, Japan and France discussed issues including the following: international terrorism, maritime security, defense equipment and technology cooperation, ACSA, joint **Chapter** 10 The ACSA applies to the following activities: (1) joint exercises; (2) UN PKO; (3) internationally coordinated peace and security operations; (4) humanitarian international relief operations; (5) operations to cope with large-scale disasters; (6) protection measures for or transportation of nationals of either party or others for their evacuation from overseas; (7) communication and di ti th ti ti iti d (8) th ti it i hi h th i i f li d i i itt d d th l d l ti f th ti t i ----- continue their close cooperation. As for recent service-to-service exchanges, the SDF has participated in the Equateur HA/DR exercises hosted by the French Armed forces stationed in New Caledonia since 2014. In August 2018, an MSDF training squadron conducted a goodwill training with French AOR Somme. In September 2018, the Naval Chiefs of Staff of the two countries signed the Strategic Orientation agreeing to strengthen bilateral cooperation not only in the Pacific region, but also in the Indian Ocean. In April 2019, MSDF Destroyer JS “Kirisame” and French frigate Vendémiaire conducted a bilateral exercise. In May of the same year, Destroyer JS “Izumo,” French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, and other ships conducted a Japan-France-Australia-U.S. multilateral exercise in the Indian Ocean. Seven GSDF personnel were invited to join the Bastille Day military parade in Paris in July 2018, which was also attended by President of the French Republic Emmanuel Macron and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono, highlighting the close relationship between Japan and France. In April 2019, Jean-Pierre Bosser, Chief of Staff of the French Army visited Japan. He held consultations with the GSDF Chief of Staff and paid a courtesy call to Defense Minister Iwaya and the Chief of Staff of the SDF Joint Staff. Showing strong interest in Japan’s defense of remote islands, he also inspected the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, which was newly established in March 2018. **(3) Canada** Between Japan and Canada, high-level exchanges, talks between defense authorities, and other exchanges have been conducted, with the Japan-Canada ACSA signed in April 2018, and entering into force in July 2019 after gaining approval by Japan’s National Diet in May 2019. At the fourth Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial meeting held in December 2018, the two countries agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation. In June 2019, which marked the 90th anniversary of Japan-Canada diplomatic relations, Defense Minister Iwaya held the first Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting in three years with Canadian Minister for National Defence Harjit Sajjan. At the meeting, the Ministers welcomed the deepening of the two countries’ relationship, including the signing of the Japan-Canada ACSA and cooperation in surveillance activities against illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. They agreed that in particular, the MSDF and the Canadian Navy will take various opportunities to conduct joint training. They also agreed to work out the specifics of cooperation in the field of peacekeeping. The Ministers also exchanged views on the regional situation, including issues ASDF personnel participating in a parade celebrating Bastille Day and marching on the Champs-Elysees (July 2018) exercises, cooperation in the space domain, and collaboration in capacity building assistance in developing countries. Following these meetings, Japan and France signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in March 2015. In March 2017, the second meeting of the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space was held. In the meeting, Japan and France signed the “technical arrangement concerning information sharing regarding the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) between the relevant authority in Japan and the Minister of Defense of the French Republic” in order to strengthen the Japan-France SSA cooperation, agreeing to promote bilateral cooperation in a concrete manner. In July 2018, the Japan-France ACSA was signed. After the approval by Japan’s National Diet in May 2019, the ACSA entered into force in June. At the fifth Japan-France “2+2” Meeting and the Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Brest, France, in January 2019, the two countries—both as maritime nations and Pacific nations—decided to establish the Japan-France Comprehensive Maritime Dialogue in order to promote specific cooperative measures, especially to materialize cooperation in the maritime field, for the purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the free and open Indo-Pacific. They also welcomed the commencement of the cooperative research on The Feasibility Study For Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities, and agreed to promote joint exercises involving French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, deployed in the Indian Ocean, and to collaborate in capacity building assistance programs for Southeast Asian countries and the Pacific Island countries. Japan and France also agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in the cybersecurity and space fields through the Japan-France Bilateral Consultations on Cybersecurity and the JapanFrance Comprehensive Dialogue on Space. Furthermore, Japan highly appreciated France’s decision to dispatch ships and aircraft in the first half of the year to patrol and monitor illegal maritime activities, including illicit ship-toship transfers. The two countries confirmed that they would **Chapter** ----- KAEDEX 2018, a Japan-Canada bilateral exercise conducted in waters off the west coast of Kyushu (from front, an MSDF destroyer, Canadian Navy frigate and Canadian Navy supply ship) (November 2018) related to the Korean Peninsula and the East and South China Seas. After the meeting, the Ministers announced a joint statement that serves as a concrete guideline for the promotion of future defense cooperation. This was the first such joint statement to be issued by the defense authorities of Japan and Canada. As for recent service-to-service exchanges, the Royal Canadian Navy ships Calgary and Asterix visited Japan and conducted bilateral exercises including “KAEDEX,”in November 2018. In August 2018, a four-country exercise was held with the above two Canadian ships, a Royal Australian Navy ship, and a Royal New Zealand Navy ship in the waters from Guam to Darwin, Australia. In June 2019, a JapanCanada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” was conducted with the Canadian Navy ships Regina and Asterix. In July 2018, the ASDF transport aircraft C-2 stopped by the Canadian Forces Base Greenwood to hold a unit-to-unit exchange when it joined the RIAT in the United Kingdom. Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki visiting New Zealand and observing P-3K2 patrol aircraft (the same type of aircraft as dispatched for warning and surveillance activities against ship-to-ship transfer last year) (June 2019) Staff made an official visit to New Zealand in February 2019. In this meeting, it was agreed that the two countries would further promote bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. In August 2018, a four-country exercise was held with a Royal New Zealand Navy ship, two Canadian Navy ships, and a Royal Australian Navy ship. **Chapter** **(5) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** When Prime Minister Abe visited Europe in May 2014, he held a meeting with then NATO Secretary General Rasmussen at NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) (revised in May 2018). Based on the IPCP, female GSDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time in December 2014 as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace and security. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF has participated in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) since 2015. In July 2018, the Mission of Japan to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was established as an additional role of the Embassy of Japan in Belgium. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera visited the Allied Joint Force Command Naples for an opinion exchange with James G. Foggo III. They welcomed the recent development of the Japan-NATO relationship especially in the cybersecurity, and agreed to further deepen their cooperation in various fields. **(6) Other European Countries** With Germany, Japan signed the agreement on defense equipment and technology transfer in July 2017. In the same month, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs visited Germany for the first Japan-Germany defense vice-ministerial strategic dialogue, indicating progress in high-level and other bilateral exchanges. In February 2019, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel visited Japan for the Japan Germany Summit Meeting In **(4) New Zealand** In relation to New Zealand, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed in August 2013. During a Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two countries agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA. In June 2019, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki visited New Zealand and paid a courtesy call to Defence Minister Ron Mark. They exchanged opinions on bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, such as the strengthening of collaboration concerning Pacific Island countries, defense equipment cooperation, and the defense policies of both countries. They also shared recognitions on regional situations. Concerning warning and surveillance activities against illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea, Vice-Minister of Defense Suzuki expressed appreciation for the dispatch of New Zealand’s patrol aircraft last year, and both sides agreed to continue to work together. As for service-to-service exchanges the Chief of Joint ----- this meeting, the two leaders welcomed that the negotiations concluded an agreement in principle, and affirmed that they would seize this opportunity to promote bilateral security and defense cooperation. Japan and Italy have been promoting institutional development for facilitating defense cooperation and exchanges, including the entry into force of the Japan-Italy Information Security Agreement in June 2016 and the signing of the Agreement on the Transfer of the Defense Equipment and Technology in May 2017 (which came into force in April 2019). In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera visited Italy for a bilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting with the Italian Minister of Defense Elisabetta Trenta. In the meeting, the two Ministers agreed to further strengthen bilateral coordination in maritime security. Spanish Defense Minister De Cospedal visited Japan in January 2018 for a Japan-Spain defense ministerial meeting, where the Japanese and Spanish ministers agreed to further enhance the relationship between the two countries’ defense authorities based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges signed in November 2014. The then Netherlands’ Minister of Defense HennisPlasschaert visited Japan in December 2016 for a JapanNetherlands defense ministerial meeting, where the two ministers signed a memorandum regarding defense cooperation and exchanges. In September 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera visited the Netherlands for the JapanNetherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister of the Netherlands Carola Schouten. In the meeting, the two Ministers exchanged opinions on cooperation under the frameworks of the NATO and the European Union (EU). In addition, then Minister of Defense Onodera explained the situation of the illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea and stressed the importance of implementing strict sanctions on these illicit practices under the UN Security Council Resolutions. It was agreed that the Netherlands would work closely with Japan regarding this matter, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and the chair of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea. In September 2018, Estonian Minister of Defense Jüri Luik visited Japan for the bilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting. Based on what was discussed during Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Estonia in January 2018, Japan and Estonia agreed to deepen cooperation in cybersecurity through bilateral and multilateral efforts, which includes the dispatch of the Japanese MOD officials to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Anatolii Petrenko visited Japan in October 2018. During this visit, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed and the Japan-Ukraine Security Meeting was held. In February 2019, Finnish Minister of Defense Jussi Niinistö visited Japan. During this visit, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed and the Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. The two countries agreed to further deepen bilateral defense cooperation in various fields, building upon the recent development of bilateral defense exchanges. In October 2018, the Chief of Joint Staff visited Finland and paid courtesy calls to President Sauli Niinistö and Minister of Defense Jussi Niinistö. He also met Chief of Defence Jarmo Lindberg and exchanged opinions on defense cooperation and exchange programs, strengthening mutual understanding and trust. 6 China **(1) Significance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with** **China** A stable relation between Japan and China is an essential factor for the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. From broad and medium- to long-term perspectives, it is necessary for both countries to strive to build and enhance the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in all areas, including security. In the security field, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote multi-layered dialogues and exchanges with China. In doing so, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible, constructive role for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement in the context of its rapidly increasing defense budget. Moreover, in order to avoid unexpected situations, Japan will utilize the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries. **Chapter** **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges** Japan-China defense exchanges stagnated following the Japanese government’s acquisition of ownership of the three Senkaku Islands (Uotsurijima Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island) in September 2012, but have gradually resumed since the latter half of 2014. In November 2015, Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting was held for the first time in four years and five months on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting. Then Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani and Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan shared the recognition that it ----- the GSDF, ASDF, and MSDF in November 2018 to develop mutual understanding and trust. In April 2019, Destroyer JS “Suzutsuki” visited China, as the first MSDF ship to do so in about seven and a half years, and participated in the International Fleet Review held by China to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy. In addition, the MSDF Chief of Staff, who visited China for the first time in about five and a half years, attended a high-level symposium held on the sideline of the Fleet Review. The MSDF Chief of Staff introduced the importance of free and open seas as common goods and promoted defense exchange through exchange of opinions with senior naval officials of participating countries including China. In 2018, the Japan-China field-grade officer exchange program hosted by Japan’s Sasakawa Peace Foundation was held for the first time in six years. In April 2018, the Chinese delegate consisting of field-grade officers of the People’s Liberation Army visited Japan and paid a courtesy call to then Minister of Defense Onodera. In addition, the Japanese delegate consisting of field-grade officers of the SDF visited China in September 2018 and April 2019 to pay courtesy calls to important persons and toured the facilities of the People’s Liberation Army. In efforts to build a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” Japan and China must strive to promote confidential relations and mutual understanding through dialogue at various levels in various areas and must proactively step up concrete cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as counter-piracy measures. **(3) “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between** **the Defense Authorities of Japan and China”** At Japan-China Summit Meetings in January and April 2007, then Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed to develop a mechanism for communications, particularly maritime communications, between the two countries’ defense authorities. Based on the agreement, their defense authorities held the first Joint Working Group Meeting on the mechanism in April 2008 and accumulated talks. From the fourth Joint Working Group Meeting in January 2015, diplomatic authorities of both countries joined the negotiations. After the eighth meeting of the Japan-China HighLevel Consultation on Maritime Affairs in December 2017 and the seventh Joint Working Group Meeting in April 2018, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities signed the Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Japanese Defense Minister Iwaya at Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting held on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting (October 2018) would be important for Japan and China to develop their defense exchanges. During the ADMM-Plus in October 2018, Minister of Defense Iwaya and Minister of National Defense Wei Fenghe held the first Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting in three years. Celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China, the two Ministers agreed during this Meeting that Japan and China would restore bilateral defense exchanges and implement various high-level exchanges, policy dialogues, unit-tounit exchanges, and exchanges in the disaster prevention field, while also working towards an early establishment of a hotline for the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China. In June 2019, the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on the occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the meeting, the Ministers confirmed that communication was becoming closer at the ministerial level. Moreover, they shared the recognition of the importance to realize mutual visits between the Japanese and Chinese Defense Ministers as soon as possible, as agreed in the Japan-China summit meeting last year. They agreed to realize Minister Iwaya’s visit to China at the earliest possible timing. In March 2015, the 13th Japan-China Security Dialogue took place in Tokyo, with the two countries’ diplomatic and defense authorities participating. It was the first such meeting in four years. This Dialogue has been held almost every year since then. In addition, the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities have also participated in the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs. The eleventh consultation was held in Hokkaido in May 2019. As for service-to-service exchanges, the delegate of the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army, led by its deputy commander (lieutenant general), visited Japan, toured the Ichigaya District and met various units of **Chapter** ----- memorandum[11] on the mechanism in the presence of Japanese Prime Minister Abe and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on the occasion of the Japan-China Summit Meeting in Tokyo in May 2018, and the operation of this mechanism commenced on June 8, 2018. The “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” has been developed (1) to promote mutual understanding and confidence between Japan and China and to enhance bilateral defense cooperation; (2) to avoid unexpected collisions; and (3) to prevent unforeseen circumstances in the sea and air from developing into military clashes or political or diplomatic issues. The mechanism’s main components include (1) annual and expert meetings between the two countries’ defense authorities; (2) a hotline between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities; and (3) on scene communication measures between vessels and aircraft of the SDF and the People’s Liberation Army. In December 2018, the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities held annual and expert meetings on the above Mechanism in Beijing, in which the leaders confirmed that the Mechanism has been effectively utilized since its launching and agreed to continue to use it in a way that contributes to building a trusting relationship. They also agreed to accelerate the preparation process of the hotline for its early establishment. See Reference 44 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China [Past Three Years]) GSDF Chief of Staff Yuasa holding a meeting with Russian Commander-in-Chief of Land Forces (May 2019) of the G7 (Group of Seven), taking the Ukrainian situation and other factors into account. At the same time, it is important to maintain constant contacts with Russia, as one of Japan’s neighbors, at the working level to avoid unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts. The MOD considers these points in a comprehensive manner and advances defense exchanges with Russia accordingly. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges** At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013, the two leaders affirmed the importance of expanding cooperation between Japan and Russia in the field of security and defense and agreed to set up the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting, where the two countries’ defense and foreign ministers participate. At the first Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct service-to-service unit exchanges between army branches and the mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis, and bilateral exercises of counter-piracy units of the MSDF and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the regular Japan-Russia Cyber Security Meeting. At the second Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in March 2017, the two countries exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations among others. Concerning the activities of the Russian Armed Forces, the Japanese side protested against enhancing armaments, including the deployment of surface to ship missiles on the Northern Territories and the deployment of divisions on islands that may contain the Four Northern Islands. Japan expressed regret that these activities conflicted with Japan’s stance that the Northern territory is an inherent part of the territory of Japan. In July 2018, then Minister of Defense Onodera became the first Japanese Minister of Defense to pay a visit to Russia. He joined the Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting and the **Chapter** 7 Russia **(1) Significance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with** **Russia** Given that Russia is a key security player in the Indo-Pacific region and an important country neighboring Japan, it is very important for Japan to promote confidential relations with Russia through bilateral defense exchanges. As Japan-Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the MOD/SDF has continuously conducted JapanRussia “2+2” Meetings and various dialogues with Russian defense authorities according to the Memorandum on JapanRussia Defense Exchanges signed in 1999 (revised in 2006), annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas,[12] and joint search and rescue exercises. The Government of Japan deals with the relationships with Russia appropriately while emphasizing the solidarity 11 Official title: Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Japanese Ministry of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of Defense 12 Offi i l titl J R i A t th ti f i id t t b d t it i l t d th i b th ----- Defense Ministerial Meeting. In these meetings, Japan and Russia agreed on promoting bilateral defense exchanges, including the Chief of Joint Staff’s visit to Russia and mutual visits of naval ships, as well as on cooperation towards the denuclearization of North Korea, which has been a shared goal for the two countries. In May 2019, the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting and the fourth Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting were held in Tokyo. Regarding defense exchange, the Ministers agreed on the first participation by the GSDF Central Band in an international military music festival in Russia to be held in the summer of 2019. Regarding defense policy, the Japanese side explained that Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system is a purely defensive one that does not pose a threat to Russia. In part of recent major Japan-Russia military exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff visited Russia in October 2018 based on the agreement in the above Defense Ministerial Meeting. He met Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov to enhance mutual understanding, defense cooperation, and trust between the two countries. In May 2019, when the GSDF Chief of Staff visited Russia, he held a meeting with Oleg Salyukov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Land Then GSDF Chief of Staff Yamazaki visiting Papua New Guinea and attending the performance by the military band of the Papua New Guinea Defense Force with Major General Toropo, Chief of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (right) (March 2019) Forces, and paid a courtesy call to Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. Through his visit to Russia, which was the first time in four years for the GSDF Chief of Staff, the mutual understanding and relationship of trust between the GSDF and the Russian Land Forces deepened. As for exercises and drills, the first counter-piracy exercise was held with the Russian Navy ships in the Gulf of Aden in November 2018. In addition, the MSDF and the **Chapter** **Transportation of Donated Goods to the Republic of the Marshall Islands** In December 2018, taking the opportunity of an exercise implemented on the Continental United States, the 401st Tactical Airlift Squadron of the 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki Air Base, Aichi Prefecture) stopped on route at the Republic of the Marshall Islands. C-130H transport aircraft delivered goods including wheelchairs, stationery and sports equipment, etc. donated by public interest incorporated foundations in Japan for the people of the Marshall Islands based on a request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The wheelchairs transported by ASDF had been used at Japanese homes and repaired for recycling by Japanese technical high school students. This was the first aerial transportation of donated goods through the inter-ministerial cooperation framework, taking the opportunity of an ASDF exercise. President Heine of the Republic of the Marshall Islands attended the handing-over ceremony. The ceremony included Kagami Biraki using Japanese sake presented by MOD/SDF volunteers and was held in a friendly atmosphere from start to finish. The year 2018 commemorated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. We believe that we were able to contribute to further deepening of the friendly relationship between the two countries. ----- Russian Navy conducted the 19th search and rescue exercise in the Sea of Japan in June 2019. See Reference 45 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with Russia [Past Three Years]) also dropped various donations to the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Palau, and the Northern Mariana Islands. As part of the Pacific Partnership 2016 led by the United States Pacific Fleet, MSDF transport ship “Shimokita” called at Palau to conduct medical and facility maintenance activities and cultural exchanges. These activities in Palau were the first activities under the Pacific Partnership that were led by Japan from planning to implementation. Moreover, in December 2018, as a collaborative effort by the MOD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ASDF transport aircraft C-130H called at Marshall Islands International Airport on the sidelines of an exercise in the United States. The aircraft carried donations to the Marshall Islands, including wheelchairs and sports goods donated by Japanese public interest incorporated foundations. The wheelchairs had long been used in Japan and were repaired and maintained by Japanese technical high school students. In March 2019, C-2 called at Fiji on the way back from the Australian International Airshow and held various exchange programs. 9 Other Countries See Reference 46 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with Other Countries [Past Three Years]) 8 Pacific Island Countries See Reference 46 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges See with Other Countries [Past Three Years]) The Pacific Island countries are important countries that share the importance of a free, open, and sustainable maritime order based on the rule of law as maritime nations, as well as bear strong historical relationships with Japan. At the eighth Pacific Alliance Leaders Meeting (PALM8) held in 2018, Japan expressed its intention to strengthen its commitment to the stability and prosperity of the region. In addition, the NDPG published in the same year referred for the first time to Japan’s intention to promote cooperation and exchanges with the Pacific Island countries. Since 2015, Japan has cooperated and strengthened the bilateral relationship with Papua New Guinea with regard to establishing and training a military band through a capacity building assistance program. After about three years and five months of training, the band gave an excellent performance of the tunes Port Moresby and Kimigayo on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in front of the national leaders in November 2018. When the GSDF Chief of Staff visited Papua New Guinea for the first time in March 2019, Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force Gilbert Toropo expressed his appreciation for the capacity building assistance Japan had provided. The two leaders shared the view that they continue to promote defense cooperation and exchanges into the future. In September 2018, MSDF Destroyer JS “Sazanami” called at Port Moresby and held various goodwill events. In November 2018, three officers of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) were invited to Japan to participate in a capacity building assistance program through observing the disaster relief exercise called Michinoku ALERT 2018 and visiting the GSDF Engineer School. They exchanged with the MOD opinions on how to improve disaster response capabilities of the RFMF (three Papua New Guinea Defence Force officers also participated in this training). In addition to these efforts, the MSDF and ASDF have strengthened Japan’s relationships with the Pacific Island countries by calling at ports and airports. Since 2015, Japan has participated in the Japan-U.S.Australia joint humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise Christmas Drop In the airdrop exercises Japan has **Chapter** **(1) Middle Eastern Countries** Japan’s Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges with Turkey’s Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense Ümit Dündar in July 2012 during their talk. In March 2013, then Minister of National Defense Yilmaz visited Japan for a Japan-Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting. At this meeting, the ministers of the two countries agreed to hold a meeting between their defense authorities at the earliest possible date and promote a variety of defense exchanges. In June 2019, Commander of the Turkish Land Forces General Ümit Dündar visited Japan, held a meeting with the GSDF Chief of Staff, and paid a courtesy call to State-Minister of Defense of Japan. During the meeting, both sides agreed that it is important for Japan and Turkey to deepen their defense cooperation and exchanges for the peace and stability of the international community. Between Japan and Jordan, a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges was signed when Jordanian King Abdullah II visited Japan in October 2016. In November 2018, the King visited Japan and welcomed the steady progress concerning the defense authorities meetings and unit-to-unit exchanges during Minister of Defense Iwaya’s ----- courtesy visit to him and during his visit to the GSDF units of Camp Narashino. Prime Minister Abe visited Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar in August 2013 and shared the view with the leaders of the countries on the need for promoting security and defense cooperation. In addition, Japan signed a memorandum on defense exchanges with Bahrain in April 2012, with Qatar in February 2015, and with Saudi Arabia in September 2016. In May 2019, Qatari Minister of State for Defense Khalid AlAttiyah visited Japan and held the first Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting with Defense Minister Iwaya, and they agreed that Japan and Qatar will engage in defense exchange in a broader range of fields. Japan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have promoted deeper bilateral defense exchanges. The two countries signed a memorandum on defense exchanges in May 2018, and held a meeting between defense authorities in December 2018. In addition, in June 2019, the Chief of Joint Staff made an official visit to the UAE as the first Chief of Joint Staff of Japan, and paid a courtesy call to Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. He also held a meeting with Lieutenant General Hamad Mohammed Thani Al Rumaithi, chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in a broad range of fields. Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with Oman’s Sultan Qaboos bin Said in January 2014 and they agreed to enhance cooperation and promote defense exchanges in the field of maritime security, including counter-piracy measures to ensure the security and safety of sea-lanes. In March 2019, Minister Responsible for Defense Affairs Sayyid Badr visited Japan and met Minister of Defense Iwaya and signed a memorandum on defense exchanges. Japan and Israel held the first foreign and defense authorities’ meeting in October 2018. This was held in accordance with the agreement reached during Prime Minister **3** **Promotion of Multilateral Security Cooperation** 1 Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives Multilateral framework initiatives, such as the ADMM-Plus and the ARF,[13] a security cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacific region, have made steady progress and served Abe s visit to Israel in May 2018. In the first meeting, the leaders exchanged opinions on a wide range of topics, from regional situations to security issues. In November 2018, the fourth Dialogue on Cyber Issues between Japan and Israel was held. In addition, in June 2019, the Chief of Joint Staff made an official visit to Israel as the first Chief of Joint Staff of Japan. He held a meeting with Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi, Chief of the General Staff, Israel Defense Forces, and agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchanges in a broad range of fields. Through these efforts, Japan and Israel have strengthened their relationship in the security field. Then State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Egypt in September 2017, marking the first high-level visit from the Japanese MOD. Moreover, in June 2019, the Chief of Joint Staff visited the country, and held a meeting with Lieutenant General Mahmoud Ibrahim Mahmoud Hegazy, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces. **(2) African Countries** With Djibouti, the only country where an overseas SDF base is located, the MOD/SDF has been cooperating in counterpiracy operations. The base was used for transporting goods to the unit sent to the UNMISS. In addition, the base was used in October 2018, when Japan conducted a training exercise on the operation of heavy equipment as part of its capacity building assistance for Djibouti. Japan will work on the stable, long-term use of this base for security cooperation in the Middle East and Africa. **Chapter** **(3) South American Countries** In December 2016, Japan and Colombia signed a memorandum on defense exchanges. From April to May 2018, then State Minister of Defense Yamamoto visited Brazil for talks with then Brazilian Defense Minister Silva e Luna. as an important foundation for discussion and cooperation and exchange in the security field. Japan attaches importance to such multilateral frameworks and intends to work to strengthen cooperation and mutual confidence with countries in the region. Moreover, Japan has contributed to 13 The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region through dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 26 countries and one organization as members and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs and defense officials to exchange opinions on the regional situation and the security area. The 26 countries are the 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), and Sri Lanka (since 2007). The organization b i th EU ----- Plus, (2) ADSOM-Plus Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG), and (3) Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs).[15] In October 2018, Minister of Defense Iwaya attended the fifth ADMM-Plus held in Singapore. In his speech, he touched on the “free and open Indo-Pacific” and denounced�unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the statusquo, stressing the importance of maintaining the rule of law. He also highly appreciated the adoption of the Guidelines for Air Military Encounters (GAME), stating that the enhancement and development of the rule of law would contribute to building confidence within the region. At this Meeting, the Ministers issued the Joint Statement on Practical Confidence Building Measures and the Joint Statement on Preventing and Countering the Threat of Terrorism. See See Fig. III-3-1-5 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the See ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus [ADMM-Plus]) Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN **Fig. III-3-1-5** Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) |ASEAN Defence Meeting Plus (A • Held annually • Vice-Minister Director Genera|Senior Officials’ DSOM-Plus) and l level| |---|---| **Chapter** **(2) ARF** Regarding the ARF, in which mainly diplomatic authorities are engaged, concrete efforts[16] have been made in recent years for specific initiatives in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building. The MOD/SDF has been making active contributions to this forum. At an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) that has been held since 2009,[17] for example, Japan has taken leadership in formulating a collection of best practices concerning support for capacity building in the field of maritime security. In the field of disaster relief, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel and aircraft to ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF-DiREx) conducted since 2009. In September 2018, National Institute for Defense Studies held the 22nd ARF Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting. The participants discussed research and education at defense universities as well as inter-university cooperation in the context of the focus of this meeting, “Building Partnerships and Capacities to Meet Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region.” **(3) Multilateral Security Dialogues Sponsored by the MOD/** **SDF** **(A) ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and** **Vientiane Vision** ASEAN Defence Ministers’ ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) New Zealand, Republic of Korea, - Held annually Russia, United States - Ministerial level ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Plus (ADSOM-Plus) - Held annually - Vice-Minister and Director General level Experts’ Working Group ADSOM-Plus Working Group (EWG) - Held annually - Director level Overview of Experts’ Working Group (EWG) ① Counter-terrorism ★Establishing EWGs in the seven specific ② Humanitarian assistance regional security fields and disaster relief ★ Co-chaired with non-ASEAN countries ③ Maritime security ★ Promoting information sharing, workshops ④ Military medicine and seminars, and multinational joint ⑤ Peacekeeping operations exercises ⑥ Humanitarian mine action ★ Submitting recommendations and reports ⑦ Cyber Security the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region by holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum annually. See Reference 47 (Record of Multinational Security Dialogues See [Indo-Pacifi c Region; Past Three Years]) Reference 48 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense) Reference 49 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues) **(1) Initiatives under the ADMM-Plus** The ASEAN member states hold the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), a ministerial level meeting among defense authorities in the ASEAN region, and the ADMM-Plus comprising the ASEAN member states and eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan.[14] The ADMM-Plus is the only official meeting of the defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region that includes countries outside the ASEAN region. Thus, the ADMMPlus is highly significant from the perspective of promoting the development and deepening of security and defense cooperation in the region. The MOD/SDF has been participating in and providing support for the meeting. Established under the ministerial-level ADMM-Plus are (1) the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM) 14 The ADMM-Plus was founded in October 2010. Japan, the United States, Australia, the ROK, India, New Zealand, China and Russia participate in this meeting as non-ASEAN countries. 15 Japan proactively contributed to the EWGs in 2018, participating in the EWG on HA/DR in February, April, July and September, in the EWG on PKO in April and November, in EWG on Humanitarian Mine Action in April and October, in the EWG on counter-terrorism in August, in the EWG on Cyber Security in May and November, in the EWG on Maritime Security in May and November, and in the EWG on Military Medicine in February and December. 16 In addition to the Ministers’ meeting at the foreign minister level, the Senior Offi cials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confi dence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, the ARF Defense Offi cials’ Dialogues (DOD) has been held ahead of the main meeting. 17 I 2011 J I d i d N Z l d h t d th thi d ISM MS i T k I 2017 J th Phili i d th U it d St t h t d th i th i T k ----- Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the ASEANJapan Commemorative Summit in December 2013, the first ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting took place in Bagan, Myanmar, in November 2014. This meeting, in which opinions were exchanged on cooperation in nontraditional security areas such as HA/DR and maritime security, was a breakthrough opportunity bringing defense ministers from Japan and the ASEAN member states together for the first time in the history of nearly 50 years of friendship and cooperation between Japan and ASEAN. This marked an important first step towards strengthening defense cooperation in the future. In November 2016, the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting was held in Vientiane, Laos. At that meeting, then Defense Minister Inada announced Japan’s own initiative called the “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” as a guideline for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation, which was welcomed by all ASEAN member states. The “Vientiane Vision” is the first of its kind to present an overall picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation in a transparent manner. Specifically, the vision that urges that cooperation contributing to capacity building in each ASEAN country and the entire ASEAN give priority to three points: (1) consolidating the order based on the principles of international law; (2) promoting maritime security; and (3) coping with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues. Based on the vision, Japan has promoted practical defense cooperation with ASEAN by combining diverse measures including: (1) promotion of international law to share understanding and experience regarding international law; (2) capacity building assistance; (3) defense equipment and technology cooperation; (4) joint training and exercises; and (5) human resource development and academic exchange. Since the year after the announcement of the vision, the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation program has been implemented every year. In the field of maritime security, since 2017, Japan has invited participants in the JapanASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program from all ASEAN nations and the ASEAN Secretariat. In June 2019, Japan implemented the third Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program on MSDF Destroyer JS “Izumo,” which was sailing from Brunei to the Philippines. Japan conducted seminars on HA/DR and international law and international aviation law related to maritime security. In the field of HA/DR, since 2018, Japan has held the Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on HA/DR. In February 2019, Japan held the second round of the invitation program, inviting participants from all ASEAN member states and The 4th ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held on the margins of the ADMM-Plus meeting (October 2018) the ASEAN Secretariat. In this program, a seminar on the Japanese large-scale disaster response guidelines and the first table-top exercise were conducted. In the field of international law, in November 2018, Japan invited all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat to the Japan-ASEAN Symposium on International Law titled “Regional Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and the Rule of Law.” In October 2018, on the sidelines of the fifth ADMMPlus, the fourth ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting was held. In this Meeting, Minister of Defense Iwaya stated that more practical defense cooperation between Japan and ASEAN would be even more important as security issues in the Indo-Pacific region become more diverse and complicated. As a specific measure to strengthen such cooperation, Minister of Defense Iwaya announced that the Professional Airmanship Program would be conducted as a Japan-ASEAN cooperation program to build confidence among air services and promote shared values to maintain the rule of law, inviting air officers from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat to Japan. ASEAN welcomed the recent progress in Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation achieved through various programs since the Vientiane Vision was announced, and ASEAN agreed with Japan to further promote practical defense cooperation going forward. Through these initiatives, Japan has worked to promote capacity building assistance, mutual understanding, and network building with participants from all ASEAN member states through seminars and training programs in various areas, including maritime security and HA/DR, while also fostering a shared recognition about international law, which has contributed to the stability of the Indo-Pacific region. See Reference 50 (Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN) **Chapter** ----- Since 2002, Japan has invited people engaging in the field of security policy from Asia-Pacific countries to Japan as opinion leaders, in order to foster understanding of Japan’s security and defense policies and the situation of the SDF. **(4) Others** **(1) International Conferences Hosted by International** **Organizations** In the Peacekeeping Ministerial Conference held in New York in March 2019, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs referred in his speech to Japan’s recent greater contribution to the United Nations Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities (RDEC), which had been carried out at Japan’s initiative, as well as its efforts for updating the manual for the UN PKO engineering unit, and efforts for increasing the number of female officers in the PKO field. Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) held by the MOD **(B) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum** Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum for the purpose of strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships through the development of human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial level officials. In September 2017, the MOD held the tenth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in Nagoya, in which viceministerial level officials from all ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat participated to exchange their views on three themes: (1) efforts to share universal values, including the rule of law and challenges; (2) measures for disaster response and challenges; and (3) prospects for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation. The participants of the Forum shared the view that, with threats becoming more complicated and diverse, it is important to promote shared universal values, including the rule of law, and improve capabilities to respond to frequent disaster. They also agreed that it is important for the defense authorities to work closely with each other to this end. **(C) Tokyo Defense Forum, Etc.** The MOD has held the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) every year since 1996 for senior officials in charge of defense policy (Director-General level officials and general-level officers) from the countries in the region to discuss defense policies of the participating countries and confidence-building measures in the field of defense. The 23rd Forum, held in March 2019, was attended by 28 countries that are mainly from the Indo-Pacific region as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the EU and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The participants discussed a wide range of matters in the context of the themes of the Forum, “security issues in the Indo-Pacific region” and “changing security challenges and prospects.” **Chapter** See Chapter 5 Section 2 (Initiatives to Support UN Peacekeeping See Operations, etc.) **(2) International Conferences Hosted by Private Organizations** International conferences on security include not only intergovernmental conferences but also meetings organized by private organizations in which various people, such as government officials, scholars, and journalists, participate to discuss medium- to long- term security issues. Major international conferences organized by private bodies include the Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)[18] hosted by IISS and the Munich Security Conference,[19] one of the most prestigious meetings on security in Europe and the United States. Japan’s Foreign Minister Kono and State Minister of Defense Harada attended the 55th Munich Security Conference in February 2019. Dozens of foreign and defense ministers and heads of more than ten international organizations participated in the conference to discuss various matters related to security in Europe, including the issues surrounding NATO and the EU, keeping in mind the security environment that is becoming more complicated. At the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue that was held in June 2019, Defense Minister Iwaya made a speech at the second session, titled “Korean Security: the Next Steps”. In the speech, he called for support for the “Free and Open IndoPacific” vision, which is shared by Japan and the United States. Having said that, he expressed Japan’s view on 18 This is a multilateral conference sponsored by the IISS, a private British think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defenserelated issues and regional defense cooperation. It has been held in Singapore every year since 2002 and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, named after the hotel where it takes place. 19 This is one of the most prestigious international security meetings organized by private bodies in Europe and the United States and has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Usual participants in the meeting include officials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as top leaders, ministers, and lawmakers from countries in the world, and k ti f i t ti l i ti ----- Then Chief of Joint Staff Kawano participating in the Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India (from left: the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Force, the Commander of the French Navy, then Chief of Joint Staff Kawano, the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, and the Commander of the Indian Army) the Indo-Pacific region as well as on the growing importance of the roles of ground forces and mutual trust among them. In September 2019, the MSDF Chief of Staff attended the International Seapower Symposium (ISS) hosted by the United States Navy, promoting mutual understanding and trust, and communicating the MSDF’s efforts to the international community through information sharing and opinion exchange with other high-level navy officers. In November 2019, the MSDF Chief of Staff attended the seminar of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which was held celebrating its tenth anniversary, in which he promoted mutual understanding and strengthened cooperative relationships with the Indian Navy and other IONS members. The ASDF Chief of Staff attended the Royal Air Force’s 100th anniversary event, the Air Power Conference (APC) and the RIAT hosted by the Royal Air Force of UK in July 2018. He exchanged opinions with the British representatives on a variety of topics, including security issues, regional situations, and security cooperation, strengthening the relationship between the air forces of the two countries. In February 2019, the ASDF Chief of Staff attended the International Forum for Air Force Chiefs of Staff in Australia, the Australian International Airshow, the AVALON International Airshow and the International Aerospace and Defence Exposition, building mutual understanding and trust through visits to other countries’ air squadrons and exchanging opinions on security and defense with the commanders of air forces. State Minister of Defense Harada holding a meeting with Swedish Defense Minister Hultqvist at the Munich Security Conference (February 2019) the situation of the Korean Peninsula by underlining the importance of pursuing the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges and calling for solidarity in the international community. Minister Iwaya also held bilateral and trilateral meetings with participating countries, exchanging opinions on the regional situation, including the North Korea situation, and defense exchange and confirming ways of strengthening cooperation in the future. **(3) Service-to-Service Exchange Initiatives** In September 2018, the Chief of Joint Staff attended the Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD) held by the United States Indo-Pacific Command. In this Conference, he shared with other countries his view on the needs for international coordination towards the denuclearization of North Korea, and on the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific from the viewpoint of freedom of navigation and the rule of law. In January 2019, the Chief of Joint Staff attended the Raisina Dialogue, a multilateral forum held in India, as one of the panelists along with the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Defence Force, the Commander of the French Navy, the Commander of the Indian Army, and the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. In his speech, the Chief of Joint Staff emphasized the importance of multilateral coordination in accordance with universal values, including the rule of law and freedom of navigation, and of strong cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia, India, and France, in order to bring about a free and open Indo-Pacific. The GSDF Chief of Staff attended the Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar (CALFS) hosted by the Australian Army in September 2018. He shared his view with other army leaders on the importance, diversity, and instability of **Chapter** 2 Promoting Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation Initiatives **(1) Pacific Partnership** The Pacific Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the ----- U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities, and engage in cultural exchange to strengthen cooperation between countries participating in the initiative and facilitate international peace cooperation activities through cooperation with governments, military forces, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in those countries. Japan has dispatched SDF medical personnel and units under the Pacific Partnership since 2007. In 2019, Japan dispatched medical personnel to the Marshall Islands and Vietnam, in addition to sending its music band members to the Marshall Islands, for medical activities and cultural exchanges. Moreover, Japan also sent lecturers on women’s studies, peace, and security. **(2) Multilateral Training and Exercises** **(1) Significance of Multilateral Training and Exercises in the** **Indo-Pacific Region** In the Indo-Pacific region, the MOD/SDF has actively participated in multilateral training and exercises in nontraditional security fields, such as HA/DR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations. It is important to participate in such multilateral training so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with relevant countries. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively engage in such training. **(2) Initiatives for Multilateral Exercises** The multilateral relationships have recently shifted from the phrase for building trust to the phrase for developing more concrete and practical cooperative relationships. Various multilateral training and exercises have been actively conducted as important initiatives to effectively help this shifting. The SDF joined the multilateral exercise cohosted by the United States and Thailand, Cobra Gold, from January to February 2019. Specifically, the SDF participated in the staff exercises on counter-piracy operations and cooperation and assistance for foreign armies, the field training exercises on rescuing Japanese nationals overseas, and humanitarian and civilian assistance training (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief department and engineering department). The GSDF participated in a multilateral exercise, Khaan Quest 18, in Mongolia in June 2018, and joined by 18 countries. In addition, the GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) every year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation initiatives, inviting officers from relevant countries. In November 2018, the North Eastern Army conducted the large-scale disaster response exercise, Michinoku ALERT 2018, with participants from 15 countries to share knowledge in the HA/ DR field. The MSDF participated in Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise (RIMPAC) 2018, a multilateral exercise hosted by the United States Navy and joined by 26 countries, in the surrounding waters of Hawaii and California from June to August 2018. In August 2018, the MSDF participated in the multilateral exercise Kakadu 2018 hosted by the Australian Navy in the surrounding waters and airspace of Australia. In December 2018, the ASDF participated in the JapanU.S.-Australia joint HA/DR exercise, Christmas Drop, in the Federal States of Micronesia. **4** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Initiatives** transfer[20] of defense equipment within the scope that is approved under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. In particular, by combining such initiatives with other initiatives, such as joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance, Japan aims to implement defense equipment and technology cooperation initiatives when necessary in an effective manner and contributes to the enhancement of Japan’s security and defense cooperation. **Chapter** See Reference 51 (Participation in Multilateral Training [Past Three Years]) **4** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Initiatives** 1 Significance of Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Defense equipment and technology cooperation is one of the important defense cooperation initiatives. The MOD aims to maintain and strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, the capabilities of recipient forces, and mid- to long-term relationships with recipient countries, by enhancing various defense equipment and technology assistance initiatives, including the overseas 20 In case of overseas transfer of defense equipment, an international agreement must be concluded with the recipient country in order to prevent extra-purpose use and transfer to third ti ith t J ’ t F d t il P t IV Ch t 2 S ti 5 ----- See Part IV, Chapter 2, Section 5 (Defense Equipment and See Technology Cooperation) 2 Cooperation with Other Countries The MOD works closely with the National Security Secretariat (NSS), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to develop specific cooperation programs and frameworks through consultations with other countries. In order to deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation, collecting information on recipients’ needs, joint research and development with countries with advanced technology, assistance for the maintenance and management of equipment, and communication of information through public-private initiatives, while also working toward the establishment of a regular working-level consultation framework. See Reference 37 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of See Agreements) Reference 62 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) **5** **Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Assistance** See Fig. III-3-1-6 (Recent Capacity Building Assistance Initiatives See (from April 2018 to May 2019)) The MOD/SDF’s capacity building assistance programs are aimed at improving the capabilities of recipient countries in a concrete and steady manner over a certain period of time. Some programs are carried out by dispatching MOD/SDF officials to the recipient country, by inviting recipient country’s officials to Japan, or by a combination of both. With the first method, SDF officials with technical knowledge are dispatched to the recipient country to help the recipient country’s forces and their related organizations through seminars, field training, and technical guidance. With the second method, the recipient country’s officials are invited to the MOD/SDF’s units and institutions to learn human resources development, education, and training that the MOD/SDF provides through seminars, field training, and observing the education and training programs. In 2018, the number of capacity building assistance programs conducted by means of dispatch was 137 (13 countries, 23 officials), and the number of those conducted by means of invitation was 63 (7 countries, 9 trainees). Under the dispatch programs, the MOD/SDF has provided technical assistance on engineering activities, such as road construction in Mongolia, which builds on previous assistance, and engineering assistance for the Harii Hamutuk training program sponsored by Australian forces in TimorLeste. Japan has also provided support for a military band in Papua New Guinea, which served in 2018 as the chair of the APEC forum. This program was conducted in coordination with MOFA’s assistance, which involved the granting of new musical instruments through Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the dispatch of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) experts. On a made-bygovernment basis, Japan thus supported the establishment and training of the military band of the Papua New Guinea Defense Force. The band gave an excellent performance in f t f ti l l d t th APEC ti i N b 1 Objectives of Capacity Building Assistance In today’s security environment, no country can maintain its peace and stability on its own. It is indispensable for the international community to unite to resolve global issues. The defense authorities of Southeast Asian and other countries have either requested the MOD to provide capacity building assistance, or expressed their expectations for such cooperation. In response to such expectations, the MOD/ SDF started to provide capacity building assistance in the security and defense areas in 2012. Providing assistance for capacity building has the following objectives: (1) creating an ideal of a more advantageous security environment for Japan by cooperating with recipient countries in the Indo-Pacific and other regions to help with the steady development of their own capacity building initiatives, develop in a steady manner, and enabling the recipient countries’ forces to play adequate roles in maintaining international peace and regional stability; (2) strengthening bilateral relationships with recipient countries; (3) strengthening relationships with other donor countries, such as the United States and Australia; and (4) promoting Japan’s efforts to work proactively and independently to realize regional peace and stability, and to gain trust in the MOD/SDF and Japan as a whole. Capacity building assistance initiatives also facilitate the improvement of SDF capabilities. The MOD/SDF will implement capacity building assistance programs effectively by carefully coordinating with diplomatic policies and combining various means to maximize effects, while also tapping into the knowledge accumulated at the SDF. 2 Specific Activities The MOD/SDF has provided capacity building assistance in such areas as HA/DR, PKO, and maritime security to 15 countries and one organization in the Asia-Pacific and other regions. **Chapter** ----- **Fig. III-3-1-6** Recent Capacity Building Assistance Initiatives (from April 2018 to May 2019) **Chapter** Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Mongolia Laos Vietnam Military medicine Military medicine Civil engineering HA/DR 【Underwater medicine* Air rescue, PKO, cybersecurity】 Myanmar Philippines Underwater medicine, establishment of an environment for learning Vessel maintenance the Japanese language, aviation meteorology 【Civil engineering, Military medicine* 】 Sri Lanka ASEAN 【Search and HA/DR rescue (*) Military medicine】 Thailand Cambodia Malaysia Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea Aviation safety, PKO Civil engineering HA/DR Vehicle maintenance Military band development 【Civil engineering* 】 - Includes collaborative projects with other countries providing assistance 2018, contributing to the success of APEC. Other programs that have thus far been conducted include seminars on air rescue, PKO, and submarine medicine in Vietnam, seminars and field training on aviation meteorology for the establishment of a weather services unit of the Myanmar Air Force, and practical training on search and rescue and medical activities in Laos. The invitation programs conducted so far include seminars on SDF medical training for medical personnel of the Sri Lanka Navy, training at the GSDF Quartermaster School for Royal Thai Army personnel to be dispatched to the UNMISS, and medical training for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In addition, as part of capacity building assistance for Africa, the MOD/SDF implemented from October to December 2018 a program for supporting the enhancement of disaster response capacity for Djibouti forces, including education on how to operate engineering equipment, such as hydraulic shovels, graders, and dozers, in order to strengthen the bilateral relationship. ASDF personnel explaining aviation meteorology to the Myanmar Air Force (January 2019) 3 Cooperation with Partner Countries In efforts to stabilize the regional security environment, Japan’s cooperation with other donor countries is essential. In particular, Japan’s capacity building cooperation with the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom is considered a priority. ThejointstatementoftheJapan U S SecurityConsultative ----- **Chapter** **Practical Initiatives Toward Enhancement of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster** **Relief Capabilities of ASEAN** **Senior Fellow Tomohiko Satake, Policy Simulation Division under the Director of Policy Simulation, National** **Institute for Defense Studies (Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)** On January 30, 2019, I participated as a facilitator in a tabletop exercise on Japan-ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (Japan-ASEAN HA/DR Table Top Exercise [TTX]) conducted at the National Institute for Defense Studies. I was also involved in the agenda setting and scenario drafting for the TTX. The TTX was part of the 2nd Japan-ASEAN Invitation Program on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) hosted by the International Policy Division, inviting military and other participants from all ASEAN member states. Its purpose was to familiarize participants with the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) of the Multinational Coordination Center (MNCC) developed by initiatives taken by Japan and Laos in preparation for disasters. In recent years, ASEAN has been exploring joint disaster relief operation, including the establishment of ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HA/DR, which specializes in HA/DR. In order to support the united approaches of ASEAN, this TTX discussed specific operations of SOP based on a scenario assuming typhoon damage in the region in three phases: (1) immediately after the disaster; (2) a week after the disaster; and (3) the period of withdrawal of assisting countries. Through the day-long discussion, both Japanese and ASEAN participants were able to deepen their understanding of the roles assigned by SOP to individual groups and MNCC operations. This was a wonderful opportunity for me as a researcher to experience defense diplomacy directly. I strongly hope that the TTX will contribute to the improvement of joint disaster relief operations in the region and to the strengthening of Japan-ASEAN relations. Author listening to a presentation by a participant in the TTX Author moderating during the TTX (second from left) Committee (SCC) in April 2015 states that the two countries would strengthen their continued close coordination on cooperation including capacity building assistance to realize peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. The two ministers agreed to promote defense cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, including capacity building assistance. Under a Japan-Australia personnel exchange program, the MOD has received an official from the Australian Department of Defense to its International Policy Division’s Capacity Building Office four times since 2013. In exchange, the MOD has dispatched an official to the Australian Department of Defense three times since 2015. In November 2017, Japan and Australia held the first working group on capacity building assistance. Japan has also cooperated with the United States and Australia in providing capacity building assistance to TimorLeste. The SDF and the U.S. forces participated in the Harii Hamutuk capacity building assistance program sponsored by the Australian forces in Timor-Leste four times since October 2015, providing technical guidance on engineering, including construction for engineering units of the TimorLeste forces. In the joint statement issued for the third Japan-UK Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting in December 2017, Japan and the United Kingdom welcomed progress of coordination of capacity building in developing countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and Africa, and shared the view to use a coordination mechanism for future joint capacity building in strategic priorities such as maritime security, counterterrorism, cybersecurity, HA/DR. It is important for Japan and other countries providing capacity building assistance to conduct such assistance effectively and efficiently by closely coordinating with and mutually complementing each other. ----- **Section** **2** **Ensuring Maritime Security** The NDPG states that for Japan, a maritime nation, strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans” based on fundamental norms, such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime and air transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. From this viewpoint, the MOD/SDF will promote assistance that contributes to improving capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, such as India, **1** **Counter-Piracy Operations** Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. Sri Lanka, and other South and Southeast Asian states. Moreover, Japan will promote such activities as joint training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges, and active port visits on these occasions. Japan will also conduct activities such as anti-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening the capabilities of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). See Chapter 1, Section 2-1-3 (Initiatives towards Ensuring See Maritime Security) States, have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As part of its counter-piracy initiatives, the EU has been conducting Operation Atalanta since December 2008, in addition to the counter-piracy operations conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)[2] that was established in January 2009. Meanwhile, other countries have been dispatching their assets to the area. The international community continues to have a critical interest in and take actions to tackle the acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. As these initiatives by the international community have proved to be effective, the number of acts of piracy occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has currently hovered at a low level. However, the assumed root causes of piracy such as terrorism and poverty in Somalia have still remained unsolved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability to crack down on piracy is also still insufficient, if the international community reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Therefore, there is no great change in the situation in which Japan must carry out its counter-piracy operations. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-3 (3) (Counter-Piracy Operations) Fig. III-3-2-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the Number of Incidents in Southeast Asia) **Chapter** 1 Basic Concept The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by itself, the SDF is to take action as well. 2 Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy and Initiatives by the International Community For Japan and the international community, the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are extremely important sea lanes, connecting Europe and the Middle East with East Asia. Successive United Nations Security Council resolutions[1] were adopted, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008 in response to the frequent occurrence of and rapid increase in the piracy incidents with the purpose of acquiring ransoms by detaining hostages caused by pirates, who are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers. These resolutions have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United 3 Japanese Initiatives **(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations** In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Other United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are: Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions 1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013), Resolution 2184 (adopted in 2014), Resolution 2246 (adopted in 2015), Resolution 2316 (adopted in 2016), Resolution 2383 (adopted in 2017), and Resolution 2442 (adopted in 2018). Th CMF th h d t f hi h i l t d i B h i d th t bli h t f th CTF i J 2009 ltil t l bi d t k f f t i ti ----- Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia) **Fig. III-3-2-1** Personnel of the Deployment Support Group conducting a security operation at the base in Djibouti manners – direct escort of private vessels across the Gulf of Aden, and zone defense in allocated areas in the Gulf of Aden. There are JCG officers aboard the MSDF destroyer.[5] **b. Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement** The Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DAPE) conducts counterpiracy activities using the MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft (two aircraft dispatched). The unit conducts warning and surveillance operations in the flight zone that is determined in coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters and confirms any suspicious boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information to the MSDF destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as confirming the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by MSDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with other related organizations, and contributes significantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected of being pirate ships. **c. Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement** In order to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the DAPE, the Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) carries out activities such as maintenance of the facility set up in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport. **d. Transport Unit** The Airlift Squadron regularly operates ASDF transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials required by the DAPE and the DGPE. **e. CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters** In order to strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations, (Number of incidents) 237 250 218 219 Somalia and surroundings 200 Southeast Asia 141141 147[147] 150 128 102 111 104 100 83 70 70 68 54 75 60 48 80 76 50 22 51 46 15 11 0 2 9 3 0 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (Year) Notes: The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-affiliated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two MSDF destroyers[3] began providing direct escort to Japan-affiliated vessels, while MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and surveillance operations in June the same year. In view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the Anti-Piracy Measures Act[4] in July the same year in order to deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy. This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their flag states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels. Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came into force on November 2013, which made it possible to have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry small arms for the purpose of security operations. See Reference 15 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 16 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units); **Chapter** **(2) Activities by the Self-Defense Forces** **a. Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement** The Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) conducts counterpiracy measures using MSDF destroyers (one destroyer dispatched). The DSPE strives to ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area in two different The number of destroyers was changed to one from December 2016. Official name: Acts on Punishment of and Measures against Acts of Piracy Ei ht JCG ffi b d d d t j di i l l f t ti iti i l di ti d i t ti i t i d ----- **Fig. III-3-2-2** Structure of the Deployed Forces |Commander, Deplo for Counter Pi|yment Surface Force racy Enforcement| |---|---| |Commander, Depl for Counter Pira|oyment Air Force cy Enforcement| |---|---| ||| ||| MSDF personnel Commander, GSDF personnel Self Defense Fleet MSDF and GSDF personnel Commander, Deployment Surface Force Commander, Deployment Air Force Commander, Deployment Support Group Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for Counter Piracy Enforcement for Counter Piracy Enforcement for Counter Piracy Enforcement Deployed unit at the Headquarters Headquarter Headquarter Total of less than 20 personnel Squadron Support and Operation Guard Military Police 1 destroyer (2 P-3Cs) logistics units units units units Total approx. 200 personnel Total approx. 60 personnel Total approx. 110 personnel (about 30 maritime, about 80 ground) Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard [Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Escort private ships with destroyers and conduct zone defense within CTF 151 - Special Boarding Unit personnel aboard [Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement] - 1 or 2 patrol helicopters, Conduct surveillance flight over the Gulf of Aden by P-3C patrol aircraft as well as 1 or 2 special boats [Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Conduct duties related to necessary support for the DAPE to conduct counter-piracy operations [CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters] SDF personnel serving as CTF 151 commander and command center officers facilitate coordination among units of countries participating in CTF 151 - In addition, Airlift Squadron comprised of C-130H transport aircraft under the Air Support Commander will provide airborne transportation of materials etc. when necessary. **Fig. III-3-2-3** SDF’s Counter Piracy Operations (image) |Col1|ment Support Group cy Enforcement|Col3| |---|---|---| |||Headquarter| |||| |||| |Guard units|Military Police units| |---|---| **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|Activities by other countries|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Naval Vessels|||Patrol aircraft| |Escort National Tasking (Japan, China, India, etc.)|Zone Defense CTF151 (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, etc.) EUNAVFOR (Spain, Netherlands, Italy, etc.)||CTF151 (Japan) EUNAVFOR (Germany, Spain)| |(Note) The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out by all the participating countries in rotation.|||| |[Zone Defense] (*) Warning and surveillance activities within specific waters|or|[Escort] (*) Escorting private vessels using the direct escort| |---|---|---| Outline of Counter Piracy Operations Deployment Forces for Counter Piracy Enforcement Activities by other countries ■ Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement Naval Vessels Patrol aircraft (approx. 200 personnel/one Destroyer) [Eight Coast Guard Officers aboard ] Escort Zone Defense ■ Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (approx.60 personnel/two P-3C patrol aircraft) National Tasking CTF151 CTF151 ■ Deployment Support Group for Counter Enforcement (Japan, China, India, etc.) (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, etc.) (Japan) (approx. 110 personnel) EUNAVFOR EUNAVFOR CTF151 (Spain, Netherlands, Italy, etc.) (Germany, Spain) [Surveillance flight (P-3C patrol aircraft)] (Note) The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out by Provision of information regarding the airspace all the participating countries in rotation. over the escort route Yemen Escort Route (900-1,100 km) Djibouti CTF151 National Tasking [Zone Defense] (*) [Escort] (*) Warning and surveillance activities within or Escorting private vessels using the direct specific waters escort (*) One vessel system (one for direct escort and one for zone defense) has been deployed since December 14, Somalia 2016.Escort is carried out as a major activity, and zone defense is conducted during the non-escort operation period. Potions Copyright©2016 GeoCatalog Inc. Source：Esri, DigitalGlobe, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, GeoEye, Getmapping, AeroGRID, IGP, UPR-EGP, and the GIS Community 0 50 100 200km ----- the MOD has dispatched SDF personnel to the CTF 151 Headquarters since August 2014. During the period from May to August 2015, the SDF also dispatched a CTF 151 commander for the first time, while between March and June 2017 and March and June 2018 a CTF 151 commander as well as staff were also dispatched to the Headquarters. **f. Achievements** As of May 31, 2019, the DSPE has escorted 4,005 vessels. Under the protection of the SDF destroyers, not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and these vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden. As for the DAPE has conducted the following activities: aircraft have flown 2,288 missions with their flying hours totaling 17,230 hours; and information was provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 14,070 occasions. The activities conducted by the DAPE account for approximately 70-80% of the warning and surveillance operations carried out in the Gulf of Aden by the international community. See Fig. III-3-2-2 (Structure of the Deployed Forces) See Fig. III-3-2-3 (SDF’s Counter Piracy Operations (image))) Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense Yamada attending the 33rd DAPE return ceremony (January 2019) national leaders and others have expressed their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly well-received by the United Nations Security Council Resolution. Moreover, the MSDF destroyers, which are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. Additionally, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other groups expressed appreciation for protection of Japan-related vessels and asked for continuation of efforts in fighting against piracy. **Chapter** 4 Praise for Japan’s Endeavors The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been highly praised by the international community. For example, **2** **Training-Centered Initiatives** The MSDF not only endeavors to enhance its tactical skills through joint training with coastal states alongside sea lanes, but also strives to contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, promote mutual understanding, and strengthen relationships of trust. Recently, the Indo Southeast Asia Deployment, consisting of three destroyers including Destroyer JS “Kaga,” carried out training with India and Sri Lanka, among others, during a lengthy deployment to the Indo-Pacific region between August and October 2018. Three destroyers, including Destroyer JS “Izumo,” also conduct Indo-Pacific Deployment in 2019. The vessels also made a number of port calls timed to coincide with this training. Strengthening cooperation with coastal states of the Indo-Pacific region through the joint training and port calls contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, which has extremely high significance. See Reference 51 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)) Fig. III-3-2-4 (Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF (2018)) **3** **Cooperation in Maritime Security** The MOD/SDF implements capacity building assistance in maritime security for Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines and Sri Lanka, thereby supporting coastal countries to enhance their MDA and other capabilities. Such program contributes to strengthening cooperation with partners countries that share common strategic interests with Japan. The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was approved by a Cabinet decision in May 2018, calls for strengthening cooperation related to maritime security with various countries through security dialogue and defense interaction among defense authorities at bilateral and multilateral levels with the aim of maintaining and advancing “free and open seas” supported by a maritime order defined by laws and ----- **Indo Southeast Asia Deployment** For August 26 to October 30, 2018, MSDF Destroyers JS “Kaga,” “Inazuma” and “Suzutsuki,” and five helicopters (with approximately 820 crewmembers) participated in Indo Southeast Asia Deployment. The purpose of the deployment was to conduct joint exercises with navies in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance tactical techniques of our troops and promote cooperation with the navies. We conducted exercises with seven countries, and visited five countries to conduct unit-to-unit exchanges and the Ship Rider Cooperation Program. “The free and open Indo-Pacific” is premised on regional peace and stability. Towards its realization, the MSDF will promote cooperation by increasing mutual understanding and strengthening confidence with other countries. indicates approximate sea area of the exercise, etc. **Chapter** Activity overview (image) (ports are numbered in the order of visit) Kure/Sasebo “Kaga” “Inazuma” “Suzutsuki” *Up to Indonesia Visakhapatnam(Oct. 7 to 11) Katsuren Subic (Sept. 1 to 5) Capacity building Changi (Oct. 18 to 23) Colombo (Sept. 30 to Oct. 4) Capacity building Jakarta (Sept. 18 to 22) Japan-U.S. joint exercise, Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise, Japan-Philippine joint exercise, various tactical exercises Japan-Indonesia goodwill exercise, Japan-U.K. joint exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise, Ship Rider Cooperation Program, Japan-India joint exercise Welcome event at port of Jakarta (joint press conference) Destroyer JS “Kaga” and C-90 aircraft transferred from Japan to the Philippines (Japan-Philippine joint exercise) Sri Lankan navy offi cers participating in Ship Rider Cooperation Program rules. In response to this, the MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime security within regional security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM-Plus and the ISM on MS. In February 2019, the first Japan-Sri Lanka Navy to Navy staff talks took place, at which the two sides agreed to hold the annual joint exercise “JA-LAN”. Exchange of the signed document on the agreement reached at Japan-Sri Lanka Navy to Navy staff talks (February 2019) ----- **Fig. III-3-2-4** Visit to Ports and Airports by SDF (2018) Eielson Air Force Base RAF Fairford Stockholm Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson JBER Helsinki Scott Air Force Base CFB Greenwood Berlin Visakhapatnam Cheongju Xiangyang Rosecrans Air National Guard Base Portsmouth Agra Kolkata Travis Air Force Base Ankara Mumbai Kalaikunda San Diego Barcelona Fujairah Chiang Mai Mina Salman Phnom Penh Nha Trang/Cam Ranh International Port Pearl Harbor Norfolk Abu Dhabi Manila/Subic Libby Army Airfield Jiddah Duqm Goa Antonio Bautista Air Base Djibouti Chennai Saipan, Tinian, Rota Manzanillo Nairobi Trincomalee Yap Guam Majuro Colombo Palau Kota Kinabalu Federated States of Micronesia Mattala Rajapaksa Bangkok/U-Tapao Honiara Kuantan Nadi Kuala Lumpur Port Moresby Changi Bengkulu 5 times or more Jakarta Sydney Muara/Bandar Seri Begawan 3 times or more Balikpapan Twice Melbourne Darwin Once **Section** **3** **Cooperation in Use of Space and Cyber Domains** In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. Rapid expansion in the use of space and cyber domains is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which makes the establishment of international rules and norms a security agendum. The MOD/SDF will, based on the NDPG, **Chapter** swiftly achieve superiority in space and cyber domain by strengthening coordination and cooperation with relevant countries through information sharing, consultation, exercise, and capacity building assistance, while promoting measures concerning the development of international norms. See Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Responses in the Domains of Space, Cyberspace and Electromagnetic Spectrum) **1** **Cooperation in the Use of Space Domain** Regarding the use of the space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fields including the SSA and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others. The MOD/SDF has taken part in the annual SSA multinational tabletop exercise (Global Sentinel) and the Schriever Wargame, a multinational tabletop exercise on space security, hosted by the U.S. Forces and is working to share the recognition of threats in space among multiple countries and acquire knowledge related to cooperation regarding SSA and guarantee of space system functions. See Chapter 2, Section 2 (Strengthening Ability of Japan-U.S. The MOD/SDF is also working on cooperation with countries other than the United States. For example, the JapanAustralia Space Security Dialogue and Japan-U.S.-Australia Space Security Dialogue are held to exchange opinions on space policy. With France, based on the agreement to strengthen bilateral dialogue on space at the Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting in March 2015, the two countries decided to start the Japan-France Comprehensive Space Dialogue. At the 2nd Japan-France Comprehensive Space Dialogue in March 2017, in order to strengthen bilateral cooperation on SSA, the two countries signed a technology arrangement on information sharing pertaining to space situation awareness between the competent authority of Japan and the Minister of Defense of the Republic of France, and ----- agreed to promote specific cooperation initiatives. With the EU, it was decided to start the Japan-EU Space Policy Dialogue at the Japan-EU Summit in May 2014, and four dialogue sessions have been held. At the Japan-India summit **2** **Cooperation in the Use of Cyber Domain** Regarding the use of the cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises. The MOD has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense authorities of Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, Estonia, and others to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country. With NATO, the MOD carries out initiatives looking at possible future operational cooperation, such as establishing a cyber dialogue between defense authorities called the Japan-NATO Expert Staff Talks on Cyber Defense and participating in the cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition) hosted by NATO as an observer. Furthermore, Japan has participated in the International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon) and has participated as an observer in a cyber defense exercise meeting in October 2018, the two countries decided to start space dialogue between the governments, and the MOD participated in the first meeting held in March 2019. See Section 1-2 (Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) See (Locked Shields), both organized by the CCDCOE based in Estonia. The MOD is further developing collaborative relationships with NATO in the cyber domain through the dispatch of personnel to the Centre since March 2019. In addition, the IT Forum has been held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia to exchange views on initiatives in the information communications area including cybersecurity and current trends in technology. The MOD has been expanding the cooperation by implementing human resource development seminars for Vietnamese Forces in the area of cybersecurity as part of its capacity building assistance in December 2017 and March 2019. See Section 1-2 (Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) See Section 1-5 (Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity Building Assistance) **Chapter** **Strengthening Cyber Collaboration with NATO** **NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (Tallinn, Estonia)** **Keiko Kono, Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies** Since March 2019, I have been working as a researcher at the Law Branch of NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia. The centre holds a multinational cyber defense exercise named Locked Shields and an annual international conference (CyCon) every year, and it also provides various education and training opportunities to military officers and government officials. Furthermore, the centre conducts research on various aspects of cyber security and publishes the outcome through its websites and other means. This year, as a member of the headquarters, I engaged in the legal play of Locked Shields by drafting legal questions and scoring answers presented from 23 teams participating in the exercise. I also research legal issues on cyber defense in the Law Branch. How to respond to cyber attacks in terms of international law, strategy, technology and operation has been increasingly attracting attention also at NATO. Expectations for the centre, which conducts research, education/training and exercises in these fields, have been rising year by year. I wish to learn the latest research trends at NATO and contribute to research projects of the centre as a member of the centre, and reflect my expertise in initiatives launched by the MOD/SDF in these fields. Author working at NATO CCDCOE (second from right) ----- Considering the fact that cyber attacks occur beyond national borders, it is important to continue to strengthen international cooperation in the cyber field through exchanges **Section** **4** **Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and missiles that can deliver them, as well as the proliferation of not only conventional arms but also goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use, pose a pressing challenge to the peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive needs. In order to deal with these issues, an international framework for arms control, disarmament, and non of views with defense authorities of other countries and relevant organizations such as the CCDCOE, and active participation in cyber defense exercises. proliferation has been developed under which Japan has played an active role. Pursuant to the NDPG, Japan will further promote the initiatives in this field in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). See Fig. III-3-4-1 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and See Non- Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.) **1** **Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation** its establishment, in accordance with the CWC regulations. Moreover, the whole of the Japanese Government is also working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC. The MOD/SDF has seconded GSDF and other personnel to the Cabinet Office to handle this project, and since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 18 occasions. In addition, the MOD has been cooperating in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, by dispatching MOD officials to major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as international export control regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). At the same time, SDF personnel were **Chapter** Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles that can deliver them, and associated technologies and materials. Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the field of chemical protection since the negotiating stage and dispatching GSDF personnel who are experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously implement verification measures following the entry of the CWC into force. In addition, small quantities of the chemical substances under the regulation of the CWC are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. Thus, the school has undergone inspections ten times in total since Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, **Fig. III-3-4-1** Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc. |Category|Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.|Col3|Col4|Col5|Conventional Weapons| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Nuclear Weapons|Chemical Weapons|Biological Weapons|Delivery Systems (Missiles)|| |Conventions on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, etc.|Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)|Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)|Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)|The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)|Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)| |Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Non-Proliferation|Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)|Australia Group (AG)||Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)|Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)| |New International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction|Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540||||| ----- **Chapter** **Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)** No international consensus on the definition of LAWS has yet been reached. International discussions on this matter have been continuing under the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). In March 2019, before the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS under the framework of CCW, Japan submitted a working paper. The submission aimed to contribute to well-balanced discussions considering both humanity and security perspectives at GGE this year so that GGE can set a direction for possible future actions of the international community on LAWS. The paper describes Japan’s approach to the key issues: (1) definition of LAWS; (2) definition of lethality; (3) form of human control; (4) scope of rules; (5) relationships with international law and ethics, and; (6) measures for confidence building. At the meeting, active discussions were made on the key issues but gaps remained between the positions of the countries. The MOD, as it has indicated, has no plan to develop any fully autonomous lethal weapons systems without human involvement, nor will the ministry conduct R&D of equipment that is not permitted under international or domestic laws. On the other hand, autonomous weapons systems do have positive security significance in terms of saving labor and reducing human error. Moving toward a common understanding in the international community, including major countries, MOD will continue to participate in making international rules actively and constructively, while considering Japan’s security and clearly presenting its approach. dispatched to training to foster substitute inspectors[1] provided by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). See Reference 52 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to See International Organizations) to international humanitarian law, and other matters. Japan intends to continue its active involvement in the discussions, while also considering the standpoints of national security. Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international community that focus on the problem of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the UN. In addition, the MOD/SDF participates in the meetings under the frameworks of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the UN Report on Military Expenditures and Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) with the purpose of increasing the transparency of its military preparedness and military expenditure, and provides the requisite reports. It also dispatches personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings for reviewing and improving these systems. Since April 2018 the MOD/SDF has been sending a Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studies as a member of the Group of Experts[4] of the 1540 Committee established pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540[5] (Resolution 1540). In order to promote implementation of the resolution, the researcher handles reviews of reports from UN member countries, responses to technical questions, and other activities. Japan has signed various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW),[2] based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. In addition, Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention),[3] which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention, the disposal of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015. The Ministry dispatches personnel to Group of Governmental Experts meetings related to LAWS and other events as necessary under the CCW framework. International discussions related to LAWS are under way on humanmachine interaction in the use of LAWS, issues pertaining Experts in relevant fields registered with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization, in preparation for the implementation of On-site Inspections (OSI) following the effective date of the CTBT. They are also expected to become inspectors who conduct OSI after the CTBT enters into force. CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects Major producers and owners of cluster munitions such as the United States, China and Russia have not signed the Oslo Convention. Group of experts who support implementation of the mandate of the 1540 Committee set up under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (Resolution 1540). Nine experts (usually their term is two years) handle reviews of reports from UN member countries, respond to technical questions, support implementation, and conduct other activities. Adopted in April 2004 to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery [missiles]) to non-state actors. The resolution imposes obligations on all states to (1) refrain from providing any form of support to terrorists, etc. that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction, etc.; (2) adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit terrorists, etc. from developing weapons of mass destruction; and (3) take ff ti t t bli h d ti t l ( t ti b d d t t l t ) t t th lif ti f f d t ti t ----- **2** **International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)[6] in May 2003, and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI; PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related items and meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations. Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), the MOD/SDF has collaborated with relevant organizations and countries, dispatching MOD officials and SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004. The MOD/SDF has participated in PSI maritime interdiction exercises, hosted by Japan, thrice, working in partnership with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, and also participated in the PSI air interdiction exercise in July 2012, which Japan hosted for the first time. Japan organized Pacific Shield 18, a PSI maritime prevention exercise, in July 2018, to carry out training in activities to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction with Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, Singapore, and the United States. ASDF personnel boarding a suspicious ship in a PSI interdiction exercise (July 2018) Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of WMDs and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD/SDF strives to strengthen nonproliferation frameworks including PSI, as well as holding various relevant exercises and meetings and participating in the same kind of activities which other countries hold. See Fig. III-3-4-2 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction See Exercise (Since 2012)) **Chapter** **Fig. III-3-4-2** Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since FY2012) |Date|Exercise|Location|Participation of the MOD/SDF| |---|---|---|---| |July 2012|PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan|Japan|Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Air Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, GSDF Seventh Chemical Weapon Defense Unit and Central Nuclear Biological Chemical Weapon Defense Unit, Internal Bureau (including two aircraft)| |September 2012|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK|ROK|Joint Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one ship and one aircraft)| |February 2013|PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE|UAE|Dispatch of observer (Joint Staff)| |August 2014|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the United States|United States|Joint Staff (including one ship)| |November 2015|PSI interdiction exercise hosted by New Zealand|New Zealand|Joint Staff| |September 2016|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Singapore|Singapore|Joint Staff| |September 2017|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Australia|Australia|Joint Staff, Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, Internal Bureau (including one aircraft)| |July 2018|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by Japan|Japan|Joint Staff, Ground Defense Command, Self Defense Fleet, Eastern Army, Yokosuka Regional Unit, Chemical School, Internal Bureau (including two vessels, two aircraft and three vehicles)| An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly t k hil l i ith i ti d ti d i t ti l l i d t t th lif ti f WMD d l t d t i l ----- **Section** **5** **Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** The MOD/SDF has been proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of ODA for resolving the fundamental causes of conflicts, terrorism and other problems. The NDPG states that, in line with the Legislation for **1** **Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities** 1 Framework of International Peace Cooperation Activities and Background to Stipulating Such Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the MOD/SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace cooperation assignments such as United Nations peacekeeping operations (the so-called UN PKO); (2) international disaster relief activities to respond to largescale natural disasters overseas; (3) activities based on the former Special Measures Act on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and (4) activities based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, and the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Act. In 2007, international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities,[1] were upgraded to become one of the primary missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.[2] In March 2016, the Legislation for Peace and Security was enforced, which allows cooperation and support operations in response to situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing based on general laws without establishing a special measures act. Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of missions, situations in host countries, and political and economic relations between Japan and host countries. 2 Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operation. For this reason, all three branches of the SDF, namely the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, designate dispatch stand-by units, and the designated units are always ready to be deployed. In September 2015, the UN launched the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) to enable the UN Headquarters to grasp the registered items of each country more specifically in order to ensure the flexibility and readiness of international peacekeeping activities. In light of this change, Japan registered engineering units and staff officers of mission headquarters in March 2016. **Chapter** International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted **Fig. III-3-5-1** by the SDF See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2 (Framework for Operation of Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in Self Defense Forces following Implementation of Peace and Security Legislation) Fig. III-3-5-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF) Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on Reference 15 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 16 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units); Activities to Respond to International Terrorism Reference 53 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter Reference 54 (The SDF Record in International Peace -Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010) Cooperation Activities) International Peace Cooperation Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” International Disaster Relief Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams” Cooperation and Support Activities, etc. for the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries Activities in accordance with the “Act Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in Situations that the International Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security” Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009) Activities to Respond to International Terrorism Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter -Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010) Legend： : Activities based on time-limited acts : Activities based on permanent acts Affairs prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Law (miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions Missions defined in Article 3 of the SDF Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan (in 2007), and international peace cooperation activities. In accordance with the entry into force of the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2016, “situations in di J ” i d t “ it ti th t ill h i t t i fl J ’ d it ” ----- Additionally, at the Defense Ministers Meeting on UN PKO held in November 2017, Japan announced that it would make arrangements for additional registration of fixed-wing aircraft for PCRS to enable air transport assistance for rapid PKO deployment. Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing information-gathering abilities and protection abilities, which are required for the SDF units to carry out their missions while ensuring the safety of personnel and units in international peace cooperation activities, etc. In addition, in order to respond to various environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment, and information communication, as well as developing a structure of logistic and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous operations. With regard to the education necessary for engaging in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit, which belongs to the Ground Component Command, provides training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College offers not only basic education courses on international peace cooperation activities, but also specialized education to train personnel who can be appointed as contingent commanders of UN PKO missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN standard training materials and foreign instructors. Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has also provided education for personnel from foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies. This initiative represents **2** **Initiatives to Support UN PKO, etc.** As a means to promote peace and stability in conflict regions around the world, UN PKO have expanded their missions in recent years to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, and other fields, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefire monitoring. To date, there are 14 UN PKO missions ongoing (as of the end of May 2019). International organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and NGO conduct relief and the approach taken by the MOD/ SDF, which emphasizes the necessity of collaboration and cooperation with other related ministries and foreign countries, based on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and complicated international peace cooperation activities. The initiative aims to contribute to more effective international peace cooperation activities by enhancing collaboration in the field of education. 3 Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched SDF Units SDF personnel are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families. Therefore, it is extremely important to make necessary arrangements so that dispatched SDF personnel can effectively carry out their assigned duty while maintaining both their physical and mental health. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has implemented various measures to support families to reduce anxiety for the dispatched SDF personnel and their families. In addition, the SDF also provides the following types of mental health care support for personnel to be sent as necessary according to the characteristics of the deployed forces: (1) a pre-dispatch course to acquire necessary knowledge on stress reduction; (2) mental health assessment conducted several times during the pre-dispatch to postdispatch period; (3) counseling on anxiety, trouble and other matters among the dispatched personnel provided by mental health personnel being dispatched; (4) dispatch of mental healthcare support teams from Japan consisting mainly of medical officers with specialized knowledge; (5) education before returning to Japan for reducing stress upon return; (6) temporary health checkups after returning to Japan. **Chapter** restoration activities for the victims of conflicts and largescale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries. Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation activities in various regions, including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 25 years, and the results of these activities have been highly praised both inside and outside of Japan. In addition to continuous dispatch of staff officers to UNMISS, Japan is able to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security along with enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. In April 2019, Japan started to dispatch staff officers to the ----- Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Based on the NDPG and the MTDP,[3] Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities. In particular, Japan will actively contribute through such activities as dispatch of personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building assistance in Japan’s field of expertise by making good use of accumulated experience, while working on human resource development. 1 [International Conferences Related to UN Peacekeeping ] Operations At the ministers’ meeting on UN PKO held in New York (the United States) in March 2019, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs mentioned the following as Japan’s future contributions: further contribution to UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities (RDEC) where Japan had played a central role, because a high level of capability and readiness for each deployed unit and personnel is critical for the success of peacekeeping missions; revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual by taking advantage of knowledge and skills acquired from Japan’s experiences and initiatives to increase female personnel in PKO. Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Nishida making a speech at the United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial (March 2019) establishment of the United Nations Force and Observers contemplated by the Treaty of Peace, the President of the Security Council announced that it would not be possible for the United Nations to provide such peacekeeping force. Against this backdrop, in August 1981, the parties signed the Protocol to the Treaty of Peace through the agency of the United States, establishing the MFO as an alternative to the envisioned UN force. Since 1982, when its activities started, by facilitating dialogue and confidence building between Egypt and Israel, the MFO has contributed to peace and stability in the Middle East, which is a foundation of peace and prosperity for Japan. With rising expectations of Japan’s role in the Middle East, Japan has provided financial assistance to the MFO since FY1988. The MFO has expressed appreciation to Japan’s contribution this background, the MFO requested that Japan send staff officers to its headquarters. In response, Japan decided to send staff officers as part of its continued efforts toward further promoting peace and stability of the region. On **Chapter** 2 Dispatch to the MFO **(1) Background of Dispatch to the MFO** After the 4th Middle-East War in 1973, the Peace Treaty between the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt was signed in March 1979. However, concerning the **Fig. III-3-5-2** Outline of MFO Operations and Relevant Maps Outline of the operations (as of April 2019) Relevant maps Location of the operation Shinai Peninsula, Egypt MFO Headquarters Palestine MFO Headquarters Rome, Italy The Mediterranean Sea Rome Force Commander’s Headquarters Sharm El-Sheikh North camp, (in the south camp in the southern part of the El Gorah Israel Shinai Peninsula) Origins of the Establishment Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (March 1979) Protocol of Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty (August 1981) Period From April 25, 1982 Jordan Leadership - Director General: Robert S. Beecroft (U.S.) - Force Commander: Simon A. Stuart (Australia) 【Legend】 ：MFO camp Number of staff - Military personnel: 1,152 (from 13 countries) Gulf of Suez *Operating units consist of infantry battalions, Gulf of Aqaba Egypt coast patrol unit, aviation units, civilian observer, Saudi Arabia unit etc. South camp, Sharm El-Sheikh (staff officers are dispatched) 100km 3 S P t II Ch t 4 S ti 1 F t t 2 ----- April 2, 2019, the Government of Japan decided to dispatch two personnel to the MFO as staff officers. The dispatch of 2 staff officers to the MFO marks Japan’s first participation in an international peace cooperation as “Internationally Coordinated Operation for Peace and Security.” See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 2-5-2 (International Peace See Cooperation Assignments) other countries dispatching officers, including the United States, and create new opportunities for human resource development. See Fig. III-3-5-2 (Outline of MFO Operations and Relevant Maps) See Fig. III-3-5-3 (Organizational Chart of MFO) **Fig. III-3-5-3** Organizational Chart of MFO **(2) Activities by Staff Offi cers and Others** The two officers are engaging in liaison and coordination between governments of the two countries or other relevant organizations and the MFO as a Deputy Chief of Liaison and an Assistant Liaison Operation Officer at the MFO Headquarters, which is located in the south camp at Sharm El-Sheikh in the southern part of the Shinai Peninsula. In addition, in order to help the two officers dispatched to the MFO carry out activities smoothly and effectively, one liaison and coordination officer is dispatched to Cairo city, Egypt, to liaise and coordinate with the relevant organizations in the dispatched country. These activities express Japan’s commitment to more active involvement in the peace and stability of the Middle East. It is also expected to promote collaboration with the |Representative office in Egypt (Cairo)|Representative office in Israel (Tel Aviv)| |---|---| |Milita|ry sector (Shinai Peninsula)| |---|---| |F|orce Commander| **Chapter** |Force Commander’s Headquarters|Col2| |---|---| ||Headquarters| |C|hief of Staff| MFO Headquarters (Rome) Director General Representative Representative Military sector (Shinai Peninsula) office in office in Egypt (Cairo) Israel (Tel Aviv) Force Commander Advisory group Force Commander’s Operation Coast Headquarters units patrol unit Chief of Staff Infantry battalion × 3 Operations Civilian branch observer unit Plans branch Logistics support battalion Logistics branch Liaison branch **Dispatch to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai** **Lieutenant Colonel and MFO staff offi cer Naoto Kuwahara, Ground Component Command (Nerima Ward, Tokyo)** Since April 2019, I have been serving as Deputy chief of the Liaison-South of MFO Headquarters at Sharm El-Sheikh in southern Egypt. This time, Captain Wakasugi and I became the first personnel from the GSDF to be dispatched to the Liaison Branch of MFO headquarters as staff officers. At the MFO, I handle liaison and coordination between two countries (Egypt and Israel) and the MFO, while assisting the chief of Liaison by confirming reports written by liaison officers of the branch sent from the member countries and conducting schedule management and other affairs. In addition to Japan, twelve countries, including the United States, dispatch personnel to the MFO. I am often bewildered by the differences in the way of work, the life style, and the environment here, but feel that this is a very meaningful duty to contribute to the peace between Egypt and Israel through communication with the unique liaison offers. As it is not long since I started serving here, I am encountering new things every day, but I will do my best to fulfill my duties as a member of the headquarters. The author making a courtesy call to Chief Cabinet Secretary Field activities Suga prior to departure (center) ----- year, and carried out activities with great significance, such as repairing roads and constructing facilities for displaced people while ensuring the safety of the personnel. After the 11th rotation took over in December 2016, the dispatched unit was assigned the task of so-called kaketsuke-keigo operations, which was approved by the Legislation for Peace and Security, as well as the task to carry out joint protection of camps. The deployment of SDF engineering units marked a milestone of five years in January 2017 since the dispatch of the first engineering rotation. In all of the PKO conducted by Japan, the unit has made a record number of achievements. The major achievements include a total of approximately 260 km of road repair and a total of approximately 500,000 m2 of development. Japan could move on to a new phase regarding engineering activities in Juba that the SDF was in charge of. Considering the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner, on March 10, 2017, the Government of Japan came to the conclusion that the SDF engineering unit would withdraw from Juba around the end of May 2017, and the Minister of Defense issued an assignment termination order for the dispatched engineering unit on March 24, 2017. SDF personnel engaged in withdrawal work, then sequentially withdrew from South Sudan by the end of May 2017, and terminated the operations by the engineering unit in UNMISS. In response to a request from the UN to transfer items possessed by the dispatched engineering unit such as heavy machinery, vehicles, and residence-related containers, Japan transferred these items to UNMISS with no charge, intending to make Japan’s cooperation with UNMISS more effective. Prior to this transfer of items, the MOD, responding to a request from UNMISS, provided training on the operation and maintenance of heavy machinery to UNMISS personnel, so that UNMISS would be able to conduct engineering activities in a smooth manner using these heavy machinery and other equipment even after the withdrawal of the Japanese unit. These dedicated activities by the dispatched engineering unit were highly appreciated and valued by the UN and South Sudan. **(3) Activities by Command Post Staff Officers and Others** Personnel dispatches to the UNMISS headquarters are continuing. Four GSDF members (logistics officer, intelligence officer, engineering officer, and air operations officer) currently carry out duties at the UNMISS headquarters. Specifically, the logistics officer procures and transports goods needed in UNMISSS activities, the database officer collects and compiles information on security conditions, the 3 UNMISS **(1) Background to the Decision to Dispatch Personnel to** **UNMISS** The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army in January 2005. Beginning in October 2008, Japan dispatched two GSDF officers to UNMIS headquarters as staff officers (logistics and database officers), but UNMIS ended its mission in July 2011 following South Sudan’s independence. Meanwhile, with the objective of consolidating peace and security as well as helping establish necessary conditions for the development of South Sudan, the UNMISS was established. The Japanese Government was requested by the UN to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF engineering units. The Cabinet approved the dispatch of two staff officers (logistics and database officers) to UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it decided to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, Coordination Center, and an additional staff officer (engineering officer). In addition, the Cabinet also approved the dispatch of one staff officer (air operations officer) in October 2014. South Sudan shares borders with six countries and is positioned in a highly important location, connecting the African continent on all four points of the compass. The peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential for the country itself; but also for the peace and stability in its neighboring countries, and by extension, Africa as a whole, as well as a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. Based on the accumulated experience through past PKO, the MOD/SDF has contributed to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, on which the UN places great expectations. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 7-3-7 (Situation in South Sudan) **Chapter** **(2) Activities by Dispatched Engineering Units** In January 2012, SDF coordination centers were established for the first time in the SDF’s participation in UN PKO, one in the South Sudan capital city of Juba and another in Uganda, in order to coordinate the activities conducted by the dispatched engineering unit. Since the commencement of its engineering activities within UN facilities in Juba in March 2012, the dispatched engineering unit has steadily expanded its activities. The SDF has continued to dispatch over 300 personnel after the second unit took over in June of the same ----- **Fig. III-3-5-4** Organization of UNMISS |Chief o|f Staff| |---|---| |Fo Comm|rce ander| |---|---| |Directo Supp|r of Mission ort Division| |---|---| Assignment of Japanese Personnel United Nations Headquarters António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General David Shearer, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Representative ofDeputy Special Chief of Staff Force Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Director of Mission the Secretary-General (Political) Commander UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator Support Division Joint Mission Military Headquarters Aviation Section Engineering Section Analysis Center Logistics (1 Engineering Staff Officer) (1 Aviation Operation (1 Intelligence Staff Officer) (1 Logistics Staff Officer) Staff Officer) Note: Double lines indicate a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed. GSDF personnel providing training on operation of heavy equipment as a part of the UN Triangular Partnership Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities in Vietnam (November 2018) Information Database officer making coordination with the security sector by phone engineering officer plans and proposes UNMISS engineering activities, and the air operations officer assists in operation of aircraft run by UNMISS. Additionally, one liaison staff members have been dispatched to the liaison office in the Embassy of Japan in South Sudan to support activities of the Japanese staff officers. These people help interactions between the South Sudan government and the International Peace Cooperation Corps in South Sudan with the aim of ensuring smooth and efficient cooperation with UNMISS. They will continue to contribute to activities as UNMISS members. See Part II, Chapter 5, Section 3-5 (Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO) Fig. III-3-5-4 (Organization of UNMISS) **Chapter** 4 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to the UN Secretariat The MOD/SDF dispatches personnel to the United Nations Secretariat for the purpose of actively contributing to the UN efforts to achieve international peace and for the purpose of utilizing experiences of dispatched personnel in Japan’s PKO activity. As of May 2019, two Self Defense Forces personnel (working level) are involved in the formulation of UN PKO policies and plans at the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO). There is also one administrative official (working level) working on activities related to the Triangular Partnership Project[4] at the UN Department of Operational Support (DOS). Since December 2002, including personnel currently dispatched, Japan has sent six SDF members (one director level, five working level) to the UN DPO and two administrative officials (working level) to the UN DOS. See Reference 52 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) 5 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Centers To support PKO undertaken by African and other countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO centers in Africa that provide education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers. See Section 1-3-1 (Multilateral Security Framework and Dialogue Initiatives) Reference 52 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) 6 Support to the UN Project for Rapid Deployment of Enabling Capabilities Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas of engineering and transport that are essential for promoting smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support the rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions and implement A partnership for supporting the capability building of the personnel from UN PKO troop contributing countries through cooperation among the UN, UN PKO troop contributing countries, and thi d t i th t t h l i d i t ----- high quality activities, Prime Minister Abe expressed Japan s active support at the PKO Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by the RDEC. In the RDEC, the UN DOS procures heavy equipment and carries out training for engineers using funds provided by Japan. Japan has been dispatching SDF personnel to the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi, Kenya, as instructors since the trial training in September 2015. It was decided to provide basic- and middle-class training at the center twice during the period from June to October 2018 so that many trainees can receive training efficiently according to their level of heavy equipment operation skill. SDF personnel were dispatched, and they provided training regarding the operation of heavy equipment for personnel of the Ghana national military and others. Training has been provided in seven sessions to date for a total of 211 members from eight African countries. Considering that 30% or more of PKO personnel are from Asia, Japan decided to implement the project for the first time in Asia and the surrounding regions. The project provides training on heavy engineering equipment operation for engineering personnel. Trial training took place in Vietnam from November to December 2018 for 16 personnel from nine countries in Asia and the surrounding regions, including Vietnam and Indonesia. 7 Revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions Military Engineer Unit Manual In order to play a more leading role in international peace cooperation activities, the MOD/SDF served as the chair of the working group on the engineer unit manual[5] since 2013 with the aim of supporting the development of UN Military Unit Manuals and contributed to the completion of the **Chapter** **Engaging as the Chair Country in the Revision of the UN Peacekeeping Missions** **Military Engineer Unit Manual** **Major Kiichi Kaji, Staff of International peace cooperation activities, GSDF Engineer School (Hitachinaka City, Ibaraki)** The UN has arranged UN Military Unit Manuals for ten fields, including aviation, communication, transport, and logistics as references for countries participating in UN PKO. One of them, the Military Engineer Unit Manual, stipulates the purpose of the activities, missions, abilities, training, and other standards of military engineer units participating in UN PKO. The meeting of experts held in Tokyo in December 2018 was the first of the four meetings for revision work to be held by Summer of 2019. In addition to the UN, ten countries, including Japan, attended the meeting. As an assistant to the Chair, Chief Instructor of the GSDF Engineer School, who leads the revision work, I am in charge of coordination for meetings, development of drafts of the military engineer unit manual, and other business concerning the revision. Because the task requires coordination with experts of the UN and other countries, I felt considerably pressured and uneasy until I meet them on the day of the meeting. However, as I interact with the frank experts, I was able to develop a relationship with them familiar enough to call each other by our first names and smoothly proceed with the meetings. The project is one of Japan’s intellectual contributions to the UN I feel very rewarded to be able to use the knowledge I have acquired in GSDF for the UN. At the same time, I feel responsible for supporting military engineers around the world who participate in UN PKO. The author explaining points of the revision Group photo for commemoration: the author is at the far left of the middle row With the aim of defining the capacity expected of PKO units and promoting understanding by the participating states, the UN has arranged manuals that prescribe the purpose, capacity d i i f h f t fi ld i i ilit li i ti iti i i i l i l f t t l i ti d F H d t (FHQ) t ----- manual. The UN asked Japan to serve as the chair of the working group again for revision of the manual. For the MOD/SDF this is a meaningful opportunity to make contributions by using the experiences and capabilities acquired through the past PKO and other missions. Therefore the MOD/ **3** **International Disaster Relief Activities** In recent years, the role of military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for military to use their capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are growing. To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in international disaster relief activities proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment. To this end, the SDF maintains its readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. In consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief activities, which fully utilize its functions and capabilities, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries. SDF decided to serve as the chair to handle the revision of the manual. The first expert meeting was held in Tokyo in December 2018. The MOD/SDF will continue to work for the revision of the manual and support for its dissemination. aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of relief items, patients and personnel by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply activities using water-purifying devices. In addition, the SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. The Ground Component Command regional units of the GSDF and other relevant GSDF units maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief activities in an independent manner anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel and their supplies to disaster affected areas. Furthermore, in April 2015, the MOD/SDF also improved its readiness to be able to swiftly respond to a request for search activities using P-3C patrol aircraft. **Chapter** See Reference 54 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by Self Defense Forces) 3 International Disaster Relief Activities in Response to the Earthquakes and Tsunami in Indonesia On September 28, 2018, a magnitude 7.5 earthquake struck the area near Sulawesi Island in central Indonesia. Upon request by the Indonesian government and based on the results of the consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the MOD/SDF decided to dispatch an SDF Disaster Relief team (Local Coordination Center and an air transport unit) on October 3. Local Coordination Center personnel arrived at the disaster site on October 3, followed by the air transport unit on October 5, and the transport using a C-130H transport aircraft started on the following day. On the 25th of the same month the Minister of Defense ordered termination of the mission, and the activities of the disaster relief team, which had lasted for 23 days, ended on October 26th. The transport unit handled transportation of about 200 tons of relief goods (food, water, tents, clothes, etc.) in total and about 400 displaced and other people between Balikpapan (Kalimantan island), Jakarta (Java island), and Palu (Sulawesi island), which was the disaster area. 1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose. See Reference 15 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) 2 International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF and SDF’s Posture Responding to specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief activities encompass (1) medical services such as first ----- # ⅣPart Core Elements Comprising Defense Capability, etc. **Chapter 1** **Human Resource Base and Medical Functions** **that Sustain the Defense Capability** **Chapter 2** **Measures on Defense Equipment and Technology** **Chapter 3** **Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** **Chapter 4** **Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens** ----- **Human Resource Base and Medical Functions** **that Sustain the Defense Capability** ### 1 **Chapter** **Section** **1** **Reinforcing Human Resource Base that Sustains the Defense Capability** The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG)[1] specifi es that the core element of defense capability is Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel, and that securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face **1** **Recruitment and Employment** 1 Recruitment It is vital to secure highly qualifi ed personnel for the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF to carry out various missions appropriately. Expectations from the public for the MOD/SDF have continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the recent economic and employment upturn, as well as the advancement of declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the environment surrounding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel is severe. In such a situation, it is necessary for the MOD/SDF to recruit excellent human resources with a strong desire to enlist, by explaining suffi ciently to them the missions, roles, duties, and working conditions of the SDF. For this reason, the MOD/SDF holds recruiting meetings at schools and also maintains Provincial Cooperation Offi ces in 50 locations throughout Japan to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with the understanding of educators and support from recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments will carry out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, including announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, with the MOD bearing the requisite cost. At the same time, the MOD will strengthen coordination with local governments to ensure successful necessary collaboration including information provision on the recruitment target, which is indispensable for ensuring smooth administrative activities regarding the recruitment. of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of the sustainability and resilience of defense capability, the SDF needs to work even further to reinforce the human resource base that sustains the defense capability. SDF’s measures to reinforce the human resource base including those taken so far are explained below. 2 Employment **(1) Uniformed SDF Personnel** Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. The upper age limit of general candidate for enlistment (Upper) and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel was raised from “under 27” to ”under 33” in October 2018 in order to secure diverse human resources from a broader range, including people with work experience in private companies. Fig. IV-1-1-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF), Fig. IV-1-1-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel) See Due to the uniqueness of their duties, personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees,[2] including “Early Retirement System” and “Fixed Term System” to maintain the SDF’s strength. After employment, uniformed SDF personnel are assigned their branch of service and duties at units all around Japan, in accordance with their choice or aptitude, following basic education and training at respective training units or schools of respective SDF services. See Reference 55 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel), Reference 56 (Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2018)) Part II Chapter 3 Section 1 Footnote 1 ----- **Fig. IV-1-1-1** Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF Number of people (thousand people) 21,000 About 18.81 20,000 About 17.43 million people About 17.5 The number of 18-32 year-olds (thousand people) 19,000 million people million people The number of 18-26 year-olds (thousand people) 18,000 About 15.63 The number of 18 year-olds (thousand people) 17,000 million people 16,000 About 13.73 15,000 million people About 12.41 14,000 million people 13,000 About 11.05 12,000 million people About 10.02 11,000 million people About 8.97 10,000 million people About 7.81 9,000 million people About 7.2 8,000 million people 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 About 1.84 million people About 1.21 About 1.06 About 0.91 About 0.83 About 0.75 2,000 million people million people million people million people million people 1,000 0 93 94 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 (FY) Material sources:The numbers for FY1993 and FY1994 are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920 - 2000” and “Current Population Estimates,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data from FY2016 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. **Fig. IV-1-1-2** Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel **Chapter** |Col1|Col2| |---|---| |Leadin|g| ||| General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF) to Second Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Officer Ensign (MSDF) Warrant Officer Warrant Officer (Note 1) Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) Officer Candidate Master Sergeant (GSDF),Petty Officer First Class (MSDF),Master Sergeant (ASDF),Sergeant First Class (GSDF),Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Enlisted (upper) Technical Sergeant (ASDF),Sergeant (GSDF),Petty Officer Third Class (Note 5) (MSDF),Staff Sergeant (ASDF) Leading Private (GSDF) (Note 3) (Note 2) (Note 6) Leading Seaman (MSDF) Leading Private Airman First Class (ASDF) (Note 4) Private First Class (GSDF) Seaman (MSDF) Airman Second Class (ASDF) 3rd Class Private (GSDF) 2nd Class Seaman Apprentice (MSDF) Airman Third Class (ASDF) 1st Class Aged 18 or older and under 33 Senior high school, and others Junior high school, and others 【Legend】 ：Exam or selection ：Employment exam ：Appointment after completing the program Notes: 1 Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine. 2 Student candidates for enlistment (upper) refers to a candidate who has been appointed as an officer with the premise that he/she will be promoted to a fixed-term position of “Enlisted (upper).” Until FY2006, there were two programs consisting of “Student candidates for enlistment (upper)” and “Enlisted (upper) candidates.” However, these two programs were reorganized and combined, and since 2007, candidates have been appointed as “General candidates for enlistment (upper).” 3 As for the SDF candidates, in order to enhance the initial education of SDF personnel in short-term service, in July 2010, it was decided that their status for the first three months of their enlistment would be as non-SDF personnel, and they would engage exclusively in fundamental education and practice as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel. 4 GSDF High Technical School trains people to be SDF personnel who will be capable not only of operating and making full use of equipment in the GSDF but also of conducting missions in the international community. For SDF students, starting from FY2010 appointments, their status was changed from SDF officer to “students,” which is a new non-regular status. New students receive a high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning. From the FY2011 appointments, a new recommendation system was introduced in which those who are considered appropriate to be a GSDF High Technical School student are selected from among the candidates based on the recommendation of the principal of their junior high school etc., in addition to the conventional general examination. 5 A three-year program ended in FY2013. A new four-year program was established at the National Defense Medical College, Faculty of Nursing in 2014. 6 For student airmen, the Maritime Self-Defense Force selects from persons 18 or above and under 23 in age and the Air Defense Force 18 or above and under 21 in age. ----- **(2) SDF Reserve Personnel, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel,** **and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel** It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed SDF personnel promptly depending on situational changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains the following three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.[3] See Fig. IV-1-1-3 (Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve See Personnel) SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, and carry out logistical support and base guard duties. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out their mission together with incumbent uniformed SDF personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders. Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, some of whom are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training. As SDF Reserve Personnel and others work in their civilian jobs under normal circumstances, they need to adjust their work schedule to participate in periodic training exercises. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ these personnel are essential. For this purpose, the MOD provides a special subsidy to **Fig. IV-1-1-3** Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel **Chapter** Graduation ceremony at the National Defense Academy (March 2019) the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such companies. Also, in 2017, the MOD established a framework that allows the MOD/SDF to provide such information as the scheduled term of a training call-up and scheduled term during which SDF Reserve Personnel/SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are called up to perform actual operations and are appointed as uniformed SDF personnel, when requested by their employers. In 2018, the MOD established a system to provide a subsidy which aims to contribute to securing understanding and cooperation from the employers regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel. Under the system, the employers are provided with a subsidy if (1) SDF Reserve Personnel or SDF Ready Reserve Personnel respond to a defense operation call-up order, civil protection dispatch call-up order, or disaster relief call-up order, etc. or if |Col1|SDF Reserve Personnel|SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel| |---|---|---|---| |Basic concept|●Upon the issuance of a defense call-up order or other orders, serve as SDF Personnel|●Serve as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability|●Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or MSDF upon completion of education and training| |Candidate|●Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|●Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|(Common to General and Technical Employment Categories) ●Those with no experience as SDF personnel (including those with less than a year of SDF experience)| |Age|●Leading privates and lower SDF Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 55 years old ●Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of two years added to respective retirement age|●Leading privates and lower SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: 18 to under 50 years old ●Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of three years subtracted from respective retirement age|●General: 18 to under 34 years old; Technical: either between the ages of 18 and under 53 or 18 and under 55 depending on technical skills possessed| |Employment|●Employed by screening, based on application ●Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training|●Employed by screening, based on application|●General: Employed by examination, based on application ●Technical: Employed by screening, based on application| |Rank designation|●Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ●Former SDF Reserve Personnel and Former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ●Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel ・General: Private ・Technical: Designated according to skills and length of experience|●Former Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ●Former Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle|●Not designated| |Term of service|●Three Years/One term|●Three Years/One term|●General: Within of three years ●Technical: Within of two years| |Education/Training|●Although the Self-Defense Forces Law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year as a standard|●30 days per year|●General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course) ●Technical: 10 days within two years (training to serve as SDF Personnel by utilizing their special skills)| |Promotion|●Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)|●Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)|●Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion| |Benefits, allowances, and other terms|●Training Call-up Allowance:  ¥8,100/day ●SDF Reserve Allowance:  ¥4,000/month|●Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400-14,200/day ●SDF Ready Reserve Allowance:  ¥16,000/month ●Continuous Service Incentive Allowance:  ¥120,000/one term|●Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ●Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty or any other duties are not required| |Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|－|●Special subsidy for companies employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month|－| ||●Special subsidy to secure understanding and cooperation from employers regarding the duties of SDF Reserve Personnel: ¥34,000/day||| |Call-up duty and other duties|●Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|●Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|●Education and training call-up| th t i ----- **Chapter** **Outstanding Performance by a SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and a Business Owner** **Who Works with SDF Ready Reserve Personnel as His Employees** **Ready Reserve Sergeant First Class Teruaki Shiina, 1st Infantry Company,** **52nd Infantry Regiment (Makomanai, Sapporo)** I participated in a disaster relief mission as a SDF Ready Reserve Personnel in the aftermath of the September 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake. Immediately after the earthquake, I learned about the severity of damage in the affected areas, hinting that I would be called up for a disaster relief operation. I consequently asked my superior at work for permission to participate in a potential disaster relief assignment beforehand, with a desire to utilize the experience I gained in participating in a two-week disaster relief duty in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. The permission was granted. I initially worried about my family suffering from an ongoing power outage. However, my family supported and encouraged me to join the disaster relief mission as a SDF Ready Reserve Personnel. In the afflicted areas, I transported relief goods, supplied drinking water Shiina (front right) supplying drinking water in Atsuma Town and engaged in other activities. Although I am not sure how much assistance I was able to provide to disaster victims, they certainly cheered me up by showing their high spirits. I sincerely hope that a disaster of this magnitude will never happen again. However, I will fully prepare for the next time I am called up for a disaster relief mission, whenever it might be, by working hard in training sessions, which amount to a total of 30 days annually. **President Tsuyoshi Fukuzawa, Fukuzawa Order Nouki Co., Ltd.** **Memuro Town, Kasai County, Hokkaido** Although the damage caused in Obihiro by the September 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake was relatively minor, I had to shut down the operation of my company there for several days due to a power outage, forcing us to deal with a lot of troubles. During the shutdown, the GSDF called up my employees for a disaster relief mission. As a business owner, I was anxious as to how to run a business with my employees away for the mission. At the same time, I was proud of the fact that my employees were selected for the mission as I am also an active SDF Reserve Personnel interested in joining disaster relief operations in affected areas. My company currently employs three SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and I agreed to send two of them this time. When I sent them off, I offered them encouragement, with the hope that they would earnestly carry out their assigned duty so that the livelihoods of affected people could be restored as quickly as possible. When my employees returned from the disaster relief mission, they looked very satisfied. I believe that they gained valuable experience that will lead to personal growth as members of society and as people in general. Recent photo of Fukuzawa in his workplace (2) they have no choice but to leave their regular occupations due to injuries during their duties, etc. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up at the time of the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake[4], the 2018 July Heavy Rain,[5] and the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake.[6] They carried out their missions, including transportation of goods and water supply. The MOD has been implementing various measures to increase and enhance SDF Reserve Personnel and others because SDF Reserve Personnel are anticipated to be called up more often in response to earthquake and other disasters. Specifically, recruitment and appointment were expanded in 2018 to secure a wide variety of human resources from a broader range. The upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower SDF Reserve Personnel was raised from “under 37” to “under 55” and the upper age limit for their continued appointment from “under 61” to “under 62.” An upper age limit is not set for persons with a license for a medical practitioner. Their continued appointment is approved when it is confirmed that they properly maintain their medical techniques and that there is no problem with their duties as SDF Reserve Personnel. The upper age limit for recruitment of leading privates and lower SDF Ready Reserve In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, a call-up order for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was issued for the second time in the SDF’s history, and 162 Ready Reserve Personnel engaged in activities such as livelihood support to the affected people. In response to the heavy rain in July 2018, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up for the 3rd time in its history. From July 12 to 30, 311 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel engaged in life support and other activities. At the time of the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were called up for the 4th time in its history. From September 8 to 23, 251 SDF Ready Reserve P l d i lif t d th ti iti ----- Personnel was raised from under 32 to under 50. In 2019 a new system was established to appoint Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel who have been appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel without experience as SDF personnel as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel after certain education and training. Also, the MOD promotes the use of SDF Reserve Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment of retired SDF pilots, who are to be reemployed in the private sector, to SDF Reserve Personnel through the re-employment system.[7] **(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering** **Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel** There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel — administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others[8] — in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly recruited from those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Comprehensive and General Service National Public Employees conducted by the National Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense Specialists conducted by the MOD. After participating in the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in this process work in a wide range of fields. Administrative officials are engaged in defense-related policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA); analysis and evaluation at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters; and administrative works at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. Technical and engineering officials are working in the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, the ATLA, the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. They are engaged in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), carrying out research and development (R&D), efficient procurement, maintenance and improvement of a range of equipment, as well as providing mental health care for SDF personnel. Instructors conduct advanced research on defense and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical College, and other organizations. See Reference 57 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, etc.) See **2** **Daily Education and Training** standardize the curriculum, while at the same time improving the education infrastructure for the utilization of cutting-edge technology and expansion of recruitment including female SDF personnel. **Chapter** 1 Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, the respective SDF training units and schools provide opportunities for phased and systematic education according to rank and duties to nurture necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills. A considerable extent of human, temporal, and economic efforts such as securing instructors with special skills, and improving equipment and educational facilities, are necessary for providing education. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or that it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic companies and research institutes. Furthermore, based on the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019FY2023; MTDP),[9] in order to promote cross-domain joint operations, the MOD/SDF will strengthen joint education and 2 SDF Training **(1) Training and Exercise by Each SDF** Training and exercise conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary proficiency for their respective fields, and training and exercise for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training and exercise for units is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted. In order to effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, based on the MTDP, The re-employment system for SDF pilots aims to prevent the outflow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF pilots over a certain age as pilots of commercial airlines, and is also significant from the perspective of the development of the airline industry in Japan as a whole. Part II, Chapter 4, Section 1, Footnote 2 Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called “SDF personnel,” including administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, d th i dditi t if d SDF l ----- See Reference 59 (Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch See of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2018)) 3 Initiatives to Safety Management, etc. The MOD/SDF constantly strive as one for safety management, such as by implementing the highest level of safety measures and precautions during routine training. Despite these efforts, two F-2 fighters of Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) Tsuiki Air Base (Fukuoka Prefecture) came into contact midair in the training air space at sea to the west of the base in November 2018. In the same month, a vehicle of ASDF Misawa Air Base (Aomori Prefecture) crashed into a house in Kamikita District, Aomori Prefecture. A shell hit a surrounding area and damaged a private vehicle when a unit belonging to Camp Shinodayama (Osaka Prefecture) was conducting firing training using 81mm mortar in the GSDF Aibano Training Area. Furthermore, in February 2019 an F-2 fighter of ASDF Tsuiki Air Base crashed in the Sea of Japan off Yamaguchi Prefecture. The MOD/SDF is fully enforcing recurrence prevention measures and expending all possible means to ensure safety. Also, in April 2019, an F-35A fighter of ASDF Misawa Air Base crashed in the Pacific Ocean to the east of Aomori Prefecture, losing one SDF personnel on duty. Regarding the cause of the accident, the MOD/SDF has come to the judgement that it is extremely unlikely that the pilot lost consciousness or the aircraft had a problem, and that the pilot was likely to have fallen into spatial disorientation (condition in which the pilot has lost sense of balance). Therefore, the MOD/SDF has taken thorough measures to prevent recurrence of the accident including providing education/training to the pilots and special inspection of F-35A aircraft just in case. Any accident that can cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. The MOD/SDF as a whole is making its utmost effort to prevent recurrence of such accidents by thoroughly investigating their causes and making sure each member has recognized the importance of safety management once again. SDF s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way. While leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies.[10 ]The SDF will also strive to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the implementation of training by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) in collaboration with U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and abroad. Also, seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. The SDF will also actively utilize the opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of the SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises as a way not only for considering and verifying plans for the actual SDF operations, but also for actively considering and verifying comprehensive issues including civil protection. See Reference 58 (Major Exercises Conducted in FY2018) See **(2) Training Environment** SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF will conduct effective training and exercises by expanding the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan based on the NDPG and other guidelines. Furthermore, the SDF will also facilitate expanded joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with the SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas, and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas, such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. **Chapter** Newly joined members of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF conducting basic training 10 Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response training, which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other additional t i i i l d I t ti l P C ti E i hi h SDF’ i t ti l ti ti iti ----- **3** **Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources** 3 Dealing with Retirement and Re-employment of SDF Personnel 1 Effective Use of Human Resources In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s (most uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system). Therefore, many of them need to find another job after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods. Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucial both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment. In addition, as the MOD does not have the authority to provide them with employment placement, the Foundation for the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job consultation services for retired SDF personnel with permission from the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness, and responsibility gained through their work performance, education and training. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their duties and vocational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries, as well as finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention and risk management at local governments. Based on the NDPG and MTDP, the MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by such means as further utilization of retired SDF personnel while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills, and experience of retired SDF personnel in addition to expanding vocational training subjects and support for step-by-step acquisition of qualifications before their retirement. Specifically, as of the end of March 2019, a total of 495 retired SDF personnel work as crisis management officers at local governments’ disaster prevention bureaus—46 prefectural bureaus have 89 of them in total, and 348 municipal bureaus have 406. As this strengthens collaboration with local governments and enhances the ability to deal with crisis management, including disaster prevention, the MOD/SDF will continue active support for the utilization of retired SDF personnel in local governments’ disaster prevention bureaus by further enhancing these efforts. See Reference 60 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support) Reference 61 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government) With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the fixed number of SDF personnel has been constantly reduced. On the other hand, there has been the need for further skilled and professional personnel in order to respond to the advancement of equipment as well as the diversification and internationalization of SDF missions. In light of such circumstances, while ensuring the robustness of the SDF, the NDPG and others plan to raise the mandatory early retirement age by one year during the period of the MTDP from 2020, and another one year during the period of the next MTDP in stages for each rank in order to ensure further utilization of older human resources who have rich knowledge, skills, and experience. The SDF also continues to expand reenrollment after retirement (up to the age of 65) and further promotes utilization of the skills of retired SDF personnel in fields requiring high levels of expertise. In addition, the SDF will promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence. See Fig. IV-1-1-4 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel) **Chapter** See 2 Improvement of Living and Work Environment and Treatment To enable all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, the NDPG and the MTDP state that the MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment. Specifically, the SDF will steadily renew aged everyday life/workplace fixtures, secure the necessary quantities of everyday necessities in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing, and proceed with measures against aging and earthquake resistance for facilities. Because SDF personnel carry out their missions under a severe environment, the SDF will improve their treatment based on the special nature of their missions and work environment. Specifically, in order to ensure appropriate treatment in accordance with the risk and special nature of their missions and the characteristics of the area of the office, the SDF will make improvements, including special work allowance. To enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high morale and pride, the MOD/SDF will improve their treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges to better acknowledge their achievements. Although these measures have already been taken, the SDF will continue to work on various measures in line with the NDPG and the MTDP. ----- **Fig. IV-1-1-4** Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel **Chapter** Improvement of everyday life/workplace were compiled, and a total of 225 cases were officially announced in September 2018. 4 Initiatives to Support Families In addition to exchanges between units and personnel’s families, as well as between the families, the MOD in cooperation with relevant external groups and organizations is also actively working to develop a family support system to be implemented in the event of large-scale natural disasters and other events, which will include receiving cooperation in confirming the safety of the family members of SDF personnel. All of these are conducted as routine initiatives. Furthermore, specific welfare services for SDF personnel deployed overseas include facilitating direct communication with their families in Japan by means such as e-mail and video conference systems. Support for sending comfort items from their families at a later date is also provided. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the dispatched SDF personnel are held to provide them with a variety of information, and a consultation desk exclusively for families of the dispatched SDF personnel (family support centers), a website for the families of the dispatched SDF personnel and similar facilities have been established to provide consolation for the various questions and concerns raised by the families. 5 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline The MOD/SDF has gained great expectations from the public and in order for the SDF to perform its maximum ability on duty, it is essential to achieve support and trust from the public. To this end, the SDF is required to always maintain strong discipline. The MOD/SDF has so far strived to foster well-disciplined personnel by impressing in them an awareness of compliance with the law through setting up such campaign periods as the “MOD Anti-Drug Abuse Month,” “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week,” and “Self-Defense Personnel Harassment Prevention Week” and implemented various measures such as thorough instructions on service discipline. |Rank|Designation|Mandatory Retirement Age| |---|---|---| |General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)|Sho|60| |Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)|Shoho|| |Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)|Issa|56| |Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)|Nisa|55| |Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)|Sansa|| |Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)|Ichii|54| |First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)|Nii|| |Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)|Sani|| |Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)|Juni|| |Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Socho|| |Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Isso|| |Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Niso|53| |Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)|Sanso|| |Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)|Shicho|－| |Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)|Isshi|| |Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)|Nishi|| Notes 1: The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff, is 62. 2: The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police officer, or information analyst, is 60. Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, new regulations about re-employment were introduced in October 2015, replacing the former prior approval system. As are the cases in other national government employees, the following three regulations were put in place in order to ensure the trust of the public regarding the fairness of official duties: (1) regulation on requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and requesting information; (2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which retired personnel had a stake whilst in office; and (3) regulation on re-employed personnel making requests.[11] In order to ensure strict observation of these regulations, bodies comprised of academic experts with no history serving as SDF members (Defense Personnel Review Board’s Separate Meeting for Monitoring Reemployment and Cabinet Office’s Re-employment Surveillance Commission) monitor the situation, and any violation will be met with penalties. Additionally, for the purpose of appropriate implementation of unified management and disclosure of re-employment information by institutionalizing notification and announcement of such information by the Cabinet, it has been decided that information on the re-employment status of retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is to be published every fiscal year by the Cabinet. In response to the introduction of this system in FY2015, notifications of re-employment of the retired SDF personnel who were in managerial positions submitted during FY2017 11 Sti l t d i P t 2 3 d 4 f A ti l 65 f th SDF L ----- **Chapter** DAPE personnel (MSDF) receiving comfort items in Djibouti Memorial Service for members of the SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty conducted with the participation of Prime Minister Abe Since 2019 the MOD/SDF has been working to prevent harassment by such means as mandatory education on harassment prevention for newly appointed directors of the ministry and other executives. 6 Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel SDF personnel suicides reached a record 101 in FY2005, and have subsequently increased and decreased, with 62 suicides in FY2018. The suicide of SDF members is truly a great tragedy for both the individuals themselves and their bereaved families. It also represents a great loss to the MOD/SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel, and the MOD/SDF is taking ongoing measures to prevent suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/ external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to raise awareness about mental health for commanders as well as enlisted personnel; and (3) Establishment of a campaign period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring by commanders of the mental health condition of their subordinates whose working environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various reference materials. In 2019 the MOD/SDF has been promoting measures using external means, including proposals by outside experts, in order to further improve the effectiveness of suicide prevention measures. of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have been devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time period, however, more than 1,900 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty. In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies in order to express condolences are carried out by each unit to which the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial Service for members of the SDF personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister.[12] 7 Commemorating Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission 12 The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members, the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel who perished in the line of duty. M i l i l h ld t i di id l SDF t d b ----- **Section** **2** **Further Promotion of Work-Life Balance and Women’s Participation Capability** The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and both the number and the duration of situations requiring the MOD/SDF’s response are increasing. On the other hand, it is anticipated that a number of MOD staff, both male and female, will face time and commuting constraints for childcare, nursing care and other reasons due to big changes in social structure. Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires creating an environment that enables staff to be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high morale, and fully demonstrate their abilities. On the basis of this view, the MOD/SDF promotes initiatives to achieve worklife balance of its staff members. Also, the MOD/SDF has been proactively encouraging **1** **Working Style Reform** **(1) Value and Mentality Reform** In order to implement working style reform, focus needs to be placed especially on reforming the values and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding working style. Since FY2017, the MOD/SDF has been implementing educational initiatives, such as message given by the MOD/ SDF leaders, seminars, and lecture meetings aimed at raising awareness concerning working style reform and the concept of work-life balance. With the increase of personnel facing time/commuting constraints for child/family care, the MOD/ SDF is also promoting correction of long working hours and encouraging taking leave to ensure proper work-life balance so that every member can exert his/her full potential. the active participation of female personnel, and the number of female personnel is on the rise. The MOD/SDF has been conducting a variety of initiatives in order to promote work-life balance and the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel in a unified manner, such as formulating various plans[1] that include three reforms: (1) working style reform; (2) reform to combine a successful career with childrearing and nursing care; and (3) reform for promoting active engagement of female personne. In addition, the Committee to Promote Working style Reform of the Internal Bureau staff was set up under the leadership of the Parliamentary ViceMinister of Defense in January 2019. Working style reform and promoting active participation of female personnel are also set in the NDPG and the MTDP. and the State Minister of Defense honored particularly excellent initiatives, out of the applications received from various organizations and others, and used them to help achieve work reform at each workplace. **Chapter** **(3) Flexible Working Hours and Location** Realizing more flexible working hours and work locations is necessary in light of factors such as workload fluctuations and time constraints faced by individuals. For this reason, the MOD/SDF introduced the flextime system in 2016 and enabled its staff to choose Flexible Working Hours by dividing early/late shifts into multiple stages. In addition, telework, a work style that allows working at home, has been available in the Internal Bureau of the MOD since FY2017 and in the ATLA since 2018. Other organizations aim to begin adopting this work system from FY2019 and are steadily making preparation by piloting the system. **(2) Work Reform in the Workplace** It is important that initiatives for the promotion of worklife balance are implemented in a way which fits the individual workplaces, and that staff members themselves consider specific measures for improving their workplace environment. This approach will lead to developing effective initiatives and workplace climate. Based on this perspective, since 2016, the annual “Competition for initiatives to promote Working Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” has been held during the campaign period for enhancing work-life balance from June to September. The Minister of Defense (1) “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance at the MOD” (January 2015), (2) “Action Plan of the MOD Based on the Law to Promote the Role of Women in the Workforce (FY2016-FY2020)” (April 2016), and (3) “Action Plan to Support a Good Work-Life Balance of the Personnel of the MOD based on the Act on Ad t f M t S t R i i N t G ti Child (FY2015 FY2020)” (M h 2015) ----- **2** **Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care** In order for MOD/SDF staff, both male and female, to be successful in their careers while realizing work-life balance, it is necessary to establish a system that enables balancing work with childrearing/nursing care, and to ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working patterns unique to the SDF. **(1) Development of an Environment that Enables Staff to** **Realize a Successful Career While Engaging in Childrearing** **and Nursing Care** The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes, which enable staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing care, such as ensuring substitute personnel for staff who take childcare leave and other leave. In particular, the ministry is encouraging its male staff to take childcare leave to promote their participation in family settings. The target rate of childcare leave acquisition by male staff is set at 13% by 2020. The MOD/SDF is also developing an environment that enables staff to balance work life with their family life by distributing e-mail newsletters to help its staff to return to work smoothly after childcare leave and encouraging staff to use a “childcare form” to facilitate managers’ and the human resources department’s thorough and detailed understanding of the situation regarding childcare. The MOD/SDF has a system to rehire SDF personnel who have previously resigned mid-career. It reassessed the system so that former SDF personnel who had resigned in their mid-career due to childrearing and nursing care could be reemployed from January 2017. The MOD/SDF started recruitment based on this system in January 2018. **Chapter** ASDF personnel using the nursery at Iruma Air Base **(2) Ensuring Childcare Services** To allow SDF personnel who are rearing children to concentrate on their duties, it is important to ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working patterns unique to the SDF. Since April 2007, the MOD/SDF has set up workplace nurseries at GSDF Camp Mishuku, GSDF Camp Kumamoto, GSDF Camp Makomanai, GSDF Asaka Camp housing district, MSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district, ASDF Iruma Air Base, Ichigaya district, where the MOD is located, and National Defense Medical College. In addition, in the event of emergency operations such as disaster relief, the MOD promotes measures to provide temporary childcare in SDF camps and bases for children of SDF personnel who have no alternative but to attend to duties with their children. **3** **Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel** **(1) Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female** **SDF Personnel and Personnel Management Policy** The “Initiative” outlines the significance of promoting the active engagement of female personnel and the MOD/SDF personnel management policy. Specifically, with SDF duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF personnel are required, more than ever, to have multifaceted capabilities including higher levels of knowledge, decision-making ability, and skills. In addition, under a severe recruitment environment due to the declining birthrate and greater advancement into higher education, it is anticipated that the number of SDF personnel with time and location restraints, including those involved in childcare nursing care and other For the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of female personnel, the MOD/SDF has been making various efforts to advance the careers of motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up specific goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion of female personnel under the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance.” Moreover, the MOD formulated the “Initiative to Promote Active Engagement of Female SDF Personnel – Aiming for Attractive SDF that Adapts to the Times and Environment” (the “Initiative”) in April 2017 to specify its conceptual policy for promoting the active participation of female SDF personnel. ----- responsibilities, will significantly increase. In light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve from a conventional organization with an emphasis on homogeneity among the members, into an organization that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources in a flexible manner. At present, the largest human resource that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women, who account for half of the population targeted for recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of female SDF personnel has the following significance: (1) securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse perspectives; and (3) reflecting values of the nation. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up a path for female personnel with motivation, ability, and aptitude to have opportunities to demonstrate their abilities in various fields, and aim for doubling the ratio of female SDF personnel. In terms of employing and promoting female SDF personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and women and assign the right person to the right place based on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude. **(2) Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female SDF** **Personnel** The MOD/SDF has been reviewing the restriction of assignment of female personnel. With the removal of the restriction on female assignments in submarines in 2018, assignment restriction against females was completely removed with the exception of the units where female personnel cannot be assigned for reasons of maternity protection (a part of the GSDF Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit [chemical] and Tunnel Company Units). **Chapter** **Success of Female Personnel – the First Female Fighter Pilot of ASDF** **First Lieutenant Misa Matsushima, 305th Squadron, Flight Group, 5th Air Wing Headquarters** **(Shintomi Town, Koyu County, Miyazaki Prefecture)** Since the latter half of the 1980s, female fighter pilots have been appearing one after another and flourishing in advanced countries. ASDF also opened the door to female fighter pilots in 2015. Thanks to favorable trends around the world like this, I was able to become a fighter pilot in August 2018 after completing various types of training. I obtained my long-desired chance to become a fighter pilot. I feel strongly that I owe this to pioneering female pilots who have been vigorously pursuing their flight tasks in the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and other female SDF personnel who are active in a broad working range overcoming various troubles and difficulties. I am now assigned to the 305th Squadron line troop and engage in missions against violation of our territorial air in times of peace while working on exercises everyday so that I can carry out operations during armed contingencies. When scrambling in response to unidentified aircraft, I feel a sense of tension like none I have felt before and the weight of responsibility of the real mission. Daily training is grueling, where I sometimes push myself to my mental and physical limits so that I will be able to complete my mission under any circumstances. I will accomplish highly tense and responsible real missions and severe training with pride and a high-minded sense of mission to protect our country, and continue daily diligence to become a full-fledged fighter pilot quickly. The author heading for flight training on an F-15 The author making operational coordination with female maintenance personnel ----- **Fig. IV-1-2-1** Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel (Number) 16,000 (%) 15,000 7.0 GSDF personnel 14,000 MSDF personnel 13,000 ASDF personnel Recruitment of women started for aviation 6.0 Total number of female SDF personnel / 12,000 Total number of SDF personnel students of the MSDF and the ASDF 11,000 Recruitment of women started for students 5.0 the of the National Defense Academy 10,000 9,000 Recruitment of 4.0 8,000 women started in the general service 7,000 area of the GSDF Recruitment of women started for students the of the 3.0 6,000 National Defense Medical College 5,000 Recruitment of women started in the general service 4,000 area of the MSDF and the ASDF 2.0 3,000 2,000 1.0 1,000 0 0.0 54 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (FY) Note: As of the end of March 2019, the total number of female SDF personnel is 15,734 (approximately 6.9% of the total number of the current SDF personnel). **(3) Expansion of the Recruitment of Female Personnel** **a. Female SDF Personnel** As of the end of March 2019, the number of female SDF personnel is about 16,000 (about 6.9% of total SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2009, about 5.2% of total SDF personnel), this is a rise of 1.7 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years. In order to increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel to over 9% by FY2027, the MOD/SDF aims to ensure that women account for more than 10% of total newly employed SDF personnel in and after FY2017. Specifically, in order to increase the number of recruits through such measures as the elimination of the gender quota and the increase in the scheduled number of female recruits, the SDF will actively recruit women, promote their active participation, and improve education, living, and work environments for female SDF personnel. In addition, with regard to promotion, MDO/SDF aims to increase the proportion of women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher to over 3.1%. As for the careers of the personnel anticipated to reach a rank of field officer or higher, emphasis is given on assigning them to a commander or assistant commander post at the rank of company officer, with the hope of allowing them to gain experience **Chapter** Fig. IV-1-2-1 (Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel) See **b. Female Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering** **Officials, Instructors, and Others** As of the end of March 2019, the number of female civilian personnel—administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, and instructors, and others— is approximately 3,300 (about 24.6% of total civilian personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2009 when females made up 23% of the total civilian personnel), this is a rise of 1.6 percentage points, indicating that the ratio of female civilian personnel is on a rising trend in recent years. With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall government target, the MOD has set up its goal of ensuring that women account for over 30% of recruits in and after FY2016. Regarding promotion, as a goal to be achieved by the end of FY2020, the proportion of women of the DivisionDirector level at local organizations and Assistant-DivisionDirector level at the ministry proper or equivalent would be approximately 5%, and the proportion of women of the Division-Director level at the ministry proper or equivalent would be approximately 2%, and the proportion of women of the Unit-Chief level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately 27%. ----- **Section** **3** **Enhancement of Medical Functions** For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must remain in good health through appropriate health management. Also, it is important for the SDF to always seek to enhance its capabilities in military medicine for protecting the lives of the personnel engaging in a variety of services as much as possible. Under the circumstances where the SDF’s missions are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it is important **1** **Enhancing Seamless Medical Care and Evacuation Posture** 1 Enhancement of Medical Functions in Various Emergency Situations In order to respond to various emergency situations, the MOD/ SDF will enhance a seamless medical care and evacuation posture from the frontline to the final transport destination, while considering joint operation, in accordance with the MTDP. Specifically, for the purpose of providing maximum protection for the lives of personnel injured on the frontline, the MOD/SDF will enhance medical functions for seamless implementation of a series of medical care and transportation starting from emergency life support by Frontline Medics[1] and damage control surgery (DCS)[2] at a medical base equipped with a field operation system[3] to safe and speedy transportation to a SDF hospital that is the final destination for complete cure. Other measures necessary for the implementation of the above will be taken, including the sharing of a patient information to appropriately and accurately carry out various medical activities, such as medical support in disaster relief and international peace keeping activities, and capacity building assistance in the medical field. The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing and strengthening its medical capabilities to be able to appropriately respond to various emergency events and carry out its various missions in Japan and abroad. system, standardization and storage of medical equipment, and introduction of armored ambulances. On this occasion, MOD/JSDF plans to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff Office for control and coordination concerning SDF medical operation on a daily basis. **Chapter** 2 Enhancement of Medical Functions in the Southwestern Region In the enhancement of seamless medical care and evacuation posture, in light of the geological characteristics of Japan, with its vast sea area and large number of remote islands, the MTDP places a special focus on the enhancement of medical functions in the southwestern region. Specifically, the MOD/ SDF will develop maintenance and evacuation guidelines for medical bases in the region and improve the medical equipment reserve system in Okinawa Island and minor islands. **2** **SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions** will continue to concentrate human and medical resources on the consolidation of SDF hospitals with increased performance levels to establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime by improving their capacity as transfer hospitals with a certain level of medical care in response to infections, gunshot wounds, and other trauma and injury caused by NBC weapons in addition to general practice. SDF hospitals have been also advancing regional medical care. The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured SDF personnel and other persons transported from their area of activity in various emergency situations, while in normal circumstances these hospitals provide medical care to SDF personnel and their families, etc. These hospitals also play the role of educational institutions that train medical personnel and maintain and enhance their skills. In accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP, the MOD “Frontline Medics” are, from among those who are certified as Licensed Practical Nurses (refer to the Assistant Nurse stipulated in Article 6 of the Act on Public Health Nurses, Midwives, and Nurses [Act No. 203 of 1948]) and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians (refer to the Emergency Life-Saving Technician stipulated in Section 2, Article 2 of the Emergency Life-saving Technicians Act [Act No. 36 of 1991]), those who have completed the training curriculum approved by the council stipulated in Article 4 of the Directives Relating to Emergency Life-Saving Actions (MOD Directive No. 60 of 2016). Hemostasis by pressing/placing gauze on damaged internal organs, suture, etc. and emergency operations to prevent contamination with intestinal tract contents. The purpose is to stabilize the patient’s condition to the level where transfer is possible.. Mobile operating room sheltered in a large truck with one of the four functions necessary for operation (operation, operation preparation, sterilization and medical supply vehicles). Th t l t i t d th ti t lif b d t d ----- Some SDF hospitals have been designated as secondary emergency medical institutions by the local municipalities to welcome emergency patients. SDF Central Hospital, in particular, accepted about 5,600 ambulances in 2018. When the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake occurred in September 2018, many hospitals did not function due to a massive blackout or other reasons. However, SDF Sapporo Hospital, which had been rebuilt with the design of a disasterresilient hospital (opened in 2015) maintained its functions intact and started carrying out treatment just after the disaster. SDF Central Hospital, with the participation of GSDF Eastern Army, GSDF Medical School, Tokyo Fire Department, Metropolitan Police Department, Setagaya Ward, Setagaya Medical Association, and others, implemented a drill to accept a large number of the injured based on a scenario of a terrorist attack using chemical war-fare agent and explosives. Through **3** **Strengthening the Function of the National Defense Medical College** As the only educational institution of the MOD/SDF for the training of SDF personnel who are physicians (medical officers), SDF personnel who are public health and registered nurses (nursing officers) and technical officers, the National Defense Medical College plays the role to train and produce the primary medical staff for the medical activities of the SDF as well as to maintain and improve their skills. In this context, the NDPG and the MTDP state that the MOD/SDF will improve the operations of the National Defense Medical College and enhance its research functions, and endeavor to secure high-quality talents. Specifically, the MOD/SDF will strengthen the system for training of excellent medical and nursing officers, and **Chapter** GSDF personnel providing life-saving treatment on the spot in a drill to accept a large number of the injured (in Setagaya Park) such drills, SDF Central Hospital strengthens collaboration with related organizations and validates the procedures of response to compound special disasters in order to enhance its coping skills. improve the conditions for providing high-quality medical care either equaling or surpassing general university hospitals. The MOD/SDF will also enhance research functions of the Research Institute of the National Defense Medical College and collaboration with medical care departments of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. Through these initiatives the MOD/SDF will further enhance the education/ research conditions at the college. The National Defense Medical College Research Institute started advanced research of defense medicine in FY2015 and has been conducting research contributing to SDF troop operation, which includes research on explosion trauma and damage caused by shock waves. **4** **Enhancement of Education of Medical and Nursing Officers** in areas such as infectious diseases and emergency medicine, as well as increasing their motivation for work. Through these measures the MOD/SDF is working to improve the sufficiency of medical officers and maintain and improve their medical skills. In the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will continue efforts to improve the sufficiency and further promote the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel who are physicians to handle missions that are expected to increase. Similar measures are taken for nursing officers to maintain and improve their knowledge/skills through practice at external hospitals, etc. Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff, such as radiological technologists, clinical technologists, and lif i t h i i d t d d t i d While greater abilities are required of personnel engaged in medical care, such as medical officers, due to the diversification of missions, only 80% of the positions have been filled in the case of medical officers, although the rate has been improving year by year. Such low sufficiency is caused by medical officers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of which is the lack of opportunity to engage in medical training and practice. The MOD/SDF continues to implement various measures with various career options to prevent medical officers from leaving the SDF by enhancing clinical education after graduation from the National Defense Medical College and other institutions, promoting various initiatives for ensuring more opportunities for medical officers to engage in medical practice, helping th i d i i li d k l d d kill ----- at SDF hospitals, schools and other relevant institutions so that the SDF can perform diverse missions and missions **5** **Enhancement of Capabilities to Treat War Injury** In order to improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and damage control surgeries and treatment while transferring the injured, the MOD/SDF has conducted research on relevant initiatives taken by the U.S. Forces and others, carried out reviews for appropriate and accurate life-saving activities, and enhancing education, training and research, including improvement of capabilities to treat combat injuries. For the improvement of first aid capabilities on the frontline, since FY2017 the MOD has been providing specific education and training for SDF personnel who are certified as both Licensed Practical Nurses and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians to acquire necessary knowledge and skills, so that the SDF personnel with these qualifications will be able to provide specialized relief treatments[4] on the spot to under special circumstances, including international peace cooperation activities and large-scale disasters. SDF personnel who are injured on the frontline, prior to their transfer to SDF hospitals and other medical facilities. SDF personnel who have completed this education and training curriculum have been designated as “Frontline Medics” and allocated to units. The SDF is also improving medical materials to be carried by the Frontline Medics. In addition to medical care on the frontline, based on the MTDP, the SDF will enhance education and training tailored to the characteristics of the units and equipment of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, which include medical care on board ship or plane, while promoting development of medical training infrastructure necessary for combat injury education and common to all SDFs. **Chapter** **6** **Developing Conditions Necessary for International Cooperation** In light of the response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the MOD/SDF is accelerating training of human resources with expertise to contribute to overseas activities against infectious diseases that could be a global threat and to the development of a framework including the National Defense Medical College, while at the same time making various efforts to improve the capabilities to respond to infectious diseases. Specifically, the MOD/SDF is currently improving the necessary facility equipment at units, the National Defense Medical College Hospital and the SDF Central Hospital. The aims of this improvement are to provide personnel training for the enhancement of capabilities to deal with infectious diseases, improve equipment to transport infectious disease patients and develop readiness for offering medical treatment to patients affected by Class I infectious diseases,[5] which are classified as the most dangerous category among known infectious diseases. The SDF Central Hospital and the National Defense Medical College Hospital were designated as a medical institution for Class I infectious diseases in April 2017 and March 2019 respectively and have been working to improve capabilities to deal with infectious diseases. SDF medical units engage in international cooperation including international disaster relief operations and capacity building assistance for foreign military forces. They have provided medical care in overseas disaster-struck areas and are actively assisting mostly Asian countries in their capacity building in such medical fields as underwater medicine, aeromedicine and disaster medicine. For the future, the MOD/SDF will develop systems necessary for various international cooperation initiatives, which include the updating of mobile medical systems that are effective for overseas medical activities and dispatch of SDF personnel to the medical departments of international organizations, the U.S. Forces and others. First aid treatment for those with symptoms such as airway obstruction and tension pneumothorax caused by injuries, and other treatments such as administration of analgesic for pain relief. Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, smallpox, South American hemorrhagic fevers, plague, Marburg disease, and Lassa disease (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of I f ti Di d M di l C f P ti t ith I f ti Di [A t N 114 f 1998]) ----- **Measures on Defense Equipment** **and Technology** ### 2 While Japan is facing severe fi nancial conditions, imports of foreign equipment are increasing due to their highperformance and the complex trends of defense equipment. On the other hand, Japan’s defense industry has been exposed to harsh conditions due to a downward trend in the number of procured equipment from domestic companies and other reasons. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. They are also working on the development of weapons utilizing potentially game-changing cutting-edge technologies and research **Section** **1** **Reviewing Equipment Structure** **1** **Initiatives for Construction of Optimized Equipment Structure** In order to acquire suffi cient capabilities for cross-domain operations in view of the aging population with a declining birth rate and the severe fi scal situation, it is essential to further promote initiatives to optimize equipment structure. The Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-2023; MTDP)[1] provides that the MOD/SDF will work on the following items to build an effective and optimized equipment structure from the perspective of joint operation. on autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artifi cial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations will make it even more diffi cult to forecast future combat aspects. Amid such a situation, it is essential to work on (1) reviewing equipment structure, (2) reinforcing technology base, (3) optimizing equipment procurement, (4) strengthening defense industrial base, and (5) promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation in order to ensure a necessary and suffi cient defense capability in terms of both quality and quantity for the construction of a Multidomain Defense Force. 2 Development of Product Families, Standardization of Specifi cations, Joint Procurement, etc. So far, based on a comprehensive perspective, the MOD has **Chapter** **KEY WORD** Development of product families This refers to adding different variations to the functions and performance of equipment to enable them to respond to different operational demands, while standardizing their basic component parts. been striving to reduce expenses incurred in development, acquisition, and maintenance by the development of product **families, standardization of equipment specifi cations, and** joint procurement of equipment common to all SDF services.[2] The MTDP plans to introduce vehicle families of next generation wheeled armored vehicles of the Ground SelfDefense Force (GSDF) that include personnel transport type, command communication type, and patient transportation type, and develop a radar with standardized specifi cations as 1 Enhancement of Joint Staff Functions In order to examine the current equipment structures of each SDF service and build an effective and optimized equipment structure from the perspective of joint operation, the MOD/SDF will study enhancement of the equipment structure at the Joint Staff, take necessary measures, and undertake the building of an equipment structure from the perspective of joint operation at an appropriate time during the MTDP period. Part II, Chapter 4, Section 1, Footnote 2 Examples of “development of product families” include guided missiles used by the GSDF, Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and ASDF; examples of “standardization of equipment specifi cations” include short-range surface-to-air guided missiles used by the GSDF and ASDF; and examples of “joint procurement of common equipment” include ammunition of the GSDF MSDF and ASDF ----- guided missiles for air base defense of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) share common specifications, potentially facilitating a reduction in unit prices through procurement in one contract. The MOD will examine specific effects from this effort. 3 Suspending Operation of Equipment of Lowered Priority The MTDP plans to reduce the number of aircraft types, suspend the use of equipment of lowered priority, and review or terminate projects of low cost-effectiveness. Specifically, 203mm self-propelled howitzer and other equipment with lower priority will not be replaced in light of the security environment surrounding Japan. Biological Reconnaissance Vehicles and other equipment of lower priority that are procured in a small number with low cost effectiveness will be decommissioned while maintaining the capabilities. **Chapter** Type-11 short-range surface-to-air guided missiles of the GSDF (front) and surface-toair guided missiles for air base defense of the ASDF (back) aiming to standardize specifications a successor to multiple types of radar, including coastal radar and low-altitude radar of the GSDF. For joint procurement of equipment common to SDF services, Type-11 short-range surface-to-air guided missiles of the GSDF and surface-to-air **2** **Initiatives to Make the Most of Limited Human Resources (Manpower Saving and Automation)** In view of the severe security environment surrounding Japan and the rapid development of the aging population with a declining birth rate, it is important to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost. Therefore, the MTDP plans to actively work on manpower saving and automation of defense equipment. 1 Initiatives for Automation The MTDP plans to actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of AI to data processing and decision making regarding unit operation, the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Specifically, the MOD/SDF will actively promote the use of unmanned equipment, which includes procurement of Global Hawk and Ship-Based Unmanned Aerial Vehicles of the MSDF, and consideration to introduce long-endurance UAVs to strengthen offshore surveillance capabilities on the vast Pacific side, while at the same time establishing a structure including a new specialized section that handles the planning of AI utilization. The MOD/SDF also plans to promote research on UUV with convertible mission modules and research on the detection of suspicious ships based on analysis of data of an automatic identification system (AIS) using AI. 2 Initiatives for Manpower Saving The MTDP plans to actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in the design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for radar sites and other equipment. Other initiatives include the introduction of patrol vessels that can be operated by a smaller crew (about 30 members) through dedication to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). ----- **Section** **2** **Reinforcing Technology Base** **1** **Necessity of Reinforcing Technology Base** As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, it is necessary to ensure technological superiority by effectively utilizing Japan’s advanced technological strength in order to protect the lives and property of Japanese people in any situation. Particularly in recent years, with the rapid advances in technological innovation, it is forecast that we will see the operationalization of so-called game-changing technology that will completely transform combat aspects in the future, and the United States and other countries are proceeding hastily with research and development. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends Concerning Military See Science and Technology) defense equipment and ensuring Japan’s security. Also, the improvement of the technology base is a pressing issue. The state-of-the-art military technologies in each country are sensitive technologies that must not be easily shared with other countries. From the perspective of Japan, for the areas, which should strategically maintain their domestic technology base, it is necessary to promote research and development domestically. In the cases of defense equipment and technology cooperation, such as equipment procurement and international joint development, it is important to maintain the leading role by owning important cutting-edge technology (key technology). This requires not only research and development by the MOD, but also the promotion of research and development by both the public and private sectors together. See Fig. IV-2-2-1 (Current Status of Research & Development See Expenditure) **Chapter** Thus, as a nation, strategically working on ways to ensure technological superiority and ensuring advanced technology base are important from the perspective of creating superior **2** **Defense Technology Strategy and Related Documents** For the purpose of ensuring Japan’s technological superiority, inventing as well as delivering advanced equipment in an effective and efficient manner, and dealing with various policy issues pertaining to defense and civilian technologies, taking account of the National Security Strategy and the 2013 NDPG[1], the MOD formulated the Defense Technology Strategy in 2016, which presented the specific direction for various measures that should be addressed strategically. Based on this strategy, the MOD promotes various measures. 1 1 Defense Technology Strategy **(1) MOD Technology Policy Objectives** The following two objectives of the MOD technology policy **Fig. IV-2-2-1** Current state of R&D spending Defense-Related Research & Development Expenditure Ratio of research & development expenditure to defense expenditure (100mn yen) of Major Countries (FY2018) *FY 2017 (%) of major countries (FY2018) *FY 2017 80,000 10 9.32 8.62[＊] 60,522 60,000 5.12[＊] 4,000 3,462[＊] 5 2,439[＊] 2.75 2.74 2,000 2.37[＊] 2.23 1,467[＊] 1,358 1,042 158 0 0 U.S. U.K. France ROK Sweden Germany Japan U.S. U.K. France ROK Sweden Germany Japan Source:“OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” Source:“OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators” “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database ©SIPRI 2019” S P t II Ch t 3 S ti 1 F t t 7 ----- are designed to strengthen the technical capabilities, which serve as the foundation of Japan’s defense capabilities, to make the foundation more robust: (i) Ensuring technical superiority (ii) Delivering superior defense equipment through effective and efficient research and development **(2) Specific Measures to be Promoted** The following three measures are promoted to achieve the objectives indicated in the previous paragraph. (i) Grasping Technological Information With regard to various scientific technologies that support defense technologies, the MOD grasps the current situation and trends both in and outside of Japan, including dual-use **technology in the public and private sectors and cutting-edge** scientific technology. In addition, the MOD develops and publishes the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook (see Paragraph 2 below) to identify advanced technology fields, which have the potential to become game **changers.** (ii) Development of Technologies The MOD formulates the “Research and Development Vision” (see Paragraph 3 below) that promotes medium- to long-term research and development. At the same time, the MOD also promotes research and development that serve as the foundation of defense force building and initiatives such as “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security,” which puts into perspective the identification and development of advanced technology expected to be used for technology exchange with relevant domestic/overseas agencies and defense purposes. (iii) Protection of Technologies The MOD implements technology control for proper technology transfer to prevent situations in which Japan’s technology leaks without the country’s intention, undermining the maintenance of the peace and security of the international community or ensuring Japan’s technological superiority. The MOD also establishes intellectual property management taking into account the transfer of defense equipment and promotes the utilization of intellectual property. will facilitate the integration of superior civilian advanced technologies and the development of technologies outside of the ministries aimed at defense equipment applications. Review is now underway for taking a more strategic approach to important technologies, including technologies pertaining to new domains and other potentially gamechanging technologies such as AI. 3 “Research and Development (R&D)Vision” The “Research and Development (R&D) Vision” presents principles on R&D, technological challenges, and roadmaps on R&D of the technologies required for our future defense capability for the purpose of conducting advanced R&D systematically from a mid-to-long term viewpoint. The MOD publishes R&D Vision, and shares them with the defense industry, with the aim of increasing predictability for relevant companies, promoting prior investment, and realizing more effective and efficient research and development by maximally exploiting the investment. So far, the MOD prepared and published the “R&D Vision on the Future Fighter Aircraft” in 2010 and the “R&D Vision on Future Unmanned Equipment: Focusing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” in 2016. The MOD is currently conducting various research and study that can serve as a common foundation for unmanned aircraft, etc. In August 2019, the MOD published the “Research and Development (R&D) Vision—Toward Realization of MultiDomain Defense Force and Beyond” in order to contribute to the realization of Multi-Domain Defense Force and to achieve technological innovation necessary for further strengthening defense capability. Considering the direction of policy, operational needs, changes in technological trends and others, the MOD will continue to review R&D Vision, as well as establish and publish Visions on new themes. **Chapter** **KEY WORD** Dual-use technology Technology that can be used for both civilian and defense purposes **KEY WORD** Game changers Technologies with the potential to drastically change military balance in the future 2 Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook The Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook presents an outlook of the technologies that can be applied to equipment expected to be established in roughly the next 20 years, and indicates technology fields that need to be developed in order to ensure Japan’s technological superiority. It is expected that making this Outlook public **3** **Initiatives for Research and Development** Technological progress is about to fundamentally change how security should be managed, and major states endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge technologies (see Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1). Against this backdrop, the MOD is promoting focused research in promising technical fields in order to ensure technological superiority ----- in strategically important equipment and technology fi elds through focused investment in technologies in new domains, potentially game-changing cutting-edge technologies such as AI, and other important technologies. Specifi cally, the MOD has been making efforts to greatly shorten the research and development periods of Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile intended for the defense of remote islands, UUV, hypersonic weapons, and other equipment through fl exible and active use of new methods such as block approach and modularization. At the same time, the MOD/SDF has been working on visualization of the capabilities of future equipment by analyzing alternatives (AOA) in technological demonstration at the initial stage of R&D. The MOD also conducts research regarding a high-energy laser system (HEL) that responds to such threats as a large number of small unmanned aerial vehicles that fl y at a low altitude and mortar shells at a low cost and with a short reaction time. Furthermore, the MOD effi ciently and effectively conducts research on UUVs, etc. using dual-use technologies based on the “Basic Policy on the Relocation of Governmental Organizations”[2] along with developing a new test and evaluation facility “Iwakuni Test Evaluation Facility (provisional name)” in Iwakuni City. The facility is also available for use by the civilian sector, including local institutions for higher education and research institutes. In addition, based on the MTDP, the MOD is working to **4** **Active Utilization of Civilian Technology** 1 1 Strengthening Technology Exchange with Relevant Domestic and Overseas Entities and Collaboration with Relevant Ministries and Agencies The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) and domestic research institutions, such as universities and independent administrative institutions, proactively engage in research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that advanced civilian technology is incorporated and effi cient research and development is conducted. At the same time, in order to create excellent defense equipment through the utilization of advanced technologies and effectively and effi ciently conduct R&D, the MOD will ensure cross-sectoral and substantial coordination at the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (CSTI)[3] and other control tower meetings[4] based on the Integrated Innovation Strategy (Cabinet Decision on June 15, 2018). The ministry also actively participates in the **Chapter** The next generation warning and control radar units at the time of technical demonstration actively leverage potentially dual-use advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities, enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with countries who are making large-scale investments in game-changing technologies, such as the U.S. and special strategic partner countries, and promote mutually complementary international joint R&D. The MOD/SDF is also conducting studies to reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze the latest foreign and domestic technological trends. Council for Integrated Innovation Strategy[5] established for its promotion in order to further enhance collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, national research and development agencies, industry, universities, and other parties. Furthermore, the MOD will further strengthen human exchange with research institutes, etc. in order to understand trends of civilian technologies for complementary and synergistic improvement of technological capabilities. As international cooperative activities, the MOD will continue Japan-U.S. joint research and engineer exchanges, and continuously consider diverse possibilities through continued opinion exchange with other countries at various opportunities while closely observing their technology strategies, etc. Decided at the Advisory Council on Vitalizing Towns, People and Jobs on March 22, 2016 One of the important policy meetings aimed at the planning and general coordination of comprehensive and basic science & technology innovation policies under the leadership of the Prime Minister and ministers in charge of Science &Technology policy, at a level higher than individual ministries. The IT Strategy Headquarters, the Intellectual Property Strategy Headquarters, the Headquarters for Healthcare Policy, the Space Development Strategy Headquarters, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, and the Geospatial Information Utilization Promotion Committee in addition to the CSTI Meeting of all ministers of state under the leadership of the Chief Cabinet Secretary for checking, sorting, and cross-sectoral and substantial coordination, and promotion of items that are i l d d i th I t t d I ti St t ( d b th C bi t J 15 2018) d th t i di ti th t l t l t d t i ti ----- **Chapter** **Thoughts of a Researcher Working on a Research Program Supported by the** **“Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” Program** **Dr. Tetsuya Morimoto, Senior Chief Researcher at the Advanced Composite Research Center, Institute of** **Aeronautical Technology, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency** “Visualization” of molecular bonding for adhesives is one of the issues of our research group. Adhesion of carbon fiber reinforced plastics (CFRPs) is widely applied in weight sensitive structures such as aircraft and spacecraft due to the excellence of CFRPs in terms of their high strength-to-weight and stiffness-to-weight ratios. However, full demonstration of the excellence has been difficult due to the adhesion design method of accepting an extra margin for bonding error and the wide distribution of bonding strength. Therefore, our team introduced scanning electrochemical microscopy (SECM), which is a new tool in biotechnology, fuel cell engineering, and so on, to seek the detrimental factors of bonding and succeeded in the visualization of adhesive performance distribution for the first time. Further development of this technology, we believe, will solve the adhesion problems to realize future aerospace structures that utilize CFRPs’ full performance. Our team is on the final term since the start of this three-year-project, under the sincere support by the program officer, not only in the form of technical comments and advice but also in the form of discussion opportunities with other teams in different fields to provide us with hints and new ideas. The excellence of program design also drives forward our team, especially the stable salary system for supporting young scientists, such as doctoral students and postdoctoral fellows, who tend to suffer unstable positions under the present aggressive environment for The author (research representative) conducting an scientists. experiment 2 Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security and Its Utilization future, but is also beneficial for the development of Japan’s science, technology and innovation in non-defense areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances in science and technology as a whole including civilian technology, such as the development of the Internet and GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote relevant measures and strives to raise awareness of this program that contributes to ensuring the freedom of study and its sound development. In April 2019, an organizational change[7] was carried out for the unified implementation of translational research in order to connect the results of advanced basic research to the research and development of specific equipment. Those research results will be acquired through such efforts as technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities, enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies, and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program for the R&D of specific equipment. See Fig. IV-2-2-2 (FY2018 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program) In FY2015 the MOD launched a competitive research funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” to discover creative research activities conducted in universities, research institutes, companies, etc., which are expected to apply defense equipment in the future and to promote promising research seeds. A total of 53 research projects were awarded[6] by FY2018, this program was expanded in FY2017 in order to enable the awards of larger-scale and longer-term research projects. The program will continue to run on a similar scale in FY2019 (total budget of about 10.1 billion yen). In the basic research areas, free thinking of researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For this reason, it is necessary to assign maximum value to freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that, for example, researchers will be able to publish all of their research results to have a wide range of academic discussions. Hence, in this program the MOD will neither restrict contractors’ publication of research results, nor designate research results as confidential, never providing any confidential data to researchers. In actuality, some research results have already been published through oral presentations, publications, etc. Active utilization of advanced civilian technology through such programs is not only essential for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people into the For the research projects adopted under the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security (a competitive research funding program), see the ATLA website (https://www.mod.go.jp/ atla/funding/kadai.html) A part of the affairs concerning the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security handled by Technology Promotion and IP Management Division of the Department of Technology St t th ATLA t f d t th Ad d D f T h l C t (f ti l h ) d th di i i t bli h d ----- **Fig. IV-2-2-2** FY2018 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program |Col1|Research Title|Brief Summary|Representative Institution for the Project| |---|---|---|---| |Large-scale research projects (Type S): Seven projects|Research for Long-Range Acoustic MIMO*1 Communications by Time Reversal|Taking advantage of time reversal MIMO communication, a technique for compensating the effect of multipath and spatial multiplexing for improving communication capacity, this research aims to: establish a method for achieving high-rate and long-range underwater acoustic communication; and also conduct demonstration tests in the sea.|Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (national research and development agency)| ||Study of predictive adaptive optics control for long-distance high-intensity light beam transmission|This research aims to: predict optical transmission by measuring the backscattered light of search beams; establish a system for dramatically increasing the transmission distance of optical communication by real-time control of a deformable mirror or other means; and conduct indoor demonstration tests.|RIKEN (national research and development agency)| ||Fabrication of High Toughness Eutectic Ceramic Composite Materials Excellent in High-Temperature Environmental Resistance|This research aims to: fnid eutectic ceramic materials excellent in heat resistance and environmental resistance; develop a technology for toughening eutectic ceramic materials and a technology for spinning eutectic ceramic fbiers; provide composite materials with high toughness in which these technologies are combined; and demonstrate the performance of these materials.|Japan Ultra-High Temperature Materials Research Center (JUTEM)| ||Research for Innovative Wireless Power Supply to Transmit a Large Amount of Electricity to Underwater Vehicles|This research aims to: conduct basic research for properties of seawater in the strong electromagnetic feild so as to uncover the mechanism by which electromagnetic waves diminish in the sea; and establish and demonstrate a magnetic-resonance, wireless electricity transmission system capable of effciiently transmitting a large amount of electricity.|Panasonic Corporation| ||Research for Innovative Infrared Ray Sensors Making Use of Two-Dimensional, Functional Atomically-Thin Films|This research aims to: highly enhance the effciiency of photothermoelectric effects in graphene, which have been brought about by unique quantum physical properties, by making use of the layer structures; apply the effects to infrared ray sensors; and examine the highly-sensitive and high-speed imaging performance of the sensors at room temperature.|Fujitsu Ltd.| ||Basic Research for Ultra-High-Voltage, α-Type Gallium Oxide Power Semiconductor Devices and Pulsed Power Sources|This research aims to: establish a high-quality crystal growth technology and device manufacturing technology for high performance α-type gallium oxide power semiconductor devices; and also manufacture pulsed power sources in which an α-type gallium oxide power semiconductor device is incorporated and confrim the performance of the sources.|FLOSFIA Inc.| ||Basic Research for Photodetector Elements Making Use of Two-Dimensional, Functional Atomically-Thin Films, E.G., Graphene|This research aims to achieve photodetector elements with high performance using a method in which a voltage change caused by irradiation of light on substrate materials is detected by using the highly-sensitive response of graphene. In advancing the research, the company will manufacture such elements and examine the effectiveness of the proposed method.|Mitsubishi Electric Corporation| |Small-scale research projects (Type A/C): 13 projects|Study on detail mechanism of Rotating Detonation Waves|The research aims to: address the fundamental mechanism of detonation waves with quantitative visualization in the cylindrical-ring combustor and with direct numerical simulations; and also identify the condition under which stable rotating detonation waves keep running.|Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (national research and development agency)| ||Innovative Methods for Creating Outstanding Broadband Transparent Nanoceramics|This research aims to: create optical materials that excellently provide not only an infrared transparency property but also mechanical properties by achieving fnie-grained microstructures from nano/amorphous ceramic powders; and establish the technologies for manufacturing such materials.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Research for Superconducting Magnetic Sensors Providing both Ultra-High-Sensitivity Performance and Environmental Resistance|Focusing on superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUID) making use of high-temperature oxide superconductors that are workable at the temperature of liquid-nitrogen or higher, this research aims to: fnid a balance between high magnetic feild resistance and magnetic sensitivity; and examine the effectiveness of the sensors that have been manufactured.|Superconducting Sensing Technology Research Association| ||Research and Development of 10kV-Class Gallium Oxide Trench MOSFETs*2|This research aims to develop low-loss and high-current semiconductor devices with ultra-high blocking voltage, which are achieved by increasing the blocking voltage of MOSFETs fabricated by β-type gallium oxide with excellent crystal quality.|Novel Crystal Technology, Inc.| ||Basic Research for collaboration between a small number of people and a group of AI|This basic research aims to effectively solve complex problems through establishing a method for building consensus between human beings and a group of artifciial intelligence.|Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.| ||Development of Innovative Actuators with MR Fluids*3 for Providing Sensitive Haptics|Focusing on actuators with MR fulids capable of high-speed torque control, this research aims to demonstrate the performance of such actuators that provide haptics in the simulated environment for telesurgery.|Oita University| ||Development of a System for Applying Mechanical Stress|This basic research will focus on the mechanism of intracellular signal transduction under the high pressure condition, leading to development of innovative sensing devices in the future.|Okayama University| ||Fundamental Research on Shallow Underground Exploration Technology by Acoustic Irradiation Induced Vibration using UAV*4|The purpose of this fundamental research is to develop a method for exploring buried objects in shallow underground by irradiating sound waves from UAV and measuring ground surface vibration by laser Doppler vibrometer.|Toin University of Yokohama| ||Development of Technology for High-Speed Automatic Detection of Low-Bright Moving Objects in Noise Images|Focusing on the observation of space debris and celestial bodies near the earth, this research aims to establish: a technology for image processing by superimposing a large amount of image data; and a technology for highly-speedily detecting moving objects at the noise level or lower levels to which an algorithm for removal of background objects is applied.|Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (national research and development agency)| ||Establishment of Standards for Reliability Assessment for Creating New Titanium Alloy with Properties of High-Temperature Resistance and Oxidation Resistance|This research aims to: establish standards for reliability assessment of new titanium in light of the results of a variety of tests; and create new titanium alloy stably applicable at high temperature by unraveling the mechanism of oxidation of titanium and other efforts.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Research for Creating New Materials that Enhance the Sensitivity of Topological Magnetic Sensors|This research aims to seek and create new materials for the purpose of achieving innovative magnetic sensors making use of unique electrical conduction.|National Institute for Materials Science (national research and development agency)| ||Analysis of Challenges in Devices for Transmission of a Large Amount of Electricity in Water and the Sea Making Use of Electromagnetic Induction, the Devices of which are Capable of Simultaneously Supplying Electricity to Multiple Targets and Providing a Function for Adjusting Distances where Electricity is Supplied; and Method for Solving the Challenges|This research aims to: establish electromagnetically-inducted, wireless electricity transmission, which is capable of supplying electricity to targets in water and the sea in a highly effciient manner; and seek a method for analyzing electromagnetic feilds in a highly speedy manner.|Science Solutions International Laboratory, Inc.| ||Research for High-Speed Charging and Discharging Materials by Controlling of Metal Oxide Nano- Structures.|This research aims to: create metal oxide electrode materials capable of storing ion in their crystal structures; unravel the mechanism of charging and discharging thereof; and improve the properties of the electrode.|Toshiba Materials Co., Ltd.| *1: The term “MIMO” is an acronym for “Multiple-Input Multiple-Output,” a wireless communication technology that receives and sends data through multiple antennas. *2: The term “MOSFET” is an acronym for “Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor Field Effect Transistor.” *3: The term “MR” is an abbreviation for “magnetorheological.” *4: The term “UAV” is an acronym for “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” **Chapter** ----- **Section** **3** **Optimizing Equipment Procurement** **1** **Project Management throughout Its Life Cycle** Strategy. In August 2018, Analysis and Evaluation of the acquisition programs were developed for 16 items for which the Acquisition Strategy, etc. had been developed. See Fig. IV-2-3-1 (Equipment for Project Management and See Equipment for Semi-Project Management) 1 Acquisition of Defense Equipment through Focused Project Management As defense equipment is becoming more sophisticated and complex, its entire life cycle (concept study, research and development, mass production, deployment, operation and maintenance) cost has a tendency to increase in recent years. It has become extremely important to streamline acquisition throughout the life cycle of equipment and to establish a systematic management to realize the streamlining in order to efficiently acquire equipment of assured quality at appropriate cost in a required timeline as planned. Therefore, since the establishment of ATLA in October 2015, the Department of Project Management in ATLA undertakes project management throughout the life cycle of equipment upon selecting important equipment, and promotes efforts to realize the optimized equipment acquisition. Specifically, the MOD has selected 17 items for major programs designated for project management and 3 items for semi-major programs for project management[1] as of the end of March 2019. The MOD designated Project Managers (PM) dedicated to specific major programs. At the same time, the MOD established a systematic project management system by setting up the Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of officials from relevant divisions within the Ministry. So far (as of the end of March 2019), for 19 out of 20 items that have been selected for major and semi-major programs, the MOD has formulated the Acquisition Strategy and the Acquisition Plan (hereinafter referred to as “Acquisition Strategy, etc.”), which specify the basic matters necessary to systematically implement project management, such as the purpose of the acquisition program, acquisition policy, and life cycle cost. The Acquisition Strategy, etc. shows strategic plans to realize optimized acquisitions of equipment. Furthermore, in principle, ATLA annually confirms the project implementation status with each SDF service, and endeavors to promote appropriate project management reflecting the latest situation by developing Analysis and Evaluation, which compiles changes made in acquisition plans from the previous fiscal year, and reviews Acquisition **Chapter** 2 Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project Management **(1) Past Initiatives** The following initiatives have been implemented to promote and strengthen project management. **a. Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS** For certain kinds of equipment produced in Japan, the MOD is promoting the introduction of a management method to visualize the progress of work and cost generated by component (Work Breakdown Structure [WBS][2]) and endeavors to manage cost and schedule to detect the signs of cost increase and schedule delay early so that swift measures can be taken. **b. Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate** Life cycle cost and other costs have been estimated based on actual cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD promotes the establishment of a cost database by collecting cost data and accumulating them into a database. **c. Accumulation and Development of Expertise through** **Strengthened Cooperation with Research and Educational** **Institutions, etc.** For further improving the management skills of Project Managers and enhancing human resources among those who engage in project management, the MOD strengthens collaboration with research and educational institutions on project management and provides opportunities to study project management methods from overseas and the private sector on a regular basis. **(2) Future Initiatives** In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment acquisition, the MOD needs to enhance the effectiveness and A semi-major project is an acquisition project of specific equipment with a limited application of project management without the designation of PM and IPT, focusing on risks in functions, performance, costs, schedules and other risk factors as in the case of equipment for project management. WBS is a hierarchical structure used to practice project management that systematically divides the project into manageable units, in which the schedule and cost of each deliverable ( d i ) ll d ----- **Fig. IV-2-3-1** Equipment for Project Management and Equipment for Semi-Project Management **Chapter** Procurement program of the project management focused equipment, etc. (2018) Equipment for Semi-Project Management, etc. (2017) Midcourse Enemy aircraftEnemy aircraft guidance technology Ship-based launch technology MSDF destroyerMSDF destroyer Land-based Aegis system Type-16 maneuver Aerial refueling/ Airborne early New ship-to-air missile (Aegis Ashore) combat vehicles transport aircraft (KC-46A) warning aircraft (E-2D) Type-17 ship-to-ship missile Develop product families Procurement program of the project management focused equipment, etc. (2015) with this as the base Combine projects Type-12 surface-to-ship New air-to-ship guided missiles guided missiles (Advanced) for reconnaissance aircraft Type-12 surface-to-ship guided missiles (Advanced) New air-to-ship guided missiles for reconnaissance aircraft SM-3 Block IIA surface-to-air missile (Improved)Type-03 medium-range Unmanned aerial vehicle(RQ-4B Global Hawk) Amphibious vehicle(AAV7) Space debris etc.Space debris etc. Japan's satelliteJapan's satelliteAvoid if there is Avoid if there is any risk of any risk of collision, etc.collision, etc. Suspicious Suspicious satellite InformationInformationsharingsharing RadarRadar telescopestelescopesOpticalOptical OperationOperationsystemsystem U.S. ArmedU.S. ArmedForcesForces Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System New destroyer helicopter (GSDF UH-X)New multipurpose Tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22) (SH-60K upgraded capability)New patrol helicopter Equipment for Project Management, etc. (2017) Fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) Transport aircraft (C-2) Fighter aircraft (F-35A) Future Fighter Aircraft FY2017 Submarine fl exibility of project management throughout equipment life cycles. To this end, under the MTDP, the MOD/SDF will take new initiatives, including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at the development stage, incorporating successful examples in the civilian sector into the manufacture of defense equipment, and actively adopting the competitive bidding method and other contracting methods that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise and **2** **Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters** 1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, which is a prompt response to swiftly changing surroundings, the MOD has been holding meetings of the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007, in addition to the Contractual Systems Study Groups held since 2010 to review acquisition systems. Since FY2016, a special research offi cer system[3] tightening cost controls. In this regard, the MOD will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifi cations and the review of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs. Furthermore, for more effi cient acquisition, during the equipment selection phase, the MOD will implement thorough life cycle cost estimation, analysis of alternatives and secure binding obligations against company principals. has been adopted in order to surely bring the review results to fruition. 2 Long-Term Contracts, etc. The production of defense equipment requires a signifi cant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain set amount is to be procured in bulk, in many cases a contract for more than This is a system to conduct research, which contributes to the acquisition system of defense equipment, by inviting experts, such as associate professors from different universities specializing in the areas of concern, in order to review and reconsider an effective procurement system, based not only on the viewpoints of the Ministry of Defense personnel but also on th i th t h b d i th fi ld f b i d i i t ti d i ----- **Fig. IV-2-3-2** Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect Bulk-procurement of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D) in the FY2019 budget Traditional procurement (image) **Chapter** |2019|2020|2021|2022|2023|2024|2025|2026| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Conclusion a contrac C|||Delivery of t|wo aircraft Delivery o|f two aircraft Delivery of t|wo aircraft Delivery of t|wo aircraft Deli one| ||of t onclusion of a contract||||||| |||Conclusion of a contract|||||| ||||Conclusion a contract||||| |||||of Conclusio a contr|||| ||||||n of act||| Delivery of one aircraft Procurement based on long-term contracts (image) |2019|2020|2021|2022|2023|2024|2025|2026| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||||| ||||||||| Total of approx. 226.5 billion yen* Reduction of 32.5 billion yen (Reduction by 14.4%) through bulk-procurement. Total of approx. 194 billion yen* Conclusion of Delivery of Delivery of Delivery of Delivery of Expenditures for spare parts necessary for the start of the - a contract two aircraft three aircraft three aircraft one aircraft operation are not included. five years is needed. With regard to defense equipment and services, economies of scale[4] tend not to work mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the MOD is the only customer; and (2) companies that provide such defense equipment, etc., are limited. In addition, it is difficult for companies to systematically move forward with their businesses with a high degree of predictability, which is peculiar to the defense industry. For these reasons, the upper limit of acts that incur national debt prescribed in the Public Finance Act as within five years in principle was changed to within ten years for specific equipment through the enactment of the Long-term Contract Act.[5] The introduction of this change regarding long-term contracts will make stable procurement possible, leading to the realization of the systematic improvement of defense capability. At the same time, for companies, given that the procurement amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk orders, will be made possible. See Fig. IV-2-3-2 (Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect) Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3-3 (Initiatives for Greater Efficiency) In addition, by realizing longer-term multiple-year contracts utilizing the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Act,[6] the planned acquisition and execution of budgets is achieved through the standardization of investment amounts of the national expenditure, and certain benefits are obtained, such as cutting equipment procurement costs, by reducing risks for those taking orders and by promoting the entry of new suppliers. As projects using the PFI Act, the MOD launched the “project of development and operation of X-band satellite communications” in January 2013 and the “project of operation and management of private ships” in March 2016. In addition, regarding procurement of certain equipment with which little competitiveness can be expected due to its characteristics, and companies that work on cost reduction using the MOD’s programs, the MOD promotes limited tendering contracts while ensuring transparency and fairness as well as clarifying and putting the subject into patterns, from the perspective of the implementation of smooth and efficient procurement, and the enhancement of the company’s predictability. Specifically, as a new initiative, in acquiring new destroyers,[7] the MOD has adopted a procurement method to acquire the new destroyers efficiently equipped with the necessary functions and to maintain and strengthen the construction technology base since February 2017. This is done by selecting a party that has made the best proposal with respect to the MOD’s requirements as a procurement counterparty, with the runner-up also involved in designing “Economies of scale” refers to the cost advantage that arises with an increased output of a product. For example, costs per unit can be reduced by a bulk purchase of materials. “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specific Defense Procurement” (enacted in April 2015. An act for its partial revision to extend the effective period by five years was enacted in March 2019.) Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative N d t th t bi i d lti i i biliti d t h ll ----- and building facilities as a subcontractor. The MOD concluded a proposal agreement in April 2017 and decided on a procurement counterparty and a subcontractor in August 2017. 3 Decrease Procurement Cost and Improve Companies’ Incentives to Reduce Cost With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, there is a large variety of equipment without a market price, and therefore, they tend to have high prices. In light of this characteristic, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously. Thus, the MOD has been striving to achieve the reduction of procurement prices by confirming the actual costs incurred and ensuring that no excessive business profit will be added after the execution of the contract through cost audit contracts with a special provision requiring respective companies to conduct a review of the contract sum and return any excessive profit (audit contracts incorporating a provision requiring the return of excessive profit). However, it has also been noted that these contracts diminish the companies’ motivation for cost reduction as they would be required to return excessive profits after the completion of the contract payment at the end of the fiscal year. Therefore, the MOD is developing a new incentive contract system in which public and private sectors jointly carry out the management of contract implementation to minimize such risk, and in which a certain percentage will be given back to the companies if the cost reduction has been performed. **3** **Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives** this database to be utilized not only to verify the validity of procurement prices, but also to enhance the accuracy and efficiency of life cycle cost estimation for new equipment. See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3-3 (Initiatives for Increasing the See Efficiency of Procurement) **Chapter** 1 Effective and Efficient Maintenance and Replenishment With regard to periodic maintenance checks of defense equipment, the MOD has been working to achieve greater efficiency by extending the interval between the maintenance checks, after making sufficient effort to ensure safety. In addition, the MOD embarks on the introduction of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)[8] from the perspective of improving the equipment availability ratio and long-term cost reductions. The Ministry is also reviewing the maintenance methods. In the FY2019 budget, reduction of the maintenance and operating costs is expected by grouping hardware and software that were rented for each information system. See Part II, Chapter 4, Section 3-3 (Initiatives for Increasing the Efficiency of Procurement) 2 Achieving Further Efficiency in the Acquisition of Defense Equipment When acquiring defense equipment, the MOD aims to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance expenses through the development of product families, standardization of equipment specifications, joint procurement of equipment common to multiple SDF services, etc., in addition to a review of the contract system. In the FY2019 budget, cost reduction is expected by switching to import of complete F-35As. In addition, the MOD is facilitating the compilation of a database on the breakdown of procurement price and actual price of major equipment in the past. The Ministry expects 3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency The MOD implements measures for making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials. As a part of the effort to “make public procurement more appropriate” across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system[9] and make bidding procedures more efficient. In addition to these, based on reflection on the past, strengthening system investigation, reviewing penalties, ensuring the effectiveness of supervision and inspection, and other measures have steadily been carried out in order to prevent recurrence of such incidents as overcharging and falsified results of equipment testing by defense-related companies in 2012. Through these measures, the MOD strives to surely prevent recurrence of scandals, enhance fairness and transparency, and make contracts more appropriate. In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks through both internal and external checking systems and check-and-balance within the organization – namely, ATLA PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation according to the level of equipment performance achieved in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive outcomes upon application to the maintenance and servicing of equipment in Western countries. Unlike the automatic bid system, which focuses only on price, this is a system whereby the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both th i d th l t Thi th d i d t d h it i i t t t h d l ti th t h l i l l t ----- further enhances internal inspections by the inspection and audit department, and through deliberations in the Defense Procurement Council, consisting of external experts, and defense inspection conducted by the Inspector General’s **4** **Promoting Initiative towards Streamlining of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Procurement** FMS is a form of U.S. security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) etc. that may enable the U.S. allies and others to purchase defense equipment and services from the U.S. government and is not intended for making economic profits. The characteristics of FMS include: (1) pricing is an estimate, (2) payments are made in advance in principle and balanced out in effect after fulfillment, and (3) the delivery date is an estimate. This program allows Japan to procure equipment with a high level of confidentiality that cannot be generally purchased through Direct Commercial Sales and highly capable equipment which can only be manufactured by the United States. Therefore, FMS is critical to strengthen Japan’s defense Office of Legal Complaints. Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education department and strives to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel. capabilities. Meanwhile, there are FMS-related challenges, such as ensuring cost transparency and late case closures. As the FMS procurement amount is rising, the MOD has been actively working to make improvements in these challenges. Specific efforts for streamlining FMS procurement include promoting equipment acquisition by aligning the timing of procurement and specification with the U.S. Forces’ equipment to reduce cost, and strengthening cooperation with the U.S. government through close Japan-U.S. consultations to attempt improving cost transparency while reducing costs and enhancing execution management. **Chapter** **Section** **4** **Strengthening Defense Industrial Base** Strong industrial base is essential for ensuring the production and a high operation rate of high-performance equipment. For this purpose, the MOD established the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases in June 2014 to maintain **1** **Current Situation of Japan’s Defense Industrial Base** The term “defense industrial base” refers to the human, physical, and technological bases that are essential for the production, operation, sustainment, and maintenance of defense equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In Japan, most of the base is covered by companies (the defense industry) that manufacture defense equipment and associated items. Therefore, a broad range of companies[2] that possess special and advanced skills and facilities are involved in the defense production and technological bases. Meanwhile, the degree of defense demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales that account for all company sales) is approximately 3% on average, indicating that defense business is not the primary business in many companies.[3] Furthermore, and strengthen the base. For the future, the ministry will make the defense industrial base more resilient, enabling to effectively adapt to a changing security environment based on the NDPG,[1] etc. unit costs and maintenance/sustainment costs tend to increase due to low-volume, high mix production and the sophistication and complication of defense equipment. For this reason, Japan’s defense industrial base faces some issues, such as difficulties in maintaining and passing on skills and techniques, and withdrawal of some companies from defense businesses because work quantity is decreasing due to a decrease of procurement volume. In addition, as the realignment of the Western defense industries and international joint development are making progress, Japan formulated the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology in April 2014. However, improvement of international competitiveness has See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1, Footnote 1 For example, it is said that approximately 1,100, 1,300 and 8,300 companies are involved in the manufacture of fighter aircraft tanks and destroyers, respectively. According to the survey of defense demand dependence conducted on 46 defense-related companies based on their sales performance in FY2015. Although relatively small in scale, some companies possess important technologies for supporting the defense industry with over 50% of the defense demand dependence, in which case the scale of defense demand has a i ifi t i t th t f th i ----- See Fig. IV-2-4-1 (Changes in Maintenance and Upgrade See Expenditures for Equipment, etc.) Section 5-1 (The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) **2** **The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases** stands; (2) characteristics of defense production and technological bases; and (3) changes in the environment surrounding defense production and technological bases. become a challenge for Japan s defense industry, because it has developed based on the production of defense equipment only for the SDF. **2** **The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases** 1 Context of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases, etc. For the purpose of maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production and technological bases, which is an important and essential element supporting Japan’s defense capability, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was formulated in June 2014. The Strategy responded to the National Security Strategy and the 2013 NDPG, replacing “Kokusankahoshin (guideline for domestic development/production).”[4] See Reference 5 (National Security Strategy [Outline]) **(2) Goals and Significance of Maintaining and Strengthening** **Defense Production and Technological Bases** Through the maintaining and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, the MOD intends to (1) ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially contribute to increasing deterrence capability, and maintaining and improving bargaining power, and (3) contribute to the sophistication of the domestic industry in Japan driven by cutting-edge technology. **(3) Basic Viewpoints for Promoting Measures** For the promotion of measures, the MOD takes into account the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing longterm partnership between the private and public sectors; (2) strengthening international competitiveness; and (3) ensuring consistency with effective and efficient acquisition **Chapter** See 2 Overview of Defense Production and Technological Bases **(1) Significance of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** “The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” has made the following three points clear: (1) the context of the formulation of the strategy on defense production and technological bases and where this strategy **Fig. IV-2-4-1** Changes in Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc. Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment, etc. (100 million yen) 10,000 8,953 8,750 8,553 8,141 8,000 7,387 7,352 7,199 7,459 7,431 7,527 7,502 7,862 7,794 7,612 6,993 6,365 6,636 6,757 6,422 6,554 6,508 6,662 6,686 6,680 6,795 6,177 6,000 5,730 5,333 4,763 4,902 4,393 4,000 2,000 0 1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2019 Note:1 “Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment” refers to the budget for repair costs for equipment, consumable goods costs, and service costs with each service of the SDF (referring to the amount calculated by excluding repair costs for the extension of vessel life and modernization of aircraft from the repair costs of each SDF unit). 2 As for FY2019, expenditure for the 3-Year Emergency Countermeasures for Disaster Prevention/Mitigation and National Resilience are included. 3 The amounts represent contractual figures. Th b i id li f d ti d d l t f d f i t th d l t id li f d f i d t d th ti l ti id li f R&D (Di ti J l 16 1970) ----- of defense equipment. **(4) Defense Equipment Procurement Methods** With regard to defense equipment procurement, currently multiple methods, such as domestic development, international joint development and production, licensed domestic production, utilization of commercially produced goods, and imports, are adopted. These methods directly affect the defense production and technological bases. According to the characteristics of defense equipment, the MOD appropriately selects acquisition methods, including international joint development and production, which have become more agile and flexible due to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. and development; (3) promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation; (4) initiatives for defense industrial organizations including the building of robust production and technological bases through understanding actual situations of the supply chain; (5) strengthening of the MOD’s functions through the establishment of ATLA, etc.; and (6) collaboration with other relevant ministries and government agencies. **(6) Courses of Actions for Each Defense Equipment Sectors** With regard to the main defense equipment sectors (such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft, explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics and command control systems, unmanned equipment, space systems and cyber), the MOD will analyze the current situation of defense production and technological bases. At the same time, based on the priority matters for developing the SDF’s structure indicated in the 2013 NDPG, the MOD will present the future direction of the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases and the acquisition plan for each defense equipment sectors, and thereby, seek to increase predictability for companies. **Chapter** **(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** In order to maintain and strengthen defense production and technological bases, the MOD will promote the following measures with a focus on variation and efficiency, while considering Japan’s severe financial condition: (1) improvement in the contract system; (2) initiatives in research **3** **Initiatives Based on the 2018 NDPG** 1 Past Initiatives Based on the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases, the MOD has implemented various measures contributing to the maintenance and strengthening of the defense industrial base, such as improving the contract system, including the Long-term Contract Act, and the establishment of ATLA, which integrated the organizations involved in the defense equipment procurement. In addition, the following new measures are also taken in ATLA: (1) formulation of Defense Technology Strategy, etc. for ensuring the technological superiority, and implementation of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (see Section 2); (2) formulation of the Acquisition Strategic Plan for promoting project management, and improvement of contract systems (see Section 3); (3) grasping the supply chain in the defense industry and responses to risks in order to maintain and strengthen the defense industrial base (see Paragraph 2 below); and (4) participation of Japanese companies in the international F-35 program and defense equipment and technology cooperation involving joint research and development with other countries (see Section 5). 2 Future Initiatives In order to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base, which is essential to the production, operation, sustainment and maintenance of defense equipment, the MOD will work on the following initiatives based on the NDPG, etc., while considering the orientation of the defense production and technology strategy. **(1) Reforming the Existing Contract System towards Creating** **a Competitive Environment among Companies** Japan’s defense industry has a poor competitive environment as there are many defense equipment items that only one company can produce. Furthermore, there is not much incentive for cost reduction because equipment prices are calculated using the cost accounting system.[5] To address this issue, the MOD will review the existing contract system towards creation of incentives and a competitive environment among companies by actively evaluating initiatives and results contributing to strengthening of the competitiveness of the defense industry and cost reduction, and appropriately reflecting the evaluation in companies’ profits through A method to calculate prices by adding the profit obtained by multiplying the cost necessary for production with a profit margin set based on the average profit margin of the manufacturing i d t ----- the United States, etc.[7] **(4) Promoting Appropriate Overseas Transfer of Defense** **Equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of** **Defense Equipment and Technology** The government as a whole will work on necessary improvement in implementation or related rules for promoting appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment. At the same time, the MOD will strengthen intellectual property management, technology control and information security to prevent leakages of important technologies regarding defense equipment. **a. Initiatives for Necessary Operational Improvement** The MOD, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, will work on necessary improvement in implementation or related rules based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which are the operational standards for the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act. As a result, the MOD will enhance predictability for the defense industry and will promote appropriate and smooth equipment transfer. Specifically, the ministry thinks it is necessary to improve the implementation of relevant systems and procedures, which include rationalization of the handling of basic marketing information necessary for early business talks at international trade shows, etc.[8] in order to ensure the smooth provision of such information. **b. Preventing Leakage of Advantageous Technologies** (a) Intellectual Property Management Through the revision of contract provisions regarding intellectual properties and other means, the MOD accurately grasps the intellectual properties generated through R&D, etc. to promote the clarification of belongings and prevention of leakages of advantageous technologies to abroad. The ministry also presents options regarding the opening or closing of intellectual properties based on the characteristics of the technology and promotes appropriate management for each option. (b) Technology Control The MOD will strengthen technology control systems and functions to ensure prompt and proper assessment of technical sensitivity based on the importance and superiority of the technologies, which is needed in the examination of the propriety of overseas transfer of defense equipment contracts. **(2) Strengthening Risk Management of Supply Chain for** **Defense Equipment** The procurement of defense equipment involves not only prime companies that directly contract with the MOD but also supplier companies in a broad range of fields and sizes, which contract with the prime companies. The chains of these companies (supply chains) are the basis of Japan’s defense industry. However, these supply chains are confronted with risks, such as supply disruption due to withdrawing or bankruptcy of some manufacturing companies. In order to deal with the risks, the MOD is taking measures in order to maintain and strengthen the supply chains. In the supply chain survey conducted by the end of 2017[6], as part of the efforts mentioned above, key suppliers holding irreplaceable technologies were identified. Additionally, vulnerabilities became apparent, such as a concentration of orders to a certain supplier and the current condition that a number of companies, mainly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), are highly dependent on defense demand. Based on the survey results, the MOD is currently working to (1) create a database by using the results of the supply chain survey, (2) build a regular monitoring system for early identification of risks, such as supply disruption, and (3) promote spin-off to strengthen the business structure of SMEs. For the future, the MOD will accurately deal with the vulnerabilities in the supply chain and strengthen them through initiatives such as (1) an in-depth supply chain survey with a focus on specific defense equipment, (2) a study of using other ministries’ support measures to cope with advancement of technology and business succession in order to manage supply disruption and other risks, and (3) a study of measures to improve production efficiency of SMEs. **Chapter** **(3) Further Participation of Japan’s Defense Industry in** **Sustainment and Maintenance of Imported Equipment, etc.** Participating in the sustainment and maintenance business of imported equipment is productive for the strengthening of Japan’s industrial base. For this purpose, it is important to pursue participation in the sustainment and maintenance of F-35A, Osprey, and other imported equipment and benefits for domestic companies through further promotion of international joint R&D of high-capability equipment with By the end of FY2017, the MOD conducted a supply chain survey up to the secondary subcontractors of 30 major defense equipment items. SM-3 block IIA, jointly developed by Japan and the United States, is subject to FMS procurement, but Japanese companies have received contracts for manufacturing about half of the components, including those procured by the United States. In October 2018, the Q&A section of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry website made it clear that information on the performance of goods and other matters that is used in early stage business talks and that does not include “specific information necessary for design, manufacture or use,” such as design information and production technique, is not subject to regulation under the Foreign Exchange Act. At the request of companies, the MOD is currently confirming the range of information included in data created by a company that may be di l d t th bli d h dl d bli l k t h l il bl t ifi d l b f l ----- **Chapter** **Defense Industry Supporting Development of Defense Capabilities** **President Shigenori Yamamoto, TERAUCHI MANUFACTURING Co., Ltd.** TERAUCHI MANUFACTURING Co., Ltd. was founded in 1913, and used to manufacture nuts and bolts for airframes and aircraft engines as a designated factory of the old Japanese Army and Navy until the end of World War II. After the war, our major products shifted to nuts and bolts for automobiles. Around the time of the establishment of the Japan Defense Agency, we resumed manufacturing of nuts and bolts for aircraft for the Air Self Defense Force as its designated supplier. In 2002, the company withdrew from the general industry and has specialized in aerospace and gas turbine fields to this day. Nuts and bolts for aircraft have their roots in the United States Air Force standards, which specify material, shape, production method, and other requirements in detail. After the heat treatment process, a screw thread is formed by thread rolling while rotating the screw on a rolling machine. This method makes the metal structure denser than machining and thereby increases its strength. Our products are used for a wide variety of defense aircraft and incorporated into engines, landing gears, airframe structure, and other parts. Each of them plays a very important role. The fundamental principle of our company is “We will contribute to world peace and social development through manufacturing.” We are proud to be able to protect the lives of crew members and contribute to the peace of Japan and the world through our work under the absolute requirement: Flight Safety. Threading a screw on a rolling machine Before (left) and after (right) thread rolling and technology. In order to prevent leakages of sensitive technologies, the MOD, in cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, promotes studies of reverse engineering countermeasure technologies, such as black box constitution. (c) Strengthening Information Security For Japan’s defense industry to participate in international businesses, it is necessary to respond to increasing threats of cyber attacks. With the aim of strengthening information security measures, the MOD will review the information security standard applicable to contractors handling the MOD’s information to be protected.[9] In order to further encourage companies to consider entry into defense procurement business and facilitate their business with defense-related companies in Japan and abroad, it is important to improve the predictability of the necessary security measures for the companies. For this purpose, the MOD will develop an information security guidebook that comprehensively defines security measures that will normally be required for concluding a contract, which involves the handling of information to be secured, with the MOD in advance. **(5) Other Initiatives to Achieve Efficiency and Strength** Other than the above-mentioned initiatives, the MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process efficient and thorough cost reduction and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures. I f ti bj t t “S iti ” “Offi i l U O l ” i th MOD d i f ti t d i h i f ti ----- **Section** **5** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of our national security, peace **1** **Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** 1 Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner, in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand, in individual cases, such as the participation of domestic companies in the joint development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) by Japan and the United States, it has taken separate measures in which arms exports are dealt with outside the Three Principles.[1] Amidst this situation, in April 2014, based on the National Security Strategy, the Government formulated the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology as new principles replacing the Three Principles on Arms Exports etc.[2] and its implementation guidelines. The new principles clarified the concrete standards, procedures and limitation. See Reference 62 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) and international cooperation. Japan will continue to realize effective defense equipment and technological cooperation through the strengthening of intelligence gathering such as the needs of its counterparts, cooperation including assistance for maintenance and repair of equipment, and strengthening of cooperative posture between the public and private sectors. **(1) Clarification of Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited (the** **First Principle)** The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment are prohibited are clarified as follows: (1) in the case of violating the obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded; (2) in the case of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of transferring to the countries in conflicts. See Fig. IV-2-5-1 (The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers See Are Prohibited”) **Chapter** **(2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted** **As Well As Strict Examination and Information Disclosure** **(the Second Principle)** The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, (2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan, or other cases. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and on the extent of the concerns that the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise for Japan’s security, 2 Main Contents of the New Three Principles **Fig. IV-2-5-1** The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited” |Situation|Situation Specific examples| |---|---| |(1) Violation of obligations under treaties concluded and other international arrangements|Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, etc.| |(2) Violation of obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions|Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), etc.| |(3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a confl ict|Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack| In December 2011, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports based on the premise of strict control, with regard to (1) cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation, and (2) cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan’s security. The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help with peace contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Si il l d t th f t th t th i i i f t h l i dditi t d th t “t f ” d t d th th “ t ” ----- **Fig. IV-2-5-2** The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted” **Chapter** |Situation|Specific examples| |---|---| |(1) Contribution to the proactive advancement of peace contribution and international cooperation|Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation and when: ●the recipient is a foreign government, or ●the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution| |(2) Contribution to the security of Japan|Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that: ●are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., ●contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., and of the following: • overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services implemented by the SDF in accordance with laws, • provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S., • provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed forces, or • defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or ●are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are: • temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items, • export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public officials, or • export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas| |(3) In cases where the influence is judged extremely limited from the perspective of the security of Japan|• Returning of misdirected items • Export of sample items on the premise that they will be returned • Re-export of equipment brought in by police officers of overseas government agencies| whilst ensuring transparency. In addition, it has been decided that important cases would be deliberated at the National Security Council and along with this, information concerning the cases that were deliberated would be disclosed. See Fig. IV-2-5-2 (The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted”) **(3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose** **Use or Transfer to Third Parties (the Third Principle)** Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige the government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of the control system at the destination. **Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and** **2** **Technology Cooperation** 2014 that these overseas transfers fall under cases that may be permitted, based on deliberations at the National Security Council. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2-2 ((2) Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation) Reference 28 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects) 2 Production, Sustainment and Maintenance of Common Equipment between Japan and the United States **(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production of the** **F-35A and the Establishment of Regional Maintenance,** **Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability** In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fighter aircraft as the next-generation fighter aircraft to be the successor to 1 Cooperative Research and Development, etc. Since 1992, Japan has implemented 23 cooperative research projects and 1 cooperative development project with the United States. At present, five cooperative research projects ((1) High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization, (2) Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures, (3) Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader, (4) High-Temperature Case Technologies, and (5) Next Generation Amphibious Technologies) are in operation. In addition, with regard to the transfer of parts for Patriot PAC2, software and parts, etc. related to the Aegis System and F100 engine parts that are installed in F-15s and F-16s from Japan to the United States, Japan has affirmed since July ----- the F-4 fighter aircraft. At the same time, the Government decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside from several completed aircraft, which will be imported. In light of this decision, the Japanese Government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries in the manufacturing process in preparation for the acquisition of F-35A fighter aircraft from FY2013 onwards. So far the Japanese companies have participated in the Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for airframe and engines, and the manufacture of some engine parts (19 items), radar parts (7 items), and Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS)[3] parts (3 items). In order to efficiently strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities under the severe fiscal circumstances, it is important to reduce prices of defense equipment. The MOD compared the unit price assuming participation of domestic companies in the production with the import price of completed aircraft. Since the latter was lower, the ministry decided to import completed F-35A fighters in FY2019 and after in order to promptly procure necessary number.[4] The MOD believes that the past participation of domestic companies in the manufacturing of F-35A fighters was meaningful because it has started to bring about the ensuring of operational and maintenance bases as well as the sustainment, development and advancement of fighterrelated technology bases through working with cutting-edge fighter technologies and knowhow. As global operation of F-35 fighter aircraft is anticipated, the U.S. Government plans to establish maintenance depot (regional MRO&U Capability) mainly for airframes and engines in the North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific regions. In December 2014, with regard to regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region for the F-35, the U.S. Government announced the following decisions: (1) Regional MRO&U Capability for airframes will be provided to Japan and Australia with both capabilities required not later than early 2018;[5] (2) with regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for engines, initial capability will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan providing additional capability at least 3-5 years later.[6] Currently the MOD is preparing regional MRO&U capability for airframes maintenance depot to handle maintenance needs that may exceed the capability of SDF maintenance units due to a malfunction of F-35A fighters of the ASDF. In February 2019, the U.S. government announced its decision to establish an MRO&U capability of some avionics components for F-35s in the Pacific Region in Japan after 2025 according to the need for maintenance.[7] Establishing a maintenance depot for airframes, engines and others within Japan, and contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacific region are significant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan, maintaining the Japanese defense industrial base, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening equipment cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. **(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of a Common** **Maintenance Base of the Japan-U.S. Osprey** As the Planned Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys deployed at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was scheduled to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Navy carried out a public tender to select a maintenance company. Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd[8] was selected as the maintenance company for this purpose in October 2015. From February 2017, the PMI has been performed at GSDF Camp Kisarazu. In March 2019 maintenance of the first aircraft was completed and the aircraft was delivered to the U.S. Forces. The MOD intends to establish a common maintenance base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Osprey by allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. Marine Corps Osprey and also to implement the future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Osprey at the same camp from the following perspectives: (1) smooth introduction of the GSDF Osprey (V-22);[9] (2) smooth and effective operation of the JapanU.S. security arrangements; and (3) enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment of a common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be extremely significant in that it will contribute mitigating the burden on Okinawa as well as the “Strengthening the basis to repair and maintain common equipment” stated in the new guideline. **Chapter** EODAS, comprising six built-in cutting-edge infrared sensors per aircraft, realizes 360-degree spherical situational awareness, and enables missile detection and tracking. Their procurement method will be reviewed appropriately when lower prices are available based on the manufacturing situation of F-35A fighters in the future. The regional MRO&U for airframes in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture). The regional MRO&U for engines in Japan is scheduled to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho factory in Tokyo) The avionics components maintenance center in Japan is planned to be developed by Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (Kamakura Works in Kanagawa Prefecture) The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017. GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. As a temporary measure until completion of the maintenance facilities in Saga Airport, training for pilots and maintenance personnel will be conducted in the United States using five GSDF O f M h 2019 t M 2020 ----- **3** **Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** **(2) France** Japan and France established committees on cooperation in the field of defense equipment and on export control respectively in January 2014, and signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[12] in March 2015. Moreover, at the Fourth JapanFrance Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (“2+2”) held in January 2018, the two countries confirmed their intention to quickly start the cooperative research on the Feasibility Study for Mine Countermeasure Technological Activities and started the cooperative research in the following June. In addition, in June 2017, the MSDF P-1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft was displayed at the “Paris Air Show 2017,” and the ATLA set up an exhibition booth for P-1 aircraft for the first time at an international defense equipment exhibition. The MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft and the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft participated in the “Paris Air Show 2019” held in June 2019. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (2) (France) See **(3) Germany** Japan and Germany signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[13] in July 2017. Also, in April 2018, the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft participated in the “Berlin Air Show 2018,” and the ATLA set up an exhibition booth related to the P-1 aircraft. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (6) (Other European Countries) 1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Major European Countries, etc. Defense equipment and technology cooperation with major European countries, which have competitive defense industries, will contribute to the strengthening of security and defense cooperation with these countries as well as the maintenance and strengthening of the defense industrial base in Japan. Therefore, Japan seeks to establish and deepen relationships with these countries. **(1) The United Kingdom** In July 2013, the Governments of Japan and the United Kingdom concluded a bilateral Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.[10] In the same month, the two countries also started the Chemical and Biological Protection Technology cooperative research project, marking the first time that Japan had engaged in such research with a country other than the United States. The cooperative research resulted in success in July 2017.1. The cooperative research resulted in success in July 2017. Also, a Japan-U.K. co-operative research project on the feasibility of a new air-to-air missile was launched in November 2014 (terminated in March 2018) followed by the Cooperative Research on Personnel Vulnerability Evaluation in July 2016, the Cooperative Research on the Certification Process of Jet Engines in February 2018, the Cooperative Research on the Feasibility of a Japan and Great Britain Universal Advanced RF System (JAGUAR) in March 2018, and the Japan-U.K. Co-operative Research Project on the Demonstration of a Joint New Air-to-air Missile in December 2018. Furthermore, the two countries are exchanging information regarding future fighters and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS)[11] that are under study by Japan and the United Kingdom respectively, such as the Joint Preliminary Study on Potential Collaborative Opportunities for FCAS/ Future Fighter, and exchanging views on the potential for future collaboration. The first meeting of the UK-Japan High-Level Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation Steering Panel was first held in July 2014, and it has been held regularly since then. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (1) (The United Kingdom) **Chapter** **(4) Italy** In May 2017, Japan and Italy signed the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.[14] In January 2019, “Japan-Italy Defense Industry Forum” was held in Europe for the first time, and was followed by the establishment of a framework for director-level meetings on defense equipment/technology cooperation between the two countries. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-5 (6) (Other European Countries) 10 Official name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items 11 Generic name of the whole future fighter aircraft system in the United Kingdom 12 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 13 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 14 Offi i l A t b t th G t f J d th G t f th It li R bli i th T f f D f E i t d T h l ----- 2 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation, etc., with Partner Countries in the Asia-Pacific Region As partner countries in the Asia-Pacific region have expressed their interest and expectation regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation with Japan, the MOD proactively seeks to build relationships with these countries. **(1) Australia** With Australia, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[15] was signed in July 2014. Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial Meeting held in October 2014, it was agreed to seek multifaceted cooperation, including the following: (1) exploration of potential cooperation opportunities in the F-35 program; (2) acquisition reform dialogue with the Defence Material Organisation of Australia; (3) at the request of the Australian side, exploration of the possibility of Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine Program; (4) defense technology exchanges with the Defence Science and Technology Organization of Australia (in the field of marine hydrodynamics and exchanges among engineers and scientists); and (5) talks between defense industries in both countries. Subsequently, joint research on Marine Hydrodynamics started in December 2015. Moreover, even though Japan had submitted the proposal for the Future Submarine Program in November 2015, the Government of Australia announced in April 2016, that they selected a French company as their partner for the Program. The first meeting of the Japan-Australia Steering Committee for Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation was held in October 2017. At the meeting, opinions were exchanged on measures for further promotion of defence equipment and technology cooperation between the countries. The second meeting was held in June 2019, where two countries deepened discussion. In March 2018, the ATLA and the Department of Defence of Australia jointly held the Japan-Australia Defence Industry Forum. Japan is promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries through such initiatives as the participation of C-2 transport aircraft in Avalon International Airshow held in Australia in February 2019, to demonstrate the technical strength of Japan. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-1 (Australia) ASDF C-2 transport aircraft giving a demonstration flight at Avalon International Airshow (February 2019) **(2) India** Defence equipment and technology cooperation with India is considered an important field of cooperation based on the special strategic global partnership between Japan and India. At the Japan-India Summit Meeting in December 2015, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[16] was signed. The discussions on the US-2 amphibian aircraft are underway for cooperation between the two countries. Other than the US-2, to form the case of defense equipment and technology cooperation, including dual use technologies, the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation have been held four times so far. At the Japan-India Defence Ministerial Meeting held in September 2017, the ministers agreed to commence the discussions for research collaboration. In July 2018, the two countries launched the cooperative research on the Visual SLAM based GNSS Augmentation Technology for UGV[17]/Robotics. As a follow up to the Japan-India Defence Industry Business Forum that was held in September 2017, people in the Japanese defense industry visited the Indian national defense industry of India in August 2018. Progress has been made in discussions on defense equipment and technology cooperation between the two countries, including the second Japan-India Defence Industry Business Forum, which was held in February 2019. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-2 (India) **Chapter** **(3) ASEAN Countries** Between Japan and ASEAN member states, exchanges of views take place regarding defense equipment and 15 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 16 Official name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology 17 “UGV” t d f “U d G d V hi l ” ----- technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting held in November 2016, it is stated that Japan’ defense equipment and technological cooperation with ASEAN countries would be promoted with a focus on the following three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer, (2) human resources development, and (3) holding seminars on defense industries. As a specific initiative with the Philippines, an official agreement was made on the transfer of MSDF’s TC90 training aircraft to the Philippine Navy at the JapanPhilippines Summit Meeting in September 2016, and TC-90 pilot training was conducted for pilots from the Philippine Navy at the MSDF Tokushima Air Base from November of the same year to March 2018. Since April 2017, maintenance and repair assistance by dispatched personnel from a Japanese maintenance company has been provided. Furthermore, two TC-90 aircraft were transferred to the Philippine Navy in March 2017, and the remaining three TC-90 aircraft were transferred in March 2018. Based on a proposal from the Philippines, regarding the transfer, it was confirmed at the Japan-Philippines Defence Ministerial Meeting in June 2018 that parts and maintenance equipment of the UH-1H utility helicopters that became unnecessary for the SDF would also be donated. After the signing of an arrangement between the defense officials involved in the transfer in November 2018, some components were delivered to the Philippines in March 2019. These two transfers were cases of the application of the provision of the SDF Act enforced in June 2017 that enables the MOD to grant or transfer the SDF’s equipment which is no longer used to the governments of developing states for a lower price than the current price (See Paragraph 3 below). Further, in January 2019, a framework was established for regular consultation of the Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation. In November 2017, Japan and Thailand agreed to promote future defense equipment and technology cooperation, including early conclusion of the agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Between Vietnam, the Terms of Reference (TOR) for regular consultations concerning defense equipment and technological cooperation was signed during the JapanVietnam Defense Vice-ministerial Level Meeting in November 2016. ATLA Commissioner Miyama and Undersecretary of Philippine Department of National Defense Elefante signing an arrangement between the defense officials (November 2018) Concerning the specific fields of cooperation, a memorandum on the orientation of promotion of defense industry cooperation was signed during the Japan-Vietnam defense ministers’ meeting in May 2019. In addition, at the Japan-Vietnam Leaders’ Working Lunch held in July 2019, the leaders agreed on commencing negotiations for an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology. Japan and Malaysia signed the Japan-Malaysia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[18] in April 2018. The MOD will continue to promote cooperation for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as the maritime security area through these initiatives. See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 (ASEAN Member Countries) **Chapter** **(4) Middle East** In November 2017, the ASDF C-2 transport aircraft, which was on an overseas flight training, participated in the “Dubai Air Show 2017,” and the ATLA set up an exhibition booth relating to the C-2 transport aircraft for the first time. Upon a request from His Majesty King Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in August 2019, Japan transferred a retired GSDF type61-combat vehicle to Jordan for display at the Royal Tank Museum. Meanwhile, the King offered to donate an armored vehicle developed in Jordan to the Japanese GSDF, which the GSDF received in the same month. 3 Establishment of Regulations on Equipment Cooperation with Developing Countries Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment, it has become even more important for Japan that the nations which have a cooperative and friendly relationship with Japan in terms of security and defense have appropriate capabilities. It is also critical to develop a foundation that will serve as the 18 Offi i l A t b t th G t f J d th G t f M l i i th T f f D f E i t d T h ----- basis for the international community to cooperate towards improving the security environment. Among these friendly nations, some have diffi culties in acquiring an adequate level of defense equipment on their own because of their economic and fi nancial situations. Some of these states are requesting to use SDF’s equipment which is no longer used. However, Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act stipulates that the Government must receive reasonable consideration when transferring or leasing any governmental properties including the SDF’s equipment to other countries. Therefore, a grant or a transfer for lower price than the current price is not allowed unless otherwise provided. Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs of such friendly nations, a special provision to Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act[19] was created in the SDF Act and **4** **Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use** With regard to aircraft involving many technological bases shared between the defense and the civilian sectors, the MOD has been considering the civilian use of aircraft developed by the MOD from the perspective that taking measures to contribute to the revitalization of the civilian sector will contribute to maintaining and activating the industrial bases of Japanese aircraft, and by extension, to maintaining and strengthening the defense industrial base in Japan. In August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for the development of a concrete system for converting aircraft to civilian use, while in 2011, it also developed an application procedure for private companies interested in civilian use. put in force in June 2017. This provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer the SDF’s equipment which is no longer used to the governments of developing states for a lower price than the current price. Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment for a lower price than the current price pursuant to this provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment, and to which government such equipment to be transferred, will be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and other regulations. In addition, an international agreement must be concluded between the Governments of Japan and the recipient countries to prevent extra-purpose use and third party transfer of the transferred equipment without the prior consent of Japan.[20] So far, technical data related to the civilian use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the F7-10 engine that are mounted on P-1 maritime patrol aircraft have been disclosed in response to requests from the implementing companies. In December 2016, the ATLA and IHI Corporation, a company manufacturing the F7-10 engine, signed a contract for the civilian use of the F7-10 for sales to the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) for the fi rst time. For civilian use of equipment other than aircraft, procedure rules were prepared in August 2018 towards project formulation in the future. **Chapter** **5** **Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions** From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation, the ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce Japan’s defense equipment policies and advanced technology. These initiatives help foreign government offi cials better understand Japan’s equipment policies and technology, and contribute to building bases for the promotion of defense equipment and technology cooperation. The ATLA has participated in international defense equipment exhibitions, such as Eurosatory in France, AUSA in the United States, and INDO DEFENCE in Indonesia, as well as the Berlin Air Show 2018 that was held in Germany in 2018. At these events, the ATLA widely disseminated ATLA’s booth at INDO DEFENCE held in Indonesia (November 2018) 19 Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act (Act 34 of 1947) Governmental assets, unless otherwise provided, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration. 20 As of April 2019, Japan has signed the agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology with the following countries: the United States; the United Kingdom; A t li I di th Phili i F It l G d M l i (S R f 37 (Sit ti C i th C l i f A t )) ----- information on the policy measures it takes, the outcomes of research and development through exhibitions of P-1 patrol aircraft, image-based mine detectors, research prototypes of unmanned equipment, and new personal protective clothes developed in Japan, and on advanced technology possessed by Japanese manufacturers. In the domestic field, the ATLA participated in Japan International Aerospace Exhibition 2018 Tokyo held in Tokyo Big Sight in November of the same year and invited people involved in national defense from 13 countries, including Western and Southeast Asian countries, in order to promote defense equipment and technology cooperation. **6** **Public-Private Defense Industry Forum** The Public-Private Defense Industry Forum is held with the purpose of promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation with partner countries as a joint effort between the public and private sectors. This forum is held to deepen understanding of the relevant parties and facilitate concrete defense equipment and technology cooperation in the In June 2019, the ATLA participated in the Paris Air Show 2019” held in France. Through the exhibition of the P-1 patrol aircraft and the C-2 transport aircraft, both of which were developed in Japan, the ATLA widely disseminated information on our nation’s advanced technology possessed by Japanese manufacturers, which are symbolized by the domestically produced aircraft. In Japan, the ATLA participated in the “MAST Asia 2019” held in Makuhari Messe in June 2019, and exchanged opinions with people involved in national defense from European and Southeast Asian countries, promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation. future through explanation of various systems surrounding the defense industry in Japan and each country as well as presentations by each company on their products and technology. Most recently, the said forum was held with Italy in January 2019, and with India in February 2019. **Chapter** **7** **Preventing Leakage of Advantageous Technologies for Defense Equipment** In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, the MOD will work to strengthen (1) intellectual property management, (2) technology control, and (3) information security in order to prevent leakage of advantageous technologies for defense equipment. See Section 4-3-2 (4) (b. Preventing Leakage of Advantageous Technologies) ----- **Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** ### 3 **1** **Military Intelligence Collection** For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for operating defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various situations, it is necessary to grasp medium- to long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the indications of various situations promptly. To this end, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/Self-Defense Force (SDF) always makes efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately by using various methods. Examples of intelligence collection means used by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing military communications and signals emanating from electronic weapons in the air over Japan; (2) collecting, processing, and analyzing data from various imagery satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite);[1] (3) surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other assets; (4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; (5) **2** **Initiatives towards Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities** Under the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG),[2] in order to provide timely and effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, the MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information. Specifi cally, the MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities so that the MOD/SDF will be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements including those related to new domains. This will be conducted by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing Information Gathering Satellites and commercial information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés and other offi cials. Additional attachés were dispatched to Belgium, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) are headquartered, in February 2019 in view of the importance of ensuring continued robust collaboration, cooperation and mutual security arrangements with Europe. In March 2019, a new dispatch was made to Chile in view of the importance of collecting strategic information in Pacifi c Rim countries. Additional attachés are also dispatched to Malaysia, a country located on key sea lanes and with which Japan is increasingly engaged across a range of fi elds from military exchange to capacity building support, defense equipment and technology cooperation. See Fig.VI-3-1 (Dispatched Defense Attachés) satellites, and diversifying means for information collection through new equipment such as long-endurance Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (UAVs). Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will also strengthen the gathering posture of HUMINT through enhancing its defense attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and expand its cooperation with allied countries. In this regard, the MOD/SDF will proactively utilize the latest information processing technology, promote all-source analysis by fusing a wide variety of information sources together, and successfully develop and connect systems that will promote information sharing.[3] In order to respond appropriately to increasingly diversifi ed intelligence requirements, the MOD/SDF will promote the securing and training of highly capable personnel handling **Chapter** Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) of the Japanese government is operated by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center. The MOD, along with other ministries and agencies, utilizes the imagery intelligence provided by the IGS. See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 1, Footnote 1 The FY2019 budget includes the construction of a new common information platform to realize all source analysis by gathering a wide variety of broad-ranging information collected by individual SDF services and the Defense Intelligence Headquarters ----- **Fig. IV-3-1** Dispatched Defense Attachés |Col1|SSwweeddeenn| |---|---| ||GGeerrmmaannyy ((22))| |DDeelleeggaattiioonn ooff JJaappaann ttoo tthhee CCoonnffeerreennccee oonn DDiissaarrmmaammeenntt ((GGeenneevvaa))|| Sweden Poland Kazakhstan Germany (2) Finland Delegation of JapanDelegation of Japan Mongolia to the Conference onto the Conference on Ukraine Disarmament (Geneva)Disarmament (Geneva) Turkey Netherlands Belgium (2) Russia (3) United Kingdom (2) France (2) China (3) Austria Republic of Korea (3) United States (6) Permanent MissionPermanent Mission Italy Vietnam (2) of Japan to theof Japan to the Myanmar United NationsUnited Nations Morocco (New York)(New York) Philippines (2) Algeria Thailand Nigeria Malaysia (2) Egypt Singapore Lebanon Australia (3) Indonesia Israel Saudi Jordan Chile South Arabia India (3) Brazil Africa Pakistan [Legend] Kenya Afghanistan ■Dispatch destination Ethiopia Iran Jointly administered country Djibouti Figures in parentheses indicate the number of defense attachés United Arab Emirates dispatched. No figure indicates one dispatched defense attaché. Kuwait As of April 1, 2019 (70 defense attachés dispatched to 82 embassies and 5 delegations of Japan) information collection and analysis. Moreover, the MOD/ SDF will take steady measures in various directions including recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis capabilities. With regard to information security, the MOD/SDF will **Chapter** coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need-to-know basis, and in taking preventative measures against information leakage. Also, the MOD/SDF will strengthen counter-intelligence capability within the MOD/ SDF by promoting collaboration with relevant organizations. ----- **Interaction with Local Communities and** **Japanese Citizens** ### 4 Various activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SelfDefense Forces (SDF) are hard to implement without the understanding and cooperation of each and every person **Section** **1** **Collaboration with Local Communities** The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond (NDPG) provides that, in recent years, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan are becoming more diverse and defense equipment more sophisticated, and that, as a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities. and local governments. Therefore it is necessary to further deepen the trust between local communities and people, and the SDF. Therefore, the NDPG provides that the MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities, and that, upon fi elding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, the MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet the desires and conditions of local communities, while suffi ciently fulfi lling accountability. **Chapter** **1** **Supporting Civilian Life** The MOD/SDF conduct activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fi elds, in response to requests from local governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confi dence. The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance and other dangerous explosives found throughout Japan. In FY2018, there were approx. 1,480 such cases (approx. 53.0 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approx. 38% of the total cases. The MSDF clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives, and approx. 4,456 explosives (approx. 2.8 tons) were handled in FY2018. The SDF camps and bases allow the local residents access **2** **Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF** **(1) Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Cooperation** **with Re-employment Support** to their facilities to the extent that it does not interfere with unit activities, thus striving to foster friendly interaction with local communities. The SDF also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands. Furthermore, based on national policy,[1] the MOD/SDF ensures opportunities for local small and medium sized enterprises to receive orders, while taking effi ciency into account, by such measures as the promotion of separated/divided ordering[2] and the securing of competition amongst companies within the same qualify cation and grade divisions.[3] See Reference 63 (Activities in Civic Life) Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation from local governments and relevant organizations “The Contract Basic Policy of the Government regarding Small and Medium Enterprises in FY2018” (Cabinet decision on September 7, 2018) For example, this is a method through which grouping of products, etc. takes place when putting up the order for general competitive bidding, and then a successful bidder for the groups is decided. This means that out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A D there is competition between grade C or D only which comprise mostly small and medium enterprises ----- is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to support the re-employment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a relatively young age under the SDF’s early retirement system. **(2) Support for and Cooperation with SDF Activities** The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with local communities, and therefore, various forms of support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including education and training, and disaster relief. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation operations and other duties receive support and cooperation from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved. The MOD/SDF are further strengthening cooperation with relevant entities such as local governments, police and fire services in order to ensure immediate and sure activities by the SDF in various contingencies. **Chapter** **Making a Connection with the Local Community** **Betsukai Town, Hokkaido** Located on the eastern edge of Japan, Betsukai Town extends over a vast 1,300 km[2] of land abundant in nature. Dairy farming and fishery are the town’ main industries. The residents of the town are keenly aware of the importance and necessity of the nation to protect the lives and assets of its people, due to the town’s close proximity to Kunashiri Island, which is one of Japan’s northern territories in dispute and is only 1.6 km away. Betsukai Town hosts two SDF-related facilities: the Yausubetsu ManeuverArea, the largest facility of this kind in Japan, and GSDF Camp Betsukai, which manages and operates the training area. SDF troops staying in the camp actively participate in local activities held by the town. In 1997, the Yausubetsu Maneuver Area accepted relocation of live fire drills by the U.S. forces across Prefectural Route 104 in Okinawa. This training area was the first Japanese facility to accept such relocation in an effort to ease the military impact on the people of Okinawa. The residents of Betsukai Town at that time commented that reducing the impact on Okinawa as much as possible was the responsibility of Japanese citizens and they wanted to be helpful on this matter. Since then, military drills have been held every year in the Yausubetsu Maneuver Area not only by the U.S. forces but also by SDF units from all around Japan. Every time military units come to the town, the “SDF support group of Betsukai Town,” consisting of town resident volunteers, hosts an exchange meeting to create an opportunity for local people and SDF troops to deepen friendships and strengthen ties between them. Betsukai Town will continue to support SDF troops engaged in national defense through the spirit of public-private partnership. **Kozo Sone, Betsukai Town Mayor** Betsukai Town residents and SDF troops taking care of rows of cherry trees SDF troops and the support group gathered in an exchange meeting planted in the region **Higashimatsushima City, Miyagi Prefecture** Situated in the central coastal region of Miyagi Prefecture, Higashimatsushima City is about a one-hour drive from Sendai. The city is rich in nature and surrounded by two shades of blue: the sea encircling Okumatsushima, and the clear sky. After ASDF Matsushima Air Base in the city was damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake, the ASDF’s Blue Impulse aerobatic demonstration team and 21st Fighter Training Squadron (F-2 fighters) had been practicing at other bases. More recently, the teams have returned to the home air base, resuming training flights above the city’s urban area and other tasks related to national defense. Although Higashimatsushima City has to deal with some land use restrictions due to the existence of the air base on its premises, the Special Defense Facilities Environs Improvement Adjustment Giantsare available for the city to effectively improve municipal roads and develop the local community. The city also works to develop a good relationship between the air base and the local residents by communicating base-related information to them. In addition, the city has been using grants for improvement of facilities vital to people’s livelihoods in order to reconstruct a rest facility in Yamoto-kaihin-ryokuchi Park (Yamoto seashore green park), which will be ----- completed this year, and a building for the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, which is scheduled to be completed next year. These facilities were severely damaged by the great earthquake and we have long waited for their reconstruction. Since I became mayor, my goal has been to support the coexistence and mutual prosperity of the local community and Matsushima Air Base. This air base is set to be the first Japanese destination at which the torch for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and Paralympics will arrive. We hope to invite many local residents to the ceremony to celebrate this occasion and are currently making necessary requests to relevant ministries and agencies. In order for the air base and the city to be able to continue sharing prosperity, we will strive to build mutual trust between the base, the city, and the local residents. **Iwao Atsumi, Higashimatsushima Mayor** Local crowds excited about the Blue Impulse exhibition flight (Matsushima Air Base Festival) Rest facility constructed in Yamoto-kaihin-ryokuchi Park (using grants for improvement of facilities vital to people’s livelihoods) **Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture** Sasebo City, with a population of about 250,000, is an administratively determined “core city” (i.e., mid-sized city) situated in the north of Nagasaki Prefecture. The city is home to such facilities as MSDF Sasebo District Headquarters, GSDF Camp Ainoura, and U.S. Navy Sasebo Base. Sasebo Naval District began operation and the modern Sasebo Port was opened 130 years ago in 1889. Sasebo City developed rapidly as the home of naval forces and built up mutual trust with the MSDF and GSDF after World War II. The city’s relationship with the SDF has been becoming even stronger in recent years through such developments as the launch of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade in March 2018, the inauguration of the Sakibe Subcamp in March 2019—the site for the deployment of an amphibious vehicle unit—and the formulation of specific port use plans by the MSDF, including the construction of a long stretch of quay walls. We are currently working to promote reemployment of retired SDF personnel to revitalize local industry under Sasebo City’s comprehensive strategy for overcoming population decline and vitalizing local economy. We have established the Sasebo City liaison committee for promoting re-employment of retired SDF personnel, consisting of the SDF, the chamber of commerce and industry, economic organizations, and the local governments. The committee is regularly meeting to discuss this subject from various perspectives, such as life quality and welfare, through collaboration between the public and private sectors. We will continue making our utmost effort to create environments favorable to SDF personnel by developing a city conducive to harmonious coexistence between the SDF and the local community, enhancing SDF facilities vital to national defense, and ensuring adequate life quality for SDF personnel and their families. **Norio Tomonaga, Sasebo Mayor** **Chapter** Amphibious vehicles parading to commemorate the first anniversary of the launch of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and the 64th anniversary of the inauguration of GSDF Camp Ainoura on April 28, 2019 Sasebo Mayor Tomonaga giving a welcome speech during a ceremony to welcome the MSDF training squadron to Sasebo Port on March 30, 2019 ----- **Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and** **3** **Local Residents** Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships with their respective local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Offices. Specifically, Regional Defense Bureaus hold seminars on defense issues for local residents and provide explanations about the defense white paper to local governments in order to gain wide understanding on defense policies. They also host Japan-U.S. friendship programs for citizens who live near U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan, U.S. Forces **4** **Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** 1 Scale and Features of Defense Facilities The uses of defense facilities are diverse, and they often require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January 1, 2019, approx. 28% of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan is jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose to enhance the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations personnel, and the families to interact with each other through sports and music. Furthermore, Regional Defense Bureaus provide necessary explanations and conduct coordination for relevant local governments when implementing the realignment of the U.S. Forces, the reorganization of SDF units, deployment of equipment, and training. They also conduct the necessary liaison and coordination in the event of incidents and accidents, or any other emergency situation, such as major earthquakes. such as takeoffs and landings cause noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities. See Fig. IV-4-1-1 (Status of SDF Facilities [Land Plots]) See Fig. IV-4-1-2 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan [Exclusively Used Facilities])) **Chapter** 2 Promoting Measures Aimed at the Areas Around Defense Facilities Defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s security. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain conditions for constant Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan **Fig. IV-4-1-2** (Exclusively Used Facilities) **Fig. IV-4-1-1** Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots) (as of January 1, 2019) |Total are|a: Approx.1,090km2| |---|---| |Total are|a: Approx.263km2| |---|---| Hokkaido region 42% Approx.460km[2] Okinawa Prefecture 70% Approx.185km[2] Distribution by use Distribution by use |(as of January 1, 2019)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Other regions 10% Approx.112km2 Kanto region 5% Approx.57km2 Kyushu region 12% Approx.136km2 Tohoku region 13% Approx.147km2 Chubu region 16% Approx.178km2||||||||| |Hokkaido region 42% Approx.460km2||||||||| |accounting for approx. 0.3% of a: Approx.1,090km2 Japan’s land area||||||||| |Maneuver Areas 75% Approx.813km2||||||||| |Airfields 7％ Approx.81km2 Barracks 5％ Approx.54km2 Others 13％ Approx.142km2||||||||| |Other regions 9% Approx.22km2 Tohoku region 9% Approx.24km2 Kanto region 12% Approx.32km2|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Okinawa Prefecture 70% Approx.185km2|||||| |accounting for approx. 0.07% of a: Approx.263km2 Japan’s land area|||||| |Maneuver Areas 47% Approx.123km2|||||| |Airfields 23％ Approx.61km2 Barracks 15％ Approx.40km2 Others 15％ Approx.40km2|||||| Maneuver Areas 75% Approx.813km[2] Maneuver Areas 47% Approx.123km[2] 20 40 60 80 100 (%) Notes:Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 20 40 60 80 100 (%) Notes:Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. ----- **Fig. IV-4-1-3** Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas |Purpose|Measures|Description of Measures| |---|---|---| |Preventing Noise Problems|Subsidies to finance sound insulation work|●Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly ●Housing| ||Compensation for relocations|●Compensation for relocating buildings ●Land procurement ●Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated| ||Improving green belts|●Planting trees, installing grass fields| |Preventing Impact Besides Noise|Subsidies to finance impediment prevention work|●Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities| |Reducing Impediment Related to Living and Business|Subsidies for building facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives|●Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fi re departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. ●Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities| |Reducing Impact on Surrounding Areas|Provision of specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants|●Improving public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities ●Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.*| ＊ Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011) and stable utilization by ensuring harmony between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of the local residents. For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to prevent, reduce or mitigate aircraft noise and other impacts caused by activities of the SDF or the U.S. Forces, or by the establishment/operation of airport and other defense facilities in the surrounding area since 1974 based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act). Taking into consideration the requests from the relevant local governments, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act in 2011, and conducted a review to enable the Specified Defense Facilities Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses. In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway to provide sound insulation at residences. Regarding the Specified Defense Facilities Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants, the MOD has implemented **5** **Other Initiatives** 1 Response to Cases of Interference against SDF and U.S. Forces Aircraft by Laser Irradiation and Kite Flying Cases of interference against the SDF and U.S. Forces FY2019 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near **Fig. IV-4-1-4** Bases (Based on contracts) **Chapter** |Col1|Col2|(100 million yen)| |---|---|---| |Project|Mainland|Okinawa| |Projects for preventing disturbances|92|13| |Sound insulation projects|586|181| |Measures related to relocations|43|2| |Subsidies for stabilizing people’s livelihoods|271|86| |Road improvement projects|64|15| |Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants|185|33| |Other projects|14|1| initiatives such as the PDCA Cycle process since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of these grants. In response to the requests by related local governments, the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve more effective and efficient measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fiscal situation. See Fig. IV-4-1-3 (Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas) Fig. IV-4-1-4 (FY2019 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near Bases (Based on Contracts)) aircraft by laser irradiation and kite flying have frequently occurred in the areas surrounding air stations in Atsugi and Futenma. In October 2018, laser light was irradiated at a Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) transport helicopter ----- flying over Miyazaki Prefecture and temporarily reduced the eyesight of a co-pilot. Starting from around the same month, incidents of laser irradiation aimed at U.S. Forces aircraft have occurred frequently around Yokota Air Base as well. These are extremely dangerous and malicious acts that may disrupt a pilot’s ability to operate aircraft and result in a catastrophe such as a crash. Therefore, the MOD disseminates information regarding the risks involved in these acts to local residents by putting up posters and requests their cooperation in reporting to the police while closely cooperating with relevant local governments. Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, making these interference acts subject to regulation as well as fines and other penalties. 2 Response to Small Unmanned Aircraft Flying over Defense Facilities and Surrounding Airspace In recent years there have been terror attacks overseas including attempted ones using unmanned aircraft systems, including commercial drones, some of which are targeted at military facilities. Given such a situation, there is a concern that drone terror attacks on the SDF facilities or the facilities/ area of the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) can also happen in Japan, which will pose a serious threat to the function of military installations for defending Japan. To address such a concern, the Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities was enforced on June 13, 2019, to prohibit small unmanned aircraft from flying over the SDF facilities and the facilities and area of the USFJ designated by the Minister of Defense. On the same day, the Minister of Defense designated 13 SDF facilities where major SDF Headquarters are located. **Chapter** **Initiatives taken by local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities** It is imperative to gain cooperation from related local authorities in order to achieve harmony between defense facilities and nearby areas. Local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities conduct initiatives to improve the local living environments utilizing assistance projects funded by the Ministry of Defense to address obstacles resulting from the presence of defense facilities, thereby ensuring the stability of the lives of local residents and the enhancement of their welfare. For example, in cases where training sites, airfields, and other facilities affect the lives of local residents, local authorities construct gymnasiums and other venues to facilitate evacuations of residents using the national subsidy. In addition, schools, hospitals and other facilities that require quiet environments are outfitted with noise insulation features that prevent and alleviate noise generated by the takeoff and landing of aircraft at airfields used by the SDF and U.S. Forces stationed in Japan and other activities. Example of gymnasium Example of noise constructed insulation work Dehumidification Sound Ventilation absorption Sound insulation (Photo provided by Konan City, Aichi Prefecture) (Photo provided by Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture) In Konan City, which lies adjacent to Gifu Airfield, a gymnasium was Noise insulation work involves the installation of soundproof sashes (sound constructed to facilitate smooth evacuations of local residents. insulation), installation of air-conditioning equipment to keep the sealed indoor environment comfortable (ventilation, temperature holding, and dehumidification), and the installation of sound absorption materials on the room walls and ceilings (sound absorption). ----- **Section** **Public Relations Activities, Public Records and Archives** **Management, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities** **2** **1** **Various Public Relations Activities** As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public. According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the SelfDefense Forces and Defense Issues” conducted by the Cabinet Office (in January 2018), public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally. In light of this result, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the MOD/SDF. In addition, given that understanding and support from foreign countries are also of utmost importance for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF initiatives, including about SDF activities abroad. English, and improving the contents of the MOD’s English website. It is proactively transmitting information to the international community through efforts such as providing international media with opportunities for press coverage, publishing English versions of the defense white paper and brochures, as well as producing PR videos. 2 Events and PR Facilities The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) vessels, and demonstration flights and boarding experiences on aircraft. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades throughout the cities, with cooperation from the local communities. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. The festival attracted approximately 41,000 visitors in total in 2018. Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) respectively. In 2018, a troop review was held by the GSDF at Asaka Training Area. About 4,000 uniformed GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel with about 260 vehicles and about 40 aircraft participated in the review and showed the **Chapter** Reference 64 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)) See 1 Information Communication for Domestic and International Audiences The MOD/SDF conducts PR activities using the Internet such as official websites, video distribution, and social media (Social Networking Services)[1] as well as actively distributes information through various means including television broadcasting, large-sized billboards, and the showing of PR videos on trains. The MOD has also been making great efforts to provide accurate information in a more extensive and timely fashion, by creating brochures, PR videos, and “Manga-Style Defense of Japan (Comic),” as well as providing assistance in editing the PR magazine “MAMOR” and cooperation on media coverage. Furthermore, based on the increasing interest in the MOD/ SDF initiatives from the international community, the MOD has been striving to gain the understanding of people in other countries by publishing the monthly English magazine, “Japan Defense Focus (JDF), launching a Twitter account in FY2018 SDF Marching Festival held at Nippon Budokan arena In addition to Facebook and other SNS accounts the GSDF and MSDF opened an Instagram account in January and October 2017 respectively ----- strength of the JSDF and cooperation with the U.S. Forces[2] to the public. The review and general rehearsal gathered about 30,000 people. In 2019, a fleet review by the MSDF is planned to take place. The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the public. For instance, the number of visitors on the facility tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya district (Ichigayadai Tour) reached 440,000 as of the end of March 2019. Each SDF service also has a large-scale PR facility in addition to PR facilities and archives at the SDF camps and bases open to the public. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting films and TV programs.[3] [Courtesy of Toho Co., Ltd.] 3 Trial Enlistment Programs The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for undergraduate and graduate students as well as women[4] and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups, companies and other organizations.[5] These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. In FY2018, approximately 100 people participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From the private sector, the SDF received approximately 1,000 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and approximately 15,000 employees experienced SDF life. One-Day Visit to SDF for Women (ASDF Naha Air Base) **Chapter** Spring Tour for College Students (MSDF Takeyama district and Yokosuka district) [Courtesy of TV TOKYO Corporation] Films and TV programs made with cooperation by the SDF AAV7s and MV-22s of the U.S. Marine Corps participated in the review. The Great War of Archimedes (movie), “In This Corner of the World” and “Two Homelands” (TV programs) for example Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women, etc. is available on the MOD/ SDF website. Tours to experience the everyday life in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. They are implemented upon request from private companies and other organizations through the Provincial Cooperation Offi ----- **Chapter** **Self-Defense Force Athletes Aiming to Compete at the Tokyo Olympics** **Second Lieutenant Megumi Tsubota, SDF Physical Training** **School (Asaka City, Saitama Prefecture)** FY2019 is the year to compete to qualify for the Olympics. Japan won the first medal in canoe slalom at the Rio Olympics but has not won a medal in canoe sprint. I engage in training every day, aspiring to win a medal at the Tokyo Olympics. I will never forget my feeling of appreciation of the school’s environment, which allows me to concentrate on training as an SDF athlete, and am battling with myself and taking on challenges day to day so that I can become an athlete who can give people dreams, hopes and energy. I would appreciate your support and cheering for me. **Second Lieutenant Hayato Katsuki, SDF Physical Training School (Asaka** **City, Saitama Prefecture)** Last year I was able to win a silver medal as an individual and a gold medal as a team in the 50km walking race at the World Race Walking Team Championships, and a gold medal in the men’s 50km walking at the Asian Games. Towards a gold medal at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, I will train myself every day without focusing on the achieved results but with a feeling of gratitude. I would appreciate your continued support and cheering for me. **Sergeant First Class Tomohiro Noda, SDF Physical Training School** **(Asaka City, Saitama Prefecture)** Last Year I won my first victory in the men’s 50km walking race at the Japan Athletics Championships and set a Japanese record at the All Japan Race Walking in Takahata in October. Setting a higher goal of winning a gold medal at the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, I will work diligently in order to become an athlete who can give people dreams and hopes through games. I would appreciate your continued support and cheering for me. **2** **Initiatives for Public Document Management and Information Disclosure** various activities in both the present and future. The MOD/ SDF shares the same understanding with other government entities: public records are not possessions of national public employees but are intellectual resources to be shared by the people in supporting the basis of sound democracy, and preparation and preservation are not auxiliary but rather an essential business of national public employees. 1 Necessity of Proper Management of Public Records and Archives The purpose of the Public Records and Archives Management Act is to enable administration to be managed properly and efficiently through proper and seamless implementation of public records and archives management, and also to ensure accountability of the State to the public for its ----- The issue of daily reports in South Sudan started from an inappropriate response to a disclosure request, followed by further inappropriate responses and explanations seeking consistency without thoroughly examining the issue, making the matters worse. The issue of daily reports in Iraq occurred due to multiple factors, including a lack of or insufficient basic actions such as the following: delivery of orders/ instructions, coordination among relevant departments for the execution thereof, and submission of proper reports to the senior officers and leaders. In order to regain the public’s confidence by reforming the awareness of personnel and the organization culture, the MOD/SDF is making full efforts to prevent recurrence based on the “Measures for Ensuring Appropriate Management of Public Records” (Adopted by the Ministerial Council on the Management of Administrative Documents and Related Matters on July 20, 2018),[6] which compiles measures necessary for proper management of public records and archives by the entire government. See Fig. IV-4-2-1 (Initiatives for Recurrence Prevention Pertaining See to the Issue of Daily Reports in South Sudan) Fig. IV-4-2-2 (Initiatives for Recurrence Prevention Pertaining to the Issue of Daily Reports in Iraq) **3** **Initiatives for Policy Evaluation** development (R&D) programs and projects concerning Special Taxation Measures as well as the major policies and programs of the NDPG and the MTDP. 2 Necessity of Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System Democracy is founded on the principle that the public has access to accurate information, thereby making appropriate judgment and exercise of sovereignty. Administrative documents held by the government are of the utmost importance for the public’s access to accurate information, and it is an important responsibility for the government to manage them in an appropriate manner and respond to the public’s information disclosure requests properly. Information held by the MOD/SDF is no exception to this, the MOD/SDF bears this important responsibility under the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Reference 65 (Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2018)) See 3 Initiatives for Recurrence Prevention Pertaining to the Issue of Daily Reports in South Sudan and Iraq The MOD/SDF takes it seriously that the issues over daily reports in South Sudan and Iraq brought about the public’s distrust to the MOD/SDF. **3** **Initiatives for Policy Evaluation** 1 Engagement in Policy Evaluation The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2018, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of research and **Chapter** **Establishment of Chief Record Officer (CRO of each ministry/agency)** On July 20, 2018, the Cabinet Meeting on appropriate management of administrative documents expressed an opinion that a series of troubles concerning public documents had undermined confidence in administration and that the prevention of their recurrence was a pressing issue. To address the issue the meeting decided to assign a Chief Record Officer (CRO) to each ministry/agency in order to strengthen their governance. In response, the MOD assigned a CRO in April 2019. The CRO is effectively responsible for the management of the MOD’s administrative documents and information disclosure, and provides: necessary instructions and coordination for inspection/audits concerning document management and necessary improvements based on their results; measures to foster a sense of compliance concerning document management; and affairs concerning information disclosure closely related to document management and protection of personal information. In addition, an official document management office is set up to assist the CRO. Under the new system, the MOD will strengthen efforts to ensure proper management of official documents, including personnel education on compliance with document management and other rules and viable checking of document management. th C bi t Offi b it (htt // 8 j / h i/k b /h i/h b df) ----- **Fig. IV-4-2-1** Initiatives for Recurrence Prevention Pertaining to the Issue of Daily Reports in South Sudan 1. Handling of daily reports (1)All daily reports including those on PKO, etc. will be retained for 10 years (After the retention period expires, they will be transferred and archived under the management of the National Archives of Japan). (2)The Joint Staff Councilor is responsible for central management of these daily reports, and also for centrally handling all information disclosure requests. (3)Strengthening structure attached to the Principal Joint Staff Councilor 2. Information disclosure work (1)Strengthening check function* *Establishing a new post of Information Disclosure Inspector who evaluates the judgment of all cases for which disclosure was rejected due to the absence of requested documents, etc. (2)Thorough review of all cases for which disclosure was rejected due to the absence of relevant administrative documents (3)Extensive and improved education and training to raise personnel awareness 3. Management of documents (1)Reports on the SDF’s actions overseas, etc. (excluding daily reports) will be retained for three years, in principle. (2)Ensuring the appropriateness of document management of the entire ministry (3)Strengthening of cooperation between information disclosure department and document management department (especially in the case for which disclosure was rejected due to the absence of relevant documents) **Fig. IV-4-2-2** Initiatives for Recurrence Prevention Pertaining to the Issue of Daily Reports in Iraq **Chapter** 1. Strengthening structure in charge of implementing Minister’s instruction and order - Specify in writing important instructions and operational orders, etc. from Defense Minister, etc. - Require the above instructions, etc., to be notified to the division chief or official in the equivalent position, as well as require relevant responses to be approved by the division chief or official. - When such instructions are made, a responsible department or bureau is required to notify the Minister’s Secretariat of implementation and coordination status. 2. Appropriate response to administrative document management and information disclosure by maintaining such documents as electronic files - Accelerate the transition to an electronic approval system - Require all the personnel to notify a responsible person at a division in charge, etc., of the response status 3. Reinforce the check system for administrative document management and information disclosure - Establish a new organization responsible for inspection of administrative document management and information disclosure - Build a framework to receive instructions and advising from external experts 4. Reform a mindset of individual SDF personnel regarding administrative document management and information disclosure - Develop extensive training programs designed to help SDF personnel improve necessary judgment in performing tasks - Consider designating administrative document management and information disclosure as part of criteria for personnel performance appraisal 5. Create an organization capable of the prompt and accurate response to information disclosure, etc. - Examine a system to centrally retain and control administrative documents in the electronic format - Reinforce exclusive structure, particularly at the Joint Staff Office. As part of this, reemploy retired SDF personnel with high expertise on administrative document management and on information disclosure for daily reports and other documents as part-time officials discloses such information upon request. 4 Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System The MOD sets up a system to handle whistleblowing made by its officials, employees and outside workers, establishing internal contact desks to deal with whistleblowing and to protect whistleblowers. 2 Promotion of Evidence-Based Policy Making (EBPM) In order to promote EBPM, the MOD has worked on the establishment of the structure for promotion of EBPM within the ministry, including the establishment of a new position, “Director-General for Evidence-based Policymaking,” who plays a central role of the EBPM in FY2018. 3 Initiatives for the Personal Data Protection System In light of respecting individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its control and ----- Reference ----- **Contents** Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country...................................................460 Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)............................................................460 Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)..............................................460 Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan.......461 Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline)..........................................461 Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY 2019 and beyond.....................................................................................464 (Annex Table)............................................................................471 Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019-FY 2023) ................472 (Annex Table)............................................................................479 Reference 8 Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned.............................479 Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications........480 Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service..................480 Reference 11 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis).............................................................481 Reference 12 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis).............................................................482 Reference 13 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries....................483 Reference 14 Outline of “Cabinet Decision” and Legislation Development......484 Reference 15 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces.............................484 Reference 16 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units......................................................487 Reference 16 MOD’s final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at an MSDF patrol aircraft (Provisional Translation)............................................................488 Reference 18 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan......................490 Reference 19 Participation of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2018).......................................................491 Reference 20 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity...........................................................................491 Reference 21 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)................................491 Reference 22 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation....................................................492 Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee...........493 Reference 24 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)........................................................................493 Reference 25 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2016)............499 Reference 26 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) � (tentative translation)................................................................503 Reference 27 Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2018.........503 Reference 28 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects..............505 Reference 29 Outline of 23 Issues..................................................................506 Reference 30 The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)............................507 The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)............................508 Reference 31 Progress of the SACO Final Report............................................509 Reference 32 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility....................511 Reference 33 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena.............................................................512 Reference 34 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces...............513 Reference 35 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan................514 Reference 36 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan...................................514 Reference 37 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements................515 Reference 38 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2018).....................516 Reference 39 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years).....................................................................516 Reference 40 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India and Sri Lanka (Past Three Years)...............................517 Reference 41 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states (Past Three Years).................................518 Reference 42 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (Past Three Years)...................................................521 Reference 43 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European � Countries, Canada and New Zealand (Past Three Years)............522 Reference 44 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)...........................................................525 Reference 45 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)..........................................................525 Reference 46 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)............................................526 Reference 47 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, Last Three Years).....................................527 Reference 48 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense........................................................527 Reference 49 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues........................................529 Reference 50 Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN..............................................................................531 Reference 51 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)..............532 Reference 52 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations...........................................................................535 Reference 53 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities...............................................................536 Reference 54 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities...536 Reference 55 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel....539 Reference 56 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2018)...........................................................540 Reference 57 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, and Others.........540 Reference 58 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2018......................................541 Reference 59 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2018).........541 Reference 60 Main Measures for Re-employment Support.............................542 Reference 61 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government........542 Reference 62 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology...............................................................................544 Reference 63 Activities in Civic Life................................................................545 Reference 64 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)......546 Reference 65 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2018).........................................547 Defense Chronology.........................................................................................548 ----- **Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country** |Col1|Col2|United States|Russia|United Kingdom|France|China| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Missiles|ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)|400 Minuteman III 400|334 SS-18 46 SS-19 30 SS-25 63 SS-27 78 RS-24 117|―|―|60 DF-5（CSS-4） 20 DF-31（CSS-10） 40| ||IRBM MRBM|―|―|―|―|148 DF-4（CSS-3） 10 DF-21（CSS-5） 122| |||||||DF-26 30| ||SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles)|336 Trident D-5 336|192 SS-N-18 48 SS-N-23 96 SS-N-32 48|48 Trident D-5 48|64 M-45 16 M-51 48|48 JL-2（CSS-NX-14） 48| |Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles||14|13|4|4|4| |Aircraft||66 B-2 20 B-52 46|76 Tu-95 (Bear) 60 Tu-160 (Blackjack) 16|―|40 Rafale 40|100 H-6K 100| |Number of warheads||Approx. 3,800|Approx. 4,350 (including Approx. 1,830 tactical nuclear warheads)|215|300|Approx. 280| Notes: 1. Data is based on “The Military Balance 2019,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2018, etc. 2. In March 2019, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2019: the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,365 and the delivery vehicles involved 656 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,461 and the delivery vehicles involved 524 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2018, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 1,750 (including 150 tactical nuclear warheads) and that of Russian ones was 1,600. 3. In November 2015, the U.K.’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be no more than 180. 4. According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 130-140 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 140-150, Israel a maximum of 90, and North Korea 10-20. **Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions** **(Approximate Numbers)** |Ground Forces|Col2|Maritime Forces|Col4|Col5|Air Forces|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Country or Region|Ground Forces (10,000 persons)|Country or Region|Tonnage (10,000 tons)|Number of Vessels|Country or Region|Number of Combat Aircraft| |India|124|United States|666.8|970|United States|3,521| |North Korea|110|Russia|204.2|1,093|China|2,890| |China|98|China|178.7|754|Russia|1,468| |Pakistan|56|United Kingdom|58.0|130|India|928| |Republic of Korea|49|India|47.8|315|Republic of Korea|640| |United States|48|France|39.2|298|Egypt|599| |Vietnam|41|Indonesia|25.5|176|North Korea|545| |Myanmar|38|Italy|23.6|183|Taiwan|495| |Iran|35|Republic of Korea|21.5|240|Pakistan|448| |Egypt|31|Germany|21.1|118|France|430| |Indonesia|30|Australia|21.0|102|Turkey|360| |Russia|28|Turkey|21.8|195|Saudi Arabia|418| |Turkey|26|Taiwan|20.5|392|Israel|369| |Thailand|25|Spain|19.0|173|Iran|339| |Colombia|22|Brazil|17.8|109|United Kingdom|295| |Japan|14|Japan|49.6|137|Japan|390| Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from “The Military Balance 2019” and other sources, and data on maritime forces is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2017-2018 and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2018, and combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings). 3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength. **Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and** **Regions (Approximate Numbers)** |Country or Region|Military Service System|Regular (10,000 persons)|Col4|Reserves (10,000 persons)| |---|---|---|---|---| |United States|Volunteer|130||80| |Russia|Conscription / Volunteer|90||200| |United Kingdom|Volunteer|15||8| |France|Volunteer|20||4| |Germany|Volunteer|18||3| |Italy|Volunteer|17||2| |India|Volunteer|144||116| |China|Conscription|204||51| |North Korea|Conscription|128||60| |Republic of Korea|Conscription|62.5||310| |Egypt|Conscription|44||48| |Israel|Conscription|17||47| |Japan|Volunteer|Ground|14|3.3 (0.4)| |||Maritime|4.3|0.05| |||Air|4.3|0.05| Notes: 1. Data from “The Military Balance 2019” and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2018. