**On the Publication of Defense of**
**Japan 2017**

Minister of Defense
**Itsunori Onodera**

A decade ago in January 2007, the Defense Agency transitioned to the Ministry of Defense. Over the last
10 years since the transition, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) / the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has responded
swiftly and precisely to frequent outbreaks of incidents ranging from natural disasters including the Great East
Japan Earthquake, to ballistic missile launches by North Korea. Especially following its inauguration, the Abe
administration established the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines, and
resumed increases in defense budgets that had been cut for 10 years, while the MOD/SDF revised the Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and sought to further strengthen the ties of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
Furthermore, the Legislation for Peace and Security was developed to ensure that we are able to secure the lives
and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people in any situation, and contribute even more proactively to the peace
and stability of the international community.

However, the security environment surrounding Japan has become more severe in the past decade. North
Korea’s ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missiles as well as repeated launches of ballistic missiles
have become a serious and imminent threat of the region and the international community. This threat has
elevated to a new level particularly since last year, when North Korea willfully conducted two nuclear tests and
launched over 20 ballistic missiles. China remains poised to fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise,
based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order. This has raised significant
concerns over the impact on the security environment in Japan and the rest of the region, and in the world.
Against this backdrop, we will focus on the following for maintaining the sovereignty and independence of
Japan and for protecting its peace: (1) Japan’s own efforts; (2) strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance; and
(3) active promotion of security cooperation.

Firstly, our security policy rests on the efforts made by Japan. The MOD/SDF has reinforced the defense
posture in the southwestern region, along with ballistic missile defense capability, and has advanced initiatives
in new fields such as space and cyberspace. We have thereby sought to enhance the defense capabilities of Japan,
both in quality and quantity, and expand the role that Japan can fulfill.

Secondly, the Japan-U.S. Alliance forms the centerpiece of Japan’s security policy. Within a short time span
since the inauguration of the new U.S. administration in January 2017, Gen (ret.) Mattis, the newly sworn-in
Secretary of Defense, visited Japan and held a Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting. This is a testament to the
importance that the new U.S. administration continues to place on Japan. Japan remains committed to making
the bonds of the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance even stronger and enhancing the deterrence and response
capabilities of the Alliance nderpinned b a relationship of tr st ith the United States


-----

Thirdly, Japan proactively promotes security cooperation with the countries concerned. In November 2016,
we announced the “Vientiane Vision” at the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers' Informal Meeting. The MOD
set forth the vision for the first time as the future direction of defense cooperation with the ASEAN as a whole,
and this was welcomed by all ASEAN member states. As for the SDF engineering units dispatched to South
Sudan that were engaged in peacekeeping operations for five years, the personnel worked hand-in-hand with
the people in the country and carried out activities in a “Japanese” manner which gave consideration to the local
situation. These activities came to an end upon accomplishing the largest achievements among Japan’s previous
deployments to peacekeeping operations.

In pressing forward with these three focal measures, the development of the Legislation for Peace and
Security has provided a foundation for further advancing these efforts. The MOD attaches particular importance
to the activities of the SDF following the Legislation’s entry into force, and has therefore conducted a variety
of exercises pursuant to the Legislation. It has also assigned new duties such as “kaketsuke-keigo” for the
peacekeeping operations in South Sudan, as well as decided on a set of Implementation Guidelines for Article
95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

In this manner the MOD/SDF makes every effort to complete its duties, with the recognition that it is a
critical body tasked with the most fundamental role for the survival of the nation, namely, to protect the peace
and independence of Japan. Those who execute the duties diligently with a strong sense of mission are the SDF
personnel on the frontlines.

To promote readers’ understanding of SDF personnel, a cornerstone of national defense, tirelessly executing
their duties for the sake of the expectations and trust conferred by our country and the international community,
Defense of Japan 2017 highlights the human aspect of the MOD/SDF, adding a new chapter that details the
human foundation and organization that support the defense force. In addition, recent active roles played by
female personnel in the MOD/SDF are featured in the opening pages. Also, we have come up with creative
ways to make the Defense of Japan a more accessible and easy-to-understand publication. For example, we
have considerably expanded the opening feature and included more photographs and figures to provide clear
explanations of important themes.

In order to ensure that the MOD/SDF is executing its duties correctly, it is above all essential to gain the
understanding and trust of the people of Japan. Having reassumed the position of Minister of Defense, I have
once again reminded myself of the grave importance of the SDF’s duty of securing peace in Japan in an extremely
severe security environment. I will do my utmost to build a more disciplined and robust organization and secure
the public’s firm trust in the MOD/SDF. I sincerely hope that the Japanese people will read this whitepaper to
ha e a greater nderstanding of the defense policies of Japan and become more familiar ith the MOD/SDF


-----

**Chronicle of the Post-**


**Feature**


**The increasingly severe security environment and the broadening**
**roles of the SDF**

Ceremony for the reorganization into the Ministry of Defense (2007)

Great East Japan Earthquake (2011)


**2007** **2008** **2009** **2010** **2011** **2012**


**2007**


**2008**


**2009**


**2010**


**2011**


**2012**



-  Reorganization into -  Review of the Medium -  Enforcement of the Anti- -  Development of the 2010
the MOD Term Defense Program Piracy Measures Act National Defense Program
Guidelines


Counter-piracy operations in the waters off the coast of Somalia
and in the Gulf of Aden (from 2009 to present)


Dispatch of SDF personnel to PKO in Haiti (from 2010 to 2013)


Dispatch of SDF personnel to PKO in South Sudan (from 2011 to 2017)



-  The reorganization from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) marked its 10th anniversary in January 2017.

-  During the past decade, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) engaged in disaster relief activities following the Great East Japan Earthquake and the
Kumamoto Earthquake in Japan, and in counter-piracy activities in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and the dispatch of
SDF personnel to peacekeeping operations (PKO) in South Sudan.

-  Today’s security environment surrounding Japan is severer compared with 10 years ago, as North Korea has pushed ahead with the development of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and China has attempted to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas.

-  The MOD/SDF will proactively contribute more than ever to securing peace and stability as well as prosperity in the world, while pursuing security
in Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacif c region.


-----

**Reorganization Decade**


Kumamoto Earthquake (2016)

Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. joint exercise (2017)

[The French Navy’s Mistral (left) and MSDF Kunisaki (right)
conducting exercise]


Missile launches by North Korea (2009, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017)

Radioactivity measurement following North Korea’s nuclear test
(2009, 2013, and 2016) Transport of Japanese nationals, etc. in Algeria (2013)


**2013**


**2014**


**2015**


**2016**


**2017**



-  Establishment of the National
Security Council

-  Development of the National
Security Strategy

-  Development of the 2013 National
Defense Program Guidelines



-  Three Principles on
Transfer of Defense
Equipment and
Technology



-  Development of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S.
Defense Cooperation

-  Enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security

-  MOD restructuring, establishment of the Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics Agency



-  Enforcement of the
Legislation for Peace
and Security



-  10th anniversary of
the reorganization into
the MOD


Capacity building assistance (2012–)

[GSDF personnel giving a lecture in Timor-Leste (2012)]

International disaster relief activities in Philippines (2013)


Transport of emergency disaster relief following the outbreak of the

International disaster relief activities in Nepal (2015)

Ebola virus disease (2014)

Dispatching commander to multilateral force (CTF151) (2015, 2017)

[Rear Admiral Ito giving a speech on his assignment as CTF
Commander (2015)] Addition of the “kaketsuke-keigo” mission (from 2016 to 2017)


-----

**Feature**

|C|h|
|---|---|


**North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic**
**missiles poses a new level of threat**

North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles and their enhanced operational
capability have become a new level of threat to
the region, including Japan, and the international
community since 2016.
In 2017, North Korea has repeatedly launched
ballistic missiles, including those deemed to be of
new type.


See

P. 61

**Capability enhancement to respond to ballistic missile attacks**


Japan will appropriately deal with the threat of ballistic missiles by
developing its own ballistic missile defense system and by striving to
enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S.
Security Arrangements.

See

P. 330


PAC3 unit deployed in the Ichigaya district


Flight test of SM-3 (Block IIA) off Hawaii (February 2017)


-----

**Security Situation Surrounding Japan**

**Scrambles by SDF aircraft exceeded 1,000 times a year for**
**the fi rst time**

The number of scrambles reached the highest since the commencement of measures against airspace violations in 1958.
Going forward, the SDF will continue to take all possible measures to carry out warning and surveillance activities in waters and airspace
surrounding Japan, and implement strict measures against airspace violations in accordance with international law and the SDF Law.

See


P. 101, P. 320

A scrambling and ascending F-15 fi ghter jet of the ASDF An H-6 bomber of the Chinese Air Force that fl ew to the Pacifi c Ocean through airspace between the main island
of Okinawa and Miyako Island (September 2016)

**An aircraft carrier of the Chinese Navy observed in adjacent**
**waters of Japan for the fi rst time**

Chinese Navy’s Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Liaoning in the central area of the East China Sea was observed for the fi rst time by MSDF.
Later, the aircraft carrier Liaoning sailed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Western Pacifi c. It is also
the fi rst time that the Chinese Navy’s aircraft carrier was seen advancing to the Pacifi c Ocean.

See

P. 98, P. 318

The Chinese Navy’s Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Liaoning sailing from the East China Sea to the Pacifi c Ocean (December 2016)

The SDF will take all possible measures, including warning and surveillance activities and information collection, in order to expeditiously
and seamlessly respond to various situations.


-----

**Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

**The Japan-U.S. Alliance deepening**
**at various levels**

The Japan-U.S. Alliance constitutes the centerpiece for Japan’s security and also functions as “public goods” that contribute to the
stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacifi c region and the world at large.
Amid the increasingly severe security situation surrounding Japan, the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance is more important
than ever.

See


P. 261


**Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting**

Japan and the United States discussed and
shared concerns over the increasingly severe
security situation in the Asia-Pacifi c region,
including the new level of threat from North
Korea’s development of nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles and China’s unilateral
attempts to change the status quo in the East
and South China Seas.

Prime Minister Abe shaking hands with U.S. President Trump at the joint press conference (February 2017) (Prime Minister’s Offi ce website)


-----

**Japan-U.S. Defense**
**Ministerial Meeting**

The Ministers confi rmed the importance
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including
the unwavering U.S. commitment to
extended deterrence, and also shared
the view on the need to further enhance
the deterrence and response capabilities
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in view of the
severe security situation.

Minister of Defense Inada and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (February 2017)

**Japan-U.S. Joint Training**

The MOD/SDF strives daily to enhance Japan-U.S. joint exercises.
It believes that bolstering coordination between Japan and the U.S.
and demonstrating the ties between the two have the effect of further
strengthening the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall
Japan-U.S. Alliance and demonstrating the high capability of Japan
towards the stabilization of the region.

U.S. Air Force B-1B bomber (upper left)
and ASDF F-15 fi ghter[s] (lower right)
conducting formation fl ying (May 2017)


MSDF destroyers Hyuga and Ashigara (the two ships in the center) navigating with U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan (front) and USS Carl Vinson (rear) and others, and ASDF F-15
fi ghter[s] (June 2017)


-----

**Activities of the Engineering Unit**

**Terminating engineering activities**
**to move on to a new phase**

During the past more than fi ve years, the SDF conducted repairs of arterial roads extending from Juba, the capital city, to various areas
of the country and other activities, which represent the largest achievement among Japan’s previous PKO activities. Thus, it was time
to move on to a new phase regarding SDF engineering activities in Juba.
In the period of about fi ve years and four months, the SDF dispatched a total of 3,854 personnel (1st to 11th units).

Dispatch period Approx. fi ve times as long as the PKO in Cambodia

Total no. of personnel dispatched Approx. 1.7 times as many as the PKO in Timor-Leste

Dispatch period

Total no. of personnel dispatched

See


P. 387


**Repair of the road connecting to the water intake point on Jabal River (March-April 2016)**

**Repair of the road leading to the main gate of the UN House district (April-October 2016)**

**Road repair between Juba and Koda (February-March 2017)**


-----

**Dispatched to South Sudan**

**Deploy to UNMISS**


Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Headquarters.

**Headquarters continues**

While the activities of the engineering unit have ended, Japan
will continue to dispatch SDF personnel to the United Nations

Going forward, Japan will proactively contribute to the new
stage of South Sudan’s nation-building efforts by continuing
and expanding support in a variety of forms, including support
for advancing the political process and humanitarian assistance,
including food aid.

The SDF personnel at the UNMISS Headquarters coordinating with forces from other countries
(April 2017)

The SDF personnel assigned to UNMISS Headquarters (in the front) having discussions about the
withdrawal of the engineering unit at the UNMISS Headquarters (March 2017)


So-called “Kaketsuke-keigo” training (October 2016)

Removal of containers by cranes as part of the withdrawal operations (April 2017)

11th unit providing training in the operation and maintenance of heavy machinery prior to the
transfer of goods (April 2017)

Unit fl ag being returned to Minister of Defense Inada by the head of the engineering unit
dispatched to South Sudan, at unit fl ag returning ceremony (May 2017)


-----

|rt|ti|
|---|---|
|t||
||i|

|ati|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|||i|

|he Path Taken|By Female SDF Personnel|
|---|---|

|nd Exp|ansion of Their Positions|
|---|---|

|Col1|n|
|---|---|


**Special**
**Feature**

##### Active Participation 

**3**

**1** **The Path Taken By Female SDF Personnel**

**and Expansion of Their Positions**

1995
Reached 10,000 personnel
(4.23%)

**and Responsibilities**

1954

144 personnel

(0.10%)

The SDF was founded
(all female SDF personnel were in nursing positions)
(1954)

Hiring of women for clerical positions began (1967)

National Defense Academy welcomed its first female cadets (1992)
First female pilot (1994)

First female Rear Admiral (2001)
First deployment of women for PKO (Timor-Leste) (2002)

First female company commander (GSDF) (2008)
First female commanding officer of a ship (MSDF) (2009)
First female commanding officer of a base (2010)
First female Major General (ASDF) (2011)

First female commander of a squadron (ASDF) (2012)


-----

##### of Female Personnel

2016
13,707 personnel

(6.11%)

The MOD/SDF offers opportunities for motivated and qualif ed

women to take a challenge in a variety of areas.

The SDF, which began with 144 female personnel, now has

approximately 14,000 female personnel.

In accordance with the “Initiative to Promote Active

Participation of Female SDF Personnel” established in April

2017, all positions in the SDF are now essentially open to female

personnel, and steps are being taken to double the ratio of female

SDF personnel.

See P. 405


-----

**Female Personnel Play Vital Roles in Diverse Fields**


Rear Admiral

**MSDF** Natsue Kondo
Director General, Logistics, Joint Staff Offi ce

When I joined the SDF 28 years ago, I could not say with pride that “I am an
MSDF personnel.” I remember this very clearly. But I found myself having
confi dence in the path I have chosen. I think it is because of the confi dence
I have gained in my work, the joy of reaching self-fulfi llment, the gratitude
for the people I have met in the SDF, and the realization of the vast world I
have discovered in this profession. After my experiences of serving on ships
and being in charge of budgeting, accounting, contracting, and supplying, I
assumed my current responsibility. And my current position is a dynamic one
that requires ability to think, execute, and be creative. I have always felt that
I have been assigned to the best positions for me at that moment, and I am
grateful that as a leader I have been able to continue pursuing a goal with my
team members in those positions. For this reason, the SDF is an organization
that has allowed me to challenge myself. To give back to the SDF, I believe it
is my new responsibility and role to create a team that gives every member
the opportunity to challenge themselves regardless of their gender.

1989 2005 2008 2011 2013 2015 2016

MSDF Offi cer 1st Supply

Headquarters Maizuru MSDF Ship Supply Headquarters Sasebo Maritime Staff Offi ce Joint Staff Offi ce

Candidate Squadron

District (Maizuru) Depot (Yokosuka) District (Sasebo) (Ichigaya) (Ichigaya)

School (Kanoya)

-  -  - 
Commanding offi cer Manager Chief manager

Lieutenant Colonel

**ASDF** Midori Higuchi

Chief of Operation Section, 1st Tactical Airlift Group

Ever since I was dispatched to Iraq leaving my 2 year-old son with my family in
Japan about 10 years ago, I have worked on various duties as a captain of the
C-130H transport aircraft. I am grateful that I have been given many opportunities
without feeling as though there was a gender gap, thanks to the warm support and
understanding of the people around me. Being a captain of an aircraft was a great
responsibility and it was never easy to give the right orders to my crew. However,
it was also a highly rewarding job in the sense that I was able to see my crew grow
and feel a sense of accomplishment in my missions. What I learned through that
experience is still with me at my present position. My current responsibility as the
Chief of Operations Section at the 1st Tactical Airlift Group is to plan missions for
aircraft including the C-130H transport aircraft. I’m doing my best to give back to
the units and my seniors who trained me, and my subordinates.
Raising children brings all kinds of problems, and balancing professional
and personal life comes with one headache after another. However, supports for
raising children are increasingly available thanks to various measures that have
been taken. Furthermore, an enabling environment is being created for women to
play a more active role as long as she has a supportive spouse and is motivated.
I look forward to seeing more women play a vital role and the day that the
participation of women will no longer be a special case in a range of fi elds.

1997 2000 2011 2014 2017

Graduated 1st Tactical Airlift Group Air Staff Offi ce Headquarters, Air 1st Tactical Airlift Group

Pilot course Support Command

NDA (Komaki) (Ichigaya) (Komaki)

(Fuchu)

-  - 
Earned Wing mark Qualifi ed as a captain


-----

Female SDF personnel and defense off cials of the MOD/SDF play an active role not only in Japan but also overseas
according to their capabilities.


Colonel

**GSDF** Noriko Yokota
Chief instructor, Artillery Department, GSDF Fuji School

When I graduated the National Defense Academy in 1997, I was one of the very
few female offi cers in the combat branch. I served as platoon and company
leader in combat units. As an instructor at the GSDF Fuji School, I was also
involved in training junior offi cers who would later bolster the SDF. Now that I
look back, I realize that I owe what I am now to what I have gained naturally
through the duties I have held.
I had the opportunity to study public management at the Graduate
School of Public Management of Waseda University for one year. Learning
with classmates who came from all walks of life in a friendly yet competitive
environment expanded my horizon and allowed me to grow. Additionally, I feel
that my classmates now have a better understanding of the SDF by getting to
know me.
Indeed people have suggested that it may be hard to be a female offi cer
in the SDF over the past 20 years, but I have never felt so. I believe that the SDF
is where everyone can continuously grow while studying regardless of gender.

1998 2000 2004 2006 2008 2010 2016

12th Artillery GSDF Command GSDF Fuji 12th Artillery Waseda GSDF

Graduated 6th Surface-to-ship Missile Ground Staff Offi ce

Regiment and Staff College School Regiment Graduate Fuji

NDA Regiment (Utsunomiya) (Ichigaya)

(Utsunomiya) (Meguro) (Suntogun) (Utsunomiya) School School

-  -  - 
Platoon leader Tactic instructor Company commander


**Defense** Sonoko Ozawa
**Offi cial** South Kanto Defense Bureau

I joined the Ministry of Defense in 2014 and began my career at the internal
bureau, with a four-month experience in South Sudan. Today, at a local defense
bureau located in Yokohama, my main role is to facilitate the relocation of the
U.S. Navy’s carrier air wing from NAF Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni.
In short, working for the MOD is extraordinary and exciting. Of course,
when I was working in South Sudan, an environment where Internet connection
is not always stable, I was afraid I would not be able to obtain permission
from the South Sudanese Government and UNMISS for our peacekeepers’
rotation, which involved more than 700 SDF personnel and supplies. Even now
I never feel at ease representing the Japanese Government in conferences with
distinguished participants such as vice governors and the Commander of U.S.
Naval Forces Japan. But every time I remind myself that the task at hand is
directly linked to our nation’s safety, and I prepare myself to calmly deal with
the reality and fi nd the courage to lean in.
“Art and science cannot fl ourish without a secured nation. That is why
I want to contribute to national security.” This was what drove me to join the
MOD. While maintaining my original enthusiasm, it is my desire to further
continue my service.

2014 2015 2016

Bureau of Local International Local Coordination

the MODJoined Local Coordination Cooperation Bureau of Operational Cooperation Division, Dispatched to South Sudan Division, South Kanto

Division Policy Defense Bureau


-----

Sergeant First Class

**GSDF** Kaori Kaminaga (TRWU leader)

Heavy mortar company, Infantry School Regiment

It was two months after I returned from my maternity leave when the company commander suggested that an all-female
team demonstrate rappelling at a disaster prevention exercise. I was surprised and nervous as none of the female members
had done rappelling at that time. Nevertheless I took the challenge partly because I wanted to start fresh after my maternity
leave. In the beginning of the training I was so afraid all I could do was just clench my teeth and jump. But everyone worked
hard as a team in the limited time that we had.
The TRWU (Takigahara Rescue Women’s Unit) put on its best performance at the disaster prevention exercise. I could
feel my knees weaken with a great sense of accomplishment as I heard the audience clapping. This challenge made me
realize that there are many trainings both men and women can take part in. I will continue to aspire to play an active role as
a female SDF personnel, while proactively taking on missions and new challenges given to me.


Petty Offi cer Third Class

**MSDF** Aki Hayashi

Missile boat Shirataka

I have been working on the missile boat Shirataka as the fi rst female crew member since June 2016. I was on destroyer Akizuki
and Suzutsuki. Before that, since a missile boat has a smaller crew, we take on various jobs regardless of job classifi cations.
Although there are only two female crew on the boat including me, there is a strong sense of unity since the work is conducted
collectively by the whole crew. There is also an at home atmosphere, which enables us to enjoy our work on the boat. On a side
note, the crew of a missile boat, which is small and fast, is constantly battling with sea sickness once underway.
There were few ships that were open to female crew when I joined the MSDF. Therefore many female SDF personnel
held shore duties. However, female crew can now work aboard all ships except for submarines, meaning more opportunities
for female SDF personnel to shine. I am thankful to be able to work on the missile boat, and I am prepared to do my part with a
sense of pride and duty.


Airman First Class

**ASDF** Sayaka Nomura

Facility Group, Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing

In my unit, I am in charge of civil engineering and construction, and my responsibility includes the maintenance and repair of the roads and buildings
on the base, and the removal of snow and grass in the airfi eld.
Although civil engineering may be associated with men, I, with a small build, operate large construction machinery with other male personnel.
While we need to be fl exible in our work as each maintenance work of a road or a building requires a different type of work, we also need to fi gure
out a safe and effi cient way to remove the snow and the grass in the airfi eld. In addition, we are required to gain wide ranging knowledge and skills
as we also provide maintenance work on vehicles. I feel fulfi lled at work because I am learning a lot through my job.
The sense of accomplishment I get after fi nishing my work and the thank-yous people say to me in the course of my work give me
encouragement and make me proud of what I am doing.


-----

**Initiatives for Work-Life Balance**

In order to realize work-life balance, the MOD/SDF is implementing the following initiatives:

See P. 403, P. 405


See


**Temporary care of children when**
**personnel must suddenly attend to**
**duties such as disaster relief dispatches**


**Development of internal crèche facilities**


hildcare facilities where personnel can leave their
children for up to about fi ve days are available on

C

camps, etc. for those who must suddenly attend to
duties such as disaster relief dispatches (GSDF, MSDF,
and ASDF).

**Using a mascot character**
**to publicize work-life balance**


nformation about work-life balance is communicated
in a friendly way by using the mascot character

I

“Walabi-chan,” which stands for Work Life
Balance (WLB).


nternal crèche facilities have opened at seven
locations (Mishuku, Kumamoto, Yokosuka, Makomanai,

I

Asaka, Iruma, and Ichigaya) to accomodate the need
for special working arrangements within the SDF.

**Holding awareness-raising seminars**
**for senior offi cers**


ince it is essential to change the mindset of senior
offi cials for work style reform, external lecturers

S

are invited to hold seminars for senior offi cials of the
Internal Bureaus and the SDF to raise awareness.


-----

**Taking Advantage of Work-Life Balance Arrangements**


**Childcare leave: Paternity leave is encouraged**

Technical Sergeant As an aircraft maintenance crew I must go on a lot of trips year-round. While
Masayuki Tominaga my job is a demanding one that requires me to be at work early in the morning

**ASDF**

Tactical Air Training Group and sometimes return home after the rest of my family has gone to sleep,

the members of my unit were supportive of my participation in child rearing.
Therefore, I decided to take a 30-day paternity leave.
In the beginning, I was nervous just holding the baby and felt uneasy
when I changed diapers. I also had no clue what to do when the baby would
not stop crying in the bath. Meanwhile, this paternity leave gave me the time
to enjoy spending quality time with my family while feeling at peace and fi lled
with happiness. Seeing smiles on the faces of my wife and the baby gave me
confi dence as a father. It was an invaluable experience.
I hope to help create a work environment that encourages people to take
advantage of this
great system which
allows parents to
take full participation
in child rearing.


**Telework: More fl exible workplaces**

*** Telework: A work style that allows working from home**

Hitoshi Hombo

**Defense**
**Offi cial** Human Resources Development Division,

Bureau of Personnel and Education

To secure time for childcare and housework
while my wife was in the hospital and
recuperating, I worked from home for about two
weeks by availing myself of telework, which
offi cially began this fi scal year.
The biggest advantage of telework is
that you can do your job from home by having
access to the communication system at work.
Thanks to the support of the offi ce, I was able
to balance work, childcare and housework by
making the most use of telework. Furthermore,
when I returned to the offi ce after telework, I
was able to get back to work smoothly.
Telework gave me a chance to learn something new. By doing childcare and housework on my own that I had left mostly to my wife on weekdays
due to my work, not only was I able to see the usual lifestyle of my child, but I was reminded of the importance of cooperating with my wife in doing
childcare and housework.
I believe it is essential to continue to create a work environment that encourages people to telework in order to realize work-life balance.


-----

MOD/SDF personnel are taking advantage of various work-life balance arrangements. Here is what they had to say.


**Flextime: More fl exible working hours**

Petty Offi cer Second Class My wife and I are both MSDF personnel. We have a 4-year-old and 2-year-old

**MSDF** Wataru Tokue boys. As both our parents live far away and we could not get any support from

Ammunition Maintenance and them, we had concerns about how we would take our child to daycare after my
Supply Facility Yokosuka wife’s maternity leave was over, even before our fi rst child was born. Then I was

told that the MSDF had a fl extime system which allows staff to choose working
hours fl exibly depending on family needs. Not only do my wife and I coordinate
so that we are not on duty at the same time, we also make use of the fl extime
system so that we can both take part in housework and child raising like taking
the boys to daycare in the morning and picking them up at night, cooking dinner,
taking them to the hospital, and giving them a bath. My wife almost gave up her
work during her maternity leave, but she was able to return to work thanks to the
fl extime system. Moreover, the fl extime system lets me focus on work without
having to worry, and balance family and work. I am thankful for the understanding
and support we receive
from our colleagues and
bosses.


**“Iku-boss” declaration: A growing trend**

Colonel

**GSDF** Koji Matsunaga

Director, Plans and Operations Division,
Ground Staff Offi ce

Working in the Policy and Program Division
involves a range of coordination work and
meetings related to the GSDF with those
inside and outside of the ministry, and it is
not unusual to work past midnight and on
weekends. Under such circumstances, each
member of the division is required to give his
or her best at work. I believe the support of
family and colleagues is essential for this.
If you are concerned about work, you
cannot focus on work. If you cannot trust
colleagues, you cannot rely on them when
faced with a diffi cult task. For this reason,
I, as a boss, established a work-life balance
policy early on, and I try to help my staff spend less time thinking about how they will get their work done. At the same time, I am also working on
creating a work environment in which my staff will feel free to take time off to attend their child’s entrance or graduation ceremonies and parent’s day.
I declared to be an “Iku-boss” (boss who actively participates in child raising) to be a role model for my staff for balancing work and family. I believe
that when my staff spend more quality time with their family and when members of the division support one another, we can achieve the most as a group.


-----

Lieutenant

**MSDF** Minako Sakurai **\ Mom and son love ships /**

ASW Offi cer, Izumo

I have a 4-year-old son with my husband who is a GSDF personnel. With
his understanding and support I am able to continue my career. I returned
to working on a ship for the fi rst time in four years after my pregnancy and
maternity leave. I am currently the ASW offi cer on the destroyer Izumo.
Being a crew on the ship, transporting GSDF units after the
earthquake in Kumamoto Prefecture and providing security for the G7
Ise-Shima Summit made me feel that I really work on the front line of
national security. On the other hand, being a crew on a ship keeps me
busy even when the ship is in port, and I do not get to go home once
the ship goes underway, meaning my husband’s burden is that much
larger. However, he has offi cially become an “iku-man” (father who
actively participates in child raising) with the help of the grandparents
and relatives while I was underway for a long time. Our son knows that
I work on a ship, and he points at Izumo saying “mom’s ship!”
I am sure we will come across many challenges along the way. But
I look forward to overcoming them together with my family.

N A day in my life (in port)
05: 30 Wake up

07: 00 Take son to daycare (husband)

07: 45 Go to work (husband)

08: 00–16: 30 Work

18: 00 Pick son up from daycare (husband)

18: 30 Return home (husband and son)

19: 00 Return home, dinner, housework, prepare for
son’s daycare

21: 30 Go to sleep


Sergeant First Class

**GSDF** Naome Hidaka **\ My mom is my hero! /**

HQ & Service Company, 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group

“I am proud of you, mom,” said my 6th grade son to me one day.
When he was younger I thought it would be best that I leave the
GSDF. But hearing his words made me feel glad that I did not leave,
and made me proud of my profession once again. Being a GSDF
personnel, I am busy and I often leave home for trainings and trips.
But I am also a mother. I go to my son’s soccer games and work out
with him on weekends. I also try to take time off from work when
he has a makeup holiday from school so that we have more time
to talk. He is very understanding of my job and very supportive. It
is my goal to balance work and child raising, while aiming to help
create a robust SDF.

N A day in my life
05: 50 Wake up

07: 00 Send son to school, get ready for work

08: 15–17: 00 Work

17: 40 Return home

18: 00 Take son to soccer practice, cook dinner

21: 00 Dinner, bath

22: 00 Prepare for next day, housework, etc.

23: 30 Go to sleep


-----

Personnel are engaged in their daily work and training while maintaining work-life balance. Here is what they had to say.


Technical Sergeant

**ASDF** Hiromi Sato **\ Work? Taiko drums? Leave it to me! /**

Operating Support Wing

I am currently assigned to the Communication and Electric Squadron
which has all kinds of communication electric devices, and I have been
in charge of supplies since last year. While I struggle since supply is not
my specialty and I had no prior experience, I feel my days at work are
fulfi lling thanks to my supportive boss, seniors and co-workers.
I am a member of the Taiko drum team on the Yokota base which
was just established when I transferred to the base. The team practices
during lunch time, at night and on weekends, and performs at various
events. My daughter is also interested in Taiko drums, so she joins me in
practice and sometimes performs on the stage with us.
I would not be able to balance work, the Taiko drum team activities
and raising my daughter without my cooperative co-workers and my
daughter who understands and supports my work. I feel very blessed.
I look forward to giving my best in all missions, and also helping
other SDF personnel who try to juggle work and raising children like me.

N A day in my life
05: 00 Wake up, housework

08: 15 Work

12: 00 Lunch, Taiko drum practice

17: 00 Get off work

18: 00 Taiko drum practice

19: 30 Return home

19: 30 Dinner with daughter,
housework, etc.

23: 00 Go to sleep

**Defense** Ayumi Sakaguchi
**Technical** Construction Division, Procurement Division **\ My family is the source of my energy /**
**Offi cial** North Kanto Defense Bureau

I am currently in charge of the construction of SDF facilities in Tokyo and
the other seven prefectures in the Kanto and Shinetsu regions. I design and
supervise various types of constructions, from general buildings such as
offi ce buildings and hospitals to facilities on an airbase such as a hangar
for fi ghter jets. Although many people associate construction related work
with men, 30% of the Construction Division are made up of women.
I feel like I am constantly busy with things to do both at work and
home ever since I returned to work from my maternity leave. Yet, I feel a
sense of fulfi llment every day. I have little time to play with my child during
the week, but I feel like the time that I eat with and read books to my child
keeps me motivated to work hard. On weekends, I play with my child a lot,
and sometimes I eat out with friends and share information. That is my
way of relaxing.
I hope to contribute to Japan’s peace and security through
construction which I love, while I achieve an ideal balance between work
and raising my child.

N A day in my life
06: 15 Wake up

07: 20 Take child to daycare

08: 30–16: 45 Work (leave 30 minutes earlier for child
rearing)

18: 00 Pick up child from daycare

18: 15 Return home, dinner, bath

19: 30 Put child in bed, housework, etc.

22: 00 Go to sleep


-----

**y**

**Part**
**Surrounding Japan**
#### Ⅰ


Chapter 1 P. 43

**Overview**

P. 43


The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming
more tangible and acute.

**Security Environment in the Asia-Pacifi c Region**

-  Security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacifi c region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious.
1 There has been also a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor
contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests.
2 There has been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their
military capabilities and to intensify their military activities.

-  In particular, North Korea’s further progress in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles development,
coupled with repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior that disregard the international community,
constitute serious and imminent threats to the security of the region including Japan and of the
international community. In 2016, North Korea conducted two nuclear tests and launched ballistic missiles
at an unprecedented frequency of more than 20 times. The threat from North Korea’s improved capabilities
in the development and use of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has entered a new stage.

-  Additionally, China’s reinforcement of its military capabilities without transparency, along with active
maritime advancements, has been rapidly shifting the regional military balance. Under these circumstances,
China’s attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas based on its unique
assertions have become serious security concerns to the region including Japan and to the international
community, including the likelihood of increasing the risk of causing unintended consequences due to
misunderstanding or miscalculation.

-  Furthermore, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent
parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved.

**Global Security Environment**

-  There is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a challenge or destabilizing factor for
the entire international community.
1 International terrorist organizations continue to remain active. Today, the threat of international terrorism is not confi ned to the Middle East and North
Africa, but is spreading globally. Given that Japanese nationals have also been victims in these incidents, Japan must squarely address the threat of
international terrorism as its own challenge.
2 Unilateral actions to change the status quo and heighten tensions, such as China’s large-scale and rapid reclamations in the South China Sea,
establishment of outposts there, and their use for military purposes, leave challenges for the response of the international community, as the actions
are further turned into a fait accompli.
3 Cyber attacks have become more sophisticated and skillful, with ■ Recent Security Related Issues around Japan
government involvement suspected in various attacks. In this context,
there are increasing risks to the stable use of cyberspace.

**Response of the International Community**

The security challenges and destabilizing factors are complex, diverse, militarily provocative military activities
and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more diffi cult for a single
country to deal with them on its own. nuclear weapons and missiles development North Korea’s further progress with

Mischief Reef where large-scale and rapid reclamation and of a fait accompli in the South China Sea
construction of a runway, hangar and other facilities are taking place **Based on the GTOPO30 (USGS) and ETOPO1 (NOAA) models.**
(July 2016) [CSLS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe]


North Korea’s series of Intensification of Russian
militarily provocative military activities
rhetoric and behavior

North Korea’s further progress with
nuclear weapons and missiles development

China’s broad and rapid
reinforcement of military
forces without transparency

China’s rapid expansion/
intensification of activities
in the East China Sea and
attempts to change the status quo

Sea lanes leading to Japan

Continuation of frequent advancements

Changes in the China-Taiwan military balance to the Pacific Ocean by the Chinese military
(in favor of the Chinese side)

Tendency towards increase in and

China’s changes of the status quo and creation prolongation of gray-zone situations
of a fait accompli in the South China Sea

**Based on the GTOPO30 (USGS) and ETOPO1 (NOAA) models.**


-----

|U.S. Forces Army: approx. 461,000 personnel Navy: approx. 319,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 313,000 personnel Marines: approx. 183,000 personnel including a shift in the global balan|Col2|
|---|---|
|Total: approx. 1,276,000 pers f ication of the activities of inte (Total in 1987: a nd ballisatipcp mroxis. s2i,l1e7s0 w,0h00ic phe hrsa|onnel rnatio ovnen erle)a|


DEFENSE OF JAPAN


**European Region**

Army: approx. 26,000 personnel
Navy: approx. 8,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 28,000 personnel U.S. Forces

Chapter 2 Marines: approx. P. 50 **3,000 personnel** Army: approx. 461,000 personnel

Navy: approx. 319,000 personnel

Total: approx. The United States65,000 personnel

Air Force: approx. 313,000 personnel

(Total in 1987:

Marines: approx. 183,000 personnel

1[ The patterns of U.S. involvement in the world have changed signifi cantly in a new security environment, including a shift in the global balance of power, ]approx. 354,000 personnel) U.S. European Command Total: approx. 1,276,000 personnel
attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine and the South China Sea, the intensifi cation of the activities of international terrorist (Total in 1987:
organizations, and the development and improved operational capability of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which have reached a new approx. 2,170,000 personnel)
level of threat. The Trump administration inaugurated in January 2017 announced a policy to make the U.S. Forces strong again and emphasize alliances,
citing the need for peace through strength, under its America First doctrine.U.S. Central Command **Asia-Pacific Region** U.S. Northern

2[ Although it has yet to present a comprehensive security and national defense strategy, immediately after taking offi ce the Trump administration has clearly ]Army: approx. 35,000 personnel Command
indicated that defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) will be its highest priority along with continuing to emphasize the security of the Navy: approx. 22,000 personnel
Asia-Pacifi c region. After reviewing the country’s policy towards North Korea, President Trump has stated “All options are on the table” and increased the Air Force: approx. 26,000 personnel

U.S. Africa Command U.S. Pacific Command Marines: approx. 21,000 personnel

country’s military presence, based on the recognition that North Korea is the most pressing security issue in the world.

Total: approx. 104,000 personnel U.S. Southern

Command

3[ President Trump determined that the Assad regime in Syria used chemical weapons, and then ordered strikes against the Syrian military, while the United ](Total in 1987:
States used the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) in its arsenal for the fi rst time in combat against ISIL in Afghanistan. The United States has also approx. 184,000 personnel)
expressed security concerns over Iran, China, and Russia.

4[ Thus, it is believed that the United States considers states and organizations that attempt to threaten the interests of the United States and its allies as ]
threats to the country, and in particular, the United States identifi es North Korea and ISIL, along with stopping the proliferation and use of weapons of mass
destruction, as issues that should be addressed with priority.

5[ Given this understanding, the Trump administration is working towards the goal of building a larger and more capable joint force as part of its efforts to ]
rebuild the U.S. Forces. In this regard, attention will focus on the details of the new national defense strategy being established by the Trump administration.

Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of the end of 2016), etc.
2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

■ The Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region



**[Japan]**

-  Deploys F-22 and RQ-4 (Global Hawk)

-  Deploys MV-22 Osprey, P-8 and F-35B

-  Deploys second TPY-2 radar

-  Additionally deployed one Aegis ship (normal ship) (June 2015)

-  Switched one Aegis ship (normal ship) with Aegis BMD destroyer
(March 2016)

Seoul -  Additionally deploys two Aegis BMD destroyers (one already

deployed in October 2015 and one to be deployed in summer 2017)

ROK

Japan **[Guam]**

-  Rotationally deploys submarines

-  Rotationally deploys bombers

Okinawa -  Established a facility for aircraft

carrier’s temporary port of call

-  Deploys unmanned

Guam reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4)

Philippines Hawaii

Manila

**[Philippines]**

-  Signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for enhancing the presence
of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014)

-  Announced US$79 million assistance and provision of one patrol vessel and one survey
vessel (November 2015)

Singapore -  Implements joint patrol activities (March 2016–)

Indonesia -  Agreed on five locations such as Air Force bases, etc. to serve as hubs for implementing

defense cooperation based on EDCA (March 2016)

Jakarta -  Regularly deploys A-10 ground attack aircraft, etc. (April 2016–)

**[Singapore]**

-  Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat Darwin **[Australia]**
Ships (LCS) (To deploy four LCSs by At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the following initiatives:
end of 2017. The first ship started rotation in April 2013, the second ship -  Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia• Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia トンガ
in December 2014 and the third ship Australia
in October 2016)

-  Rotationally deployed P-8 (December In September 2016, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter announced a plan to deploy 60%
2015) of the assets of the U.S. Navy and overseas Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as to

-  Signed enhanced defense cooperation proceed with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment.
agreement (December 2015)

Canberra

-  A map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is used


-----

**Part**
**Ⅰ**


**North Korea**


Chapter 2 P. 60


P. 60


**General Situation** P. 60


The military trend in North Korea constitutes a serious and imminent threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the entire region and the international
community. Especially since last year, when it willfully conducted two nuclear tests and launched more than 20 ballistic missiles, the development and
enhancement of the operating capabilities of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by North Korea have reached a new level of threat.

**Development of WMD and Ballistic Missiles** P. 62


1[ North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime.]
2[ North Korea willfully conducted the fi fth nuclear test in September 2016. Considering North Korea has already conducted fi ve nuclear tests so far, it is ]
conceivable that North Korea has made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program.

3[ Considering the technological maturity that is estimated to have been reached through North Korea’s previous fi ve nuclear tests, it is possible that North ]
Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads.

4[ North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea ]
is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons. The possibility cannot be denied that North Korea is able to load
biological and/or chemical weapons on ballistic missiles.

5[ It appears that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles. North Korea has repeatedly launched various types of ballistic ]
missiles. Particularly in 2016, it conducted an unprecedented 20-plus launches, and continues to repeatedly conduct launches in 2017 including launches
of what appear to be new types of missiles.

6[ As for recent trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile launches, ]

-  Firstly, it appears that the country aims to acquire longer-range ballistic missiles.

-  Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance the accuracy and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks with regard to ballistic
missiles already deployed.

-  Thirdly, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles from Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), which makes it possible to launch ballistic missiles from any point. Furthermore, it is possible that North Korea is proceeding with the
development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Through these means, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks
by enhancing secrecy and instantaneity to make it diffi cult to detect signs of a launch.

-  Fourthly, North Korea may be attempting to diversify the forms of launches. It was confi rmed that so-called lofted trajectories were utilized for launches.
Generally, when a launch is conducted on a lofted trajectory, interception is considered to be more diffi cult.

7[ North Korea has launched four new types of ballistic missiles in 2017.]

-  Since the new type of ballistic missile that appears to be a modifi ed version of the SLBM for ground launch, launched on February 12 and May 21, 2017,
is estimated to have been launched on somewhat higher trajectories than nominal and its fi ring range is estimated to exceed 1,000 km if launched on
a nominal trajectory, and North Korea has made references to its deployment for “operational deployment,” there is a possibility that North Korea will
newly deploy a new type of ballistic missile using solid fuel that includes Japan within its fi ring range.

-  The ballistic missile launched on May 14, 2017 is estimated to have been launched on a lofted trajectory. Had it been launched on a nominal trajectory,
the maximum fi ring range is expected to reach approximately 5,000 km as of this present time. Thus, there is renewed concern over the increasing
ranges of North Korea’s ballistic missiles.

-  Regarding the new type of ballistic missile launched on May 29, 2017 that appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile, since North Korea
announced that Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the development of a ballistic missile that can strike adversary ships
and other individual targets with precision, the intent appears to be to enhance the accuracy of ballistic missile attacks.

-  Regarding the ballistic missile launched on July 4, 2017, since it is believed to have a maximum range of at least more than 5,500 km given the height,
distance, etc. of its fl ight, it is believed to be an intercontinental range ballistic missile. In addition, North Korea announced that it had conducted a
demonstration test of warhead reentry technology with this launch, from which it can be deemed that it is aiming at the operationalization of long-range
ballistic missiles.

8[ Taking into account that North Korea has not changed its stance of continuing its nuclear weapons program, it is believed that with the passage of time, ]
there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead that includes Japan in its range. In this regard,
related developments need to be monitored carefully.

9[ Should North Korea acquire longer-range ballistic missile capability and simultaneously achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquisition of ]
nuclear warheads and come to have a false sense of confi dence and recognition that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States, this could lead
to increases and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan.


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

■ Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles

Taepodong-2 Variant 10,000 km New York
(approx. more than 10,000km) Washington, D.C.

Chicago

Musudan (approx. 2,500-4,000km)

Paris London 5,500 km Denver

5,000 km Anchorage

Moscow 4,000 km San Francisco

1,500 km Los Angels

1,300 km

Taepodong

Beijing

Pyongyang Tokyo Hawaii

Tongch’ang-ri 1,000 km

Okinawa

Guam

New type of intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) (up to approx. 5,000km)

Nodong (approx. 1,300km/1,500km)

(ICBM criterion) (more than 5,500km*)
Scud-ER (approx. 1,000km)

- The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.

**Domestic Affairs** P. 76


1[ Five years have gone by since the Kim Jong-un regime, which places Kim Jong-un at the top of the military, party and the state, was established after the ]
demise of then Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il in 2011.

2[ North Korea held the Seventh KWP Congress in May 2016 for the fi rst time in 36 years, where it positioned itself as a “nuclear weapons state” and ]
displayed, both to those in and outside of the country, its posture of continuing to develop nuclear weapons and missiles including consistently upholding
the new strategic line (so-called Byungjin line) policy.

3[ The holding of the KWP Congress may be an indication that North Korea has shifted into high gear by establishing the state-run governance system ]
centered on the party and led by KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un, in terms of its organization, personnel, among other dimensions, both in name and in
substance. However, due to an atrophy effect created by the frequent executions, demotions, and dismissals of senior offi cials, it is believed that there is
growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of North Korea turning to military provocations without making adequate diplomatic considerations.

**Relations with Other Countries** P. 78


1[ Regarding the North Korea policy of the Trump administration, it was declared that the United States aims to pressure North Korea into dismantling its ]
nuclear, ballistic missile, and proliferation programs by tightening economic sanctions and enhancing diplomatic measures. In response, North Korea has
reiterated its claim from before that it needs its own nuclear deterrence in order to counter the nuclear threat from the United States and has repeatedly
launched ballistic missiles, maintaining its posture of continuing its activities for nuclear and missile development.

2[ The Moon Jae-in administration inaugurated in May 2017 has expressed its position on its North Korea policy that it is open to dialogue but will respond ]
resolutely to provocations. The impact of the new administration’s new policy towards North Korea on inter-Korean relations, where tension is rising,
requires close attention.

3[ China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of infl uence on the country. In 2017, China announced the provisional ]
suspension of coal imports from North Korea for the remainder of the year. China plays an extremely important role in securing the effectiveness of the UN
Security Council resolutions, and North Korea-China relations require continued attention.


-----

**Part**
**Ⅰ**


**China**


Chapter 2 P. 85

|P. 8|5|
|---|---|


P.


85


**General Situation** P. 85


1[ There continues to be high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international ]
norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues.

2[ While advocating “peaceful development,” China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests confl ict with others’, continues to act in an assertive ]
manner, including attempts at changing the status quo by coercion based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing international order. These
actions include dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. China remains poised to fulfi ll its unilateral demands without compromise,
which has included making steady efforts to turn these coercive changes to the status quo into a fait accompli. There is strong concern regarding the
impact of these actions on the security environment of the region including Japan and of the international community.

3[ The Communique of the sixth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in October 2016 refers to “comprehensive, strict governance of the CCP,” ]
and it is expected that corruption within the party and the military will continue to be addressed in the lead-up to the 19th National Congress of the CCP.
At the same plenary session, the party also demonstrated its intention to further bolster the power foundations of the current regime, which included the
designation of General Secretary Xi Jinping as the “core” of the Central Committee. The relevant developments will be a point to watch out for.

4[ China is believed to be enhancing its asymmetric military capabilities to deter military forces of other countries from approaching and advancing to China’s ]
surrounding region, and to inhibit their military activities in the region (so-called “A2/AD” capabilities).

**Military Affairs** P. 86


1[ China has broadly and rapidly reinforced its military forces, and furthermore, has rapidly expanded and intensifi ed its activities qualitatively and quantitatively ]
in sea areas and in airspace, including the East and South China Seas. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese military activities, etc., together with
the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, and needs to keep utmost attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns
for the region and the international community.

2[ China has not disclosed specifi c information on a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. In December 2016, in the case where ASDF aircraft ]
scrambled against a Chinese aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace, China claimed that the ASDF aircraft conducted interference at close
distance, which is inconsistent with the facts. It is becoming more important for China itself to explain its military activities according to the facts and
improve the transparency of its national defense policy and military capabilities. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its
military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specifi c and accurate information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.

3[ China’s announced national defense budget has increased at a rapid pace every year since FY1989. The nominal size of China’s announced national ]
defense budget has grown nearly 3-fold in the 10 years since FY2007. Attention will be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth affects its
national defense budget.

4[ China is currently carrying out reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which are seen as being the largest in the country’s history and these military ]
reforms have taken shape at a rapid pace. There are views that dissatisfaction is growing within the military because of the rapid military reforms. Attention
will be paid to the progress of the reforms as well as their outcomes, including their effects on the security of Japan and the rest of the region.

5[ China is likely developing anti-ship ballistic missile (DF-21D and DF-26) and long-range cruise missile (DH-10 (CJ-10)) assets to strengthen its “A2/]
AD” capabilities. Furthermore, in order to
acquire striking force that will be capable of ■ Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget

the hypersonic glide vehicle WU-14. 9,5009,000 Defense budget (in 100 million yuan)

6[ In April 2017, a launching ceremony was held ] 7,500

second indigenous aircraft carrier. It is 5,000
said that the so-called maritime militia is 4,000

it is necessary to continue to monitor these 1,000500

|n yuan)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|(%|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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J-20 fi ghter which some consider to be a Ministry of Finance official.”
next-generation fighter


(100 million yuan) (%)

10,500
10,000 40

9,500
9,000 Defense budget (in 100 million yuan)

8,5008,000 Year-on-year growth rate (%) 30

7,500
7,000 25
6,500
6,000
5,500 20
5,000
4,500 15
4,000
3,500
3,000 10
2,500
2,000
1,500 5
1,000
500
0 0

89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 17
(FY)

Note: This basically shows the defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. Note that the FY2002 budget was calculated on the assumption that the disclosed rate
and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001, because the FY2002 budget was not disclosed and discrepancies
arise when the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. Since FY2015, the Chinese Government announced only
the defense budget within the basic expenditures of the central government (part of the central fiscal expenditures). As for the FY2015 defense budget, however,
since the local transfer expenditure amount in FY2015 was announced separately at a later date, it was added to calculate the FY2015 defense budget within
central fiscal expenditures. Regarding the FY2017 China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency announced the FY2017 defense budget as a “statement by a senior
Ministry of Finance official.”


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

8[ In January 2017, Vice Admiral Yuan Yubai became the fi rst non-army offi cer to be appointed commander of a theater of operations. As only army offi cers ]
had been appointed commanders of theater of operations until then, it can be assumed that progress is being made towards consolidation in the personnel
assignments domain as well.

**Activities in Sea Areas and Airspace around Japan** P. 98


1[ China is presumably aiming to enhance operation capabilities on the open ocean, given the continued advancement of Chinese fl eets to the Pacifi c Ocean ]
with high frequency. In December 2016, the advancement of the aircraft carrier Liaoning to the Western Pacifi c was confi rmed for the fi rst time. The
activities are worthy of attention as an indication of the enhancement of the capabilities of China’s naval forces and enhancement of its force projection
capabilities to distant areas. There is also the possibility that the activities of Chinese naval forces in the Sea of Japan will likewise increase. In the East
China Sea, Chinese naval vessels conduct operations continuously and actively. They have recently tended to expand the sea area of their regular activities
to the south, and are continuously conducting activities in the sea area near Japan’s Senkaku Islands.

2[ With regard to activities of Chinese government vessels, since October 2013, they have repeatedly intruded into these territorial waters in a routinized ]
manner. China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Chinese government vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial
waters, and it appears that the operation capabilities of Chinese government vessels in the sea areas around Japan are also improving. In early August
2016, an incident occurred where a large number of Chinese government vessels and fi shing boats repeatedly intruded into territorial waters for fi ve days
in a row.

3[ The number of scrambles by ASDF aircraft against Chinese aircraft is growing dramatically, setting a record in FY2016. At the end of January 2016, Chinese ]
military aircraft conducted activities in the Sea of Japan for the fi rst time. There is a possibility that the activities will continue to increase in the future. The
scope of the activities of PLA aircraft in the East China Sea has tended to expand eastward and southward in recent years. As a result, PLA aircraft have
recently been confi rmed conducting activities actively in airspace closer to the main Island of Okinawa and the rest of the Southwestern Islands.

4[ The objectives of the maritime activities are considered to be to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far away as possible in ]
order to defend Chinese territory, etc., and strengthen its territorial claims at sea and in airspace surrounding the islands to which China claims territorial
sovereignty.

5[ In late June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface radar and a surveillance camera on one of the offshore platforms for digging oil and natural gas was ]
confi rmed. Attention will be paid to developments in China related to the platforms, such as the purpose of the use of such equipment.

**Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and the “Far Seas”** P. 103, P. 105


1[ Since 2014, China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation on seven features in the Spratly Islands. Even after the Philippines-]
China arbitration award issued in July 2016 determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation, China has continued to develop
infrastructure that could be utilized for military purposes in addition to batteries and other military facilities. Military activities in the South China Sea are
expanding as well. In September of the same year, the China-Russia joint exercise Joint Sea 2016 was conducted for the fi rst time in the South China Sea.

2[ The Chinese Navy is steadily ] ■ Conceptual Image of Recent Major Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan
increasing its capabilities to conduct (The wakes shown are an illustration)
operations in more distant seas

years. China is in the process of
building facilities to provide logistics

the new port in Doraleh, Djibouti.

concept, and the Chinese Navy’s

country’s infl uence in the region.


Examples of naval vessels confirmed near Japan (photos: MSDF)

Aircraft carrier Liaoning Luyang III-class destroyer Jiangkai II-class frigate

Frequent advancements to the [First confirmed in 2016]
Pacific Ocean passing between Advancement to the
Okinawa and Miyako Island Pacific Ocean by aircraft

carrier Liaoning

Kitadaito IslandKitadaito Island

TokyoTokyo OkinawaOkinawa Miyako Miyako

IslandIsland

Amamioshima Amamioshima
IslandIsland

Yonaguni IslandYonaguni Island

TaiwanTaiwan

Senkaku IslandsSenkaku Islands

Sea of JapanSea of Japan

Intermittent intrusions

Ningbo into Japanese territorial

Activities by Chinese waters by Chinese
naval vessels in East government vessels
China Sea

“Confrontation exercises,” the Chinese
Ministry of National Defense for the first
time announced the conduct of this in 2016.

Qingdao -  Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates.


-----

**Part**
**Ⅰ**


Chapter 2 P. 119

**Russia**

P. 119

1[ As defense expenditures become more and more diffi cult due to the recent severe economic situation, Russia is making efforts to modernize its military ]
forces while also increasing the activities of its military forces and expanding its area of operation.

2[ With regard to the situation in Ukraine, the outcomes of Russia’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo have taken on an aspect of being entrenched, ]
while the Russian armed forces have made it clear that new brigades are being deployed along the border with Ukraine and Belarus. Also, attention will
be focused on Russia’s move to increase its infl uence in the Middle East, which includes brokering a ceasefi re and peace talks between the Assad regime
and opposition forces.

3[ Russia has plans to deploy four Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to the Pacifi c Fleet by 2020 as part of its efforts to ]
reinforce its maritime strategic deterrence posture. It has already deployed two of these submarines as of the end of last year.

4[ Russia is proceeding with the development of military facility areas in the Northern Territories (Etorofu Island and Kunashiri Island). Russia has also ]
announced the deployment of surface-to-ship missiles and has been increasing its activities in the Northern Territories under de facto occupation.


Chapter 2 P. 141

**Southeast Asia**

P. 141

1[ In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against ]
the backdrop of economic development, etc., and are moving to modernize their military
by, among other means, introducing primary naval and air force equipment such as
fourth-generation fi ghters and submarines.

2[ In the South China Sea, Southeast Asian countries are opposed to China’s claims ]
concerning territorial disputes, and as tensions in the region heighten, the international
community’s deep concern over the unilateral changes in the status quo and their creation
of a fait accompli is quickly becoming ever more widespread. Some countries concerned
are also making efforts to settle the issues in accordance with international law. As a
result, attention will continue to focus on the direction of discussions aimed at resolving
these issues.


August 2014 June 2017

Example of unilateral, large-scale and rapid construction of facilities by China,
on Fiery Cross Reef [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe]


Chapter 2 P. 159

**Europe**

P. 159

1[ Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as NATO and the EU, while also proactively participating in activities ]
outside the European region.

2[ Amid Russia’s attempts to change the status quo using force and responses to international terrorism, in 2014, NATO member states agreed to allocate ]
2% or more of their GDP to national defense spending by 2024.

3[ In 2017, the United Kingdom gave offi cial notice to the EU of its intention to exit the EU, and as a result, future developments, including decline in the ]
centripetal force of the EU, will be the focus of attention.

Chapter 3 P. 166

**Trends in Regional Confl icts and**
**International Terrorism**

P. 166

1[ The confl icts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world involve various issues, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources. In many ]
cases, areas with a governance vacuum have become a hotbed for the activities of terrorist organizations. Among them are organizations which operate
across national borders and regions, which continue to pose imminent security challenges to the international community.

2[ There has been a rise in the number of young people who sympathize with the extremism of international terrorist organizations, including ISIL, against ]
the backdrop of dissatisfaction towards society. These people are participating in the activities of international terrorist organizations, while there has been
an increase in incidents where they also conducted “homegrown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism activities in their home countries. The worldwide proliferation
of such extremism indicates that terrorism is spreading globally and Japan is not in any way immune from the threat of international terrorism, given the
terrorist attack in Bangladesh in July 2016 in which seven Japanese nationals were murdered.

3[ Some international terrorist organizations are capable of implementing terror attacks in locations far from their bases. These terrorist organizations ]
generally tend to use cyberspace, including social media, to form global networks to obtain weapons and funds. Some organizations use sophisticated
public relations strategies to skillfully promote themselves, recruit fi ghters and inspire terror attacks. Some organizations are said to have the potential to
d t b tt k


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

Chapter 3 P. 189

**Maritime Trends**

P. 189

1[ In the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert ]
their rights or take actions, based on their own assertions which are incompatible with the existing
international order.

2[ While China asserts historical rights as a basis for the so-called “nine-dash line,” such historical rights ]
were refuted in the award rendered for the arbitration case between the Philippines and China.

3[ The Arctic states have been more proactively promoting efforts to secure their interests in resource ] Multipurpose icebreaker patrol boat reportedly under
development and use of the sea route. It is considered that some of these Arctic states including Russia construction by the Russian Navy [Jane’s By IHS Markie]
are promoting efforts to deploy new military capabilities for the purpose of securing their interests and
defending their territories. Traditionally, the Arctic Ocean has been used for the deployment of strategic
nuclear forces and as their transit route. In this regard, the strategic importance of the region is increasing,
as it could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces in the future.

4[ China’s commitment to ensuring the security of its sea lanes is also considered to be connected to the Chinese Navy’s objective of building up capacity for ]
continuous operations in more distant waters. In Djibouti, a country facing the Gulf of Aden, China is building facilities for providing logistics support to the
military in Djibouti. Additionally, China supports the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries.


Chapter 3 P. 196

**Outer Space**

P. 196

1[ Major countries are making efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C4ISR functions. Such ]
satellites include image reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, early warning satellites that detect the launch of ballistic
missiles, satellites gathering radio wave information for military communications, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning
satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems.

2[ Meanwhile, Chinese, Russian, and other countries’ development of anti-satellite weapons and scattering of space debris have come to be seen as ]
a threat to space assets such as satellites of various countries. The risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security
challenges countries face.

-  The term “C[4]ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Chapter 3 P. 201

**Cyberspace**

P. 201

1[ As military dependence on information communication networks grows further, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of ]
exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. It is believed that many units of foreign militaries are developing the ability to execute attacks in
cyberspace.

2[ Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against the information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces ]
of various countries. With the suggested involvement of government organizations such as those of China, Russia, and North Korea, cyber attacks are
becoming more sophisticated by the day, and cybersecurity has become one of the most important security issues for each country.

3[ There has been a movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the international community.]


Chapter 3 P. 207

**Military Science and Technology and**
**Defense Production and**

P. 207

**Technological Bases**

1[ Major countries with sophisticated and modernized military forces, including the United States, place emphasis on improving the destructive capabilities of ]
weapons, precision guidance technology, information-related technology including C4ISR, unmanned technology (e.g., drones), and hypersonic technology
to be able to carry out more precise and effective attacks.

2[ In the United States, a variety of DoD-related agencies provide funds including large-scale funding for research undertaken by entities such as companies ]
and universities.

3[ Western countries are increasing competitiveness through realignment of their defense industry as well as promoting equipment technology cooperation ]
among their allies and partners, in order to adapt to the escalation of development and production costs of equipment due to their growing sophistication
d l it


-----

**p** **y**

**Part**
**Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance**
#### Ⅱ


**The National Security Strategy**



Chapter 1

|P. 2|16|
|---|---|


**Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the**
**Principle of International Cooperation**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) developed in December 2013
sets forth Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, which
is that Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken
as a peace-loving nation, and contribute even more proactively
in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international
community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region as a proactive contributor to
peace based on the principle of international cooperation.


■ Relationship among the NSS, the NDPG, the MTDP, and the fi scal year budget


Basic policy for national security centered

NSS

around diplomatic and defense policies
(approx. 10-year time frame)

based on NSS

Prescribe future defense force and target

NDPG levels of defense force that Japan should

achieve (approx. 10-year time frame)

achieve target levels of
defense force

Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures

MTDP

and quantity of major equipment

appropriate budget,
develop specific projects

Examine based on the current situations,

Annual budget

appropriate annual budget as necessary


**The National Defense Program Guidelines**



Chapter 2

|P. 2|19|
|---|---|


The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) developed in December 2013 based on the NSS defi nes Japan’s basic defense policy, the
role of its defense forces, and the target levels for the specifi c structures of the SDF.

**Japan’s Basic Defense Policy**

The NDPG specifi es (1) Japan’s own efforts, (2) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and (3) active promotion of security cooperation as the basic principles
from the perspective of becoming a proactive contributor to peace based on international cooperation.

**Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force**

To build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, the MOD conducts capability assessments based on joint operations for the enhancement of deterrence and response
capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing
defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities.

**Role of the Defense Forces**
1[ The following points will be emphasized in particular as effective means of deterrence and response to various situations:]

(1) Ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan (2) Response to an attack on remote islands

(3) Response to ballistic missile attacks (4) Responses in outer space and cyberspace (5) Responses to major disasters

2[ The following points will be emphasized in particular for the stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c region and improvement of the global security environment:]

(1) Holding training and exercises (2) Promoting defense cooperation and exchange (3) Promoting capacity building assistance

(4) Ensuring maritime security (5) Implementing international peace cooperation activities

(6) Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation


**The Medium Term Defense Program**


Chapter 2


P. 228


1[ The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) (FY2014-FY2018) developed in December 2013 based on the NDPG specifi es the review of major units, major ]
projects concerned with the capability of the SDF, policies to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the maintenance scale of main equipment (“appendix”),
and required expenses.

2[ The expenditures required to implement the defense capability build-up described in this program amount to approximately 24.670 trillion yen in ]
FY2013 prices.


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN


Chapter 2 P. 229

**Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2017**

P. 229


Japan will steadily build up its defense capability in FY2017, which is the fourth fi scal year under the NDPG and the MTDP, to establish a
Dynamic Joint Defense Force, based on these programs. The main activities are as follows.


An amphibious rapid deployment
brigade (tentative name) will
be established to develop
suffi cient amphibious operational
capabilities, which enable the
SDF to land, recapture, and
secure without delay any remote
islands that might be invaded.

As part of Japan’s ongoing
initiative to increase its submarine
force, Submarine Division 6 will be
established, which will raise the
number of submarine divisions to
six, and a new class submarine
(3,000 tons) with higher detecting
and other capabilities will be built.


The Southwestern Composite Air
Division will be abolished and the
Southwestern Air Defense Force
will be established to enhance
Japan’s air defense posture in the
southwestern region.


Advanced interceptor missiles
for BMD that can be fitted
on Aegis ships (SM-3 Block
IIA) will be acquired to deal
with more sophisticated and
diversifying future ballistic
missile threats.

The GSDF Ground Central Command
will be established for the purpose
of carrying out swift and fl exible
nationwide operations of basic GSDF
units under the joint operations.


Six F-35A fi ghters will be
acquired to obtain and secure air
superiority. In addition, one new
air refueling and transport aircraft
(KC-46A) will be acquired to allow
Fighter Aircraft Units and other
units to execute various operations
continuously.


**Defense-Related Expenditures**


Chapter 2


P. 232


In FY2017, in order to strengthen the
posture for protecting the life and
property of the Japanese people as
well as Japan’s territorial land, sea,
and airspace in light of the increasingly
severe security environment, Japan
has increased defense-related
expenditures following on from
FY2016 (increased 0.8% from the
previous year to 4.8996 trillion yen).


■ Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years


50,000

49,262

48,996

49,000

48,760

48,607

48,297 48,221

48,000 47,815 47,838

47,903 47,426

47,028

47,000 46,826

46,804

46,625

46,453

46,000

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the U.S. forces realignment expenses, or expenses associated with
the acquisition of a new government aircraft. The total defense expenditures when including these items are 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004,
4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen
for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen for FY2014, and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015,
5,054.1 billion yen for FY2016, and 5,125.1 billion yen for FY2017.


-----

**Part**
**Ⅱ**


Chapter 3 P. 237

**Legislation for Peace and Security**

P. 237


The Legislation for Peace and Security, consisting of the Act for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security and the International
Peace Support Act, was passed and enacted in September 2015 and entered into force in March 2016. In FY2016, after the legislation
entered into force, the MOD/SDF conducted the necessary training related to the legislation, assigned new duties for the UN peacekeeping
operations in South Sudan, and approved guidelines for the operation of the protection of weapons and other equipment of the United
States and other countries.

**Overview of Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security** P. 241


**Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law**
1[ Establishment of provisions for measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas]
In addition to the existing duty of “transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas,” “rescue measures,” including guarding and rescue of
Japanese nationals and others overseas, became possible.

2[ Establishment of provisions for the protection of weapons and other equipment of the United States and other countries]
The provisions enable SDF personnel to protect the weapons and other equipment of the armed forces of the United States and other countries that are,
in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan.

3[ Expansion of the provision of supplies and services to the United States Armed Forces]
The revision expands the range of settings where the provision of supplies and services is possible, as well as the scope of supplies and services available.

**Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Infl uence on**
**Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in**
**Areas Surrounding Japan)**
1[ The name of situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security has been changed from “situations in areas surrounding Japan” ]
to “situations that will have an important infl uence.”

2[ “Armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the UN Charter,” etc. were added as the ]
armed forces, etc. responding to situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security that can receive Japan’s support. The law’s
revision expanded the types of supplies and services the SDF can provide in situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security
and also set forth measures to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country.

**Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Act**
1[ “Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security” (humanitarian relief support and safety-ensuring tasks not under the control of the UN) ]
were added as operations Japan can participate in. In addition to the satisfaction of the Five Principles for Participation, Japan can participate in these
operations based on UN resolutions or at the request of the UN, or other prescribed organizations.

2[ The so-called “safety-ensuring operations” and the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations, etc. were added as tasks of UN peacekeeping operations, etc., ]
and the authority to use weapons was also reviewed. Prior Diet approval is required, in principle, for the “safety-ensuring operations.”

**Revision of the Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations**
1[ “Survival-Threatening Situation][(*1)][” was newly added to the situations to which Japan must respond under the Armed Attack Situations Response Act.]
2[ Necessary revisions were made to relevant laws to make it possible to issue an order for defense operations to respond to a “Survival-Threatening ]
Situation” for the SDF’s primary duty of the defense of Japan, and also to require prior Diet approval for this, in principle, in the same manner as for the
defense operations in the case of the armed attack situations, etc.

**Enactment of the International Peace Support Act (New)**
1[ The International Peace Support Act enables Japan to conduct cooperation and support operations, search and rescue operations, and ship inspection ]
operations for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for peace and security of the international community in “situations threatening
the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing[(*2)]”.

2[ The operations of the armed forces of foreign countries need to have competent UN resolutions as well as meet other requirements in order for Japan to ]
provide support. The Act also sets forth measures in order to avoid “integration” with the use of force by a foreign country, such as those not allowing the
SDF to conduct support activities “in the scene where combat operations are conducted at that time” in situations threatening the international peace and
security that the international community is collectively addressing.

3[ Prior Diet approval is required without exception, and re-approval is necessary in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of ]
the response measures.

*1 A situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the
people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.
*2 Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, and the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the UN Charter to remove
the threat. In addition, Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities.


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

**Revision of the Act for Establishment of the National Security Council**
1[ Responses to “Survival-Threatening Situation,” “situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security,” and “situations threatening ]
international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing” were added as items for deliberation.

2[ “Rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas” and “decisions on and changes in implementation plans for the implementation of safety-]
ensuring operations or ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ operations” were added as the items the National Security Council must deliberate without fail.

■ Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security


Images of Situations and Conditions

Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. Support activities (including logistics support) in situations Response to armed attack situations, etc

[Self-Defense Forces Law] that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace [Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations]
Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (New) and security (Expansion) Responses to “Survival-Threatening Situation” (New)

[Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security ・ “Use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions”

Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment [Self-Defense Forces Law] (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security]
Protection of weapons, etc. of the U.S. forces and armed forces of other countries (New) Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed ・ Clarification of the purpose of the revisionthe purpose of the Act） （Revision of (1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or The “Three New Conditions”when an armed attack

・Forces in peacetime Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan [Self-Defense Forces Law] (Expansion) ・・ Support activities for armed forces of foreign countries Expansion of the scope of support activities(not only the U.S.) (2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happinessensure Japan’s survival and protect its people

Ship Inspection Operations (Expansion) (3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary

[Ship Inspection Operations Act]

・ Enable ship inspection operations in
situations that the international community is

International Peace Cooperation Activities collectively addressing for international peace and security

[International Peace Cooperation Act]

UN PKO (Addition)

・ Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation
(ensuring security of specified areas including Cooperation and Support activities to armed forces of
protection of local population) foreign countries in situations that the international
・ Review of authority to use weapons (small arms) in necessary cases community is collectively addressing for international peace and security (New)

Internationally coordinated operations for peace [International Peace Support Act (New)] The exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not
and security permitted for the purpose of the so-called defense of a foreign
(Multinational cooperation outside UN PKO framework, New) country, namely, for the purpose of turning back an attack

made against a foreign country.

Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council]

(Note) Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount
to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby (Development of no new legislation)


**The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security** P. 256


**Implementation of Training Pertaining to the Legislation for Peace and Security**

Since August 2016, the SDF has undergone training related to the Legislation for Peace and
Security, including training to prepare for the dispatch to peacekeeping operations in South
Sudan and a multilateral joint exercise (Cobra Gold 17).

**Assignment of New Task for the South Sudan PKO**

After a comprehensive consideration, the Government decided to assign the task of socalled “kaketsuke-keigo” starting with the 11th rotation of the SDF Engineering Unit to be
deployed to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Following
the deliberations and the approval at the National Security Council, the Cabinet approved the
revision of the Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for
UNMISS on November 15, 2016.

**The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment**
**of the Units of the Armed Forces of the United States and Other Countries**

In order to ensure the appropriate operation of the system for the protection of weapons, etc.,
of the units of the U.S. Forces and the armed forces of other foreign countries, the Government
decided on the Implementation Guidelines concerning Article 95-2 of the SDF Law at the
National Security Council in December 2016, and started operating the article in relation to
the U.S. Forces.

**Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing**
**Agreement (ACSA)**

The ACSA was prepared as a new agreement to enable the application of existing settlement
procedures to the provision of supplies and services from the SDF to the U.S. Forces that
become possible under the newly enacted Legislation for Peace and Security, and was
d d f d b th Di t


GSDF unit in a training of rescue of Japanese nationals overseas as part of the
Cobra Gold 17 exercise

Defense Minister Inada being briefed by the commander of the 10th
rotation of the SDF Engineering Unit during her visit to South Sudan
(photo center)


-----

**Part**
**Ⅱ**


**The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements**


Chapter 4


P. 261


1[ The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, ]
together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security.

2[ The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as ]
public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of
the Asia-Pacifi c region and the world at large.

3[ As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and ]
the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement
and presence in the Asia-Pacifi c region, it has become more important than ever to
strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan.

4[ The stationing of USFJ based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty not only contributes ]
to the interests of Japan but also to the interests of the United States, which has an
interest in this region.


President Trump and Prime Minister Abe during the Japan-U.S. joint press conference
following the ballistic missile launch by North Korea (February 2017)

**Initiatives to Build the Foundation for**
**Strengthening the Alliance**


Chapter 4


P. 264


**Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** P. 265


The Guidelines update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan
and the United States, as well as manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater
shared responsibilities. The Guidelines newly specify the matters to be emphasized in security and
defense cooperation, and maintain the concept of the objectives of the 1997 Guidelines.

**Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance** P. 270


In order to respond to the increasingly severe security environment, Japan and the United States will
establish a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including
cooperation in “gray zone” situations, while enhancing the Japanese and U.S. presence in the Western
Pacifi c. The two countries are continuing to promote the expansion of joint training and exercises as
well as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and also the expansion of the
joint use of facilities and areas of both countries that serve as the bases for these activities.

**Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States** P. 279


Since February 2017, Japan and the United States have affi rmed the following in their series of bilateral
summit meetings and defense ministerial meetings (February and June 2017).
1[ The U.S. commitment to defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities is ]
unwavering.

2[ Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty covers the Senkaku Islands.]
3[ Close bilateral cooperation between Japan and the United States and trilateral cooperation among ]
Japan, the United States, and the ROK are important for addressing North Korea’s nuclear and
missile development programs which are becoming a new level of threat.

4[ The relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and the two countries will continue ]
to cooperate closely for its realization.


MSDF destroyers JS Hyuga and JS Ashigara (two vessels in the
center) sailing with U.S. Navy aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan
(front) and USS Carl Vinson (back) along with ASDF F-15 fi ghters
during a Japan-U.S. joint exercise (June 2017)

ASDF UH-60J rescue helicopter (photo front right) receiving mid-air
refueling from a U.S. Air Force KC-130 (photo left) along with a U.S.
Air Force helicopter (photo rear right) during a Japan-U.S. bilateral
joint exercise (Keen Sword 17) (October 2016)

U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis (photo right) and Defense Minister
Inada (photo left) shaking hands at a Japan-U.S. Defense


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

Chapter 4 P. 284

**Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan**

P. 284


For the Japan-U.S. Alliance to adequately function as a deterrence that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as to the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacifi c region, it is necessary to secure the presence of USFJ and to maintain a posture to respond swiftly and expeditiously to
emergencies.
For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of USFJ, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S.
Security Arrangements.

■ Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive

**Host Nation Support (HNS)** P. 285


HNS plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective 400
implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and the 350 Area (km[2])
Government of Japan has thus been providing HNS while paying adequate Facilities/Areas
attention to its tight fi scal situation.

**Realignment of USFJ** P. 287


Realignment of USFJ is extremely important in mitigating the impact on local 46 43
communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence
capabilities of the U.S. Forces. The MOD will advance the U.S. Forces 0

|353 Area (km2)|Col2|
|---|---|
||Area (km2)|
||Facilities/Areas|
|278 249 242||
|186||
|144||
|83||
|46 43||
|31||

realignment and other initiatives while making continuous efforts to gain the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 January 2017
the understanding and cooperation of local communities accommodating of Okinawa
USFJ facilities and areas.

400

353

350 Area (km[2])

Facilities/Areas

300 278

249 242

250

200 186

144

150

100 83

46 43

50 31

0

Right before May 1972 End of End of As of
the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 January 2017

of Okinawa

**Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** P. 288


1[ Approximately 70.6% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Japan are concentrated ]
in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 15% of the main island of Okinawa.
Therefore, it is necessary to continue to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact.

2[ The relocation of MCAS Futenma is the only solution to eliminate its danger as quickly as ]
possible while simultaneously maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces.
Thus, the Government of Japan is making all-out efforts to realize the relocation.

3[ On December 22, 2016, the return of approximately 4,000 ha, a major portion of the ]
Northern Training Area, was achieved, the largest of its kind since the reversion of
Okinawa to the mainland.

4[ As part of its initiatives to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a tangible manner, the ]
Government of Japan is addressing issues such as the return of land areas south of Ceremony for the return of the Northern Training Area held on December 22, 2016
Kadena Air Base, the reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa and its relocation to
Guam, and the training relocation of tilt-rotor/rotary-wing aircraft such as U.S. Marine
Corps’ MV-22 Osprey aircraft.



**Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa** P. 304

In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to consolidate facilities and areas
of USFJ and to proceed with the realignment of USFJ. Such measures are aimed at securing the stable
presence of the U.S. Forces while maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local
communities.

**Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan** P. 308

On March 31, 2017, an act revising part of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the
Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act) that came into
force in August 2007 entered into force. The revisions include a ten-year extension of the expiration of the

Training relocation of U.S. Marine Corps’ MV-22 Osprey

aircraft (Forest Light 02)


-----

**Property of the People as well as Securing**
**Part** **the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace**
#### Ⅲ


Chapter 1 P. 318

**Effective Deterrence and Response**

|P. 31|8|
|---|---|



The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that
it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

**Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan** P. 318


1[ In FY2016, there were 12 confi rmed incidents of activities by Chinese Navy vessels ]
including passage through the Southwestern Islands such as the sea areas between the
main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. In June 2016, a Chinese Navy combatant
vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands for the fi rst
time. Since then, Chinese Navy vessels have continued their activities in the sea areas
surrounding Japan.
Due to such circumstances, the MOD/SDF is working to strengthen the collaboration
with relevant government ministries and agencies such as sharing information with the
Japan Coast Guard.

2[ In FY2016, ASDF aircraft scrambled 1,168 times, which was 295 times more than the ]
previous fi scal year and the highest fi gure since scrambles commenced in 1958. Among
them, the number of scrambles against Chinese aircraft was 851, which was 280 times
more than the previous fi scal year, and sets a record high.
The MOD/SDF continues to take all possible measures necessary to engage in warning An ASDF F-15J fi ghter scrambling
and surveillance activities in both the sea and airspace around Japan as well as engages
in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures.

3[ In May 2017, there was an incursion into Japan’s territorial airspace by a small unmanned ]
aircraft (drone)-like object that was fl own from a Chinese government vessel, which had intruded into Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands.
(This was the second incident of an incursion into territorial airspace by Chinese authorities since 2012).


GSDF personnel conducting coast observation MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and
surveillance activities

■ Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War


ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control system aircraft
conducting warning and surveillance activities


(Times)

1,200 **1,168**

1,000 **943**

**944**

**873**

**812** **810**

800

**464** **851**

**567**

600 **415** **571**

**425**

**386**

400 **306**

**311** **299** **96** **156**

200 **220** **158** **23731** **38** **359** **473**

**193** **197** **264** **247** **248** **288** **301**

**124**

0

1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 (FY)

Note: The peak durning the cold war

Russia China Taiwan Others Total


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN


**Defending Japan’s Remote Islands** P. 324


1[ In order to respond to attacks on Japan’s remote islands, it is important to position troops and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and ]
also to detect signs at an early stage and to obtain and secure maritime and air superiority through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) conducted by the SDF from peacetime.
If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be swiftly deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment
of enemy units, and deter and remove enemy attacks through joint operation combining all of the three services (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF). In case
of an invasion of the islands, the SDF suppresses the enemy force by ground attack from aircraft and vessels, and then implements operations to retake
the islands through the amphibious landing of GSDF units and other initiatives to retake.

2[ For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, the ASDF established the 9th Air Wing in Naha Air Base in January 2016, while the GSDF formed ]
the Yonaguni coast observation unit in Yonaguni in March of the same year. The ASDF also formed the Southwestern Air Defense Force in July 2017. Going
forward, the SDF will deploy some units including an area security unit in charge of the initial responses in Amami Oshima, Miyako Island, and Ishigaki
Island in the southwestern region. In addition, the SDF will establish an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade” (provisional name) equipped with a full
function for amphibious operations, and acquire SH-60K rotary wing patrol helicopters.

3[ In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities ]
through: the improvement of Osumi class transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank); a review of the role of multipurpose vessels; and the introduction of V-22
Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft.

■ Deployment Status of Major Units in the Southwestern Islands


(As of April 1, 2017)

MSDF Amami Naval Base Facility
ASDF Amami Communication Wing

ASDF 55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.

Amami Oshima

Okinoerabujima

ASDF 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.

GSDF 15th Brigade
MSDF Fleet Air Wing 5

Kumejima ASDF Southwestern Composite

Air Division, etc.

Senkaku Islands Approx. 420 km

Main Island of Okinawa

Approx. 290 km

Approx. 150 km
Approx. 210 km

Ishigaki
Yonaguni Island Miyako Island
Island

Approx. 110 km Approx.

Approx.
130 km
120 km ASDF 53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.

SDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit

-  The Southwestern Air Defense Force was established on July 1, 2017.

[Legend]

: GSDF Units : MSDF Units : ASDF Units


-----

**as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace**

**Part**
**Ⅲ**


**Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks** P. 327


1[ Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) is based on an effective multi-tier defense system ]
with upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both
interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).

2[ Since the beginning of 2016, North Korea has conducted ballistic missile launches at frequencies ]
and of a content that were unprecedented, and this tendency continues in 2017.

3[ In order to improve its response capability against ballistic missile attacks, the MOD will acquire ]
advanced ballistic missile interceptors (SM-3 Block IIA) for BMD, which is currently being
developed jointly by Japan and the United States and intends to acquire the enhanced capability
type of Patriot PAC-3, PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE), as soon as possible.

4[ The MOD has conducted studies on a future ballistic missile interception system since FY2016. ]
The FY2017 budget also covers expenses for the implementation of simulations, including
measures to improve defense capabilities against ballistic missiles.

Test launch of SM-3 Block IIA conducted


in waters off Hawaii (February 2017)

**Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others** P. 332


1[ Illegal activities by infi ltrated armed agents, and sabotage carried out by guerillas or special operation forces can pose a serious threat to peace and ]
security, even if they are small-scale infi ltrations and attacks.

2[ The MOD/SDF conducts joint exercises and training with relevant agencies such as the police force and the Japan Coast Guard, and strives to strengthen ]
cooperation with these agencies.

**Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security** P. 334


1[ For maintaining the order of “Open and Stable Seas” and to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the MOD/SDF promotes various kinds of initiatives such ]
as implementing counter-piracy operations, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and conducting joint training in close cooperation
with Japan’s allies.

2[ As pertains to the relationship with China, consultation meetings have been held between the defense authorities of both countries towards the ]
commencement of early implementation of the maritime and air communication mechanism in order to avoid and prevent unexpected situations.


**Responses in Space** P. 334


1[ From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in ]
space between the defense authorities in Japan and the United
States, the two countries established the “Space Cooperation
Working Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 and proactively
consider activities in broad areas such as: (1) promotion of
policy-related consultation on space, (2) closer information
sharing, (3) cooperation for nurturing and securing experts
on this subject matter, and (4) implementation of tabletop
exercises.

2[ Going forward, the MOD will develop a sensor system, ]
which can perform constant surveillance of space debris
and suspicious satellites, in order to ensure the safety of
satellites contributing to Japan’s use of outer space including
the SDF’s activities.


■ Initiatives for the development of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System


SSA System by the Ministry of Education, Culture,

SSA System by the MOD (Image) Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)/JAXA

(renovation and update of existing facilities)

Space debris etc.

Avoid if there is
any risk of collision,
etc.

Optical Monitoring Facility (Ibara City, Okayama Prefecture)
*Facility to monitor objects in geostationary orbit

Cooperation

Suspicious
satellite

Examples of
a sensor system

Radar Monitoring Facility
(Kagamino-cho, Okayama Prefecture)

Radar Optical telescope Operation system U.S. *Facility to monitor objects in geostationary orbit

Armed Forces

Analysis System (Tsukuba City, Ibaraki Prefecture)

Information sharing

➢ In cooperation with MEXT/JAXA, complete the development of the MOD’s SSA System by FY2022 <Basic Plan on Space Policy>
➢ Started the overall system design in FY2016
➢ Planning to undertake the development of operation systems and sensors in or after FY2017


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

SDF personnel from the Cyber Defense Unit participating in cyber
security exercises

■ Image of penetration test

I Enhancement of Security L

tests can be discovered.

owned by th

I Enhancement of the Capac

Effectiveness of response
by the System Protection U

Whether invading into various types
of command system, etc. is possible

The degree of bearable attacks

The degree of damages occurring

Whether the attacks spread to
other command systems, etc.


Rescue activity in Iwaizumi (Iwate Prefecture)
(September 2016)

Activities for avian infl uenza epidemic prevention measures
(Gifu Prefecture) (January 2017)


**Response to Cyber Attacks** P. 338


1[ The SDF Supervised Units of Communication Systems are monitoring MOD/SDF communications ]
networks around the clock. In addition, the MOD/SDF is engaged in holistic measures including:
the introduction of intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and
communications systems, development of defense systems, establishment of rules stipulating the
posture and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, improvement of human resources and
technological bases, and research on leading-edge technology.

2[ Considering that cyber attacks occur beyond national borders, it is important to promote ]
cybersecurity cooperation with countries other than the United States as well. Japan will continue
to strengthen international cooperation in the cyber fi eld through exchanges of views with
relevant organizations including defense authorities of other countries and active participation in
cyber defense exercises.

3[ In order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks, which are becoming ]
increasingly sophisticated and skillful by the day, the FY2017 budget sets out to develop a system
for conducting practical cyber training using a cyber training space that simulates the SDF’s
command and control system, as well as a system for conducting penetration tests to examine the
vulnerability of the SDF’s command and control system using the same method as actual cyber
attacks. Along with these initiatives, personnel increases have also been budgeted.

**Response to Large-Scale Disasters** P. 341


1[ Due to heavy rain caused by Typhoon No. 10, which moved through the Tohoku region and Hokkaido ]
Prefecture from August to September 2016, the SDF dispatched approximately 3,800 personnel
to carry out rescue operations for isolated individuals, searches for missing persons, water supply
assistance, and other disaster relief activities in Iwate and Hokkaido Prefectures.

2[ For implementing epidemic control measures against the outbreak of avian infl uenza in Hokkaido, ]
Miyagi, Chiba, Niigata, Gifu, Saga, Kumamoto and Miyazaki Prefectures, approximately 9,100 SDF
personnel were dispatched to engage in disaster relief dispatch activities from November 2016 to
March 2017.

3[ The SDF transports by aircraft emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with ]
insuffi cient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2016, out of a total of 516
cases of disaster relief dispatches, 409 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients.

**Rescue and Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas and Others** P. 345


1[ The SDF stands ready to dispatch its units swiftly. Specifi cally, the SDF maintains operational ]
readiness by which the GSDF designates a helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel,
the MSDF designates vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF
designates airlift units and personnel for dispatch.

2[ In December 2016, the SDF carried out its fi rst exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals ]
overseas and others, in which it went through the whole rescue process. In the annual multilateral
joint exercise Cobra Gold that took place in February 2017 in Thailand, the MOD/SDF conducted
an exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas and others with the cooperation of
the Japanese Embassy in Thailand and other agencies, and strengthened collaboration with the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


Exercise for rescue of Japanese nationals overseas and others conducted
in Thailand in cooperation with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Japanese Embassy in Thailand and other relevant agencies (February 2017)


-----

**as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace**

**Part**
**Ⅲ**


**Active Promotion of Security Cooperation**



Chapter 2

|P. 3|51|
|---|---|


The MOD/SDF will enhance bilateral and
multilateral defense cooperation and
exchanges, and will more actively promote
United Nations Peace Keeping Operations
(UN PKO), counter-piracy operations,
international peace cooperation activities,
and other relevant missions to address
global security issues.


■ Number of high-level bilateral
dialogues and consultations
(June 2016–June 2017)

-  “High-level” refers to Minister, State Minister,
Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative
Vice-Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for
International Affairs, and the Chief of Staff of
each SDF branch.


More than 5 exchanges
More than 3 exchanges
2 exchanges 1 exchange


Finland
Sweden Russia

United
Kingdom Netherlands Canada

France GermanyItaly Turkey Mongolia Republicof Korea United States

Jordan Qatar China

South SudanArabiaSaudiMaldivesDjiboutiOman Sri LankaIndiaThailandCambodiaMyanmarMalaysiaLaosIndonesiaPhilippinesVietnamBrunei

Singapore

Timor-Leste

Australia

New Zealand


**Towards Strategic International**
**Defense Cooperation**



Chapter 2

|P. 3|51|
|---|---|


**Major Multilateral Security Dialogues, etc.** P. 354, P. 357


1 [ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting and the Vientiane Vision]
In November 2016, the Second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting was held in Vientiane,
Laos. At the meeting, Defense Minister Inada proposed Japan’s own initiative called the “Vientiane
Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” as a guideline for the Japan-ASEAN defense
cooperation. The “Vientiane Vision” is the fi rst of its kind to present, in a transparent manner, an overall
picture of the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation, and it was welcomed
by all ASEAN member states.

2 [International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)]
In June 2017, at the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Defense Minister Inada delivered a speech at the Defense Minister Inada attending the ASEAN
Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in

second plenary session on “Upholding the Rules-Based Regional Order.” Defense Minister Inada also held Laos (November 2016)
bilateral and trilateral meetings with other participating countries to exchange opinions on regional situations
and defense cooperation including the situations in North Korea and the East and South China Seas, and to confi rm the measures for strengthening
future cooperation with the countries.


**Capacity Building Assistance** P. 358


Through the capacity building assistance program launched in 2012, Japan has provided assistance in various areas
such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, PKO, maritime security, and international law to 12 countries
mainly in the Asia-Pacifi c region.


MSDF personnel giving an oceanography lecture
as part of capacity building assistance for the
Indonesian Navy (January 2017)


**Multilateral Joint Training in the Asia-Pacifi c Region** P. 362


In the Asia-Pacifi c region, the MOD/SDF actively participates in multinational training in non-traditional security fi elds, such as humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, as well as Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to traditional training that has been conducted conventionally in preparation
for combat situations.


Opening ceremony of the multilateral joint exercise Cobra Gold
in Thailand co-hosted by the United States and Thailand
(February 2017)


MSDF destroyer Fuyuzuki (front) withdrawing after completing
at-sea replenishment with the Royal Australian Navy’s
replenishment ship, Success (center), at the Australian
Navy-hosted multinational maritime exercise Kakadu 2016


Aircraft of participating units conducting formation fl ying led by
the U.S. Air Force’s B1 bomber aircraft (far left) in the JapanU.S.-Australia joint exercise in Guam (Exercise Cope North Guam
2017) (An ASDF F-15J fighter and F2 fighter can be seen at the


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

**Ensuring Maritime Security**


Chapter 2


P. 379


1[ For Japan, a maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on fundamental rules, ]
such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime
transport, is a foundation of peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. For this
reason, in cooperation with relevant countries, the MOD/SDF promotes various initiatives
including counter-piracy activities and capacity building assistance in this fi eld for coastal
countries alongside sea lanes, and makes use of various opportunities to enhance joint
training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan.

2[ For counter-piracy operations, the SDF surface force and air force have participated in ]
the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) and conducted its missions in cooperation with
other countries.

3[ From March to June 2017, the SDF dispatched a CTF 151 commander.]

Destroyer Suzutsuki of the counter-piracy
team rushed to a commercial ship whose
engine room had caught on fi re while
navigating through the Gulf of Aden and was
stranded in mid sea, and also conducted
warning and surveillance activities
(November 2016)


Commemorative photograph of 180,000
vessels and ships in total of the Deployed
Forces for Counter-Piracy Enforcement
(August 2016)

CTF 151 Commander Rear Admiral Fukuda (front
row, sixth from left) and staff offi cers of the CTF
151 Headquarters in Bahrain


**Efforts for International Peace**
**Cooperation Activities**



Chapter 2

|P. 38|5|
|---|---|


Japan proactively engages in international peace cooperation activities and makes multi-layered contributions to international peace
cooperation activities.

**United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)** P. 387


1[ January 2017 marked fi ve years since the dispatch of the fi rst engineering unit. In all of the PKOs conducted by Japan, the SDF engineering unit has made a ]
record number of achievements. The nation-building process of South Sudan is entering a new phase due to the efforts made by the international community.

2[ As a result of a comprehensive consideration of the SDF’s activities in South Sudan, the Government of Japan considered that it could move on to a new ]
phase regarding SDF engineering activities in the capital city of Juba, and the activities of the SDF engineering unit were terminated at the end of May
2017. Meanwhile, Japan continues to dispatch SDF personnel to UNMISS Headquarters and contribute to the United Nations peacekeeping operations as
a member of UNMISS.


Personnel of the 11th unit loading containers for its withdrawal
(May 2017)


SDF personnel listening to an address at the Ceremony for the
Return of the Unit Flag (May 2017)


Headquarters staff coordinating with the personnel of other
countries at UNMISS Headquarters (April 2017)


**Cooperation for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Area of Human Resources Development** P. 390


To support UN PKOs, Japan has co-hosted the United Nations Training of Trainers (TOT) with the United Nations, dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to PKO
centers in other countries, and dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to the United Nations Project for Africa Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities.


-----

**as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace**

**Part**
**Ⅲ**


**Human Foundation and Organization that**
**Supports the Defense Force, and Active**
**Participation of Female SDF Personnel**


Chapter 3 P. 394


P. 394


**Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force** P. 394


In order to exert its defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is extremely important that the
MOD/SDF further enhances and strengthens their human foundation and organization, which supports the
defense force.

**Recruitment and Employment**
1[ Due to the declining birthrate and greater advancement into higher education, the environment of ]
recruiting SDF personnel is increasingly severe. Amid such a situation, the MOD/SDF is recruiting
qualifi ed personnel nationwide in various categories.

2[ The MOD/SDF has the systems in place such as the SDF Reserve Personnel System in which SDF ]
Reserve Personnel, who normally engage in their own professions, become SDF personnel upon the
issuance of a defense call-up order, or other orders, and engage in their SDF missions. Newly hired MSDF personnel receiving basic education

**Measures to ensure effective use of human resources**
From the perspective of ensuring the robustness of the SDF and making effective use of human resources under a constrained budget, measures for personnel
system reform have been implemented in order to adapt to the advancement of equipment as well as diversifi cation and internationalization of SDF missions.

**Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active Participation of Female Personnel** P. 403


-  For the promotion of more active participation of female personnel and work-life balance of all SDF personnel in a unifi ed manner, the MOD/SDF implements
“working style reform” (promotion of telework, expansion and enhancement of fl extime system, etc.), “reform to realize a successful career with a balanced
life between childrearing and nursing care, etc.” (development of internal crèche facilities, etc.), and “reform for promoting successful female personnel”
(setting numerical targets regarding the recruitment and promotion of female employees, etc.).

-  The MOD formulated the “Initiative to Promote Active Participation of Female SDF Personnel” in April 2017, in which it unveiled its conceptual policy for
promoting the active participation of female SDF personnel.
1 The MOD has made it possible to deploy female personnel to some units, such as GSDF infantry companies and tank companies, and essentially
abolished the restriction on the deployment of female personnel across the whole SDF organization.
2 The MOD will expand the recruitment of female SDF personnel and aims to double the percentage of female personnel among all SDF personnel.


■ Changes in the number of female SDF personnel at each SDF branch and their percentage as a share of all
SDF personnel


ASDF personnel making use of an internal

Female MSDF pilot fl ying a helicopter


crèche facility at the MODcrèche facility at the MOD


(Number) (%)

15,000 7.0

14,000

GSDF personnel

13,000 MSDF personnel Recruitment of women started 6.0

12,000 ASDF personnel the MSDF and the ASDFfor aviation students of

Total number of female SDF personnel /
Total number of SDF personnel Recruitment of women

11,000 the National Defense Academystarted for students the of 5.0

10,000

9,000

4.0

8,000

Recruitment of

7,000 women started

6,000 Recruitment of womenstarted in the general the National Defensefor students the ofMedical College 3.0

service area of

5,000 the MSDF and the ASDF

2.0

4,000

Recruitment of
women started in

3,000 the general service

area of the GSDF

2,000 1.0

1,000

0 0.0

54 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 (FY)

Note: As of the end of March 2017, the total number of female SDF personnel is 13,707 (approximately 6.1% of the total number of the current SDF personnel)


-----

DEFENSE OF JAPAN

**Enhancement of Medical Functions** P. 408

The MOD/SDF is enhancing and strengthening their capabilities in military medicine to be able to appropriately
carry out a variety of missions, including in response to various emergency events and international peace
cooperation activities.
1[ The MOD aims to establish an effi cient and high-quality medical care system at the National Defense ]
Medical College Hospital, and is taking steps to strengthen the function of the hospital as a training and
research center for defense medicine.

2[ The MOD/SDF is working to develop a framework to protect the lives of personnel who are injured on ]
the frontline as much as possible, in order to enable SDF personnel with the appropriate knowledge and
training to provide specialized fi rst aid on the spot before the injured SDF personnel are transferred to GSDF personnel conducting training of
hospitals and other medical facilities. medical evacuation of the injured

3[ The MOD/SDF is undertaking preparations for the enhancement of capabilities to respond to infectious diseases, a potential global threat.]


**Measures on Defense**
**Equipment and Technology**


Chapter 4 P. 411

|P. 4|11|
|---|---|


**Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring Technological Superiority** P. 411


1[ The MOD formulated the Defense Technology Strategy in August 2016, which presents a specifi c ]
direction for various measures that should be implemented strategically. This aims to ensure Japan’s
technological superiority, invent and deliver advanced equipment in an effective and effi cient
manner, and deal with various policy issues pertaining to defense and civilian technologies. The MOD
promotes various measures in light of the Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook and
the Research and Development Vision based on the Defense Technology Strategy.

2[ The “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” is a funding program which issues ]
Call for Proposals and entrusts basic researches regarding advanced civilian technology, with the
expectation that the studies would contribute to future research and development in the defense fi eld.
In FY2017 the MOD expanded the program to enable the awards of large-scale and long-term
research projects.


Beam direction device


Initiatives for high-power energy technology designated as
one of the advanced technology fi elds with the potential to
play a game changing role (Medium-to-Long Term Defense
Technology Outlook)


**Defense Production and Technological Bases** P. 415


Defense production and technological bases are an important and indispensable foundation supporting Japan’s defense capabilities.
To maintain and enhance these capabilities, the MOD implements various measures such as the visualization of the supply chain in the defense industry and
the adoption of a new procurement method in acquiring an escort ship (new destroyer) based on the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases
formulated in June 2014.
The MOD will promote defense equipment and technology measures in collaboration with relevant ministries and agencies as well as companies and other
relevant organizations. For example, the MOD seeks to adopt the rapidly developing cutting-edge civilian technology for equipment and to conduct a matching
between the MOD/SDF and small and medium-sized enterprises that possess technical capabilities available for use in equipment.

**Efforts toward Project Management, etc.** P. 420


1[ In order to manage the acquisition process throughout the entire life cycle of the equipment, the MOD ]
selected 12 types of equipment for project management to realize the strategically most effi cient and
effective acquisition of defense equipment. In FY2017, Middle-range SAM (improved version) moved to
the mass production and deployment phase.

2[ The MOD/SDF intends to realize the cost reduction and stabilization of procurement of equipment ]
and services by utilizing long-term contracts, promoting the effi ciency of equipment maintenance and
implementing bulk purchases.

out within Japan (eligible equipment for project management
focused equipment)


-----

**as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace**

**Part**
**Ⅲ**


MV-22 under maintenance at the Japan-U.S.

**Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** P. 426


Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation
in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance
and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of
peace and international cooperation.
1[ For the purpose of ensuring a maintenance base for common equipment between Japan and the United ]
States, the Japanese government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries
in the manufacturing process in preparation for the acquisition of F-35A fi ghter aircraft. In addition,
Japan also established a common maintenance base for the United States Marine Corp’s Osprey (MV-22)
aircraft and the GSDF’s Osprey (V-22) aircraft within the GSDF Camp Kisarazu, and commenced Periodic
Maintenance Inspection (PMI) of MV-22 aircraft.

2[ An arrangement on a Joint Preliminary Study on potential collaborative opportunities for Future Combat ]
Air Systems/Future Fighter was signed between the United Kingdom and Japan in March 2017, which the
two countries will exchange ideas on the potential for future collaboration.

3[ At the Japan-Philippines Summit Meeting in September 2016, the two leaders agreed on the transfer of fi ve ]
MSDF TC-90 training aircraft. In March 2017, two TC-90 aircraft were transferred to the Philippine Navy.

4[ In order to respond to the needs of Japan’s friendly nations, the SDF Law was revised to enable the MOD ]
to grant or transfer SDF’s equipment which are no longer used to the governments of developing states,
for lower price than the current price.

receiving water discharge at its

shared maintenance infrastructure

MSDF TC-90 training aircraft

transfer destination in the Philippines

Chapter 5 P. 434

**Interaction with Local Communities**
**and Japanese Citizens**

P. 434

**Collaboration with Local Communities** P. 434


The MOD/SDF conducts a variety of cooperation activities to support civilian life. Such
activities further deepen the trust between local communities/people and the SDF as well
as signifi cantly contribute to the maintenance and vitalization of local communities.


MSDF underwater disposal personnel (Okinawa) and underwater ASDF Blue Impulse fl ying over the Kumamoto Castle at the Kumamoto

MSDF underwater disposal personnel (Okinawa) and underwater
mines explosion (Iwo-To)mines explosion (Iwo-To)

**Various Public Relations Activities** P. 438


The MOD/SDF publicizes current circumstances of the SDF both at home and abroad. For example, as part
of the commemoration of the SDF’s anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan every
year. In addition, annual reviews by the SDF—a troop review, a fl eet review, and an air review—are hosted
in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively. In 2016, a troop review was held at the GSDF Asaka
Training Area. The MOD/SDF also publishes a monthly public relations pamphlet in English, and makes
proactive efforts to disseminate information to the international community.


-----

**Part**
## Ⅰ

Security Environment
Surrounding Japan


Chapter 1
**Overview**

Chapter 2
**Defense Policies of Countries**

Chapter 3
**Issues in the International**
**Community**


-----

**Chapter** **Overview**
### 1


**Section 1 Trends in the International Community**


The security environment surrounding Japan has
become increasingly severe, with various challenges and
destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute.
Even after the end of the Cold War, interstate
confl icts remain in the periphery of Japan. While
nations with large military forces are concentrated in
this region, a regional cooperation framework in the
security realm has not been suffi ciently institutionalized.
Opaque and uncertain factors such as territorial disputes
and reunifi cation issues remain. There has been also
a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of
so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure
peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty,
and maritime economic interests. In addition, there has
been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries
to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities
and to intensify their military activities. In this regard,
security challenges and destabilizing factors in the AsiaPacifi c region including the area surrounding Japan are
becoming more serious.
In particular, North Korea’s further progress in
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles development
through its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches,
coupled with repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior
that disregard the international community, constitute
serious and imminent threats to the security of the region
including Japan and of the international community.
In 2016, North Korea conducted two nuclear tests and
launched ballistic missiles at an unprecedented frequency
of more than 20 times. The threat from North Korea’s
improved capabilities in the development and use of
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles has entered a
new stage. Additionally, China’s reinforcement of its
military capabilities without transparency, along with
active maritime advancements, has been rapidly shifting
the regional military balance. Under these circumstances,
China’s attempts to change the status quo in the East and
South China Seas based on its unique assertions which
are incompatible with the existing order of international
l h b i it t th i


including Japan and to the international community,
including the likelihood of increasing the risk of causing
unintended consequences due to misunderstanding or
miscalculation. Furthermore, unilateral actions to change
the status quo and heighten tensions, such as China’s
large-scale and rapid reclamations in the South China
Sea, establishment of outposts there, and their use for
military purposes, leave challenges for the response of
the international community, as the actions are further
turned into a fait accompli.
In a global security environment, interdependence
among countries has expanded and deepened with
globalization and rapid advances in technological
innovations. At the same time, there is a growing risk
that unrest or a security problem in a single country or
region could immediately develop into a challenge or
destabilizing factor for the entire international community.
International terrorist organizations, including the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continue to
remain active. Today, the threat of international terrorism
is not confi ned to the Middle East and North Africa, but
is expanding globally. Given that Japanese nationals have
also been victims in these incidents, Japan must now


**KeyWord** So-called “gray-zone” situations

So-called “gray-zone” situations concisely describe a broad range

of situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies. For

example, they could involve the following circumstances:

1) Confl icting assertions between states, etc., over territory, sovereignty,

economic interests including maritime interests, and other forms of
rights and interests;

2) Not relying only on diplomatic negotiation among parties for a party

to make its country’s assertions or demands, or to have the other

party accept said assertions or demands; and
3) Showing physical presence frequently, or attempting or making

changes to the status quo in an area related to the dispute by using

armed organizations or other means to the extent that it does not

constitute armed attack, in order to appeal a party’s assertion or

demand or to force acceptance of it.


-----

consider international terrorism as its own issue that
must be faced head-on. Furthermore, while Russia has
still been subjected to the sanctions by the international
community, the outcomes of Russia’s changes to the
status quo by force or coercion through so-called “hybrid
warfare”[1] in Ukraine have taken on an aspect of being
entrenched, and it is expected that the international
community will make further efforts to improve the
situation. In addition, the recent spate of cyber attacks
has become more sophisticated and skillful by the day,
with government involvement suspected in various
attacks. In this context, there are increasing risks to the
stable use of cyberspace.
Against this background, President Trump was
inaugurated in January 2017 and immediately declared a
shift to an “America First” policy agenda. Although it has
yet to announce a comprehensive strategic policy on its
involvement in the regional security of the Asia-Pacifi c,
the Middle East, and Europe, the new administration
has made it clear that it will continue to give priority to
the security of the Asia-Pacifi c region. Attention is now
focused on how exactly the United States will deepen
relations with its allies and partners, including how
policy changes ushered in by the Trump administration,
will affect the future policies of other countries. With
expanding and deepening interdependence, major
countries have a more important shared interest in
building a more stable international security environment.
Countries with a shared interest in resolving issues are
increasingly collaborating to take proactive responses
to achieve regional and global stability. For example,
the international community is working together to
protect the existing international order based upon law,
including a free and open maritime order. The coalition
and countries such as Russia are conducting military
activities against ISIL as part of the “War on Terror.”
Countries are also engaged in diplomatic efforts at the
summit level to fi nd solutions to the ever more complex
and divisive regional confl icts.
The multi-polarization of the world continues as a
result of shifts in the balance of power due to the extension
of the international infl uence of countries such as China,
India, and Russia on the political, economic, and military
fronts, and the relative change of infl uence of the United
States. Increases in demand for natural resources, energy,
and food stemming from economic growth in emerging
countries and a larger middle class are expected to


further intensify the international competition for these
resources. Against this backdrop, changes in or denial of
the existing regional and international order, or assertions
and activities to secure economic interests could become
more tangible and acute. This in turn could lead to
increases in “gray-zone” situations and regional confl icts
in the future.
Additionally, the rapid spread of the Internet and
information and communications technology (ICT)
networks, including social media – one of the key factors
of globalization – have given non-state actors a much
greater ability to disseminate their opinions and assertions
as well as mobilize supporters, and by extension, have
signifi cantly increased their infl uence on countries and
the international community. For example, criticism of a
nation sent out by an individual, or extremism disseminated
by an international terrorist organization, has tended to
propagate and spread explosively or be transmitted across
the world by ICT networks. Controlling these activities
have become increasingly challenging even for countries
like authoritarian nations with strong control over their
people, as well as for the international community that
strives to contain the operations of international terrorist
organizations. As a result, countries have been forced to
pay greater consideration to public opinion on domestic
governance and management of state affairs. At the same
time, the international community is faced with more
complex issues which need to be resolved and which are
increasingly diffi cult to address.
In addition, it is believed that national security
decision-making is more complex than ever before, as
some nations have important economic relationships
despite differences in fundamental values and strategic
interests as seen in the case of Europe and Russia with
regard to the Ukraine issue in 2014, as well as the response
of Europe, ASEAN member states, and other countries
to China’s proposal to establish the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015.
The security challenges and destabilizing factors
in the international community which has these
characteristics are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging,
and it is becoming ever more diffi cult for a single
country to deal with them on its own. In this context, it is
increasingly important for countries which share interests
in regional and global stability to cooperate and actively
respond to security challenges. Cross-cutting government
efforts are also critical to overcome these challenges.


While various explanations have been offered for so-called “hybrid warfare,” in this white paper, the term is used to mean “aggression conducted by methods that are diffi cult to identify defi nitively as


-----

**Section 2 Asia Pacific Security Environment**


The Asia-Pacific is a unique region with a concentration of
large-scale military forces. Recently, the shift in the global
balance of power stemming from the increase in power
of China and other nations is having an acute impact on
military trends in the region. Under this situation, countries
in the region have made efforts to enhance and strengthen
specific and practical intra-regional coordination and
collaboration with a particular focus on non-traditional
security fields such as humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief. On the other hand, this region abounds
in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity.
Also, views on security and perceptions of threats are
different by country. Therefore, a regional cooperation
framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently
institutionalized, and longstanding issues of territorial
rights and reunification continue to remain in the region.
In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have
been divided for more than half a century, and the
faceoff continues between the military forces of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. There are
issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Furthermore, with regard to Japan, territorial disputes
over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both
of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan,
remain unresolved.
On top of this, recent years have seen a continued
tendency towards the prolongation of “gray-zone”
situations, raising concerns that they may develop into
more serious situations in the absence of a clear path
towards the resolution of the situations.
In North Korea, it is deemed that following the
change of regime that made Chairman of the State Affairs
Commission Kim Jong-un the leader of the country,
the regime continues to strengthen and tighten its grip
to make Chairman Kim Jong-un the sole leader. North
Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military
force. It is also furthering its development, deployment,
transfer, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs), including nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles, and it maintains a large-scale special operations
force. Through these activities, North Korea continues
to maintain and strengthen asymmetrical military
capabilities.[1] In particular, it is regarded that North Korea
has further advanced its entire ballistic missile program,


including new ballistic missiles, through technological
verification conducted by launching a series of ballistic
missiles. Recently, North Korea has not only engaged in
research and development of ballistic missiles, but has
also intensified activities to increase their operational
capabilities, including surprise attack. North Korea has
conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls of restraint
from the international community, and is believed to be
seeking to acquire hydrogen bombs to further enhance
its nuclear forces. Considering the technological
maturity reached through the past five nuclear tests, it is
possible that North Korea has successfully miniaturized
nuclear weapons for warheads and enabled them to be
equipped on ballistic missiles. With the passage of time,
there will likely be a growing risk that North Korea
would deploy ballistic missiles mounted with a nuclear
warhead that have ranges covering Japan. North Korea
has repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior against
related countries including Japan. In 2013, North Korea
emphasized that Japan is within the range of its missiles,
referring to specific Japanese cities, and in March 2017,
North Korea announced that it had launched a ballistic
missile by “units tasked to strike the bases of the U.S.
military forces in Japan.” Such North Korean military
trends constitute a serious and imminent threat to the
security not only of Japan but also of the entire region
and the international community, and furthermore,
the threat from North Korea’s improved capabilities
in the development and use of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles has entered a new stage. North Korea’s
abduction of Japanese nationals, a grave issue concerning
the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and security of the
Japanese people, is yet to be resolved. A solution will
require concrete actions by North Korea.
Today, China has significant influence in the
international community. Accordingly, there continues
to be strong expectations on China to recognize its
responsibility in the international community, accept
and comply with international norms, and play an active
role in a more cooperative manner in regional and global
issues. In the meantime, China has been continuously
increasing its defense budget at a high level, and has been
rapidly reinforcing its military capabilities in a wide range
of areas, without sufficient transparency. In particular,


Asymmetrical military capabilities, in this context, refer to means of attack different from those of an opponent with superior conventional military capabilities. Such measures are exploited to


-----

China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its
asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military
activities by other countries in the region, denying access
and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding
areas (“Anti-Access/Area-Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities),
and recently, pursuing large-scale military reforms
designed to build its joint operations structure with actual
combat in mind. In addition, China is rapidly expanding
and intensifying its activities both in quality and quantity
in the maritime and aerial domains in the region,
including in the East and South China Seas. In particular,
China has continued to take assertive actions with regard
to issues of confl icts of interest in the maritime domain,
as exemplifi ed by its attempts to change the status quo
by coercion, and has signaled its position to realize its
unilateral assertions without making any compromises.
As for the seas and airspace around Japan, Chinese
government ships have routinely and repeatedly intruded
into Japan’s territorial waters, and China has engaged
in dangerous activities that could cause unintended
consequences, such as its naval vessel’s direction of fi re
control radar at a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF) destroyer, the fl ight of fi ghters abnormally close
to SDF aircraft, and its announcement of establishing
the “East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone
(ADIZ)” based on its own assertion, thereby infringing
the freedom of overfl ight. In the South China Sea, China
has continued to take unilateral actions that change the
status quo and heighten tension, including large-scale and
rapid reclamation of multiple features, establishment of
outposts there, and their use for military purposes, based
on China’s unique assertions which are incompatible
with the existing international order, and has made steady
efforts to create a fait accompli. In addition, a Chinese
fi ghter is alleged to have fl own abnormally close to and
conducted an intercept of a U.S. Forces aircraft. These
Chinese activities represent serious security concerns of
the region encompassing Japan, and of the international
community. For this reason, China is urged to further
increase transparency regarding its military and enhance
its compliance with international norms. It is a key task
to further strengthen mutual understanding and trust
by promoting dialogue and exchanges with China, and
make further progress on measures to build trust, such as
measures to avoid and prevent unintended consequences
in the maritime domain.
Russia, while perceiving the buildup of an affl uent
nation as its task for the present, attaches importance
to becoming an infl uential power in a multipolarizing
world, based on the deployment of its new economic,
lt l d ilit i ht R i h t d th


strengthening of the readiness of its Armed Forces and
the development and acquisition of new equipment,
while continuing to give priority to its nuclear force.
Recently, a confrontational relationship has developed
between Russia and such countries as the United States
and European nations over Ukraine which Russia
deems is part of its sphere of infl uence. Meanwhile,
Russia took actions intended to expand its international
infl uence, including military interventions in Syria. Even
as expenditure cuts are thus made in a wide range of
areas, Russia has striven to secure defense spending with
priority and has continued to modernize its Armed Forces.
Recently, Russia has intensifi ed its military activities not
only in the Asia-Pacifi c region, but also in the Arctic,
Europe, the periphery of mainland United States, and
the Middle East, and has been expanding the area of
activities. In the Far East, the Russian Armed Forces have
conducted large-scale exercises. Russia has unveiled the
deployment of coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles in the
Northern Territories and a plan to deploy a division to
the Northern Territories or the Chishima Islands, and thus
continued attention needs to be paid to Russian military
movements in the Far East, including the Four Northern
Islands. Furthermore, Russia’s changing of the status quo
by force or coercion in Ukraine has heightened the threat
of Russian “hybrid warfare,” especially in Europe, and
is perceived as a global issue that could affect the entire
international community, including Asia.
As seen above, in the Asia-Pacifi c region, where the
security environment has increasingly grown severe, the
presence of the U.S. Forces remains extremely important
in order to achieve regional stability. Accordingly, Japan
and other countries, such as Australia and the ROK, have
established bilateral alliances and partnerships with the
United States, and allow the stationing and rotational
deployment of the U.S. Forces in their territories. In
addition, the U.S. Forces have recently taken measures
to further strengthen their presence. In regard to the
responses to the unilateral changes in the status quo
by force or coercion based on unique assertions, it is


“Anti-Access/Area-Denial”

**KeyWord**

[“A2/AD”] capabilities

Anti-Access (A2) is a concept introduced by the United States. It refers

to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing

force from entering an operational area. Area-Denial (AD) refers to

capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing
force’s freedom of action within the operational area. Weapons used for

A2/AD include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons,

air-defense systems, submarines, and mines.


-----

important for the international community centered
around countries in the region to make concerted efforts
to protect the existing international order based on law.

See Fig. I-1-2-1 (Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region

(Approximate Strength))

See


Opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges
between countries in the region have increased in
recent years. Multilateral security dialogues, including


the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN
Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus),
conferences hosted by nongovernmental institutions
with the participation of relevant defense ministers,
and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises are
held. Promoting and developing such multilayered
approaches among countries is also important to
ensure stability in the region.

|Russian Far East|80,000 troops (12) 260 vessels - 630,000 tons 390 aircraft|
|---|---|

|orth Korea|1,020,000 troops (33) 780 vessels - 560 aircraft 104,000 tons|
|---|---|


Fig. I-1-2-1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (Approximate Strength)

**80,000 troops (12)** **260 vessels - 630,000 tons** **390 aircraft**
**Russian Far East**

**China** **1,020,000 troops (33)** **780 vessels -** **560 aircraft**

**North Korea** **104,000 tons**

**1,150,000 troops (149)**
**10,000 marines (2)** **ROK**

**495,000 troops (54)**

**740 vessels -** **29,000 marines (3)**
**1,630,000 tons** **240 vessels -**

**213,000 tons**

**620 aircraft** **Japan**

**2,720 aircraft**

**140,000 troops (15)**

**U.S. Forces in the ROK**

**134 vessels -**

**15,000 troops (5)** **479,000 tons**

**80 aircraft** **400 aircraft**

**U.S. Forces in Japan**

**16,000 troops (1)**

**Taiwan** **150 aircraft**

**130,000 troops (15)** **U.S. 7th Fleet**
**10,000 marines (3)**

**30 vessels -**

**390 vessels -**

**400,000 tons**

**205,000 tons**
**510 aircraft** **50 (carrier-based)**

aircraft

The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1

Notes: 1. Source: “The Military Balance 2017,” documents published by the U.S. DoD, etc.
2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of 2016; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding
transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only).
3. Figures for the U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of the Army and Marine Corps personnel combined.
4. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft.
5. Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. That of North Korea shows only divisions. That of
Taiwan includes military police as well.
6. The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam.
7. Figures of combat aircraft of the U.S. Forces, Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighters.

Legend

Ground forces Naval vessels Combat aircraft
(200,000 troops) (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft)


-----

**Section 3 Global Security Issues**


A range of regional confl icts still exists across the globe,
which have complex and diverse backgrounds and forms.
Especially in the Middle East and Africa, against the
backdrop of the turmoil, civil war, and regional confl ict
that followed the “Arab Spring,” there is an increase in
areas which lack national governance. In many cases,
international terrorist organizations made inroads in
these areas, expanded their organizations, and intensifi ed
their activities. These cases have made regional confl icts
more complex, making it increasingly challenging for
nations and regional organizations with confl icts in their
regions to address and resolve them, as well as for the
international community. On the other hand, climate
change and competition between sovereign nations
to secure resources and energy could become more
tangible, and cause regional disputes. They have become
new factors that affect the global security environment.
Furthermore, even as the various functions of military
forces are utilized more to conduct prompt rescue
activities in response to large-scale natural disasters and
outbreaks of infectious diseases, the presence of countries
with weak governance has made it more diffi cult to deal
with risks such as the explosive outbreak and spread of
infectious diseases.
The proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear,
biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of ballistic
missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs
is still viewed as a signifi cant threat to the international
community. In particular, there are continuing concerns
about the acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state
actors, such as international terrorist organizations. In
this regard, the international community continues to
pursue efforts to counter terrorism activities that utilize
nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.
Meanwhile, with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, the
United States, the European Union (EU), among other
countries have imposed sanctions against Iran, while
engaging in discussions with the country. In 2015, a fi nal
agreement was reached on the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action, containing provisions on Iran’s implementation
of measures to restrict uranium enrichment activities
and ban the production of weapons-grade plutonium.
Also, in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic
missile issues, in March 2016, the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2270,
and following North Korea’s second nuclear test in
2016 th UNSC d t d R l ti 2321 i N b


that year that imposes more rigorous limitations on the
movement of people, goods, and funds to North Korea,
including placing a cap on coal exports, a major source of
income for North Korea. Furthermore, in June 2017, the
UNSC adopted Resolution 2356 that extends the scope
of sanctions in response to the repeated ballistic missile
launches and other acts conducted by North Korea.
In addition, initiatives which focus on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are under way, such as
the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
entering into force between the United States and Russia
in 2011.
Furthermore, there has been a growing tendency
for the threat of international terrorism to spread
rapidly. The diversifi cation of actors that carry out acts
of terrorism, coupled with the increasing complexity of
regional confl icts, have made the prevention of terrorism
even more challenging. ISIL, through ingenious public
relations strategies using the Internet and other tools,
is communicating its extremist ideology and gaining
multiple followers and new members around the world.
In addition, the United States, European nations, and
elsewhere face concerns over the threat of so-called
“home-grown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism – namely, acts of
terrorism perpetrated in the home country singlehandedly
or by a small number of people, including those who


Islamic State of Iraq and

**KeyWord**

the Levant (ISIL)

ISIL is a Sunni-affi liated extremist organization that sprang from

Al Qaeda in Iraq. ISIL has expanded its reach in Iraq since January

2014 when public security deteriorated due to religious opposition

and other factors. Unlike conventional terrorist organizations, ISIL
maintains strong funding, a powerful and refi ned military force, and

a well-developed organizational structure. Another unique aspect is

that ISIL holds de facto control over a large swath of land. It has been
noted that ISIL effectively utilizes online propaganda based on a strong

public relations strategy, while using it for recruiting, which has led to a

large infl ux of fi ghters to its ranks. Recently it has been pointed out that

ISIL controls less land, especially since the Mosul offensive launched

in October 2016 that recaptured about half of ISIL’s lands to the East,
causing the organization to weaken. Terrorist attacks led by ISIL have

extended beyond the Middle East to include targets around the world

in Europe and Asia. As of late, it has been suggested that attacks have

shifted from those directly led by ISIL to those carried out by certain

supporters upon being encouraged (remote operations). This has raised

concerns about the further spread of terrorism and radicalization.


-----

experienced combat in a conflict area and returned to
their home country, or those who have become influenced
by extremism. As shown by the terror attacks in Paris in
2015 and in Brussels in 2016, the threat of international
terrorism is not confined to the Middle East and North
Africa, and is spreading globally. In view of incidents
including the terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh in
July 2016 that claimed the lives of Japanese nationals, it
can be said that Japan is in a situation where it needs to
squarely address the threat of international terrorism as
its own challenge.
Securing the stable use of not only conventional
areas of activity – sea and airspace – but also new areas of
activity such as outer space and cyberspace is becoming
a significant security challenge for the international
community. Further developments in military and science
technology and the recent dramatic advances in ICT are
increasing the dependence of social infrastructure and
military activities on outer space and cyberspace. On the
other hand, the development of anti-satellite weapons by
nations and the increasing number of cyber attacks, in
some of which the involvement of government agencies
is suspected, are heightening the risks to the stable use
of outer space and cyberspace. In recent years, concrete
initiatives have been under way in various countries
aimed at strengthening an entire country’s capabilities
to respond to cyber attacks including private companies,
as well as acquiring capabilities to monitor threats to
satellites and other space assets. There is also an effort in
the international community to promote the rule of law,
including establishing a code of conduct in outer space
and cyberspace.
With regard to the maritime domain, which has
been regarded as a fundamental means for supporting
international trade, piracy acts have taken place in various
parts of the world, and there have been cases where
countries unilaterally assert their rights and take actions
based on their own assertion that is inconsistent with the
existing international order, thereby unduly infringing the
freedom of navigation on the high seas and of overflight.
Recently, China has made further efforts to create a fait
accompli through unilateral acts that alter the status quo


and heighten tension, such as large-scale and rapid land
reclamation in the South China Sea, establishment of
outposts there, and their use for military purposes. In
response to these situations, the international community
has been taking various measures such as continuing
to conduct antipiracy operations in relevant waters
including off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of
Aden, collaborating to protect the existing international
order based on law including a free and open maritime
order, and implementing initiatives designed to avoid and
prevent unintended consequences in the maritime domain
and airspace.
As seen above, the international community today
faces complex, diverse, and broad security challenges
and destabilizing factors. Along with deterrence and
handling of armed conflicts, the roles of military forces
in responding to these challenges are becoming so
diverse that they include a broad spectrum of activities
from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance.
Moreover, as opportunities for military forces to play
such important roles increase, comprehensive responses
are required that combine military capacity with other
capacities such as diplomacy, law enforcement and
justice, intelligence, and the economy.
Developments in science and technology, as
represented by the great leaps forward in ICT in recent
years, have also had spillover effects on the military.
The United States and other developed countries
put emphasis on research and development of new
technologies including those for precision guidance,
unmanned vehicles, and stealth capability, while actively
seeking international joint development and production
to address rising development and production costs and
the deterioration of the national fiscal situation. On the
other hand, states and non-state actors without cuttingedge technology are anticipated to develop and acquire
WMDs and asymmetrical means of attack such as cyber
attacks, while acquiring the technologies of developed
countries in an illicit manner. How these trends in
military science and technology will unfold is expected
to have significant effects on military strategies and
military balance in the future.


-----

**Chapter** **Defense Policies of Countries**
### 2


**Section 1 The United States**


**Security and Defense Policies**
**1**


During then President Barack Obama’s eight-year term in
offi ce from January 2009 to January 2017, the patterns of
U.S. involvement in the world had changed signifi cantly
in a new security environment following the end of the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, including a shift in the
global balance of power, attempts to change the status
quo by force or coercion in Ukraine and the South China
Sea, the intensifi cation of the activities of international
terrorist organizations, and the development and
improved operational capability of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles which have reached a new
level of threat.
Based on a strategic policy of pursuing four national
interests, i.e., security, prosperity, respect for universal
values, and international order based on norms, the former
Obama administration had demonstrated a commitment
to playing a role in the peace and stability of the world
by drawing on its world-leading, comprehensive national
power, even in the face of a severe fi nancial situation.
As is outlined in its strategy documents,[1] the
United States under the former Obama administration
had focused on the Asia-Pacifi c region by promoting a
rebalance towards the region, based on the approach of
deepening relations with its allies there and enhancing
both the quantity and quality of U.S. assets deployed to
the region.
Concurrently, the United States had dealt with
security issues outside of the Asia-Pacifi c region. In
response to the attacks in Iraq and Syria since 2014 by
ISIL and other organizations, the United States, since
August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR),
a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes


(see Chapter 3, Section 1-2). With regard to Afghanistan,
in October 2015, then President Obama revised the plan
to withdraw U.S. troops by the end of 2016, and instead
stated that a strength of 8,400 troops would be maintained
during his term in offi ce. Furthermore, in order to
strengthen the deterrent of the U.S. Forces in Europe
facing a large infl ux of refugees and an increasingly tense
situation in Ukraine, the budget related to the European
Reassurance Initiative[2] had been increased.
In other efforts, the United States had also promoted
the Third Offset Strategy to develop military technologies
in new fi elds to maintain and increase the superiority
of the U.S. Forces, deeming that its military superiority
is gradually eroding in light of recent trends, including
China and other countries’ enhanced “Anti-Access/AreaDenial” (“A2/AD”) capabilities.
Against this backdrop, newly elected President
Donald Trump declared a shift to an “America First”
policy in his inaugural address made on January 20,
2017, unveiling a new vision for governance in which all
future decisions, including on diplomatic issues, would
be made to benefi t the workers and their families in the


**KeyWord** Third Offset Strategy

The United States’ Third Offset Strategy is based on the concept of

offsetting the capacity of the adversary by acquiring asymmetrical

means that differ from the capacity of the adversary. There were
two previous offset strategies as follows: (1) the nuclear deterrent

of the 1950s; and (2) precision-guided missiles and stealth aircraft

technologies of the 1970s.


The policy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacifi c region has been set out in “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” released in January 2012, the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR) released in March 2014, the National Security Strategy (NSS) released in February 2015, and the National Military Strategy (NMS) released in July 2015.

This initiative reassures allies and partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that the United States is committed to their security and territorial integrity. The initiative includes measures
such as increasing the presence of the U.S. Forces in Europe, conducting further bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with NATO allies and other countries, and strengthening the


-----

United States. President Trump also stated that he would
reinforce old alliances and form new relationships as
well as unite the world to completely eradicate Islamic
extremist terrorism from the face of the Earth.
In addition, on the same day of its inauguration
the Trump administration articulated the issues of six
policies[3] including foreign and military policies. The
administration’s foreign policy[4] sets forth that peace
through strength lies at the center of that policy, and assigns
an order of priority to the components of the foreign
policy. Greatest priority is placed on defeating ISIL and
other Islamic extremist terrorist organizations, followed
by the rebuilding of the U.S. Forces by reversing the
reduction trend in the Navy and Air Force. Furthermore,
the policy outlines that the Trump administration would
embrace diplomacy and would welcome old enemies
becoming friends and friends becoming allies. In its
military policy,[5] the Trump administration touched upon
the need to deploy various assets to defend the United
States, expressed the view that it cannot allow other
countries to surpass U.S. military capability, and stated
that it would pursue the highest level of military readiness.
The Trump administration also set forth as priority issues
the development of a state-of-the-art missile defense
system to protect against missile attacks from Iran and
North Korea, and the advancement of cyber capabilities.
Based on these policy issues, President Trump
conducted a readiness review of the U.S. Forces soon after
taking office, and instructed U.S. Secretary of Defense
Mattis[6] to submit a plan for improving this readiness and
to start establishing a new National Defense Strategy
(NDS) for rebuilding the U.S. Forces.
With regard to defeating ISIL set as a top priority of
the administration, President Trump ordered his cabinet


President Trump giving a speech on the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford under construction
on rebuilding the military in March 2017 [photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy]

members and others to quickly begin establishing a plan
to defeat ISIL, and decided that the U.S. Secretary of
Defense would be responsible for presenting the draft
proposal of this plan.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has yet to
indicate a comprehensive strategy on how it will be
involved in regional security in the Asia-Pacific, the
Middle East, and Europe. It has, however, made clear that
it would continue to emphasize the security of the AsiaPacific region. In particular, at the instruction of President
Trump, the United States reviewed its policy on North
Korea and strengthened its military presence against
North Korea (see 1-3 of this Section). Also, in the Middle
East, in April 2017, President Trump determined that
the Assad regime carried out a chemical weapons attack
on an area controlled by opposition forces in northwest
Syria, and then ordered strikes against the Syrian military
(see Chapter 3, Section 1-4), while the United States used
the Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) in its arsenal


The six policy issues announced by the Trump administration on January 20, 2017 are: (1) America First Energy Plan; (2) America First Foreign Policy; (3) Bringing Back Jobs and Growth; (4) Making
Our Military Strong Again; (5) Standing Up for Our Law Enforcement Community; and (6) Trade Deals that Work for All Americans.

“The America First Foreign Policy” outlines the following order of priority (in what follows, “we” refers to the United States):

(1) Defeating ISIL and other radical Islamic terror groups will be our highest priority. To defeat and destroy these groups, we will pursue aggressive joint and coalition military operations when necessary.

(2) Next, we will rebuild the American military. Our Navy has shrunk from more than 500 ships in 1991 to 275 in 2016. Our Air Force is roughly one third smaller than in 1991. President Trump is
committed to reversing this trend, because he knows that our military dominance must be unquestioned.

(3) Finally, in pursuing a foreign policy based on American interests, we will embrace diplomacy. The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when
old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies.

The main items of the “Making Our Military Strong Again” issue are as follows (in what follows, “we” refers to the United States):

-  Our military needs every asset at its disposal to defend America. We cannot allow other nations to surpass our military capability. The Trump administration will pursue the highest level of military readiness.

-  President Trump will end the defense sequester and submit a new budget to Congress outlining a plan to rebuild our military. We will provide our military leaders with the means to plan for our
future defense needs.

-  We will also develop a state-of-the-art missile defense system to protect against missile-based attacks from states like Iran and North Korea.

-  Cyber warfare is an emerging battlefield, and we must take every measure to safeguard our national security secrets and systems. We will make it a priority to develop defensive and offensive cyber
capabilities at our U.S. Cyber Command, and recruit the best and brightest Americans to serve in this crucial area.

-  We must also ensure that we have the best medical care, education and support for our military service members and their families. We will get our veterans the care they need wherever and
whenever they need it.

On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum on “Rebuilding the U.S. Armed Forces” concerning national security for the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. This memorandum states, “To pursue peace through strength, it shall be the policy of the United States to rebuild the U.S. Armed Forces,” and then instructs the
review of readiness posture and budget requests related to this review, the establishment of a National Defense Strategy (NDS) based on a new national security strategy, and the start of the Nuclear


-----

for the fi rst time in combat against ISIL in Afghanistan.[7]
These actions indicate the United States’ posture of
continuing to deal with security issues also outside of the
Asia-Pacifi c region.
At the same time, along with withdrawing from the
Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) and pursuing trade and
economic policies that prioritize domestic employment,
in the area of security policy President Trump has thus far
expressed the view that certain allies considered to have
a small cost burden should make payments proportionate
to the security provided to them by the United States. In
this connection, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson, who
attended the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting held in
Brussels in March 2017, requested that NATO members
quickly achieve the goal of increasing defense spending
to 2% or more of GDP.
Following the inauguration of the new administration
and the declaration of its shift to America First policy,
attention will focus on specifi c relationship-building
exercises between the United States and its allies and
partners in the future. Attention will also be given
towards the extent to which such policy changes ushered
in by the Trump administration will affect the policies
of other countries, when coupled with changes in the
situation surrounding the Asia-Pacifi c, the Middle East,
and Europe.

**1** **Understanding of Security**


The National Military Strategy released in July 2015
during the former Obama administration explicitly cites
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as “revisionist
states” that are attempting to revise key aspects of the
international order and are acting in a manner that
threatens U.S. national security interests. It also mentions
that violent extremist organizations such as ISIL are
becoming imminent threats.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration has yet to
release a strategy document providing a comprehensive
view on its recognition of security threats. Nevertheless,
President Trump placed the defeat of ISIL and other
Islamic extremist terrorist organizations as a top priority


immediately after his inauguration. Additionally, he
stated with regard to the attack on Syria executed in
April 2017 that inhibiting and deterring the proliferation
and the use of chemical weapons is in the indispensable
interest of U.S. security. Also, in April 2017, U.S.
Secretary of State Tillerson explained to the UN Security
Council that the threat of a North Korean nuclear attack
on the ROK and Japan was real, and that failure to act on
the most pressing security issue in the world might bring
catastrophic consequences, while also pointing out that it
was likely only a matter of time before North Korea had
the capability to strike the U.S. mainland. Furthermore,
in April 2017, President Trump ordered a review of
the agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue (see Chapter 3,
Section 2-5) based on his understanding that Iran is not
following the spirit of the agreement. At the Japan-U.S.
Defense Ministerial Meeting in February 2017, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Mattis expressed his concerns
towards China’s actions in the East and South China
Seas, and during a press conference in Afghanistan
in April 2017, he indicated the view that the United
States would have to confront Russia, which does not
attempt to recognize the sovereignty of other countries
in violation of international law.
In light of this understanding, it is believed that
based on its America First governance vision, the United
States considers states and organizations that attempt to
threaten the interests of the United States and its allies as
threats to the country, and in particular, the United States
identifi es North Korea and extremist organizations such
as ISIL, along with stopping the proliferation and use of
weapons of mass destruction, as issues that should be
addressed with priority.

**2** **Defense Strategy**


**2**


The QDR released in March 2014 states that three pillars,
which are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, would
be emphasized in order to embody priorities outlined in
the Defense Strategic Guidance[8] including rebalancing
to the Asia-Pacifi c region and maintaining a strong
commitment to stability in Europe and the Middle East,


The MOAB “GBU-43/B” dropped by the U.S. Forces is approximately 10 m in length and weighs about 9.8 tons. It is said to be the largest and the most destructive non-nuclear aerial bomb in the
U.S. arsenal. After being dropped from a large transport aircraft such as a C-130, the massive bomb is guided to its target using GPS.

The Defense Strategic Guidance was released in January 2012 by the former Obama administration. It began withdrawing U.S. Forces from Iraq and Afghanistan after a decade of war. Also, due to
both domestic and external factors demanding deep cuts in government spending including defense spending under the Government’s serious fi scal situation, defense priorities were reviewed once i


-----

namely: protect the homeland; build security globally;
and project power and win decisively.[9]

The QDR states that across the three pillars, the
U.S. Forces are capable of simultaneously implementing
the following undertakings, and if deterrence fails at
any given time, the U.S. Forces could defeat a regional
adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and
deny the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs
on—another aggressor in another region.[10]

1) Defending homeland
2) Conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist
operations
3) Deterring aggression and assuring allies through
forward presence and engagement in multiple regions
Furthermore, in order to achieve the three pillars, the
DoD seeks innovative approaches to how it fi ghts, how
it postures its force, and how it leverages its asymmetric
strengths and technological advantages. More
specifi cally, the QDR mentions positioning additional
forward deployed naval forces in critical areas, such as
the Asia-Pacifi c region, and deploying new combinations
of ships, aviation assets, and crisis response forces.[11]

In this context, in February 2017, U.S. Secretary
of Defense Mattis stated, “The ultimate objective is to
build a larger, more capable, and more lethal joint force,”
with regard to long-term DoD initiatives in response to
President Trump’s instructions regarding the rebuilding
of the U.S. Forces. In this regard, attention will focus
on the details of the new national defense strategy being
established by the new administration.

**3** **Involvement in the Asia-Pacifi c Region**


U.S. aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson under way in the Philippine Sea on April 24, 2017

[photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy]

Parliament, clearly stating, for the fi rst time, that he
would give top priority to the U.S. presence and mission
in the Asia-Pacifi c region. The President indicated that
the United States would maintain its strong presence
in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), while
enhancing its presence in Southeast Asia.
On February 4, 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Mattis visited Japan and held a meeting with Minister of
Defense Inada at the very early timing of just two weeks
after the inauguration of the new Trump administration.
During the meeting, he emphasized that the Asia-Pacifi c
region remains a top priority for the United States and
that the United States would strengthen its commitment
by maintaining the presence of the U.S. Forces in the
region. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held on
February 10, 2017, Prime Minister Abe and President
Trump shared their concerns regarding the increasingly
severe security environment in the Asia-Pacifi c region,
including North Korea’s nuclear and missile development
which have reached a new level of threat, and unilateral
attempts to change the status quo in the East and South
China Seas. The joint statement released on the same day
affi rms that the United States will strengthen its presence
in the region.


**3**


As indicated by the Defense Strategic Guidance, the
QDR, and the National Security Strategy (NSS), the
United States places emphasis on the Asia-Pacifi c region
and has continued a rebalancing policy to enhance
its presence in the region.[12] In November 2011, then
President Obama delivered a speech to the Australian


9 The three pillars constitute primarily of the following:
(1) Protect the homeland: Maintain the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the United States. Protection of the homeland includes assisting U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores,
and borders, and in responding effectively to disasters.
(2) Build security globally: Continue a strong commitment to shaping world events in order to deter and prevent confl ict and to assure the security of allies and partners.
(3) Project power and win decisively: The U.S. Forces deter acts of aggression in one or more theaters by remaining capable of decisively defeating adversaries, while projecting power to provide
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

10 The 2010 QDR stated that the U.S. Forces possess the capability of countering attacks by two countries while also being able to conduct a wide range of operations. The 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance states that the United States maintains forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’s aggressive objectives in one region while being capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing
unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.

11 The QDR states that the Joint Force would: rebalance for a broad spectrum of confl ict; rebalance and sustain its presence and posture abroad; rebalance capability, capacity, and readiness; and equip
itself with advanced capabilities and readiness while scaling back the U.S. Forces. The QDR notes that even as budget and other resource cuts are made, the DoD would give priority to the following
capability areas that are in close alignment with the pillars of the defense strategy: (1) missile defense; (2) nuclear deterrence; (3) cyber; (4) space; (5) air/sea; (6) precision strike; (7) intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); (8) counter terror and special operations; and (9) resilience.

12 The QDR, etc. state that the centerpiece of the DoD commitment to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacifi c region is to update and enhance security initiatives with its allies in the region, including Japan. i


-----

In particular, the Trump administration conducts a
review of policy on North Korea along with ending the
former Obama administration’s “strategic patience”
policy which he considers to have failed in terms of
past efforts to block North Korea’s development and
testing of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and
has repeatedly stated that “All options are on the table”
including diplomatic, security, and economic measures.[13]
Amidst this, in April 2017, it was announced that the
aircraft carrier strike group led by the USS Carl Vinson,
originally scheduled to depart Singapore for Australia,
was headed north for duties in the Western Pacifi c, while
the nuclear submarine USS Michigan docked in the Port
of Busan, ROK. In May 2017, B1-B strategic bombers
fl ew over the Korean Peninsula, following a similar fl ight
earlier in March. Furthermore, it is also reported that
the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system[14]
deployed with the U.S. Forces in the ROK reached its
initial capability in May 2017.
U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson stated at a UN
Security Council ministerial meeting held in April 2017
that more pressure would be placed on North Korea
through economic sanctions and diplomatic means so
that it would give up development of its nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles. Yet, while mentioning once again
that all options are on the table, he also noted that this
pressure will be backed up by a willingness to counteract
North Korean aggression with military action, and the


United States would continue to defend itself and its
allies.[15] Given this policy on North Korea taken by the
Trump administration, it is believed that the United
States will continue to demonstrate its military presence
to North Korea.

**4** **Third Offset Strategy**


**4**


In November 2014, then U.S. Secretary of Defense
Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative and
expressed his expectation that it would develop into a
third offset strategy. Since the 1950s, the United States
has invested in the development of military technologies
in new fi elds in which adversaries do not have capabilities.
Through a strategy of acquiring asymmetrical means
to offset an adversary’s capabilities,[16] the United States
has maintained military operational and technological
superiority. Today, however, such U.S. superiority is
gradually eroding as a result of potential adversaries
modernizing their military forces and acquiring advanced
military capabilities, and with technologies proliferating.
The United States notes that this initiative was established
to newly identify innovative ways to sustain and expand
U.S. superiority, utilizing limited resources.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work,
who is leading the work of establishing this initiative,
states that the third offset strategy is aimed at gaining
technological, organizational, and operational superiority


B1-B strategic bomber

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifi cations, performance>
Maximum speed: Mach 1.25

Maximum radius of action: 11,991 km

Payload: Internal 34,019 kg, external 31,751 kg
<Description>

A strategic bomber developed by Boeing and employed by the U.S. Air Force


THAAD system

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Description>

System for intercepting short- and medium-range missiles at the

terminal stage (between a ballistic missile’s atmospheric reentry and
impact. It apprehends and intercepts the target at high altitude in the

exo-atmosphere or the upper atmosphere.)


13 The Trump administration’s policy on North Korea of ending “strategic patience” in favor of the view that “all options are on the table” was clearly articulated by U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson and Vice
President Pence at a press conference during their visits to the ROK in March and April 2017. U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson once again repeated this stance at the UN Security Council’s ministerial
meeting on North Korea held on April 28, 2017.

14 A ballistic missile defense system that intercepts short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase from the ground. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 for ballistic missile defense
systems that track and intercept targets at high altitude in the upper atmosphere or beyond the atmosphere.

15 In addition, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson stated at the UN Security Council ministerial meeting held on April 28, 2017 that the United States will not negotiate a way back to the negotiating table with
North Korea, and will only engage in talks with North Korea when it exhibits a good-faith commitment to abiding by the Security Council resolutions and its past promises to end its nuclear programs.

16 Then Secretary Hagel stated that the previous two “offset strategies” were as follows: (1) in the 1950s, the United States offset the conventional capacity of the former Soviet Union by using the
nuclear deterrent; and (2) in the 1970s, while the nuclear capabilities of the former Soviet Union achieved parity with those of the United States, the United States gained superiority over the former


-----

over adversaries, in order to strengthen deterrence
using conventional assets against great powers, taking
Russia and China into account. He states that to this
end, investments would be made with priority on
human-machine collaboration and combat teaming.[17]
In addition, Deputy Secretary Work explains that the
competitive environments have changed signifi cantly due
to innovations in commercial technologies, and in order
to follow and make use of commercial technologies, the
United States must work more closely with the private
sector. He further notes that the proliferation of technology
could cause loss of superiority in a short timeframe.

**5** **Nuclear Strategy**


**6** **FY2018 Budget**


As the budget defi cit of the U.S. Government is deepening
in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August
2011 established a signifi cant cut in government spending
by FY2021. In January 2012, the DoD announced that
the reduction in defense spending in light of the act
would amount to about US$487 billion over the 10
years from FY2012 to FY2021 (about US$259 billion
over the fi ve years from FY2013 to FY2017). In March
2013, the mandatory sequestration of government
spending including defense spending was started based
on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. Mandatory
sequestration for the FY2014 and FY2015 budgets was
eased as a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act of the
Democratic and Republican parties passed in December
2013. Furthermore, mandatory sequestration for the
FY2016 and FY2017 budgets was eased as a result of the
Bipartisan Budget Act passed in November 2015.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration announced
that it would end the mandatory sequestration of
defense spending in order to rebuild the U.S. military,
while the defense budget request in the Statement on
Proposed FY2018 Budget submitted to Congress in May
2017 called for a basic budget of US$574.5 billion,[19]
representing about a 10% increase over the previous
year. At the same time, it also declared the need to lift the
defense budget cap in order to protect the security of the
United States. For the overseas contingency operations
budget, a total of US$64.6 billion would be appropriated
per the request, including an increase in the budgeted
amount for the OIR and the European Reassurance
Initiative. The key principles of the defense budget
include: (1) improving warfi ghting readiness; (2) address
evolving national security challenges; and (3) increasing
capacity and lethality while preparing for future growth.
Objectives for the U.S. Army will be an increase in units,
fl ight training, and ammunition, for the U.S. Navy a
total of eight combat ships will be procured, along with
91 aircraft, including 24 F-35(B) fi ghters and 14 F/A18E/F fi ghter attack aircraft, and for the U.S. Air Force a
total of 46 F-35 fi ghters will be procured and personnel
increased to address shortages of pilots and maintenance
workers. Furthermore, for ballistic missile defense, the


**5**


While then President Obama aimed to realize a world
without nuclear weapons, he noted that this will not be
realized in the near future, and that a nuclear deterrent
will be maintained as long as nuclear weapons exist.
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in
April 2010 stated that the nuclear security environment
is changing, and that nuclear terrorism and nuclear
proliferation are an imminent threat today. Furthermore,
it pointed to the necessity of working on the issue of
ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers,
in particular Russia and China.[18]

In June 2013, then President Obama delivered a
speech on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Berlin,
which was followed by the release of the Report on
Nuclear Employment Strategy by the DoD on the
same day. In the speech and report, the United States
announced that it would negotiate with Russia to pursue
up to a one-third reduction in U.S. deployed strategic
nuclear weapons.
On the other hand, President Trump has instructed
U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis to initiate a new NPR to
ensure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is modern, robust,
fl exible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to
deter 21st century threats and to reassure its allies. In
April 2017, Secretary of Defense Mattis directed the
commencement of the NPR and would make a fi nal
report to the president by the end of 2017.

See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Nuclear Weapons)


17 According to the explanation by Deputy Secretary Work in his address in November 2015, specifi c examples include investments in: (1) learning machines; (2) human-machine collaboration;
(3) assisted human operations; (4) human-machine combat teaming; and (5) networked autonomous weapons.

18 The NPR presents fi ve key objectives based on awareness of this security environment: (1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons; (3)
maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and (5) sustaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal.


-----

budget request calls for the completion of adding eight
new ground launching intercept missiles to the 32 already
deployed in Alaska by the end of 2017, along with the 4

**Military Posture**
**2**

**1** **General Situation**


In regard to strategic offensive weapons including
nuclear force, the United States under the former
Obama administration proceeded with its reduction
based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that
came into force in February 2011. In April 2017, it
announced that its deployed strategic warheads[20] stood
at 1,411, while its deployed delivery platforms stood
at 673.[21] The United States is studying the concept of
a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an
effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce
reliance on nuclear weapons.[22]

In regard to Missile Defense (MD), the United States
under the former Obama administration announced the
BMDR in February 2010. On homeland defense, the
review noted that the United States would use groundbased interceptors to respond to Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) from North Korea and Iran, and that
in regard to regional defense, the United States would


in California, in order to reinforce protection from the
threat of ICBMs launched by North Korea and Iran.

See Fig. I-2-1-1 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget)

See


expand investments in MD systems while taking a phased
adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region
and improve the MD capabilities step by step, working
with partner countries and properly sharing the burden.
However, in January 2012, the United States announced
that it would continue investments in MD programs in
its homeland and Europe while reducing the spending
for deployable regional MD systems with a view to
increasing reliance on its allies and partners in the future.
Further, in March 2013, the United States announced that
it would additionally deploy ground-based interceptors
in the U.S. homeland and mobile radars for Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) in Japan in order to bolster
homeland security in response to North Korea’s nuclear
test and the advancement of its long-range ballistic
missile development, while restructuring the program
of the standard missile (SM-3) Block IIB scheduled for
deployment in Europe. Furthermore, in July 2016, the
United States announced it would deploy to the ROK the
THAAD system in order to address the growing threat
from North Korea’s ballistic missiles. In May 2017,
it was reported that the THAAD system reached its
initial capability. Additionally, the Trump administration
announced that the United States successfully conducted
the fi rst intercept test targeting a mock-ICBM in
May 2017.[23] After taking offi ce, President Trump has
instructed U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis to initiate a
new BMDR to identify ways of strengthening missiledefense capabilities, rebalancing homeland and theater
defense priorities, and highlighting priority funding areas.
In May 2017, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis directed
the commencement of the BMDR and would make a fi nal
report to the president by the end of 2017.
The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled
by the individual branches of the broader armed forces,
rather it is operated under the leadership of the Unifi ed


Fig. I-2-1-1 Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget


Fig. I-2-1-1


Defense budget (in $1 million)

Year-on-year growth rate (%)
($1 million) (％)

800,000 20

700,000

15

600,000

10

500,000

400,000 5

300,000

0

200,000

–5

100,000

0 –10
12 13 14 15 16 17
(FY)

Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on Historical
Tables (Outlays), Budget of the United States Government, FY2015.
2. The amount for FY2016 is an estimate.


20 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted
as one nuclear warhead).

21 The fi gure as of March 1, 2017.

22 The concept is designed to cripple the A2 capabilities of an adversary and promptly strike a target anywhere in the world using non-nuclear long-range precision guided missiles that hit targets with
high accuracy.

23 The U.S. Missile Defense Agency stated that the targeted mock-ICBM was launched from the Reagan Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, while the ground-based


-----

Combatant Commands, comprising leaders from multiple
branches of the armed forces. The Unifi ed Combatant
Commands consist of three commands with functional
responsibilities and six commands with regional
responsibilities.
The U.S. ground forces consist of about 460,000
Army soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are
forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan,
among other countries. As described in the Defense
Strategic Guidance, the Army continues its transition to
a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct a
full range of operations worldwide. The Marine Corps
aims to acquire forces capable of responding to any
threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam
between smaller special operations forces and larger
heavy conventional forces.
The U.S. maritime forces consist of about 890
vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about
6.25 million tons. The 6th Fleet is deployed in the East
Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the
5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and northwest
Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacifi c; the 4th
Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the
7th Fleet in the western Pacifi c and Indian Ocean.
The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,580 combat
aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In
addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of
the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the
United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK.
Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in
cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace.
The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full
capability in November in the same year.

See Fig. I-2-1-2 (Structure of the Unifi ed Combatant Command)

**2** **Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacifi c Region**


Fig. I-2-1-2 Structure of the Unifi ed Combatant Command

|U.S. S of De|ecretary fense|
|---|---|


|U.S. Africa Command|U.S. Central Command|U.S. European Command|U.S. Northern 北方軍 Command|U.S. Pacific 太平洋軍 Command|U.S. Southern Command|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|


Fig. I-2-1-2

President : Functional command

: Geographic command

U.S. Secretary
of Defense

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs統合参謀本部議長of Staff

Operations CommandU.S. Special U.S. StrategicCommand U.S. TransportationCommand輸送軍

U.S. Africa U.S. Central U.S. European U.S. Northern北方軍 太平洋軍U.S. Pacific U.S. Southern
Command Command Command Command Command Command


broaden the perspective of the U.S. Forces and promote
better understanding of the U.S. Forces from allies, the
Pacifi c Command headquarters accept personnel from
allies in the region. Under this scheme, personnel from
Canada and Australia are currently serving in the Pacifi c
Command as deputy director level-offi cials.
The Pacifi c Command consists of the U.S. Army
Pacifi c, U.S. Pacifi c Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces
Pacifi c, and U.S. Pacifi c Air Forces, which are all
headquartered in Hawaii.
The Army Pacifi c’s subordinate commands include
the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in
the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces
in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the
Army Pacifi c assigns approximately 2,800 personnel to
commands, such as I Corps Forward and the U.S. Army
Japan Command in Japan.[24]

The U.S. Pacifi c Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet,
which is responsible for the Western Pacifi c and the
Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East
Pacifi c and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacifi c Fleet in total
controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet is centered on
a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in
Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial
lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical
national interests of the United States and its allies. The
7th Fleet consists of an aircraft carrier, amphibious ships,
and Aegis cruisers and destroyers.
The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacifi c deploys one
Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland
and Japan. Of this force, about 14,000 personnel are
in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fi ghters and other
aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning


**2**


The United States, a Pacifi c nation, continues to play an
important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the
Asia-Pacifi c region by placing the Pacifi c Command, a
joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps, in the region. The Pacifi c Command is
a command with regional responsibilities for the largest
geographical area, and its component commands include
U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to


24 The fi gures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of December 31, 2016), and could change


-----

ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are
deployed in the Western Pacifi c.[25]

The U.S. Pacifi c Air Force has three air forces, of
which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fi ghters and
C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force


stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16
fi ghters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

See Fig. I-2-1-3 (U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of

the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region)


See


Fig. I-2-1-3 U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region


Fig. I-2-1-3


**European Region**

Army: approx. 26,000 personnel
Navy: approx. 8,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 28,000 personnel U.S. Forces
Marines: approx. 3,000 personnel Army: approx. 461,000 personnel

Navy: approx. 319,000 personnel

Total: approx. 65,000 personnel

Air Force: approx. 313,000 personnel

(Total in 1987:

Marines: approx. 183,000 personnel

approx. 354,000 personnel)

U.S. European Command Total: approx. 1,276,000 personnel

(Total in 1987:
approx. 2,170,000 personnel)

U.S. Central Command

**Asia-Pacific Region** U.S. Northern

Command

Army: approx. 35,000 personnel
Navy: approx. 22,000 personnel
Air Force: approx. 26,000 personnel

U.S. Africa Command U.S. Pacific Command Marines: approx. 21,000 personnel

Total: approx. 104,000 personnel U.S. Southern
(Total in 1987: Command
approx. 184,000 personnel)

Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of the end of 2016), etc.
2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam.

**[Japan]**

-  Deploys F-22 and RQ-4 (Global Hawk)

-  Deploys MV-22 Osprey, P-8 and F-35B

-  Deploys second TPY-2 radar

-  Additionally deployed one Aegis ship (normal ship) (June 2015)

-  Switched one Aegis ship (normal ship) with Aegis BMD destroyer
(March 2016)

Seoul -  Additionally deploys two Aegis BMD destroyers (one already

deployed in October 2015 and one to be deployed in summer 2017)

ROK

Japan **[Guam]**

-  Rotationally deploys submarines

-  Rotationally deploys bombers

Okinawa -  Established a facility for aircraft

carrier’s temporary port of call

-  Deploys unmanned

Guam reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4)

Philippines Hawaii

Manila

**[Philippines]**

-  Signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for enhancing the presence
of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014)

-  Announced US$79 million assistance and provision of one patrol vessel and one survey
vessel (November 2015)

Singapore -  Implements joint patrol activities (March 2016–)

Indonesia -  Agreed on five locations such as Air Force bases, etc. to serve as hubs for implementing

defense cooperation based on EDCA (March 2016)

Jakarta -  Regularly deploys A-10 ground attack aircraft, etc. (April 2016–)

**[Singapore]**

-  Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat Darwin **[Australia]**
Ships (LCS) (To deploy four LCSs by At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the following initiatives:
end of 2017. The first ship started rotation in April 2013, the second ship -  Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia• Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia トンガ
in December 2014 and the third ship Australia
in October 2016)

-  Rotationally deployed P-8 (December In September 2016, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter announced a plan to deploy 60%
2015) of the assets of the U.S. Navy and overseas Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as to

-  Signed enhanced defense cooperation proceed with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment.
agreement (December 2015)

Canberra

-  A map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is used


-----

**Section 2 Korean Peninsula**


On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity
have been divided into two—north and south—for more
than half a century. Even today, the ROK and North Korea
pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each
other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Fig. I-2-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula


Peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula under
such security environment is an extremely important
challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region
of East Asia.

See Fig. I-2-2-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula)

|Col1|Col2|North Korea|ROK|U.S. Forces in Korea|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Total armed forces||Approx. 1.19 million personnel|Approx. 630,000 personnel|Approx. 23,000 personnel|
|Army|Ground troops|Approx. 1.02 million personnel|Approx. 495,000 personnel|Approx. 15,000 personnel|
||Tanks|T-62, T-54/-55, etc. Approx. 3,500|M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Approx. 2,400|M-1|
|Navy|Naval vessels|Approx. 780; 104,000 tons|Approx. 240; 213,000 tons|Supporting corps only|
||Destroyers Frigates Submarines|4 20|12 10 13||
||Marines||Approx. 29,000 personnel||
|Air Force|Combat aircraft|Approx. 560|Approx. 620|Approx. 80|
||3rd and 4th generation fighter aircraft|Mig-23 x 56 Mig-29 x 18 Su-25 x 34|F-4 x 70 F-16 x 163 F-15 x 60|F-16 x 60|
|Reference|Population|Approx. 25.1 million|Approx. 50.9 million||
||Term of service|Men: 12 years Women: 7 years|Army: 21 months Navy: 23 months Air Force: 24 months||


See


Fig. I-2-2-1


Orang

General Staff Department
Navy Headquarters Toksan Chaho
Pyongyang Defense Headquarters Kaechon Mayangdo

Taejo

Air Force Headquarters

Pyongyang

Chunghwa

Nampo Hwangju

Uijongbu

U.N. Command Headquarters

Mukho

U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Sagot Seoul

U.S. 2nd Infantry Division

Command Headquarters Suwon
Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea

Pyeongtaek Osan

U.S. 7th Air Force Headquarters

Kunsan

Taegu

Kwangju

Busan

Mokpo Chinhae

North Korea ROK U.S. Forces in Korea

Total armed forces Approx. 1.19 million personnel Approx. 630,000 personnel Approx. 23,000 personnel

Ground troops Approx. 1.02 million personnel Approx. 495,000 personnel Approx. 15,000 personnel

Army T-62, T-54/-55, etc. M-48, K-1, T-80 etc.

Tanks M-1

Approx. 3,500 Approx. 2,400

Naval vessels Approx. 780; 104,000 tons Approx. 240; 213,000 tons Supporting corps only

Destroyers 12

Navy Frigates 4 10

Submarines 20 13

Marines Approx. 29,000 personnel

Combat aircraft Approx. 560 Approx. 620 Approx. 80

Mig-23 x 56 F-4 x 70

Air Force 3rd and 4th

Mig-29 x 18 F-16 x 163 F-16 x 60

generation fighter aircraft

Su-25 x 34 F-15 x 60

Population Approx. 25.1 million Approx. 50.9 million

Army: 21 months

Reference Men: 12 years

Term of service Navy: 23 months

Women: 7 years

Air Force: 24 months

Note: Data from “The Military Balance 2017,” etc. Data for the troop strength of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) from U.S. DoD information (December 2016).


-----

**North Korea**
**1**


**1** **General Situation**

**1**


North Korea has been advocating the building of a
strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics,
military affairs, and economy,[1] and it adopts “militaryfi rst (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. “Militaryfi rst (Songun) politics” has been defi ned as a basic form
of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of
socialism to victory by giving priority to the military
forces in all activities under the principle of military
fi rst, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the
revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting
as the central and main force.[2] In fact, leader Kim Jongun, Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP),[3]
who is in a position to control the military, noted the
importance of military power in his report on the work
of the Central Committee at the Seventh Congress of
the KWP in May 2016: “It is necessary to uphold the
military-fi rst revolutionary path as the constant strategic
path, and strengthen the might of the military power in
all of its dimensions.” He also regularly visits military
organizations. In this light, it is conceivable that the
Chairman will continue to attach importance to and rely
on the military forces.
Although North Korea has been facing serious
economic diffi culties and has depended on the international
community for food and other resources, it seems to be
maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and
combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources
to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its
military forces along the DMZ. According to the offi cial
announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in
April 2017, the proportion of the defense budget in
the FY2016 national budget was 15.8%. However, it is
believed that this represents only a fraction of the real
defense expenditures.
Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and
reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities
by continuing to promote the development of WMDs and
ballistic missiles and the enhancement of its operation


capabilities, including conducting fi ve nuclear tests so
far and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles, and by
maintaining large-scale special operations forces. In
addition, North Korea repeatedly uses provocative rhetoric
and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan.[4]

Such a military trend in North Korea constitutes a
serious and imminent threat to the security not only of
Japan but also of the entire region and the international
community. Especially since last year, when it willfully
conducted two nuclear tests and launched more than 20
ballistic missiles, the development and enhancement
of the operating capabilities of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles by North Korea have reached a new
level of threat (see column). On this point, at the G7
Taormina Summit held in Italy in May of this year, the
leaders expressed the view that the situation in North
Korea is a top priority in the international agenda and
has come to pose a new level of threat of a grave nature
to international peace and stability. It was also agreed
that the G7 stands ready to strengthen measures to urge
North Korea to immediately and fully comply with all
relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs)
and abandon all nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
The leaders also strongly called on the international
community to redouble its efforts to ensure the thorough
implementation of relevant UNSCRs. In this manner,
there is a common understanding that the North Korea
issue is a global threat that is not confi ned to Northeast
Asia. Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of
nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. Suffi cient attention
needs to be paid to the development and deployment
of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the
Korean Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs and
ballistic missiles by North Korea.
Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely
closed regime, it is diffi cult to accurately capture the
details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is
necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them.


North Korea used to insist that it would open the door to a “powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)” in 2012, which marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim
Il-sung. Recently, however, North Korea has been using mainly the expression, “powerful and prosperous country (Kangseong Kukka).”

Written decision of the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016).

Kim Jong-un was named “Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party” at the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016. For consistency purposes, “Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party” is used for
the title of Kim Jong-un in this white paper, including for matters predating Kim Jong-un’s appointment as KWP Chairman.

In particular, from March to April 2013, North Korea underscored that it would exercise its right to preemptive nuclear attack against the United States and other countries, and that the strike zone of
its ballistic missiles included Japan, naming specifi c cities. For example, it has stated that “not only Yokosuka, Misawa, Okinawa, and Guam but also the U.S. mainland are within our range” (March
31, 2013, Rodong Sinmun), “none of Japan’s territories shall be spared from being the target of our retaliatory attack (listing the names of Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, and Kyoto in this context)”
(April 10, 2013, Rodong Sinmun), etc. More recently, the March 10, 2016 Rodong Sinmun stated that “once fi re breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, not only the bases in Japan for U.S. invasion
but anything in Japan that can be used for war shall turn into ashes in an instant,” and “[Choson], if it now so wishes, has the retaliatory power to not only destroy Japan but also smash Hawaii and
the United States.” On March 7, 2017, the Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported that “the Hwasong artillery corps of the KPA Strategic Rocket Forces, which are responsible for striking the


-----

military forces, arming the entire population, and
fortifying the entire country).[5]

North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly
of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly
1.19 million. While North Korea’s military forces
are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing


**2** **Military Posture**


**(1) General Situation**
North Korea has been building up its military capabilities
in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines
(extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all


**Commentary**

**A New Level of Threat**

North Korea has repeatedly launched a variety of ballistic missiles to date. In 2016 in particular, it conducted launches at an
unprecedented frequency, fi ring over 20 missiles, which is more than the total number of missiles (16) launched during the 18
years that Kim Jong-il was the Chairman of the National Defense Commission. Moreover, North Korea has continued to repeatedly
launch missiles in 2017, including what appears to be a new type of missile. The recent developments related to the ballistic missile
launches by North Korea are as follows:

(1) First, it appears that North Korea seeks to increase the range of its ballistic missiles. In 2016, it launched a long-distance ballistic
missile (a variant of Taepodong-2) disguised as a “Satellite” in February, and repeatedly launched a medium-range ballistic
missile (Musudan) which reportedly has Guam in its range. If the new type of ballistic missile that is presumed to have been
launched on a lofted trajectory on May 14, 2017 had been launched on a nominal trajectory, its range is expected to reach a
maximum of approximately 5,000 km at this point in time. Furthermore, the ballistic missile launched on July 4, 2017 is thought
to have a maximum range exceeding at least 5,500 km based on factors such as its fl ight altitude and distance, and is therefore,
considered to be an ICBM-class ballistic missile.
(2) Second, North Korea launched three ballistic missiles (Scud ERs) simultaneously in September 2016, all of which fell into more
or less the same place in Japan’s EEZ, and launched four ballistic missiles (Scud ERs) simultaneously on March 6, 2017. It is
possible that North Korea is aiming to enhance the accuracy and operation capabilities necessary for saturation attacks by the
ballistic missiles that are already deployed.
(3) Third, it appears that North Korea aims to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing the secrecy and instantaneity
of the launches in order to make their signs diffi cult to detect. Using a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) or submarine, it is
possible to conduct launches from anywhere, making it diffi cult to detect signs of a launch in advance, and North Korea has been
repeatedly conducting TEL and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. In addition, North Korea may be switching
to solid-fueled ballistic missiles, as suggested by the repeated launches of SLBMs in 2016 and the launches of a new type of
ballistic missile that is presumed to be a modifi ed version of the SLBM for ground launch that was launched on both February 12
and May 21, 2017, which are believed to have used solid fuel. Generally speaking, solid fuel-propelled missiles in comparison to
liquid fuel-propelled missiles can be launched instantly, and the signs of their launches are more diffi cult to detect in advance. In
this regard, North Korea is deemed to be aiming to improve its surprise attack capabilities.
(4) Fourth, there is the possibility that North Korea is attempting to diversify the forms of launches. At the June 22, 2016 Musudan
launch and the May 14 and July 4, 2017 launches of the new type of ballistic missile, it has been confi rmed that they were
launched on so-called lofted trajectories, in which the missiles are launched at higher angles than normal to higher altitudes.
Generally, interception is considered to become more diffi cult when a launch is conducted on a lofted trajectory.

Given that North Korea may also have achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads, and that
it has not wavered from its position of continuing its nuclear weapons program, it is deemed that with time there will be a growing
risk of deployment of ballistic missiles mounted with a nuclear warhead, which have Japan in their fi ring range.
It is the understanding of the Government of Japan that since 2016, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles and enhancement of their operational capabilities have reached a new level of threat to the region including Japan and the
international community.


-----

their capabilities and operational readiness, most of its
equipment is outdated.
Meanwhile, North Korea has forces such as largescale special operations forces that can conduct various
operations ranging from intelligence gathering and
sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea
seems to have many underground military-related
installations across its territory.

**(2) Military Capabilities**
The North Korean Army comprises about 1.02 million
personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to
be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army
is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces
including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea
is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along
the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and
170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and
bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital
city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed
that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its
conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as
main battle tanks and multiple rocket launchers.[6]

The Navy has about 780 ships with a total
displacement of approximately 104,000 t and is chiefl y
comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed
missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model
Romeo-class submarines, about 70 midget submarines,
and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter
two of which are believed to be used for infi ltration and
transportation of the special operations forces.
The Air Force has approximately 560 combat
aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made
in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some
fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fi ghters and
Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a
large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well,
which are believed to be used for transportation of special


operations forces.
In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric
military capabilities, namely, special operations forces
whose size is estimated at 100,000 personnel.[7] In recent
years, North Korea is seen to be placing importance on
and strengthening its cyber forces.[8]

**3** **WMD and Ballistic Missiles**


**3**


While North Korea continues to maintain largescale military capabilities, its conventional forces are
considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S.
Forces Korea. This is the result of a variety of factors,
including decreases in military assistance from the
former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War
regime, limitations placed on North Korea’s national
defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the
rapid modernization of the ROK’s defense capabilities. It
is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts
on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to
compensate for this shortfall.
North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles
is considered to have made further strides through going
ahead with the fi fth nuclear test and repeating ballistic
missile launches. Coupled with its provocative rhetoric
and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on
Japan, North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles
poses a serious and imminent threat to the security of the
region including Japan and the international community.
Especially since 2016, when it willfully conducted
two nuclear tests and launched more than 20 ballistic
missiles, the development and enhancement of the
operating capabilities of nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles by North Korea has reached a new level of threat.
Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge
to the entire international community with regard to the
non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs.


According to “The Military Balance 2014,” North Korea is replacing Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks with the Ch’onma-ho that North Korea independently produced based on the T-62. Furthermore,
the Defense White Paper 2014 that the ROK Ministry of National Defense released in January 2015 refers to North Korea’s development of a new 300 mm multiple rocket launcher, as well as the
signifi cant increase in the number of tanks, armored cars, and multiple rocket launchers in North Korea’s possession. North Korea allegedly fi red several rounds from the 300 mm multiple rocket
launcher on three instances in March 2016 and launched a new short-range surface-to-air missile in April 2016. In addition, North Korea announced that it had successfully conducted test launches
of a new type of surface-to-air missiles and a new type of surface-to-ship cruise missiles on May 28 and June 9, 2017, respectively.

It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the KWP. However, it has been reported that these organizations
were consolidated in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the military forces. The existence of the bureau was offi cially confi rmed in March 2013
when Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported General Kim Yong-chol as the Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Moreover, James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces
Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White
Paper 2016 notes, “Special operation forces are currently estimated at approximately 200,000 strong.”

The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 notes, “North Korea probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive cyber
attacks to support its political objectives.” The annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (2015) submitted to Congress by the U.S. DoD
also in February 2016 states,“North Korea probably views OCO [offensive cyber operations] as an appealing platform from which to collect intelligence and cause disruption in South Korea and other
adversaries including the United States.” According to the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016, North Korea has trained approximately 6,800 cyber warfare personnel and carries out various forms of


-----

**(1) Nuclear Weapons**
a. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program
Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program are largely unclear, partly because
North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In
light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments,
and considering North Korea has already conducted five
nuclear tests including the nuclear test in September 2016,
it is conceivable that North Korea has made considerable
progress in its nuclear weapons program.
With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can
be used for nuclear weapons,[9] North Korea has suggested
its production and extraction on several instances.[10]
Moreover, in June 2009, North Korea announced that it
would weaponize all of its newly extracted plutonium.[11]
In April 2013, North Korea announced its policy to
readjust and restart all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon,
including the nuclear reactor, the disablement of which
was agreed upon at the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks
in September 2007. In November 2013, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opined that while lack of
inspection makes it impossible to determine conclusively,
multiple activities were observed from satellite imagery
suggesting that the nuclear reactor was restarted.[12]
Furthermore, in September 2015, North Korea stated that
all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon including the nuclear
reactor and the uranium enrichment plant were readjusted
and started normal operation. Because the restarting of
the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of
plutonium by North Korea, such developments are causes


of great concern.
As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used
for nuclear weapons, in 2002 the United States announced
that North Korea acknowledged the existence of a
uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later
in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement
of uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in November 2010,
North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to
American nuclear specialists and later announced that
it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped
with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this
uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in August
2013; in this regard, North Korea could have increased
its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean
behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the
possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using
highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.[13]

With regard to the development of nuclear weapons,
North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in October
2006,[14] May 2009,[15] February 2013,[16] January 2016[17] and
September 2016.[18] It is highly likely that North Korea has
made strides in its nuclear weapons program, collecting
the necessary data through these nuclear tests.
It is believed that North Korea seeks to miniaturize
nuclear weapons and develop them into warheads that
can be mounted on ballistic missiles, as part of its nuclear
weapons program. Images were released in March 2016
showing KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un meeting with
nuclear weapons engineers and others and observing
an object that North Korea claims to be a miniaturized


9 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic
material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium.
This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%).

10 North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional
8,000 used fuel rods.

11 Then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Armed Services Committee in April 2011 that “we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several
nuclear weapons.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2016 estimates that North Korea has more than 50 kg of plutonium, up from the 40 kg estimate in the ROK Defense White Paper 2014.

12 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2016 notes, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon
enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that if the reactor is restarted, North Korea would have the capability to produce enough
plutonium (approximately 6 kg) to manufacture approximately one nuclear bomb in one year.

13 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2012 states, “the North’s disclosure (of a uranium enrichment facility) supports the U.S. longstanding
assessment that North Korea has pursued uranium-enrichment capability.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2016 assesses that North Korea’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) program “has reached a
significant level.”

14 On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as Japan’s own careful examination of the U.S. and ROK analyses, the Japanese Government
arrived at the judgment that the probability of North Korea conducting a nuclear test was extremely high.

15 The Japanese Government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on this day, given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had
successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, and in light of the Japan Meteorological Agency’s detection of seismic waves with a waveform that differed from an ordinary waveform.

16 On February 12, 2013 at around 11:59 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that differed
from an ordinary waveform and were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a nuclear
test. On this basis, the Government of Japan verified the facts in coordination with other relevant parties, including the United States and the ROK. Based on a comprehensive consideration of the
aforementioned information, the Japanese Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. North Korea announced that it “succeeded in the third underground nuclear test,” “the
test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power,” “physically demonstrating the good
performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.”

17 On January 6, 2016 at around 10:30 am, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms different from an
ordinary waveform and were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb
test. Based on a comprehensive consideration of this and other information, the Japanese Government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test.

18 On September 9, 2016 at approximately 9:30 a.m., the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that were
not those of a natural earthquake and possibly differed from an ordinary waveform. Based on a comprehensive consideration of all the information including this, the Government believes that North


-----

nuclear warhead.[19] North Korea also announced with
regard to the fifth nuclear test in September of the same
year that “a nuclear explosion test to determine the power
of our nuclear warheads was successfully conducted.” In
general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to
be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably
high degree of technological capacity. However,
considering, for example, that the United States, the
former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and
China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early
as the 1960s, as well as the technological maturity that is
estimated to have been reached through North Korea’s
previous five nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea
has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and
has developed nuclear warheads.[20]

Although North Korea asserts that the fourth nuclear
test conducted in January 2016 was a hydrogen bomb
test,[21] it is doubtful that a general hydrogen bomb test was
conducted, considering the magnitude of the earthquake.[22]

In any case, taking into account that North Korea has
not changed its stance of continuing its nuclear weapons
program, it is believed that with the passage of time,
there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying
a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead
that includes Japan in its range. In this regard, related
developments need to be monitored carefully.
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development,
considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to
enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending
the range of ballistic missiles that could become the
delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses a serious and imminent
threat to the security of the region including Japan and


of the international community, and significantly impairs
peace and stability. Therefore, it can never be tolerated.
b. Background of the Nuclear Program
As regards the objective of North Korea’s nuclear
development, North Korea is deemed to be developing
nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for
maintaining the existing regime in light of the following:
North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance
of the existing regime;[23] North Korea considers that it
needs its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear
threat of the United States[24] and is in no position at least in
the short-term to overturn its inferiority in conventional
forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK;
North Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes
collapsed and that Syria was attacked by U.S. Forces in
April 2017 due to their lack of nuclear deterrence;[25] and
North Korea reiterates nuclear weapons will never be
traded away at negotiations.
In fact, North Korea has repeatedly claimed to the
international community that it was a “nuclear weapons
state.”[26] In March 2013, North Korea adopted the “new
strategic line” (so-called “Byungjin line”) policy of
simultaneous economic and nuclear development,
alleging that even if it does not increase defense
spending, it would be able to concentrate on its economic
development and on improving the people’s livelihood as
long as robust nuclear deterrence is achieved by increasing
the effectiveness of its war deterrent and defense force.
At the Seventh KWP Congress, it revealed that it would
remain steadfast to this policy, and is not wavering in
its stance of continuing to promote the development of
nuclear weapons.


19 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station on March 9, 2016, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un met with engineers and others from the nuclear weapons research team, provided guidance
regarding the nuclear weapons program, and stated, “The nuclear warheads have been standardized to be fit for ballistic missiles by miniaturizing them.”

20 Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted five nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology
development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear
weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016 assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons
seems to have reached a considerable level.” At a press briefing on January 3, 2017, U.S. White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest stated that “the intelligence community has previously said that
the United States has not seen North Korea test or demonstrate the ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and put it on an ICBM. I’m not aware that that assessment has changed.”

21 Regarding the nuclear test conducted on January 6, 2016, North Korea announced: “The first H-bomb test was successfully conducted”; and “The DPRK fully proved that the technological
specifications of the newly developed H-bomb for the purpose of test were accurate and scientifically verified the power of smaller H-bomb.” Prior to this, on December 10, 2015, the Korean Central
Broadcasting Station reported KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un as saying, North Korea has “become a powerful nuclear weapons state that can reverberate the large explosion sound of a hydrogen bomb.”

22 In regard to North Korea’s nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (February 2016) states, “Although we are continuing to evaluate
this event, the low yield of the test is not consistent with a successful test of a thermonuclear device.” Furthermore, in January 2016, the ROK National Intelligence Service reportedly briefed the
National Assembly that because the power and seismic waves of the fourth nuclear test do not match up to those of the previous three nuclear tests, the test was unlikely a hydrogen bomb test.

23 U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” March 2016.
24 For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014 alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North
Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people.

25 For example, a comment in the Rodong Sinmun dated December 2, 2013 contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S.
preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability. In addition, the “Statement by the Spokesperson of the
Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” dated April 8, 2017 states with regard to the U.S. attack on Syria two days earlier on April 6 as follows: “Swaggering as a superpower,
the US has been picking only on countries without nuclear weapons and the Trump administration is no exception.”

26 North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state” in 2012 in its revised constitution. In April 2013, after conducting its third
nuclear test in February, North Korea adopted the Law on Consolidating the Position of Self-Defensive Nuclear Weapons State. During the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016, KWP Chairman
Kim Jong-un delivered a report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, setting out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state,” and stating, “We will consistently take hold on the strategic


-----

With regard to the issue of North Korea s development
of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the Six-Party Talks have
been held since August 2003, aimed at taking peaceful
measures to achieve the verifi able denuclearization on
the Korean Peninsula. At the sixth round of the Talks
in September 2007, the parties reached an agreement,
which included completion of the disablement of nuclear
facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct
declaration of all (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by
the end of the year. However, the implementation of the
agreement has not been completed, and the Six-Party
Talks has been suspended since December 2008.

**(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons**
North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition,
most materials, equipment, and technology used for
manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for
both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates
camoufl age. For these reasons, details of the status
of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons
development and arsenals are unclear. However, with
regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected
to have several facilities capable of producing chemical
agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents.
North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure
for the production of biological weapons.[27] Possession of
sarin, VX gas, mustard gas and other chemical weapons,
and of anthrax, smallpox, pest and other biological agents
that could be used as biological weapons have been
pointed out.
The possibility cannot be denied that North
Korea is able to load biological and/or chemical
weapons on warheads.[28]


however, that North Korea gives high priority to the
development of ballistic missiles out of political and
diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of
earning foreign currency,[29] in addition to enhancing its
military capabilities. The ballistic missiles currently
deemed to be possessed and developed by North Korea
are the following.[30]

See Fig. I-2-2-2 (Ballistic Missiles North Korea is Deemed to Possess or

Be Developing)

See

Fig. I-2-2-3 (Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles)
Fig. I-2-2-4 (North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Launches)

a. Types of Ballistic Missiles Possessed or Developed by
North Korea
(a) Toksa
Toksa is a short-range ballistic missile with a range
estimated to be approximately 120 km. It is mounted on
a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL). It is deemed that
Toksa is the fi rst ballistic missile possessed or developed
by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant.[31]

**KeyWord** Ballistic missiles


**KeyWord**


A ballistic missile is a rocket engine-propelled missile that fl ies on a

parabolic trajectory. It is capable of attacking distant targets. Ballistic

missiles are generally categorized according to the following table.

|Category|Range|
|---|---|
|Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM)|Under approx. 1,000 km or less|
|Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)|Approx. 1,000 km – Under approx. 3,000 km|
|Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)|Approx. 3,000 km – Under approx. 5,500 km|
|Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)|Approx. 5,500 km or more|



Ballistic missiles launched from submarines are collectively referred

to as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), while a ballistic

missile that has a precision guidance system on its warhead necessary

to attack aircraft carriers and other vessels is called an anti-ship

ballistic missile (ASBM).


**(3) Ballistic Missiles**
As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North
Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing
to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears,


27 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2016 points out that, following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500-5,000 t of various
chemical weapons stored. It also notes that North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, and pest. Moreover, the U.S. DoD’s “Military
and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of February 2016 points out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a
variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.” North Korea ratifi ed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention.

28 In principle, the ballistic missile defense system is also used to handle ballistic missiles carrying biological or chemical weapons. With regard to the damage on the ground in the case where a ballistic
missile carrying a biological or chemical weapon is destroyed by a Patriot missile PAC-3, etc., there is no single answer to the question since the damage varies according to the various conditions
such as the type, performance, intercepted altitude and speed of the ballistic missile, and the weather. However, in general terms, the biological or chemical weapon will likely be neutralized by the
heat, etc. at the time of the destruction of the ballistic missile, and even if it retains its potency it will disperse during the freefall stage. Thus, it is believed that the ballistic missile will be unable to
demonstrate its prescribed effectiveness.

29 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry
spokesperson on December 13, 2002) At the same time, it is pointed out that North Korea’s ballistic missile exports have been set back by increasing pressure from the international community.

30 According to “IHS Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia” (accessed in May 2017) North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 ballistic missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed
to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong-class, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles.

31 In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testifi ed before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic
missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fi red the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more fl exibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will


-----

Fig. I-2-2-2 Ballistic Missiles North Korea Possesses and/or Is Developing

|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|missile|Col10|Col11|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Range|Approx. 120 km|Approx. 300 km/ Approx. 500 km/ Approx. 1,000 km/ Under analysis|Approx. 1,300 km/ Approx. 1,500 km|Approx. 2,500– 4,000 km|1,000 km or more|1,000 km or more|Maxim appr 5,000|um ox. 5,500 km or more km|Approx. 10,000 km or more|5,500 km or more (ICBM (repeatedly))|
|Fuel|Solid|Liquid|Liquid|Liquid|Solid|Solid|Liqu|id Liquid|Liquid|Liquid|
|Operation platform|TEL|TEL|TEL|TEL|Gorae-class submarine|TEL|TEL|TEL|Launch site|TEL|


Fig. I-2-2-2

(m)
30

20

08

14

variant
ER

variant

B, C

10

**New type,**

**Scud B, C, ER,** **Scud B, C, ER,** **Modifi ed** **New type,** **intercontinental-** **Taepodong-2**
**Toksa** **Musudan** **SLBM** **KN-08/KN-14**
**Modifi ed** **Modifi ed** **SLBM** **IRBM** **range ballistic** **variant**

**missile**

Approx. 300 km/

Approx. Maximum Approx.

Approx. Approx. 500 km/ Approx. 1,300 km/ 1,000 km 1,000 km 5,500 km or more
Range 2,500– approx. 5,500 km or more 10,000 km
120 km Approx. 1,000 km/ Approx. 1,500 km or more or more (ICBM (repeatedly))

4,000 km 5,000 km or more

Under analysis

Fuel Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Solid Solid Liquid Liquid Liquid Liquid

Operation Gorae-class
TEL TEL TEL TEL TEL TEL TEL Launch site TEL
platform submarine

Source: Made by MOD based on Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, etc.


Fig. I-2-2-3 Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles


Fig. I-2-2-3


Taepodong-2 Variant 10,000 km New York
(approx. more than 10,000km) Washington, D.C.

Chicago

Musudan (approx. 2,500-4,000km)

Paris London 5,500 km Denver

5,000 km Anchorage

Moscow 4,000 km San Francisco

1,500 km Los Angels

1,300 km

Taepodong

Beijing

Pyongyang Tokyo Hawaii

Tongch’ang-ri 1,000 km

Okinawa

Guam

New type of intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) (up to approx. 5,000km)

Nodong (approx. 1,300km/1,500km)

(ICBM criterion) (more than 5,500km*)
Scud-ER (approx. 1,000km)

-  The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.


-----

Fig. I-2-2-4 Ballistic Missile Launches by North Korea to Date

|Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|1993/5/29|Nodong (possible)|Unknown|Unknown|Approx. 500 km|
|1998/8/31|Taepodong-1|1|Taepodong Area|Approx. 1,600 km|
|2006/7/5|Scud and Nodong|6|Kittaeryŏng Area|Approx. 400 km|
|2006/7/5|Taepodong-2|1|Taepodong Area|Unknown, presumed to have failed|
|2009/4/5|Taepodong-2 or variant|1|Taepodong Area|3,000 km or more|
|2009/7/4|Scud or Nodong|7|Kittaeryŏng Area|Maximum approx. 450 km|
|2012/4/13|Taepodong-2 or variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Unknown, presumed to have failed|
|2012/12/12|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri Area|Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)|
|2014/3/3|Scud|2|Near Wonsan|Approx. 500 km|
|2014/3/26|Nodong|2|Near Sukchon|Approx. 650 km|
|2014/6/29|Scud|2|Near Wonsan|Approx. 500 km|
|2014/7/9|Scud|2|Approx. 100 km south of Pyongyang|Approx. 500 km|
|2014/7/13|Scud|2|Near Kaesong|Approx. 500 km|
|2014/7/26|Scud|1|Approx. 100 km west of Haeju|Approx. 500 km|
|2015/3/2|Scud|2|Near Nampo|Approx. 500 km|

|Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|2016/2/7|Taepodong-2 variant|1|Tongch’ang-ri|Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)|
|2016/3/10|Scud|2|Near Nampo|Approx. 500 km|
|2016/3/18|Nodong|1|Near Sukchon|Approx. 800 km|
|2016/4/15|Musudan (indicated)|1|East coast area|Unknown, presumed to have failed|
|2016/4/23|SLBM|1|Off the coast of Sinpo|Approx. 30 km (ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff)|
|2016/4/28|Musudan|2|Wonsan|Unknown, presumed to have failed|
|2016/5/31|Musudan (possible)|1|Wonsan|Unknown, presumed to have failed|
|2016/6/22|Musudan|2|Wonsan|First: Approx. 100 km (maximum); Second: Approx. 400 km|
|2016/7/9|SLBM|1|Off the coast of Sinpo|A few kilometers (ROK media reports)|
|2016/7/19|Scud and Nodong|3|Near Hwangju|First: Approx. 400 km; Third: Approx. 500 km|
|2016/8/3|Nodong|2|Near Unnyul|Approx. 1,000 km (the f irst exploded right after launch)|
|2016/8/24|SLBM|1|Oear Sinpo|Approx. 500 km|
|2016/9/5|Scud ER|3|Near Hwangju|Approx. 1,000 km|
|2016/10/15|Musudan|1|Near Kusong|Unknown, presumed to have failed|
|2016/10/20|Musudan|1|Near Kusong|Unknown, presumed to have failed|

|Date|Presumed type of missile|Number of launches|Location|Flight distance|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|2017/2/12|New type of ground-launched ballistic missile modif ied from SLBM|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 500 km|
|2017/3/6|Scud ER|4|Near Tongch’ang-ri|Approx. 1,000 km|
|2017/3/22|Under analysis|1|Near Wonsan|Exploded within seconds of launch, presumed to have failed|
|2017/4/5|Under analysis|1|Near Sinpo|Approx. 60 km|
|2017/4/16|Under analysis|1|Near Sinpo|Exploded right after launch, presumed to have failed|
|2017/4/29|Under analysis|1|Near Pukchang|Fell inland approx. 50 km away, presumed to have failed|
|2017/5/14|New type of IRBM-class ballistic missile|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 800 km|
|2017/5/21|New type of ground-launched ballistic missile modif ied from SLBM|1|Near Pukchang|Approx. 500 km|
|2017/5/29|New type of ballistic missile modif ied from Scud missile|1|Near Wonsan|Approx. 400 km|
|2017/7/4|New type of intercontinental-range ballistic missile|1|Near Kusong|Approx. 900 km|


Fig. I-2-2-4


2015 and earlier

**Number of**
**Date** **Presumed type of missile** **Location** **Flight distance**
**launches**

1993/5/29 Nodong (possible) Unknown Unknown Approx. 500 km

1998/8/31 Taepodong-1 1 Taepodong Area Approx. 1,600 km

2006/7/5 Scud and Nodong 6 Kittaeryŏng Area Approx. 400 km

2006/7/5 Taepodong-2 1 Taepodong Area Unknown, presumed to have failed

2009/4/5 Taepodong-2 or variant 1 Taepodong Area 3,000 km or more

2009/7/4 Scud or Nodong 7 Kittaeryŏng Area Maximum approx. 450 km

2012/4/13 Taepodong-2 or variant 1 Tongch’ang-ri Area Unknown, presumed to have failed

2012/12/12 Taepodong-2 variant 1 Tongch’ang-ri Area Approx. 2,600 km (second stage landfall)

2014/3/3 Scud 2 Near Wonsan Approx. 500 km

2014/3/26 Nodong 2 Near Sukchon Approx. 650 km

2014/6/29 Scud 2 Near Wonsan Approx. 500 km

2014/7/9 Scud 2 Approx. 100 km south of Pyongyang Approx. 500 km

2014/7/13 Scud 2 Near Kaesong Approx. 500 km

2014/7/26 Scud 1 Approx. 100 km west of Haeju Approx. 500 km

2015/3/2 Scud 2 Near Nampo Approx. 500 km

2016

**Number of**
**Date** **Presumed type of missile** **Location** **Flight distance**
**launches**

2016/2/7 Taepodong-2 variant 1 Tongch’ang-ri Approx. 2,500 km (second stage landfall)

2016/3/10 Scud 2 Near Nampo Approx. 500 km

2016/3/18 Nodong 1 Near Sukchon Approx. 800 km

2016/4/15 Musudan (indicated) 1 East coast area Unknown, presumed to have failed

2016/4/23 SLBM 1 Off the coast of Sinpo Approx. 30 km (ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff)

2016/4/28 Musudan 2 Wonsan Unknown, presumed to have failed

2016/5/31 Musudan (possible) 1 Wonsan Unknown, presumed to have failed

First: Approx. 100 km (maximum);
2016/6/22 Musudan 2 Wonsan
Second: Approx. 400 km

2016/7/9 SLBM 1 Off the coast of Sinpo A few kilometers (ROK media reports)

2016/7/19 Scud and Nodong 3 Near Hwangju First: Approx. 400 km; Third: Approx. 500 km

Approx. 1,000 km
2016/8/3 Nodong 2 Near Unnyul
(the fi rst exploded right after launch)

2016/8/24 SLBM 1 Oear Sinpo Approx. 500 km

2016/9/5 Scud ER 3 Near Hwangju Approx. 1,000 km

2016/10/15 Musudan 1 Near Kusong Unknown, presumed to have failed

2016/10/20 Musudan 1 Near Kusong Unknown, presumed to have failed

2017

**Number of**
**Date** **Presumed type of missile** **Location** **Flight distance**
**launches**

New type of ground-launched ballistic
2017/2/12 1 Near Kusong Approx. 500 km
missile modifi ed from SLBM

2017/3/6 Scud ER 4 Near Tongch’ang-ri Approx. 1,000 km

2017/3/22 Under analysis 1 Near Wonsan Exploded within seconds of launch, presumed to have failed

2017/4/5 Under analysis 1 Near Sinpo Approx. 60 km

2017/4/16 Under analysis 1 Near Sinpo Exploded right after launch, presumed to have failed

2017/4/29 Under analysis 1 Near Pukchang Fell inland approx. 50 km away, presumed to have failed

2017/5/14 New type of IRBM-class ballistic missile 1 Near Kusong Approx. 800 km

New type of ground-launched ballistic
2017/5/21 1 Near Pukchang Approx. 500 km
missile modifi ed from SLBM

New type of ballistic missile modifi ed
2017/5/29 1 Near Wonsan Approx. 400 km
from Scud missile

New type of intercontinental-range
2017/7/4 1 Near Kusong Approx. 900 km
ballistic missile


-----

(b) Scud
The Scud is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic
missile and is transported and operated on a TEL.
Scud B and Scud C, a variant of Scud B with extended
range, are short-range ballistic missiles with ranges


estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively.
It is believed that North Korea has manufactured and
deployed them, and has exported them to the Middle East
and other countries.
The Scud ER (Extended Range) is a ballistic missile
that has an extended range due to the extension of the
Scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the
warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER
is estimated to reach approximately 1,000 km,[32] and it
appears that a part of Japan falls within this range.
(c) Nodong
The Nodong is a liquid fuel propelled single-stage
ballistic missile and is transported and operated on a
TEL. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km,
reaching almost all of Japan.
Although the details of Nodong’s performance have
not been confi rmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy
to carry out precise strikes on specifi c target installations,
as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud
technology. However, it has been suggested that North
Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. In
this regard, it had been suggested that there is a type of
Nodong aimed at enhancing accuracy by improving the
shape of the warhead (whose range is deemed to reach
approximately 1,500 km through the weight reduction of
the warhead). Against this backdrop, the launch of this
type of ballistic missile was confi rmed for the fi rst time
in the images published by North Korea a day after the
launch of one Scud and two Nodong missiles on July 19,
2016. Thus, it is necessary to continue to pay attention to
related developments.
(d) Musudan
The Musudan is a new type of intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) currently being developed by
North Korea. With a range of between 2,500 and 4,000
km, it has been suggested that all parts of Japan and
Guam may fall within its fi ring range.[33] Similar to its
Scud and Nodong counterparts, it is liquid fuel-propelled
and is loaded onto a TEL to transport and operate. It has
been noted that Musudan is a revamped version of the
Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that North Korea acquired in the
early 1990s.
In April 2016, North Korea is thought to have made
its fi rst attempt to launch a ballistic missile presumed to
be the Musudan but it ended in failure. However, in June


Transporter-Erector-Launcher

**KeyWord**

(TEL)

The signs of a launch from a fi xed launcher are easy for the adversary to

detect and are vulnerable to attack by the adversary. TEL was developed

mainly by the former Soviet Union among others in order to make the

detection of launch signs more diffi cult and increase survivability.

According to the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments

Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of February 2016,

North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs for Toksa and Scuds

combined, 50 TELs for Nodongs, and 50 TELs for IRBMs (presumably

refer to Musudans).

The type of TEL differs according to the length and weight of the

missile. The Scud, Nodong, Musudan, and KN-08/14 are mounted on a

four-, fi ve-, six-, and eight-axle wheel-drive TEL, respectively. The ballistic

missile launched on February 12 and May 21, 2017 appears to have been

launched from a continuous track TEL. Generally, a continuous track TEL

is adapted to operating on uneven ground but is not adapted to long
distance transportation compared to the wheel-drive TEL.
As for a TEL-mounted missile launch, it is deemed diffi cult to detect

individual specifi c signs in advance concerning the detailed location and

timing of the launch. This is because it is operated by being mounted

and transported on a TEL, and furthermore, military-related underground

facilities are thought to exist nationwide.
Along with activities related to the development of ballistic missiles,

developments related to the building of TELs require close watch as they

concern the operation capacities of ballistic missiles by North Korea.


32 “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” submitted by DoD to Congress in February 2016.

33 In a statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, then Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, testifi ed, “North Korea is now fi elding a new intermediate range
ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska.” The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016 notes that, “In 2007, it [North Korea] fi elded the Musudan missile (range of over 3,000 km).


-----

2016, an IRBM presumed to be the Musudan that was
launched from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast
of North Korea reached an altitude exceeding 1,000 km
(maximum height was 1,413.6 km according to North
Korea’s announcement) and flew approximately 400 km
before falling into the Sea of Japan. With regard to the
situation of this launch, it is believed that the missile
was launched on a “lofted trajectory,” meaning it was
launched at a steep angle to reach a higher altitude than a
nominal trajectory, while flying a shorter distance.[34] If this
same ballistic missile presumed to be the Musudan were
launched on a nominal trajectory, it is estimated that its
range would correspond to a range between approximately
2,500 and 4,000 km, the previously suggested range of
a Musudan. In this light, it is considered that, through
its launch in June, North Korea demonstrated that its
missile had functions of an IRBM to some level. While
the failures of North Korea’s several Musudan launches[35]
since April 2016 have suggested that there could be
fundamental flaws with the engine and missile body,
it cannot be ruled out that North Korea has striven to
solve the problems through the failures and made some
technical gains. On the other hand, on October 15 and 20
North Korea launched a ballistic missile that is presumed
to be the Musudan, which appears to have failed, and
therefore, there may still be obstacles remaining towards
the operationalization of the Musudan.
(e) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an
SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry
the SLBM. Since it announced in May 2015 through
its media that it conducted a successful test launch of
an SLBM, it has made public SLBM launches on four
occasions.[36] Judging from the images and footage that it
has made public so far, North Korea may have succeeded
in operating the “cold launch system,” in which the missile
is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Moreover, in the


launches in April and August 2016, it appears, based on
observations such as the shape of the flame coming out of
the missile and the color of the smoke, that the militarily
superior solid fuel propellant system was adopted.[37]

A ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM has
been confirmed in flight in the direction of Japan,
launched from the vicinity of Sinpo, on the east coast
of North Korea, on August 24, 2016. The SLBM flew
approximately 500 km. Considering that this was its
first SLBM to fly approximately 500 km, the possibility
cannot be denied that North Korea had striven to solve
the problems through the preceding launches and
achieved certain technological progress. Furthermore, it
is predicted that the ballistic missile presumed to be the
SLBM that was launched at this time flew on a somewhat
higher than nominal trajectory. If it were launched on a
nominal trajectory the firing range is expected to surpass
1,000 km.[38]

It is also thought that North Korea’s SLBM launches
are conducted from a Gorae-class submarine (displacement
1,500 t). North Korea is believed to have one such
submarine. It is also pointed out that North Korea seeks to
develop a larger submarine to launch SLBMs.[39]


34 On June 23, 2016, North Korea announced on the Korean Central Broadcasting Station that the test launch had been conducted on a high-angle launch system. It is not necessarily clear why North
Korea launched the missile on a lofted trajectory. However, based on Korean Central Broadcasting Station’s report on the same day that “The test-fire was successfully conducted without giving any
slightest effect to the security of surrounding countries,” it is possible that North Korea aimed to minimize the anticipated backlash and criticism from the international community, including neighboring
countries and the United States, should its missile overfly the territories of other countries including Japan. In general, it is considered that ballistic missiles launched on a lofted trajectory make
interception more difficult.

35 On April 28, 2016, North Korea launched a ballistic missile presumed to be the Musudan in the early morning and late afternoon, respectively, but the launches ended in failure. Additionally, in the
early morning of May 31, 2016, North Korea launched an IRBM that could be a Musudan, but it ended in failure. Furthermore, on April 15, 2016, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that ended
in failure. It is suggested that this missile was also a Musudan.

36 On May 9, 2015, North Korea announced that it had succeeded in a test launch of an SLBM. On January 8, 2016, it released footage of an SLBM test launch that appears to be different from the one
unveiled in May 2015. On April 24 and August 25, 2016, it again announced that it had succeeded in SLBM test launches. Moreover, the MOD predicts that North Korea also launched one ballistic
missile presumed to be an SLBM on July 9, 2016, although North Korea has not made an announcement about the launches.

37 It has been pointed out that North Korea’s SLBM is an improved version of the former Soviet Union’s liquid fuel propelled SLBM “SS-N-6,” similar to the Musudan.
38 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station on August 25, 2015, North Korea announced that this test launch “was successfully conducted without any negative effects on the safety of
nearby countries” based on the “high-angle launch system,” which presumably means a “lofted trajectory.”


-----

SLBM. Based on factors including these announcements
and the flight distance of the February 12 and May 21,
2017 launches, it is presumed that the ballistic missiles
launched on those dates were a new type of ballistic
missile that had been modified from an SLBM as a
ground-launched type. Given that the firing range of this
ballistic missile is estimated to exceed 1,000 km and that
North Korea has made references to its deployment for
operational deployment, there is a possibility that North
Korea will newly deploy a new type of missile using solid
fuel that includes Japan within its firing range.
The second is a new type of intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM). This ballistic missile was
launched on May 14, 2017 and is presumed to have
reached a height of over 2,000 km (the highest altitude
reached was 2,111.5 km according to the North Korean
announcement) and flew a distance of approximately 800
km for about 30 minutes.[41] Based on this flight pattern,
it is presumed that the ballistic missile was launched on
a lofted trajectory. Had it been launched on a nominal
trajectory, the maximum firing range is expected to be
close to approximately 5,000 km as of this present time.
A day after the launch, North Korea announced that it
had successfully conducted the test launch of a newly
developed ground-to-ground medium-to-long range
strategic ballistic rocket. In addition, it can be confirmed
from the images released by North Korea a day after the
launch that the shape of the warhead of the launched
ballistic missile is different from that of the Scud,
Nodong or Musudan, and that although it was mounted
on a wheel-drive TEL, it was launched from a simplified
launch pad in the image of the actual launch. Furthermore,
the straight-line exhausts characteristic of a liquid fuel
propelled engine can be confirmed from the images
released by North Korea, suggesting that the ballistic
missile uses liquid fuel. In view of factors including these
announcements by North Korea and the flight distance
of the May 14 launch, it is presumed that a new type of
IRBM using liquid fuel had been launched. Given that
this ballistic missile appears to have displayed a certain
level of function as an IRBM based on the flight distance,
etc., together with the February 2016 launch of the variant
of the long-range ballistic missile Taepodong-2 and the
repeated launches of the medium-range ballistic missile


It is deemed that through developing the SLBM
and a new submarine to carry it, North Korea intends
to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and
improve survivability.
(f) New Types of Ballistic Missiles
In 2017, North Korea has launched four types of what
appear to be new ballistic missiles that are different from
the above.
The first is a new type of ballistic missile that appears
to be a modified version of the SLBM for ground launch.
This ballistic missile was launched on both February
12 and May 21, 2017, and is estimated to have flown
approximately 500 km on both occasions, on somewhat
higher trajectories than nominal.[40] If it were launched
on a nominal trajectory, the firing range is expected to
surpass 1,000 km. A day after the launch on February
12, North Korea named the ballistic missile that was
launched “Pukguksong-2” and announced that it was
developed as a ground-to-ground ballistic missile based
on the results of the August 2016 SLBM launch. It also
announced a day after the launch on May 21, 2017 that
it had again successfully conducted the test launch of the
Pukguksong-2 and that KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un had
authorized its “operational deployment.” Moreover, the
launch itself by a “cold launch system,” in which the missile
is ignited after it is ejected into the air from a continuoustrack TEL and the characteristic radial exhausts of solid
fuel propellant engines, can be confirmed from each of
the images that North Korea released the day after the
launch, characteristics that it shares in common with the


40 A day after the February 12 launch, North Korea announced that it had conducted the launch by the high-angle launch method in consideration of the safety of nearby countries.


-----

Musudan, there is renewed concern over the increasing
ranges of North Korea’s ballistic missiles.
The third is a new type of ballistic missile that
appears to be an improvement of the Scud missile.
This ballistic missile was launched on May 29, 2017,
and is presumed have flown approximately 400 km and
fallen into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
A day after the launch, North Korea announced that
it had successfully conducted a test launch of a newly
developed ballistic rocket incorporating a precision
navigation guidance system. In addition, while the
images released by North Korea show that the ballistic
missile was launched from a continuous track TEL and
had what appears to be small wings[42] on its warhead,
i.e., characteristics different from those of existing Scud
missiles, the shape other than the warhead and length
are similar to existing Scud missiles. In addition, it can
be confirmed that the missile has straight-line exhausts
characteristic of a liquid fuel-propelled engine similar
to existing Scud missiles. Given factors including these
announcements by North Korea and the flight distance
of the May 29, 2017 launch, it is presumed that the
missile that was launched was a new type of ballistic


missile modified from the Scud missile. It is unclear
how the newly developed ballistic rocket incorporating
a precision navigation guidance system will perform.
However, since North Korea announced that KWP
Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the development of a
ballistic missile that can strike adversary ships and other
individual targets with precision, the intent appears to be
to enhance the accuracy of ballistic missile attacks.
According to images released by North Korea, these
three types of ballistic missiles are similar in shape, etc
to the ballistic missiles unveiled for the first time at the
review of troops on April 15, 2017.
The fourth is a new type of intercontinentalrange ballistic missile. One such ballistic missile was
launched on July 4, 2017, reaching a height well over
2,500 km, and is estimated to have flown approximately
40 minutes. It flew approximately 900 km and is
estimated to have fallen into Japan’s EEZ. From this
flight pattern, it is presumed that the ballistic missile was
launched on a lofted trajectory and is believed to have
a maximum range of at least more than 5,500 km. On
the day of the launch, North Korea made an “important
announcement”[43] and announced that it had successfully


42 It is generally said that small wings on the warhead have the functions of stabilizing aerodynamics, navigating during flight, and enhancing precision.
43 In addition to this announcement, the announcement that North Korea had succeeded in its first hydrogen bomb test (January 6, 2016) and the announcement that it had succeeded in the launch of


-----

conducted a test launch of a new type of intercontinental
ballistic missile. In addition, a day after the launch, North
Korea announced that it had conducted a demonstration
test of warhead reentry technology, from which it can
be deemed that it is aiming at the operationalization of
long-range ballistic missiles.
(g) Taepodong-1 and 2
Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 are long-range ballistic
missiles launched from fixed launch pads. Taepodong-1
is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant
ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and
a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range
of at least approximately 1,500 km. Taepodong-1 was
launched from the Taepodong district on North Korea’s
northeastern coastline in 1998, and it is presumed that part
of it flew over Japan and fell in to the Sanriku offshore
waters. Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product
for the development of Taepodong-2.
Taepodong-2 is believed to be a missile which uses
in its first stage, four engines, each of which is developed
based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type
of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to
be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while
the range of its three-stage variant can be more than
approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of
the warhead is not over approximately 1 t. Taepodong-2
missiles and its variants have been launched a total of five
times so far.
Most recently, in February 2016, North Korea
conducted a launch of a missile disguised as a “Satellite”
from the Tongch’ang-ri district in the northwest
coastline of North Korea using a Taepodong-2 variant,
a type similar to that of the previous ballistic missile
launch in December 2012, after notifying international
organizations.[44] It is assessed that North Korea’s longrange ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had


been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that
(1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic
missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost the same
way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit
around the Earth.
Accordingly, it is believed that these test launches
of long-range ballistic missiles can contribute to the
development of shorter-range missiles in such ways
as increasing the range and payload capability and
improving the circular error probability (CEP). Also,
related technology such as the separation technology
of multi-stage propelling devices and the technology
of posture control and thrust modulation of long-range
ballistic missiles can be applied to other middle-range and
long-range ballistic missiles that North Korea is newly
developing. Therefore, the launch may lead not only to
the improvement of other types of its ballistic missiles
including Nodong but also to the advancement of North
Korea’s entire ballistic missile program including the
development of new ballistic missiles such as Musudan,
KN-08 and SLBM and diversification of attack measure.
North Korea continues to claim that it will keep
conducting “satellite launches” and will develop and
launch more capable satellite launch vehicles. It is highly
possible that North Korea will further develop its longrange ballistic missiles by repeating similar launches
under the name of “satellite” launches, in order to carry
out further technical tests to operationalize its long-range
ballistic missiles. It has been suggested that North Korea
is carrying out modification for upsizing its launch tower
in Tongch’ang-ri district.[45] While the missile launched
in February 2016 was similar in size to the Taepodong-2
variant launched in December 2012, North Korea may
launch larger long-range ballistic missiles in the future.
Furthermore, as launches from fixed launch pads are
vulnerable to external attacks, North Korea may seek


44 In June 2016, what appears to be a part of the fairing of the Taepodong-2 variant launched in February 2016, based on its appearance and other features, washed ashore and was discovered in the
coast of Tottori Prefecture. The MOD has received it from Shimane Prefecture and was analyzing the details as of the end of June 2017.

45 Articles dated October 1 and July 29, 2014 published on the website (38 North) of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University in the United States point out that analyses of satellite images
of the Tongch’ang-ri district show that the launch tower was raised to 55 m, enabling launches of rockets up to 50 m in height, larger than the Taepodong-2 variant (total height approx. 30 m) which


-----

resiliency and survivability through building underground
or silo launch facilities and launching from TELs.
(h) KN-08
The details of the new missile “KN-08” which was
showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July
2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be
an ICBM.[46] At the military parade in October 2015, a new
missile thought to be the “KN-08” was showcased with a
different-shaped warhead from the previous version.[47] The
U.S. DoD reportedly calls the new missile, considered
a variant of the “KN-08,” the “KN-14.” Whereas the
Taepodong-2 is launched from a fixed launch pad, the
“KN-08” and “KN-14” are carried by a TEL, making it
difficult to detect signs of their launch in advance, and is
likely intended to increase survivability.
b. Trends in Recent Ballistic Missile Launches
North Korea has repeatedly launched various types of
ballistic missiles. Particularly in 2016, it conducted
an unprecedented 20-plus launches, and continues to
repeatedly conduct launches in 2017 including launches
of what appear to be new types of missiles.
As for trends in North Korea’s ballistic missile
launches, firstly, it appears that the country seeks
to increase the firing range of ballistic missiles.[48] In
February 2016, it launched a long-range ballistic
missile (a Taepodong variant) which was disguised as
a “satellite,” and in the same year repeatedly launched
the IRBM Musudan considered to have Guam in its
range. As for the new type of ballistic missile that is
presumed to have been launched on a lofted trajectory
on May 14, 2017, had it been launched on a nominal
trajectory, it is expected to reach a maximum firing range
of approximately 5,000 km as of this present time. As
for the ballistic missile launched on July 4, 2017, it is
deemed to be an intercontinental range ballistic missile[49]


since its maximum range appears to surpass at least 5,500
km in view of its altitude, flight distance, etc. Although
it is considered necessary for the operationalization of
long-range ballistic missiles to further verify technology
for protecting the re-entry vehicle from the ultrahigh
temperature that is generated during the atmospheric
re-entry of the warhead part, North Korea announced in
March 2016 that it had successfully conducted a “mock
ballistic missile atmospheric re-entry environment test”[50]
and announced that it had demonstrated atmospheric reentry technology for warheads on the July 4 launch.[51] It
also announced that it conducted a static firing test of a new
type of engine,[52] displaying an intention to seek to secure
and enhance technology aimed at the operationalization
of new medium- and long-range ballistic missiles. This
has become a serious concern for relevant countries
including Japan.
Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance
the accuracy and operation capabilities necessary for
saturation attacks with regard to ballistic missiles already
deployed. As for the Scud and Nodong, which are already


46 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of February 2015 notes that, “[North Korea] has publicly displayed its KN-08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that
North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although the system has not been flight-tested.”