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and is not included in the total figure. 3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system. 4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former. ----- **Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan** Ground Forces Maritime Forces Air Forces (10,000 persons) (10,000 tons) (Number of Combat Aircraft) 2 5 0 2 50 8,0 00 2 0 0 1 5 0 2 00 1 50 6,0 00 4,0 00 1 0 0 50 1 00 5 0 2,0 00 1999 2009 2018 1999 2009 2018 1999 2009 2018 Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan **Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline)** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) **I. Purpose** ❍ As Japan’s security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society. ❍ In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community. ❍ The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security. ❍ With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach. ❍ When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy. ❍ The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner. **II. Fundamental Principle of National Security** 1. Principles Japan Upholds ❍ Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.” ❍ Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. ❍ Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. ❍ Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.” ❍ Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold. 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives National Interests ❍ To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition. ❍ To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end, it is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability). ❍ To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. National Security Objectives ❍ To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage. ❍ To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation. ❍ To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions. **III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges** 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation ❍ The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is increasing its presence in the international community. The United States, which has the world’s largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. ❍ The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding. (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials ❍ The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international community. (3) Threat of International Terrorism ❍ International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to the advancement of globalization. ❍ Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have ----- actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad. (4) Risks to Global Commons ❍ In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious. ❍ In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of respective states. ❍ Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat. ❍ There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite collisions amongst others. ❍ Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious. (5) Challenges to Human Security ❍ Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. ❍ These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community. (6) The Global Economy and Its Risks ❍ The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing. ❍ Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules are becoming apparent. ❍ The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by emerging countries are observed. 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region ❍ The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. (2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions ❍ North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other countries is being substantially aggravated. ❍ As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored. ❍ North Korea’s abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility. (3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas ❍ There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. ❍ China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency. ❍ China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own “Air Defense Identification Zone”). ❍ The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability. **IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security** 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles - To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments. - Enhancing Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large. - In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment ❍ The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. ❍ It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. ❍ It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the international community. ❍ By highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities. ❍ Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions. (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan ❍ Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. ❍ Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters. ❍ In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective. ❍ With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity ❍ Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. ❍ Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations. ❍ Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities. (4) Ensuring Maritime Security ❍ As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force. ❍ Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks. ❍ Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan. (5) Strengthening Cyber Security ❍ Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan’s critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected. ----- areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and largescale disaster response operations. (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces ❍ While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements, in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including Okinawa. 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region through the following approaches. ❍ Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the AsiaPacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic interests. — ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security cooperation. Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together closely in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues. — Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation. — ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its unity. — India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership. ❍ Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly but in a calm manner to China’s recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion. ❍ Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant Security Council resolutions. ❍ Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole. ❍ In promoting these efforts, Japan will actively utilize and engage in multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks. ❍ Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region. ❍ European countries are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE. ❍ Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges. ❍ Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with the Gulf States, encompassing political and security cooperation beyond natural resources and energy. In addition, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East. ❍ Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. 4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations ❍ Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. ❍ Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and nonpermanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council. (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law ❍ In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions are duly reflected. ❍ Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc. ❍ Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense cooperation. (6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism ❍ Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and analyzing intelligence on the situation of international terrorism. (7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities ❍ Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open source intelligence. ❍ Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote allsource analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government’s disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy formulation. (8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation ❍ From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. ❍ While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer. (9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes ❍ Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of informationgathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites. Japan will also enhance a system for space situational awareness. ❍ Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to longterm, including the development of technologies. (10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities ❍ Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan’s technological capabilities. ❍ Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government. ❍ Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding technologies in diplomacy. 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance - Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community. - The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners. - In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. Alliance. (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas ❍ Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy. ❍ Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, and strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad ----- ❍ Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of legal systems. (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation ❍ Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.” ❍ Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and nonproliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance. (4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation ❍ Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities. ❍ Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance. ❍ Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations concerned. (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism ❍ Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international legal framework. ❍ Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc. 5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community. (1) Sharing Universal Values ❍ Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues. ❍ Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights. ❍ Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women. (2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security ❍ It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address development issues as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. ❍ Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and play a leading role in the formulation of the next international development goals. ❍ Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community. (3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries ❍ Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including students and administrative officials, and provide them education and training. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to ensure that these personnel can contribute to development in their home countries. (4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System ❍ Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP. Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. (5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues ❍ Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable supply of energy and other natural resources. ❍ In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming. (6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges ❍ Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges. ❍ Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture. 6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding - In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be effectively demonstrated. - It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security. (1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological ❍ Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness. (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities ❍ It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations with other countries. ❍ With the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages. ❍ Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas. ❍ By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the form of international opinion. (3) Reinforcing the Social Base ❍ It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity. ❍ Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region. ❍ Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan. (4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base ❍ Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education. ❍ Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of higher education, think tanks, etc. ❍ Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government officials. **Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2019 and** **beyond** (December 18, 2018) **I. NDPG’s Objective** Japan since the end of World War II has consistently treaded the path of a peace- loving nation. This has been accomplished by the persistent efforts of our forerunners under the principle of maintaining peace. The most consequential responsibility of the Government of Japan is to maintain Japan’s peace and security, to ensure its survival and to defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property of its nationals and territorial land, waters and airspace. This is the foremost responsibility that Japan must fulfill as a sovereign nation. Carrying out this responsibility by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative is at the very heart of Japan’s national security. Japan’s defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of its security and the clear representation of the unwavering will and ability of Japan as a peace-loving nation. And maintaining Japan’s peace and security is an essential premise for its prosperity. At present, security environment surrounding Japan is changing at extremely high speeds. Changes in the balance of power in the international arena are accelerating and becoming more complex, and uncertainty over the existing order is increasing. In addition, rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security, which has prioritized responses in traditional, physical domains, which are land, sea and air. Even under these circumstances, Japan will vigorously march forward as a peace- loving nation. To do so, Japan, amid the dramatically changing security environment, needs to fundamentally strengthen its national defense architecture with which to protect, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence, thereby expanding roles Japan can fulfill. Today, no country can preserve its security by itself alone. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as security cooperation with other countries are critical to Japan’s national security, and this cannot be achieved without Japan's own efforts. The international community also expects Japan to play roles that are commensurate with its national power. In strengthening its defense capability, Japan must squarely face the aforementioned realities of national security and ensure necessary ----- and sufficient quality and quantity so as to build a truly effective defense capability that does not lie on a linear extension of the past. In particular, it has become essential that Japan achieve superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. To build a new defense capability that combines strengths across all domains, Japan needs to engage in a transformation at a pace that is fundamentally different from the past, completely shedding the thinking that relies on traditional division among land, sea, and air. On the other hand, given the rapidly aging population with declining birthrates and severe fiscal situation, Japan cannot strengthen its defense capability without thorough rationalization that does not dwell on the past. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, together with Japan's own defense architecture, continues to be the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. As stated above, Japan's fulfillment of its foremost responsibility as a sovereign nation is the very way to fulfill its roles under the Japan-U.S. Alliance and further enhance the Alliance’s ability to deter and counter threats, and is a foundation upon which to strategically promote security cooperation in line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific. Based on the foregoing thoughts, the Government, in line with “On National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013, and hereinafter referred to as “National Security Strategy”), hereby sets forth the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond” as the new guidelines regarding how Japan’s national defense ought to be to form the foundation of Japan’s future. **II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan** 1. Characteristics of current security environment In the international community, interdependency among countries further expands and deepens. On the other hand, thanks to further growth of national power of such countries as China, changes in the balance of power are accelerating and becoming more complex, thereby increasing uncertainty over the existing order. Against such a backdrop, prominently emerging are inter-state competitions across the political, economic and military realms, in which states seek to shape global and regional order to their advantage as well as to increase their influence. These inter-state competitions occur on a continuous basis: In conducting inter- state competitions, states leverage various means such as undermining other country’s sovereignty using military and law-enforcement entities, and manipulating foreign country’s public opinion by exploiting social media. Also, the so-called gray-zone situations are becoming persistent over a long period of time, playing out as part of inter- state competitions. They may possibly further increase and expand. Such gray-zone situations harbor the risk of rapidly developing into graver situations without showing clear indications. In addition, methods employed to alter the status quo, such as “hybrid warfare,” that intentionally blur the boundaries between the military and non-military realms are forcing affected actors to take complex measures not limited to military ones. Driven by rapid technological innovation in information & communications and other fields, military technologies are showing remarkable advances. Against the backdrop of such technological advances, contemporary warfare increasingly features capabilities combined across all domains: not only land, sea and air but also new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. Aiming to improve overall military capability, states are seeking to gain superiority in technologies that undergird capabilities in new domains. Since space and cyber domains are widely used for civilian purposes, if stable use of these domains is impeded, it may entail serious consequences for the safety of state and its citizens. Due to advances in military technologies, a variety of threats can now easily penetrate national borders. States endeavor to develop weapons that leverage cutting-edge, potentially game-changing technologies. They also engage in research of autonomous unmanned weapon systems equipped with artificial intelligence (AI). Further technological innovations hereafter are expected to make it difficult still to foresee future warfare. In the international community, there is a broadening and diversifying array of security challenges that cannot be dealt with by a single country alone. With respect to space and cyber domains, establishing international rules and norms has been a security agenda. In maritime domain, there have been cases where country unilaterally claims its entitlements or take actions based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. These have generated undue infringement upon freedom in high seas. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic missiles as well as worsening international terrorism remain grave challenges for the international community. Against such background, qualitatively and quantitatively superior military powers concentrate in Japan’s surroundings where clear trends are observed in further military build-up and increase in military activities. 2. Situations by country and region While remaining to possess the world’s largest comprehensive national power, the United States, with inter-state competitions in a range of areas prominently emerging, has acknowledged that particularly important challenge is strategic competition with China and Russia who attempt to alter global and regional order. To rebuild its military power, the United States is engaged in such efforts as maintaining military advantage in all domains through technological innovations, enhancing nuclear deterrent, and advancing missile defense capabilities. The United States upholds defense commitments to allies and partners and maintains forward force presence, while calling on them to share greater responsibility. The United States frames the Indo-Pacific as a priority region where it adopts a policy of strengthening alliances and partnerships. Member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) including the United States are reviewing their strategies to deal with coercive attempts to alter the status-quo as well as “hybrid warfare.” In view of changes in the security environment, NATO member states have been increasing their defense expenditures. With an aim to build “world-class forces” by the mid-21st century, China has sustained high-level growth of defense expenditures with continued lack of transparency. China has engaged in broad, rapid improvement of its military power in qualitative and quantitative terms with focus on nuclear, missile, naval and air forces. In so doing, China attaches importance to ensuring superiority in new domains: it is rapidly advancing capabilities in cyber and electromagnetic domains with which to disrupt opponent’s command and control; and continues to enhance space domain capabilities through developing and experimenting anti-satellite weapons. China is also improving missile defense penetration capabilities and amphibious landing capabilities. Such capability enhancement serves to improve the so-called Anti-Access/Area Denial (“A2/AD”) capabilities—capabilities to deny access and deployment of foreign militaries to one’s surrounding areas and to disrupt their military operations therein—as well as to build capabilities with which to conduct military operations over greater distances. In addition, China is promoting civil-military integration policy in areas of national defense, science & technology and industry, and actively developing and acquiring cutting-edge technologies of potential military utility. Also, maritime law enforcement agencies and the military are improving their collaboration. China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with existing international order. In the East China Sea and other waters, China is expanding and intensifying its military activities at sea and in the air. Around the Senkaku Islands, an inherent part of Japanese territory, Chinese government vessels continually violate Japanese territorial waters despite Japan’s strong protests while Chinese naval ships continuously operate in waters around the Islands. China is also expanding its military activities in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan. In particular, the Chinese military in recent years has frequently advanced to the Pacific, with its navigation routes and unit composition becoming more diverse. In the South China Sea, China has forcibly conducted large-scale, rapid reclamation of maritime features, which are being converted into military foothold. China in the South China Sea is also expanding and intensifying its maritime and air activities. Such Chinese military and other developments, coupled with the lack of transparency surrounding its defense policy and military power, represent a serious security concern for the region including Japan and for the international community. Japan needs to continue to pay utmost attention to these developments. China is eagerly expected to play active roles in a more cooperative manner in the region and the international community. North Korea in recent years has launched ballistic missiles at unprecedented frequency, rapidly improving its operational capabilities such as simultaneous launch and surprise attack. Given technological maturity obtained through a series of nuclear tests, North Korea is assessed to have already successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads. Although North Korea expressed its intention for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and blew up in public its nuclear test site, it has not carried out the dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner: There has been no essential change in North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. North Korea is assessed to possess large-scale cyber units as part of its asymmetric military capabilities, engaging in theft of military secrets and developing capabilities to attack critical infrastructure of foreign countries. North Korea also retains large-scale special operation forces. Such military developments of North Korea pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security and significantly undermine peace and security of the region and the international community. Through United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international community also has made it clear that North Korea’s nuclear- and ballistic missile-related activities constitute a clear threat to international peace and security. Russia is enhancing its military posture by continuing force modernization efforts with a focus on nuclear forces. Russia is in sharp confrontation with Europe and the United States over issues including situation in Ukraine. Russia’s military activities are trending upward in the Arctic Circle, Europe, areas around the United States and the Middle East, as well as in the Far East including Japan’s Northern Territories. Close attention therefore needs to be paid to its developments. 3. Characteristics of Japan Surrounded by sea on all sides and with long coastlines, Japan possesses numerous islands remote from the mainland and is blessed with vast ----- Exclusive Economic Zones: spread widely therein are life, person and property of its nationals, territorial land, waters and airspace, as well as various resources, all of which Japan must defend to the end. For Japan, a maritime nation dependent on overseas trade for the bulk of energy resources and food supplies, fundamental to its peace and prosperity is to ensure the safety of maritime and air traffic by strengthening the order of “Open and Stable Oceans,” an order based on fundamental norms such as rule of law and freedom of navigation. Japan is prone to natural disasters that exact heavy damage. Industry, population and information infrastructure concentrate in Japan’s urban areas, and a large number of critical facilities such as nuclear power plants are located in coastal areas. In addition, Japan is undergoing population decline and ageing with dwindling birthrate at unprecedented pace. Severe fiscal conditions continue as well. 4. Summary In light of the foregoing, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was of concern during the Cold War era, remains low, Japan’s security environment is becoming more testing and uncertain at a remarkably faster speed than expected when the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013 and hereinafter referred to as the “former Guidelines”) was formulated. To prevent threats to Japan from materializing to menace life and peaceful livelihood of its nationals, it behooves Japan to take measures that are in line with these realities. **III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** In line with the National Security Strategy and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” Japan has enhanced its diplomatic strength and defense capability. Japan has also expanded and deepened cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance being a cornerstone. In so doing, Japan under the Constitution has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining the exclusively defense- oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threat to other countries, ensured civilian control of the military, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Japan under these precepts will ever not change the course it has taken as a peace- loving nation. Based on this premise, Japan, even amid the realities of security environment it has hitherto never faced, must strive to preserve national interests identified in the National Security Strategy—defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property, territorial land, waters and airspace, and its sovereignty and independence. To that end, the Government will identify national defense objectives and the means to achieve them, and proactively and strategically promote measures with added variety. National defense objectives are: first, to create, on a steady-state basis, security environment desirable for Japan by integrating and drawing on the strengths at the nation’s disposal; second, to deter threat from reaching Japan by making opponent realize that doing harm to Japan would be difficult and consequential; and finally, should threat reach Japan, to squarely counter the threat and minimize damage. Japan will strengthen each of the means by which to successfully achieve these national defense objectives: Japan’s own architecture for national defense; the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and international security cooperation. These efforts, including achieving superiority in new domains, which are space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum, must be carried out swiftly and flexibly in order to deal with increasingly complex security environment that is changing at accelerating speeds. In dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons, U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential: Japan will closely cooperate with the United States to maintain and enhance its credibility. To deal with the threat, Japan will also increase its own efforts including comprehensive air and missile defense as well as civil protection. At the same time, towards the long-term goal of bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan will play an active and positive role in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 1. Strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense (1) Building comprehensive architecture for national defense In order to squarely address the realities of security environment that it has hitherto never faced and to securely achieve national defense objectives, Japan will build national defense architecture that in all phases integrates the strengths at the nation’s disposal: this structure enables not only Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF) efforts but also coherent, whole-of-government efforts; and enables cooperation with local governments and private entities. In particular, Japan will accelerate its efforts and cooperation in such fields as space, cyberspace, electromagnetic spectrum, ocean, and science & technology, and also promote measures concerning the formulation of international norms in fields such as space and cyberspace. Japan will further advance steady-state efforts such as strategic communications by systematically combining all available policy tools. In order to address a range of situations including armed contingencies and “gray- zone” situations, Japan has been strengthening its posture under the principle of civilian control of the military. Japan further needs to seamlessly deal with various situations in a coherent, whole-of-government manner by way of swift and pertinent decision-making under even stronger political leadership, which will be assisted by enhanced support mechanism. In view of protecting the life, person and property of its nationals, Japan will also continue to strengthen organization for disaster response and civil protection, and, in cooperation with local governments, work to secure evacuation facilities. Japan will build a posture fully prepared to evacuate Japanese nationals overseas during emergencies and ensure their safety. Japan will promote measures to protect infrastructure critical to people’s daily lives such as electricity and communication as well as to protect cyberspace. In addition to making aforementioned efforts, in order to ensure the effectiveness of various policies and measures, Japan will, on a steady-state basis, devise and review relevant plans while systematizing them; also, expand the use of simulations and comprehensive training and exercises to improve the effectiveness of emergency response posture. (2) Strengthening Japan’s defense capability a. Significance and necessity of defense capability Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s national security. Defense capability represents Japan’s will and ability to: deter threat from reaching Japan; and should threat reach Japan, eliminate the threat and, as a sovereign nation, by exerting efforts on its own accord and initiative, defend to the end Japanese nationals’ life, person and property as well as territorial land, waters and airspace. At the same time, defense capability is essential for Japan to play on its initiative its roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance at all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. Strengthening Japan’s defense capability to provide for national security is none other than strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Defense capability is essential also for advancing Japan’s efforts in security cooperation with other countries. Defense capability is the most important strength for Japan in retaining self- sustained existence as a sovereign nation amid security environment it has never faced before. Japan must strengthen this capability on its own accord and initiative. b. Truly effective defense capability – Multi-domain Defense Force To be able to deter and counter qualitatively and quantitatively superior military threats in increasingly testing security environment, it has become vitally important to adapt to warfare that combines capabilities in new domains—space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum—and traditional domains—land, sea and air. Japan needs to develop, while qualitatively and quantitatively enhancing capabilities in individual domains, a defense capability that can execute cross-domain operations, which organically fuse capabilities in all domains to generate synergy and amplify the overall strength, so that even when inferiority exists in individual domains such inferiority will be overcome and national defense accomplished. In order to ensure national defense in increasingly uncertain security environment, it is also important for Japan to be able to seamlessly conduct activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. To date, Japan has endeavored to develop a defense capability that allows to engage in diverse activities in a swift and sustainable manner. In recent years, however, SDF has had to increase the scope and frequency of its steady- state activities such as maintaining presence, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities: This is exacting a chronic burden on its personnel and equipment, generating a concern that SDF may not be able to maintain proficiency and the volume of its activities. Japan needs to: improve quality and quantity of capabilities that support sustainability and resiliency of various activities; and develop a defense capability that enables sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities commensurate with the character of given situations. Further, Japan’s defense capability needs to be capable of strengthening the ability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats as well as promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered security cooperation. In light of the foregoing, Japan will henceforth build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi-Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the former Guidelines. (3) Roles that defense capability should play In order to create a security environment desirable for Japan and to deter and counter threats, Japan’s defense capability must be able to serve the roles specified below in a seamless and combined manner. In particular, in view of protecting the life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals, it is all the more important for Japan’s defense capability to fulfill diverse roles on a steady-state basis. a. From peacetime to “gray-zone” situations SDF will enhance its presence on a steady-state basis by actively engaging in, among others, joint training and exercises and overseas port visits, thereby demonstrating Japan’s will and capability. SDF will, in close integration with ----- diplomacy, promote strategic communications including aforementioned activities by SDF units. SDF will leverage its capabilities in all domains to conduct wide-area, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter referred to as “persistent ISR”) activities around Japan. SDF will prevent occurrence or escalation of emergencies by employing flexible deterrent options and other measures. Leveraging posture in place for these activities, SDF will, in coordination with the police and other agencies, immediately take appropriate measures in response to actions that violate Japan’s sovereignty including incursions into its territorial airspace and waters. SDF will provide persistent protection against incoming ballistic missiles and other threats, and minimize damage should it occur. b. Attack against Japan including its remote islands In response to attack on Japan including its remote islands, SDF will quickly maneuver and deploy requisite units to block access and landing of invading forces while ensuring maritime and air superiority. Even when maintaining maritime and air superiority becomes untenable, SDF will block invading forces’ access and landing from outside their threat envelopes. Should any part of the territory be occupied, SDF will retake it by employing all necessary measures. Against airborne attack by missiles and aircraft, SDF will respond in a swift and sustained manner by applying optimal means and minimize damage to maintain SDF’s capabilities as well as the infrastructure upon which such capabilities are employed. In response to attack by guerrillas or special operations forces, SDF will protect critical facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy infiltrating forces. c. Space, cyber and electromagnetic domains during all phases In space, cyber and electromagnetic domains, to prevent any actions that impede its activities, SDF will conduct on a steady-state basis persistent monitoring as well as collection and analysis of relevant information. In case of such event, SDF will promptly identify incidents and take such measures as damage limitation and recovery. In case of armed attack against Japan, SDF will, on top of taking these actions, block and eliminate the attack by leveraging capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. In addition, in light of the society’s growing dependence on space and cyberspace, SDF will contribute to comprehensive, whole-of-government efforts concerning these domains under appropriate partnership and shared responsibility with relevant organizations. d. Large-scale disasters In case of large-scale disasters, to protect the life, person, and property of Japanese nationals, SDF will swiftly transport and deploy requisite units to take all necessary measures for initial response, and, as required, maintain its posture for disaster response for a longer term. SDF will carefully address the needs of affected citizens and local governments, and engage in life saving, temporary repair and livelihood support in appropriate partnership and cooperation with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. e. Collaboration with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, in line with the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Japan will effectively conduct activities described in 2. by playing on its initiative its own roles in the Japan-U.S. Alliance. f. Promotion of security cooperation SDF will actively engage in efforts for enhanced security cooperation as stated in 3.: In accordance with policies that are tailored to individual regions and countries, SDF will strategically promote defense cooperation and exchanges such as: joint training and exercises, cooperation in defense equipment and technologies, capacity building assistance, and service-to-service exchange. 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone for Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as its core, plays a significant role for peace, stability and prosperity of not only Japan but also the Indo-Pacific region and the international community. As inter-sate competitions prominently emerge, it has become all the more important for Japan’s national security to further strengthen relationship with the United States, with whom Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. The United States also views that cooperation with its allies has become more important. While the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been reinforced through activities including those that were made possible by the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan needs to further enhance the Alliance through efforts under the “Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation” in order to achieve its national defense objective as security environment surrounding Japan becomes more testing and uncertain at remarkably fast speeds. In further strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, it is an essential premise that Japan strengthen its own defense capability on its own accord and initiative. Fulfilling this premise, Japan needs to press ahead with efforts such as: bolstering the ability of the Alliance to deter and counter threats; enhancing and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas; and steadily implementing measures concerning the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. (1) Strengthening ability of Japan-U.S. Alliance to deter and counter threats In all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies as well as during disasters, Japan will enhance information sharing with the United States, conduct effective and smooth bilateral coordination involving all relevant organizations and take all necessary measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security. For these purposes, Japan will further deepen various operational cooperation and policy coordination with the United States. In particular, Japan will expand and deepen cooperation in: space and cyber domains; comprehensive air and missile defense; bilateral training and exercises; bilateral ISR operations; and bilateral flexible deterrent options. Japan will also promote formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and deepen the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In addition, Japan will even more actively conduct activities such as logistic support for U.S. force activities and protection of U.S. ships and aircraft. (2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a wide range of areas In order to create a desirable security environment including maintaining and enhancing free and open maritime order, and with an eye on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will conduct bilateral activities such as capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) and counter-piracy. In order for Japan and the United States to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will enhance and expand cooperation with the United States in such areas as equipment, technology, facility, and intelligence as well as information security. In particular, Japan will promote standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, and sharing of various networks. In order to support sustainable U.S. force activities around Japan as well as to ensure high operational availability of SDF equipment, Japan will build capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment. To efficiently improve Japanese and U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S equipment through optimized Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and JapanU.S. joint research and development. With respect to SDF facilities and U.S force facilities and areas including training facilities and areas, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use and efforts for improved resiliency. (3) Steady implementation of measures concerning stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan Japan will provide stable support for smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures including Host Nation Support (HNS). Japan will also steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan to mitigate impact on local communities while maintaining deterrence provided by U.S. forces. Okinawa is located in areas critically important to Japan’s national security and U.S. force stationing in Okinawa greatly contributes to deterrent the Japan-U.S. alliance provides: At the same time, facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Japan are highly concentrated in Okinawa. In light of this, Japan in recent years has been furthering its efforts to mitigate impact on Okinawa including returns of U.S. facilities and areas. Japan will continue to work to mitigate impact on Okinawa by steadily implementing such measures as realignment, consolidation and reduction of facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa including the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of impact on Okinawa. 3. Strengthening security cooperation In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to work on defense cooperation and exchanges which include joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address global security challenges. In implementing these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with the countries that share universal values and security interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic policy. (1) Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges With Australia, to further improve interoperability and by utilizing frameworks such as Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), Japan will further promote joint training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation, and advance cooperative activities such as bilaterally-aligned capacity building assistance to third parties. Japan will also strengthen cooperative relations under trilateral framework among Japan, Australia and the United States, which share universal values and strategic interests. ----- With India, in view of enhancing strategic partnership and by utilizing frameworks such as “2+2,” Japan will promote joint training and exercises and defense equipment and technology cooperation in a broad range of areas including maritime security. Japan will also strengthen cooperation among Japan, India and the United States. With Southeast Asian countries, Japan will continue to support efforts for strengthening the centrality and unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is the key to regional cooperation, and promote practical bilateral and multilateral cooperation, including joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and capacity building assistance. With the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan will promote defense cooperation in a broad range of fields and strive to establish the foundation for collaboration. Japan will also continue to strengthen trilateral cooperation among Japan, the ROK and the United States to maintain peace and stability in the region. With the United Kingdom and France, to contribute to the stability of maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will, while leveraging such frameworks as the “2+2,” promote efforts including more practical joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement. Japan will strengthen cooperation with European countries as well as NATO and the European Union (EU). With Canada and New Zealand, Japan will promote efforts including joint training and exercises as well as bilateral collaboration on third-party engagement. With China, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote multi-layered dialogues and exchange. In so doing, Japan will continue to encourage China to play responsible and constructive roles for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, comply with international norms of conduct, and improve transparency regarding military capability enhancement. In order to avoid unexpected situations between the two countries, Japan will utilize the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China” in a manner that contributes to building a trusting relationship between the two countries. Japan will calmly and firmly deal with Chinese activities at sea and in the air around Japan. With Russia, in order to enhance mutual understanding and trust, Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia including the “2+2,” high-level interactions and broad unit-to-unit exchanges, and deepen joint training and exercises. With island nations of the Pacific Ocean, Japan will promote port and airport visits by SDF as well as exchanges and cooperation that utilize capabilities and characteristics of each service of SDF. With countries in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, in order to build and strengthen cooperative relations Japan will promote exchanges at all levels, including high level, and cooperation in such fields as capacity building assistance related to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Regarding multilateral frameworks, Japan attaches importance to the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ MeetingPlus (ADMM-Plus) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that provide significant foundations for discussions, cooperation and exchanges related to security field in the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, Japan will contribute to strengthening cooperation and mutual trust among the countries in the region. (2) Responding to global issues From the viewpoint of securing the freedom and security of navigation and flight, Japan will promote cooperation to contribute to the improvement of capabilities pertaining to the maritime security of coastal states in the IndoPacific region, which include South Asian countries such as India and Sri Lanka, as well as Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, Japan will promote such activities as joint training and exercises, unit-to-unit exchanges and active port visits at these occasions. Japan will also conduct activities such as anti-piracy efforts in cooperation with relevant countries and cooperation for strengthening capabilities of the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Regarding the use of space domain, Japan will promote partnership and cooperation in various fields including the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and mission assurance of the entire space system, through consultations and information sharing with relevant countries and active participation in multilateral exercises among others. Regarding the use of cyber domain, Japan will enhance its partnership and cooperation with relevant countries through measures such as sharing views on threat awareness, exchanging views on response to cyber attacks, and participating in multilateral exercises. In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. While making good use of past experiences to develop human resources, Japan will actively contribute through such efforts as sending embedded personnel to mission headquarters and capacity building assistance in areas that Japan excels. Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities. **IV. Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability** 1. Guiding thoughts In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, it is essential that Japan use budget and personnel even more effectively. In strengthening defense capability, Japan will enhance priority capability areas as early as possible, allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation, and undertake necessary fundamental reforms. In taking these measures, SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces in all areas and, avoiding stove-piped approach, optimize their organizations and equipment. In particular, SDF will further promote joint- ness in a wide range of areas such as capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, comprehensive air and missile defense, damage recovery, transportation, maintenance, supply, security, education, medical service and research. With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, and work further to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization. 2. Priorities in strengthening capabilities necessary for cross-domain operations (1) Acquiring and strengthening capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology. In doing so, SDF will strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. a. Capabilities in space domain Effective use of satellites for such purposes as information-gathering, communication and positioning is essential for realizing cross-domain operations. On the other hand, threats to the stable use of space are increasing. SDF therefore will further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities. SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent ground- and space-based space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will also work to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information. In so doing, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the United States and other relevant countries. SDF will also engage in organization building such as the creation of units specializing in space and dedicated career field, and develop human resources and accumulate knowledge and expertise in the space field. b. Capabilities in cyber domain Information and communications networks that leverage cyberspace are a foundation for SDF’s activities in various domains, and attack against them seriously disrupts organized activities of SDF. In order to prevent such attack, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for persistent monitoring of command and communications systems and networks as well as for damage limitation and recovery. In addition, SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. In so doing, SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and take into consideration its contributions to whole-of-government efforts. c. Capabilities in electromagnetic domain Since the use of electromagnetic spectrum has expanded in range and purpose, it is now recognized as a major operational domain situated on the frontline of offense-defense dynamic in today’s warfare. Ensuring superiority in electromagnetic domain is also critical to realizing cross-domain operations. SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent’s electronic ----- jamming. In addition, SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan. In order to smoothly perform these activities, SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic spectrum. (2) Enhancing capabilities in traditional domains SDF will enhance capabilities to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. a. Capabilities in maritime and air domains In order to effectively deal with armed attack against Japan, it is extremely important for Japan to establish and maintain maritime and air superiority. SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan. SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft which bring operational flexibility, SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. In so doing, as number of air bases that allow for take-off and landing of fighters is limited, Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel. b. Stand-off defense capability As other countries make remarkable advances in early warning and control capabilities and the performance of various missiles, SDF needs to effectively intercept attack against Japan, while ensuring safety of its personnel. SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies. c. Comprehensive air and missile defense capability Japan needs to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage. SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats. Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures. d. Maneuver and deployment capability In order to effectively deal with various situations such as attack on remote islands, requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis and to maneuver and deploy according to situation. SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities. In addition, to enable swift and large-scale transport, SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis. (3) Strengthening sustainability and resiliency To be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support needs to be enhanced. SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, SDF will improve sustainability through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel. SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, SDF will work toward more effective and efficient equipment maintenance by reviewing existing maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability. 3. Priorities in strengthening core elements of defense capability (1) Reinforcing human resource base The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. Securing human resources for SDF personnel and improving their ability and morale are essential to strengthening defense capability. This has become an imminent challenge in the face of shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates. Also in light of sustainability and resilience of defense capability, SDF needs to work even further to reinforce human resource base that sustains SDF personnel. MOD/SDF will promote efforts, including those address institutional aspects, in order to secure diverse, high-quality talents from a wider range of people. These efforts include: various recruitment measures such as cooperation with local governments and other entities; diversifying applicant pool including college graduates; expanding women’s participation; appropriate extension of SDF personnel’s mandatory retirement ages; leveraging retired SDF personnel as well as reserve personnel; and measures for raising fulfillment rates. MOD/SDF will also promote manpower saving and automation by leveraging technological innovations such as artificial intelligence. To enable all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise their ability, MOD/SDF will improve living and work environment and promote work style reforms at MOD/SDF to ensure proper work-life balance. Through such efforts as enhancing joint education and research, MOD/ SDF will enrich education and research to improve SDF’s capabilities and foster its unity. MOD/SDF will enhance education for organization management skills. In addition, MOD/SDF will improve treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges, and allowance increase that reflects the special nature of SDF’s missions. MOD/SDF will also further improve re-employment support for SDF personnel in view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system. (2) Reviewing equipment structure MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure from joint operation perspective and build an optimized equipment structure. In so doing, while giving due considerations to capabilities each SDF service requires for its operations, MOD/SDF will: develop equipment with multiple functional variants; optimize and standardize specifications of equipment; and jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services; reduce types of aircraft; suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased; and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness. (3) Reinforcing technology base As character of warfare changes dramatically due to advances in military technologies, it is becoming all the more important to reinforce technological base that has bearing on defense equipment through whole-of-government approach by leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology. MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game- changing technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development timelines by streamlining R&D processes and procedures. In doing so, MOD/SDF will encourage company’s prior investments and leverage its strength to full potential by actively using design proposal-based competition scheme and improving foreseeability through the formulation of R&D visions on capabilities required for Japan’s future national defense. In addition, MOD/SDF will work to actively leverage potentially dualuse, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends. (4) Optimizing equipment procurement In order to secure necessary and sufficient quality and quantity of SDF equipment, MOD/SDF needs to acquire high-performance equipment at the most affordable prices possible. MOD/SDF also needs to do thorough cost management and reduction not only during budget development but also during budget implementation. MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment maintenance. MOD/SDF will facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies, and promote defense equipment development that eyes towards international joint development and production as well as overseas transfer. In order to efficiently procure U.S.-made high-performance equipment, MOD/SDF will promote rationalization of FMS procurement and work to align procurement timings and specifications with U.S. forces and other parties. In taking these steps, MOD/SDF will further strengthen efforts on project management throughout the entire life cycle of defense equipment. (5) Strengthening defense industrial base Japan’s defense industry is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment. For the production of highperformance equipment and to ensure their high operational availability, it is necessary to make defense industrial base more resilient by overcoming challenges such as high costs due to low- volume, high-mix production and ----- lack of international competitiveness, thereby enabling it to effectively adapt to changing security environment. In addition to taking various measures concerning equipment structure, technological base, and equipment procurement, to create a competitive environment for companies, MOD/SDF will reform the existing contract system including affording incentives to companies. MOD/SDF will enhance supply-chain risk management and work to further expand Japanese defense industry’s participation in maintenance work of imported equipment. For whole-of-government efforts to promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases where the transfer contributes to Japan’s security, MOD/SDF will work to make necessary improvements in the Principles’ implementation. At the same time, MOD/SDF will strengthen intellectual property management, technology management and information security in order to prevent drain of important defense equipment-related technologies. Through abovementioned measures, MOD/SDF will work to reduce equipment costs and improve industrial competitiveness, thereby striving to build resilient defense industrial base. MOD/SDF will also examine further measures to that end. (6) Enhancing intelligence capabilities MOD/SDF will enhance intelligence capabilities to provide timely, effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations. MOD/SDF will strengthen capabilities for each stage of collection, processing, analysis, sharing, and protection so that SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to indications of various situations and also take requisite measures based on medium- to long-term military trends. In so doing, while giving due considerations to technological trends in information processing, MOD/SDF will strengthen capability and posture, including those related to new domains, for the collection of SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, OSINT and others. MOD/SDF will enhance collaboration with relevant domestic agencies including the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center which operates Information Gathering Satellites and with the ally as well as with other parties. MOD/SDF will work to hire, retain and train personnel for information collection and analysis and to acquire and connect informationsharing systems. MOD/SDF also will establish more robust information security regime and strengthen counter-intelligence capability. **V. Organization of Self-Defense Forces** In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will strengthen joint operations as described in 1 and develop organization of each SDF service as described in sections from 2 to 4. Organic structure of major units and specific quantities of major equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table. 1. Joint operation to realize cross-domain operations (1) In order to further promote joint-ness of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF in all areas, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF’s capabilities. SDF will examine future framework for joint operation. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services. (2) SDF will maintain an ASDF unit that specializes in space domain missions, and strengthen its posture for joint operations in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies through such means as mission assurance and disruption of opponent’s command, control, communications and information. (3) SDF will maintain a cyberspace defense unit as an integrated unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF’s information and communications networks as well as to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack. (4) SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff Office’s posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum. SDF will strengthen each SDF service’s posture to enable SDF to collect and analyze information concerning electromagnetic domain and to neutralize radar, communications and others operated by opponent that intends to invade Japan. (5) In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats: GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units and ballistic missile defense units; MSDF will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers; ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units; and SDF will build comprehensive air and missile defense capability comprising these assets. (6) At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations. 2. Organization of GSDF (1) In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations, GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and electromagnetic domains; airborne operations; amphibious operations; special operations; air transportation; defense against NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) weapons; and security cooperation with foreign countries. In view of the excellent training environment it offers, GSDF will maintain half of rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, on the premise that these units will deploy and move via joint transport capability. GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats by taking measures including: persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities between ships and Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade and other mobile operating units as well as their various training and exercises; stationing of units in remote islands hitherto without SDF presence; and establishing networks with MSDF and ASDF. (2) To be able to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units for remote island defense. (3) With respect to basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in (1), GSDF will review their organization and equipment with focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. With respect to units under the direct command of regional armies, GSDF will also review their organization and equipment related to aerial firepower. GSDF will thoroughly implement rationalization and streamlining of these units and appropriately position them to meet conditions and characteristics of each region. 3. Organization of MSDF (1) In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, antisubmarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, and to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain reinforced destroyer units including destroyers with improved multi-mission capabilities, minesweeper units and embarked patrol helicopter units. MSDF will organize surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will maintain patrol ship units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. With respect to the destroyers equipped with improved multi-mission capabilities, MSDF will introduce multi-crew shiftwork and promote collaboration with patrol ships equipped with high ISR capability, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. (2) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area underwater ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain reinforced submarine units. By introducing a test-bed submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. (3) In order to effectively conduct steady-state, wide-area airborne ISR, and to effectively engage in patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will maintain fixed- wing patrol aircraft units. 4. Organization of ASDF (1) ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of groundbased warning and control units and reinforced airborne warning units: ground-based warning and control units are capable of conducting persistent surveillance in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side; and airborne warning units are capable of conducting effective, sustained airborne warning, surveillance and control during “gray zone” and other situations with heightened tensions. (2) In order to be able to provide for air defense in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side with a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircraft and supporting functions, ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by high-performance fighter aircraft. In order to enable fighter aircraft units and airborne warning units to sustainably conduct various operations in wide areas, ASDF will maintain reinforced aerial refueling and transport units. (3) In order to be able to effectively carry out activities such as maneuver and deployment of ground forces and security cooperation with foreign countries, ASDF will maintain air transport units. (4) In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will maintain unmanned aerial vehicle units. **VI. Elements Supporting Defense Capability** For Japan’s defense capability to demonstrate its true value, SDF needs to constantly maintain and improve its capabilities and foster broad understanding by Japanese nationals. ----- MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/ SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures include noise mitigation. MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations. In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF’s emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. At the same time, in administering garrisons and bases, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to their contributions to local economies. 4. Intellectual Base In order to facilitate understanding of security and crisis management among the populace, MOD/SDF will work to promote security-related education at educational institutions. Within MOD/SDF, in order to achieve at high levels both academic research and policy-support by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), MOD/SDF will facilitate NIDS’ collaboration with the policy-making sector. MOD/SDF will further enhance its defense research regime with NIDS playing central roles. In so doing, MOD/SDF will promote systematic collaboration on education and research with other research and educational institutions within the Government, as well as with universities and think-tanks of excellence both at home and abroad. **VII. Points of Attention** 1. Japan’s defense capability these Guidelines set forth envisions approximately 10 years. The National Security Council will conduct periodic, systematic evaluations throughout the course of implementation of various measures and programs. In order to build truly effective defense 1. Training and exercises In order to maintain and improve its tactical skills, SDF will conduct more practical, effective and systematic training and exercises while, as necessary, work in partnership with relevant organizations, local governments and the private sector. In so doing, in order to conduct more practical training, SDF will: develop and utilize domestic training ranges such as those in Hokkaido as well as fine training environment overseas; facilitate joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas; facilitate use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas; and more actively introduce training simulators and others. SDF will also actively utilize training and exercises to constantly examine and review various plans for emergencies. 2. Medical Care SDF needs to enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel’s vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to protect the lives of SDF personnel to the maxim extent possible, MOD/SDF will strengthen its posture for medical care and onward transfer of patients, seamlessly covering the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations. Taking into account conditions and characteristics of each region, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan’s southwestern region. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. In order to secure medical personnel in operation units, SDF will: improve the management of the National Defense Medical College; enrich and enhance education and research such as improving medical care capabilities for war injury. In addition, SDF will improve requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance. 3. Collaboration with local communities Amid increasingly testing and uncertain security environment, activities, training and exercises of SDF and U.S. forces in Japan are becoming more diverse and defense equipment more sophisticated. As a result, it is becoming all the more important to gain understanding among and secure cooperation from local governments and residents around defense facilities. |Annex Table|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Joint Units|Cyber Defense Units Maritime Transport Units||1 squadron 1 group| |Ground Self- Defense Force|Authorized Number of Personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major Units|Rapid Deployment Units|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Regional Deployment Units|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile Intended for the Defense of Remote Islands Units|2 battalions| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |||Ballistic Missile Defense Units|2 squadrons| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Major Units|Surface Vessel Units Destroyers Destroyer and minesweeper vessels Submarine Units Patrol aircraft Units|4 groups (8 divisions) 2 groups (13 divisions) 6 divisions 9 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers （Aegis-Equipped Destroyers） Submarines Patrol Vessels Combat Aircraft|54 (8) 22 12 Approx. 190| |Air Self- Defense Force|Major Units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units Space Domain Mission Units Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Units|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW wing (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 4 groups(24 fire squadrons) 1 squadron 1 squadron| ||Major Equipment|Combat Aircraft Fighters|Approx. 370 Approx. 290| Notes 1. The current numbers of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY 2018) are respectively approx. 600 and approx. 500, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future. 2. Fighter Aircraft Units (13 squadrons) includes STOVL Units. ----- capability while firmly grasping changes in security environment, MOD/ SDF will conduct verifications regarding capabilities required for Japan's defense in the future. 2. When major changes in situation are anticipated during evaluation and verification processes, these Guidelines will be amended as necessary after examining current security environment and others. 3. Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development to curb costs. MOD/SDF will work to ensure that defense capability can smoothly and fully perform its functions while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government. **Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019 - FY 2023)** activities and consultations with the U.S., in a wide range of areas under “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation”. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, to strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, Japan will actively leverage its defense capability to promote defense cooperation and exchanges which include joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, and interchanges among military branches. 5. With respect to hedging against invasion scenarios such as amphibious landing employing large-scale ground forces, which were assumed primarily during the Cold War period, SDF will retain forces only enough to maintain and carry on the minimum necessary expertise and skills with which to adapt to changes in situation in the future, by achieving efficiency and rationalization. 6. Considering increasingly severe fiscal conditions and importance of other budgets related to people’s daily life, MOD/SDF will work to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development while harmonizing with other policies and measures of the Government. **II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** 1. In order to build a structure that is capable of realizing cross-domain operations including new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum, SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture designed for effective SDF operations and for new domains, thereby enabling swift exercise of SDF’s capabilities. For the future framework for joint operations, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to conduct the operation of organizations in which the functions in the new domains are operated unitarily, and come to conclusions after considering how the integrated structure should be during steady-state to appropriately execute instructions from the Minister based on the posture of the strengthened Joint Staff. SDF will also work to flexibly leverage personnel of each SDF service through such efforts as building posture for force protection and damage recovery with an eye on mutual cooperation among SDF services. SDF will establish 1 squadron of ASDF space domain mission unit in order to conduct persistent monitoring of situations in space, and to ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies. SDF will establish 1 squadron of cyber defense unit as joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen cyber defense capabilities, including capability to disrupt, in the event of attack against Japan, opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack as well as to conduct persistent monitoring of SDF’s information and communications networks. SDF will strengthen the Joint Staff’s posture in order to appropriately manage and coordinate, from joint operation perspective, the use of electromagnetic spectrum, and advance efforts to enhance defense capability related to the use of electromagnetic spectrum in each SDF service. In order to provide persistent nation-wide protection on a steadystate basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats, GSDF will establish 2 squadrons of ballistic missile defense (BMD) units. In addition, in order to operate units more efficiently including command and control in accordance with the enhancement of SDF’s ballistic missile response capabilities, ASDF will reorganize surface-to-air guided missile units from 6 fire groups to 4 groups while maintaining 24 fire squadrons. At all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will establish 1 group of maritime transportation unit as Joint Unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and deploy in joint operations. 2. In order to strengthen operation capabilities in new domains, GSDF will establish cyberspace units and electromagnetic operation units as subordinate units of the Ground Component Command. In order to respond swiftly, and to deter and counter effectively and swiftly with various situations, GSDF will transform 1 division and 2 brigades respectively into 1 rapid deployment division and 2 rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will strengthen its ability to deter and counter threats through conducting persistent steady-state maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. In addition, through continuing to establish area security units in charge of initial response activities, MOD will newly establish surface-to-air guided missile units and surface-to-ship guided missile units, GSDF will strengthen its defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region. Furthermore, to counter invasion of remote islands, GSDF will take necessary measures to establish hyper-velocity gliding projectile (HVGP) units for the defense of remote islands. From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, December 18, 2018 **I. Program Guidelines** In the defense program for FY 2019 - FY 2023, with accordance to “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and Cabinet on December 18, 2018), Japan will significantly strengthen defense capability to build a truly effective defense capability, “Multi- Domain Defense Force,” which: organically fuses capabilities in all domains including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum; and is capable of sustained conduct of flexible and strategic activities during all phases from peacetime to armed contingencies. The development of “Multi-Domain Defense Force” will be done while honing the attributes of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force” under the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013). In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in security environment, Japan will strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. In view of aging population with declining birth rate and severe fiscal situation, Japan will strengthen its defense capability effectively by allocating resources flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation. Furthermore, SDF will further promote joint-ness of the Ground, Maritime and Air SelfDefense Forces in all areas, avoid stove-piped approach and optimize their organizations and equipment. Given the guiding thoughts above, SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense capability based on the following program guidelines: 1. In order to realize cross-domain operations, SDF will acquire and strengthen capabilities in new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum by focusing resources and leveraging Japan’s superb science and technology, and strengthen and protect command, control, communications and information (C4I) capabilities that effectively connect capabilities in all domains including the new ones. In addition, SDF will enhance capabilities in maritime and air domains, stand-off defense capability, comprehensive air and missile defense capability and maneuver and deployment capability to effectively counter attacks by aircraft, ships and missiles during cross-domain operations in close combination with capabilities in space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Furthermore, to be able to sustain a range of requisite activities at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, sustainability and resiliency of defense capability including logistics support will be enhanced. 2. In procuring equipment, by properly combining the introduction of new, high- performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment, MOD/SDF will efficiently secure defense capability in necessary and sufficient “quality” and “quantity”. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. Moreover, MOD/SDF will make focused investments through selection and concentration in cutting-edge technologies. MOD/SDF will also dramatically shorten research and development (R&D) timelines by streamlining its processes and procedures. 3. In the face of rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rates, to ensure SDF’s strength, to strive to secure human resources for SDF personnel and to improve their ability and morale, who are the core element of defense capability, MOD/SDF will comprehensively promote various measures to reinforce human resource base such as securing diverse and high-quality talents including diversifying applicant pool, promoting women’s participation and leveraging reserve personnel, improving living and work environment, promoting work style reforms, and improving treatment. 4. In order to maintain and strengthen the commitment of the United States (U.S.) to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region and to secure Japan’s security, and based on the premise that Japan will strengthen its own capabilities, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperative ----- while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with mobile combat vehicles and disuse of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into newly organized field artillery units under the direct command of the respective regional armies. Furthermore, GSDF will reduce its combat helicopter units under the direct command of the respective regional armies and consider the review of their deployment to operate them effectively and efficiently. 3. In order to provide for defense in the waters around Japan and security of maritime traffic through effective prosecution of persistent ISR, anti-submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, to be able to effectively engage in security cooperation with other countries, MSDF will maintain 4 groups mainly consisting of 1 helicopter destroyer (DDH) and 2 Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and maintain 2 groups consisting of new type of destroyers (FFM) with improved multi- mission capabilities and minesweeping vessels. MSDF will newly establish surface units composed of these destroyer units and minesweeper units. In addition, MSDF will establish patrol vessel units to enable enhanced steady-state ISR in the waters around Japan. Furthermore, by introducing a test submarine, which the type will be changed from an existing submarine, MSDF will work to achieve greater efficiency in submarine operations and accelerate capability improvement, thereby enhancing persistent ISR posture. In order to effectively conduct underwater ISR and patrols and defense in the waters around Japan, MSDF will continue to take measures necessary to increase the number of submarines. 4. In order to enhance the air defense posture and operate effectively in airspace around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, ASDF will reorganize 8 warning groups and 20 warning squadrons to 28 warning squadrons and establish 1 airborne early warning (AEW) wing as part of air warning and control units, and take necessary measures to establish 1 squadron of fighter aircraft units. ASDF will disband 1 squadron of tactical reconnaissance unit with the retirement of its reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4), and will establish 1 squadron of aerial refueling/transport units to enhance its aerial refueling/transport function. In order to be able to conduct information collection in areas relatively remote from Japan and persistent airborne monitoring during situations with heightened tensions, ASDF will establish 1 squadron of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit. 5. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY 2023 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active- duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY 2023 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY 2018. During the period of the program, SDF will promote initiatives to optimize organizations and missions such as reviewing the existing organizations and missions whose importance has declined and assigning personnel mainly to new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. **III. Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities** 1. Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-Domain Operations (1) Acquiring and Strengthening Capabilities in Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domains (A) Capabilities in Space Domain In order to secure the stable use of space, SDF will build a structure to conduct persistent space monitoring under an appropriate role-sharing with related ministries and agencies by such means as newly establishing space domain mission unit and establishing a space situational awareness (SSA) system and will also newly introduce space-based optical telescopes and SSA laser ranging devices. In order to further improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities, SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C4I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. SDF will also strive to secure redundancy by such means as receiving multiple positioning satellite signals including those of Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and utilizing information gathering satellites (IGS) and commercial satellites including micro ones. Additionally, in order to use these capabilities continuously, SDF will conduct necessary study and research, and newly introduce training devices to study and train responses to the vulnerabilities of Japanese satellites, and devices to grasp the state of electromagnetic interference against Japanese satellites. By this strengthening of the structure for grasping the situation, SDF will build the capability to disrupt C4I of opponents in collaboration with the electromagnetic domain. In this regard, in addition to efforts to establish new job categories and enhance education dedicated to the space domain, SDF will actively leverage civilian technologies and promote to enhance cooperation including the development of human resources, with relevant agencies including the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and with the U.S. and other relevant countries, given that cutting-edge technology and knowhow have been accumulated in these organizations. (B) Capabilities in Cyber Domain SDF aims to persistently ensure sufficient security against cyber attack and acquire capability to disrupt, opponent’s use of cyberspace in the event of attack against Japan. With consideration to enhancing joint functions and efficient resource allocations, SDF will establish the necessary environment by such measures as expanding the structure of cyber defense squadron and other units, enhancing the resiliency of the C4 systems of SDF, strengthening capabilities of information gathering, research and analysis, and developing a practical training environment that can test SDF’s cyber defense capability. In addition, SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest information including cyber-related risks, counter measures and technological trends, through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks, joint exercises and other opportunities with the ally and other parties. As the methods of cyber attack are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, securing personnel with expertise on a continuing basis is essential. SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, increasing learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and conducting personnel management that cultivates expertise. In addition, SDF will strengthen the cyber defense capability by utilizing superior outside expertise. In order to enable a comprehensive response through a whole-of-government approach in cyber domain, MOD/SDF seeks to enhance close coordination with relevant ministries and agencies, etc. by providing knowledge and MOD/SDF personnel on a steady-state basis, and enhance training and exercises. (C) Capabilities in the Electromagnetic Domain MOD/SDF will newly establish specialized sections in the internal bureau and the Joint Staff respectively in order to enhance the function to make policies pertaining to effective and efficient use of electromagnetic spectrum in MOD/SDF as well as to improve coordination with other ministries and agencies. In order to enhance information gathering and analysis capabilities concerning electromagnetic spectrum and develop an information sharing posture, SDF will promote the procurement of radio wave information gathering aircraft and ground-based SIGINT sensor, the upgrade of the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) system, the connection of each SDF service’s systems including the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and the improvement of each SDF service’s data links. In order to neutralize the radar and communications of opponent attempting to invade Japan, SDF will proceed with the procurement of fighters (F-35A) and network electronic warfare devices, and the upgrade of fighters (F-15) and utility aircraft (EP-3 and UP-3D). SDF will also swiftly proceed with studies and R&D aimed at the procurement of standoff electronic warfare aircraft, high-output electronic warfare equipment, high-output microwave equipment and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ammunition. (2) Enhancing Capabilities in Traditional Domains (A) Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains (i) Strengthening a Posture of Persistent ISR In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas at sea and in the air around Japan including vast airspace on the Pacific side, and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, SDF will procure new type of destroyers with enhanced capabilities to respond to a wide range of missions (FFM), submarines, patrol vessels, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH- 60K/K (upgraded version)) and shipborne UAVs, conduct service-extension work on existing ----- destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J and SH-60K) and upgrade the capabilities of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1). In this respect, SDF will strengthen the posture of persistent ISR through increasing the number of the operating days by introducing rational shifts of multiple crews and coordination with patrol vessels to be newly introduced for the new type of destroyers (FFM), and through increasing the opportunities for operation of the submarine fleet on a steady-state basis by introducing the test submarine, which the type has been changed from existing submarines. In addition, SDF will maintain a fully-prepared ISR posture through procuring airborne early warning aircraft (E-2D) and a long-endurance UAV (Global Hawk), upgrading the capabilities of the existing airborne warning and control systems (E-767), development of a new fixed air defense radar, establishing 1 AEW wing as part of air warning and control units as stated in II4, preparing an operating base for mobile air defense radars on the islands on the Pacific side and strengthening over- the-horizon radar capabilities. (ii) Obtaining and Maintaining Air Superiority SDF will strive for the comprehensive enhancement of air defense capability in airspace around Japan including vast air space on the Pacific side. SDF will proceed replacing fighters that are not suitable for modernization (F-15) by increasing the number of fighters (F-35A) and will newly introduce fighters that are capable of short take-off and vertical landing (hereinafter referred to as “STOVL aircraft”) to enhance the flexibility of fighter operations, as the number of air bases that allow for conventional take-off and landing of fighters is limited. In this regard, SDF will refurbish MSDF’s multi-function helicopter carrier destroyers (Izumo class) after studying operation of STOVL aircraft so that the operation where necessary will be possible such as response to air attacks in time of emergency, ISR, training and disaster response, in order to further improve flexibility in fighter operations while ensuring safety of SDF personnel and to improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace. These destroyers shall continue to engage as multi-function destroyers in a wide range of missions after refurbishment, such as the defense of Japan and the response to large- scale disasters. There will be no change in the existing Government opinion concerning equipment that cannot be possessed under the Constitution. In addition, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of modernized fighter aircraft (F-15) including the enhancement of electronic warfare capabilities, mounting stand-off missiles and increasing the number of mounted missiles. Furthermore, SDF will upgrade the capabilities of fighter aircraft (F-2) including the enhancement of network functions. With regard to future fighter, SDF will procure new fighters that are capable of playing a central role in future networked warfare before the retirement of the fighter aircraft (F-2). MOD/SDF will promote necessary research and launch a Japan-led development project at an early timing with the possibility of international collaboration in sight. Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, SDF will continue to improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). In addition, SDF will continue to procure aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-46A) and rescue helicopters (UH-60J). (iii) Obtaining and Maintaining Maritime Superiority In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic by effectively conducting various activities including holding persistent ISR, anti- submarine operations and mine countermeasure operations, SDF will procure equipment such as a new type of destroyers (FFM), conduct service-extension activities on equipment such as existing destroyers, and enhance the capabilities of equipment such as fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1) as stated in (i), and will procure minesweeping/ transport helicopters (MCH-101). In addition, SDF will continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels and amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and will establish the structure for enhancing tactical development and education and training capabilities. Furthermore, SDF will continue to procure surface-to-ship guided missiles and will introduce new surface-to-ship guided missiles and air-to-ship guided missiles with further extended ranges. In addition, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the introduction of long-endurance UAVs to strengthen surveillance capabilities in the water including on the vast Pacific side. Moreover, SDF will strive to steadily enhance C4I capabilities and will deploy unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) and proceed with R&D aiming at further enhancement of capabilities to utilize them for oceanic observation and ISR. (B) Stand-off Defense Capability In order to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan while ensuring safety of SDF personnel, SDF will procure stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM and LRASM), which are capable of responding from the outside of their threat envelopes, and will proceed with R&D on HVGP intended for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles intended for the defense of remote islands and hypersonic weapons. In addition, in order to appropriately leverage advances in military technology, MOD/SDF will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability through measures such as comprehensive R&D of related technology. (C) Comprehensive Air and Missile Defense Capability In order to effectively and efficiently counter increasingly diverse and complex airborne threats such as ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft by optimum means and minimize damage, SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, those for missile defense as well as air defense equipment that each SDF service has separately used, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection on a steady-state basis and to be able to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. In this regard, SDF will strive to standardize and streamline the means for interception that each SDF service possesses including their maintenance and replenishment systems. For reinforcing its multi-layered and persistent defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, SDF will procure its land-based Aegis system (Aegis Ashore), continue to upgrade the capabilities of its existing Aegis- equipped destroyers (DDG) and surface-toair guided missile PATRIOT system as stated in (A) (ii). SDF will also conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture. In order to effectively counter missile attacks, SDF will procure its interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 block IB and block IIA), interceptor missiles with upgraded capabilities (PAC-3MSE), long-range ship-to-air missiles (SM-6) and midrange ground-to-air guided missiles. In order to reinforce the detecting and tracking capabilities for missiles and to unitarily command and control the various equipment that each SDF service possesses, SDF will proceed with initiatives such as upgrading its Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE) and procuring its air defense command and control system (ADCCS), developing its new fixed air defense radar, adding cooperative engagement capability (CEC) to its E-2D, R&D on a network system that enables engage-on-remote launch of weapons by destroyers (DD) (FC network), and research on satellite-mounted dualwave-length infrared sensors and will also study ways to counter future airborne threats. Based on basic role and mission sharing between Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole, Japan will continue to study a potential form of response capability to address the means for missile launch and related facilities and will take necessary measures. In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a missile attack, SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance/response equipment, mobile combat vehicles, transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and UAVs in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities including nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units, and also enhance the ability to respond effectively and efficiently by proceeding with the networking of its troops and strengthening information sharing. In sensitive locations such as areas where many nuclear power plants are located, SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants. (D) Maneuver and Deployment Capability In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale ----- transportation and deployment operations for a wide variety of situations and improve effective deterrence and counter capabilities, SDF will take necessary measures after considering how to command and coordinate the transport capabilities of each SDF service unilaterally from a steadystate including the reinforcement of the transport coordination function of the Joint Staff. SDF will continue to procure transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) and introduce new utility helicopters, and will also promote relevant initiatives in order to obtain the cooperation of related local governments and other entities in promptly deploying GSDF Ospreys (V-22). In developing such aerial transport capability, SDF will take necessary measures after considering the further enhancement of efficiency and effectiveness such as avoiding functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation. In order to strengthen the transport function to remote islands, SDF will newly introduce logistics support vessels (LSV) and landing craft utilities (LCU), and consider new vessels necessary to smoothly implement amphibious and other operations in the future. SDF will also continue to actively utilize ships for which the funds and know- how of the privatesector have been utilized and consider further expansion in order to conduct large-scale transportation efficiently for coordination with the transport capabilities of SDF in light of the current situation in which they are being used effectively in dispatches to disasters and transporting its troops. SDF will equip mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift to its rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) as stated in II- 2, and will establish rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations. In addition to rapid deployment divisions and brigades, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be strengthened by the establishment of 1 amphibious rapid deployment regiment, will conduct persistent steadystate maneuver such as coordinated activities with ships as well as various training and exercises. SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver training for prompt deployment to remote islands. (3) Strengthening Sustainability and Resiliency (A) Securing Continuous Operations In order to be able to operate units continuously at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, SDF will promote measures necessary for securing ammunition and fuel and protecting infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. With regard to securing ammunition, SDF will prioritize to procure anti-aircraft missiles that are necessary to secure air superiority, torpedoes that are necessary to secure maritime superiority, stand-off firepower that is necessary for countering from the outside of their threat envelopes and interceptor missiles for BMD while taking account of the needs of joint operation. With regard to securing fuel, SDF will secure the effective emergency procurement and promote necessary measures such as newly introduction of tankers from the perspective of stabilizing fuel supply during emergencies. In order to minimize damage from various attacks and quickly recover functions, SDF will proceed with initiatives for the dispersion, recovery, and substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations while taking the perspective of protection from electromagnetic pulse attacks into consideration, and will construct a posture regarding patrol and damage recovery based on the perspective of mutual cooperation among each SDF service. In addition, SDF will also proceed with various measures to make it possible for SDF to immediately utilize private airports and ports in contingency situations. With regard to strengthening logistics foundations, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations and proceed with the establishment of the necessary facilities. SDF will also expand some arsenals and make it possible to have them used jointly by each SDF service and will study and take the measures necessary to optimize combat service support including logistics from the perspective of joint operations. SDF will steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases and will also proceed with measures for facilities regarding their deterioration and earthquake resistance. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted. (B) Ensuring the Operational Availability of Equipment In order to swiftly and effectively respond to various situations, MOD/SDF will ensure high operational availability of procured equipment by securing the necessary and sufficient funds for sustainment and maintenance of equipment, expanding the use of umbrella contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding sustainment and maintenance, sharing information on supply data between the public and private sectors, promoting the utilization of Additive Manufacturing (3D printers), which can form complex shapes with speed and precision and promoting the procurement of parts and components from international markets. 2. Priorities in Strengthening Core Elements of Defense Capability (1) Reinforcing Human Resource Base As equipment becomes more advanced and complex and missions become more varied and internationalized against the context of the rapidly shrinking and aging population with declining birth rate, MOD/SDF will strive to secure diverse, high- quality talents from a wider range of people and also promote initiatives on a priority base towards the establishment of an environment that enables all SDF personnel to maintain high morale and continue to fully exercise ability. (A) Enhancement of Recruitment Initiatives In order to steadily secure high-quality human resources into the future within the severe recruiting environment accompanying the rapidly aging population and declining birth rates, MOD/ SDF will proceed with measures towards expanding the recruitment of untenured troops and expanding the source for prospects including university graduates. MOD/SDF will also proceed with a wide range of solicitation measures including the enhancement of recruiting advertisement and recruiting systems and will also strengthen collaboration with local governments and related organizations, etc. Furthermore, in order to increase attractiveness at the point of recruiting, MOD/ SDF will improve living and working environment and strive to improve re-employment support for being rehired as public servants and matriculating at universities after completing tenure. (B) Effective Utilization of Human Resources In order to further increase the proportion of female SDF personnel among total SDF personnel, MOD/SDF will actively hire women, promote women’s participation and proceed with the establishment of the foundations for the education, living and work environment for female SDF personnel. In order to further utilize advanced-age human resources who have plenty of knowledge, skills and experience while keeping strength, MOD/SDF will raise the early retirement age for SDF personnel and promote the expansion of reenrollment and the utilization by units of the skills of retired SDF personnel in SDF fields requiring high levels of expertise. MOD/ SDF will also secure personnel for units that are responsible for fields that require high levels of expertise by effectively utilizing human resources in the private sector. (C) Improving Living and Work Environment As the duration of the activities of the units becomes longer in response to the severe security environment, MOD/SDF will strive to improve the living and work environment, so that all the troop members who undertake the noble mission of protecting life and peaceful livelihood of Japanese national will be able to fully exercise their capabilities and fulfill their missions with high morale, by such means as steadily renewing aged daily life/workplace fixtures, steadily securing the necessary quantities of daily necessities and reducing the number of days on offshore duty per onboard person through the introduction of shifts by multiple crews, in addition to accelerating the securing and reconstruction of the necessary barracks and housing and proceeding with measures against aging and earthquake resistance for facilities. (D) Promotion of Work Style Reforms As the number of SDF personnel under time and mobility constraints because of child rearing and nursing care increases due to the consequence of major changes in the social structure, MOD/SDF will promote work style reform at MOD/SDF such as correcting long working hours and promoting the use of holidays in order to ensure proper work-life balance so that all SDF personnel will be able to fully exercise their ability and play prominent roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will proceed with initiatives such as establishing workplace nurseries, and ----- will also promote measures supporting families of military personnel such as providing temporary care for children of SDF personnel who must show up at the workplace for emergency operation, while strengthening our collaboration with local governments and other entities. (E) Enhancing Education At each SDF service and the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDAJ), MOD/SDF will strive to enhance the content and organizational structure of the education and training, including the academic knowledge and international sensibilities necessary to nurture broad perspectives concerning security. In addition, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering whether adequate education and research regarding joint operations is possible with the existing organizations, in order to enhance the capabilities and the unity of the SDF and promote cross-sectoral operations, and strive to strengthen education concerning the organizational management capabilities of MOD/SDF. In order to further promote mutual reinforcement between each SDF service, MOD/SDF will strive to standardize the curriculum and will utilize cutting-edge technology in order to promote effective and efficient education. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strive to build up the network of students from overseas who graduated from NDAJ as a mean of support for strengthening defense cooperation and exchanges. In order to steadily implement education and training, MOD/SDF will take necessary measures after considering the procurement of new primary trainer aircraft as the successor to the existing primary trainer aircraft (T-7). (F) Improving Treatment and Re-Employment Support To enable SDF personnel to fulfill their missions with high moral and pride, MOD/SDF will promote improving treatment through measures concerning honors and privileges including the enhancement of the defensive meritorious badges and improving conditions including salaries that reflects the special nature of the missions and working environment and will strive to enhance welfare benefits including family support. In view of the fact that it is the responsibility of the Government to secure the livelihood of SDF personnel under the mandatory early retirement system, MOD/SDF will strive to further improve re-employment support by such means as promoting the further utilization of retired SDF personnel in the disaster prevention-related departments of local governments and related ministries and agencies while strengthening collaboration with local governments and related organizations from the perspective of utilizing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel in addition to expanding vocational training subjects and support for step-bystep acquisition of qualifications. (G) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, MOD/ SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broader areas and opportunities. In order to enhance the fulfillment of the ranks of SDF reserves, MOD/ SDF will also increase the number of enrollees as reserve candidates who are drawn from people without experience as SDF personnel, and promote the appointment of SDF reserves who are former reserve candidates as reserve ready personnel. Furthermore, in order to make it easier for SDF reserves to respond to training summons, MOD/SDF will undertake the strengthening of the foundations for education and training and the revision of the content of the training, and will implement measures to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the employers. (2) Reviewing Equipment Structure MOD/SDF will examine the existing equipment structure and strengthen the functions of the Joint Staff in order to build an effective and rational equipment structure from a joint operation perspective. MOD/SDF will also develop equipment with multiple functional variants, optimize and standardize specifications of equipment, jointly procure equipment commonly used across SDF services, reduce types of aircraft, suspend the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, and review or discontinue projects of low cost-effectiveness. In order to maximize defense capability by effectively utilizing the limited human resources to the utmost, MOD/SDF will actively promote initiatives towards automation through such means as the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) to data processing and decision makings regarding unit operation, the procurement of UAVs and R&D of unmanned surface vehicles (USV) and UUVs. MOD/SDF will also actively promote initiatives to save manpower through such means as streamlining in design of new types of destroyers (FFM) and submarines and use of remote control for radar sites and other equipment. (3) Reinforcing Technology Base In order to ensure technological superiority in strategically important areas of equipment and technology by making focused investments in important technologies including artificial intelligence and other potentially game-changing technologies, MOD/SDF will revise Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook and newly formulate R&D visions on technologies that will be important for future joint operation, presenting the future direction of medium to long-term research and development from a strategic perspective. In order to significantly shorten R&D timelines by streamlining its process, MOD/SDF will adopt new methods such as block approach and modularization for R&D of HVGP for the defense of remote islands, new surface-to-ship missiles for the defense of remote islands, UUVs and hypersonic weapons. MOD/SDF will also provide the capabilities of future equipment promptly through analysis of alternatives by the technological demonstration at the initial stage of R&D. MOD/SDF will work actively to leverage potentially dualuse, advanced commercial technologies through such efforts as: technology exchange with relevant domestic and overseas entities; enhanced collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies; and use of the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” program. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strengthen and expand cooperation with the countries who are making large-scale investments in game-changing technologies such as the U.S., and promote mutually complementary international joint R&D. MOD/SDF will reinforce its structure aimed at early discovery of innovative, emerging technologies and fostering thereof by utilizing and creating think tanks that survey and analyze latest foreign and domestic technological trends. (4) Optimizing Equipment Procurement In order to further promote effective and efficient equipment procurement, MOD/SDF will enhance the effectiveness and flexibility of project management throughout equipment lifecycles. To this end, MOD/SDF will take various initiatives including undertakings that contribute to cost reduction at mass production stage as a requirement at development stage, incorporating successful cases in the civilian sector to the manufacture of defense equipment, actively adopting contracting methods such as the competitive bidding method that contribute to the utilization of private sector knowledge and expertise and tightening cost controls. In this regard, MOD/SDF will expand the items subject to project management and strive to adjust the standards for the specifications and the review of project plans with consideration of life cycle costs, and apply them. Regarding the cost estimation of equipment without market prices, MOD/SDF will undertake more appropriate costs calculation by making the calculation of the processing costs required for the manufacture more precise and appropriate, and will also conduct the procurement of information systems at appropriate price levels. To implement these initiatives effectively, MOD/SDF will actively develop and allocate human resources by utilizing human resources with specialized expertise, skills and experiences in the private sector, and will also strive to construct the cost-database on component level of equipment based on the information compiled from the cost estimates/contract records. MOD/SDF will actively use systematic acquisition methods including long-term contracts which facilitate efficient procurement, and streamline equipment sustainment and maintenance including the expansion of PBL and other umbrella contracts. MOD/SDF will also facilitate competition among domestic and foreign companies regarding domestically procured equipment with low cost effectiveness by considering price reduction through imports and considering the deduction of unique specifications for domestic use. Furthermore, in light of the growing importance of the management of price, delivery time and other matters in procurement through Foreign Military Sales (hereinafter referred to as “FMS procurement”), MOD/SDF will collaborate closely with the U.S. Government and other organizations through JapanU.S. consultations and promote initiatives towards the streamlining of FMS procurement, such as striving to acquire equipment in coordination with U.S. forces regarding the timing of procurement and specifications, and to manage the status of implementation in a timely and appropriate manner. (5) Strengthening Defense Industrial Base In order to strengthen the resilience of Japan’s defense industry base, which is an essential foundation for the production, operation, and maintenance of defense equipment, Government will actively take measures such as introducing the competition principle to Japan’s defense industry, which is in a poor competitive environment, incorporating the knowledge, expertise, and technology of the ----- civilian sector, and strengthen the supply chains of equipment. As part of these measures, MOD/SDF will review the contracting system with the aim of creating a competitive environment, including the introduction of the enterprise evaluation system that assesses how much a contractor company tries to contribute to strengthening of defense industry. MOD/SDF will also encourage the spin-off from defense technology to civilian purposes and the spin-on from cutting-edge technologies in the civilian sector to the defense industry including innovative manufacturing technologies. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will strengthen risk management regarding the vulnerability of supply chains of equipment through research on the supply chains and also promote the participation of Japan’s defense industry in the sustainment and maintenance of imported equipment. The government as a whole will promote appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which permits transfer of defense equipment in cases such as the transfer contributes to Japan’s security. In order to do so, based on progress and other elements in defense cooperation with our partners, the Government will make necessary improvements in implementation or related rules, promote public-private partnership in information gathering and dissemination, strengthen technology control and intellectual property management in order to prevent leakage of key defense equipment-related technologies on the occasion of overseas transfer and develop defense equipment with an eye on overseas transfer. MOD/SDF will also strengthen information security measures that will be necessary for Japan’s defense industry to participate in international businesses, and develop an information security guidebook for Japan’s defense industry. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will actively promote international joint development and production with other countries utilizing Japan’s technological strengths. In addition, MOD/SDF will undertake measures such as making the equipment manufacturing process and thorough cost reduction and will strive to make Japan’s defense industry base efficient and resilient while foreseeing possible realignment and consolidation of businesses that may occur as a result of these measures. (6) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities In order to be able to provide timely and effective intelligence support to policy decision and SDF operations, MOD/SDF will promote initiatives to comprehensively enhance intelligence capabilities at all stages of intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing of information. MOD/SDF will drastically strengthen information gathering and analysis capabilities so that MOD/SDF will be fully capable of meeting various intelligence requirements including those related to new domains. This will be conducted by strengthening gathering postures for SIGINT and IMINT through establishing and enhancing capabilities of information collection facilities, utilizing intelligence gathering satellites and commercial satellites, and diversifying means for information collection through new equipment such as long-endurance UAVs. Furthermore, MOD/ SDF will also strengthen the gathering posture of HUMINT through enhancing its defense attaché system, reinforce the gathering posture of OSINT and expand its cooperation with allied countries. In this regard, MOD/SDF will strive to achieve its even more effective and efficient posture by proactively utilizing the latest information processing technology, and will also promote all-source analysis, which fuses a wide variety of information sources together. MOD/SDF will also strive to utilize information effectively by successfully developing and connecting systems that will promote information sharing. In order to respond appropriately to increasingly diversified intelligence requirements, MOD/SDF will promote securing and training of highly capable personnel handling information collection and analysis. Moreover, MOD/SDF will take steady measures in various directions including recruitment, education, training, and personnel allocation to strengthen comprehensive information collection and analysis capabilities. With regard to information security, MOD/SDF will coordinate with relevant offices to make every effort by such means as education in ensuring information sharing on a need-to-know basis, and in taking preventative measures against information leakage. Also, MOD/SDF will strengthen counter-intelligence capability within MOD/SDF by promoting collaboration with relevant organizations. 3. Large-Scale Disasters In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond to it by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units based on a joint operational approach, and also will promote measures to strengthen the response posture including the deployment of drones for disasters, a helicopter satellite communication system (HeliSat), lifesaving systems, and emergency power sources. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, local governments and the private sector, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF’s disaster and deployment operations is affected. 4. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance (1) Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation In order to ensure Japan’s national security and to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further strengthen Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” while strengthening Japan’s own capability as a premise for these efforts. Japan will continue to promote cooperation in space and cyber domains, comprehensive air and missile defense, joint training and exercises and joint ISR activities. Japan will also further deepen Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in various areas such as formulation and renewal of bilateral plans and the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. In order for Japan and the U.S. to be able to fully leverage their capabilities during bilateral activities, Japan will advance efforts for standardization of defense equipment that contributes to Japan-U.S. bilateral activities, sharing of various networks, building capacity for in-country maintenance of U.S.-made equipment and initiatives for intelligence/information security. To efficiently improve Japanese and the U.S. capabilities, while facilitating common understanding of respective priorities in defense capability enhancement, promote measures such as effective acquisition of advanced U.S equipment through optimized FMS procurement and Japan-U.S. joint R&D. Furthermore, Japan will promote cooperation on joint/shared use of SDF and U.S force facilities, and efforts for improved resiliency. (2) Steady Implementation of Measures Concerning Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan In order to make the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily secure Host Nation Support (HNS). 5. Strengthening Security Cooperation In line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will further promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges based on the understanding that realizing a security environment that is desirable for Japan is an extremely important and necessary undertaking that contributes to Japan’s defense itself and also relates to its basic fundamentals. In particular, in addition to high-level exchanges, policy dialogues and exchanges among military branches, in order to improve interoperability with relevant countries and to strengthen Japan’s presence, Japan will appropriately combine and strategically implement specific initiatives such as joint training and exercises, defense equipment and technology cooperation and capacity building assistance, while taking characteristics and situation specific to each region and country into account. Based on this significance of defense cooperation and exchanges, in order to further collaborate mutually and conduct specific and thoroughgoing initiatives, Japan will proceed with the improvement of operation procedures, development of organizational systems and review of systems, and will further reflect needs concerning defense cooperation and exchanges in SDF operations. Japan will also strive to collaborate with relevant ministries and agencies as well as with other countries, non- governmental organizations and the private sector, and strategically disseminate information on Japan’s initiatives. In this regard, Japan will focus on the following in particular. (1) Holding Joint Training and Exercises Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises based on their significance as defense cooperation and exchanges. Through this, Japan will represents the will and ability to create a desirable security environment and will also seek to improve interoperability with relevant countries and strengthen cooperative relationships with other countries. (2) Equipment and Technology Cooperation Japan will strengthen initiatives for equipment and technology cooperation including overseas transfers of defense equipment, and strive to enhance our partners’ military capabilities and maintain/strengthen medium and long-term relationships with those countries. In particular, Japan will effectively promote these initiatives by combining other efforts such as training and exercises and capacity building assistance as necessary. (3) Capacity Building Assistance Japan will work with countries of the Indo-Pacific region to support advance capacity development efforts based on their voluntary ownership, so as to enable counterpart military organizations to contribute further towards international peace and regional stability, thus creating security environment that is desirable to Japan. In this regard, Japan will effectively utilize knowledge ----- and expertise accumulated by SDF, coordinate thoroughly with diplomatic policy, and coordinate with partner countries such as the U.S. and Australia undertaking capacity building assistance, so as to maximize results by combing various measures efficiently. (4) Maritime Security Based on the understanding that open and stable seas are a foundation of the peace and prosperity of Japan as a maritime nation and in line with the vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japan will promote initiatives such as joint training and exercises, equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, information sharing and visits by ships and aircraft as warranted by the occasion, with foreign countries that share the understanding of maritime security. Through these, Japan will show the will and ability to stabilize maritime order in an active and visible manner. (5) International Peace Cooperation Activities In line with the Legislation for Peace and Security, Japan will actively promote international peace cooperation activities, while giving comprehensive consideration to such factors as purposes of mission, situation in host country, and political and economic relations between Japan and host country. In particular, Japan will actively promote activities such as dispatch of embedded personnel to mission headquarters, dissemination of United Nations (UN) military engineer unit manuals and capacity building assistance in Japan’s field of expertise by making good use of accumulated experiences. While Japan will also proceed with education and training that match missions conducted on the basis of the Legislation for Peace and Security, GSDF will take the necessary measures towards newly establishing an International Activities Unit with high-level emergency response capabilities and high-level technology in areas such as facilities and the operation of UAVs by unifying the Central Readiness Regiment and the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit. The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds. Regarding SDF operation facility in the Republic of Djibouti, which is used for anti-piracy efforts, Japan will work towards stable, long-term use of the facility for regional security cooperation and other activities. (6) Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation In cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will promote non-proliferation efforts regarding: weapons of mass destruction and missiles which can serve as their delivery means; and goods and sensitive technologies of potential military use. Leveraging SDF’s knowledge and human resources, Japan will engage in various activities related to arms control and disarmament undertaken by the UN and other bodies, including the discussion on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). 6. Elements Supporting Defense Capability (1) Training and Exercises To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises are to be conducted in a tailored and visible way while fully grasping the environment of the surroundings of the training areas and making absolutely sure that safety is secured. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, SDF will expand the establishment and utilization of the training areas in Hokkaido and elsewhere in Japan and conduct effective training and exercises. SDF will also facilitate to expand joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities and areas with SDF while accounting for relations with local communities. Furthermore, SDF will facilitate the use of places other than SDF facilities or U.S. Forces facilities and areas and the utilization of excellent training environments overseas such as the U.S. and Australia, and introduce simulators actively. SDF will also strive to further enhance amphibious operation capability by the implementation of training by GSDF and MSDF in collaboration with U.S. Marines, SDF will strive to enhance the effectiveness of the swift and continuous deployment of units and strengthen their presence on a steady-state basis by organically coordinating such training and exercises that utilize training environments in Japan and abroad. Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-ofgovernment approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police, firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. SDF will also actively utilize the opportunities presented by the joint training and exercises of SDF and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises as a way not only for considering and verifying plans for the actual operations of SDF, but also for actively considering and verifying comprehensive issues including civil protection. (2) Medical Care SDF will enhance its medical functions to keep SDF personnel’s vitality and enhance their ability to deal with various situations and engage in a diverse range of missions at home and abroad. In order to respond to various situations, SDF will strive to enhance the capacity to rapidly deploy medical bases and conduct Damage Control Surgery (DCS) to stabilize the symptoms of patients, and the capacity to manage patients being sent back as part of strengthening the system to seamlessly cover the entire stretch between the frontline and final medical evacuation destinations including the perspective of joint operations. In this regard, SDF will establish a system to jointly possess patient information from the frontline to final destinations. SDF will also strive to standardize medical supplies for the sake of interoperability and to stockpile necessary supplies. Furthermore, in order to transport patients safely, SDF will take necessary measures to introduce armored ambulances. Taking conditions and characteristics of each region into account, SDF will focus on strengthening medical functions of SDF in Japan’s southwestern region. In order to conduct the control and coordination regarding medical operations of SDF on a steady-state basis, SDF will strive to strengthen the organization of the Joint Staff. SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care regime through further endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into medical hubs with enhanced functions. Furthermore, SDF will proceed to improve the management of the National Defense Medical College, enhance its research functions and strive to secure high-quality talents, as well as striving to enrich the clinical experience of medical officers to better secure the number of medical officers, and promoting the appointment of SDF Reserve Personnel (physicians). In addition, MOD/SDF will proceed with the establishment of hygienic education and training foundations common to each SDF service that are necessary to improve medical care capabilities for combat injuries and the requisite posture for various international cooperation including capacity building assistance. (3) Collaboration with Local Communities MOD/SDF will constantly and actively engage in public relations activities regarding defense policies and activities. Upon fielding units and equipment of SDF or U.S. Forces in Japan and conducting training and exercises, MOD/SDF will make careful, detailed coordination to meet desires and conditions of local communities, while sufficiently fulfilling accountability. At the same time, MOD/ SDF will continue to promote various impact alleviation measures including sound insulation projects at residences. MOD/SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations including local governments, police and fire departments in order to enable SDF to swiftly and securely conduct its activities in response to various situations. In certain regions, presence of SDF units makes substantial contributions to maintenance and revitalization of local communities. There are also cases where SDF’s emergency patient transport is supporting community medicine. In light of this, MOD/SDF will give due considerations to local conditions and characteristics upon reorganization of operation units as well as placement of SDF garrisons and bases. MOD/SDF will also promote various measures that contribute to the local community by such means as striving to secure opportunities for local small and medium enterprises to receive contract orders based on the contracting policy of the nation, etc., concerning small and medium enterprises while also being mindful of efficiency. (4) Intellectual Base MOD/SDF will contribute to the promotion of national security education through such means as dispatching instructors to educational institutions and holding public symposiums. In addition, MOD/SDF will provide efficient and highly trustworthy information to increase public access to the research results regarding security. Moreover, MOD/SDF will promote various measures to improve the capabilities for providing information including that in foreign languages, the further utilization of increasingly diversified social networks, and MOD/SDF will also expand networks and institutional collaboration with research and education organizations, and think-tanks in Japan and abroad in order to further strengthen the research system of MOD/SDF with the National Institute for Defense Studies playing central roles. Furthermore, MOD/SDF will contribute to policy development through timely and appropriate supply of high-quality research results, based upon expertise and research capabilities, to the policy development departments. ----- **IV. Quantities of Major Procurement** The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. **V. Expenditures** 1. The expenditure target for the implementation of the defense capability build-up described in this program amount to approximately ¥27,470 billion in FY 2018 prices. 2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, substantive funds will be secured by means of thoroughgoing greater efficiency and streamlining in defense force development, suspending the use of equipment whose importance has decreased, reviewing or discontinuing projects of low cost-effectiveness, optimizing equipment procurement through cost management/ suppression and long-term contracts and securing other revenue. The annual defense budgets target for the implementation of this program is expected to be around approximately ¥25,500 billion over the next five years. In order to adapt to increasingly rapid changes in the security environment, Japan must strengthen its defense capability at speeds that are fundamentally different from the past. Moreover, to achieve rapid procurement of defense equipment, Japan must pursue flexible and swift project management, and the budgetary process for each fiscal year which will be conducted taking into account the economic and fiscal conditions among other budgets. 3. The amount of expenses based on contracts (material expenses) to be newly concluded to implement this program will be allocated within the ceiling of approximately ¥17,170 billion in FY 2018 prices (excluding the amount corresponding to payments outside of the program period for contracts that contribute to improving project efficiency such as maintenance), and the future obligation shall be managed appropriately. 4. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions. **VI. Other** While maintaining U.S. Forces deterrence, Japan will steadily implement specific measures stipulated in “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” and other SCC documents and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa. |Annex Table|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |Ground Self- Defense Force|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles New Utility Helicopters Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Land-based Aegis Systems (Aegis Ashore) Tanks Howitzers|134 29 34 3 3 companies 5 companies 2 30 40| |Maritime Self-Defense Force|Destroyers Submarines Patrol Vessels Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K/K (Upgraded Capability)) Ship-Borne Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Minesweeping and Transport Helicopters (MCH-101)|10 5 4 4 23 (approx. 66,000t) 12 13 3 1| |Air Self-Defense Force|Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft (E-2D) Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Upgrade (F-15) Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft (KC-46A) Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Global Hawk)|9 45 20 4 5 4 groups (16 fire squadrons) 1| 1. Japan will basically pursue the establishment of 75 Patrol Helicopters and 20 Ship-borne UAVs at the completion of the “NDPG for FY 2019 and beyond”, but those exact numbers will be considered during the period of the “MTDP (FY 2019 - FY 2023).” 2. 18 aircraft out of 45 aircraft of Fighters (F-35A) would have STOVLs. **Reference 8 Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of March 31, 2019)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Type|Recoilless Guns|Mortars|Field Artillery|Rocket Launchers, etc.|Anti-aircraft Machine Guns|Tanks|Armored Vehicles| |Approximate number owned|2,600|1,100|400|60|50|560|990| Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns. ----- **Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|(As of March 31, 2019)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Service|Type|Model|Use|Number Owned|Maximum Speed (knots)|Crew (number)|Full Length (m)|Full Width (m)|Engine| |GSDF|Fixed- wing|LR-2|Liaison and Reconnaissance|7|300|2 (8)|14|18|Turboprop, twin-engines| ||Rotary- wing|AH-1S|Anti-tank|55|120|2|14|3|Turboshaft| |||OH-6D|Observation|26|140|1 (3)|7|2|Turboshaft| |||OH-1|Observation|37|140|2|12|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-1J|Utility|127|120|2 (11)|13|3|Turboshaft| |||CH-47J／JA|Transport|55|150／140|3 (55)|16|4／5|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-60JA|Utility|40|150|2 (12)|16|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||AH-64D|Combat|12|150|2|18|6|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |MSDF|Fixed- wing|P-1|Patrol|19|450|11|38|35|Turbofan, quadruple-engine| |||P-3C|Patrol|55|400|11|36|30|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| ||Rotary- wing|SH-60J|Patrol|24|150|4|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||SH-60K|Patrol|58|140|4|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||MCH-101|Minesweeping and transport|10|150|4|23|19|Turboshaft, triple engine| |ASDF|Fixed- wing|F-15J／DJ|Fighter|201|mach 2.5|1／2|19|13|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||F-4EJ/EJ (improved)|Fighter|34|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||F-2A／B|Fighter|91|mach 2|1／2|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine| |||F-35A|Fighter|12|mach 1.6|1|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine| |||RF-4E／EJ|Reconnaissance|10|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||C-1|Transport|13|mach 0.76|5 (60)|29|31|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||C-2|Transport|10|mach 0.82|2～5 (110)|44|44|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||C-130H|Transport|14|320|6 (92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple-engine| |||KC-767|Aerial refueling transport|4|mach 0.84|4～8 (200)|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||KC-130H|Aerial refueling transport|2|320|6 (92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple-engine| |||E-2C|Early warning|13|320|5|18|25|Turboprop, twin-engines| |||E-2D|Early warning|1|350|5|18|25|Turboprop, twin-engines| |||E-767|Early warning and control|4|450|20|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| ||Rotary- wing|CH-47J|Transport|15|160|5 (48)|16|5|Turboshaft, twin-engines| Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported. 2. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2019. **Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2019)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|Destroyer|Submarine|Mine Warfare Ship|Patrol Combatant Craft|Amphibious Ship|Auxiliary Ship| |Number (vessels)|48|19|24|6|11|29| |Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)|263|54|23|1|28|127| Notes: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. ----- **Reference 11 Pattern of Defense Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |Item Fiscal Year|GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)|Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|General Annual Expenditures (C)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Defense- Related Expenditures (D)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)|Ratio of Defense- related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1955|75,590|9,915|△0.8|8,107|△2.8|1,349|△3.3|1.78|13.61|16.6| |1965|281,600|36,581|12.4|29,198|12.8|3,014|9.6|1.07|8.24|10.3| |1975|1,585,000|212,888|24.5|158,408|23.2|13,273|21.4|0.84|6.23|8.4| |1985|3,146,000|524,996|3.7|325,854|△0.0|31,371|6.9|0.997|5.98|9.6| |1995|4,928,000|709,871|△2.9|421,417|3.1|47,236|0.9|0.959|6.65|11.2| |2010|4,752,000|922,992|4.2|534,542|3.3|46,826 47,903|△ 0.4 0.3|0.985 1.008|5.07 5.19|8.76 8.96| |2011|4,838,000|924,116|0.1|540,780|1.2|46,625 47,752|△ 0.4 △ 0.3|0.964 0.987|5.05 5.17|8.62 8.83| |2012|4,796,000|903,339|△2.2|512,450|△5.2|46,453 47,138|△ 0.4 △ 1.3|0.969 0.983|5.14 5.22|9.06 9.20| |2013|4,877,000|926,115|2.5|527,311|2.9|46,804 47,538|0.8 0.8|0.960 0.975|5.05 5.13|8.88 9.02| |2014|5,004,000|958,823|3.5|564,697|7.1|47,838 48,848|2.2 2.8|0.956 0.976|4.99 5.09|8.47 8.65| |2015|5,049,000|963,420|0.5|573,555|1.6|48,221 49,801|0.8 2.0|0.955 0.986|5.01 5.17|8.41 8.68| |2016|5,188,000|967,218|0.4|578,286|0.8|48,607 50,541|0.8 1.5|0.937 0.974|5.03 5.23|8.41 8.74| |2017|5,535,000|974,547|0.8|583,591|0.9|48,996 51,251|0.8 1.4|0.885 0.926|5.03 5.26|8.40 8.78| |2018|5,643,000|977,128|0.3|588,958|0.9|49,388 51,911|0.8 1.3|0.875 0.920|5.05 5.31|8.39 8.81| |2019|5,661,000|994,285 （1,014,564）|1.8|599,352 （619,639）|1.8|50,070 52,574|1.4 1.3|0.884 0.929|5.04 5.18|8.35 8.48| Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates. 2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY2010 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 25.6 billion yen in FY2019), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 167.9 billion yen in FY2019), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, and 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, and 6.2 billion yen in FY2019) as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/reduction and national resilience (50.8 billion yen in FY2019), while the lower figures include them. 3. Annual expenditure on general account and the lower figures in parentheses in the general annual expenditures column for FY2019 include temporary/special measures. ----- **Reference 12 Changes in Composition of Defense Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |FFYY IItteemm|2015|Col3|2016|Col5|2017|Col7|2018|Col9|2019|Col11| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio| |Personnel and provisions|21,121|43.8 42.4|21,473|44.2 42.5|21,662|44.2 42.3|21,850|44.2 42.1|21,831|43.6 41.5| |Materials|27,100 28,680|56.2 57.6|27,135 29,069|55.8 57.5|27,334 29,589|55.8 57.7|27,538 30,061|55.8 57.9|28,239 30,744|56.4 58.5| |Equipment acquisition|7,404|15.4 14.9|7,659|15.8 15.2|8,406|17.2 16.4|8,191|16.6 15.8|8,329|16.6 15.8| |R&D|1,411|2.9 2.8|1,055|2.2 2.1|1,217|2.5 2.4|1,034|2.1 2.0|1,283|2.6 2.4| |Facility improvement|1,293|2.7 2.6|1,461|3.0 2.9|1,571|3.2 3.1|1,752|3.5 3.4|1,407|2.8 2.7| |Maintenance|11,808|24.5 23.7|11,707|24.1 23.2|10,888|22.2 21.2|11,343|23.0 21.9|12,027|24.0 22.9| |Base countermeasures|4,425|9.2 8.9|4,509|9.3 8.9|4,529|9.2 8.8|4,449|9.0 8.6|4,470|8.9 8.5| |The cost for SACO-related projects|46|0.1|28|0.1|28|0.1|51|0.1|256|0.5| |U.S. Forces realignment- related expenses (mitigation of the impact on local communities)|1,426|2.9|1,766|3.5|2,011|3.9|2,161|4.2|1,679|3.2| |Introduction of government aircraft|108|0|140|0.3|216|0.4|312|0.6|62|0.1| |National resilience-related expenses|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|－|508|1.0| |Others|758|1.6 1.5|744|1.5 1.5|723|1.5 1.4|768|1.6 1.5|723|1.4 1.4| |Total|48,221 49,801|100|48,607 50,541|100|48,996 51,251|100|49,388 51,911|100|50,070 52,574|100| Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures. 2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships. 3. R&D expenses include those of equipment. 4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfi elds and barracks. 5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training. 6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ. 7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. 8. The upper fi gures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, 2.8 billion yen in FY2017, 5.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 25.6 billion yen in FY2019), the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities; 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, 201.1 billion yen in FY2017, 216.1 billion yen in FY2018, and 167.9 billion yen in FY2019), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, 21.6 billion yen in FY2017, 31.2 billion yen in FY2018, and 6.2 billion yen in FY2019), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/ reduction and national resilience, while the lower fi gures include them. ----- **Reference 13 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries** |FY Country|2015|2016|2017|2018|2019| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan (100 million yen)|48,221 49,801 0.8% 2.0%|48,607 50,541 0.8% 1.5%|48,996 51,251 0.8% 1.4%|49,388 51,911 0.8％. 1.3%|50,070 52,574 1.4% 1.3%| |U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)|562,499 △2.7％|565,370 0.5%|568,896 0.6%|600,714 5.6%|652,229 8.6%| |China (100 million yuan)|8,896 10.1%|9,544 7.6%|10,444 7.1%|11,070 8.3%|11,899 7.5%| |Russia (100 million RR)|31,814 28.3%|37,753 18.7%|28,523 △24.4％|28,270 △0.9%|31,134 10.1%| |Republic of Korea (100 million won)|374,560 4.9%|387,995 3.6%|403,347 4.0%|431,581 7.0%|466,971 8.2%| |Australia (1 million Australian dollar)|32,695 11.6%|32,882 0.6%|35,191 7.0%|36,231 3.0%|38,562 6.4%| |U.K. (1 million GBP)|35,200 2.0%|35,000 △0.6％|35,500 1.4%|36,000 1.4%|37,800 5.0%| |France (1 million euro)|36,791 △5.5％|39,939 8.6%|40,841 2.3%|42,742 4.7%|― ―| |Germany (1 million euro)|32,974 1.7%|34,288 4.0%|37,005 7.9%|38,520 4.1%|43,228 12.2%| Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others. 2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year. 3. In Japan, the fi gures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (4.6 billion yen for FY2015, 2.8 billion yen for FY2016, 2.8 billion yen for FY2017, 5.1 billion yen for FY2018, and 25.6 billion yen for FY2019), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment (the portion allocated for mitigating the impact on local communities) (142.6 billion yen for FY2015, 176.6 billion yen for FY2016, 201.1 billion yen for FY2017, 216.1 billion yen for FY2018, and 167.9 billion yen for FY2019), expenses related to the introduction of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen for FY2015, 14.0 billion yen for FY2016, 21.6 billion yen for FY2017, 31.2 billion yen for FY2018, and 6.2 billion yen for FY2019), as well as expenses for the three-year emergency measures for disaster prevention/ reduction and national resilience (50.8 billion yen for FY2019), while the fi gures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them. 4. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defi ned by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2019 are estimated values. 5. The fi gures for China are based on the initial budget in the Finance Budget Report to the National People’s Congress (since FY2015, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released; however, for FY2015 and FY2017, the fi gures are the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure as it was calculable.) The rate of growth over the previous year was calculated by comparing with the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure. However, for FY2015, the rate was calculated by comparing with the defense expenditure in the central government expenditure as it had been released in the previous year. The defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure for FY2015 and FY2017 was 886.9 billion yuan and 1.0226 billion yuan, respectively. 6. Russia’s defense expenditure is based on the FY2015-2018 expenditures and the FY2019 budget amount in the Information on Excecution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal Treasury (initial). 7. The fi gures for the Republic of Korea are based on the initial budget released on its Ministry of National Defense website. 8. The fi gures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence. 9. The fi gures for the United Kingdom are based on the initial budget in the budget message. 10. The fi gures for France are based on the initial budget in “Annuaire Statistique de la Defense.” The defense expenditure for FY2019 has not been released as of June 2019. 11. The fi gures for Germany are based on the initial budget released on its Federal Ministry of Defense website. ----- **Reference 14 Outline of Cabinet Decision and Legislation Development** |Items of the Cabinet Decision|Outline|Legislation Development| |---|---|---| |1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack|• Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations. • The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.|* Acceleration of procedures to issue orders for public security operations/maritime security operations * Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces)| |2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community|• So-called Logistics Support and “Integration with the Use of Force” (*1) ➢ The Government is of the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “Integration with the use of force” of that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international community. ➢ Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. ➢ Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes in the situation. • Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent requests) and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as police-like activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with the consent from the territorial State. ➢ As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary. ➢ When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. ➢ The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained and whether the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc., based on deliberations, etc., at the National Security Council.|* The Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations That Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan), Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Act, Enactment of the International Peace Support Act * Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act, revision of the Self- Defense Forces Law (Rescue of measures for Japanese nationals overseas)| |3. Measures for Self- Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution|• The Government understands that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. • The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under international law, a basis on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes that which is triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, it is permitted under the Constitution only when it is taken as a measure for self- defense which is inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. • The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.|* Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law (The provision concerning defense operations) etc.| Notes: 1. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area,” etc., have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “integration with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“integration with the use of force”) by other countries. 2. Use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of the execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution if such use of weapons is directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.” **Reference 15 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces** |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)|(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan’s survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required|m Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self- defense) m Maintenance of public order (same asfor public security operation)1 m Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, civil protection, etc.)1| |Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)|When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)1 (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)|m Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeor body or other personnel on duty| ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act)|When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation|(1) Authorized by Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services (2) Consent of the Diet: not required for supplies; required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) for services2 (3) Cabinet decision: not required for supplies; required (approval of the Prime Minister) for services|m Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act m Provision of services as a related measure m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeor body or other personnel on duty| |Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)|When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)|m Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law m Partial application of the Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.)3 m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) m Use of weapons| |Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)|When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required|m Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) m Use of weapons m Control over the Japan Coast Guard| |Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)|When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission|m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeand body or other personnel on duty| |Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)|When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission|❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons| |Guarding operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81-2)|When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor|❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control) ❍ Use of weapons| |Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)|When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister; when the response is for a submerged submarine, approval of the Prime Minister is not subject to Cabinet decision)|❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons| |Counter-piracy operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-2 and Anti-Piracy Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister|❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons| |Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3)|When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are fyling toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory from the damage caused by the missiles|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister|❍ Use of weapons| |Disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83)|When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters4|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)|❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)| |Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-2)|When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large- Scale Earthquakes)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)|m Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) m Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)| |Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-3)|When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)|m Same as in disaster relief dispatch| ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Action against violation of territorial airspace (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84)|When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required|m The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.)5| |Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2)||(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required|m Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea| |Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3)|Emergency situations overseas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to conduct rescue measures such as guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body|m Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty, and to execute duties| |Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4)|Natural disasters, unrest, and other emergency situations overseas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: as necessary (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened|m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeor body or other personnel on duty| |Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations that will have an important infulence on Japan’s peace and security|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister for supplies; Minister of Defense for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)|m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeor body or other personnel on duty| |Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Support Act, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister-for supplies; Minister of Defense-for services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan) m Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty|m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeor body or other personnel on duty| |International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Disaster Relief Law)|In the case that a large scale disaster has happened or is about to happen overseas, especially in developing countries/areas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs|| |International peace cooperation activities (Primary operations of peacekeeping force and “safety-ensuring” operations) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)|United Nations peacekeeping operations and internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations of peacekeeping activities)|(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: required (only if the operations are conducted by SDF units, etc.; prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)|m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeor body or other personnel on duty m Use of weapons to execute duties (when conducting so-called “safety-ensuring” operations)| |International peace cooperation activities (Operations other than primary operations of peacekeeping force) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)|United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, and international humanitarian assistance (operations other than the so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations of peacekeeping activities)|(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)|m Use of weapons to protect one’s own lifeor body or other personnel on duty m Use of weapons for so-called “kaketsuke- keigo”| (All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law) Notes: 1. Measures based on an assumption of direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not applicable to the situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival. 2. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack). 3. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present. 4. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry’s facilities. 5. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.” ----- **Reference 16 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units** |Type of Operation|Provision|Content| |---|---|---| |Defense operation|Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.| ||Article 92 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.| |Establishment of defense facilities|Article 92-4, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Civil protection dispatch|Article 92-3 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant cast guard officers, are not present.| |Public security operation|Article 89 (1), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.| ||Article 90 (1), Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.| ||Article 91 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.| |Information- gathering duties before public security operation order|Article 92-5, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Guarding operation|Article 91-2 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.| ||Article 91-2 (3), Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.| |Maritime security operation|Article 93 (1), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.| ||Article 93 (3), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.| |Counter-piracy operations|Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.| |||If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter- piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.| |Destruction measures against ballistic missiles|Article 93-3, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.| |Action against violation of territorial airspace|Article 84, Self- Defense Forces Law|The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.1| |Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas|Article 94-5, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas|Article 94-6, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Infulence on Japan’s Peace and Security - Logistics support activities, etc.||SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law - Ship inspection operations||SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 25 and 26, International Peace Cooperation Act – International peace cooperation operations||SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces’ units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “safety- ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “kaketsuke-keigo (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request)” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| ----- |Type of Operation|Provision|Content| |---|---|---| |Protection of SDF weapons and other equipment|Article 95, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries|Article 95-2, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other foreign armed forces, which are actually engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including joint exercises and training, and excluding the activities carried out in the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted), may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situations when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Guarding facilities|Article 95-3, Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding the SDF facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Maintenance of internal order|Article 96 (3), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.| |Article 12, The U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act||SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably depending on necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of other the SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 37, Maritime Transportation Restriction Act||Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.| |Article 152, Prisoners of War Act||SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 11, International Peace Support Act||SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| Notes: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.” **Reference 17 MOD’s final statement regarding the incident of an ROK** **naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at an MSDF** **patrol aircraft (Provisional Translation)** **Introduction** The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has made endeavors in the past for close communication to take place between the defense authorities of Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and in this spirit, regarding the current issue concerning the fire-control radar irradiation by an ROK destroyer, a series of consultations have been held between Japan and the ROK. However, it is extremely regrettable that even today, the difference between the respective understandings regarding major issues, including whether or not there was an irradiation of fire-control radar, is not yet resolved. The MOD takes this incident seriously, and in light of firmly seeking for prevention of recurrence, has decided to summarize and make publicly available the objective facts that are possessed by the Japanese side. We hope that this announcement will lead to the prevention of similar incidents in the future. **1. Regarding the fire-control radar irradiation** Because Japan is surrounded by wide sea space, in order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, during peacetime, the MOD is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance of foreign vessels conducting activities in Japan’s surrounding waters. As shown in the footage released by the MOD on December 28, 2018, on December 20, around 3PM, an MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft was flying within Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Sea of Japan as part of ordinary intelligence collection and warningandsurveillance activities whenit observed an ROKdestroyer andan ROKpatrol and rescue vessel. While photographing the said vessels, the P-1 was suddenly irradiated by a fire-control radar from the ROK destroyer. The MSDF P-1 immediately took actions to ensure safety. Fire-control radars are directed at its target immediately before firing, and to aim it at foreign aircrafts without a rational reason is an extremely hazardous act that may cause unintended consequences. According to CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea), a code adopted in 2014 by navies from 21 countries including Japan and the ROK, aiming fire control radars is considered a simulation of attack, and is stipulated as an action a commander might avoid In response to the occurrence of a serious incident of such nature, the MOD lodged a strong protest and requested the prevention of recurrence to the ROK. However, not only did the ROK deny the fact this incident occurred, their actions regarding the incident entirely focus on demanding Japan to “stop distorting facts” and “apologize for conducting a threateningly low-altitude flight”. Upon careful and meticulous analysis by the MOD’s specialized unit of the frequency, intensity, waveform, etc. of the radar waves directed at the MSDF P-1, the MOD has confirmed that the P-1 was continuously irradiated for a certain period, multiple times by the fire-control radar (STIR-180) of the ROK destroyer that was being photographed. The STIR-180 was not mounted on the patrol and rescue vessel that was nearby at the time, and the fact the ROK destroyer directed its radar is clear from the footage released by the MOD on December 28, 2018. The MOD has decided publicly disclose at the Ministry’s website, upon processing for information security, the data of the radar waves converted to sound that the P-1 patrol aircraft crew heard inflight, as further evidence of the irradiation of the fire-control radar. In general, fire-control radars continuously direct radar waves to its target in order to obtain the target’s location, speed etc. to fire missiles and ammunition with precision. The data collected from the fire-control radar, such as wave forms, is clearly different from that of a surface search radar, which searches/detects targets in surrounding areas by emitting radar waves while rotating its head. Therefore, by analyzing the emitted radio waves, it is possible to determine its type and source of emission. The radio waves directed at the MSDF P-1 had shown characteristics unique to that of firecontrol radars. Although it is apparent from the result of MOD’s analysis that this radar wave was emitted by the ROK destroyer being photographed by the MSDF P-1, for the objective and neutral determination of these facts, it is necessary that a comprehensive assessment is made upon comparison of Japan’s data regarding the radar waves it has detected, and the ROK’sdataregardingthedet ailedcapabilityofthefire-controlradarequippedonthe ROK destroyer, based on the principle of reciprocity. In this light, at the working-level meeting held on January 14, 2019, the MOD proposed a joint verification of data based on the principle of reciprocity, by comparing the factual evidence of the incident such as the detected radar waves and its sound conversion, to the ROK radar’s capabilities and record of use. However, this proposal was rejected. The MOD had made a proposal of the same intent during the working-level meeting held on December 27, ----- 2018. In addition, the MOD also brought the data of the sound conversion of the detected radar waves, as evidence to contribute to the verification of facts, to the meeting on January 14 and proposed to have the ROK listen to it there, but this proposal was also rejected. On the following day, January 15, the spokesperson of the ROK’s Ministry of National Defense denounced the MOD’s proposals as “extremely rude”, an expression that is diplomatically rare, and, in violation of the agreement made between Japan and the ROK ahead of the meeting, one-sidedly disclosed information contrary to facts regarding the content of the meeting. These comments by the ROK spokesperson undermine the relationship of mutual trust and hinder the candid exchange of views. It is extremely regrettable that such actions were taken, and on the 16th, the MOD firmly requested that such actions never recur. However, the ROK has failed to provide a sincere response. Taking into account the series of actions by the ROK and the fact that the ROK’s claims have lacked both consistency and credibility, there is no choice but to conclude that the ROK has been repeating claims that by all means differ from truth. In such a situation, an objective and neutral determination of facts based on the principle of reciprocity must be deemed difficult, and it is unlikely that the truth will ever be made clear even if working-level meetings were to continue to be held. The MOD once again strongly protests against the ROK destroyer’s fire-control radar irradiation, and strongly urges the ROK to accept that this incident occurred and conduct thorough measures to prevent the recurrence of such event. **2. Regarding other claims made by the ROK** (1) Regarding the flight by the MSDF P-1 The ROK claims that the MSDF P-1 conducted “a threateningly low-altitude flight” in the vicinity of a ROK destroyer conducting a “humanitarian rescue mission”, and is demanding an apology. There is no international law that directly regulates the minimum safety altitude for military aircrafts, but in order to ensure safety, the MSDF operates under Japan’s domestic law that conforms to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and did not conduct any flight that may threaten the ROK destroyer. It is our understanding that normal operations by the U.S. Forces and NATO are carried out under similar standards. In fact, as apparent from the footage released by the MOD on December 28 and the MSDF P-1’s track chart, the MSDF P-1 maintained a sufficiently safe altitude (approx. 150m) and distance (approx. 500m) from the ROK destroyer even at its closest, and did not conduct flight that may interrupt the ROK destroyer’s activities. In addition, because the ROK destroyer did not respond to the P-1’s call outs by radio communication, the MSDF P-1 was unable to recognize that the ROK was conducting rescue activities. No evidence to support the ROK’s claim can be found in the tensecond footage released by the ROK of what seems to be the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft filmed from the ROKpatroland rescue vessel, and noother objective evidence to support the ROK’s claim that the MSDF P-1 conducted “a threateningly low-altitude flight” has been presented. Even prior to this incident, the MSDF has conducted similar flights and has photographed vessels when observing not only Korean but other foreign vessels during its intelligence collection and warning and surveillance activities. Since April 2018, the MSDF has photographed the exact same ROK destroyer “Gwanggaeto-daewang” destroyer three times (April 27, April 28 and August 23), but the ROK did not express its concern regarding these flights. The MOD had requested additional objective evidence to support the ROK’s claim at the working-level meetings, but the ROK has failed to provide such evidence, and has repeatedly responded with claims that entirely lack in objectivity, such as “if the subject of the threat feels threatened, it is then a threat”. For these reasons, the MOD has concluded that the ROK’s claim lacks both persuasiveness and support from factual evidence, and was made to dilute other important issues regarding the fire-control radar incident. (2) Regarding communication conditions In general, naval vessel crew will call out by radio communication when feeling threat, but the ROK destroyer, despite seeing the MSDF P-1 aircraft’s flight as a problem, had not taken measures by any means to call out to the P-1 about its concern. In addition, after being irradiated by the fire-control radar, the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft had called out using three frequencies in international VHF (156.8MHz) and emergency frequencies (121.5MHz and 243MHz), but there was no response at all from the ROK destroyer. Regarding this issue, the ROK has explained that the destroyer did not respond because the communication condition on site was poor, and they were unable to catch most of the call outs from the aircraft and thought they heard the phrase “KOREA COAST”. In addition, the ROK also explained that the communication equipment on board was not tuned to be able to hear one of the three frequencies. However, the weather conditions on site that day was sunny with very few clouds, and communication conditions were extremely good. In addition, the MSDF P-1 used the same radio communication equipment (it has been confirmed that this equipment was operating normally before, during, and after flight) used to call out to the ROK destroyer tocommunicatewithon-landstationsin Saitama Prefecture, andithasalsobeenconfirmed that an ASDF training aircraft flying at a location approximately 240 km away from the P- 1 heard the call out made by the P-1 to the ROK destroyer. It is improbable under normal circumstances that radio communication could not be clearly received in such good communication conditions, and in the footage released by the ROK, the call out from the P-1 to the ROK destroyer can be clearly heard (“KOREAN SOUTH NAVAL SHIP, HULL NUMBER 971, THIS IS JAPAN NAVY.”) Considering this point, at the working-level meetingon January 14, the ROKexplained for the first time that, upon repeated inspection of the call out from the MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft, it was later found that the communication personnel had misheard the radio communication. Prior to this, the ROK had never disclosed this information in its press conferences and had only explained that the destroyer did not respond because they heard “KOREACOAST”. The MOD strongly calls for the ROK to take measures to improve communication between Japan-ROK defense authorities on site, such as conducting appropriate communication to JSDF aircrafts, improving conditions of communication reception, and conducting education/ training to communication personnel, so that such incidents never recur. **3. Path forward** For the above reasons, the MOD once again strongly protests against the ROK destroyer’s fire-control radar irradiation, and strongly urges the ROK to accept that this incident occurred and conduct thorough measures to prevent its recurrence. At the same time, given that the ROK refuses to conduct an objective and neutral determination of facts based on the principle of reciprocity, and thus it is unlikely that the truth will ever be made clear even if working-level meetings were to continue, the MOD deems that it has become difficult to continue to hold consultations with the ROK regarding this matter. That being said, our stance remains unchanged in that the Japan-ROK and Japan-ROK-U.S defense cooperation is extremely important, and is indispensable in confronting security challenges such as the nuclear and missile issue in North Korea and maintaining the stability of the security environment in East Asia. We hope that this announcement will lead to the prevention of similar incidents in the future, and we will continue to make sincere efforts towards continuous Japan-ROK and Japan-ROK-U.S defense cooperation. ----- **Reference 18 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan** |1993|May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan| |---|---| |1995|Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense| |1998|August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory| ||The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system| |1999|Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles| |2002|Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD| |2003|The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started| |2005|Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD| |2006|July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediate after the launch| |2007|The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started| |2009|March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan| |2012|March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean| |2014|North Korea launched ballistic missiles in March, June, and July March 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 26: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 600 km and fell into the Sea of Japan June 29: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 9: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 13: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 26: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan| |2015|March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan| |2016|North Korea launched over 20 ballistic missiles including those claimed to be “satellites” in a single year February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued February 7: Launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean March 10: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 18: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan April 15: Launched a ballistic missile April 23: Launched a ballistic missile April 28: Launched two ballistic missiles May 31: Launched a ballistic missile June 22: Launched two ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 100 km and fell near the east coast of North Korea The second flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 9: Launched a ballistic missile July 19: Launched three ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan; the second failed to fly on and did not fall into the Sea of Japan, the details being unclear; and the third flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan August 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, one of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately after the launch August 24: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan September 5: Launched three ballistic missiles, all of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan October 15: Launched a ballistic missile October 20: Launched a ballistic missile December 22: At the Nine Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the ballistic missile defense enhanced-capability interceptor missile (SM-3 block IIA) would progress to the joint production and deployment stage| |2017|North Korea launched more than 10 ballistic missiles beginning in February February 4: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea February 12: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 6: Launched four ballistic missiles, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell into the Sea of Japan (three in the Japanese EEZ) April 5: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 60 km and fell into the Sea of Japan April 16: Launched a ballistic missile that exploded immediately after launch April 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which fell inland approximately 50 km from the launch site May 14: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan May 21: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan May 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan June 22: Conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA at the sea July 4: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan. July 28: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan. August 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 2,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific. September 15: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 3,700 km over Japan and fell in the Pacific. November 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew for approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan. December 19: NSC and the cabinet meeting approved introducing two units of Aegis Ashore systems.| |2018|January 31: The U.S. conducted a test shot of the SM-3 block IIA June 1: The MOD announced candidate sites for the deployment of two units of Aegis Ashore (GSDF Araya Maneuver Area in Akita Prefecture and Mutsumi Maneuver Area in Yamaguchi Prefecture). July 30: The MOD selected the components of Aegis Ashore (LMSSR). October 26: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA in waters. October 29: The MOD started surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore. December 11: The United States conducted a test shot of the SM-3 Block IIA.| |2019|May 4: North Korea launched ballistic missiles. May 9: North Korea launched ballistic missiles. May 27 and 28: The MOD explained results of surveys concerning the deployment of Aegis Ashore and results of study by the MOD to the governors of Akita and Yamaguchi Prefectures. July 25: North Korea launched ballistic missiles. August 6: North Korea launched ballistic missiles.| ----- **Reference 19 Participation of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Civil Protection Joint Training Exercises with Central and Local Government Bodies (2018)** ExerciseTypes of Training content (estimated) Date Location (cumulative times) ExerciseTypes of Training content (estimated) Date Location (cumulative times) Field exerciseSimulation Simulation and Field exerciseexercise Terrorism using explosivesTerrorism using explosives and chemical agentsTerrorism using explosives, and a barricade incidentTerrorism using explosives and chemical agentsTerrorism using explosives and chemical agentsTerrorism using explosives January 24-25, 2019September 26, 2018November 20, 2018February 17, 2019January 11, 2019February 1, 2019 Hyogo Prefecture (4 times)Oita Prefecture (5 times)Kumamoto Prefecture Shizuoka Prefecture Okinawa Prefecture Aichi Prefecture (4 times)(5 times)(5 times)(4 times) Simulation exercise Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incidentTerrorism using chemical agents, and a barricade incidentTerrorism using explosives and chemical agentsTerrorism using explosives, and a barricade incidentTerrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident December 26, 2018January 25, 2019January 24, 2019January 22, 2019January 9, 2018 Mie Prefecture (5 times)Kagoshima Prefecture Okinawa Prefecture Niigata Prefecture Fukui Prefecture (13 times)(4 times)(4 times)(4 times) Field exercise Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents January 15, 2019 Iwate Prefecture (6 times) Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident February 13, 2019 Ishikawa Prefecture (2 times) |Types of Exercise|Training content (estimated)|Date|Location (cumulative times)| |---|---|---|---| |Simulation exercise|Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident|December 26, 2018|Kagoshima Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using chemical agents, and a barricade incident|January 9, 2018|Fukui Prefecture (13 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|January 22, 2019|Mie Prefecture (5 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|January 24, 2019|Niigata Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|January 25, 2019|Okinawa Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|January 30, 2019|Shiga Prefecture (5 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives|February 8, 2019|Fukushima Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident|February 13, 2019|Ishikawa Prefecture (2 times)| |Types of Exercise|Training content (estimated)|Date|Location (cumulative times)| |---|---|---|---| |Field exercise|Terrorism using explosives|January 11, 2019|Aichi Prefecture (5 times)| |Simulation exercise|Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|November 20, 2018|Shizuoka Prefecture (5 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|February 1, 2019|Kumamoto Prefecture (4 times)| |Simulation and Field exercise|Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|February 17, 2019|Hyogo Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|January 24-25, 2019|Okinawa Prefecture (4 times)| |Field exercise|Terrorism using explosives|September 26, 2018|Oita Prefecture (5 times)| ||Terrorism using chemical agents, and a barricade incident|October 31, 2018|Toyama Prefecture (9 times)| ||Terrorism using chemical agents|November 20, 2018|Tokyo (7 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|November 21, 2018|Osaka Prefecture (4 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|January 15, 2019|Iwate Prefecture (6 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|January 31, 2019|Miyazaki Prefecture (6 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|February 5, 2019|Osaka Prefecture (5 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|February 24, 2019|Tokushima Prefecture (11 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents|March 9, 2019|Kanagawa Prefecture (6 times)| |Simulation exercise|Terrorism using explosives and chemical agents, and a barricade incident|September 6, 2018|Oita Prefecture (6 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|November 15, 2018|Yamagata Prefecture (7 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives|November 30, 2018|Fukuoka Prefecture (6 times)| ||Terrorism using explosives, and a barricade incident|December 19, 2018|Ibaraki Prefecture (5 times)| **Reference 20 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity** |2012|April: Agreed in a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole June: Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC) September: “Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces” formulated| |---|---| |2013|May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities| |2014|March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command November: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted| |2015|January: Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet January: National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat May: Joint statement issued by the CDPWG September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision| |2016|April: The MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology| |2018|January: Japan was approved to join the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence located in Estonia. July: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision December: Cyber Security Basic Act revised| |2019|March: Dispatch MOD personnel to NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Estonia April: Cybersecurity Council established April: Shared the view at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues, and affirmed that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty| **Reference 21 Record of Disaster Relief (Past Five Years)** |FY|2014|2015|2016|Kumamoto Earthquake* (2016)|2017|Northern Kyushu torrential rains* (2017)|2018|2018 July Heavy Rain* (2018)|2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake* (2018)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Number of Dispatches|521|541|515|－|501|－|430|12|1| |Personnel|66,267|30,035|33,123|Approx. 814,200|23,838|Approx. 81,950|22,665|Approx. 957,000|Approx. 211,000| |Vehicles|9,621|5,170|5,824|－|3,340|Approx. 7,140|3,090|Approx. 49,500|Approx. 17,800| |Aircraft|1,232|888|725|2,618|792|169|644|340|230| |Vessels|0|2|11|300|39|0|11|150|20| - Kumamoto Earthquake, Northern Kyushu torrential rains, 2018 July Heavy Rain and 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake are excluded from the record of each fiscal year. ----- **Reference 22 United States Japan Roadmap for Realignment** **Implementation** (Washington, DC, May 1, 2006) **Overview** On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.– Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document. **Finalization of Realignment Initiatives** The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan. The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities. **Key Implementation Details** 1. Realignment on Okinawa (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)  The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.  In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.  Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.  Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.  Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.  Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.  In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.  The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility. (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam  Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.  The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.  The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.  Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road. (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities  F ll i th l ti t th FRF th t f MCAS F t and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.  Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:  Camp Kuwae: Total return.  Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.  MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).  Makiminato Service Area: Total return.  aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).  Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.  All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.  While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.  Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.  ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities. (d) Relationships among Initiatives  Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.  Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.  The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam. 2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability  U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.  Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.  In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.  Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.  A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.  Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate. 3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace  ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.  A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.  The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.  Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.  Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.  Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.  Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control ----- **Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** (April 27, 2012) **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)** **Preamble** (1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap. (2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility. (3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance. **I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa** (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia. (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap. (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam. (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is $8.6 billion. Japan’s financial commitment will be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to $2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized. Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment. **II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity** (1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats). (2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012. **III. Land Returns in Okinawa** (1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5) (ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 (iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps’ relocation to locations outside of Japan: Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area (2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012. **IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma** (1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution. (2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment. (END) For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (http://www. mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html) procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.  The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.  The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dualuse must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.  Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military dual-use. 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni  The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.  Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.  The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.  U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.  Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.  A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.  Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni. 5. Missile Defense  As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.  The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.  The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.  U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time. 6. Training Relocation  Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.  Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities— Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.  The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.  Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.  In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.  At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.  The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. (Attached conceptual diagram omitted) **Reference 24 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** (April 27, 2015) **I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines** In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: - seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; - synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; - a whole-of-government Alliance approach; - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and - the global nature of the Japan U S Alliance ----- The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines.” The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combatready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **II. Basic Premises and Principles** The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles. A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged. B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements. C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures. **III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination** Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective wholeof-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime. B. Enhanced Operational Coordination Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-of-command. C. Bilateral Planning The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments. **IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security** Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the wholeof-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to: - assess the situation; - share information; and - develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation. To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security. A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following: 1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security. 2. Air and Missile Defense The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities. 3. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on ----- various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary. 4. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises. 5. Training and Exercises The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern. 6. Logistic Support Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements. 7. Use of Facilities In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate. B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations. In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below. 1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants. The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises. 2. Maritime Security Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law. 3. Measures to Deal with Refugees If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan s peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan. 4. Search and Rescue The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 5. Protection of Facilities and Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces. 6. Logistic Support The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 7. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de- escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV. 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/ shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan. 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs a. Principles for Coordinated Actions If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region. Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and ----- security. Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments. The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan. b. Concept of Operations i. Operations to Defend Airspace The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack. The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies. iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self- Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the SelfDefense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. v. Cross-Domain Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously. Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets. The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the SelfDefense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate. The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces’ special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate. c. Operational Support Activities The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations. i. Communications and Electronics The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness. ii. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. iii. Logistic Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. iv. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate. D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a ----- third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-ofgovernment Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack. The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below: 1. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense. 2. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. 3. Maritime Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate. 4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches. 5. Logistics Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan’s peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’ cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters. **V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security** In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world. When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries. A. Cooperation in International Activities The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include: 1. Peacekeeping Operations When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate. 2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution. 3. Maritime Security When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities. 4. Partner Capacity Building Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations. 5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals. 6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets. 7. Training and Exercises In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures. 8. Logistic support When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards. ----- **VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation** A. Cooperation on Space Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads. To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities. B. Cooperation on Cyberspace To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will: - maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems; - share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity; - ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance; - contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and - conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies. In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond. **VII. Bilateral Enterprise** The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will: - cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services; - strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness; - facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and - explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology. B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security - Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level. - In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information. - The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing. C. Educational and Research Exchanges Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation. **VIII. Processes for Review** The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the JapanU.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time. ----- **Reference 25 Japan U.S. (Minister Level) Consultations (Since 2016)** |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Sep. 15, 2016 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter|• Reconfirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas • With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confrimed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks • Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines • Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016 • The Japanese side stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter. • Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area| |Dec. 7, 2016 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter|• Agreed to oppose North Korea’s nuclear and missile development as well as unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks • Agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to collaborate closely with the existing strong Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation • Welcomed the efforts under way based on the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security, including the signing of the Japan-U.S. ACSA and the commencement of Japan-U.S. joint training in accordance with the Legislation for Peace and Security • Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016 • Confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to realize the return of a majority of the Northern Training Area in December 2016 • With regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter| |Feb. 4, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared the view that China’s activities in the East and South China Seas pose security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region • Shared the view that advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development constitute grave security threats to the stability of Japan and the United States and the region • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to strengthen engagement in the East China Sea • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks • The Japanese side stated that it will strengthen its defense capabilities and expand Japan’s role in the Alliance • The U.S. side stated that it will remain committed to the defense of Japan, and underscored that the U.S. commitment to the region will be enhanced through its ongoing presence • Confirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the United States’ unwavering commitment to extended deterrence • Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking into account the Guidelines established in 2015 • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the steady progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces Japan. The U.S. side stated that it seeks to advance the realignment through Japan-U.S. collaboration. • With regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan| |Jun. 3, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore Participants: Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared the view that North Korea’s successive ballistic missile launches and other acts are flagrant provocations against the stability of Japan and the United States and the region and are absolutely intolerable, and that it is important to have close Japan-U.S.-ROK collaboration in addition to Japan-U.S. collaboration • The Japanese side highly praised the United States’ visible commitment to the peace and stability of the region, including the dispatch of its carrier strike group, and stated that it is important to strengthen pressure on North Korea • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Confirmed that Japan and the United States will deepen their cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in the East China Sea and regarding engagement in the South China Sea • Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and welcomed the joint training between the SDF and the carrier strike group being conducted in the Sea of Japan as an activity contributing to this end • Agreed that they will continue to coordinate for the prompt holding of a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting • Agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the U.S. side announced its commitment to continue to promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation • Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan| |Aug. 17, 2017 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Secretary of Defense Mattis Secretary of State Tillerson|• Reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. • Condemned in the strongest terms North Korea’s development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and agreed on taking concrete actions to bolster the defense capabilities of the Alliance to deter threats of North Korea while closely coordinating between Japan and the U.S., and the two countries and the Republic of Korea. • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands. • Reaffirmed the importance of working together to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea. • Underlined the significance of continued engagement in the South China Sea, including through respective activities to support freedom of navigation. • Confirmed their shared intent to develop specifci measures and actions to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through reviewing roles, missions, and capabilities, to ensure seamless Alliance responses across a full spectrum of situations. • Japan intends to expand its role in the Alliance and augment its defense capabilities, with an eye on the next planning period for its Mid-Term Defense Program. • The United States remains committed to deploying its most advanced capabilities to Japan. • Directed respective staffs to proceed with the policy making process based on the guidance given by the ministers. • Reaffirmed the two governments’ commitment to implementation of the 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. • Welcomed important steps within the Alliance to operationalize mutual asset protection and to bring into force the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). • Reaffirmed the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. • Confirmed their shared commitment to enhance and accelerate cooperation in such areas as bilateral planning, air and missile defense, non-combatant evacuation operations, defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security. • Affirmed their desire to expand bilateral cooperation in space and cyber, and called for deepening consultations for such cooperation. • Highlighted ongoing efforts to advance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with other partners in the region. • Emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing and expand trilateral exercises between Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. • Affirmed their intention to further enhance capacity building programs and defense equipment and technology transfers to Southeast Asian nations. • Confirmed their shared commitment to launch a whole-of-government dialogue on maritime security capacity building. • Reaffirmed the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. • Reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to implement the existing arrangements for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan. • Reaffirmed the overall level of Host Nation Support. • Reaffirmed the two Governments would promote joint/shared use. • Stressed the importance of steadily implementing supplementary agreements to SOFA regarding environmental stewardship and the civilian component.| ----- |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Aug. 17, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Agreed on the importance of establishing trust between defense leaders of Japan and the U.S., and working together to strengthen the Alliance. • Exchanged views on issues regarding North Korea. The Japanese side commented that now is the time to increase pressure on the regime and that Japan will take necessary measures to continue to coordinate with the U.S. Forces to fully respond to various contingencies. • Reaffirmed close communication and coordination between the two governments is vital in order to respond to issues regarding North Korea. Agreed on putting further pressure on North Korea and working on bolstering the defense capabilities to deter threats posed by North Korea. • In light of an increasingly severe security environment, shared their commitment to take initiatives to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines and to bolster the capabilities of the Alliance to deter and respond while both Japan and the U.S. work on improving their respective capabilities.| |Oct. 23, 2017 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Philippines Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared information on the situation of and prospects for North Korea’s nuclear and missile development. • The Japanese side commented that North Korean nuclear and missile development is posing an unprecedentedly serious and immediate threat to the security of this region including Japan, and called for thorough discussion to ensure the Alliance can take an orchestrated response to any situation. The U.S. side shared this view and reaffirmed its commitment to the security of Japan including a commitment to extended deterrence. • Given the increased level of North Korean ballistic missile threat, the two governments agreed on ensuring a reliable defense posture. Also confirmed working together for the introduction of new BMD assets including the Aegis Ashore. Agreed on bringing even closer coordination to the operation of Japanese and U.S. assets including Aegis-equipped ships. • Welcomed the high level of communication through telephone meetings on continued provocations by North Korea, and reaffirmed to continue to share information between Japan and the U.S. • Confirmed the importance of continuously pressuring North Korea in a visible way and the importance of close coordination between Japan and the U.S. • Reaffirmed the two governments’ intention to promote close cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea. • Shared the position that Japan and the U.S. will work together for the peace and security of the East China Sea while keeping a close watch on the situations. • Agreed on the importance of engagement in the Southeast Asia region while keeping a close watch on the situations in the South China Sea, and welcomed progress in multilateral security cooperation as well as dialogues in the region through the framework of ADMM Plus. • The Japanese side mentioned its intention to take initiatives to help ASEAN with capacity building based on the “Vientiane Vision,” Japan’s defense cooperation initiatives with ASEAN. • Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will continue to cooperate closely to provide capacity building assistance to Southeast Asian partners. • The Japanese side requested the U.S. Forces to make efforts to operate safely as understanding from the local communities is vital in ensuring the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.| |Apr. 20, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on the way ahead including the meeting between leaders of United States and North Korea, regarding the issue of North Korea. • Agreed on the need to keep a close watch on North Korea, given no concrete initiatives by North Korea to give up its nuclear development has been confirmed, despite the changes in the regime’s posture such as requesting for talks. • The Japanese side spoke about the necessity to put maximum pressure on North Korea in order to make it abolish its nuclear and missile development, and affirmed that the two governments will maintain pressure and sanctions on North Korea with the goal of having North Korea relinquish all weapons of mass destruction and all ballistic missile plans in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. • The U.S. side commended efforts by the MSDF to address the issue of illegal ship-to-ship transfers by North Korean vessels, and showed its commitment to continue these efforts with Japan and other partner nations. • Affirmed the importance of cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the Republic of Korea and other nations through joint training and exercise. • Agreed on the importance of continuing close information-sharing to ensure the Alliance’s response capabilities to any situation. • Welcomed progress in cooperation between Japan and the U.S. under Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines such as the SDF protecting and providing supplies and services to the U.S. Forces, and reaffrimed the further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation through the steady enforcement of the Legislation and the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. • The Japanese side talked about moving forward on the review of the National Defense Program Guidelines towards the end of FY2018 and the study of setting forth a next Mid- Term Defense Program, and reaffirmed on sharing information between the ministers. • The Japanese side spoke about the need to introduce high-performance equipment including those used by the U.S. military to bolster Japan’s defense capabilities amid an increasingly severe security environment. The two ministers affirmed to work together to make it possible for Japan to smoothly and swiftly acquire equipment made in the U.S. including the Aegis Ashore by addressing the issues regarding FMS. • The Japanese side requested the securing of safe operations by the U.S. Forces, including the CV-22 to be deployed to Yokota Air Base and U.S. Forces aircraft in Okinawa, and the U.S. side acknowledged the importance of ensuring filght safety. • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on the local community of Okinawa and other places, and concurred that the U.S. will continue to cooperate with Japan on efforts to gain the understanding of the local community.| |May 29, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Hawaii Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. • The Japanese side expressed its view that the meeting between the leaders of U.S. and North Korea should be an opportunity to advance outstanding issues of concern such as nuclear, missile and abductions issues. The Ministers confirmed that they will continue exerting pressure and sanctions, under the common principle of realizing abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in complete, verifiable and irreversible way. • In light of illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods, the Ministers welcomed measures implemented by Japan in coordination with partner countries including United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and agreed that they will continue to take actions with the voluntary countries, and reaffirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. • The U.S. side expressed renewed commitment to Japanese defense. The Ministers agreed that they will continue to maintain close communication to take concerted action as an alliance in response to any situations. • The Ministers exchanged opinions on regional challenges, and in light of China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas, agreed that it is important for both countries to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, to cooperate for the peace and stability, and to be continuously engaged in the South China Sea. • The Ministers noted that China has enforced its military capability and intensified its activities in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and also agreed to reinforce the Alliance capability to deter and respond through enhancement of defense capability based on the close cooperation of Japan and U.S. for the peace and stability of the region. • The Ministers reconfirmed the importance of cooperating with the allied countries and various partners to assure the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and agreed that Japan and U.S. or Japan, U.S., and Australia proceed with coordination in the promotion of the basic principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation, and in capacity building. • The Japanese side requested efforts to ensure safe operations of U.S. Forces and cooperation in efforts to obtain consent from local communities including those in Okinawa.| |Jun. 29, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers, taking into account the recent situations regarding the issue of North Korea, closely compared and adjusted the defense agencies’ understandings and policy on future response against North Korea issues. • The Ministers agreed that, complying with the UNSCRs, they will work together to realize CVID of all of its WMD including biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles of all ranges in coordination with the international community, and confirmed that Japan and U.S. continue to counter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea in coordination with their partner countries. • The U.S. side explained the suspension of U.S.-ROK combined military exercises, and the Ministers reaffirmed that neither withdrawal nor reduction of the USFK has been considered, and reconfirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. • The U.S. side expressed renewed U.S. commitments to defend Japan, and the Ministers agreed to proceed with the reinforcement of the alliance’s deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. joint exercises steadily, as planned. • The Ministers exchanged their views based on the U.S. Secretary of Defense’s visit to China, and agreed that they will continue to maintain a close channel of communication to take concerted actions as an alliance in response to every situation. • The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to continue to closely watch on the situations in the East China Sea, and to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability. • The Ministers also confirmed the importance to collaborate towards consolidating basic principles such as rule of law and freedom of navigation. • The Ministers welcomed the progress and improvements being made in challenges regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and the Ministers also confirmed the U.S. will continue to work to help Japan achieve efficient procurement. • The Ministers agreed to closely work towards the steady implementation of the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, and the Japanese side requested cooperation to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| ----- |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Oct. 19, 2018 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting / Singapore Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Secretary of Defense Mattis|• The Ministers shared the understandings about the importance of the free and open Indo-Pacific, and confirmed the significance of cooperation between Japan and the United States and with various partners. • The Ministers welcomed the development of the regional multilateral security cooperation and dialogue under the framework of the ADMM-Plus, and agreed to strengthen the cooperation with partner countries in maintaining basic international principles such as rule of law, freedom of navigation and in implementing measures for peace and stability such as capacity building assistance. • The Ministers, taking into account that China continues unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, confirmed that the two countries work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea, and it is important for both countries to be engaged in the South China Sea. • The Ministers confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • As part of efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Security Council resolutions, the Ministers additionally confirmed the importance of working with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea, and welcomed the monitoring and surveillance activities taking place since September with the participation of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and agreed that the two countries conduct the operation in cooperation with like-minded countries. • The Ministers confirmed that U.S. Forces in ROK is a stabilizing force in the region, and that no change in U.S. Forces in ROK has been considered. • The Ministers also agreed to work together to reinforce the deterrence and response capability including conducting Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises steadily as planned. • The Ministers confirmed to work together to improve effciiency regarding Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Japan’s buying U.S-made defense assets. • The Japanese side explained the current status of the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and the formulation of the Mid-Term Defense Program for the next term, and the Ministers concurred to continue to closely exchange information. • The Ministers reconfirmed that the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. • The Ministers confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to secure the understanding from the local communities, and to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| |Jan. 16, 2019 Meeting with the U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan|• The U.S. side supported the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond (NDPG) and the Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023; MTDP), and welcomed that Japan expressed its strong resolve to enhance its defense architecture and to play a larger role in accordance with the NDPG and the MTDP. • In regards to the current security environment, both sides shared views that competition among states is becoming more apparent. They also agreed that gaining technological superiority in new domains such as space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly important. • Both sides also confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made pursuant to Japan’s NDPG and MTDP, and the United States’ National Defense Strategy (NDS) respectively, as well as to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond following the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. With the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific in mind, they agreed to work together to shape a desirable security environment with Japan-U.S. alliance being the cornerstone of cooperation with other nations. • Both sides confirmed to strengthen and expand cooperation in wide range of fields including the following: m Promote Japan-U.S. cooperation in the “new domains,” including space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum. The United States welcomed Japan’s first participation in the Schriever Wargame. m Closely coordinate in joint exercises and capacity building assistance, taking into account increasing both nations’ presence in the Indo-Pacific. m Welcome and even make progress in the two countries’ cooperation in the operational field following Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and the Guidelines (e.g. U.S. Forces asset protection mission conducted by the SDF, provision of supplies and services). m Make continued effort in streamlining FMS process, while welcoming the recent progress and improvements in issues related to FMS. Cooperate in ensuring cost transparency, improving late case closure, strengthening activities to realize and promote multi-year procurement. m Continue cooperation to realize Japan’s smooth and prompt introduction, including cost management of U.S.-made advanced defense equipment such as Aegis Ashore, E-2D and F-35. m Enhance cooperation in defense equipment and technology as well as promoting Japan-U.S. joint development and researches. • Both sides confirmed they continue to support full implementation of the UNSC resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMDs and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • Both sides agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter North Korea’s illicit “ship-to-ship” transfers. • Both sides confirmed that deterrence through Japan-U.S. Alliance and U.S.-ROK Alliance is essential in maintaining the security of the region, and agreed that both countries will steadily implement Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises. • In regards to the East and South China Seas, both sides affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion, and that it is important to work together to make sure that Rule of Law and Freedom of Navigation are firmly established. • Both sides also reaffirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands. Both sides confirmed that Japan and the United States work together for the peace and stability of the East China Sea. • Both sides affirmed the recent progress in the construction project of Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), and reconfirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid its continued use. The Japanese side requested for cooperation with efforts to mitigate impact on the local communities including Okinawa. Both sides confirmed to work together closely for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives and training relocation. • Both sides also affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| |Apr. 19, 2019 “2+2” Meeting / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan Secretary of State Pompeo|• The Ministers shared the view that the Japan-U.S. Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and that Japan and the United States will work together to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” • The Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will jointly increase their presence in the region, while collaborating with partners in the region through joint exercises, port calls, and other activities. • The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, including Japan’s NDPG. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will strengthen cooperation for cross-domain operations, including capability enhancement in new domains, such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. • The Ministers shared the view that they will seek to achieve North Korea’s abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to work together in cooperation with other partner countries in fully implementing UN Security Council resolutions, including combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers. • The Ministers also reaffirmed that U.S. force stance in the region would remain robust, and shared the view on deepening consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also shared the view that they will continue to engage in close cooperation between Japan and the United States as well as among Japan, the United States, and the ROK. • The Ministers shared the view on calling upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately. • Regarding the security environment in the Indo-Pacifci region, the Ministers expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). • The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. • The Ministers confirmed that they will deepen cooperation on space capabilities, and shared the view on promoting cooperation for enhancing space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities through Japan’s development of a Deep Space Radar and hosting of U.S.-provided SSA payloads on Japan’s Quasi Zenith Satellite System. • The Ministers shared the view on enhancing cooperation on cyber issues. They affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. • The Ministers confirmed that it is important to develop defense capabilities efficiently and effectively in order to enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan- U.S. Alliance. The Ministers shared the view that the two countries will cooperate to introduce advanced weapon systems to Japan and to further streamline the FMS process. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of information security, and shared the view on the need for greater supply chain security, noting threats to the defense industrial base, national networks, and critical infrastructure required for mission assurance. • In order to improve Japan-U.S. Alliance readiness, the Ministers shared the view on further deepening operational cooperation, such as mutual asset protection, logistical support, and joint ISR operations. • The ministers shared the view that they will steadily implement the realignment of the USFJ, from the perspective of mitigating the impact on local communities, including Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The Ministers welcomed the significant progress on the construction of the FRF and reaffirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that avoids its continued use. • Foreign Minister Kono conveyed to the U.S. side that it is important to mitigate the impact on the local people, including making progress, one by one, on the issues surrounding the operation of U.S. forces and the SOFA, while steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces. • Defense Minister Iwaya requested the U.S. side to minimize the impact of the operation of U.S. forces on local communities, including noise of transient aircraft. • The two ministers also requested the U.S. side to prevent incidents and accidents.| ----- |Col1|Outline and Results| |---|---| |Apr. 19, 2019 Meeting with Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense / Washington, D.C. Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan|• The Ministers welcomed the successful holding of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” meeting and affirmed that the defense authorities of Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate with each other to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance. • The Ministers affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward complete, verifiable, and irreversible abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea. • The Ministers also agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to cooperate with like-minded countries in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers by North Korea. • They affirmed the importance of deterrence based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the U.S.-ROK Alliance and agreed to steadily conduct Japan-U.S. joint exercises. • The Ministers agreed to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations and affirmed that the two countries will further promote cooperation in space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. • The Ministers affirmed that Japan and the United States will further streamline the FMS process and agreed to strengthen defense equipment and technology cooperation by promoting Japan-U.S. joint research and development. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will cooperate closely to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.| |Jun. 4, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Iwaya and Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya Acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Shanahan|• The two ministers affirmed that they will closely cooperate with each other in line with the policy confirmed at the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting. • The Ministers affirmed the need to deepen Japan-U.S. cooperation with a sense of urgency with respect to new domains, such as space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. They affirmed that they will promote Japan-U.S. cooperation for cross-domain operations. • Defense Minister Iwaya welcomed the Indo-Pacifci Strategy Report by the United States. Both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation with the United States to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific as indicated in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. The Ministers affirmed the importance of cooperating with diverse partners. • The Ministers discussed the regional situation and other matters in light of the discussions held at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue. • Regarding North Korea, they affirmed the importance of continuing to ensure full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions toward the abandonment of all weapons of mass destruction and all ranges of ballistic missiles by North Korea in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and they also confirmed that Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation will be maintained. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue close cooperation to make steady progress in implementing the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces.| |Aug. 7, 2019 Meeting between Minister of Defense Iwaya and U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper / Tokyo Participants: Minister of Defense Iwaya U.S. Secretary of Defense Esper|• The Ministers confirmed the importance of full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions for a complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missiles of all ranges. • The Ministers agreed that Japan and the United States will continue working together with partner countries to counter illicit ship-to-ship transfers of goods by North Korea. • The Ministers confirmed the importance of the deterrent capability of regional U.S. Forces including U.S. Forces Korea. • The Ministers affirmed their position that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status-quo by coercion in the East and South China Seas, and that it is important to work together to make sure that the rule of law and the freedom of navigation are firmly established. • The Ministers reconfirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands, and that they would oppose any unilateral actions which attempt to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands, and agreed to cooperate with each other for the peace and stability in the East China Sea. • The Ministers confirmed that they will closely coordinate in their efforts to be made based on the strategy documents of both countries and to even strengthen the alliance capability to deter and respond. • They confirmed the significance of cooperation with various partners, including conducting joint exercises and capacity building assistance to maintain and strengthen a free and open Indo-Pacific with Japan-U.S. Alliance being the cornerstone. • The Ministers confirmed to make continued effort in streamlining FMS process. • The Ministers confirmed that the relocation to Henoko-saki is the only solution to avoid the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. • The Japanese side requested for cooperation in the Government of Japan’s efforts to mitigate the impact on the local communities including Okinawa. The Ministers confirmed to work closely together for the steady implementation of the U.S. forces realignment initiatives. • The Japanese side also requested the U.S. Forces to minimize its operational impact on the local communities and the Ministers affirmed the importance to ensure the safe operations of the U.S. Forces.