47 Jane’s Defence Weekly dated October 13, 2015 notes that the “KN-08” showcased at the military parade on October 10, 2015 had a larger third stage than the earlier version, and therefore, could
have an extended range. It also suggests that low quality ablative materials cannot withstand high temperatures during re-entry, and thus, a blunter shape warhead may have been developed to
reduce speed to protect the warhead.

48 North Korea is thought to have started developing longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong.
49 KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un's January 2017 New Year's Address announced that the test launch of an ICBM had entered the final stage of preparation. In North Korea, a New Year’s Address by
President Kim Il-sung had been given every year on January 1 up to 1994. Since the death of the president, from 1995 to 2012, a New Year’s Joint Editorial by the KWP bulletin Rodong Sinmun, the
Korean People’s Army bulletin Joson Inmingun, and the Kimilsungist Youth League bulletin Youth Vanguard had been published in its place.

50 According to images released by North Korea, the aim of the test appears to be to conduct a test that simulates the high temperature that occurs during the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by
firing the engine of the ballistic missile at the test object installed on a fixed platform. Generally it is difficult to recreate the circumstances of the atmospheric re-entry of the warhead by the emission
from the engine alone. It is necessary to conduct technology verification by flight tests to conduct an accurate demonstration including the impact of the airflow, etc.

51 Further analysis is necessary to determine whether North Korea was able to demonstrate the warhead protection technology during atmospheric re-entry necessary for the operationalization of longrange ballistic missiles by the July 4, 2017 launch.

52 North Korea announced the implementation of the ground test for a “new type of large-output generator (engine) for ICBMs” in April 2016, the implementation of the ground test for a new type of


-----

|It is said that it is being developed|on the basis of Musudan technology.|
|---|---|

|ype|Col2|
|---|---|
|It is said to have been develop factured|It is said to have been develop|
|e ion 0s.||


**Commentary**

**History of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Development**

It is deemed that North Korea began developing ballistic missiles in the 1970s, and currently possesses and is developing several
types of ballistic missiles. They are considered to have been developed along two lines, those based on the Scud B manufactured in
the former Soviet Union (Scud type) and those based on the submarine-launched ballistic missile SS-N-6 likewise manufactured by
the former Soviet Union (Musudan type).
In 1981, North Korea is believed to have imported from Egypt the Scud B, a short-range solid fuel propulsion ballistic missile
manufactured in the former Soviet Union with a fi ring range of approximately 300 km. The Scud C, Scud ER (Extended Range), Nodong,
Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2 and its variant are thought to have been developed on the basis of the Scud B. It is considered that
North Korea was able to manufacture Scud B copies by the mid-1980s. From the mid-1980s onwards, North Korea created the Scud
C, whose range was extended to approximately 500 km by enlarging the Scud B’s fuel tank, and deployed it together with the Scud
B. In addition, it appears that the Scud ER, whose range was extended to approximately 1,000 km by extending the Scud C’s body
and reducing the warhead weight, has also been deployed. The Nodong is a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) whose range is
believed to reach approximately 1,300 km, created by enlarging the Scud airframe and engine, and is thought to have been already
deployed. Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 and its variant are long-range ballistic missiles launched from fi xed platforms, and are
deemed to have been developed based on Scud and Nodong technology. It is presumed that the Taepodong-2 uses four engines
using Nodong technology on the fi rst stage and one such engine on the second stage. (The Taepodong-2 variant has three stages.
The third stage also has an engine.)
The other ballistic missile that became the basis of North Korea’s ballistic missile development is the SS-N-6, a liquid fuel
propulsion submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) manufactured by the former Soviet Union with a range of approximately
2,500-3,000 km, which it acquired from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. It is believed to be the basis of the development of the
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) Musudan and an SLBM.
The details of the progress of the development are unclear, but it has been pointed out that North Korea is developing the
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) KN-08/14 based on Musudan technology. North Korea may be using this missile for the
development of the KN-08/14 ballistic missile multi-staging and engine clustering technology for extending the range acquired
by developing the Taepodong-2. Furthermore, there is the possibility that the SLBM and the new type of ground-launched ballistic
missile launched on February 12 and May 21, 2017 that appears to be based on an SLBM are using solid fuel technology acquired
by developing the Toksa, a solid fuel propulsion short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).

Scud type Range extended by enlarging Developed on the basis of First stage: Four engines in which Nodong technology

airframe (*1) and engine Scud and Nodong technology is used; second stage: One engine of the same type.

Variant has engine on third stage as well.

Range extended by
enlarging fuel tank

Nodong
Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)

Scud B manufactured Scud C
in the former Soviet Union The four clustered

Imported from Egypt in 1981. Range extended by extending the body Taepodong-1 engines of the Nodong

Taepodong-2

and reducing the weight of the warhead *1 Physical structure of a missile without propulsion engine variant

Scud ER

It may be using ballistic missile multi-staging and engine clustering

Musudan type technology acquired through the development of Taepodong-2.

It is said to have been developed on the basis of SS-N-6. It is said that it is being developed on the basis of Musudan technology.

“SS-N-6” manufactured
by the former
Soviet Union

Acquired from the Musudan
former Soviet Union Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
in the early 1990s.

-  It is said to have been developed on the basis of SS-N-6.

-  It is possible that solid fuel technology (*2) is utilized. KN-08/14

*2 Possibly technology acquired through the development of (under development)
the solid fuel propulsion short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) Toksa Intercontinental ballistic
Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) missile (ICBM)


-----

**Commentary**

**Ballistic Missiles Displayed at the Review of Troops**

On April 15, 2017, the 105th anniversary of the birthday of the late President Kim Il-sung (Day of the Sun), North Korea conducted
a review of troops (military parade) participated by KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un. At the review of troops, in addition to the mediumrange ballistic missile (IRBM) Musudan (1), which had been launched for the fi rst time in 2016, ballistic missiles that were newly
displayed in 2017 were: a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (2); a new type of ground-launched ballistic missile launched
on February 12 and May 21, 2017 that appears to be based on an SLBM (3); a new type of IRBM-class ballistic missile launched on
May 14, 2017 (4); and a new type of ballistic missile launched on May 29, 2017 that appears to be based on the Scud missile (5).
Two other types presumed to be unconfi rmed ballistic missiles were also on display.
As for the two types presumed to be unconfi rmed ballistic missiles, one on display was mounted on a trailer-type vehicle (6) and
is said to be an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). However, it appears unclear whether a missile was encased in the canister.
The second type on display was carried on a TEL similar to an eight-axle wheel-drive TEL for KN-08/14 (7). While the estimated
length of the canister suggests that it could have been an ICBM, it appears unclear whether a missile was encased in the canister.
It is possible that North Korea is developing a TEL-mounted ICBM different from the KN-08/14 that North Korea has already been
said to possess.
It is necessary to continue to closely follow the various weapons that were displayed at this review of troops with serious concern.


deployed, launches had been confi rmed when Kim Jong-il
was the Chairman of the National Defense Commission.
Since 2014, they have been launched eastward from
unprecedented locations in western North Korea, cutting
across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late
hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers.
This indicates that North Korea is capable of launching
Scuds and Nodongs from any place and at any time, from
which it is deemed that it has increased confi dence in the
performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.
As for Scuds and Nodongs, since 2016, there have
been launches where it is presumed that warheads
fell in Japan’s EEZ, posing a major threat to Japan’s
it Th b lli ti i il l h d A t 3


2016 that appears to be a Nodong fl ew approximately
1,000 km, with its warhead predicted to have fallen into
the Japanese EEZ for the fi rst time. The three ballistic
missiles launched on September 5 of the same year,
apparently Scud ERs, were launched simultaneously and
are all estimated to have fallen in more or less the same
place in Japan’s EEZ after fl ying approximately 1,000
km. Moreover, the four ballistic missiles, apparently
Scud ERs, launched on March 6, 2017 were launched
simultaneously, of which three are predicted to have
fallen within Japan’s EEZ and the other near the EEZ,
after fl ying approximately 1,000 km.
It is possible that through these launches, North
K ’ i t ti t l h d d l t


-----

of ballistic missiles but also the enhancement of their
operational capabilities. Since KWP Chairman Kim
Jong-un has repeatedly instructed the military troops to
reject formality and conduct practical training, it can be
considered that these instructions underpin the launches
of ballistic missiles that have already been deployed.
North Korea also has claimed that a new type of
ballistic missile which appears to have been modifi ed
from the Scud missile launched on May 29, 2017 is a
“ballistic missile that incorporates a precision navigation
guidance system.” It is unclear how the ballistic missile
will perform. However, based on the announcement
that KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un has instructed the
development of a ballistic missile that can conduct a
precision attack on adversary vessels and other individual
targets, it is deemed that North Korea is aiming to enhance
the accuracy of attack by upgrading ballistic missiles that
have already been deployed.
Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve
its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy
and instantaneity to make it diffi cult to detect signs of a
launch. Using a TEL or submarine, a ballistic missile can
be launched from any point, making it diffi cult to detect
signs of a launch in advance. North Korea has repeatedly
launched ballistic missiles from TELs and SLBMs from
submarines. In addition, the SLBMs repeatedly launched
in 2016 and the new type of ballistic missile presumed to
be modifi ed from the SLBM as a ground-launched type
and launched on February 12 and May 21, 2017 appear
to use solid fuel. It is thus possible that North Korea is
proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic
missiles. Generally solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles
are pre-loaded with solid fuel, and therefore, they can be
launched instantly and the signs of their launch are more
diffi cult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded
more quickly, and they are relatively easier to store and
handle in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles. In
this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily.
From these factors, North Korea is deemed to be aiming
to enhance its surprise attack capabilities.
Fourthly, North Korea may be attempting to diversify
the forms of launches. It has been confi rmed that at the
June 22, 2016 Musudan launch and the May 14 and July
4, 2017 launches of the new type of ballistic missile, socalled lofted trajectories, in which missiles are launched
at higher angles than nominal to high altitudes, were
utilized. Generally when a launch is made on a lofted
trajectory, interception is considered to be more diffi cult.
Should North Korea make further progress in the
development of ballistic missiles and realize longer-range
b lli ti i il bilit d i lt l hi


the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquisition
of nuclear warheads, etc., North Korea may come to
have a one-sided understanding that it secured strategic
deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea
have such a false sense of confi dence and recognition
regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases and
the escalation of military provocations by North Korea
in the region and could create situations that are deeply
worrying also for Japan.
Coupled with its nuclear issue, North Korea’s
ballistic missile issue has become more realistic and
imminent for the Asia-Pacifi c region, including Japan,
and for the international community from the perspective
of both the improvement of the capability and transfer
and proliferation, and thus such developments are
profoundly worrisome.

**4** **Domestic Affairs**


**4**


**(1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime**
After the demise of Chairman of the National Defense
Commission Kim Jong-il in 2011, Kim Jong-un became
the de facto head of the military, party, and the state by
assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the
KPA, First Secretary of the KWP, and First Chairman of
the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The
framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in
a short period of time. Since the transition to the new
regime, there has been a number of announcements of
party-related meetings and decisions, and in May 2016,
the Seventh KWP Congress was held for the fi rst time
since the last Congress in October 1980, 36 years earlier.
These developments suggest that the state is run under the
leadership of the party. Meanwhile, KWP Chairman Kim
Jong-un underscores the importance of military strength
and makes frequent visits to military organizations. In
this light, the Chairman is anticipated to continue to
attach importance to military strength.
Following the change in regime, KWP Chairman
Kim Jong-un has conducted frequent personnel reshuffl es,
including reshuffl es of the top three military posts of
the Director of the General Political Bureau, the Chief
of the General Staff, and the Minister of the People’s
Armed Forces. In turn, individuals whom Chairman Kim
Jong-un selected were assigned to the key party, military,
and cabinet posts. In addition, in December 2013, Jang
Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense
Commission and Chairman Kim Jong-un’s uncle, was
executed for “plotting to overthrow the state.” It is believed
that through such measures, the Chairman endeavors
t t th d lid t lithi l d hi


-----

system.[53] In 2014, the North Korean media stopped
reporting the activities of Kim Kyong-hui, Secretary of
the KWP and Kim Jong-un’s aunt. Meanwhile, the North
Korean media began to report the activities of Chairman
Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior
member of the KWP.[54] These developments suggest that
a generational change in the leadership may be taking
place among the Kim dynasty.
At the KWP Congress held in May 2016, Kim Jongun was named to the new post of KWP Chairman. In his
report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, the
Chairman set out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons
state,” and said the country would consistently uphold the
“Byungjin line” policy of economic development and the
building of nuclear force as well as further boost its selfdefensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity. In
this manner, the Chairman demonstrated, both to those
in and outside of the country, North Korea’s readiness to
continue with its nuclear and missile development. Prior
to the Congress, North Korea conducted provocations
at unprecedented frequency and content, including the
launch of ballistic missiles.
The holding of the KWP Congress may be an
indication that North Korea has shifted into high
gear by establishing the state-run governance system
centered on the party and led by KWP Chairman Kim
Jong-un, in terms of its organization, personnel, among
other dimensions, both in name and in substance.[55] At
the Supreme People’s Assembly session convened in
June 2016, it was decided that the National Defense
Commission would be turned into the State Affairs
Commission, and KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un was
named Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, the
new “highest position” of the “state” replacing First
Chairman of the National Defense Commission. These
changes are also likely to be manifestations of the


governance system moving into full swing.[56] However,
with senior officials unable to dispute the decisions of
KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un due to an atrophy effect
created by the frequent executions, demotions, and
dismissals of senior officials, it is believed that there is
growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of
North Korea turning to military provocations without
making adequate diplomatic considerations. In addition,
it has been suggested that there is declining social control
caused by widening wealth disparities and information
inflow from other countries. In this regard, attention will
be paid to the stability of the regime.

**(2) Economic Conditions**
In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing
chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in
recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist
planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation
with the former Soviet Union and East European
countries following the end of the Cold War. Especially
for food, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to
rely on food assistance from overseas.[57] Following North
Korea’s various provocations including the nuclear test in
January 2016 and launch of a ballistic missile disguised
as a “Satellite” in February 2016, the ROK decided to
completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial
Complex, which makes up over 99% of inter-Korean trade.
Furthermore, countries including Japan and the United
States have strengthened their sanctions. Along with these
measures, if China, North Korea’s largest trading partner,
and other relevant countries rigorously implement the
sanctions of the related UN Security Council resolutions in
response to the implementation of nuclear tests and missile
launches by North Korea, an even more severe economic
situation could beset North Korea.
To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea


53 Following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, the North Korean media repeatedly calls for the strengthening of the “monolithic leadership system”
and “single-minded unity.” For example, an editorial in the Rodong Sinmun dated January 10, 2014 urged the people to stay cautious even of trivial phenomena and elements which erode North
Korea’s single-minded unity. In May 2015, it was suggested that Hyon Yong-chol, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, may have been executed on charges of treason. The ROK National Intelligence
Service reportedly briefed the National Assembly that the Minister was executed in late April 2015. In July 2015, the North Korean media introduced Pak Yong-sik, previous Deputy Director of the
General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, with the title, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. Additionally, since February 21, 2016, the North Korean media has introduced Ri Myong-su,
previous Minister of People’s Security, as Chief of General Staff Department instead of Ri Yong-gil. Ri Yong-gil was announced as an alternate member of the KWP Politburo at the KWP Congress in
May 2016.

54 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, Kim Yo-jong was elected a member of the KWP Central Committee at the KWP Congress held in May 2016. The media has also shown her
supporting KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un on the podium during the celebration parade following the KWP Congress.

55 Elections for members and alternate members of the KWP central leadership agencies (e.g., KWP Central Committee and KWP Politburo) were held during the KWP Congress. Pak Pong-ju, Premier,
and Choe Ryong-hae, KWP Secretary, were newly elected as KWP Politburo Standing Committee members to form a five-member Standing Committee including: Kim Jong-un, KWP Chairman; Kim
Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and Hwang Pyong-so, Director of the General Political Bureau. All five members of the KWP Politburo Standing Committee
are not genuine military personnel. Furthermore, the ranks of military personnel have fallen within the KWP Politburo, and Premier Pak Pong-ju has been added as a member of the KWP Central
Military Commission. It is pointed out that these aspects show that a KWP-led governance system is shifting into high gear.

56 After the Supreme People’s Assembly session in June 2016, state media introduced the “Minister of the People’s Armed Forces,” who is considered equivalent to the minister of defense, as the “Minister
(Secretary) of the People’s Armed Forces,” raising the possibility that the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces has been reorganized into the Ministry (Department) of the People’s Armed Forces.


-----

has made attempts at limited improvement measures and
some changes to its economic management systems,[58] and
promotes the establishment of economic development
zones[59] and the enlargement of the discretion of plants
and other entities over production and sales plans.[60] At
the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016, the report
on the work of the KWP Central Committee referred
to the delays in the economic sector and identifi ed
the country’s economic revitalization and raising the
people’s standard of living as the most important tasks.
These all suggest North Korea is placing importance on
the rebuilding of the economy. Nonetheless, North Korea
is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could
lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system,
and thus, various challenges confront the fundamental
improvement of its current economic situation.

**5** **Relations with Other Countries**


Intelligence Dan Coats released on April 26, 2017, it
was declared that the U.S. policy towards North Korea
aims to pressure North Korea into dismantling its nuclear,
ballistic missile, and proliferation programs by tightening
economic sanctions and pursuing diplomatic measures
with its allies and regional partners. The United States
has been enhancing its alliance relationships with Japan
and the ROK and urging China more strongly to take
relevant actions.
In response, North Korea has reiterated its claim from
before that it needs its own nuclear deterrence in order
to counter the nuclear threat from the United States and
has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles, maintaining its
posture of continuing its activities for nuclear and missile
development.

**(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea**
When North Korea conducted a nuclear test in January
2016 and went ahead with the launch of a ballistic missile
disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016, the ROK
took measures such as resuming loudspeaker broadcasts
targeting North Korea, deciding to begin formal talks
between the ROK and the United States regarding the
deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) to U.S. Forces Korea,[62] and deciding to
completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial
Complex. In response, North Korea declared the
Kaesong Industrial Complex a military control zone, and
announced that it would expel all ROK nationals from the
zone and freeze their assets. When a U.S.-ROK combined
exercise was carried out from March to April 2016,
North Korea repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior,
noting that the fi rst target of attack would be the ROK
Blue House, resulting in heightened tensions between
the ROK and North Korea. Since the Seventh KWP
Congress in May 2016, North Korea has proposed to the
ROK to hold dialogue between their military authorities.
However, the ROK has maintained that it would not
agree to dialogue unless North Korea demonstrates its


**5**


**(1) Relations with the United States**
North Korea has reacted sharply to the U.S.-ROK
combined exercise, alleging that such activities were a
manifestation of the U.S. “hostile policy” towards North
Korea. In this regard, North Korea has repeatedly voiced
strong criticisms against the United States and conducted
military provocations such as ballistic missile launches.
When the U.S.-ROK combined exercise was carried
out from March to April 2017, North Korea reiterated
its hardline arguments against the United States and
repeatedly launched ballistic missiles.[61]

The U.S. Trump administration announced that it
would deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue
based on the concept of “all options are on the table,”
and increased its presence in this region by such means
as deploying a carrier strike group in April 2017 that
had been scheduled to leave Singapore and call port in
Australia to the Western Pacifi c. In addition, in the Joint
Statement by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary
of Defense James Mattis, and Director of National


58 For example, North Korea conducted a so-called currency revaluation (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009. The currency revaluation is said to have led to economic
disorder, such as price escalation due to shortfall of supply, which in turn increased social unrest.

59 During the plenary meeting of the KWP Central Committee on March 31, 2013, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the establishment of economic development zones in each province. Pursuant
to these instructions, the Economic Development Zone Law was enacted in May of that year. In November 2013, the establishment of 1 special economic zone and 13 economic development zones
was announced. In January 2015, it was reported that development plans for 13 economic development zones were established.

60 While the details of the policy are not necessarily clear, it is understood that in the industrial sector, entities would be able to independently make production decisions and conduct sales outside
the scope of the national plan, as well as determine employee remuneration and benefi ts based on the situation of the entities. In the agriculture sector, an autonomous business system would be
introduced at the household level. It has been said that 1,000 pyeong (1 pyeong = approx. 3.3 m[2]) of land would be allocated per person, with 40% of the agricultural products going to the state and
60% going to individuals.

61 On this point, Rodong Sinmun dated March 24, 2017 states that “our Strategic Forces have also routinized ballistic rocket launch exercises” in response to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise.

62 A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes


-----

intention to denuclearize with actions. Subsequently, in
light of the September 2016 nuclear test and the repeated
ballistic missile launches, the ROK announced its own
new measures against North Korea in December 2016 in
coordination with Japan and the United States.
Regarding its North Korea policy, the Moon Jae-in
administration inaugurated in May 2017 has expressed
its position on being open to dialogue but responding
resolutely to provocations. The impact of the new
administration’s new policy towards North Korea on
inter-Korean relations, where tension is rising, requires
close attention.

**(3) Relations with China**
The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is
still in force.[63] In addition, China is currently North Korea’s
biggest trade partner. In 2015, trade volume between
China and North Korea was very large, accounting for
approximately 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding
trade between North Korea and the ROK),[64] suggesting
North Korea’s dependence on China.
With regard to the situation in North Korea and
its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for the
denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early
resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In addition, when
North Korea conducted a nuclear test in January 2016
and launched a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite”
in February 2016, China expressed concerns towards
excessive sanctions, stating that a destabilization on
the Korean Peninsula must be avoided. Nevertheless, it
endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 2270, which
included a significant strengthening of sanctions against
North Korea, including a ban in principle on exports or
provision of aircraft fuel to North Korea and a ban in
principle on coal and iron ore imports from North Korea.
Moreover, China also endorsed UN Security Council
Resolution 2321, adopted in November 2016 in light of
North Korea’s nuclear test in September, which bolsters
the contents of related preceding resolutions, further
tightening restrictions on the flow of people, material
and funds to North Korea, in particular, establishing a
limit on coal exports, which are a source of funds for
North Korea.[65]

China is a vital political and economic partner for


North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on the
country. North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions
which are in line with the position of China over nuclear
and ballistic missile issues. Furthermore, China has
opposed the implementation of excessive sanctions on
North Korea that could lead to destabilizing the Korean
Peninsula. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China
relations and China’s influence on North Korea require
continued attention.

**(4) Relations with Russia**
Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along
with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization
on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the SixParty Talks. After the nuclear test conducted by North
Korea in February 2013, Russia issued a statement that
condemned the test but opposed sanctions that could have
implications on normal trade and economic relations with
North Korea. When North Korea conducted a nuclear test
in January 2016 and launched a ballistic missile disguised
as a “Satellite” in February 2016, Russia condemned
North Korea for violating UN Security Council
resolutions, while maintaining a cautious stance towards
rigorous sanctions, saying that an economic collapse in
North Korea should be avoided, but ultimately agreed to
UN Security Council Resolution 2270 in March 2016.
As for UN Security Council Resolution 2321, adopted in
November 2016 following North Korea’s nuclear test in
September, Russia advocated that while harsh measures
had been adopted due to North Korean actions, the
situation on the Korean Peninsula should not be used to
enhance military presence in the region.


**(5) Relations with Other Countries**
Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish
relations with a series of West European countries
and others, including the establishment of diplomatic
relations with European countries[66] and participation in
the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been
reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships
with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar,
and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and
military technology transfer. In April 2013, North Korea’s
attempt to export gas masks and other items to Syria was
intercepted by Turkish authorities. In July of the same


63 It includes a provision that if either of the signatories (China and North Korea) is attacked and enters into a state of war, the other would make every effort to immediately provide military and other assistance.
64 According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).
65 In February 2017, China announced the provisional suspension of coal imports from North Korea for the remainder of the year.


-----

year, the North Korean vessel Chong Chon Gang sailing
from Cuba to North Korea was seized by Panamanian
authorities near the Panama Canal. As a result, contents of
cargo that violated UN Security Council resolutions were
confi scated, including MiG-21 fi ghters and a surface-toair missile system.
In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be
strengthening its relations with African countries, with
North Korean senior offi cials paying visits to African
countries.[67] The underlying purposes for enhancing
relations with these countries include the usual objective
of deepening political and economic cooperation. In
addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire
foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military

**The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea**
**2**

**1** **General Situation**


In May 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration was
inaugurated in the ROK. With regard to its North Korea
policy, the administration has expressed its position on
being open to dialogue but responding resolutely to
provocations. The impact of the new administration’s new
policy towards North Korea on inter-Korean relations,
where tension is rising, requires close attention.
The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been
stationed in the ROK since the ceasefi re of the Korean
War. The ROK has established very close security
arrangements with the United States primarily based on
the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces
Korea have been playing a vital role in deterring the
outbreak of large-scale armed confl icts on the Korean
Peninsula.


cooperation with African countries – activities which are
becoming increasingly diffi cult due to sanctions based on
UN Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in
the Middle East.[68] The possibility that North Korea’s illegal
activities would provide a funding source for nuclear and
ballistic missile development is a cause for concern.
In February 2017, a North Korean man was murdered
in Malaysia and the Malaysian Government later confi rmed
that the man was Kim Jong-nam. The Malaysian police
also announced that VX gas, whose production and
use are banned by the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical
Weapons Convention), was detected from his body.

country from external military threats and invasions, to
support peaceful unifi cation, and to contribute to regional
stability and world peace.” As one of the “external
military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper,
used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy.”
However, the ROK presently uses the expression, “the
North Korean regime and its armed forces…will remain
as our enemies.”[69]

The ROK has continued to undertake reforms
of its national defense.[70] In 2005, the ROK Ministry
of National Defense announced the Defense Reform
Basic Plan (2006-2020) including reduction of the
number of troops, as part of the plan to transition from
a “quantitative military structure centered on troop
strength” to a “qualitative military structure centered
on information and knowledge.” In 2009, in light of the
changes in the situation such as the missile launches and
nuclear tests by North Korea, it announced the Defense
Reform Basic Plan (2009-2020), which explicitly
referred to matters such as scaling down the reduction
of the number of troops and the possibility of preemptive
attacks on North Korea’s nuclear and missile facilities.
In August 2012, in light of the sinking of the ROK patrol
boat and the bombardment of Yeonpyeong in 2010, the


**2** **Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK**

**2**


The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital
Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10
million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set
the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the


67 For example, in May 2016, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam attended the inauguration ceremony of the President of Equatorial Guinea. He held talks with
the President, as well as with the leaders of the Republic of Chad, the Gabonese Republic, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Republic of Guinea, and the Republic of Mali who
were attending the inauguration ceremony.

68 The fi nal report of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee released in March 2017 makes references to the export of military communication
equipment to Eritrea, the export of man-portable air-defense missile systems to Mozambique, and police and military cooperation in Uganda, among others.

69 The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2016 describes North Korea as follows: “[T]he constant military threats and provocations from North Korea are the primary security threats the ROK faces today. In
particular, North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear weapons and missiles, cyber-attacks and terrorism pose major threats to our national security. As long as these threats
persist, the North Korean regime and its military will remain an enemy insofar as they are the agents carrying out these threats.”

70 Under the Act concerning National Defense Reform passed in 2006, the Defense Reform Basic Plan must analyze and evaluate changes in the situation and the results of the promotion of national


-----

Defense Reform Basic Plan (2012-2030) was released,[71]
which included enhancing deterrence capabilities against
North Korea and making the military even more effi cient.
In March 2014, the Defense Reform Basic Plan (20142030) was unveiled,[72] which included in its scope the
long-term development of defense capabilities in order
to respond to potential threats after the unifi cation of the
Korean Peninsula while securing response capabilities
against the threat from North Korea. In February 2017,
it announced the Defense Reform Basic Plan (20142030) (rev.1), which, while maintaining the objectives
and underlying tone of Defense Reform Basic Plan
(2014-2030), emphasizes having readiness capability for
simultaneous local provocations and all-out war, while
giving top priority to bolstering the organization and
military power for responding to nuclear, missile and
other asymmetrical threats from North Korea.

**3** **Military Posture of the ROK**


The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground
forces consist of 22 army divisions and 2 marine divisions,
totaling 520,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of
240 vessels with a total displacement of approximately
213,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy
combined) consist of approximately 620 combat aircraft.
The ROK has been modernizing its military forces—
not only its Army but also its Navy and Air Force—in
order to establish an omnidirectional defense posture to
deal with future potential threats, not least threats from
North Korea. The Navy has been introducing submarines,
large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers.
The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the
installation of the F-35A as a next-generation fi ghter with
stealth property.
In October 2012, the ROK Government announced


a revision of its missile guidelines stipulating the range
of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision includes the
extension of their maximum range from 300 km to 800
km to enhance the deterrence against military provocation
by North Korea. In addition, to address North Korean
nuclear and missile threats, the ROK intends to expand
the missile capabilities of the ROK Forces,[73] establish a
system known as “Kill Chain” to conduct swift preemptive
strikes using missiles and other assets,[74] and develop an
indigenous missile defense system (Korea Air and Missile
Defense [KAMD]).[75] In addition, in September 2016, in
response to the implementation of the fi fth nuclear test
by North Korea, the ROK Ministry of National Defense
announced that it would expand the existing “Kill Chain”
and KAMD by adding the Korea Massive Punishment &
Retaliation (KMPR) concept[76] and changing to a Koreantype three-axis system.
In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted
equipment export, which reached approximately US$3.5

Fig. I-2-2-5 Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget


Fig. I-2-2-5


Defense budget (in 100 million won)

Year-on-year growth rate (%)

(100 million won) (%)

450,000 20

400,000

350,000

15

300,000

250,000

10

200,000

150,000

5

100,000

50,000

0 0
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 (FY)

Notes: 1. ROK Defense White Paper 2016 for FY2011 to FY2016.
2. The Ministry of National Defense website for FY2017.


71 The ROK Ministry of National Defense states that in order to convert the ROK Forces into an “order-made military structure” that matches the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula, it
will signifi cantly expand response capabilities in the Northwestern Islands area, reorganize the senior command structure in preparation for the transfer of wartime operational command, gradually
proceed with the reduction and reorganization of the troops, and signifi cantly expand response capabilities against missiles and cyberwarfare, etc. In order to build a “high-effi ciency developed
country-type national defense operation structure,” it will also promote effi ciency, reorganize the human resources control structure, enhance the welfare of the military, and improve the military
service environment of the troops.

72 The ROK Ministry of National Defense plans to introduce an additional three Aegis-class cruisers, develop next-generation destroyers and submarines, and introduce medium- and high-altitude
reconnaissance drones and multipurpose satellites in order to secure response capabilities against existing and potential threats.

73 In April 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the country has developed and already fi elded missiles that include cruise missiles able to strike throughout North Korea. In
February 2013, the ministry indicated that it would accelerate the development of 800 km-range ballistic missiles, possession of which was made possible by the revision of the missile guidelines in
October 2012, and announced that it has fi elded cruise missiles to be launched from vessels or submarines and capable of attacking the entire area of North Korea. Also in October, during an event
commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the armed forces, the ROK Forces displayed to the public for the fi rst time the “Hyeonmu 2” ballistic missile, which is said to have a 300 km
range, and the “Hyeonmu 3” surface-to-surface cruise missile, which is said to have a 1,000 km range. The ROK conducted successful test launches of a new ballistic missile with a range of 500 km
in April 2014 and a new ballistic missile with a range of 800 km in June 2017.

74 The ROK Ministry of National Defense explains that the system is capable of detecting and identifying signs of missile launch, determining attack, and actual attacking instantaneously. It is noted
that the system is comprised of ISR capabilities (reconnaissance drone and satellite), striking capabilities (F-35 fi ghter, air-to-surface missile, and new ballistic missile, etc.), and intercept capabilities
(current PAC-2, as well as PAC-3 and indigenously built anti-air missile).

75 The ROK Ministry of National Defense has denied participation in the U.S. missile defense system, and has underscored that the ROK was creating its own indigenous systems. The reported reasons
include differences in threat perceptions between the United States and the ROK, concern over Chinese backlash, and cost effectiveness.

76 The ROK Ministry of National Defense website states that “KMPR, the third axis, is a Korean-type massive retaliation concept, a system in which counterattacks are conducted by directly aiming at
the North Korean leadership including its war command headquarters, in the case where North Korea threatens with its nuclear weapons,” and “missile and other strike forces capable of delivering


-----

billion on a contract value basis in 2015. Since 2006, the
amount has increased by nearly 14-fold in nine years. It
is reported that export items have diversifi ed to include
communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels.[77]

Defense spending in FY2017 (regular budget)
increased by about 3.6% from the previous fi scal year
to nearly KRW 40.3337 trillion, marking the 18th
consecutive year of increases since 2000.

See Fig. I-2-2-5 (Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget)

See


**4** **U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea**


**4**


The United States and the ROK have taken various steps
to deepen the U.S.-ROK Alliance in recent years.
While regularly confi rming the strengthening of
the U.S.-ROK Alliance at the summit level, as specifi c
undertakings, the two countries signed the U.S.-ROK
Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s
provocations in March 2013,[78] and approved the Tailored
Deterrence Strategy, designed to enhance deterrence
against North Korean nuclear and other WMD threats, at
the 45th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October
of the same year.[79] At the 46th SCM in October 2014,
the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles
of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile
Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North
Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in
November 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D
Operational Concept was approved.[80] Additionally, after
North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January
2016, the United States and the ROK began formal
talks regarding deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces
Korea in February 2016 and offi cially decided in July
to deploy them. Part of the system arrived in the ROK
in March 2017, and its deployment to the designated
site for operations commenced by the end of April. In
addition, it was reported that in the U.S.-ROK combined
exercise held from March to April 2017, around 300,000
ROK Forces personnel and around 13,000 U.S. Forces
personnel participated, and a record number of troops


and equipment were mobilized including a carrier strike
group for the second straight year.
At the same time, the two countries have worked to
deal with such issues as the transition of OPCON to the
ROK[81] and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. Despite
these efforts, however, the two countries are pressed to
revise their plans. For the transition of OPCON to the
ROK, the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance
2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to
complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two
countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning
from the existing combined defense arrangement of the
U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement
led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces.
Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of
North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides
decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition
of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach,
i.e., implementing the transition when the ROK Forces
meet conditions such as enhanced capabilities. This
new approach does not present a specifi c deadline for
the transition. However, since the central challenges to
enhancing the capabilities of the ROK Forces are deemed
to be the Kill Chain, KAMD, and KMPR three-axis
system and these systems have the early 2020s as the
target completion date, attention will be focused on their
impact on the OPCON transition period.


77 As for recent examples, in 2012, the ROK concluded an agreement to export three Type 209 submarines to Indonesia as well as an agreement to export four of the new Military Afl oat Reach and
Sustainability (MARS) vessels to the United Kingdom. In 2014, the ROK concluded an agreement to export 12 FA-50 light attack aircraft to the Philippines.

78 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint
responses in the event of a North Korean provocation. However, the details of the plan have not been made public.

79 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and
wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK to maximize their deterrent effects. However, the details have not been made public.

80 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 46th SCM, the “Concepts and Principles” are designed to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy missile threats including nuclear and biochemical warheads.
However, the details have not been made public. Furthermore, according to the “Strategic Digest 2015” of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, the “Concepts and Principles” apply from peacetime to war, and
will guide operational decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and acquisitions.

81 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and
to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea
Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency. In 2007, the
two countries decided to dissolve the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command in April 2012 and to transition OPCON to the ROK. However, in June 2010, they agreed to postpone the transition timing


-----

With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces
Korea,[82] an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the
relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in
the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul,
and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north
of the Han River to the south of the river. However, the
relocation to the Pyeontaek area had been delayed due to
logistical reasons, including increases in relocation costs.
The decision to postpone the transition of OPCON that
was made at the 46th SCM has in turn necessitated some
U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison. In
addition, the two countries decided that the counter-fi res
forces of the U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their
location north of the Han River to counter the threat of
North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. These decisions
have given rise to new factors that force the two countries
to partially revise the plans. Accordingly, while the plans
themselves would be maintained, their completion date
was revised to “strive for completion in a timely manner.”
In May 2016, the ROK Ministry of National Defense
announced that “The relocation to Pyeontaek of most of
the units including the U.S. Forces Korea command is
scheduled to be completed by 2017.” These challenges
are perceived to have signifi cant impact on the U.S.-ROK
defense postures on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard,
relevant developments need to be followed closely.

**5** **Relations with Other Countries**


ROK s ADIZ. Furthermore, it included the airspace
above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese
name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK
have confl icting claims to the jurisdictional authority
over the exclusive economic zone. Against this backdrop,
the ROK Government announced the expansion of
its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from
the same month. In addition, following North Korea’s
nuclear test in January 2016 and launch of a ballistic
missile in February 2016, the deployment of THAAD by
U.S. Forces Korea was offi cially decided in July 2016.
Part of the system arrived in the ROK in March 2017,
and its deployment to the designated site for operations
commenced by the end of April. China has protested that
the deployment of THAAD to the ROK would undermine
China’s strategic security interests.

**(2) Relations with Russia**
Military exchanges have been under way between the
ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges
among high-ranking military offi cials. The two countries
have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military
technology, defense industry, and military supplies. At the
ROK-Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to
upgrade the bilateral relations to a “strategic cooperative
partnership.” In March 2012, the two countries held the
fi rst ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed
to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President
Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement
was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen
dialogue in the areas of politics and security.
On the other hand, Russia opposes the deployment
of THAAD by U.S. Forces Korea for the reason that it is
part of the U.S. missile defense network and harms the
strategic stability of the region.


**5**


**(1) Relations with China**
China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to
strengthen their relations. Recently, in February 2015, the
Minister of National Defense of China visited the ROK
for the fi rst time in nine years, and in September 2015,
then President Park Geun-hye visited China and attended
the military parade that was part of the “commemorative
event for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese
people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression.” In
this regard, a trend in deepening the bilateral relations was
observed among government leaders and senior offi cials.
Meanwhile, outstanding issues have emerged
between China and the ROK. The “East China Sea Air
Defense Identifi cation Zone” (ADIZ) issued by China
in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the


**(3) Overseas Activities**
Since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia
in 1993, the ROK has participated in a number of UN
peacekeeping operations (PKO). In December 2009,
the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the
number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions
from the current level.[83] In July 2010, the ROK created
the “International Peace Support Force,” a special unit


82 The United States intends to consolidate and relocate the bases of the U.S. Forces Korea which are scattered across the ROK, in order to ensure stable stationing conditions for U.S. Forces Korea and
a balanced development of ROK land. The agreement between the United States and the ROK include: (1) an agreement to conduct the relocation to south of the Han River in two stages (June 2003);
and (2) the withdrawal of 12,500 of the nearly 37,500 personnel out of the ROK (October 2004). The United States has thus been transforming its posture in accordance with these agreements.
However, at the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in April 2008, the two countries agreed to maintain the current 28,500 as the appropriate troop level. Since then, the two countries have continued to affi rm
that maintaining this troop level would be appropriate.

83 The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK Forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, an act concerning participation in UN


-----

for overseas dispatch. Since March 2013, the ROK has
dispatched troops composed primarily of engineering
units to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of
South Sudan (UNMISS).
Furthermore, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels
to off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK

registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO)
of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Since January
2011, the ROK has dispatched a ROK special forces unit
for the purpose of supporting the training of the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) special forces units, joint exercises,
and protecting ROK nationals in emergency situations.


-----

**Section 3 China**


**General Situation**
**1**


China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast
landmass surrounded by a long borderline shared with
14 countries as well as a long coastline. China is also a
nation with various races, religions, and languages. China,
with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining
a distinct culture and civilization. China’s pride in its
unique history and semi-colonial experience in and after
the 19th century is driving its desire for a strong nation
and fueling its nationalism.
In recent years, China has increased its presence in
the international community. For example, China takes
a proactive stance towards efforts in non-traditional
security areas and makes personnel and financial
contributions to UN PKOs. In addition, China has
been sending its ships continuously for counter-piracy
activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of
Aden. Furthermore, China has participated proactively
in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.
These activities have been highly appreciated by the
international community. There continues to be high
expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in
the international community, accept and comply with
international norms, and play an active role in a more
cooperative manner on regional and global issues.
Yet, while advocating “peaceful development,”[1]
China, particularly over maritime issues where its
interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an
assertive manner, including attempts at changing the
status quo by coercion based on its own assertions
incompatible with the existing international order.[2]
These actions include dangerous acts that could cause
unintended consequences. China remains poised to fulfill
its unilateral demands without compromise, which has
included making steady efforts to turn these coercive
changes to the status quo into a fait accompli. There is
strong concern regarding the impact of these actions on
the security environment of the region including Japan
and of the international community.


In addition, China faces various problems domestically
including human rights issues. The spread of bribery
and corruption among the central and local leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become a
significant political problem. Furthermore, China’s rapid
economic growth has brought with it emerging problems
such as regional disparities between urban-rural and
coastal inland regions, the issue of the tax system that
facilitates these disparities, wealth gaps among urban
residents, inflation, environmental pollution, and lack of
agricultural and industrial water. More recently, China
has witnessed a slowdown in its economic growth.[3] In the
future, China is also expected to face issues associated
with the rapid aging of the population, including pension
and other issues related to the social security system.
The Chinese Government has been tightening its control
over society[4] as these potentially destabilizing factors
to the government administration expand and diversify.
However, it is suggested that controlling activities of the
masses becomes increasingly difficult with the spread
of the Internet, coupled with other factors. Additionally,
China confronts issues concerning ethnic minorities in
the country, with their staging protests and carrying out
campaigns in pursuit of separation and independence
in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region, and elsewhere.


The term China’s “peaceful development” began to come into formal use in around 2004. According to a paper presented by then State Councilor Dai Bingguo on March 11, 2011, “peaceful
development” is thought to refer to China’s development whose nature is (1) peaceful, (2) independent, (3) scientific, (4) cooperative, and (5) common with other countries.

For example, regarding the so-called “nine-dash line” asserted by China in the South China Sea, “historic rights” claimed by China were rejected by the Philippines-China arbitration award (July 2016).

According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.7% year-on-year in 2016. While it was along the lines of the Chinese Government’s target of
6.5% to 7.0%, the growth was the slowest since 26 years ago in 1990.

See Chapter 2, Section 3-2 (7 Education and Training) for China’s promotion of the national security legal system. In January 2017, a notice was issued requiring permission to provide VPN services,


-----

In the meantime, since December 2015, the People s
Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing what can be
described as its most signifi cant reforms since the founding
of the country. Also, in China, under the policy of cracking
down on both “tigers” and “fl ies,”[5] “corruption” has been
subject to severe charges, including that conducted by
former prominent leaders of the party and military such
as Zhou Yongkang, then a Politburo Standing Committee
member, as well as then Vice Chairmen of the Central
Military Commission (CMC), Guo Boxiong and Xu
Caihou. The Communique of the sixth plenary session
of the 18th CCP Central Committee in October 2016
refers to “comprehensive, strict governance of the CCP,”
and it is expected that corruption within the party and
the military will continue to be addressed in the lead-up
to the 19th National Congress of the CCP to be held in
autumn 2017. At the same plenary session, the party also
demonstrated its intention to further bolster the power
foundations of the current regime, which included the
designation of General Secretary Xi Jinping as the “core”
of the Central Committee. The relevant developments
will be a point to watch out for.
On the diplomatic fi eld, it is believed that, in order
to maintain national stability, China strives to maintain
stability in the strategic international environment by
sustaining good relations with major powers such as the
United States and Russia, while deepening relations with

**Military Affairs**
**2**


**1** **Defense Policies**


neighboring countries, and is strengthening cooperation
with developing countries. In addition, China seeks to
promote multipolarization of the world through building
China-led multilateral mechanisms[6] and to secure
interests necessary for economic development such as
natural resources and energy supply.
On the military front, for over a quarter century,
China has strengthened its military forces broadly and
rapidly by sustaining large increases in its defense budget.
In particular, China gives priority to the Taiwan issue
as an issue pertaining to the “core” interest of national
sovereignty.[7] It is deemed that China is strengthening
its military forces for the time being with the aim of
improving military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s
independence. As part of such efforts, China is believed to
be enhancing its asymmetric military capabilities to deter
military forces of other countries from approaching and
advancing to China’s surrounding region, and to inhibit
their military activities in the region (so-called “A2/AD”
capabilities[8]). Additionally, China has made active efforts
to acquire capabilities for missions other than for dealing
with a Taiwan contingency such as the enhancement of
operation execution capabilities in distant waters. As
China now has considerable infl uence in the international
community politically, economically, and militarily, other
countries are closely watching its military trends.

accelerate the modernization of national defense and the
military forces; to fi rmly protect its national sovereignty,
security, and development interests; and to provide strong
assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great
revival of the people of Chinese ethnicity. China contends
that these defense policies are defensive in nature.[10]

China has a policy to actively promote “Revolution
in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,”
which mainly aims to encourage mechanization and


**1**


China regards that the buildup of strong defense capabilities
and powerful military forces constitutes a strategic mission
to modernize the state, and that it ensures the security of
the state under “peaceful development.” China considers
the main goal and mission of national defense policies as:
to adapt to the changes in the new security environment;
to accomplish the strategic guideline of active defense[9]
to realize the CCP’s goal of building a strong military; to


On January 22, 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping said in a speech during the second plenary session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, “we must uphold the fi ghting of tigers
and fl ies at the same time” to punish corruption. This is assumed to mean that corruption by both key senior offi cials and low-ranked offi cials will be exposed.

China seeks to implement its own initiatives in the security realm; at the Conference on Interaction and Confi dence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), China criticized military alliances and proposed
“the security of Asia by the people of Asia.” In the international fi nance domain as well, China plays a leading role in establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

China strongly urges Japan, the United States, and other countries to respect China’s “core interests.” In its white paper on defense “China's Peaceful Development” published in September 2011,
China explains that it “never seeks hegemony” and will take “the path of peaceful development,” while at the same time stating that it is “fi rm in upholding its core interests.” “Core interests” include
“national sovereignty,” “national security,” “territorial integrity,” “national reunifi cation,” “national political system and social stability,” and “basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social
development.” In particular, with regard to “territory,” some suggest that it refers to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang and includes also China’s territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. According to the
Ministry of National Defense of China, in June 2016, during his meeting with former GSDF Chief of Staff Yoshifumi Hibako who was visiting China, Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan stated to
the effect that Japan was exaggerating “China’s military threat” by criticizing this and that about issues related to the “core interests” of China, including the East and South China Seas.

For a defi nition of the so-called “A2/AD” capabilities, see Chapter 1, Section 2.

The strategic concept of active defense is seen as the essence of the CCP’s military strategic concept. It upholds the principles of defense, self-defense, and “post-emptive strike” (suppress the
adversary after it attacks), and maintains that “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”


-----

informatization of its military power, based on its military
strategy to win informatized local wars. This is in response
to global developments in military affairs observed in
the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War, and other
wars. It is believed that China emphasizes not only
physical means but also non-physical means in military
affairs and warfare. It has incorporated the concept of
“Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological
Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — into the tasks of the
political work of the military. In addition, China has set
forth a policy of close coordination between military
struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural,
and legal endeavors.
Dealing with a Taiwan contingency is believed to be
a top priority in China’s strengthening of military forces;
more specifi cally, improving its capabilities to hinder the
independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for
it. Furthermore, in recent years, China is working actively
to acquire capabilities for missions other than dealing with
a Taiwan contingency, and is steadily enhancing operation
execution capabilities in more distant waters. With regard
to China’s military strengthening, China proclaims that it
would “realize the basic mechanization and achieve major
progress in construction of informatization by 2020” and
“by focusing on the capability to win local wars under
informatized conditions, it will improve the abilities to
accomplish diversifi ed military missions and thoroughly
complete the historical military missions in a new phase
of the new century.”[11] These suggest that China’s military
forces will be developed in tandem with the enhancement
of its national strength.
China has sustained large increases in its defense
spending and broadly and rapidly reinforced its military
forces, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well
as its Navy and Air Force. As part of such efforts, it is
understood that China is strengthening its so-called
“A2/AD” capabilities. In addition, China is working
to improve joint operational capabilities, enhance
capabilities for extended-range power projection,
conduct practical exercises, cultivate and acquire
personnel for administering operations of informatized
forces, improve the foundation of its domestic defense
industry, and ensure law-based military governance.
Furthermore, China has rapidly expanded and intensifi ed
its activities quantitatively and qualitatively in sea areas
and in airspace, including the East and South China


Seas. China, particularly over maritime issues where
its interests confl ict with others’, continues to act in an
assertive manner, such as attempts at changing the status
quo by coercion. China also remains poised to fulfi ll
its unilateral demands without compromise, which has
included making steady efforts to turn these coercive
changes to the status quo into a fait accompli. Japan has
great concerns over such Chinese military activities, etc.,
together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs
and security issues, and needs to keep utmost attention to
them. These activities also raise security concerns for the
region and the international community.

**2** **Military Transparency**


China has not disclosed specifi c information on
possession of weapons, procurement goals and past
procurements, organization and locations of major units,
records of main military operations and exercises, and
a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget.
Moreover, China has neither set out a clear and specifi c
future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured
adequate transparency of its decision-making process in
relation to military and security affairs.
China has released defense white papers including
“China’s National Defense” every two years since 1998.
China also conducts numerous dialogues with national
defense authorities of other countries.[12] The Chinese
Ministry of National Defense has been giving monthly


**KeyWord** Three Warfares

China amended the Regulations of the PLA on the Political Work in

December 2003 to add Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfares

to the PLA’s political work. They are collectively referred to as the

“Three Warfares.” U.S. DoD explains these warfares as follows: (1)

Media Warfare is aimed at infl uencing domestic and international

public opinion to build public and international support for China’s
military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies

perceived to be adverse to China’s interests; (2) Psychological Warfare

seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations
through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking,

and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian

populations; and (3) Legal Warfare uses international and domestic

laws to gain international support and manage possible repercussions

of China’s military actions.


11 The defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2008” also states the following target: “by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st
century.” It is regarded that this target takes into account the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (2049), one of “the two 100 years,” with the other being the 100th
anniversary of the CCP (2021).


-----

press conferences by a spokesperson since April 2011. In
November 2013, the position of spokesperson was newly
established at seven departments, including the Navy
and Air Force.[13] Such moves can be perceived on the one
hand as efforts that contribute to the improvement of the
transparency of military forces, and on the other as efforts
to strengthen “Media Warfare.”
However, China has not provided a detailed
breakdown of its national defense spending. In the past,
China disclosed the total amounts and general purposes
for the following three categories: personnel; training
and maintenance; and equipment.[14] Nonetheless, such
explanations have not been offered in recent years.
Moreover, in China’s defense white papers released
since 2013, the contents have been limited to selective
topics. The papers make no reference to national defense
spending that was described in previous defense white
papers, and the overall volume of the text has decreased.
In this respect, transparency is declining, and China has
not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a
responsible nation in the international community.
Incidents have been occurring that incite concerns
over China’s military decision-making and actions,
including Chinese explanations against the facts. For
example, details have yet to be disclosed regarding the
causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s
submerged navigation in Japan’s territorial waters in
November 2004 although it constitutes a breach of
international law. Furthermore, with respect to the
incident of a Chinese naval vessel directing its firecontrol radar at an MSDF destroyer (January 2013),
among other incidents, both the Chinese Ministry of
National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave
explanations which were inconsistent with the facts; that
is, they have denied the use of the radar itself. With regard
to the incident in which Chinese fighters flew abnormally
close to aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF (May and June
2014), the Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave
explanations that were contrary to the truth; it claimed
that Japanese aircraft “entered the airspace for the


Chinese drills without reporting to China and conducted
dangerous acts.” Particularly since 2016, China has
repeatedly made claims that are contrary to fact. In the
case where SDF aircraft scrambled against Chinese
aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace, China
claimed that the SDF aircraft “conducted interference
at close distance and shot IR flares, endangering the
safety of the Chinese aircraft and its crew.”[15] In recent
years, amid the significant changes in the environment
surrounding the military, including advances in military
specialization and diversification of missions associated
with military strengthening, some see that relations
between the CCP leadership and the PLA have become
increasingly complex. Others opine that the military’s
level of influence on foreign policy decisions has been
changing.[16] Attention will be paid to such situations also
as an issue of crisis management.
Chinese false explanations are also evident in
China’s coercive, rapid, and large-scale development on
features in the South China Sea.[17] In September 2015, at
the U.S.-China Summit Meeting, President Xi Jinping
stated, “China does not intend to pursue militarization” in
the South China Sea. However, since then, deployment of
what appears to be surface-to-air missiles to the Paracel
Islands, the deployment of what is presumed to be antiaircraft guns on the Spratley Islands, and other activities
have been detected, causing serious concern within the
international community.[18]

As China’s influence in the international community
has risen politically, economically, and militarily, other
countries are closely following China’s moves. In order
to allay their concerns over China, it is becoming more
important for China itself to explain its military activities
according to the facts and improve the transparency of
its national defense policy and military capabilities. It
is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency
concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing
specific and accurate information pertaining to its defense
policies and military capabilities.


13 The seven departments are: then PLA General Political Department; then PLA General Logistics Department; then PLA General Armaments Department; PLA Navy; PLA Air Force; then PLA Second
Artillery Corps; and People’s Armed Police.

14 The defense white papers “China’s National Defense in 2008” and “China’s National Defense in 2010” provided a breakdown of personnel expenses, training and maintenance costs, and equipment
costs for the active force, reserve force, and militia, limited to the FY2007 and FY2009 defense budget expenditures, respectively.

15 For example, on December 10, 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced, “When Chinese Air Force aircraft mobilized for regular blue water training in the Western Pacific
and passed through the Miyako Strait (sic) airspace, the Japanese SDF mobilized two F-15 fighters and conducted interference against the Chinese aircraft at close distance and shot IR flares,
endangering the safety of the Chinese aircraft and its crew.” On October 28 of the same year, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made a similar announcement. See
Chapter 2, Section 3-5 (3).

16 For example, some point out that in recent years, the PLA increasingly expresses its position on security issues concerning national sovereignty or maritime interests. Others point out that the extent of
the military’s involvement in the party’s decision-making process is limited because the number of PLA representatives to key decision-making bodies of the CCP is fewer than in the past. Meanwhile,
the PLA has repeatedly stressed “absolute instruction of the forces by the party.”

17 See Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5 (4); Chapter 2, Section 6-4; Chapter 3, Section 3-3-7 and 3-3-8.
18 For example, in response to the deployment of equipment that appears to be surface-to-air missiles on the Paracel Islands, then Defense Secretary John Kerry stated in February 2016 that “there is
every evidence, every day that there has been an increase of militarization of one kind or another — it's of serious concern.” In October 2015, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of


-----

China s national defense budget.
In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the
defense budget announced by China is considered to
be only a part of its actual military expenditures.[22] For
example, it is believed that the announced defense budget
does not include all the equipment procurement costs and
research and development (R&D) expenses.

See Fig. I-2-3-1 (Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget)

See

**4** **Military Posture**


China’s military forces are composed of the PLA, the
People’s Armed Police Force (PAP),[23] and the militia.[24]
It is provided that these bodies be instructed and
commanded by the Central Military Commission (CMC).
The PLA is defi ned as a people’s force created and led by
the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Rocket Force, etc.


**3** **National Defense Budget**


China announced that its national defense budget
for FY2017 was approximately 1,444 billion yuan.[19]
This initial budget amount represented a growth of
approximately 7.1% (approximately 68.2 billion yuan)[20]
compared to the initial budget amount for the previous
fi scal year. China’s announced national defense budget
has increased at a rapid pace every year since FY1989.[21]
The nominal size of China’s announced national defense
budget has grown approximately 49-fold in the 29
years since FY1988 and nearly 3-fold in the 10 years
since FY2007. China positions the buildup of defense
capabilities as important a task as economic development.
It is believed that China continues to invest resources in
the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem
with its economic development. Attention will be paid to
how the slowdown in China’s economic growth affects

Fig. I-2-3-1 Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget

|n yuan)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Defense budget (in 100 million yuan) Year-on-year growth rate (%)||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||
|||||||||||||||


Fig. I-2-3-1


(100 million yuan) (%)

10,500
10,000 40

9,500
9,000 Defense budget (in 100 million yuan)

8,500 Year-on-year growth rate (%) 30

8,000
7,500
7,000 25
6,500
6,000
5,500 20
5,000
4,500

15

4,000
3,500
3,000 10
2,500
2,000
1,500 5
1,000
500
0 0

89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 17
(FY)

Note: This basically shows the defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. Note that the FY2002 budget was calculated on the assumption that the disclosed rate
and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001, because the FY2002 budget was not disclosed and discrepancies
arise when the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. Since FY2015, the Chinese Government announced only
the defense budget within the basic expenditures of the central government (part of the central fiscal expenditures). As for the FY2015 defense budget, however,
since the local transfer expenditure amount in FY2015 was announced separately at a later date, it was added to calculate the FY2015 defense budget within
central fiscal expenditures. Regarding the FY2017 China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency announced the FY2017 defense budget as a “statement by a senior
Ministry of Finance official.”


19 Reported by China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency as a “statement by a senior Ministry of Finance offi cial.” While converting national defense budgets of foreign countries into another currency
simply by applying currency exchange rates does not necessarily refl ect an accurate value due to differences in price level, China’s national defense budget for FY2017 is equivalent to approximately
17,754.7 billion yen if, hypothetically, it is converted using a rate of 17 yen per yuan (FY2017 rate that the Japanese Government uses for offi cial purposes).

20 Calculated for FY2016 from the basic expenditures of the central government for FY2016 and FY2017, since China released only the national defense budget amount as part of the basic expenditures
of the central government, which do not include local relocation expenditures among other expenses.

21 China’s announced national defense budget within central fi scal expenditures achieved double-digit growth on the initial-budget basis every year from FY1989 to FY2015 except in FY2010. For
FY2015 and FY2016, the defense budget was announced within the basic expenditures of the central government. However, since the local relocation expenditure amount, etc. for FY2015 were
released separately, this was added to calculate the national defense budget within central fi scal expenditures.

22 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) estimates China’s military-related defense spending as having
been at least US$180 billion in FY2016. The same report indicates that China’s announced defense budget (US$144.3 billion) does not include major categories of expenditure such as R&D expenses
and foreign procurement.

23 Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and fi refi ghting activities. According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2002,” “it
is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.”

24 The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistics support for combat operations in wartime. The defense white paper “China’s National
Defense in 2002” explains, “[u]nder the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat
support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social


-----

**(1) Military Reform**
China is currently carrying out reforms of the PLA which
are seen as being the largest in the country’s history.
In November 2015, for the fi rst time at the CMC
Reform Work Conference, President Xi Jinping unveiled
China’s offi cial position on a specifi c direction of the
military reforms, announcing that the military reforms
would be carried out by 2020, which would include:
establishment of “theaters of operations” and a command
structure for joint operations as well as reduction of
troops by 300,000 personnel.
Recently, these military reforms have taken shape at
a rapid pace. In late December 2015, a ceremony was
held in Beijing for the establishment of the PLA Army
Headquarters (PLAA),[25] Rocket Force (PLARF),[26] and
Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).[27] In January 2016, the
four general departments[28] that were the headquarters for
the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections
under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department,
Political Work Department, Logistic Support Department,
and Equipment Development Department. In February
2016, the PLA’s seven Military Regions[29] were abolished,
and fi ve theaters of operations responsible for command
of operations were newly created, namely, the Eastern
Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern
Theater, and Central Theater.[30] Furthermore, in September
2016, the establishment conference for the Joint Logistics
Support Force was held in Beijing.[31]
It is considered that these series of reforms are
designed to build military forces that can fi ght and win
wars by improving their joint operational capabilities
and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the
development of military capabilities and organizational
management from peacetime.[32] It is suggested that the
realignment of the Four General Departments was aimed
to decentralize the leading organs, strengthen the direct
leadership of the CMC and its Chairman, and tackle
corruption at the center of the military. While China is


expected to continue these reforms,[33] there are views that
dissatisfaction is growing within the military because
of the rapid military reforms.[34] Attention will be paid to
the progress of the reforms as well as their outcomes,
including their effects on the security of Japan and the
rest of the region.

**(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces**
China has made independent efforts to develop nuclear
capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the mid1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence,
supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining
its voice in the international community. It is regarded
that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter a nuclear attack
on its land by maintaining a nuclear force structure able
to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a small number


**KeyWord** Central Military Commission (CMC)

The guidance and command institution of the PLA. Formally, there are

two CMCs—one for the CCP and another for the state. However, both

commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both

are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the

military forces.


25 The PLA was considered a large organization of the Army, and therefore, a headquarters of the Army did not exist. The ongoing reforms have given the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force (the Strategic
Missile Force) the same status as the Army. The headquarters for each service previously consisted of commander and deputy commanders, political commissar and deputy political commissars,
headquarters, Political Department, Logistics Department, and Armament Department. It has not been announced whether the new PLAA has been organized in a similar manner.

26 The establishment of PLARF is seen as a de facto elevation of the Second Artillery Force.

27 PLASSF is identifi ed as a new force for maintaining national security. Reportedly it is in charge of cyber, outer space, and electronic warfare capabilities.

28 General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department.

29 Shenyang Military Region, Beijing Military Region, Jinan Military Region, Nanjing Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, and Lanzhou Military Region.

30 At a ceremony for the establishment of the theaters of operations, President Xi Jinping commented on the role of the theaters and of military services that, “The CMC conducts the overall management,
theaters supervise operations, and military services build up forces.”

31 The Joint Logistics Support Force is considered to be the fi rst Chinese command dedicated to joint logistics support for the armed forces.

32 The report “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation” (February 2015) by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and the RAND Corporation identifi es the weaknesses of the
PLA as the following: (1) organizational structure (e.g., party-military relations); (2) organizational culture (e.g., corruption); (3) force structure (size of the PLA, recruitment system, veteran’s benefi ts);
(4) command structure (e.g., military regions); and (5) human capital (e.g., decline in the quality and mindset of new soldiers stemming from the one-child policy, etc.).

33 At a regular press conference at the end of November 2016, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense stated, “as the next stage, the armed forces will successively implement
further measures concerning reforms based on the demands of the overall goals of the reforms and actively and securely promote the reforms of defense and the armed forces.”

34 Veterans and others held demonstrations in front of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in October 2016 and near the building that houses the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection


-----

of targets such as cities in the adversary s country, should
China be subject to nuclear attack.[35] The PLA Rocket
Force was newly established with equal status as the
Army, Navy, and Air Force as part of the ongoing military
reforms, suggesting that China will continue to attach
importance to its nuclear and ballistic missile forces.[36]

China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic
missiles: ICBM; SLBM; IRBM/medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM); and short-range ballistic missile
(SRBM). The update of China’s ballistic missile forces
from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant
system is improving their survivability and readiness.[37]
Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase
performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy,
mounting warheads, and by other means.
China’s main ICBM strategic nuclear asset had been
the fixed-site liquid-fueled DF-5 missile.[38] However, it has
been suggested that China has in recent years deployed
the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid
propellant system mounted onto a transporter-erectorlauncher (TEL), as well as the DF-31A, a model of the
DF-31 with extended range, and that China will increase
the number of DF-31A in particular. China is also viewed
as developing a new ICBM known as DF-41. With regard
to SLBM, it is considered that Jin-class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to carry the JL-2,
whose range is deemed to be approximately 8,000 km,
are currently operational. If the Jin-class SSBNs begin
nuclear deterrence patrols, it is believed that China’s
strategic nuclear capabilities will improve significantly.[39]

As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific
region including Japan, China has the solid-propellant
DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated
on a TEL. These missiles are capable of carrying both
conventional and nuclear warheads. China possesses
ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with
high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and deploys
the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) carrying
conventional warheads, which could be used to attack


ships at sea including aircraft carrier.[40] The DF-26,[41]
which has a range including Guam, is considered the
“second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of
the DF-21D, and is thought to be capable of attacking
moving targets. In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China
possesses the DH-10 (CJ-10), a cruise missile with a
range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 (Tu-16), a
bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It
is deemed that these missiles will complement ballistic
missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including
Japan. China is likely developing these ASBMs and
long-range cruise missile assets to strengthen its “A2/
AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a
large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF11, and they are believed to be deployed facing Taiwan.[42]
It is believed that their ranges also cover a part of the
Southwestern Islands including the area surrounding the
Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan.
Furthermore, in order to acquire striking force
that will be capable of penetrating layered anti-missile
defenses, China is considered to be rapidly developing
the hypersonic glide vehicle WU-14, which is launched


H-6 (Tu-16) bomber

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Maximum speed: 1,015 km/h

Main armament (H-6K): Air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum firing

range 2,200 km)

<Description>

Domestic strategic bomber. The H-6K, its latest version, can carry
cruise missiles (DH-10) that can be loaded with nuclear warheads.


35 The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) states that “China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy
that is defensive in nature. China...will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.” On the other hand, the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) states that there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s “no first use” policy would or would not apply.

36 Observing the Rocket Force institutions for the first time in September 2016, President Xi Jinping stated that “the Rocket Force plays an important, irreplaceable role in deterring the threat of war,
securing a favorable strategic posture for the security of our country and in maintaining global strategic balance and stability.” The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) lists
“having both nuclear and conventional forces” as part of the strategic development of the military forces for then Second Artillery Corps.

37 For differences between the liquid-propellant system and solid-propellant system, see Chapter 2, Section 2-1-3 (3).
38 The DF-5B is thought to carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).
39 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) indicates that “China continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN,
with four commissioned and others under construction” and that the SSBNs, which are equipped with JL-2 SLBMs, “are the country’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent.”

40 DF-21D is called the “carrier killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]).
41 DF-26 is called the “Guam killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]).
42 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) states that China possessed approximately 1,200 SRBMs,


-----

Fig. I-2-3-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)

Washington D. C.

11,500 km

12,000 km

7,200 km

13,000 km London

Paris 5,400 km North Pole

San Francisco

4,000 km

Moscow

2,800 km

2,500 km

Beijing Hawaii

New Delhi

Guam

1,550–2,500 km Maximum range of DF-21, DF-21A/B/C

Jakarta

2,400–2,800 km Maximum range of DF-3, DF-3A

4,000 km Maximum range of DF-26

5,400 km Maximum range of DF-4

Canberra

7,200–11,500 km Maximum range of DF-31, DF-31A

12,000–13,000 km Maximum range of DF-5, DF-5A/B

-  The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Beijing for the sake of convenience.


by a ballistic missile. This weapon is said to travel at
ultra-high speed and be diffi cult to intercept by a missile.
Attention will be paid to the relevant developments.[43]

China announced that it conducted tests on
midcourse missile interception technology in January
2010 and 2013.[44] Attention will be paid to China’s future
trends in ballistic missile defense.

See Fig. I-2-3-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing))

**(3) Ground Forces**
The size of the Chinese ground forces is the second largest
in the world, next to India, with approximately 1.15
million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously
sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the
number of personnel and streamlining organizations and
systems in order to improve effi ciency. China aims to
develop highly capable military forces, while reducing
units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifi cally,
it is improving mobility by such measures as switching
from the past regional-defense model to a nationwidemobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its


infantry. China is also believed to be strengthening its
airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force), amphibious
forces, and special operations forces and helicopter
units.[45] China undertakes efforts to make its military
units multifunctional, to build a command system for
improvement of its joint operational capabilities and
effi cient operations, and carries out reforms to improve
its logistical support capabilities.
China has annually conducted mobile exercises that
cut across multiple regions such as Stride and Firepower.
These are aimed at verifying and improving capabilities
necessary for deployment of Army units to distant areas
such as capabilities for the Army’s long-distance maneuver
and for logistics support including mobilization of militia
and public transportation. Furthermore, the Navy and
Air Force reportedly took part in Mission Action 2013,
and since 2014, have conducted combined military
branch and service exercises under Joint Action. These
suggest that China intends to improve joint operational
capabilities as well.

See Fig. I-2-3-3 (Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army)


43 China reportedly conducted fl ight tests of its WU-14 in January, August, and December 2014, June, August, and November 2015, and April 2016 (total: 7 times). Some reports refer to it as DF-ZF.

44 In addition to these two tests, China claims that the test conducted in July 2014 was another missile interception technology test. However, it is pointed out that this was actually an anti-satellite
weapon (ASAT) test. (See Chapter 3, Section 4-2-4.)i


-----

**(4) Naval Forces**
The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet;
East Sea Fleet; and South Sea Fleet. The Chinese Navy
has approximately 740 ships (including approximately 60
submarines), with a total displacement of approximately
1.63 million tons. The Chinese Navy mass produces
the indigenous Yuan-class submarines with superior
quietness,[46] as well as surface combatant ships with
improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities.[47]
The Navy is also developing cruisers equipped with vertical
launch systems (VLSs) capable of launching the latest YJ18 anti-ship cruise missile. It is furthermore suggested that
submarines are being developed capable of carrying antisurface cruise missiles. In addition, the Navy is increasing
the number of large landing ships and supply ships.
With regard to aircraft carriers, China renovated the
Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier
purchased from Ukraine. The carrier was named Liaoning
and commissioned in September 2012. It was thought that
after the commission, China continued training of carrierbased aircraft pilots using domestic J-15 carrier-based
fighters and takeoff and landing tests on the Liaoning
mainly in the Bohai and Yellow Seas.[48] In December 2016,
live ammunition exercises by the carrier and a variety of
other vessels including live ammunition firing by carrierbased fighters were carried out in the Bohai Sea. The
exercises are considered the first comprehensive live
action, live ammunition exercises since the commission
of the Liaoning. Furthermore, later in the same month,
the advancement of the carrier together with multiple


vessels to the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea
was confirmed. These activities are believed to indicate a
further expansion of the distant deployment capability of
the Chinese Navy. In April 2017, a launching ceremony
was held for an indigenous aircraft carrier with “a
conventional power plant and a displacement of 50,000
tons” and “a ski-jump takeoff mode.”[49] The Chinese
Ministry of National Defense announced that “system
and facility adjustments and rigging will be conducted as
well as comprehensive berth tests.” Furthermore, China
is building its second indigenous aircraft carrier, and it


Aircraft carrier Liaoning

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Full load displacement: 59,439 tons

Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h)

Onboard aircraft: 24 fighters

Main armament: Ship-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 9 km) anti
submarine rockets

<Description>

China’s first aircraft carrier, purchased from Ukraine as unfinished

carrier and refurbished. In December 2016, it was first confirmed

passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and

advancing to the Pacific Ocean.


Yuan-class submarine

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>
Water displacement: 3,600 tons

Speed: Unknown

Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 40 km),

torpedoes

<Description>
New type of domestic submarine adopting air independence propulsion

(AIP) technology, which provides long-distance submerged navigation

and high degree of quietness. More vessels under construction.


J-15 carrier-based fighter

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Speed: Unknown

Main armament: Air-to-air missiles, air-to-ship/surface missiles
(estimate)

<Description>

Carrier-based aircraft on the aircraft carrier Liaoning. It has many

features in common with the J-11 and Su-33 fighters.


46 These submarines are believed to be superior in quietness and to be equipped with an air independent propulsion (AIP) system. By carrying the necessary oxygen in advance, this system allows these
submarines to remain submerged underwater for longer periods than previous submarines without accessing atmospheric oxygen by surfacing or other means.

47 See column “Modernization of China’s Naval and Air Forces.” The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017)
estimates that China’s submarine “force will likely grow to between 69 and 78 submarines” by 2020.

48 In November 2013, the Liaoning advanced to the South China Sea for the first time and conducted test navigation there.
49 It is suggested that China is conducting research on the electromagnetic aircraft launch system in order to overcome the limitations of the ski-jump configuration, namely, few weapons and little fuel ii


-----

Fig. I-2-3-3 Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army

|Northe eadquart|rn Theater ers: Shenyang)|
|---|---|
|||

|Col1|Col2|Col3|aiwan (Reference)|
|---|---|---|---|
|Total military forces||Approx. 2.2 million troops A|pprox. 220,000 troops|
|Ground forces|Group troops|Approx. 1.15 million troops A|pprox. 130,000 troops|
||Tanks, etc.|Type-99/A, Type-98/A, M-6 Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,400 vehicles A|0A, M-48A/H and others pprox. 1,200 vehicles|
|Maritime forces|Warships|Approx. 740 vessels / 1,630,000 tons Approx|. 390 vessels / 210,000 tons|
||Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates|Approx. 80 vessels|Approx. 20 vessels|
||Submarines|Approx. 60 vessels|4 vessels|
||Marines|Approx. 10,000 troops|Approx. 10,000 troops|
|Air forces|Combat aircraft|Approx. 2,720 aircraft|Approx. 510 aircraft|
||Modern fighters aircraft|J-10 x 346 Su-27/J-10 x 329 Su-30 x 97 J-15 x 13 J-16 x 2 (under tests) J-20 x 2 (under tests) (Fourth-g (Fourth-/fifth-generation fighters (total): 789)|Mirage 2000 x 56 F-16 x 144 Ching-kuo x 128 eneration fighters (total): 328)|
|Reference|Population|Approx. 1.38 billion|Approx. 23 million|
||Term of service|2 years|1 year|


Fig. I-2-3-3


Central Theater
(Headquarters: Beijing)

Northern Theater
(Headquarters: Shenyang)

(Shijiazhuang)

(Jinan)
(Lanzhou)

Western Theater
(Headquarters: Chengdu)

(Fuzhou)

Southern Theater
(Headquarters: Guangzhou) Eastern Theater

(Nanning) (Headquarters: Nanjing)

Notes: 1. G Theater headquarters    Theater Army organization
2. Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc.

**China** **Taiwan (Reference)**

Total military forces Approx. 2.2 million troops Approx. 220,000 troops

Group troops Approx. 1.15 million troops Approx. 130,000 troops

Ground Type-99/A, Type-98/A, M-60A, M-48A/H and others
forces Tanks, etc. Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others

Approx. 7,400 vehicles Approx. 1,200 vehicles

Warships Approx. 740 vessels / 1,630,000 tons Approx. 390 vessels / 210,000 tons

Aircraft carriers,

Approx. 80 vessels Approx. 20 vessels

Maritime destroyers, and frigates
forces

Submarines Approx. 60 vessels 4 vessels

Marines Approx. 10,000 troops Approx. 10,000 troops

Combat aircraft Approx. 2,720 aircraft Approx. 510 aircraft

J-10 x 346
Su-27/J-10 x 329

Mirage 2000 x 56

Air Su-30 x 97

Modern fighters F-16 x 144

forces J-15 x 13

aircraft Ching-kuo x 128

J-16 x 2 (under tests)
J-20 x 2 (under tests) (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 328)
(Fourth-/fifth-generation fighters (total): 789)

Population Approx. 1.38 billion Approx. 23 million

Reference
Term of service 2 years 1 year

Source: “The Military Balance 2017,” etc. China’s total military forces to be cut by 300,000 troops by the end of 2017.


is suggested that this carrier may be equipped with a
catapult system.
In view of these developments concerning the
strengthening of the naval forces, China appears to be


steadily building up capabilities for conducting operations
in more distant waters in addition to near sea defense. It is
necessary to continue to monitor the development of the
Chinese naval forces.[50]


50 China’s defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifi es “offshore waters defense and open seas protection” as a strategy for enhancing the military capabilities of the Navy.
According to the white paper, “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned” and China will aim to “develop a modern maritime military force structure.” As implied by these


-----

It is pointed out that among the militia that is China s
armed force other than the military forces, the so-called
maritime militia is playing the role of the advance
guard for supporting China’s maritime interests.[51] The
maritime militia is said to operate in the South China
Sea, etc.[52] It is believed that the militia is made up of
fishermen and residents of isolated islands, though the
details of its actual situation have not been revealed.
Given the emphasis on the necessity of “fully exerting
the overall power of the military, security and militia”
on the seas,[53] it is necessary to continue to monitor these
asymmetrical forces.[54]

**(5) Air Forces**
The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately
2,720 combat aircraft in total. As for fourth generation
modern fighters, China imported from Russia and
produced under license the Su-27 fighter, and imported
from Russia the Su-30 fighter equipped with antisurface and anti-ship attack capabilities. China also mass
produces the J-11B fighter, which is allegedly an imitation
of the Su-27 fighter, and the domestic J-10 fighter.
China’s domestic J-15 carrier-based fighter thought to
be modeled on Russia’s Su-33 carrier-based fighter is
carried on the aircraft carrier Liaoning. In November


2015, China reportedly signed an agreement with a
Russian state-run military company to purchase 24 Su-35
fighters, considered the newest fourth generation fighter,
and received the delivery of the first four in December
2016. Additionally, China is considered to have started
test flights of the J-20 fighter, said to be a next-generation
fighter, and the J-31 fighter is also under development.[55]
The Chinese Air Force has H-6K bombers that are thought
to carry nuclear weapons as well as cruise missiles
including the state-of-the-art YJ-12 air-to-ship missile.
China is also making continuous efforts to improve
capabilities which are essential for operations of modern
air forces by introducing the H-6U tanker and KJ-500 and
KJ-2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control system.[56]
Furthermore, in July 2016, China started the deployment
of the indigenously developed Y-20 large cargo aircraft
in order to enhance its transportation capability, and it is
believed to be advancing efforts to produce the engines
for the aircraft domestically. China is also deemed to be
domestically developing a variety of unmanned aerial


Launching ceremony of China’s domestic aircraft carrier (April 2017) [Jane’s By IHS Markit]

J-10 fighter

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Maximum speed: Mach 1.8

Main armament: Air-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 70 km), air
to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 120 km)

<Description>

China’s first main fighter produced domestically. First deployed in 2003,

it is reportedly in mass production.


51 In April 2013, when President Xi Jinping visited the maritime militia of Hainan Province to give encouragement, he reportedly gave instructions to the maritime militia to collect information on distant
seas and actively conduct island construction activities and stated, “you are playing the role of the vanguard in protecting our maritime interests.”

52 For example, when Chinese naval and other vessels obstructed the U.S. Navy surveillance ship Impeccable on the high seas on the South China Sea in March 2009, maritime militia were said to be
aboard the fishing boat that tried to take away a sonar from Impeccable. It is also pointed out that when the deep-water drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 conducted prospective drilling to the south of
the Paracel Islands from May to July 2014, steel-hull fishing boats maned by maritime militia also arrived as an escort fleet.

53 In August 2016, when Defense Minister Chang Wanquan made an observation tour of the maritime militia equipment in Zhejiang Province, he gave instructions on the necessity of “fully exerting the
overall power of the military, security and militia from the perspective of ensuring the requirement to ‘win the battle’.”

54 The status of China’s maritime militia under international law is said to be unclear. In November 2015, Admiral Scott H. Swift, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, emphasized on the occasion of his
meeting with then Admiral Wu Shengli, the former Commander of the PLA Navy, the importance of China’s forces including maritime enforcement agencies and maritime militia acting professionally
according to international law.

55 At the Zhuhai Air Show in November 2016, the J-20 fighter conducted its first exhibition flight test. A prototype of the J-31 fighter has also been verified at the Zhuhai Airshow held in November
2014. It is suggested that in the future, the J-31 fighter could be turned into a carrier-based fighter or be exported. “The Military Balance 2016” anticipates that China’s first stealth fighter will become
operational in around 2020 if the current pace of development is maintained.

56 The AG-600, which China is developing indigenously with the design completed in July 2016, will be the largest amphibious aircraft in the world. Although it is claimed that it will be used for
civilian purposes such as natural resource research, the possibility of its conversion to military use has been pointed out. It has also been reported that China and Ukraine signed an agreement for


-----

vehicles (UAV),[57] including those capable of long-hour
flights at high altitude for reconnaissance and other
purposes (high-altitude long endurance [HALE]) and
those capable of carrying missiles and other weapons for
attack purposes. Some of these are thought to be being
produced and deployed.
Judging from the modernization of the air forces, it is
believed that China is not only improving its air defense
capabilities for its national territory, but also aiming to
build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface
and anti-ship attacks in areas which are further distant
from China, and improving long-range transportation
capabilities.[58] Further attention needs to be paid to these
activities conducted by the Chinese air forces.

**(6) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities**
China is said to have developed its space program in the
shortest time in the world. In December 2016, China


published the white paper China s Space Activities for
the first time in five years, which emphasizes peaceful
use of outer space but does not reject its use for military
purposes.[59] As it is thought to be developing directedenergy weapons and satellite jammers in order to restrict
and interfere with the use of space-based assets by
adversaries in wartime, China may be using outer space for
military purposes. In addition, China has interest in cyber
space. Some have speculated that China is reinforcing its
“A2/AD” capabilities by using cyber attacks to destroy
an adversary’s network in the entire region. This can
be attributed to the fact that information gathering and
command and communication in the military sector, which
are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength,
increasingly rely on satellites and computer networks.

See Chapter 3, Section 4 (Outer Space and Security);

Chapter 3, Section 5 (Trends in Cyberspace)


See


**(7) Establishment of Joint Operational Posture**

J-20 fighter In recent years, organizational reform has been under way

to improve integrated and combined operations capability
among the military services. The CMC Joint Operations
Command Center for the CCP to carry out decisionmaking at the highest strategic level is believed to have
been established as part of this reform. In November

<Specifications, performance> 2015, President Xi Jinping, Chairman of the CMC,

Details unknown delivered an address regarding the specific direction of

<Description> the military reforms, in which he elaborated on creating a

sound command structure for joint operations of the CMC

J-20 fighter

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Details unknown

<Description>

Fifth-generation fighter with stealth capabilities. First demonstration

flight of two J-20 fighters at air show in 2016. Its test deployment has

reportedly been started already.


Airborne early warning and control (AWAC) aircraft. A Russian IL-76 Large multipurpose cargo aircraft independently developed by China.

Y-20 large cargo aircraft

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Maximum cruising speed: 796 km/h

Maximum payload: 66,000 kg (estimate)
<Description>

Large multipurpose cargo aircraft independently developed by China.

Deployed to military units in July 2016.

KJ-2000 AWACS

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>
Details unknown

<Description>

Airborne early warning and control (AWAC) aircraft. A Russian IL-76
strategic airlifter mounted with a radar dome.


57 HALE UAVs being developed by China include the Xianglong (Soar Dragon) considered the “Chinese Global Hawk.” The BZK-005 is a UAV that can be used for multiple purposes, such as
reconnaissance, communications relay, and signals intelligence. It has been suggested that a UAV of unknown nationality that flew about 200 km north of the Senkaku Islands in September 2013
was the BZK-005. Some media have reported that this aircraft has been deployed to Woody Island of the Paracel Islands. Attack UAVs include the GJ-1 (“Yilong”) and CH-4 (“Caihong”), which are
deemed to have taken part in the Peace Mission 2014 counter-terrorism combined exercise held in August 2014. “The Military Balance 2016” states that the GJ-1 is currently being operated by the
Air Force.

58 The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifies “building airspace capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations” as a strategy for enhancing the military
capabilities of the Air Force.

59 “China’s Space Activities 2016” states the objective of space exploration as utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes to promote human civilization and social progress and provide benefits to all


-----

**Commentary**

**Modernization of China’s Naval and Air Forces**

China is increasing its national defense budget at a fast pace and proceeding with the rapid modernization of its military forces
against this backdrop. China appears to be modernizing its naval force in an effort to build up its capabilities for conducting operations
in more distant waters. Specifi cally, it continues to bolster its fl eet with new types of surface vessels as well as new types of
submarines. Liaoning, the fi rst Chinese air carrier, was commissioned in September 2012 and advanced to the Pacifi c Ocean for the
fi rst time in December 2016. The fi rst indigenous aircraft carrier was launched in April 2017, and will allegedly be commissioned
within two or three years. With regard to the modernization of its air force, it appears that China seeks not only to improve its air
defense capabilities for its national territory, but also enhance its capabilities for armed confl ict in more distant areas. Specifi cally, it
has steadily increased the number of fourth-generation fi ghters and is said to have started test fl ights of its next-generation fi ghter
J-20. In addition, it is now capable of developing, producing and deploying a wide range of indigenous military aircraft including
fi ghters, aerial refueling tankers, early warning aircraft, and cargo aircraft. This strengthening of Chinese military forces has become
a security concern to the region including Japan and the international community, partly because it has not been made clear how it
will specifi cally manifest.

Naval Force

(Number of vessels) New types of submarines

50 45

40

30

20 Jin-class SSBN

10

0

0

91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 16 17

-  Total number of Jin-, Shang-, Song-, Yuan-, and Kilo-class submarines. Yuan-class submarine

(Number of vessels) New types of destroyers and frigates 54

50

40

30

Luyang III-class destroyer

20

10

0

0

91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 16 17

*1 Total number of Luhu-, Luhai-, Sovremenny-, Luyang-, and Luzhou-class destroyers and Jiangwei- and
Jiangkai-class frigates.
*2 China also had 19 Jiangdao-class corvettes as of 2016. Jiangkai II-class frigate

[Jane’s by IHS Markit]

Air Force

Number of fourth-/ffth-generation fghters

900 2016: 789 2017: Begin J-16, J-20 test deployment
800 Begin J-15
700 deployment 2017
600 2006: Begin J-10 J-10 346 J-16 fighter (test aircraft)

500 deployment Su-30 97
400 2001: Su-27 (J-11) 329
300200 1992: Begin Su-27 procurement Begin Su-30 procurement J-15 J-16 (under tests) 132

J-20 (under tests) 2

100 0 Total 789
0 J-15 carrier-based fighters

91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 16 17 [Jane’s by IHS Markit]


and establishing a command structure for joint operations
in theaters of operations. Indeed, a multiple department
system was introduced to the CMC in January 2016 while
fi ve new theaters of operation were created the following
month. As for assignment of senior military offi cials, in
J 2017 Vi Ad i l Y Y b i b th fi t


non-army offi cer to be appointed commander of a theater
of operations. As only army offi cers had been appointed
commanders of military regions or theater of operations
until then, it can be assumed that progress is being made
towards consolidation in the personnel assignments
d i ll A h Chi f th d l


-----

**(2) Situation of Activities in Japan s Surrounding**
**Sea Areas**

a. Activities of the Naval Fleets of the Chinese Navy
Regarding the activities of naval forces, the advancement
of Chinese naval fl eets to the Pacifi c Ocean continues
with high frequency, with 10 advancements confi rmed in
2016.[61] Six advancements have been confi rmed in 2017
as of June 30. Additionally, the advancement routes are
multiplying. Chinese naval fl eets have transited the sea
area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
Island several times every year since 2008, and have
been found passing through the Osumi Strait and the
sea area between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami
Island near Iriomote Island as well as the sea area
between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island.
Furthermore, naval fl eets are beginning to routinely pass
through waters north of Japan, transiting the Tsugaru
Strait and the Soya Strait, among other sea areas. By
diversifying routes in this manner, China appears to be

Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning advancing to the Pacifi c Ocean (December 25, 2016)


its joint operational posture as military reforms make
further progress.
Furthermore, China has recently conducted drills
aimed at the development of a joint operational posture,
as demonstrated by long-distance mobile exercises which
cut across theaters such as Stride and Firepower and the
navigation of the aircraft carrier Liaoning, as well as
the joint exercises conducted among the Army, Navy,
Air Force, and other units such as Mission Action 2013
and Joint Action. The above drills are considered to be
intended to further facilitate coordination among the
different military services as well as the mobilization of
assets across theaters. The relevant developments will be
a point to watch out for.

**5** **Maritime Activities**


**(1) General Situation**
In recent years, China is believed to be aiming to build
up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant
waters and airspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly
expanded its maritime activities based on its sea and
air powers both in qualitative and quantitative ways. In
the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, Chinese
naval vessels and navy and air force aircraft have been
observed conducting training exercises, such as carrierbased helicopter fl ights and fl eet formation and maneuver
exercises, as well as information gathering activities. A
large number of Chinese government ships that belong
to maritime law enforcement agencies and their aircraft
have been observed engaging in monitoring activities
for the protection of its maritime rights and interests.[60]
Extremely regrettable are such activities by China, which
include: intermittent incursions into Japan’s territorial
waters by Chinese government vessels; intrusion into
Japan’s airspace; and dangerous acts that could cause
unintended consequences, including a Chinese vessel’s
direction of a fi re-control radar at an MSDF destroyer,
the fl ight of Chinese military fi ghter jets abnormally
close to an SDF aircraft, and activities that could infringe
upon the freedom of overfl ight over the high seas, such
as the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense
Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ).” China is urged to act on the
basis of the principle of the rule of law.

See Chapter 3, Section3 (Maritime Trends)


Chinese government ships

**KeyWord**

that belong to maritime law
enforcement agencies

Surveillance and other activities at sea used to be conducted by
“Maritime Police” (Haijing) of the Ministry of Public Security, “China

Maritime Surveillance” (Haijian) of the State Oceanic Administration of

the Ministry of Land and Resources, “China Fisheries Law Enforcement

Command” (Yuzheng) of the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of

Agriculture, “Maritime Safety Administration (Haixun)” of the Ministry

of Transport, and the maritime anti-smuggling force of the General

Administration of Customs, all of which were under the State Council.

In March 2013, China decided to reorganize the four agencies,

excluding “Maritime Safety Administration,” into the new “State

Oceanic Administration” and that the new organization would carry out
surveillance and other activities under the name of “China Coast Guard”

(Zhongguo Haijing) under the guidance of the Ministry of Public Security.

In July of that year, the China Coast Guard was formally launched. The
State Committee of Border and Coastal Defense, under the guidance of

the State Council and the CMC, is coordinating maritime activities by

these maritime law-enforcement agencies and the Navy.


60 Concerning the PLA, there is a view that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, China intends to
desensitize the alertness of others and make the international community tolerate and accept changes in the situation (Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report).

61 The number of advancements into the Pacifi c Ocean by Chinese Navy combatant vessels since 2008 was as follows: 2 times (2008); 1 time (2009); 3 times (2010); 2 times (2011); 7 times (2012);


-----

aiming to enhance its deployment capabilities to the
open ocean. Furthermore, taking into account the nature
of the activities it is conducting in distant areas, China
is presumably aiming to enhance operation capabilities
on the open ocean. In October 2013, China conducted
Maneuver 5, the first joint exercise by its three naval
fleets in the Western Pacific. In December 2014, a similar
joint exercise involving the three fleets was reportedly
conducted.[62] In December 2016, the aircraft carrier
Liaoning navigated the East China Sea together with other
vessels and passed the sea area between the main island
of Okinawa and Miyako Island to advance to the Western
Pacific. On that occasion, a surveillance helicopter
took off from a Jiangkai II-class frigate accompanying
the carrier and flew in airspace approximately 10 to 30
km southeast of the territorial airspace over Miyako
Island, as confirmed by scrambling SDF fighters, etc.
This was the first confirmation of the advancement
of the aircraft carrier Liaoning to the Western Pacific.
Although no activities in the Western Pacific by carrierbased fighters were confirmed, the activities are worthy
of attention as an indication of the enhancement of the
capabilities of China’s naval forces and enhancement
of its force projection capabilities to distant areas.[63] In
the Sea of Japan as well, the “confrontation exercises”
by the Chinese naval fleet were announced for the first
time in August 2016, and it is reported that naval vessels
and aircraft conducted joint training in the same sea area
in January 2017. Activities by naval forces in the Sea
of Japan, in addition to the activities of air forces, may
become more active going forward. As such, the trends
in the activities of the Chinese naval force continue to
require close attention.
Chinese naval vessels conduct operations in the
East China Sea continuously and actively.[64] Stating its
own position regarding the Senkaku Islands, China
alleges that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea
areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and
lawful. In June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate of the
Chinese Navy entered Japan’s contiguous zone around the
Senkaku Islands. This was the first time a Chinese Navy
combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone around
the Senkakus. In this manner, Chinese naval vessels have


recently tended to expand the sea area of their regular
activities to the south, and are continuously operating in
the area near Japan’s Senkaku Islands. In recent years,
Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs)
have also been found conducting multiple activities. A
Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly navigated
back and forth outside of the contiguous zone south of the
Senkaku Islands in November 2015 and in waters outside
of the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula
in December 2015 and February 2016. In June 2016,
the same type of AGI sailed in Japan’s territorial waters
near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island and then
sailed within Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaito
Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducted
east-west passages outside the contiguous zone south
of the Senkaku Islands. This was the first navigation in
Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese Navy vessel in
approximately 12 years.[65] Recently, China has unilaterally
escalated activities in waters near Japan, such as activities
that are seen as actions based on their own assertions
related to the Senkaku Islands and further expansion of its
naval vessels’ reach to include the area around the Senkaku
Islands, creating a situation that is of serious concern.


Dongdiao-class AGI

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Water displacement: 6,096 tons

Speed: 20 knots (approximately 37 km/h)

Main armament: 37 mm and 14.5 mm autocannons

<Description>

In June 2016, it navigated through Japanese territorial waters near

the Kuchinoerabu and Yakushima Islands, subsequently navigated

the contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands, and finally

navigated back and forth east-west outside the contiguous zone to the
south of the Senkaku Islands. It also navigated back and forth outside

the contiguous zone to the southeast of the Boso Peninsula in February

2016 and other occasions.


62 Some news reports call this exercise “Maneuver 6.” Some of the vessels that participated in this exercise subsequently circled Japan by transiting the Soya and Tsushima Straits.
63 On December 24, 2016 at approximately 4 p.m., the MSDF confirmed for the first time eight vessels including the aircraft carrier Liaoning in the middle area of the East China Sea. On the following
day at approximately 10 a.m., the MSDF confirmed six vessels including the Liaoning passing between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to advance to the Western Pacific. A surveillance
helicopter was confirmed that afternoon.

64 For example, a China Military Online article (October 21, 2015) reported that in recent years, the average number of days in a year that all major combatants in the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy
conducted operations exceeded 150 days.

65 In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear submarine conducted “submerged passage through the territorial sea of another country” in Japanese territorial waters in violation of international law. In
addition, in July 2017, a Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI sailed through Japan’s territorial waters southwest of Matsumae-kojima island in Matsumae, Hokkaido, and subsequently sailed east i


-----

b. Activities of Chinese Government Vessels
With regard to activities of Chinese government vessels,
in December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance
vessels hovered and drifted inside Japan’s territorial
waters around the Senkaku Islands – operations which
are not permitted under international law. Since then,
China Maritime Surveillance and China Fisheries Law
Enforcement Command vessels have intensifi ed their
activities in the aforementioned territorial waters. Such
activities have intensifi ed greatly after September 2012,
when the Japanese Government acquired property rights
to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri
Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island).
Since October 2013, Chinese government vessels have
repeatedly intruded into these territorial waters in a
routinized manner, and the form of the intrusions have
become more aggressive.[66]

China is seen to be steadily strengthening an
operational posture intended to use Chinese government
vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. For


example, since December 2015, Chinese government
vessels carrying weapons that appear to be cannons
have begun to repeatedly intrude into Japan’s territorial
waters.[67] Additionally, government vessels deployed to
seas near the Senkaku Islands are increasingly larger
in size, with at least one of the government vessels
intruding into Japan’s territorial waters being a 3,000 t
or larger-class vessel since August 2014. Since February
2015, three 3,000 t or larger-class government vessels
have been confi rmed entering Japan’s territorial waters
simultaneously multiple times. China is also building
the world’s largest 10,000 t-class patrol vessels, and one
vessel[68] was incorporated into the fl eet in July 2016.
It appears that the operation capabilities of Chinese
government vessels in the sea areas around Japan are also
improving. In early August 2016, approximately 200-300
fi shing boats advanced to the contiguous zone around the
Senkaku Islands. At that time, a maximum of 15 Chinese
government vessels navigated within the contiguous
zone simultaneously, and for fi ve days a large number of


Fig. I-2-3-4 Conceptual Image of Recent Major Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan (The wakes shown are an illustration)

Fig. I-2-3-4

Examples of naval vessels confirmed near Japan (photos: Maritime Self-Defense Force)

Aircraft carrier Liaoning Luyang III-class destroyer Jiangkai II-class frigate

Frequent advancements to the [First confirmed in 2016]
Pacific Ocean passing between Advancement to the
Okinawa and Miyako Island Pacific Ocean by aircraft

carrier Liaoning

Kitadaito IslandKitadaito Island

TokyoTokyo OkinawaOkinawa Miyako Miyako

IslandIsland

Amamioshima Amamioshima
IslandIsland

Yonaguni IslandYonaguni Island

TaiwanTaiwan

Senkaku IslandsSenkaku Islands

Sea of JapanSea of Japan

Intermittent intrusions

Ningbo into Japanese territorial

Activities by Chinese waters by Chinese
naval vessels in East government vessels
China Sea

“Confrontation exercises,” the Chinese
Ministry of National Defense for the first
time announced the conduct of this in 2016.

Qingdao - Locations, wakes, etc. include images and estimates.


66 While with some exceptions, Chinese government vessels often intrude into Japan’s territorial waters two to three times a month from around 10 a.m. for about two hours. The number of vessels had
been two to three until August 2016. Since then, four vessels often intrude into territorial waters in a group.

67 For example, “China Coast Guard 31239,” which intruded into Japanese territorial waters twice in March 2017, carries weapons.


-----

Chinese government vessels and fishing boats repeatedly
intruded into territorial waters. It was confirmed that
the government vessels that advanced into those waters
included many armed vessels.[69] This case appears to
indicate that China has the capability to simultaneously
inject a large number of government vessels including
armed vessels in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands.
These activities of Chinese government vessels in
the sea area around the Senkaku Islands are an attempt
to unilaterally change the status quo by force. Japan
finds China’s actions which escalate the situation totally
unacceptable.
In May 2017, it was confirmed that an object that
appeared to be a small drone was flying from a Chinese
government vessel that was intruding into Japanese
territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. This flight
of an object that appears to be a drone also represents a
unilateral escalation of the situation and constitutes an
invasion of territorial airspace.
Retired Navy vessels were handed over to the China
Coast Guard[70] that was formally launched in July 2013.
In 2014, the Navy and the China Coast Guard conducted
a coordinated drill. Also, the Navy and the Maritime
Safety Administration conducted the joint drill Poseidon
2014. It appears that the Navy is supporting maritime
law enforcement agencies on both the operations and
equipment fronts.

See Fig. I-2-3-4 (Recent Major Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan)

**(3) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Airspace**
In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy and Air Force
aircraft, which appear to be gathering information about
Japan of some form, have been intensified. The number
of scrambles by the ASDF against Chinese aircraft is also
increasing dramatically, reaching a new high in FY2016.[71]
As for the advancement of air forces into the Pacific
Ocean, in July 2013, the advancement of a Y-8 early
warning aircraft into the Pacific Ocean, passing between
the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, was
confirmed for the first time. Since then, advances into the


H-6K bomber carrying a missile-shaped object (September 25, 2016)

Pacific Ocean via this airspace have continued, and five
flights were conducted in 2016.[72] The types of aircraft
passing through the airspace are also increasing in variety
year by year. It was confirmed that the newest bomber
H-6K and Su-30 fighters advanced to the Pacific Ocean
for the first time in May 2015 and November 2016,
respectively. It has been confirmed by sight that at least
one of the H-6K bombers that flew in September 2016
carried objects in the form of missiles.[73] Flight patterns
have also been changing. In November of the same year,
H-6K bombers and other aircraft flew from the south
of the Sakishima Islands to the East China Sea, passing
between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island.
On that occasion, two Su-30 fighters that flew from the
East China Sea and passed between the main island of
Okinawa and Miyako Island joined with the H-6K and
other aircraft and reversed course, passing between the
main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. In December
of the same year, H-6K bombers, Su-30 fighters, and other
aircraft advanced to the Western Pacific, passing between
the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. Later,
the Su-30 fighters reversed course and went back in the
direction of the continent, while the H-6K bombers and
other aircraft flew in the direction of the Bashi Channel.[74]
In this manner, China’s air forces appear to be further
enhancing operation capabilities. With regard to SDF
aircraft scrambles against PLA aircraft intruding Japan’s


69 Since then, from mid-August, Chinese government vessels confirmed in the sea area around the Senkaku Islands have not conducted intrusion into territorial waters following Chinese fishing boats.
The frequency of intrusions into territorial waters, etc. has returned to about the same level as before the activities in early August.

70 It has been suggested that three Jiangwei I-class frigates belonging to the Chinese Navy were repaired to be handed over to the China Coast Guard. Similarly, it has been suggested that two Ludaclass destroyers will behanded over from the Chinese Navy to the China Coast Guard.

71 In FY2016, the number of times that ASDF aircraft scrambled against Chinese aircraft set a record at 851 times.
72 The total number of confirmed flights over waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean by the air forces since 2013 was five in 2013, five in 2014, six in
2015, and five in 2016. A spokesperson of the PLA Air Force announced that for the first time PLA Air Force aircraft flew over a strait between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island before
conducting a drill in the Western Pacific. An announcement was also made that a similar drill was conducted on November 27 of the same year. Furthermore, on March 30, 2015, the spokesperson
announced that Air Force aircraft flew over the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines before conducting their first drill in the Western Pacific. An announcement was also made that a
similar drill would be conducted on August 14 of the same year.

73 The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015) states that the H-6K bomber’s ability to carry the DH-10 (CJ-10) land attack cruise missile, which
allows for more long-distance attacks, enables China to target as far as the second island chain including Guam.

74 With regard to this flight of a PLA aircraft, Feng Shih-kuan, Minister of National Defense of Taiwan, stated on December 12, 2016 at the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee of the


-----

territorial airspace, the Chinese Ministry of National
Defense has made false announcements that SDF aircraft
have shot IR fl ares, endangering the safety of the Chinese
aircraft.[75] However, there is absolutely no truth to these
announcements; SDF aircraft conduct scrambles in
accordance with international law and the SDF Law.
The Chinese air forces have gradually intensifi ed its
activities in the Sea of Japan. Near the end of January
2016, two aircraft—one Y-8 early warning aircraft and
one Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft—passed through
the Tsushima Strait and for the fi rst time conducted
activities in the Sea of Japan. Three aircraft including two
H-6 bombers, for two consecutive days in August of the
same year, and eight aircraft including six H-6 bombers
in January 2017 passed through the Tsushima Strait
and conducted activities in the Sea of Japan. Such may
continue to intensify going forward.
China’s air forces are also actively conducting
activities in the East China Sea on a routine basis. In
January 2013, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense
made public that Chinese military aircraft regularly
conducted warning and surveillance activities and that
Chinese fi ghters conducted activities believed to be Combat
Air Patrols (CAP) in the East China Sea. In addition, in the
Chinese defense white paper published in the same year,
text was newly added concerning surveillance patrols
by the Air Force in maritime airspace. On November
23, 2013, the Chinese Government announced that it
established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the
Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were
a part of China’s “territory,” and that the Chinese Armed
Forces would take “defensive emergency measures” in
the case where aircraft does not follow the relevant rules
set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense.[76]
The scope of the activities of PLA aircraft has tended to
expand eastward and southward in recent years. As a result
of this incremental expansion, PLA aircraft have recently
been confi rmed conducting activities actively in airspace
closer to the main Island of Okinawa and the rest of the
Southwestern Islands. The intent of the PLA aircraft may
be to effectively operate the “East China Sea ADIZ,” as
it appears that these activities are being conducted as part
of ordinary warning and surveillance and training. In May
and June 2014, incidents occurred where two PLA Su-27


fi ghters of the PLA came abnormally close to MSDF and
ASDF aircraft that were conducting normal warning and
surveillance activities in the East China Sea.[77] It is alleged
that in June 2016, a J-10 fi ghter of the PLA conducted a
dangerous fl ight, approaching a RC-135 reconnaissance
aircraft of the U.S. Air Force in international airspace
over the East China Sea, and in May 2017, two Su-30
fi ghters of the PLA intercepted a U.S. Air Force WC-135
atmospheric-collection aircraft.
Regarding Japan’s airspace over and around the
Senkaku Islands, territorial airspace intrusion by a fi xedwing aircraft of the SOA in December 2012 marked the fi rst
such instance by a Chinese aircraft. Subsequently, fi xedwing aircraft of the SOA were frequently observed fl ying
near the airspace up through March 2014.[78] Recently, it
has been confi rmed that the scope of the activities of PLA
aircraft near the Senkaku Islands has tended to expand
in the southward direction. In June 2016, ASDF fi ghters
scrambled against PLA aircraft that fl ew southward
closer to the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese Ministry

Changes in the Number of Scrambles against
Chinese Aircraft


Fig. I-2-3-5


(Times)

900

850
800

750

600

550
500

450
400
350
300

250
200

150
100

50
0

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

(FY)


**KeyWord** Combat Air Patrol (CAP)

CAP refers to a mission where interceptors patrol or stand by in a

designated airspace as a precaution.


75 See footnote 15 of this section

76 On the same day, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft respectively fl ew over the East China Sea, and the Chinese Air Force announced that it conducted
its fi rst patrol fl ight since the establishment of the ADIZ. In November 2016, a spokesperson of the PLA Air Force stated that the PLA Air Force had been continuously conducting patrols of the “East
China Sea ADIZ” for the past three years. See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea).