| ----- **Reference 26 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** **(2+2) (tentative translation)** (April 19, 2019) **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee** On April 19, 2019, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee convened in Washington, DC, with the participation of Secretary of State Pompeo, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono, and Minister of Defense Iwaya. During the meeting, the Ministers affirmed their strong commitment to realize a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” a shared vision for a region in which all nations are sovereign, strong, and prosperous. Decades after the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed, the U.S.-Japan Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and remains ironclad amid an increasingly complex security environment. The Alliance will continue to play an indispensable role in upholding a rules-based international order and promoting the shared values of the American and Japanese people. The Ministers welcomed the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, namely the United States’ National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines. These strategies show that the U.S.-Japan security partnership continues to adapt to be stronger, more advanced, and more effective, consistent with the objectives of the bilateral 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Ministers acknowledged their shared concern that geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Ministers highlighted the need for an increasingly networked structure of alliances and partnerships, anchored by the U.S.-Japan Alliance, to counter these challenges. The Ministers also expressed concern about rapidly evolving technological advancement in new domains, including space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The Ministers highlighted the need to address these challenges jointly to ensure the Alliance’s superiority in a contingency and to safeguard our institutions and rules-based order during peacetime. The Ministers affirmed that their two nations’ strong bilateral security relationship continues to be the foundation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. As such, the Ministers decided that cooperation in cross- domain operations, enhancing the Alliance’s capabilities, and increasing operational readiness and cooperation should be core objectives to advance our defense relationship. The United States welcomed Japan’s proactive steps to strengthen its defensive capabilities, with the Ministers confirming that both nations need to constantly re-evaluate their roles, missions, and capabilities. Acknowledging the changing dynamics of warfare, the Ministers highlighted the importance of developing capabilities and increasing operational cooperation in both conventional and non- conventional domains. The Ministers highlighted space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum as priority areas to better prepare the Alliance for cross-domain operations. On cyberspace issues, the Ministers recognized that malicious cyber activity presents an increasing threat to the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan. To address this threat, the Ministers committed to enhance cooperation on cyber issues, including deterrence and response capabilities, but as a matter of priority, emphasized that each nation is responsible for developing the relevant capabilities to protect their national networks and critical infrastructure. The Ministers affirmed that international law applies in cyberspace and that a cyber attack could, in certain circumstances, constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The Ministers also affirmed that a decision as to when a cyber attack would constitute an armed attack under Article V would be made on a case-by-case basis, and through close consultations between Japan and the United States, as would be the case for any other threat. The Ministers recognized the critical role that U.S. extended deterrence plays in ensuring the security of Japan, as well as the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. The United States reiterated its commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional and nuclear. The Ministers reiterated the importance of the international community’s ongoing commitment to achieving North Korea’s abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related programs and facilities in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The Ministers welcomed the United States’ diplomatic efforts to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, including through the U.S.-North Korea Summits. The Ministers affirmed their commitment to lead international efforts in UNSCR implementation, particularly in combatting illicit ship-to-ship transfers, and the Ministers committed to strengthen and enhance cooperation with other partner countries participating in UNSCR implementation. The Ministers also recognized the successful efforts to bring back U.S. nationals held in North Korea, and called upon North Korea to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately. The Ministers reaffirmed that U.S. force posture in the region would remain robust and grounded in a clear-eyed assessment of threats, and they determined to deepen consultation on ensuring deterrence and security in the region. The Ministers also highlighted the importance of cooperation among the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and committed to work together to promote trilateral security cooperation and exercises. The Ministers expressed serious concern about, and strong opposition to, unilateral coercive attempts to alter the status quo in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS). The Ministers renewed their determination to work together to safeguard the peace and stability of the ECS, and reconfirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and that both nations oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. The Ministers renewed their commitment to work both together and multilaterally to further support a free and open Indo-Pacific, including through joint exercises and port calls with partners in the region, capacity building in such areas as maritime domain awareness and law enforcement, and promotion of sustainable economic development and connectivity through quality infrastructure. The Ministers also recognized the crucial role of the U.S.-Japan Security arrangements in facilitating the greater presence of U.S. forces in the region. To enable the United States to continue to maintain forward deployed forces in Japan, the Ministers reaffirmed the two Governments’ commitment to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces. The Ministers also welcomed the significant progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and reconfirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The Ministers underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion as soon as possible. In recognition of the depth and breadth of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, the Ministers agreed to release a fact sheet detailing additional areas of bilateral cooperation. **Reference 27 Record of Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2018** |Joint Training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Remarks| |Japan-U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise|Oct. 29- Nov. 8, 2018|SDF facilities, U.S. Forces bases in Japan, waters and airspace surrounding Tsushima and Japan, and Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the United States, and their surrounding waters and airspace|Each Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Self-Defense Fleet, respective Regional Districts, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Totaling approximately 47,000 personnel Approximately 20 vessels Approximately 170 aircraft|U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Forces in Japan, Missile Defense Agency, etc.|Training and exercises according to the SDF’s operational procedure and the Japan-U.S. bilateral response procedure| |Japan-U.S. joint air defense/ missile defense exercise|Feb. 22, 25- Mar. 1, 2019|JGSDF Camp Iiduka and Vice- Camp Yaese; MSDF Yokosuka and Sasebo Districts; ASDF Yokota, Kasuga, and Naha Air Bases; and U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base|Joint Staff Office, 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade and 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment of Western Army, Self-Defense Fleet HQs, Destroyers JS “Kongou,” “Myoko,” “Suzutuki,” and “Akizuki,” Air Defense Command HQs, Western and Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, and 2nd and 5th Air Defense Missile Group|U.S. 7th Fleet HQs, several vessels, etc.|Simulation training for response to ballistic missiles and Air defense combat| ----- **Ground Self Defense Force** |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Remarks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Field training with U.S. Army|May 28- Jun. 30, 2018|Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson and surrounding training area (Alaska, the United States), and Donnelly Training Area|1st Airborne Brigade Totaling approximately 110 personnel|Major units of 4-25 Brigade Combat Team and 1-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 230 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| |Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (United States)|Jun. 13-28, 2018|Fort Shafter Army Base, Hawaii|Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command HQs, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc. Totaling approximately 150 personnel|Pacific Command HQs, U.S. Army Japan HQs, I Corps, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc. Totaling approximately 150 personnel|Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army| |Field training with U.S. Army|Aug. 23-Sep. 22, 2018|Yakima Training Center, Washington|One major unit of the 1st Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 130 personnel|Major units of 1-17 Infantry Battalion, 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 230 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| |Field training with U.S. Army|Aug. 26- Sep. 19|Camp Takigahara, Soumagahara Maneuver Area, etc.|Major units of 21th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division Totaling approximately 1,200 personnel|Major units of 2-151 Infantry Battalion, 76 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 850 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| |Joint exercise with U.S. Marines|Oct. 5-19, 2018|Tanegashima and its surrounding waters (Kagoshima Prefecture)|Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade Command, 2nd Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, and 1st Helicopter Brigade, etc. Totaling approximately 230 personnel|2nd Battalion E, 4th Marine Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 90 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| |Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (United States)|Dec. 3-17, 2018|Camp Higashi Chitose, Camp Sendai, etc.|Ground Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, MSDF, ASDF, etc. Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel|I Corps, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, U.S. Army Japan HQs, etc. Totaling approximately 1,600 personnel|Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army| |Joint exercise with U.S. Marines|Dec. 7-19, 2018|Hijudai Maneuver Area, Jumonjihara Maneuver Area, and ASDF Tsuiki Air Base|Major units from 41th Infantry Regiment, 4th Division Totaling approximately 750 personnel|Major units of 2-23 Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment Totaling approximately 250 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| |Joint exercise with U.S. Marines|Jan. 7- Feb. 16, 2019|Camp Pendleton (California, the United States) and its surrounding waters and airspace|Ground Component Command HQs, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade Command, 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 550 personnel|1st Marine Expeditionary Unit HQs; 1st Marine Division HQs; 1st Marine Regiment; and Amphibious Squadron, 3rd Fleet Totaling approximately 500 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| |Joint exercise with U.S. Marines|Feb. 4-15, 2019|Aibano Maneuver Area, Camp Imazu, and Camp Akeno|Major units of 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Division Totaling approximately 600 personnel|Major units of 2-23 Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, and 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Totaling approximately 340 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| |Field training with U.S. Army in the United States|Jan. 20- Mar. 13, 2019|Fort Irwin (National Training Center) (California, the United States)|Major units of the 72nd Tank Regiment, the 7th Division Totaling approximately 390 personnel|1-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, U.S. Army Alaska Totaling approximately 4,500 personnel|Training for Japan- U.S. coordination, and enhancement of interoperability| **Maritime Self-Defense Force** |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Remarks| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan-U.S. joint training|Apr. 9, 2018|Waters west of Kyushu|1 vessel|Several amphibious assault ships, etc.|Tactical training| |Japan-U.S. joint medical training|Jun. 14, 2018|Submarine Rescue Ship JS “Chiyoda,” Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Hospital Ship USNS “Mercy,” and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka|Self-Defense Fleet HQs, Underwater Medical Center, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, Medical Service Unit Yokosuka, and Submarine Rescue Ship JS “Chiyoda” Totaling approximately 100 personnel|U.S. 7th Fleet HQs; Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka; U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka; and Hospital Ship USNS “Mercy” Totaling approximately 350 personnel|Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination in the medical area| |Joint cruise training|Jun. 16-23, 2018|Waters and airspace surrounding Guam through south of Okinawa|2 vessels|Several carriers, etc.|Tactical training| |Joint cruise training|Aug. 15-21, 2018|Waters and airspace south of Kanto through surrounding Okinawa via south of Shikoku|1 vessel|Several carriers, etc.|Tactical training| |Japan-U.S. joint training|Aug. 26-27, 2018|Waters surrounding Okinawa|1 vessel|Several Amphibious assault ships, etc.|Tactical training| |Japan-U.S. joint training|Aug. 31, 2018|Waters and airspace west of the Philippines|3 vessels|Several carriers, etc.|Tactical training| |Medical special training|Sep. 21, 2018|U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base, Self- Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka|HQs Yokosuka District, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, and Medical Service Unit Yokosuka Totaling approximately 160 personnel|Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka; and U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka Totaling approximately 350 personnel|Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination in the medical area| |Bilateral training with U.S. Navy|Oct. 8-10, 2018|Waters and airspace east of Okinawa through west of Kyushu via the East China Sea|1 vessel 4 aircraft|Several carriers, etc.|Tactical training| |Joint cruise training|Oct. 22-27, 2018|Waters and airspace surrounding Bashi Channel through south of Kyushu via east of Okinawa|1 vessel|Several carriers, etc.|Tactical training| |Joint cruise training|Nov. 8-16, 2018|Waters and airspace south of Shikoku through surrounding Okinawa|1 vessel|Several carriers, etc.|Tactical training| |Japan-U.S. joint training|Nov. 14-17, 2018|East China Sea|2 aircraft|1 aircraft|Information sharing training| |Joint cruise training|Nov. 27-Dec.5, 2018|Waters and airspace surrounding Bashi Channel through south of Kanto|1 vessel|Several carriers, etc.|Tactical training| |Joint cruise training|Jan. 11-12, 2019|Waters west of Kyushu|1 vessel|Several Amphibious assault ships, etc.|Tactical training| |Anti-submarine special training|Feb. 13-22, 2019|Off the coast of Shikoku|5 vessels 5 submarines Several aircraft|Submarine|Anti-submarine warfare training| ----- |Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Remarks| |Fighter combat training|Apr. 6-12, 2018|Airspace off the coast of Hyakuri|4 aircraft|5 aircraft|Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills| |Fighter combat training|Apr. 23-27, 2018|Airspace west of Hokkaido and east of Misawa|4 aircraft|6 aircraft|Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills| |Fighter combat training|May 9-24, 2018|Airspace east of Misawa and west of Akita, and Misawa Air-to- Ground Range|10 aircraft|8 aircraft|Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills| |Navigation and formation training|May 17, 2018|Airspace surrounding Kyushu|4 aircraft|2 aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills| |Participation in U.S. Air Force exercise (RED FLAG-Alaska)|May 28- Jun.30, 2018|Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, and their surrounding airspace|10 aircraft Totaling approximately 290 personnel|Aircraft, etc.|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills| |Fighter combat training|Jul. 16-20, 2018|Airspace off the coast of Komatsu|4 aircraft|6 aircraft|Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills| |Navigation and formation training|Jul. 27, 2018|Airspace over the Sea of Japan|6 aircraft|2 aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills| |Navigation and formation training|Sep. 27, 2018|Airspace of the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan|16 aircraft|1 aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills| |Fighter combat training|Oct. 27-Nov. 9, 2018|Airspace off the coast of Shikoku|20 aircraft|8 aircraft|Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills| |Fighter combat training|Nov. 5-8, 2018|Airspace off the coast of Shikoku|10 aircraft|6 aircraft|Training for Japan-U.S. coordination and air combat, improvement of tactical skills| |Navigation and formation training|Mar. 5, 2019|Airspace surrounding the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea|16 aircraft|1 aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills| |Air defense combat training|Mar. 20, 2019|Airspace off the coast of Shikoku|4 aircraft|10 aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, improvement of tactical skills| **Reference 28 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects** |Item|Summary|Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development|Completion date| |---|---|---|---| |Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, lowvulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, electronic device mounted on successor aircraft to P-3C, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications, hybrid electric drive||Completed|| |SM-3 Block IIA|Development of advanced missile interceptor|June 2006|Ongoing (moved to the joint produce/ deployment stage)| |High-Speed Multi-Hull Vessel Optimization|Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area|March 2014|Ongoing| |Comparison of Operational Jet Fuel and Noise Exposures|Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel|November 2015|Ongoing| |Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader|Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit|February 2017|Ongoing| |High-Temperature Case Technologies|Research on rocket motor case made of high-temperature CFRP* (CFRP: Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic)|July 2018|Ongoing| |Next Generation Amphibious Technologies|Research on the feasibility of the technology by simulations based on digital models of amphibious vehicles|May 2019|Ongoing| ----- **Reference 29 Outline of 23 Issues** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of April 1, 2019)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Facility|Scope|Area (ha)|Classification||||Remarks| ||||SCC|Gun-Ten- Kyo|Governor|U.S. Forces|| ||||||||| |Army POL Depots|1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City|4|||◎||Returned on December 31, 1990| |Camp Zukeran|2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)|0.1||◎|||Returned on September 30, 1991| ||20. Awase Meadows Golf Course|47|||◎||Returned on July 31, 2010| |Northern Training Area|3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district|480||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1993| ||4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line|(256)|◎||||| |Camp Schwab|5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)|1|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Makiminato Service Area Annex|6. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on March 31, 1993| |Naha Cold Storage|7. In whole|Building|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Sunabe Warehouse|8. In whole|0.3||||◎|Returned on June 30, 1993| |Yaedake Communication Site|9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)|19|◎||||Returned on November 30, 1994| |Onna Communication Site|10. In whole|62|||◎||Returned on September 30, 1995| ||11. Eastern part|(26)|◎||||| |Kadena Air Base|12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)|2||◎|||Returned on January 31, 1996| |Chibana Site|13. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on December 31, 1996| |Camp Hansen|14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)|3||◎|||Returned on December 31, 1996| ||23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)|162|◎||||Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha) Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))|74|○||||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)|3|◦|◎|||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)|9|○||||Returned on March 31, 2005| ||(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)|58|○||||Returned on October 31, 2006| |Torii Communication Station|16. Kadena bypass|4||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1999| |Deputy Division Engineer Office|17. In whole|4|◎||||Returned on September 30, 2002| |Camp Kuwae|(19. Southern side of the eastern part)|2|○|○|||Returned on December 31, 1994| ||18. Northern part (Ihei)|38||◎|||Returned on March 31, 2003| ||(18. Along Route 58)|(5)|○||||| |MCAS Futenma|21. Lands along eastern side (Nakabaru - Ginowan)|4||◎|||Returned on July 31, 2017| ||17 facilities, 21 issues|977|7|8|3|3|| ||||||||| |Camp Kuwae|19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)|0.5|◎||||Change agreed on December 21, 2001| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area|43|◎||||Release agreed on March 28, 1996| ||2 facilities, 2 issues|44|2|0|0|0|| |Total|17 facilities, 23 issues|1,021|9|8|3|3|| Notes: 1. For the “Area” column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above. 2. A single circle in the “Classification” column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue. 3. The numbers in the “Scope” column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues. 4. “SCC” in the “Classification” column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. “Gun-Ten-Kyo” indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa’s governor. “Governor” indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. “U.S. Forces” indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa. ----- **Reference 30 The SACO Final Report (tentative translation)** (December 2, 1996) The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance. The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year. The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996. The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned. Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary. The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee. The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security SubCommittee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject. In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time. **Return Land:** — Futenma Air Station—See attached. — Northern Training Area Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/ 9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions: � Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean. � Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area. — Aha Training Area Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided. — Gimbaru Training Area Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Sobe Communication Site Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated. — Camp Kuwae Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa. — Senaha Communication Station Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained. — Makiminato Service Area Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area. — Naha Port Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres). — Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran) Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.). **Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:** — Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997. — Parachute drop training Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield. — Conditioning hikes on public roads Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated. **Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:** — Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented. — Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed. — Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996. — Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998. — Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces. **Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:** — Accident reports Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities. — Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements. ----- — Visits to U.S. facilities and areas Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all nontactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997. — Supplemental automobile insurance Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997. — Payment for claims Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner: - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible. - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities. - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount. — Quarantine procedures Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States. — Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee **The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station** **(an integral part of the SACO Final Report) (tentative translation)** (Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996) 1. Introduction a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF). b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary. c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work. 2. Decisions of the SCC a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations. b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions. c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base. d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available. e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational. 3. Guiding Principles a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities. b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas. c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing. d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision. f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation. 4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible. a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed. b. Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater. c. Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea. 5. The Next Steps a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection. b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility. c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility. ----- **Reference 31 Progress of the SACO Final Report** |[Return of Lands] 1. Already returned facilities|Col2| |---|---| |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)|x April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc. x February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) x December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,010ha) was returned| |Aha Training Area (Return of total area)|x December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)| |Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)|x January 2008: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen x July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60ha)| |Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)|x April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen x December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53ha) returned| |Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)|x October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated x December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 191ha) returned| |Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)|x March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station x September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61ha excluding the microwave tower portion) x October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station| **2. Facilities to be returned as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan** |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation x December 2015: Japan and the U.S. came to an agreement on partial early land return to be used for municipal roads.| ||[Already returned area] x May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 473m2) x September 1997: Partially returned (approx. 62m2) x July 2017: Partially returned (approx. 4ha) x March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 0.4ha)| |Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas) → Return of total area)*|x July 2002: Youth Center provided x January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities. x December 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital. x February 2008: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (helipad) x December 2008: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of accessory facility (utility). x May 2009: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (barracks for non-accompanied enlisted sailors) x October 2009: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 1) x October 2010: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facility (water tank 2) x September 2011: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities (barracks for non-accompanied officers, blood storage facility, etc.) x February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished x March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened x December 2013: The Japan-U.S. committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) x December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished| ||[Already returned Area] x March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38ha)| |Makiminato Service Area (Return of most areas) → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation x December 2015: the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on partial land return for the expansion of national highway x March 2018: Partially returned (approximately 3ha)| ||[Already returned area] x May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 38m2) x September 2001: Partially returned (approx. 1ha) x August, 2013: Return of north access road (approx. 1ha) x March 2018: Partially returned (approx. 3ha) x March 31, 2019: Return of area near Gate 5 (approx. 2ha)| |Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| ||[Already returned area] x June 2000: Partially returned (approx. 1ha)| ----- |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*|(Phase I: Golf Range Area) x April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others x July 2002: Two high rises were furnished x July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) x February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others x September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) x March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others x June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) x March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others x February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation * April 2013: It was written in the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa that the OHC plan will be reassessed under SACO, and that 910 family housing (including alternatives for housing that are to be removed in consolidated areas) will be built in addition to 56 housing already agreed to build based on the request for family housing after the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.| ||[Already returned area] x March 1997: Partially returned (approx. 371m2) x May 1997: Partially returned (approx. 598m2) x June 1997: Partially returned (approx. 353m2) x December 1997: Partially returned (approx. 0.3ha) x March 1998: Partially returned (approx. 2ha) x February 2000: Partially returned (approx. 3ha) x December 2006: Partially returned (approx. 145m2) x March, 2015: Return of West Futenma Housing Area (approx. 51ha)| **[Adjustment in training or operation]** |Point|State of Progress| |---|---| |Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104|x Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997| |Parachute Drop Training|x Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000| **[Implementation of initiatives to reduce noise]** |1. Initiatives already taken|Col2| |---|---| |Point|State of Progress| |Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base|x June 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of rinse facility x September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished x February 2009: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp x October 2010: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of area forming and the construction of ramp and taxiway. x April 2011: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of parking and utility. x February 2013: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of the construction of type II maintenance hangar. x July 2013: Ramp, etc. provided. x July 2014: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc. x December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc. x January 2017: Relocation completed| |Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base|x July 2000: Furnished| **2. Ongoing initiatives as the U.S. Forces realignment** |Point|State of Progress| |---|---| |Transfer of KC-130 aircraft*|* May 2006: United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam.| ----- **Reference 32 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility** |Month & Year|Background| |---|---| |April 1996|Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.| |December 1996|SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).| |November 1999|Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use| |December 1999|Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab| |July 2002|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided| |November 2003|Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.| |August 2004|A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.| |October 2005|“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)| |April 2006|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).| |May 2006|x “2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved “Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. x “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.| |August 2006|Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”| |August 2007|The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.| |April 2009|Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |September 2009|Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.| |November 2009|Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.| |December 2009|Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.| |May 2010|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”| |August 2010|Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report| |June 2011|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.| |December 2011 - January 2012|The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.| |February 2012|The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.| |April 2012|“2+2” Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.| |December 2012|Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |March 2013|Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.| |April 2013|Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → MCAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.| |October 2013|“2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma| |December 2013|Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project| |July 2014|Started the construction of replacement facilities| |April 2015|“2+2” Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma| |October 2015|x Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project x The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution x The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit| |November 2015|x Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma x The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit| |March 2016|x The government announced it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation x Landfill work was suspended x The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit x Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism| ----- |Month & Year|Background| |---|---| |April 2016|Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court suggested settlement under the philosophy of ‘’haste makes waste,’’ and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that its understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe’s strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation.| |June 2016|x The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review x Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it fully understands the views of the Japanese Government and will continue to work closely with Japan.| |July 2016|x The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act| |September 2016|x Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it will continue to work closely with Japan.| |December 2016|x Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely x The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa in a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act (finalized victory of the national government) x Governor of Okinawa retracted the revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project x Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project x Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction| |February 2017|x Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely x Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution| |April 2017|Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation| |July 2017|Okinawa Prefectural Government filed a lawsuit against the central government arguing it is illegal to damage rock on the seabed without securing permission of the governor.| |August 2017|Joint statement of “2+2” → The four ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma.| |March 2018|x Naha District Court dismissed Okinawa Prefecture’s claim regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc.| |August 2018|x Okinawa Prefecture revoked (withdrew) the landfill permit for public waters.| |October 2018|x The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review Okinawa Prefecture’s withdrawal of the landfill permit for public waters, and requested the suspension of its execution. x The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit.| |November 2018|x Okinawa Prefecture objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to suspend execution, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council.| |December 2018|x The Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court rejected an appeal by Okinawa Prefecture regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. x Landfill work in Henoko side commenced| |February 2019|x The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review by Okinawa Prefecture.| |March 2019|x Okinawa Prefecture filed a lawsuit to demand a revocation of the decision to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. x Okinawa Prefecture withdrew a petition for acceptance of final appeal with the Supreme Court regarding a suit that demands for an injunctive order for actions that damage the reefs, etc. (finalized victory of the central government).| |April 2019|x Regarding the request for review by the Okinawa Defense Bureau, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism decided to revoke the withdrawal of the landfill permit by Okinawa Prefecture x Okinawa Prefecture withdrew its claim regarding the suit to revoke the decision to suspend execution of the withdrawal of the landfill permit. x Okinawa Prefecture objected to the decision by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, and applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council| |June 2019|x The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council dismissed the request for review by Okinawa Prefecture| |Reference 33|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Returned (March 31, 2015) The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned (August 31, 2013) Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned (March 31, 2019) A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2019 or later1||| ||West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|Returned (March 31, 2015)| ||The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|Returned (August 31, 2013)| ||Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|Returned (March 31, 2019)| ||A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2019 or later1| |Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) JFY2025 or later Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later2, 3 Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area JFY2025 or later Naha Port JFY2028 or later Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 JFY2022 or later Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma JFY2022 or later||| ||Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)|JFY2025 or later| ||Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||A part of Kishaba Housing area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later2, 3| ||Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area|JFY2025 or later| ||Naha Port|JFY2028 or later| ||Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1|JFY2022 or later| ||Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma|JFY2022 or later| ----- |Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan|Col2| |---|---| |Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|—| |The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2024 or later4| Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) — The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2024 or later4 Notes: 1. Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing. 2. Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. 3. Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing. 4. Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. |Reference 34|Col2| |---|---| |June 6, 2011|The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.| |June 13, 2012-|Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc. to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 29-|Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa x Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). x Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. x The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.| |July 23|Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.| |September 19|Released the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey’s operations.| |October 6|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.| |January 28, 2013|The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.| |April 30|The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).| |July 30|The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.| |September 25|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.| |May 11, 2015|The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.| |December 13, 2016|Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.| |February 1, 2017|Planned maintenance interval of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.| |March 14|Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.| |August 5|Accident of a MV-22 attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (Futenma) off the east coast of Australia.| |April 3, 2018|U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed to Japan around summer of 2018, and that a total of ten Osprey would be deployed gradually over the next few years.| |August 22, 2018|Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Forces in Japan announced that five CV-22 Osprey would be deployed at Yokota Air Base on October 1, 2018, and that a total of ten CV-22 would be deployed at Yokota Air Base gradually by around 2024.| |October 1, 2018|Five CV-22 Osprey were deployed at Yokota Air Base.| ----- **Reference 35 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan** 1. Purpose It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc. 2. Special Measures, etc. (1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts  In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents’ lives more convenient and to developing industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.  The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented. (2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts  Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.  Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant ministers, and at the Council’s meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment). (3) Measures for USFJ local employees  Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees. 3. Expiration of the Law This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on the situation of the realignment. Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuantto the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017. 2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation. However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint Statement of April 2012 limited Japan’ s financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized. **Reference 36** **Agreement between the Government of Japan and the** **Government of the United States of America on** **Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices** **Relating to the Civilian Component of the United States** **Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement** **under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and** **Security between Japan and the United States of America,** **Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United** **States Armed Forces in Japan** (signed on January 16, 2017) The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “United States Government”), hereinafter referred to as the “Parties”; Confirming that the United States armed forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the “United States armed forces”) under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the “Treaty”) and the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (hereinafter referred to as the “Status of Forces Agreement”), both signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East; Bearing in mind the “Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component” announced by the Parties on July 5, 2016, and its recognition of the spirit of Alliance cooperation and the mutual commitment of Japan and the United States to strengthen the Alliance further and to enhance deterrence in a complex regional and global security environment; Acknowledging the essential role of members of the civilian component defined in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Civilian Component”) in fulfilling the United St t ’ bli ti d th T t ll th i t f t i i d education processes for United States personnel with Status of Forces Agreement status; Wishing to strengthen cooperation between the Parties by establishing a framework, including this Agreement which supplements the Status of Forces Agreement, with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component; Affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Joint Committee provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Committee”) as the means for consultation between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement; and Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component further contributes to achieving the objective of the Treaty and strengthening the Alliance; Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1 The purpose of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation between the Parties with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component. ARTICLE 2 The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint Committee. Through the Working Group, the Parties shall retain the right to initiate consultations regarding implementation of this Agreement. ARTICLE 3 The Parties shall continue to cooperate fully, through the framework of the Joint Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays an essential role in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty. 1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian Component consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint Committee to develop. 2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that the United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee ----- positions for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component. Such criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component have skills or knowledge required for the accomplishment of mission requirements. ARTICLE 4 Through the framework of the Joint Committee, the Parties also shall cooperate to strengthen mechanisms and procedures to ensure that persons ordinarily resident in Japan are excluded from being members of the Civilian Component. ARTICLE 5 1. The Parties, through the framework of the Joint Committee, shall establish a procedure so that the Government of Japan is notified promptly ofcontractor employees who have been designated as members of the Civilian Component. The Parties shall consult in the Working Group upon the request of either Party regarding such notification. 2. Upon the development of criteria as directed in Article 3, the United States Government is to establish and maintain procedures for formalized, regular reviews of contractor employees who are designated as members of the Civilian Component to ensure that they are in fact eligible for such status. 3. The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall establish procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component. The United States Government is to provide such reports to the Government of Japan. ARTICLE 6 If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for resolving matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement. ARTICLE 7 1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature. 2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement remains in force. 3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this Agreement by giving one year’s written notice through diplomatic channels to the other Party. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement. DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017. **Reference 37 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements** |Col1|Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement|Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)|Information Security Agreement|Security and Defense Cooperation Documents| |---|---|---|---|---| |United States|Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983 Established the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006|Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in October 1996 Signed in April 1998 and revised in September 1999 Signed in February 2004 and revised in July 2004 Signed in September 2016 and entered into force in April 2017|Signed and entered into force in August 2007|Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Set forth in November 1978 Set forth in September 1997 Set forth in April 2015 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in April 1996| |Australia|Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in December 2014|Signed in May 2010 Entered into force in January 2013 Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in September 2017|Signed in May 2012 Entered into force in March 2013|Signed memorandum in September 2003 Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security in March 2007 Revised memorandum in December 2008| |United Kingdom|Signed and entered into force in July 2013|Signed in January 2017 Entered into force in August 2017|Signed in July 2013 Entered into force in January 2014|Signed memorandum in January 2004 Revised memorandum in June 2012 Japan-U.K Joint Declaration on Security in August 2017| |France|Signed in March 2015 Entered into force in December 2016|Signed in July 2018 Entered into force in June 2019|Signed and entered into force in October 2011|Signed statement of intent in July 2014| |India|Signed in December 2015 Entered into force in March 2016|Agreed to begin negotiations for conclusion at the Japan-India Summit Meeting in October 2018|Signed and entered into force in December 2015|Japan-India Joint Declaration on Security in October 2008 Signed memorandum in September 2014| |Republic of Korea|—|Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011|Signed and entered into force in November 2016|Signed statement of intent in April 2009| |Indonesia|Agreed to begin negotiations at the “2+2” Meeting in December 2015|—|—|Signed memorandum in March 2015| |Philippines|Signed in February 2016 Entered into force in April 2016|—|—|Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015| |New Zealand|—|Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014|—|Signed memorandum in August 2013| |Germany|Signed and entered into force in July 2017|—|Affirmed conclusion of an agreement in principle at Japan-Germany Summit Meeting in February 2019|—| |Italy|Signed in May 2017 Entered into force in April 2019|—|Signed in March 2016 Entered into force in June 2016|Signed statement of intent in June 2012 Signed memorandum in May 2017| |Canada|—|Signed in April 2018 Entered into force in July 2019|—|Japan-Canada Joint Declaration on Political, Peace and Security Cooperation in November 2010| |Russia|—|—|—|Signed memorandum in August 1999 Revised memorandum in January 2006| |NATO|—|—|Signed and entered into force in June 2010|Announced: Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between Japan and NATO in May 2014 Revised in May 2018| |Malaysia|Signed and entered into force in April 2018|—|—|Signed memorandum in September 2018| |UAE|—|—|—|Signed memorandum in May 2018| ----- **Reference 38 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2018)**  (Number of students) |Country Institution|Thailand|Philippines|Indonesia|Singapore|Malaysia|Vietnam|Cambodia|T Lim eso ter-|Laos|Myanmar|India|Pakistan|oR fe Kpu ob relic a|Mongolia|Australia|United States|United Kingdom|Germany|France|New Zealand|Mexico|Spain|Ghana|Qatar|Sri Lanka|Italy|Sub total| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |National Institute for Defense Studies|||||||||||1|||||2||1|||||||||4| |National Defense Academy|6|2||||11|2|2|2|2|||3|3|1|5|||7||||||||46| |Ground Self-Defense Force (Training Evaluation Research and Development Command, etc.)|1||||||1||||1|4|3|2||3|||||||||||15| |Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|1||||||||||1||2||1||||||||||||5| |Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|1||||||||||1||4|||1|||||||||||7| |Joint Staff College|1||||2||||||1||4|||||2||1|2|1|1|1|2|1|19| |Total|10|2|0|0|2|11|3|2|2|2|5|4|16|5|2|11|0|3|7|1|2|1|1|1|2|1|96| **Reference 39 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Apr. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017 Apr. 2017 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Jan. 2018 Mar. 2018 Sep. 2018 Oct. 2018 Oct. 2018 Jan. 2019 Jan. 2019 Feb. 2019 Feb. 2019 Feb. 2019 Jun. 2019|Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting)  Japan-Australia ACSA signed and entered into force in September 2017 Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (7th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army Visit to Australia by Vice Defense Minister of Japan Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Air Force Telephone conference between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Japan by Australian Prime Minister (summit meeting, meeting with Japanese Defense Minister) Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff Telephone conference between Japanese and Australian Defense Ministers Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (8th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Meeting Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Australia by Chief of Staff Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Australia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Yamada Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Jan. 2018 May 2019|Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)| ----- |Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation (See reference 46 for training and exercise)|Jun. 2016 Feb. 2016 Oct. 2016 Jun. 2017 Jun. 2017 May 2018 Jun. 2018 May 2019 Jun. 2019|4th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) 5th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Japan) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))| |---|---|---| Mar. - May 2016 Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise (MSDF) May 2016 Participation in Japan-Australia bilateral exercice (MSDF) Sep. 2016 Visit to U.S. Yokota Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (KC-30A) and implementation of exchanges between inflight refueling and airlift troops Dec. 2016 Visit to Chitose Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (government plane: B-737) and implementation of exchanges between special airlift troops Feb. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 to Australia Unit-to-unit exchange, etc. Aug. 2017 Visit to Australia by Central Readiness Force Oct. 2017 Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise (MSDF) Oct. 2017 Visit to Iruma Air Base by Australian C-130J, and implementation of exchanges between airlift troops Nov. 2017 Participation in Japan-Australia bilateral exercice (MSDF) Nov. 2017 Dispatch of C-2 to Australia (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges Dec. 2017 Implementation of exchanges between Central Readiness Force and Australian Army 1st Division Sep. 2018 Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise (MSDF) Jun. 2016 4th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Feb. 2016 Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Oct. 2016 Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Jun. 2017 5th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Japan) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation (See reference 46 Jun. 2017 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) for training and exercise) May 2018 Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Jun. 2018 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) May 2019 Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Jun. 2019 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue)) **Reference 40 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India and Sri Lanka (Past Three Years)** ||Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|India|Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Nov. 2016 Dec. 2016 Dec. 2016 Apr. 2017 May 2017 Sep. 2017 Jan. 2018 Mar. 2018 Aug. 2018 Nov. 2018 Dec. 2018 Jan. 2019|Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))) Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi) Visit to India by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to India by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy Staff, Indian Navy Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Indian Defense Minister (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to India by Chief of Staff (participated in the Raisina Dialogue) Visit to India by Chief of Staff Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi) Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of the Air Staff of Indian Air Force Visit to India by Chief of Staff (participated in the Raisina Dialogue)| ||Sri Lanka|Dec. 2016 Jul. 2017 Nov. 2017 Mar. 2018 Aug. 2018|Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Sri Lankan State Minister of Defense Visit to Sri Lanka by Chief of Staff Visit to Sri Lanka by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|India|Mar. 2017 Jun. 2018|4th Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 5th Defence Policy Dialogue (Tokyo) 5th Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 6th Defence Policy Dialogue (Delhi)| ----- |Col1|Col2|Oct. 2018 Oct. - Nov. 2018 Nov. 2018 Dec. 2018 Feb. 2019|Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-India bilateral exercise (GSDF) Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-India bilateral exercise (ASDF) Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF)| |---|---|---|---| ||Sri Lanka|Apr. 2016 May 2016 Jul. 2016 Dec. 2016 Apr. 2017 Jul. 2017 Aug. 2017 Dec. 2017 Aug. 2018 Oct. 2018 Jan. 2019 Mar. 2019|Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Dispatch of ASDF U-4 to Sri Lanka (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)| |Japan-U.S.-India trilateral cooperation (See reference 50 for training and exercise)||Jun. 2016 Apr. 2018|8th Japan-U.S.-India Consultation (Tokyo) 9th Japan-U.S.-India Consultation (Delhi)| Jun. 2016 Unit-to-unit exchanges involving Indian Air Force transport aircraft crews in ASDF bases. Jul. 2016 ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft dispatched to India. Aug. 2016 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF) Dec. 2016 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF) Mar. 2017 Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area with Indian Air Force helicopter units (Japan) Apr. 2017 3rd India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security Sep. 2017 Japan-India goodwill exercise (MSDF) Oct. 2017 Japan-India goodwill and bilateral exercise (MSDF) Dec. 2017 Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area with Indian Air Force helicopter units (India) India Jan. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) May 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Jul. 2018 4th India-Japan Dialogue on Ocean Security Sep. 2018 Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) **Reference 41 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN member states (Past Three Years)** ||Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|Indonesia|Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Sep. 2018|Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Indonesian Chief of Staff of the army Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Vice Defense Minister of Indonesia (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff (AFFJ) Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Vice Defense Minister of Indonesia (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))| ||Vietnam|Jul. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jun. 2017 Aug. 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Jan. 2018 Apr. 2018 Jun. 2018 Jul. 2018 Sep. 2018 Jan. 2019 Mar. 2019 May 2019|Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff (Pacific Partnership) Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Chief of General Staff Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense| ----- |Col1|Jun. 2018 Jul. 2018 Sep. 2018 Oct. 2018 May 2019|Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (5th ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence| |---|---|---| |Philippines|May 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017 Apr. 2017 May 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Oct. 2017 Nov. 2017 Mar. 2018 Apr. 2018 Apr. 2018 Jun. 2018 Jun. 2018 Sep. 2018 Sep. 2018 Nov. 2018 Nov. 2018 Mar. 2019 Mar. 2019 Apr. 2019 Jun. 2019|Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFFJ) Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense and Commanding General of Philippine Air Force (Turnover ceremony for the parts, etc. of UH-1Hs) Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Philippine Secretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff| |Thailand|May 2016 Jun. 2016 Aug. 2016 Aug. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jan. 2017 Mar. 2017 May 2017 Nov. 2017 Nov. 2017 Feb. 2018 Mar. 2018 Apr. 2018 May 2018 Sep. 2018 May 2019|Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Army Commander Visit to Thailand by Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Thailand by Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander Visit to Thailand by State Minister of Defense Visit to Thailand by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Thailand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (to observe exercise) Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defense Forces Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander| |Cambodia|Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2018|Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Air Force (AFFJ) Visit to Japan by Cambodian Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting, Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum))| |Myanmar|Apr. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Aug. 2017 Sep. 2017 Jan. 2018 Sep. 2018|Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by Minister of Defense Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan Japan by Myanmarese Secretary of National Defense and Deputy Minister of Defence (Tokyo (Defense Ministerial Meeting), Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force (AFFJ) Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Myanmar by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))| Jun. 2016 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jun. 2016 Japan-Singapore Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) May 2017 Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff Jun. 2017 Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jun. 2017 Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Oct. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Singapore Army Singapore Feb. 2018 Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff May 2018 Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Jun. 2018 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jul. 2018 Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Singaporean Defence Permanent Secretary (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2018 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (5th ADMM-Plus)) May 2019 Visit to Japan by Singaporean Minister of Defence May 2016 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Sep. 2016 Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFFJ) Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy Mar. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Apr. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs May 2017 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Oct. 2017 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Nov. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff Philippines Mar. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy Apr. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Jun. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Jun. 2018 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Sep. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Nov. 2018 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Nov. 2018 Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense Mar. 2019 Visit to Japan by Undersecretary for Finance and Materiel of the Philippine Department of National Defense and Commanding General of Philippine Air Force (Turnover ceremony for the parts, etc. of UH-1Hs) Mar. 2019 Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff Apr. 2019 Visit to Japan by Philippine Secretary of National Defense Jun. 2019 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff May 2016 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Army Commander Jun. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Minister of Defense Aug. 2016 Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces Aug. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Nov. 2016 Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff Jan. 2017 Visit to Thailand by Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Mar. 2017 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs May 2017 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander Thailand Nov. 2017 Visit to Thailand by State Minister of Defense Nov. 2017 Visit to Thailand by MSDF Chief of Staff Feb. 2018 Visit to Thailand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (to observe exercise) Mar. 2018 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Apr. 2018 Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defense Forces May 2018 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander Sep. 2018 Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff May 2019 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander Aug. 2016 Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Air Force (AFFJ) Cambodia Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting, Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum)) Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice- Ministerial Forum)) Apr. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Jun. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Minister of Defense Jul. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan Japan by Myanmarese Secretary of National Defense and Deputy Minister of Defence (Tokyo (Defense Ministerial Meeting), Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Myanmar Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force (AFFJ) Aug. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services of Myanmar Sep. 2017 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Jan. 2018 Visit to Myanmar by GSDF Chief of Staff Sep. 2018 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defense (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) ----- |Col1|Laos|Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Sep. 2018 Dec. 2018|Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos (2nd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting)) Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Laos by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Defense of Laos (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| |---|---|---|---| ||Malaysia|Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017 Sep. 2017 Apr. 2018 Sep. 2018 Sep. 2018|Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Chief of Navy of Malaysian Navy Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Fukuoka (9th Japan-ASEAN Defense vice-Ministerial Forum))  Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Malaysia (Defense Ministerial Meeting, Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))| ||Brunei|Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2018 Sep. 2018|Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Brunei by Administrative Vice Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting)) Visit to Brunei by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei (Nagoya (10th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum))| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Indonesia|Jul. 2017|3rd Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Consultation (PM), 8th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Vietnam|Nov. 2016 Aug. 2017 Jul. 2018|4th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo) 5th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Nha Trang) 6th Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)| ||Singapore|Apr. 2017|15th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Philippines|Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017|4th Japan-Philippines Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Sendai) 5th Japan-Philippines Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)| ||Thailand|Aug. 2016 Sep. 2018|13th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 13th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Thailand) 14th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Cambodia|Jul. 2017|5th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation, 4th Japan-Cambodia Defense Consultation (Phnom Penh)| ||Myanmar|Mar. 2017|2nd Japan-Myanmar Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)| ||Laos|Jul. 2017|2nd Japan-Laos Defense Consultation (Vientiane)| ||Malaysia|Jun. 2017|6th Japan-Malaysia Defense Consultation (Kuala Lumpur)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Indonesia|Aug. 16 Jan. 2017 Sep. 2018|Japan-Indonesia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Indonesia unit-to-unit exchanges (Halim) (ASDF) Japan-Indonesia goodwill exercise (MSDF)| ||Vietnam|Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017 May 2018 Sep. 2018 Mar. 2019 Jun. 2019|Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF) Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF) Japan-Vietnam goodwill exercise (MSDF) Visit to Vietnam by a training submarine (Cam Ranh) (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-130H to Vietnam (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges) Japan-Vietnam goodwill exercise (MSDF)| ||Singapore|May 2017 Oct. 2017 Nov. 2017 Oct. 2018|MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Singapore Navy (Singapore) (MSDF) Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Tokyo, etc.) (GSDF) Japan-Singapore unit-to-unit exchanges (Paya Lebar) (ASDF) Japan-Singapore goodwill exercise (MSDF)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Philippines|Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Jan. 2017 May 2017 Sep. 2017 Nov. 2017 Feb. 2018 May 2018 Sep. 2018 May 2019 Jun. 2019|Japan-Philippines unit-to-unit exchanges (Clark) (ASDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-Philippines bilateral exercise (MSDF)| Apr. 2016 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Aug. 2016 Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Minister of National Defense of Laos (Sendai (8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum)) ----- |Thailand|Nov. 2017 Jan. 2018 Feb. 2018 Oct. 2018 Oct. 2018|Participation in fleet review hosted by the Royal Thai Navy in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of ASEAN (Pattaya) (MSDF) Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Don Mueang) (ASDF) Japan-Thailand goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (GSDF) Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF)| |---|---|---| |Laos|Jan. 2017|Japan-Laos unit-to-unit exchanges (Vientiane) (ASDF)| |Malaysia|Apr. 2016 Jan. 2017 May 2017 Jan. 2018 Sep. 2018 Apr. 2019|Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Malaysia unit-to-unit exchanges (Subang) (ASDF) Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF)| |Brunei|May 2017 Jul. 2017 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2019 Jun. 2019|Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise Japan-Brunei unit-to-unit exchanges (Bandar Seri Begawan) (ASDF) Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-Brunei bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-Brunei bilateral exercise (MSDF)| Jan. 2017 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF) Sep. 2017 Japan-Thailand goodwill exercise (MSDF) Nov. 2017 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (U-tapao) (ASDF) Nov. 2017 Participation in fleet review hosted by the Royal Thai Navy in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of ASEAN (Pattaya) (MSDF) Thailand Jan. 2018 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Don Mueang) (ASDF) Feb. 2018 Japan-Thailand goodwill exercise (MSDF) Oct. 2018 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (GSDF) Oct. 2018 Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF) Laos Jan. 2017 Japan-Laos unit-to-unit exchanges (Vientiane) (ASDF) Apr. 2016 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Jan. 2017 Japan-Malaysia unit-to-unit exchanges (Subang) (ASDF) May 2017 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Malaysia Jan. 2018 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Sep. 2018 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) Apr. 2019 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise (MSDF) May 2017 Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise Jul. 2017 Japan-Brunei unit-to-unit exchanges (Bandar Seri Begawan) (ASDF) Brunei Feb. 2018 Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise (MSDF) Apr. 2019 Japan-Brunei bilateral exercise (MSDF) Jun. 2019 Japan-Brunei bilateral exercise (MSDF) **Reference 42 Recent Japan-ROK Defense Cooperation and Exchanges (Past Three Years)** ||Col2|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of defense and others|Apr. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Mar. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Apr. 2018 Jun. 2018 Oct. 2018 Oct. 2018|Visit to Japan by ROK Army Chief of Staff Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue)) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Seoul (5th Seoul Defense Dialogue)) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to ROK by GSDF Chief of Staff (participated in PACC) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Japan by Chief of ROK Army Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to ROK by MSDF Chief of Staff (participated in Western Pacific Naval Symposium) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM Plus))| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Mar. 2018|11th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Tokyo)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|May 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Feb. 2017 Oct. 2017 Dec. 2017 Sep. 2018 Nov. 2018|Participation of MSDF vessels in Pacific Reach hosted by the ROK (MSDF) Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF) Visit to the ROK by Sasebo District Commandant (MSDF) Visit to Atsugi Air Base by ROK Navy P-3C (MSDF) Visit to Japan by Commander of the 2nd Operations Command of the ROK (GSDF) Port visit to Pyeongtaek by MSDF Training Squadron (MSDF) Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy, Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise (Yokosuka) (MSDF) Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF) Port visit to Japan by the training squadron of the Korean navy (Sasebo) (MSDF)| ----- Jun. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Sep. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Oct. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Dec. 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Seoul) Mar. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Apr. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Tokyo) May 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Jun. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jul. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Aug. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan – U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation Sep. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Oct. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (4th ADMM-Plus)) Oct. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Hawaii) Dec. 2017 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Mar. 2018 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Washington D.C.) May 2018 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Hawaii) Jun. 2018 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Oct. 2018 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (5th ADMM-Plus)) Oct. 2018 Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Meeting (Washington D.C.) May 2019 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense working level meeting (Seoul) Jun. 2019 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue)) **Reference 43 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries, Canada and New Zealand (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|United Kingdom|Jun. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jan. 2017 Apr. 2017 Jul. 2017 Aug. 2017 Aug. 2017 Sep. 2017 Nov. 2017 Dec. 2017 Feb. 2018 Feb. 2018 Mar. 2018 Jun. 2018 Jul. 2018 Sep. 2018 Sep. 2018 Feb. 2019|Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the Air Staff  Japan-U.K. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed; entered into force in August 2017 Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to Japan and tour of JS Izumo by U.K Prime Minister Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to the U.K. by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to the U.K. by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to the U.K. by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defence Visit to Japan by First Sea Lord Visit to the U.K. by Chief of Joint Staff Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the General Staff| ||France|Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jun. 2017 Jun. 2017 Sep. 2017|Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense Visit to France by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense (Paris Air Show) Japan-France Defense Ministerial Teleconference| ----- |France|May 2018 Jun. 2018 Jul. 2018 Jan. 2019 Apr. 2019|Visit to France by MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue))  Japan-France Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed; entered into force in June 2019 Visit to France by State Minister of Defense (5th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the French Army| |---|---|---| |Canada|Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Jun. 2016 Sep. 2017 Sep. 2017 Nov. 2017 Dec. 2017 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2018 Dec. 2018 Jun. 2019|Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Canada (3rd Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)) Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Canada by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Canada by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Canada by State Minister of Defense (UN PKO Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Commander, Royal Canadian Navy Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Armed Forces  Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed Visit to Japan by Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada (4th Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”)) Visit to Japan by Minister for National Defence of Canada| |New Zealand|Jun. 2016 Feb. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 May 2018 Feb. 2019 Jun. 2019|Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by New Zealand Chief of Defense Force Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander Visit to New Zealand by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| |NATO|Jun. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jun. 2017 Oct. 2017 Mar. 2018 Sep. 2018|NVisit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Visit to NATO by Minister of Defense (talks with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg) Visit to Japan by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATO Visit to Japan by Secretary General of NATO (talks with Defense Minister) Visit to NATO by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples by Minister of Defense| |Germany|Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 Sep. 2017 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2018 May 2018 Jun. 2018 Feb. 2019|Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense Visit to German by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Visit to Germany by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs (1st Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue)  Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Visit to Germany by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Berlin International Aerospace Show) Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference)| |Italy|Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 May 2017 Sep. 2017 Oct. 2017 Feb. 2018 Sep. 2018 Feb. 2019|Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Italy by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defense Ministerial Meeting)  Signed an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff Signed a document of exchange between National Institute of Defense Studies and Italian defense research and education organizations Visit to Italy by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Italy by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| |Netherlands|Dec. 2016 Sep. 2018|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Netherlands (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Netherlands by Minister of Defense| |Spain|Jan. 2018 Jul. 2018|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting) 1st Japan-Spain Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Barcelona)| |Belgium|Mar. 2018|Visit to Belgium by Chief of Joint Staff| |Sweden|Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017 Jan. 2018|Visit to Sweden by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Sweden by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Sweden by State Minister of Defense| |Finland|Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017 May 2018 Oct. 2018 Feb. 2019|Visit to Finland by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Finland Air Force Commander Visit to Finland by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Finland by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Finland (Defense Ministerial Meeting)  Japan-Finland memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange signed| Nov. 2017 Visit to France by GSDF Chief of Staff Jan. 2018 Visit to Japan by Minister of Armed Forces (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) May 2018 Visit to France by MSDF Chief of Staff France Jun. 2018 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jul. 2018  Japan-France Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed; entered into force in June 2019 Jan. 2019 Visit to France by State Minister of Defense (5th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Apr. 2019 Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the French Army Apr. 2016 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Canada (3rd Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)) Apr. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy Jun. 2016 Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Sep. 2017 Visit to Canada by ASDF Chief of Staff Sep. 2017 Visit to Canada by Chief of Joint Staff Canada Nov. 2017 Visit to Canada by State Minister of Defense (UN PKO Defense Ministerial Meeting) Dec. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commander, Royal Canadian Navy Feb. 2018 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief, Canadian Armed Forces Apr. 2018  Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed Dec. 2018 Visit to Japan by Associate Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada (4th Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”)) Jun. 2019 Visit to Japan by Minister for National Defence of Canada Jun. 2016 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Feb. 2017 Visit to New Zealand by ASDF Chief of Staff May 2017 Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Jun. 2017 Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) New Zealand Jul. 2017 Visit to New Zealand by State Minister of Defense Jul. 2017 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Chief of Defense Force May 2018 Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander Feb. 2019 Visit to New Zealand by Chief of Joint Staff Jun. 2019 Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Jun. 2016 NVisit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Jan. 2017 Visit to NATO by Minister of Defense (talks with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg) Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Supreme Allied Commander Transformation NATO NATO Oct. 2017 Visit to Japan by Secretary General of NATO (talks with Defense Minister) Mar. 2018 Visit to NATO by Chief of Joint Staff Sep. 2018 Visit to NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples by Minister of Defense Sep. 2016 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense Sep. 2016 Visit to German by Chief of Joint Staff Feb. 2017 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Jul. 2017 Visit to Germany by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs (1st Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue) Jul. 2017  Signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies Germany Sep. 2017 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Teleconference Feb. 2018 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Apr. 2018 Visit to Germany by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Berlin International Aerospace Show) May 2018 Visit to Germany by MSDF Chief of Staff Jun. 2018 Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (17th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Feb. 2019 Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Jun. 2016 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Jun. 2016 Visit to Italy by State Minister of Defense May 2017 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defense Ministerial Meeting)  Signed an agreement concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology Italy Sep. 2017 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Teleconference Oct. 2017 Visit to Italy by MSDF Chief of Staff Feb. 2018 Signed a document of exchange between National Institute of Defense Studies and Italian defense research and education organizations Sep. 2018 Visit to Italy by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Feb. 2019 Visit to Italy by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Dec. 2016 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Netherlands (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Netherlands Sep. 2018 Visit to Netherlands by Minister of Defense Jan. 2018 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Spain Jul. 2018 1st Japan-Spain Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Barcelona) Belgium Mar. 2018 Visit to Belgium by Chief of Joint Staff Feb. 2017 Visit to Sweden by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Sweden Mar. 2017 Visit to Sweden by Chief of Joint Staff Jan. 2018 Visit to Sweden by State Minister of Defense Feb. 2017 Visit to Finland by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Mar. 2017 Visit to Japan by Finland Air Force Commander May 2018 Visit to Finland by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Finland Oct. 2018 Visit to Finland by Chief of Joint Staff Feb. 2019 Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Finland (Defense Ministerial Meeting)  Japan-Finland memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange signed ----- |Col1|Norway|Apr. 2018 Apr. 2018|Visit to Japan by State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Norway Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy of Norway| |---|---|---|---| ||Estonia|May 2018 Sep. 2018|Visit to Estonia by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Estonia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| ||Ukraine|Aug. 2017 Oct. 2018|Visit to Ukraine by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Deputy Minister of Defence of Ukraine  Japan-Ukraine memorandum for defense exchange signed| ||Latvia|Feb. 2018|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defense of Latvia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| ||Czech Republic|Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017|Visit to Japan by Deputy Minister of Defense of the Czech Republic (exchanged opinions with Commissioner of ATLA) Visit to Czech Republic by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense  Japan-Czech Republic memorandum for defense cooperation signed| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|United Kingdom|Oct. 2016 Nov. 2017 Feb. 2019|15th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London) 16th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 17th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 13th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London)| ||France|Jul. 2016 Dec. 2017|19th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 17th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Paris) 20th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 18th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Canada|Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017|9th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Ottawa)| ||New Zealand|Feb. 2017 Dec. 2018|10th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Wellington) 11th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo)| ||NATO|May 2017|15th Japan-NATO High-Level Consultation (Tokyo)| ||Germany|Jun. 2016 Dec. 2018|15th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 13th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Berlin) Japan-Germany Vice-Ministerial Level Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Italy|Sep. 2017 Jan. 2019|4th Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome) 5th Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Rome)| ||Spain|Oct. 2016 Jul. 2017 Jun. 2019|1st Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid) 2nd Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 3rd Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid)| ||Sweden|Oct. 2017 Feb. 2019|4th Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 5th Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)| ||Finland|Sep. 2017|2nd Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Ukraine|Oct. 2018|1st Japan-Ukraine Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities| ||EU|Oct. 2016|1st Japan-EU Consultation on Security and Defense (Belgium)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|United Kingdom|Apr. 2016 Jul. 2016 Jul. - Aug. 2016 Oct. - Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jul. 2017 Apr. 2018 Jul. 2018 Aug. 2018 Sep. 2018 Sep. - Oct. 2018 Dec. 2018 Mar. 2019|Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. Port call in London by MSDF training squadron Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (ASDF) Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) ASDF C-2 participated in RIAT Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (GSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise (MSDF)| ||France|Jun. 2017 Feb. 2018 Feb. 2018 Apr. 2019 Jun. 2019|Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show) Japan-France bilateral exercise (VINEX18) Japan-France goodwill exercise (MSDF) Japan-France bilateral exercise (MSDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to France (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges, and participation in Paris Air Show)| ||Canada|Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 Jul. 2017 Dec. 2017 Nov. 2018 Jun. 2019|Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange (Komaki) (ASDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” (MSDF) Japan-Canada unit-to-unit exchange “Komox” (ASDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” (MSDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” (MSDF) Japan-Canada bilateral exercise “KAEDEX” (MSDF)| ----- |New Zealand|Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017 Nov. 2017|Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H) Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise Dispatch of C-2 aircraft to New Zealand (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges| |---|---|---| |Germany|Apr. 2018|Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to Germany (participation in Berlin International Aerospace Show)| |EU|Apr. 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jan. 2017 Dec. 2017 Jul. 2018 Aug. 2018|Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise| Oct. 2016 Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H) Nov. 2016 Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy New Zealand Feb. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand Jun. 2017 Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise Nov. 2017 Dispatch of C-2 aircraft to New Zealand (overseas flight training) and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges Germany Apr. 2018 Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to Germany (participation in Berlin International Aerospace Show) Apr. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise May 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise Jun. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise Jul. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise Sep. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise EU Nov. 2016 Japan-EU bilateral exercise Jan. 2017 Japan-EU bilateral exercise Dec. 2017 Japan-EU bilateral exercise Jul. 2018 Japan-EU bilateral exercise Aug. 2018 Japan-EU bilateral exercise **Reference 44 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)** ||Col2|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of defense and others|Jun. 2016 Oct. 2018 Jun. 2019|Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Philippines (5th ADMM-Plus)) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (18th Shangri-La Dialogue))| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Oct. 2017 Apr. 2018 May 2018 Oct. 2018 Dec. 2018 Feb. 2019|14th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Beijing) 6th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Tokyo) 15th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting) (Tokyo) 7th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing)  Signing of the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China” (Memorandum) 3rd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo) 1st Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism Annual and Experts Meeting 16th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Foreign Affairs and Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Nov. 2018|Visit to Japan by delegate of the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army| **Reference 45 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)** (Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019) ||Col2|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of defense and others|Mar. 2017 Nov. 2017 Dec. 2017 Jul. 2018 Oct. 2018 May 2019 May 2019|Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Russian Army Visit to Japan by Chief of Joint Staff, Russian Military Visit to Russia by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Russia by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (4th Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Russia by GSDF Chief of Staff| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Jan. 2017 Oct. 2017 Nov. 2017 Jul. 2018 Nov. 2018 Jun. 2019|16th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise Port visit to Vladivostok by MSDF Training Squadron 17th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise 18th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise Counter-piracy exercise 19th Japan-Russia bilateral search and rescue exercise| ----- **Reference 46 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Maldives|Dec. 2016|Visit to the Maldives by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Fiji|Mar. 2018|Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Republic of Fiji Military Force| ||Papua New Guinea|Feb. 2017 Mar. 2019|Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force Visit to Papua New Guinea by GSDF Chief of Staff| ||Kazakhstan|Jul. 2017|Visit to Kazakhstan by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense  Japan-Kazakhstan memorandum for defense exchange signed| ||Turkey|May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2019|Visit to Turkey by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Turkey by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense of Turkey| ||Jordan|Feb. 2017 Jul. 2017|Visit to Japan by Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of Jordan Visit to Japan by Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Jordan (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| ||Saudi Arabia|Sep. 2016 Jan. 2017|Visit to Japan by Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Saudi Arabia by Chief of Joint Staff| ||Israel|Jun. 2019|Visit to Israel by Chief of Joint Staff| ||UAE|May 2016 Nov. 2017 Apr. 2018 May 2018 Jun. 2019|Visit to Japan by UAE Air Force Commander Visit to UAE by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Dubai Air and Space Show) Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Visit to Japan by UAE Minister of State for Defence Affairs (signing ceremony for memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation and exchange, Vice-Ministerial Meeting) Visit to UAE by Chief of Joint Staff| ||Bahrain|Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017 Jun. 2018|Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama dialogue) Visit to Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (Manama Dialogue) Visit to Bahrain by MSDF Chief of Staff| ||Brazil|Apr. 2018|Visit to Brazil by State Minister of Defense| ||Mongolia|Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016|Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Mongolia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Mongolia Air Force Commander| ||Timor-Leste|Jun. 2016|Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Defense Ministerial Meeting)| ||Others|Aug. 2016 Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017 May 2017 Jul. 2017 Aug. 2017 Aug. 2017 Sep. 2017 Dec. 2017 Dec. 2018 Dec. 2018 Mar. 2019 May 2019 Jun. 2019|Visit to Djibouti by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of Staff (equivalent to commander of Army) of Djibouti Visit to South Sudan and Bahrain by State Minister of Defense Visit to Qatar by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Oman by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Djibouti and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Commander of the Chief of the Army of Chili Visit to Ukraine by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces Visit to Djibouti and Egypt by State Minister of Defense Visit to Austria, Serbia Montenegro by Vice Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of Staff (equivalent to commander of Army) of Djibouti Visit to Japan by Minister Responsible for Defence Affairs of Oman Visit to Japan by Minister of State for Defense Affairs of Qatar Visit to Egypt by Chief of Joint Staff| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Kazakhstan|Jul. 2018|1st Japan-Kazakhstan Consultation between defense authorities| ||Turkey|Nov. 2017|3rd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Ankara)| ||Jordan|Nov. 2017|2nd Japan-Jordan Consultation between defense authorities (Anman)| ||Saudi Arabia|Nov. 2016|2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Security Dialogue, 2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Riyadh)| ||Israel|Oct. 2018|1st Japan-Israel Security Dialogue (Tel Aviv)| ||UAE|Nov. 2017 Dec. 2018|1st Japan-UAE Consultation between defense authorities (Abu Dhabi) 2nd Japan-UAE Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Qatar|Mar. 2018|3rd Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Tokyo)| ||Bahrain|Dec. 2016|3rd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Tokyo)| ||Mongolia|Aug. 2017|4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 4th Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and security authorities (Ulaanbaatar)| ||Pakistan|Aug. 2016 Apr. 2018 Jun. 2019|8th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad) 9th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 10th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad)| |Unit-to-unit exchange, etc.|Turkey|Jun. 2016|Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise| ||Saudi Arabia|Apr. 2017|Japan-Saudi Arabia goodwill exercise| ||UAE|Jan. 2017 Apr. 2017 Jul. 2017 Nov. 2017 Jun. 2019|Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchanges (Al Ain) (ASDF) Japan-UAE goodwill exercise Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchange (Al Dhafra) (ASDF) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 transport aircraft to UAE (overseas flight training and participation in Dubai International Air and Space Show) Dispatch of ASDF C-2 to UAE (overseas flight training and implementation of unit-to-unit exchanges)| ||Oman|May 2018|Japan-Oman goodwill exercise (MSDF)| ||Pakistan|Jan. 2017 May 2017|Japan-Pakistan goodwill exercise Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)| ----- **Reference 47 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Indo-Pacific Region, Last Three Years)** ||Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---|---| ||Dialogue||Date| |Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region|Intergovernmental|m ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) x Ministerial Meeting x Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM-Plus) x Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM-Plus WG) x Experts’ Working Group (EWG) Counter-Terrorism EWG Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG Maritime Security EWG Military Medicine EWG Peacekeeping Operations EWG Humanitarian Mine Action EWG Cyber EWG m ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting m ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) x Meeting among defense authorities|(Oct. 2017, Oct. 2018) (Apr. 2016, Apr. 2017, Jul. 2018, Apr. 2019) (Mar. 2017, Jan. 2018, Mar. 2019) (Dec. 2016, Jul. 2017, Aug. 2018, Jan. 2019, Apr. 2019) May 2016, Dec.2016, May 2017, Sep. 2017, Feb. 2018, Apr. 2018, Jul. 2018, Sep. 2018, Mar. 2019, Apr. 2019) (Nov. 2016, Nov. 2017, May 2018, Nov. 2018, Feb. 2019) (Jan. 2017, Dec. 2017, Feb. 2018, Dec. 2018, Feb. 2019, Mar. 2019) (Oct. 2016, May 2017, Oct. 2017, Apr. 2018, Nov. 2018, Mar. 2019) (Oct. 2016, May 2017, Oct. 2017, Apr. 2018, Oct. 2018, Mar. 2019) (Jul. 2017, Nov. 2017, May 2018, Nov. 2018) (Nov. 2016, Oct. 2017, Oct. 2018) (Apr. 2016, May 2016, May 2017, Jun. 2017, May 2018, Jun. 2018, May 2019)| ||Hosted by the private sector|x IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)|(Jun. 2016, Jun. 2017, Jun. 2018, May 2019)| |Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense|m Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum m Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) m International Seminar for Military Science m International Conference of Cadets||(Sep. 2016, Sep. 2017, Sep. 2018) (Mar. 2017, Mar. 2018, Mar. 2019) (Jul. 2016) (Mar. 2017, Feb. 2018, Feb. 2019)| |Reference 48|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Security Dialogue|||Outline|Recent Situations| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|Internal Bureau and others|Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.|In September 2018, the MOD held the tenth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in Nagoya, in which vice-ministerial level officials from all ASEAN member states participated to exchange their frank and constructive views on three themes: efforts to share universal values, including the rule of law and challenges; measures for disaster response and challenges; and prospects for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.| |||Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence building focusing on the defense field.|The 23rd Forum, held in March 2019, was attended by 27 countries (25 Asia-Pacific countries, France and the United Kingdom) as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the EU and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The participants discussed a wide range of matters in the context of the themes of the Forum, “security issues in the Indo-Pacific region” and “changing security challenges and prospects.”| ||GSDF|Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP)|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting officers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.|In November 2018, with participants from 15 countries, including those in the Asia-Pacific region, the GSDF communicated information regarding efforts for disaster response by GSDF in cooperation with local governments and private companies, and conducted the disaster response exercise, Michinoku ALERT 2018.| |||G5 Dialogue (G5D)|Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively contribute to regional peace and stability.|In February 2018, with the participation of 5 service branches from 4 countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and France, group discussions under the theme of “Direction of defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for” and field trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out.| |||Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.|The 22st Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2018. The participants were working-level officers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 20 countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme “Logistic Readiness for Domestic and International Disasters.”| |||Asia Pacific Naval College Seminar (APNCS)|Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.|The 21st seminar was held in February 2018 with the participation of navy military personnel from 17 countries, personnel from the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), personnel from Keio University, and personnel from the Canon Institute for Global Studies. Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of “Changes in the Role of the Navy.” In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the MSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.| Security Dialogue Outline Recent Situations In September 2018, the MOD held the tenth Japan-ASEAN Defense Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level Vice-Ministerial Forum in Nagoya, in which vice-ministerial level officials officials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited Japan-ASEAN Defense from all ASEAN member states participated to exchange their frank and to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The Vice-Ministerial Forum constructive views on three themes: efforts to share universal values, objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by including the rule of law and challenges; measures for disaster response building close interpersonal relationships. and challenges; and prospects for Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation. Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually The 23rd Forum, held in March 2019, was attended by 27 countries (25 since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense Asia-Pacific countries, France and the United Kingdom) as well as the Forum for Defense Authorities in policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific ASEAN Secretariat, the EU and International Committee of the Red Cross the Asia-Pacific Region region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense (ICRC). The participants discussed a wide range of matters in the context (Tokyo Defense Forum) officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote of the themes of the Forum, “security issues in the Indo-Pacific region” confidence building focusing on the defense field. and “changing security challenges and prospects.” Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, In November 2018, with participants from 15 countries, including those in Multinational Cooperation inviting officers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major the Asia-Pacific region, the GSDF communicated information regarding program in the Asia Pacific countries in the Asia-Pacific region to provide them with opportunities efforts for disaster response by GSDF in cooperation with local (MCAP) to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and governments and private companies, and conducted the disaster response initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common. exercise, Michinoku ALERT 2018. Hosted by the GSDF for the first time in 2017, this dialogue provides a In February 2018, with the participation of 5 service branches from 4 platform for the army and other services of like-minded countries that countries to include the U.S. (including the Marines), Australia, the U.K. and G5 Dialogue (G5D) has close ties with the GSDF to exchanges views on multilateral France, group discussions under the theme of “Direction of defense engagement in the Asia-Pacific region for the armies to actively cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region the army should aim for” and field contribute to regional peace and stability. trip to the GSDF Chemical School were carried out. The 22st Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, November 2018. The participants were working-level officers in charge of Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks inviting officers in charge of logistics support from major countries in logistics sent from armies in 20 countries in the Asia-Pacific region and (MLST) the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme “Logistic Readiness for to exchange views on logistic system. Domestic and International Disasters.” The 21st seminar was held in February 2018 with the participation of navy Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 military personnel from 17 countries, personnel from the National Graduate with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia-Pacific Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), personnel from Keio University, and region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to Asia Pacific Naval College personnel from the Canon Institute for Global Studies. Presentations by the exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to Seminar (APNCS) participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme encouraging school education/research and contributing to the of “Changes in the Role of the Navy.” In addition, unit and cultural study promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the MSDF as well as participating countries. Japanese culture and history. Hosted by the MSDF, this programs has been held annually since With the participation of naval officers and other personnel from 25 Western Pacific naval 2011, with the participation of junior naval officers from the WPNS countries, the 7th WPNS STEP was held in October 2017. Presentations Symposium Short Term countries. The program is designed to provide them with opportunities and exchange of candid views were carried out under the theme of Exchange Program (WPNS STEP) to deepen their understanding of Japan’s security environment, “Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific Region of the 21st Century,” defense policy and buildup, and culture and history. including new initiatives by each navies and future equipment. ----- |Col1|Col2|Security Dialogue|Outline|Recent Situations| |---|---|---|---|---| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|ASDF|Air Staff College Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2015, with the participation of officials related to air colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer’s education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar.)|Air college personnel and researchers from four countries were invited in November 2018 to provide keynote speeches and presentations and to exchange their views on the theme of “Future Warfare, Advanced Technology and Innovation.”| |||International Air Command and Staff Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of air college students from the Asia-Pacific region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.|With the participation of air college students from 24 countries and 2 organizations, the 18th seminar was held in October 2018. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Regarding How We Should Employ Air Power through Multilateral Cooperation.”| ||National Defense Academy|International Seminar on Defense Science|Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.|The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research.” This seminar ended in 2016.| |||International Cadets’ Conference|Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from each country. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.|In March 2018, 20 countries were invited to the 21st conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of “To Become Ideal Leaders.”| ||National Institute for Defense Studies|International Security Colloquium|Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.|In January 2019, this symposium was held as an international symposium in collaboration with the International Forum on War History. Recognized researchers and practitioners from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of “New Strategic Environment and Role of Ground Defense Capability.”| |||International Forum on War History|Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.|In January 2019, it was held as an international symposium in collaboration with the International Security Colloquium. Recognized researchers and practitioners from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of “New Strategic Environment and Role of Ground Defense Capability.”| |||Asia-Pacific Security Workshop|Hosted by National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common. Since 2018, participating regions are limited to ASEAN countries.|In February 2019, researchers from Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam were invited, and they exchanged opinions under the theme of “China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative and ASEAN.”| ----- **Reference 49 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues** |Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Col2|Col3|Overview| |---|---|---|---| |Hosted by the Government|Internal Bureau and others|ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)|Started in October 2010. This is the only defense ministerial meeting in the Asia-Pacific region hosted by governments, and provides opportunities for exchanging views on issues concerning regional security. It was decided in the 4th ADMM-Plus held in October 2017 that this meeting will take place annually instead of biennially.| |||ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting|First held in 2014. A platform for defense ministers of all of the ASEAN nations and Japan to discuss a wide spectrum of security related issues, and to exchange views on concrete action plans to develop future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation.| |||ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum|A forum that started in 1994, designed to improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region through political and security dialogue and cooperation. Currently 26 countries (10 ASEAN nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995), Myanmar (since 1996)), Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the ROK, Russia, the U.S., Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), Sri Lanka (since 2007)), and 1 organization (EU) are members of the forum. Authorities in charge of diplomacy and defense meet through various government-to-government meetings to discuss the current regional situation and security area.| |||Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)|ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.| |||Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)|This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012.| ||Joint Staff|Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)|CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.| |||Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)|PASOLS is a seminar hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan’s participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.| ||GSDF|Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.| |||Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)|PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.| |||Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC)|LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA annually in Hawaii. Through panel discussions and consultations, high-level land force officials from the Indo-Asia-Pacific region exchange opinions on strategic issue in the region.| |||Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar|This seminar was called “Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)” until 2016. It is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.| |||Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)|This symposium was held for the first time in May 2015, hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, from the perspective of contributing to the amphibious operations capacities of friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific region and contributing to regional stability through strengthening relations with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, and enhancing interoperability. It has been held annually since then. Japan has participated from the first meeting.