77 See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea).

78 For example, on March 7, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter believed to belong to the SOA fl ew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above water around the Japanese
destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On April 12, 2012, a Y-12 aircraft believed to belong to the SOA fl ew as close as approximately 50 m


-----

Fig. I-2-3-6 Conceptual Image of Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan (The fl ight paths shown are an illustration)

Examples of military aircraft confirmed near Japan (photos: Air Self-Defense Force)

Y-8 intelligence H-6 bomber Su-30 fighter
gathering aircraft

[First confirmed in 2016] Passing through Passed through airspace between the
Tsushima Strait and advancing to the Sea main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
of Japan (three times in 2016, once in and flew over the Pacific Ocean (five times
2017 as of June 31) in 2016, once in 2017 as of June 31)

Okinawa

Miyako
Island Object that appeared to be a

small drone invaded Japanese

Senkaku territorial airspace by flying near

East China Sea “Air Defense Islands the bridge of a government
Identification Zone (ADIZ)” vessel that had intruded into
(announced in November 2013) Shanghai territorial waters (May 2017)

Taiwan

Scope of Chinese military
aircraft activities expanding
east- and southward

-  Locations, flight paths, etc. include images and estimates.

of National Defense released an offi cial announcement **(4) Situation of Activities in the South China Sea**
stating that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against China has also been intensifying its activities in the South
PLA aircraft.[79] However, SDF aircraft conduct scrambles China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands
in accordance with international law and the SDF Law, and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes
and it is not true that SDF aircraft conducted provocations exist with neighbors, including some ASEAN member
against PLA aircraft. states. In March 2009 and December 2013, a Chinese
In this manner, the activities of PLA aircraft in the naval vessel and other vessels approached and intercepted
airspace near the Senkaku Islands and elsewhere around a U.S. Navy vessel navigating in the South China Sea.[80]
Japan are expanding and intensifying. Moreover, Chinese In May 2016 and February and May 2017, there have
announcements concerning the Japanese response have been incidents in which a PLA fi ghter allegedly fl ew
been one-sided, and it is extremely regrettable that close to a U.S. Forces aircraft, etc.[81] It is also reported
the Chinese side is unilaterally making explanations that Chinese naval vessels fi red warning shots at fi shing
contrary to fact, as doing so undermines the Japan- boats of neighboring countries. Furthermore, in recent
China relationship. It is necessary to continue to keep a years, there has been growing friction between China
close watch on the activities of Chinese air forces in the and its neighboring countries over the South China Sea,
airspace around Japan with strong interest. as illustrated by protests by Vietnam and the Philippines

See Fig. I-2-3-5 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese against China’s development activities on the features

Aircraft);

in these waters, including land reclamation and various

Fig. I-2-3-6 (Conceptual Image of Recent Chinese Activities in
Airspace near Japan) infrastructure development on the features.

79 Regarding the scramble by ASDF fi ghters against PLA aircraft that fl ew southward towards the Senkaku Islands on June 17, 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense released the following
announcement: “Chinese fi ghter jets were approached by two Japanese F-15 fi ghter jets in high speed. They conducted provocations and used fi re-control radars against us. The PLA responded
decisively and took measures such as tactical maneuver. Consequently, the Japanese fi ghter jets fl ew away after fi ring infrared jamming shells.”

80 See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea).


-----

Since 2014, on seven features in the Spratly Islands,[82]
China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land
reclamation works[83] and developed various infrastructures
that could be utilized for military purposes, such as
runways and harbors. The Philippines-China arbitration
award issued in July 2016 denied the rights claimed by
China in the waters surrounded by the “nine-dash line”
including the “historic rights” as the basis of the “ninedash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality
of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However,
China has made clear that it would not comply with the
award and has continued to develop batteries and other
military facilities as well as infrastructure such as hangars
and radar facilities. In Fiery Cross Reef, the construction
of a large harbor capable of receiving surface combatants
continues to make progress. In January 2016, China
declared completion of a 3,000 m-long runway which
fighters and bombers can take off from and land on, and
aircraft test flights were conducted willfully against the
protests from countries in the area.[84] In April 2016, a Navy
patrol aircraft on patrol over the South China Sea landed
at Fiery Cross Reef to evacuate emergency patients. At
Subi and Mischief Reefs in July of the same year, China
conducted aircraft test fights on a runway where large
aircraft can take off and land[85] for two straight days.[86] It
has been noted that buildings capable of being equipped
with anti-aircraft guns are being built on these features. On
the other four features, it has been pointed out that what
appears to be large anti-aircraft guns and close in weapon
systems (CIWSs) may have already been deployed,
in addition to the progress made in the construction of
facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars. If these
features are used for full-scale military purposes, it could
significantly change the security environment in the
Asia-Pacific region. In the Paracel Islands, China has
similarly carried out land reclamations and promoted
their use for military purposes. In Woody Island, China
has extended the runway since 2013. In October 2015,
China deployed J-11 and other fighters, and in February
2016, the deployment of equipment likely to be surfaceto-air missiles was confirmed. It was reported that this


equipment, which appear to be surface-to-air missiles,
had been withdrawn in July of the same year, but it was
again alleged in January 2017 that the equipment may
have been deployed. In recent years, Chinese vessels
have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be
survey activities in the Scarborough Shoal, where a
standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine
government ships in April 2012. The possibility of new
land reclamations in the shoal in the future has been
suggested as well.[87] It has been suggested that if China
conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities,
runways, and other infrastructure in the Scarborough
Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability to track the
situation and strategic capabilities in the surrounding
sea area and ultimately enhance its capabilities in all of
the South China Sea. Attention must continue to be paid
to the situation going forward by taking into account
such aspects.
The activities of the PLA in sea areas and airspace
are expanding as well. In July and August 2016, after the
Philippines-China arbitration award was rendered, a PLA
Air Force H-6K bomber conducted “combat air patrol”
in the airspace in the periphery of the Scarborough Shoal.
The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced
that this patrol would “become the normal state.” In
September of the same year, the China-Russia joint
exercise Joint Sea 2016 was conducted for the first time in
the South China Sea. In this manner, it appears that China
seeks to expand its presence and enhance its operation
capabilities in the South China Sea militarily.[88]

Equipment that appears to be surface-to-air missiles, which have been repeatedly reported to
be deployed to Woody Island of the Paracel Islands (January 28, 2017) [CSIS Asia Maritime
Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe]


82 The seven features are: Johnson South Reef; Cuarteron Reef; Gaven Reefs; Hughes Reef; Fiery Cross Reef; Mischief Reef; and Subi Reef.
83 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) notes that China added over 3,200 acres of land in the Spratly
Islands by late 2015 and completed the land reclamation.

84 China is believed to have conducted three test flights at Fiery Cross Reef on January 2, 3, and 6 of 2016. In response, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam expressed strong
opposition on January 2, and the Philippines protested in writing on January 8.

85 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) describe the runway at Subi Reef as 3,250 m long and 55 m wide, and the runway at
Mischief Reef as 2,644 m long and 55 m wide.

86 On July 14, 2016, the spokesperson of the Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that it was an infringement on Vietnamese sovereignty.
87 In March 2016, with regard to China’s activities near the Scarborough Shoal, U.S. Chief of Naval Operation John Richardson stated, “I think we see some surface ship activity and those sorts of
things, survey type of activity, going on. That’s an area of concern...a next possible area of reclamation.” According to media reports, it has also been suggested that, “China will start reclamation at
the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea later this year and may add an airstrip to extend its air force’s reach over the contested waters.”l


-----

**(5) Situation of Activities in the Far Seas**
The Chinese Navy is thought to be shifting its naval
forces towards “offshore waters defense and open seas
protection,”[92] and is steadily increasing its capabilities to
conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian
Ocean in recent years. For example, since December
2008, Chinese Navy vessels sail in the Indian Ocean to
the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to take part in
international counter-piracy efforts. Activities of Chinese
Navy submarines are also beginning to be spotted
continuously in the Indian Ocean. In 2014, a Song-class
submarine reportedly conducted operations in the Indian
Ocean and called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice
in the same year. This marked the first time that a Chinese
submarine entered port overseas. It is reported that in
May 2015 and May 2016, a Yuan-class submarine and
a Shang-class submarine respectively called at a port in
Karachi, Pakistan, and in January 2017, a Song-class
submarine called at a port in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia.
Outside of the Indian Ocean, in September 2015, five
Chinese vessels reportedly sailed in the high seas in the
Bering Sea and sailed in U.S. territorial waters near the
Aleutian Islands.[93]

Additionally, China has been securing overseas bases


Such activities by China constitute acts that
unilaterally change the status quo and further advance its
efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned
about these activities, and the concern is shared with the
international community, including the United States.[89]

In response to the growing international concerns
over the development on the features, China asserts
that a number of ASEAN member states including the
Philippines and Vietnam are illegitimately occupying
features of the Spratly Islands and carrying out
largescale construction work to build fixed facilities
such as airstrips[90] However, China’s development work
on the features is of a scale incomparable to the activities
carried out by other countries and is being conducted at
a rapid pace.[91]

In any case, the issues over the South China Sea
are of concern to the entire international community
due to their direct implications for peace and security of
the Asia-Pacific region. Countries concerned including
China are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that
heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of
the rule of law.

See Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia); Chapter 3, Section 3

(Maritime Trends)


Song-class submarine

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Water displacement: 2,286 tons

Speed: 22 knots (approximately 41 km/h)

Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 40 km),

torpedoes

<Description>

Conventional submarine. Surfaced near U.S. aircraft carrier USS Kitty
Hawk in the seas near Okinawa.


Shang-class submarine

[Jane's By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Water displacement: 6,096 tons

Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h)
Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 40 km),

torpedoes

<Description>

New type of nuclear-powered attack submarine.


89 As regards U.S. concerns, for example, on January 11, 2017, Rex Tillerson, who had been nominated Secretary of Defense, testified in his confirmation hearing by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations that “[w]e’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” On November 21, 2015,
at the Halifax International Security Forum, Commander Harry Harris of the U.S. Pacific Command noted that “Tensions in the region were significantly heightened” because of China’s development
work on the features in the South China Sea, and that it “raised concerns” among nations including the United States. As regards the concerns of the international community, for example, at the
G7 Taormina Summit held in May 2017, the Leaders’ Communique stated that “[w]e remain concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and strongly opposed to any unilateral
actions that could increase tensions.”

90 Remark by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on April 29, 2015.
91 The U.S. DoD’s “The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” (August 2015) states, “As of June 2015, [China] had reclaimed more than 2,900 acres of land” and “China has now reclaimed 17 times
more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years, accounting for approximately 95% of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands.”

92 See the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015).


-----

**Commentary**

**Development on Features of the Spratly Islands and**
**Its Impact on Security**

Various countries are conducting development on features of the Spratly Islands, which extend from the center to the south of the
South China Sea. China in particular has pressed ahead since 2014 with rapid and large-scale land reclamation works on seven
features around the Spratly Islands such as Mischief Reef and Cuarteron Reef, building military facilities including batteries and
developing a variety of infrastructure that could be utilized for military purposes such as runways and hangars, harbors, and radar
facilities. Its implications on security can be considered as follows (two impacts).
First, if China builds ports on the Spratly Islands and secures deployment, supply and maintenance capabilities for military
and government vessels, it will be able to continuously deploy and project military and government vessels in all of the South
China Sea. As a result, China’s warning and surveillance as well as operation execution capabilities in the South China Sea could
be enhanced signifi cantly.
Secondly, by constructing runways and facilities deemed to be hangars on Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs, China will be
able to forward project, supply, and maintain a variety of air force power. In addition, the deployment of radar facilities on the Spratly
Islands will dramatically improve China’s warning and surveillance capabilities in the South China Sea. This situation may make it
easier for China to reinforce its force projection capabilities and secure air superiority in all of the South China Sea, leading to the
enhancement of its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Therefore, China’s aerial presence may grow even larger and the
“South China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ)” might be established in the future.
The “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” and securing the safety of the sea lanes in the South China Sea are matters of
great interest to Japan. In the case where China proceeds with the development of features and their military use, it cannot be denied
that tension with countries in the area, etc. will not only increase, but that there would also be impacts on security such as increase
in risk to the stable use of the sea lanes.

Mischief Reef
January 2015

In July 2016, it was reported
that at Mischief Reef, where a
runway and other facilities are
under construction, there are
hangars capable of housing
various military aircraft
including fighters. July 2016

Hangars whose construction
is considered to have
been completed.

[CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe]

Cuarteron Reef
August 2014

At Cuarteron Reef, it has been
reported that construction of
anti-aircraft guns and various
infrastructure facilities are
under way, including facilities

November 2016

that are presumed to be a
close-in weapons system December 2014
(CIWS).

[CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe]


-----

of activities such as harbors, which would help support
its far seas operations. For example, China is building
“security facilities” at the new port in Doraleh, Djibouti,
located in a strategic position in East Africa facing the Gulf
of Aden.[94] Some indicate that by supporting Indian Ocean
countries to build port infrastructure under the “One Belt,
One Road” initiative, China is aiming to secure places for
making port calls and strengthening the defense of China’s
sea lanes in addition to the expansion of its infl uence in
the region.[95] The Chinese Navy could further build up its
capabilities to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean and
other distant waters through these activities.

**(6) Objectives of Maritime Activities**
Taking into consideration such factors as the situation of
the development of Chinese naval and air forces, activities
in sea areas and airspace, statements in defense white
papers, China’s geographical location and economic
globalization, the maritime activities of the Chinese
Navy, Air Force and other organizations are considered
to have the following objectives.
The fi rst is to intercept operations by adversaries
in waters and airspace as far as possible from China
in order to defend its territory, territorial waters and
territorial airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in
effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress
in science and technology.
The second is to develop military capabilities
to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China
maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention
in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unifi cation
of China. In trying to prevent foreign intervention into
Taiwan surrounded by the sea in all directions through
China’s use of force, China needs to enhance its military
operational capabilities at sea and airspace.
The third is to weaken the control of other countries
over the islands to which China claims territorial
sovereignty and to strengthen the claim through various
surveillance activities and use of force at sea and in
airspace surrounding the islands.
The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its


maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and
gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying
for the drilling in the East and South China Seas. It
has been confi rmed that in addition to the existing 4
platforms, China is building 12 new offshore platforms
on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of
the East China Sea since June 2013.[96] In May 2016,
superstructures were installed on 2 of the 12 platforms
at which only a foundation had been installed. In late
June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface vessel radar
and a surveillance camera on one of the platforms was
confi rmed. Attention will be paid to developments in
China related to the platforms, such as the purpose of
the use of such equipment. Japan has repeatedly lodged
protests against such unilateral development by China
and demanded the termination of such work.[97]

The fi fth is to defend its sea lanes of communications.
In the background is the fact that its sea lanes of
communications, including its crude oil transportation

**KeyWord** “One Belt, One Road” initiative

A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping.

The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century

Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September

and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are

collectively referred to as the “One Belt, One Road” initiative.


The offshore platform (No. 12) on which the installment of a marine radar and a surveillance
camera was confi rmed in late June 2016


94 In December 2015, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, mentioned at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation that, “The PLA base will be established in a section of the new
Doraleh port under construction,” following which, in January 2016, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China announced that China and Djibouti held consultations and reached
agreement regarding the building of “security facilities.” In November of the same year, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that Fan Changlong, CMC Vice Chairman, had visited the
“security facilities.” The Chinese word for “security” has the meaning of “support.”

95 China is collaborating on port development projects and other programs with local governments at such ports as Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong Port in
Bangladesh. Gwadar Port in Pakistan offi cially commenced operations in November 2016.

96 On November 1, 2016, Foreign Minister Kishida revealed that new gas fi eld drilling was taking place in that sea area and stated that “it is extremely regrettable that [China] is continuing with acts
towards unilateral development.”

97 With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, in September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan
for implementing the so-called “June 2008 Agreement.” While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out that China is highly likely carrying out gas production in the Kashi gas fi eld i


-----

routes from the Middle East, are extremely important for
the globalizing Chinese economy. The question of which
parts of its sea lanes of communication the Chinese Navy
deems it should defend depends on such factors as the
international situation at the time. However, given the
recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force,
it is believed that they will develop a capacity to defend
areas past China’s near seas to the “far seas.”
Given these objectives and recent trends in China’s
maritime activities, it is believed that China plans to
further expand the sphere of its maritime activities, and
further intensify its operations in waters surrounding
Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacifi c
Ocean, as well as the South China Sea and the airspaces
over these sea areas. Therefore, more attention needs to
be paid to activities such as operations of naval vessels
and Navy and Air Force aircraft, various surveillance
operations near Japan, developments of facilities that
serve as bases for these activities,[98] and evolution of
China’s interpretation regarding the nature and scope of
rights in China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and
other areas.[99]

Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown
interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected
situations at sea areas and airspace. For example, in April
2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan
and the United States, agreed to the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards
of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of
the Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (WPNS) member
states have unexpected encounters. In September 2014,
Japanese and Chinese defense authorities agreed in
principle to resume consultations to swiftly begin the
implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication
Mechanism, which China had not agreed to since
September 2012. In November 2016, the sixth Joint
Working Group meeting was held for the fi rst time in one
year and fi ve months.[100]


**6** **International Military Activities**

**6**


In recent years, the PLA has been emphasizing
nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and counterpiracy. In order to carry out these missions, it has actively
dispatched its units overseas. It is believed that in the
background of the PLA’s stance on international military
activities is the expansion of China’s national interests
beyond its national borders, which in turn increased its
necessity to protect and promote its national interests
overseas, as well as China’s intent to raise its stature by
demonstrating its will to fulfi ll its responsibilities to the
international community.
China vows to consistently support and actively
participate in UN PKOs. According to the Ministry
of National Defense of China, it has sent more than
35,000 military personnel to them.[101] According to the
UN, as of late May 2017, China has contributed a total
of 2,512 troop personnel, police offi cers, and military
observers to UN PKOs,[102] including UNMISS, and has
signifi cantly increased its share of the PKO budget.[103]
In this manner, China has actively made personnel and
fi nancial contributions and has a growing presence in
UN PKO. It is deemed that partly underlying China’s
proactive attitude towards UN PKOs is China’s wish to
strengthen its relations with the regions where PKOs are
conducted, particularly with African nations, by way of
these activities.
Moreover, China has been actively participating in
counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and
in the Gulf of Aden as well as humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief activities. In view of the deteriorating
situation in Libya, China carried out an evacuation
operation of Chinese nationals from the country from
February through March 2011. In this operation, China
dispatched a Navy vessel and Air Force transportation
aircraft to Libya. This is the military’s fi rst participation


98 China is reportedly constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point
out that the base is in a strategically important location that secures access to the South China Sea as well as the western Pacifi c, and that China is advancing construction work in order for the base
to play a role as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, including for the deployment of aircraft carrier.

99 It is pointed out that, in recent years, China aims to limit military activities of other countries in coastal areas of China’s EEZs by employing its own interpretations of the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). For instance, the Chinese Government announced in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 26, 2010 that it is opposed to unsanctioned military activities by
any country in coastal areas of China’s EEZs.

100 See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4 (4 Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation)
101 According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense website. (last viewed May 2017)
102 In September 2014, China’s State Council and CMC decided to deploy 700 infantry personnel to South Sudan. From January to March 2015, China’s fi rst UN PKO operational units arrived in
South Sudan.

103 China’s share of the UN PKO budget was approximately 6.6% in 2015, ranking it sixth. It then increased signifi cantly in 2016, exceeding Japan and ranking China second after the United States. Its


-----

in an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals living
overseas. More recently, in response to the Ebola
virus disease outbreak in West Africa, China provided
assistance to Sierra Leone and Liberia centered on medical
assistance, including the dispatch of units to help fi ght
Ebola. From March to April 2015, based on the worsening
situation in Yemen, the Chinese Navy’s counter-piracy
forces docked at the ports of Aden, Al Hudaydah, and
elsewhere for the evacuation of Chinese nationals and
foreign nationals, including one Japanese national, living
in Yemen. China’s humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief activities have received international praise. It has
been pointed out, however, that through such activities,
China aims to build a pacifi st and humanitarian image
of its military forces and demonstrate, both domestically
and internationally, its intent to place priority on military
operations other than war. It is also suggested that China
hopes to test its ability to project its military power to
distant locations.

**7** **Education and Training**


In recent years, the PLA has conducted practical exercises
including large-scale exercises such as joint exercises of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force, confrontation exercises,
landing exercises, and exercises that cut across military
regions and theaters of operations, as well as night-time
exercises and joint exercises with other countries in order
to strengthen its operational capabilities. The goal of
“being able to fi ght and winning battles” was repeatedly
mentioned in statements by President Xi Jinping as well
as in the military training instructions given by the general
staff. This is construed as evidence that the military is
promoting implementation of more practical exercises.[104]
The Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect
since 2009, highlights training for military operations
other than war (MOOTW), education in knowledge and
expertise required for informatization, simulated training
of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training,
and training in complex electromagnetic environments
where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint
exercises by different services.
In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop
military personnel versed in science and technology.
In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project


to develop human resources capable of directing joint
operations/ informatized operations and of building
informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of
achieving a big leap in the development of military
personnel to 2020. On the other hand, in recent years, a
variety of issues have been raised in relation to benefi ts,
including remuneration, the personnel development
system, and the treatment of veterans.[105]

China has been developing a mobilization system to
make effective use of civilian resources in the case of war
and other emergencies. In February 2010, China enacted
the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the
basic law for wartime mobilization, and in July of the
same year, put the law into effect.
China outlined the promotion of “rule of law” at the
fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee
in 2014 and is proceeding to develop various related laws.
In November 2014, China revised the existing National
Security Law and enacted the Anti-Spy Law to strengthen
the domestic espionage prevention mechanisms, and the
law entered into force on the same day. Following this,
in July 2015, a new National Security Law was enacted
that covers not only security from external threats, but a
comprehensive range of national security areas including
stability, security, and development. Furthermore, in
January 2016, the Anti-Terrorism Law, which aims at
strengthening state control, entered into force. In April
of the same year, the Law on Management of Domestic
Activities of Overseas Non-governmental Organizations,
which strengthens control of overseas NGOs, entered
into force. This is also explained as part of “rule of
law.”[106] Attention will be paid to how the security-related
legislation will be implemented.

**8** **National Defense Industry Sector**


**8**


While China imports highly sophisticated military
equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically
from other countries such as Russia, China is believed
to place emphasis on their indigenous production. The
country manufactures much of its military equipment
domestically and actively carries out R&D of new
equipment. China’s national defense industry sector
appears to be making advances due to the improvement of
private industry infrastructures accompanying economic


104 In November 2016, the CMC announced the “Provisional Provisions concerning the Strengthening of Practical Military Exercises” to enter into force on January 1, 2017. It appears to be part of efforts
for the strengthening of practical exercises by the military.

105 See footnote 34 of this section.


-----

growth, use of dual technologies, the absorption of
foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The
sector serves the role of supporting the strengthening of
Chinese military forces.[107]

Growth in the Chinese defense industry was once
hindered by ineffi ciency caused by excessive secrecy
and other factors. However, in recent years, reform of
the defense industry has progressed. Under the State
Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for
National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology, a department of the State
Council, China has formed ten corporations to develop
and produce nuclear weapons, missiles, rockets, aircraft,

**Relations with Other Countries**
**3**

**1** **General Situation**


China, particularly over maritime issues where its
interests confl ict with others’, continues to act in an
assertive manner, including attempting to change the
status quo by coercion. China remains poised to fulfi ll
its unilateral demands without compromise, which has
included making steady efforts to turn its acts into faits
accompli. In addition, China has acted to create its unique
international order. In May 2014, President Xi Jinping
criticized military alliances and proposed “the security of
Asia by the people of Asia” at the CICA. Furthermore,
China has proposed to build a “New Model of MajorCountry Relations” with the United States,[108] and calls
on the United States to respect China’s “core interests.”
Some have speculated that through this concept, China
attempts to have the United States accept the partitioning
of U.S. and Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacifi c. On the
other hand, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable
international environment is necessary for maintaining
sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s
overall national power. Based on such recognition, in
its relationships with other countries, China proactively
carries out military exchanges including reciprocal visits
by senior military offi cials and joint military exercises. In
recent years, China has been engaged in dynamic military
exchanges not only with major powers such as the United
States and Russia and with its neighboring countries
including Southeast Asian countries, but also with


vessels, and other conventional weapons. In doing so,
China promotes, in particular, two-way technological
exchanges where military technologies are utilized for
developing the national economy, and, in turn, civilian
technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national
defense. As a result, specifi cally, the technologies of the
defense industry have contributed to the development of
civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the
shipbuilding industry.
Furthermore, China encourages and supports
international cooperation and competition in dual-use
industries. China is thus thought to have interest in
absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries.

countries in Africa and Latin America. At the same time,
the objectives of China’s promotion of military exchanges
are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns
regarding China by strengthening its relations with these
countries, creating a favorable security environment for
China, enhancing China’s infl uence in the international
community, securing stable supplies of natural resources
and energy, and building foreign bases. China is believed
to consider military exchanges as a strategic means to
safeguard its national interests, and as such, to position
military exchanges as an element in China’s overall
diplomatic strategy. Moreover, China has set forth the
“One Belt, One Road” concept as its foreign policy. In
the international fi nance domain, China plays a leading
role in the establishment of the New Development Bank
(BRICS Development Bank) and AIIB.


**2** **Relations with Taiwan**

**2**


China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China,
and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue.
The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is
the underlying premise and foundation for discussions
between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it
would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unifi cation,
and expresses that it would take up policies and measures
to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and to
protect their due authority. Meanwhile, China is strongly


107 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual foreign Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (June 2017) states that China uses various means including cyber
theft in order to acquire foreign military and dual-use technology.

108 “New Model of Major-Country Relations” dates back to 2012, when then Vice President Xi Jinping visited the United States and utilized the term during his talks with then President Obama. China l


-----

opposed to any foreign intervention in the unifi cation of
China as well as any move towards the independence of
Taiwan, and on this basis, has repeatedly stated that it
has not renounced the use of force. The Anti-Secession
Law, enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out the nonrenunciation of the use of military force by China.[109]

Former President Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang)
of Taiwan advocated a policy of pursuing Taiwanese
economic development by expanding economic
exchanges with China and maintaining the status quo
rather than gaining independence. As a result, the bilateral
relationship deepened primarily along the economic
realm. In November 2015, President Xi Jinping and
then President Ma Ying-jeou held the fi rst China-Taiwan
Summit Meeting since the two had split.
However, when the Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) administration led by Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated
in May 2016, China announced in June of the same year
that exchanges with Taiwan had already been suspended
against the Tsai Ing-wen administration, which had not
taken a clear position regarding the principle of “One
China.”[110] Moreover, international organizations have
refrained in succession from extending invitations to
Taiwan to meetings before and after the inauguration
of Tsai Ing-wen, while countries that have diplomatic
relations with Taiwan announced the breaking off of
relations with Taiwan and the establishment of diplomatic
relations with China.[111]

It was under these circumstances that the telephone
talk between President Tsai Ing-wen and then U.S.
President-elect Donald Trump was held on December 2,
2016. This was the fi rst time that a Taiwanese President
and a U.S. President or President-elect held direct talks
since the establishment of diplomatic relations between
the United States and China. China reacted harshly,
issuing a stern protest among other responses. Attention
will focus on the efforts of the new U.S. administration
and China’s response going forward.
Regarding the Senkaku Islands, China and Taiwan
have their own assertions,[112] and Taiwan has expressed
reluctance to work with China.


**3** **Relations with the United States**

**3**


There are various outstanding issues between the United
States and China, such as human rights in China, the
Taiwan issue,[113] and trade issues. However, since a stable
U.S.-China relationship is essential for China to develop
its economy, it is believed that China will continue to
aspire to maintain stable relations with the United States.
The United States states that it welcomes the rise of
a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and that it will
continue to further deepen cooperative relations between
the two countries. At the same time, the United States
calls on China to uphold international rules and norms on
global issues, including maritime security, international
trade, and human rights, and states that it would continue
to closely monitor China’s military modernization and
expanding presence in Asia.[114] Furthermore, the United
States sees China as one of the “revisionist states” that
are challenging international norms, and perceives that
it poses serious security concerns.[115] Conversely, China
seeks to establish what it calls a “New Model of MajorCountry Relations” based on mutual respect and “winwin” cooperation. However, the United States and China
have not necessarily reached a consensus on what this
relationship exactly entails.[116]

Regarding the Senkaku Islands, the United States
has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies
to the islands. This was confi rmed in a document between
the Japanese and U.S. leaders for the fi rst time in February
2017, in the joint statement from the fi rst Japan-U.S.
Summit Meeting since the inauguration of the Trump
administration, which explicitly referred to the application
of Article 5 of the Treaty to the Senkaku Islands. The
same interpretation is reiterated in the “Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving
the People’s Republic of China” published in June 2017 by
the U.S. DoD. China has indicated that it would strongly
protest these developments. With regard to the issues
over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned
about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of
navigation in maritime transport routes, restrictions on


109 The law stipulates, “[in] the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunifi cation should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other
necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

110 On June 25, 2016, the spokesperson of the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce of the Chinese State Council stated that “the exchange mechanism with Taiwan has been suspended since May 20.”
111 See Chapter 2, Section 3-4-1
112 Taiwanese authority vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands three times in 2012.
113 In December 2016, then U.S. President-elect Trump made a statement on Twitter that appeared to cast doubt on the Unites States being bound by the “One China” policy. However, it was announced
that President Trump agreed to respect the U.S. policy of “One China” in a U.S.-China Summit telephone talk on February 10, 2017.

114 U.S. National Security Strategy (February 2015).
115 U.S. National Military Strategy (July 2015).
116 The United States is cautious on the concept of the “(New Model of) Major-Country Relations” that describes the United States and China as having an “equal” and “special” relationship. The United


-----

the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security
situation in the entire region. The United States has
requested China to comply with international norms, and
has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and assertive
actions.[117] The United States implements the Freedom
of Navigation Operation[118] in the South China Sea to
counteract excessive claims to maritime interests by
China and other countries.
China and the United States have deepened military
exchanges and conducted various policy dialogues. A
military hotline between the defense departments of the
two countries was set up in April 2008. China has also
dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint
drills have been conducted between the Chinese and
U.S. navies on mutual port visits. In November 2013,
the U.S. and Chinese armies conducted a humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief exercise. In addition, in
2014 and 2016, Chinese navy vessels participated in the
Rim of the Pacifi c Exercise (RIMPAC). However, China
also asserts that there are a number of issues that must be
resolved in order to realize the sound development of the
relations between the two militaries. The issues include
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, activities of U.S. military
vessels and aircraft within China’s EEZs, legal hurdles in
mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in
China on the part of the United States.[119] Some unstable
facets have been observed in military exchanges of the
two countries.[120] For example, China notifi ed suspensions
of the major military exchanges with the United States
when the U.S. DoD notifi ed Congress of possible arms
sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010. On
the other hand, the United States asserts that U.S.-China
relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing
confi dence and reducing misunderstanding. With regard
to military exchanges, it is believed that the aim of the
United States is to improve the current situation, wherein
such exchanges are frequently suspended once problems
arise, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining
more stable channels of decision-making for mutual
understanding. In recent years, for instance, Strategic


Security Dialogues have been established in 2011 in
the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and
these dialogues had been held annually. In April 2017,
it was decided at the U.S.-China Summit Meeting that
the U.S.-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue would
be established as part of the U.S.-China Comprehensive
Dialogue that replaced the previous Dialogue, and the
fi rst meeting was held in Washington, D.C. in June of
the same year.[121] In addition, in November 2014 and
September 2015, it was announced that an agreement
was reached on confi dence-building measures aimed at
lowering the risk of unintended encounters between the
United States and China.[122]

**4** **Relations with Russia**


**4**


Ever since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in
1989, China and Russia have placed importance on
their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the
deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its
establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the ChinaRussia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly
Cooperation[123] was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing
issue of border demarcation between the two countries
came to a settlement. The two countries have a common
view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and
the establishment of a new international order, and have
further deepened their relations.
On the military front, since the 1990s, China has
purchased modern weapons from Russia, including
fi ghters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently
the largest supplier of weapons to China.[124] Meanwhile,
their trade amounts are said to be declining in recent years
due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production
in China. However, it is suggested that China has shown
strong interest in continuing to import Russia’s advanced
equipment. For example, in November 2015, China
reportedly signed an agreement with a Russian state-run
military company to purchase 24 Su-35 fi ghters, which are
considered 4.5-generation fi ghters, and received delivery


117 See Section 3, footnote 89.
118 As part of the Freedom of Navigation Operation of the U.S. Forces, U.S. Navy vessel USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands in October 2015. The U.S. Navy
vessel USS Curtis Wilbur sailed within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands in January 2016. The U.S. Navy vessel USS William P. Lawrence sailed within 12 nautical miles of Fiery
Cross Reef of the Spratly Islands in May 2016. In October of the same year, U.S. Navy vessel USS Decatur conducted the same operation near the Paracel Islands. In May 2017, it was reported that
U.S. Navy vessel USS Dewey navigated within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands and the Mischief Reef.

119 According to remarks by then CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in a meeting with then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009).
120 When the U.S. DoD notifi ed Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in December 2015, while China expressed strong opposition, no major military exchanges between China and the United States
were cancelled.

121 It was reported that consultations were held on the issue of North Korea, the South China Sea, U.S.-China military exchanges, among other matters.
122 See Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5 (6).
123 Regarding the military fi eld, this treaty mentions military confi dence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation,
and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.


-----

of the fi rst four aircraft in December 2016. It is also
suggested that an agreement was reached between China
and Russia regarding the import of the S-400 surfaceto-air missile system. At the same time, it is pointed out
that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a
policy of not supplying sophisticated weapons to China
that would cause a threat to Russia and of differentiating
the performance of the weapons it exports. It is also
suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with
China in arms exports.[125] China and Ukraine have deep
ties in the fi eld of arms procurement, as indicated by
China’s purchase of the Ukrainian unfi nished Kuznetsovclass aircraft carrier Varyag, which became the basis of
the aircraft carrier Liaoning. In this regard, attention will
also be paid to the relationship with Ukraine.[126]

Military exchanges between China and Russia take
place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior
military offi cers and joint exercises. For example, the
two countries have held the large-scale naval combined
exercise Joint Sea every year since 2012,[127] and held it
in the South China Sea for the fi rst time in 2016. These
exchanges will likely enable China to not only deepen
mutual understanding and confi dence-building between
their militaries, but also learn about the operation methods
of Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine
of the Russian Armed Forces. Furthermore, China holds
the counter-terrorism combined exercise Peace Mission
among China and Russia or among the member countries
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that
includes China and Russia.[128] With the leaders and military
forces of both countries participating in their respective
commemorative events for the 70th anniversary of war
victories in 2015, the two countries continue to enjoy
good military relations.

**5** **Relations with Other Countries**


be carried out actively. In 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi, State
Councilor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar
(August), Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines
(October), and other dignitaries visited China, while
President Xi Jinping visited Cambodia (October). China
is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such
as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan,
China, the ROK) and the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF). In September 2016, Premier Li Keqiang attended
multilateral meetings in Laos including the ASEAN
Plus One Summit and the East Asia Summit Meeting.
Furthermore, China has developed bilateral relations
through infrastructure development support, etc. under
the “One Belt, One Road” concept. For example, in
January 2017, the construction of the China-Laos railway
got under way.
On the military front, actions can be seen aimed at
building trust in the military domain, such as, for example
in October 2016, PLA Navy vessels that had participated
in counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and
in the Gulf of Aden made friendship visits to Myanmar,
Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In January 2017, a
Song-class submarine made the fi rst port call in Malaysia.
These efforts can also be considered to have the objective
of securing bases for the activities of the PLA Navy in the
distant sea areas of the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, some ASEAN member states have
shown alarm over China’s advancements in the South
China Sea. For example, China’s drilling in the oil
and gas fi elds in the Paracel Islands in May 2014 has
escalated tension between China and Vietnam. As for
Indonesia, the so-called “nine-dash line” claimed by
China overlaps with Indonesia’s exclusive economic
zone around the Natuna Islands. Confl ict between the
two countries is manifesting, for example, in the form
of the multiple cases of seizure of Chinese fi shing boats
in 2016. In addition, the Philippines instituted arbitral
proceedings against China regarding their disputes over
the South China Sea, including Scarborough Shoal and
Second Thomas Shoal, in accordance with UNCLOS.[129]


**5**


**(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries**
As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia,
reciprocal top-level visits and other activities continue to


125 It is suggested that China is plagiarizing, copying, and reverse-engineering military science technologies, including redesigning its own J-11B fi ghter based on the Russian-made Su-27 fi ghter. Feeling
strong discontent and casting doubts over China, it is suggested that Russia is cautious about supplying state-of-the-art equipment to China, such as the Su-35 fi ghter and the S-400 surface-to-air
missile. For example, Russia has allegedly requested that the agreement regarding the supply of Su-35 fi ghters requires the payment of a vast amount of compensation if China copies and produces
the fi ghter. It has also been noted that Russia may supply only the S-400 missiles with relatively short ranges.

126 China and Ukraine agreed on the export and joint production of four Zubr-class air-cushioned landing craft for China in 2009, of which two were delivered to China between 2013 and 2014. In 2011,
the two countries entered into a contract for the sale of three IL-78 aerial refueling tankers. It was reported in 2016 that they signed an agreement to hold consultations concerning the export and
production in China of the massive cargo aircraft An-225.

127 The Joint Sea exercise was held in April 2012, July 2013, May 2014, May and August 2015, and September 2016 in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok, northern East China
Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Peter the Great Gulf, and the South China Sea, respectively. It has been announced that the exercise would be held in 2017 in the Baltic Sea in July and the Sea of
Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk in September.

128 The Peace Mission exercise was held among China and Russia in August 2005, July 2009, and July to August 2013, and among the SCO member countries including China and Russia in August
2007, September 2010, June 2012, and August 2014.


-----

In July 2016, a final award was rendered in which nearly
all of the Philippines’ submissions were ruled in favor
of the Philippines. However, in the joint statement of
the Philippines-China Summit Meeting held in October
2016, it was explicitly stated that “regarding the South
China Sea” “[b]oth sides affirm that contentious issues
are not the sum total of the China-Philippines bilateral
relationship.”[130] At the same time, towards China, which
continues to develop facilities on the Paracel Islands, then
Foreign Minister Yasay stated that “this is a provocation
and we will not refrain from protesting.” Attention will
be paid to the development of the Philippines-China
relationship going forward.

**(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries**
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the
western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia.
It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It has ethnic minorities
settled in the areas straddling borders, and there are
lively exchanges between the people of those countries.
Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political
stability and security situations in Central Asian states
such as terrorism by Islamic extremists. Such concerns
of China appear to be reflected in China’s engagement
in SCO, which was established in June 2001. Moreover,
China is strongly interested in the abundant energy
and natural resources of Central Asia, with a view to
diversifying its supply source and procurement methods
of these resources. China promotes cooperation in the
energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the
construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between
China and Central Asian nations.


is rising for China, partly because of the geopolitical
features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean.[131]
Gwadar Port in Pakistan, whose construction China
had been assisting, officially commenced operations in
November 2016.
China and India have undemarcated areas,[132] and
it is deemed that “problems” over this area have arisen
between the two countries even in recent years.[133] On
the other hand, China has recently striven to improve its
relationship with India, while also paying consideration
to maintaining balance with Pakistan.[134] Identifying
China’s relationship with India as a strategic partnership,
the leaders of the two countries actively conduct mutual
visits. It is believed that the deepening of bilateral
relations is attributed to the importance China places on
the economic growth of both countries as well as China’s
response to strengthening U.S.-India relations.
In recent years, China has also been deepening its
relations with Sri Lanka. Initially after taking office,
President Maithripala Sirisena, who had campaigned
to shift from a diplomacy oriented towards China to a
diplomacy oriented towards all countries and won the
election in January 2015, suspended the Colombo Port
City development projects financed by China. However,
he subsequently announced their resumption in January
2016, and new development projects with China are also
showing progress. In October of the same year, China and
Sri Lanka agreed on the provision of a Chinese coastline
patrol vessel. Furthermore, it has been suggested that
Sri Lanka is considering withdrawing its policy to
ban Chinese submarines from making port calls as the
President had initially announced. Additionally, China
is deepening its relations with Bangladesh, such as
by developing the harbor in Chittagong where a naval
base is located and exporting arms.[135] In October 2016,
President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese President
in approximately 30 years to visit Bangladesh.
With regard to military exchanges, China has
conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and
India since 2003, including joint naval search and rescue
exercises and counter-terrorism exercises.


**(3) Relations with South Asian Countries**
China has traditionally maintained a particularly close
relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their
leaders take place frequently. Their cooperation in
the military sector, including exporting weapons and
transferring military technology, is also considered to
be deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases
for China, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan


130 It had been pointed out that over the last several years China had been dispatching maritime law enforcement vessels appearing to belong to the Chinese Coast Guard around Scarborough Shoal to
interfere with Philippine fishing boats approaching the Shoal. According to CSIS/AMTI, it was confirmed that Philippine fishing boats were operating around Scarborough Shoal after the PhilippinesChina Summit Meeting in October 2016. In November of the same year, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that China was allowing Philippine fishing boats to
operate, stating that “the matter of Philippine fishermen conducting fishing was dealt with appropriately based on friendship.”

131 China identifies CPEC, a ground transport route that starts from the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, as a flagship project of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and announced that China would invest
US$46 billion in CPEC.

132 They include the Kashmir region and the state of Arunachal Pradesh.
133 According to a press conference in August 2013 by the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense.
134 President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India met three times in 2016—in June (Tashkent, Uzbekistan), September (Hangzhou, China), and October (Goa, India). At the June meeting,
Xi Jinping reportedly stated that “the common interests of China and India are much larger than their differences in views.”


-----

**(4) Relations with EU Countries**
For China, the European Union (EU) countries are now
as important a partner as Japan and the United States,
especially in the economic fi eld. China, through diplomatic
opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their
arms embargo against China which has been imposed since
the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.[136]

Regarding information technology, avionics, and
AIP systems for submarines and other areas, EU member
countries possess more advanced technologies than China
or Russia which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if
the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, the weapons
and military technologies of EU countries would transfer
to China and would be utilized as a bargaining chip to
gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. For
this reason, Japan has consistently expressed to the EU
its objection to the lifting of the arms embargo on China,
as well as requested EU member states to carry out more
rigorous management of the exports of arms, dual-use
goods, and their technologies to China. Although it was
explicitly stated in the EU’s China strategy, which was
adopted for the fi rst time in 10 years in July 2016 that
the position concerning the arms embargo against China
remained unchanged, continuous attention will need to
be paid to future discussions within the EU.

**(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries,**
**Pacifi c Islands, and Central and South American**
**Countries**

China has been enhancing its relations with Middle
Eastern and African nations in the economic realm,
including providing active assistance for their
infrastructure development and investment in their
resource and energy development, and has been further
expanding its infl uence in the region. In recent years,
not only interactions among state leaders[137] and senior
military offi cials but also arms exports and exchanges
between military forces are actively conducted.
Underlying these moves could be China’s aim to ensure
a stable supply of energy and natural resources and to
secure overseas hubs in the future. China has strengthened
its engagement in the region, actively sending personnel
to UN PKO in Africa and holding the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit in Africa for the
fi rst time in December 2015.


As regards China-Australia relations, a Chinese
company’s agreement with the Northern Territory
Government of Australia to lease Darwin Port raised
debates over security.[138] China has also been boosting its
relations with the Pacifi c islands. It has been developing
oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea
and has signed an agreement on military cooperation
with the country. Proactive and continuous economic
assistance has also been implemented in other islands.
Furthermore, military exchanges are being promoted
with Fiji and Tonga.[139]

China has striven to further deepen its relations with
Central and South American countries. Chinese senior
military offi cials have continuously visited countries,
such as Argentina and Brazil. In January 2015, China
and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean
States (CELAC) held their fi rst ministerial meeting. In
November 2016, the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting
was held in Lima, Peru, and President Xi Jinping visited
Ecuador, Peru, and Chile.

**6** **International Transfer of Weapons**


China’s arms export total has surpassed its arms import
total since 2010. China has expanded provision of
weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft to
developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas.
Specifi cally, it is reported that the main recipients are
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are
also being exported to African countries such as Algeria,
Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya, to Central
and South American countries including Venezuela,
and to Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Iran.
Some experts claim that China transfers weapons in


**KeyWord** Arms embargo against China

EU countries announced the suspension of arms sales to China as a

measure against the suppression of human rights in China during the

Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. However, the actual embargoed

items are ultimately left to the interpretation of the individual member
countries. China continues to seek the lifting of the arms embargo

against China, and there are movements towards reconsideration

within the EU.


136 For example, in November 2010, then Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, and on this occasion, China and France announced a joint statement that included text supporting the lifting of the
arms embargoes against China. It is deemed that some EU countries have positive opinions about the lifting of their arms embargoes against China.

137 In January 2016, President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, and announced economic assistance of about 6.3 trillion yen for the Middle East.
138 In November 2015, at the U.S.-Australia Summit Meeting in Manila, then U.S. President Obama reportedly told his counterpart that the United States would have liked a “heads up” about Australia’s
lease of Darwin Port to a Chinese company and to “Let us know next time.”


-----

order to strengthen its strategic relationships with allies,
enhance its infl uence in the international community,
and secure energy and natural resources. China does not
participate in some of the frameworks of international
arms export control, and some observers point out that

**Military Capabilities of Taiwan**
**4**

**1** **Relations with China**


Tsai Ing-wen (Democratic Progressive Party) won a
landslide victory over Zhu Lilun (Kuomintang) in the
presidential election in January 2016, and the DPP
administration headed by President Tsai was inaugurated
on May 20 of the same year. Present Tsai has not outlined
a clear stance regarding the “1992 Consensus,” which
positions China as the political foundation of crossStrait relations and which exemplifi es the “One China”
policy.[141] At the same time, President Tsai has upheld the
“maintenance of dialogue and communication of intent”
and the “maintenance of the promotion of the peaceful
and stable development of cross-Strait relations”[142] from
the beginning, and called on China to engage in dialogue
even after China announced the suspension of exchanges
with Taiwan.[143]

However, international organizations successively
refused the attendance of Taiwanese representatives and
refrained from extending invitations to Taiwan to meetings
before and after the inauguration of President Tsai Ingwen, while countries that have diplomatic relations with
Taiwan announced the breaking off of relations with
Taiwan and the establishment of diplomatic relations
with China.[144] Taiwan is strongly protesting, citing these
actions as “Chinese acts that shrink the international
space of Taiwan.”
On the economic front as well, it is said that the
number of Chinese visitors to Taiwan has declined


there is proliferation of missile-related technology.[140]
Attention will be paid to whether China will increase
the transparency of international weapons transfer in
response to the concerns of the international community.

since the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen. It was
reported in September 2016 that 20,000 people including
those in the Taiwanese tourism agency held a protest
demanding that the government take measures.
On December 2, 2016, the Presidential Offi ce of
Taiwan announced that President Tsai Ing-wen held
a telephone talk with then U.S. President-elect Trump.
The Taiwanese side claimed that “there were no
deep discussions”[145] and indicated that it would place
importance on relations with both China and the United
States. However, the Chinese side strongly protested,
stating that “it is merely a cheap trick done by Taiwan.”
Attention will be paid to the future direction of crossStrait relations going forward including developments
in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship under the new U.S.
administration.


**2** **Military Capabilities of Taiwan**

**2**


Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan has put forth a
national defense development plan with “Safeguard the
Nation,” “Cultivate a Professional Military,” “Realize
Defense Self-Reliance,” and “Protect People's Wellbeing,”
“Strengthen Regional Stability” as the strategic goals
and “resolute defense, multi-domain deterrence” as the
military strategic concepts, and aerospace, shipbuilding
and information security as the core fi elds.[146]

Taiwan, for improving the expertise of its military


140 For example, China does not participate in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and some observers point to proliferation of Chinese missile-related technology to Pakistan and other countries.
141 On May 20, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen stated in her inaugural address: “In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communication and
negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside
differences. I respect this historical fact.”

142 In her inauguration address on May 20, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen stated that she would “work to maintain current mechanisms concerning dialogue and communication of intent” and that “the
two sides should maintain the peaceful and stable development of cross-Strait relations on the existing political foundations.”

143 In a speech given on October 10, 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen stated that “there has been no change of any word or phrase in my inauguration address, and we shall make the greatest of efforts
to maintain cross-Strait dialogue and communication of intent.”

144 In 2016, the Taiwanese representative was forced to leave an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) meeting on iron and steel on April 18, and Taiwanese offi cials
were shut out of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Committee on Fisheries (COFI) meeting held in July. Furthermore, it is reported that participation by Taiwanese representatives in the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Police Organization (ICPO) plenary meetings in August and November were postponed. Taiwan claims that these are due to Chinese
demands and urgings. It was announced that São Tomé and Príncipe and Panama severed diplomatic relations, while established relations with China in December 2016 and June 2017, respectively.
In January 2017, it was announced that the Taiwan representative offi ce in Nigeria had changed its name and relocated from the national capital.

145 The spokesperson of the Offi ce of the President of Taiwan commented on December 3, 2016 that “there were no deep discussions regarding specifi c details. Good cross-Strait relations and good
relations with the United States are equally important, and there is no confl ict or clash between them.”

146 According to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan released on March 16, 2017, “resolute defense…protect the homeland” and “achieving multi-domain


-----

remained mostly unchanged for nearly 20 years. As of
2016, China’s announced defense budget was roughly 15
times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget.[149]

While the PLA proceeds to enhance its missile,
naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military still struggles
to modernize its equipment. The U.S. DoD has notifi ed
Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan based on the
Taiwan Relations Act.[150] Taiwan has announced that it will
continue to purchase advanced weapons,[151] and continued
attention needs to be paid to related developments.
Taiwan also promotes the independent development
of military equipment. Tien Kung II surface-to-air
missiles, Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles, and Hsiung
Feng IIE surface-to-surface cruise missiles with longrange attack capabilities are deployed. Additionally, in
order to counter large vessels including aircraft carriers,
Taiwan is moving to induct a new model of indigenous
stealth high-speed missile ships mounted with Hsiung
Feng III supersonic anti-ship missiles. Moreover, Taiwan
is developing the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missile
in order to acquire anti-ballistic missile capability and
promoting the indigenous development of its main vessels
and aircraft and has started indigenous construction of
submarines.


personnel and other purposes, aims to reduce the total
forces from 215,000 personnel at the end of 2014 to
170,000-190,000 by 2019 while transforming its armed
forces consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into
all-volunteer forces.[147] At the same time, the Taiwanese
armed forces attribute importance to the introduction
of advanced technologies and improvement of joint
operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the
serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August
2009, the Taiwanese armed forces identify disaster
prevention and relief as one of their major missions.
With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present,
ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a
total of approximately 140,000 personnel. It is believed
that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the
air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case
of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kiddclass destroyers which were imported from the United
States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates
and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan
possesses F-16 A/B fi ghters,[148] Mirage 2000 fi ghters,
Ching-kuo fi ghters, among other assets.

**3** **Military Balance between China and Taiwan**


**3**


While China has continued to increase its defense budget
by a signifi cant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget has

Ching-kuo fi ghter

[Jane's By IHS Markit]

<Specifi cations, performance>

Speed: 1,296 km/h

Main armament: 20 mm Vulcan cannons, air-to-surface missiles

(maximum fi ring range 60 km), air-to-ship missiles

<Description>
Taiwan’s domestic fi ghter. Designed and developed with technical

cooperation from the United States, it conducted its maiden fl ight in 1989.


147 Originally, the Ministry of Defense had aimed to transition to all-volunteer forces by the end of 2014, but in September 2013 announced that this would be postponed until the end of 2016. Later, in
December 2016, Minister of National Defense Feng Shih-kuan responded to a question in the Legislative Yuan from one of its members that “a draft would not be conducted in 2018 and beyond.”

148 On November 17, 2016, the Taiwan Air Force announced that it would begin the upgrade of its F-16A/B fi ghters to F-16V fi ghters with enhanced radar performance, etc. beginning on January 16,
2017. It states that four aircraft will be upgraded in the fi rst year and the project will be completed by 2023.

149 This fi gure was obtained by comparing China’s announced FY2016 defense budget of approximately 954.4 billion yuan and Taiwan’s announced FY2015 defense budget of approximately 320.1
billion Taiwan dollars by converting them into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for FY2015 released by the Central Bank of Taiwan (US$1 = 6.6445 yuan = 32.318 Taiwan dollars). China’s actual
defense budget is reportedly larger than the amount announced, and therefore, the actual difference in the defense budgets of China and Taiwan could be greater.

150 Recently, the U.S. DoD notifi ed Congress of possible sales to Taiwan of PAC-3 missiles, UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and other assets in January 2010, possible arms sales including
equipment necessary to upgrade F-16A/B fi ghter aircraft in September 2011, and possible sales of two Oliver Hazard Perry-class missile frigates, 36 AAV7 amphibious vehicles, and other assets in
December 2015.

151 It is said that Taiwan has sought the sale of F-16C/D fi ghters and conventional submarines from the United States but they have not been achieved. “Asia-Pacifi c Rebalance 2025” published by
CSIS notes, “Taiwan has stopped requesting F-16C/Ds and probably hopes that the United States will eventually make available F-35s, perhaps in a decade.” In addition, in June 2017, the Trump
administration for the fi rst time since its inauguration notifi ed Congress that approximately US$1.4 billion worth of arms would be sold to Taiwan. However, it is reported that this does not include the


-----

The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are
generally characterized as follows:
1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an
overwhelming number of troops, their capability
of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is
limited at this point in time. Nevertheless, China
has been steadily improving its landing and invasion
capabilities in recent years, such as building large
landing ships.[152]

2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which
overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also
been rapidly strengthening its naval and air forces in
recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan had
superiority over China.[153]

3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has
been strengthening its ballistic missile defense,
including upgrading PAC-2 to PAC-3 and newly
inducting PAC-3. China possesses numerous shortrange ballistic missiles and other assets with ranges
covering Taiwan. Taiwan is deemed to have few
effective countermeasures.
In addition to the size of forces and performance and
quantity of military equipment, a comparison of military
capabilities should take into account various factors
such as the objectives and characteristics of envisioned
military operations, the operational posture, profi ciency
in military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as


China is rapidly strengthening its military power, the
overall military balance between China and Taiwan
is shifting in favor of China, and the gap appears to be
growing year by year. The strengthening of both the
Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities, U.S. weapon
sales to Taiwan, and indigenous development of the main
equipment by Taiwan require close attention.

See Fig. I-2-3-7 (Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget);

Fig. I-2-3-8 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of

See

China and Taiwan)

Fig. I-2-3-7 Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget


Fig. I-2-3-7


Defense budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars)

(100 million

Year-on-year growth rate (%)

Taiwan dollars) (%)

4,000 30

3,500 25

3,000 20

2,500 15

2,000 10

1,500 5

1,000 0

500 –5

0 –10
07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
(FY)

Source: Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan’s “National Defense Reports” and
the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics,
Executive Yuan


Fig. I-2-3-8 Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan

Fig. I-2-3-8

(Number of Aircraft)

850
800
750 China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, J-10, J-15, J-16, J-20)

700
650 Taiwan (Ching-kuo, F-16, Mirage2000)
600

550
500

450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 (Year)

Source: “The Military Balance” (of respective years)


152 The Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan states in the 2015 National Defense Report published in October 2015: “The PLA plans to complete the establishment of a formidable military arsenal for
conducting military operations against Taiwan before 2020.”

153 China has 789 fourth-generation fi ghters, whereas Taiwan has 328. In addition, China has about 80 destroyers and frigates and about 60 submarines, whereas Taiwan has about 20 and four,


-----

**Section 4 Russia**


**General Situation**
**1**


Under President Vladimir Putin who reassumed office in
May 2012, Russia, having allegedly completed the phase
of reconstruction and strengthening, sets an agenda of
building a rich and prosperous Russia, and at the same
time, attaches importance to becoming an influential
power amid a new balance of economic, civilizational,
and military forces.[1]

“The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major
geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.”[2] President
Putin, who made this remark, aims to realize the concept
of the Eurasian Union[3] encompassing the areas of the
former Soviet Union. The President has made clear
Russia’s confrontational stance against the West, noting
that the West is responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, and
that the West exercises influence directly or indirectly on
the former Soviet Union countries that Russia considers
are under its sphere of influence.[4]

With regard to the situation in Ukraine, even since
the efforts to implement the ceasefire agreement (Minsk
Protocol)[5] in the destabilized region of eastern Ukraine,
sporadic skirmishes have been continuing between
Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces. No major
progress has been made in the political process either,
such as holding local elections in the areas controlled by
separatists or expanding the local self-government, as
were set out in the Minsk Protocol. The West has alleged
that Russia has attempted to change the status quo by
force or coercion by engaging in “hybrid warfare,”
but Russia has continued to assert the legitimacy of its
unilateral actions. The outcomes of these changes have


taken on an aspect of being entrenched, and it is expected
that the international community will make further efforts
to improve the situation.[6] These have led to increased
awareness of the threat posed by Russia through “hybrid
warfare,” especially in Europe.[7]

In addition, Russia has been conducting military
intervention in Syria since September 2015. Russia has
indicated that it has the ability to continually and swiftly
deploy military assets in remote areas while acquiring
bases in Syria. At the same time, it is thought that
Russia considers the intervention as an opportunity to
test and demonstrate its equipment. In December 2016,
Syrian government troops controlled Aleppo, which is a
strategic location in Syria, and at the end of the month a
ceasefire agreement entered into force between the Assad
Government and opposition forces led by Russia and
Turkey. Since January 2017, Russia has been increasing
its presence in the Middle East, including the hosting of
Syrian peace talks brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran,
while continuing the fighting with ISIL and Al-Nusra
Front. Furthermore, Russia concluded an agreement with
the Government of Syria for its continued use of bases in
Syria in the future. Attention will focus on the extent to
which Russia will expand its influence in the Middle East
as well as Syria.

See Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends in Regional Conflict and International

Terrorism)

In addition, while Russia faces severe economic
conditions, forecasts indicate that following the recovery
in oil prices, a major export, the country will head


Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (December 2012).

Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (April 2005).

In an article in the Izvestia dated October 4, 2011, then Prime Minister Putin proposed the creation of a “Eurasian Union” that would strengthen intraregional economic partnerships based on a customs
union and a common economic space.

Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (December 2014).

The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of
the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area
in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection
with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in
Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the
territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants
of the consultations.

During a press conference on December 17, 2015, President Putin stated, “We’ve never said there are no people there [in Ukraine] who deal with certain matters, including in the military area, but
this does not mean that regular Russian troops are present there.”

Russia has taken actions which, some suggest, were aimed at maintaining the status quo, such as the announcement of the de facto “completion of the annexation” through the dissolution of the
Ministry of Crimean Affairs in July 2015, a ministry that was established for the economic integration of the Crimean Peninsula, along with the repeated visits to Crimea by President Putin and Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev.

Due to the complex nature of hybrid warfare that combines economic, intelligence operation, and diplomatic aspects, some suggest that the rising threat of hybrid warfare will drive closer cooperation


-----

towards positive economic growth in 2017.[8] Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is believed
to have cooperated on the development of Russia’s
ICBM. It is suggested that the suspension of Ukraine’s
technical support following the deterioration of the
bilateral relation could impair the operations of Russian
equipment that rely highly on Ukraine.
Under these circumstances, attention is being paid on
how President Putin, while maintaining his power base,

**Security and Defense Policies**
**2**


**1** **Basic Posture**


will deal with Russia s diplomatic isolation from Europe
and the United States and economic situation, as well as
promote economic structural reforms and measures aimed
at the modernization of Russia’s military forces and its
effort to expand international infl uence.[9] Furthermore,
although attention was focused on the improvement of
Russia-U.S. relations immediately after the inauguration
of the Trump administration, anti-Russia sentiment in the
United States remains strong and the outlook is unclear.

doctrine expresses growing alarm, defi ning the following
as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the
realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global
extremism (terrorism); inauguration of governments in
neighboring countries that carry out policies threatening
Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social,
and religious confrontations in Russia.
The doctrine continues to regard nuclear weapons as an
essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear
wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It states that
Russia will maintain a suffi cient level of nuclear deterrent
capability and reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in
response to an event where nuclear or other WMDs are
used against it or its allies, or under circumstances wherein
conventional weapons are used against it and where the
survival of the country itself is imperiled.
Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic
was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime.
As for Russia’s defense budget, the initial FY2017
budget registered a year-on-year decrease of around 25%
compared to the amount spent in the previous year, while
the amounts executed in the FY2011-FY2016 continued
to record year-on-year double-digit growth.[10] So far,
Russia has given priority to securing its defense budget
amid a severe fi nancial situation. The negative growth
rate shows Russia’s severe economic situation, which
is anticipated to have implications including delays in
equipment procurement.

See Fig. I-2-4-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget)


**1**


Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including
the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in
Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities
of domestic and foreign policies in the “National
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” revised in
December 2015.
The National Security Strategy construes that Russia
has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing
world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO
and expansion of its member states as threats to national
security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S.
deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe
and the Asia-Pacifi c region for undermining global and
regional stability.
In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to
giving continued priority to the role fulfi lled by Russia’s
military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and
preventing military confl ict by maintaining a suffi cient
level of nuclear deterrent capability and the RAF.
The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, revised
in December 2014 as a document substantiating the
principles of the National Security Strategy in the military
sphere, states the existing view that while the probability
of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military
risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of
NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders
including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment
and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the


8 According to the Russian news agency TASS, the IMF predicted that Russia’s GDP growth rate for 2016 would be minus 0.6% but would increase to 1.1% in 2017 and 1.2% in 2018.

9 In his campaign platform papers published after January 2012, then Prime Minister Putin listed his policies: to expand the public’s participation in politics; to prevent corruption; to exit the resourcedependent economy and strengthen domestic industries to modernize the economy; and to develop a middle class that plays a leading role in the society.

10 According to the Russian Federal Treasury, the initial FY2017 defense budget dropped 10% from the initial budget of the previous fi scal year to 2.8358 trillion rubles, marking a 24.9% decrease i


-----

it was decided that RAF would have a strength of one
million personnel as of 2016.[12] Since December 2010,
Russia reorganized its six military districts into four
military districts (Western, Southern, Central and
Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a
joint strategic command in each military district and is
carrying out integrated operations of its entire military
forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force
under the control of the Military District Commander. In
December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command
in charge of the Arctic became operational.[13]

Regarding the modernization of the military
forces, based on the State Armaments Program (GPV:
Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2011-2020
that appeared to have been approved by the President by
the end of 2010, Russia intends to further modernize its
equipment and invest approximately 20 trillion rubles
(approximately 42 trillion yen) to increase its percentage
of new equipment up to 70%[14] by 2020.
Regarding the professionalization of the military
forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the
permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes
the introduction of a contract service system (for noncommissioned offi cers and soldiers) which selects
personnel who would serve under contracts from the
conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of
contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted
personnel for the fi rst time, and in the future the percentage
of contract servicemen is set to increase further.[15]

In the context of the gradual increase in diffi culties
in securing the defense budget due to the recent severe
economic situation, attention will be paid to the trends
related to Russian efforts to improve the capacity of
conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence
capability provided by nuclear weapons.


Fig. I-2-4-1 Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget

|on rubles)|Col2|
|---|---|
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|||
|Defense budget (in 100 million rubles)||
|Defense budget (in 100 million rubles)||
|Year-on-year growth rate (%)||


Fig. I-2-4-1

(100 million rubles) (%)

40,000 40

35,000 35

30,000 30

25,000 25

20,000 20

15,000 15

10,000 10

5,000 5

0 0

–5

–10

–15

–20

Defense budget (in 100 million rubles) –25
Year-on-year growth rate (%)

–30

13 14 15 16 17
(FY)

Note: Official figures announced by the Russian government.


**2** **Military Reform**


**2**


Russia has implemented full-scale military reform
since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform:
downsizing; modernization; and professionalization.
Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future
Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,”
that was approved by then President Dmitry Medvedev in
September 2008, Russia is advancing measures including
troop reductions, structural reform (from the division-based
command structure to a brigade-based one[11]), strengthening
of combat readiness, and modernization of the RAF such as
the development and introduction of new equipment.
Regarding the downsizing of the military forces,


**Military Posture and Trends**
**3**


Russia’s military force is comprised of forces such as the Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal
RAF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security National Guard Service of the Russian Federation.[16] The

11 The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command–brigade. Although
this was said to be completed in December 2009, in May 2013 the Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifl e Division and the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, which had been reorganized into
brigades under then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov, were reactivated and participated in a victory parade. Furthermore, in the January 25, 2016 edition of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), a
newspaper of the military, Gen. Oleg Salyukov, Ground Forces Commander, stated that four divisions were scheduled to be established in 2016 based on the existing brigades.

12 It was decided that the total military force would be one million personnel as of 2016 by an executive order of December 2008 (the strength was approximately 1.13 million as of 2008). According
to TASS, an Executive Order issued by the President of Russia in July 2016 calls for the number of military personnel to be kept at one million.

13 The Northern Joint Strategic Command is a unifi ed force led by the Northern Fleet and consists of fl eets, ground forces, and air forces. Its area of operation covers the seas and remote islands
extending from the Barents Sea to the East Siberian Sea, and the Arctic coast.

14 In his campaign platform paper on national defense policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin indicated that he would strengthen military power, including nuclear force, aerospace
defense, and naval power by spending approximately 23 trillion rubles (approximately 48 trillion yen) in ten years.

15 Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease in the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (since January 2008,
the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2016, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel
strength adequacy was around 93% and contracted soldiers totaled approximately 384,000.

16 In April 2016, President Putin signed an executive order that directed the establishment of the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation to ensure national and public security and to


-----

RAF consists of three services and two independent Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.
forces: Land Force; Navy; Aerospace Force;[17] Strategic See Fig. I-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military)

|Fig. I-2-4-2 Location and Strength of Russian Military|Col2|
|---|---|
|||
|Northern Joint Strategic Command Baltic Fleet Kaliningrad Northen Fleet Severomorsk Black Sea Fleet Sevastopol (in Ukraine) Western Military District (Western Joint Strategic Command) (HQ: Saint Petersburg) Eastern Military District (Eastern Joint Strategic Command) Caspian Flotilla (HQ: Khabarovsk) Astrankhan Central Military District (Central Joint Strategic Command) (HQ: Yekaterinburg) Southern Military District (Southern Joint Strategic Command) (HQ: Rostov-on-Don) Pacific Flotilla Vladivostok The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Center: ETOPO1 Russia Total military forces Approx. 830,000 troops Ground troops Approx. 320,000 troops Ground T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,700 forces Tanks (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 20,200 including mothballed tanks) Warships Approx. 1,050 vessels Approx. 2,052,000 tons Aircraft carriers 1 vessel Cruisers 4 vessels Maritime Destroyers 14 vessels forces Frigates 32 vessels Submarines 72 vessels Marines Approx. 35,000 troops Combat aircraft Approx. 1,330 aircraft 135 MiG-29 aircraft 91 Su-30 aircraft 112 MiG-31 aircraft 18 Su-33 aircraft Modern fighter aircraft 200 Su-25 aircraft 86 Su-34 aircraft 139 Su-27 aircraft 52 Su-35 aircraft Air forces (4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 833) 16 Tu-160 aircraft Bombers 60 Tu-95 aircraft 63 Tu-22M aircraft Population Approx. 142.40 million Reference Term of service 1year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system) Source: “The Military Balance 2017,” etc. Ground troops include 270,000 ground force personnel and 45,000 airborne unit personnel.||


See


Fig. I-2-4-2


17 Formed on August 1, 2015 by merging the previous Air Force and Aerospace Defense Forces. Minister of Defence Shoigu explained that the realignment was implemented because of “the increasing


-----

ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles
with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in
accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical
nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them
in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia,
however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear
forces. Under such circumstances, in July 2014, the U.S.
Government concluded that Russia possesses groundlaunched cruise missiles (GLCM) in violation of the
INF Treaty and notifi ed the Russian Government. The
Russian side denies this. U.S. Government offi cials refer
to this missile as SSC-8 which is allegedly owned by
two battalions and deployed at Kapustin Yar and other
locations in Astrakhan Oblast located in southeast Russia.

**2** **Conventional Forces and Other Issues**


**1** **Nuclear Forces**


Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global
position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of
the United States and to supplement its inferiority in
conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is
making efforts to maintain readiness of its nuclear forces
unit.
Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long
range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks)
following only the United States in scale.
Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms
pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
concluded with the United States.[18] Russia is working
on accelerating the development and introducing new
weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization
of nuclear forces based on its GPV.
In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of RS24, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the
“Topol-M” ICBM.[19] SSBN building and deployment are in
progress. For example, in January 2013, Yuri Dolgoruky,
the fi rst of the Borey-class SSBN, which is believed to
carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” was delivered to
the Northern Fleet. Additionally, Alexander Nevsky, the
second of the SSBNs, and Vladimir Monomakh, the third
of the SSBNs, were incorporated to the Pacifi c Fleet in
December 2013 and December 2014, respectively.[20]

In October 2016, fi ring training took place using
SLBM from a Delta III-class SSBN in the Okhotsk
Sea and Delta IV-class SSBN from the Barents Sea as
well as an ICBM “Topol” from Plesetsk Cosmodrome.[21]
President Putin, at the Expanded Meeting of the Defense
Ministry Board, noted that the share of modern weapons
in Russia’s nuclear forces nearly reached 60% of total
armaments and one of the important issues for the
following year would be to enhance the combat capability
of strategic nuclear forces, primarily by strengthening
missile complexes that will be guaranteed to penetrate
missile defense systems.
As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped


**2**


Russia is considered to be developing and procuring
conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. Close
attention will need to be paid to Russia’s development,


Borey-class submarine

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifi cations, performance>

Water displacement: 19,711 tons

Maximum speed: 25 knots (approximately 46 km/h)

Main armament: SLBM Bulava (maximum fi ring range 8,300 km)

torpedoes

<Description>

Russian Navy’s new type of strategic nuclear-powered submarine
carrying ballistic missiles, the fi rst ship being commissioned in 2012.

It can carry 16 SLBMs. It has been deployed with the Pacifi c Fleet

since 2015.


18 In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and the treaty came into force in February 2011.
Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. In April 2017, the United
States announced that Russia’s deployed strategic warheads was 1,765 and their deployed delivery platforms was 523 as of March 1, 2016.

19 In March 2011, the fi rst regiment of RS-24 missiles was operationally deployed in the division in Teykovo, Ivanovo oblast in northeast Moscow. At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board
in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that six rocket regiments equipped with RS-24 were put on combat duty in 2015. In addition, it is believed that Russia is developing a new heavy
ICBM “Sarmat” that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and be equipped with many warheads, a light-weight mobile solid-fuel ICBM RS-26 “Rubezh,” as well as new warheads aimed at enhancing
the capability to penetrate MD. “Rubezh” was scheduled to be deployed to Irkutsk in 2015.

20 Eight Borey-class SSBNs were planned to be built by 2020, but the seventh and eighth of these vessels are not expected to be placed into service until 2021 and 2022, respectively. In 2014, fi ring
tests of the SLBM “Bulava” on board the fi rst, second, and third vessels were all conducted successfully.

21 According to an announcement by Russia’s Ministry of Defence on October 12, 2016, Pacifi c Fleet Delta III-class SSBN Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets fi red an SLBM “Stingray” from the Okhotsk
Sea towards the Chizha test range in northern Russia, and Pacifi c Fleet Delta IV-class SSBN Novomoskovsk fi red an SLBM “Sineva” from the Barents Sea towards an exercise area on the Kamchatka


-----

procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such
as the “PAK FA” currently under development as the
so-called “fi fth generation fi ghter”[22] and the T-14 Armata
tank,[23] in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fi ghter
and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.”
Along with carrying out a range of exercises,[24] since
February 2013, the RAF have been conducting surprise
inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of
the military districts, etc. for the fi rst time since the collapse
of the Soviet Union.[25] These inspections are contributing to
the improvement of long-distance mobilization capability
of the RAF.[26] Outside of Russia, the RAF has maintained
deployment of vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.[27] A
plan is underway to construct or rebuild 10 airfi elds in
the Arctic, and in August and September 2016, a fl otilla
mainly comprising Northern Fleet Udaloy-class destroyers
took part in a training exercise in the Arctic Ocean while
navigating the long distance from Severomorsk on the Kola
peninsula to the Novosibirsk islands.[28] The RAF has been
intensifying its activities in the Arctic, which include not
only such deployment and exercises of naval vessels and


resumption of military facility operation, but also strategic
nuclear deterrence patrols by SSBN and patrol fl ights by
long-range bombers.


**KeyWord** Fifth generation fi ghter

While there are no clear standards for demarcating fi ghter generations,

it is pointed out that a fi fth generation fi ghter has more advanced

capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest

technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth.


T-14 Armata tank

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifi cations, performance>

Maximum speed: 80-90 km

Armament: 125 mm smooth-bore cannon

<Description>

Main next-generation tank, displayed at the 2015 parade and reportedly

currently under development.


Su-35 fi ghter

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifi cations, performance>

Speed: Mach 2.25

Main armament: Air-to-air missiles (maximum fi ring range 200 km),

air-to-surface and air-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring range 200 km)

<Description>

New type of multipurpose fi ghter of the Russian Air Force, it has been

deployed in the Far East since 2014.


22 According to media reports, in January 2015, President Yury Slusar of Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation stated that Russia’s PAK FA (Future Air Complex for Tactical Air Forces) “fi fth generation
fi ghters” have begun to be delivered to the Air Force for test fl ights. In September 2015, Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Force Viktor Bondarev stated that PAK FA would be supplied to units
in 2017. In July 2015, Deputy Minister of Defence Borisov stated that Russia would reduce the number of aircraft to be procured and that only one squadron (12 aircraft) would be purchased over
the next several years.

23 A new tank fi tted with an unmanned turret that was unveiled for the fi rst time during the Victory Day Parade on May 9, 2015. In addition to this tank, Russia is currently developing a family of crawler
and wheeled infantry fi ghting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled howitzers. The GPV 2011-2020 plans to renovate 2,300 tanks, 3,000 self-propelled artillery, and 30,000 other
armored fi ghting vehicles by 2020.

24 As it proceeds with its military reform, Russia has conducted large-scale exercises for verifi cation and other purposes in recent years. Among these, Kavkaz 2016 was held in September 2016 as
a command and staff exercise held in a round-robin format involving all military districts. Taking part in this exercise were around 12,500 troops, 60 aircraft and helicopters, 90 tanks, and 15 naval
vessels. The purpose of this exercise is believed to be the defense of Russian territory in the southwest and enhancing the preparedness and operating capabilities of unifi ed forces for the protection
of national interests. (Exercises from the previous four years included: Kavkaz 2012 [South Military District], Zapad 2013 [West Military District], Vostok 2014 [East Military District], and Tsentr 2015

[Central Military District].)

25 Surprise inspections were conducted at the Central and Southern Military Districts in February 2013, Southern Military District in March 2013, Western Military District in May 2013, Eastern and
Central Military Districts in July 2013, strategic nuclear units in October 2013, and Western and Central Military Districts from February to March 2014. In September 2014, a surprise inspection of
the Eastern Military District was conducted, which transitioned to the Vostok 2014 large-scale exercise.

26 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the surprise inspections held fi ve times a year on average would enable the
commanders of every military district and military service as well as staff to mobilize long distances and execute tasks in unknown regions.

27 Russia’s naval fl eet in the Mediterranean which is said to have completed its formation on June 1, 2013, is considered a permanent operational force.

28 Among the military installations being developed in the Arctic, it is believed that the bases under construction on Alexandra Island in the Franz Joseph Land and Kotelny Island in the Novosibirsk Islands
will house 150 and 250 personnel each and have enough supplies to continue operations without assistance for a period of 18 months. In addition, the Northern Fleet has conducted long distance


-----

In April 2015, Russian aircraft including the Tu95 long-range bomber conducted patrol fl ights over
the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Atlantic
Ocean.[29] Furthermore, in July and November 2015, the
Tu-95 long-range bomber approached the airspaces of
U.S. mainland and Guam.[30]

As for military intervention into Syria, the missile
cruiser Varyag belonging to the Pacifi c Fleet and the
aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov belonging to the
Northern Fleet were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea
off the coast of Syria in January 2016 and November

**Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan**
**4**


**1** **General Situation**


2016, respectively.[31]

The RAF has thus intensifi ed activities not only in
the Asia-Pacifi c, but also in the Arctic, Europe, and areas
near the U.S. mainland. In particular, Russia’s vessels
and aircraft tend to expand their area of activity.[32]

As for the future of RAF, there are uncertain
elements which may be infl uenced by Russia’s future
economic and social development and trends in Russia’s
diplomatic relations with European and other countries;
therefore, it is necessary to keep our attention on future
developments.

a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear
forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces
in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing activity,
including the deployment of new units and trends related
to military facility development.
Given that the RAF set their basis of operation
on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic
nuclear units and dealing with confl icts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units,


**1**


Russia newly established the Eastern Military District
and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010.[33]
Land Forces, the Pacifi c Fleet, and the Air Force and
Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military
District Commander, who conducts unifi ed operation of
these services.
The current presence of the RAF in the Far East region
is signifi cantly smaller than it was at its peak. However,


Tu-95 long-range bomber

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]
<Specifi cations, performance>

Speed: 828 km

Maximum radius of action: 6,398 km

Main armament: Air-to-surface cruise missiles (maximum fi ring range

2,800 km)
<Description>

Produced between 1956 and 1994, the fi nal version is currently under

refurbishment for modernization. Capable of carrying eight air-tosurface cruise missiles (conventional or nuclear warhead).


Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]
<Specifi cations, performance>

Full load displacement: 59,439 tons

Speed: 30 knots (approximately 56 km/h)

On-board aircraft: Maximum 18 fi ghters and attack aircraft

Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum fi ring range 550 km)
<Description>

Commissioned in 1990, it is currently the only aircraft carrier that the

Russian Navy possesses. Carrier-based aircraft take off by the ski jump
method. Scheduled to begin refurbishment in 2017.


29 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced that on April 4, 2015, two Tu-95 long-range bombers that departed Engels base conducted patrol fl ights over the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the
Atlantic Ocean, escorted by Mig-31 fi ghters, and that on this occasion, the bombers were followed by Typhoon fi ghters of the U.K. Royal Air Force and the F-16 fi ghters of the Royal Danish Air Force.

30 Tu-95 long-range bombers fl ew near Alaska and over northern California on Independence Day in the United States on July 4, 2015. Two of these bombers fl ew within 50 miles of the coast of
California. On November 25, 2015, two Tu-95 long-range bombers fl ew in international airspace near Guam.

31 The missile cruiser Moskva belonging to the Black Sea Fleet was deployed to the coast of Syria in order to strengthen the aerial defense capabilities of the RAF deployed to Syria. However, the Varyag
belonging to the Pacifi c Fleet was dispatched to replace the Moskva.

32 It is deemed that the RAF intends to maintain and enhance their combat readiness, as well as use diversionary approach towards the West and other countries in connection with the situation in
Ukraine, and expand Russia’s infl uence.


-----

**(3) Naval Forces**
The Pacific Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases
in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet is comprised
of approximately 260 ships with a total displacement
in the region of approximately 630,000 tons, including
approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately
20 submarines (approximately 15 of which are nuclear
powered submarines) with a total displacement of
approximately 320,000 tons. Additionally, it plans on
deploying four multipurpose Steregushchiy-class frigates
(the first of these, the Sovershennyy, plans to be deployed
in 2017).

**(4) Air Forces**
In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys
approximately 390 combat aircraft from its Air Force and
Navy combined. Existing models are being refurbished
and new models, such as the Su-35 fighters, are being
introduced[35] to improve their capabilities.


it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning
and trends of the RAF in the Far East region while also
keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions.

**(1) Nuclear Forces**
As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region,
ICBMs, such as SS-25s and approximately 20 Tu-95
long-range bombers are deployed mainly along the
Trans-Siberian Railway. Additionally, the Delta III-class
SSBNs carrying SLBMs are deployed in and around the
Sea of Okhotsk. By and large strategic nuclear units are
believed to be maintaining readiness posture. In a surprise
inspection conducted in October 2013 and a field training
exercise conducted in May 2014 for the strategic nuclear
unit, the Delta III-class SSBNs launched SLBMs in the
Sea of Okhotsk. The second of the Borey-class SSBNs
Alexander Nevsky was incorporated to the Pacific Fleet
in December 2013 and the third of the SSBNs Vladimir
Monomakh in December 2014. Subsequently, Alexander
Nevsky and Vladimir Monomakh were brought to
the Pacific in September 2015 and September 2016,
respectively.[34] Russia is prioritizing the reinforcement
of its maritime strategic deterrence posture which had
been greatly scaled-down compared to the former Soviet
Union, and as part of these efforts, it plans on deploying
four Borey-class SSBN to the Pacific Fleet by 2020.


**(2) Ground Forces**
As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be
reorganizing the command structure from a division- [Jane’s By IHS Markit]
based to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its <Specifications, performance>
combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern
Military District now consists of eleven brigades and one
division with approximately 80,000 personnel in total ship-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 60 km)
as well as a marine brigade equipped with amphibious On-board aircraft: One helicopter (Ka-27)
operations capability. The Eastern Military District <Description>
has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” The Russian Navy’s new type of frigate, the first of which was
surface-to-surface missile system, “Bal” and “Bastion”
surface-to-ship missiles, and the “S-400” surface-to-air
missile system.

Steregushchiy-class frigates

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifications, performance>

Full load displacement: 2,235 tons
Speed: 26 knots

Main armament: Ship-to-ship missiles (maximum firing range 130 km),

ship-to-air missiles (maximum firing range 60 km)

On-board aircraft: One helicopter (Ka-27)

<Description>

The Russian Navy’s new type of frigate, the first of which was

commissioned in 2007. The Russian Ministry of Defense is scheduled

to deploy Sovershennyy (fourth ship), Gromkiy (seventh ship), Aldar

Tsydenzhapov (11th ship), and Rezkiy (12th ship) to the Pacific Fleet.


34 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky and the third SSBN Vladimir
Monomakh joined the formation of the permanent readiness units in 2015.ii


-----

coastal (surface-to-ship) missiles to Etorofu and Kunashiri
Islands.[39] In February 2017, Russian Minister of Defence
Shoigu stated at a meeting of the State Duma (lower
house) that the deployment of a division to the Northern
Territories or the Chishima Islands would be completed
before the end of the year. In April 2016, Russia carried
out an anti-landing exercise in the Northern Territories
or Chishima Islands involving around 1,500 troops
belonging to the Eastern Military District.
As described above, Russia continues to station RAF
in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories
of Japan, and has recently been increasing the RAF’s
activities in the territories under de facto occupation.
Some point out that such developments refl ect the Russian
people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity
due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military
importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea
of Okhotsk, an operating area of SSBN.[40]

During the Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense


**2** **Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories**

**2**


Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia
has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and
Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are
inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop
strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times,
one division is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu
Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various
types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed.[36]

After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri
Island for the fi rst time as head of state in November 2010,
Russian ministers and others have made repeated visits to
the Northern Territories.[37] Between July and September
2015, Prime Minister Medvedev and six minister-level
dignitaries also visited Etorofu Island, among other
areas. Also, Russia is proceeding with the development
of military facilities in the Northern Territories.[38] In
November 2016, Russia announced that it deployed


Surface-to-ship missile Bal

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifi cations, performance>

Maximum fi ring range: 130 km

<Description>

Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc.,

it has been deployed to the Pacifi c Fleet since 2016.


Surface-to-ship missile Bastion

[Jane’s By IHS Markit]

<Specifi cations, performance>

Maximum fi ring range: 300 km

<Description>

Surface-to-ship missile with the objective of coastal defense, etc., it

has been deployed to the Pacifi c Fleet since 2014.


36 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which is comprised of two regiments, is one of the few division units making up the RAF since most divisions were transformed into brigades due to
military reform, and is stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted in the Eastern Military District and elsewhere
in July 2013. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500. At the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence
Minister Igor Rodionov revealed that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov
visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo. In February
2011, a senior offi cial of the General Staff was said to have stated that troops on the Northern Territories would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel in the process of reorganizing divisions
into brigades. In May 2014, Commander Sergey Surovikin of the Eastern Military District announced the buildup of military facilities on the Northern Territories. In August 2014, Russia opened a new
airport in Etorofu Island. Through such measures, Russia has stepped up its activities in the Northern Territories under de facto occupation.

37 After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin in January to
February 2011, followed by then Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov in May 2011. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands
in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, Deputy Minister of Defence Dmitry Bulgakov, and in February 2011, then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and
Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there. Furthermore, Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers visited Kunashiri Island in July 2012. In July 2015, Minister of Healthcare Veronika
Skvortsova visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island, and in August 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District
Yury Trutnev, Minister for the Development of Russian Far East Galushka, and Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov visited Etorofu Island. In September 2015, Minister of Agriculture
Alexander Tkachev visited Etorofu Island, and Minister of Transport Maksim Sokolov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island.

38 At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence of Russia in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that a total of 392 buildings and facilities are actively being built in the military facility
areas on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Subsequently, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence in January 2016, the Minister noted that completing infrastructure construction in the areas was
one of the priorities for 2016.

39 In March 2016, Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced that it planned to deploy surface-to-ship missiles “Bastion” and “Bal” to the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands before the end of the
year. In November 2016, Boyevaya Vakhta, a newsletter published by the Pacifi c Fleet, mentioned that a “Bastion” coastal missile unit is being rotated to Etorofu Island and a “Bal” coastal missile unit
to Kunashiri Island using an artillery squadron.

40 In Soviet Military Power 1989, the U.S. DoD refers to “Bastion” as the activity area of SSBN to be protected by land, sea, and air assets while utilizing topography in the territorial waters of the former
Soviet Union. It was assumed that in the Pacifi c region, the former Soviet Union had set up a “Bastion” mainly in Okhotsk Sea. Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy stated that regular long-term


-----

Ministerial Meeting (2+2) held in March 2017, Japan
expressed it was regrettable that Russia had deployed
surface-to-ship missiles in the Northern Territories and
that Russia may deploy a new division to the islands
including the Four Northern Islands. Closer attention
must be paid to Russian military movements in the Far
East, including the Northern Territories.

**3** **Operations in the Vicinity of Japan**


**3**


In the vicinity of Japan, the RAF has been generally
increasing its activities, including exercises and drills
which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as
verifying the results of the military reform.
In September 2014, the large-scale exercise Vostok
2014, considered the largest and the most important of
the RAF exercises and drills conducted that year, was
carried out in the Eastern Military District. Over 155,000
personnel, over 4,000 combat vehicles, approximately
80 vessels, and approximately 630 aircraft participated
in the exercise.[41] It is regarded that its purpose was to
verify the combat readiness and mobilization postures
of the units in the Far East strategic front, including the
Arctic. The exercise included units from not only the
Eastern Military District, but also the Western and Central
Military Districts. The various units conducted longdistance maneuvers covering a distance of 12,000 km
at most. Furthermore, the exercise trained coordination
among the Ministry of Defence and other ministries,
agencies, and local governments.
The number of exercises carried out by the Russian
Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased
from the peak. However, its activities are generally
increasing.
With regard to naval vessels, their activities are
generally increasing in recent years. For example,
joint exercises have been carried out by Pacifi c Fleet


Satellite photo of Matsuwa Island (June 2010) [NASA Earth Observatory]

vessels involving long distance voyages, along with
fi eld activities involving operations in Syria and patrols
by nuclear-powered submarines.[42] In September 2011,
24 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile
cruiser passed through the Soya Strait in succession.
This was the fi rst time since the end of the Cold War that
such a major transit of this strait by Russian naval vessels
was confi rmed.[43] In recent years, ten or more Russian
naval vessels have passed through the Soya Strait one
to three times a year. Additionally, survey activities took
place from May to September 2016 on Matsuwa Island
located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands.
The objective was to study the feasibility of deploying
the Pacifi c Fleet’s forces there in the future. Furthermore,
a secondary survey is set to take place from June to
September 2017.[44]

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol
activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia
has been increasing fl ights by long-range bombers and
carrying out fl ights of Tu-95 long-range bombers and
Tu-160 long-range bombers which are refueled in midfl ight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft and
Su-27 fi ghters.[45]

Russian aircraft were particularly active in FY2014


41 The large-scale exercise Vostok 2014 was conducted over a vast area extending from the Arctic to the coastal area. In the Kamchatka Peninsula, ALCM launches were carried out from long-range
bombers, as well as launches of SLCMs from Oscar II-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN). In Wrangel Island in the Arctic, night-time parachute landings and survival drills
were conducted. In the Sakhalin, the Naval Infantry conducted landing drills as well as drills to prevent the landings of opposing forces. In the coastal and inland areas, drills including the launches
of short-range ballistic missiles and GLCMs using the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, as well as drills that made use of private infrastructure, such as takeoff and landing drills of the
Su-25 attack aircraft using roads for motor vehicles were conducted.

42 The number of cases of the Russian naval fl eet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identifi ed and released in FY2016 is as follows:
18 cases in the Soya Strait (22 in FY2015, 10 in FY2014); 1 case in the Tsugaru Strait (0 in FY2015, 1 in FY2014); and 7 cases in the Tsushima Strait (4 in FY2015, 8 in FY2014).

43 Some of the 24 naval vessels participated in the exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places.

44 In May 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that under the command of Vice Admiral Andrei Ryabukhin, Deputy Commander of the Pacifi c Fleet that arrived in Matsuwa Island, an
expedition comprised of approximately 200 personnel including representatives from the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Russian Geographical Society, the Eastern Military District, and the Pacifi c
Fleet began conducting survey activities. Colonel-general Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Eastern Military District, stated at a military meeting of the district that six Pacifi c Fleet vessels and over
200 personnel participated in an expedition by the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Geographical Society to Chishima, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands, and that its primary objective was
to study the feasibility of establishing a Pacifi c Fleet base in the future. Furthermore, Russia’s Minister of Defence announced that three ships of the Pacifi c Fleet and around 100 personnel arrived
on Matsuwa Island in June 2017 in order to conduct a secondary survey.

45 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in January 2014 that surveillance fl ights of two Tu-95 long-range bombers took place with the assistance of Su-27 fi ghters and A-50 airborne early


-----

during the height of tensions in Ukraine, and in April the
same year when eastern Ukraine began to destabilize,
unusual fl ights took place with Tu-95 long-range bombers
conducting fl ights around Japan on four occasions in one
month. On two of these occasions, a total of six Tu-95
fl ew on the same day.[46]

Russian aircraft activities in FY2016 generally took
place at the same level as the previous year. Yet, Russian
aircraft continue to be active around Japan, as indicated
by the fl ights of Tu-95 long-range bombers in January
2017 and fl ights in the vicinity of Japan conducted by
Tu-95 long-range bombers as well as patrol aircraft and
surveillance aircraft in April 2017.

See Fig. I-2-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian

Aircraft)


Changes in the Number of Scrambles against
Russian Aircraft

Fig. I-2-4-3

(Times)

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

(FY)

**Relations with Other Countries**
**5**


possibility of cooperation with other countries towards
stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist
organizations, including ISIL.
Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance
its posture and develop its relations with other countries
in terms of economic-centered and benefi t-focused
foreign policy, and Russia’s politics and diplomacy which
include the security domain.


See


**1** **General Situation**

**1**


Russia considers the realization of its national interests as
a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing the
multipolarization of international relations, the shift of
global power to the Asia-Pacifi c region, and the growing
importance of force in international relations.[47] Moreover,
based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages
in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect
its national interests. It aims to pursue multidirectional
diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring
as many partners as possible around the world.[48]

For this reason, Russia has been working on deepening
its economic partnerships with the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS).[49] Furthermore, Russia aspires
to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacifi c countries,
seen as drivers of the global economy,[50] and in recent
years, has attached importance to China and India as
countries with which to strengthen bilateral relations.
Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its
cooperative relations with the West are still facing
challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with
regard to the Syrian situation, Russia is exploring the


**2** **Relations with Asian Countries**

**2**


Russia recognizes that the signifi cance of the Asia-Pacifi c
region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy,
and considers it strategically important to strengthen its
status in the region from the viewpoint of socioeconomic
development in Siberia and the Far East,[51] and security.[52]
In the executive order concerning foreign policy issued in
May 2012, President Putin upheld his policy to participate
in the integration process of the Asia-Pacifi c region in
order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the
East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia
would make efforts to develop relationships with Japan,


46 The number of times Russian military aircraft fl ew around Japan since FY2012 was: one time in FY2012; one time in FY2013; six times in FY2014; two times in FY2015; and one time in FY2016.

47 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (November 2016).

48 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “With a view to protecting its national interests Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign
policy ruling out futile confrontation (including a new arms race). (Abridged) The Russian Federation’s objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world.”

49 In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement.

50 Press conference by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov following the Russia-China-India foreign ministers’ meeting (April 2016).

51 Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin.

52 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in November 2016). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed i


-----

the ROK, and other countries, along with China,[53] India,
and Vietnam. To achieve strategic stability and equal
strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis
on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship
and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key
factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and in
assigning an important role for the privileged strategic
partnership with India.[54]

Under this policy, Russia has participated in various
frameworks in the Asia-Pacifi c region.[55] In September
2016, the Eastern Economic Forum for accelerating the
economic development of Eastern Russia and expanding
international cooperation with the Asia-Pacifi c region
was held in Vladivostok, following on from 2015.
Among these different countries, Russia and India
maintain a close relationship under a strategic partnership,
with the leaders of both countries paying mutual visits.
During President Putin’s visit to India in October
2016 an agreement was reached on defense equipment
contracts for S-400 surface-to-air missiles and Admiral
Grigorovich-class frigate, among other equipment,
valued at approximately US$10 billion. Both countries
are strengthening their military technology cooperation,
including the joint development of the fi fth generation
PAK FA fi ghter and the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise
missile.[56] Additionally, since 2003 Russia and India
have been conducting INDRA antiterrorism exercises
involving the Armies and Navies of both countries.
Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states
that it will develop mutually benefi cial cooperation and
is intensifying its approach in many fi elds including
politics, economy and security.

**3** **Situation in Ukraine**


after the ceasefi re agreement of February 2015 (package
of measures for the implementation of the Minsk
agreements).[57] In October 2016, a summit meeting was
held among Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine for
the fi rst time in about one year, and agreement was
reached on the creation of a roadmap for executing
the ceasefi re agreement of February 2015. However,
subsequent coordination has proven diffi cult and the
ceasefi re continues to be broken in the eastern region.
Also, no major developments have been seen in the
political process for elections in the separatist controlled
areas. As can be seen from the above, the outcomes of
the changes to the status quo in the Crimean Peninsula
and eastern Ukraine via Russia’s “hybrid warfare” have
taken on an aspect of being entrenched. Additionally,
Ukraine President Poroshenko has indicated that
he would like to carry out a national referendum on
whether the country should join NATO. This could lead
to opposition from Russia and potentially affect the
situation in Ukraine.

**4** **Situation in Syria**


In September 2015, Russia began airstrikes in Syria as per
the assistance requested by President Assad of Syria. The
West condemned Russia for attacking not only terrorist
organizations including ISIL, but also Syrian dissidents
that are opposed to the Assad regime,[58] while on the other
hand ISIL declared it would retaliate against Russia.
In October 2015, a Russian passenger aircraft crashed
after departing from Egypt, killing 224 passengers and
crew. Russia concluded that this incident was a terrorist
attack conducted by ISIL, declared retaliation against
ISIL, and strengthened its airstrikes by mobilizing
strategic bombers and other assets.

See Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends in Regional Confl ict and International

Terrorism)


**3**


In Ukraine, sporadic clashes between Ukrainian troops
and separatist armed forces continued in the east even


53 See Chapter 2, Section 3-3 for the relationship with China.
In November 2013, President Putin made offi cial visits to Vietnam and the ROK.

54 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “The Russian Federation will develop its comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative
relationship with the People’s Republic of China as a key factor for maintaining global and regional stability. The Russian Federation will assign an important role to the privileged strategic partnership
with the Republic of India.”

55 Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the APEC, the ARF, the SCO, and the East Asia Summit (EAS; since 2011).

56 Aside from this cooperation, it has been reported that in March 2015, India requested Russia to lease another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine in addition to the one already on lease.

57 The package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements consists of the following items: (1) implementation of ceasefi re starting from February 15, 2015 00.00 AM (local time); (2)
withdrawal of heavy weapons to create a security zone with widths ranging from 50 to 140 km; (3) monitoring of the ceasefi re by the OSCE; (4) launch a dialogue on local self-government of areas
controlled by separatists; (5) ensure pardon and amnesty; (6) ensure release of all hostages; (7) ensure humanitarian assistance; (8) resumption of socio-economic systems in the East, including
social transfers such as pension; (9) reinstatement of full control of the state border by the Government of Ukraine throughout the confl ict area; (10) withdrawal of foreign armed formations, military
equipment, and mercenaries from Ukraine; (11) carrying out constitutional reform, providing for decentralization as a key element, and adopting legislation on the special status of certain areas of
Donetsk and Lugansk regions (local self-government) by the end of 2015; (12) discuss local elections with representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; and (13) intensify the
work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups (consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE).

58 In October 2015, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey issued a joint declaration calling on Russia to cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and i


-----

Also, in November 2015, a Turkish military aircraft
shot down a RAF aircraft flying near the Syrian-Turkish
border on the grounds that the Russian aircraft intruded
into Turkish airspace, following which Russian-Turkish
relations deteriorated. However, in June 2016, Turkish
President Erdogan expressed his deepest regret over the
incident in a written letter, and at a summit meeting held
in August the same year both leaders affirmed measures
aimed at improving bilateral relations, paving the way for
both countries to work together on the Syrian ceasefire
agreement and other matters.
To date, while acquiring Tartus Naval Base and
Khmeimim Air Base as bases of its operations in Syria,
the Russian military has conducted aerial bombing using
fighter-bombers and long-range bombers[59] as well as
fired cruise missiles from surface vessels and submarines
deployed to the Caspian Sea and Mediterranean. Russia’s
Ministry of Defence announced in November 2016 that
the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov deployed
to the eastern part of the Mediterranean launched aircraft
and conducted airstrikes on land-based targets for the first
time in Russia’s naval history. These aircraft from the
aircraft carrier are reported to have flown 420 sorties over
a two-month period, bombing a total of 1,252 terrorist
facilities. It has been pointed out, though, that most of
these sorties were flown from Khmeimim Air Base since
the aircraft was moved from the aircraft carrier to the
Air Base soon after the airstrike began. It is therefore
open to question whether this should be assessed as the
operational capability of the aircraft carrier.
In December 2016, Syrian government troops gained
control of strategically located Aleppo, where fighting
has continued involving Syrian government troops,
opposition forces, Kurdistan troops, and ISIL fighters.
At the end of the same month, a nationwide ceasefire
agreement brokered by Russia and Turkey took effect
between the Assad administration and opposition forces.
Since January 2017, Russia has increased its presence
in the Middle East. It has continued fighting ISIL and
Al-Nusra Front, while also holding Syrian peace talks in
Astana, Kazakhstan together with Syria and Iran, where


establishment of a ceasefire monitoring organization and
de-escalation areas were announced.
Furthermore, Russia has concluded an agreement
with the Syrian Government to continue using Tartus
Naval Base and Khmeimim Air Base. As such, attention
will be paid to Russia’s moves to expand its influence in
Syria and the Middle East.

See Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends in Regional Conflict and International

Terrorism)

The objectives of Russian military intervention may
include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which
is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests
including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the
threat of international terrorist organizations including
ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East.
Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the
recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control
and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, the use of
cruise missiles and strategic bombers in the attacks has,
in turn, demonstrated Russia’s long-range precision strike
capabilities. Considering the significant influence of
Russia’s military intervention on the course of the Assad
administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships
between Russia and surrounding countries such as Turkey
and Iran, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria
and on anti-ISIL military operations cannot be neglected.


59 After commencing operations in Syria, Russian aircraft have flown some 18,800 sorties attacking terrorist infrastructure, including 725 training camps and 405 explosives plants, killing 35,000 i


-----

**5** **Relations with Commonwealth of**
**Independent States**

**5**


Russia positions the development of bilateral and
multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the top
foreign policy priority. Russia considers that its vital
interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS,[60]
and has dispatched troops to be stationed in Ukraine
(Crimea), Moldova (Transnistria[61]), Armenia, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia),
which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009.[62] In
November 2014, Russia and Abkhazia concluded
an alliance and strategic partnership treaty.[63] In such
ways, Russia has been working on ensuring its military
infl uence.[64]

Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed
insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia
has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on
counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized
the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001
within the framework of the CIS Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO).[65] Furthermore, in June 2009,
a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established
to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid
Deployment Force.[66]

In addition, out of concern that the worsening
security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of
Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries support
Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen
the security of the Afghan border.[67]


**6** **Relations with the United States**

**6**


President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative
relations with the United States in the economic domain,
while opposing the United States on any action Russia
considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s
strategic interests.”
Russia strongly opposed the deployment plan of
the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating
that it would have a negative impact on Russia’s nuclear
deterrent capabilities. In September 2009, the United
States announced that it was reviewing the proposed
deployment of the MD system in Europe,[68] which was
cautiously welcomed by Russia.
However, Russia’s understanding is that the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) effective
from February 2011 would be invalidated if the United
States developed, both quantitatively and qualitatively,
its MD capabilities and threatened Russia’s potential
strategic nuclear strength.[69] Russia has striven to keep the
United States in check in response to the recent progress
of the U.S. MD plan in Europe, indicating that Russia
may withdraw from the New START.[70]

With regard to the military exchanges with the United
States, Russia was considered as seeking establishment
of a cooperative relationship with the United States
to some extent, as exemplifi ed from Russian vessels’
participation in RIMPAC in waters around Hawaii for
the fi rst time in July 2012. However, following Russia’s
actions in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the


60 In August 2008, following the confl ict with Georgia, then President Medvedev indicated that one of the fi ve principles of Russia’s foreign policy was that there are regions in which Russia has
privileged interests.

61 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but it was never recognized as such by the
international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone
conference between President Putin and President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately 1,500
troops is currently stationed in Transnistria.

62 After the confl ict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian
territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving GeorgiaRussia relations, defeated the ruling “United National Movement” that adopts an anti-Russian policy. In the presidential election of October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili, backed by “Georgian Dream,”
was elected and became president in November of the same year. In his inauguration speech, President Margvelashvili stated that he was ready to deepen the dialogue with Russia, expressing his
intention to continue with pro-Euro, pro-U.S. lines while pursuing improvement of the relationship with Russia.

63 Russia’s “Military Doctrine” revised in December 2014 states that Russia would promote cooperation with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia aimed at shared defense
and security.

64 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and
Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the
period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 201st Motor
Rifl e Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fi ghters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the fi rst time.

65 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Toshkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan,
Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was
reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization.

66 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not suffi ciently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic confl ict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in
June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the effi ciency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a
member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, Vzaimodeistvie (cooperative operation), were implemented
in Kazakhstan in October 2009 and October 2010, in Armenia in September 2012, and in Belarus in September 2013.

67 At the Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board in December 2013, President Putin said that the withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014 would be a destabilizing element
not only to Afghanistan but also to Central Asia and could pose a threat to the national interests and security of Russia.

68 See Chapter 2, Section 1-2 for the U.S. deployment plan of the MD system in Europe.

69 Statement by the Russian Federation concerning MD (April 8, 2010)

70 Russia has demanded a legal guarantee that the MD plan of the United States is not targeted at Russia, and claimed that the United States is not considering Russia’s concerns. Russia issued an
executive statement in November 2011, mentioning countermeasures such as deployment of operational early-warning radars and the possibility of its withdrawal from the New START. In November


-----

United States announced suspension of the military
exchanges with Russia in March 2014.[71] In addition, the
United States dispatched a missile destroyer to the Black
Sea and provided non-lethal weapons to the Ukrainian
Government.[72] In February 2015, as the tense situation in
eastern Ukraine continued, the United States stepped up
its activities to keep Russia in check, including suggesting
to provide lethal weapons to the Ukrainian Government.
In regard to the situation in Syria, the ceasefi re
agreement brokered by the United States and Russia
took effect in February and September 2016, but in
either case the agreement de facto broke down within a
short period of time.[73] During a telephone talk between
President Putin and President Trump shortly after he
took offi ce (January 2017), both parties stated they
would cooperate with each other regarding various
issues including the fi ght against terrorism and would
work to improve bilateral relations. However, in April
2017, following the United States’ missile strike on
Syria in response to its chemical weapons attack, the
United States and Russia criticized each other, clouding
the outlook for improved bilateral relations.

See Chapter 3, Section 1 (Trends in Regional Confl ict and International

Terrorism)

**7** **Relations with Europe and NATO**


for the NRC s ambassador-level meetings.[74] Additionally,
NATO and European countries have maintained a severe
diplomatic stance towards Russia while working with the
Ukrainian Government.
At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November
2010 prior to the suspension of working level
cooperation, Russia and NATO stated that both sides
would work towards building a true and modernized
strategic partnership. They have continued searching for
possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in fi elds such as
MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and
anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation,
no progress was made on Russia-NATO relations.
For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense
ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference
in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation
in which only information and data would be exchanged
under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia,
and the position of Russia aiming at “sector MD” in
which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for
each country’s responsibility under a unifi ed MD system
of NATO and Russia.
Meanwhile, there remains an unsolved issue between
Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.[75]

Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has presented a
threat to NATO’s eastern border for the fi rst time since
the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s member
states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor national
security concerns. For this and other reasons, NATO
continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of its
collective defense.[76]

Meanwhile, Russia has actively conducted air activity


**7**


Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council
(NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal
partner in the areas of mutual interest, such as by
participating in certain decision-making processes.
However, following the Ukrainian crisis, NATO and
European countries suspended their practical cooperation
with Russia, including that in the military domain, except


71 Following the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, then U.S. DoD Spokesperson Kirby announced in March 2014 that the United States would cease all military exchange with Russia,
including joint exercises with the RAF, consultations, and port calls.

72 The United States provided non-lethal weapons such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents,
counter mortar radars, uniforms, fi rst aid equipment, and other related items to Ukraine.

73 A ceasefi re between Syrian government troops and opposition forces took effect in February 2016 pursuant to the agreement between the United States and Russia. Because strikes against ISIL
and Al-Nusra Front were permitted during the ceasefi re, Syrian government troops continued their aerial bombing, reigniting fi ghting across the country beginning in April 2016, causing a de facto
breakdown in the ceasefi re. In September 2016, another ceasefi re was reached which stipulates clearly that Russia would permit the ban on Syrian government troops from conducting aerial bombing
on opposition forces that have formed a united front with the Al-Nusra Front, while in exchange, the United States would detach the Al-Nusra Front and opposition forces and only bomb Al-Nusra Front
jointly with Russia. However, the fi ghting mainly around Aleppo intensifi ed and the ceasefi re collapsed once again.

74 NATO issued a statement condemning Russia over the situation in Ukraine, and has deployed additional military forces to countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. However, there are discrepancies
among NATO’s member states in their responses to Russia.

75 At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, an agreement was reached on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and on complying with the current CFE
Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty comes into effect. Russia was dissatisfi ed with the fact that despite its ratifi cation of the adapted CFE Treaty, NATO member states refused to ratify the Treaty on the
grounds that the RAF were not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova. Therefore, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this
treaty. Presently, only four countries have ratifi ed the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has not yet come into effect. In addition, Russia has proposed dissolving
the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region.


-----

that can be deemed provocative in Europe, especially
near the Baltic countries.[77] It has also made known that
Russia is deploying two divisions near the border with
Ukraine and one division near the border with Belarus.
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept announced in
November 2016 states that containment policies of the
United States and its allies undermine regional and
global stability, and Russia would maintain its negative
perspective towards NATO expansion.

**8** **Exportation of Arms**


system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry
as an integral part of the nation’s military organization
and is committed to improving and further developing
the military industry by such measures as promoting the
integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG,
and Tupolev.
Russia exports equipment such as fi ghters and vessels
to countries including India, China, Algeria, ASEAN
member states, and Venezuela.[79] Russia concluded an
agreement with China to sell new Su-35 fi ghters and the
S-400 surface-to-air missile system. Deliveries of the Su35 fi ghters[80] have already begun at the end of 2016, and
plans call for a total of 24 of these aircraft to be delivered
to China by 2018. It has been pointed out that this deal
was made possible because the interests of China and
Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous
weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for
state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid
diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to
gain economic profi t through arms exports.[81]


**8**


Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms
not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military
industry and to make economic profi t, but also to help
promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value
has been increasing in recent years.[78] In January 2007,
the Russian Government granted the exclusive right to
export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation
as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export


77 In October 2014, NATO announced that the Russian Air Force conducted signifi cant military maneuvers over the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Atlantic Ocean, and Black Sea on October 28 and 29. NATO
criticized that this air activity represents an unusual level of activity over European airspace.

78 According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2011 and 2015 increased by 28% compared to that of the period between 2006 and 2010. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports
in the world (25%) after the United States.

79 Russia has delivered to Indonesia 5 Su-27 fi ghters and 11 Su-30 fi ghters. Furthermore, it was reported in 2016 that Russia plans to sell 10 Su-35 fi ghters to Indonesia. To date, Russia has delivered
18 Su-30 fi ghters to Malaysia and 12 Su-27 fi ghters and 36 Su-30 fi ghters to Vietnam. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam for Kilo-class submarines. All six of these submarines
were delivered to Vietnam by January 2017. With regard to India, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya
in November 2013, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, to date, Russia has delivered to Algeria 52 Su-30 fi ghters and to Venezuela 24 Su-30 fi ghters. Russia’s exports to China have
included Su-27 and Su-30 fi ghters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out
that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. With regard to Iran,
Russia started exporting the “S-300” surface-to-air missile system in April 2016.

80 According to news reports, a contract was signed to export 24 Su-35 fi ghters for approximately US$2 billion and 32 S-400 launchers for approximately US$3 billion. The fi rst four Su-35 fi ghters were
delivered by the end of 2016.


-----

**Section 5 Australia**


**General Situation**
**1**


Australia maintains a special strategic partnership with
Japan and shares universal values, such as strategic
interests, respect for freedom and human rights, and
democracy. It is allied with the United States, as are
Japan and the ROK.
In Australia, in September 2015, Malcolm Turnbull
was elected to lead the ruling Liberal Party. As a result,
Prime Minister Abbott with a stagnant approval rating
resigned, being replaced by the Turnbull administration
from the conservative coalition. In July 2016, both the
upper and lower houses were dissolved simultaneously
for the first time in 29 years after a labor-related bill
failed to pass in the upper house in April 2016. Therefore,
Turnbull continues to be prime minister of a conservative
coalition that controls the lower house.[1] The former
Abbott administration criticized the defense spending
cuts of the previous Labor Party administration, and
signaled its intention to actively make investments which
are deemed necessary for building a stronger defense
force. This policy has continued under the Turnbull
administration.

**Security and Defense Policies**
**2**


The Australian Government launched its first National
Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013.[2] The
Strategy provides a blueprint for national security
over the next decade, presenting the recognition that
responding to the economic and strategic changes in
the Asia-Pacific region is vital to the national security
of Australia. The Strategy defines four objectives for
the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe
and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen


The Defence White Paper released in February
2016 during the Turnbull administration states that over
the next two decades, the Australian Government will
make important investments to maintain a high level of
capability of the ADF, setting out a plan to continue to
increase the troop strength and acquire high performance
equipment. The white paper states explicitly that defense
funding would be increased over the next decade, setting
a specific target to reach 2% of Australia’s GDP by 2020.
With regard to Australia’s international relationships, the
white paper sets forth that Australia would aim to mature
and deepen practical engagement with partners across the
Indo-Pacific, including Japan, while continuing to give
highest priority to its alliance with the United States.
To achieve its strategic defense objective of contributing
military capabilities to coalition operations that support
Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order,
Australia makes proactive contributions to the peace
and stability of the international community through
the deployment of ADF to overseas operations, among
other efforts.

Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets,
infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a
favorable international environment. On this basis, the
Strategy outlines the following priorities for the next
five years: (1) enhanced engagement in the Asia-Pacific
region;[3] (2) integrated cyber policy and operations;[4] and
(3) effective partnerships.[5]

In February 2016, the Australian Government
released its seventh new Defence White Paper.[6] This


In this election, the conservative coalition comprised of the Liberal, National, and other parties won a majority 76 out of the 150 lower house seats, resulting in Prime Minister Turnbull continuing on
as leader, although the coalition lost a large number of seats from its initial total of 89. In the upper house, the coalition aimed to capture seats from minority parties through election reform but failed
to obtain a majority, and may continue to encounter difficulties with government administration going forward.

This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National
Security Community. The national security strategy is scheduled to be revised every five years.

This includes: deepening the Australia-U.S. alliance; enhancing bilateral cooperation with influential regional countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, and India; and promoting the
superiority and effectiveness of multilateral forums.

The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) integrates the capabilities of Australia’s Department of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, and Federal Police and the cyber-related personnel of
the Australian Crime Commission.

This includes sharing information securely and quickly with domestic and international partners and strengthening information sharing between government and business.

The Defence White Paper of Australia presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 (Hawke
Labor Party administration), 1994 (Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 (Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 (Rudd Labor Party administration), 2013 (Gillard Labor Party administration),


-----

white paper presents an outlook of Australia s security
environment over the next two decades. It then outlines
the direction of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing
with this environment, and the development of the
defense force pursuant to this strategy.
Specifi cally, the white paper maintains that
while there is little prospect of a military attack on
Australian territory in the period to 2035, Australia
will face new complexities and challenges.[7] Based on
this understanding, three strategic defense interests are
identifi ed, namely: a secure, resilient Australia (including
the security of sea lanes); a secure nearer region; and a
stable Indo-Pacifi c region and rules-based global order.
Additionally, three strategic defense objectives are given,
which are: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or
threats to Australia and its national interests; (2) Make
military contributions to support the security of maritime
Southeast Asia and support the governments of South

**Relations with Other Countries**
**3**


In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia subscribes
to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity are
directly linked to the development of the nearer region, the
Indo-Pacifi c region, and the global strategic environment.
Based on this view, Australia will build and maintain
international security relationships to achieve its strategic
defense objectives. In particular, Australia will aim to
mature and deepen practical engagement with partners
across the Indo-Pacifi c region, including Indonesia,
Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and China, while
continuing to give the highest priority to its alliance with
the United States.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation

and Exchanges)


Pacifi c countries to build and strengthen their security; and
(3) Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations
that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global
order. To maintain the ADF’s high level of capability
needed to achieve these objectives, the Government will
make important investments. In addition to increasing
the troop strength by approximately 4,400 personnel,[8]
Australia will acquire high performance equipment,
including 12 new submarines,[9] 3 air warfare destroyers
(Aegis vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and 7 MQ4C unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia
will seek to strengthen ISR capabilities, electronic
warfare capabilities, and cyber security capabilities, as
well as strengthen the functions of its bases in northern
Australia and elsewhere. To support these programs
by funding, the white paper also presents the concrete
target of increasing defense funding to reach 2% of
GDP by 2020.

**1** **Relations with the United States**


**1**


In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that its
alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security
Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States of America (ANZUS)[10] is based on shared values
and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s
defense policy. Australia notes that the United States,
which remains the pre-eminent global military power
over the next two decades, will continue to be its most
important strategic partner, and the active presence of the
United States will continue to underpin the stability of
the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and
supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring
stability in the Indo-Pacifi c region.
Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly


7 The white paper identifi es six factors that will shape the security environment of Australia over the next two decades: (1) the roles of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacifi c region and the
relationship between them; (2) challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order; (3) the threat of terrorism to Australians at home and abroad; (4) state fragility caused by uneven economic
growth, crime, social, environmental and governance challenges, and climate change; (5) the pace of military modernization and the development of more capable regional military forces; and (6) the
emergence of new complex, non-geographic threats (e.g., cyber threats). With regard to (5), the white paper notes that in the Indo-Pacifi c region, half of the world’s submarines and at least half of
the world’s advanced combat aircraft will be operating and more countries may acquire ballistic missile technology.

8 According to the white paper, over the next decade, the number of active duty ADF personnel would be increased to approximately 62,400 personnel from the current approximately 58,000 personnel.
If this is realized, the ADF would return to its largest size since 1993.

9 The Defence White Paper refers to the submarines to be acquired as “regionally superior submarines.” It explains that Australia would select the submarine classifi cation by the end of 2016, and
that the fi rst submarine would begin entering service in the early 2030s. Japan, Germany, and France participated in the submarine Competitive Evaluation Process. In April 2016, the Australian
Government announced that the French company DCNS was chosen as the partner for building the submarines. In August 2016, it was found that confi dential DCNS documents on its submarine
order for the Indian Navy had leaked, resulting in rising calls in Australia for a review of the deal. Prime Minister Turnbull emphasized that the submarines being built for Australia are a different type
than the one leaked, refuting the need for a review.

10 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand


-----

convening the Australia-United States Ministerial
Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic
and security issues. On the operational front, the two
countries have made efforts to increase interoperability
through joint exercises, including Exercise Talisman
Saber.[11] Since April 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps have
conducted rotational deployments to northern Australia.[12]
On the equipment front, the two countries have been
simplifying the export procedures associated with
equipment deals pursuant to the Australia-U.S. Defence
Trade Cooperation Treaty that entered into force in May
2013. In addition, the two countries are considering the
joint development of the F-35 JSF and missile defense
cooperation.[13] Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is being
advanced in areas such as ISR, space,[14] and cyber.[15]
Since the Abbott administration that was inaugurated in
September 2013, Australia has continued to pursue the
further deepening of bilateral relations. In August 2014,
the two sides signed the Force Posture Agreement which
provides a legal framework for the rotational deployment
of the U.S. Marine Corps. From October 2014, the ADF
has been participating in the combat mission of the U.S.led operation against ISIL. In July 2015, the two countries
conducted a training in which B-52 strategic bombers of
the U.S. Forces were fl own from the U.S. mainland to
drop bombs on an air weapons range in Australia and
then returned to the United States. Under the Turnbull
administration, at the 30th AUSMIN in October 2015, the
two sides signed a joint statement on defense cooperation[16]
to serve as a guideline for future defense cooperation, and
reaffi rmed their strong bilateral cooperation. In October


2016, cost-sharing negotiations for the Force Posture
Initiatives were concluded in principle.
Under the Trump administration, AUSMIN was
held in June 2017 where they decided to further expand
defense and security cooperation. As a result, the detailed
progress of these efforts will be a focus of attention in
the future.

**2** **Relations with China**


**2**


In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that
its relationship with China is crucial in different ways
from its relationship with the United States, and that
it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and
the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and
other countries in the Indo-Pacifi c. It goes on to say
Australia is committed to continuing the development of
Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to
enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency,
and build trust.
Based on such a policy, Australia and China
continuously hold dialogues among their defense
authorities,[17] along with exchanges to develop the
cooperative relations between their defense forces,
including joint exercises and mutual visits by vessels.[18]
In April 2016, Prime Minister Turnbull visited China for
the fi rst time since taking offi ce where he met with his
counterpart Premier Li Keqiang. During the AustraliaChina summit meeting, an announcement was made about
connecting China’s “One Belt, One Road” concept with
the development of infrastructure in northern Australia.


11 Exercise Talisman Saber, started in 2005, is a biennial combined U.S.-Australia training designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability. About 33,000 U.S. Forces and ADF personnel
participated in the exercise held in July 2015.

12 By way of the Force Posture Initiatives of November 2011, the United States and Australia announced that the U.S. Marine Corps would conduct rotational deployments approximately every six months
to Darwin and northern Australia. Accordingly, approximately 200 U.S. Marines were deployed in 2012 and 2013, 1,150 Marines in 2014 and 2015, approximately 1,250 Marines in 2016 and 2017.
The Defence White Paper 2016 sets out that the size would be increased to approximately 2,500 Marines by 2020. In addition, under this same initiative, access to Australian military facilities and
areas in northern Australia by U.S. Air Force aircraft was set to be expanded, together with opportunities for joint exercises and training. Accordingly, in February 2017, 12 F-22 fi ghter aircraft were
deployed to Australia.

13 While Australia considers that the threat of an ICBM attack on Australia is low, it deems there is a possible threat of an attack on Australian territory by a long-range or submarine-launched ballistic
missile or cruise missile, as well as attack on the deployed ADF by a short-range ballistic missile or cruise missile. To counter such threats, Australia and the United States have launched a working
group to study options that could contribute to missile defense in the region.

14 Since signing the Space Situational Awareness Partnership in November 2010, Australia and the United States have promoted space cooperation, including the relocation of the U.S. C-band groundbased radar system and the Space Surveillance Telescope to Australia.

15 At the AUSMIN in September 2011, the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace and confi rmed that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would
consult together and determine appropriate options to address threats in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the
United States.

16 The statement envisions that greater competition for resources and territorial disputes will increase the possibility of miscalculation and the potential for confl ict in the Asia-Pacifi c and Indian Ocean
regions, and states that the two countries would further deepen their defense relationship to deal with this. Specifi cally, the statement sets forth: deeper interoperability; strengthened policy and
intelligence cooperation; increased collaboration in science and technology, capability development, and defense industry engagement; and coordinated multilateral engagement.

17 In July 2014, Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, visited Australia, and held talks with then Prime Minister Abbott, then Minister
for Defence David Johnston, and others. The two sides agreed to hold a U.S.-China-Australia trilateral joint exercise. In addition, Australia and China have regularly convened the Defence Strategic
Dialogue since 1997. At the 19th Dialogue held in October 2016, Australian offi cials, including Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin, Chief of the Defence Force, and Dennis Richardson, Secretary of the
Department of Defence, visited China, where they met with Fang Fenghui, Chief of Joint Staff of the PLA.

18 In January 2016, three PLA Navy vessels visited Brisbane, Australia to take part in navigation training together with RAN vessels. In August 2016, following on from the previous two years, KOWARI
2016, the third survival training among the United States, China, and Australia, was conducted in northern Australia, with ten personnel participating from each country. In September 2016, Exercise


-----

Similar cooperation was brought to light also during the
Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue held in
February 2017.
Meanwhile, like the previous Abbott administration,
the Turnbull administration has been making Australia’s
position on China very clear. The Joint Statement of the
AUSMIN in October 2015, referring to China by name,
expresses strong concerns over recent land reclamation
and construction activity in the South China Sea, and
calls on all claimant states to halt militarization. When
the United States conducted the Freedom of Navigation
Operation in the South China Sea in the same month,
Minister for Defence Marise Payne of Australia issued
a statement expressing strong support for rights to
freedom of navigation and overfl ight under international
law.[19] In July 2016, Minister for Foreign Affairs Bishop
announced, with regard to the fi nal ruling by the Arbitral
Tribunal on the case between the Philippines and China,
that Australia would support the rights of all countries
that resolve disputes peacefully following international
law, including the UNCLOS, and that Australia would
continue to exercise its rights related to the freedom
of overfl ight and the freedom of navigation pursuant
to international law. In the Defence White Paper 2016,
Australia asserts that it will be important for regional
stability that China provides reassurance to its neighbors
by being more transparent about its defense policies, and
expresses particular concern with the unprecedented pace
and scale of China’s land reclamation activities in the
South China Sea.
In October 2015, the Government of the Northern
Territory leased to a Chinese company the rights to
operate the commercial wharfs of the Darwin Port, also
utilized by ADF and U.S. Force vessels. After it became
clear that the Australian federal government did not lodge
objections, saying there were no security concerns, people
expressed uneasiness within and outside of Australia.[20]
Later, deals involving Chinese companies seeking to
acquire Australian facilities continued to emerge.[21]
In January 2017, the federal government of Australia


announced the establishment of a dedicated center within
the Attorney General’s Department, which will identify
facilities requiring surveillance and carefully manage the
risks for advising related institutions in order to block
the sale of important infrastructure related to national
security, including specifi c ports and harbor facilities, to
companies from other countries.[22]

**3** **Relations with India**


**3**


In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that
it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the IndoPacifi c region, and that it sees India as a key security
partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its
defense relationship with India in support of their shared
strategic interests.
The Australia-India relationship was elevated to
strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two
countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues,
mutual visits by senior military offi cers, interactions
among military services, and mutual dispatches of
students to military educational organizations. More
recently, in November 2014, Prime Minister of India
Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the fi rst visit
to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The
two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover
research, development, and industry engagement, to hold
regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and
conduct regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks
between each of their military services. Accordingly, in
June 2015, two Indian Navy vessels made a goodwill visit
to Australia, and in September 2015, the fi rst bilateral
joint naval exercise AUSINDEX 15 was conducted off
the east coast of India.[23] Mutual exchanges between the
two countries are steadily progressing, with a contingent
from India participating in KAKADU 16, a multilateral
maritime training exercise hosted by Australia in
September 2016.

See Chapter 2, Section 7-1-2 (Military Affairs)


19 In response to China’s announcement of the “East China Sea ADIZ” in November 2013, Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop issued a statement saying Australia has made clear its opposition to
any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea.

20 In addition, opposition parties and think tanks raised concerns over the fact that this Chinese company is thought to have close ties with the Communist Party of China and the PLA, and over the fact
that the U.S. Forces that utilize Darwin Port were not consulted in advance. According to press reports, then President Barack Obama requested Prime Minister Turnbull to provide advance notice.

21 The Government of Australia has struck down the acquisition of a farming company, S. Kidman & Co., which owns land equivalent to about 1% of Australia’s landmass and the acquisition of major
power company Ausgrid by Chinese companies due to reasons of national security.

22 The newly established Critical Infrastructure Centre is viewed as supporting the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) which screens individual projects and advises the Government.


-----

**4** **Relations with Southeast Asia and South Pacifi c**
**Countries**

**4**


In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia regards a
secure nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast
Asia and South Pacifi c as its strategic interest. In
particular, Australia considers that instability and
confl icts in Southeast Asia have the potential to threaten
Australia’s security and economic relations with countries.
Furthermore, Australia depends on maritime trade with
Southeast Asian countries and maritime trade that transits
Southeast Asia. In this regard, Australia perceives that
the security of these sea lanes must be ensured alongside
freedom of navigation. Based on this understanding,
Australia seeks to make military contributions to support
the maritime security of Southeast Asia and support the
governments of South Pacifi c and other countries to build
and strengthen their security.
Australia has been deepening its relations with
Indonesia in the security and defense fi elds following
the signing of the Lombok Treaty in November
2006, the elevation of their relationship to strategic
partnership in March 2010, and the conclusion of the
Defence Cooperation Arrangement in September 2012.[24]
However, issues have emerged, including differences
in their responses to stowaways from Indonesia, the
case of wiretapping of the Indonesian President and
others by Australia’s intelligence agency, and the issue
of the execution of Australian nationals in Indonesia.[25]
Consequently, cooperative relations in the security and
defense fi elds stalled intermittently between the two
countries. Subsequently, in the second half of 2015,
mutual visits by ministers and higher-level offi cials
resumed, including the visit to Indonesia by Prime
Minister Turnbull. The Foreign and Defense Ministerial
Meeting (2+2) was held in November 2016, and the
bilateral relationship is seeing further improvements.[26]


With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries
out regular joint combined exercises in the South China
Sea and other areas[27] under the framework of the Five
Power Defence Arrangements.[28] Australia considers
that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and
that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime
trading environment. Defense cooperation is also
deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of
understanding concerning military training and training
area development in Australia under the comprehensive
strategic partnership in October 2016. As regards
Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian
Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes
to maintaining regional security and stability through
patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern
Indian Ocean.[29]

Australia plays a leading role in assisting Papua New
Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the South Pacifi c countries in
fi elds such as security maintenance, coping with natural
disasters, and maritime patrol.[30] In particular, in the fi eld
of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF
assets to the South Pacifi c to assist with patrol activities.
In addition, in June 2014, Australia unveiled a plan to
replace the 22 patrol vessels it provided to these countries
in the past.


24 The Lombok Treaty is a security cooperation framework that espouses wide-ranging cooperation in the defense fi eld. It entered into force in February 2008. The Defense Cooperation Arrangement
covers strengthened cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security.

25 In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and
others. The Indonesian Government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian Government. The Government
also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia. In April 2015, two Australians were executed in Indonesia for helping to smuggle drugs, and the
Australian Government strongly protested to Indonesia.

26 In January 2017, there was also the incident in which Indonesia announced the temporary suspension of cooperation with the ADF, stating that the curriculum it used contained disparaging remarks
about the fi ve founding principles of Indonesia.

27 See Chapter 2, Section 6, Footnote 9.

28 In Exercise Bersama Shield held in April 2016, approximately 200 personnel, vessels including a submarine, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated. In October 2016, Exercise Bersama Lima was
held in Malaysia, Singapore and South China Sea in which approximately 400 personnel, vessels, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated.

29 See Chapter 3, Section 3-6.

30 Australia has extended proactive assistance for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the momentum for independence heightened in Timor-Leste. The ADF led the
International Stabilization Force (ISF) since 2006, and with the stabilization of the security situation in Timor-Leste, the withdrawal of the ADF was completed in March 2013. In the Solomon Islands,
the ADF extended assistance for their stabilization since July 2003 through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ADF withdrew from the country in August 2013, when


-----

With New Zealand, Australia has an alliance
pursuant to the ANZUS Treaty. The two countries hold
regular meetings by their leaders and defense ministers,
and have maintained close cooperative relations in the
security and defense fi elds through joint exercises and
joint activities in the region.

See Chapter 2, Section 6 (Security and Defense Policies of Each Country)

See


**5** **Overseas Activities**


October 2014. In addition, Australia has been advising
and assisting, as well as providing capacity building
assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces on the military
front since May 2015. As of late June 2017, about 780
personnel (of which approximately 400 personnel are
engaged in assistance in the United Arab Emirates), 6
F/A-18 fi ghter/attack aircraft, 1 E-7A early warning and
control aircraft, 1 KC-30A refueling aircraft, among
other assets are carrying out activities in Iraq.
In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately
1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually
in reconstruction assistance activities and the trainings of
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the
completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about
270 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist NATOled Afghan forces. In July 2016, Australia announced
that it would extend its support in the region until 2020
in order to solidify the progress that has been made in
Afghanistan to date.


**5**


In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia identifi es
the following strategic defense objective: contribute
military capabilities to coalition operations that support
Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line
with this objective, as of late June 2017, about 2,350 of
Australia’s approximately 57,800 force strength[31] are
deployed and are conducting operations overseas.
In Iraq, to support the airstrikes conducted by the
U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq, Australia began
air-dropping humanitarian supplies in August 2014 and
participating in combat missions such as airstrikes from


-----

**Section 6 Southeast Asia**


**General Situation**
**1**


Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffi c,
linking the Pacifi c and the Indian Oceans, such as the
Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an
important region for Japan which relies on maritime
transport for many of the supplies needed for economic
activities and the lives of the Japanese people. The


countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve
political stability and steady economic growth, and lately
have realized overall economic development to varying
degrees. Such economic development has deepened
interdependence within the region and with countries
outside the region. In late 2015, the establishment of the


Fig. I-2-6-1 Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2016


Fig. I-2-6-1


**ROK**

Ground forces
**1.15 million troops**
Combat aircraft Ground forces
approx. 2,720 aircraft **495,000 troops**

Combat aircraft
approx.
**620 aircraft**

Vessels National Defense Budget
**213,000 tons** approx. U.S.$ 34.8 bn

Vessels National Defense Budget (40.3337 trillion won)
**1.630tons million** approx. U.S.$ (1044.4 billion yuan)161.4 bn **China**

Ground Combat
forces aircraft
**140,000** approx.
troops **400 aircraft**

Vessels

National Defense Budget

**All of Southeast Asia** **479,000** approx. U.S.$ 44.5 bn

tons

(4.8996 trillion yen)

(134 vessels)

**1.655Ground forces million troops** **Japan**

Combat aircraft
approx.
**870 aircraft**

National Defense Budget

Vessels approx. U.S.$ 38.2 bn
**690,000 tons**

Notes: 1. Source: “The Military Balance 2017,” etc. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size. There are limits to the comparisons of national defense
budgets which have simply been converted into U.S. dollars when the different elements are taken into consideration, such as each country’s exchange rate fluctuations and
price levels. However, as the purchasing power parities of Southeast Asian countries are not published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
(except Indonesia), this figure intentionally represents the national defense budgets of Japan and other countries that have been converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange
rate published by the Ministry of Finance of Japan.
2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2016; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the
ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fixed-wing aircraft only).
The Japanese national defense expenditures are the initial budget excluding SACO-related expenses, the portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the
U.S. Forces realignment expenses, and expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft.
3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister’s Budget Report to the National People’s Congress in 2017.
4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from ROK Ministry of National Defense sources from 2017, etc.
5. The national defense budget for all of Southeast Asia represents the sum of the 2016 figures for each country according to “The Military Balance 2017.” However, the sum uses
2014 figures from “The Military Balance 2016” for Laos.
6. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated using the FY2017 Ministry of Finance exchange rates of 110 yen to 1 dollar,
17 yen to 1 yuan, and 95 yen to 1,000 won.
7. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2017 figures using the FY2017 Ministry of Finance exchange rate of 110 yen to 1 dollar.


-----

ASEAN Community was declared as an outcome of the
strides made in ASEAN cooperation towards its integration.
Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors,
including the territorial disputes over the South China
Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence
movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover,
there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe
passage of ships is obstructed. Furthermore, in recent
years, there is a concern about nationals embarking
to Iraq and Syria for the purpose of joining ISIL and
engaging in terrorism after returning to their countries.[1]

**Security and Defense Policies of Each Country**
**2**


**1** **Indonesia**


In order to cope with these issues, the countries in
Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for
national defense and maintenance of domestic public
security, as well as for addressing new security issues
such as terrorism and piracy. Recently, against the
backdrop of economic development, the countries have
been modernizing their military forces, particularly
their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their
maritime law enforcement capacities.

See Fig. I-2-6-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget

between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2017)

See


with its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the vicinity
of the Natuna Islands, and in recent years confrontation
between the two countries has emerged in the waters
surrounding the Natuna Islands, resulting in Indonesia
seizing a number of Chinese fi shing vessels in the area
and other incidents.[5]

Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other
Southeast Asian countries, and adopts an independent
and active foreign policy. With the United States, it is
strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fi elds
as military education and training and military equipment
procurement, and carries out joint training with the United
States. These include the “Cooperation Afl oat Readiness
and Training (CARAT)”[6] and the “Southeast Asia
Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)”[7] exercises.
In October 2015, President Joko visited the United
States. The two leaders discussed the strengthening of the
comprehensive partnership between the two countries,
and welcomed the signing of the Joint Statement for
Comprehensive Defense Cooperation between the
Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defense that
took place at the same timing.[8]

With China, the counter-terrorism training Sharp
Knife has been held among the special operation forces
of the two countries since 2011, and Sharp Knife


**1**


Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia
with the world’s largest Muslim population, vast land
and territorial waters, and strategic importance for
maritime traffi c. Although Indonesia does not confront
any immediate external military threats, it faces internal
concerns, including the activities of Islamic extremists,[2]
such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and secession and
independence movements in Papua Province.
Under the banner of the maritime nation concept,
President Joko Widodo who took offi ce in October 2014
strives to revive maritime culture, address territorial
disputes through maritime diplomacy, and strengthen
maritime defense capabilities.
As part of its military force reform, Indonesia
aims to meet the requirements for minimum defense
capabilities—what it calls “Minimum Essential Force
(MEF).” However, Indonesia has indicated that its
maritime defense capabilities, in particular, are still very
much inadequate.[3] Accordingly, Indonesia has announced
a defense budget increase as well as a policy to bolster its
deployment of assets to the Natuna Islands in the South
China Sea and other locations.[4] Indonesia is concerned
that the “nine-dash line” claimed by China overlaps


As of November 2015, approximately 700 Indonesian nationals reportedly embarked for Iraq and Syria to join ISIL. It has also been suggested that nationals embarked from Malaysia, Singapore, and
the Philippines.

For details, see Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-3 “Trends in the Spread of International Terrorism”

In October 2014, Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Moeldoko commented that the country had only yet reached 38% of the target to achieve MEF in the next four years. Chief of
Staff of the Indonesian Navy Marsetio has stated that the country’s maritime defense capabilities are very much inadequate, and that 12 submarines and 16 frigates are necessary.

It is believed that on December 15, 2015, Minister of Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu unveiled a plan to deploy a fi ghter squadron and small vessels to the Natuna Islands as well as increase the
number of troops stationed there from the current 800 to around 2,000, including the special operations force of the Air Force, for the purpose of “being prepared for a range of threats such as illegal
operations and illicit intrusion.” Furthermore, in June 2016, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut announced a concept to build a submarine base on the Natuna Islands.

In March 2016, a China Coast Guard vessel rammed a Chinese fi shing boat that an Indonesian government ship had seized and was towing, and recovered the fi shing boat. In response, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia protested to China’s ambassador to Indonesia. In June the same year, an Indonesian naval corvette fi red a warning shot at a Chinese fi shing boat operating illegally and
then seized the vessel, while a similar incident also occurred in May.

A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste.

A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

On October 26, 2015, the Joint Statement for Comprehensive Defense Cooperation was signed between then U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter and Minister of Defense Ryamizard during his visit to
the United States. The joint statement consists of fi ve pillars: maritime; peacekeeping; HA/DR; defense modernization; and countering transnational threats. In November 2015, when then President
Obama unveiled his policy of strengthening assistance for Southeast Asian countries, the President stated that the United States would expand cooperation on Indonesia’s coastal patrol and ISR


-----

“Defence Diplomacy” in its defense policy. On the other
hand, in connection with the recent continued anchoring
of Chinese government vessels around the South Luconia
Shoal over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia
has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement
agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring,
and that Malaysia would defend its sovereignty. Along
with strengthening its maritime defense force, in recent
years Malaysia has striven to bolster its defense posture
in eastern Malaysia, announcing in October 2013 that it
would construct a new naval base in Bintulu close to the
James Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal.[10]

Malaysia and the United States hold joint exercises
such as CARAT and SEACAT, and promote military
cooperation including capacity-building in the maritime
security fi eld.[11]

Despite competing claims over the sovereignty of the
South China Sea and other matters, Malaysia and China
have strong ties, especially their economic relationship,
and mutual visits by dignitaries take place frequently.
In November 2016, Prime Minister Najib visited China
and reached an agreement on economic cooperation
and the purchase of naval vessels. Also, in 2015 and
2016, Malaysia and China conducted the bilateral fi eld
training exercise Peace and Friendship. Furthermore, in
November 2015, when the Commander of the Chinese
Navy visited Malaysia, it is said that the two countries
agreed on making use of the Port of Kota Kinabalu for
port calls by Chinese Navy vessels.[12] In January 2017,
a Chinese submarine made a port call at Kota Kinabalu
naval base for the very fi rst time.


Airborne among the airborne units of the air forces of
the two countries since 2013. In March 2015, President
Joko visited China as a state guest, and affi rmed with
President Xi Jinping that they would deepen bilateral
relations under the framework of comprehensive
strategic partnership.
Indonesia is carrying out bilateral coordinated
patrols and maritime training exercises with India.
Moreover, in December 2016, President Joko visited
India and released a statement regarding maritime
cooperation between the two countries.

See Chapter 2, Section 5-3 (Relations with Other Countries);

Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((1) Indonesia)

**2** **Malaysia**


**2**


Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast
Asia, considers itself to have common strategic interests
with its neighboring countries. Although Malaysia
does not acknowledge any imminent external threats at
present, it believes that its forces should maintain a level
of readiness for dealing with all military threats, and
therefore, places importance on “Independence,” “Total
Defence,” “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power
Defence Arrangements (FPDA),”[9] “Cooperation to the
UN for World Peace,” “Measures against Terrorism,” and


9 Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat
of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The fi ve countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements.

10 In October 2014, Prime Minister Najib Razak announced that Malaysia would relocate Squadron Hawk (light attack aircraft) from the Malay Peninsula to the Labuan Air Base located in the northeastern
part of Kalimantan Island facing the South China Sea, and that Malaysia would upgrade the runway at the airport in Lahad Datu in the state of Sabah in the northeastern part of Borneo.

11 In November 2015, Minister of Defence Hishammuddin Hussein, joined by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter who was visiting Malaysia, boarded and toured a U.S. aircraft carrier in the
South China Sea. In the same month, when then President Obama unveiled his policy of strengthening assistance for Southeast Asian countries, the President stated that the United States
would provide assistance of US$2.5 million to Malaysia over two years until 2016. The President then announced that the United States would expand bilateral cooperation in such areas as port
security and joint exercises.

12 Admiral Wu Shengli, Commander of the Chinese Navy, visited Malaysia from November 9 to 11, 2015. When the Commander held talks with offi cials including Malaysia’s Deputy Minister of Defence
and Chief of Navy, the two sides agreed that they would deepen the relations between their military forces and promote practical cooperation in all directions. In addition, the two sides are said to


-----

Following the murder of Kim Jong-nam at Kuala
Lumpur International Airport in February 2017,
relations between the two countries have deteriorated,
as demonstrated by Malaysia’s measure to expel the
North Korean Ambassador from the country and
announcement of the suspension of visa exemptions for
North Korean nationals.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((9) Malaysia)

See


**3** **Myanmar**


executive order the following month.
With regard to the efforts for a ceasefi re agreement
with ethnic minorities, in October 2015, the Government
signed a national ceasefi re agreement with eight of the
armed ethnic minority groups, while in August 2016,
the inaugural 21st Century Panglong Union Peace
Conference was held for peace and reconciliation. Amid
ongoing fi ghting with some groups, the second Peace
Conference was held in May 2017, attended for the fi rst
time by three groups which are said to be clashing with
the armed forces. While this marked a level of progress,
the peace process still remains a top priority for the new
administration.
Additionally, including in the years preceding the
previous administration, nuclear issues and military
ties with North Korea have been raised as matters of
concern.[15] The confl icts between Rohingya Muslim
ethnic minorities and Buddhists since 2012 have caused
widespread concern among the international community.
In October 2016, an incident occurred where an armed
group attacked a police station and other locations in
Northern Rakhine State where a majority of Rohingya
live. Following this, the military attacked the area where
the Rohingya live citing the need to wipe out armed
forces. However, the international community has
expressed concern over this incident on the grounds that
there was a possible genocide and violation of human
rights. With regard to the Rohingya issue, Myanmar does
not recognize the Rohingya people as its citizens, and thus,
their legal status as stateless people is complicating this
issue. In terms of foreign policy, Myanmar continues to
uphold a policy of neutrality and non-alignment, while
for its national defense policy, continues to emphasize
the three national causes of Non-disintegration of the
Union, Non-disintegration of National Solidarity, and
Perpetuation of Sovereignty, as well as resolutely repelling
foreign invasions and interference in domestic matters.
With regard to foreign relations, China is thought
to be an especially important partner to Myanmar since
its period of military rule. With economic support
from China, a gas pipeline and a port, among other
infrastructure, are being built. On the military front, China
is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. In August
2016, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi visited China,


**3**


Myanmar shares borders with China and India, which
are steering the changing balance of power in the
international community, and is located on the border
of South Asia and Southeast Asia. In light of these
factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic signifi cance.
In Myanmar, the armed forces had control over the
government following the collapse of the socialist regime
in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused
by the economic sanctions imposed by the West against
the military government, coupled with isolation from
the international community, transition to civilian rule
based on the road map to democracy[13] was completed.
Later, in the fi rst general elections held in November
2015, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led
by President Aung San Suu Kyi secured a victory, and
in March 2016 the new Htin Kyaw administration was
inaugurated. Having relatives who are foreign nationals,
Aung San Suu Kyi is unable to become president under
the provisions of the constitution. Therefore, she was
appointed Foreign Minister and to the newly created post
of State Counsellor, and in these roles she is exercising
leadership in the administration.
Since the previous Thein Sein administration,
the Government of Myanmar has actively taken steps
towards democratization, including the release of
political prisoners and ceasefi re agreements with ethnic
minorities.[14] The international community has shown
some level of appreciation for these steps, with the West
including the United States successively easing economic
sanctions on Myanmar. In September 2016, during State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to the United States,
then President Obama announced the lifting of sanctions
on Myanmar and offi cially removed the sanctions with an


13 Consists of seven steps: reconvening of the National Assembly; stepwise implementation of processes necessary for democratization; drafting a new constitution; a national referendum on the
constitution; general election; convening of the House of Representatives; and the establishment of a new government.

14 About 30% of Myanmar’s population is ethnic minorities, some of which demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In the 1960s, the Government of Myanmar implemented oppressive
policies involving human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed confl icts with armed groups of ethnic minorities.

15 It is reported that at talks with then President Lee Myung-bak of the ROK in May 2012, President Thein Sein admitted that some weapons trading took place with North Korea in the past 20 years
and indicated that the country would not engage in such trade in the future. He denied cooperation with North Korea on nuclear development. Moreover, it has been reported that, at the 11th IISS
Shangri-La Dialogue (Asia Security Summit) held in June the same year, then Defence Minister Hla Min disclosed that while the previous government attempted to start academic research on nuclear


-----

where she announced the promotion of a comprehensive
strategic cooperative partnership. Furthermore, Myanmar
has maintained a cooperative relationship with Russia in
the military fi eld, including during the military regime, and
Russia has been a destination for students from Myanmar
and a supplier of major defense equipment. As for India,
since the transition to civilian rule, Myanmar has deepened
cooperative relations in the fi elds of the economy and
military, which has developed into defense cooperation
and exchanges such as the hosting of various seminars and
friendly visits to Myanmar by Indian naval vessels.
Also, in recent years, Myanmar has taken steps
to strengthen cooperative relationships with Western
countries and in particular European countries. In
November 2016, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing,
Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces,
visited Belgium and Italy, where he attended meetings
of the EU Military Committee and EU Political and
Security Committee. Then, in April 2017 he visited
Austria and Germany.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((7) Myanmar)

**4** **The Philippines**


announced, during his fi rst State of the Nation Address in
July the same year, a policy that emphasizes combating
crime, illegal drugs and corruption, sweeps against Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG), and peace in Mindanao.
As regards domestic security issues, over the
last approximately 40 years, armed confl icts have
repeatedly broken out between the Government of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) in particular. With the support of the activities
of the International Monitoring Team (IMT),[16] the peace
process has made progress, including the signing of the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and the
partial decommissioning of MILF forces and weapons.[17]
On the other hand, military clashes have occurred
between the government army and National Police, and
armed forces opposing the peace talks.[18] It is deemed that
time will be required to achieve practical peace.
ASG, an Islamic extremist group, claimed
responsibility for a terrorist bombing in September 2016
that killed and injured a number of people in Davao
City located in the southern part of Mindanao. ASG has
also orchestrated a number of kidnappings for ransom
in the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea. Given this situation,
in June 2017, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia
announced that they had launched the trilateral maritime
patrol in the region of the Sulu sea.
In May 2017, security forces clashed with the Maute
group, an Islamic extremist organization, in the city of
Marawi as part of a sweep to eliminate terrorism. The
ensuing battle resulted in fatalities and injuries, causing
public safety in the city to deteriorate. As a result, a state


**4**


The Philippines perceives that it confronts new security
challenges, including non-traditional threats, such as
transnational crime. At the same time, it identifi es that
long-standing issues, such as the territorial disputes over
the South China Sea and terrorism perpetrated by domestic
anti-government armed groups, constitute major security
concerns. President Duterte who took offi ce in June 2016


16 Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, and the EU are the member states of the IMT. (As of March 2015)

17 In October 2012, the Framework Agreement for the realization of a fi nal agreement on the Mindanao peace process was signed. In January 2014, the Government of the Philippines and MILF
signed the Annex on Normalization. The goal of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed in March 2014 was to launch an autonomous government in 2016 after formulating the
Bangsamoro Basic Law, holding a referendum in order to demarcate a jurisdictional domain, abolishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and establishing the Bangsamoro
Transition Authority (BTA).

18 In January 2015, in Mindanao, an exchange of fi re occurred between the Philippine National Police that were mobilized to arrest JI suspects, and the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters


-----

of martial law was declared in the Mindanao region.
The Philippines and the United States, with a
historically close relationship, have maintained a
cooperative relationship under their mutual defense
treaty and military assistance agreement, even after
the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992.[19] The two
countries are conducting joint exercises including the
large-scale military exercise Balikatan. Under the Duterte
administration, the Department of National Defense
announced in November 2016 that President Duterte
had approved the continuation of joint military exercises
between the Philippine and U.S. forces, even though
several bilateral exercises would be discontinued.
In March 2016, the two countries agreed on fi ve
locations for carrying out defense cooperation under the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)[20]
they signed in April 2014 for strengthening their
cooperation on such areas as the capacity enhancement of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and disaster relief.[21]
It is expected that concrete steps will be taken, including
the development of facilities in the Philippines for the
rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces in accordance
with the EDCA. In January 2017, it was reported that
President Duterte has approved a plan to build new
facilities. In this regard, attention will be paid to related
developments in the future.
The Philippines and China have competing claims
over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and the
Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. Seeking
a settlement under international law, in January 2013,
the Philippines launched arbitral tribunal proceedings
pursuant to UNCLOS against China. In July 2016, a
fi nal award was rendered accepting nearly all of the
Philippines’ submissions. The Government of the
Philippines released a statement that it welcomed the
award by the arbitral tribunal and strongly affi rms its
respect for the decision. Also, President Duterte stated in
his State of the Nation Address held in the same month
that the Philippines would strongly affi rm and uphold the
award handed down for the arbitration case between the


Philippines and China. However, when President Duterte
visited China in October 2016, a joint statement was
announced that included infrastructure investment, drug
enforcement cooperation, coastal security cooperation
and military cooperation but did not make reference to
the tribunal’s award in the case involving the Philippines
and China. Also, in May 2017, President Duterte toured
a PLA Navy vessel that made its fi rst port call at the port
in Davao, where the president grew up, and announced an
agreement concerning joint military exercises to be held
with China’s PLA. In this regard, attention will be paid to
developments in the future.

See Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other

Issues over the South China Sea)

See

Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((4) The Philippines)

**5** **Singapore**


**5**


Given its limited land area, population, and resources,
Singapore’s existence and development depend on the
peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy.
Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with
defense spending accounting for about one-fi fth of its
national budget.
Singapore identifi es deterrence and diplomacy as
twin pillars of its national defense policy. Because it is
a very small country, Singapore’s armed forces make use
of the training facilities of other countries, including the
United States and Australia, while continually dispatching
military personnel to take part in training exercises.
Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative
relations with ASEAN and the FPDA,[22] and has concluded
defense cooperation agreements with countries within
and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to
peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S.
presence in the Asia-Pacifi c and permits it to use military
facilities in Singapore. In 2013, U.S. littoral combat
ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments.[23]
In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S.
Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week
for the fi rst time. The two countries have committed to


19 In 1947, a military base agreement was concluded that allows the U.S. Forces to use Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station for 99 years. A military assistance agreement was also concluded in
1947, followed by the mutual defense treaty in 1951. With the revision of the 1966 military base agreement, the time limit for the stationing of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991.
Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station were returned in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Subsequently, the two countries concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, establishing the legal
status of U.S. Forces personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.

20 The EDCA is designed to enable the U.S. Forces to utilize and develop facilities in the Philippines, preposition equipment, among other activities. It was agreed that the bases in the Philippines to
be utilized by the U.S. Forces would be decided through consultations after the EDCA was concluded and would be stated in an annex to the agreement. After the signing in 2014, the consultations
regarding the annex had been suspended as litigation procedures were instituted in the Philippines on the grounds that the EDCA was unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court of the Philippines
handed down a ruling in January 2016 that the EDCA is indeed constitutional.

21 At the 2+2 talks held on January 12, 2016 (EST), the ministers welcomed the decision that the EDCA was constitutional, and reaffi rmed their commitment to continue strengthening their alliance in
terms of ensuring both countries’ mutual defense and security as well as jointly contributing to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity. On March 17-18, 2016 (EST), a strategic dialogue
among foreign and defense authorities was held in Washington, D.C. The two sides agreed on the following fi ve EDCA Agreed Locations: Antonio Bautista Air Base; Basa Air Base; Fort Magsaysay;
Lumbia Air Base; and Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base.

22 See Chapter 2, Section 6-2, Footnote 9.


-----

and security of the lives and property of the people
in southern Thailand as an urgent task. In addition,
undemarcated border issues exist between Thailand and
neighboring countries including Myanmar and Cambodia.
In August 2013, the submission of an amnesty bill[25]
by opposition parties to the House of Representatives
sparked large-scale anti-government demonstrations,
mainly in the capital city of Bangkok. The House was
dissolved in December 2013, and a declaration of a state
of emergency was issued in January 2014.
In May 2014, following the declaration of martial
law nationwide, forces led by the RTAF launched a coup
d’état and seized power over the nation. Subsequently,
then Commander-in-Chief Prayuth Chan-o-Cha of the
Royal Thai Army established the National Council for
Peace and Order that he chairs. In August 2014, he was
elected interim Prime Minister. Based on the roadmap
for transitioning to civilian rule, his government is
aiming to hold general elections and transition to a new
administration under a new constitution. As a result,
a national referendum on the draft new constitution
was approved in August 2016, but later new King
Vajiralongkorn who ascended to the throne immediately
after the death of the former King Bhumibol demanded
that the draft new constitution be revised. This is expected
to delay the general elections.
Under its fl exible omni-directional diplomatic
policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast
Asian countries and coordination with major countries,
including Japan, the United States, and China. Since the
conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950,
Thailand and its ally,[26] the United States, have maintained
a cooperative relationship. They have conducted the
lateral joint exercise Cobra Gold since 1982, as well as
the CARAT and SEACAT joint exercises.[27]

Thailand and China have also promoted military
exchanges, conducting joint exercises such as Blue Strike
among their marines and Falcon Strike[28] among their air
forces. In April 2012, the two countries agreed on the
joint development of multiple rocket launchers.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((5) Thailand)


continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely.[24]
In addition, Singapore conducted joint exercises with the
United States, such as CARAT and SEACAT.
With China, active mutual visits by their dignitaries
have taken place. In November 2015, President Xi
Jinping visited Singapore. In May 2015, the two countries
conducted their fi rst bilateral naval joint exercise ChinaSingapore Cooperation 2015. On the other hand, in
November 2016, an incident occurred where nine
armored vehicles of the Singaporean Army were seized
in Hong Kong while being transported back to Singapore
after a military exercise held in Taiwan. As an underlying
reason, some note that China sought to put pressure on
Singapore which continues to call for the rule of law over
the issue of the South China Sea.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((3) Singapore)

**6** **Thailand**


**6**


Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense
cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations,
and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive
use of political, economic, and other national strengths;
and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness
of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing
the defense industry. Attacks and bombing incidents by
Islamic extremists seeking secession and independence
have become a frequent occurrence in southern Thailand.
The Government identifi es the swift restoration of peace


24 In December 2015, Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen of Singapore visited the United States. The two sides signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and concurred that in accordance
with this Agreement, they would strengthen their defense cooperation in the fi ve areas of military, policy, strategy, technology, and the non-traditional security area of piracy and terrorism.

25 The bill gives amnesty to those who were arrested in the political upheaval since the military coup d’état in 2006. It is deemed that the bill would allow former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who
has been convicted but is living overseas, to return to Thailand.

26 Thailand and the United States have an alliance based on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of 1954 and the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962.

27 In May 2014, following the coup d’état in Thailand, the United States announced it would suspend joint exercises and freeze military assistance. However, the lateral joint exercise Cobra Gold was
held in February 2015, and the bilateral joint exercise CARAT was held in August 2015.

28 From November 12 to 30, 2015, the fi rst joint exercise between Chinese and Thai air forces, Falcon Strike-2015, was held at the Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. From China, six J-11B
fi ghters participated, and from Thailand, fi ve JAS-39 Gripen fi ghters participated. In addition, in the air show of the closing ceremony of the exercise, from China, seven J-10 fi ghters of the August i


-----

consultations and dialogues and engagement in maritime
security.[31] In July 2015, General Secretary Trong, making
his fi rst visit to the United States as CPV General
Secretary, held talks with then President Obama. In the
area of defense, the two sides confi rmed that they would
continue to cooperate on maritime security, carry out
defense equipment trade, and cooperate on the transfer
of defense science technologies.[32] In June 2016, during
his visit to Vietnam, then President Obama announced
that the United States would fully lift its arms embargo
on Vietnam.
Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen
cooperation in the area of national defense. In March 2013,
Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu visited Vietnam,
and the two sides agreed to jointly construct vessel
replenishment facilities along Cam Ranh Bay. In 2014,
Russian IL-78 aerial refueling tankers landed at Cam Ranh
International Airport for the fi rst time for the refueling
fl ights for Russia’s Tu-95MS strategic bombers.[33] As
these examples demonstrate, the two countries have been
carrying out new military cooperation. In recent years,
the two countries have also promoted cooperation in the
energy sector, such as nuclear power generation. Vietnam
is nearly dependent on Russia for its defense equipment.

See Chapter 2, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries)

Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive
strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively
conduct exchanges among their senior government
offi cials. However, the two countries have competing
claims concerning issues such as sovereignty over
the South China Sea. In November 2015, President Xi
Jinping visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed that
differences in opinion regarding maritime issues would
be dealt with appropriately. They also signed a joint
statement noting that the two countries would refrain from
actions that further complicate the issue. Furthermore,
in January 2017, General Secretary of the Communist
Party of Vietnam Trong visited China, where the bilateral
agreements of past summit meetings, including the basic


**7** **Vietnam**

**7**


Vietnam perceives that it confronts diverse and complex
security challenges. It considers that the issues in the
South China Sea have serious impacts on the maritime
activities of Vietnam, and non-traditional threats, such as
piracy and terrorism, are matters of concern.
During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union
provided the most signifi cant assistance to Vietnam. Until
2002, Russia had a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After
the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly
expanded its diplomatic relations with other countries,
including establishing diplomatic ties with the United
States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional
diplomatic policy and seeks to actively participate in
international and regional cooperation in order to build
friendly relations with all countries. In March 2016, an
international port opened in the key strategic position of
Cam Ranh Bay, and since then a number of navy vessels
from not only Japan but also the United States and China
have made calls to the new port.
In January 2016, the Congress of the Communist
Party of Vietnam (CPV) was held after fi ve years since the
previous Congress. The Congress decided that Nguyen
Phu Trong would remain CPV General Secretary, among
other decisions, and a new leadership was established.[29]
General Secretary Trong in his second term identifi ed
that his focal missions for the next fi ve years would
include the following: enhance party building; carry out
political reform; accelerate national modernization; and
maintain the country’s independence, sovereignty, unity,
and territorial integrity.
Vietnam and the United States have strengthened
their military relations in recent years.[30] This has taken
such forms as joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and port
calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In June 2015,
then Minister of National Defence Thanh and then U.S.
Secretary of Defense Carter, who was visiting Vietnam,
signed a joint statement spelling out promotion of


29 President Truong Tan Sang, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Minister of National Defence Phung Quang Thanh, among others were not reelected and retired from offi ce. In April 2016, President Tran
Dai Quang, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Minister of National Defense Ngo Xuan Lich, and others were appointed at the Vietnamese National Assembly.

30 In 1984, the United States invoked an arms embargo on Vietnam on the grounds of its human rights issue. In 2007, the arms embargo was lifted excluding lethal weapons. In October 2014, the
United States announced the lifting of its embargo on the sale of maritime security-related lethal weapons to Vietnam. In November 2015, when President Obama unveiled his policy of strengthening
assistance for Southeast Asian countries, the President stated that the United States would provide approximately US$40 million of assistance to Vietnam over two years until 2016. The President
then announced the bolstering of maritime ISR capabilities and the expansion of cooperation on bilateral exercises focusing on HA/DR.

31 On June 1, 2015, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter and Vietnamese Minister of National Defence Thanh signed a joint statement in Hanoi. They confi rmed that the two countries would, among
other things: (1) promote senior-level consultations and defense policy dialogues and mutually carry out UN PKO; (2) mutually carry out search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and disaster
relief; and (3) promote maritime security. The United States affi rmed that it stood ready to share its experience and information, conduct personnel training, and provide equipment that contribute to
maritime security and law enforcement.

32 In July 2015, CPV General Secretary Trong of Vietnam visited the United States for the fi rst time as General Secretary and held talks with then President Obama. At the joint press conference following
the meeting, the two sides announced that they would: strengthen their defense and security relations; promote economic, trade, and investment cooperation; and increase mutual visits by senior
offi cials and bilateral consultations. The two sides also announced the signing of the “United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement,” “Memorandum on UN PKO Cooperation,” and agreements
pertaining to trade promotion, infectious disease measures, and grant assistance related to civil aircraft.

33 In March 2015, it was reported that U.S. DoD authorities, while stating the relevant facts, requested Vietnam to prevent the recurrence of this activity. In addition, a senior offi cial of the U.S. Pacifi c
Command allegedly stated that the Russian military aircraft that received refueling from the aerial refueling tankers arriving from the Cam Ranh base conducted provocative fl ights. In January 2015, i


-----

principles concerning the South China Sea finalized in
2010, were reaffirmed and it was agreed that they would
advance cooperation aimed at joint development.
Vietnam and India have been deepening their
cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas,
including security and economy. In the area of defense
cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces
support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine
personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels
make friendly visits to Vietnam. Furthermore, when then
Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh visited
India in May 2015, the two sides signed the Joint Vision
Statement on Defence Cooperation for the period 20152020.[34] In September 2016, Prime Minister Modi became
the first Indian prime minister to visit Vietnam in 15 years.
During the visit an agreement was reached on raising
the status of the bilateral relationship to comprehensive
strategic partnership, while an announcement was made
concerning a loan of US$500 million for deepening
defense cooperation. Cooperation in the area of energy


between India and Vietnam is also deepening, with a joint
development program for oil and natural gas in the South
China Sea.

See Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other

Issues over the South China Sea)

See

Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((2) Vietnam)

**Military Modernization in the Region**
**3**


December 2011 to purchase three ROK-made 209-class
submarines. The two countries started joint development
of the KF-X fighter, and in October 2014, concluded a
basic agreement which sets forth the details of their cost
sharing and bilateral cooperation. In addition, Indonesia
is domestically building two frigates based on the
Dutch Sigma-class vessel. The first of these vessels was
delivered in January 2017.
In 2009, Malaysia introduced two Scorpène-class
submarines (jointly developed by France and Spain) as its
first submarines. In November 2014, Malaysia reportedly
concluded an agreement to purchase six corvettes from the
ROK. Malaysia announced a plan to build six indigenous
LCSs. It has been reported that the first of these vessels
will be received in 2019. In November 2016, Malaysia
concluded an agreement with China to purchase four
littoral mission ships (LMS). Furthermore, it has also
introduced 18 Russian-made Su-30 fighters by 2009.
The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to
modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of
conflicts over territorial rights in the South China Sea.
After the F-5 fighters were decommissioned in 2005,
the Philippines did not have any fighters for some length


In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased
their defense spending against the backdrop of economic
development and other reasons, and are modernizing their
military forces focusing on inducting equipment such
as submarines and fighters including fourth-generation
modern fighters. The underlying factors noted are
increases in defense spending, the relationship between
Southeast Asian countries in the sense that they react to
neighboring states’ development of military capabilities,
response to the expansion of China’s influence, and the
inadequate role of regional security organizations to
nurture relationships of trust.[35] Many Southeast Asian
countries procure much of their defense equipment from
a wide range of countries. As such, there are perceived
difficulties in achieving consistent operations and
maintenance in the respective countries.
Indonesia has introduced a total of 16 Russian
Su-27 fighters and Su-30 fighters by 2013. Moreover,
discussions are underway with Russia regarding the
purchase of Su-35 fighters. In 2011, an agreement
was reached regarding the U.S. provision of 24 F-16
fighters, three of which were delivered in July 2014.
With the ROK, Indonesia concluded an agreement in


34 The statement was agreed upon in May 2015, when Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh of Vietnam visited India and held talks with Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. While the content
of the Joint Vision Statement has not been disclosed, it is said to cover the period 2015-2020, with maritime security cooperation constituting the main pillar. On the same day, the two sides also
signed an MOU on strengthening the cooperation between their coast guards.


-----

of time. However, by May 2017, the Philippines has
introduced 10 of the 12 FA-50 light fighters for which a
purchase agreement had been concluded with the ROK,
and it plans on introducing the remaining two before
the end of the year. As for naval forces, the Philippines
received three Hamilton-class frigates from the United
States in 2011, 2012, and 2016, and in June 2014, it was
reported that the ROK would provide decommissioned
Pohangclass corvettes. Additionally, in October 2016,
an agreement was reached with the ROK to build two
frigates and in June 2016 it placed into service the first
dock landing ship procured from Indonesia. By January
2015, seven Italian AW109 multi-purpose helicopters
tailored to wide-ranging naval missions, such as maritime
patrol, have been delivered. Additionally, the Philippines
has announced plans to procure equipment, such as attack
helicopter, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, transport
vessel, and amphibious vehicle.
Singapore is actively striving to modernize its
forces. By 2012, Singapore introduced two Archerclass (Västergötland-class) submarines from Sweden.
In December 2013, Singapore concluded an agreement
to purchase two German 218SG-class submarines, and
announced a plan to build eight indigenous patrol vessels.
With regard to fighters, Singapore inducted U.S.-made
F-15 fighters and participates in the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) Program.


Thailand has an aircraft carrier but does not own
submarines. In July 2014, Thailand established the
Submarine Squadron Headquarters, and has started the
evaluation work to procure submarines. In July 2015,
it was reported that the Royal Thai Navy decided on a
plan to purchase Chinese-made submarines. While it was
deemed that subsequently Minister of Defence Prawit
Wongsuwon instructed the reconsideration of the plan, in
April 2017 Thailand’s cabinet approved a plan to purchase
three Yuan-class submarines from China over the next
11 years.[36] With regard to frigates, in September 2012,
the Cabinet approved a plan to introduce two frigates,
and concluded an agreement to purchase an ROK-made
frigate for the first frigate. In addition, by 2013, Thailand
has introduced 12 Swedish-made JAS-39 Gripen fighters.
In December 2009, Vietnam concluded a contract to
purchase six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines and
introduced all of them by January 2017. In 2013, it was
reported that Vietnam concluded a contract to purchase
two Dutch-made Sigma-class corvettes. Plans call for an
additional four Gepard-class frigates to be procured from
Russia to add to the two currently in service. Furthermore,
Vietnam reportedly concluded a contract to purchase 24
Russian-made Su-30 fighters from 2009 to 2011, and
concluded a contract to additionally purchase 12 of the
same fighter by 2013.



**Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea**
**4**


In the South China Sea, ASEAN countries and China
have competing claims to such areas as the Spratly
Islands[37] and the Paracel Islands.[38] Under these
circumstances, China’s unilateral, large-scale, and
rapid land reclamation and building of facilities have
heightened tension in the region, increasing international
concern over freedom of navigation in the seas and other
dimensions. Against this backdrop, the international
community’s deep concern over the unilateral changes
in the status quo and their creation of a fait accompli is
quickly becoming ever more widespread.
In recent years, the relevant countries and others
are increasing their activities in the South China Sea in
support of their territorial claims.
China enacted the Act on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China in


1992, which stated that the Spratly Islands and the Paracel
Islands are the territories of China. In addition, China
attached a map of the “nine-dash line” to a verbal note
addressed to the UN in 2009, in which it made claims to the
parts of the South China Sea that purportedly came under
China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction.
The “nine-dash line” has given rise to competing claims
with Southeast Asian countries over the sovereignty and
other aspects of the South China Sea. To date, China
has not offered any concrete explanations regarding the
relationship between the “nine-dash line” and relevant
international norms. In June 2012, China announced the
establishment of Sansha City in Hainan Province, which
claims to have jurisdiction over the islands of the Spratly
Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and
their surrounding waters. In November 2013, Hainan


36 The plan to purchase Chinese-made submarines for the Royal Thai Navy approved by Thailand’s cabinet on April 18, 2017 first calls for purchasing one vessel in installments appropriated over the
budgets from 2017 to 2023, and then procuring a total of three vessels over the next 11-year period. On May 5, a contract was concluded on the purchase of one of these three submarines.

37 The area surrounding the Spratly Islands is expected to have offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. The area is also a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fishery resources.


-----

Province amended its regulation on the implementation
of China’s fi shing law, stipulating that foreign fi shing
vessels that wish to carry out fi shing activities in waters
under the jurisdiction of Hainan Province must obtain
permission from the relevant departments under China’s
State Council. In January 2016, China set out a maritime
policy for the next fi ve years beginning from 2016,
which stated that China would build a “Spratly Islands
ecosystem protection zone.”
In March 2009, the Philippines passed the so-called
Archipelagic Baselines Law, stating that the Philippines
has sovereignty over part of the Spratly Islands and the
Scarborough Shoal pursuant to UNCLOS.[39] In May
2009, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly requested to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS)[40] an extension of the continental shelf of the
sea area that includes part of the Spratly Islands. In June


2012, Vietnam adopted the Maritime Law (effective
January 2013) that asserts its sovereignty over the Spratly
and Paracel Islands.
Some of the countries concerned in the South China
Sea have reportedly resorted to the use of force on the
opposing country’s vessels, including seizing vessels and
fi ring warning shots, and the concerned countries have
mutually lodged protests against these actions. In May
2014, China’s unilateral commencement of oil drilling in
waters near the Paracel Islands triggered confrontations
between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels, and many
vessels reportedly sustained damages due to collisions.
In July 2015, a Vietnamese fi shing vessel was rammed
by a Chinese vessel and sunk near the Paracel Islands.
Similar incidents are believed to have taken place in
September 2015 and January, March, and July 2016. In
November 2015, a Chinese vessel allegedly appeared


August 2014 June 2017


Example of unilateral, large-scale and rapid construction of facilities by China, on Fiery Cross Reef [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/Digital Globe]

39 According to the Republic Act No. 9522. This law gives the location of the baselines of the archipelago in terms of latitude and longitude, including of Luzon Island, Palawan Island, and Mindanao
Island. However, for the Spratly Islands (Filipino name: Calayan Islands) and the Scarborough Shoal (Filipino name: Bajo de Masinloc), the law states that the baseline is based on the “Regime of
Islands” under Article 121 of UNCLOS and does not give the geographical location of the baseline.

40 The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is a body established under UNCLOS (Article 76 and Article 1 of Annex II). Coastal states (signatories) submit information concerning the
continental shelf to CLCS when establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and then CLCS issues a recommendation based on scientifi c and technical guidelines.
The limits of the continental shelf based on the CLCS recommendation is fi nal and binding for coastal states. CLCS consists of 21 members serving a term of fi ve years. Members must be experts in i


-----

several kilometers off the coast of Thitu Island of the Vietnam is believed to have carried out land
Spratly Islands occupied by the Philippines and anchored reclamation covering 486,000 square meters over the
there for approximately ten days.[41] In January 2016, a most recent two-year period at a total of 10 marine
Vietnamese fishing vessel operating near the Spratly features, including Spratly Island in the Spratly Islands
Islands reportedly collided with a Taiwanese coast guard and West London Reef. It has also been noted that
vessel. Additionally, in May the same year, a high speed Vietnam has lengthened the runway on Spratly Island
Chinese vessel reportedly followed a Vietnamese fishing from 760 to more than 1000 m.[43] Additionally, in August
boat and intimidated it with its guns near Cuarteron 2016, it was reported that Vietnam newly deployed rocket
Reef in the Spratly Islands. In January the same year, a launchers to five sites in the Spratly Islands over a several
dispute occurred over oil resource development in which month period, but the Government of Vietnam has denied
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, alleging that such reports. In 2011, the Philippines unveiled a plan
China’s oil drilling rig “Haiyang Shiyou 981” conducted to repair the harbor and runway on Thitu Island of the
activities in an area north of the Paracel Islands where Spratly Islands.
Vietnam and China have overlapping claims to the Under these circumstances, some countries involved
continental shelf, requested China to suspend its to date are also making efforts to settle the issues in
operations and withdraw the rig.[42] A similar event is said accordance with international law. In January 2013,
to have occurred again in April the same year. Also, in the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant
March 2016, in an incident involving Malaysia and China, to UNCLOS for the dispute over China’s assertions
it is said that China Coast Guard vessels and around 100 and actions in the South China Sea. In July 2015, the
Chinese fishing boats together made an incursion into the Philippines presented oral arguments in The Hague in
area around the Luconia Shoals within Malaysia’s EEZ. the Netherlands to determine whether or not the arbitral
In April 2017, Secretary of National Defense Lorenzana tribunal had jurisdiction over the submissions made by
indicated his intention to protest to China through the Philippines. In October 2015, the arbitral tribunal
diplomatic channels concerning an incident that occurred ruled that it had jurisdiction with respect to some of the
in March 2017 in waters near the Spratly Islands when matters. In response, China issued a statement saying that
China Coast Guard vessels fired warning shots across this decision was “invalid and has no binding force,” and
the bows of Filipino fishing vessels. Furthermore, the reiterated its position that it would not participate in the
Secretary landed on Thitu Island, effectively controlled proceedings. In July 2016, the arbitral tribunal rendered
by the Philippines, in a military aircraft where he stated a final ruling in which it ruled in favor of nearly all of the
his intention to push forward with repairs of the runway. Philippines’ submissions.[44] In response, China once again
Furthermore, some of the countries concerned issued a statement noting that the ruling was invalid and
in the South China Sea conduct land reclamations and had no binding force and that China opposed and refused
build facilities on the features they respectively occupy, to accept it. Pursuant to UNCLOS provisions, the award
including the Spratly Islands. Since 2014, China of the arbitral tribunal is final and is legally binding on
has pushed forward with rapid and large-scale land the parties to the dispute, and therefore, it is necessary
reclamation activities and continued to install military that the parties adhere to the award.
facilities such as batteries, as well as develop various Also, in 2002, ASEAN and China signed the
types of infrastructure that can be used for military Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
purposes, including runways, hangars, harbors and radar. Sea (DOC)[45] aimed at peacefully resolving the issues over

See Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5 (Maritime Activities) the South China Sea. Official talks are now ongoing for

41 Thitu Island (Filipino name: Pag-asa Island) is a feature located near Subi Reef where China is building a runway. The mayor with jurisdiction over the island spotted the China Coast Guard vessel. This
was reportedly the first time that a vessel anchored for as long as ten days.

42 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, on January 16, 2016, China’s oil rig “Haiyang Shiyou 981” was found 21.4 nautical miles east of the assumed median line where the
Vietnamese and Chinese continental shelves overlap. It is believed that representations were lodged to China on January 18.

43 According to an article of the CSIS and AMTI. It is reportedly known that approximately 151,000 square meters were reclaimed in the Spratly Islands (Vietnamese name: Quần đảo Trường Sa) from
May 2014 to November 2016 and 285,000 square meters were reclaimed on West London Reef (Vietnamese name: Da Tay) during the four-year period from March 2013 to April 2016.

44 With regard to the “nine-dash line” and China’s claim to historic rights, the arbitral tribunal found that China’s claims to historic rights with respect to the maritime areas encompassed by the “ninedash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the limits of China’s maritime entitlements under UNCLOS. With regard to the legal status of features, the
arbitral tribunal found that all of the features in Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands (including Itu Aba Island [Taiwanese name: Taiping Dao]) have no EEZ or continental shelf. With regard to the
legality of Chinese activities, the tribunal found that China has unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal, violated its obligations to protect the
marine environment through its largescale land reclamations, artificial island-building, and other activities, violated its obligations pertaining to navigation safety by virtue of the dangerous navigation
by its law enforcement vessels, breached the Philippines’ sovereign rights through its land reclamations at Mischief Reef, and violated its obligations by aggravating and extending the disputes through
its dredging, artificial island-building, and other activities following the commencement of arbitral proceedings.

45 The DOC includes commitments to resolve territorial and other disputes by peaceful means, and to reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct would further promote peace and stability in the


-----

establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (COC), which goes into further detail than the
DOC and is deemed to have legal binding force. China and
ASEAN announced that they have completed negotiation
of the draft COC framework in May 2017. However,
China’s Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, who took part
in the talks, said “The framework contains only the relevant
elements and is not yet the detailed rules,” and with regard
to the legal binding force of the framework, he stated, “It
is an important issue that should be discussed in the next
step of the consultation process, and it is difficult to respond
based on predictions at the current time.” The progress of
these talks will be the focus of attention.
The issues surrounding the South China Sea have
been discussed repeatedly at ASEAN-related meetings
and other fora, with a view to achieving their peaceful
resolution. However, as exemplified by the unprecedented
situation in the past that led to the failure to adopt an
ASEAN joint statement, there have been instances in
which consensus was not reached among the member
states. Nevertheless, at the ASEAN Summit in 2015,
members shared concerns regarding the possibility of
further militarization in the South China Sea. At the
East Asia Summit held in the same month that was also

**Regional Cooperation**
**5**


The ASEAN Community established on December 31,
2015 is comprised of three pillars, namely, cooperation
by the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN
Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community. The first of these, the ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Community (APSC), adopts the principle of
building on what has been constructed over the years in
the field of political and security cooperation through
ASEAN’s initiatives, and of aiming to ensure a peaceful
life in a democratic and harmonious environment. The
APSC Blueprint 2025 identifies the four characteristics
of (1) aiming to become a rules-based, people-oriented,
people-centered community; (2) aiming to become
a peaceful, secure, and stable region; (3) aiming for
dynamic and outward-looking ASEAN centrality; and
(4) aiming for strengthened ASEAN institutional capacity
and presence.
ASEAN member states also utilize ASEAN as the


attended by non-ASEAN countries, members took note
of the serious concerns regarding developments related
to the situation in the South China Sea. The Chairman’s
Statement included reference to the fact that the members
welcomed assurances given by President Xi Jinping of
China during his visit to the United States in September
2015 that China “does not intend to pursue militarization
in the South China Sea.”[46] Meanwhile, at the Special
ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in June
2016, a joint statement expressing serious concern over
the situation in the South China Sea was released but was
withdrawn immediately and the joint press conference
was likewise canceled. This was suggested as indicating
dissention within ASEAN and more intense confrontation
between ASEAN and China.
The issues surrounding the South China Sea are a
matter of concern for the whole international community,
and are directly related to the peace and stability of the
Asia-Pacific region. As such, attention will continue to be
paid to trends in the countries concerned, as well as the
direction of dialogues aimed at the resolution of the issues.

See Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the

Freedom of the High Seas” in the East and South China Seas);
Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4 (Promotion of Defense Cooperation
and Exchanges)

multilateral security framework of the region that it has
been over the years. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as
the ARF and ADMM, which provide opportunities for
dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has
made efforts to improve the security environment in the
region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding
the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition,
ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations
with countries outside of the region. It holds the ASEAN
Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), a
platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including
Japan to ADMM,[47] and holds HA/DR exercises.[48] Moving
forward, ASEAN member states are expected to further
develop such initiatives as dialogues, HA/DR exercises,
and expansion of relations with non-ASEAN countries,
in accordance with the principle and concepts of APSC.


46 Meanwhile, China asserts that the installation of military facilities for defense purposes does not constitute “militarization.”
47 In addition to the framework of the ADMM Plus, defense ministers’ meetings are held between the United States and ASEAN, China and ASEAN, Russia and ASEAN, and Japan and ASEAN. In April
2014, a U.S.-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting was held in the United States for the first time.

48 In May 2015, the fourth ARF Disaster Relief Exercise was held in Malaysia. The exercise was participated by more than 2,000 personnel from ARF member countries, including co-organizers Malaysia


-----

**Section 7 South Asia**


**India**
**1**

**1** **General Situation**

With a population of more than 1.2 billion on its vast
land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It
has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and
has signifi cant infl uence in the South Asian region. Also,
it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of
strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines
of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacifi c region
with the Middle East and Europe.
India shares borders with many countries, and has
non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan.
India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and
languages,[1] and there are concerns about the activities of
ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements,
as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed
across the India-Pakistan border.
On the diplomatic front, the Modi administration
that was inaugurated in May 2014 has maintained
the neighborhood fi rst policy, which emphasizes
strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while
expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external
relations to the Asia-Pacifi c region, in accordance with
the “Act East” policy.[2] In addition, the administration has
carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also
on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, Europe,
among other areas. In the defense domain, maintaining
preparedness at its land borders and addressing the threat
of terrorism remain major concerns. At the same time,
the administration has also recently attached importance
to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian
Ocean. Furthermore, the administration has made efforts
aimed at modernizing its military by expanding foreign
companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry
under the “Make in India” initiative and promoting the


domestic production of equipment through enhancing
technological cooperation with other countries. Moreover,
the administration has deepened collaboration with other
countries to strengthen maritime security cooperation. In
February 2016, India held an international fl eet review
for the fi rst time in 15 years, inviting 24 foreign military
vessels from 21 countries.[3]

**2** **Military Affairs**


**2**


India’s security environment is directly linked to its
neighboring countries and the regions of West Asia,
Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Indian
Ocean; and India recognizes that strategic-economic
factors impose upon them an increasingly larger
responsibility. In view of the multifaceted security
concerns and the global dimensions of the challenges,
India has strengthened cooperative relations with other
countries and has long been actively participating in
UN PKOs. In order to respond rapidly and effectively to
diversifi ed security issues, the Government and defense
forces remain fully prepared to tackle all challenges.
Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India
adheres to the following policies: minimum nuclear
deterrence, the no-fi rst-use nuclear policy, no use against
non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the
unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests that it announced
immediately after the nuclear test in 1998.[4] India
promotes the development and deployment of various
ballistic missiles. India conducted launch tests of “Agni
5” in December 2016 and “Agni 4” in January 2017 and
reportedly started developing “Agni 6,” which is alleged
to have a range of up to 10,000 km. It is deemed that the
country aspires to extend the ranges of ballistic missiles


The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country’s population is Hindu.

It is regarded that based on the progress of the “Look East” policy intended to strengthen India’s relations with ASEAN, the “Act East” policy which advocates a more practical approach has been
adopted since the inauguration of the Modi administration.

On February 6, 2016, the Indian Navy held an international fl eet review off the coast of Visakhapatnam in eastern India participated by 70 Indian vessels as well as 24 vessels from 21 countries
including the United States, China, Brazil, Malaysia, Vietnam, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The destroyer Matsuyuki participated from the MSDF. President Pranab Mukherjee of India, who reviewed
the international fl eet, stated that the international fl eet review signifi ed “our common desire to use the seas to promote peace, cooperation and friendship, as also to develop partnerships for a secure
maritime future.”

The Bharatiya Janata Party led by Prime Minister Modi referred to revising the nuclear doctrine in its 2014 election manifesto. However, following criticism from inside and outside the country, Prime


-----

and make other performance improvements. In regard to
cruise missiles, India jointly develops “BrahMos” with
Russia and deploys them. India is also developing a
ballistic missile defense system.[5]

In recent years, India has been injecting efforts
into modernizing its naval and air forces in particular.
As a part of these efforts, it is expanding procurement
of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint
development with them, and has emerged as the world’s
largest arms importer.[6]

With respect to its naval capabilities, India
decommissioned one aging British-built aircraft carrier INS
Viraat in March 2017. India introduced the Russian-built
conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya
in November 2013, and is also building one indigenous
conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.[7]
With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russianbuilt Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine
INS Chakra in April 2012 under a lease arrangement. It
reportedly placed into service its fi rst indigenous ballistic
missile and nuclear submarine INS Arihant in August
2016. Furthermore, in 2009, India concluded an agreement
with the United States to purchase eight P-8 patrol aircraft.
India has so far deployed all eight aircraft to a base in
southern India facing the Bay of Bengal, and in July 2016
it concluded a purchase agreement for an additional four
P-8 patrol aircraft.
With respect to its air force capabilities, India is
refurbishing its existing fi ghter aircraft. Moreover, it signed
an agreement to purchase 36 Rafale aircraft from France in
September 2016 as part of India’s plan to induct medium
multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA).[8] With Russia,
India has concluded an agreement in December 2012 to
purchase 42 additional Su-30 fi ghters. India has also been
deepening military technological cooperation with Russia,


Military Forces of India and Pakistan
Fig. I-2-7-1
(approximate)

Approx. 560,000 troops
Approx. 59 vessels
Approx. 94,000 tons
Approx. 470 aircraft

Pakistan

Approx. 1.20 million troops
Approx. 286 vessels
Approx. 490,000 tons
Approx. 920 aircraft

India

[Legend]

Ground forces (200,000 troops)

The United States Geological Survey:

Naval vessels (100,000 tons) GTOPO30; and the United States National

Combat aircraft (200 aircraft) Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:

ETOPO1

Notes: 1. Figures based on “The Military Balance 2017,” etc.
2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft.


including the joint development of the Fifth Generation
Fighter Aircraft based on the PAK FA being developed
by Russia. With the United States, India has concluded an
agreement in 2010 to purchase ten C-17 transport aircraft
and has inducted all of these aircraft by 2014.
In addition to aircraft carriers and nuclear
submarines, India undertakes the development and
indigenous production of tanks and light combat aircraft.
However, delays in their development present challenges
for India’s domestic production of equipment.

See Fig. I-2-7-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate))

**3** **Relations with Other Countries**


**3**


**(1) Relations with Pakistan**
India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty
of Kashmir,[9] and have had three armed confl icts of
signifi cant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir


Regarding missiles that India possesses, the following have been indicated:
“Prithvi 2”: a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 250-350 km
“Agni 1”: a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 700-1,250 km
“Agni 2”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,000-3,500 km
“Agni 3”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 3,000-5,000 km
“Agni 4”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 4,000 km
“Agni 5”: a mobile, three-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 5,000-8,000 km
“Agni 6”: a three-stage solid/liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 8,000-10,000 km
“BrahMos”: a solid/Ramjet supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 300-500 km
Ballistic missile defense system: India is developing a two-stage intercept system consisting of a missile for high altitude interception (PAD) up to 80 km in altitude and a missile for low altitude
interception (AAD) up to 30 km in altitude

According to SIPRI.

The indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant is 262.5 m long, has a standard displacement of 40,642 t, and is scheduled to be commissioned in 2018.

Since 2007, India has been implementing a project to induct 126 MMRCA. In 2012, India announced that it selected the French Rafale aircraft. In April 2015, during his visit to France, Prime Minister
Modi expressed India’s intention to swiftly purchase 36 Rafale aircraft. It is believed that a purchase agreement was signed in September 2016 and discussions are still ongoing regarding the model
of the remaining 90 aircraft.

India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends
that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military
forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 UN i


-----

has long been in contention between India and Pakistan,
with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending.[10]

More recently, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of
Pakistan was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s swearingin ceremony in May 2014. In December 2015, on
his return from visiting Afghanistan, Prime Minister
Modi made a surprise informal visit to Pakistan. In this
regard, both countries have demonstrated readiness to
improve their relations. Meanwhile, it remains uncertain
whether bilateral dialogues would be sustained, with the
postponement of their vice foreign ministerial meeting
in both August 2014 and January 2016.[11] Armed clashes
between the two militaries have repeatedly taken place
in the Kashmir region. The large-scale armed clashes
in October 2014 reportedly killed and injured civilians.
Furthermore, in January 2016, armed forces intruded
into an Indian Air Force base adjacent to the Kashmir
area, killing and wounding security personnel and
others. In September 2016, armed insurgents attacked
an Indian military base on the Indian side of Kashmir,
reportedly killing and injuring a number of troops. In
the same month, the Indian Army announced that India’s
military crossed the Kashmir Line of Control to carry
out a localized attack on a terrorist camp located on the
Pakistani side. In this manner, the Kashmir issue remains
a concern for both countries.

**(2) Relations with the United States**
India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations
with the United States. The United States is also promoting
engagement with India in line with the expansion of
the relationship derived from the economic growth of
India. The two countries conduct joint exercises, such
as Malabar,[12] on a regular basis. In addition, in recent
years, the United States has become one of India’s major
equipment procurement destinations.[13]

In January 2015, then President Obama visited India


to attend its Republic Day celebrations as Chief Guest.
The leaders agreed that they would expand technology
cooperation to include co-development and co-production
of equipment. Furthermore, the leaders affirmed that
they would deepen cooperation in the field of maritime
security, and agreed that cooperation between their navies
would be expanded, including upgrading their bilateral
naval exercise Malabar that is conducted between the two
countries. In December 2015, then Minister of Defence
Manohar Parrikar of India visited the United States. The
two sides held talks on strengthening various defense
cooperation, and confirmed the progress made in the
technology cooperation consultations related to aircraft
carriers and jet engines conducted by their joint working
group. In such ways, their cooperation in the field of
security has expanded. In addition, when Prime Minister
Modi visited the United States in June 2016, the United
States recognized that India is a “Major Defense
Partner.” In August 2016, in a joint statement of the U.S.
and Indian defense ministers, the United States agreed
to elevate defense trade and technology sharing with
India to a level commensurate with its closest allies and
partners. Also, a memorandum was signed concerning
logistics support cooperation.
In June 2017, Prime Minister Modi visited the United
States. At his first summit meeting with President Trump,
the two sides agreed to continue to strengthen their strategic
partnership. In the area of security, they underscored the
importance of Malabar, and furthermore, the United States
proposed the sale of unmanned aerial systems.

**(3) Relations with China**

See Chapter 2, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian Countries)


**(4) Relations with Russia**

See Chapter 2, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries)


10 Dialogue between the two countries was suspended due to the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, but it resumed following the February 2011 talks by their Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 2011, both
countries affirmed the importance of peacefully settling all outstanding issues between the two countries through dialogue. Pakistan then decided to grant India most-favored nation status.

11 In December 2014, Minister of State for External Affairs Vijay Kumar Singh attributed the postponement of the meeting in August that year to the meeting between Pakistan’s High Commissioner and
Kashmiri leaders of organizations which seek Kashmir’s secession from India. The meeting was ultimately held in March 2015. It is suggested that the meeting in January 2016 was postponed due
to the attack on the Indian Air Force base that occurred in the same month.

12 The Malabar was initially a bilateral naval exercise between the United States and India. Then, Japan, Australia, and Singapore joined Malabar 07-2, and Japan participated in Malabar 09, Malabar
14, Malabar 15, and Malabar 16.


-----

**Pakistan**
**2**


**1** **General Situation**

**1**


Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of
India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing
borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a
geopolitically signifi cant and complex position. In
particular, Islamic extremists conduct activities across
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Pakistan’s attitude
towards the war against terrorism draws much attention
from the international community.
While supporting the United States’ war against
terrorism in Afghanistan, the Government of Pakistan
has been struggling as its domestic security situation has
worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment
and retaliatory terrorism by Islamic extremists. Prime
Minister Sharif who took offi ce in June 2013 conducted
peace consultations holding up a policy of dialogue with
armed forces. However, these forces committed a series
of terrorist attacks, and in June 2014, the Pakistan Armed
Forces launched a military operation against these forces.
Following a school attack in Peshawar in the same
year, upon revising the Constitution, Pakistan developed
the National Action Plan that includes establishing a
special military tribunal to try terrorist suspects, and
announced that the Armed Forces would continue with
and step up its mop-up operation. Subsequently, while it
appears that terrorist attacks have decreased considerably,
other attacks have been never ceasing. In January 2016,
an attack targeting a university in Charsadda in northeast
Peshawar occurred, killing and injuring many students
and others,[14] and terrorist attacks have continued to occur
sporadically since then.


**2** **Military Affairs**

**2**


Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear
deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is
essential to ensure national security and self-defense.
In the past, the so-called Khan network was involved
in the proliferation of nuclear-related materials and
technologies.[15]

Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the
development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted
a number of test launches in recent years. In 2015,
Pakistan conducted two test launches of the ballistic
missile “Shaheen 3” in March and December, and a test
launch from an aircraft of the cruise missile “Raad” in
January 2016. Pakistan also conducted a test launch of
the cruise missile “Babur” from a submarine and a test
launch of the new ballistic missile “Ababeel” in January
2017. It is deemed that Pakistan has steadily increased the
military capabilities of its ballistic and cruise missiles.[16]

Pakistan is the world’s seventh largest importer of
weapons, importing most of its weapons from China
and the United States.[17] Pakistan concluded a contract to
purchase four Sword-class frigates from China, which
have already been delivered. Pakistan jointly develops
the JF-17 fi ghter aircraft with China and has inducted
69 aircraft through indigenous production. Pakistan is
also considered to have recently conducted negotiations
with China to newly purchase four frigates and eight
submarines. Pakistan has inducted 18 F-16C/D fi ghter
jets by 2011 from the United States.


14 On January 20, 2016, an armed group attacked Bacha Khan University using guns and bombs, killing 21 people including students and injuring dozens. A faction of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
claimed responsibility. In the attack against a military-run school in Peshawar in December 2014 believed to be perpetrated by TTP, a total of 148 people reportedly died, including students.

15 Pakistan is believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s and conducted its fi rst nuclear test near the Changai District of the Balochistan Province in 1998. In 2004, it came to
light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. Khan and other scientists, who had led the nuclear
program in Pakistan.

16 Regarding missiles that Pakistan possesses, the following have been indicated:
“Nasr” (Hatf 9): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 60 km
“Ghaznavi” (Hatf 3): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 290 km
“Shaheen 1” (Hatf 4): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 750 km
“Ghauri” (Hatf 5): a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 1,300-1,800 km
“Shaheen 3” (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km
“Ababeel”: a new ballistic missile with a range of about 2,200 km
“Raad” (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km
“Babur” (Hatf 7): a supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 750 km


-----

This dialogue was held again in January 2015. During
his visit to Pakistan, then Secretary Kerry welcomed
the mop-up operation conducted by Pakistan’s Armed
Forces against insurgents, and announced the provision
of about US$250 million to assist temporary displaced
persons (TDPs). In October 2015, Prime Minister
Sharif of Pakistan visited the United States. During
his meeting with then President Obama, the two sides
confi rmed that the efforts of the two countries and the
U.S. military assistance were contributing to improving
Pakistan’s counter-terrorism capabilities.
Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to
immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists
in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan Government has
protested repeatedly.[18]

The United States, on the other hand, condemns
Pakistan for providing safe zones to Islamic extremists
in Afghanistan, which poses threats to the United States.
Attention will be paid to developments related to the
relationship between the two countries, including their
stance on the war on terror.

**(3) Relations with China**

See Chapter 2, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian Countries)


**3** **Relations with Other Countries**

**3**


**(1) Relations with India**

See Chapter 2, Section 7-1-3 ((1) Relations with Pakistan)


See


**(2) Relations with the United States**
Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by
launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists
in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Recognizing the
efforts of Pakistan, the United States designated it as a
“major non-NATO ally” in 2004.
The two countries conducted strategic dialogues
from 2010, and the United States provided Pakistan with
military support. However, these were suspended after
U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated as a consequence of
the then Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation conducted
by the U.S. Forces in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011.
In October 2013, dialogue was resumed after summit
meetings were held between then President Obama and
Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. In January 2014, a
strategic dialogue was held between then U.S. Secretary
of State John Kerry and Advisor to the Prime Minister
of Pakistan Sartaj Aziz for the fi rst time in three years.


18 In November 2011, NATO forces conducted airstrikes on border posts in Pakistan, causing casualties to Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan strongly condemned this action and retaliated by closing the ground
supply route for ISAF. Additionally, it is reported that at an all-party conference organized by the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in September 2013, the Government adopted a resolution


-----

**Section 8 Europe**


**General Situation**
**1**


With the end of the Cold War, many European countries
now recognize the need to address diverse security
challenges, such as outbreaks of regional conflict within
and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation
of WMDs, and an increasing number of cyberspace
threats. At the same time, these same countries recognize
that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries
has disappeared. Nevertheless, since the heightening
of tensions in the Ukraine in February 2014, there is a
growing need to revisit existing strategies and propose
new concepts in order to deal with Russia’s changing of
the status quo through the use of force or coercion and
“hybrid warfare.” With regard to international terrorism,
the incidents of terrorism occurring within European
nations, including the terror attacks in Paris in November
2015 and the terror attacks in Brussels in March 2016,
has made counter-terrorism efforts an urgent task.[1] Given
this situation, the trend of reducing national defense
spending and military strength due to severe financial
circumstances has begun to change in recent years. In
2014, NATO member states agreed to allocate 2% or
more of their GDP to national defense spending until


2024. At the NATO Summit held in May 2017, President
Trump strongly urged countries that have not yet done
so to increase defense spending by more than 2% of
their GDP.[2] Furthermore, following the “Arab Spring”
democratization movement that spread across the Arab
world from 2010 to 2012, refugees from the Middle East
have risen amid the sharp increase in people fleeing their
countries to escape suppression and persecution. The
number of refugees and migrants crossing into Europe has
soared especially since 2015, but the influx has slowed as
of late. Nevertheless, border security remains a challenge.
To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe
has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral
frameworks, such as NATO and the EU.[3] At the same
time, it is working to contribute to the security and
stability of the international community by proactively
participating in activities outside the European region.
Moreover, initiatives are made at the national level for
reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming
national defense systems, and strengthening bilateral[4]
and multilateral[5] defense and security cooperation.

See Fig. I-2-8-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States)


Recent terrorist incidents in Europe include an ISIL sympathizer driving a truck into a crowd of people in Nice, France in July 2016, a truck being driven into a Christmas market in Berlin, Germany in
December 2016, a vehicle being driven into a crowd of pedestrians in London, United Kingdom in March 2017, and a suicide bombing in Manchester in central United Kingdom that occurred in May
2017. European countries are now reviewing their security systems and tightening immigration controls, among other measures. Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1.

In 2014, NATO member states agreed to allocate 2% or more of their GDP towards national defense spending until 2024. However, as of 2016, only five (United States, United Kingdom, Greece,
Estonia, and Poland) of the 28 member states have reached this level. Currently, the United States accounts for approximately 70% of total national defense spending by all NATO countries. During the
joint press conference by the NATO Secretary General and U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis held on the margins of the NATO defense ministers meeting in February 2017, the NATO Secretary General
stated, “The U.S. has been clear that we need more defense spending, and fairer burden-sharing,” while U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis shared his view as follows, “And it’s absolutely appropriate as
a European minister of defense said last week: it’s a fair demand that all who benefit from the best defense in the world carry their proportionate share of the necessary cost to defend freedom.”

NATO has continued expanding towards Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of stabilizing the entire European and Atlantic regions. In December 2015, at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting,
Montenegro was invited to begin accession talks. In June 2017, Montenegro acceded to NATO. Currently, two countries—Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—have been approved to participate
in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a program that provides support to future member states in their preparation to enter NATO (conditionally for Bosnia and Herzegovina). The participation
in the MAP of six other countries—Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova—is currently undecided, as these countries support initiatives for integration into the European
and Atlantic regions through frameworks such as the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), which is a program offered to countries that have the intent to deepen political cooperative relationships
with NATO.

For example, the United Kingdom and France signed the Treaty between the United Kingdom and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation and the Treaty between the United
Kingdom and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities at a summit meeting held in November 2010. In addition, at a U.K.-France summit meeting held in January
2014, the Declaration on Security and Defence was adopted, and the two countries agreed on conducting joint development of anti-ship missiles and joint research on unmanned combat air vehicles,
as well as on aiming to begin deploying a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force by 2016. Joint training exercises have been conducted on several occasions between 2012 and 2016.

For example, in September 2010, the four European countries of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to jointly deploy transport


-----

Fig. I-2-8-1 Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States

|Current members Expansion situation of the member st NATO (29 countries) U.K.(Note) France Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands U.S. Austria Luxembourg Canada Finland Spain Portugal Norway Sweden Greece Czech Republic Iceland Ireland Hungary Poland Turkey Malta Denmark Slovakia Albania Cyprus Lithuania Estonia Montenegro Latvia Romania Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 EU (28 countries) (*As of June 2017) Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the E Original NATO members Joined NATO by 19 Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO i Joined NATO in June 2017 Note: The United Kingdom officially notified the EU of its intention to leave on March 29, 2017.|ates Joined the EU in May 2004 U in July 2013 82 Joined NATO in 1999 n April 2009|
|---|---|


Fig. I-2-8-1

**Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks**
**2**


**1** **Security and Defense Policy of NATO/EU**


Following Russia’s “hybrid warfare” over Ukraine
as well as the frequent “abnormal fl ights” of Russian
Armed Force aircraft over the European front, including
the Baltic states, NATO and member states reaffi rmed the
threat posed by Russia. In April 2014, they suspended
practical cooperation with Russia and took other steps,
including expanding its Baltic air policing mission, which
had taken place from 2004 when the three Baltic nations
joined NATO.[7] Additionally, at the NATO Summit held
in Wales in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint
declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation”
of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP)
for enhancing existing readiness forces.[8] This plan was
created in order to deal with the infl uence of Russia and
threats from the Middle East and North Africa. Based on
this plan, NATO has continued to maintain its presence in
eastern allies, while steps have been taken to signifi cantly
improve the readiness of the existing multinational
NATO Response Force (NRF) and create the Very High


**1**


Founded for the core task of collective defense among
member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its
activities to confl ict prevention and crisis management
since the end of the Cold War.
In the NATO Summit held in Lisbon in November
2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept[6] for the
fi rst time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next
decade for the creation of a more effi cient and fl exible
alliance. The document cites major threats such as
proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism,
confl ict or instability beyond NATO borders, and cyber
attacks, and prescribes three core tasks as follows:
(1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of
the NATO Treaty, the basic treaty of NATO; (2) crisis
management including confl ict prevention and postconfl ict stabilization and reconstruction assistance; and
(3) cooperative security including active contribution to
arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.


The Strategic Concept is an offi cial document defi ning the objectives, characteristics, and basic national security responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been formulated seven times (1949,
1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010).

NATO has conducted air policing on a rotational basis since 2004. The missions involved patrolling the skies of a single country with four aircraft, but since the crisis in Ukraine, the missions were
enhanced, shifting to patrolling the skies of four countries with 16 aircraft. In September 2015, the missions were reduced to patrols above two countries with eight aircraft. Similar air policing by
NATO is conducted over Slovenia, Iceland, and Albania, in addition to the three Baltic nations. A mission was conducted over Bulgaria, too, in 2016.

RAP was approved as one of the concrete efforts of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI). CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint exercises and drills among member states.


-----

of missions including counter-terrorism and capacitybuilding assistance, among others. Additionally, at the
defense ministers meeting held in February 2017, a
decision was made to set up a hub in Naples to gather
intelligence and coordinate activities related to the
Middle East and North Africa.
The EU seeks to enhance its security initiatives
under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),[12] and
in June 2016, Global Strategy for the European Union’s
Foreign and Security Policy detailing the EU’s fundamental
approach to foreign and security policy was adopted by
the European Council for the first time in approximately
10 years. This document calls for initiatives towards
enhancing the EU’s internal and external resilience to
threats against order in Eastern Europe, and the threat of
terrorism or other events in the Middle East and Africa,
in accordance with the principles of rules-based order
and democracy. In November 2016, an agreement was
reached on the execution of this strategy, with priority
given to responding to conflict and crises outside of the
EU, capacity building of partners, and protecting EU
citizens from terrorism and other threats. It also required
assigning priority to necessary capabilities and deepening
relations between member states. In the same month,
the European Commission released an action plan for
reinforcing defense cooperation in Europe, including the
establishment of the European Defence Fund.
In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has
condemned the military responses of Russia and
implemented economic sanctions against Russia.[13] In
addition, to support the economic and political reforms in
Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in nonmilitary
affairs, including the provision of large-scale financial
assistance to Ukraine.
To deal with the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds
to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq.
Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such
as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacity

Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized
within two to three days.[9] Furthermore, the declaration
adopted at the NATO Summit held in Warsaw in July
2016 cited Russia’s aggressive actions and terrorism by
ISIL as threats. At the meeting, a decision was reached
to deploy four battalions to the three Baltic nations and
Poland on a rotational basis. Specifically, at the defense
ministers meeting held in October 2016, it was decided
that the battalions would be multinational in nature
with more than 20 countries participating, including the
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada,
which would be leading the battalions, and they have
been deployed in succession in and after January 2017.
Member states view Russia in varying lights due to
differences in their geographic distance from Russia and
other factors. While measures are being taken to counter
Russia’s influence, member states are also maintaining
opportunities for dialogue with Russia.[10]

In the Mediterranean, a permanent maritime force[11]
has been deployed to the Aegean Sea since February
2016 due to the influx of illegal immigrants transiting the
Mediterranean. This force monitors the influx of illegal
immigrants and shares information with Turkey, Greece,
and other countries. Also, in November 2016, Operation
Active Endeavor, focused on collective defense held
since 2001, was succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian,
focused on crisis management, resulting in a wider array


9 The NRF consists of 40,000 personnel, and the VJTF is a multinational force consisting of approximately 20,000 personnel from the NRF (including 5,000 land force personnel).

10 For example, France held talks with President Putin of Russia following the terror attacks in November 2015, and the two sides agreed to exchange intelligence between their military forces. The
United Kingdom, in its strategy document SDSR2015, states that the issues of Ukraine would significantly change the rules-based international order, while it also states that the country would seek
ways to cooperate with Russia on the issues of ISIL topping the list. Germany, too, has stated the need for deterrence and dialogue with Russia in its white paper on national defense published in
July 2016. Additionally, in April 2016, NATO held the dialogue framework of the NATO-Russia Council in Brussels for the first time in almost two years, which was followed by meetings in July and
December 2016 and again in March 2017 (each at the ambassador level). At the NATO Board of Directors meeting in December 2016, an agreement was reached to hold a meeting for improving air
security over the Baltic Sea together with Russian experts at the beginning of 2017. In March 2017, representatives from the Baltic states including Russia, NATO, and the European Space Agency
(ESA) met in Helsinki, where the same meeting was convened and it was agreed that discussions would continue to be held.

11 See Chapter 3, Section 3 for more information about the permanent maritime force
12 The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the CFSP, which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took
effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict
areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP.

13 The EU takes measures, such as capital regulations and ban on exports of equipment and dual use goods, along with asset freezes and travel bans. In December 2016, the EU decided to extend


-----

building assistance in counter-terrorism measures, among
other activities. In November 2015, in accordance with a
request from France after the terror attacks in Paris, the
EU, for the fi rst time, activated the “mutual assistance
clause”[14] stipulating a mutual defense obligation, and EU
member states expressed their support to France.[15]

In May 2015, the EU started Operation Sophia
conducted by European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
(EUNAVFOR Med) to respond to the surge of refugees
and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe.
The fi rst phase focusing on the monitoring of smuggling
and human traffi cking networks was completed in
October 2015. The operation has entered the second phase
involving the search, seizure, and diversion on the high
seas of vessels suspected of being used for smuggling and
human traffi cking. Furthermore, at the foreign ministers
meeting held in June 2016, agreement was reached
to add two tasks to Operation Sophia: training of the
Libyan Navy Coast Guard; and providing support for
implementing the UN arms embargo on the high seas.
Also, in October 2016, the European Border and Coast
Guard was established, with its own equipment and at
least 1,500 personnel ready at any time for emergency
deployment in order to crack down on the infl ow of
refugees and immigrants.
In June 2016, the United Kingdom conducted a
national referendum to decide whether or not the country
should leave the EU. Following the victory of the proBrexit camp, the United Kingdom gave offi cial notice to
the EU of its intention to exit the EU in March 2017. With
suggestions that this could raise momentum for other
countries to leave the EU, future developments including
decline in the centripetal force of the EU will be the focus
of attention.
Advancements have been seen in cooperation
between NATO and the EU. At the NATO Summit held
in July 2016, a joint declaration was released citing fi elds
which NATO and the EU should prioritize cooperation, and
at the NATO and EU Council meetings in December 2016,
42 recommendations were adopted for implementing
the joint declaration. These recommendations included
responding to the threat of hybrid warfare by reinforcing


information sharing and bolstering resilience, and
expanding operational cooperation on migration and
maritime monitoring in the Mediterranean and other seas.
Based on these recommendations, NATO’s Operation
Sea Guardian and the EU’s Operation Sophia are now
mutually collaborating in the Mediterranean.

**2** **NATO/EU’s Activities Outside the Region**


**2**


Since August 2003, NATO had been leading ISAF in
Afghanistan. Its mission was completed in December
2014. In place of this mission, since January 2015,
NATO has been leading the Resolute Support Mission
(RSM), whose primary tasks are to provide training,
advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense
and Security Forces (ANDSF). NATO still deploys
approximately 13,000 personnel to Afghanistan. At the
NATO Summit held in July 2016, it was determined that
RSM would continue in 2017 and that support including
the fi nancing of the ANDSF until 2020 would continue.
Besides Afghanistan, NATO is also carrying out missions
in Kosovo, Somalia, and other countries.[16] Since October
2008, NATO had dispatched ships from the permanent
maritime forces to the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to
take part in Operation Ocean Shield to combat piracy, but
these activities ended in December 2016.
With regard to ISIL, NATO has taken the stance
of emphasizing prevention over intervention. The
Wales Summit Declaration of September 2014 strongly
condemned ISIL’s violent acts and affi rmed that NATO
would activate its collective defense if any member state
were attacked by ISIL. Furthermore, the Warsaw Summit
Communiqué of July 2016 set forth the decision to
dispatch early warning and control forces to fi ght against
ISIL, with surveillance and reconnaissance missions
taking place since October 2016.
In 2003, the EU led peacekeeping operations for the
fi rst time in Macedonia by using NATO’s equipment and
capabilities. Since then, it has been actively committed
to the operations in crisis management and maintenance
of peace and order[17] by, for example, sending troops to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the


14 Article 42, Paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a mutual defense obligation, where if a EU member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member
states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

15 On November 17, 2015 after the terror attacks, then Minister for Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian of France requested the application of the “mutual assistance clause” at the EU Foreign Affairs Council
meeting. The application was agreed upon unanimously. Based on the application of the clause, France requested other EU member states to: (1) contribute to counter-ISIL operations in Iraq and
Syria; and (2) help reduce the military burden of France by contributing to France’s counter-terrorism operations in Mali, Central Africa, and other areas. Nevertheless, the extent of cooperation has
remained relatively small, except for that from the United Kingdom and Germany.

16 In Kosovo, NATO has carried out its mission within the framework of the Kosovo International Security Force since 1996. Today, NATO provides recommendations, training, and capacity-building
assistance to the Kosovo Security Force. In Somalia, NATO takes part in transport operations and dispatches expert personnel to tactical divisions as support for the AU Somalia Mission.