| |||Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)|Hosted annually by AUSA in Washington, D.C., the Chief and Vice-Chief of Staff of theGSDF participate in the meeting, exchange opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and deliver speeches.| ----- |Hosted by the Government|MSDF|International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)|ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.| |---|---|---|---| |||Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)|WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.| |||International MCM Seminar|This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan’s MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.| |||Asia Pacific Submarine Conference|Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.| |||Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)|This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.| |||RAN Sea Power Conference (SPC)|Held biennially as part of the Pacific International Maritime Exposition. As many navies send their Chief of Staff or Admirals to this conference, the conference serves as a platform for bilateral and multilateral exchange.| |||Regional Seapower Symposium (RSS)|Biennially hosted by the Italian Navy. Mostly attended by Chief of Staff of Navy from NATO nations who gather to exchange views on common naval challenges. Japan has participated since the 7th symposium in 2008.| |||International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS)|Hosted by the Indonesian Navy every other year. Chief of Staff of Navy from mostly western Pacific nations exchange opinions on maritime security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.| |||Galle Dialogue|Hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually. Chief of Staff of Navy of nations around the Indian Ocean exchange views on maritime security challenges. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2010.| ||ASDF|Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)|PACS is a conference hosted by the United States every other year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.| |||Space Symposium|Space Symposium is hosted by the United States every year with senior air force officials such as Air Chiefs and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the symposium since the 35th meeting in 2019.| |||PACRIM Airpower Symposium|This symposium is held every year and hosted jointly by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995| |||Air Power Conference (APC)|APC is an international conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.| |||Air Force Symposium|Air Force Symposium is hosted by the Philippine Air Force annually to exchange opinions under the themes concerning security. Japan has participated in this symposium four times since 2015.| |||Colombo Air Symposium|Colombo Air Symposium is hosted by the Sri Lankan Navy annually to exchange opinions concerning air power and air strategy. Japan has participated in this symposium twice since 2016.| ||Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)|Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.| ||National Institute for Defense Studies|ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting|Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001. In September 2018, the 22nd meeting was held in Tokyo for the first time in 17 years.| |||NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)|CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries in turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013). Japan participated in the conference held in Italy in May 2019.| Other Multilateral Security Dialogue Overview ----- |Col1|Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Overview| |---|---|---| |Hosted by the Private Sector|IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)|Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. From Japan, the Minister of Defense has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002 (except for the 3rd and 11th conferences in 2004 and 2012; and the State Minister of Defence participated in the 11th conference).| ||IISS Fullerton Forum|A Sherpa meeting (preparation meeting) for the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by the IISS. Defense authorities (director/vice chief level) of the countries that attend the Shangri-La Dialogue exchange opinions on regional security issues. Japan has participated since the 1st meeting in 2013.| ||Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)|Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the State Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th, 12th and 13th Conferences in 2010, 2016, and 2017.| ||Munich Security Conference|This Conference was established in 1962. It is one of the most prestigious international conferences on security in Western countries. Foreign dignitaries such as Cabinet members, Diet/Parliament members, officers of defense authorities from Germany, which is the host country, NATO member countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.), Russia, and central and eastern Europe countries attended. Japan participated for the first time in the 45th Conference in 2009, sending the Minister of Defense. The State Minister of Defense participated in the 52nd, 53rd, 54th and 55th Conferences in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019.| ||Halifax International Security Forum|Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each EU country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.| ||The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)|Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants—private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States)—to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.| **Reference 50 Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN** Introduction  “Vientiane Vision: Japan’ s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” is Japan’ s own initiative for the future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation  Annually follow up the implementation of the specific and practical activities listed in the Vision through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum starting from 2017 Contents 1. Background of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation (1) The Asia-Pacific region faces increasingly serious challenges for the security, which makes more difficult for any single country to respond alone (2) ASEAN is a hub for the regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region with an increasing importance. Japan and ASEAN have traditionally maintained strong ties; Further enhancement of bilateral/multilateral cooperation is crucial in ensuring a stable regional security environment (3) Japan welcomes the establishment of ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 and supports its centrality and unity. Since the establishment, ASEAN-Wide multilateral cooperation has become even more important, in addition to bilateral cooperation with its individual member states 2. Evolution of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: deepening “exchanges” toward “cooperation” (1) Starting defense exchanges from 1990s: enhancing mutual understanding and confidence through defense exchanges (2) Developing defense cooperation from 2000s: more practical/ operational defense cooperation with ASEAN member states (3) Deepening defense cooperation from 2010s: starting new projects such as capacity building cooperation with further specific and practical activities and promoting multilateral cooperation through regional frameworks such as ADMM-Plus 3. Future Direction of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: Toward the “ASEAN-Wide” Practical Cooperation (1) Purpose: In addition to the cooperation with “Individual ASEAN Member States,” “ASEAN-Wide” cooperation will be expanded through promoting practical cooperation with a view to 1. respecting and promoting shared principles such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights, 2. promoting and enhancing the rule of law, 3. supporting ASEAN efforts to strengthen its centrality and unity which is a cornerstone of regional cooperation (2) Direction: In order to contribute to regional peace, security and prosperity, future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation will be focused on the following three points  To consolidate the order based on the principles of international law governing peaceful conduct among states, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to uphold principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space  To promote maritime security which is a foundation for the regional peace and prosperity, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space  To cope with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities in various fields (3) Measures: Conducting practical defense cooperation by effectively combining the following diverse measures 1) Promotion of International Law (PIL): sharing understanding and experience regarding international law, especially in the field of maritime security, through i.e. conducting researches and sponsoring seminars, etc., with a view to its effective implementation. 2) Capacity Building Cooperation (CBC): conducting CBC in various fields such as HA/DR, PKO, landmine and UXO clearance, cybersecurity, defense buildup planning (sharing know-how), etc. 3) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (DETC): transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources regarding DETC, holding seminars on defense industries, etc. 4) Joint Training and Exercises (JTE): continued participation in multilateral joint training and exercises, inviting ASEAN observers to Self- Defense Forces’ training, etc. 5) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchange (HRD/AE): Inviting Opinion Leaders from ASEAN, etc. (4) The JMOD institutional development to better address “ASEAN-Wide” practical cooperation based on the Vision ----- **Reference 51 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)** ||Col2|Col3|Col4|(Apr. 1, 2016 - Jun. 30, 2019)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise||Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |Cobra Gold||January - February 2017 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China, India|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.| |||January - February 2018 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S. Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China and India|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.| |||January - February 2019 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S. Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China and India|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Ground Component Command, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.| |Pacific Partnership||July - August 2016 (Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Palau, Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand|1 vessel Approximately 70 personnel| |||March - May 2017 (Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Vietnam)|Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., ROK|2 vessels Approximately 70 personnel| |||March - June 2018 (Micronesia, Palau, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam)|Japan, U.S. Australia, U.K., ROK|Approximately 50 personnel| |||March - May 2019 (Marshall Islands, Timor-Leste, Vietnam)|Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., ROK, Canada, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Honduras, Peru|Approximately 30 personnel| |ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise||September 2016 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Australia, New Zealand, Russia|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau| |ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Counterterrorism Exercise)||May 2016 (Brunei and Singapore)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Russia|1 vessel| |ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Mahi Tangaroa 16)||November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)|Japan, U.S., Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, etc.|1 vessel| |ADMM-Plus Military Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX-2019)||March 2019 (India)|Japan, U.S., India, Myanmar, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, China, New Zealand, ROK, Russia|Approximately 15 personnel| |Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise|Shanti Prays III|March - April 2017 (Nepal)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, ROK, Nepal, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, etc.|Central Readiness Force 2 personnel| |Multilateral Exercise (Khaan Quest)||May - June 2016 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Approximately 50 personnel *including observers| |||July - August 2017 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Approximately 50 personnel *including observers| |||June 2018 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Approximately 40 personnel| |||June 2019 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Approximately 60 personnel| |Australian Army-Hosted Shooting Convention||April - May 2016 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, UAE, etc.|Approximately 30 personnel| |||April - May 2017 (Australia)||Approximately 20 personnel| |||April - May 2018 (Australia)||Approximately 20 personnel| |||March - April 2019 (Australia)||Approximately 20 personnel| |KOMODO Multilateral Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy||April 2016 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, China, Russia, etc.|1 vessel| |||May 2018 (Indonesia)||1 vessel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training||December 2016 (Waters around Micronesia)|Japan, U.S., Australia|1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel| |||September 2017 (Waters around Japan)||4 vessels 4 submarines 30 aircraft| |||December 2017 (Waters around Micronesia)||1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel| |||November 2018 (Waters around Japan)||22 vessels 2 or 3 aircraft| |||December 2018 (Waters around Micronesia)||1 aircraft Approximately 30 personnel| ----- |Exercise|Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |---|---|---|---| |Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Training|June 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)|Japan, U.S., ROK|1 vessel| ||October 2016 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel| ||November 2016 (Waters around Japan)||1 vessel| ||January 2017 (Waters around Japan)||1 vessel| ||March 2017 (Waters around Japan)||1 vessel| ||April 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel 1 aircraft| ||October 2017 (Waters around Japan)||2 vessels| ||December 2017 (Waters around Japan)||1 vessel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Exercise (Pacific Vanguard)|May 2019 (South of Honshu - around Guam)|Japan, U.S., Australia, ROK|2 vessels| |Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada five-country Training|August 2016 (Waters around Hawaii)|Japan, U.S., Australia, ROK, Canada|1 vessel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia-Canada four- country exercise|June 2017 (South China Sea)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada|2 vessels| |Japan-Australia-Canada-Singapore four-country exercise|August 2018 (Guam and waters and airspace around Australia)|Japan, Australia, Canada, New Zealand|1 vessel| |Japan-Canada-Singapore Trilateral Training|June 2017 (Waters south of Shikoku)|Japan, Canada, New Zealand|1 vessel| |U.S. and India-Hosted Maritime Exercise (Malabar)|June 2016 (Waters east of Sasebo - Okinawa)|Japan, U.S., India|1 vessel 3 aircraft| |Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise (Malabar)|June 2017 (Waters and airspace east of India)|Japan, U.S., India|2 vessels| ||June 2018 (Waters and airspace around Guam)|Japan, U.S., India|3 vessels 1 submarine 7 aircraft| |Japan-U.S.-India Trilateral Exercise|November 2017 (Waters around Japan)|Japan, U.S., India|1 vessel| ||July 2018 (Waters around Japan)||19 vessels 8 aircraft| |Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)|September 2016 (Waters around Australia)|Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.|1 vessel 2 aircraft| ||August - October 2018 (Waters around Australia)|Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.|1 vessel 1 aircraft| |Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Exercise|September 2016 (Waters and airspace around Singapore)|Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.|1 personnel| ||September 2017 (Australia and waters and airspace around Australia)||1 aircraft Approximately 20 personnel| ||July 2018 (Waters and airspace around Japan)||2 vessels, 2 aircraft Approximately 280 personnel| |U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise|September 2017 (Waters around the Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|2 vessels| |U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise|May 2017 (Bahrain)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Several personnel| |U.S.-Philippines joint exercise (KAMANDAG)|September - October 2017 (Luzon, the Philippines)|Japan, U.S., Philippines|14 personnel| ||September - October 2018 (Luzon, the Philippines)||93 personnel| |Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise|June 2017 (Waters around Guam)|Japan, U.S., etc.|5 personnel| |Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise|May 2016 (Waters around ROK)|Japan, U.S., ROK, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore|2 vessels| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)|February 2017 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 480 personnel| ||February - March 2018 (Guam and its surrounding airspace)||Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel| ||February - March 2019 (Guam and its surrounding airspace)||Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 480 personnel| Field Training with U.S. and Australian May 2016, May 2017, Forces in Australia May - June 2018, May - June 2019 Japan, U.S., Australia Approximately 100 personnel (Southern Jackaroo) (Australia) ----- |Exercise|Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |---|---|---|---| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Nankai Rescue 2017)|July 2016 (Central District)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Middle Army 5,500 personnel, approximately 700 vehicles, 10 aircraft| |RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)|June - August 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, Columbia, Chile, etc.|2 vessels, 2 aircraft, Western Army, etc.| ||June - August 2018 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK,. Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, Chile, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, etc.|1 vessel, 2 aircraft, Ground Component Command, Western Army, etc.| |New Zealand Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Ngatahi)|November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)|Japan, New Zealand, etc.|2 aircraft| |Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)|November 2016 (New Caledonia)|Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France|5 personnel| |Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Équateur)|September 2017 (New Caledonia)|Japan, France, U.S., Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, U.K.|1 personnel| |Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. Four-Country Training|May 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu - Guam - Northern Mariana Islands)|Japan, France, U.K., U.S.|220 personnel, 1 vessel, 2 aircraft| |Pakistani Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Training (Aman-17)|February 2017 (Surrounding airspace of Pakistan)|Japan, Pakistan, etc.|2 aircraft| |Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise|March 2017 (Waters around Malaysia)|Japan, Malaysia, U.S., etc.|1 vessel| |Multilateral Counter-Piracy Joint Training|April 2017 (Gulf of Aden)|Japan, U.S., U.K., ROK|1 vessel, 1 aircraft| |Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral HA/DR exercise (Christmas Drop)|December 2016 (Guam (U.S.), Micronesia, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Approximately 6 aircraft Approximately 150 personnel| ||December 2017 (Guam (U.S.), Micronesia, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace)||Approximately 6 aircraft Approximately 150 personnel| ||December 2018 (Guam (U.S.), Micronesia, Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding airspace)||Approximately 6 aircraft Approximately 150 personnel| |Japan-U.S.-India-Philippines Four- Country Exercise|May 2019 (Waters west of Kyushu through the East China Sea)|Japan, U.S., India, Philippines|2 vessels| |Japan-France-Australia-U.S. Four- Country Exercise (La Perouse)|May 2019 (Waters and Airspace west of Sumatra)|Japan, France, Australia, U.S.|2 vessels| |Japan-U.S.-U.K trilateral exercise|December 2018 and March 2019 (Waters and airspace south of Honshu)|Japan, U.S., U.K.|1 vessel 1 aircraft| ----- **Reference 52 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations**  **(1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies** (As of May 31, 2019) |Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel| |---|---|---| |Jun. 9, 1997 - Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 - Jul. 31, 2007|Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)1| |Jun. 23, 1997 - Jun. 23, 2000|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)| |Oct. 1, 2002 - Jun. 30, 2007|Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |Jul. 11, 2005 - Jul. 10, 2009|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Jan. 9, 2009 - Jan. 8, 2013|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Aug. 27, 2013 - Aug. 31, 2016|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)| |Dec. 2, 2002 - Jun. 1, 2005|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Nov. 28, 2005 - Nov. 27, 2008|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jan. 16, 2011 - Jan. 15, 2014|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Sep. 18, 2013 - Sep. 17, 2016|Force Generation Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jun. 1, 2015 - Nov. 30, 2017|Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |Mar. 1 - Aug. 31, 2016|Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)2| |Aug. 29, 2016 -|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) (New York)3|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Feb. 11, 2017 -|Strategic Support Service, Logistics Division, Department of Operational Support, United Nations (New York)4|1 administrative official| |Apr. 1, 2018 -|Group of Experts, Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (New York)|1 instructor| Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007. 2. Dispatched as an official of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from “Department of Peacekeeping Operations” to “Department of Peace Operations.” 4. Due to the organizational change on January 1, 2019, the name changed from “Department of Field Support” to “Department of Operational Support.” **(2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.** |Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel| |---|---|---| |November 21 - 30, 2008|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |May 22 - June 6, 2009|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)| |August 28 - September 5, 2009|Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |April 10 - 17, 2010|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)Note| |August 14 - 30, 2010|Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |November 15 - 20, 2011|Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |July 31 - August 5, 2012|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |December 15 - 19, 2012|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 9 - 14, 2013|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |August 28 - September 1, 2013|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |October 5 - 9, 2013|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |March 8 - 13, 2014|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |March 23 - May 25, 2014|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |August 12, 2014|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |October 5 - 9, 2014|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |October 6 - 23, 2014|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 19 - April 1, 2015|UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |June 4 - July 1, 2015|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |September 5 - 20, 2015|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |October 22 - November 7, 2015|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 21 - April 1, 2016|UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)| |May 31 - June 17, 2016|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |November 4 - 19, 2016|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |March 6 - 19, 2017|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |June 2 - 18, 2017|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |December 1 - 15, 2017|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Aug. 22 - 28, 2018|Indonesian National Defense Forces Peacekeeping Centre (Indonesia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Nov. 2 - 18, 2018|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Mar. 3 - 15, 2019|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jun. 28 - Jul. 12, 2019|Peace Support Training Centre (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| Notes: First dispatch of female SDF personnel. ----- **Reference 53 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities** |Item|International Peace Support Act|International Peace Cooperation Act|Japan Disaster Relief Team Law|Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)|Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Purpose|m Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community|m Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts towards international peace|m Contribution to promotion of international cooperation|m Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq m Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq|m Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism m Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan| |Provisions in the SDF Law|m Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|m Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|m Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|m Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law|m Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law| |Major Activities|m Cooperation and support activities1 m Search and rescue activities1 m Ship inspection operations3|m International peacekeeping activities m Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security m International humanitarian assistance m International election monitoring activities m Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities|m Rescue activities m Medical treatment (including prevention of epidemics) m Activities for disaster emergency response and disaster recovery m Transportation of personnel or equipment/goods for the abovementioned activities|m Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities m Support activities for ensuring security|m Replenishment support activities| |Areas of Operation|m Territories of Japan m Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. m High seas and the airspace above|m Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)|m Regions overseas, especially in less-developed regions|m Territories of Japan m Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq)2 m High seas and the airspace above2|m Territories of Japan m Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required)2 m High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above2| |Diet Approval|m Prior approval required without exception|m To be discussed in advance in the Diet in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety- ensuring operations4|N/A|m To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures4|(Note 5)| |Diet Report|m Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|m Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay|N/A|m Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|m Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay| Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place. 2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented. 3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries. 4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session. 5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval. **Reference 54 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities** **(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq** (As of May 31, 2019) |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Southeast Iraq, etc.|Jan. 2004 - Jul. 2006|Approx. 600|x Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.| ||Kuwait, etc.|Jun. - Sep. 2006|Approx. 100|x Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others| |MSDF|Persian Gulf, etc.|Feb. 20 - Apr. 8, 2004|Approx. 330|x Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF’s activities| |ASDF|Kuwait, etc.|Dec. 2003 - Feb. 2009|Approx. 210|x Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance| **(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF|Indian Ocean|Nov. 2001 - Nov. 2007|Approx. 320|x Materials supplies for foreign vessels| |ASDF|U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.||−|x Transportation of materials| ----- **(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF|Indian Ocean|Jan. 2008 - Feb. 2010|Approx. 330|x Materials supplies for foreign vessels| **(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF (Maritime Force)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden|Mar. 2009 - Dec. 2016|Approx. 400|Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.| |||Dec. 2016 -|Approx. 200|Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.| |MSDF (Air Unit)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|May 2009 - Feb. 2011|Approx.100|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.| |||Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012|Approx.120|| |||Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014|Approx.110|| ||Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Jul. 2014 - Jul. 2015|Approx. 70|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.| ||Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Jul. 2015 -|Approx. 60|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.| |MSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul. 2014 -|Approx. 30|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.| |MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)|Bahrain, etc.|Aug. 2014 -|Under 20|Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151| |MSDF (Local Coordination Center)|Djibouti|Jul. 2012 - Jul. 2014|3|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation| |GSDF (Air Unit)|Djibouti|May 2009 - Feb. 2011|Approx. 50|Security of activity base and P-3C| |||Feb. 2011 - Jun. 2012|Approx. 60|| |||Jun. 2012 - Jul. 2014|Approx. 80|| |GSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul. 2014 -|Approx. 80|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.| **(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |PKO|United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)|Ceasefire Monitors|Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993|8|16|x Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire x Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border| |||Engineer unit|Sep. 1992 - Sep. 1993|600|1,200|x Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure x Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups x Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities for work and medical care to staff of UNTAC components| |PKO|United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)|Headquarters staff|May 1993 - Jan. 1995|5|10|x Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters| |||Transport coordination unit|May 1993 - Jan. 1995|48|144|x Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees|Rwandan refugee relief unit|Sep. - Dec. 1994|260||x Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies| |||Air transport unit|Sep. - Dec. 1994|188||x Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo) x Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations| |PKO|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 1996 - Feb. 2009|1st-13th personnel: 2|38|x Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters| ||||Feb. 2009 - Jan. 2013|14th-17th personnel: 3||| |||Transport unit|Feb. 1996 - Aug. 2012|1st-33rd personnel: 43|1,463|x Transport food and other supplies x Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure,maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance| ||||Aug. 2012 - Jan. 2013|34th personnel: 44||| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste|Air transport unit|Nov. 1999 - Feb. 2000|113||x Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR x Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel| ----- |Col1|Col2|Col3|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees|Air transport unit|Jan. 2001|138||x Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR| |PKO|United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2002 - Jun. 2004|1st rotation: 10 2nd rotation: 7|17|x Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters| |||Engineer unit|Mar. 2002 - Jun. 2004|1st and 2nd rotation: 680 3rd rotation: 522 4th rotation: 405|2,287|x Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities x Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance x Public welfare support operations| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees|Air transport unit|Mar. - Apr. 2003|50||x Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims|Air transport unit|Jul. - Aug. 2003|98||x Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims| |PKO|United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)|Arms monitors|Mar. 2007 - Jan. 2011|6|24|x Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force| |PKO|United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)|Headquarters staff|Oct. 2008 - Sep. 2011|2|12|x Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector x Database management| |PKO|United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013|2|12|x MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items| |||Engineer unit|Feb. 2010 - Jan. 2013|1st rotation: 203 2nd rotation: 346 3rd and 4th rotation: 330 5th and 6th rotation: 317 7th rotation: 297 Withdrawal support unit: 44|2,184|x Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.| |PKO|United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT|Military liaison officer|Sep. 2010 - Sep. 2012|2|8|x Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste| |PKO|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Headquarters staff|Nov. 2011 -|4|37|x Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics x Management of database x Planning and coordination of engineering duties x Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports| |||Engineer Unit|Jan. 2012 - May 2017|1st rotation: 239 2nd - 4th rotation: 349 5th and 6th rotation: 401 7th - 10th rotation: 353 11th rotation: 354 Withdrawal support unit: 58 (Number of personnel for 1st to 4th rotations includes personnel at the local support coordination center)|3,912|x Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) x Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities x Coordination regarding logistics| |||Local support coordination center|Jan. 2012 - Dec. 2013|||x Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities x Coordination regarding logistics| |Internationally coordinated operation|International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula|Headquarters staff|Apr. 2019 -|2|2|x Liaison and coordination between the Egyption and Israeli governments or other relevant organizations and the MFO| Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan). 2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort. ----- **(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF (past 5 years)** |Col1|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)|Local coordination center|Dec. 5 - 11, 2014|4|x Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities| ||Air transport unit||10|x Transport activities| ||Epidemiological study support|Apr. 21 - May 29, 2015|1|x Support for WHO’s epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)|Local support coordination center|Jan. 3 - 9, 2015|3|x Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries| ||International disaster relief surface force||Approx. 350|x Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501| |International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)|Joint operations coordination center|Apr. 27 - May 22, 2015|4|x Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries| ||Medical support unit||Approx. 110|x Medical treatment for affected people| ||Air transport unit||Approx. 30|x Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment| |International disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)|Air patrol unit|Nov. 15 - 18, 2016|Approx. 30|x Evaluation of damages by aircraft (one P-1 aircraft)| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake and tsunami disaster)|Local coordination center|Oct. 3 - 25, 2018|Approx. 10|x Information collection concerning damages and operations in the affected areas x Coordination with relevant organizations of Indonesia and relevant countries| ||Air transport unit||Approx. 60|x Transportation of personnel/goods as international disaster relief activities| **Reference 55 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel** ||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|(As of March 31, 2019)| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|GSDF|MSDF|ASDF|Joint Staff etc.|Total| |Authorized|150,834|45,360|46,936|4,024|247,154| |Actual|137,634|42,550|42,750|3,613|226,547| |Staffing Rate (%)|91.2|93.8|91.1|89.8|91.7| |Category|Non-Fixed-Term Personnel|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Fixed-Term Personnel|Col11| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Officer||Warrant Officer||Enlisted (upper)||Enlisted (lower)|||| |Authorized|45,793||4,923||138,619||57,819|||| |Actual|42,274|(2,329)|4,603|(76)|137,052|(8,311)|20,734|(2,136)|21,884|(2,882)| |Staffing Rate (%)|92.3||93.5||98.9||73.7|||| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value. 2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget. ----- **Reference 56 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2018)** |Classification|Col2|Col3|Col4|Number Applied|Number Recruited|Competition Ratios| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Officer candidates|||GSDF|2,161 ( 286 )|171 ( 27 )|12.6 ( 10.6 )| ||||MSDF|1,194 ( 159 )|61 ( 8 )|19.6 ( 19.9 )| ||||ASDF|1,344 ( 289 )|57 ( 12 )|23.6 ( 24.1 )| ||||Total|4,699 ( 734 )|289 ( 47 )|16.3 ( 15.6 )| |Non- commissioned officers|Technical Petty Officer||MSDF|83 ( 16 )|17 ( 2 )|4.9 ( 8.0 )| ||Technical Sergeant||ASDF|0|0|—| |Aviation students|||MSDF|792 ( 96 )|86 ( 4 )|9.2 ( 24.0 )| ||||ASDF|1,955 ( 188 )|73 ( 6 )|26.8 ( 31.3 )| ||||Total|2,747 ( 284 )|159 ( 10 )|17.3 ( 28.4 )| |Non-commissioned officer candidates|||GSDF|15,699 ( 2,867 )|4,001 ( 310 )|3.9 ( 9.2 )| ||||MSDF|4,388 ( 844 )|1,486 ( 259 )|3.0 ( 3.3 )| ||||ASDF|7,493 ( 1,417 )|977 ( 243 )|7.7 ( 5.8 )| ||||Total|27,580 ( 5,128 )|6,464 ( 812 )|4.3 ( 6.3 )| |Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)|||GSDF|17,784 ( 3,301 )|4,551 ( 1,002 )|3.9 ( 3.3 )| ||||MSDF|4,785 ( 922 )|971 ( 204 )|4.9 ( 4.5 )| ||||ASDF|5,576 ( 1,073 )|1,553 ( 129 )|3.6 ( 8.3 )| ||||Total|28,145 ( 5,296 )|7,075 ( 1,335 )|4.0 ( 4.0 )| |National Defense Academy Students||Recommended|Humanity and social science|152 ( 44 )|30 ( 7 )|5.1 ( 6.3 )| ||||Science and engineering|256 ( 43 )|102 ( 12 )|2.5 ( 3.6 )| ||||Total|408 ( 87 )|132 ( 19 )|3.1 ( 4.6 )| |||Selective exam|Humanity and social science|128 ( 29 )|14 ( 2 )|9.1 ( 14.5 )| ||||Science and engineering|193 ( 14 )|37 ( 2 )|5.2 ( 7.0 )| ||||Total|321 ( 43 )|51 ( 4 )|6.3 ( 10.8 )| |||General exam|Humanity and social science|5,779 ( 2,412 )|80 ( 13 )|72.2 ( 185.5 )| ||||Science and engineering|7,418 ( 1,497 )|253 ( 23 )|29.3 ( 65.1 )| ||||Total|13,197 ( 3,909 )|333 ( 36 )|39.6 ( 108.6 )| |National Defense Medical College students||||6,113 ( 1,911 )|84 ( 27 )|72.8 ( 70.8 )| |National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)||||1,905 ( 1,563 )|74 ( 64 )|25.7 ( 24.4 )| |GSDF High Technical School Students||Recommended||152|69|2.2| |||General exam||2,076|277|7.5| |||Total||2,228|346|6.4| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females. 2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2018. **Reference 57 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel, and Others** ||Col2|Col3|(As of March 31, 2019)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Special Service|||Regular Service|| |Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength| ||Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense||Administrative Officials, and others 27|Part-Time Officials| ||SDF Personnel|||| ||Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense|Candidates for SDF Personnel||| ||Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs|Reserve Personnel 47,900||| ||Director General, and others 675|Ready Reserve Personnel 8,075||| ||Administrative Officials, and others 20,226|Candidates for Reserve Personnel 4,621||| ||Uniformed SDF Personnel 247,154|National Defense Academy students||| |||National Defense Medical College students||| |||GSDF High Technical School students||| |||Part-Time Officials||| Notes: 1. Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations 2. “Others” in the title includes Minister of Defense, State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense, and Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense ----- **Reference 58 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2018** |m Joint Training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note| |Training for Rescue of Japanese Nationals Overseas|Sep. 1 - 9, 2018|Republic of Djibouti, etc.|Joint Staff Offcie, Ground Staff Offcie, Air Staff Offcie, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Central Readiness Force, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 120 personnel|To enhance ability to deploy units overseas and their operational capabilities relating to transport of overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and U.S. Forces| |Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise (feild training exercise)|Oct. 29 - Nov. 8, 2018|SDF facilities, U.S. Forces bases in Japan, waters and airspace surrounding Tsushima and Japan, and Guam, the United States, and its surrounding waters and airspace|Each Staff Offcie, Ground Component Command, respective Regional Armies, Self-Defense Fleet, respective Regional Districts, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 47,000 personnel, 20 vessels, and 170 aircraft|In order to enhance SDF’s readiness and interoperability between Japan and the United States, train and exercise according to the SDF’s operational plan in armed attack situations, etc. and the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan| |Training for Rescue of Japanese Nationals Overseas|Dec. 11 - 14, 2018|Nikko Training Area, Miho Air Base, Camp Yonago, the route linking them, and waters and airspace surrounding them|Joint Staff, Ground Component Command, Western Army, Military Police units, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, ASDF military police, etc.|To enhance joint operations capabilities relating to protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and relevant organizations| |m GSDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note| |Army Corps field training exercise (Northern Army)|Aug. 29 - Sep. 28, 2018|Camps, bases, maneuver areas and privately owned land inside the Northern Army District|Northern Army, etc. Approximately 11,700 personnel, 3,300 vehicles, 27 aircraft, and 2 vessels|To maintain and enhance Army’s capability to respond to various situations| |Army Corps field training exercise (Western Army)|Oct. 22 - Nov. 24, 2018|Camps, bases, maneuver areas and privately owned land inside the Western Army District|Western Army, etc. Approximately 17,000 personnel, 4,500 vehicles, 65 aircraft|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)|Jun. 15 - Jul. 31, 2018|Middle-Northern Regional Army Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, Kamifurano Maneuver Area, etc.)|Major units of 13th Brigade Approximately 2,400 personnel, 900 vehicles|To enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)|Jul. 4 - 11, 2018|Numazu Beach Training Area|Major unit of 14th Brigade Approximately 110 personnel, 45 vehicles|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 23 - Nov. 12, 2018|Northen-Western Regional Army Districts (Oyanohara Maneuver Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 12th Division Approximately 850 personnel, 280 vehicles, 3 aircraft|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 17, 2018 - Nov. 24|Northeastern-Western Regional Army Districts (Camps, etc. inside the Western Army District)|One Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division Approximately 550 personnel, 100 vehicles|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 18, 2018 - Oct. 31|Northeastern-Northen Regional Army Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division Approximately 1,050 personnel, 330 vehicles, 3 aircraft|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments) 2nd Division, 5th Division|Oct. 29 - Nov. 10, 2018|Middle-Western Regional Army Districts (Hijudai Maneuver Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 14th Division Approximately 900 personnel, 300 vehicles, 5 aircraft|| |m ASDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note| |ASDF comprehensive training (feild training exercise)|Oct. 18 - 26, 2018|ASDF bases, and waters and airspace surrounding Japan|Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Development and Test Command, Air Materiel Command Approximately 26,000 personnel, 90 aircraft|Train and exercise operations of ASDF, which concerns defense of Japan, to maintain and enhance operational capability of units| **Reference 59 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2018)** |Col1|Exercise|Date|Location|Dispatched Unit| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live- fire training|Sep. 18 - Nov. 13, 2018|McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|16 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 510 personnel| ||Surface-to-ship missile unit level live-fire training|Sep. 29 - Oct. 15, 2018|Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.|2 surface-to-ship missile regiments Approximately 180 personnel| |MSDF|(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Aug. 21 - Nov. 17, 2018|Sea areas surrounding Hawaii|1 submarine| ||(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Mar. 30 - Jun. 29, 2019|Waters surrounding Hawaii|1 submarine| |ASDF|Annual service practice by antiaircraft units|Aug. 30 - Nov. 16, 2018|McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|6 Air Defense Missiles groups, Air Defense Missile Training Group Approximately 370 personnel| ----- **Reference 60 Main Measures for Re-employment Support** |Classification|Measures for re-employment support|Description| |---|---|---| |Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel|Occupational aptitude testing|Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes| ||Technical training|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (large-sized vehicle operation, forklift operation, boiler maintenance, large-sized special vehicle operation, electrician, regular-sized vehicle operation, first-level training for nursing care workers, heavy-duty vehicle operation, chief hazardous material engineer, crane operation, course for civil servant examination, drone operator qualification [new in FY2019], employment counsellor [new in FY2019], etc.)| ||Disaster prevention and risk management training|Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan (attending lectures in this area are a prerequisite for receiving the Cabinet Office’s Regional Disaster Prevention Manager license)| ||Correspondence courses|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement and eligible for qualifications (hazardous materials engineer, electrician, financial planner, real estate transaction specialist, property administrator, medical clerk, data security officer, support to personnel who wish to go to university [new in FY2019], etc.)| ||Business management training|Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement| ||Career guidance|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and right mindset toward reemployment| ||Outsourcing career counseling, etc.|Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel| |Measures for internal support personnel|Training for support personnel|Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel| |Measures for promotion outside of SDF|Support for publicity aimed at to business owners|Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of retiring uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire| ||Inviting business owners on unit tours|Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the re-employment support situation, etc.| **Reference 61 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government** ||(As of March 31, 2019 495 personnel)| |---|---| |Prefectural Government|Government employment situation| |Hokkaido|Hokkaido Prefectural Government (four persons), Sapporo City Government (three persons), Hakodate City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Kushiro City Government, Obihiro City Government (two persons), Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Rumoi City Government, Tomakomai City Government, Wakkanai City Government, Bibai City Government, Ashibetsu City Government (two persons), Akabira City Government, Shibetsu City Government, Nayoro City Government, Chitose City Government (four persons), Takikawa City Government, Sunagawa City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kitahiroshima City Government, Hokuto City Government, Matsumae Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town Office, Kuromatsunai Town Office, Rankoshi Town Office, Naganuma Town Office, Shintotsukawa Town Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Nakafurano Town Office, Toyotomi Town Office, Rebun Town Office, Bihoro Town Office (two persons), Engaru Town Office (two persons), Shiraoi Town Office, Atsuma Town Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Otofuke Town Office, Memuro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office| |Aomori|Aomori Prefectural Government, Aomori City Government (three persons), Hirosaki City Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Towada City Government, Misawa City Government, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office, Oirase Town Office| |Iwate|Iwate Prefectural Government, Morioka City Government, Miyako City Government, Hanamaki City Government, Kamaishi City Government, Hachimantai City Government, Takizawa City Government, Yamada Town Office| |Miyagi|Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government, Tagajo City Government, Iwanuma City Government, Tome City Government, Higashi Matsushima City Government, Shibata Town Office, Taiwa Town Office, Ohira Village Office, Minamisanriku Town Office| |Akita|Akita Prefectural Government (two persons), Akita City Government, Odate City Government, Yuzawa City Government, Yurihonjo City Government, Daisen City Government (two persons), Senboku City Government| |Yamagata|Yamagata Prefectural Government, Yamagata City Government, Sakata City Government, Kaminoyama City Government, Nagai City Government, Tendo City Government, Higashine City Government, Asahi Town Office, Mikawa Town Office| |Fukushima|Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government| |Ibaraki|Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Koga City Government, Ryugasaki City Government, Shimotsuma City Government, Joso City Government, Takahagi City Government, Ushiku City Government, Moriya City Government, Hitachi Omiya City Government, Ami Town Offcie, Sakai Town Offcie| |Tochigi|Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government| |Gunma|Gunma Prefectural Government, Numata City Government, Shibukawa City Government| |Saitama|Saitama Prefectural Government, Saitama City Government, Fukaya City Government, Asaka City Government, Wako City Government, Okegawa City Government, Yoshikawa City Government| ----- |Prefectural Government|Government employment situation| |---|---| |Chiba|Chiba Prefectural Government, Chiba City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Funabashi City Government, Tateyama City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons), Mobara City Government, Narita City Government, Narashino City Government, Kashiwa City Government, Ichihara City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Kimitsu City Government, Urayasu City Government, Yotsukaido City Government, Tomisato City Government, Katori City Government, Sammu City Government, Isumi City Government, Oamishirasato City Government, Shisui Town Offcie| |Tokyo|Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons), Shinagawa Ward Office (three persons), Ota Ward Office, Shibuya Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Adachi Ward Office, Mizuho Town Office| |Kanagawa|Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (nine persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Sagamihara City Government, Yokosuka City Government, Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Odawara City Government, Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Miura City Government, Ebina City Government (three persons), Zama City Government, Kaisei Town Office, Hakone Town Office, Yugawara Town Office| |Niigata|Niigata Prefectural Government, Niigata City Government, Murakami City Government, Tsubame City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Tainai City Government| |Toyama|Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government, Himi City Government, Tonami City Government| |Ishikawa|Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Nomi City Government| |Fukui|Fukui Prefectural Government (three persons), Fukui City Government, Awara City Government, Takahama Town Office| |Yamanashi|Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Fujiyoshida City Government, Minami-Alps City Government, Yamanakako Town Office| |Nagano|Nagano Prefectural Government (two persons), Nagano City Government, Matsumoto City Government, Chino City Government, Saku City Government, Azumino City Government| |Gifu|Gifu Prefectural Government (three persons), Gifu City Government, Minokamo City Government, Kakamigahara City Government, Hida City Government, Kaizu City Government, Ginan Town Office, Sakahogi Town Office| |Shizuoka|Shizuoka Prefectural Government (six persons), Shizuoka City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Atami City Government, Ito City Government, Shimada City Government (two persons), Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Izu City Government, Makinohara City Government, Kannami Town Office, Oyama Town Office| |Aichi|Aichi Prefectural Government, Toyohashi City Government, Okazaki City Government, Handa City Government, Kasugai City Government, Kariya City Government, Nishio City Government, Inazawa City Government, Tokai City Government, Takahama City Government, Toyoake City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Ama City Government, Nagakute City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Office, Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office| |Mie|Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Yokkaichi City Government, Ise City Government, Kuwana City Government, Nabari City Government, Owase City Government, Toba City Government, Shima City Government| |Shiga|Shiga Prefectural Government, Kusatsu City Government, Konan City Government| |Kyoto|Kyoto Prefectural Government, Maizuru City Government, Joyo City Government, Yawata City Government, Kizugawa City Government, Seika Town Office (two persons)| |Osaka|Osaka Prefectural Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Kaizuka City Government, Hirakata City Government, Ibaraki City Government, Izumisano City Government, Tondabayashi City Government, Kawachinagano City Government, Daito City Government, Takaishi City Government, Shijonawate City Government, Osakasayama City Government, Toyono Town Office| |Hyogo|Hyogo Prefectural Government, Himeji City Government, Akashi City Government, Nishiwaki City Government, Kawanishi City Government, Yabu City Government| |Nara|Nara Prefectural Government (three persons), Nara City Government (four persons), Yamato Takada City Government, Gojo City Government (three persons), Gosho City Government, Ikoma City Government| |Wakayama|Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Hashimoto City Government, Shirahama Town Office| |Tottori|Tottori Prefectural Government (three persons), Tottori City Government, Yonago City Government, Sakaiminato City Government, Yurihama Town Office, Nanbu Town Office| |Shimane|Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government| |Okayama|Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government, Nagi Town Office| |Hiroshima|Hiroshima Prefectural Government, Hiroshima City Government, Kure City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Higashihiroshima City Government, Hatsukaichi City Government, Kaita Town Office| |Yamaguchi|Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Hagi City Government, Hofu City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Nagato City Government, Shunan City Government, Waki Town Office, Tabuse Town Office| |Tokushima|Tokushima Prefectural Government (three persons), Komatsushima City Government, Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Awa City Government, Miyoshi City Government| |Kagawa|Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Sakaide City Government, Zentsuji City Government, Sanuki City Government, Manno Town Office| |Ehime|Ehime Prefectural Government, Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government, Saijo City Government| |Kochi|Kochi Prefectural Government, Kochi City Government, Konan City Government| |Fukuoka|Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kitakyushu City Government, Fukuoka City Government (two persons), Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government (two persons), Tagawa City Government, Chikugo City Government, Yukuhashi City Government, Nakama City Government, Kasuga City Government, Onojo City Government (two persons), Munakata City Government (two persons), Dazaifu City Government, Asakura City Government, Itoshima City Government, Nakagawa City Government, Kasuya Town Office, Chikuzen Town Office, Tachiarai Town Office| |Saga|Saga Prefectural Government (three persons), Karatsu City Government, Yoshinogari Town Office| |Nagasaki|Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Nagasaki City Government, Sasebo City Government (three persons), Shimabara City Government, Omura City Government (two persons), Matsuura City Government, Iki City Government, Saikai City Government| |Kumamoto|Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Yashiro City Government, Arao City Government, Minamata City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Koshi City Government, Ozu Town Office, Kuma Village Office| |Oita|Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Oita City Government, Beppu City Government, Kitsuki City Government| |Miyazaki|Miyazaki Prefectural Government (six persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons), Nobeoka City Government, Nichinan City Government, Kobayashi City Government, Hyuga City Government, Kushima City Government, Saito City Government, Ebino City Government (two persons), Mimata Town Office, Takanabe Town Office, Tsuno Town Office, Kadogawa Town Office| |Kagoshima|Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Kagoshima City Government, Tarumizu City Government, Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Soo City Government, Kirishima City Government (two persons), Aira City Government, Kinko Town Office, Minami Okuma Town Office| |Okinawa|Tomigusuku City Government| Notes: Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2019 (part-time personnel included). ----- **Reference 62 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and** **Technology** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014) TThe Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minster Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations. Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures. An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs. On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized. In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology. **1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited** Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when: 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded, 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack). **2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict** **examination and information disclosure** In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of— implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as— supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations. Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999). **3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to** **third parties** In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licenser. ----- Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision. For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms. The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes. |Reference 63|Col2| |---|---| |Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records| |Details of Activities and Their Past Records|m The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. m Disposal operations in FY2018: a total of 1,480 disposal operations (average of approximately 28 operations per week), weighing approximately 53.0 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 20.0 tons, (accounting for about 38% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Removal of Underwater Mines (Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law)|m The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others. m Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. m Disposal operations in FY2018: a total 4,456 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 2.8 tons in total (0 underwater mines disposed). (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Medical Activities (Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others)|m Medical services are provided to the general public at the National Defense Medical College Hospital in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). m The National Defense Medical College Hospital serves as an advanced treatment hospital (provision of advanced medical treatment, etc.) and a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services (acceptance of emergency patients in critical condition). m In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs. m The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. m The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on disaster and emergency medicine.| |Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings (Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.)|m At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services. m The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.| |Exchanges with Local Communities|m Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.| ----- **Reference 64 Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)** Outline of the survey period: January 11 - 21, 2018 For details, refer to 1 Interest in the Self Defense Forces Interested (subtotal) 67.8 Not Interested (subtotal) 31.4 Very Somewhat Not that Totally interested interested interested uninterested (Eligible number Don’t know of people) Total (1,671) 2 Impression toward the SDF Good impression (subtotal) 89.8 Good More of a impression positive impression (Eligible number of people) Total Bad impression (subtotal) 5.6 More of a Bad negative impression impression Don’t know |36.7|53.0|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| 4.7 0.7 4.9 |14.9|52.9|25.9| |---|---|---| 0.8 5.5 3 Defense capabilities of the SDF Should be decreased Should be increased Current strength is sufficient Don’t know 6 Role expected of the Self Defense Forces (multiple responses) (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Disaster dispatches (relief activities, emergency patient transport, and other activities during disasters) Protecting national security (national security in surrounding sea and airspace, response to attacks on islands, and others) Maintaining public order in Japan (Eligible number of people) Total (1,671) |29.1|60.1| |---|---| 6.2 4.5 Responding to ballistic missile attacks Participating in international peace cooperation activities (such as United Nations PKO and international emergency relief activities) Private-sector cooperation (civil engineering projects and National Sports Festival assistance, unexploded ordnance disposal, and others) 4 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF Appreciate (Total) 87.3 Do not appreciate (Total) 7.4 Highly Appreciate to a Do not appreciate Do not appreciated certain degree very much appreciate at all (Eligible Don’t know number of people) Total (1,671) |36.7|50.6|Col3| |---|---|---| 6.2 1.1 5 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities Rescuing Japanese people in other countries Promoting defense cooperation and interaction (implementing meetings and discussions and joint training with defense agencies of other countries, defense equipment assistance, and others) Contributing to stable use of cyberspace (response to cyberattacks and others) Taking actions to deal with piracy (initiatives to protect private-sector vessels from piracy offshore near Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Cooperating with arms control and disarmament and non-proliferation effects Assisting capability building (initiatives to improve capabilities of developing countries in national security and defense fields) Contributing to stable use of outer space Should maintain current engagement level Should reduce the amount of efforts in engaging from current level Should make more efforts in engaging proactively Should not engage in such efforts Don’t know (Eligible number of people) Total (1,671) Others |20.6|66.8|Col3| |---|---|---| 1.7 Nothing in particular Unsure 79.2 60.9 49.8 40.2 34.8 26.0 21.0 20.8 18.2 17.3 14.8 13.2 7.5 0.1 2.2 1.7 Total (N = 1,671 people, M.T. = 407.7%) ----- **Reference 65 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2018)** |Col1|Col2|Ministry of Defense Headquarters|Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches|Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|Total| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |1 Number of disclosure requests||2477|1834|114|4425| |2 Number of decisions regarding disclosure Requests accepted Requests partially accepted Requests declined||2652|2109|130|4891| ||Requests accepted|1493|894|41|2428| ||Requests partially accepted|1035|1203|87|2325| ||Requests declined|124|12|2|138| |3 Number of administrative protests||12404|0|1|12405| |4 Number of lawsuits||4|1|2|7| ----- **Defense Chronology** 1951 Jan. 23 Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1945|Aug. 15 Aug. 17 Aug. 17 Aug. 28 Sep. 02 Oct. 09 Oct. 15 Oct. 24 Nov. 30|World War II ends Higashikuninomiya Cabinet established Republic of Indonesia declares independence Provisional government of People’s Republic of Vietnam established GHQ established Shidehara Cabinet established General Staff Office and Military Command abolished United Nations established Army and Navy Ministries abolished| |1946|Jan. 04 Jan. 10 Jan. 27 Feb. 26 Mar. 05 Apr. 05 Apr. 24 May 03 May 22 Oct. 01 Nov. 03 Dec. 19|GHQ orders purge from public office First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14) GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands Far East Commission formed Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech First meeting of Allied Council on Japan Civil administration of Okinawa established International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened Yoshida Cabinet established International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg renders judgment The Constitution of Japan promulgated First Indochina War starts (through 1954)| |1947|Mar. 12 May 03 Jun. 01 Jun. 05 Aug. 15 Aug. 15 Oct. 05 Dec. 17|Truman Doctrine announced The Constitution of Japan takes effect Katayama Cabinet established Marshall Plan announced India and Pakistan gain independence First India-Pakistan conflict (through 1965) Cominform established Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)| |1948|Mar. 10 Apr. 01 Apr. 27 May 14 Jun. 11 Jun. 26 Aug. 15 Sep. 09 Oct. 19 Nov. 12|Ashida Cabinet established USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949) Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated Israel gains independence; First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949) U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution Berlin airlift starts Republic of Korea (ROK) declares independence North Korea established Inauguration of the second Yoshida Cabinet International Military Tribunal for the Far East renders judgment| |1949|Jan. 25 Feb. 16 Apr. 04 Apr. 21 May 06 Jul. 05 Jul. 15 Aug. 17 Sep. 24 Oct. 01 Oct. 07 Dec. 07|Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) established Inauguration of third Yoshida Cabinet North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) (NATO established) Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany) Shimoyama incident Mitaka incident Matsukawa incident USSR declares possession of atomic bomb People’s Republic of China established German Democratic Republic established (East Germany) Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan| |1950|Jan. 27 Feb. 14 Jun. 21 Jun. 25 Jun. 28 Jul. 07 Jul. 08 Aug. 10 Aug. 13 Aug. 14 Sep. 07 Sep. 15 Oct. 25 Nov. 24 Dec. 18|U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan Korean War (ends July 27, 1953) Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Police Reserve National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima U.N. troops land at Inchon Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces| Police Reserve Jan. 29 First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations) Mar. 01 Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins Apr. 11 MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Jul. 04 Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (second term) Aug. 30 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed Sep. 01 Australia-New Zealand-U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty Sep. 08 49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan; Japan-U.S. Security Treaty concluded Oct. 20 Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi P f t i th k f T h R th |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1950|Oct. 26 Dec. 26|House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councilors approval given November 18) Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (third term)| |1952|Jan. 19 Feb. 28 Apr. 26 Apr. 28 Apr. 28 Apr. 28 May 01 May 26 May 27 Jul. 21 Jul. 26 Jul. 31 Aug. 01 Oct. 15 Oct. 30 Oct. 31 Nov. 01 Nov. 12|ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line) Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement signed Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty enter into force Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ Abolished May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Germany European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force Japan-U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed National Safety Agency Law promulgated National Safety Agency established; Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency; Coastal Safety Force inaugurated National Safety Force inaugurated Inauguration of fourth Yoshida Cabinet; Kimura becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Japan-U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed| |1953|Jan. 01 Apr. 01 May 21 Jul. 27 Aug. 12 Sep. 27 Oct. 01 Oct. 30 Dec. 25|Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established Inauguration of fifth Yoshida Cabinet Korean War Armistice Agreement signed USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed Ikeda-Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored| |1954|Jan. 21 Mar. 01 Mar. 01 Mar. 08 May 14 Jun. 02 Jun. 09 Jul. 01 Jul. 21 Sep. 03 Sep. 08 Dec. 02 Dec. 10|U.S. launches world’s first nuclear submarine (USS Nautilus) U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed Chinese People’s Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed Hatoyama Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1955|Mar. 19 Apr. 18 May 05 May 06 May 08 May 14 Jul. 31 Aug. 06 Aug. 31 Nov. 14 Nov. 22 Dec. 19|Inauguration of second Hatoyama Cabinet; Sugihara becomes Minister of State for Defense Africa-Asia conference held at Bandung West Germany formally admitted to NATO Live shell frie by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to friing intensifeis Protests begin at Sunagawa Base Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO starts) Sunada becomes Minister of State for Defense First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Japan-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed Inauguration of third Hatoyama Cabinet; Funada becomes Minister of State for Defense Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated| |1956|Feb. 09 Feb. 14 Mar. 23 Apr. 17 Apr. 26 Jul. 02 Jul. 26 Sep. 20 Oct. 19 Oct. 23 Oct. 29 Dec. 18 Dec. 23|House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councilors, February 10) Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki USSR announces dissolution of Cominform First Japan-made destroyer Harukaze completed National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal First domestically-produced F-86F fgihter delivered Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese-Soviet relations Hungarian Revolution Second Middle East War (Suez War; through November 6) Japan joins the U.N. Ishibashi Cabinet established; Prime Minister concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense| |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1957|Jan. 31 Feb. 02 Feb. 25 Mar. 15 May 15 May 20 Jun. 14 Jun. 21 Jul. 10 Aug. 06 Aug. 26 Aug. 27 Sep. 10 Oct. 04 Nov. 23|Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense Kotaki becomes Minister of State for Defense Kishi Cabinet established House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Basic Guidelines for National Defense National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on First Defense Build-up Plan Kishi-Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued Inauguration of reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Tsushima becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan-U.S. Security Council inaugurated USSR announces successful ICBM test Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura National Defense Council decision to produce P2V-742 aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17 USSR launches the world’s frist artifciial satellite, Sputnik 1 World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration| |1958|Jan. 01 Jan. 01 Jan. 14 Jan. 31 Feb. 17 Apr. 18 Jun. 12 Aug. 23 Sep. 11 Oct. 04 Oct. 23 Dec. 17|Japan becomes non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council European Economic Community (EEC) starts First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28) U.S. successfully launches an artificial satellite ASDF begins scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs Inauguration of second Kishi Cabinet; Sato becomes Minister of State for Defense Chinese People’s Liberation Army attack on Quemoy intensifies Fujiyama-Dulles talks (Washington, D.C.); agreement on revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Commencement of Japan-U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Dulles talks with Chiang Kaishek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM| |1959|Jan. 12 Mar. 30 Jun. 18 Aug. 25 Sep. 18 Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Nov. 06 Dec. 01 Dec. 16|Ino becomes Minister of State for Defense Tokyo District Court rules the stationing of U.S. Forces unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case Inauguration of second reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Akagi becomes Minister of State for Defense China-India border dispute USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete military reductions at U.N. Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon Vera U.S.-Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David National Defense Council decision to produce 200 F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on November 10 Antarctica Treaty signed Supreme Court reverses original ruling in the Sunagawa case| |1960|Jan. 11 Jan. 19 Feb. 13 May 01 May 24 Jul. 19 Jul. 20 Dec. 08 Dec. 20|Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed (enters into force June 23) France conducts its first nuclear test in the Sahara U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace Disaster relief teams dispatched after the earthquake and tsunami in Chile Ikeda Cabinet established; Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM Inauguration of second Ikeda Cabinet; Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense Formation of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front| |1961|Jan. 13 Apr. 12 May 16 Jul. 06 Jul. 11 Jul. 18 Jul. 18 Aug. 13|National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20 USSR successfully launches manned spacecraft Military junta seizes power in a coup in ROK Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Fujieda becomes Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Second Defense Build-up Plan Construction of Berlin Wall| |1962|Jul. 18 Jul. 23 Aug. 15 Oct. 15 Oct. 20 Oct. 24 Oct. 28 Nov. 01 Nov. 09|Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (second term); Shiga becomes Minister of State for Defense International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva International Conference GSDF completes 13 division organization Type 61 tank first introduced China-India border dispute (through November 22) U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20) Premier of the Soviet Union Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba Defense Facilities Administration Agency established Shiga visits U.S. for frist time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)| ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1963|Jun. 20 Jul. 18 Aug. 08 Aug. 14 Sep. 16 Dec. 09 Dec. 17|Agreement signed for U.S.-Soviet hotline Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (third term); Fukuda becomes Minister of State for Defense Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by US.-USSR-U. K. (enters into force on October 10) Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Malaysian Federation established Inauguration of third Ikeda Cabinet ROK transits to civilian government, Park Chung-hee becomes President| |1964|Jun. 15 Jul. 18 Aug. 02 Oct. 16 Nov. 09 Nov. 12|Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan Inauguration of third reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Koizumi becomes Minister of State for Defense Gulf of Tonkin incident China successfully carries out its first nuclear test Sato Cabinet established U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time| |1965|Feb. 07 Feb. 10 Jun. 03 Jun. 22 Sep. 01 Nov. 10|U.S. starts bombing of North Vietnam Diet debate on Mitsuya study Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Matsuno becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan-ROK Basic Treaty signed Second India-Pakistan conflict (to September 22) Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)| |1966|May 16 Jul. 01 Aug. 01 Oct. 27 Nov. 29 Dec. 03|Cultural Revolution starts in China France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined April 4, 2009) Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Kambayashiyama becomes Minister of State for Defense China successfully carries out its first nuclear missile test National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuda becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1967|Jan. 27 Feb. 17 Mar. 14 Mar. 29 Jun. 05 Jun. 17 Jul. 01 Aug. 08 Nov. 25|Outer Space Treaty signed Inauguration of second Sato Cabinet National Defense Council decision adopted on Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan (Cabinet decision on March 14) Sapporo District Court renders judgment on Eniwa Case Third Middle East War (through June 9) China successfully carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Formation of European Community (EC) Formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet| |1968|Jan. 16 Jan. 19 Jan. 23 Feb. 26 May 13 Jun. 26 Jul. 01 Aug. 20 Aug. 24 Nov. 30|Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. troops east of Suez U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea New Japan-U.S. nuclear agreement signed First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacifci Inauguration of second reshuffeld Sato Cabinet (second term); Arita becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1969|Jan. 10 Mar. 02 Apr. 15 Jun. 10 Jul. 25 Nov. 21|National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island) North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane South Vietnam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government U.S. President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine) Sato-Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)| |1970|Jan. 14 Jan. 24 Feb. 03 Feb. 11 Mar. 05 Mar. 31 Apr. 16 Apr. 24 Jun. 23 Aug. 12 Oct. 20 Nov. 25|Inauguration of third Sato Cabinet; Nakasone becomes Minister of State for Defense Formation of integrated WPO (Warsaw Pact) forces (involving seven countries) Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force Yodo hijacking U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks China successfully launches its first satellite Automatic extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty West Germany-USSR sign non-aggression pact Publication of “The Defense of Japan,” the first white paper on defense Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya| 1971 Feb. 11 Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes Jun. 17 Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed Jun. 29 Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed Jul. 05 Inauguration of third reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense Jul. 30 All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi) |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1971|Aug. 02 Aug. 09 Sep. 30 Oct. 25 Nov. 24 Nov. 27 Dec. 03 Dec. 03 Dec. 05|Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense India-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan House of Representatives resolution on nonnuclear weapons ASEAN declares SEA neutrality Third India-Pakistan conflict Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense ASDF first domestic supersonic aircraft ASDF XT-2 delivered| |1972|Jan. 07 Feb. 08 Feb. 27 Apr. 10 Apr. 18 May 15 May 26 Jul. 03 Jul. 04 Jul. 07 Sep. 29 Oct. 09 Dec. 21 Dec. 22|Sato-Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan U.S. President Nixon visits China; China-U.S. Joint Communique Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on SDF deployment in Okinawa Return of Okinawa SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit of U.S. President Nixon to USSR India-Pakistan truce signed ROK and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peaceful unification Tanaka Cabinet established; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, Key Matters for Inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, and Measures to Enhance Civilian Control East-West Germany Basic Treaty signed Inauguration of second Tanaka Cabinet| |1973|Jan. 23 Jan. 27 Feb. 01 Feb. 21 Mar. 29 May 29 Jun. 22 Jul. 01 Sep. 07 Sep. 21 Oct. 06 Oct. 08 Oct. 17 Nov. 07 Nov. 25|14th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program) Vietnam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect on January 28) Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength Laos Peace Treaty signed U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Vietnam Yamanaka becomes Minister of State for Defense General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgment) Japan-North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25) Japan-Soviet summit (Moscow) Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO Inauguration of second reshuffled Tanaka Cabinet| |1974|Jan. 05 Jan. 18 Apr. 20 Apr. 25 May 18 Jul. 03 Oct. 08 Nov. 11 Nov. 13 Nov. 15 Nov. 23 Dec. 09|Japan-China Trade Agreement signed Israel and Egypt sign Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Treaties Japan-China Aviation Agreement signed National Defense Medical College opens India carries out its first underground nuclear test U.S. President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize Inauguration of second reshuffled second Tanaka Cabinet (second term); Uno becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan-China Marine Transport Agreement signed U.N. forces in Korea discovers a North Korean infiltration tunnel U.S. President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement on SALT II Miki Cabinet established; Sakata becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1975|Apr. 01 Apr. 23 Apr. 30 Aug. 01 Nov. 17|Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29) U.S. President Ford declares end of Vietnam War South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki) First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), held annually since| 1976 Apr. 05 Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident) Jun. 04 Publication of second white paper on defense, “The Defense of Japan” (henceforth published annually) Jun. 08 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan Jul. 02 Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unified Vietnam) proclaimed Jul. 08 Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) established Aug. 05 Sapporo High Court renders judgment in Naganuma Nike suit Aug. 18 U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom by North Korea Sep. 06 MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1976|Sep. 15 Oct. 29 Nov. 05 Dec. 24|Inauguration of reshuffled Miki Cabinet National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Immediate-term Defense Build-up and Handling Major Items in Preparations for Defense Forces Fukuda Cabinet established; Mihara becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1977|Feb. 17 Jun. 30 Jul. 01 Aug. 01 Aug. 10 Nov. 28 Dec. 29|Mito District Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective) Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200- mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study Inaguruation of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Kanemaru becomes Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of F-15s and P-3C| |1978|Apr. 12 Aug. 12 Sep. 21 Nov. 03 Nov. 27 Nov. 27 Dec. 05 Dec. 07 Dec. 25|Chinese fishing fleet infringes on waters around Senkaku Islands Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China signed in Beijing Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Agreement signed (ASDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1) Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28 Afghanistan-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Relations and Cooperation signed Ohira Cabinet established; Yamashita becomes Minister of State for Defense Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia (withdrawal completed on September 26, 1989)| |1979|Jan. 01 Jan. 07 Jan. 11 Feb. 11 Feb. 17 Mar. 26 Jun. 18 Jul. 17 Jul. 25 Nov. 09 Dec. 27|U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifies termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty after one year Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of E-2C Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran Sino-Vietnamese War (through March 5) Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed SALT II signed Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980-FY1984) Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes frist visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26) Inauguration of second Ohira Cabinet; Kubota becomes Minister of State for Defense Soviet Union invades Afghanistan| |1980|Feb. 04 Feb. 26 Apr. 11 May 18 Jul. 17 Jul. 17 Aug. 18 Aug. 19 Aug. 21 Sep. 03 Sep. 22|Hosoda becomes Minister of State for Defense Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18) Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacifci Ocean for the frist time House of Councillors establishes special committee for Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Territories issues Suzuki Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced Soviet nuclear submarine has an accident off the main island of Okinawa First meeting of the Japan-U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (Washington, D.C., through September 4) Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war| |1981|Jan. 06 Apr. 22 Jul. 07 Jul. 13 Oct. 01 Nov. 30 Dec. 13|February 7 decided as Northern Territories Day (Cabinet understanding) Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation Tokyo High Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgment in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits (GSDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3) Inauguration of reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet; Ito becomes Minister of State for Defense Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military Council of National Salvation| 1982 Feb. 15 (GSDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Takigahara, through February 19) Apr. 02 Falklands dispute (ends June 14) Apr. 25 Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula May 15 Use of some sections of land within facilities and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law Jun. 06 Israeli forces invade Lebanon Jun. 08 BWC enters into force in Japan Jun. 09 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded Jun. 29 Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.-Soviet Union (Geneva) Jul. 23 1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and appro ed b National Defense Co ncil ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1982|Aug. 17 Sep. 09 Oct. 12 Oct. 20 Nov. 27|U.S.-China Joint Statement about U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan Supreme Court renders judgment on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case China successfully tests SLBM water launch Yokohama District Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit Nakasone Cabinet established; Tanikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1983|Jan. 01 Jan. 14 Mar. 23 Jun. 12 Sep. 01 Oct. 09 Oct. 25 Nov. 08 Dec. 12 Dec. 27|U.S. establishes new Unified Combatant Command (Central Command) Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S. (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary) U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Director Tanigawa first Minister of State for Defense to inspect Northern Islands KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fighters near Sakhalin 19 ROK Government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorists U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada Signing of negotiation statement for sharing military technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (ASDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (Fuchu, through December 15) Inauguration of second Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1984|Jan. 01 Jun. 11 Oct. 16 Nov. 01|Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN on January 7) (MSDF) First Japan-U.S. bilateral command post exercise (Yokosuka, through June 15) Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet; Kato becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1985|Mar. 12 Apr. 02 Jun. 04 Aug. 12 Sep. 18 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|U.S.-Soviet Union arms control talks begin USAF begins to station F-16 fighters at Misawa China announces the reduction of one million personnel from the People’s Liberation Army Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the JAL aircraft crash National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program; National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on introduction of Patriots Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet (second term)| |1986|Feb. 24 Apr. 09 Apr. 26 Jul. 01 Jul. 22 Aug. 10 Aug. 15 Sep. 05 Sep. 22 Oct. 15 Oct. 27|First Japan-U.S. bilateral joint command post exercise (Hinoki-cho, headquarters of USFJ, etc., through February 28) Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union Security Council Establishment Law enacted Inauguration of third Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San Francisco, through August 11) Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts fnial documents (Stockholm) USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan First Japan-U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise (eastern and southern part of Honshu island, etc., through October 31)| |1987|Jan. 24 Jan. 30 May 27 May 29 Jul. 15 Jul. 20 Aug. 26 Oct. 06 Oct. 21 Nov. 06 Nov. 29 Dec. 08 Dec. 18|Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas Director Kurihara frist incumbent Director to visit China (through June 4) Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits U.N. Security Council adopts Iran-Iraq Conflict Cease Fire resolution (Number 598) Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted First Japan-U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7) Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and announced Takeshita Cabinet established; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists over the Bay of Bengal INF Treaty signed Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas| 1988 Mar. 02 Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Mar. 14 Armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Spratly Islands Apr. 12 Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance A t b t th t t i |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1988|May 29 Jun. 01 Jul. 23 Aug. 17 Aug. 20 Aug. 24 Sep. 20 Oct. 17 Nov. 29 Dec. 07 Dec. 27|U.S.-Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged) Supreme Court renders judgment on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka) First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada) Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran-Iraq War Tazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised Military Bases Agreement Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops Inauguration of reshuffled Takeshita Cabinet| |1989|Jan. 07|Demise of Emperor Showa| |1989|Feb. 15 Feb. 24 Mar. 09 Mar. 09 Mar. 15 Mar. 30 Apr. 01 May 10 Jun. 03 Jun. 04 Jun. 20 Jun. 22 Jun. 24 Aug. 10 Sep. 26 Nov. 09|Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan Emperor Showa’s funeral Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started (Vienna) Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) started (Vienna) Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court renders judgment in the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit New BADGE system begins operations Consumption Tax Law enforced START-I reopened at U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through May 11) Uno Cabinet established; Yamasaki becomes Minister of State for Defense Chinese martial law units fire on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident) Supreme Court renders judgment in the Hyakuri Base suit Yokohama District Court renders judgment in the Atsugi Air Base suit to vacate the premises Zhao Ziyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin Kaifu Cabinet established; Matsumoto becomes Minister of State for Defense Vietnam completely withdraws from Cambodia GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall)| |1990|Feb. 13 Feb. 20 Feb. 28 Mar. 03 May 29 Jun. 19 Jun. 21 Aug. 02 Aug. 02 Oct. 03 Oct. 16 Oct. 24 Nov. 10 Nov. 12 Nov. 23 Dec. 20 Dec. 29|U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. troops in Europe Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide “military technology related to FS-X” to U.S. Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ishikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, G.H.W. Bush, Palm Springs, through March 4) Naha District Court renders judgment in administrative handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Japan-U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items) Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security Iraq invades Kuwait U.S. President G.H.W. Bush gives speech at Aspen German unification Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet USSR conducts underground nuclear tests in the Arctic Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled Coronation of Emperor Great Thanksgiving Festival Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991- FY1995) Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ikeda becomes Minister of State for Defense| 1991 Jan. 17 Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters Jan. 17 Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm Jan. 24 Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region Jan. 25 Cabinet decision adopted on ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled April 19) Mar. 13 Kanazawa District Court renders judgment on the 1st and 2nd Komatsu Air Base noise suits Mar. 31 WPO (Warsaw Pact structures) dismantled Apr. 11 Gulf War formally ended Apr. 24 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on “Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf” Apr. 26 Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf Jun. 03 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Fugendake on Mt. Unzen Jul. 31 U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow Sep. 06 Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states Sep. 17 U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations Oct. 09 SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1991|Nov. 05 Nov. 05 Nov. 26 Dec. 05 Dec. 08|House of Representatives establishes the Committee on National Security Miyazawa Cabinet established; Miyashita becomes Minister of State for Defense Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of Ukrainian Republic CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at summit (Brest, Belarus)| |1992|Feb. 07 Feb. 25 Apr. 01 Apr. 01 Apr. 27 May 22 May 23 May 25 Jun. 19 Aug. 10 Aug. 24 Sep. 17 Sep. 19 Sep. 30 Nov. 09 Nov. 24 Dec. 03 Dec. 12 Dec. 16 Dec. 18 Dec. 21|Twelve EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty) China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency First female students enter National Defense Academy of Japan Tokyo District Court renders judgment in suits pertaining to the surrender of land for Atsugi Air Base North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fire guns START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet States including Russia IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities (through June 5) Announcement of “International Peace Cooperation Law” (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of “Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams” (enacted June 29) International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force China and the ROK establish diplomatic relations Departure commences of 1st Cambodia Dispatch Facilities Battalion (All units returned to Japan by September 26, 1993) Departure of Electoral Observer to Cambodia (Narita) U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines) CFE Treaty becomes formally effective U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal from Philippines complete) U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military action by multinational forces in Somalia Inauguration of reshuffled Miyazawa Cabinet; Nakayama becomes Minister of State for Defense U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy peacekeeping operations in Mozambique Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-FY1995) Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit| |1993|Jan. 03 Jan. 13 Feb. 25 Mar. 12 Mar. 25 Apr. 08 May 04 May 04 May 11 May 14 May 29 Jun. 01 Jun. 09 Jun. 11 Jul. 12 Aug. 04 Aug. 09 Sep. 01 Sep. 13 Sep. 23 Oct. 13 Nov. 01 Dec. 02|U.S.-Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed Japan signs CWC Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit and 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits North Korea announces secession from NPT Aegis ship (Kongo) enters service Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Cambodia Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II) Death of Superintendent Haruyuki Takada, a civilian police officer in Cambodia Mozambique Dispatch Transport Coordination Unit begin departing for Mozambique (All units returned home by January 8, 1995) United Nations Operation in Mozambique headquarters staff depart for Mozambique North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.-North Korea consultations Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12) Signing of peace treaty in Rwandan civil war Hosokawa Cabinet established; Nakanishi becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. DoD announces the Bottom Up Review Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Japan-Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed Maastricht Treaty comes into effect; European Union established Aichi becomes Minister of State for Defense| 1994 Feb. 24 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kadena Air Base noise suits Mar. 23 First female aviation students join MSDF Mar. 24 First female aviation students join ASDF Mar. 30 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit Apr. 28 Hata Cabinet established; Kanda becomes Minister of State for Defense Jun. 08 U.S. DoD submits “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation” pertaining to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons Jun. 30 Murayama Cabinet established; Tamazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense Sep. 22 U.S. DoD announces “Nuclear Posture Review” ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1994|Oct. 21 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 05 Dec. 18 Dec. 20 Dec. 26|U.S.-North Korea talks, both sides sign “Framework Agreement” relating to support for North Korean light water reactors, and provision of substitute energy First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17) Commander of U.S.-ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces START-I comes into force Russia starts military operations against Chechnya First visit to Japan by the ROK’s naval training vessel (Harumi, through December 23) Kanazawa branch of Nagoya High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Komatsu Air Base noise suits| |1995|Jan. 17 Mar. 09 Mar. 20 May 11 May 19 Jun. 05 Jul. 28 Aug. 01 Aug. 08 Sep. 04 Sep. 15 Oct. 27 Nov. 17 Nov. 19 Nov. 28 Dec. 14 Dec. 14 Dec. 14 Dec. 20 Dec. 26|Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin- Awaji Earthquake (through April 27) Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23) NPT extended indefinitely Enactment of “Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use by United States Forces in Japan” (effective June 20) The defense authorities of Japan and the ROK both issue the “letter concerning the prevention of accidents between aircraft of the Japan Self-defense Forces and military aircraft of the Republic of Korea” Vietnam offciially joins ASEAN 1st KEDO Meeting (Japan-U.S.-ROK) held (New York) Inauguration of reshuffled Murayama Cabinet; Eto becomes Minister of State for Defense Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa Ratifciation of Chemical Weapons Convention Announcement of “Law Relating to the Treatment of Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International Organizations” (effective January 1, 1996) Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996 Security Council of Japan decision adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000) (Cabinet decision on December 15) Security Council of Japan makes decision “Regarding upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter” (December 15, Cabinet approval); Model of Next-Generation Support Fighter “F-2” decided Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations Tokyo High Court renders judgement on remanded appeal trial for 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit| 1996 Jan. 11 Hashimoto Cabinet established; Usui becomes Minister of State for Defense Jan. 26 START-II ratified by U.S. Senate Jan. 31 SDF units dispatched to United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) Mar. 08 China carries out three missile firing exercises in total, naval and air force live-fire drills and, ground, naval and air force integrated exercises in the waters close to Taiwan March 8-25 Mar. 23 Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections; Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected Apr. 12 Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied) Apr. 15 Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective October 22) Apr. 16 Cabinet decision adopted on promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture Apr. 17 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued Jul. 12 Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna) Jul. 20 U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan Jul. 26 First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30, Russian Navy’s 300th anniversary naval review) Jul. 29 China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45th), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing Aug. 28 First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6) Aug. 28 Supreme Court renders judgement in lawsuit regarding mandamus pertaining to proxy signature with regard to the Act on Special Measures Concerning USFJ Land Release Sep. 10 U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Sep. 18 North Korean minisubmarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory (clearing operation completed November 7) Sep. 26 Hong Kong protest vessels (Baodiao) etc., intrude into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands Sep. 27 Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of the provisional government Oct. 03 Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed Nov. 07 Inauguration of second Hashimoto Cabinet; Kyuma becomes Minister of State of Defense |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1996|Nov. 18 Dec. 02 Dec. 24|Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia- Herzegovina SACO final report approved by Japan-U.S. Joint Security Council Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters| |1997|Jan. 02 Jan. 20 Apr. 29 May 12 Jun. 09 Jul. 01 Jul. 03 Jul. 16 Sep. 11 Sep. 23 Nov. 10 Dec. 03 Dec. 19|Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Russian Nakhodka shipwreck and oil spill disaster (through March 31) Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters CWC enters into force Russia-Chechnya peace treaty signed Self-Defense Offciial (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through June 2002) Hong Kong reverts to China The first artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa conducted on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji, through July 9) North Korean soldiers cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops Inauguration of second reshuffled Hashimoto Cabinet Guidelines for New Japan-U.S. defense cooperation approved by Security Consultative Committee (SCC) China-Russia summit talks: China-Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China- Russian eastern border declared Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000)| |1998|Mar. 26 Apr. 28 May 11 May 22 May 28 Jun. 06 Jun. 12 Jun. 12 Jun. 22 Jul. 27 Jul. 29 Jul. 30 Aug. 31 Sep. 01 Sep. 02 Sep. 24 Sep. 30 Oct. 21 Nov. 14 Nov. 15 Nov. 20 Dec. 17 Dec. 22 Dec. 22 Dec. 25|Introduction of a system of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13) Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Kadena Air Base noise suits Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30) U.N. Security Council resolution adopted that condemns nuclear tests by India and Pakistan Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Government Reform Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12) A North Korean submarine intrudes into the east coast of ROK, seized by ROK forces China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, “Defense of China” Bilateral search and rescue exercise between MSDF/ ASDF and Russian Navy — the first full-fledged bilateral exercise between Japan and Russia Obuchi Cabinet established; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace Temporary freezing of Japan-North Korea normalization talks Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement concluded (Takeshima Issue shelved) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded KEDO signed Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations in region November 18-December 1, return to Japan December 5) First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima) Norota becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20) Cabinet decision adopted on introduction of information gathering satellite Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO) Security Council approves Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies| 1999 Jan. 14 Inauguration of reshuffled Obuchi Cabinet Mar. 23 Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24) Mar. 29 GSDF establishes first brigade Apr. 01 Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet) May 24 Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the “Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement” (adding cooperation for operations to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan) approved in Diet (effective September 25) May 28 Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan promulgated (enters into force August 25), Act for Partial Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act promulgated and enters into force Jun. 15 Shooting incident between North Korean Naval ships which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South Korean Naval ships Jul. 23 Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 2nd Atsugi Air Base noise suit Aug. 05 First Bilateral Exercise of Search and Rescue Exercise between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu) Aug. 25 The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1999|Sep. 02 Sep. 23 Sep. 29 Sep. 30 Oct. 05 Nov. 22 Nov. 22 Dec. 17 Dec. 20 Dec. 27 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a new military demarcation line on the sea SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22) Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura (through October 3) Inauguration of second Obuchi Cabinet; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000) Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in place of UNSCOM Rule over Macao transferred to China Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the “Joint Response Manual for Suspicious Ships” Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station Cabinet decision adopted on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station| |2000|Jan. 17 Feb. 16 Apr. 01 Apr. 05 Apr. 14 May 07 May 08 Jun. 16 Jul. 04 Jul. 21 Aug. 25 Sep. 13 Nov. 20 Dec. 05 Dec. 15|Anti-personnel mine disposal begins First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17) Enactment of the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act” Mori Cabinet established Russian Duma ratifeis the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II) Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force Inauguration of second Mori Cabinet; Torashima becomes Minister of State for Defense Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23) Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF Inauguration of second reshuffled Mori Cabinet; Saito becomes Minister of State for Defense Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001- FY2005)| 2001 Feb. 05 SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11), following the major earthquake which hit western India on January 26 Feb. 09 Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005) Feb. 10 Collision between Ehime Maru and U.S. submarine Mar. 01 The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect Mar. 07 Former Maritime Self-Defense official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy Apr. 01 Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force Apr. 01 Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes Apr. 26 Koizumi Cabinet established; Nakatani becomes Minister of State for Defense Jun. 15 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established Aug. 08 Disaster relief teams dispatched for submarine rescue ship Chihaya to cooperate in raising the Ehime Maru (returned December 16) Sep. 11 Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur Sep. 12 U.N. Security Council adopts resolution condemning the terrorist attacks Sep. 19 Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S. Oct. 02 In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty Oct. 06 International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12) Oct. 07 U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan (October 19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, first ground fighting) Oct. 08 Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the first meeting Oct. 29 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session Nov. 02 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002) Nov. 25 Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities Nov. 27 Exchange of fire in the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) Dec. 05 U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I Dec. 20 U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Dec. 22 Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman Dec. 22 Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2001|Dec. 29|Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba| |2002|Jan. 29 Feb. 15 Mar. 02 Mar. 06 Mar. 27 Apr. 22 May 04 May 20 May 24 May 30 Jun. 13 Jun. 29 Jul. 16 Jul. 29 Sep. 04 Sep. 17 Sep. 20 Sep. 30 Oct. 01 Oct. 13 Oct. 15 Oct. 16 Oct. 16 Oct. 31 Nov. 01 Nov. 14 Nov. 18 Nov. 21 Dec. 02 Dec. 12 Dec. 16 Dec. 17|U.S. President G.W. Bush depicts “Axis of Evil” in the State of the Union Address Cabinet decision adopted on international cooperation execution plan for Timor-Leste 680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to Timor-Leste (through June 25, 2004) Kanazawa District Court renders judgement in 3rd and 4th Komatsu Air Base noise suits Introduction of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel System 2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the frist multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2) Russia completes return of the Cam Ranh base to Vietnam. The United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Exchanges of frie between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL U.S. Government releases “National Strategy for Homeland Security” Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed Incident in central Sea of Japan (response to a suspicious ship) Japan-North Korea Summit held Kim Jong- Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions U.S. Government announces “National Security Strategy” Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ishiba becomes Minister of State for Defense Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and Planning Branch) (through July 6) First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay) Five of those abducted return to Japan U.S. Government issues statement that North Korea admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, during Assistant Secretary of State Kelly’s visit to North Korea Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 3rd, 4th and 5th Atsugi Air Base noise suits Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in the suit pertaining to the surrender of land for Sobe Communication Site Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect classifeid information (defense secrets) KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December First SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido NATO Prague Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe SDF personnel dispatched for the first time to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (December 5) in Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system (ground- and sea-based interceptor missiles and PAC-3)| 2003 Jan. 10 North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Jan. 24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security established Jan. 28 Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air Station Replacement Feb. 08 Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some exceptions) Mar. 20 U.S. and U.K. Forces begin military operations in Iraq Mar. 27 Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency Establishment Act, etc. (changes in SDF personnel quota and number of Ready Reserve Personnel) enters into force Mar. 30 International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2) May 01 U.S. President G.W. Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan May 13 Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits May 31 U.S. President G.W. Bush proposes Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for the first time Jun. 01 U.S.