-----

Congo, Chad, Mali, and Central Africa. For example, in
January 2014, the EU decided to dispatch security forces
to Central Africa, where the situation had been of constant
tumult. The forces commenced operations in April 2014
and completed its mission by March 2015. In the same
month, the EU launched the European Union’s Military
Advisory Mission (EUMAM) to support preparations
for security sector reform in Central Africa. Since July

**Security / Defense Policies of European Countries**
**3**


**1** **The United Kingdom**


2016, the European Union s Training Mission (EUTM)
has succeeded the mission, which continues to modernize
military forces in Central Africa. Also, the EU has been
conducting Operation Atalanta, the fi rst maritime mission
to combat piracy off the Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
since December 2008. Under this mission, vessels and
aircraft dispatched from each country protect ships in the
area and conduct surveillance in these waters.[18]

the entire list of expanded threats.[20] The NSS-SDSR2015
lays out that the United Kingdom would continue to be a
key player in the international community, and promote
procurement of equipment and formation of units with
high readiness and mobility, in view of dealing with
threats such as terrorism and cyber security.[21]

Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has
conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition,
it carries out ISR activities using unmanned aerial
vehicles, provides education and training to forces
engaged in ground war such as the Iraqi Security Forces
and Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan
Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian
assistance to refugees. Furthermore, following the
terror attacks in Paris, the United Kingdom decided in
December 2015 to extend the scope of the airstrikes from
Iraq to Syria, and commenced airstrikes in Syria on the
day after the Parliament gave its approval.[22]

With regard to the Asia-Pacifi c region, the NSSSDSR2015 presents the view that the region offers
signifi cant economic opportunities for the United
Kingdom, and has considerable infl uence on the future
integrity and credibility of the rules-based international
order. It then expresses commitment to attaching
importance to working with the United Kingdom’s
security partners including Japan. In particular, it
considers Japan as the United Kingdom’s closest security


**1**


After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom,
perceiving that there is no direct military threat
against the country, has advanced national defense
reform with particular focus on improving its overseas
deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal
with new threats such as international terrorism and the
proliferation of WMDs.
Against this backdrop, in November 2015, the
Cameron administration released the National Security
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review
2015 (NSS-SDSR2015) in the face of destabilization
in the Middle East, including the rise of ISIL, the crisis
in Ukraine, and the threat posed by cyber attacks.
Recognizing that the United Kingdom confronts threats
from both states and non-state actors, the NSS-SDSR2015
sets out the challenges that the United Kingdom should
address in the coming decade as follows: terrorism
and extremism; resurgence of state-based threats;
technological developments including cyber threats;
and the erosion of the rules-based international order.
While the previous SDSR2010 committed to cutting the
troop strength, reducing key equipment, and reviewing
procurement plans due to pressure to decrease defense
spending,[19] the NSS-SDSR2015 calls for ending the
defense spending cuts and explicitly proposes to increase
the defense force in order to develop capacities to address


18 To tackle piracy in this area, the EU has undertaken “European Union Training Mission-Somalia” and “European Union Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in Somalia,” in addition to Operation
Atalanta. Based on a comprehensive approach, the EU not only implements piracy countermeasures, but is also working to develop and strengthen its coastal policing and judicial system capabilities.

19 The SDSR2010 committed to decreasing defense spending by 8% by FY2014, including at least 4.3 billion pounds in non-front line savings, excluding spending for operations such as in Afghanistan.
The SDSR2010 decided to decrease, by 2015, Royal Navy personnel by 5,000, Army personnel by 7,000, and Royal Air Force personnel by 5,000, along with reduction of the holdings of main battle
tanks by 40%. In the Army realignment plan “Army 2020” released later in July 2013, the United Kingdom was to reduce the Army’s active military personnel from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2020, while
increasing reservists from 15,000 to 30,000 by 2018.

20 The NSS-SDSR2015 will maintain the size of the Armed Forces personnel and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by 700 personnel combined. It also decided to build two aircraft carriers,
introduce nine new maritime patrol aircraft, and maintain a fl eet of four strategic nuclear submarines. Underpinned by a stable economy, the NSS-SDSR2015 is to maintain defense expenditure
amounting to 2% of GDP which is the NATO’s target and to further increase defense spending, especially equipment procurement spending.

21 The NSS-SDSR2015 is to add two Typhoon squadrons, establish a F-35 squadron capable of operating from new aircraft carriers, create two strike brigades of up to 5,000 personnel, and have a
system that can deploy an expeditionary force of around 50,000 personnel overseas by 2025.ii


-----

partner in Asia. Based on this view, in this region, the
United Kingdom conducts Operation Patwin, a natural
disaster assistance mission to the Philippines, participates
in the multilateral joint exercise RIMPAC, and conducts
goodwill trainings with Japan.[23]

In March 2017, the United Kingdom offi cially
informed the EU of its intention to leave the union. While
the United Kingdom will continue to be a NATO member
state, some have noted that the United Kingdom’s exit
from the EU would reduce the EU’s military capacity by
around one-fourth. Therefore, attention will be given to
various trends, including the EU’s security initiatives and
relations with NATO. Additionally, the United Kingdom
held a general election of the House of Commons in June
2017 in which the ruling Conservative Party led by Prime
Minister May lost a number of seats, resulting in a loss
of its majority, and its impact on the country’s security
policy will be the focus of attention.

**2** **France**


that France would use a combination of these mechanisms
to respond to changes in the strategic environment
over the coming 15 years. Regarding France’s foreign
relations, it positions NATO’s functions as follows:
(1) means of securing collective defense of member
states; (2) an important instrument of the strategic
partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic; and
(3) a common framework for military action in dealing
with threats and crisis. On the other hand, with regard
to the EU, the White Paper clearly stipulates France’s
leadership role in strengthening defense and security
capabilities, and aims to drive forward the CSDP in
a practical and realistic manner. In May 2015, the
Parliament enacted the Military Planning (2015-19) Act,
the updated version of the Military Planning (2014-19)
Act, in order to implement plans laid out in the White
Paper for realizing the national security strategy. This law
stipulated a larger budget for equipment, the maintenance
of defense industry capabilities, among other items.[25]

France has been conducting airstrikes against
ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since
September 2015.[26] Following the terror attacks in Paris
in November 2015, France declared a state of emergency
domestically, and decided to deploy 10,000 military
personnel to maintain domestic security and suspend
troop reductions. Outside of France, the country enhanced
its airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and deployed mobile
units including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle
to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, France has
continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi
Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian
assistance for refugees.
France, which has territories in the Asia-Pacifi c
region, expresses the view in its White Paper on Defence
and National Security, that the region is a key actor of
growth worldwide, but at the same time is a region where
there is signifi cant tension and many confl icts. In October
2015, the Floréal-class frigate Vendémiaire made a
port call in Japan to display presence in the region and
conducted a goodwill training with the MSDF. France
actively hosts multilateral exercises, including Croix du


**2**


Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused
on maintaining independence of its defense policies,
while having led initiatives to enhance the defense
structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on
the development of its military capacity by integrating
military bases, dealing with operational requirements to
strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing
its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment
required in the future.
The White Paper on Defence and National Security
published in April 2013 for the fi rst time in fi ve years
outlines that although France does not face any direct,
explicit conventional military threat against its territory,
there is growing diversity in the types of threats
it faces as a result of globalization. These include
international terrorism, cyber threats, organized crime,
and the proliferation of WMDs. It continues to position
(1) intelligence, (2) nuclear deterrence, (3) protection,
(4) prevention, and (5) deployment[24] as the fi ve key
mechanisms of the national security strategy, and states


23 From October to November 2016, Typhoon fi ghters visited Japan to take part in Japan-U.K. joint exercises. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-4 regarding the maritime security strategy of the United Kingdom.

24 In its White Paper on Defence and National Security released in April 2013, France identifi ed the following regions as priority regions: (1) the periphery of Europe; (2) the Mediterranean basin; (3)
part of Africa (from Saharan Africa to Equatorial Africa); (4) the Persian Gulf; and (5) the Indian Ocean. In these regions, France will maintain independent or multinational operational capabilities. In
Saharan Africa, the French forces are singlehandedly engaged in a particularly large military operation called Operation Barkhane, which has its command center in Chad’s capital city of N’Djamena.

25 The Military Planning (2014-19) Act set forth that military personnel would be reduced by 25,800 between 2015 and 2019. However, following the acts of terrorism against Charlie Hebdo in January
2015, that same month President Francois Hollande held a Defense Council meeting and decided to scrap the loss of 7,500 of these personnel. In May 2015, the Council of Ministers decided on the
Military Planning (2015-19) Bill whose main components include: (1) the long-term deployment of 7,000 military personnel in France; (2) a 3.8 billion euro total increase in the 2016-2019 defense
budget; and (3) an increase in the number of Reserves and the number of days of activities. The same law stated that total personnel would be reduced by 7,000, but this plan was shelved following
the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015.i


-----

Sud and Equateur.[27, 28] France and Security in the AsiaPacifi c” released by the Ministry of Defence in June 2016
states that threats include international terrorism, the
launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea, and attempts
to change the status quo in the South China Sea, and that
France has begun rebalancing towards the India-Pacifi c
Ocean region. Also, the document stated a policy of
continuing to build strong partnerships with Asia-Pacifi c
nations through defense cooperation and other means.[29]

In April and May 2017, France held presidential
elections in which Mr. Emmanuel Macron, former
Minister for the Economy and Finance, was elected
president. In June 2017, the country held legislative
elections in which “La République En Marche” led by
President Macron won a sweeping victory and gained a
stable majority in the Parliament. The focus of attention
will be on how future security policies will be affected by
the new administration.

**3** **Germany**


specifi c threats such as international terrorism, cyber
attacks, disputes between countries, and the infl ux of
refugees and immigrants. The white paper also states
that Germany would continue to emphasize multilateral
cooperation and cross-government approaches, while
striving to realize rules-based international order.
Furthermore, with regard to the number of military
personnel, the white paper notes that although an upper
limit was in place following the end of the Cold War and
Germany has continually worked to reduce personnel, it
would shift to a policy with no upper limit and perform
regular reviews of its military force plan to adjust the
number of personnel fl exibly.
In Iraq, Germany has thus far provided education
and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga,
supplied equipment and ammunition, extended fi nancial
assistance for humanitarian assistance, as well as
conducted training of Kurdish troops in Germany. In
December 2015, following the terror attacks in Paris in
November 2015, the Cabinet approved plans to provide
logistics support to the Coalition that is conducting
counter-ISIL military operations. This expanded German
engagement in counter-ISIL military operations, albeit
the commitment is limited to logistics support missions,
such as reconnaissance and aerial refueling.[31]

With regard to the Asia-Pacifi c region, Germany
considers it to be important from the standpoint of its
large population and economic strength, and expresses the
view that the region plays a central role in international
politics, while on the other hand, the region faces issues
such as being home to two-thirds of the world’s poor.
Germany’s military engagement in the region is limited
to dispatches in response to natural disasters and goodwill
visits, and does not include joint training.
In September 2017, Germany will hold its federal
elections, and, the focus of attention will be on the impact
of the election results on the security policy of the country.


**3**


While Germany has been implementing a large-scale
reduction of its military personnel since the end of the
Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch
of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany
has advanced the reform of its defense forces to enable
them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing
confl ict prevention and risk management in the context of
multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and
the UN. However, following a worsening in the security
environment, in May 2016 Germany changed policy and
announced that it would increase military personnel by
around 7,000 by 2023.[30]

The country’s defense white paper released in July
2016 for the fi rst time in about 10 years explains that
Germany’s security environment has grown more complex
and unstable, causing gradually rising uncertainty, citing


27 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-5 regarding the maritime security strategy of France.

28 At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2016, then Minister for Defence Le Drian affi rmed France’s renewed commitment to the Asia-Pacifi c region, stating, “Why shouldn't the European navies, therefore,
coordinate to ensure a presence that is as regular and visible as possible in the maritime areas in Asia? I will shortly explain this proposal in detail to my European colleagues.”

29 France has actively taken part in such forums as the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and the South Pacifi c Defence Ministers’ Meeting. For
example, France and India have established a strategic partnership. They conduct joint exercises among their land, naval, and air forces, respectively, and have equipment cooperation. In addition,
France carries out close political dialogue with Malaysia and extends cooperation, including capacity-building support for the submarine unit of the Malaysian Armed Forces.

30 Germany decreased its military personnel strength which was once more than 500,000 at the time of its reunifi cation to 250,000 by 2010. In 2016, personnel were cut further back to 177,000.
However, since July 1994, when the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions under multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and
NATO was constitutional, Germany has gradually expanded dispatch of its federal forces to participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities
in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

31 The Cabinet approved the following commitment during the 12-month period from early January to end of December 2016: (1) dispatch the frigate Augsburg to escort the French aircraft carrier
Charles de Gaulle; (2) deploy Tornado fi ghters (up to six fi ghters) and aerial refueling aircraft to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; and (3) deploy up to 1,200 personnel to areas of ISIL’s operations in Syria,
their airspace, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea to collect intelligence using reconnaissance satellites and share this intelligence with relevant countries. In October the
same year, the Cabinet approved extending the dispatch until the end of 2017. This decision also added the dispatch of personnel to NATO’s AWACS (airborne warning and control system) unit to the
mission. Furthermore, Germany strives to reduce the operational burden of France by increasing the number of German personnel participating in the UN PKO in Mali (United Nations Multidimensional


-----

**Issues in the International**

**Chapter**
### 3

**Community**


**Section 1** **[Trends in Regional Confl icts and International Terrorism ]**
**(with a Focus on the Middle East and Africa)**


**General Situation**
**1**


In a global security environment, there is a growing
risk that unrest or a security problem in a single
country or region could immediately develop into a
security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire
international community.
The confl icts occurring in recent years in various
parts of the world are not necessarily of the same nature.
An array of problems is at the root of confl icts, including
ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources. The impacts
of climate change and other global issues have also been
suggested as causes of confl icts.[1] Confl icts can take diverse
forms, from armed confl icts, to the continuation of military
standoffs. Furthermore, human rights violations, refugees,
hunger, poverty, and other consequences of confl icts
can have impacts affecting not only the countries in the
confl icts but also a wider area. In many cases, areas where
civil wars or regional confl icts have created or expanded a
governance vacuum have become a hotbed of the activities
of terrorist organizations. Among them are organizations
which operate across national borders and regions, which
continue to pose imminent security challenges to the
international community. The presence of states with weak
governance has made it diffi cult to tackle risks such as the
explosive outbreak and spread of infectious diseases.
Particularly in states with unstable political situations
and weak governance, which are often found in the Middle
East and Africa, border control is inadequate, leading to
cross-border movement of terrorist organization members
and weapons, as well as narcotics that are a funding source
for terrorist organizations, posing threats to the regions.
Furthermore, these regions have seen renewed fi ghting
even after a temporary ceasefi re is achieved pursuant to a
peace agreement or other arrangements between the parties
in confl ict. The “Arab Spring,” which grew into a full-scale


movement in 2011, encouraged transitions to democratic
systems in some countries in the Middle East and North
Africa. However, political turmoil associated with the
change in government created clashes between tribes,
religions, and political parties, and these clashes have
still not ended in some countries. The underlying factors
are deemed to include public dissatisfaction, especially
among young people, with economic and social disparities
as well as with high unemployment rates. Furthermore,
in developed countries, such as the United States and
European countries, there has been a rise in young people
who sympathize with the extremism of international
terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL)[2] that had gained strength in Iraq
and Syria, against the backdrop of dissatisfaction towards
estrangement from society, discrimination, poverty,
and disparities. In an increasing number of cases, these
people have joined the activities of international terrorist
organizations as fi ghters and also conducted “homegrown”
and “lone-wolf” terrorism activities in their home countries.
As evidenced by the simultaneous terrorist attacks in Paris
in November 2015 and the act of terrorism in Bangladesh
in July 2016, the global expansion of such extremism has
resulted in growing terror threats not only in the Middle
East and Africa but also in the rest of the world. In countries,
such as Mali and the Central African Republic, the
people’s dissatisfaction with politics and economics under
their weak governance systems as well as clashes over
territories and resources have caused confl icts. The rapid,
vast outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa in
2014 threatened the stability of the affected countries and
spread the disease to other countries including Western
nations, shedding light on the seriousness of the risk posed
by the spread of infectious diseases.


The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 2014 regards climate change as one of key factors that will shape the future security environment.
It claims that climate change may accelerate instability and confl ict by causing water scarcity, sharp increases in food costs, and other effects.


-----

**KeyWord** The Arab Spring

The Arab Spring is a term generally used to refer to the series of

democratization movements that were undertaken on a full-fl edged

basis in Middle Eastern and North African countries starting in early

2011, resulting in the political regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt,

Libya, and Yemen. Media played a major role in these movements,

with information disseminating rapidly via social media. However, the

movements did not necessarily lead to stability or peace, with some

countries like Syria and Yemen still remaining in a state of confusion.


It has become increasingly important for the
international community to examine the shape of tailored
international frameworks and involvement measures,
and seek out appropriate responses for addressing these
complicated and diverse destabilizing factors.
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising
expectations for peacekeeping efforts, and, as a result, many
UN PKOs[3] have been established. In recent years, their
missions have come to include a wide range of activities,
including those by civilians and police, encompassing such
traditional roles as the monitoring of a ceasefi re or military
withdrawal as well as the monitoring of disarmament, security
sector reform, the monitoring of elections and administrative
activities, and humanitarian assistance (e.g., return of
refugees to their homeland). Under such circumstances, the
importance of the roles related to the protection of civilians
and peace-building has been increasing.

See Fig. I-3-1-1 (List of Peacekeeping Operations)

**Current Situation of Regional Confl icts and the International Response**
**2**


**1** **Situations in Syria and Iraq in Response to the**
**Rise of ISIL**


“Homegrown” and “lone-wolf”

**KeyWord**

terrorism

“Homegrown” terrorism in which residents are inspired by the

extremism espoused by Al Qaeda or ISIL and conduct terrorist attacks

at home has become a threat in European countries and the United

States. In particular, there are concerns that their nationals would

accumulate combat training and combat experience in confl ict-torn

regions such as Iraq and Syria, become indoctrinated into extremism,

and then return to their countries and conduct terrorist attacks.

In recent years, “lone-wolf” terrorism is also seen as a threat because

it is diffi cult to detect signs in advance and prevent it. “Lone-wolf”

terrorism is planned and committed by individuals or groups who

become infl uenced by extremist ideology through information found on

the Internet and elsewhere, without having any offi cial relations with

terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIL.


In addition to the UN PKO framework, multinational
forces authorized by the UN Security Council and
regional organizations engage in confl ict prevention,
peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In Africa, regional
organizations such as the African Union (AU)[4] undertake
their activities based on UN Security Council resolutions,
and their activities are sometimes handed over to UN
PKOs later. The international community also offers
recommendations and training assistance and supplies
equipment from a long-term perspective, prompting
African nations to help themselves so that they can
enhance local government organizations and improve the
capabilities of their military and security organizations.

outbreak of anti-government demonstrations across the
country calling for democratization and the resignation
of President Assad. As a result, the clashes between
the government forces and the opposition forces[5] have
continued to take place throughout the country.[6] Taking
advantage of the instability after the “Arab Spring”


**1**


**(1) Political Turmoil in Syria and the Rise of ISIL**
In Syria, since March 2011, the Government has
mobilized military and security forces in response to the


As of the end of May 2017, 16 UN PKOs are operating globally, including about 95,300 military and police personnel and about 15,000 civilian personnel (as of the end of December 2016) from 128
countries. Out of these UN PKOs, there are 12 operations in the Middle East and Africa. (See Fig. I-3-1-1)

The world’s largest regional organization comprised of 55 countries and regions in Africa. It was established in July 2002 by reorganizing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (established in May
1963). Its objectives include achieving the integration and solidarity of African nations and people, accelerating political, economic, and social integration of Africa, and promoting peace, security, and
stability in Africa. In January 2017, the AU Assembly approved the accession of Morocco, the only non-member in Africa.

According to an announcement by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in January 2016, the clashes in Syria killed more than 250,000 people. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, over 11 million
people have become refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

In addition, Syria faces the issue of the Assad administration’s use of chemical weapons. In August 2013, when the United States, which called for a military response to the use of chemical weapons
in Syria, and Russia, which sought to place Syrian chemical weapons under the control of the international community, were at odds, chemical weapons were used in the suburbs of Syria’s capital city
Damascus, which killed many civilians. Following this attack, U.S. President Barack Obama who had stated previously that the use of chemical weapons would cross a red line, assessed that the Syrian
Government used chemical weapons. The President stated he decided that military action should be taken against the Assad administration, further heightening military tension. In September 2013,
following negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov of Russia, the United States and Russia agreed on a framework which demanded that
the Syrian Government declare its chemical weapons stockpiles as well as accept international inspections, aimed at the complete destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. The Syrian Government
submitted a list of its chemical weapons stockpiles to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and took responses which were set out in the framework, including accession
to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Due to these responses, military action by the United States and other countries against the Assad administration was averted. Pursuant to OPCW decisions
and related UN Security Council resolution, international efforts were made to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons. The work to destroy the weapons, which was carried out on the U.S. Government’s


-----

Fig. I-3-1-1 List of Peacekeeping Operations

|Col1|Mission|Date Established|
|---|---|---|
|1|United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)|Apr 1991|
|2|United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)|Sep 2003|
|3|United Nations Operation in Côte d’lvoire (UNOCI)|Apr 2004|
|4|African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)|Jul 2007|
|5|United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)|Jul 2010|
|6|United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)|Jun 2011|
|7|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Jul 2011|
|8|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)|Apr 2013|
|9|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)|Apr 2014|


Fig. I-3-1-1

15

12

14 11

13

10

16 1

8

4 6

2 3 9 7

5

Note: According to the United Nations (as of the end of May 2017).

**Africa** **Middle East**

Mission Date Established Mission Date Established

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

1 Apr 1991 10 May 1948

Western Sahara (MINURSO) (UNTSO)

United Nations Disengagement Observer

2 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Sep 2003 11 Jun 1974

Force (UNDOF)

United Nations Operation in Côte d’lvoire United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

3 Apr 2004 12 Mar 1978

(UNOCI) (UNIFIL)

African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation

4 Jul 2007

in Darfur (UNAMID) **Asia**

United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in

5 Jul 2010 Mission Date Established

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

United Nations Military Observer Group in

United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei 13 Jan 1949

6 Jun 2011 India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

(UNISFA)

United Nations Mission in the Republic of

7 South Sudan (UNMISS) Jul 2011 **Europe/CIS**

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission Date Established

8 Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Apr 2013

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

14 Mar 1964

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated (UNFICYP)

9 Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic Apr 2014

United Nations Interim Administration Mission

(MINUSCA) 15 Jun 1999

in Kosovo (UNMIK)

**The Americas**

Mission Date Established

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

16 Jun 2004

(MINUSTAH)


democratic movement, international terrorist organization
Al-Nusrah Front and ISIL[7] have gained strength in Syria.
Meanwhile, following the withdrawal of U.S.
Forces in December 2011, the security situation in Iraq

|Col1|Mission|Date Established|
|---|---|---|
|10|United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)|May 1948|
|11|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)|Jun 1974|
|12|United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)|Mar 1978|

|Asia|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
||Mission|Date Established|
|13|United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)|Jan 1949|

|Col1|Mission|Date Established|
|---|---|---|
|14|United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)|Mar 1964|
|15|United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)|Jun 1999|

|Col1|Mission|Date Established|
|---|---|---|
|16|United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)|Jun 2004|


deteriorated rapidly against the backdrop of political
feuds and religious confrontations. In January 2014,
ISIL, which had increasingly gained strength from its
stronghold in Syria, seized the unstable situation in Iraq


-----

to begin invading areas in western Iraq. In June 2014,
ISIL took control of the second largest city, Mosul, in
northern Iraq. Following this, ISIL’s leader Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi, a self-proclaimed “caliph,”[8] unilaterally
declared the establishment of the “Islamic State” and
called on Islam followers throughout the world to pledge
their allegiance to him.

**(2) Trends in Military Operations against ISIL**
In August 2014, ISIL launched an offensive against the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern
Iraq, and made advances towards Erbil where the U.S.
Consulate and other facilities are located. In response to
this development, the United States and other countries
began airstrikes on ISIL in order to protect U.S. citizens
in Iraq, among other purposes.[9] In an address on the
U.S. strategy for ISIL delivered in September 2014,
then President Obama stated that the military action
would be extended to cover Syria.[10] The countries in the
Coalition are participating in the military operations for
the main missions of: (1) limited air raids; (2) education
and training of local forces;[11] (3) supply of weapons; and
(4) rescue of hostages by the special forces.
Although the Iraqi Security Forces (including
paramilitary troops and the police, in addition to Iraqi
government forces) were reportedly plagued with
problems such as weak command functions and low
morale, primarily among the Iraqi forces, they appear to
have improved their operational capabilities, through the
Coalition’s education and training, among other means.
In contrast, the Peshmerga, the military organ of the
KRG, has experience with the Iraq War and is considered
to have relatively advanced training and a functioning
chain of command, and plays a critical role in the military
action against ISIL.
The Coalition and the local forces are cooperating
in the operations to recapture strategic cities in Iraq from
ISIL. In the past two years, ISIL lost its strongholds in
Iraq one after another, including Ramadi[12] and Fallujah.[13]
In particular, the Coalition and the local forces in
October 2016 launched an operation to recapture Mosul,


Female Peshmerga soldiers having completed three-week basic infantry training with
the Italian military [photo courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense]

an important city for ISIL as a symbol of its expanding
influence, and took control of the eastern half of the
city in January 2017. In February 2017, they began the
military operation to gain control of the western half of
Mosul. As of the end of June 2017, with Iraqi government
forces recapturing the Great Mosque of al-Nuri, a symbol
to ISIL, it is clear that ISIL has become inferior to the
Coalition and the local forces, and is said to be weakening
under such circumstances.
In Syria, meanwhile, in addition to air raids by the
Coalition, the United States provided support to the
opposition forces fighting ISIL. The forces have thus far,
however, failed to adequately cope with ISIL. Under such
circumstances, Russia launched its military operation in
Syria in September 2015 in an apparent bid to support the
survival of the Assad administration and protect its own
interests.[14] In the initial phase of its military operation,
Russia carried out air raids and sea-launched cruise
missiles.[15] Furthermore, after concluding that the October
2015 crash of a Russian airliner was a terrorist attack by
ISIL, Russia used various platforms, including dropping
precision satellite-guided bombs using strategic bombers
to enhance airstrikes, and in November 2016, temporarily
deploying the flattop Admiral Kuznetsov to conduct air
raids by carrier-borne aircraft. It has been noted that a
string of military actions by Russia were designed to
display its military capabilities as well as to verify these


8 The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term has been used to refer to those who led the Islamic community. Since then, a number of the heads of hereditary
dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title.

9 In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Jordan participated in the airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq as of May 2017.

10 Then President Obama stated that the military action would be extended to cover Syria to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. President Obama announced that the United States would not only lead a
broad coalition to conduct airstrikes, but also provide military support to the Iraqi Security Forces fighting a ground war and to moderate opposition forces in Syria. As of May 2017, the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, Australia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Bahrain, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were participating in airstrikes against ISIL in Syria. In addition,
Russia has been conducting airstrikes in Syria separately from the Coalition.

11 The Coalition has completed the training of 31,822 members of the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga members (as of October 5, 2016) through its operations.
12 After the recapture, new problems have emerged, including confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis.
13 The Iraqi territories under the control of ISIL have decreased from 40% in 2014 to 6.8%, according to an announcement by the Iraqi Joint Forces Command in April 2017.
14 Tartus is the only Russian naval base facing the Mediterranean Sea in Syria, reportedly having a dockyard that can provide fuel and food to and repair military ships.
15 Russia dispatched Su-24, Su-25, Su-30 and other fixed-wing fighters, as well as Mi-24, Ka-52 and other rotary-wing attack helicopters, among other aircraft, to Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia. In


-----

capabilities, while it has also been pointed out that Consequently, it has been noted that ISIL has been
Russia’s military operations are targeting not ISIL but the gradually driven back and weakened. In January 2017,
opposition forces in confrontation with the Assad regime. U.S. President Trump instructed Secretary of Defense
Turkey, concerned about the growing influence of Mattis to submit a comprehensive plan of operations to
Kurdish forces in northern Syria, launched Operation defeat ISIL. Considering that the Trump administration
Euphrates Shield in August 2016, and crossed the border cites the elimination of ISIL as a top priority, it has been
into northern Syria to attack ISIL together with some suggested that an expansion of U.S. military actions may
of the opposition forces, gaining some achievements, become one of its options.
including seizure of part of the areas controlled by ISIL.
The Coalition continued air raids on Raqqa, claimed **(4) Situation in Syria and its Peace Process**
to be the capital by ISIL, while the Kurdish-led Syrian In terms of the violent clashes between armed groups in
Democratic Forces, among the opposition forces, Syria that have been continuing since March 2011, the
declared the launch of the Euphrates Wrath Operation Syrian government forces have been gradually gaining an
in November 2016 to take over Raqqa. The military upper hand in the wake of Russia’s air raids against the
operations are now under way to seize the surrounding opposition forces launched in September 2015. Following
areas to isolate Raqqa, and the Syrian Democratic Forces the takeover of Aleppo, the largest strongpoint of the
commenced the final stage of the Euphrates Wrath opposition forces, by the government forces in December
Operation and have allegedly fully encircled Raqqa as of 2016, the overall situation is turning in favor of the Syrian
late June 2017. Attention will be on whether the forces government forces.
including the Syrian government forces will be able to Meanwhile, in UN-led peace talks, UN Security
coordinate with each other going forward. Council Resolution 2254[18] was adopted in December

2015 as a roadmap for the peace process. In February

**(3) Weakening of ISIL and its Future Outlook** 2016, UN Security Council Resolution 2268 that calls
Anti-ISIL military operations by the U.S.-led Coalition for a cessation of hostilities in Syria was adopted.
and Russia have fragmented ISIL’s command and control However, the ceasefire has collapsed frequently due to
functions through the killing of ISIL fighters including violations by various forces.
commanders and airstrikes on oil facilities, undermined Under these circumstances, Russia, Turkey, and Iran
ISIL members’ morale, and led to the greater escape of sponsored Syrian peace talks in Astana, the capital of
fighters. As a result of the loss of territories under its Kazakhstan, in January, February and March 2017, where
control, ISIL’s financial capacity has eroded[16] and its they discussed a framework for monitoring a ceasefire.
ability to govern is believed to have been compromised.[17] Representatives of both the Syrian Government and

the opposition forces refused to sign the deal, bringing
the challenges ahead in sharp relief. Nevertheless, at a
meeting held in May 2017, an agreement was reached
on the creation of safe zones and the provision of
humanitarian assistance supplies, among other matters.
As the international community puts efforts into
achieving peace in Syria, the United States launched an
attack on the Syrian government forces in April 2017,
concluding that the Assad Government used chemical
weapons in attacking an area under control of the
opposition forces in the southern part of Idlib province in
northwestern Syria.[19] In this attack, 59 Tomahawk cruise
U.S. troops firing grenade launcher [photo courtesy of U.S. Department of Defense] missiles launched from two U.S. naval vessels deployed

16 ISIL has lost 50,000 km[2] of the areas it controlled (announcement of the U.S. Department of State, 2017).
17 ISIL’s financial capacity is said to have decreased by about 30% as of April 2016 compared with mid-2015. It has also been noted that the deterioration of ISIL’s financial conditions has prompted
some of the relatively well-treated foreign fighters to flee ISIL. Furthermore, due in part to tighter international controls, the number of fighters joining ISIL declined to just about 20 a month as of July
2016 from the peak level of around 2,000 a month.

18 UN Security Council Resolution 2254 calls for establishing an inclusive and non-sectarian government and setting a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution within six months, and
expresses support for the holding of free and fair elections within 18 months pursuant to the new constitution.

19 While the United States asserted that the Syrian Government carried out a chemical weapons attack with sarin, the Russian Government insisted that an induced explosion of chemical weapons stored
by the opposition forces on the site of air raids caused the chemical damage, showing the stark differences in their views. In April 2017, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons


-----

in the Mediterranean Sea hit Al Shayrat airfi eld in western
Syria, causing material damage to Syrian aircraft and
support infrastructure.[20] U.S. President Trump said in a
statement that it is in the vital national security interest of
the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use
of deadly chemical weapons, indicating that there could
be further military actions by the United States depending
on the Syrian Government’s responses.

**(5) Growing Number of Refugees and their Impact**
**on Europe**

Against the backdrop of the unrest in the Middle East
situation, a growing number of refugees and immigrants
mainly from the Middle East and North Africa fl ed to
Europe mainly via routes through the Mediterranean
Sea or routes that pass through Turkey and Greece
heading north on the Balkan Peninsula in 2015.
Though the situation has begun to calm down recently,
the international community including Europe is still
struggling with its response.
The refugee problem has led to increased terror
threats in Europe, as ISIL and other terrorists have
concealed themselves among the refugees, fl owing into
Europe and joining potential terrorists in various parts of
Europe to form networks. It has been pointed out that the
terrorists who carried out the simultaneous attacks in Paris
in November 2015 included terrorists who mingled with
refugees and immigrants in entering Europe. European
countries thus face various challenges including the
acceptance of many refugees, the prevention of ISIL
fi ghters’ fl ow into Europe, the crackdown on refugee
smuggling boats and the rescue of refugees on smuggling
boats that capsize in the Mediterranean Sea.
In a bid to resolve problems brought about by the
rapid infl ux of refugees and immigrants, the United
Kingdom, France and other European countries are
making diplomatic efforts such as engaging in the Syrian
peace process and participating in military operations
against ISIL to stabilize Syria and Iraq.[21]


**2** **Situation in Yemen**

**2**


**(1) Political Turmoil**
In Yemen, anti-government demonstrations from February
2011 following the Arab Spring democratic movement,
as well as international pressure,[22] led to a non-military
transition of government through election from then
President Ali Abdullah Saleh to new President Abd-Rabbu
Mansour Hadi, though it was accompanied by some
clashes between demonstrators and security forces.
President Hadi implemented the national dialogue
process. Nevertheless, from August 2014, the confrontation
between the government and the opposition insurgent
group Houthis,[23] based in northern Yemen, intensifi ed
and deepened the political unrest. In September 2014, the
Houthis captured the capital city of Sana, and President
Hadi subsequently fl ed to the southern Yemeni city of Aden.


**(2) Military Intervention in Yemen and Islamic**
**Extremists’ Expansion of Power**

Subsequently, the Houthis advanced into the Red
Sea’s coastal areas and key cities between the capital
city of Sana and Aden. In response to this situation,
President Hadi’s faction requested the support of
Arab countries. Then, in March 2015, a Saudi Arabialed coalition launched airstrikes against bases of the
Houthis and the alliance forces led by former President
Saleh. Nonetheless, the Houthis have still maintained
their strength. In Yemen and near the Saudi Arabian
border, civilians and others caught in the exchanges
of ballistic missiles and rocket fi re and airstrikes
have died, prompting the international community to
express strong concerns to both sides. In April 2015,
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2216[24] and
implemented initiatives to bring the situation to a close.
Nevertheless, the Houthis continued attacks on Saudi
Arabia in the border areas,[25] while Saudi Arabia and
other Arab countries continued airstrikes and ground
operations against the Houthis.[26] Although ceasefi res


20 The United States stated that it decided to attack Al Shayrat airfi eld based on the belief that the airfi eld was the base for aircraft that carried out the chemical weapons attack, and that the chemical
weapons were stored at the airfi eld.

21 However, it has also been pointed out that Russian airstrikes have resulted in increasing the number of refugees and immigrants.

22 In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait established in 1981 for their coordination, integration and
cooperation in all fi elds including defense and economic policies, proposed a GCC initiative including a clause that the president could escape indictment in exchange for immediately transferring
power to the vice president.

23 The Houthis are followers of the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam and are based in Saada governorate in northern Yemen. From 2004 to 2010, the Houthis staged an armed uprising as an antigovernment
group, and an armed confl ict broke out with the Yemeni military.

24 The resolution provides for the withdrawal by the Houthis and others from government buildings they seized, the return of weapons they captured from the Yemeni forces, an arms embargo, a freeze
on assets and other measures.

25 In June 2015, the Houthis and Yemeni forces units supporting former President Saleh fi red a Scud missile at Khamis Mushait in southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi forces fi red two Patriot missiles to
intercept the Scud and identifi ed and destroyed the Scud launching site in southern Saada governorate. Since then, multiple similar incidents have occurred. It has been suggested that the Yemeni
Scud missile was purchased from North Korea and that Yemeni forces units supporting the Houthis were involved with its fi ring.


-----

and peace talks have been implemented repeatedly
under mediation by the UN since June 2015,[27] no fi nal
peace agreement has been reached.
Meanwhile, Yemen has become a foothold for
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is
based in southern Yemen. Amid the politically unstable
situation following the Houthis’ incursion into Aden in
February 2015, Islamic extremists gained strength, with
ISIL setting up a branch in Yemen and conducting terror
attacks on key government offi cials and Shiite mosques.
AQAP and ISIL have taken advantage of the confusion to
recruit fi ghters and gained strength, creating a new matter
of concern.

**(3) Attacks on Naval Vessels Navigating in the Red Sea**
**and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait**

In October 2016, there was an incident in which antiship missiles were fi red from an area under control of the
Houthis against the guided-missile destroyer USS Mason
of the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea, though no material damage
in the attack was confi rmed. In January 2017, the Houthis
reportedly used a bomb-laden boat to attack a frigate ship
of the Saudi Arabian Navy, causing casualties.[28]

Regarding commercial vessel, an anti-ship missile
hit and caused some damage to a UAE-registered
commercial vessel, leased by the Coalition that was
continuing air raids on the Houthis. The Houthis claimed
responsibility for the attack. In addition, a string of
other attacks on commercial vessels has been noted. A
group of the Houthis is said to have been involved in the
aforementioned attack on the commercial vessel.
Furthermore, in January 2017, the Houthis were
reported to have laid mines in Yemeni territorial waters
around the port of Mocha in western Yemen. It has been
pointed out that the Houthis apparently laid mines there
to prevent the Coalition from using the port.
At present, there have been no reports of damages
to vessels affi liated with Japan. As the Red Sea and the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait are important areas through which


many Japanese ships navigate, it is hoped that the turmoil
surrounding Yemen will be settled at an early date.

**3** **Situation in Libya**


**3**


**(1) Collapse of the Gaddafi Regime**
In Libya, following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime
in 2011, elections for a General National Congress were
held in July 2012. However, progress has not been made
in the rehabilitation of the military and public security.[29]
Militia and tribal leaders exert strong infl uence,[30] and
while receiving their support, secular and Islamic groups
struggle for power. Confrontation between Islamic and
secular groups intensifi ed, and consequently, Libya
became fragmented with two assemblies existing in
parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National Congress
based in the capital city of Tripoli and the secular groups’
Council of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern
Libya. In December 2015, the UN mediated an agreement
to form a national consensus cabinet. In March 2016, the
national unifi ed government was established, while both
Islamic groups and secular groups remained opposed to
it. However, as former Islamic groups took control of the
new government, former secular groups turned their back
and refused to join the national consensus government.
As a result, Libya remains divided between the East and
the West, with the establishment of domestic governance
and security not yet in sight.

**(2) Trends of Islamic Extremists**
Amid the political instability, Islamic extremists have
gained strength in Libya.[31] From January 2015, ISILrelated organizations in Libya conducted a series of
terrorist attacks.[32] ISIL positions Libya as the strongpoint
in North Africa, and with up to about 6,000 fi ghters
operating, the Libyan branch was considered to be the
most developed.[33] Based in Sirte, in particular, ISIL in
Libya has been gaining strength mainly through attacks
on coastal oil facilities. In May 2016, militias of the


27 The fi rst round of peace talks under the mediation by the UN took place in Geneva. Both the Yemeni Government and anti-government forces participated in the talks and had indirect consultations,
but fell short of reaching any fi nal agreement. In Switzerland in December 2015, the Yemeni Government and anti-government forces held the second round of peace talks, realizing their fi rst direct
negotiations. Although a ceasefi re was put into force before the second round, repeated ceasefi re violations occurred, leading the second round to be suspended without any major achievement.

28 In October 2000, the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole was attacked by a small boat loaded with high explosives. The attack, planned and carried out by Al Qaeda, killed 17 U.S. sailors.

29 According to The Military Balance 2011 and 2014, Libyan troop strength has decreased from 76,000 before the Arab Spring to 7,000 as of 2014.

30 In the eastern coastal area, a militia organization seeking to expand autonomous rule occupied oil-related facilities for nine months.

31 In September 2012, an Islamic extremist group attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, killing four Americans, including the Ambassador. In January 2014, the U.S. Department of State designated
Ansar al-Sharia, an offshoot of Al Qaeda that is deemed to have been involved in this incident, as a terrorist organization.

32 In January 2015, an armed group attacked an upscale hotel in the capital city of Tripoli, killing at least 13 people. ISIL’s “Tripoli Province” claimed responsibility for the attack. In February 2015, an
extremist organization that has sworn allegiance to ISIL posted a video on the Internet of what is believed to be the murder of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. In April 2015, an extremist organization
that has sworn allegiance to ISIL also released a video on what is believed to be the murder of 28 Ethiopian Christians. Furthermore, in January 2016, a suicide bomber’s truck ran into a police training
facility in Zliten in western Libya and exploded, killing over 67 trainees and injuring 120 trainees. On the same day, ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack.


-----

national united government began an operation to capture
Sirte, where several thousands of fi ghters entrenched
themselves, and in August 2016, at the request of the
national unifi ed government, the U.S. Forces commenced
air raids on Sirte. Thus, military operations against ISIL
in Libya gradually widened, and in December 2016, the
ground units of the national unifi ed government, with the
support of air raids by the U.S. Forces, recaptured Sirte.
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the threat
of ISIL still remains in Libya, and the U.S. Forces has
indicated its intention to continue military operations
in Libya. Going forward, there are concerns that ISIL
fi ghters who fl ed Libya may intensify their activities in
neighboring countries.

**4** **Situation in Afghanistan**


to cover (1) close air support to increase fi repower, and
(2) accompanying and advising Afghan ground and air
units. As there are destabilization factors, including the
Taliban’s expansion of infl uence, it was noted that the U.S.
Forces may again expand engagement in Afghanistan. In
July 2016, then President Obama reaffi rmed the policy
of maintaining the U.S. troop strength at around 8,400
through the end of the term of his administration. While
the Trump administration has not made its intention clear
with regard to enhancement of the U.S. engagement
in Afghanistan, the commander of the U.S. Forces in
Afghanistan in February 2017 requested a reinforcement
of around 1,000 troops for the missions of education,
training and advice for the Afghan forces.
As ISAF completed its mission in December 2014,
its security authority in Afghanistan was transferred to
ANDSF, but ANDSF faces challenges with logistics,
morale, air capabilities and leadership. According to a
report released by the U.S. Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in January 2017,
the U.S. Forces stationed in Afghanistan estimates that
the areas controlled by or under the infl uence of the
Afghan Government decreased by as much as 15% from
November 2015, suggesting that the Taliban is expanding
its own areas of control.[35]

Meanwhile, ISIL has established a Khorasan branch
in Afghanistan and its vicinity and has been carrying
out terrorist attacks there, and they need to be closely
monitored going forward.[36]
Afghanistan faces not only security problems but
also a plethora of challenges related to reconstruction,
including preventing corruption, enhancing the rule of
law, strengthening the crackdown on narcotics traffi cking,
and promoting regional development. Ensuring peace
and stability in Afghanistan is a common challenge of
the international community, which requires continuing
engagement with the country.


**4**


In Afghanistan, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in
the United States, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
that the U.S. Forces launched in November 2001 has
been engaged in the mop-up operation of the Taliban and
other groups. Furthermore, the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have conducted
security duties. These efforts have reportedly been
reducing the Taliban’s assault capabilities. Nevertheless,
the Taliban is still continuing to conduct terrorist attacks
across Afghanistan.
In December 2014, ISAF’s mission was completed.
In January 2015, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM)[34]
was launched, which primarily provides education,
training, and advice under the leadership of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The U.S. Forces,
while providing training to Afghan forces as a member
of NATO, implements Operation Freedom’s Sentinel
(OFS) against terrorism. In June 2016, then U.S.
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter indicated that the
U.S. Forces would expand its missions in Afghanistan


34 As of February 2017, about 13,000 troops were participating in the RSM. Based in Kabul, they were active in fi ve locations (Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Laghman). See Part I, Chapter
2, Section 8 for NATO’s tasks for the RSM.

35 In July 2015, the death of supreme Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar was confi rmed. While the Taliban has elected Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour as its new supreme leader, an internal
strife between pro- and anti-Mansour groups has been confi rmed. However, the Taliban has mounted offensives in northern, southern and western parts of Afghanistan, as well as in the capital Kabul,
effectively expanding areas under its control.

36 This is based on the “Worldwide Threat Assessment 2016” by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (released in February 2016). According to a report released in December 2015 by the Soufan li


-----

drafted by the provisional government, and former
Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was elected. In
the subsequent parliamentary election, supporters of
President el-Sisi won most of the seats. In the third year
since its inauguration, the el-Sisi government faces major
challenges, including the Libyan situation, responses
to domestic terrorism, shift to a fl oating exchange rate
system, and long-term stability through economic
reforms, such as abolition of subsidies.

**(2) Trends of Islamic Extremists**
In light of the rise in terror attacks by Islamic extremists
in the Sinai Peninsula in recent years, the Egyptian
Armed Forces has enhanced counterterrorism measures,
including operations to subdue them. Recently, however,
ISIL’s Sinai Province[40] has gained strength, carrying
out repeated terror attacks on security forces and other
targets. The group is said to have implemented operations
based on very advanced, organized plans, including
an attack on an Egyptian coast guard ship in August
2015.[41] In October, a Russian jetliner crashed due to
the explosion of a bomb set on the aircraft by an airport
employee supporting ISIL, killing all 224 passengers
and crewmembers. Later, ISIL’s Sinai Province claimed
responsibility for the incident. This kind of incident
has become a new matter of concern suggesting that
the ISIL network has been gradually penetrating into
Egypt. In addition to the Sinai Peninsula, terror attacks
have occurred in the Egyptian capital of Cairo[42] and ISIL
claimed responsibility for these attacks, indicating that
ISIL threats have been spreading not only in the Sinai
Peninsula but also in the rest of Egypt.


**5** **Situation of the Middle East Peace Efforts**


In the Middle East, there have been four wars between
Israel and Arab countries since the foundation of Israel
in 1948. Meanwhile, a peace process between Israel
and Palestine made temporary progress, including the
1993 Oslo Agreement, but has fallen short of achieving
peace.[37] As Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria
and Lebanon,[38] the international community needs to take
further initiatives.

**6** **Situation in Egypt**


**6**


**(1) Security Situation after the Arab Spring**
Then President Mohamed Mursi from the Muslim
Brotherhood,[39] elected by the presidential election
following the Arab Spring, was dismissed as an outcome
of the intervention by the armed forces in July 2013, and
a provisional government was formed. In May 2014, a
presidential election was held in line with the roadmap


37 Between Israel and Palestine, a peace process through full-fl edged negotiations started through the 1993 Oslo Agreement. In 2003, both Israel and Palestine accepted a roadmap for realizing a peace
initiative featuring their coexistence. However, its implementation has made little progress. Following rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces launched large-scale military actions
from late 2008 to early 2009 that included airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and the mobilization of ground forces. In November 2012, Israeli forces again conducted airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. By 2012,
Israel thus conducted two major military operations against the Gaza Strip. In both cases, fi ghting ceased under mediation by Egypt and others.

38 Israel and Syria disagree on issues such as the return of the Golan Heights that Israel has occupied since the Third Middle East War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has
been deployed in the Golan Heights to observe the implementation of the ceasefi re and military disengagement between the two countries. Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization. Military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO) are also active in this region.

39 A Sunni political organization established in Egypt in 1928 as an organization targeting the general public to “revive Islam.” In the 1950s, it became a target of a clampdown for plotting the
assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, by the 1970s, the organization became moderate to the extent of conducting political activities through parliament. Meanwhile, extremist
organizations were derived, with Muslim Brotherhood serving as the parent organization.

40 The predecessor of ISIL’s Sinai Province is said to have been Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, an Islamic extremist organization based in the Sinai Peninsula that aimed to overthrow Israel. It is deemed that the
organization intensifi ed its terrorist activities targeting Egyptian security authorities following the collapse of the Mursi Government in July 2013.

41 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment 2016” by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence.


-----

cessation of hostilities agreement. Later, IGAD added
international organizations (the UN, the AU, and the EU),
the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, China,
and African countries (South Africa, Chad, Algeria,
Nigeria, and Rwanda) to its mediation mission and
continued the mediation. In August 2015, the government
and the anti-government group reached the Agreement
on the Resolution of the Confl ict in the Republic of
South Sudan (ARCSS), including the establishment of
a transitional government. In response to the agreement,
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2241 in
October 2015 to add support for the implementation
of the agreement and other missions to the UNMISS
mandate, and Resolution 2252 in December 2015 to
extend the mandate of UNMISS until the end of July
2016. Later, efforts to implement the agreement were
made, and on April 29, 2016, Transitional Government
of National Unity was established in which Mr. Kiir and
Mr. Machar were the president and the fi rst vice-president
respectively.
On July 7, 2016, a shooting occurred in Juba
between the security forces of President Kiir and First Vice
President Machar. The fi erce exchange of fi re took place in
Juba until both sides declared the cessation of hostilities
on the night of July 11. As First Vice President Machar
left Juba and fl ed the country after July 10, President Kiir
dismissed First Vice President Machar on July 25 and
appointed then Mining Minister Taban Deng as First Vice
President. It has been pointed out that after Machar fl ed the
country, his unifying force of the anti-mainstream faction[45]
has weakened compared to before July. After leaving South
Sudan, Machar stayed in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and then went to South Africa. He is now believed
to be waiting for the optimal opportunity to return to South
Sudan from South Africa.
On August 12, 2016, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution to renew the mandate of UNMISS[46]
for the purpose of maintaining security in Juba and
surrounding areas, added the provisions to enable the
creation of the Regional Protection Force (RPF) with the
strength of up to 4,000 members[47] and the consideration


**7** **Situation in South Sudan**

**7**


Following the end of the North-South civil war that had
continued since 1983, the Republic of South Sudan was
separated and gained independence from the Republic
of the Sudan on July 9, 2011. On the same day, the
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
(UNMISS) was established with the adoption of UN
Security Council Resolution 1996 in order to maintain
peace and stability, and to support the establishment of
an environment contributing to the further development
of South Sudan.[43]

In South Sudan, President Kiir dismissed Vice
President Machar and all other cabinet ministers in July
2013, bringing to the surface a political confl ict between
the pro-President faction (government) and the pro-Vice
President faction (anti-government group). In December
of the same year, clashes that broke out between the proPresident faction and the pro-Vice President faction in
the capital city of Juba and violent acts targeting specifi c
ethnic groups spread to different areas of the country in a
short span of time, resulting in a large number of casualties,
refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Under
these circumstances, on December 24, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 2132 and decided to enhance
UNMISS by increasing the maximum military personnel
by 5,500. In addition, the “Intergovernmental Authority
on Development” (IGAD)[44] assisted by the UN and
the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South
Sudanese leaders and enable their reconciliation. The
IGAD helped the government and anti-government group
to sign an agreement in January 2014 on ceasing hostile
activities in South Sudan.
As confrontation between the government and the
anti-government group intensifi ed again subsequently,
the UN Security Council in May 2014 adopted Resolution
2155, which stipulated that the mandate of UNMISS
would be restricted to the four areas of the protection
of civilians, monitoring and investigating human rights,
creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian
assistance, and supporting the implementation of the


43 The initial mandate period was one year, with UNMISS comprised of up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 police personnel. UNMISS was designed to fulfi ll the roles of: (1) supporting peace
consolidation and thereby fostering long-term state building and economic development; (2) supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for confl ict
prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protection of civilians; and (3) supporting the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule
of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors.

44 IGAD was established in 1996. Its members are the eight East African nations of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Eritrea, and South Sudan.

45 After then First Vice President Machar was dismissed and Taban Deng of the anti-government faction became a member of the provisional government as First Vice President in July 2016, the “antimainstream faction” is used instead of the “anti-government faction.”

46 UN Security Council Resolution 2304 (August 2016). The time limit of the mandate is until December 15, 2016.

47 According to UN Security Council Resolution 2304, the RPF reports to the UNMISS Force Commander and is responsible for providing a secure environment for Juba and neighboring areas. The RPF
is authorized to use all necessary means to achieve the following three mandates: (1) support the development of conditions for safe and free actions in entering and departing Juba; (2) protect the


-----

of Islamic Courts (UIC). In 2006, Ethiopian forces
intervened with assistance from the United States and
drove away the UIC. In 2007, the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM)[52] was established based on the
approval of the UN Security Council. On the other hand,
Al Qaeda-related extremist insurgents derived from the
UIC, “Al-Shabaab”, gained strength in the central and
southern parts of the country and resisted the TFG. In
response to this, neighboring countries dispatched
troops to AMISOM and other organizations, and seized
Kismayo, a major stronghold of Al-Shabaab, in October
2012. In August 2014, AMISOM launched Operation
Indian Ocean and successfully recaptured some of the
cities in the central and southern areas which had served
as the bases of Al-Shabaab. In the following month, AlShabaab‘s leader Godane was killed by the attacks of the
U.S. Forces. In retaliation, Al-Shabaab frequently staged
terrorist attacks on AMISOM troops and member states.[53]
It has been pointed out that these attacks are designed to
restrain AMISOM member countries.
Additionally, in Somalia, especially the northern part
of it, there are believed to be outposts of pirates who are
active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
The international community implements a series of
initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia
based on the perception that instability of Somalia
triggers piracy issues.[54] The international community has
continued to implement initiatives off the Somalian coast,
which have contributed to steadily reducing the number
of pirate attacks.
Somalia saw the end of the transitional governance
period of the TFG in August 2012 and convened a
new federal assembly. A new president was elected
in September 2012 and a new cabinet was formed in
November 2012, establishing the integrated government
for the fi rst time in 21 years. The situation in Somalia
deteriorated in October 2016 with armed clashes
intensifying in the Puntland autonomous region in the
northeast and Galmudug autonomous region in the
central part of the country. Despite such circumstances,
elections were held for the House of the People and the
Upper House of the Federal Parliament across the country


of an arms embargo in certain cases.[48] The deployment
of the RPF was delayed in the absence of proactive
cooperation of the South Sudanese Government. Then, the
Government adopted a cabinet decision on November 25,
2016 to accept the RPF immediately and unconditionally,
allowing the work to move ahead to coordinate details
for the acceptance of the RPF deployment. On April 20,
2017, an advance party of Bangladesh’s construction
engineering company arrived in South Sudan as the fi rst
unit of the RPF.
On December 16, 2016, the UN Security Council
decided to extend the mandate of UNMISS for another
year to December 15, 2017,[49] and asked the UN SecretaryGeneral to report on the situation of South Sudan every
30 days, 90 days and six months.
In December 2016, President Kiir announced the
initiation of the national dialogue[50] and issued the relevant
decree. On May 22, 2017, a swearing-in ceremony of the
national dialogue steering committee was held to launch
the national dialogue, showing some progress in the
political process towards domestic stability.

**8** **Situation in Somalia**


**8**


Somalia has been in a state of anarchy since its government
collapsed in 1991.[51] In 2005, the “Transitional Federal
Government” (TFG) was established as a product
of mediation by neighboring countries, but fi ghting
escalated with opposing groups such as the “Union


48 When the UN Secretary-General reports that the deployment of the RPF is being obstructed in political or operational aspects and/or the implementation of the mandate of UNMISS is being obstructed,
the UN Security Council, within fi ve days of the report, is to consider appropriate measures, including an arms embargo.

49 UN Security Council Resolution 2327 (December 2016). The time limit of the mandate is until December 15, 2017.

50 The political process to manage the important transitional period of the state, including achieving a breakthrough in the political impasse.

51 “Somaliland” located in the Northwest declared its independence in 1991. “Puntland” located in the Northeast declared the establishment of an autonomous government in 1998.

52 AMISOM is composed mainly of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, and joined by Ethiopia in January 2013. Under UN Security Council Resolution 2124 (November 2013),
it was decided that the number of troops would be increased from 17,731 to 22,126.

53 In January 2016, Al-Shabaab attacked an AMISOM base in El Adde, southern Somalia, killing and injuring a large number of people.


-----

in November 2016. In February 2017, the presidential
election was held by votes of the members of the lower
and upper houses of parliament, where Farmajo, former
prime minister of the provisional government, was elected
by defeating incumbent President Hassan.

**9** **Situation in Mali**


by the sending of troops by France and the deployment
of AFISMA. In April 2013, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 2100 to determine the establishment
of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), whose
tasks include the stabilization of densely-populated areas
and support for the reconstruction of national functions
throughout Mali. Based on this resolution, MINUSMA,
which had its authority delegated by AFISMA, became
operational in July 2013. With the support of MINUSMA,
a presidential election was held in a peaceful manner, and
a new government was established in September of the
same year.[57]

In August 2014, the French forces integrated and
reorganized its units in Mali, Chad, and Niger in order
to deal effectively with the expanding threat of terrorism
across the whole Sahel region, including Mali,[58] and
launched Operation Barkhane covering the entire region.[59]
The French forces are currently working with MINUSMA
and the troops of the countries in the region to stabilize
the Sahel region, including northern Mali.[60]

In June 2016, the UN Security Council adopted
Resolution 2295 to extend the mandate of MINUSMA
to June 2017 and decided to increase the strength
of MINUSMA by about 2,500 troops.[61] In February
2017, the Mali Government and armed groups began
joint patrols based on the Agreement on Peace and
Reconciliation in Mali.[62]


**9**


In Mali, an anti-government Tuareg[55] insurgent group,
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA), raised a rebellion in January 2012, joined by
other groups, including “Ansar Dine,” an Islamic extremist
group. The MNLA conquered northern cities and declared
the independence of the northern region in April 2012.
Subsequently, Islamic extremist groups, including Ansar
Dine that expelled the MNLA, “Movement for Unity and
Jihad in West Africa” (MUJAO), and “Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), governed the northern region
based on the sharia law, aggravating the humanitarian and
security situations in northern Mali.
In response to this situation, in December 2012,
the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2085 and
approved the deployment of the African-led International
Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA),[56] whose tasks
included revitalizing the capabilities of Malian troops
and security organizations and supporting the Malian
authorities. The Malian provisional government recaptured
its major cities in the northern part of the country, assisted


55 The Tuareg Tribe is a nomadic ethnic minority in the Sahara Desert. It is pointed out that the tribe has been in confl ict with the Government of Mali seeking for autonomy in northern Mali.

56 AFISMA receives troops from member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria.

57 In June 2013, the provisional government and MNLA reached an agreement on such issues as allowing the northern area to participate in the presidential election and approving the dispatch of Mali
troops to northern cities.

58 The Sahel region refers to the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. The countries in the Sahel region include Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.

59 Operation Barkhane consists of a total of around 3,500 troops. The Operation’s headquarters is located in Chad, and it has bases in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The operation is executed through
the swift deployment of units to various areas. In northern Mali, the French forces collaborate with MINUSMA units, and in other areas, collaborate with the military forces of the countries in the region.
The Operation mainly conducts mop-ups of terrorists and joint patrol.

60 A UN Security Council resolution authorizes the French forces to take every measure to support MINUSMA personnel under urgent and serious threats at the request of the UN Secretary-General.
Germany has increased its MINUSMA personnel to effectively reduce the burden of France.

61 Under UN Security Council Resolution 2295 (June 2016), it was decided to extend the mandate period to June 2017, expand the maximum military personnel from the existing 11,240 to 13,290,
and increase the maximum civilian police personnel from the existing 1,440 to 1,920.

62 The Mali Government signed a peace and reconciliation agreement with the Platform, a pro-government armed group in northern Mali, on May 15, 2015, and a similar agreement with the Coordination


-----

**Trends in the Spread of International Terrorism**
**3**

**1** **Characteristics of Recent International Terrorism**

International terrorist organizations, including Al
Qaeda and ISIL, are based primarily in countries and
regions where governing systems have been weakened
or collapsed mainly in the Middle East and Africa.
They cross insuffi ciently controlled national borders to
expand and boost their operations. Some organizations
are capable of implementing terror attacks in locations
far from their bases. These terrorist organizations,
though considered to be differing in their objectives and
capabilities, generally tend to use cyberspace, including
social media, for information sharing and coordination,
and to form global networks to obtain weapons and funds.
Some organizations use sophisticated public relations
strategies to skillfully promote themselves, recruit
fi ghters and inspire terror attacks.[63] Some organizations
are said to have the potential to conduct cyber attacks.[64]

While Western countries have led the War on Terror
since the September 2001 terror attacks in the United
States, the number of victims of terror attacks in recent
years is increasing.[65]

In European countries and the United States,
“homegrown” terrorism in which residents are inspired by
the extremism espoused by Al Qaeda or ISIL and conduct
terrorist attacks at home has become a serious threat. In
particular, there are concerns that their nationals would
accumulate combat training and combat experience in
confl ict-torn regions such as Iraq and Syria, become
indoctrinated into extremism, and then return to their
countries and conduct terrorist attacks.
In recent years, “lone-wolf” terrorism is also
seen as a threat because it is diffi cult to detect signs in
advance and prevent it. “Lone-wolf” terrorism is planned
and committed by individuals or groups who become
infl uenced by extremist ideology through information
found on the Internet and elsewhere, without having any
offi cial relations with terrorist organizations such as Al


Qaeda and ISIL. Given that ISIL has continued to call for
terrorist attacks in Europe and other parts of the world,
there are concerns about terrorist attacks taking place in
the future as well.
In connection with Japan, in early 2015, when there
was a terrorist incident involving the murder of Japanese
nationals in Syria, ISIL declared clearly that its acts of
terrorism would target Japanese nationals. In October
2015, ISIL claimed responsibility for the murder of a
Japanese national in Bangladesh. An ISIL magazine has
also cited Japanese nationals as terror attack targets. In
light of the terrorist attack in Bangladesh in July 2016, in
which seven Japanese nationals were murdered, Japan is
not in any way immune from the threat of international
terrorism.[66]

The proliferation of the threat of terrorism has gained
momentum. The diversifi cation of its perpetrators, coupled
with the growing complexity of regional confl icts, has
made it further diffi cult to prevent their occurrence. For
this reason, international cooperation on counterterrorism
measures has become even more important. Currently,
the international community as a whole is taking various
steps, including military means as well as measures to
cut off the funding sources for terrorist organizations and
prevent the international movement of terrorist fi ghters.[67]

**2** **Trends of Major International Terrorist**
**Organizations**


**2**


**(1) ISIL**
ISIL is characterized by its pursuit of a unique political
and religious order by rejecting the conventional system
of national governance outright and claiming the
establishment of the caliphate.
ISIL, unlike traditional terrorist organizations, is
also said to be characterized by its abundant funds,
powerful and sophisticated military forces, well

63 International terrorist organizations use the Internet and social media to recruit young people as fi ghters. According to a UN report in May 2015, the international community is called on to cooperate
in efforts to address the issue of women joining terrorist organizations.

64 In January 2015, a cyber attack was lodged against the U.S. Central Command’s Twitter account. The attacker is believed to be the Cyber Caliphate, an ISIL-affi liated cyber unit.

65 ISIL and other Islamic extremists have increased attacks on soft targets, leading to a rise in the number of ordinary citizens becoming victims of terrorist attacks.

66 The seventh issue of the ISIL propaganda magazine Dabiq published in February 2015 included descriptions of the murder of two Japanese nationals in Syria and renewed a call for terror attacks
on Japanese nationals and interests. Furthermore, the 11th issue (published in September 2015) called for terror attacks on Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
The 12th issue (published in November 2015) described the murder of a Japanese national in Bangladesh and warned anew that Japanese nationals and Japanese interests would be the targets
of terror attacks.

67 In September 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 on the issue of foreign terrorist fi ghters. The resolution requested member states to make exits from their countries for
the purpose of executing acts of terrorism punishable under domestic laws. The resolution also includes measures obligating member states to prevent entry or transit through their territories
of any individual about whom that state had credible information which demonstrates reasonable grounds for believing that the individual is attempting to enter or transit through its territory for
the purpose of participating in acts of terrorism. In addition, at the G7 Summit held in Germany in June 2015, the leaders reaffi rmed their commitment to effectively implement the established


-----

developed organizational structure, and effective control
of certain areas. It is deemed that ISIL has excellent
military operational capabilities with the participation by
Ba’ath Party members from the former Iraqi regime and
former Iraqi military offi cers, and includes numerous
foreign fi ghters. Thanks in part to an adept public relations
strategy, ISIL was able to increase the number of its fi ghters
for a while. It has been noted, however, that the number
of fi ghters has declined markedly because of the killings
of many fi ghters in air raids and the growing number of
deserters due to delays in salary payments amid ISIL’s
fi nancial diffi culties and the degradation of morale.
Since the start of the invasion of Iraq, ISIL had
brought under its control strategic cities, oilfi eld regions,
and military facilities in succession, making clever use of
a variety of equipment captured from the Iraqi Security
Forces and using deceptive tactics.[68] Recently, however,
ISIL has suffered signifi cant loss of territories under
its control, and the terrorist group is reportedly shifting
gradually to asymmetric warfare. In October 2016, it was
confi rmed in Iraq that ISIL adopted the tactic of using a
small commercial drone loaded with bombs.
Since ISIL has also called for terror attacks in
European countries and the United States, there are
credible concerns that ISIL fi ghters returning home from
regions of confl ict like Iraq and Syria would carry out
terrorist attacks in these countries. As seen in the series


of terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the
attack on a restaurant in Dhaka, Bangladesh in July 2016,
ISIL perpetrated terrorist acts in places far away from its
bases, including Europe and Asia. ISIL is also urging its
supporters to carry out terror attacks using knives and
vehicles if bombs or guns are not available, raising the
specter of more terrorist attacks with the use of whatever
is around. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that terror
attacks are recently being transformed from those directly
directed by ISIL into remote-controlled attacks by some
supporters who are urged to carry them out, giving rise
to concerns over the further spread and intensifi cation of
terrorist activities.

**(2) Al Qaeda**
With regard to Al Qaeda that is believed to have directed
the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Osama Bin Laden, the group’s
leader who was hiding in Pakistan, as well as many
executives of affi liated organizations, were killed in U.S.
operations in May 2011. The Al Qaeda core is now said
to be focused on ensuring the survival of the organization.
Nonetheless, the possibility of Al Qaeda attacks has not
disappeared. While the command and control capabilities
of Al Qaeda’s leadership have been declining, Al
Qaeda affi liates have reportedly gained strength and are
perpetrating terrorism from their bases mainly in North
Africa and the Middle East.


**Commentary**

**Recent Tactics of ISIL**

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has adopted brutal methods to carry out terrorist attacks from before, and recently it
has resorted to attacks making use of new tactics, including the use of drones.
For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has stated that ISIL uses small commercial drones that can fl y for 45 minutes for
its terrorist attacks in the eastern part of Mosul liberated by the Iraqi Security Forces. These drones were reported to have engaged
in reconnaissance and other missions previously, and now they appear to be used to drop grenades and other explosives from above.
Since ISIL has carried out attacks using chemical weapons in the past, there are fears that the group may conduct attacks using
drones loaded with chemical weapons.
ISIL has been distributing manuals over the Internet regarding various methods of terrorist attacks*, and has also been calling
on supporters around the world to carry out terrorist attacks against Western interests. In this light, there are also fears that terrorist
attacks using drones may take place in Western developed countries.

-  Islamic extremists often give online lessons on terrorist attacks. In the past, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and other groups have disclosed bombmaking methods in their offi cial publications, thereby fueling the spread of terrorism.


68 It has been pointed out that ISIL uses combat uniforms, etc., obtained from the Iraqi Security Forces and others to approach security checkpoints and vehicles to conduct suicide bombings. ISIL is l


-----

**(3) Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)**
AQAP[69] is a Sunni extremist organization based in Yemen.
While Yemen has remained in a state of confusion, AQAP
has expanded operations based in Yemen and taken
control of a Yemeni military base. It is feared that AQAP
will take advantage of the power vacuum to expand its
infl uence further. The United States is engaged in the
limited military operation, including the killing of AQAP
leader Wuhayshi in a mop-up operation using drone
strikes. In January 2017, the United States carried out an
operation using the Osprey aircraft.

**(4) Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)**
AQIM, a Sunni extremist organization based in Algeria,
has kidnapped mainly Algerians, Europeans, and U.S.
nationals. The strength of AQIM in northern Mali has
declined due to the French-led military intervention that
started in 2013, but the group is still continuing its terrorist
attacks in northern Mali and other regions in West Africa
and is also continuing activities in Libya and Tunisia as
well. In December 2015, Al-Murabitoun joined AQIM,
and in March 2017, AQIM Sahara, Ansar Dine and AlMurabitoun were integrated. It has been pointed out that
the integration was designed to counter ISIL, which had
been gaining strength in western Africa and began to hurt
AQIM’s vested interests. AQIM is reportedly expected to
scale up its terror attacks going forward.


It has been noted that the number of terror attack
incidents has been on the rise in Turkey in recent years.
In the country, terror attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), or PKK,[71] which has
been feuding with the Turkish Government for years,
and others have been occurring continuously.[72] ISIL is
also believed to have been responsible for a bombing
attack at a tourist spot in Istanbul in January 2016, a
suicide bombing attack at Ataturk International Airport
in Istanbul in June 2016, and an attack on a nightclub
in Istanbul in January 2017. It has been pointed out that
the increase in terror attacks apparently carried out by
ISIL can be traced to Turkey’s deeper involvement in the
military operations against ISIL.
Among North African countries, Algeria, Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia have seen frequent terrorist attacks in
recent years, indicating that ISIL and Al Qaeda affi liates
have been operating in these countries. In January 2013,
the masked brigade of Al-Murabitoun led by Mokhtar
Belmokhtar launched an assault on a natural gas plant
in In Amenas, southeastern Algeria, killing numerous
people, including 10 Japanese nationals. In Tunisia,
ISIL attacked the Bardo National Museum in Tunis in
March 2015, killing 21 people, including foreign tourists,
among whom were three Japanese nationals. ISIL was
also involved in the indiscriminate fi ring at a hotel beach
in the tourist spot of Sousse in June 2015, in which 38
people were killed.

Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the
Middle East Regions


**3** **Trends in Global Terrorism**


**(1) The Middle East and North Africa**
Terrorist attacks by ISIL, which is based and operating in
Iraq and Syria, and Al Qaeda-affi liated groups and other
Islamic extremist organizations continue to take place in
various parts of the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia, cited by AQAP and ISIL as their
attack target, has continued to crack down on those
alleged to have connections with these organizations.[70]
In particular, ISIL has very frequently conducted terror
attacks on Shiite mosques and issued statements vowing
to continue such attacks. Therefore, it is feared that ISIL
will continue expanding terror attacks.

|Col1|: ISIL-related group : Al Qaeda affiliate : Group whose relation with Al Qaeda has been pointed out : Other major Islamic extremist terrorist group|
|---|---|
|||
|||
|||


Fig. I-3-1-2


Al Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM) Al-Nusrah Front and the Levant (ISIL)Islamic State of Iraq Al Qaeda

ISIL Libya Branch Hizballah Taliban
(Total: 3 branches) SyriaSyria

Hamas LebanonLebanon IraqIraq AfghanistanAfghanistan

PalestinePalestine ISIL Khorasan

AlgeriaAlgeria LibyaLibya EgyptEgypt Branch PakistanPakistan

ISIL Algeria Branch Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia ISIL Bahrain Branch

Tenrik-e Taliban Pakistan

Mali ISIL Sinai Branch

YemenYemen ISIL Yemen Branch

ISIL Saudi Arabia Branch (Total: 5 branches)

NigeriaNigeria (Total: 3 branches) SomaliaSomalia

Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP)

Ansar al-Dine ISIL West Africa Branch

(Boko Haram)

: ISIL-related group Al-Shabaab

: Al Qaeda affiliate

: Group whose relation with Al Qaeda has been pointed out Source: Worldwide Threat Assessment 2016, U.S. Department of State

: Other major Islamic extremist terrorist group “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015,” etc.


69 AQAP was established in 2009 by its founder Nasser al-Wuhayshi along with Al Qaeda members active in Saudi Arabia to found a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the entire Middle East and
implement Sharia. AQAP was reportedly involved in an attempted bombing attack on a Northwest Airlines jet in December 2009 and in an incident where explosives were found in multiple air cargoes
on a fl ight from Yemen to the United States in October 2010. The fi rst issue of Inspire published by AQAP in July 2010 explained a simple way of making a bomb.

70 In July 2015, the Saudi security authorities arrested 431 people alleged to have connections with ISIL, enhancing the domestic crackdown on terrorists.

71 PKK is a separatist organization that operates from footholds in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq for the purpose of establishing a Kurdish state. Its attacks target mainly the Turkish Government
and security forces.

72 In February 2016, a bombing terror attack, alleged to have targeted the Turkish military forces, occurred near the Air Force command in Ankara, killing 29 people. A PKK affi liate known as Teyrebazen


-----

**(2) Sub-Saharan Africa**
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic extremists have been
gaining strength in countries such as Kenya, Mali,
Somalia, and Nigeria.
In Kenya, Al-Shabaab[73] is stepping up terror attacks
in Nairobi, Mombasa, in the northeastern region and the
coastal region. Meanwhile, ISIL had many of its members
arrested in Kenya in 2016. Despite this, the group still
claimed responsibility for the assault on the Mombasa
police station in September 2016 and the assault on
policemen guarding the U.S. Embassy in October 2016.
It has been noted that these incidents demonstrate the
broadening of the ISIL network in East Africa and the
possible increase in the number of returning ISIL fighters,
raising the fear of further terror attacks by ISIL within
Kenya going forward.
In Somalia, Al-Shabaab has been continuing attacks
on AMISOM units. In February 2016, the group evidently
resorted to terror techniques different from previous ones,
exploding a personal computer-shaped bomb on a plane
departing from Mogadishu to Djibouti.
In Nigeria, Boko Haram,[74] which aims to create an
Islamic state, has stepped up its activities since 2009,
repeatedly carrying out terrorist attacks[75] in retaliation
against crackdowns by police and other authorities. In
March 2015, Abubakar Shekau, who leads the biggest
faction in Boko Haram, pledged allegiance to ISIL, which
accepted the pledge the same month and recognized Boko
Haram as ISIL’s West African branch. However, as ISIL
designated al-Barnawi as the new leader of Boko Haram,
internal strife has been intensifying within the group.
Cited as an underlying factor of the internal strife is the
difference in approaches between the Shekau faction and
the Barnawi faction. While the Shekau faction targets
ordinary citizens and Muslims in suicide bomb attacks
by children and women, the Barnawi faction targets the
Nigerian security forces and Christians. As the Nigerian
forces and military forces of neighboring countries are


mounting mop-up operations against Boko Haram, its
influence is reportedly declining to make it difficult to
carry out large-scale terror attacks.

**(3) Europe**
In Europe, individuals inspired by Islamic extremists and
fighters returning mainly from Iraq and Syria have been
conducting terror attacks. It is possible that ISIL has its
foreign fighters return to their home countries and instructs
them to conduct terror attacks at home. It has been pointed
out that European countries participating in the coalition
against ISIL are exposed to the threat of terror attacks by
individuals directly instructed by ISIL or inspired by its
ideas. In line with this warning, the European Counter
Terrorism Centre (ECTC) notes that France, Belgium,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom face a
particularly large risk of terror attacks.
In France, the shooting attacks, including one at
the head office of the French weekly newspaper Charlie
Hebdo,[76] occurred in January 2015. In November 2015,
large-scale coordinated terror attacks were carried out
in Paris, killing a large number of people. “ISIL France”
claimed responsibility for these attacks in a statement.
Furthermore, in July 2016, a truck driven by a person
inspired by ISIL’s extremism ran into pedestrians in Nice,
southern France, killing 86 people.
In Belgium,[77] a string of terror attacks in Brussels
killed 35 people in March 2016. “ISIL Belgium” later
claimed responsibility for the attacks in a statement.
Furthermore, in Germany, multiple terrorist incidents
reportedly linked to ISIL occurred in 2016. For example,
in December 2016, a truck ploughed into a Christmas
market in Berlin, killing 12 people.
In the United Kingdom, in March 2017, an attacker
drove a car into pedestrians on the pavement in central
London and attempted to make a raid on the U.K.
Parliament, killing five people in total. In May 2017, a
suicide bomber attacked a concert hall in Manchester in


73 Al-Shabaab, an official Al Qaeda affiliate, has attacked the Somali military forces and foreign forces stationed in Somalia to found an Islamic state, overthrow the Somali Government, and remove
foreign forces. Most Al-Shabaab members are Somali and foreign fighters. In February 2015, Al-Shabaab called on Islamic followers in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada to
conduct attacks at shopping centers and business districts in these countries.

74 Boko Haram, aiming to overthrow the Nigerian Government, implement Islamic law and deny Western education, has repeatedly conducted suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks on the military,
police, and government officials, as well as Christian facilities, mainly in northern Nigeria (primarily Borno State where there are numerous Muslims). Recently, soft targets such as markets have come
under Boko Haram attacks. At present, Boko Haram operates as ISIL’s West African branch. In April 2014, Boko Haram abducted over 200 female students. In response, the United States dispatched
drones and other assets to support the search activities of the Nigerian Government. In addition, the UN Security Council Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee (the name at the time; it has since been
renamed the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee) added Boko Haram to its list of sanction targets.

75 Recently, Boko Haram has reportedly repeated suicide bombings using women and girls who are less likely to raise alarm.
76 Of the two brothers who conducted the shooting attack at the Charlie Hebdo head office, one is known to have received training at an AQAP camp. In addition, AQAP released a statement saying it
had issued instructions directly to the brothers. Amedy Coulibaly, who attacked a Jewish grocery store, is believed to have posted a video on the Internet in which he swears allegiance to ISIL, although
no clear link between these attacks has been confirmed.i


-----

the central part of the United Kingdom, killing 22 people.
In the incident in Manchester, in particular, the attacker
contacted an ISIL recruiter and the possibility of his
traveling to Syria was also noted. These incidents raised
concerns over the penetration of individuals inspired by
Islamic extremist groups in the United Kingdom.
It has been suggested that the string of terror attacks
believed to have been perpetrated by ISIL-affiliated
organizations and ISIL supporters in Europe in recent
years have certain links among them. For example, the
attacks in Nice, Berlin, and London were carried out in a
similar manner using trucks. It is alleged that the groups
responsible for the series of terror attacks in Paris and
Brussels cooperated with each other. These attacks may
indicate that ISIL, despite the dwindling territories under
its control in Iraq and Syria, intended to demonstrate its
operational capabilities even outside those countries. It
has also been noted that ISIL is increasingly turning to
remote-controlled terror attacks by continuing to call
for acts of terrorism outside Iraq and Syria, prompting
European governments to grow more alert.[78]

**(4) The United States and Oceania**
Terror threats have spread to the Americas. Since
December 2015, terrorist incidents perpetrated by ISIL
have occurred in the United States as well. These series
of terror attacks were carried out against soft targets,
leading to concern over further occurrences of lone-wolf
terrorist attacks by ISIL in the United States.
In Canada, a male convert to Islam, who is believed
to have sympathized with ISIL’s extremism, shot and
killed a soldier of the Canadian forces in front of the
Parliament in Ottawa in October 2014.
In Australia in December 2014, an ISIL supporter
attacked a Sydney café. Under the National Terrorism
Threat Advisory System introduced in Australia in
November 2015, the threat level remains “Probable,” the
third from the top of the scale of five levels providing


advice about the likelihood of an act of terrorism
occurring in Australia. In September 2016, ISIL called for
terrorist attacks by naming tourist facilities in Australia.
While those suspected of planning terror attacks have
been continuously identified and arrested in Australia,
the threat of terrorism in the country is still deemed to
be high.

**(5) Southeast Asia**
In Southeast Asia, while some progress continued to be
observed in the crackdown on terrorist organizations in
2016, Islamic extremist groups have become more active
in Indonesia and the Philippines. In addition, young
people from Indonesia, Malaysia, and other countries
have reportedly traveled to Iraq and Syria as foreign
fighters, posing a new threat to the region.[79]

While Indonesia has enhanced its crackdown on
ISIL supporters, a bombing attack occurred in Jakarta
in January 2016, the first terrorist attack by ISIL in
Southeast Asia. As Indonesia provides the largest number
of ISIL fighters among Southeast Asian countries, there is
credible concern over the occurrence of terrorist attacks
by returning fighters.
While no major terror attacks have been seen in
Malaysia, in June 2016, a grenade exploded in a restaurant
in the suburbs of the capital city of Kuala Lumpur,
causing some injuries. This is said to be the first terror
attack committed by ISIL in the country. In Malaysia, a
large number of ISIL supporters have been arrested since
2014, leading some observers to believe that the layers
of ISIL supporters have been expanding in the country.[80]
In the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and the Maute Group,[81] both of which pledged allegiance
to ISIL, are perpetrating acts of terror. In particular, the
ASG was responsible for a bomb attack on the market
in Davao in the south of the country in September 2016.
More recently, the militant group is believed to have been
involved in attacks on ships navigating on the Sulu Sea


78 After the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015, the French Government raised the terror alert to the highest level in Paris, mobilizing a large number of police officers and military personnel. It has
also extended the declaration of the state of emergency issued immediately after the Paris terror attacks, and remains highly alert to the threat of terrorism.

79 In Indonesia, the Government banned participation in ISIL in August 2014. Under the existing legal system, however, it is said that the law enforcement authorities do not have the authority to arrest
ISIL supporters unless there is evidence of their clear involvement in terrorism activities.

80 It has been pointed out that security force members, public servants and other government employees, as well as housewives and other ordinary citizens, were among those arrested.
81 The Maute Group is an Islamic extremist organization made up of remnants of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and foreign fighters. The Philippine police is investigating the suspected


-----

and a number of hostage-taking incidents. In addition,
Marawi, a city in Mindanao in the south of the country,
has continued to be occupied by what is believed to be
the same Group, among other forces, since May 2017.
Despite the operation of the Philippine military to
recapture the city, the Group has taken citizens as hostages
and the casualties from the fighting have extended to
civilians, becoming a significant concern to the country.
Many people believe that the ASG’s pledge of allegiance
to ISIL was for propaganda. But the group beheaded
two Canadian hostages in June 2016, and a German
hostage in February 2017, showing the brutality similar
to that of ISIL, raising concern that ISIL’s extremism has
penetrated deeply into Southeast Asia.

**(6) South Asia**
South Asia has been subject to frequent terror attacks for
a long time. In Pakistan, particularly, Tehrik-e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) and other terrorist organizations have
frequently conducted terror attacks on educational,
military and other facilities. In recent cases of terrorist
attacks with large casualties, such as the bombing attacks
that took place in Quetta, western Pakistan in August
and October 2016, TTP and ISIL both issued statements
claiming responsibility for the attacks. This is taken to
indicate the possibility of ISIL deepening cooperation
with extremist groups in Pakistan.
In Bangladesh, Japanese nationals were caught in
terrorist incidents in October 2015 and in July 2016. In


the terrorist attack on a restaurant in Dhaka in July 2016,
a total of 20 people were killed, including seven Japanese
aid workers. “ISIL Bangladesh” claimed responsibility
for these incidents.
ISIL has unilaterally established the Khorasan
branches in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the Indian
subcontinent, in September 2014, Al Qaeda’s leader
Ayman al Zawahiri announced the establishment of a new
branch in India.[82] Given these developments including a
bombing near the German embassy in Afghanistan’s
capital city of Kabul in May 2017 that killed and wounded
more than 500 people, Islamic extremists are feared to
intensify terror attacks in South Asia.

**(7) Russia**
ISIL has gained strength in southern Russia, establishing
a Caucasus branch in June 2015.[83] Meanwhile, ISIL
issued statements in October and November 2015 calling
for terror attacks on Russia for implementing airstrikes in
Syria. While no major terror attack had been confirmed
in Russia previously, a bombing attack and an attempted
bombing occurred targeting the subway in the second
largest Russian city of St. Petersburg in April 2017,
killing 13 people. The attack is said to have been carried
out under the influence of Islamic extremists. Given that
the northern Caucasus region is one of the major fighter
suppliers for ISIL, there is concern that ISIL-inspired
fighters and ISIL supporters in the region will carry out
terror attacks and that terror threats will spread in Russia.


82 Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri has stated that the goal of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is to free Muslim followers who are oppressed in Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and
Sri Lanka.


-----

**Section 2 Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**


The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological and
chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that
deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a significant

**Nuclear Weapons**
**1**


During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962
raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear
war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other
than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device in or before 1966[1] from having
nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and
disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through
two-way negotiations.[2]

The NPT is currently signed by 191 countries and
regions.[3] While some countries that had previously
possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this
treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning
these weapons,[4] India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to
accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. There
are other countries that have declared the development
and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea,
which announced that it conducted nuclear tests in
October 2006, May 2009, February 2013, January 2016,
and September 2016.[5]

Then U.S. President Obama’s speech in April 2009
in which he expressed his hopes for a world without
nuclear weapons demonstrated U.S. determination to
take concrete steps towards this world, specifically: the
reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national
security while maintaining nuclear deterrence; the signing
of a new treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction


threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there
still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including
terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less
effectively, could acquire and use WMDs.

Treaty I (START I) between the United States and Russia;
and pursuit of ratification of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty (CTBT)[6] by the U.S. Government.
This in turn encouraged the international community
to take initiatives towards nuclear disarmament and
nonproliferation.
In fact, in April 2010, the presidents of the United
States and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (New START)[7] to replace START I,
which was put into effect in February 2011.
The United Kingdom also stated in the Strategic
Defense and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010
that the country would decrease the number of its nuclear
warheads, and the NSS-SDSR 2015 released in November
2015 confirmed there is no change in this policy to reduce
the number of nuclear warheads.
In the area of “nuclear security” which addresses
terrorist activities that utilize nuclear and other radioactive
materials, the Nuclear Security Summit that commenced
at the proposal of then President Obama has been held
on four occasions. The fourth Nuclear Security Summit
that was held in Washington, D.C. in March-April 2016
adopted a Communiqué, which shared the recognition
that the threat of nuclear terrorism remains an imminent
challenge to the international community, and which
outlined the need for continuous efforts to prevent nuclear
materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors
even after the summit.[8]


The United States, the then Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China acceded to the NPT in 1992.

Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith.

As of June 2017

South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

After North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, it pledged that it would remain a contracting state to the NPT. However, North Korea again declared its withdrawal from the
NPT in January 2003. In the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted in September 2005, North Korea pledged to return to the NPT at an early date. Nonetheless, North Korea subsequently
announced the implementation of five nuclear tests. North Korea’s nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT.

Adopted in 1996, this treaty bans all nuclear test explosions regardless of the location. Of the 44 nations that are required to ratify it for the treaty to enter into force, 8 nations have not yet
ratified or signed the treaty (United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and North Korea) (as of December 2016).

The treaty stipulates that both countries would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 by seven years following the
treaty’s entry into force. In April 2017, the United States reported that it had 1,411 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 673 deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia reported that it had
1,765 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 523 deployed delivery vehicles. These numbers are as of March 1, 2017.

At the Nuclear Security Summit, it was confirmed that the IAEA would play a central role in international nuclear security initiatives. Accordingly, the IAEA hosted the International Conference on


-----

The fact that the international community has
begun to make steady and major strides towards nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation contributes to
improving the international security environment, and is
a welcome development. At the same time, while in June
2013, then President Obama made a speech in Berlin
in which he announced his intention to negotiate with
Russia on the reduction of the number of U.S. deployed

**Biological and Chemical Weapons**
**2**


Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture
at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most
materials, equipment, and technology needed to
manufacture these weapons can be used for both military
and civilian purposes. For example, water purification
equipment used to desalinate sea water can be exploited to
extract bacteria for the production of biological weapons,
and sodium cyanide used for the process of metal coating
can be abused for the production of chemical weapons.[11]
Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are
attractive to states and non-state actors, such as terrorists,
seeking asymmetric means of attack.[12]

Biological weapons have the following characteristics:
(1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there
is usually an incubation period of a few days between
exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even
the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and
(5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending
on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon.[13]

As has been pointed out, advancements in life
science could be misused or abused for the development
of biological weapons. In view of these concerns, in
November 2009, the United States established guidelines[14]


strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third, among
other cuts, negotiations have yet to begin.[9] In contrast,
China is deemed to have increased its inventory of
nuclear warheads as well as developed and deployed their
means of delivery,[10] and thereby, continued to enhance
the capability of its nuclear forces. It has been pointed out
that initiatives for reducing nuclear weapons involving
China will be needed in the future.

on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons
and their use by terrorists. The guidelines set out that the
United States would take measures to ensure the thorough
management of pathogens and toxins.[15]

As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used
mustard gas, tabun, and sarin[16] in the Iran-Iraq War. In
the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress
Iraqi Kurds.[17] It is believed that other chemical weapons[18]
that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent,
and easy-to-manage binary rounds.[19] In August 2013,
sarin was used in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, where
Syrian troops clashed with antigovernment groups.[20] The
Syrian Government denied using chemical weapons, but
entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
in line with an agreement between the United States and
Russia. Subsequently, international efforts have been
underway for the overseas transfer of chemical agents
and other measures based on the decisions made by the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW)[21] and a UN Security Council resolution.[22] In
August 2014, the operation to destroy Syria’s sarin,
VX gas, and other chemical weapons on the U.S. Navy
transport vessel Cape Ray was completed.[23] In this


9 Regarding this proposal, Russia explained its position that all elements impacting strategic stability including missile defense, space weapons, and non-nuclear strategic weapons need to be taken
into consideration, and that negotiations concerning the further reduction of strategic nuclear weapons require a multilateral framework involving all countries that have nuclear weapons.

10 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2 for China’s ballistic missile development
11 The export of related dual-use items and technologies that can be used to develop and produce these biological and chemical weapons is controlled by the domestic laws of member states, including
Japan, pursuant to an agreement of the Australia Group, a framework for international export control.

12 They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks
13 Then Japan Defense Agency, “Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons” (January 2002).
14 In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released. It presents guidelines on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists.
In the State of the Union Address in January 2010, then President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to respond promptly and effectively to bioterrorism and
infectious diseases.

15 U.S. Executive Order (July 2, 2010)
16 Mustard gas is a slow-acting blister agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents
17 It has been reported that a chemical weapons attack against a Kurdish village in 1988 killed several thousand people at once.
18 A weapon in which two types of relatively harmless chemicals that serve as ingredients for a chemical agent are contained separately within the weapon. It was devised so that the impact of the firing
of the weapon or other action mixes the chemical materials in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and thereby synthesis of the chemical agent. Binary rounds are easier to store and handle
than weapons containing chemical agents from the outset.

19 Iraq joined the CWC in February 2009.
20 “United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic: Final Report” (December 12, 2013)
21 (The 33rd and 34th) meetings of the Executive Council of OPCW
22 UN Security Council Resolution 2118
23 According to OPCW, 600 tons of Category 1 extremely toxic chemical materials, including sarin and VX gas, were disposed of (August 19, 2014, Statement by the OPCW Director-General). In January 2016,


-----

connection, in August 2015, the UN Security Council
adopted a resolution that establishes a Joint Investigative
Mechanism of the UN and OPCW to identify users
of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war, and
investigation is under way. In November 2016, the term
of this investigative mechanism was extended for one
year. Currently efforts continue to be made to identify
those responsible for the use of chemical weapons and
to ensure that chemical weapons are not used ever again.
Until now, the joint investigation mechanism involving
the UN and OPCW has specified persons responsible
for four incidents of chemical weapons use in Syria. It
has been reported that three of these are attributed to the
Syrian Army, while the remaining incident was initiated
by ISIL.[24, 25] Also, OPCW announced that sarin was used

**Ballistic Missiles**
**3**


Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads
over long distances and can be used as a means of
delivering WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons. Once launched, ballistic missiles
follow an orbital flight trajectory and fall at a steep angle
at high speed. As such, effectively countering them
requires a highly advanced interceptor missile system.
The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where
armed conflict is under way runs the risk of intensifying
or expanding the conflict. Additionally, it has the risk of
further heightening tension in a region where military
confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of
that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a
means of attacking from a distance or threatening another
country that has superior conventional forces.


once again in Khan Sheikhun, Syria in April 2017.
North Korea is an example of a country that is still
presumed to possess these chemical weapons and which
has not entered into the CWC. Furthermore, the Tokyo
subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of
bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the
United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained
in a mail item in February 2004, showed that the threat
of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these
weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities.
Also, the Malaysian police announced that a VX nerve
agent whose production and use are banned by the CWC
was found on the body of Kim Jong-nam who was
assassinated in February 2017.

In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic
missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise
missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for
terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and which
has the potential for proliferation.[26] Because cruise missiles
are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and
are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either
produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it
is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target
accuracy and that they are difficult to detect while in
flight.[27] Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to
secretly approach a target, and present a serious threat if
they carry WMDs in their warheads.[28]


**Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies**
**4**


Even weapons that were purchased or developed for selfdefense purposes could easily be exported or transferred
once domestic manufacturing becomes successful.
For example, certain states that do not heed political
risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies


to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in
conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs.
Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to
put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due
to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are


24 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 for ISIL.
25 In a report by the joint investigation mechanism (JIM) involving the UN and OPCW, it was determined that the Syrian Government used chlorine gas in Talmenes (April 21, 2014), in Sarmin (March 16,
2015), and Qmenas (March 16, 2015). The report also found that ISIL used mustard gas in Marea (August 21, 2015). The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of
February 2016 referred to ISIL’s contribution to this incident, and assessed that non-state actors are using chemicals in warfare in Syria.

26 In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six
anti-ship cruise missiles among other items on cargo ships subject to inspection.

27 United States Congressional Research Service, “Cruise Missile Proliferation” (July 28, 2005)


-----

active in their countries. Therefore, it is conceivable
that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs
would increase.
Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can
effectively manage the related technology and materials,
there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances
will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with
high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even
terrorists who do not possess related technologies would
use a dirty bomb[29] as a means of terrorist attack so long as
they gain access to radioactive materials. Nations across
the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and
use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors.[30]

The proliferation of WMDs and other related
technologies has been noted in numerous instances.
For example, in February 2004, it came to light that
nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment
technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and
Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan.
It has also been suggested that North Korea supported
Syria’s secret nuclear activities.[31]

Furthermore, there has been significant transfer and
proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means
of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and
other countries exported Scud-Bs to many countries and
regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan.
China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and
Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable
number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In
addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles
are believed to be based on North Korea’s Nodong
missiles. Further still, it has been suggested that North


Korea conducted missile-related trade with Syria and
Egypt until recently.[32]

North Korea has made rapid strides in the
development of its ballistic missiles with only a few
test launches. It is believed that an underlying factor of
this fact was North Korea’s imports of various materials
and technologies from outside of the country. It is also
noted that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic
missile airframes and related technologies, and that it
promotes the further development of missiles using funds
procured by such transfer and proliferation.[33]

The international community’s uncompromising and
decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of
WMDs and other technologies has put significant pressure
on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of
them to accept inspections by international organizations
or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether.[34]
Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states
of proliferation concern have sustained their proliferation
activities by averting international monitoring, through
illicitly exporting WMDs and other technologies
overseas by falsifying documentation, diversifying
transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies
and intermediaries. Additionally, intangible transfer of
technology has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely,
states of proliferation concern have obtained advanced
technologies which could be adapted for the development
and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies
via their nationals—researchers and students who have
been dispatched to leading companies and academic
institutions in developed countries.[35]


29 Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive materials.
30 Based on these concerns, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which sets forth the decision that all UN member states would refrain from providing support to non-state
actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use WMDs and their means of delivery, as well as adopt and enforce laws that are appropriate and effective for
prohibiting these activities. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007.

31 DNI “Worldwide Threat Assessment” from January 2014 states, “North Korea’s assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North’s
proliferation activities.” The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of May 2011 states that the destroyed reactor was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared to
the IAEA.

32 The February 2016 report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee states North Korea attempted to export principal
components of liquid propellants and replacement parts likely for Scuds, to Syria and Egypt until recently.

33 In addition, concerning the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out
that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007,
illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities.” Moreover, in the report entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was published by
the U.S. DoD in March 2014, it was pointed out that North Korea uses various techniques to circumvent measures taken by each country on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, including
sending cargo through multiple front companies and intermediaries.

34 Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 between Libya and the United States and the United Kingdom. In December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its WMDs and to
allow an international organization to carry out inspections. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. Meanwhile, after the military activity against Libya by a multinational force,
in March 2011, North Korea denounced the military attacks against Libya, saying that attacking after disarmament was an “armed invasion.”

35 The February 2016 report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council DPRK Sanctions Committee states that over the past 20 years since 1996, North Korea has dispatched more than 30
engineers to the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific, which receives technical support from the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs. These engineers participate
in research programs concerning topics such as satellite communications, space science and atmospheric chemistry, and satellite navigation systems. The report notes that such knowhow regarding


-----

**Iran’s Nuclear Issues**
**5**


The nuclear issues of Iran are a serious challenge to the
international non-proliferation regime. Since the 1970s,
Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction
project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that its
nuclear-related activities are for peaceful purposes in
accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, Iran’s covert
construction of facilities including a large-scale uranium
enrichment plant was exposed by a group of dissidents.
Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without
notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time
in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially
leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In
September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors
recognized Iran’s breach of compliance with the NPT
Safeguards Agreement. Since 2003, Iran has continued
with its uranium enrichment activities despite resolutions
adopted by the IAEA Board and the UN Security
Council urging Iran to stop its uranium enrichment and
other activities.
However, with Hassan Rouhani winning the presidential
election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions with the
EU3+3 were advanced, resulting in the announcement
of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the
comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November
2013. The execution of the first step measures of the JPOA
commenced in January 2014.[36]

On April 2, 2015, consultations held in Lausanne,


Switzerland resulted in an agreement regarding the key
parameters of the final agreement. On July 14, 2015, the
final agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran,
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was
announced in Vienna. Following this, on July 20, 2015,
UN Security Council Resolution 2231 approving the
JCPOA was adopted. In the agreement, it was decided
that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and
number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons
grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among
other measures, in exchange for ending the sanctions of
previous UN Security Council resolutions and the U.S.
and EU’s nuclear-related sanctions.[37]

Subsequently, the JCPOA reached its adoption date
on October 18, 2015, 90 days after the Security Council
resolution was adopted. On January 16, 2016, the IAEA
released a report confirming Iran’s completion of the
necessary preparatory steps to start the implementation
of the JCPOA. Accordingly, the United States suspended
its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. In addition, the
EU terminated some of its sanctions, and the sanctions
imposed by previous UN Security Council resolutions
concerning the nuclear issues of Iran ended, in accordance
with UN Security Council Resolution 2231. In the future,
it will be important for Iran to steadily fulfill its agreed
upon obligations and for the IAEA to monitor and verify
Iran’s actions.


36 First step measures include the limited relaxation of sanctions by the EU3+3, provided that for six months, Iran: (1) retains half of its current inventory of enriched uranium with a concentration of
approximately 20% as oxide and dilutes the remaining half to less than 5%; (2) does not enrich uranium to a level of 5% or greater; (3) does not make any further advances of its activities conducted
in uranium enrichment facilities and heavy-water reactors; and (4) accepts enhanced monitoring by the IAEA and so on.

37 The major nuclear-related restrictions on Iran in the JCPOA include the following: with regard to uranium enrichment, limiting the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to 5,060 or less,
keeping the level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and restricting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg; and with regard to plutonium production, redesigning and rebuilding the Arak
heavy water reactor to not produce weapons grade plutonium and shipping spent fuel out of Iran, and not engaging in reprocessing spent fuel including R&D and not constructing reprocessing
facilities. According to then U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, with this agreement Iran’s breakout time (the time it takes to manufacture nuclear fuel for a single nuclear weapon) will be extended from
90 days or less before the JCPOA to a year or more. Furthermore, the JCPOA is an agreement pertaining to nuclear issues and does not suspend or lift sanctions related to international terrorism,
missiles, human rights, among other issues. In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, in his address to the UN General Assembly in October 2015, strongly criticized the Iranian
nuclear agreement for making war more likely. In the United States, while the Republican Party that makes up the majority of Congress had been opposed to the agreement, the motion of disapproval


-----

**Section 3 Maritime Trends**


Maritime security is of critical importance to Japan,
a maritime nation surrounded by sea. For example,
Japan relies on sea transport to import energy resources.
Accordingly, ensuring secure sea lanes is vital for the
survival of the nation. Securing the stable use of one

**Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East and South China Seas**
**1**


The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
provides for the principles of freedom of navigation in
the high seas and freedom of overflight. Nevertheless,
in the waters and airspace in the periphery of Japan,
especially the East and South China Seas, it has become
increasingly common for countries to unilaterally
assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique
assertions which are incompatible with the existing
international order. This has caused situations of undue
infringement upon such principles.
Numerous cases of acts which go against the
principle of freedom of the high seas have been recently
seen in the East China Sea. Since March 2011, Chinese
helicopters and other aircraft apparently of the State
Oceanic Administration (SOA) on several occasions
have flown close to Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF) destroyers which were engaged in monitoring
and surveillance in the East China Sea. In January 2013,
a Chinese naval vessel directed its fire-control radar at an
MSDF destroyer navigating in the East China Sea and is
suspected to have directed fire-control radar at a helicopter
carried onboard an MSDF destroyer. In May and June
2014, fighters of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
of China flew abnormally close to aircraft of the MSDF
and of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force which were
flying over the East China Sea. In June 2016, a Chinese
fighter is speculated to have conducted a dangerous act
by approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft
at a high speed over the East China Sea, and in May 2017,
an incident allegedly occurred where Chinese fighters
obstructed the route of an aircraft of the U.S. Forces.
On November 23, 2013, the Chinese Government
declared “the East China Sea Air Defense Identification


of the global commons, the “maritime domain,” is a
key security issue for the international community. In
recent years, maritime trends in the countries concerned
are drawing attention, including their compliance with
relevant international norms.[1]

Zone (ADIZ)” including the Senkaku Islands as if they
were a part of China’s “territory.” China’s Ministry of
National Defense announced that it would enforce rules
it set on any aircraft flying in the ADIZ and that the PLA
would take “defensive emergency measures” if aircraft
does not follow the instructed procedures. Japan is deeply
concerned about such measures, which are profoundly
dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in
the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may
cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea.
Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the freedom
of overflight. Japan is demanding China to revoke any
measures that could go against the principle of freedom
of overflight. The United States, the Republic of Korea
(ROK), Australia, and the EU, too, have expressed
concern about China’s establishment of such zone.
Such actions have been seen in the South China
Sea. In March 2009, Chinese ships, including a naval
vessel, a maritime research ship of the SOA, a Bureau
of Maritime Fisheries’ patrol ship, and fishing vessels,
approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating
in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations, while
in December 2013, a Chinese naval vessel cut across
the bow of a U.S. Navy cruiser operating in the South
China Sea at point blank range, and in August 2014, a
Chinese fighter is speculated to have flown abnormally
close to and obstructed a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft over
the South China Sea. Furthermore, in May 2016, Chinese
fighters are speculated to have flown abnormally close
to a reconnaissance aircraft of the U.S. Navy over the
South China Sea, and in December 2016, an unmanned
underwater vehicle belonging to the U.S. Navy was
momentarily seized in the South China Sea by a vessel of


For example, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted as a comprehensive treaty on the law and order of the seas in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan concluded


-----

the PLA Navy. These cases are dangerous acts that could
cause unintended consequences.[2]

Additionally, while China asserts historical rights as
a basis for the so-called “nine-dash line,”[3] such historical
rights were refuted in the award rendered in July 2016
for the arbitration case between the Philippines and
China. With friction between China and ASEAN member
states and other countries surfacing over issues including
sovereignty, China went ahead with land reclamation on
multiple features on a massive and rapid scale, and has
continued to proceed to develop various infrastructure
that can be used for military purposes, such as military
facilities including batteries as well as runways, hangars,
harbors, and radar facilities. Furthermore, Chinese
government vessels have obstructed fishing and other
vessels of countries approaching the features, etc. by
firing warning shots and water cannons at the vessels.
Claimants as well as the international community
including the United States have repeatedly said they are
deeply concerned about China’s unilateral changes of the
status quo, further advancement of efforts to create a fait
accompli, and assertive and dangerous acts that could
cause unintended consequences.
Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to
securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent
years progress has been made on efforts to avert and
prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies.
In April 2014, navies of participating countries of the
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including


Japan, the United States, and China, reached agreement
on the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).[4]
CUES sets forth a code of conduct for unexpected
encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of each
country. In November 2014, the United States and China
agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification
of military activities, together with rules of behavior to
avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance
with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015,
the two countries announced an agreement concerning
an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert
air encounters. In September 2014, defense authorities of
Japan and China agreed in principle to restart discussions
aimed at the early implementation of the “Maritime and
Aerial Communication Mechanism between Japan-China
Defense Authorities”[5] for averting incidental collisions
between Japan and China. As a result, in January and
June 2015 and again in November 2016, joint working
group discussions took place. In recent years, official
discussions are being held between ASEAN and China on
the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea (COC). It is strongly hoped that
these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended
consequences in the seas and skies will supplement
the existing international order, and that the countries
concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral
actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the
principle of the rule of law.

See Chapter 2, Section 3 (China); Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia)

**Trends in the Arctic Ocean**
**2**


and use of the sea route. On the other hand, there are
unresolved issues among the Arctic states over the
demarcation of maritime boundaries based on UNCLOS
and extension of the continental shelf. Some of these
Arctic states including Russia are promoting efforts
to deploy new military capabilities for the purpose of
securing their interests and defending their territories.
Traditionally, the Arctic Ocean has been used for the


The Arctic Ocean, which covers most of the Arctic
Region, borders Russia, the United States, Canada,
Denmark, and Norway.[6]

In recent years, decrease in sea ice has increased
the potential for utilization of the Northern Sea Route
and exploration of natural resources. For these reasons,
the Arctic states have been more proactively promoting
efforts to secure their interests in resource development


According to the written testimony of then U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations dated May 13,
2015, the United States has enhanced its presence in and around the South China Sea to protect U.S. national interests in the South China Sea, such as peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of
navigation in the high seas, and freedom of overflight. For example, U.S. military forces are conducting port calls of naval vessels, carrying out ISR activities, and exercising with neighboring countries.
In addition, the U.S. Forces conduct the Freedom of Navigation Operations to counter China’s excessive claims over maritime interests. See Paragraph 3 of this section for more details (Maritime
Security Efforts of Countries).

See Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea)

CUES sets forth safety procedures and notification methods for unplanned encounters at sea by the naval vessels and air force aircraft of participating countries of the WPNS. CUES is not legally
binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties.

During the Fourth Joint Working Group Consultation, the two sides agreed to coordinate on the mechanism’s naming to “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism” in order to clarify its coverage
of aircraft.

The Arctic Region is the area north of the latitude line of 66 degrees 33 minutes north latitude. There are eight countries in the Arctic Region – the five countries that border the Arctic Ocean and
Finland, Sweden, and Iceland that do not border it. In 1996, the Arctic Council was established, which aims to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the


-----

deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit
route. In addition, due to the decrease of sea ice, ships
can navigate for a longer period of time and in wider
areas than before. In this regard, it is considered that the
region could be used for deploying maritime forces or
maneuvering military forces using the maritime transport
capabilities of military forces in the future. Therefore,
strategic importance of the region is increasing.
In the Russian Federation’s National Security
Strategy revised in December 2015, Russia continues
to maintain that it would secure its interests in resource
development and use of the sea route. Russia has been
actively involved with the Arctic, underpinned by
Russia’s possession of the largest exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) among the coastal states, the potential
abundance of resources in the waters of the Arctic
Ocean, the geographic and security importance of the
Northern Sea Route located off the coast of Russia, and
Russia’s military superiority ensured by the deployment
of military forces directly facing the Arctic Ocean coast.[7]
In the Arctic Strategy released by the U.S. DoD in 2013,
the United States expresses its desire for the Arctic to
become a secure and stable region where U.S. national
interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected,
and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.
In December 2016, then U.S. President Obama decided
to ban new drilling for oil and natural gas in a majority
of U.S. territorial waters in the Arctic to protect marine
resources, showing a negative stance towards resource


Multipurpose icebreaker patrol boat reportedly under construction by the Russian Navy

[Jane’s BY IHS Markit]

development. However, newly elected U.S. President
Trump signed an executive order repealing this decision
of then U.S. President Obama in April 2017.[8]

Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 12
countries including Japan and China have observer status
in the Arctic Council. Notably, China has shown active
involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying the polar
research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean for seven
times since 1999.[9] In August 2015, it was confi rmed for
the fi rst time that fi ve Chinese naval vessels sailed in the
Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacifi c.
Focus will be on whether or not such activities would
have any relation to the PLA Navy’s future advancements
into the Arctic Ocean.


**Maritime Security Efforts of Countries**
**3**


With regard to oceans, not only for economic development
but also for the national security of each country, it has
become even more important to promote appropriate
rulemaking and to make concerted efforts by the
international community to address risks and ensure
freedom of navigation while respecting such rules.
“Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and
prosperity of the international community as a whole. In
this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with
others various issues including piracy, unidentifi ed vessels,


illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime
disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for
maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication.

**1** **United States**


**1**


The U.S. National Security Strategy unveiled in February
2015 presents that the United States has an enduring
interest in freedom of navigation and the safety and
sustainability of the maritime environment, and therefore,


Russia is said to have a fl eet of around 40 icebreakers, while an additional three nuclear-powered icebreakers and two multipurpose icebreaker patrol ships are currently under construction. See
Chapter 1, Section 4 (Russia) regarding the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic, the deployment and training of the Northern Fleet vessels, the development of military facilities,
strategic patrols by strategic nuclear submarines, patrol fl ights by long-range bombers, and large-scale exercises and trainings in the Arctic.

As regards activities of other coastal nations, Canada states that the Arctic is a priority region under its policies in Canada’s Northern Strategy (released in 2009), and similar to the United States,
in December 2016 Canada announced a moratorium on the development of oil and natural gas in its territorial waters in the Arctic Ocean. Denmark and Norway have also developed the Kingdom
of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (released in 2011) and the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy (released in 2006), respectively, which outline their stances of attaching
importance to the Arctic, including the perspective of security.

In 2012, Xue Long became the fi rst polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, a cargo vessel Yong Sheng became the fi rst Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean.


-----

would maintain the capability to ensure the free fl ow of
commerce, to respond quickly to those in need, and to
deter those who might contemplate aggression. Since
around May 2015, the United States has repeatedly
expressed concerns over China’s reclamation of features
in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, underpinned
by the U.S. position of supporting the principles of rule
of law and freedom of navigation.[10] The DoD released in
August 2015 the Asia-Pacifi c Maritime Security Strategy,
indicating U.S. intentions to have the U.S. Pacifi c
Command maintain a robust presence in and around the
South China Sea and engage in wide-ranging activities
including trainings, exercises, and port calls with allies
and partners, and to conduct Freedom of Navigation
operations[11] as part of routine activities, and has navigated
vessels around maritime features in the Spratly Islands
and Paracel Islands. In February 2017, U.S. Secretary
of Defense James Mattis visited Japan just two weeks
after the Trump administration’s inauguration where he
met with Minister of Defense Inada. During the meeting,
the Ministers shared the view that China’s activities in
the East and South China Seas are a security concern in
the Asia-Pacifi c region. Additionally, President Trump
himself shared the same view during the summit meeting
held with Prime Minister Abe on February 10, 2017.
The United States deems that its safety and economic
security depend upon the secure use of the world’s
oceans, and that the United States has a vital interest in
maritime security. Based on this recognition, the United
States leads the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)[12] to
counter piracy and advance maritime safety, including
tackling terrorism in waters surrounding the Middle
East and Africa, such as the Gulf of Aden, the Persian
Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. In waters surrounding
Central America, the United States conducts operations
to counter illicit traffi cking, primarily drug traffi cking
with European and Western Hemisphere countries.[13] The
United States thus dispatches vessels to the various sea
areas of the world and takes actions to combat piracy,


organized crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

**2** **NATO**


**2**


NATO has the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, which
are a multinational, integrated force made up of vessels
from member countries. Through routine exercises and
maintenance of rapid deployment capability, NATO has
provided deterrence in the sea to member countries.
NATO identifi es acts of terrorism as a threat to its
member countries. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in
the United States, NATO has conducted Operation Active
Endeavour since October 2001 and has implemented
counter-terrorism activities, including maritime patrols in
the Mediterranean Sea, as part of the collective defense
pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the
NATO Summit held in Warsaw, Poland in July 2016,
a decision was made to transition to Operation Sea
Guardian, whose mission is crisis management, and
a wide range of operations has been carried out since
November 2016, including counter-terrorism and capacity
building assistance, among others, while collaborating
with Operation Sophia of the European Union (EU).
Furthermore, in February 2016, NATO decided to deploy
the Standing NATO Maritime Groups to the Aegean Sea
to deal with the large infl ux of refugees and migrants,
and notify information regarding refugee boats to Greek
and Turkish authorities as well as the European Agency
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the EU. In
response to the threat of piracy, NATO has deployed
vessels of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups to off the
coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. NATO has been
carrying out Operation Ocean Shield since August 2009,
and while it engaged in counter-piracy activities by boat
as well as helped countries build up their capacities to
counter piracy if requested, NATO ended these activities
in December 2016.


10 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016” unveiled in May 2016 introduced the view that China’s land reclamation
is bolstering its de facto control over the Spratly Islands by improving military and civilian infrastructure, while noting that China has used low-intensity coercion to enhance its presence and control
in the disputed areas of the East and South China Seas. Furthermore, in May 2016, then Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that China has taken expansive and unprecedented actions that
have generated concerns about China’s strategic intentions, and China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.

11 The Freedom of Navigation Operations are operational activities conducted by the U.S. Forces for countering excessive claims over maritime interests asserted by coastal states to protect the rights,
freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all states under international law. It is deemed that the Operations have been conducted on an ongoing basis since 1979. In October 2015,
the United States sent the U.S. Navy missile destroyer USS Lassen to navigate within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands. The United States sent the missile destroyer USS Curtis
Wilbur to navigate within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands in January 2016, sent the missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence to navigate within 12 nautical miles of Fiery
Cross Reef of the Spratly Islands in May 2016, and sent the missile destroyer USS Decatur to navigate in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands in October 2016. Also, in May 2017, it was reported that
the missile destroyer USS Dewey navigated within 12 nautical miles of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands.

12 CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 31 countries participate in CMF, and the CMF
Commander concurrently serves as the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime
security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter-piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The Japan
Self-Defense Forces deploy units to CTF-151.

13 Fourteen European and Western Hemisphere countries, including the United States, conduct Operation Martillo to combat illicit traffi cking, including the traffi cking of narcotics, precursor chemicals,
bulk cash, and weapons, as well as organized crime along the sea areas surrounding Central America. From the U.S. Forces, Joint Interagency Task Force South under the U.S. Southern Command


-----

In January 2011, NATO unveiled the Alliance
Maritime Strategy. The advancement of globalization
has facilitated terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs.
Based on this recognition, the Strategy outlines NATO’s
intention to carry out efforts to ensure its contribution
to deterrence, crisis management, collective defense,
maritime security, among other areas. These efforts
include: (1) deepening cooperative relations with
appropriate countries and international actors, such
as the EU and the United Nations; and (2) developing
fully capable, fl exible, rapidly deployable, interoperable,
and sustainable maritime forces. The Wales Summit
Declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in September
2014 states that NATO would continue to intensify and
expand its implementation of the measures outlined
in the Strategy, and further enhance the Alliance’s
effectiveness in the maritime domain. Furthermore, the
Warsaw Summit Communique adopted at the NATO
Summit held in July 2016 states that the same strategy
would be promoted, and the latent naval capabilities of
member countries would be fully utilized to strengthen
NATO’s maritime posture.


**4** **United Kingdom**


The United Kingdom is an island nation surrounded by
sea, and has a heritage of engaging actively in maritime
activities, including maritime trade. Furthermore, the
United Kingdom has many overseas territories and has
an EEZ which extends about 25 times the U.K. terrestrial
extent. Due to these factors, the United Kingdom
proactively deploys its forces to NATO-and EU-led
multinational forces[15] in order to ensure the maritime
security of the sea areas surrounding the United Kingdom,
including its overseas territories, and by extension, the
seas of its neighboring countries.
In May 2014, the U.K. Government released the
U.K. National Strategy for Maritime Security.[16] The
United Kingdom considers that ensuring maritime
security is synonymous with the advancement and
protection of the United Kingdom’s national interests,
at home and abroad. Based on this recognition, the
Strategy identifi es objectives, such as promoting a
secure international maritime domain and upholding
international maritime norms, developing the maritime
governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of
strategic maritime importance, and assuring the security
of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes.
To these ends, the Strategy lists measures, including:
(1) attain a comprehensive understanding of the maritime
domain through the use of information resources across
departments and agencies, among other means; (2) work
closely with maritime partners through championing
regional initiatives as a proponent of freedom of
navigation; (3) share information with partners and
support capacity-building efforts in areas of strategic
importance; and (4) coordinate joint operations between
maritime departments and agencies and seek to procure
common equipment. In the NSS-SDSR2015[17] released in
November 2015, it was decided that the United Kingdom
would introduce nine P-8 patrol aircraft to strengthen
maritime patrol capabilities. In addition, two Queen
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers are under construction,
which will be launched into service in succession starting
in 2018. The fi rst of these aircraft carriers began a test
voyage in June 2017.


**3**


With many of its member states facing the ocean, the EU
has high maritime traffi c and economic activity in the sea.
To date, the EU has actively engaged in counter-piracy
activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
in order to maintain maritime stability.[14] In June 2014,
the European Council adopted the EU Maritime Security
Strategy, for purposes including presenting a framework
for the development of the maritime policies of EU member
states and protecting the strategic maritime interests of the
countries. The Strategy construes piracy, terrorism, the
proliferation of WMDs, and restrictions to the freedom of
navigation as threats. It sets forth comprehensive, crosssectoral, coherent, and effi cient approaches to maritime
security, including: (1) promote rules-based good
governance at sea; (2) promote coordination amongst
member states and with other international organizations
and partners; and (3) enhance the role of the EU as an
actor that conducts confl ict prevention, crisis response, and
management of maritime interests.


14 The EU has conducted the counter-piracy operation Operation Atalanta in this sea area, which became the EU’s fi rst maritime mission, since December 2008. Vessels and aircraft that countries deploy
escort ships, conduct patrols in these waters, among other activities. Operation Sophia is being carried out in the Mediterranean Sea since 2015. See Chapter 2, Section 8-2 for more details about
Operation Sophia.

15 The United Kingdom rotationally deploys forces to Operation Atalanta organized by the EU. The headquarters of this operation is located at the Northwood Maritime Command Headquarters in the
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also deploys forces to CMF-led operations.

16 This Strategy is a strategy document released jointly by four departments: the Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce; the Home Offi ce; the Ministry of Defence; and the Department for Transport.


-----

not released details of its patrol activities around the
South China Sea, but media reports have been confi rmed
stating that Australian patrol aircraft operating in the
area have been subject to PLA aircraft interference on a
regular basis. The ADF also engages in expanding naval
cooperation with India, providing patrol vessels to South
Pacifi c countries,[20] and conducting coastal patrols by
mobilizing ADF assets.

**7** **China**


China also relies on sea transport for over 90% of its trade
cargo.[21] Accordingly, ensuring the security of China’s sea
lanes constitutes a critical part of the “basic safeguards for
ensuring sustainable economic and social development,”[22]
one of China’s “core interests.” Therefore, as a member
of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating
Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP),[23] China shares information and participates
in cooperative arrangements related to piracy in Southeast
Asia. Since December 2008, China has deployed naval
vessels to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden
and has been involved in international efforts to repress
piracy. Through such activities, China has contributed
to ensuring maritime security. China’s commitment to
ensuring the security of its sea lanes is also considered
to be connected to the PLA Navy’s objective of building
up capacity for continuous operations in more distant
waters. In particular, China and Djibouti, a country facing
the Gulf of Aden, are building facilities for providing
logistics support to the military in Djibouti. Additionally,
China supports the construction of port infrastructure in
Indian Ocean countries. In this regard, China is likely
aiming to build bases for conducting operations in the
Indian Ocean and other areas.
Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, China and
ASEAN member states have confl icting assertions over
the sovereignty of such areas as the Spratly Islands[24]
and the Paracel Islands.[25] In recent years, the countries
concerned, including China, have stepped up their
activities to assert their sovereignty. Developments


**5** **France**


France, with its many overseas territories, is deemed to
have the second largest EEZ in the world. About 62%
of this EEZ is in the Pacifi c region, and about 24% is
in the Indian Ocean. France attaches importance to its
maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacifi c, identifying itself
as “a sovereign power and a player in the security of
the Indian Ocean and the Pacifi c” in the White Paper
on Defence and National Security. The French Armed
Forces station their units in French territories, including
Polynesia and New Caledonia, and deploy frigates,
landing ships, and other equipment. Also, “France and
Security in the Asia-Pacifi c,” which the Ministry of
Defense released in June 2016, presents on France’s
active engagement in the region through ports of call
by frigates, participation in exercises, and humanitarian
assistance.[18] At the IISS Asia Security Summit (ShangriLa Dialogue) in June 2016, then Minister for Defence
Le Drian affi rmed France’s stance of becoming further
involved in the Asia-Pacifi c region, stating, “Why
shouldn’t the European navies coordinate to ensure a
presence that is as regular and visible as possible in
the maritime areas in Asia? I will shortly explain this
proposal in detail to my European colleagues.”

**6** **Australia**


**6**


Australia’s Defence White Paper unveiled in 2016
considers the security of sea lanes as a strategic defense
interest, along with the security and resilience of
Australia. Especially as Australia depends on maritime
trade with Southeast Asia and maritime trade transiting
Southeast Asia, Australia sees a need to ensure the
security of trade routes in the country’s proximate
waters and in Southeast Asia.
Based on this policy, the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) conducts patrol activities called “Operation
Gateway” in the North Indian Ocean and the South China
Sea, which includes establishing a base at the Butterworth
airbase in Malaysia.[19] The Australian Government has


18 See Chapter 2, Section 8-3-2 for more information about French ships calling on ports and France’s involvement in exercises. As for humanitarian assistance activities, France carried out activities
in the Philippines, Vanuatu, and Fiji following the damaging typhoons and cyclones that struck these countries in November 2013, March 2015, and February 2016.

19 In December 2015, the Australian Department of Defence admitted that as part of these activities, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft conducted patrol activities in the South China Sea from
November to December. This was preceded by BBC’s release of the content of the radio communications that allegedly took place between RAAF aircraft and the PLA Navy, claiming that Australia
was carrying out “freedom of navigation” fl ights in the South China Sea.

20 See Chapter 2, Section 5-3-4

21 According to the website of the Central People’s Government of China, over 90% of China’s export and import cargo, such as crude oil, iron ore, food, and container, are transported by sea.

22 Then State Councilor Dai Bingguo, “China will unswervingly follow path of peaceful development” (December 7, 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website)

23 As of June 2017, the contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands;
Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; United Kingdom; United States; and Vietnam.

24 See Chapter 2, Section 6-4, Footnote 37


-----

associated with the freedom of navigation in the sea have
been subject to increasing international concern.

**8** **Southeast Asia**


arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute
between the Philippines and China over its assertions
and actions in the South China Sea. In July 2016, a fi nal
award was rendered in which nearly all of the Philippines’
submissions were ruled in favor of the Philippines.[27] This
award will be fi nal and legally binding on both parties.
Moreover, Vietnam, another claimant, has requested the
tribunal to take into consideration Vietnam’s assertions
over the South China Sea. In this regard, there has been a
trend among some countries concerned to work towards
a peaceful solution of the issue in accordance with
international law.
In the Southeast Asia region, multilateral cooperation
has also made progress to deal with wide-ranging
security issues, including piracy and other transnational
issues. With regard to counter-piracy measures,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct
the Malacca Strait Patrols.[28] Efforts have also been under
way to share information related to piracy and build a
cooperation arrangement in accordance with ReCAAP.
Additionally, in recent years, piracy activities have grown
more prominent in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea.
As a result, in June 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines announced they were beginning joint patrols
in the Sulu Sea.

See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and

Other Issues over the South China Sea)


**8**


Southeast Asia is located at the crossroads of traffi c,
linking the Pacifi c and the Indian Oceans, such as the
Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. This region,
however, has maritime security issues, including disputes
over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and piracy.
In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)[26]
aimed at peacefully settling the issues over the South
China Sea. Since 2013, offi cial consultations have been
held with a view to establishing the COC. The COC is
deemed to contain more specifi c content than the DOC and
be legally binding. China and ASEAN have announced
the completed negotiation of the draft COC framework
in May 2017. However, China’s Vice Foreign Minister
Liu Zhenmin who took part in the talks stated that the
framework is not yet the detailed rules and that the legal
binding force of the framework should be discussed in
the next step of the consultation process. In this regard,
attention will focus on future developments.
Furthermore, there have been developments related
to settling issues through arbitral proceedings set out in
UNCLOS. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted


26 See Chapter 2, Section 6-4, Footnote 45

27 See Chapter 2, Section 6-4, Footnote 44

28 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004 by the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to monitor piracy and other activities in


-----

**Section 4 Outer Space and Security**


**Outer Space and Security**
**1**


Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched
into outer space for the first time in the history of mankind.
In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has
been applied to various areas. No state is allowed to own
outer space, and it is freely available to all nations. Major
countries thus make proactive efforts to use outer space.[1]
For example, meteorological and observation satellites
are used to observe weather as well as land and waters;
communication and broadcasting satellites are used for
the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning satellites
are used to navigate aircraft and ships. These satellites
have widely prevailed in social, economic, scientific, and
other areas as essential infrastructure for the public and
private sectors.
In major countries, military forces are actively
involved in outer space activities and utilize a variety of
satellites. There is no concept of national borders in outer
space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables
the observation of, communication at, and positioning
on any area on Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts
to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites
and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C[4]ISR
functions.[2] Such satellites include imagery reconnaissance
satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets,
early warning satellites that detect the launch of ballistic
missiles, satellites gathering radio wave information for
military communications, communication satellites for
military communication, and positioning satellites for
navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the
precision of weapons systems.
On the other hand, in January 2007, China conducted
a test to destroy its aging satellite with a ground-launched


missile. The resulting space debris[3] spread across the
satellite’s orbit, and came to be seen as a threat against
space assets such as satellites owned by countries.
Furthermore, countries including China and Russia are
thought to also be developing anti-satellite weapons
(ASAT) that do not directly hit and destroy a satellite by
a missile, creating less space debris. For example, it has
been noted that ASATs under development include an
ASAT that approaches the target satellite using a “killer
satellite” and utilizes a robot arm to capture the target
satellite to disable its functions, as well as an ASAT that
disables the functions of the target satellite by using a
jammer to interfere with communications between the
target satellite and the ground station.
Against this backdrop, since existing frameworks,
including the Outer Space Treaty that prescribes
the exploration and use of outer space, do not have
provisions on avoiding the destruction of space objects
and actions triggering space debris, international efforts
have been under way recently for the creation of the
International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities
and the guidelines for “Long-term Sustainability of Outer
Space Activities.”[4] Moreover, countries are working on
the Space Situational Awareness (SSA)[5] by monitoring
the impact of accelerated solar activity on satellites,
electronic equipment on Earth and threats caused by
meteors reaching Earth, in addition to threats posed by
anti-satellite weapons and space debris to space assets.
As the above illustrates, the risk to the stable use
of outer space has become one of the critical security
challenges countries face.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-6 (Responses in Space)


The Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that came into force in
October 1967 defines such matters as the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the freedom in principle of exploration and use of outer space, and the prohibition of
ownership. However, no clear international agreement has been reached on the definition of outer space, though according to one of the concepts, outer space is considered space located 100 km
or further away from the Earth’s surface.

The term “C[4]ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1991 Gulf War is considered “the first high-tech war conducted in outer
space in the history of mankind.”

Unnecessary artifacts orbiting around the Earth, including satellites no longer in use, upper stages of launch vehicles, parts, and fragments.

In 2007, the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) proposed to discuss “the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in relation to
civil space activities, for the purpose of defining risk reduction for long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. Based on this proposal, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
of UN COPUOS set up a working group, which carries out discussions every year for establishing the guidelines. However, a final agreement has not been reached due to political disputes and a
divergence of views over the adoption method of the guidelines.

In August 2015, Gen. John E. Hyten, Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, stated, “Total number that we track is about 23,000 objects...we expect to be tracking 250,000 to 500,000 ii


-----

**Trends in the Use of Space by Countries for Security Objectives**
**2**


**1** **United States**

**1**


The United States launched its fi rst satellite, Explorer 1,
in January 1958, following the satellite launches by
the former Soviet Union. The country has since then
proceeded with a variety of space activities in fi elds
including military, science, and resource exploration,
such as launching the world’s fi rst reconnaissance satellite
and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the
world’s leading space power. The U.S. Forces clearly
recognize the importance of outer space for their actions,
and in this regard, actively utilize outer space for security
purposes. In June 2010, the United States released the
National Space Policy that presents the country’s basic
guidelines for space policy, including its objectives and
principles. It specifi ed guidelines on security space, civil
space, commercial space, and international cooperation,
among other sectors. In February 2011, the country also
released the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS)[6]
as the security guideline regarding outer space. Based on
these strategic guidelines, the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) has set the goal of maintaining and strengthening
U.S. space superiority for security purposes, recognizing
that the United States needs to prepare for the possibility
of confl ict extending into outer space.
From an organizational perspective, the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
responsible for non-military space development in
the United States, while the U.S. DoD works on space
development from a national security perspective.
Major satellites used for military purposes include
satellites for imagery reconnaissance, early warning,
electronic / signals intelligence, communication, and
global positioning, and their operations are wide-ranging.


**2** **Russia**

**2**


Russia’s space activities have been continuing since
the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union
successively launched multiple satellites after it launched
the fi rst satellite in the history of mankind, Sputnik 1, in
October 1957, and had the largest number of launched
satellites in the world until the collapse of the former
Soviet Union. The satellites included many military
satellites, which enabled the country to compete against
the United States for military expansion in outer space.
Russia’s space activities have declined since the former
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country
has recently started to expand its activities once again.
Regarding the country’s trends in security, the
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,
approved in December 2015, states that the U.S.
deployment of weapons into outer space constitutes one
of the factors undermining global and regional stability.
The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, a
document created in February 2010 to specifi cally defi ne
the principles of the National Security Strategy in the
military fi eld,[7] mentions that securing supremacy in
outer space is one of the decisive factors in achieving the
objectives of its armed forces.
From an organizational perspective, the Roscosmos
State Corporation for Space Activities is in charge
of space activities related to Russia’s scientifi c and
economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence
is involved in space activities for security purposes.
The Russian Aerospace Forces[8] conducts actual space
activities for military purposes, manages facilities for
launching satellites, among other activities.
Major satellites launched by Russia are satellites
for imagery reconnaissance, early warning, radio wave


This strategy presents the view that the current and future outer space environment is driven by three trends: (1) congestion caused by artifi cial objects including satellites; (2) contestation by potential
adversaries; and (3) increasing competition with other countries. Based on this understanding, the NSSS identifi es that the U.S. strategic objectives for outer space are to: (1) strengthen safety, stability,
and security in outer space; (2) maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by outer space; and (3) energize the space industrial base that supports
U.S. national security. To meet these objectives, the NSSS states that the country will pursue the strategic approaches of (1) promoting responsible, peaceful, and safe use of outer space, (2) providing
improved U.S. outer space capabilities, (3) partnering with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial fi rms, (4) preventing and deterring aggression against space infrastructure
that supports U.S. national security, and (5) preparing to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.

“The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” was revised in December 2014. It also states that the tasks of the armed forces include providing timely warning to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of an air or space attack and deploying and maintaining space systems supporting the activities of the Russian Armed Forces. In addition, it refers to
the need to establish air-space defense organizations.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Aerospace Forces were created by merging the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces, and started performing its tasks in August 2015. The
tasks of the Aerospace Forces include: (1) providing focused combat command to the air force; (2) conducting aerial and missile defense; (3) launching and controlling satellites; (4) warning about


-----

information gathering, communication, positioning, and
others, all of which are presumed to be used for security
purposes. Currently, Russia is developing a new Angara
carrier launch vehicle,[9] along with building a new launch
site in Vostochny in the Far East.[10]

**3** **Europe**


Regarding European outer space activities, France
succeeded in launching its own satellite for the fi rst
time in 1965, following the former Soviet Union and
the United States, and the United Kingdom succeeded
in launching its own satellite for the fi rst time in 1971.
Italy and Germany used launch vehicles developed by
the United States to own satellites in December 1964 and
July 1965, respectively. On the other hand, the European
Space Agency (ESA)[11] Convention signed in May 1975
established the ESA, which launched a satellite in 1979.
In Europe, the EU, the ESA, and European countries
are promoting their own unique space activities and are
helping each other to implement space activities.[12]

The ESA signed a “framework agreement” with the
EU in May 2004 to specify that they will collaborate
to proceed with space development and hold regular
minister-level council meetings. The joint council meeting
held by the ESA and the EU in May 2007 approved
the “European Space Policy.”[13] The “European Space
Policy” mentions improving synergy effects between
space activities for civil and defense purposes, and the
importance of implementing space activities based on
coordinated efforts among member states and ensuring
an internationally competitive space industry. The Policy
identifi es security as one of its areas of priority.
It is thought that in the future, “Galileo,” a satellite


positioning system planned by the EU and the ESA;[14]
“Copernicus,” an Earth observation program;[15] and the
Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS),[16]
a reconnaissance satellite project implemented by the
European Defence Agency (EDA),[17] will be utilized for
security in Europe.

**4** **China**


**4**


China began work on space development in the 1950s,
and in April 1970, the county launched its fi rst satellite
“Dong Fang Hong I,” mounted on the transportation
launch vehicle “Long March 1,” using technology
enhanced through its missile development. Additionally,
the number of China’s cargo rocket launches in 2016[18]
totaled 22, the same as the United States, making it the
most in the world for the fi rst time.
China has thus far conducted activities such as
manned spacefl ight and lunar rover launches, and is
aiming to construct its very own space station.[19] It is
speculated that China’s space development is intended to
enhance national prestige and develop space resources.
With regard to the organizational setup, the State
Administration for Science, Technology and Industry
for National Defense, under the Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology of the State Council,
oversees industries related to space, nuclear technology,
aviation, ships, and weapons. The China National Space
Administration enforces the administrative control of
the space area for civil and commercial purposes and
represents the Chinese Government externally.
China’s defense white paper “China’s Military
Strategy” (May 2015) states that outer space is a
commanding height in strategic competition among all


9 In July 2014, the fi rst launch of “Angara-1.2PP” was conducted successfully. In December 2014, “Angara-A5” successfully put a dummy satellite into orbit for the fi rst time. The Angara launch vehicle
is considered as the fi rst large launch vehicle that Russia developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is expected that the vehicle will be launching commercial as well as military satellites.

10 The new launch site is being built to replace the Russian-leased Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, and Russia aims to have the site fully operational by 2020. The fi rst launch vehicle was launched
in April 2016.

11 The ESA was established in May 1975 based on the ESA Convention targeting to establish a single European space organization focusing on the peaceful use of space research, technology, and
application areas. The organization was formally established in October 1980.

12 In September 2000, the European Commission (EC) and the ESA created the European Strategy for Space that committed to pursuing Europe’s coherent and effective space activities. The strategy
envisioned that the EC would make political and strategic decisions on space policies and that ESA would function as the implementing organization. For the satellite positioning system “Galileo”
currently in operation and the environmental and security monitoring program “Copernicus,” the EU and ESA are complementing each other in carrying these projects forward, with the former mainly
taking charge of the policy dimension and the latter the technical dimension.

13 The EC released the European Strategy for Space in October 2016.

14 In December 2016, initial services were launched with 18 satellites. Galileo is set to offer the services in conjunction with GPS because of the insuffi cient number of satellites. The system is expected
to be fully operational by 2020 when all 30 satellites are in place.

15 New observation satellites called “Sentinels” are being launched to collect imagery necessary for conducting Earth observations. Sentinels are classifi ed according to their purpose into: 1) all-weather
satellite that takes images of land and ocean; 2) all-weather satellite capable of high-resolution land monitoring to provide imagery of vegetation, inland waterways, and coastal areas; and 3) satellite
measuring land-and sea-surface temperature and topography. Four Sentinels are said to be in orbit as of November 2016.

16 The MUSIS was started by Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and Spain. The organization was joined later by Poland in December 2010. This is a joint project succeeding such projects as
“Helios 2” (a French military reconnaissance satellite), “Pleiades” (a French Earth imaging satellite used for military and civilian purposes), “SAR-Lupe” (a German group of military radar satellites),
“COSMO-SkyMed” (an Italian constellation of Earth observation satellites), and “Ingenio” (a Spanish optical satellite).

17 The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004 to improve Europe’s defense capabilities for crisis management purposes and to execute and maintain security and defense policies.

18 The number of cargo rocket launches in 2016 was 22 in the United States, 22 in China, 17 in Russia, 11 in Europe, 7 in India, 4 in Japan, and 1 in Israel. This marked the fi rst time that China surpassed
Russia in launches.

19 The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development published by the State Council of China in February 2006 positions space station construction, lunar i


-----

parties. Meanwhile, China asserts that its activities in
outer space constitute “peaceful use of outer space,” and
underscores that China is “opposed [to] the weaponization
of and arms race in outer space, and [will take] an active
part in international space cooperation.” China also
commits to “[keeping] abreast of the dynamics of outer
space, deal with security threats and challenges in that
domain, and secure its space assets.” In addition, “China’s
Space Activities in 2016,” China’s white paper on space
activities released in December 2016, presents a vision to
“build China into a space power” and for “the realization
of the Chinese Dream.” It also presents a schedule of
launches[20] up to 2020, and emphasizes international
cooperation and the peaceful use of space. On the other
hand, the white paper also notes that China will satisfy
its needs for security, which does not deny the country’s
military use of space.
China is indeed actively using space for information
collection, communications,[21] and positioning for military
purposes.[22] Since September 2015, China has publicized
a series of decisions on military reforms, and in January
2016, the establishment of the Strategic Support Force
was announced. While the details of the Force’s tasks
and organization have not been revealed, it is suggested
that it is in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic
warfare. Additionally, China successfully launched a
number of all new Long March series cargo rockets[23] and
has stated that it is developing a cargo rocket capable of
carrying extra heavy payloads. Carrier launch vehicles
are developed and manufactured by Chinese state-owned
enterprises, which are thought to be also developing and
manufacturing ballistic missiles. It is expected that China
will pursue space development through close collaboration
between the public sector, military, and private sector.


Moreover, it is regarded that China is focusing also on the
development of satellite ground stations. China opened
its very first satellite data receiving station outside of
China near Kiruna in Sweden in December 2016. It is
noted that this receiving station located in the Arctic
Circle offers many security advantages,[24] such as ease of
receiving data obtained by Earth observation satellites in
sun-synchronous orbit (including photo reconnaissance
satellites). Also, China is considered to have become one
of the space powers through investments, research and
development, and introduction of technologies from the
United States and other countries. It has been suggested
that China could threaten U.S. information superiority in
outer space in the future.[25] Furthermore, China continues
to develop ASATs. In January 2007, China conducted a
test using a ground-launched missile that destroyed its
own satellite. In July 2014, China tested an anti-satellite
missile not involving the destruction of a satellite.[26] It is
also suggested that China is developing directed-energy
weapons,[27] including “killer satellites,” jammers, and
laser beams.


20 In addition to lunar exploration, it also cites the launch of worldwide services for the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, Mars exploration, asteroid exploration, and Jupiter exploration.
21 In August 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum science satellite called Mozi that will be carrying out a proof-of-concept mission for quantum communication between space and a ground
station. In general, quantum communication is considered to be a highly secure mode of communication that makes eavesdropping and cryptanalysis virtually impossible.

22 By December 2012, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System officially started its services covering most of the Asia-Pacific region. It is reported that the BeiDou system has already started to be
mounted on navy vessels, government vessels belonging to maritime law enforcement agencies, fishing boats, among other vessels. BeiDou offers not only positioning services but also interactive
short message features. It is suggested that these features make it possible to centrally capture and share, in real time, the position and other data related to vessels of other countries that Chinese
navy vessels have detected, and improve information gathering capabilities on the ocean and other areas.

23 In September 2015, China succeeded in its first launch of Long March-6 (for launching small satellites) and Long March-11 (for instantaneous launching of solid-fuel small satellites). China also
succeeded in launching Long March-7 (for launching “Shenzhou” manned spacecraft) in June 2016 and Long March-5 (for launching large satellites) in November 2016. It also announced plans to
launch Long March-9 (for launching ultra-large satellites), which aims to achieve capability to launch 100-ton payload into low orbit, by around 2030.

24 Generally, Earth observation satellites in sun-synchronous orbit (including photo reconnaissance satellites) transmit data when they fly over the country of origin. Therefore, these satellites can only
transmit data several times per day, making transmission efficiency poor. Setting up a satellite ground station in the Arctic Circle or Antarctic Circle will increase transmission efficiency and short lead
time because the satellite will fly over the satellite ground station every time it orbits.

25 According to the annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of November 2015.
26 The February 2015 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence notes that in July 2014, China tested an anti-satellite missile not involving the destruction of a satellite.
In addition, it states that China has satellite jamming capabilities and is making progress on an anti-satellite system.

27 According to the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” of May 2015, China continues to develop a variety of capabilities, l


-----

**5** **India**

**5**


India’s space development promotes space programs
aimed at social and economic development in line
with the 5-year national plan. The country’s 12th FiveYear Plan[28] focuses on non-military projects including
communication, positioning, Earth observation (e.g.,
disaster monitoring, resource exploration, and weather
observation), transportation systems, space science, and
spinoff promotions.
The Indian Space Commission (ISC) determines the
country’s space policy under the leadership of the Prime
Minister and assumes responsibility for preparing space
development budgets and implementing space development
programs. The Department of Space, managed by the ISC,
oversees the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO),
which implements space development policy following
the country’s space policy, develops and launches launch
vehicles, and develops and manufactures satellites.
In April 2016, India operated a positioning satellite
that can position itself around India[29] as well as launched
an Earth observation satellite, which are said to be used
also for security purposes. In February 2017, India
successfully launched a satellite launch vehicle loaded
with 104 satellites, marking the largest number ever
carried on a single rocket in the world.[30] In the future, the
country plans to implement planetary explorations and
conduct manned spacefl ight.[31]


**6** **Republic of Korea**

**6**


The Republic of Korea (ROK) is considered to have
started full-scale space development from the latter
half of the 1990s. The ROK carries out space activities
based on the three key plans it established in November
2013, namely: the “Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Space
Development (2014-2040),”[32] which plans to move up the
fi rst launch of launch vehicles manufactured by the ROK[33]
to June 2020;[34] the “Space Technology Industrialization
Strategy,” which prompts the private sector to lead space
development; and the “Revision of the Korean Rocket
Development Plan,” which outlines the use of ROKmade launch vehicles and the ROK’s own development
of planetary and space exploration satellites and high
orbit satellites.
On the security front, the ROK’s Defense White Paper
published in December 2012 states that the ROK would
secure a space surveillance system and other mechanisms
for developing the Air Force into an aerospace force, and
establish a Satellite Surveillance Control Group in order
to secure air and space operational capabilities.
On the organizational front, the Korea Aerospace
Research Institute leads research and development as an
implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency
for Defense Development is engaged in the development
and use of various satellites.
Major satellites used by the country include imagery
reconnaissance and communication satellites. The ROK
relies on other countries to launch its satellites.


28 The 12th Five-Year Plan covers the period between April 2012 and March 2017.

29 In April 2016, India succeeded in launching the seventh satellite constituting the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), which completed the deployment of the constellation.

30 All 104 satellites were launched and placed into polar orbit at the same time. They comprised India’s roughly 700 kg Cartosat-2D Earth observation satellite and 103 small satellites weighing less
than about 10 kg each (1 each from Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UAE, 2 from India, and 96 from the United States).

31 In December 2014, the ISRO succeeded in the test launch of a large launch vehicle carrying an unmanned capsule.

32 In January 2013, for the fi rst time on its third attempt, the ROK successfully launched the space launch vehicle “Naro (KSLV-1)” that was developed based on the fi rst stage of the Russian Angara rocket.

33 The ROK had planned to launch a test space rocket in December 2017, but has postponed this launch until October 2018 due to technical issues.i


-----

**Section 5 Trends in Cyberspace**


**Cyberspace and Security**
**1**


Owing to the advancement of information and
communications technology (ICT) in recent years,
information and communications networks such as the
Internet have become essential components across all
facets of life. Meanwhile, cyber attacks[1] against critical
infrastructures, namely, information and communications
networks, have the potential to seriously impact the lives
of individuals.
Types of cyber attacks include functional
interference, data falsification and data theft caused by
unauthorized access to information and communications
networks or through the transmission of viruses via
e-mail, functional impairment of the networks through
simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data,
as well as attacks intending to shut down or take over
a system belonging to critical infrastructure, such as
power systems. Also, Internet-related technologies are
constantly evolving, with cyber attacks[2] becoming more
sophisticated and skillful by the day.
For military forces, information and communications
form the foundation of command and control, which
extend from central command to ground-level forces. In

**Threats in Cyberspace**
**2**


Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently
been carried out against the information and communications
networks of government organizations and military forces


this regard, ICT advancements are further enhancing the
dependence of units on information and communications
networks. Furthermore, military forces rely on various
critical infrastructures, including electricity, to execute
their missions. Accordingly, cyber attacks against such
critical infrastructures could become a major impediment
to their missions. For this reason, cyber attacks are
regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating
the strengths of adversaries by exploiting the weaknesses
of an adversary’s forces. It is believed that many foreign
military forces are developing offensive capabilities in
cyberspace. In addition, actors attempting to cause harm
to nations, etc. have all realized that attacking through
cyberspace is often easier than attacking directly using
physical means.[3] Moreover, it is said that the information
and communications networks of countries are being
compromised for the purpose of gathering intelligence.
As more confidential information begins to be stored in
cyberspace, cyber espionage through cyber attacks is
causing more serious damage.
As such, cybersecurity has become one of the most
important security issues for countries.

of various countries.[4]

Some of these cyber attacks are said to involve
a range of organizations including China’s PLA,


The targets of cyber attacks are wide-ranging. Beginning with large targets, they range from global-level targets, including interstate targets, as well as nations and government institutions, local
communities, business communities and infrastructures, companies, and individuals. As such, it is said that measures to counter cyber attacks need to be optimal relative to the size of the target.

In the Japanese MOD’s “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace” of September 2012, cyber attacks are characterized as follows: (1) diversity: cyber attacks involve diverse actors, methods,
objectives, and context; (2) anonymity: actors can easily conceal and disguise their identity; (3) stealth: some cyber attacks are difficult to identify and can take place without causing any realization
of damage; (4) offensive dominance: attack tools are easy to acquire depending on the tool, and it is difficult to completely eliminate software vulnerabilities; and (5) the difficulties of deterrence:
retaliatory strikes and defensive measures have minimal deterrence effect.

According to the “Cybersecurity National Action Plan” unveiled by then U.S. President Obama in February 2016.

According to the U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s “Annual Report to Congress: Federal Information Security Management Act” (February 27, 2015), the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) recorded that in FY2014 there were 69,851 incidents of cyber attacks against the U.S. Government, and that a total of 640,222 incidents of cyber attacks were reported
to US-CERT, including attacks against government agencies and companies. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 names Russia, China,
Iran, North Korea, and non-state actors as threat actors to cyberspace, expressing the opinion that, for example: (1) Russia is assuming a more assertive cyber posture based on its willingness to
target critical infrastructure systems and conduct espionage operations; (2) China continues to conduct cyber espionage against the U.S. Government, its allies, and U.S. companies, and uses cyber
attacks against targets it believes threaten Chinese domestic stability or regime legitimacy; (3) North Korea is likely capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support
the achievement of its political objectives; (4) Iran conducts information theft, propaganda, and cyber attacks to support its security priorities, influence the situation, and counter threats; and (5) ISIL


-----

intelligence agencies, security agencies, private hacker
groups, and companies.[5, 6] According to the defense white
paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015),[7] China
will accelerate efforts to build up its cyber capacity.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that cyber warfare
units have been formed under the Strategic Support Force
that was created as part of China’s military reforms[8] in
late December 2015. In June 2015, the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) became a target of a
cyber attack in which, as it later came to light, personal
information of about 22 million people including U.S.
federal employees and U.S. Forces personnel were
stolen. While Chinese involvement in this attack is also
suggested,[9] China denies government involvement and
explains that it was a “crime” involving Chinese hackers.
Additionally, it has been pointed out that China is using
cyber attacks to obtain sensitive information concerning
critical infrastructure, national security decisionmaking processes, and plans of military tactics of other
countries.[10] China’s cyber attacks have also shifted
recently, from attacks by large numbers of amateurs to
highly professional attacks by a select few individuals.[11]

In December 2015, a large-scale power outage
occurred in Ukraine.[12] It is said that Russia was involved
in this attack. The U.S. Government has also criticized
Russian intelligence agencies for carrying out a cyber


attack to affect the outcome of the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.[13, 14] In March 2017, the U.S. Department of
Justice announced that it indicted four hackers, including
two personnel from Russia’s Federal Security Service
(FSB), for computer hacking in order to steal information
from at least 500 million user accounts of a major
Internet company in the United States. It is believed
that the Russian military, intelligence and security
agencies, and other organizations engage in cyber attacks.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Russian military has its
own cyber command.[15] This cyber command is believed
to be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities,
including inserting malware into enemy command and
control systems.[16] It has been indicated that such Russian
activities reflect objectives including: (1) intelligence
gathering to support Russian decision-making on the issues
of Ukraine and Syria; (2) operations to support military
and political objectives; and (3) continuing preparation of
the cyberspace environment for future contingencies.[17]

In December 2016, it was found that a cyber attack
breached the internal network of the ROK Armed Forces.
According to the ROK Ministry of National Defense,
this was the first time that its military network had been
hacked. This cyber attack resulted in the loss of certain
military documents, including confidential information.
The ROK’s cyber command stated that it presumed


5 “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” released in February 2013 by Mandiant, a U.S. information security company, concludes that the most active cyber attack group targeting the
United States and other countries is Unit 61398 under then Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department. The report also states that then Third Department of the General Staff Department,
which constituted the cyber unit, had 130,000 personnel.

6 The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2016) notes that China carries out cyber espionage led by the Ministry of State Security and military
organizations as well as cyber espionage led by China’s many non-state actors targeting the United States. These actors include hackers contracted by the government, civilian “patriotic hackers,”
and criminal organizations.

7 The defense white paper notes that, “Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security,” “As international strategic competition in
cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces,” and China is “one of the major victims of hacker attacks.”

8 Since September 2015, China has publicized a series of its decisions on military reforms, and in January 2016, announced the establishment of the Strategic Support Force and other units. While
the details of the Force’s tasks and organization have not been revealed, it is suggested that it is in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare.

9 See the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015). In addition to this attack, the report states that a U.S. airline company was attacked by the
same method used in the attack against the U.S. OPM.

10 According to the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released in November 2016.
11 According to the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission released in November 2016.
12 In February 2016, the New York Times reported that there were doubts about the involvement of the Russian military with which Ukraine is in a standoff over the annexation of Crimea and other matters.
13 Critical elections were held in major EU countries in 2017, notably the Dutch general election (House of Representatives) in March and the French presidential election in May, and there were concerns
that similar cyber attacks would affect their outcomes. During the presidential campaign in France, Macron, known as a hardliner on Russia, was reportedly a target of a cyber attack, as well as a
widespread fake news story about having hidden assets in a tax haven. After being appointed president, in a joint press conference of the French and Russian presidents, Macron criticized Russian
media outlets by name, referring to them as organs of lying propaganda. German Bundestag elections will be held in autumn 2017, and it remains a concern that these elections too will be a target
of similar incidents.

14 According to the joint statement issued by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Director of National Intelligence Clapper in October 2016, the joint report issued by the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security and FBI concerning Russian cyber attacks on the United States released in December 2016, and the U.S. intelligence community report on Russia’s cyber attacks on the U.S.
presidential election released in January 2017.

15 According to a statement made by Russian Minister of Defence Shoigu during a briefing of lower house members in February 2017. According to this statement, the Russian military has a cyber
command. Minister Shoigu emphasized that the command was “for opposing political propaganda activities” since there was an information war taking place between Russia and the West, indicating
the purpose of the command was for defense. Also, it is pointed out that Russia’s cyber force numbers around 1,000.

16 According to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015.


-----

this incident to be a cyber attack by North Korea.[18] It has
been pointed out that North Korea is involved in such
cyber attacks on government institutions[19] and is training
personnel nationally for such attacks.[20] It is viewed that
such cyber attacks are implemented as a military operation.
Cyber attacks on the information and communications
networks of governments and militaries,[21] as well as
on critical infrastructure significantly affect national
security. As there have been allegations of involvement
of government organizations, Japan must continue to
pay close attention to developments related to threats
in cyberspace.
Meanwhile, in Japan, the Japan Pension Service was
a target of a cyber attack in May 2015, which led to the
theft of the personal information of pension recipients
and policyholders. Hacker groups and others have also

**Initiatives against Cyber Attacks**
**3**


Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various
initiatives are under way at the overall government level
and the ministry level, including defense ministries.[25]

A number of issues have been raised that need to
be dealt with to allow for an effective response to cyber
attacks, which have become a new security challenge
in recent years. For instance, it is regarded that the
international community has diverging views concerning
the fundamental matters of cyberspace, including how


carried out cyber attacks against Japanese government
agencies and companies.
In addition, supply chain risks, such as companies
supplying products embedded with deliberately and
illegally altered programs, have been also pointed
out.[22] Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
rise in devices that connect to the Internet, including
“smart” devices incorporated into household appliances,
can increase network complexity, and that private
infrastructures and government systems could become
more vulnerable, including to malicious attacks aimed
at causing malfunctions to systems equipped with
artificial intelligence.[23] Also, in June 2010, a malware
called “Stuxnet” designed to attack the Industrial Control
System (ICS) was discovered, and since then sophisticated
malware has been detected frequently.[24]

international law applies. It is suggested that countries
have clashing claims, with the United States, Europe, and
Japan calling for maintaining a free cyberspace,[26] while
many countries including Russia, China, and emerging
countries call for strengthening national control of
cyberspace. Against this backdrop, there has been a
movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the
international community. For example, in August 2015,
a UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) released a


18 Based on various media reports. The IP address (Internet address) used in the attack was Shenyang, China. It is pointed out that previous cyber attacks involving North Korea used this same IP address.
19 In November 2013, ROK media outlets reported that the ROK National Intelligence Service made revelations about North Korean cyber warfare capabilities in the national audit of the Information
Committee of the National Assembly, and that Kim Jong-un, First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party of North Korea, stated that, “Cyber attacks are omnipotent swords with their power paralleled
with nuclear power and missiles.” In the U.S. Department of Defense’s “2015 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”
published in February 2016, it is stated that North Korea has an offensive cyber operations capability. The 2016 Defense White Paper published by the ROK in January 2017 notes that North Korea
has concentrated on boosting its cyber unit to nearly 7,000 personnel.

20 For example, a North Korean defector association in the ROK, “NK Intellectual Solidarity,” held a seminar entitled “Emergency seminar on cyber terrorism by North Korea 2011” in June 2011, and
presented material entitled “North Korea’s cyber terrorism capabilities,” explaining that North Korean organizations conducting cyber attacks were supported by government agencies employing
superior human resources from all over the country, giving them special training to develop their cyber attack capabilities.

21 CyberBerkut, a Ukrainian pro-Russian group, carried out cyber attacks against multiple websites of NATO in March 2014 and against the websites of the German Government and the German
parliament, the Bundestag, in January 2015. In June 2015, the “Syrian Electronic Army” attacked and hacked the U.S. Department of Defense’s Army website. Furthermore, in November 2015, the
international hacker group “Anonymous” announced that it attacked accounts linked to ISIL over the terror attacks in Paris. As these examples demonstrate, there are also frequent cyber attacks by
hacker groups.

22 In October 2012, the U.S. House Information Special Committee published an investigation report, entitled “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications
Companies Huawei and ZTE.” The report advised that products manufactured by Huawei Technologies and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) (major Chinese communications equipment
manufacturers) should not be used, due to their threats to national security based on strong concerns over China’s cyber attack capabilities and intentions targeting critical U.S. infrastructure, as well
as opaque relations between Chinese major IT companies and the central government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the PLA augmenting supply chain risks. A similar move has been taken by
other countries, including France, Australia, Canada, India, and Taiwan. Some countries, including the United Kingdom and the ROK, have issued warnings.

23 According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016.
24 This was the first ever virus program confirmed to target control systems that combine specific software and hardware. It is pointed out that such a virus program has the ability to access the target
system undetected and then steal information and make modifications to the system. Additionally, malware programs called “Duqu,” “Flame,” “Gauss,” and “Shamoon” have been detected in October
2011, May 2012, June 2012, and August 2012, respectively.

25 Generally, the trends at the governmental level are thought to include the following: (1) organizations related to cybersecurity that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being
integrated, and their operational units are being centralized; (2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, creating new research divisions and enhancing such
functions; (3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and (4) more emphasis is being given to international cooperation. At the level of the defense
ministry, various measures have been taken, such as establishing a new agency to supervise cyberspace military operations and positioning the effort to deal with cyber attacks as an important
strategic objective.l


-----

report containing recommendations on how to apply the
principles of international law to acts using cyberspace
and on voluntary, non-binding norms of state behavior.[27]

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-7 (Response to Cyber Attacks)

See


**1** **The United States**


Command, a sub-unifi ed command of U.S. Strategic
Command, oversees the cyber forces of the U.S. Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and manages
operations in cyberspace. U.S. Cyber Command has
expanded along with the expansion of its missions, and
has already established the Cyber Protection Force that
operates and defends the information infrastructure of the
DoD. In addition, U.S. Cyber Command has created the
Cyber National Mission Forces to support U.S. defense
against national-level threats, and the Cyber Combat
Mission Force that supports the operations conducted by
unifi ed combatant commands on the cyber front. These
three forces are collectively referred to as the Cyber
Mission Force.[31]

The Trump administration that was inaugurated in
January 2017 announced its policy on the rebuilding
of the U.S. Forces on the day of its inauguration. It
indicated that a variety of means must be employed to
protect national security secrets and systems from cyber
attacks, and that based on this awareness the U.S. Cyber
Command would give top priority to developing both
defensive and offensive cyber capabilities.
The United States deems that China continues to
conduct cyber-enabled theft targeting a broad set of U.S.
interests ranging from information related to national
security, to sensitive economic information and U.S.
intellectual property.
In September 2015, then U.S. President Obama and
Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed at their summit
meeting that the two countries would not conduct cyberenabled theft of intellectual property.[32] Nevertheless, it is
pointed out that cyber espionage from China continues
unimpeded as before.[33]


**1**


The “International Strategy for Cyberspace” released
in May 2011 outlines the U.S. vision for the future of
cyberspace, and sets an agenda[28] for partnership with
other nations and people to realize this vision. The
Strategy also points out seven policy priorities.
In the United States, the Department of Homeland
Security is responsible for protecting Federal government
networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks,
and the Department’s Offi ce of Cybersecurity and
Communications (CS&C) works to protect the networks
of government agencies.
With regard to cyber threats, The DoD Cyber
Strategy released in April 2015 expresses the view that
the United States faces serious cyber threats, noting that
state[29] and non-state actors intend to carry out destructive
cyber attacks against U.S. networks, as well as steal
U.S. military technology information. In this light, the
DoD has set out the following three primary missions
in cyberspace: (1) defend the DoD networks, systems,
and information; (2) defend the United States and its
interests against cyber attacks of signifi cant consequence;
and (3) provide integrated cyber capabilities to support
military operations.[30] Additionally, the DoD states that the
aforementioned cyber capabilities include cyber operations
to disrupt an adversary’s military-related systems.
From an organizational perspective, U.S. Cyber


27 The UN GGE on Cyber Issues has continued to hold consultations since 2004, with the participation of experts from a total of 15 countries (a total of 20 countries since the July 2014 meeting),
including Japan, the United States, Russia, and China. In its report released in August 2015, the GGE expresses the following views regarding the application of international law to states’ use of ICT,
namely, that: (1) states must observe state sovereignty and other principles in their use of ICT; (2) the GGE must note the “inherent right” of states to take measures consistent with international law
and as recognized in the UN Charter; (3) states must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICT; and (4) states should ensure that their territory is not used by non-state actors
to commit such acts. Furthermore, with regard to voluntary norms of state behavior, the report recommends, for example, that a state should not conduct or support ICT activity that intentionally
damages critical infrastructure.

28 The Strategy points out seven policy priorities: economy; protection of national networks; law enforcement; military; Internet governance; international development; and Internet freedom.

29 The DoD Cyber Strategy states that Russia and China have acquired advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. It goes on to say that Russian activities are carried out stealthily and their intentions
are diffi cult to discern. The Strategy notes that China steals intellectual property to benefi t Chinese companies. Furthermore, it states that while Iran and North Korea do not have developed cyber
capabilities, they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests.

30 In order to execute these missions in cyberspace, the DoD presents the following fi ve strategic concepts: (1) build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations;
(2) defend the DoD information network and data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions; (3) establish arrangements to defend the United States and its interests from cyber attacks of signifi cant
consequence through collaboration with relevant departments and companies; (4) use cyber options to control confl ict; and (5) build close cooperative relations with allies and partners.

31 According to a statement made in April 2015 by the commanding offi cers of U.S. Cyber Command to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, among other sources, the three forces are made
up of several teams, and dozens of them are currently operating. Employing the National Guard and reserve units, the Cyber Mission Force is set to have 133 teams (National Mission Teams [13
teams], Cyber Protection Teams [68 teams], Combat Mission Teams [27 teams], Support Teams [25 teams]) and 6,200 personnel by September 2018.

32 During the summit meeting, then President Obama allegedly expressed deep concerns over China’s cyber attacks and stated that the United States would exercise all possible tools, hinting at the
application of economic sanctions. Meanwhile, the two sides agreed that they would hold U.S.-China ministerial dialogues on fi ghting cybercrime.


-----

**2** **NATO**


**3** **The United Kingdom**


The new NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, and its action
plan, which were adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify
the political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s
response to cyber attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would
provide assistance to member states to develop their
cyber defense, and provide assistance to member states if
they are subject to cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles
on cooperation with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO
Summit in September 2014, agreement was reached
that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks
against member states.
As for its organization, the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) provides political oversight on policies and
operations concerned with NATO’s cyber defense. In
addition, the Emerging Security Challenges Division
formulates policy and action plans concerning cyber
defense. Furthermore, NATO has conducted cyber
defense training exercises annually since 2008 to heighten
the defense capabilities of its servers. NATO and the EU
have expressed their intention to expand collaboration in
the fi elds of cybersecurity and cyber defense.[34]

Also, in 2008, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) was authorized to
serve as NATO’s cyber defense-related research and
training institution,[35] and was established in Estonia’s
capital of Tallinn. CCD COE carries out research on the
relationship between cyber activities and international
law, and created the “Tallinn Manual.”[36] In February 2017,
“Tallinn Manual 2.0” was published as a continuation of
this manual in which a total of 154 “black letter” rules
are identifi ed based on a review of broad discussion
points, from peacetime legal regimes, such as laws on
state responsibility, human rights, aviation, space, and
maritime affairs, to contingency legal regimes, such as
the use of force and laws on armed confl ict.


The United Kingdom, in November 2015 in its “NSSSDSR2015”, committed to investing £1.9 billion
over the next fi ve years in increasing its cyber defense
capabilities to strengthen the functions for identifying
and analyzing cyberspace threats. In November 2016,
the country announced a new “Cyber Security Strategy”
that presented a vision for the United Kingdom, which
is to be secure and resilient to cyber threats, prosperous
and confi dent in the digital world. To achieve this vision,
the Strategy requires the United Kingdom to possess
the means to effectively “defend” from cyber threats,
to “deter” through having the means for offensive cyber
action, and to “develop” cutting-edge technologies.
In terms of the Government’s overall cybersecurity
policy, the Offi ce of Cyber Security and Information
Assurance (OCSIA) has been set up to present strategic
policies and to coordinate cybersecurity planning for the
overall government. In October 2016, the National Cyber
Security Centre (NCSC) was newly established under the
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
to promote public-private partnerships for responses to
national cyber incidents.

**4** **Australia**


**4**


In January 2013, Australia published its fi rst “National
Security Strategy,” which positions integrated cyber
policies and operations as one of the top national
security priorities. In April 2016, a new “Cyber Security
Strategy” through 2020 was released, which provides
that Australia will ensure the safety of the people, that
private companies will participate in cybersecurity, and
that threat information will be shared.
In terms of organization, the Australian Cyber
Security Centre (ACSC) that brings cybersecurity


34 In June 2013, the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting placed cyber attacks at the top of the agenda for the fi rst time. They agreed to establish an emergency response team and to implement a cyber
defense mechanism on a full scale by October 2013.

35 According to the Joint Declaration issued after the NATO Summit in July 2016.

36 The “Tallinn Manual” and the “Tallinn Manual 2.0” are both considered independent outputs of the members that participated in the project (Professor Michael N. Schmitt of the U.S. Naval War College i


-----

capabilities from across the government into a single
location was established in November 2014 to respond
to major cybersecurity issues related to government
agencies and critical infrastructures.[37] In July 2015, the
ACSC issued its fi rst report on cybersecurity,[38] which
contended that the number, type, and sophistication of
cyber threats to Australia are all increasing.
In addition, the Defence White Paper released in
February 2016 notes that cyber attacks are a direct threat
to the Australian Defence Force’s warfi ghting ability
given its reliance on information networks, and commits
to strengthening the Department of Defence’s cyber
capabilities and systems.

**5** **Republic of Korea**


the national defense sector, the Cyberspace Command
was established in January 2010 to carry out planning,
implementation, training, and research and development
for its cyberspace operations, and currently operates under
the direct control of the Ministry of National Defense.[41]
In April 2015, to strengthen its measures against
cyber attacks, the ROK Government established the
cybersecurity advisor post at the National Security Offi ce
of the President’s Offi ce. Furthermore, the Ministry of
National Defense prepared the “National Cyber Security
Strategy” that presents a vision for national cybersecurity
and a direction for medium- to long-term development. It
also created the “National Cybersecurity Crisis Response
Manual” that stipulates rapid response procedures to
cybersecurity crises. In 2015, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
centralized the cyber attack tactical system mainly
around the Joint Chiefs of Staff by newly establishing the
Cyber Tactics Department, assigning control authority
concerning cyber tactics to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and publishing a fi eld manual on “joint
cyber tactics.”


**5**


The ROK formulated the “National Cyber Security Master
Plan” in August 2011, which clarifi es the supervisory
functions of the National Intelligence Service[39] in
responding to cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis
on strengthening the following fi ve areas: prevention,
detection, response,[40] systems, and security base. In


37 The ACSC, comprised of staff from the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate, the Australian
Computer Emergency Response Team, and the Defence Intelligence Organisation, analyzes threats in cyberspace and responds to both public and private sector incidents. The ACSC is set to grow
to approximately 300 personnel by 2017.

38 According to the report, adversaries in cyberspace targeting Australia are: (1) foreign government-sponsored adversaries; (2) serious and organized criminals; and (3) groups motivated by certain
issues and individuals with personal grievances.

39 Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and improving a
national cybersecurity structure, coordinating related policies and roles among institutions, and deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders.

40 In February 2014, the ROK Ministry of National Defense reportedly briefed the National Assembly that it planned to develop cyber weapons for attacking other countries.

41 The basic plan for national defense reform (2012-2030) that was submitted to the President in August 2012 by the Ministry of National Defense proposed signifi cant enhancement of cyber warfare


-----

**Section 6** **[Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as ]**
**well as Defense Production and Technological Bases**


**Military Science and Technological Trends**
**1**


Recent developments in science and technology, as
represented by the dramatic advancement of information and
communications technology (ICT), has impacted a variety
of areas, triggering significant and revolutionary changes in
many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle.
The military is no exception. Developed countries,
including the United States, consider that transformations
driven by advances in ICT can dramatically improve
combat and other capabilities, and therefore, continue to
pursue a variety of ICT research and policies.
For example, if information on enemy forces
collected using information-gathering systems, including
reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft, is
shared on a network, command and control can be
exercised immediately, even from remote headquarters.
By extension, offensive power can be directed swiftly,
precisely, and flexibly against targets.
Additionally, new ICT technology has developed in
recent years. For instance, in August 2016, China launched
a satellite called “Mozi” to perform the world’s first
quantum communications[1] testing. In addition to quantum
communications, new technologies such as artificial
intelligence (AI) and big data analysis,[2] could potentially
be used by countries in military applications in the future.
Furthermore, 3D printing could make revolution in
military logistics.[3] For example, the U.S. Army Research
Laboratory announced that it carried out a demonstration
experiment[4] on a system for manufacturing a small


unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) using a 3D printer
based on a request received from the frontlines during a
training exercise. In addition, the U.S. Navy succeeded
in the test launching of a ballistic missile made with
components created by a 3D printer, and a 3D printer
has been used to manufacture engine components[5] used
for the MV-22 Osprey.
Major countries with sophisticated and modernized
military forces, including the United States, place
emphasis on improving the destructive capabilities of
weapons, precision guidance technology, informationrelated technology including C[4]ISR, unmanned
technology (e.g., drones[6]), and hypersonic technology[7] to
be able to carry out more precise and effective attacks.
Recently, reports have been published of successful

Demonstration of UAV produced by 3D printer by U.S. Army Research Institute
in December 2016 [photo courtesy of U.S. Army]


Quantum communications refers to communications using the characteristics of light particles or photons. In quantum communications, photons cannot be divided or reproduced. For this reason, it
is impossible for other parties to intercept or decrypt such communications, making it an ultimate form of communications technology.

In the explanation on its “Third Offset Strategy,” the United States has given the example of “deep-learning machine” technology using AI, which could analyze big data to detect signs of cyber attack
and to issue alerts, among serving other functions.

The 3D printer’s manufacturing method called additive manufacturing (AM) can form three-dimensional objects from computer drawings using materials such as metal and plastic. Further
advancement of 3D printing technologies will make it possible, for instance, to immediately manufacture necessary components without relying on their stock.

This training exercise was held in December 2016. A 3D-printed On-Demand Small Unmanned Aircraft System (ODSUAS) was used during the training exercise. Once soldiers inputted the
requirements into the software, the system determines the specifications for the optimal UAV and a 3D printer produced it. This system can deliver a UAV in less than 24 hours.

Announcement made by the Naval Air Systems Command in July 2016.

Drones for military use which have been developed include unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), and unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV) (UMVs may be classified into
unmanned surface vehicle (USV) and unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV)). It is suggested that these drones could shift from human-operated types to fully autonomous types, as known as Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Within the framework of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), discussions are taking place on the need for international
law and regulations for the operation of systems that automatically kill an enemy without human judgment. In January 2016, Gen. Paul Selva, Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United
States, reportedly made the following comment: “that brings us [military] to the cusp of questions about whether we are willing to have unmanned, autonomous systems that can launch on an enemy.”

For example, in the United States, DARPA and the Air Force are engaged in joint research and development of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC), aiming to apply the technology
to hypersonic missiles, etc. in the future. HAWC uses the technology of scramjet engine, which enables hypersonic flight by taking in air at hypersonic speed and burning it without reducing the speed


-----

tests of railguns[8] and high energy laser weapons[9] that
are expected to provide effective firepower compared
to existing weapons, such as artillery, in terms of their
cost per firing, range, precision, promptness, and other
aspects. Furthermore, there have been reports about the
development of high speed strike weapons (HSSW) that
can strike even long-range targets with conventional
weapons, quickly and with pinpoint accuracy.[10]

Recent research of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) of the U.S. Department of
Defense (DoD) have included: research to develop a
small unmanned aircraft called “Gremlin”[11] capable of
airborne launch and recovery, and reuse; and research
to develop an unmanned vessel called “Sea Hunter” to
detect submarines.[12]

Recent advances in military science and technology
are also largely attributed to the advancement of civil
technology. In recent years, as the capabilities of existing
equipment are improved and new equipment is developed,
dual-use technology has been leveraged frequently.


On the other hand, it is expected that countries having
difficulty possessing high-tech forces for technological
and economic reasons as well as non-state actors
including terrorist organizations will carry out research
and development on weapons and other equipment
that will enable them to gain superiority in fighting
against countries with state-of-the-art technology, and
illegitimately obtain technology through ICT or other
means. In short, these countries and organizations
tend to focus on asymmetrical means of attack that
can be developed or obtained with relatively low cost,
enabling them to attack their opponents’ vulnerability
without using conventional military capabilities. These
asymmetrical means of attack include: WMDs, such
as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; ballistic
missiles; terrorist attacks; and cyber attacks.
As asymmetrical means of attack may spread
throughout the world, the research and development of
technology[13] that responds to these asymmetrical threats
is also recognized as an important challenge.



**Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases**
**2**


Recently, Western countries in particular have continued
to face difficulties in significantly increasing defense
budgets. On the other hand, the sophistication of military
science and technology and the greater complexity of
equipment have escalated development and production
costs and are raising unit prices for equipment
procurement. Under these circumstances, many countries
are working on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain
and enhance their national defense production and
technological bases.
Western countries have set a target to increase
competitiveness through realignment of their defense
industry, based on the aforementioned situation related
to national defense budgets. The United States has
experienced repeated mergers and integrations among


domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced
cross-border mergers and integrations of the defense
industry, especially in Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and Italy.
In response to escalating development and production
costs, Western countries are promoting joint development
and production and technological cooperation related to
equipment among their allies and partners. This move
aims for (1) splitting development and production costs,
(2) expanding demands in all countries participating in joint
development and production, (3) mutual complementarity
of technologies, and (4) raising domestic technology levels
by obtaining the latest technology.
For example, the joint development and production
of the F-35 fighter jet led by the United States is the


8 A railgun is a weapon that fires bullets by using the magnetic field generated from electric energy instead of gunpowder. The U.S. Forces are developing a railgun with a range of about 370 km, or
about ten times that of the existing 5-inch (127 mm) ammunition. A single railgun shot reportedly costs 1/20th to 1/60th the price of a missile.

9 The U.S. Forces are developing laser weapons to strengthen low-altitude air defense capabilities against small ships and drones. From September to November 2014, a laser weapon was test fired
onboard the USS Ponce. It is suggested that high energy laser weapons systems would be miniaturized, with a view to placing the weapons also on light mobility vehicles. The cost of a laser shot
is reported to be less than US$1. In addition, since July 2015, DARPA and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory have been jointly financing and conducting tests integrating the high energy liquid
laser area defense system (HELLADS) and a ground-based laser weapons system demonstrator. Their goal is to continue to carry out tests to make operational improvements and to transition to the
testing and military use phase.

10 The goal of the HSSW is to considerably shorten the time required for attack with a conventional weapon. The HSSW is deemed to travel at a low trajectory that is clearly different from the trajectory
of ballistic missiles. It is suggested that the United States and China are developing HSSWs.

11 The U.S. DoD also develops micro-drones. In October 2016, three F/A-18 combat fighter jets successfully carried out an experiment in which they released 103 small drones and flew in formation
together. Micro-drones are about 16 cm long and have a wingspan of 30 cm. They weigh around 300 g and can fly up to about 110 km/hour.

12 As known as the Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) (“Sea Hunter”), this pilot vessel christened in April 2016 is a trimaran approximately 40 m long, capable of
navigating several thousand kilometers for months without crewmembers on board through constant remote supervision by humans. In August 2016, this vessel allegedly completed its initial sea
trials ahead of its deployment by the U.S. Navy slated for sometime before 2018.


-----

largest such project in the world. At present, there is
anticipated demand for around 3,100 of these aircraft.[14]
This project will have impacts on the defense production
and technological base of those countries involved,
through the operation and sustainment maintenance
stages of the aircraft.
Additionally, in an increasing number of cases,
governments are providing funding for national defense
related research and development conducted by the private
sector. In the United States, for example, approximately
US$2.87 billion of the FY2016 budget were appropriated
to DARPA[15] whose mission is to make pivotal investments
in breakthrough technologies for national security for
research and development. The defense authorities
have long provided substantial funding for the research
conducted by companies and universities, among other
institutions. The EU, too, has promoted an incremental
process for the framework to fund research for defense
technology, against the backdrop of the consistent
decline in national defense research expenditure by
member countries over the past 10 years. In March 2017,
the EU is expected to commence Preparatory Action
related to research on Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) in which it will provide 90 million
Euros over three years to more than 12 national defense
research programs. The European Defense Agency is the

Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional
Arms Export (2012-2016)


implementing body of this framework.[16]

Countries have been exporting equipment overseas
since the Cold War era, and even today, many countries
are taking measures to promote exports.
Exports of equipment to the Asia-Pacifi c region are
increasing in recent years. This has been underpinned by
economic growth in the region as well as the growing
infl uence of China, the existence of territorial disputes
with China, and responses to the enhancement of military
buildup in neighboring countries. Countries such as China
and the ROK have established the infrastructure required
for production of equipment through their past imports
of equipment and their improved capabilities in science
and technology, enabling them to increase exports of
affordable equipment.
Countries that import equipment have adopted
offset policies[17] for striking a balance between improving
defense abilities through imports and developing defense
production and technological bases domestically,
requiring domestic companies’ involvement in parts
manufacturing as a requirement for procurement of
equipment and services from outside the country.

See Fig. I-3-6-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms

Export (2012-2016));
Fig. I-3-6-2 (Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional Arms in
the Asia-Pacifi c Region (2012-2016))

Trends in Import Value of Major Conventional
Arms in the Asia-Pacifi c Region (2012-2016)

|Country|Col2|Import values ($ billion), 2012–2016|Comparison with 2007–2011 import values (%)|
|---|---|---|---|
|1|India|182.39|+43|
|2|China|63.80|-11|
|3|Australia|46.36|-7|
|4|Pakistan|44.93|-28|
|5|Viet Nam|42.72|+202|
|6|Republic of Korea|35.86|-49|
|7|Indonesia|29.67|+70|
|8|Taiwan|28.24|+647|
|9|Singapore|26.16|-47|
|10|Bangladesh|21.32|+681|

|Country|Col2|Global shares in defense equipment export (%), 2012–2016|Comparison with 2007–2011 export values (%)|
|---|---|---|---|
|1|United States|33%|21%|
|2|Russia|23%|5%|
|3|China|6%|74%|
|4|France|6%|-5%|
|5|Germany|6%|-36%|
|6|United Kingdom|5%|27%|
|7|Spain|3%|3%|
|8|Italy|3%|22%|
|9|Ukraine|3%|49%|
|10|Israel|2%|13%|


Fig. I-3-6-1


Fig. I-3-6-2


**Import values** **Comparison with**
**Country** **($ billion),** **2007–2011 import**
**2012–2016** **values (%)**

1 India 182.39 +43

2 China 63.80 -11

3 Australia 46.36 -7

4 Pakistan 44.93 -28

5 Viet Nam 42.72 +202

6 Republic of Korea 35.86 -49

7 Indonesia 29.67 +70

8 Taiwan 28.24 +647

9 Singapore 26.16 -47

10 Bangladesh 21.32 +681

Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” The top 10 countries by
import value between 2012–2016 are listed.


**Global shares in**

**Comparison with**

**defense equipment**

**Country** **2007–2011**

**export (%),**

**export values (%)**

**2012–2016**

1 United States 33% 21%

2 Russia 23% 5%

3 China 6% 74%

4 France 6% -5%

5 Germany 6% -36%

6 United Kingdom 5% 27%

7 Spain 3% 3%

8 Italy 3% 22%

9 Ukraine 3% 49%

10 Israel 2% 13%

Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.” The top 10 countries by
export value between 2012–2016 are listed (decimals are rounded).


14 There are nine countries involved in the joint development and production including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Countries acquiring the fi ghter include Israel, the ROK, and Japan. The defense production and technological base of these countries is involved in production and sustainment.

15 DARPA is the DoD agency. Approximately 100 program managers, who are hired for limited stints, generally three to fi ve years, oversee around 250 research and development programs. It does not
have its own research and development facilities.

16 The EU has launched a funding program called Horizon 2020 for research and innovation to which it has committed 80 billion Euros over the seven-year period from 2014 to 2020. However, the
provision of funds is limited to research for civilian or dual-use technology. In the United Kingdom, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) has a budget of £6 million in FY2017 and
regularly solicits conceptual demonstration research topics in order to fund research with a novel, high risk and high potential benefi t to develop capabilities for U.K. defense and security.

17 The defi nition of offset in defense trade encompasses a range of industrial and commercial benefi ts such as co-production, licensed production, subcontracting, technology transfer, purchasing, and


-----

**Part**
## Ⅱ

Japan’s Security and
Defense Policy and
the Japan-U.S. Alliance


Chapter 1
**Basic Concepts of Japan’s**
**Security and Defense**

Chapter 2
**Building a Dynamic Joint**
**Defense Force**

Chapter 3
**Development of Legislation for**
**Peace and Security and the SDF**
**Activities Since Legislation’s**
**Enforcement**

Chapter 4
**Strengthening of the Japan-U.S.**
**Alliance**


-----

**Basic Concepts of Japan’s**
**Chapter**
### 1
**Security and Defense**


**Section 1 Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security**


The independent state of a nation must be protected in
order for it to determine its own direction in politics,
economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture,
tradition, and sense of values. However, peace, safety,
and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing
for them. The essence of national security can be found
in creating an international environment that is stable and
predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats
before they occur, through diplomacy. Nevertheless, the
reality of the current international community suggests
that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions
from the outside by employing only nonmilitary means
such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation
were to be invaded it would not be able to remove such
a threat. Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate
guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to
eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced
by any other means.
For this reason, Japan is striving to develop
appropriate defense capabilities to protect the life and
properties of its nationals and to
defend the territorial land, sea,
and airspace of Japan. At the
same time, it is strengthening the
Japan–U.S. Alliance[1] with the
United States, which shares basic
values and interests with Japan.
This underlines that the peace and
security of Japan is ensured through
developing seamless defense


measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities
with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
In addition, Japan also works domestically to enrich
the backbone of the people, which is characterized
by ensuring stable lives of the people and protecting
the country, while also working to establish a security
foundation by implementing various measures in such
sectors as the economy and education so as not to allow
the chance of an invasion.
Moreover, from the perspective of improving the
security environment surrounding Japan and preventing
the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of
the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in
cooperative efforts as a member of the Asia-Pacifi c region
and the international community.
Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities,
Japan aims to ensure national security as well as bringing
peace and safety to the Asia-Pacifi c region, and eventually
to the entire world through making its utmost efforts in a
variety of fi elds.


Prime Minister Abe and Minister of Defense Inada inspecting the Special Guard of Honor

In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate


-----

**Section 2 Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy**


**Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense**
**1**


Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not
to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build
a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting
peace, and the principle of pacifi sm is enshrined in the
Constitution, Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation
of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial
of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since
Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not


deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign
state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets this as a
constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces
needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the
Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as
an armed organization, holding its exclusively defenseoriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and
continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.



**The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution**
**2**


The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears
to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all
forms. However, when considered in light of “the right
(of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the
Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article
13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the
people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”
shall be the supreme consideration in governmental
affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be
interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of selfdefense necessary to maintain its peace and security and
to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are
permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with
imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally
overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country,
and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence,
“use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end
is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic,
of the view consistently expressed by the government to
date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted
under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown
in the document “Relationship between the Right of
Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted
by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the
House of Councillors on October 14, 1972.
This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9
of the Constitution.
To date, the Government has considered that “use


**1** **Permitted Self-Defense Capability**


Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the
required minimum self-defense capability. The specifi c
limit is subject to change according to the prevailing
international situation, the level of military technologies,
and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided
through annual budget and other deliberations by the
Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability
constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by Article
9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered
within the context of Japan’s overall military strength.
Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess
certain armaments depends on whether such possession
would cause its total military strength to exceed the
constitutional limit.
The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive
weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of
another country is not permissible under any circumstance
as it would, by defi nition, exceed the minimum necessary
level. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range
strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

**2** **Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under**
**Article 9 of the Constitution**


**2**


In the Cabinet decision[1] made on July 1, 2014, measures
for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the
Constitution were defi ned as follows.


-----

of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when
an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in
light of the situation in which the security environment
surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed
and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power
balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation,
and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc.,
in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a
foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival,
depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc.
Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost
diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful
settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance
with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed
based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is
still required, however, to make all necessary preparations
in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.
Under such recognition and as a result of careful
examination in light of the current security environment,
it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack
against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against
a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan
occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and
poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when
there is no other appropriate means available to repel the
attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people,
use of force to the minimum extent necessary should
be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as
measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic
logic of the Government’s view to date.
As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be
carried out while observing international law. At the same
time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional
interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain
situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under
the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right
of collective self-defense. The Government has reached a
conclusion that although this “use of force” includes those
which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a
foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution


only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which
are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its
people, in other words, for defending Japan.

See Fig. II-1-2-1 (“Three New Conditions” for the “Use of Force”

as Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of

See

the Constitution)

**3** **Geographic Boundaries within which the Right**
**of Self-Defense may be Exercised**


**3**


The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan
under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confi ned
to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory,
territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is diffi cult to
give a general defi nition of the actual extent to which it
may be used, as this would vary with the situation.
Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as
a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed
troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of
other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas
deployment of troops would exceed the defi nition of the
minimum necessary level of self-defense.

**4** **Right of Belligerency**


Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes
that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does
not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a
general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has
under international law, including the authority to infl ict
casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force
and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan
may of course use the minimum level of force necessary
to defend itself. For example, if Japan infl icts casualties
and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising
its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished
from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though
those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation
of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum
necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible.


Fig. II-1-2-1 “Three New Conditions” for the “Use of Force” as Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution


Fig. II-1-2-1



-  When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship
with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to
life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

-  When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people.

- Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.


-----

**Basic Policy**
**3**


Under the Constitution, Japan has effi ciently built a
highly effective and joint defense force in line with the
basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defenseoriented policy and not becoming a military power that
poses a threat to other countries, while fi rmly maintaining
the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to
the principle of civilian control of the military, observing
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

**1** **Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy**


The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that
defensive force is used only in the event of an attack,
that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the
minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense
capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are
limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The
policy including these matters refers to the posture of a
passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of
the Constitution.


**4** **Securing Civilian Control**


Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the
military in a democratic state or democratic political
control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious
refl ection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened
until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict
civilian control system that is entirely different from the
one under the former Constitution.[4] Civilian control aims
to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in
accordance with the will of the people.
The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals,
makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such
matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and
main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) /
the SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of
the SDF. The function of national defense, as a general
administrative function, entirely falls under the executive
power of the Cabinet. The Constitution requires that the
Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute
the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf
of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme
command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of
Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense,
exercises general control and supervision over the SDF
duties. In addition, the National Security Council of
Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on
national security.
At the MOD, the Minister of Defense is responsible

Prime Minister Abe being saluted by the commander of the Engineering Unit dispatched to
South Sudan at the ceremony for the lowering and return of the fl ag

[photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce]


**2** **Not Becoming a Military Power**

**2**


There is no established defi nition for the concept of a
military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a
military power that could threaten other countries means
that Japan will not possess and maintain a military
capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries,
beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense.


**3** **Three Non-Nuclear Principles**

**3**


The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not
possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not
allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres
to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fi xed line of
national policy.
Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and
possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy
Basic Law.[2] In addition, Japan ratifi ed the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as
a non-nuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to
manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.[3]


Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed
independently under democratic management.”

Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...”


-----

for issues concerning national defense, and as the head
of the MOD also controls and manages the SDF. The
Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and
political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the
Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the
Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense.[5]

In addition, the Special Advisers to the Minister of
Defense provide the Minister of Defense with advice on
important issues under the jurisdiction of the MOD based
on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council
consisting of political appointees, civilian officials


and uniformed SDF personnel of the MOD deliberates
on basic principles concerning administrative affairs
under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways,
the MOD aims to further enhance the operation of the
civilian control system.
As mentioned above, the civilian control system
is well established. However, in order to ensure that
the system achieves good results, it is necessary to
continue making practical efforts in both political and
administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in
national defense taken by the people.


P t III Ch t 1 S ti 1 1 (O i ti f th Mi i t f D f (MOD)/th S lf D f F (SDF))


-----

**Section 3 Outline of the National Security Strategy**


**National Security Council**
**1**


As the security environment surrounding Japan grows
increasingly severe, Japan faces mounting security
challenges it needs to address. Under such circumstances,
it is necessary to carry forward policies pertaining to
national security from a strategic perspective under strong
political leadership with the Prime Minister at its core. For
this reason, the National Security Council was established
in the Cabinet in December 2013 to provide a platform to
discuss important matters with regard to Japan’s security.
Since its establishment, the Council has met 147 times (as
of the end of May 2017) and has been serving as a control
tower for foreign and defense policies. The National
Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG) are also deliberated and approved in
this National Security Council.
The National Security Secretariat established
within the Cabinet Secretariat provides constant support
to the National Security Council as its secretariat. The
Secretariat is also tasked with planning and designing,


and overall coordination of basic guidelines and
important matters with regard to foreign and defense
policies pertaining to national security. Administrative
organs that are deeply involved in policies support the
Secretariat with both personnel and information. The
Secretariat has many civilians and uniformed personnel
of the MOD with concurrent posts offering ideas essential
to designing policies and data such as global military
trends in a timely manner.
The enhanced ability to plan and design national
security policies has led to systematic alignment of
Japan’s national security, and to providing a direction
for policies with regard to new security challenges.
Furthermore, individual defense policies are formulated
and efforts to expedite decision-making are made based
on the basic guidelines discussed at the National Security
Council, and this is contributing signifi cantly to improved
planning and execution of policies within the MOD.

See Fig. II-1-3-1 (Organization of the National Security Council)


Fig. II-1-3-1 Organization of the National Security Council

|Structure to Support the National Security Council (Image)|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|National Security Council|||
|4-Minister Meeting|9-Minister Meeting|Emergency Situations Minister Meeting|
|Serves as a control tower for foreign and defense policies concerning national security|Maintains the civilian control function of the former Security Council|Strengthens the response to serious emergencies|


Fig. II-1-3-1


A scene from a National Security Council meeting held upon
North Korea’s ballistic missile launch

[photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce]

|Provide data, information and personnel|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|Related Ministries and Agencies|||
|Ministry of Defense|Ministry of Foreign Affairs|etc…|


Structure to Support the National Security Council (Image)

National Security Council

Emergency Situations
4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting
Minister Meeting

Serves as a control tower for Maintains the civilian control Strengthens the response to
foreign and defense policies function of the former Security serious emergencies
concerning national security Council

Support

Other Agencies within

National Security Secretariat within the Cabinet Secretariat
the Cabinet Secretariat Situation response /

Functions as a secretariat to provide constant support to the National Security CouncilPlanning and designing, and overall coordination of coordinationClose crisis managementNational Center of
basic guidelines and important matters pertaining to Incident Readiness and
foreign and defense policies with regard to national Strategy for Cybersecurity
security
Provides necessary advice when responding to Cabinet Intelligence
contingencies from a national security viewpoint and Research Office

etc…

Provide data,
information
and personnel

Related Ministries and Agencies

Ministry of Defense Ministry of Foreign Affairs etc…


-----

**National Security Strategy**
**2**


To date, the NDPG has contained mention of
nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense
policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries with it great
meaning as the defi nitive statement of the Government’s
basic policy on national security, with a focus on
diplomatic affairs and defense policy.

See Fig. II-1-3-2 (Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP and Annual Budget)

See


**2** **Outline of the National Security Strategy:**
**Proactive Contribution to Peace based on**

**2**

**the Principle of International Cooperation**


**1** **Japan’s National Security Policy Framework**


The NSS approved by the National Security Council and
the Cabinet in December of 2013 represents Japan’s fi rstever basic policy on national security with a focus on
diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS defi nes
approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term
view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy
on National Defense, which had served as the basis for
Japan’s defense policies theretofore.
The NDPG, which was established based on the NSS,
defi nes basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role
of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specifi c SDF
equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a mediumto long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense
equipment and the establishment of troop operational
systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires
many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly
designed for the next decade or so.
The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP)
specifi es a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay
defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent
fi ve-year period in order to achieve the defense capability
targets defi ned in the NDPG. The fi scal year budget
is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and
the necessary expenses for each fi scal year will be
appropriated based on relevant situations.

Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP and Annual
Budget


Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed
to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player
in international politics and business, it also seeks its
own security as well as peace and security in the AsiaPacifi c region from its stance as a proactive contributor to
peace based on the principle of international cooperation.
Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before
to the peace, security and prosperity of the international
community.
In achieving the aforementioned fundamental
principle of national security, the NSS stipulates national
interests and goals, and presents a strategic approach that
needs to be employed.

See Fig. II-1-3-3 (Outline of Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security)

Reference 5 (National Security Strategy (Outline))


Fig. II-1-3-2


Basic policy for national security centered

NSS

around diplomatic and defense policies
(approx. 10-year time frame)

based on NSS

Prescribe future defense force and target

NDPG levels of defense force that Japan should

achieve (approx. 10-year time frame)

achieve target levels of
defense force

Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures

MTDP

and quantity of major equipment

appropriate budget,
develop specific projects

Examine based on the current situations,

Annual budget

appropriate annual budget as necessary


**KeyWord** Proactive contributor to peace

A fundamental principle of national security introduced in the NSS, which

refers to Japan’s commitment to contribute to ensuring international

peace, stability and prosperity even more proactively and in a manner
proportional to Japan’s national power.


-----

Fig. II-1-3-3 Outline of Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security

|Fundamental Principle of National Security = Proactive Contribution to Peace Based on the Principle of International Cooperation|Col2|Col3|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|National Interests||◆ Maintain Japan’s peace and security, and ensure its survival ◆ Enhance Japan’s peace and security ◆ Maintain and uphold international order based on universal values and rules||
|Objectives||◆ Reinforce necessary deterrence and prevent direct threats to Japan ◆ Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacif ic region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce threats through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance and enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside of the region ◆ Improve the global security environment and build a prosperous international community||
|Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security||||
|1|Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles||● Reinforce diplomacy ● Build a comprehensive defense architecture ● Strengthen efforts for the protection of Japan’s territorial integrity ● Ensure maritime security ● Strengthen cybersecurity ● Strengthen measures against international terrorism ● Enhance intelligence capabilities ● Defense equipment and technology cooperation ● Ensure the stable use of outer space and promote its use for security purposes ● Strengthen technological capabilities|
|2|Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance||● Further strengthen the security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. ● Ensure a stable presence of the U.S. Forces|
|3|Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community||● Enhance the cooperative relations with the ROK, Australia, ASEAN countries, and India ● Establish a “Mutually Benef icial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” with China ● Encourage North Korea to take concrete actions to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missiles issues ● Advance cooperation with Russia in all areas ● Actively utilize multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks ● Cooperate with partners of the Asia-Pacif ic region ● Cooperate with countries outside the Asia-Pacif ic region|
|4|Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community||● Strengthen diplomacy at the United Nations ● Strengthen the rule of law ● Lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation ● Promote international peace cooperation ● Promote international cooperation against global terrorism|
|5|Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues||● Share universal values; address development issues and realize “human security”; cooperate with human resource development efforts in developing countries; maintain and strengthen the free trade system; respond to energy and environmental issues; enhance people-to-people exchanges|
|6|Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding||● Maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases ● Strengthen communication of information ● Social base ● Strengthen the intellectual base|


Fig. II-1-3-3


**Fundamental Principle of National Security =**
**Proactive Contribution to Peace Based on the Principle of International Cooperation**

-  Maintain Japan’s peace and security, and ensure its survival

National Interests -  Enhance Japan’s peace and security

-  Maintain and uphold international order based on universal values and rules

-  Reinforce necessary deterrence and prevent direct threats to Japan

-  Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacifi c region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce threats through strengthening the

Objectives

Japan-U.S. Alliance and enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside of the region

-  Improve the global security environment and build a prosperous international community

**Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security**

-  Reinforce diplomacy

-  Build a comprehensive defense architecture

-  Strengthen efforts for the protection of Japan’s territorial integrity

-  Ensure maritime security

Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s -  Strengthen cybersecurity
1
Capabilities and Roles -  Strengthen measures against international terrorism

-  Enhance intelligence capabilities

-  Defense equipment and technology cooperation

-  Ensure the stable use of outer space and promote its use for security purposes

-  Strengthen technological capabilities

-  Further strengthen the security and defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S.
2 Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

-  Ensure a stable presence of the U.S. Forces

-  Enhance the cooperative relations with the ROK, Australia, ASEAN countries, and India

-  Establish a “Mutually Benefi cial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” with China

Strengthening Diplomacy and Security -  Encourage North Korea to take concrete actions to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues
Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missiles issues

3

Peace and Stability in the International -  Advance cooperation with Russia in all areas
Community -  Actively utilize multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks

-  Cooperate with partners of the Asia-Pacifi c region

-  Cooperate with countries outside the Asia-Pacifi c region

-  Strengthen diplomacy at the United Nations

Proactive Contribution to International -  Strengthen the rule of law
4 Efforts for Peace and Stability of the -  Lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation
International Community -  Promote international peace cooperation

-  Promote international cooperation against global terrorism

Strengthening Cooperation Based on -  Share universal values; address development issues and realize “human security”; cooperate with human
5 Universal Values to Resolve Global resource development efforts in developing countries; maintain and strengthen the free trade system; respond
Issues to energy and environmental issues; enhance people-to-people exchanges

Strengthening the Domestic -  Maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases
Foundation that Supports National -  Strengthen communication of information

6

Security and Promoting Domestic and -  Social base
Global Understanding -  Strengthen the intellectual base


-----

**Building a Dynamic Joint**

**Chapter**
### 2

**Defense Force**


**Section 1 Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines**


Since it was fi rst developed in 1976, the National Defense
Program Guidelines has been established fi ve times,
and the new National Defense Program Guidelines for
FY2014 and beyond (NDPG) was introduced in 2013.[1]


The NDPG sets out the future defense force and target
levels of defense force that Japan should achieve, taking
into consideration the security situation of the times.

See Fig. II-2-1-1 (Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability)


See


**Basic Approach – Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force**
**1**


The NDPG is the fi rst of its kind to be developed based for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as
on the National Security Strategy (NSS), and it calls the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and

Fig. II-2-1-1 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability


Fig. II-2-1-1



[Background]

Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG
1976 NDPG Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community

Balanced relationship among the United States, China, and -  The concept of Basic Defense Capability

(October 29, 1976 the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Japan -  Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation
the National DefenseCouncil/Cabinet Meeting) Need to show the target of defense force buildup preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping

with a direct military threat to Japan

19 years

[Background]

Basic ideas in 1995 NDPG

1995 NDPG The end of Cold War

International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty -  Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability

(November 28, 1995 National expectations to international contribution -  “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing
the Security Council/
Cabinet Meeting) to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense

capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation”

9 years

[Background]

Basic ideas in 2004 NDPG

2004 NDPG New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic

missile attacks -  Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international

(December 10, 2004the Security Council/ Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and
Cabinet Meeting) Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on diverse contingencies

deterrence to handling the situation -  Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of basic defense capability

6 years

[Background]

Basic ideas in 2010 NDPG

2010 NDPG Change in global power balance

Complex military situation surrounding Japan -  Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic

(December 17, 2010 Diversification of the military role in global society Defense Capability)
the Security Council/
Cabinet Meeting) -  Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and

making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the
security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security

3 years

environment in a dynamic manner

[Background]

Basic ideas in 2013 NDPG

2013 NDPG Security situation surrounding Japan has become

increasingly severe -  Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force

(December 17, 2013the National Security U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region -  Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which
Council/Cabinet Meeting) Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security

of the Great East Japan Earthquake environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime

supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly


-----

security in light of Japan s geographical characteristics[2]
under the new security environment.[3 ]

Amid the increasingly severe security environment
surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of
situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations
(see Part I, Chapter 1, Section 1), that is, neither pure
peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the
territory or vested interests, which require the SDF’s
commitment are both increasing. Therefore, it is essential
to regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a
response posture in accordance with the development
of the situation to prevent further escalation. In dealing
with such situations, it is also essential to minimize the
damage by dealing with situations by effective response
through achieving necessary maritime supremacy[4] and air
superiority.[5] Among these situations, the qualitative and
quantitative capabilities of the defense force underpinning
the SDF activities were not necessarily suffi cient.
The NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls
for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability
by pursuing further joint operations, improving the missioncapable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct
activities, as well as developing defense capabilities adequate


both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities.
To this end, Japan has conducted capability assessments
based on joint operations in relation to the SDF’s total
functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions
and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized.
The NDPG carries great signifi cance as it has made it
possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment
surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and
effi cient defense capability build-up, based on the results of
these capability assessments.
Additionally, it requires the build-up of the most
effective operational posture, by further strengthening a
wide-ranging logistics support foundation. Specifi cally,
the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of various
fi elds as the basic foundations for the SDF such as training
and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and
education, medical, defense production and technological
bases, effi cient acquisition of equipment, research and
development, collaboration with local communities,
boosting of communication capabilities, enhancement
of the intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the
Ministry of Defense.

See Reference 6 (NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for

FY2014 and beyond)

**Japan’s Basic Defense Policy**
**2**


Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear
weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the United
States is indispensable. Japan will closely cooperate with
the United States, and take appropriate responses through
its own efforts. In addition, Japan will play a constructive
and active role in international nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation efforts.


**1** **Basic Policy**


In light of the NSS, Japan will build a comprehensive
defense architecture, and actively promote bilateral and
multilateral security cooperation with other countries
while strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, thereby
seeking to establish an infrastructure necessary for fully
exercising its defense capabilities.
Under the Constitution, Japan will effi ciently build
a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the
basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defenseoriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses
a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle
of civilian control of the military and observing the Three
Non-Nuclear Principles.


**2** **Japan’s Own Efforts**

**2**


Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan
will effi ciently develop a highly effective joint defense force
and make efforts to employ it with a high level of fl exibility
and readiness based on joint operations. In the event of various


The NDPG discusses that Japan’s geographical characteristics make it a maritime state, therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffi c through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas”
order constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. It also states that Japan faces security vulnerabilities such as frequent natural disasters, concentration of population, and a large number of nuclear
power plants in coastal areas.

The NDPG describes new trends in the global security environment and the security environment of the Asia-Pacifi c region. With regard to the new trends in the global security environment, it
mentions: 1) expanded and deepened interdependence among countries; 2) increase in the number of gray-zone situations; 3) change in the power balance; 4) undue infringement upon freedom of
the high seas; and 5) securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace.
With regard to the trends in the security environment of the Asia-Pacifi c region, it lists general situations, including that gray-zone situations tend to linger and could develop into more serious
situations. In addition, the NDPG discusses military trends in North Korea, China, Russia and the United States.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 (Effective Deterrence and Response).


-----

situations, Japan will appropriately and promptly make
decisions and seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold,
in a whole-of-the-government approach, in coordination with
local governments, private sectors, and others.
Furthermore, Japan will continue to develop various
systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect
its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the
safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an
emergency situation.
In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan
will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster
response posture by systemizing various related plans
and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive
training, and exercises.
Furthermore, Japan will make efforts to build up
a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as mentioned above,
in addition to the establishment of a comprehensive
defense architecture.

**3** **Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance**


The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with
Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s
national security. Also, the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions
as public goods that contribute to the stability and
prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacifi c
region and the world at large. From this perspective,
Japan will place emphasis on: strengthening deterrence
and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance;
strengthening and expanding of cooperation in a broad
range of fi elds; and steady implementation of measures
relating to the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan.


confrontation and the sense of curiosity towards one
another in the Asia-Pacifi c region. In particular, with
regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia and
India, Japan will make efforts to improve cooperation
and interoperability. Japan will also endeavor to promote
dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia.
Additionally, with regard to capacity building
assistance, Japan will promote and carry it out in full
coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including
Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA), and Japan will
expand the range of countries receiving support as well
as its scope.
Furthermore, in multilateral security cooperation
and dialogue, Japan, in cooperation with the United
States and Australia, will proactively contribute to
building cooperative relationships in the region, and
Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint
training and exercises.

**(2) Cooperation with the International Community**
It is very diffi cult for a single country to respond to
global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the
roles of military forces have diversifi ed, such forces
play an important role in building peace and promoting
confi dence-building. Therefore, Japan will continue
and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms
control, disarmament, non-proliferation and capacity
building assistance on a regular basis in cooperation
with the international community. Specifi cally Japan
will strengthen its cooperation with the European Union
(EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), along with the United Kingdom, France and
other European countries. Furthermore, Japan will
actively promote various international peace cooperation
activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular,
will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the
SDF’s capabilities.


**4** **Active Promotion of Security Cooperation**

**4**


**(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c Region**
Japan will promote a variety of cooperative initiatives
in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of


**Future Defense Forces**
**3**


**1** **Role of the Defense Forces**

**1**


**(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations**
Japan will achieve intelligence superiority[6] through
persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to
detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through
such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not


to tolerate any change of the status quo by force, thereby
preventing various situations from occurring.
At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly
respond to situations from an early stage, including grayzone situations, and establish the necessary posture to
continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover,


-----

Japan will implement an effective response tailored to
each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur
in a consecutive or concurrent manner.
In particular, the following points will be emphasized:
(1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan;
(2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to
ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and
cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters.

**(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c Region and**
**Improvement of the Global Security Environment**

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and
the timely and appropriate implementation of training,
exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure
the stability of the security environment in the region.
Moreover, by working in partnership with its allies and
partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives,
including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation
and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity
building assistance.
In order to respond appropriately to global security
issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused
on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as
well as actively promote international peace cooperation


activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building
assistance. Japan will attach importance to the following in
particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting
defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity
building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security;
(5) implementing international peace cooperation activities;
and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms control,
disarmament, and non-proliferation.

**2** **Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF**


**(1) Basic Approach**
Based on the results of the capability assessments
conducted based on the standpoint of joint operations
in relation to various potential contingencies, the SDF
will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure
maritime superiority and air superiority, which is the
prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in
various situations, including defense posture buildup
in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF
will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment
capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wideranging logistics support foundation.
At the same time, in terms of preparation for an


Fig. II-2-1-2 Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized and Their Content

|Functions and Capabilities|Contents|
|---|---|
|ISR capabilities|● Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, and adopt a f lexible approach for boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.|
|Intelligence capabilities|● Japan will strengthen its system for collecting intelligence, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations and take other actions. ● The SDF will seek to enhance its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. ● The SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the securing and nurturing of personnel in information gathering and analysis.|
|Transport capability|● In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with the civilian transport sector on a regular basis.|
|Command and control, and information and communication capabilities|● In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), among other measures. ● The SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services, along with other capabilities.|
|Response to an attack on remote islands|● T he SDF will strengthen its engagement capability for the ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for an effective response. ● The SDF will strengthen the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands, and newly develop suff icient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. ● The SDF will enhance its logistics support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region. ● The SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacif ic.|
|Response to ballistic missile attacks|● To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will comprehensively improve its response capability against ballistic missiles. ● With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory. ● B ased on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities.|
|Response in outer space and cyberspace|● While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will improve the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. ● As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment.|
|Responses to major disasters, etc.|● The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately sized units.|
|Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities|● The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units. ● The SDF will enhance transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and logistics and medical service structure. ● Furthermore, the SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems.|


Fig. II-2-1-2


**Functions and Capabilities** **Contents**

-  Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, and adopt a fl exible approach for boosting its ISR posture
ISR capabilities
according to the developments of situations.

-  Japan will strengthen its system for collecting intelligence, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so
that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations and take other actions.

-  The SDF will seek to enhance its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent

Intelligence capabilities

ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles.

-  The SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the securing and nurturing of personnel in
information gathering and analysis.

-  In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with
Transport capability
the civilian transport sector on a regular basis.

-  In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central

Command and control,

headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), among other measures.

and information and

-  The SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link

communication capabilities

functions among the three services, along with other capabilities.

-  The SDF will strengthen its engagement capability for the ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for an
effective response.

-  The SDF will strengthen the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands, and newly develop suffi cient

Response to an attack on amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote
remote islands islands.

-  The SDF will enhance its logistics support capabilities, so that its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the
southwestern region.

-  The SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacifi c.

-  To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will comprehensively improve its response capability against ballistic
missiles.

-  With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to

Response to ballistic missile

strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.

attacks

-  Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrence of the Japan-U.S.
Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response
capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities.

-  While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities,

Response in outer space and the SDF will improve the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness.
cyberspace -  As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and

secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment.
Responses to major -  The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately
disasters, etc. sized units.

Responses focused

-  The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units.

on international peace

-  The SDF will enhance transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and logistics and medical service structure.

cooperation activities and

-  Furthermore, the SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems.

other similar activities


-----

invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces,
the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of
expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts
to achieve even greater effi ciency and rationalization.

**(2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized**
The SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions
and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance
joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. Forces.

-  ISR capabilities

-  Intelligence capabilities

-  Transport capability

-  Command and control, and information and
communication capabilities

-  Response to an attack on remote islands

-  Response to ballistic missile attacks



-  Response in outer space and cyberspace

-  Responses to major disasters, etc.

-  Responses focused on international peace cooperation
activities and other similar activities

See Fig. II-2-1-2 (Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized and

See


Their Content)

**3** **Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense Forces**


**(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)**
In order to respond swiftly to an attack on offshore
islands and various other situations, the GSDF will
maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid
deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an
armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and
ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain


Fig. II-2-1-3 Key Changes in the Structure of the GSDF

|Regionally deployed units in peacetime|8 divisions 6 brigades|
|---|---|

|Regionally deployed units|5 divisions 2 brigades|
|---|---|

|Rapid Deployment Units|1 armored division Central Readiness Force|
|---|---|

|Rapid Deployment Units|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade|
|---|---|

|Tank|(approx. 700)|
|---|---|

|Artillery|(approx. 600/vehicle)|
|---|---|


Fig. II-2-1-3


Rapid Deployment Divisions/Brigades

Approximately half of the divisions and brigades will be reorganized into rapid deployment divisions and rapid
deployment brigades comprised of units, including rapid deployment regiments furnished with advanced
mobility and ISR capabilities.

Type-16 Mobile Combat Vehicles suitable for transportation on aircraft will be introduced.

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Regionally
deployed 8 divisions Regionally 5 divisions
units in 6 brigades deployed units 2 brigades
peacetime

3 rapid deployment
divisions
4 rapid deployment Type-16 Mobile Combat Vehicle (MCV)

Rapid 1 armored division Rapid brigades -  Prototype
Deployment Central Readiness Deployment 1 armored division
Units Force Units 1 airborne brigade

1 helicopter brigade
1 amphibious rapid
deployment brigade

Establishment of Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade

In order to enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be
invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade will be established. Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV7)

Greater Efficiency and Streamlining

Only the minimum necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during
the Cold War, will be retained to promote greater efficiency and streamlining.

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Tank (approx. 700) (approx. 300)

Artillery (approx. 600/vehicle) (approx. 300/vehicle)

-  Major reduction from the objective specified in the NDPG FY2010 (approx. 400 tanks and approx. 400 artillery)

Establishment of the Ground Component Command

The Ground Component Command will be established in order to allow swift and flexible operations of each unit of the GSDF under the joint operations.
(Introduced in the Mid-Term Defense Program) [Refer to Column “Establishment of the Ground Component Command”]


-----

mobile operating units capable of effectively performing
amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain
half of these rapidly deployable basic operational units in
Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment.
The GSDF will implement rationalization and
streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and
rockets, and review the organization and equipment of units.
The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at
around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of
FY2013, in order to ensure suffi cient personnel availability
to respond to major disasters or other situations.