-Russia leaders talk, enforcement of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions Jun. 06 Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws passed in the House of Councillors plenary session Jul. 17 International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18) Jul. 26 Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed in the House of Councillors plenary session Aug. 27 First Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through August 29) Sep. 12 First PSI exercise held in the Coral Sea northeast of Australia (through September 14) |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2003|Sep. 22 Sep. 30 Oct. 07 Oct. 10 Oct. 15 Nov. 19 Nov. 29 Dec. 18 Dec. 19 Dec. 19 Dec. 30|Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet (second term) Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of award for people engaged in dangerous activities (November 3, 2003 Former SDF personnel are conferred the award for people engaged in dangerous activities for the first time) Joint communique signed for the frist time at Japan-China-ROK Summit meeting Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years China launches its first manned spacecraft Shenzhou 5 Inauguration of second Koizumi Cabinet Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq Iran signs IAEA agreement Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions) Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (January 1-2, 2004)| |2004|Jan. 22 Feb. 03 Feb. 09 Feb. 09 Mar. 04 Mar. 26 Apr. 15 Apr. 15 Apr. 28 May 22 Jun. 01 Jun. 14 Jun. 14 Jun. 18 Jun. 28 Aug. 13 Sep. 27 Oct. 25 Nov. 10 Nov. 16 Dec. 10 Dec. 28|ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8) Disaster relief teams dispatched for the first time in response to bird flu (Tanbacho, Kyoto Prefecture, through March 11) Diet decides on installation of ballistic missile defense system (FY2004 draft budget passed in the House of Councillors plenary session) First transport of Japanese nationals living overseas implemented, 10 nationals transported from Iraq to Kuwait Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Defense Agency/SDF U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction Japan-North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang). Five family members of abductees return to Japan U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in House of Councillors plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed Cabinet agreement for SDF’s activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces) Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa Inauguration of second reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ohno becomes Minister of State for Defense PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan for the first time (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27) Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan’s territorial waters-Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12) Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine’s intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005” and “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005-FY2009” MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand’s Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia’s Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)| 2005 Jan. 04 SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean that occurred on December 26, 2004 (all teams returned home by March 23) Jan. 19 The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged submarines in Japan’s territorial waters Feb. 10 North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement implying its manufacture of nuclear weapons (May 11, announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods) Feb. 17 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit Feb. 19 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) — common strategic objectives confirmed Mar. 08 ROK’s Government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft approaching Takeshima without authorization Mar. 14 National People’s Congress adopts “Anti-Secession Law” Mar. 14 A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20) Mar. 16 Shimane Prefecture establishes “Takeshima Day” Mar. 25 Cabinet decision adopted on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians Apr. 25 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the railroad accident on JR West’s Fukuchiyama Line |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2005|Jul. 14 Aug. 05 Sep. 09 Sep. 09 Sep. 21 Oct. 12 Oct. 20 Oct. 29 Oct. 31 Oct. 31 Nov. 11 Nov. 27 Nov. 30 Dec. 14 Dec. 16 Dec. 24|Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in the East China Sea An MSDF vessel dispatched to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All units returned home by August 10) First China-Russia joint military exercises “Peace Mission 2005” (through August 25) Five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class, are navigating in the sea area surrounding “Kashi” gas field near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea Inauguration of third Koizumi Cabinet SDF units dispatched for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to large-scale earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All units returned home by December 2) GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attacks for the first time Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) joint announces “Japan-U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” Inauguration of third reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year) Cabinet decision adopted on “the Government’s actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee held on October 29, 2005” Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the frist time in Fukui Prefecture Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits The first East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur) U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the human rights situation in North Korea Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on “Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense”| |2006|Jan. 10 Feb. 04 Mar. 06 Mar. 27 Apr. 23 May 01 May 11 May 29 Jun. 01 Jun. 20 Jun. 23 Jun. 29 Jul. 05 Jul. 13 Jul. 31 Aug. 16 Aug. 29 Aug. 29 Sep. 26 Oct. 09 Oct. 13 Dec. 19|Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment Japan-North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/missile issues are held (through February 6) At the Japan-China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (through March 7) Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles, etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) announces the “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State for Defense sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ First P-3C visit to Australia SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java on May 27 (through June 22) The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces Agreement concerning provision of arms and military technologies to the United States is signed Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, joint document “The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century” announced North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd, 4th and 5th Atsugi Air Base noise suits Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (inc. reinforcement of facilities administration function of the agency, establishment of the Equipment headquarters and reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices) A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia U.S. Navy, deploys Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 at Yokosuka naval facility The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station established, and its first meeting held Abe Cabinet established; Kyuma becomes Minister of State for Defense North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test U.N. General Assembly adopts draft resolution condemning abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea| 2007 Jan. 09 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of the Defense Agency into the Ministry of Defense and stipulation of the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities as its primary mission) Jan. 09 Kyuma becomes Minister of Defense Jan. 12 China conducts an anti-satellite test Feb. 13 North Korea agrees to disable all of its nuclear facilities during the 5th Six-Party Talks ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2008|Sep. 25 Sep. 25 Oct. 03 Oct. 10 Oct. 19 Oct. 22 Oct. 24 Nov. 02 Dec. 02 Dec. 20 Dec. 23 Dec. 26|The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS “George Washington” arrives in the port of Yokosuka for the first time China launches a manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 7,” and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the first time U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism Four Chinese naval warships including a destroyer sail through Tsugaru Strait for the first time Japan-India Summit Meeting: Japan-India Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed SDF personnel dispatched to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (through September 30, 2011) Four Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean for the first time U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1846 on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009) ASDF Airlift Wing that was deployed under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq returns to Japan Chinese naval fleet of three destroyers sets off to Somalia for escort mission| |2009|Jan. 08 Jan. 15 Feb. 10 Feb. 17 Feb. 27 Mar. 13 Mar. 13 Mar. 14 Mar. 27 Mar. 30 Apr. 03 Apr. 05 Apr. 10 May 04 May 15 May 19 May 25 Jun. 02 Jul. 04 Jul. 14 Jul. 17 Jul. 24 Jul. 31 Aug. 01 Sep. 16 Oct. 05 Oct. 27 Nov. 10 Nov. 23 Dec. 01 Dec. 03 Dec. 05 Dec. 17|ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri Air Base) Ministry of Defense decides on “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space” Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the redeployment group Signing of the “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit Cabinet decision adopted on Anti-Piracy Measures Law SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security operations as part of anti-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Two MSDF ships are dispatched to protect vessels with ties to Japan from the piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (through April 6) MSDF ships begin escort missions as part of anti-piracy measures Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits 1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines) Order issued for P-3C to be dispatched to Djibouti for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” comes into force North Korea conducts the 2nd underground nuclear test Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan Ratification of Convention on Cluster Munitions Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their Possession Anti-Piracy Measures Law enacted, Order issued for anti-piracy operations Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. establishment of the Defense Council and the Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the Defense Councilors System) Hatoyama Cabinet established; Kitazawa becomes Minister of Defense SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia (though October 17) Destroyer collides with ROK cargo ship in the Kammon Straits North and South Korean ships engage in fire in the Yellow Sea Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) receives the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea Lisbon treaty comes into effect Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Supreme Court) START I lapses Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on the build-up of defense capability for FY2010| 2010 Jan. 11 China announces that it has performed missile interception test Jan. 17 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in Haiti (February 14, operation completed) Jan. 19 “2+2” joint statement on the 50th anniversary of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Jan. 29 First test flight of Russian fifth-generation fighter PAK FA Year Date Major Events Year Date Major Events |2007|Mar. 05 Mar. 13 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 30 Mar. 30 Apr. 16 Apr. 16 May 01 May 18 May 29 Jun. 01 Jul. 04 Jul. 20 Aug. 10 Aug. 27 Aug. 29 Sep. 01 Sep. 26 Oct. 03 Oct. 17 Nov. 01 Nov. 16 Nov. 28 Dec. 18 Dec. 19 Dec. 24 Dec. 24|First Aviation Training Relocation associated with realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Tsuiki, through March 8) Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed Emergency response procedures for destruction measures against ballistic missiles are prepared Establishment of the GSDF Central Readiness Force A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Iruma Air Base for the first time SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers (through January 18, 2011) First Japan-U.S.-India trilateral exercise (MSDF, U.S. Navy and Indian Navy) Kanazawa Branch of Nagoya District Court renders judgment on the 3rd and 4th trials for the suits pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) announces the joint statement “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation” ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility Supreme Court renders judgement in 5th, 6th and 7th Yokota Air Base noise suits Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General’s Offcie of Legal Compliance and the Local Defense Bureau, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, etc.) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted Koike becomes Minister of Defense Enactment of the “Basic Act on Ocean Policy” Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S. General Security of Military Information Agreement Inauguration of reshuffled Abe Cabinet; Koumura becomes Minister of Defense Enactment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created Fukuda Cabinet established; Ishiba becomes Minister of Defense The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the “Second- Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” is announced First Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercise (MSDF, U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Council for MOD Reform established Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the first time (through December 1) Aegis vessel MSDF Kongo conducts a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S. forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ realignment “Improvement of next fixedwing aircraft” and “Important issues among contents of Defense Capability Buildup in FY2008” Cabinet decisions adopted on “Changes of emergency response measures on destruction measures by ballistic missiles”| |---|---|---| 2008 Jan. 16 Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January 24, 25) Jan. 25 New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed Feb. 19 Collision between Aegis vessel MSDF and fishing boat Feb. 20 U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down out-of-control satellite outside the earth’s atmosphere with an SM-3 Feb. 21 Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean (through January 15, 2010) Mar. 18 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” Mar. 26 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. reorganization of the SDF Command and Communication Unit) Apr. 24 Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack Jun. 24 First visit of MSDF vessel to China (through June 28) Jun. 26 Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea Jun. 26 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Futenma Air Station noise suits Jul. 07 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through July 9) Jul. 15 Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released Jul. 17 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 4th and 8th Yokota Air Base noise suits Aug. 02 Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Hayashi becomes Minister of Defense Aug. 08 Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces Aug. 10 Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Aug. 29 TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1 Sep. 24 Aso Cabinet established; Hamada becomes Minister of Defense |2010|Feb. 05 Feb. 27 Mar. 07 Mar. 11 Mar. 26 Mar. 26 Apr. 01 Apr. 06 Apr. 12 May 01 May 19 May 23 May 26 May 27 May 28 Jun. 08 Jun. 09 Jun. 25 Jun. 28 Jul. 01 Jul. 13 Jul. 29 Aug. 31 Sep. 07 Sep. 10 Sep. 17 Oct. 01 Nov. 01 Nov. 23 Dec. 07 Dec. 17|Decision made to dispatch SDF units to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (February 6, deployment commences) (January 25, 2013, operation completed) U.S. announces “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) and “Ballistic Missile Defense Review” (BMDR) Russia publishes new Navy doctrine ASDF Hyakuri Air Base, joint civilian use of runway ROK naval patrol ship “Cheonan” sank in the Yellow Sea by a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (new establishment of the 15th Bridge and reorganization of the Youth Technical School) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of GSDF students) U.S. announces “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR) 1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., through April 13) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to foot and mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27) Signing of Japan-Australia ACSA The MOD/SDF dispatches units to the Pacific Partnership 2010 for the first time (through July 15) Enactment of the “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” U.S. announces “National Security Strategy” (NSS) Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Kan Cabinet established U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding additional sanction on Iran Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Nato Information Security Agreement Release of the U.S. “National Space Policy” (NSP) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of SDF recruits) Cabinet decision adopted on “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 1st and 2nd Futenma Air Station noise suits Air transport activities by helicopter in aid of flood disaster in Pakistan (through October 10) Chinese fishing boat collides with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in waters near the Senkaku Islands Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF officers as key military contact personnel (military observers) to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (dispatched on September 27) Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition of the lowest enlisted ranks) Russian President Medvedev visits the Kunashiri Island North Korea shells the ROK’s Yeonpyeong island Establishment of a governmental committee to review information security, as a result of the leakage of the video showing the fishing boat collision off the Senkaku Islands Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond and the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011 to FY2015)| |---|---|---| 2011 Jan. 11 China conducts test flight of fighter aircraft touted as the next-generation stealth aircraft Jan. 14 Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet (second term) Jan. 21 Signing of the new Special Measures Agreement in connection with cost-sharing arrangements on the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan (comes into effect on April 1) Jan. 27 Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit Feb. 04 The United States releases “National Security Space Strategy” (NSSS) Feb. 05 New START comes into effect Feb. 23 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in New Zealand (through March 3) Mar. 11 Four pirates that had shot at Japanese vessels off the Oman Coast in the Arabian Sea were arrested under the Anti-Piracy Law Mar. 11 Great East Japan Earthquake strikes Mar. 11 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through August 31) Mar. 12 Nuclear disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through December 26) Mar. 16 Cabinet decisions adopted on first disaster call-up of SDF Reserve Personnel and Ready Reserve Personnel in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake Mar. 16 Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch GSDF Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel (through August 31) Mar. 19 The coalition force led by the U.S., U.K., and France commence military operations against Libya Apr. 11 Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake established Apr. 15 Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch MSDF and ASDF reserve personnel (through August 31) Apr. 27 Partial revision to the Environmental Improvement Law (extended target projects for subsidies to improve the environment surrounding specified defense facilities) ----- Year Date Major Events |2011|May 02 Jun. 01 Jun. 21 Jun. 22 Jun. 24 Jun. 28 Jul. 08 Jul. 09 Aug. 10 Aug. 24 Sep. 02 Sep. 09 Sep. 19 Sep. 27 Sep. 29 Sep. 30 Oct. 10 Oct. 11 Oct. 24 Oct. 31 Nov. 15 Nov. 22 Dec. 18 Dec. 20 Dec. 20 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|U.S. President Obama announces the killing of Osama bin Laden, leader of the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda SDF activity base in Djibouti initiates operation Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” in Washington, D.C.) joint statement; release of “Toward a Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance: Building on 50 years of Partnership” U.S. President Obama announces guidelines to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan Exercise of the Basic Act on Reconstruction First meeting of the headquarters for reconstruction measures U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1996 to establish UNMISS Independence of the Republic of South Sudan Conducts its frist navigation Chinese aircraft carrier Varyag The Chinese fsiheries patrol ships enter Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Noda Cabinet established; Ichikawa becomes Minister of Defense 24 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait Detection of cyber attacks against defense industry Japan-Philippines Summit (Tokyo), Japan-Philippines joint statement made Chinese space laboratory “Tiangong 1” launched Cabinet decisions adopted on “Promotion of the operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System project” and “Promoting development and utilization of aerospace” ATR to Guam as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through October 28) Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Futenma Air Station noise suit Signing and entry into force of the Japan-France Information Security Agreement NATO ends operations in Libya Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF personnel as headquarters staff for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (departing Japan on November 28) Six Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq Decision made by the Security Council and seconded by the Cabinet regarding “acquisition of the next-generation fighter aircraft” Cabinet Decision on dispatching engineer units, etc. for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (deployed from January 11, 2012) (Operation completed on May 31, 2017) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc. Environmental impact statement for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture (through January 6, 2012)| |---|---|---| 2012 Jan. 11 1st Advance unit for UNMISS starts departing Japan Jan. 13 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet; Tanaka becomes Minister of Defense Feb. 10 Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency Mar. 16 Chinese government ship “Haijian” enters Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Mar. 26 Transfer of ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base Mar. 27 Prime Minister Noda attends the Nuclear Security Summit Mar. 30 SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated April 13) Apr. 13 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” Apr. 13 Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission Apr. 17 Ten-month extension of SDF dispatch to support the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (through February 28, 2013) Apr. 27 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee “2+2” joint statement Apr. 29 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean May 17 Signing of the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement Jun. 04 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (second term); Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense Jul. 01 26 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait (through July 2) Jul. 03 First PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Hokkaido, through July 5) Jul. 11 Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands Jul. 12 One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands Jul. 12 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law for Establishment of Cabinet Office Aug. 10 South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima Sep. 07 “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the MOD/JSDF” is released Sep. 11 Government’s purchase of the three Senkaku Islands Sep. 23 SDF dispatch to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ended Sep. 25 The first Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” commissioned Oct. 01 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (third term) Oct. 16 Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island for the first time Nov. 26 Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. |2012|Dec. 04 Dec. 07 Dec. 12 Dec. 13 Dec. 26|Launch of capacity building program in East Timor SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated December 12) North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands) Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes Minister of Defense| |---|---|---| |2013|Nov. 23 Nov. 24 Dec. 04 Dec. 08 Dec. 13 Dec. 14 Dec. 17 Dec. 23 Dec. 23 Dec. 27|China announces establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identifciation Zone” Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., China, Russia) reach first phase agreement for the comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue National Security Council established The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identification Zone Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets promulgated Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing National Security Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on “National Security Strategy,” “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond,” and “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014- FY2018)” Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned (incorporated into Pacific Fleet) Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approves application for public water reclamation for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project| |---|---|---| Year Date Major Events 2013 Nov. 23 China announces establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” Nov. 24 Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., China, Russia) reach first phase agreement for the comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue Dec. 04 National Security Council established Dec. 08 The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identification Zone Dec. 13 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets promulgated Dec. 14 Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing Dec. 17 National Security Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on “National Security Strategy,” “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond,” and “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014- FY2018)” Dec. 23 Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Dec. 23 Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned (incorporated into Pacific Fleet) Dec. 27 Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approves application for public water reclamation for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project 2014 Jan. 01 Entry into force of the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement Jan. 07 National Security Secretariat launched Jan. 15 Collision accident between transport vessel and fishing vessel in the Hiroshima Bay Jan. 22 Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa established Feb. 14 Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa established Mar. 01 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Mar. 03 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Mar. 11 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the missing Malaysian Airplane (through April 28) Mar. 18 Russian “annexation” of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea Mar. 19 A submarine seen navigating underwater in Japan’s contiguous zone (waters east of Miyako Island) Mar. 24 Prime Minister Abe attends 3rd Nuclear Security Summit (Hague, through March 25) Mar. 26 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Apr. 01 Partial enforcement (establishment of Faculty of Nursing at National Defense Medical College) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Apr. 01 Cabinet decision adopted on “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” Apr. 28 U.S. and Philippines sign Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement: (EDCA) May 02 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean May 07 Collision and confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels occur (through mid-July) May 14 “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam” comes into force May 15 The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security submits its report May 21 Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 6th, 7th, and administrative 1st and 2nd Atsugi Air Base noise suits May 24 Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft Jun. 07 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Jun. 11 Japan-Australia “2+2” (Tokyo) Jun. 11 Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft Jun. 19 Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases released Jun. 21 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (response to early retirement system) Jun. 29 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Jun. 29 ISIL declares establishment of “Islamic State” and caliphate Jul. 01 Cabinet decision adopted on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People” Jul. 08 Japan-Australia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed Jul. 09 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Jul. 13 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Jul. 25 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs) Jul. 26 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Aug. 01 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (quota for SDF personnel posts of Internal Bureau, establishment of Air Tactics Development & Training Wing, etc.) Aug. 8- U.S. Central Command begins airstrikes on ISIL in Northern Iraq Aug. 12 Russian Armed Forces conduct exercises in the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands Aug. 19 Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to U.S. Forces’ patrol aircraft Aug. 20 Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11) Aug. 28 MOD formulates “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space (revised)” Sep. 01 Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo); “Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership” Sep. 03 Eto becomes Minister of Defense Sep. 03 2nd Reshuffled Abe Cabinet is established Year Date Major Events 2012 Dec. 04 Launch of capacity building program in East Timor Dec. 07 SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated December 12) Dec. 12 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” Dec. 13 A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands) Dec. 26 Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes Minister of Defense 2013 Jan. 16 Abduction of Japanese nationals in Algeria Jan. 19 A Chinese naval vessel may direct fire-control radar at a helicopter based on a JMSDF destroyer Jan. 20 SDF dispatch to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) ended (ceremony to return unit flag) Jan. 20 As a measure for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas (TJNO) prescribed in the Self-Defense Forces Act, SDF transports Japanese victims of the Algerian hostage crisis from Algeria to Japan (return home on January 24) Jan. 25 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on build-up of defense capability for FY2013 Jan. 25 “Basic Plan on Space Policy” is decided by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development Jan. 30 A Chinese vessel directs fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer in the East China Sea Jan. 31 Three Chinese vessels sail northeast of Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean Jan. 31 Japan-Australia ACSA enters into force Jan. 31 Partial enforcement (regarding Japan-Australia ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Feb. 01 Partial enforcement (regarding pilot allowance) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Feb. 07 Russian fighters intrude into Japan’s territorial airspace Feb. 12 North Korea’s underground nuclear test Feb. 20 Naha District Court renders judgment on Henoko environmental assessment case Feb. 23 Meeting between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Abe Mar. 01 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on participation of Japan’s industries in the production of the F-35A Mar. 15 SDF dispatch for the MINUSTAH mission ended (ceremony to return unit flag) Mar. 22 Entry into force of Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement Mar. 26 Partial enforcement (regarding shift of Air Rescue Wing’s affiliation) of partially amended laws, including the Self- Defense Forces Act, etc. Mar. 30 Four Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 02 North Korea announces that it will readjust and restart the graphite moderated reactor that was mothballed and disabled under an agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks Apr. 26 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” May 07 Two Chinese vessels sail northeast of the Yonaguni Island to the Pacific Ocean May 27 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Jul. 04 Signing of the Japan-U.K. Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies and the Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement Jul. 05 China-Russia first joint naval exercise “Naval Interaction 2013” (through July 11) Jul. 13 Chinese naval fleets sail through Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk Jul. 22 China Coast Guard sign put up Jul. 24 Chinese early warning aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean for the first time Aug. 21 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Aug. 22 Russian bombers intrude into Japan’s airspace Aug. 27 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Aug. 30 “Direction of the MOD Reform” released Sep. 08 Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Sep. 09 Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unidentified nationality flies over the East China Sea Sep. 10 1st meeting of MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games held Sep. 27 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2118 on elimination of Syrian chemical weapons Oct. 03 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”, Tokyo) Oct. 03 Signing of the “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam” Oct. 16 Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon No. 26 (through November 8) Oct. 23 Five Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Oct. 30 Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Nov. 12 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to typhoon disaster in the Philippines (through December 18) Nov. 15 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decides on detailed terms of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, etc. Nov. 22 Revisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (e.g., expanded category of people who may be transported by the JSDF, in the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas) promulgated and entered into force ----- Year Date Major Events |2015|Jul. 30 Aug. 17 Aug. 20 Aug. 22 Aug. 26 Sep. 15 Sep. 19 Sep. 28 Oct. 01 Oct. 01 Oct. 03 Oct. 07 Oct. 15 Oct. 26 Oct. 27 Oct. 28 Nov. 11 Nov. 26 Nov. 27 Dec. 04 Dec. 07 Dec. 12 Dec. 12 Dec. 13 Dec. 26 Dec. 31|Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 6th, 7th and administrative 1st and 2nd Atsugi Air Facility noise suits Seven Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait northward. Subsequently, China-Russia naval combined exercise, Joint Sea 2015 (II), is held (Sea of Japan) (August 20-28). Following the exercise, five vessels sail Soya Strait eastward (August 29), sail in the high seas in the Bering Sea (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 2), and enter into U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 4). Shelling incident occurs between North Korea and the ROK Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island Signing of agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan Presumed Russian aircraft intrudes into Japanese territorial airspace over the coast of the Nemuro Peninsula Legislation for Peace and Security (“Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Bill”) is passed in the House of Councillors plenary session Signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship Relating to the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (unification of actual unit operations into Joint Staff, establishment of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, etc.) Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office are abolished; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency is established Shooting attack in Bangladesh (one Japanese national is killed; ISIL Bangladesh claims responsibility for the attack in a statement) Inauguration of the third reshuffled Abe Cabinet Iwakuni Branch of Yamaguchi District Court renders judgment in 1st, 2nd and 3rd Iwakuni Air Base noise suits U.S. naval destroyer USS Lassen sails within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation Cabinet verbal understanding regarding “Revocation of reclamation approval based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface pertaining to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project” Written notice regarding start of construction work related to Futenma Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture A Chinese Navy AGI repeatedly conducts east-west passages near the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands (through November 12) Suit is instituted for “Case regarding retraction order request for revocation of the landfill permit based on provisions of Article 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act” (“administrative suit”) China’s four bombers and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson of China announces flight by PLA Air Force aircraft). At around the same time, four bombers and early warning aircraft conduct operations near the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. Japan-U.S. Joint Press Release “Implementation of Bilateral Plans for Consolidating Facilities and Areas in Okinawa” Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Japan-India Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (New Delhi) Signing and entry into force of the Japan-India General Security of Military Information Agreement Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean A China Coast Guard vessel carrying weapons that appear to be cannons intrudes into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time Russia revises National Security Strategy| |---|---|---| 2016 Jan. 06 North Korea conducts fourth nuclear test which it called a “hydrogen bomb test” Jan. 11 Chinese Ministry of National Defense announces organizational realignment of the Central Military Commission (dismantlement of four general departments, CMC’s introduction of multiple section system) Jan. 26 Two Russian bombers conduct flight along the perimeter of Japan Jan. 30 A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation Jan. 31 China’s intelligence gathering aircraft and early warning aircraft pass Tsushima Strait for the first time through to the Sea of Japan Feb. 01 Chinese Ministry of National Defense dismantles seven Military Regions and announces the establishment of five theaters of operations Feb. 02 Four Chinese vessels sail through Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean Feb. 04 A Chinese Navy AGI conducts round-trip northeastsouthwest passages near the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through February 8) Feb. 07 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” Feb. 16 Locations of equipment deemed to be surface-to-air missile in Woody Island, Paracel Islands are confirmed |2014|Sep. 10 Sep. 22- Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Sep. 29 Oct. 26 Nov. 16 Nov. 21 Nov. 24 Nov. 28 Dec. 01 Dec. 04 Dec. 04- Dec. 10 Dec. 19 Dec. 24 Dec. 24 Dec. 26 Dec. 31|U.S. President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL The United States and other coalition countries begin airstrikes on ISIL in Syria Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Mt. Ontake (through October 16) Afghanistan’s new government is launched Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Nakaima in Okinawa gubernatorial election “Global Hawk” is decided as the model of unmanned aerial vehicle ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near Takeshima Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, through December 11) SDF personnel dispatched to NATO for the first time Five Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacifci Ocean Chinese People’s Liberation Army begins exercise in Western Pacifci. Subsequently, some vessels transit Soya Strait (December 24) and Tsushima Strait (December 27) and circle Japan Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets enters into force Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Inauguration of the third Abe Cabinet, Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect Deployment of U.S. Forces TPY-2 (“X-band radar”) to Kyogamisaki is completed Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11)| |---|---|---| Year Date Major Events 2014 Sep. 10 U.S. President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL Sep. 22- The United States and other coalition countries begin airstrikes on ISIL in Syria Sep. 26 Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York) Sep. 27 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Mt. Ontake (through October 16) Sep. 29 Afghanistan’s new government is launched Oct. 26 Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF Nov. 16 Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Nakaima in Okinawa gubernatorial election Nov. 21 “Global Hawk” is decided as the model of unmanned aerial vehicle Nov. 24 ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near Takeshima Nov. 28 Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, through December 11) Dec. 01 SDF personnel dispatched to NATO for the first time Dec. 04 Five Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Dec. 04- Chinese People’s Liberation Army begins exercise in Western Pacific. Subsequently, some vessels transit Soya Strait (December 24) and Tsushima Strait (December 27) and circle Japan Dec. 10 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets enters into force Dec. 19 Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Dec. 24 Inauguration of the third Abe Cabinet, Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense Dec. 24 Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect Dec. 26 Deployment of U.S. Forces TPY-2 (“X-band radar”) to Kyogamisaki is completed Dec. 31 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11) 2015 Jan. 02 ISIL releases video of Japanese hostages (videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals subsequently released on January 24 and February 1) Jan. 09 “Basic Plan on Space Policy” is decided by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development Jan. 21 First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (London) Feb. 06 The United States releases “National Security Strategy” (NSS) Feb. 12 Minsk agreement II (German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders agree on new ceasefire agreement) Feb. 13 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Feb. 14 China’s intelligence gathering aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (February 15) Mar. 02 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Mar. 13 Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Tokyo) Apr. 21 National Defense Medical College instructor dispatched to support WHO’s epidemiological studies on the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, etc. (through May 29) Apr. 27 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to earthquake in Nepal (through May 22) Apr. 27 The new “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” is approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting (“2+2,” New York) Apr. 30 Promulgation and enforcement of the Special Measures Act on the Number of Years of the National Subsidization of Specific Defense Procurements (so-called “Long-term Contract Act”) May 09 North Korea announces SLBM launch test was conducted successfully May 14 Cabinet decision on “Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Bill” May 14 Cabinet decisions on “Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law,” “The Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group,” and “Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas” May 21 Two Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson announces first flight by Chinese Air Force aircraft in this airspace) May 26 China releases defense white paper, “China’s Military Strategy” May 31 Dispatched MSDF personnel as commander of Combined Task Force (CTF 151) for counter-piracy operations (through August 27) Jun. 11 Naha District Court’s Okinawa Branch renders judgment in 4th, 6th, 7th and 8th Futenma Air Station noise suits Jun. 12 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Jul. 01 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey releases National Military Strategy Jul. 03 Disaster relief teams dispatched to support search of missing persons in Mt. Ontake (through August 7) Jul. 18 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Jul. 29 China’s intelligence gathering aircraft, early warning aircraft, and two bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (July 30) Year Date Major Events 2016 Mar. 04 The government announces it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation in the “Case regarding retraction order request for cancellation of the reclamation permit based on provisions of Article 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act” (“administrative substitute execution suit”) and suspends landfill work (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) Mar. 10 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Mar. 18 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Mar. 22 Terror bombing attacks occur in Brussels, Belgium Mar. 28 Two Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Mar. 28 Establishment of Camp Yonaguni Mar. 29 Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security (“Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Act”) Mar. 31 Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C.) (through April 1) Apr. 07 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 08 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 14 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (through May 30) Apr. 15 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Apr. 17 Disaster relief call-up order for to Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through May 9) Apr. 20 China’s early warning aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 23 North Korea launches an SLBM Apr. 28 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Apr. 28 Alleged murder case involving a civilian component member of the USFJ in Okinawa Prefecture Apr. 29 Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan is established May 10 A U.S. destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as part of the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” May 17 A Chinese PLA fighter jet flies abnormally close to a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea May 22 U.S. President Obama visits Vietnam (through May 25), fully lifts arms embargo on Vietnam May 31 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Jun. 07 A Chinese PLA fighter jet conducts dangerous flight, approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea Jun. 09 A Chinese naval combatant vessel enters the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands for the first time Jun. 15 A Chinese naval intelligence gathering vessel sails in Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture and then sails within Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducts east-west passages outside the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands. (June 19 through 20) Jun. 16 Five Chinese naval vessels sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Jun. 20 Ten Russian vessels pass through the Soya Strait and move to the Okhotsk Sea. Jun. 22 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Jul. 2 Bangladeshi militants take hostages (7 Japanese nationals are killed); ISIL claims responsibility on the Internet Jul. 8 The U.S. and ROK decide on the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea Jul. 9 North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile Jul. 11 ASDF aircraft dispatched to Juba, the capital of South Sudan, to transport Japanese nationals overseas due to the situation deterioration in South Sudan (through July 26) Jul. 12 The arbitral tribunal renders a final award in which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions are ruled in favor of the Philippines with regard to arbitral proceedings pursuant to the South China Sea Jul. 15 Terror attack with a truck occurs in Nice, France Jul. 18 Chinese Air Force announces that it will be conducting combat patrol in the South China Sea on a regular basis Jul. 19 North Korea launches three ballistic missiles Aug. 3 2nd Reshuffled 3rd Abe Cabinet is established Aug. 3 Inada becomes Minister of Defense Aug. 3 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (one of them fell into Japan’s EEZ) Aug. 5 200 to 300 Chinese fishing vessels operate in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. Chinese government vessels intrude into Japan’s territorial waters following the fishing vessels for the first time (total of 15 vessels in 5 days / through August 9) Aug. 12 Three Chinese naval vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Aug. 18 A Chinese early warning aircraft and two bombers fly over Tsushima and advance to the Sea of Japan Aug. 24 North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile Aug. 30 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Iwate Prefecture (through September 16) Aug. 31 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Hokkaido (through September 18) Sep. 05 North Korea launches three ballistic missiles (fell into Japan’s EEZ) Sep. 09 North Korea conducts its fifth nuclear test ----- Year Date Major Events Year Date Major Events |2016|Sep. 12 Sep. 25 Oct. 15 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 21 Oct. 27 Oct. 28 Nov. 01 Nov. 15 Nov. 18 Nov. 23 Nov. 25 Dec. 01 Dec. 10 Dec. 22 Dec. 22 Dec. 25 Dec. 26 Dec. 27|First training relocation involves Tilt-Rotor/Rotary wing aircraft outside of Okinawa Prefecture in the context of the realignment of the U.S. Forces (through October 5) Four Chinese bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean (fighter jets [probable] are observed for the first time passing) North Korea launches a ballistic missile North Korea launches a ballistic missile Three Chinese naval vessels pass through the Osumi Strait and advance to the Pacific Ocean A U.S. destroyer sails around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea as part of the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” China’s early warning aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S.- Australia Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Cabinet Decision regarding changes to the procedures for responding to piracy (reducing the number of ships to engage in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden from two to one) Cabinet Decision on changes in the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” (mission of “kaketsuke-keigo” was added) The Russian Forces announces the deployment of surface-to-ship missile on the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri Signing and entry into force of Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement Two bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fgihter jets fly over the sky between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fgihter jets fly from the south of Sakishima Islands) Japan-France defense equipment and technology agreement takes effect Two Chinese fgihter jets, two bombers, and two intelligence gathering aircraft fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fgihter jets fly toward the Bashi Channel) The implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law (decided by the National Security Council) Transition to the joint production and deployment phases of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA) (decided at the National Security Council) Six Chinese naval vessels including an aircraft carrier sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance into the Pacific Ocean (first time a Chinese aircraft carrier is observed sailing into the Pacifci Ocean) Governor of Okinawa Onaga withdraws his cancellation of the reclamation approval (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) “China’s Space Activities in 2016” is released| |---|---|---| 2017 Jan. 09 Six Chinese bombers, an early warning aircraft, and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly over the Tsushima Strait and advance to the Sea of Japan Jan. 14 Signing of Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (Sydney) Jan. 24 Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan Feb. 08 U.S. Navy P-3 patrol aircraft and Chinese military aircraft fly abnormally close to each other (South China Sea) Feb. 12 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Mar. 02 A Chinese early warning aircraft, six bombers (probable), and six fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean (total of 13 aircraft, the largest fleet so far) Mar. 02 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea Mar. 05 Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait Mar. 06 North Korea launches four ballistic missiles (three of them fell into Japan’s EEZ) Mar. 22 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Mar. 23 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea Mar. 27 Transfer of MSDF TC-90 to the Philippines Mar. 27 Completion of development of future transport aircraft (XC-2) Apr. 02 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 05 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Apr. 06 U.S. launches strikes on Syria Apr. 16 North Korea launches a ballistic missile Apr. 18 Chinese vessels sail west bound from the Osumi Strait Apr. 20 China launches its first unmanned cargo spacecraft “Tianzhou 1” Apr. 24 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean Apr. 25 Commencement of seawall construction (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) Apr. 26 China’s first domestically built aircraft carrier is launched Apr. 29 North Korea launches a ballistic missile May 14 North Korea launches a ballistic missile May 18 An object believed to be a small unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) flies over the front of the bridge of a Chinese government ship which is within Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands May 21 North Korea launches a ballistic missile May 23 Martial law is declared in Mindanao in the Philippines |2017|Nov. 23 Nov. 28 Nov. 29 Dec. 05 Dec. 07 Dec. 07 Dec. 09 Dec. 09 Dec. 11 Dec. 11 Dec. 13 Dec. 17 Dec. 18 Dec. 18 Dec. 18 Dec. 19 Dec. 19 Dec. 20|Four Chinese bombers and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea. An intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island via Sakishima Islands in the South Pacific and flies toward the East China Sea Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan’s EEZ) Chinese vessels sail east bound from the Osumi Strait and advances to the Pacific Ocean A Chinese early warning aircraft and four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and moves to the East China Sea Four Chinese bombers and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea The Iraqi government declares liberation of all areas from the ISIL Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the continent. The bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel via the south of Sakishima Islands on the Pacific Ocean side President Putin visits Syria and announces withdrawal of the main part of troops (The two bases in Syria will continue daily operation) Fall of a U.S. Forces helicopter window onto Futenma Dai-ni Elementary School in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft and two electronic warfare aircrafts pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fyl to the East China Sea A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies to the East China Sea The United States releases the National Security Strategy A Chinese Su-30 fighter jet’s advance to the Sea of Japan is confirmed for the first time National Security Council and Cabinet approval on the “fundamental improvement in ballistic missile defense capability” The United States denounces North Korea for the cyber attack using malware “WannaCry” in May 2017 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies to the East China Sea| |---|---|---| Year Date Major Events 2017 May 24 A U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” (reported) May 29 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (fell into Japan’s EEZ) May 31 Dispatch of SDF units to UNMISS is terminated Jul. 01 Establishment of Southwestern Air Defense Force Jul. 02 A Chinese naval Dongdiao-class intelligence gathering ship sails within Japan’s territorial waters near the southwest of Kojima Island, Matsumae Town, Hokkaido Jul. 02 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported) Jul. 04 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan’s EEZ) Jul. 05 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the heavy rain in North Kyushu in July 2017 (through August 20) Jul. 05 16 Russian vessels pass through the Soya Strait and move to the Sea of Japan Jul. 13 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean. Four other bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea Jul. 15 Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan’s territorial waters in the southeast of Tsushima- shimojima (Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture) and north of Okinoshima (Munakata City, Fukuoka Prefecture) Jul. 17 Two China Coast Guard vessels sail in Japan’s territorial waters in the west-northwest of Henashisaki (Nishitsugaru County, Aomori Prefecture) and northeast of Tappizaki (Higashitsugaru County, Aomori Prefecture) Jul. 20 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft, an intelligence gathering aircraft and four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea. Four bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean Jul. 24 Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea Jul. 28 Minister of Defense Kishida came into office Jul. 28 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan’s EEZ) Aug. 01 China conducts a flag raising ceremony for the Support Base in Djibouti Aug. 03 Minister of Defense Onodera came into office Aug. 09 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea Aug. 10 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported) Aug. 12 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft and two bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea Aug. 13 Two Chinese electronic warfare aircrafts pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly toward the East China Sea Aug. 14 A Chinese electronic warfare aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the East China Sea Aug. 17 A car runs into pedestrians in Barcelona, Spain Aug. 23 Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan Aug. 24 Six Chinese bombers, after passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, fly over the Pacific Ocean in the south of Kyushu and Shikoku, turn around off the Kii Peninsula, and fly to the East China Sea on a similar route (First time for a Chinese aircraft to fly northeast bound after advancing to the Pacific Ocean) Aug. 26 MSDF SH-60J helicopter falls into the sea west of Tappizaki, Aomori Prefecture Aug. 26 India announces agreement between India and China on disagreement of border personnel at Doklam following the confrontation of their forces Aug. 29 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan) Sep. 03 North Korea conducts sixth nuclear test which it called a “hydrogen bomb test for ICBM” Sep. 15 North Korea launches a ballistic missile (flies over Japan) Oct. 01 Shooting in Las Vegas, United States Oct. 10 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported) Oct. 11 A U.S. Forces helicopter conducts an emergency landing and catches fire in Higashi-son, Kunigami- gun, Okinawa Prefecture Oct. 17 ASDF UH-60J helicopter crashed in the Pacific Ocean south of Hamamatsu City, Shizuoka Prefecture Nov. 11 Three U.S. carrier strike groups conduct joint exercises in the western Pacific (through November 14) Nov. 18 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and flies toward the Bashi Channel Nov. 19 Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island from the East China Sea to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island again to fly toward the East China Sea Nov. 20 The United States re-designates North Korea as a State Sponsor of Terrorism ----- Year Defense Domestic International 2018 Jan. 09 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Jan. 12 Japan-Estonia Summit (Tallinn) Jan. 09 North-South High Level Official’s Meeting Jan. 09 FY2017 Japan-U.S. joint exercise (command post Jan. 13 Japan-Latvia Summit (Riga) Jan. 10 A Chinese submerged submarine enters Japan’s contiguous zone near Miyakojima Island and exercise) (through February 3) Jan. 13 Japan-Lithuania Summit (Vilnius) Taisho Island (through January 11) Jan. 21 Participation in multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2018 Jan. 14 Japan-Bulgaria Summit (Sofia) Jan. 11 A Chinese vessel enters Japan’s contiguous zone near Taisho Island (through February 23) Jan. 15 Japan-Serbia Summit (Belgrade) Jan. 17 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Jan .15 Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 16 Japan-Romania Summit (Bucharest) Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (reported) Jan.Jan. 2626 Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (Deployment of the first F-2+2) (Tokyo) 35A at ASDF Misawa Air Jan.Feb. 0218 Japan-Australia Summit (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Jan.Jan. 1929 The U.S. National Defense Strategy is releasedA Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China Sea Base Feb. 06 Japan-Germany Summit (Tokyo) Jan. 29 A Chinese vessel sails Tsushima Strait northward and after advancing to the Sea of Japan Jan. 27 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 07 U.S. Vice President Pence pays courtesy visit to temporarily, sails the strait southward Prime Minister Abe Jan. 29 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Jan. 31 U.S. President Trump delivers the State of the Union address supply supports in Sado City, Niigata Prefecture Feb. 09 Japan-ROK Summit (PyeongChang) Feb. 02 The United States releases the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) (through February 2) Feb. 14 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Feb. 05 Maldives declares a state of emergency Jan. 30 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Feb. 14 Japan-Norway Summit (Tokyo) supply supports in Wajima City, Ishikawa Prefecture Feb. 20 U.S. military aircraft throws away a fuel tank into Feb. 08 North Korea conducts a military parade (through February 2) Lake Ogawara in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Feb. 09 PyeongChang Olympics (through February 25) Feb. 06 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to heavy Aomori Prefecture Feb. 10 Sri Lanka declares a state of emergency snow in Fukui Prefecture (through February 10) Feb. 23 Japan-Chile Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 14 South African President Zuma resigns Mar. 06 Japan-Canada Summit Telephone Talk Feb. 15 Ethiopian Prime Minister resigns Feb. 14 Japan-ASEAN Cope North Guam 2018 exercise Mar. 09 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Feb. 15 The United States and other countries denounce Russia for a large scale of damage caused by program (through February 21) (Guam) Mar. 13 Naha District Court renders judgement regarding the ransomware “Not Petya” in June 2017 Feb. 15 Disaster relief teams dispatched to help remove snow demand of an injunctive order for actions that crush Feb. 16 Ethiopia declares a state of emergency Feb. 16 in Fukui City, Fukui Prefecture (through February State Minister of Defense Yamamoto attends the Munich Security Conference (through February 1818) ) Mar. 14 the reef, etc. (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project)Japan-Sri Lanka Summit (Tokyo) Feb.Feb. 2326 U.S.-Australia SummitA Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through February 28) Feb. 16 Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” Mar.Mar. 1523 Japan-Germany summit telephone talkOkinawa Prefectural Government appeals against the judgement of the Naha District Court to the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court (Futenma Feb.Feb. 2727 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China SeaA Chinese Y-confirmed for the first time9 intelligence gathering aircraft’s passage of Tsushima Strait Western Channel is Feb. 21 Disaster relief teams dispatched for collection of fuel, Replacement Facility construction project) Mar. 01 Russian President Putin introduces new weapons at the annual presidential address etc. in Tohoku Town, Kamikita Country, Aomori Mar. 31 Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area Mar. 05 1st session of the 13th National People’s Congress (NPC) (through March 20) Prefecture (through March 7) adjacent to Route 58 Mar. 05 ROK special envoys visit North Korea and meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un Feb. 26 (through March Japan-ASEAN HA/DR Invitation Program (Kanto Region) 2) Apr. 05 Japan-Iraq Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 09 PyeongChang Paralympics (through March 18) Mar. 26 Transfer of MSDF’s five TC-90 training aircraft to the Apr. 11 Japan-Bhutan Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 18 President Putin is re-elected as president (4th term) Philippines completed Apr. 12 Japan-Switzerland Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 18 The Turkish government announces taking control of Afrin, Syria Mar. 27 22nd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Apr. 17 Japan-U.S. Summit (Florida) Mar. 23 Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass Region (Tokyo) (through March 28) Apr. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and Mar. 27 Establishment of the Ground Component Command Apr. 29 Japan-ROK summit telephone talk thereafter turn around, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again and and the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, and first reorganization to rapid deployment divisions/ brigades MayMay 0101 Japan-Jordan Summit (Jordan)Japan-Palestine Summit (Palestine) Mar. 23 fly to the continent. At the same time, two fighter jets (probable) fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the East China SeaHostage siege in Trèbes, south of France Apr. 06 Launch of X-band communications satellite May 02 Japan-Israel Summit (Israel) Mar. 23 A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of “Kirameki1” May 04 Japan-China summit telephone talk the Mischief Reef in Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (reported) Apr. 09 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) May 09 Japan-China-ROK Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 25 Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea visits China (through March 28) Apr. 09 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water May 10 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Mar. 26 China-North Korea Summit supply supports in Oda City, Shimane Prefecture May 15 Japan-Samoa Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 26 Presidential election in Egypt (through April 11) May 16 Japan-Fiji Summit (Tokyo) Apr. 05 Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to Apr. 11 Disaster relief teams dispatched for rescue operations May 18 Prime Minister Abe attends the 8th Pacific Islands the Pacific Ocean in response to the landslide in Nakatsu City, Oita Prefecture (through April 23) May 24 Leaders Meeting (Fukushima) (through May Prime Minister Abe visits Russia (through May 1926) ) Apr. 10 An aircraft that appears to be a Chinese unmanned aircraft vehicle (BZK-China Sea (within Japan’s air defense identification zone) 005) files over the East Apr. 20 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.) May 25 Japan-France Summit (St. Petersburg) Apr. 12 China conducts a naval review on the South China Sea Apr. 22 Signing of the Japan-Canada Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) MayMay 2628 Japan-Russia Summit (Moscow) Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Apr. 14 The United States, United Kingdom and France conduct military operations against facilities related to chemical weapons in Syria Apr. 29 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply supports in Irabujima, Miyakojima City, Okinawa Jun.Jun. 0708 Japan-U.S. Summit (Washington, D.C.)Prime Minister Abe attends the G7 Summit in Apr. 18 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi Channel Prefecture (through May 2) Charlevoix (through June 9) Apr. 19 Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence May 04 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting Jun. 08 Japan-Germany Summit (Charlevoix) gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and thereafter the two bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence May 06 Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting Jun. 08 Japan-U.K. Summit (Charlevoix) gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel May 09 Defense authorities of Japan and China sign the Jun. 08 Japan-Italy Summit (Charlevoix) Apr. 20 North Korea announces a halt to “nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic rocket test-fire” and Memorandum on the Maritime and Aerial Jun. 08 Japan-Canada Summit (Charlevoix) abolishment of nuclear test sites Communication Mechanism Jun. 11 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Apr. 20 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach May 10 Signing of the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of Defence of the United Arab Emirates Aug.Jun.Jul. 171201 Japan-EU Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Malta Summit (Tokyo)Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Apr. 20 the Pacific Ocean and fly toward the Bashi ChannelA flight of carrier-based fighter jets (probable) of the Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” over the Pacific Ocean is confirmed for the first time MayMayMay 101518 2(Indonesia-Malaysia) (through May Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy”Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)”nd Japan-ASEAN Ship Rider Cooperation Program 15) Aug.Aug.Sep.Sep.Sep.Sep.Sep. 11122405100722 Japan-Mongolia Summit (Vladivostok)Japan-China Summit (Vladivostok)Japan-Turkey Summit (New York)Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone TalkJapan-Ecuador Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Russia Summit (Vladivostok)Japan-Saint Vincent Summit (Tokyo) Apr.Apr.Apr. 212426 Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advance to the East China SeaA Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through April Two Chinese bombers, two fighter jets (probable), an electronic warfare aircraft and an intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. The two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward the continent. The two bombers, electronic warfare aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft fly toward the Bashi Channel29) May 21 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Sep. 25 Japan-ROK Summit (New York) Apr. 27 The Inter-Korean Summit, Panmunjom Declaration agreement Jun.MayMay 222902 Defense Minister Onodera attends the June Participated in the Pacific Partnership Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hawaii)2) 172018th Shangri-La (through Sep.Sep.Oct.Oct. 05082626 Japan-Vietnam Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Iran Summit (New York)Japan-U.S. Summit (New York)Japan-Tajikistan Summit (Tokyo) MayMayApr. 280808 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes Tsushima Strait and advances to the Sea of Japan from the East China SeaChina-North Korea SummitU.S. President Trump announces withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran Jun. 02 Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)3) Oct.Oct. 0808 Japan-Cambodia Summit (Tokyo)Japan-Laos Summit (Tokyo) May 11 Two Chinese bombers and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. Thereafter, the two fighter jets (probable) turn around and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again to fly toward Jun.Jun. 0202 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting Oct.Oct. 0809 Japan-Thailand Summit (Tokyo)10th Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting (Tokyo) the continent. Two bombers fly toward the Bashi Channel. Two bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft and an electronic warfare aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island from the Pacific Ocean in the direction of the Bashi Channel and move to the (Singapore) Oct. 09 Meeting with State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung East China Sea Jun. 02 Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting San Suu Kyi (Tokyo) May 12 Attack occurs near the Paris Opera House in the center of Paris, France (Singapore) Oct. 12 Japan-Lithuania Summit (Tokyo) May 13 Terror attacks by suicide bombers occur in churches in Subaraya, Indonesia Jun. 02 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting Oct. 16 Japan-Spain Summit (Madrid) May 13 China conducts the first sea trial of its first domestic aircraft carrier (through May 18) (Singapore) Oct. 17 Japan-France Summit (Paris) May 18 A Chinese bomber and other aircraft conduct a takeoff and landing training in the South China Sea Jun. 03 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting Oct. 18 12th ASEM Summit (Brussels) (through October 19) (pointed out as Woody Island, Paracel Islands) (Singapore) Oct. 18 2nd “V4 plus Japan” Summit Meeting (Brussels) May 21 The United States releases a new Iran strategy Jun. 03 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Oct. 18 Japan-EU Summit (Brussels) May 25 Two Chinese bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island through to Jun. 03 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Oct. 18 Japan-Germany Summit (Brussels) the East China Sea Jun. 08 Launch of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Oct. 19 Japan-Italy Summit (Brussels) May 26 The Inter-Korean Summit Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China Oct. 19 Japan-Singapore Summit (Brussels) May 27 A U.S. naval destroyer and cruiser conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 Jun. 14 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Oct. 19 Japan-Australia Summit (Brussels) nautical miles of Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported) Jun. 18 Disaster Relief for Northern Osaka Prefecture Earthquake (through June 26) Oct.Oct. 2629 Japan-China Summit (Beijing)Japan-India Summit (Tokyo) Jun. 03 A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean Jun. 19 FY2018 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through June Nov. 06 Japan-Malaysia Summit (Tokyo) Jun. 04 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean and after flying toward the Bashi Channel, it turns 22) Nov. 09 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk around and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again Jun. 29 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Nov. 14 Japan-ASEAN Summit (Singapore) Jun. 04 A Chinese vessel passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and moves Jul. 06 Disaster Relief in Response to July 2018 Flooding Nov. 14 Japan-Russia Summit (Singapore) to the East China Sea Disaster (through August18) Nov. 15 Japan-Singapore Summit (Singapore) Jun. 12 U.S.-North Korea Summit Jul. 11 Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Nov. 15 21st ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting (Singapore) Jun. 17 A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Ready Reserve Personnel in response to July Flooding Disaster 2018 Nov. 15 East Asia Summit (Singapore) to the Pacific Ocean Jul. 11 Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Nov. 15 Japan-Indonesia Summit (Singapore) Jun. 18 U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Freedom Guardian exercise Personnel is issued (through July 31) Nov. 15 Japan-New Zealand Summit (Singapore) Jun. 19 Kim Jong-Un visits China (through June 20) Jul. 13 Signing of the Japan-France Acquisition and Nov. 15 Japan-Philippines Summit (Singapore) Jun. 20 China-North Korea Summit Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Nov. 16 Japan-Australia Summit (Australia) Jun. 22 U.S. DoD announces suspension of the Korean Marine Exchange Program Jul. 31 Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Moscow) Nov. 17 Japan-Papua New Guinea Summit (Papua New Jun. 23 A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to Jul. 31 Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting Guinea) the East China Sea (2+2) (Moscow) Nov. 18 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (margin) Jun. 24 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through June 29) Aug. 06 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water and Nov. 18 Japan-Chile New Guinea Summit (Papua New Jun. 24 Presidential election and general election in Turkey food in Tozawa Village, Mogami County, Yamagata Guinea) Jun. 27 Permanent ceasefire agreed in South Sudan Prefecture (through August 8) Nov. 18 Japan-Canada Summit (Papua New Guinea) Jun. 29 A Chinese hospital ship enters Japan’s contiguous zone north of Taisho Island, Senkaku Islands Aug. 10 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Nov. 19 Japan-Burkina Faso Summit (Tokyo) Jun. 29 Relocation of the Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea from Seoul to Pyeongtaek Aug. 20 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting Nov. 27 Japan-Jordan Summit (Tokyo) A 21 J S i L k D f Mi i t i l M ti ----- Year Defense Domestic International |2018|Sep. 01 Sep. 03 Sep. 06 Sep. 07 Sep. 07 Sep. 09 Sep. 11 Sep. 21 Oct. 02 Oct. 03 Oct. 10 Oct. 10 Oct. 13 Oct. 14 Oct. 19 Oct. 19 Oct. 19 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 24 Oct. 29 Dec. 06 Dec. 11 Dec. 20 Dec. 25 Dec. 26 Dec. 28|FY2018 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (outside Japan) (through September 9) Japan-Australian Defense Ministerial Telephone Call Disaster relief in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (through October 14) Cabinet Decision on disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel in response to the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake Disaster relief call-up order for Ready Reserve Personnel is issued (through September 24) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (Nagoya) Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting Japan-Estonia Defense Ministerial Meeting Minister of Defense Iwaya came into office International disaster relief activities in response to the earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia (through October 25) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney) Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Sydney) FY2018 Tomodachi Rescue Exercise (TREX) Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces (through October 14) Troop review commemorating the SDF anniversary Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting (Singapore) 5th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (Singapore) Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply support in Suo-oshima Town, Yamaguchi Prefecture (through November 7) Keen Sword19/30FTX (through November 8) Disaster relief teams dispatched for search and rescue of U.S. aircraft crew off the coast of Shikoku (through December 11) FY2018 Exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas (in Japan) (through December 14) Incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft occurs Disaster relief teams dispatched for the first time in response to swine fever outbreak in Seki City, Gifu Prefecture (through December 27) 1st annual meeting of the Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China (Beijing) Footage of the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft released|Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Nov. 30 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 02 Dec. 02 Dec. 05 Dec. 11 Dec. 13 Dec. 18 Dec. 18|G20 Buenos Aires Summit (Buenos Aires) (through December 1) Japan-France Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-U.S. Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-India Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-China Summit (Buenos Aires) Tachikawa Branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 9th and 12th Yokota Air Base noise suits Japan-Russia Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-U.K. Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-Turkey Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-EU Summit (Buenos Aires) Japan-Uruguay Summit (Montevideo) Japan-Paraguay Summit (Asuncion) Fukuoka High Court renders judgement on a demand for an injunctive order for actions that crush the reef, etc. (Futenma Replacement Facility construction project) Japan-Ghana Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Mongolia Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Zambia Summit (Tokyo) National Security Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2019 and beyond,” and “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2019-FY2023)”|Jun. 29 Jul. 01 Jul. 07 Jul. 10 Jul. 12 Jul. 23 Jul. 27 Jul. 27 Aug. 03 Aug. 06 Aug. 08 Aug. 14 Aug. 28 Aug. 29 Aug. 29 Sep. 01 Sep. 01 Sep. 06 Sep. 09 Sep. 11 Sep. 12 Sep. 14 Sep. 18 Sep. 18 Sep. 18 Sep. 19 Sep. 20 Sep. 24 Sep. 30 Sep. 30 Oct. 02 Oct. 02 Oct. 02 Oct. 04 Oct. 16 Oct. 19 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 22 Oct. 22 Oct. 25 Oct. 25 Oct. 28 Oct. 29 Nov. 11 Nov. 17 Nov. 19 Nov. 24 Nov. 25 Nov. 26 Nov. 26 Nov. 28 Dec. 01 Dec. 05 Dec. 06 Dec. 07 Dec. 08 Dec. 11 Dec. 12 Dec. 14 Dec. 14 Dec. 27 Dec. 27|U.S. NBC reports that North Korea has increased its production of fuel for nuclear weapons (enriched uranium) at secret sites China Coast Guard is integrated into the People’s Armed Police Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait ROK Government announces suspension of its independent “Ulchi exercise” in the summer of 2018, followed by suspension of U.S.-ROK joint exercises NATO Summit Brussels 2018 “38 North,” a website dedicated to analysis of North Korea, announces the start of dismantlement of the main facility on the satellite launch site in Dongchang-ri *The report on August 22 announces that no new dismantlement activity has been apparent since August 3 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan China announces a successful launch test of its new model of a hypersonic projectile A Chinese vessel sails westbound from the Osumi Strait to the East China Sea A Chinese vessel sails eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean A car attack occurs in London, U.K. A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through August 29) A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again 14 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and move to the Sea of Okhotsk (through August 30) Two Russian patrol aircraft fly and circle around Japan 28 Russian vessels sail through the Soya Strait and moved to the Sea of Japan (through September 2) U.S.-India Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) North Korea stages a military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of its foundation as a nation in Pyongyang, without ICBM or other ballistic missiles Russia starts the exercise phase of a large scale military exercise “Vostok 2018” (through September 17) Government of South Sudan and relevant parties including anti-government forces sign the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict Inter-Korean Liaison Office opens (Kaesong) U.S. DoD releases its Cyber Strategy The Inter-Korean Summit (through September 20) Syrian Army accidentally shoots down a Russian aircraft Three Russian aircraft, including a fighter, make a long-distance flight over the Sea of Japan (an Su-35 fighter is confirmed by scramble for the first time) U.S. DoD designates the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission of China as a subject to sanctions U.S. DoD notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$330 million) A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reefs and Johnson South Reef in Spratly Islands (reported) A Chinese naval destroyer approaches abnormally close to a U.S. vessel A Chinese vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Inauguration of a new government in Iraq A Saudi Arabian journalist dies in the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Turkey U.S. releases National Strategy for Counterterrorism A U.S. bomber flies over the South China Sea U.S. and ROK Governments announce suspension of the Vigilant Ace exercise, a joint military exercise scheduled for December 2018 President Trump announces an intention to withdraw from the INF Treaty General election in Afghanistan (House of the People) Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait First ASEAN-China maritime exercise (Zhanjiang) (through October 28) Prime Minister Abe visits China (through October 27) Israel-Oman Summit A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through October 29) A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again Ceremony commemorating the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I (Paris) APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Papua New Guinea) (through November 18) A U.S. bomber flies over the South China Sea (reported) Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen resigns as chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party after suffering a major defeat in the general election A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through November 26) A U.S. naval cruiser conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around Paracel Islands in the South China Sea (reported) A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait U.S.-China Summit (Osaka) A U.S. naval destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Peter the Great Gulf (reported) Yemen peace talks (through December 13) A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean A Chinese vessel sails westward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea A Chinese vessel sails southeastward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to reach the Pacific Ocean. After flying to off the coast of Amami Oshima Island, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea UAE reopens its embassy in Syria A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around, and flies to the East China Sea again| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| Jan. 01 A U.S. Aegis destroyer conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” in Paracel Islands Jan. 01 Chairman Kim Jong-un expresses his intention to neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them in his “New Year’s Address” in 2019 Jan. 07 Kim Jong-un visits China (through January 10) Jan. 07 A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles around Paracel Islands Jan. 15 ROK releases Defense White Paper 2018 Jan. 17 United States releases the Missile Defense Review (MDR) Jan. 24 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Jan. 24 A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Feb. 02 U.S. provides Russia with formal notice to withdrawal from the INF Treaty Feb. 11 Two U.S. destroyers conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” around the Mischief Reef Feb. 16 A Chinese vessel advances to the Sea of Japan (through February 24) Feb. 23 A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the East China Sea to reach the Sea of Japan. Thereafter it turns around and flies to the East China Sea again Feb. 25 Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Feb. 27 2nd U.S.-North Korea Summit Meeting (through February 28) Mar. 04 Russia notifies U.S. of the suspension of Russia’s obligation under the INF Treaty Mar. 15 51 people are killed in a shooting incident in Christchurch, New Zealand Mar. 19 A flight by a Chinese Y-9 patrol aircraft within Japan’s air defense identification zone in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time 2019 Jan. 11 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brest) Jan. 11 Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Brest) Jan. 14 Multilateral exercise Cobra Gold 2019 (Thailand) (through February 23) Jan. 17 Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.) Jan. 21 FY2018 SDF Joint Exercises (command post exercise) (through January 26) Jan. 21 The MOD published its final statement regarding the incident of an ROK naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at MSDF patrol aircraft Jan. 23 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 23 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to forest fire in Tokigawa Town, Hiki County, Saitama Prefecture (through January 25) Jan. 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to forest fire in Tanabe City, Wakayama Prefecture (through January 26) Feb. 05 Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 05 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Aichi Prefecture, etc. (through February 9) Jan. 08 Japan-Rwanda Summit (Tokyo) Jan. 09 Japan-Netherlands Summit (Rotterdam) Jan. 10 Japan-U.K. Summit (London) Jan. 22 Japan-Russia Summit (Moscow) Jan. 23 Japan-Brazil Summit (Davos) Jan. 29 Japan-Qatar Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 04 Japan-Germany Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 15 Japan-Australia Summit (Tokyo) Feb. 20 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Feb. 28 Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Mar. 08 Japan-Palau Summit (Tokyo) Mar. 24 Replacement of government aircraft from B-747 to B-777 Mar. 31 Return of the land at Makiminato Service Area near Gate 5 Apr. 04 Japan-Panama Summit (Tokyo) Apr. 16 Naha Branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 3rd and 5th Futenma Air Station noise suits Apr. 23 Japan-France Summit (Paris) Apr. 24 Japan-Italy Summit (Rome) Apr. 24 Japan-Poland Summit (Bratislava) ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2019|Feb. 14 Feb. 19 Feb. 20 Mar. 03 Mar. 08 Mar. 12 Mar. 12 Mar. 26 Mar. 27 Mar. 28 Apr. 02 Apr. 05 Apr. 09 Apr. 10 Apr. 17 Apr. 17 Apr. 19 Apr. 19 Apr. 23|Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through February 20) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Mizunami City, Gifu Prefecture (through February 21) Air rescue in response to a radar losing track of an F-2 of Tsuiki Air Base Pacific Partnership 2019 (through May 19) ADMM-Plus Medicine Field Training Exercise (MEDEX 2019) (Lucknow) (through March 18) 23rd Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) (Tokyo) (through March 13) Turnover ceremony for the UH-1H parts, etc., grant of a portion of the parts, etc. Establishment of Camp Amami and Camp Miyakojima Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through March 30) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 1) Cabinet Decision on the “Implementation Plan for International Peace Cooperation Assignment in Sinai Peninsula” Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to forest fire in Sakuho Town, Nagano Prefecture (through April 7) Air rescue in response to the crash of an F-35A fighter of Misawa Air Base Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Seto City, Aichi Prefecture (through April 13) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Ena City, Gifu Prefecture (through April 19) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Washington, D.C.) Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) (Washington, D.C.) Japan-Bulgaria State Defense Minister-Level Meeting|Apr. 25 Apr. 25 Apr. 25 Apr. 25 Apr. 26 Apr. 28 Apr. 30|Japan-Slovakia Summit (Bratislava) 3rd “V4 plus Japan” Summit Meeting (Bratislava) Japan-Czech Summit (Bratislava) Japan-EU Summit (Brussels) Japan-U.S. Summit (Washington, D.C.) Japan-Canada Summit (Ottawa) Taiirei-Seiden-no-gi|Mar. 24 Mar. 24 Mar. 25 Mar. 28 Mar. 30 Apr. 01 Apr. 02 Apr. 02 Apr. 05 Apr. 05 Apr. 06 Apr. 09 Apr. 15 Apr. 15 Apr. 15 Apr. 17 Apr. 21 Apr. 24 Apr. 26 Apr. 28 Apr. 28 Apr. 29|General election in Thailand (House of Representatives) Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait U.S. President Trump recognizes Israel’s sovereign right over the Golan Heights A Chinese vessel sails eastbound from the Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Four Chinese bombers, an intelligence gathering aircraft, and two presumed fighter jets fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean, they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft and two bombers fly from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean, they turn around, and pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again Three Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait southward and move to the East China Sea A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island temporarily to the Pacific Ocean A Russian patrol aircraft flies from off the coast of Sanin through off the coast of the Noto Peninsula A French vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait General election in Israel A Chinese vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island southeastward, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on the same day, the vessel sails between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island northwestward to the East China Sea Four Chinese bombers and an electronic warfare aircraft fly from the Bashi Channel, pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and fly to the East China Sea U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$500 million) Presidential election in Indonesia Bomb attacks by Islamic extremists occur simultaneously in Colombo and other places, Sri Lanka Kim Jong-un visits Russia (through April 26) Five Russian vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Four Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan China-Russia joint naval exercise “Joint Sea 2019” (Qingdao) (through May 4)| |2019|May 02 May 17 May 17 May 18 May 19 May 21 May 22 May 23 May 27 May 27 May 27 May 30 May 30 Jun. 01 Jun. 01 Jun. 01 Jun. 01 Jun. 04 Jun. 05 Jun. 17 Jun. 21 Jun. 29 Jul. 25 Aug. 07|Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) Cabinet Decision on revision of the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Tahara City, Aichi Prefecture, etc. (through May 20) Disaster relief teams dispatched to rescue stranded residents due to heavy rain in Yakushiima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture (through May 20) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to water supply failure, etc. due to heavy rain in Kuchinoerabujima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture (through May 24) FY2019 Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) (through May 24) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Qatar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to forest fire in Hinohara Village, Tokyo (through May 29) Disaster relief teams dispatched to rescue missing persons due to ship collision off the coast of Inubosaki, Chiba Prefecture (through May 31) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to forest fire in Oumu Town, Hokkaido (through June 4) Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Meeting between Defense Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan (Tokyo) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Yamagata City, Gifu Prefecture, etc. (through June 8) Establishment of Aegis Ashore Introduction Promotion Headquarters Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to forest fire in Kitagawa Village, Aki County, Kochi Prefecture (through June 22) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to swine fever outbreak in Nishio City, Aichi Prefecture (through July 2) Revision of the Guidelines Regarding Off-Base U.S. Military Aircraft Accidents in Japan Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)|May 01 May 01 May 06 May 17 May 27 May 29 May 30 May 31 May 31 May 31 Jun. 06 Jun. 10 Jun. 12 Jun. 14 Jun. 26 Jun. 27 Jun. 27 Jun. 27 Jun. 27 Jun. 27 Jun. 27 Jun. 28 Jun. 28 Jun. 28 Jun. 28 Jun. 28 Jun. 28 Jun. 29 Jun. 29 Jun. 29|Kenji-to-Shokei-no-gi Sokui-go-Choken-no-gi Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Enactment of the revised Act on Prohibition of Flight of UASs around and over Key Facilities Japan-U.S. Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Bangladesh Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Laos Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Malaysia Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Cambodia Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Philippines Summit (Tokyo) Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 10th and 11th Yokota Air Base noise suits Japan-Switzerland Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Iran Summit (Teheran) Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk Japan-France Summit (Tokyo) Japan-EU Summit (Osaka) Japan-India Summit (Osaka) Japan-Argentina Summit (Osaka) Japan-Egypt Summit (Osaka) Japan-Australia Summit (Osaka) Japan-China Summit (Osaka) G20 Osaka Summit chaired by Prime Minister Abe (through June 29) Japan-U.S. Summit (Osaka) Japan-U.S.-India Summit (Osaka) Japan-Germany Summit (Osaka) Japan-U.K. Summit (Osaka) Japan-Thailand Summit (Osaka) Japan-South Africa Summit (Osaka) Japan-Brazil Summit (Osaka) Japan-Russia Summit (Osaka)|May 03 May 04 May 06 May 06 May 09 May 11 May 19 May 19 May 22 May 23 May 26 May 27 May 29 May 30 Jun. 01 Jun. 08 Jun. 08 Jun. 10 Jun. 12 Jun. 13 Jun. 14 Jun. 16 Jun. 16 Jun. 18 Jun. 20 Jun. 20 Jun. 20-21 Jun. 21 Jun. 23 Jun. 30 Jul. 02 Jul. 06 Jul. 08 Jul. 15 Jul. 22 Jul. 23 Jul. 24 Jul. 25 Jul. 25 Jul. 27 Aug. 01 Aug. 06 Aug. 24|A Russian patrol aircraft passes the Tsushima Strait from the Sea of Japan, and flies to the East China Sea. Thereafter, it passes through the Tsushima Strait again, and flies to the Sea of Japan North Korea launches ballistic missiles Two U.S. vessels conduct the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Gaven Reefs and Johnson South Reef Five Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait to the Sea of Japan North Korea launches ballistic missiles Three Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean Federal election in Australia A U.S. vessel conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal in Zhongsha Islands Two U.S. vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Pakistan conducts a test launch of ballistic missiles A Chinese vessel sails southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island, and advances to the Pacific Ocean temporarily. However, on May 30, the vessel sails northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea Taiwan conducts a military field exercise “Han Kuang 35” (through May 31) A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again. In addition, just around the same time, a Chinese electronic warfare aircraft flies over the East China Sea to near the Tsushima Strait Inauguration of 2nd Modi government of India U.S. DoD releases the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk Two Russian vessels sail northward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island Chinese vessels including the aircraft carrier “Liaoning,” sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean Three Russian vessels sail northbound from the Tsushima Strait Commercial vessels, including one related to Japan, are attacked near the Straits of Hormuz China Coast Guard vessels sail in the Japanese contiguous zone around Senkaku Islands for the longest-ever period of 64 consecutive days A Chinese vessel sails northwestward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the East China Sea A Chinese intelligence gathering aircraft flies from the East China Sea. After passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and flying over the Pacific Ocean, it turns around, and passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again Two Canadian vessels transit through the Taiwan Strait Two Russian long-range bombers fly around Japan, and intrude into Japan’s territorial airspace twice when flying northward over the Pacific Ocean Iran shoots down a U.S. drone over the Straits of Hormuz President Xi Jinping visits North Korea (the first visit to North Korea by a Chinese president since the last visit by then President Hu Jintao 14 years earlier in 2005. President Xi visits North Korea for the first time in about 11 years since his last visit in 2008 as Vice President) Two Russian vessels sail eastbound from the Soya Strait Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait Leaders of U.S. and North Korea meet at Panmunjom China conducts the first test launch of anti-ship ballistic missiles in the South China Sea from June through July (reported) Two Chinese vessels sail southbound from the Tsushima Strait U.S. Government notifies Congress of the sales of weapons to Taiwan (worth US$2.2 billion) Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait A Chinese vessel sails northbound from the Tsushima Strait, and advances to the Sea of Japan temporarily. However, on July 23, the vessel sails southbound from the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea Two Chinese bombers and two Russian bombers pass through the Tsushima Strait and fly southward over the East China Sea. Thereafter, the two Chinese bombers fly northwestward to the continent, while the two Russian bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean. After turning around, the Russian bombers pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island again, fly northward over the East China Sea, and pass through the Tsushima Strait again. In addition, an early warning and control aircraft A-50 that reportedly supports the Russian bombers intrudes into Japan’s territorial airspace over Takeshima Island China releases the 10th Defense White Paper “China’s National Defense in the New Era” (for the first time in about four years) A U.S. vessel transits through the Taiwan Strait North Korea launches ballistic missiles Two Chinese vessels sail southward between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island to the Pacific Ocean Two Russian vessels sail westbound from the Soya Strait North Korea launches ballistic missiles North Korea launches ballistic missiles| ----- ----- Eastern Army Headquarters (Asaka) 1st Infantry Regiment (Nerima) 32nd Infantry Regiment (Omiya) 34th Infantry Regiment (Itazuma) 1st Field Artillery unit (Kitafuji) 1st Logistics Support Regiment (Nerima) Other units 2nd Infantry Regiment (Takada) 13th Infantry Regiment (Matsumoto) 30th Infantry Regiment (Shibata) 12th Field Artillery unit (Utsunomiya) 12th Helicopter Unit (Somagahara) 12th Logistics Support Unit (Shinmachi) Other units 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo) 5th Engineer Group (Takada) Other units Other units Eastern Air Group (Tachikawa) Other units Middle Army Headquarters (Itami) 7th Infantry Regiment (Fukuchiyama) 36th Infantry Regiment (Itami) 37th Infantry Regiment (Shinodayama) 3rd Field Artillery unit (Himeji) 3rd Logistics Support Regiment (Senzo) Other units 10th Division Division Headquarters (Moriyama) 14th Infantry Regiment (Kanazawa) 33rd Infantry Regiment (Hisai) 35th Infantry Regiment (Moriyama) 10th Field Artillery Regiment (Toyokawa) 10th Logistics Support Regiment (Kasugai) Other units 13th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Kaitaichi) 8th Infantry Regiment (Yonago) 17th Infantry Regiment (Yamaguchi) 46th Infantry Regiment (Kaitaichi) 13th Field Artillery unit (Nihonbara) 13th Logistics Support Unit (Kaitaichi) Other units 14th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Zentsuji) 15th Rapid Deployment Regiment (Zentsuji) 50th Infantry Regiment (Kochi) 14th Logistics Support Unit (Zentsuji) Other units 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara) 4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo) 6th Engineer Group (Toyokawa) 7th Engineer Group (Okubo) Other units Middle Army Combined Brigade 47th Infantry Regiment (Kaitaichi) (Otsu) 49th Infantry Regiment (Toyokawa) Other units Middle Field Artillery Unit (Matsuyama) Middle Air Group (Yao) Other units Western Army Headquarters (Kengun) 4th Division Division Headquarters (Fukuoka) 16th Infantry Regiment (Omura) 40th Infantry Regiment (Kokura) 41st Infantry Regiment (Beppu) 4th Logistics Support Regiment (Fukuoka) Other units 8th Division Division Headquarters (Kita Kumamoto) 42th Rapid Deployment Regiment (Kita Kumamoto) 12th Infantry Regiment (Kokubu) 43rd Infantry Regiment (Miyakonojo) 8th Logistics Support Regiment (Kita Kumamoto) Other units 15th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Naha) 51st Infantry Regiment (Naha) 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Yaese) 15th Helicopter Unit (Naha) 15th Logistics Support Unit (Naha) Other units Western Field Artillery Unit 5th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kengun) (Yufuin) Field Artillery Regiment (Kita Kumamoto) Other units 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade 3rd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Iizuka) (Iizuka) 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Takematsu) Other units 5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori) 2nd Engineer Group (Iizuka) 9th Engineer Group (Ogori) Other units Western Army Combined Brigade 19th Infantry Regiment (Fukuoka) (Ainoura) 24th Infantry Regiment (Ebino) Other units Western Army Tank Unit (Kusu) Western Air Group (Takayubaru) Other units Training Evaluation Research and Development Command (Meguro) Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) Other units and organizations Chief of Staff, GSDF Ground Staff Office Ground Component Ground Component Command Headquarters (Asaka) Command 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Ainoura) 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) System and Signal Brigade (Ichigaya) Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya) Special Forces Group (Narashino) Other units Northern Army Headquarters (Sapporo) 3rd Infantry Regiment (Nayoro) 25th Infantry Regiment (Engaru) 26th Infantry Regiment (Rumoi) 2nd Tank Regiment (Kamifurano) 2nd Field Artillery Regiment (Asahikawa) 2nd Logistics Support Regiment (Asahikawa) Other units 4th Infantry Regiment (Obihiro) 6th Infantry Regiment (Bihoro) 27th Infantry Regiment (Kushiro) 5th Field Artillery Regiment (Obihiro) 5th Logistics Support Unit (Obihiro) Other units 11th Infantry Regiment (Higashi Chitose) 71st Tank Regiment (Kita Chitose) 72nd Tank Regiment (Kita Eniwa) 73rd Tank Regiment (Minami Eniwa) 7th Field Artillery Regiment (Higashi Chitose) 7th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Shizunai) 7th Logistics Support Regiment (Higashi Chitose) Other units 11th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Makomanai) 10th Infantry Regiment (Takikawa) 18th Infantry Regiment (Makomanai) 28th Infantry Regiment (Hakodate) 11th Field Artillery unit (Makomanai) 11th Logistics Support Unit (Makomanai) Other units 1st Field Artillery Brigade 1st Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kita Chitose) (Kita Chitose) 2nd Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Bibai) 3rd Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kamifurano) 1st Field Artillery Group (Kita Chitose) 4th Field Artillery Group (Kamifurano) Other units 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Higashi Chitose) (Higashi Chitose) 4th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Nayoro) Other units 3rd Engineer Brigade 12th Engineer Group (Iwamizawa) (Minami Eniwa) 13th Engineer Group (Horobetu) 14th Engineer Group (Kamifurano) Other units Northern Army Combined 52nd Infantry Regiment (Makomanai) Brigade (Higashi Chitose) Other units Northern Air Group (Okadama) Other units Northeastern Army Headquarters (Sendai) 20th Infantry Regiment (Jinmachi) 22nd Infantry Regiment (Tagajo) 44th Infantry Regiment (Fukusima) 6th Field Artillery Regiment (Koriyama) 6th Logistics Support Regiment (Jinmachi) Other units 5th Infantry Regiment (Aomori) 21st Infantry Regiment (Akita) 39th Infantry Regiment (Hirosaki) 9th Artillery Regiment (Iwate) 9th Logistics Support Regiment (Hachinohe) Other units Northeastern Field Artillery Unit 4th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Hachinohe) (Sendai) Other units 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka) 10th Engineer Group (Funaoka) 11th Engineer Group (Fukushima) Other units Northeastern Army 38th Infantry Regiment (Tagajo) Combined Brigade (Sendai) Other units Northeastern Air Group (Kasuminome) Other units Eastern Army Northern Army Middle Army Northeastern Army Western Army ----- **Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces** (As of April 1, 2019) Air Support Command Headquarters (Fuchu) 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki) 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma) 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing (Miho) Air Traffic Control Group (Fuchu, Each region) Air Weather Group (Fuchu, Each region) Flight Check Squadron (Iruma) Special Airlift Group (Chitose) Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki) Air Training Command Headquarters (Hamamatsu) 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu) 4th Air Wing (Matsushima) 11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama) 12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita) 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya) Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami, Kumagaya) Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru) Other units and organizations Air Development and Test Command Headquarters (Fuchu) Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu) Electronics Development and Test Group (Fuchu) Aeromedical Laboratory (Iruma, Tachikawa) Air Communications and Systems Wing (Ichigaya, Each region) Aero Safety Service Group (Tachikawa) Air Materiel Command (Jujo, Each region) Other units and organizations Chief of Staff, ASDF Air Staff Office Northern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Misawa) 2nd Air Wing (Chitose) 3rd Air Wing (Misawa) Northern Air Defense Control Group (Misawa) Northern Aircraft 42nd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Ominato) Control and Warning 45th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Tobetsu) Wing (Misawa) 18th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Wakkanai) 26th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Nemuro) 28th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Abashiri) 29th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okushiritou) 33rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kamo) 36th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Erimo) 37th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Yamada) 1st Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Chitose) Other units 3rd Air Defense 9th, 10th Fire Unit (Chitose) Missile Group 11th, 24th Fire Unit (Naganuma) (Chitose) Other units 6th Air Defense 20th, 23rd Fire Unit (Yakumo) Missile Group 21st, 22nd Fire Unit (Shariki) (Misawa) Other units Northern Air Civil Engineering Group (Misawa, Chitose) Other units Central Air Defense Force Headquarters (Iruma) 6th Air Wing (Komatsu) 7th Air Wing (Hyakuri) Central Air Defense Control Group (Iruma) Central Aircraft 1st Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Kasatoriyama) Control and WarningWing (Iruma) 23rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Wajima) 27th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Otakineyama) 5th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kushimoto) 22nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Omaezaki) 35th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kyogamisaki) 44th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mineokayama) 46th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Sado) 2nd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Iruma) Other units 1st Air Defense 1st Fire Unit (Narashino, Ichigaya) Missile Group(Iruma) 2nd Fire Unit (Takeyama) 3rd Fire Unit (Kasumigaura) 4th Fire Unit (Iruma) Other units 4th Air Defense 12th Fire Unit (Aibano) Missile Group(Gifu) 13th, 15th Fire Unit (Gifu) 14th Fire Unit (Hakusan) Other units Central Air Civil Engineering Group (Iruma, Each region) Other units Western Air Defense Force Headquarters (Kasuga) 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru) 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) Western Air Defense Control Group (Kasuga) Western Aircraft 13th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Takahatayama) Control andWarning Wing 43rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Seburiyama) (Kasuga) 7th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Takaoyama) 9th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Shimo-Koshikijima) 15th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Fukuejima) 17th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mishima) 19th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Unishima) 3rd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kasuga) Other units 2nd Air Defense 5th, 6th Fire Unit (Ashiya) Missile Group(Kasuga) 7th Fire Unit (Tsuiki) 8th Fire Unit (Kouradai) Other units Western Air Civil Engineering Group (Ashiya, Each region) Other units Southwestern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Naha) 9th Air Wing (Naha) Southwestern Air Defense Control Group (Naha) Southwestern Aircraft 56th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Yozadake) Control and Warning 53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Miyakojima) Wing (Naha) 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kumejima) 55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okinoerabujima) 4th Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Naha) Other units 5th Air Defense 16th, 18th Fire Unit (Chinen) Missile Group(Naha) 17th Fire Unit (Naha) 19th Fire Unit (Onna) Other units Southwestern Air Civil Engineering Group (Naha) Other units Air Rescue Wing (Iruma, Each region) AIr Tactics Development Wing (Yokota, Each region) Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Hyakuri) Airborne Warning and Control Wing (Hamamatsu, Each region) Other units Minesweeper Division 41 Other units Minesweeper Division 42 Other units Air Support Command Minesweeper Division 44 Other units Air Training Squadron 211 (Kanoya) Air Training Squadron 212 (Kanoya) Training Division 1 (Kure) Air Training Command Air Development and Test Command Minister of Defense Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Joint Staff Chief of Staff, MSDF Maritime Staff Office Headquarters (Yokosuka) Headquarters Yokosuka District Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force Escort Flotilla 1 Escort Division 1 (Yokosuka) Yokosuka District (Yokosuka) Escort Division 5 (Sasebo) Escort Flotilla 2 (Sasebo) Escort Division 2 (Sasebo) Escort Division 6 (Yokosuka) Headquarters Kure District Escort Flotilla 3 (Maizuru) Escort Division 3 (Maizuru) Kure District Sub Area Activity Hanshin Escort Division 7 (Ominato) (Kobe) Escort Flotilla 4 (Kure) Escort Division 4 (Kure) Escort Division 8 (Sasebo) Headquarters Sasebo District Fleet Training Command Yokosuka Fleet Training Group Sasebo District Sub Area Activity Shimonoseki(Shimonoseki) (Yokosuka) Kure Fleet Training Group Sub Area Activity Okinawa Sasebo Fleet Training Group (Uruma) Maizuru Fleet Training Group Coastal Defense Group Tsushima (Tsushima) Ominato Fleet Training Group (Mutsu) Other units Missile System Training Center (Yokosuka) Escort Division 11 (Yokosuka) Headquarters Maizuru District Escort Division 12 (Kure) Maizuru District Escort Division 13 (Sasebo) Escort Division 14 (Maizuru) Headquarters Ominato District Escort Division 15 (Ominato) Ominato District Sub Area Activity Hakodate Replenishment-at-Sea Squadron 1 (Yokosuka) (Hakodate) Drone Support Squadron 1 (Kure) Coastal Defense Group Yoichi (Yoichi-cho, Yoichi-gun) Other units Base Facility Wakkanai (Wakkanai) Other units Headquarters (Ayase) Fleet Air Force Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya) Air Patrol Squadron 1 (Kanoya) Headquarters (Kashiwa) Air Training Command Air Training Group Shimofusa Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe) Air Patrol Squadron 2 (Hachinohe) (Kashiwa) Fleet Air Wing 4 (Ayase) Air Patrol Squadron 3 (Ayase) Air Training Group Tokushima Air Station Iwo-to (Ogasawara) (Matsushige-cho, Itano-gun) Air Training Group Ozuki Fleet Air Wing 5 (Naha) Air Patrol Squadron 5 (Naha) (Shimonoseki) Fleet Air Wing 21 Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 21 (Tateyama) (Tateyama) Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 23 (Maizuru) Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 25 (Mutsu) Headquarters (Kure) Fleet Air Wing 22 (Omura) Air ASW Helicopter squadron 22 (Omura) Air ASW Helicopter squadron 24 (Komatsushima) Training Squadron Other units Fleet Air Wing 31 (Iwakuni) Air Rescue Squadron 71 (Iwakuni) Air Reconnaissance Squadron 81 (Iwakuni) Air Training Support Squadron 91 (Iwakuni) Communications Command (Ichigaya) Air Development Squadron 51 (Ayase) Air Service Squadron 61 (Ayase) MSDF Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo) Mine Countermeasure Helicopter Squadron 111 (Iwakuni) Other units Other units and organizations Fleet Submarine Force Headquarters (Yokosuka) Submarine Flotilla 1 (Kure) Submarine Division 1 (Kure) Submarine Division 3 (Kure) Submarine Division 5 (Kure) Submarine Flotilla 2 Submarine Division 2 (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Submarine Division 4 (Yokosuka) Submarine Division 6 (Yokosuka) Training Submarine Division 1 (Kure) Submarine Training Center (Kure) Mine Warfare Force Minesweeper Division 1 (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Minesweeper Division 2 (Sasebo) Minesweeper Division 3 (Kure) Minesweeper Division 101 (Kure) Landing Ship Division 1 (Kure) Mine Warfare Support Center (Yokosuka) Fleet Intelligence Operational Intelligence Center (Yokosuka) Command (Yokosuka) Basic Intelligence Center (Ichigaya) Electronic Intelligence Center (Yokosuka) Oceanography ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare Center (Yokosuka) Support Command ASW Evaluation Center (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Oceanographic Observation StationOkinawa (Uruma) Oceanographic Observation Station Shimokita (Higashidoori Shimokita-gun) Other units Fleet Research and C4I Systems Center (Yokosuka) Development Command Surface Systems Center (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Air Systems Programming Center (Ayase) Other units Air Defense Command Northern Air Defense Force Air Defense Command Headquarters (Yokota) Central Air Defense Force Western Air Defense Force Southwestern Air Defense Force ----- Location of Principal SDF Units (for illustrative purposes) (As of March 31, 2019) Rebuntou Wakkanai **2nd Division** Tobetsu Asahikawa **Northern Air Defense Force** Okushiritou Makomanai **Western Air** Sapporo **Northern Army** **Defense Force** Takeshima **11th Brigade** Chitose Abashiri Higashi Chitose Unishima **7th Division** Obihiro **5th Brigade** Mishima Ominato Nemuro Kamo Aomori Erimo Ainoura Takaoyama Fukuejima Seburiyama Fukuoka **Northeastern** Misawa Sasebo **13th Brigade** Hachinohe **Sasebo District** Kita KumamotoOmura KasugaTsuiki Iwakuni KaitaichiKure **Maizuru District** Wajima Sado **9th DivisionArmy** **Ominato District** **Ministry of Defense; Joint Staff Office;Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Office** Kengun4th Division **Middle Army** Maizuru Kyogamisaki Komatsu Jinmachi Yamada **Ground Self-Defense Force** Shimokoshikijima **Western Army** **10th Division** Ground Component Command Headquarters Zentsuji Sendai **8th Division** **14th Brigade** Itami Gifu **12th Brigade** (and Eastern Army Headquarters) Nyutabaru Senzo **Eastern Army** **6th Division** Army Headquarters Kanoya Takahatayama **3rd Division** Division Headquarters / Brigade Headquarters Moriyama Somagahara Otakineyama Kasatoriyama Airborne Brigades Kushimoto **1st Division** **Kure District** Ichigaya Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade Omaezaki **Southwestern Air Defense Force** **Yokosuka District** Helicopter Brigades **Maritime Self-Defense** **Force** **Central Air Defense Force** Iruma Asaka Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters Nerima Yokota Headquarters District Atsugi Ichigaya Hyakuri Principal Naval Bases Funakoshi Narashino Principal Air Bases (Fixed-wing Aircraft Units) Uotsuri Island Senkaku Islands Yokosuka Kuba Island Principal Air Bases (Helicopter Units) Yonagunijima Kisarazu Taisho Island Mineokayama Tateyama **Air Self-Defense Force** **Southwestern Air Defense Force** Air Defense Command Headquarters Air Defense Force Headquarters Miyakojima Kumejima Okinoerabujima Fighter Units Yozadake Naha Surface-to Air Guided Missile Units **15th Brigade** Aircraft Control and Warning Units (Radar Site) ----- Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2019) |10th Area Support Group 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (A|irborne)| |---|---| US Army US Navy **Camp Hansen** US Air Force US Marines 12th Marine Regiment (Artillery) **Torii Station** 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Headquarters 10th Area Support Group 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) **Kadena Air Base** 18th Wing  F-15 fighter **Camp Schwab**  KC-135 air refueling aircraft 4th Marine Regiment (Infantry)  HH-60  E-3 early warning and control aircraft, etc. Fleet Activities Okinawa Patrol Squadron  P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft  P-8A patrol aircraft, etc. 1-1 Air Defense Artillery **Camp Courtney**  Patriot PAC-3 III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters 3rd Marine Division Headquarters **Camp Foster** **White Beach Area** 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters  Port facility  Oil storage facility **MCAS Futenma** Marine Aircraft Group 36  CH-53 helicopter  AH-1 helicopter **Camp Kinser** 20km  UH-1 helicopter 3rd Marine Logistics Group Headquarters  MV-22 Osprey, etc. Note: Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources. |Mari  CH  AH  UH  MV|ne Aircraft Group 36 -53 helicopter -1 helicopter -1 helicopter -22 Osprey, etc.| |---|---| ----- Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan (Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2019) |Shariki|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |10th Missile Defense Detachment ●TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”)||| |||| |14th Missile Defense Battery ●TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”)|Col2| |---|---| |Naval Air Facility, Atsugi Carrier Air Wing 5 ●MH-60 helicopter|Col2| |---|---| Note: Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources. US Army US Navy **Shariki** US Air Force US Marines 10th Missile Defense Detachment - TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”) **Misawa** 35th Fighter Wing **●** F-16 fighter **※In addition, rotational deployment of** RQ-4 Global Hawk **Kyogamisaki** **Iwakuni** Naval Air Facility, Misawa 14th Missile Defense Battery Patrol & Reconnaissance Force, Carrier Air Wing Five (carrier-based aircraft) **●** TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”) 7th Fleet **●** F/A-18 strike fighter **●** P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, etc. **●** EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft **●** E-2 airborne early warning aircraft Joint Tactical Ground Station **●** C-2 transport aircraft **Yokota** Marine Aircraft Group 12 **U.S. Forces, Japan Headquarters** **●** F/A-18 strike fighter 5th Air Force Headquarters **●** KC-130 tanker/transport aircraft 374th Airlift Wing **●** F-35B fighter **●** C-130 transport aircraft **●** C-12 transport aircraft, etc. **●** C-12 transport aircraft **●** UH-1 helicopter **※** In addition, deployment of CV-22 Osprey sequentially starting in October 2018 **Sagami General Depot** 38th Air Defense Artillery **Yokosuka** Brigade Headquarters **Sasebo** **Commander, Naval Forces Japan** Commander Fleet Activities, Sasebo Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka **Zama** 7th Fleet 7th Fleet **U.S. Army, Japan** **Atsugi** **●** Amphibious assault ship (Wasp) **●** Aircraft carrier (USS Ronald Reagan) I Corps (Forward) **●** Transport landing ship, etc. Naval Air Facility, Atsugi **●** Cruiser **●** Landing ship Carrier Air Wing 5 **●** Amphibious command ship (USS Blue Ridge) **●** Minesweeper, etc. **●** MH-60 helicopter **●** Destroyer, etc. ----- -----