See Fig. II-2-1-3 (Key Changes in the Structure of the GSDF)

See


**(2) Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)**
The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers to 54
(14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer
improved response capabilities for various missions and


have more compact designs, and will maintain ship-based
patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of
surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime
traffi c. Furthermore, two Aegis destroyers will be added,
bringing the fl eet to eight.
Furthermore, in order to effectively carry out regular
information gathering and warning and surveillance
activities, as well as patrolling of surrounding waters[7]
and defense operations, the MSDF will maintain an
augmented submarine fl eet and patrol aircraft units.

See Fig. II-2-1-4 (Key Changes in the Structure of the MSDF)


See


**KeyWord** Aegis destroyer

Destroyers equipped with the Aegis Weapon System that uses high

performance computers to automatically process series of operations

such as target search, detection, identifi cation and attack


Fig. II-2-1-4 Key Changes in the Structure of the MSDF

|Destroyers|47 destroyers|
|---|---|

|Aegis Destroyers|6 Aegis destroyers|
|---|---|

|Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft|65 fixed-wing patrol aircraft|
|---|---|

|Patrol Helicopters|76 patrol helicopters|
|---|---|

|Submarines|16 submarines|
|---|---|


Fig. II-2-1-4


Structure of Destroyer Units

Current situation Future

Reinforcement of destroyer units (at the end of FY 2013) 10 years later)(approx.
Increase in the number of destroyers by introduction of the new destroyer with additional
multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull

An 8-destroyer structure with 2 additional Aegis-equipped destroyers

**47** **54**

[The End of FY 2013] [Target Situation]

**destroyers** **destroyers**

Destroyers 47 destroyers 54 destroyers

**Introduction of**

**25** **the new destroyer**

Aegis Destroyers 6 Aegis destroyers 8 Aegis destroyers **mine-** **18**

**sweeping** **mine-**
**vessels** **sweeping**

**vessels**

Structure of Patrol Aircraft Units

Maintenance of current structure of fixed-wing patrol aircraft through continued procurement of
fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1)

[Maintenance of current structure]

Fixed-wing 65 fixed-wing
Patrol Aircraft patrol aircraft

Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1)

Increase in the number of patrol helicopters

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Patrol 76 patrol 80 patrol
Helicopters helicopters helicopters

Structure of Submarine Units Patrol Helicopter (SH-60K)

Continued increase in the number of submarines through construction and life extension

[→ Commentary: Increasing the Number of Submarines]

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Submarines 16 submarines 22 submarines

Submarine (Soryu Class)


-----

**(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)**
The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units
in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space
over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating
warning and control operations at air defense command
centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups
into warning squadrons as well as establish one new
squadron in the air warning unit.
As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will
be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will
be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to

Fig. II-2-1-5 Key Changes in the Structure of the ASDF


the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a twosquadron architecture.
Furthermore, the ASDF will maintain surface-toair guided missile units providing multi-layered defense
for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with
the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in
tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of
the GSDF.

See Fig. II-2-1-5 (Key Changes in the Structure of the ASDF)

Fig. II-2-1-6 (NDPG Comparison Tables)

|Fighter Aircraft Units|12 squadrons|
|---|---|

|Number of Fighter Aircraft|Approx. 260|
|---|---|

|Air Warning Unit|2 squadrons|
|---|---|

|Air Warning & Control Units|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons|
|---|---|

|Aerial Refueling / Transport Units|1 squadron|
|---|---|


See


Fig. II-2-1-5


Increase the Number of Fighter Aircraft Units

Newly establish the 13th fighter aircraft unit
At Naha Air Base, increase the number of fighter squadrons to two, and newly establish the 9th
Air Wing

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Fighter Aircraft
12 squadrons 13 squadrons
Units

F-35A Fighter Aircraft

Number of
Approx. 260 Approx. 280
Fighter Aircraft

[⇒ Commentary “Initiatives to Begin the Operation of F-35A”]

Increase the Number of Air Warning and Control Units

Establish 1 squadron in the Air Warning Unit (at Naha Air Base)
Change warning groups into warning squadrons by consolidating warning and control operations
at air defense command centers (DC)

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Air Warning Unit 2 squadrons 3 squadrons

E-2D Airborne Early Warning Aircraft

Air Warning & 8 warning groups 28 warning
Control Units 20 warning squadrons squadrons

Increase the Number of Aerial Refueling / Transport Units

Newly establish 1 squadron in the Aerial Refueling / Transport Units

[The End of FY 2013] [Target]

Aerial Refueling /
1 squadron 2 squadrons
Transport Units

KC-46A Aerial Refueling / Transport Aircraft


-----

Fig. II-2-1-6 NDPG Comparison Tables

|Col1|Category|Col3|1976 NDPG|1995 NDPG|2004 NDPG|2010 NDPG|2013 NDPG|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|GSDF|Authorized Number of personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||180,000|160,000 145,000 15,000|155,000 148,000 7,000|154,000 147,000 7,000|159,000 151,000 8,000|
||Major units|Regionally deployed units in peacetime1|12 divisions 2 combined brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades|
|||Rapid Deployment Units|1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division Central Readiness Force|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade|
|||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile units|||||5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|
|||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|
||Major equipment|Tanks2 Artillery (Main artillery)2|(approx. 1,200) (approx. 1,000/vehicle)|approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)|approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)|approx. 400 (approx. 400/vehicle)|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)|
|MSDF|Major units|Destroyer units for mobile operations regional deployment Submarine units Minesweeper Units Patrol aircraft units|4 f lotillas (Regional units) 10 units 6 divisions 2 f lotillas (Land-based) 16 squadrons|4 f lotillas (Regional units) 7 units 6 divisions 1 f lotilla (Land-based) 13 squadrons|4 f lotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 f lotilla 9 squadrons|4 f lotillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions 6 divisions 1 f lotilla 9 squadrons|4 f lotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 6 divisions 1 f lotilla 9 squadrons|
||Major equipment|Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft|approx. 60 16 approx. 220|approx. 50 16 approx. 170|47 16 approx. 150|48 22 approx. 150|54 22 approx. 170|
|ASDF|Major units|Air Warning & Control Units|28 warning groups 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)|
|||Fighter Aircraft Units Fighter-interceptor units Support f ighter units|10 squadrons 3 squadrons|9 squadrons 3 squadrons|12 squadrons|12 squadrons|13 squadrons|
|||Air Reconnaissance Units|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron||
|||Aerial refueling/ transport units Air transport units|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|2 squadrons 3 squadrons|
|||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups|
||Major equipment|Combat aircraft (Fighters)|approx. 430 (approx. 350)2|approx. 400 approx. 300|approx. 350 approx. 260|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280|
|Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions3||Aegis-equipped destroyers|||4 ships|6 ships4|8 ships|
|||Air Warning & Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|||7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups|11 warning groups/ units 6 groups||


Fig. II-2-1-6


**Category** **1976 NDPG** **1995 NDPG** **2004 NDPG** **2010 NDPG** **2013 NDPG**

Authorized Number of personnel 180,000 160,000 155,000 154,000 159,000
Active-Duty Personnel 145,000 148,000 147,000 151,000
Reserve-Ready Personnel 15,000 7,000 7,000 8,000

Regionally deployed units in 12 divisions 8 divisions 8 divisions 8 divisions 5 divisions
peacetime[1] 2 combined brigades 6 brigades 6 brigades 6 brigades 2 brigades
Rapid Deployment Units 1 armored division 1 armored division 1 armored division Central Readiness Force 3 rapid deployment
divisions
1 artillery brigade 4 rapid deployment
brigades
1 airborne brigade 1 airborne brigade Central Readiness Force 1 armored division 1 armored division

GSDF 1 training group 1 airborne brigade

Major units

1 helicopter brigade 1 helicopter brigade 1 amphibious rapid
deployment brigade
1 helicopter brigade

5 surface-to-ship

Surface-to-Ship Guided

guided missile

Missile units

regiments
Surface-to-Air Guided 8 anti-aircraft artillery 8 anti-aircraft artillery 8 anti-aircraft artillery 7 anti-aircraft artillery 7 anti-aircraft artillery
Missile Units groups groups groups groups/regiments groups/regiments
Major Tanks[2] (approx. 1,200) approx. 900 approx. 600 approx. 400 (approx. 300)
equipment Artillery (Main artillery)[2] (approx. 1,000/vehicle) (approx. 900/vehicle) (approx. 600/vehicle) (approx. 400/vehicle) (approx. 300/vehicle)

Destroyer units 4 fl otillas (8 divisions) 4 fl otillas (8 divisions)
4 divisions 6 divisions
for mobile operations 4 fl otillas 4 fl otillas 4 fl otillas (8 divisions)
regional deployment (Regional units) 10 units (Regional units) 7 units 5 divisions

Major units

Submarine units 6 divisions 6 divisions 4 divisions 6 divisions 6 divisions

MSDF Minesweeper Units 2 fl otillas 1 fl otilla 1 fl otilla 1 fl otilla 1 fl otilla

Patrol aircraft units (Land-based) 16 (Land-based) 13 9 squadrons 9 squadrons 9 squadrons
squadrons squadrons

Destroyers approx. 60 approx. 50 47 48 54

Major

Submarines 16 16 16 22 22

equipment

Combat aircraft approx. 220 approx. 170 approx. 150 approx. 150 approx. 170

Air Warning & Control Units 28 warning groups 8 warning groups 8 warning groups 4 warning groups 28 warning squadrons
20 warning squadrons 20 warning squadrons 24 warning squadrons
1 squadron 1 squadron 1 AEW group 1 AEW group 1 AEW group
(2 squadrons) (2 squadrons) (3 squadrons)
Fighter Aircraft Units 12 squadrons 12 squadrons 13 squadrons
Fighter-interceptor units 10 squadrons 9 squadrons

Major units Support fi ghter units 3 squadrons 3 squadrons
ASDF Air Reconnaissance Units 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron

Aerial refueling/ 1 squadron 1 squadron 2 squadrons
transport units

Air transport units 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons
Surface-to-Air Guided 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups
Missile Units

Major Combat aircraft approx. 430 approx. 400 approx. 350 approx. 340 approx. 360
equipment (Fighters) (approx. 350)[2] approx. 300 approx. 260 approx. 260 approx. 280

Aegis-equipped destroyers 4 ships 6 ships[4] 8 ships

Major equipment/units that 7 warning groups 11 warning groups/

Air Warning & Control Units

may also serve for BMD 4 warning squadrons units
missions[3] Surface-to-Air Guided 3 groups 6 groups

Missile Units

Notes: 1. Units referred to as Regional Deployment Units in the 2013 NDPG.
2. Although not stated in the Attached Tables of 1976 NDPG and the 2013 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG Attached Table from 1995 to 2010.
3. “Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions” are included in the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF in the 2004 NDPG
and the 2010 NDPG, but their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of destroyers (Aegis-equipped destroyers), air warning & control units, and surface-to-air guided
missile units in the 2013 NDPG.
4. Additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as
the development of ballistic missile defense technology and fi nancial matters.


-----

implementation of the various measures and programs.
Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future
defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations
based on joint operational capability assessment. When
major changes in the situation are anticipated during the
review and verifi cation process, necessary examination
considering the security environment at that time will
be implemented and these guidelines will be revised
adequately. In light of the increasingly severe fi scal
conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater effi ciency
and streamlining in the defense capability buildup while
ensuring harmony with other national initiatives.


**4** **Basic Foundation for SDF**


To ensure that the defense force can function as
effectively as possible, it is also imperative to strengthen
the foundations underpinning the defense force.

See Fig. II-2-1-7 (Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability)

See

**5** **Additional Points**


The NDPG sets out the form of Japan’s defense capabilities
over the next decade or so. The National Security Council
will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of


Fig. II-2-1-7 Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability

|Category|Main measures|
|---|---|
|Training and Exercises|● Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido; enhance and strengthen training and exercises that also involve relevant agencies and the civilian sector. ● Promote the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities in the southwestern region with the SDF for the purpose of securing a good training environment while paying close attention to the relationship with local communities.|
|Operations Infrastructure|● Enhance resiliency, including the ability of camps and bases to recover so as to respond effectively to various situations, as well as to ensure the expeditious deployment of units etc.; improve facilities and dormitories of each branch of the service to ensure readiness. ● Discuss ways to enable the immediate use of civilian airports and ports by the SDF as the foundation of its operations in response to situations that arise. ● Implement various family support measures for personnel engaged in duties and for their families. ● Secure and store necessary ammunition; maintain equipment.|
|Personnel Education|● Take measures to ensure an appropriate rank and age distribution given the duties and characteristics of respective branches of the service. ● Make use of female uniformed SDF personnel more effectively; facilitate measures to make good use of human resources including reemployment and measures related to honors and privileges; expand training and exercise opportunities, and secure personnel who can instantly cope with various situations with f lexibility based on a broad view and experience gained through working in other relevant ministries and agencies in order to enhance the joint operations structure. ● Facilitate various recruitment programs; promote support for the reemployment of SDF personnel through measures such as enhancing coordination with local governments and relevant agencies. ● Promote the use of Reserve SDF personnel in a wide range of areas and implement measures to boost the staff ing rate of Reserve SDF personnel etc. in order to support the continued operation of troops.|
|Medicine|● Establish an eff ciient and high-quality medical system, including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. ● Secure and train such medical staff as medical off icers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. Improve f irst aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation.|
|Defense Production and Technological Bases|● Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole; promote the adaptation of equipment to civilian use. ● Formulate clear principles that comply with the new security environment about the overseas transfer of weapons, etc.|
|Eff icient Acquisition of Equipment|● In order to carry out effective and eff icient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system; enhance project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment; study the possibility of employing more long-term contracts. ● Improve readiness and response capabilities by reforming the supply system through the effective utilization of civilian capabilities; make the acquisition process transparent and optimize to the contract system.|
|Research and Development (R&D)|● Under the constrained budget, ensure there is consistency between research and development and priority of defense buildup, while considering needs that arise in operations of the SDF. ● In order to respond to new threats and ensure technological advantage in strategically important areas, promote research and development based on a mid-to-long-term perspective. ● Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancing coordination with universities and research institutions, and transfer military technologies into civilian activities.|
|Collaboration with Local Communities|● Advance measures aimed at the areas around defense facilities; continuously engage in proactive public relations activities aimed at local governments and residents. ● Give consideration to the attributes of each area when reorganizing units; give consideration to the impact that the operation of camps and so on have on local economies.|
|Boosting Communication Capabilities|● Enhance strategic publicity; utilize a wide range of media networks.|
|Enhancing the Intellectual Base|● Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions. ● Strengthen the research environment of the MOD and the SDF including the National Institute of Defense Studies; promote various forms of coordination with other national research institutes as well as universities and think tanks at home and abroad.|
|Promoting Reform of the MOD|● Foster a sense of unity among civilian off icials and uniformed personnel; optimize the build-up of defense as a whole; enhance SDF joint operation functions; enhance policy-making and communication functions.|


Fig. II-2-1-7


**Category** **Main measures**

-  Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido; enhance and strengthen training and exercises that also involve
relevant agencies and the civilian sector.

Training and Exercises

-  Promote the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities in the southwestern region with the SDF for the purpose of securing a
good training environment while paying close attention to the relationship with local communities.

-  Enhance resiliency, including the ability of camps and bases to recover so as to respond effectively to various situations, as
well as to ensure the expeditious deployment of units etc.; improve facilities and dormitories of each branch of the service to
ensure readiness.

Operations Infrastructure -  Discuss ways to enable the immediate use of civilian airports and ports by the SDF as the foundation of its operations in

response to situations that arise.

-  Implement various family support measures for personnel engaged in duties and for their families.

-  Secure and store necessary ammunition; maintain equipment.

-  Take measures to ensure an appropriate rank and age distribution given the duties and characteristics of respective branches
of the service.

-  Make use of female uniformed SDF personnel more effectively; facilitate measures to make good use of human resources
including reemployment and measures related to honors and privileges; expand training and exercise opportunities, and
secure personnel who can instantly cope with various situations with fl exibility based on a broad view and experience gained

Personnel Education

through working in other relevant ministries and agencies in order to enhance the joint operations structure.

-  Facilitate various recruitment programs; promote support for the reemployment of SDF personnel through measures such as
enhancing coordination with local governments and relevant agencies.

-  Promote the use of Reserve SDF personnel in a wide range of areas and implement measures to boost the staffi ng rate of
Reserve SDF personnel etc. in order to support the continued operation of troops.

-  Establish an effi cient and high-quality medical system, including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced
functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital.

Medicine

-  Secure and train such medical staff as medical offi cers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. Improve fi rst aid
capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation.

-  Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole;

Defense Production and

promote the adaptation of equipment to civilian use.

Technological Bases

-  Formulate clear principles that comply with the new security environment about the overseas transfer of weapons, etc.

-  In order to carry out effective and effi cient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system; enhance project
management throughout the life-cycle of equipment; study the possibility of employing more long-term contracts.

Effi cient Acquisition of Equipment

-  Improve readiness and response capabilities by reforming the supply system through the effective utilization of civilian
capabilities; make the acquisition process transparent and optimize to the contract system.

-  Under the constrained budget, ensure there is consistency between research and development and priority of defense buildup,
while considering needs that arise in operations of the SDF.

-  In order to respond to new threats and ensure technological advantage in strategically important areas, promote research and

Research and Development (R&D)

development based on a mid-to-long-term perspective.

-  Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancing coordination with universities and research
institutions, and transfer military technologies into civilian activities.

-  Advance measures aimed at the areas around defense facilities; continuously engage in proactive public relations activities

Collaboration with Local aimed at local governments and residents.
Communities -  Give consideration to the attributes of each area when reorganizing units; give consideration to the impact that the operation

of camps and so on have on local economies.
Boosting Communication Capabilities -  Enhance strategic publicity; utilize a wide range of media networks.

-  Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions.

Enhancing the Intellectual Base -  Strengthen the research environment of the MOD and the SDF including the National Institute of Defense Studies; promote

various forms of coordination with other national research institutes as well as universities and think tanks at home and abroad.

-  Foster a sense of unity among civilian offi cials and uniformed personnel; optimize the build-up of defense as a whole;
Promoting Reform of the MOD
enhance SDF joint operation functions; enhance policy-making and communication functions.


-----

**Section 2 Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program**


**Program Guidelines**
**1**


Based on the NDPG, the Mid-Term Defense Program
(FY2014-FY2018) (MTDP) states that an appropriate
defense buildup is to be achieved under the following six
basic program guidelines.

See Fig. II-2-2-1 (6 Basic Guidelines of the Mid-Term Defense Program)

See

**Authorized Number of SDF Personnel and Quantities of Major Procurement**
**2**


The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the
end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with
approximately 151,000 being SDF Regular Personnel,
and approximately 8,000 being Ready Reserve Personnel.
The authorized number of SDF personnel of the MSDF
and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the


In reinforcing the structure of the SDF, Japan
will prioritize the improvement of the functions and
capabilities which the NDPG specifi es as those that
should be emphasized, and aim to build highly effective
integrated defence forces in an effi cient manner.

See This Chapter, Section 1-3-2 (2) (Functions and Capabilities to

be Emphasized)

See

Reference 7 (Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018))

same levels as at the end of FY2013.
The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of
major procurement. Japan aims to develop the defense
forces described in the Annex Table of the NDPG over a
10-year time frame.

See Fig. II-2-2-2 (Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program)


Fig. II-2-2-1 6 Basic Guidelines of the Mid-Term Defense Program

|6 Basic Guidelines of the Mid-Term Defense Program Following the New NDPG|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|1|Focus on 9 functions and capabilities|● Place particular emphasis on the following functions and capabilities, while focusing on further enhancement of joint functions: (1) ISR Capabilities (2) Intelligence Capabilities (3) Transport Capabilities (4) C3I Capabilities (5) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands (6) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks (7) Response to Outer Space and Cyberspace Threats (8) Response to Large-Scale Disasters (9) International Peace Cooperation Efforts|
|2|Development of capacities to ensure maritime superiority and air superiority as well as rapid deployment capabilities|● The SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime superiority and air superiority as well as rapid deployment capabilities, so as to effectively deter and respond to various situations. ● To prepare for invasions such as the landing of a large-scale ground force, the SDF will have capacities to the extent necessary to establish a minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to unforeseen changes in the security situation in the future.|
|3|Eff iciently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality|● Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will eff iciently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the MOD will strive to improve cost effectiveness by reducing life cycle costs through the strengthening of project management and other means.|
|4|Promote measures to reform the personnel management system|● Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF’s strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system.|
|5|Strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan- U.S. Alliance|● Initiatives for the smoother, more effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan will be promoted proactively by further expanding various cooperation and discussions, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.|
|6|Achieve greater eff iciencies and streamline the buildup of the defense forces|● Considering the increasingly diff ciult situation in Japan’s public f inance, Japan will strive to achieve greater eff iciencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.|


Fig. II-2-2-1


**6 Basic Guidelines of the Mid-Term Defense Program Following the New NDPG**

-  Place particular emphasis on the following functions and capabilities, while focusing on further enhancement of
joint functions:
(1) ISR Capabilities
(2) Intelligence Capabilities
(3) Transport Capabilities

1 Focus on 9 functions and capabilities (4) C3I Capabilities

(5) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands
(6) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
(7) Response to Outer Space and Cyberspace Threats
(8) Response to Large-Scale Disasters
(9) International Peace Cooperation Efforts

-  The SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime superiority and air superiority as well as

Development of capacities to

rapid deployment capabilities, so as to effectively deter and respond to various situations.

ensure maritime superiority and

2 -  To prepare for invasions such as the landing of a large-scale ground force, the SDF will have capacities to

air superiority as well as rapid

the extent necessary to establish a minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to

deployment capabilities

unforeseen changes in the security situation in the future.

-  Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new equipment,

Effi ciently secure defense

with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will effi ciently secure defense

3 capabilities adequate both in quantity

capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the MOD will strive to improve cost effectiveness

and quality

by reducing life cycle costs through the strengthening of project management and other means.

-  Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent

Promote measures to reform the years, to ensure SDF’s strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement
4
personnel management system measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its

personnel management system.

Strengthen the deterrence and -  Initiatives for the smoother, more effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan will be promoted proactively by
5 response capabilities of the Japan- further expanding various cooperation and discussions, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S.
U.S. Alliance Defense Cooperation.

Achieve greater effi ciencies and -  Considering the increasingly diffi cult situation in Japan’s public fi nance, Japan will strive to achieve greater
6 streamline the buildup of the defense effi ciencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other
forces measures taken by the Government.


-----

Fig. II-2-2-2 Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program

|Service|Equipment|Quantity|
|---|---|---|
|GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31|
|MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9|
|ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education|
|Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3|


Fig. II-2-2-2

**Service** **Equipment** **Quantity**

Mobile Combat Vehicles 99
Armored Vehicles 24
Amphibious Vehicles 52
Tilt-Rotor Aircraft 17

GSDF Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) 6

Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles 9 companies
Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles 5 companies
Tanks 44
Howitzers (excluding mortars) 31

Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) 5 (2)
Submarines 5
Other Ships 5

MSDF Total (Tonnage) 15 (approx. 52,000 t)

Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) 23
Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) 23
Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based) 9

New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft 4
Fighters (F-35A) 28
Fighter Modernization (F-15) 26

ASDF

New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft 3
Transport Aircraft (C-2) 10
Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) 2 groups & education

Joint units Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 3

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above.

**Expenditures**
**3**


The expenditures required to implement
the defense force developments described
in this program amount to approximately
24,670 billion yen in FY2013 prices. For the
duration of this program, in harmony with
other measures taken by the Government,
approximately 700 billion yen will be
secured by means of further streamlining
and rationalization through efforts such as
equipment procurement reform. The annual
defense budgets for the implementation of
this program will be allocated within a limit
of approximately 23,970 billion yen over the
next fi ve years.


State Minister of Defense Wakamiya giving a speech at the rollout ceremony for the fi rst F-35A for the ASDF
(Texas, U.S.A.) (September 2016)


**Section 3 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2017**


Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during
FY2017, which is the fourth fi scal year under the NDPG
and MTDP, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force,
based on these programs.
As part of this build-up, Japan will improve its
d f biliti f i f th h t f


joint functions in order to seamlessly and dynamically
fulfi ll its defense responsibilities, which include providing
an effective deterrence and response to a variety of
security situations, and supporting stability in the AsiaPacifi c region, as well as improving the global security
i t I d i J ill l ti l


-----

Fig. II-2-2-2 Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program

|Service|Equipment|Quantity|
|---|---|---|
|GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31|
|MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9|
|ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education|
|Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3|


Fig. II-2-2-2

**Service** **Equipment** **Quantity**

Mobile Combat Vehicles 99
Armored Vehicles 24
Amphibious Vehicles 52
Tilt-Rotor Aircraft 17

GSDF Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) 6

Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles 9 companies
Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles 5 companies
Tanks 44
Howitzers (excluding mortars) 31

Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) 5 (2)
Submarines 5
Other Ships 5

MSDF Total (Tonnage) 15 (approx. 52,000 t)

Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) 23
Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) 23
Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based) 9

New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft 4
Fighters (F-35A) 28
Fighter Modernization (F-15) 26

ASDF

New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft 3
Transport Aircraft (C-2) 10
Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) 2 groups & education

Joint units Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 3

Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above.

**Expenditures**
**3**


The expenditures required to implement
the defense force developments described
in this program amount to approximately
24,670 billion yen in FY2013 prices. For the
duration of this program, in harmony with
other measures taken by the Government,
approximately 700 billion yen will be
secured by means of further streamlining
and rationalization through efforts such as
equipment procurement reform. The annual
defense budgets for the implementation of
this program will be allocated within a limit
of approximately 23,970 billion yen over the
next fi ve years.


State Minister of Defense Wakamiya giving a speech at the rollout ceremony for the fi rst F-35A for the ASDF
(Texas, U.S.A.) (September 2016)


**Section 3 Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2017**


Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during
FY2017, which is the fourth fi scal year under the NDPG
and MTDP, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force,
based on these programs.
As part of this build-up, Japan will improve its
d f biliti f i f th h t f


joint functions in order to seamlessly and dynamically
fulfi ll its defense responsibilities, which include providing
an effective deterrence and response to a variety of
security situations, and supporting stability in the AsiaPacifi c region, as well as improving the global security
i t I d i J ill l ti l


-----

emphasis on the following measures: ISR capabilities;
intelligence capabilities; transport capabilities; command,
control, communication, intelligence (C3I) capabilities;
response to attacks on remote islands; response to
ballistic missile attacks; response to outer space and
cyberspace threats; response to large-scale disasters, etc.;
and international peace cooperation efforts, etc., while
also focusing on ensuring technological superiority, and
the maintenance and enhancement of defense production
and technological bases.
Furthermore, considering the increasingly severe
situation in Japan’s public fi nance, Japan will strive to
achieve greater effi ciencies and streamlining through
efforts such as longer-term contracts, while harmonizing
these efforts with other measures taken by the Government.

See Fig. II-2-3-1 (Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for

FY2017)


Parliamentary Vice-Minister Kobayashi giving instructions on board the Frigate Kaga
at its delivery and commission ceremony (March 2017)


See


Fig. II-2-3-1 Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2017

|Category|Main Programs|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|Effective deterrence and response to various situations|Ensure security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan|● Acquire unmanned aerial vehicle (Global Hawk); ● build a submarine; ● build a minesweeper; ● build an acoustic research ship, etc.|
||Response to attacks on remote islands|● Procure f ighter aircraft (F-35A); ● establish a temporary F-35 squadron (provisional title) at Misawa Base; ● acquire new aerial refueling / transport aircraft (KC-46A); ● procure type-03 middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles (improved); ● develop type-12 surface-to-ship guided missiles (advanced) and new air-to-ship guided missiles for reconnaissance aircraft; ● procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA); ● acquire tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22); ● procure transport aircraft (C-2); ● acquire type-16 maneuver combat vehicles; ● establish the Ground Component Command; ● establish the Amphibious Rapid Development Brigade; ● develop infrastructure for the Southwestern Area Security Unit, etc.|
||Response to ballistic missile attacks|● Procure advanced ballistic missile interceptor (SM-3 Block IIA); ● study and research future ballistic missile interceptor system, etc.|
||Response in outer space|● Strengthen efforts on space surveillance; ● utilize satellite communication; ● make use of commercial imagery satellite and meteorological satellite information, etc.|
||Response in cyberspace|● Develop infrastructure for practical combat cyber exercise and penetration test, etc.|
||Response to large-scale disasters|● Maintain and strengthen functions of camps and bases that will serve as hubs during a disaster; ● carry out training on large-scale and special disasters, etc.|
||Strengthening intelligence capabilities|● Strengthen the Defense Attaches management system; ● enhance capability to collect and analyze intelligence, etc.|
|Stabilization of the Asia-Pacif ic region and improvement of the global security environment||● Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for stabilizing the Asia-Pacif ic region, and carry out training and exercises as needed and as appropriate. More actively participate in international peace cooperation activities, etc. in order to respond appropriately to global security and other issues.|
|Measures for the strengthening of the Japan- U.S. Alliance||● While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, steadily carry out specif ic measures including the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa.|
|Measures for personnel and education||● Along with securing talented personnel who will take a role in national defense, carry out a comprehensive study on necessary measures and ensuring those measures are appropriately taken, including strengthening recruiting operations and re-employment assistance, raising the staff nig rate of SDF reserve personnel in order to ensure the robustness of the SDF, while also implementing measures to support female personnel to achieve their potentials.|
|Initiatives for greater eff iciency||● Proceed with various initiatives and save approx. 204 billion yen to greater eff iciency in all areas of the procurement of equipment.|
|Initiatives for policies regarding defense equipment and technology||● Promote strategic initiatives including enhancing research and development in light of the Defense Technology Strategy and expanding the Innovative Science and Technology Initiative for Security program (funding program); ● steadily proceed with the procurement program of the project management focused equipment, etc., while also implementing measures in accordance with joint operation and categorization; ● work closely with the private sector, reinforce effective defense equipment and technology cooperation posture through intelligence gathering such as the needs of its counterparts, providing comprehensive support including assistance for maintenance and repair of equipment, and sending out information; ● promote measures for maintaining and reinforcing the base by initiatives such as discovering and utilizing outstanding technology held by small and medium sized enterprises and carefully assessing the reality of the supply chain.|
|Other (projects pertaining to the structure and the strength of the organization)||● Reorganization into rapid deployment division and brigade (8th Division and 14th Brigade); ● establishment of the GSDF Education and Training Research Command; ● establishment of the GSDF Intelligence School (provisional title); ● establishment of the Southwestern Air Defense Force, etc.|


Fig. II-2-3-1


**Category** **Main Programs**

Ensure security of the sea

-  Acquire unmanned aerial vehicle (Global Hawk); ● build a submarine; ● build a

and airspace surrounding

minesweeper; ● build an acoustic research ship, etc.

Japan

-  Procure fi ghter aircraft (F-35A); ● establish a temporary F-35 squadron (provisional
title) at Misawa Base; ● acquire new aerial refueling / transport aircraft (KC-46A);

-  procure type-03 middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles (improved); ● develop Submarine (3,000 t-class) (image)

Response to attacks on type-12 surface-to-ship guided missiles (advanced) and new air-to-ship guided missiles
remote islands for reconnaissance aircraft; ● procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA); ● acquire tilt-rotor

Effective aircraft (V-22); ● procure transport aircraft (C-2); ● acquire type-16 maneuver combat
deterrence and vehicles; ● establish the Ground Component Command; ● establish the Amphibious Rapid
response to Development Brigade; ● develop infrastructure for the Southwestern Area Security Unit, etc.
various situations Response to ballistic -  Procure advanced ballistic missile interceptor (SM-3 Block IIA); ● study and research

missile attacks future ballistic missile interceptor system, etc.

-  Strengthen efforts on space surveillance; ● utilize satellite communication; ● make use
Response in outer space
of commercial imagery satellite and meteorological satellite information, etc.
Response in cyberspace -  Develop infrastructure for practical combat cyber exercise and penetration test, etc. Fighter Aircraft (F-35A)
Response to large-scale -  Maintain and strengthen functions of camps and bases that will serve as hubs during a
disasters disaster; ● carry out training on large-scale and special disasters, etc.

Strengthening intelligence -  Strengthen the Defense Attaches management system; ● enhance capability to collect
capabilities and analyze intelligence, etc.

-  Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for stabilizing the Asia-Pacifi c region,

Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c region

and carry out training and exercises as needed and as appropriate. More actively

and improvement of the global security

participate in international peace cooperation activities, etc. in order to respond

environment

appropriately to global security and other issues.

-  While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, steadily carry out specifi c measures

Measures for the strengthening of the Japan-

including the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan to mitigate the impact on local

U.S. Alliance communities, including those in Okinawa. Aerial Refueling and Transport Aircraft (KC-46A)

-  Along with securing talented personnel who will take a role in national defense, carry
out a comprehensive study on necessary measures and ensuring those measures are
appropriately taken, including strengthening recruiting operations and re-employment

Measures for personnel and education

assistance, raising the staffi ng rate of SDF reserve personnel in order to ensure the
robustness of the SDF, while also implementing measures to support female personnel to
achieve their potentials.

-  Proceed with various initiatives and save approx. 204 billion yen to greater effi ciency in
Initiatives for greater effi ciency
all areas of the procurement of equipment.

-  Promote strategic initiatives including enhancing research and development in light of Tilt-Rotor Aircraft (V-22)
the Defense Technology Strategy and expanding the Innovative Science and Technology
Initiative for Security program (funding program);

-  steadily proceed with the procurement program of the project management focused
equipment, etc., while also implementing measures in accordance with joint operation
and categorization;

Initiatives for policies regarding defense

-  work closely with the private sector, reinforce effective defense equipment and

equipment and technology

technology cooperation posture through intelligence gathering such as the needs of its
counterparts, providing comprehensive support including assistance for maintenance and
repair of equipment, and sending out information;

-  promote measures for maintaining and reinforcing the base by initiatives such as
discovering and utilizing outstanding technology held by small and medium sized
enterprises and carefully assessing the reality of the supply chain. SM-3 Block II-A

-  Reorganization into rapid deployment division and brigade (8th Division and 14th

Other (projects pertaining to the structure and Brigade); ● establishment of the GSDF Education and Training Research Command;
the strength of the organization) -  establishment of the GSDF Intelligence School (provisional title); ● establishment of the

Southwestern Air Defense Force, etc.


-----

**Commentary**

**Establishment of the Ground Component Command**

In light of the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the GSDF will establish the Ground Component Command
(GCC) at the end of FY2017, for the purpose of carrying out swift and fl exible nationwide operations of its basic operational units
(divisions and brigades) under the joint operation of the three services.
Currently fi ve regional armies of the GSDF stand in parallel, and each army is operated under its Commanding General. Upon the
establishment of the GCC, the operation of the GSDF will integrally fall under the Commander of the GCC, leading to swift and fl exible
nationwide operations of the GSDF divisions and brigades, etc. under the joint operation.
Furthermore, putting the GCC in sole charge of coordination with the Joint Staff, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, and
the U.S. Forces in Japan for both peacetime and contingency operations, which is currently being carried out by each army, will lead
to more expeditious and smooth coordination, resulting in improved effectiveness of the joint operation.


**Commentary**

**Increasing the Number of Submarines**

As neighboring countries intensify their maritime activities, the MSDF is taking steps
to increase its submarine force both in quality and quantity for the protection of the
seas surrounding Japan.
While the MSDF has worked to improve the capability of the force in terms of FY2017 submarine (3,000 ton class) (Image)
quality, the FY2017 budget calls for the construction of a new type of submarine. In order to better respond to submarines of other
countries which have increased performance including quietness, the future submarine will have an improved detection as well as
stealth capabilities compared to conventional submarines.
In terms of quantity, in addition to an ongoing initiative to increase the force by building a new submarine and extending the life
of existing submarines, the 6th Submarine Division will be newly established in FY2017 in accordance with the National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG), increasing the number of submarine divisions from fi ve to six.
With these initiatives, the MSDF is expected to acquire 22 submarines by the mid-2020s as specifi ed in the NDPG.


**Commentary**

**Establishment of the Southwestern Air Defense Force**

In recent years, China has been increasing and intensifying

Northern Air

its activities both in quality and quantity in sea areas and Defense Force
airspace including the East China Sea, and the number of

Western Air Central Air

scrambles by the ASDF has been on a drastic rise. The Defense Force Defense Force
ASDF is steadily reinforcing the defense posture in the
southwestern region through measures such as creating Air Defense ForceSouthwestern
one new squadron in the Air Warning Unit at Naha Air Base Southwestern Composite

Air Division

in 2014, and establishing the 9th Air Wing by increasing

Abolishment of the Southwestern Receiving the unit fl ag

the number of fi ghter squadrons to two in 2016. In Composite Air Division and establishment

of the Southwestern Air Defense Force

FY2017, based on the importance of its missions and roles
it is tasked with, the Southwestern Composite Air Division, which was historically positioned as a sub-unit to air defense forces, will
be upgraded and reorganized into the Southwestern Air Defense Force for enhancing the defense posture in the southwestern region.


-----

**Section 4 Defense-Related Expenditures**


**Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures**
**1**


Defense-related expenditures include expenses for
improving defense capabilities and maintaining and
managing the SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the
implementation of measures against neighborhood affairs
in the vicinity of defense facilities.
In comparison with the previous fi scal year, defenserelated expenditures for FY2017 were increased by
38.9 billion yen to 4.8996 trillion yen. When including
expenses related to Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S. Forces realignment-related
expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden
on local communities) and the expenses associated with
the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft,
defense-related expenditures were increased by 71 billion

**Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures**
**2**


Personnel and food provision expenses as well as
obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory
expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related
budget. The remaining 20% of the budget which is set
aside for general material expenses includes spending
for repairing equipment and for implementing measures
to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting
U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage of
the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes.
For this reason, the breakdown of the defense-related


yen from the previous fi scal year to 5.1251 trillion yen.
Additionally, the second supplementary budget for
FY2017 contains an appropriation of 21.7 billion yen
as necessary expenses for enhancing the warning and
surveillance posture, the rapid deployment and response
capabilities, and the response capability to ballistic
missile attacks, etc. The third supplementary budget
allocates 176.9 billion yen as necessary expenses for
securing stable operations of the SDF, which includes
responding to ballistic missile attacks.

See Fig. II-2-4-1 (Comparison Between FY2016 Budget and FY2017

Budget)

See

Fig. II-2-4-2 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past
15 Years)

expenditures cannot be easily altered in a signifi cant
manner on a single-year basis.

See Fig. II-2-4-3 (Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future

Obligation Due to New Contracts)

Personnel and food provision expenses were
increased by 19.0 billion yen from the previous fi scal year
due to the revision of the remuneration of civil servants
based on the FY2016 recommendation by the National
Personnel Authority and other factors. Obligatory outlay
expenses for the year increased by 17.7 billion yen


Fig. II-2-4-1 Comparison Between FY2016 Budget and FY2017 Budget

|Category|Col2|FY2016|FY2017 Fiscal YOY growth (▲indicates negative growth)|Col5|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||Fiscal YOY growth (▲indicates negative growth)|
|Annual expenditure (note)||48,607|48,996|389 (0.8%)|
||Personnel and food provisions Material expenses|21,473 27,135|21,662 27,334|190 (0.9%) 199 (0.7%)|
|Future obligation (note)||43,070|46,589|3,520 (8.2%)|
||New contracts Existing contracts|20,800 22,270|19,700 26,889|▲1,100 (▲5.3%) 4,620 (20.7%)|


Fig. II-2-4-1


(100 million yen)

**FY2017**
**Category** **FY2016** **Fiscal YOY growth**
**(** -  **indicates negative growth)**

Annual expenditure (note) 48,607 48,996 389 (0.8%)

Personnel and food provisions 21,473 21,662 190 (0.9%)
Material expenses 27,135 27,334 199 (0.7%)

Future obligation (note) 43,070 46,589 3,520 (8.2%)

New contracts 20,800 19,700 - 1,100 ( - 5.3%)
Existing contracts 22,270 26,889 4,620 (20.7%)

Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community), or expenses associated with the
acquisition of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft). If these are
included, the fi gures are 5,054.1 billion yen for FY2016 and 5,125.1 billion yen for FY2017; and for future obligation, 4,653.7 billion yen for FY2016 and 4,872.6 billion yen for FY2017.
Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding.


-----

Fig. II-2-4-2 Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years

Fig. II-2-4-2

50,000

49,262

48,996

49,000

48,760

48,607

48,297 48,221

48,000 47,815

47,838

47,903

47,426

47,028

47,000 46,826

46,804

46,625

46,453

46,000

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the U.S. forces realignment expenses, or expenses associated with
the acquisition of a new government aircraft. The total defense expenditures when including these items are 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004,
4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen
for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, 4,884.8 billion yen for FY2014, and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015,
5,054.1 billion yen for FY2016, and 5,125.1 billion yen for FY2017.


Fig. II-2-4-3 Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts

|Contract Obligatory outlay expenses paid in part (1 billion yen) General material expenses|Contract|Col3|Col4|Payment|
|---|---|---|---|---|

|Contract|Col2|
|---|---|
|||
|||

|Contract|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
||||
||OObblliigg|aattoorryy|

|Contract|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
||eexxppee||
||||
||||

|Contract ((3355|Col2|
|---|---|
||..44%%))|


Fig. II-2-4-3


2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Amount of future obligation

When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement
of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years.
Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple
years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the
time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future.
Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond

Personnel under such contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years

and foodand food

provisionsprovisions FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020

expensesexpenses Contract Payment

Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Remaining sum paid
expenses paid in part expenses paid in part expenses paid in part (6 billion yen)
(1 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (2 billion yen)

General material Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay

(44.2%) expenses expenses expenses expenses

2013 Contract

Future obligation (9 billion yen)

Amount of contract (10 billion yen)

2014 Contract

Obligatory

outlayoutlay

2015 Contract expensesexpenses

Existing
contracts

Future

2016 Contract obligation

(35.4%)

Structure of Defense-related Expenditures ContractContract General New

Annual expenditure materialmaterial contracts

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses and material expenses (operating expenses). expensesexpenses(activity(activity Material expenses on contract basis

food provisionsPersonnel andexpenses Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirementallowance, meals in barracks, etc. expenses)expenses)

Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of (20.3%)
equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff;

(operating expenses)Material expenses facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and

expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local
communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan FY2017

outlay expensesObligatory Expenses paid in FY2017 based on contracts made before FY2016 Defense-related

General material expenditures
expenses Expenses paid in FY2017 based on contracts made in FY2017
(activity expenses)


-----

Fig. II-2-4-4 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2017)

Fig. II-2-4-4

R&D 2.5%
Other 1.5%

Facility development
3.2%

Base measures Personnel and
9.2% food provisions

44.2%
Procurement of **By purpose**
equipment, etc. **of use**
17.2%

Other

General materials Maintenance, etc.
20.3% (9,970) 22.2% 16.7% (8,164) GSDF

[0.2%] 36.1% (17,706)

Personnel and **By**

**By expense** food provisions **organization**

44.2% (21,662) ASDF

[0.9%]

23.6% (11,578)

Obligatory outlays
35.4% (17,364)

MSDF

[1.0%]

23.6% (11,548)

Notes: 1. ( ) is the budget amount; unit: 100 million yen.
2. The above figure does not include SACO-related expenses (2.8 billion yen), the portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community (201.1 billion yen) out of

the realignment expenses, nor the expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft (21.6 billion yen).

3. Figures in square brackets [ ] indicate year-on-year growth rate (%).


from the previous year, while general material expenses
increased by 2.2 billion yen from the previous year.[1]

See Fig. II-2-4-4 (Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2017))

Reference 14 (Changes in Composition of Defense-Related
Expenditures (Original Budget Basis))


Consequently, for such items, a procedure is undertaken
whereby a multi-year contract is arranged, and it is
promised in advance at the time of the contract that
payments will be made in the following fi scal year and
beyond (within fi ve years, in principle). The sum of
money to be paid in the following fi scal year and beyond,
based on such a multi-year contract, is called the “future
obligation.” The amount of new future obligation arising
in FY2017 decreased from the previous fi scal year by
110.0 billion yen (5.3%).
Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis,[2] which
shows the scale of operations, there is a decline from the
previous fi scal year of 107.8 billion yen (3.5%).

See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3 (Efforts toward Project Management, etc.)

**Initiatives for Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement**
**3**


FY2014 to FY2016 through the following measures:
1) utilize long-term contracts (Part III, Chapter 4, Section
3); 2) review maintenance methods; 3) use of civilian
goods and review of specifi cations; 4) bulk purchase of
equipment; and in addition to 1) to 4), 5) promote efforts
such as prime cost scrutiny. Furthermore, approximately
204 billion yen of cost reduction is expected in the


In addition to the annual budget expenditure, the
amount of new future obligation also indicates payments
for the following year and beyond (the amount of future
obligation arising in the applicable fi scal year). In the
build-up of defense capabilities, it is common to take
multiple years from contract to delivery or completion,
in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and
other primary equipment, as well as the construction
of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks.

**Initiatives for Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement**
**3**

In light of the increasingly severe fi scal conditions, the
MTDP specifi es securing approximately 700 billion yen
based on a policy to achieve further streamlining and
rationalization in the defense capability buildup.
For this purpose, the Ministry of Defense is currently
carrying out reviews to achieve effi ciency, and has sought
a reduction of approximately 369 billion yen from


The comparison with the previous year is concerning expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion for the reduction of the burden
on local communities and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft). The same applies hereinafter in regard to this section.

The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (operating expenses) that are to be contracted in the ii


-----

Fig. II-2-4-5 Amount of Reduction Achieved Through Past Streamlining Efforts

|Example|FY2014|FY2015|FY2016|FY2017|FY2018|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Procurement of equipment, etc. and services using long-term contracts|—|¥41.7 billion|¥14.8 billion|¥11.0 billion||
|Review of maintenance methods (Logistics reform)|¥8.1 billion|¥33.6 billion|¥43.2 billion|¥54.0 billion||
|Use of civilian goods and review of specif ication|¥25.0 billion|¥42.3 billion|¥45.5 billion|¥58.2 billion||
|Bulk purchase of equipment|¥33.1 billion|¥35.0 billion|¥46.5 billion|¥46.7 billion||
|Prime cost scrutiny, etc.|—|—|—|¥34.5 billion||
|Single-year total|¥66.0 billion|¥153.0 billion|¥150.0 billion|¥204.0 billion (Note 1)|Amount of required cost reduction approx. ¥130.0 billion|
|Total|¥66.0 billion|¥219.0 billion|¥369.0 billion|¥573.0 billion|¥700.0 billion|


Fig. II-2-4-5


**Example** FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018

Procurement of equipment, etc. and
— ¥41.7 billion ¥14.8 billion ¥11.0 billion
services using long-term contracts

Review of maintenance methods
¥8.1 billion ¥33.6 billion ¥43.2 billion ¥54.0 billion
(Logistics reform)

Use of civilian goods and review
¥25.0 billion ¥42.3 billion ¥45.5 billion ¥58.2 billion
of specifi cation

Bulk purchase of equipment ¥33.1 billion ¥35.0 billion ¥46.5 billion ¥46.7 billion

Prime cost scrutiny, etc. — — — ¥34.5 billion

Amount of required cost
Single-year total ¥66.0 billion ¥153.0 billion ¥150.0 billion ¥204.0 billion [(Note 1)] reduction
approx. ¥130.0 billion

Total ¥66.0 billion ¥219.0 billion ¥369.0 billion ¥573.0 billion ¥700.0 billion

Notes: 1. The 61.6 billion yen reduction from introducing the Patriot system capable of carrying and operating PAC-3MSE missiles, which was appropriated in the third supplementary budget for
FY2016, is included in the reduction amount for FY2017.
2. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding.


FY2017 budget. Concrete initiatives introduced in the
FY2017 budget are as follows.

-  A reduction of approximately 11 billion yen by
procuring six transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in bulk
under a long-term contract over fi ve fi scal years and
making a long-term contract of Performance Based
Logistics (PBL) (Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3) for
transport aircraft (C-130R).

-  A reduction of approximately 54 billion yen through
a review of maintenance methods including the
modifi cation of existing engines to be used in the
transport helicopters.

**Comparison with Other Countries**
**4**


Monolithic understanding of the defense expenditures of
each country is not possible in view of differences in the
socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an
internationally unifi ed defi nition of defense expenditures,
and breakdowns of defense expenditures are unclear in
some countries where such data is publicly disclosed.
Furthermore, in comparing the defense expenditures
of each country, though there exists the method of
converting their defense expenditures into dollar amounts
at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense
expenses calculated in this way do not necessarily refl ect
the precise value based on each country’s price levels.
Therefore, the results of converting Japan’s defense


-  A reduction of approximately 58.2 billion yen by
pursuing cost savings through the use of civilian goods
and review of specifi cations of equipment such as the
development of a new ship-to-air missile based on a
similar domestically-developed missile.

-  A reduction of approximately 46.7 billion yen through
bulk procurement of equipment in a single fi scal year
that could lead to a reduction in expenses.

-  A reduction of approximately 34.5 billion yen through
initiatives such as scrutinizing the unit cost and related
expenses of major equipment, etc.

See Fig. II-2-4-5 (Amount of Reduction Achieved Through Past

Streamlining Efforts)

related expenditures and those of other countries offi cially
published by each government into dollar amounts, using
the purchasing power parity[3] of each country reported
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), are shown in Fig. II-2-4-6 (The
Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2015)).

See Part I, Chapter 2 (Defense Policies of Countries)

Reference 15 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries)

In addition, Fig. II-2-4-7 (Changes in Defense
Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten
Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of
Japan’s neighboring countries over the past ten years.


-----

Fig. II-2-4-6 The Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2015)

|lion USD)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Defense budgets (100 million USD) Defense budgets as % of GDP|||||||||
|Japan|U. S.|China|Russia|ROK|Australia|UK|France|Germany|
|470|5,625|2,567|1,326|421|224|511|460|426|
|1.0|3.4|1.3|3.9|2.4|2.0|2.1|1.8|1.2|


Fig. II-2-4-6

(100 million USD) (%)

8,000 6.0

7,000 Defense budgets (100 million USD)

5.0

Defense budgets as % of GDP

6,000

4.0

5,000

4,000 3.0

3,000

2.0

2,000

1.0

1,000

0 0.0

Japan U. S. China Russia ROK Australia UK France Germany

470 5,625 2,567 1,326 421 224 511 460 426

1.0 3.4 1.3 3.9 2.4 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.2

Notes: 1. Defense budgets are based on each country’s public documents. Dollar

conversions have been made while referring to each country’s purchasing
power parity for FY2015 as published by the OECD (official rate listed on
the OECD website) (as of April 2017).

(1 dollar=102.563188 yen=3.465969 yuan=23.984696 rubles

=890.723513 won=1.462527 Australian dollars=0.688433 pound
=0.799810 euros (France)=0.773508 euros (Germany))

2. Defense budgets as a proportion of GDP for the U.S., China, and Russia are

estimated based on figures published by the governments of each country.
That of the U.K., France, and Germany are based on a NATO publication.
The GDP figure published by the IMF was employed to calculate that of the
Republic of Korea and Australia.


Fig. II-2-4-7 Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years


Fig. II-2-4-7


(Times)

5.00

4.50

4.00

3.50

3.00 China 3.01 times

2.50

2.00 Russia 2.00 times

ROK 1.65 times

1.50 Australia 1.60 times

U.S. 1.08 times

1.00 Japan 1.02 times

0.50

0.00

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country.
2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2007 value as 1 (times) (rounded to two decimal places).
3. The definition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as price levels of each
country, it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries.


-----

**p** **g**

**Chapter** **and Security and the SDF Activities**
### 3

**Since Legislation’s Enforcement**


**Section 1 Circumstances of the Development of Legislation**


**Background to the Development of Legislation**
**1**


The security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly
severe, and we are now in an era where threats could
easily spread beyond national borders, and no country can
maintain its own security only by itself any longer.
Against this background, it is fi rst and foremost
important to advance vibrant diplomacy in order to
maintain peace and security of Japan, and ensure its
survival, as well as to secure its people’s lives. However,
at the same time, it is also necessary to prepare for the
worst-case scenario.
Specifi cally, it is essential to avoid armed confl icts
beforehand and prevent threats from reaching Japan by
appropriately developing, maintaining and operating
Japan’s own defense capability, strengthening mutual
cooperation with the United States which is Japan’s ally,
and other partner countries, and in particular, further
elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the JapanU.S. Alliance for the peace and stability of Japan and the
Asia-Pacifi c region.
On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives
and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation
and contribute even more proactively to the peace and

**Background and Signifi cance of the Development of Legislation**
**2**


Following the aforementioned Cabinet Decision, a
legislation drafting team was launched under the National
Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat. In
addition, the Ministry of Defense established “The Study
Committee on the Development of Security Legislation”
with the Minister of Defense as its Chairman, and
conducted the deliberations towards the development of


stability of the international community under the policy of
“Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle
of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop
domestic legislation that enables seamless responses.
In February 2013, Prime Minister Abe resumed the
Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis
for Security. Following a total of seven meetings, the
Advisory Panel submitted its report to Prime Minister
Abe in May 2014.
Following the Advisory Panel’s report and in
accordance with the basic orientation for the way that
further deliberations would take place as presented
by Prime Minister Abe, discussions were held in the
ruling parties and studies were also conducted by the
Government. Following this, in July 2014, a cabinet
decision was made on “Development of Seamless
Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and
Protect its People,” which set forth the basic policy for
the development of legislation that enables seamless
responses to any situations.

See Fig. II-3-1-1 (Outline of the Cabinet Decision and the Development

of Legislation)
Reference 16 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation to
Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People)

security legislation.
The deliberations in the Government were conducted
based on the discussions at a total of 25 meetings in the
ruling parties, and, on May 14, 2015, the Government
made Cabinet Decisions on two bills, the Bill for the
Development of Legislation for Peace and Security[1] and
the International Peace Support Bill.[2] The two bills were


Bill for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community


-----

Fig. II-3-1-1 Outline of the Cabinet Decision and the Development of Legislation

|Items of the Cabinet Decision|Outline|Legislation Development|
|---|---|---|
|1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack|● Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations. ● The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law.|⇒ Acceleration of procedures to issue orders for public security operations/maritime security operations ⇒ Revision of the SDF Law (Protection of weapons, etc. of the units of the U.S. Forces and Armed Forces of other countries)|
|2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community|● So-called logistics support and “integration with the use of force” (*1) ➢ The Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “Integration with the use of force” of that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international community. ➢ Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. ➢ Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation. ● Use of weapons associated with international peace cooperation activities Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request) and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including UN peacekeeping operations, as well as police-like activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with the consent from the territorial State. ➢ As for UN peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the conf lict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary. ➢ When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. ➢ The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained and whether the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc., based on deliberations, etc., at the National Security Council.|⇒ Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf ulence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan), revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Act, enactment of the International Peace Support Act ⇒ Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act, revision of the SDF Law (Rescue measures for Japanese nationals overseas)|
|3. Measures for Self- Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution|● The Government believes that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. ● The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under international law, a basis on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. ● The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.|⇒ Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, revision of the SDF Law (The provisions concerning defense operations)|


Fig. II-3-1-1


**Items of the Cabinet**
**Outline** **Legislation Development**
**Decision**

-  Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are ⇒ Acceleration of procedures to
to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the issue orders for public security
Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the operations/maritime security
respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In operations

1. Response to an cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies
Infringement that Does cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and
Not Amount to an Armed accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations.
Attack -  The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited ⇒ Revision of the SDF Law

“use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment (Protection of weapons, etc.
of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, of the units of the U.S. Forces
currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), and Armed Forces of other
in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law. countries)

-  So-called logistics support and “integration with the use of force” (*1)
➢ The Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and ⇒ Law Concerning Measures to
transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually Ensure Peace and Security of
being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “Integration with the use of force” of Japan in Situations that Will
that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation Have an Important Infl uence
which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging on Japan’s Peace and
in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international Security (Revision of the Law
community. Concerning Measures to Ensure
➢ Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually Peace and Security of Japan in
being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. Situations in Areas Surrounding
➢ Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting Japan), revision of the Ship
support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” Inspection Operations Act,
due to changes of the situation. enactment of the International

Peace Support Act

2. Further Contributions to -  Use of weapons associated with international peace cooperation activities
the Peace and Stability Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order ⇒ Revision of the International
of the International to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to Peace Cooperation Act,
Community the protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request) and the “use of revision of the SDF Law

weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities (Rescue measures for
that do not involve the “use of force,” including UN peacekeeping operations, as well as police-like Japanese nationals overseas)
activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with
the consent from the territorial State.
➢ As for UN peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs,
“a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the confl ict who have given consent of
acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary.
➢ When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including
the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial
State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the
consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is
maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area.
➢ The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained
and whether the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc.,
based on deliberations, etc., at the National Security Council.

-  The Government believes that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when ⇒ Revision of Legislation for
an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a Responses to Armed Attack
result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right Situations, revision of the
to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to SDF Law (The provisions
repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum concerning defense operations)
extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for
self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.

3. Measures for Self
-  The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under international

Defense Permitted

law, a basis on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those

under Article 9 of the

which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted

Constitution

under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable
for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan.

-  The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in
principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force”
permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a
foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in
the current laws and regulations.

Notes: 1. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area,” etc., have been established in past
legislations to ensure that the issue of “integration with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is
intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an
“integral part” of the use of force (“integration with the use of force”) by other countries.
2. Use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of the
execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons is directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.”


then submitted to the 189th ordinary session of the Diet
on May 15, 2015.
These two bills enable seamless responses to
any situations, from the protection of assets including
f it f th U S F d d f


of foreign countries during peacetime, support activities
to armed forces of foreign countries, etc., in situations
that have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and
security and situations that the international community
i ll ti l dd i f d it (t


-----

be discussed later), to the limited use of the right of
collective self-defense as a measure for self-defense to
the minimum extent necessary to defend Japan when the
“Three New Conditions”[3] are satisfi ed.
Following the longest extension of a Diet session in
the postwar, the longest Diet debate of security-related
bills in the postwar period was conducted, constituting
about 116 hours of debate in the House of Representatives
and about 100 hours of debate in the House of
Councillors, totaling about 216 hours. As a result, the
two bills were passed at a plenary session of the House
of Councillors and enacted on September 19, 2015, upon
formation of broad consensus, with approval of not only
the ruling parties but also the three opposition parties of
the then Assembly to Energize Japan, the then Party for
Future Generations and the then New Renaissance Party
(altogether fi ve parties out of the ten political parties).
Just before the passage, these fi ve parties reached the
“Agreement Concerning the Legislation for Peace and
Security” (the “Five-Party Agreement”), which include
matters that should be taken into consideration in judging


the applicability of the Three New Conditions related to
the recognition of a “survival-threatening situation,” and
committed them to obtaining a conclusion on the shape of
a Diet organization for the constant surveillance and postverifi cation of SDF activities based on the Legislation for
Peace and Security, and the strengthening of the Diet’s
involvement. The Government also made a cabinet
decision to the effect that the Government will respect
the Five-Party Agreement and handle these matters
appropriately. The Legislation for Peace and Security
was put into force on March 29, 2016.
With the security environment surrounding Japan
becoming increasing severe, the enforcement of the
Legislation for Peace and Security has a historical
signifi cance as further ensuring peace and security of
Japan through enhancing deterrence and making more
proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the
region and the international community.
The Legislation for Peace and Security has been
highly appraised around the world, drawing strong support
from the United States, which is Japan’s ally, Australia,


**Commentary**

**Foreign Countries’ Understanding of the Legislation for**
**Peace and Security**

The Legislation for Peace and Security has been strongly supported and highly valued by the United States, which is Japan’s ally,
Australia, India and the countries of Southeast Asia and Europe, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the European Union (EU), etc. (See the body text.)
At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2015, for example, then U.S. President Obama expressed his congratulations
on the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and said the legislation enhances Japan’s defense functions and
enables Japan and the United States to further broaden their cooperation in the region and the world. The U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee also welcomed the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security in a joint
statement in September 2015, saying that it “will strengthen the vital alliance between our two countries.” Furthermore, in February
2016, Commander Harris of the U.S. Pacifi c Command, stated regarding responses to ballistic missile launches by North Korea, that
the Legislation for Peace and Security and the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation enhanced the capabilities of both
Japan and the United States and also improved cooperation between Japan and the United States.
In the Japan-Australia Joint Statement of December 2015, Australia welcomed and supported Japan’s passage of the Legislation
for Peace and Security, which enables Japan to contribute even more actively in securing the peace, stability and prosperity of the
region and the world in line with its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.”
In November 2015, regarding the Japanese Government’s decision to give the SDF the new duty of the so-called “kaketsukekeigo,” the deputy spokesman for the UN Secretary-General stated that “the United Nations appreciates the discussions Japan held
on this matter. We welcome any measure of a UN member state that helps enhance the abilities of PKO personnel to protect civilians
and UN staff.”
As described above, the strong support for the Legislation for Peace and Security clearly shows that this legislation will help
deter war and contribute to the peace and security of the world.


The “three new conditions” are as follows: “(1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs
and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is no appropriate means available


-----

India and countries of Southeast Asia and Europe as well
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the European Union (EU). This fact clearly shows
that the Legislation for Peace and Security strengthens


the Japan-U.S. Alliance and enhances deterrence, and
also contributes to the peace and stability of the region
and the international community.


**Commentary**

**The Relationship between the Legislation for Peace and Security**
**and the Constitution**

The “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution

-  When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a
close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to
fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;

-  When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect
its people; and

-  Use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary,

only when the Three New Conditions above are satisfi ed. Even for the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions, the
basic logic of the constitutional interpretation presented in the Governmental view of 1972 (below) has not changed:

-  The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit the “use of force” in international relations in all
forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of all peoples of the world) to live in peace” as recognized
in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all of
the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental
affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-
defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival.

-  Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful
situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due
to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, the “use of
force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted.

Furthermore, the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions remains within the scope of the Supreme Court
decision on the Sunagawa Case. The Supreme Court decision states that

-  “it must be pointed out that it is natural for Japan, in the exercise of powers inherent in a state, to take measures
for self-defense that may be necessary to maintain its peace and security, and to ensure its survival.”

In other words, the decision can be interpreted as recognizing that Japan should be able to take “measures for self-defense”
to maintain its peace and security and ensure its survival after stating that Japan has the right to self-defense, without making a
distinction between the right to individual self-defense and the right to collective self-defense.
As the Legislation for Peace and Security, which refl ects the Three New Conditions described above in just proportion, maintains
the basic logic of the constitutional interpretation hitherto presented by the Government and remains within the scope of the Sunagawa
Case decision by the Supreme Court, the only institution endowed with the power to fi nally determine the constitutional interpretation,
it is consistent with the Constitution.


-----

**Section 2 Outline of the Legislation for Peace and Security**


The Legislation for Peace and Security consists of the
Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace
and Security, (which bundles together a host of partial

Fig. II-3-2-1 Layout of the Legislation for Peace and Security


amendments to existing laws) and the newly enacted
International Peace Support Act.

See Fig. II-3-2-1 (Layout of the Legislation for Peace and Security)

Fig. II-3-2-2 (Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security)


See


Fig. II-3-2-1


**Peace and Security Legislation Development Act**

（Bundling together partial amendments to the existing laws）

**Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security: Law Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for**
Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community

1. Self-Defense Forces Law

2. International Peace Cooperation Act
Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations

3. Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan → Changed to Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace
and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security
Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security

4. Ship Inspection Operations Act
Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations

5. Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations
Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation

6. U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Act → Changed to the U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act
Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation

7. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities
Law Concerning the Use of Specific Public Facilities and Others in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs

8. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act
Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation

9. Prisoners of War Act
Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation

10. Act for Establishment of the National Security Council

**New enactment (one)**

**International Peace Support Act: Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International**
Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security


Fig. II-3-2-2 Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security


Fig. II-3-2-2


Images of Situations and Conditions

Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. Support activities (including logistics support) in situations Response to armed attack situations, etc

[Self-Defense Forces Law] that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace [Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations]
Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (New) and security (Expansion) Responses to “Survival-Threatening Situation” (New)

[Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security ・ “Use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions”
of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important

Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment

[Self-Defense Forces Law] (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security]
Protection of weapons, etc. of the U.S. forces and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)
armed forces of other countries (New)

Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed ・ Clarification of the purpose of the revisionthe purpose of the Act） （Revision of (1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or The “Three New Conditions”when an armed attack
Forces in peacetime [Self-Defense Forces Law] (Expansion) ・ Support activities for armed forces of foreign countries against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs

・ Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan ・ Expansion of the scope of support activities(not only the U.S.) (2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happinessensure Japan’s survival and protect its people

Ship Inspection Operations (Expansion) (3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary

[Ship Inspection Operations Act]

・ Enable ship inspection operations in
situations that the international community is
collectively addressing for international

International Peace Cooperation Activities peace and security

[International Peace Cooperation Act]

UN PKO (Addition)

・ Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation
(ensuring security of specified areas including Cooperation and Support activities to armed forces of
protection of local population) foreign countries in situations that the international
・ Review of authority to use weapons (small arms) in community is collectively addressing for international
necessary cases peace and security (New)

[International Peace Support Act (New)]

Internationally coordinated operations for peace The exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not
and security permitted for the purpose of the so-called defense of a foreign
(Multinational cooperation outside UN PKO framework, New) country, namely, for the purpose of turning back an attack

made against a foreign country.

Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council]

(Note) Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount
to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby (Development of no new legislation)


-----

**Outline of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security**
**1**


**1** **Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law**

**1**


**(1) Establishment of Provisions for Measures to Rescue**
**Japanese Nationals Overseas (Article 84-3)**

Previously, operations to protect Japanese nationals
overseas in emergency situations were limited to
transporting to safe places those who need protection of
their lives or bodies, and rescue of Japanese nationals
overseas involving the use of weapons was not allowed
even in cases of terrorist attacks. In light of these
circumstances, the newly established provisions enable
the units of the SDF to take “rescue measures” that go
beyond transportation and include guarding and rescue of
Japanese nationals overseas whose lives or bodies could
be harmed in emergency situations when the following
requirements are satisfi ed:
a. Procedures
Upon the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
after subsequent consultations between the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, the Minister
of Defense issues an order following approval by the
Prime Minister.
b. Requirements for Implementation
When all of the following are met, the rescue measures
may be implemented:
(1) It is recognized that in places where the rescue measures
are taken, the competent authorities of the country
concerned are maintaining public safety and order at the
time, and no act of combat will be conducted;
(2) The country concerned[1] consents to the SDF taking the
rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and
(3) It is expected that coordination and cooperation can
be ensured between the units of the SDF and the
competent authority of the country concerned in order
to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and
safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers.
c. Use of Weapons (Article 94-5)
In carrying out their duties to implement the rescue
measures, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to
the extent judged to be reasonably necessary, depending
on the situation when there are adequate grounds to
recognize the compelling need to use weapons to protect
the lives and bodies of Japanese nationals and others or
themselves, or to eliminate actions that obstruct their


duties (including the permission to resort to the so-called
use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate.[2]
However, causing harm to people is permitted only in
cases of legitimate self-defense and evasion of clear and
present danger.).

**(2) Establishment of Provisions for the Protection of**
**Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the**
**United States Forces and the Armed Forces of Other**
**Foreign Countries (Article 95-2)**

The newly established provisions enable SDF personnel
to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units
of the United States Forces and the armed forces of other
foreign countries that are, in cooperation with the SDF,
currently engaged in activities that contribute to the
defense of Japan.
In December 2016, the National Security Council
approved “The Implementation Guidelines for Article
95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law,” which sets out
the basic principles of the article and the Cabinet’s
involvement in the operationalization of the article, etc.
a. Coverage
Weapons, etc. of the units of the United States Forces,
armed forces of other foreign countries and other similar
organizations, that are, in cooperation with the SDF,
currently engaged in activities that contribute to the
defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding
activities in the scene where the combat activities are
actually being conducted.).
b. Procedures, etc.
When the request is made by the United States Forces,
etc., and only when the Minister of Defense deems it
necessary, SDF personnel provide asset protection.
c. Use of Weapons
In protecting weapons and other equipment described
in a. above as part of their duties SDF personnel are
permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be
reasonably necessary depending on the situation when
there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to
use weapons to protect persons, weapons, and other
equipment (however, causing harm to people is permitted
only in cases of legitimate self-protection and evasion of
present danger).


It includes an organization, if any, that administers the said country in accordance with a resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council of the UN.

While the so-called “right to use weapons of self-preservation type” permits the use of weapons only for the protection of oneself and others (oneself, SDF members who are at the same scene as
oneself, or those under the supervision of oneself), the so-called “right to use weapons in defense of the mission mandate” allows the use of weapons beyond self-preservation, for example, to protect


-----

**(3) Development of Provisions concerning the**
**Expansion of the Provision of Supplies and Services**
**to the United States Armed Forces (Article 100-6)**

Regarding the provision of supplies or services to the
United States Armed Forces, the scope of the U.S. Armed
Forces and the scope of supplies covered were expanded
as follows:
a. Scope of the United States Armed Forces Covered
(1) The scope extended to the United States Armed Forces
that are on fi eld sites along with the units of the SDF
carrying out the following actions or activities and
engaged in activities similar to those of the SDF units:

-  Guarding of facilities and areas of bases, etc. of
U.S. Forces Japan

-  Counter-piracy operations

-  Operations necessary to take measures to destroy
ballistic missiles, etc.

-  Removal and disposal of mines and other explosive
hazardous objects

-  Protection measures for Japanese nationals, etc. in
emergency situations in foreign countries

-  Activities to collect information by ships or aircraft
about the movements of the armed forces of foreign
countries and other information that contributes to
the defense of Japan
(2) The scope extended to the U.S. Armed Forces
participating in multilateral exercises of three or more
countries, including Japan and the United States, in
addition to the U.S. Armed Forces participating in
Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises
(3) The scope extended to the U.S. Armed Forces that
are in fi eld sites along with SDF units temporarily
staying at facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces for
day-to-day operations, in addition to the U.S. Forces
temporarily staying at SDF facilities
b. Scope of Supplies to be Provided
Added ammunition (weapons remain excluded)

**(4) Establishment of Provisions for the Punishment of**
**Those Who Commit Crimes Overseas (Article 122-2)**

Since the duties of the SDF overseas are to be expanded
under the latest legal revisions, it is necessary to more
adequately ensure the discipline and control of the
activities of the SDF overseas.


For this reason, provisions were established for the
punishment of those who commit crimes overseas such as
the following: (1) Colluded defi ance of superiors’ offi cial
orders and unlawful command of units, and (2) Defi ance
of and disobedience to superiors’ orders by those given
defense operation orders

**2** **Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace**
**and Security of Japan in Situations that Will**

**2**

**Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace**
**and Security**
**(Revision of the Law Concerning Measures**
**to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in**
**Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)**


The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and
Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding
Japan stipulated rear area support,[3] rear area search
and rescue operations[4] and ship inspection operations
(those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law)
conducted by Japan as measures to respond to situations
that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace
and security in areas surrounding Japan.
In accordance with the changes in the security
environment surrounding Japan, the law revision deleted “in
areas surrounding Japan” from “situations that will have an
important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security in areas
surrounding Japan” and changed the name of situations
from “situations in areas surrounding Japan” to “situations
that will have an important infl uence,”[5] and also expanded the
scope of support targets and response measures as follows.

**(1) Support Targets**
On top of the existing “U.S. Armed Forces engaged in
activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives
of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” the revised law added
“armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in


**KeyWord** Situations that will have

an important infl uence

Situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and
security, including situations that, if left unattended, could result in a

direct armed attack on Japan


Rear area support under the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan means support measures, including the provision of
goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to the U.S. Armed Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Rear area search and rescue operations under the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan mean operations conducted by the
SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat and were stranded in rear areas (including transportation of those rescued).

Previously, “situations in areas surrounding Japan” was understood to be an idea that focuses on the nature of situations, not a geographical idea. In light of the changes in the security environment in
recent years, however, the defi nition was revised since it is not appropriate to use an expression that could be interpreted as geographically limiting areas where situations that will have an important
infl uence on Japan’s peace and security may arise. In association with this, the title of the Law was amended from the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in l


-----

**(4) Diet Approval**
As before the law revision, prior Diet approval is
required, in principle, and ex-post facto approval is also
allowed in emergency.

**3** **Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Law**


Ship inspection operations mean operations to inspect
and confi rm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding
warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a
change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the
purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures
concerning trade or other economic activities to which
Japan is a party, conducted based on the UN Security
Council resolutions or with the consent of the fl ag state.[6]

Previously, ship inspection operations were stipulated
as to be conducted only in situations in areas surrounding
Japan.[7] However, the international community has
witnessed accumulated examples of ship inspection
operations against international threats such as cross-border
movements of weapons of mass destruction and weapons
of international terrorist organizations, etc., since 2000
when the Ship Inspection Operations Law was enacted.
In light of such global situation, it was made possible
to conduct ship inspection operations in situations
threatening the international peace and security that
the international community is collectively addressing
set forth in the International Peace Support Act. In
conjunction with this, the revision to the law was made
in association with the review of the Law Concerning
Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.


activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives
of the UN Charter” and “other similar organizations” as
armed forces, etc., responding to situations that will have
an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security.

**(2) Response Measures to Situations that Will Have an**
**Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security**

The revised law sets out measures to respond to situations
that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and
security as (1) logistics support activities, (2) search and
rescue activities, (3) ship inspection operations, and (4) other
measures necessary to respond to situations that will have
an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security,
and added “lodging, storage, use of facilities and training
services” as the types of goods and services provided by the
SDF in (1) logistics support activities, on top of the “supply,
transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities,
communications, airport and seaport services, and base
services” previously. While the provision of weapons is
not included, as before, the revised law now allows the
“provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance
of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.”
The revised law made it possible to implement
response measures in foreign territories, but only when
the foreign country concerned consents.


**(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force**
The revised law sets forth the following measures in order
to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign
country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:

-  The SDF does not carry out response measures in
“the scene where combat activities are actually being
conducted.” Regarding search and rescue operations,
however, when the personnel having been stranded
have already been found and rescue operations have
commenced, search and rescue activities concerning
them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of
the SDF units is ensured.

-  The commanding offi cers, etc., of the SDF units order
the temporary suspension of activities, etc., if combat
operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of
their activities or in the vicinity.

-  The Minister of Defense designates the area for
implementing activities, and if it is deemed diffi cult to
implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole
or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change
the designation of the area or order the cessation of the
activities being implemented there.


**4** **Amendment to the International Peace**
**Cooperation Act**

**4**


The International Peace Cooperation Act, enacted in 1992,
set forth a framework for extending appropriate and prompt
cooperation for the three categories of operations of UN
PKOs, International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and
International Election Observation Operations, and for
Japan to take measures to provide Contributions in Kind
for those operations, thereby enabling Japan to actively
contribute to international peace efforts centering upon
the UN. The law also stipulates a set of basic guidelines, or
the so-called “Five Principles for Participation” for Japan’s
participation in these activities.
At the time of the enactment of the Act, it was


The state that has the right to fl y its fl ag as prescribed in Article 91 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

At the time when the Ship Inspection Operations Law was enacted, the conduct of ship inspection operations in situations other than situations in areas surrounding Japan was positioned as a separate


-----

So-called Five Principles for
Participation”


assumed that Japan was to cooperate with the ceasefi re
monitoring in conventional confl icts between states
within the framework of UN PKOs under the control
of the UN. However, the nature of confl icts that the
international community faces has transformed into
intra-state confl icts and a combination of inter-state and
intra-state confl icts. Therefore support for the nationbuilding of state parties to confl ict and the creation
of a safe environment necessary to achieve this end
have become important tasks in international peace
cooperation activities. Furthermore, there is a wide range
of international peace cooperation activities that have
come to be implemented outside of the UN frameworks.[8]

Given the diversifi cation and qualitative change of
the international peace cooperation activities, Japan,
in order to contribute further to peace and stability of
international community under the policy of “Proactive
Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of
international cooperation, has expanded the scope of
tasks that can be implemented in UN PKOs and reviewed
the authority to use weapons, and also introduced new
provisions to allow for active participation in humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance, safety-ensuring, and other
non-UN-led operations (“Internationally Coordinated
Operations for Peace and Security”).

**(1) Requirements for Participation**
a. UN Peacekeeping Operations
While maintaining the framework of the Five Principles
for Participation, the implementation of so-called
“safety-ensuring” operations and so-called “kaketsukekeigo” operations requires that the consent of acceptance
of countries to which the areas where these operations
are conducted belong is stably maintained throughout the
duration of the operations in addition to those required
for implementing the operations.
b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security
Besides the existing three types of operations (UN PKOs,
International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and
International Election Observation Operations), Japan
is now able to participate in Internationally Coordinated
Operations for Peace and Security, when any of the
following is satisfi ed, in addition to the fulfi llment of the
Five Principles for Participation.
(1) Based on resolutions of the General Assembly,
the Security Council, or the Economic and Social
Council of the UN
(2) At the requests of any of the following international


**KeyWord**


(1) Agreements on a ceasefi re have been reached among the Parties
to Armed Confl ict; (2) Consent for the conduct of UN Peacekeeping
Operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations have been
obtained from the countries to which the areas where those operations
are to be conducted belongs as well as the Parties to Armed Confl ict;
(3) The operations shall be conducted without partiality to any of the
Parties to Armed Confl ict; (4) Should any of the requirements in the
above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfi ed, the International Peace
Cooperation Corps shall terminate the International Peace Cooperation
Assignments; and (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum
necessity for the protection of the lives of personnel dispatched, in
principle. Following the latest amendment of the Act, additional condition,
“when the consent for acceptance is deemed to be consistently
maintained, the use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate is
allowed for implementation of so-called ’safety-ensuring’ operations
and the so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (coming to protection of individuals
related to operations in response to urgent request) operations as the use
of weapons beyond self-preservation and Article 95 of the SDF Law (the
use of force for protection of weapons, etc.)” has been added to (5) of the
Five Principles for Participation.

organizations:

-  The UN

-  Organs established by the UN General Assembly
or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes
of the UN such as the Offi ce of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specifi ed
by a Cabinet Order

-  Regional organizations, as prescribed in Article
52 of the UN Charter or organs established by
multilateral treaties, acknowledged as having the
actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the
activities of Internationally Coordinated Operations
for Peace and Security such as the European Union
or otherwise specifi ed by a Cabinet Order
(3) At the requests of the countries to which the areas
where those operations are to be conducted belong
(limited to only those cases that are supported by any
of the principal organs of the UN as prescribed in
Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter).


**(2) Description of Tasks**
In addition to ceasefi re monitoring and humanitarian
relief operations for affl icted persons, the following tasks
have been added and expanded to tasks in UN PKOs, etc.

-  Addition of monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspections
at checkpoints and security escort for the protection
of safety of specifi ed areas including prevention and
suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies


These activities include the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), implemented at the request of the European Union, and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), implemented at the


-----

and property of local population, affl icted persons
and other populations requiring protection (so-called
“safety-ensuring” operations)

-  Addition of protection of lives and bodies of individuals
engaging in international peace cooperation operations
or providing support for those operations, in response
to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to lives or
bodies of such individuals related to operations occur or
are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations)

-  Expansion of tasks such as provision of advice or
guidance related to works for the purpose of assisting
in establishing or re-establishing organizations of
the Government relating to national defense or other
organizations

-  Expansion of tasks conducted at organizations for
supervision and coordination of tasks to include planning,
drafting, coordination or collection and updating of
information in Headquarters Offi ce or coordination offi ces
conducting UN PKOs and Internationally Coordinated
Operations for Peace and Security, for the implementation
of tasks (of mission headquarters’ operations)

**(3) Authority to Use Weapons**
a. Expansion of the Authority to Use Weapons for Selfpreservation (Joint Protection of Camps)
Camps of UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), etc.,
are the bases where personnel of participating countries


spend their time when not conducting operations outside
camps, and the last bastion, so to speak, to secure the
safety of lives and bodies of those inside. Thus, in the
case of unexpected situations, such as attacks against UN
camps by armed groups, it is essential for SDF personnel
stationed in the camps, even if they are not the direct target
of such attacks, to coordinate with the personnel of other
countries and protect each other and deal with the common
danger. In light of this, the use of weapons for the purpose
of protecting individuals jointly stationed at the camps was
allowed as the use of weapons for self-preservation.[9]

b. The Authority to Use Weapons in the So-Called
“Kaketsuke-Keigo” Operations
In carrying out so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations,
uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons
to the extent judged reasonably necessary according to
the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found
for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or
bodies of themselves or individuals related to operations
that they intend to protect (however, infl icting injury on
a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate selfdefense and aversion of clear and present danger).
c. The Authority to Use Weapons for So-Called “SafetyEnsuring” Operations
In carrying out so-called “safety-ensuring” operations,
uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons
within the limits judged reasonably necessary according


**Commentary**

**Risk for SDF Members**

The missions by SDF members defi nitely entail risks, but the degree of risk varies depending on the situation in the region to which
they are actually dispatched and details of their activities, etc., and SDF members are dispatched only when dispatching them is
judged possible after assessing risks in the course of considering concrete cases of dispatches. Moreover, in dispatching SDF
members, the SDF strives to minimize risks associated with their performance of missions. These processes are no different from
those adopted in dispatching SDF members on disaster relief missions following the eruption of Mt. Ontake and the Great East Japan
Earthquake or on UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan.
While new missions may give rise to new sorts of risks, when the SDF dispatches its members, it minimizes and localizes such
risks by legal and operational mechanisms for security. For example, the legal mechanism for security includes provisions for the
designation of areas of activities where SDF units can conduct their activities smoothly and safely and for the cessation/suspension
of activities when areas of activities by SDF units become “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted.” In
addition, the operational mechanism for security includes adequate information gathering on situations in areas of activities, carrying
enough equipment to secure the safety of SDF members, and adequate education and training.
Moreover, the dispatch of SDF units must go through appropriate procedures, such as the development of robust plans, cabinet
decisions and approval by the Diet.
The SDF is fully committed to security measures for SDF members by taking a variety of measures as described above.


The authority to use weapons for self-preservation is allowed in view of the existence of particular circumstances, whereby armed personnel, who protect camps which are the last bastions of safety,


-----

to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found
for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies or
properties of themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate
obstructive behavior for their duties (however, infl icting
injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate
self-defense and aversion of clear and present danger).

**(4) Diet Approval**
Diet approval is necessary prior to the commencement
of so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, in addition to
ceasefi re monitoring, in principle (ex-post facto approval
is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of
Representatives is dissolved).


**5** **Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed**
**Attack Situations**

**5**


As the security environment surrounding Japan changes,
it is likely that an armed attack occurring against a
foreign country could threaten Japan’s survival as well,
depending on its purpose, scale and manner. For this
reason, in addition to the armed attack situations, etc.,
(an armed attack situation and an anticipated armed attack
situation), “Survival-Threatening Situation” was newly
added to the situations to which Japan has to respond for
the defense of Japan, and responses to such a situation
was defi ned as one of the SDF’s primary missions as
avoidable self-defense measures for Japan’s defense. The
following amendments, including the above, were made
to relevant laws, including the Armed Attack Situations
Response Act[12] and the SDF Law.


**(5) Ensuring Safety of Personnel of the International**
**Peace Cooperation Corps of Japan**

The provision for the consideration to ensuring the safety
of personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps
was added, while the measures for ensuring the safety of
personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps
were incorporated into the matters to be stipulated in the
Implementation Procedures.

**(6) Other Key Points of Amendment**

-  Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the UN
(dispatch of Force Commanders of UN PKOs, etc.)
The Act was amended to make it possible to dispatch
uniformed SDF personnel and have them engage
in the tasks of the UN and those concerning overall
management of tasks implemented by units of the
SDF, etc., or units of armed forces of foreign states
participating in UN PKOs, at the request of the UN,
with the consent of the Prime Minister.[10]

-  Provision of supplies and services to the Armed Forces
of the United States, etc., for their operations to cope
with large-scale disaster[11]

The Act was amended to make it possible for the SDF to
provide the U.S. Armed Forces or the Australian Defence
Force with supplies or services when they request the
provision and are located in the area together with the
units of the SDF, etc., and is undertaking operations to
cope with large-scale disasters, so far as it does not hinder
the performance of International Peace Cooperation
Assignments, etc., of the SDF.


**(1) Revision of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act**
a. Purpose
Responses to Survival-Threatening Situation were added,
in addition to the responses to armed attack situations, etc.
b. The Basic Response Plan to Respond to Armed Attack
Situations, etc. or Survival-Threatening Situation
The Basic Response Plan is set to provide for the
following points: (1) Developments in the situation, the


Armed Attack Situation and

**KeyWord**

Anticipated Armed Attack Situation

An armed attack situation means a situation where an armed attack

against Japan from outside has occurred or an imminent and clear

danger of the armed attack is acknowledged.

An anticipated armed attack situation means a situation where

an armed attack has yet to occur, but circumstances are growing

increasingly strained and an armed attack is anticipated.


**KeyWord** Survival-Threatening Situation

A Survival-Threatening Situation means a situation where an armed
attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with

Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of

Japan’s survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people’s
right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.


10 The dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel is limited to cases where the consent of the countries hosting the UN PKOs for which the dispatched uniformed SDF personnel will conduct operations and
of state parties to the confl ict regarding the implementation of the UN PKO (when the state parties to the confl ict are nonexistent, the consent of the countries where the UN PKOs are to be conducted)
is deemed to be stably maintained throughout the duration of the dispatch and where circumstances that lead to the suspension of the dispatch are deemed unlikely to occur.

11 The MOD/SDF participated in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) following the major earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, but was unable to provide supplies and services
to the U.S. Armed Forces engaged in disaster relief operations in Haiti outside the framework of UN PKOs, due to the absence of necessary domestic legislation.

12 Following the addition of Survival-Threatening Situation, the title of the Act was revised from the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s
Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc.” to the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival

-----

confi rmation of the situation as an armed attack situation,
etc., an anticipated armed attack situation or SurvivalThreatening Situation, and the facts that serve as the
premises supporting the confi rmation; (2) When the
situation is confi rmed as an armed attack situation, etc.,
or Survival-Threatening Situation, reasons why there is
no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s
survival and protect its people, and the use of force is
necessary to respond to the situation; and (3) An overall
plan to respond to the armed attack situation, etc., or
Survival-Threatening Situation.
c. Diet Approval
When an order is given to the SDF for defense operations
to respond to a “situation where an armed attack against
a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival,”
prior Diet approval is required, in principle, in the same
manner as for the armed attack situations, etc.

**(2) Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law**
a. Positioning as the Mission of the SDF (Article 3)
The SDF’s response to Survival-Threatening Situation
was defi ned as one of the primary missions of the SDF.
b. Defense Operation (Article 76)
Survival-Threatening Situation was categorized as a
situation in which a defense operation will be ordered.
c. Others
Among the provisions setting forth a variety of authorities,
etc., and special measures necessary for SDF operations,
those whose purpose is entirely for responses to direct


armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not
to be applied to Survival-Threatening Situation.[13]

**(3) Revisions to Other Relevant Legislation**
a. Act Related to the Actions of the U.S. Forces and Others
In addition to support for the U.S. Armed Forces
responding to armed attack situations, etc., support
operations for the armed forces of foreign countries other
than the United States in armed attack situations, etc., as
well as support operations for the U.S. Armed Forces and
the armed forces of other foreign countries in SurvivalThreatening Situation were added.
b. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act
The provisions to restrict maritime transportation in
Survival-Threatening Situation were added. Furthermore,
the waters to impose the restrictions on maritime
transportation are defi ned as Japan’s territorial waters,
territorial waters of foreign countries (only when their
consent is obtained) and the high seas.
c. Prisoners of War Act
The provisions were added for the application of the
Prisoners of War Act to Survival Threatening Situation
as well.
d. Act Regarding the Use of Specifi c Public Facilities
The operations of the armed forces of foreign countries
other than the United States Forces in armed attack
situations, etc. were added to the scope of coordination
of the use of specifi c public facilities.


**Commentary**

**Risk of Being Dragged into a War**

The “use of force” permitted as a measure for self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan must meet the very strict
requirements of the Three New Conditions. They are extremely stringent requirements not seen anywhere else in the world and serve
as a clear constitutional restraint. Furthermore, when the Minister of Defense issues a defense operation order to actually conduct
the “use of force,” the Government must seek Diet approval in advance, in principle. As such, since the SDF conducts its activities in
compliance with the Constitution and laws enacted by the Diet, it will never be the case that the “use of force” by the SDF expands
endlessly, resulting in Japan being dragged against its intention into a war of another country.
In addition, under the Legislation for Peace and Security, the Japan-U.S. Alliance will function more for Japan’s peace and
security. By sending this message out to the world, Japan’s capability to prevent a confl ict from occurring, in other words its
deterrence capability, will be further enhanced, and the risk of Japan coming under an attack will be further reduced. Furthermore, it
will enable Japan to cooperate further with the international community for the maintenance of peace and development of the region
and the world, making the world more peaceful.


13 The examples of application include the organization of special units, and the defense call-up of SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Reserve Personnel, etc., while the examples of non-application


-----

National Security Council must deliberate without fail.

-  Regarding international peace cooperation operations,
decisions on and changes in plans for the implementation
related to the implementation of the so-called safetyensuring operations or the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo”
operations

-  Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel (force
commanders, etc.) who are to be engaged in supervisory
duties for operations conducted by units of countries
participating in UN PKOs

-  Implementation of protection measures, including
guarding and rescue, of Japanese nationals overseas
and others

**Outline of the International Peace Support Act**
**2**


maintenance, medical services, communications,
airport and seaport services, base services, lodging,
storage, use of facilities, training services and
construction) are to be provided.
While the provision of weapons is not included
as in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the
Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will
Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and
Security, the revised law now allows the “provision
of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of
aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.”
(2) Search and rescue activities
(3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship
Inspection Operations Law)


**6** **Revision of the Act for Establishment of the**
**National Security Council**

**6**


Responses to “Survival-Threatening Situation” and
responses to “situations threatening the international
peace and security that the international community
is collectively addressing” were added as the items
for deliberation, and items for deliberation regarding
“situations in areas surrounding Japan” were changed to
items for deliberation regarding “situations that will have
an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security.”
Furthermore, the following items (all items are related
to the stable maintenance of the consent of acceptance
of hosting countries) were specifi ed as the items the


The International Peace Support Act is the newly enacted
law that enables Japan to conduct cooperation and support
operations, for the armed forces of foreign countries
engaged in operations for international peace and
security in situations threatening the international peace
and security that the international community is collectively
addressing in order to ensure peace and security of the
international community.

**1** **Requirements**


Either of the following UN resolutions (by the General
Assembly or the Security Council) is required for the
operations of armed forces of foreign countries that are
covered by Japan’s cooperation and support operations.
(1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or
authorize foreign countries subject to Japan’s support
operations to respond to the situation that threatens
the peace and security of the international community
(2) Other than (1), resolutions that regard the situations as
a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and call on UN
member states to respond to the situation concerned


**3** **Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force**


The revised law sets forth the following measures in order
to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign
country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel:


**2** **Response Measures**

**2**


The following response measures can be implemented
in situations threatening the international peace
and security that the international community is
collectively addressing.
(1) Cooperation and support activities
Supplies and services to armed forces of foreign
t i ( l t t ti i d


Situations threatening the

**KeyWord**

international peace and security
that the international community
is collectively addressing

These refer to situations that threaten peace and security of the international
community, and the international community is collectively addressing the

situations in accordance with the objectives of the UN Charter to remove

the threat; Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to

independently and proactively contribute to these activities


-----

-  Japan does not implement support activities in the scene
where combat operations are actually being conducted.
However, when the personnel having been stranded
have already been found and rescue operations have
commenced, search and rescue activities concerning
them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of
the SDF units is ensured.

-  The commanding offi cers of the SDF units, etc., order
a temporary suspension of support activities if combat
operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of
their activities or in the vicinity.

-  The Minister of Defense designates the area for
implementing activities, and if it is deemed diffi cult

**Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operation**
**3**


Considering the increasingly severe security environment
surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure
peacetime nor contingencies (the so-called gray zone
situations) are liable to occur, posing risks which could
develop into more serious situations. In order to respond
promptly to such situations of infringement that do not
amount to an armed attack, and ensure seamless and
suffi cient responses to any unlawful acts, the Government
made cabinet decisions regarding the acceleration of
procedures to issue orders for public security operations
and maritime security operations, etc., in May 2015,
particularly in the following three cases:


to implement operations smoothly and safely in the
whole or part of that area, must promptly change the
designation of the area or order the cessation of the
activities being implemented there.

**4** **Diet Approval**


Prior Diet approval required without exception, and
each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts
towards decisions within 7 days (excluding any period
when the Diet is in recess). In addition, re-approval is
required in the case of a lapse of more than two years
since the commencement of the response measures.



-  Responses to foreign naval vessels making maritime
navigation through the territorial sea or the internal
waters of Japan that does not fall under the category of
innocent passage under international law

-  Responses to the unlawful landing on a remote island
or its surrounding seas by an armed group

-  Responses to acts of infringement when SDF ships
or aircraft detect foreign ships committing said acts
against Japanese private ships on the high seas
Specifi cally, when an urgent decision is necessary
concerning the issuance of orders for public security
operations, etc., but it is diffi cult to promptly convene


Fig. II-3-2-3 Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operation


Fig. II-3-2-3


H Cabinet decision to accelerate procedures to issue orders for public security/maritime security operations in the following three cases,
referring to Cabinet Decision on Government Responses when there is a Risk of Large-Scale Terrorism (November 2, 2001):

Responses to Foreign Vessels Making
Maritime Navigation that Does Not Fall Responses to Illegal Landing on Remote Responses to Foreign Vessels Infringing on
under the Category of Innocent Passage Islands by Armed Groups Japanese Commercial

Vessels on the High Seas

under International Law

H Responses are made by SDF units under H When armed groups or groups that are H When Japanese commercial vessels are
orders for maritime security operations highly probable to be armed are likely to actually subject to infringement activities,
in principle. illegally land or actually land on remote H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting
H The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of islands, to issue orders for (urgent) counter-
Foreign Affairs and the Japan Coast H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting piracy operation or maritime security
Guard promptly and expeditiously share to issue orders for maritime security operation.
information, coordinate and cooperate. operations/public security operations.
H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting
to issue orders for maritime security
operation.

When an urgent decision is necessary but it is difficult to promptly convene an adhoc cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister
can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers by telephone and
other means (any Minister who could not be contacted in advance shall be notified of the cabinet decision ex post facto).


-----

an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister
can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision
by obtaining the consent of the Ministers of State by
telephone and other means. Any Minister of State who

**Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation**
**4**


**1** **Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and**
**Survival-Threatening Situation**

**1**


The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and
Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in
Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening
Situation specifi es items that should be stipulated as
basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response
Plan) regarding responses to armed attack situations,
etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation as well as the
responsibilities of national and local governments in the
event of an armed attack situation.


could not be contacted in advance shall be notifi ed of the
cabinet decision ex post facto.

See Fig. II-3-2-3 (Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public

Security Operations and Maritime Security Operation)

See


See Fig. II-3-2-4 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations,

etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation)

See

Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)
Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of
Weapons by SDF Personnel)


**(1) Basic Response Plan, etc.**
In situations such as an armed attack situations, etc., or
Survival-Threatening Situation, the Cabinet must decide
upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and
ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic
Response Plan is decided, a temporary Task Force for
Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be


Fig. II-3-2-4 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening Situation


Fig. II-3-2-4


Occurrence of armed attack, etc.

Creation of a draft basic response plan (1) Formulation of the draft basic response

plan by the Prime Minister

The Government

National Security Council

(2) The draft basic response plan sent to

Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Consultation the National Security Council for deliberation

(3) Recommendation by the National Security

Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning

Recommendation Council to the Prime Minister concerning

Specialized assistance to National Security Council the draft basic response plan

Cabinet decision on the basic response plan (4) Cabinet decision on the basic response plan

The Diet

Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc. (note) Request for the approval of the Diet (5) Approval of the basic response plan by Diet
(Task Force Chief: Prime Minister)

Approval Rejection

-  Comprehensive promotion of response measures

-  Formulation of usage guidelines for specific public Terminate immediately
facilities, etc.

Response according to the basic

Designated government institutions Local governments Designated public institutions

response plan and usage guidelines

Note: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for the comprehensive promotion of measures to respond to armed attack situations or a situation where an armed attack against
a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival


-----

Fig. II-3-2-5 Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative Institutions, Local Governments or Designated Public Institutions


Fig. II-3-2-5


Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by
armed attacks, in order to bring an armed attack situation, etc., to an end Survival-Threatening Situations in order to bring the situation to an end

(1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the (1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the
SDF necessary to repel an armed attack SDF necessary to repel an armed attack against a foreign country that is in
(2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures a close relationship with Japan which as a result threatens Japan’s survival
implemented so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1), actions taken and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the people’s right to
by the United States Armed Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (a survival-threatening armed attack)
necessary to repel an armed attack, and actions taken by armed forces of (2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures implemented
other foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel an so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1) and actions taken by armed
armed attack can be conducted smoothly and effectively forces of foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel
(3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above an armed attack against a foreign country that results in threatening

Japan’s survival can be conducted smoothly and effectively
(3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above

Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from an
armed attack, or minimize the impact of an armed attack on the people’s Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from a
lives and the national economy implemented according to changes in survival-threatening armed attack, or minimize the impact of a
armed attack situations, etc. survival-threatening armed attack on the people’s life and the national

economy implemented according to changes in a situation where an armed

(1) Measures to announce warnings, give instructions on evacuation and the attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival
rescue of injured parties, measures for the restoration of facilities and
equipment, and other measures
(2) Price stabilization and distribution of daily necessities etc., and other -  Measures to ensure the security of public facilities and secure the stable
measures supply of daily necessities, etc.


established within the Cabinet, and it will implement
these measures.
(1) The following items concerning situations that need
to be dealt with:
a. Developments in the situation, the confi rmation of
the situation as an armed attack situations, etc., or
Survival-Threatening Situation, and the facts that
serve as the premises supporting the confi rmation
b. When the situation is confi rmed as armed attack
situations, etc., or Survival-Threatening Situation,
reasons why there is no other appropriate means
available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its
people, and the use of force is necessary to respond
to the situation
(2) An overall plan to respond to the armed attack
situations, etc., or Survival-Threatening Situation
(3) Important matters related to the response measures

**(2) Response Measures**
When responding to armed attack situations, etc., or
Survival-Threatening Situation, the designated government
institutions, local governments and designated public
institutions will implement the required measures based on
legal provisions during the period between the formulation
and termination of the Basic Response Plan.

See Fig. II-3-2-5 (Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative

Institutions, Local Governments or Designated Public Institutions)


Responsibilities of the National and Local
Governments, etc.

|Subject|Responsibility|
|---|---|
|Government|• Have a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people • Respond to armed attack situations, etc., and Survival- Threatening Situation by taking every possible measure and using all organizations and functions • Implement all possible measures as a whole nation|
|Local Government|• Have responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, bodies, and properties of the residents • Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc., in mutual cooperation with the national government, other local governments and other institutions|
|Designated Public Institutions|• Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc., in the scope of their work, in mutual cooperation with the national government, local governments, and other institutions|
|Nationals|• Strive to provide necessary cooperation when the designated administrative institutions, local governments or designated public institutions implement response measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc.|


Fig. II-3-2-6

**Subject** **Responsibility**

- Have a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the
homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people

- Respond to armed attack situations, etc., and Survival
Government

Threatening Situation by taking every possible measure
and using all organizations and functions

- Implement all possible measures as a whole nation

- Have responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives,
bodies, and properties of the residents

Local

- Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack

Government

situations, etc., in mutual cooperation with the national
government, other local governments and other institutions

- Implement necessary measures to deal with armed

Designated

attack situations, etc., in the scope of their work, in

Public

mutual cooperation with the national government, local

Institutions

governments, and other institutions

- Strive to provide necessary cooperation when the
designated administrative institutions, local governments

Nationals

or designated public institutions implement response
measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc.


Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and SurvivalThreatening Situation are as outlined below.

See Fig. II-3-2-6 (Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments,

etc.)


**(4) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures**
Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan,
for overall promotion of response measures, the Task
Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force)
will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime
Minister appointed as the Chief of the Task Force and
appropriate Ministers of State as the Deputy Chief and
th b f th T k F


**(3) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments**
The responsibilities of the national and local governments
as defi ned in the Act on the Peace and Independence of
J d M i t f th N ti d th P l ’


-----

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are
obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies or properties of the
people, or to eliminating an armed attack, and particularly
when necessary response measures under comprehensive
coordination are not implemented, the Prime Minister
may instruct the head of the local government concerned
and other relevant persons to implement the necessary
response measures.
In circumstances where the necessary response
measures are not implemented or if there are obstacles to
protecting the lives, bodies and properties of the people or
to eliminating an armed attack, and emergency responses
are required in light of the situations, the Prime Minister
or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating
to the relevant countermeasures may take responsibility
for and implement the response measures that the local
governments or designated public institutions have failed
to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local
government or other relevant individuals.

**(5) Report to the United Nations Security Council**
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the UN,
the Government shall immediately report measures it
has taken to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the
Security Council.


Fig. II-3-2-7 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches

Fig. II-3-2-7

Municipal mayors

Ask for dispatch Communication (When a dispatch request cannot be sought)
request

Prefectural governors Task Force Chief[1]

Request for Ask for dispatch
dispatch Notification

Report
(When communication
is established by
municipal mayors)

Report

Minister of Defense Prime Minister

Approve

Issue an order to Issue an order for civil
gather for civil protection dispatches
protection, etc.[2, 3]

SDF Ready Reserve
Personnel
SDF Reserve Personnel

Report for duty

Units

Notes: 1. Armed Attack Situations, etc. Task Force Chief or Emergency Response Situation

Task Force Chief

2. If it is particularly necessary to respond
3. Ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel will be called on if necessary upon

the approval of the Prime Minister


Guidelines”), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection
Act.[15] The Basic Guidelines presume four types of armed
attack situations, including (1) amphibious landing
invasion, (2) guerilla or special operations forces unit
attacks, (3) ballistic missile attacks, and (4) air attacks,
and prescribe matters requiring attention to implement
civil protection measures in response to each of them.
The MOD/SDF established the MOD/ Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics Agency Civil Protection Plan
based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Guidelines.
The Plan calls upon the SDF, in armed attack situations,
etc., to go all out to perform its primary mission of
forcing back the armed attack, and also implement civil
protection measures to support the evacuation and rescue
of residents and deal with the armed attack-induced
disasters to the extent possible without interfering with
the primary mission.


**2** **Responses to Emergency Situations other than**
**Armed Attack Situations, etc.**

**2**


The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and
Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in
Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survival-Threatening
Situation provides for appropriate and rapid response
measures to be implemented in emergency situations[14]
other than an armed attack situation and a situation where
an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in
threatening Japan’s survival, in order for the Government
to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and
to maintain the security of the country and its people.


**3** **Initiatives for Civil Protection**

**3**


**(1) Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection and the Roles**
**of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF**

In March 2005, the Government established the Basic
Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic


14 A contingency situation other than an armed attack situation and a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival that may have a signifi cant impact
on the security of the nation and its people, including an emergency response situation (a situation where actions that may kill or injure many people by using methods equivalent to those used in an
armed attack situation occurs, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state)i


-----

**(2) Relationship between Survival-Threatening**
**Situation and Civil Protection Measures**

In the event of armed attack situations, etc., and an
emergency response situation, the SDF may undertake such
operations as support for the evacuation of residents, relief
of evacuated residents and stopgap restoration work as civil
protection measures and emergency response protection
measures based on the civil protection dispatches.
In this regard, the Civil Protection Act, from the
perspective of protecting the people and its livelihood
from a direct attack against Japan and its physical
damage, provides for necessary matters to that end,
including issuance of warnings and measures for the
evacuation and relief of residents. Survival-Threatening
Situation and a situation that requires warning issuance
and the evacuation and relief of residents is nothing less
than a situation where an armed attack against Japan is
anticipated or imminent. In such a case, it is recognized
as armed attack situations, etc., and necessary measures
are to be implemented under the Civil Protection Act.[16]

See Fig. II-3-2-7 (Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches)

See


**(3) Activities by the MOD/SDF to Facilitate the Civil**
**Protection Measures**

a. Participation in Training for Civil Protection
In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil
protection measures in armed attack situations, etc., it
is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the
implementation of civil protection measures in peacetime
with other ministries and agencies, local governments,
and other relevant organizations.
For this reason, the MOD/SDF has held civil
protection training with cooperation from relevant
government organizations or local governments, etc. In
addition, the MOD/SDF also actively participates and
cooperates in civil protection training implemented by
relevant government organizations, or local governments.

See References 19 (Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection

Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY 2016))


GSDF personnel coordinating with prefectural staff during a drill for protecting
the public conducted in Ishikawa Prefecture

b. Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime
From peacetime, the MOD/SDF closely coordinates
with local governments. The Provincial Liaison &
Coordination Division has been posted within the
GSDF Regional Army Headquarters to achieve effective
implementation of civil protection measures through
close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to
coordination and cooperation with local governments,
etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures
Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in
each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office.
Civil Protection Councils have been established
in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to
comprehensively promote policies related to civil
protection measures, with members of the SDF and
employees of the regional defense bureaus appointed as
council members.
In addition, in some cases, retired SDF personnel are
employed by local governments as crisis management
supervisors to facilitate cooperation with the MOD/SDF
and help to develop and implement disaster response
plans and training programs as experts on civil protection.


16 In the case that an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is not regarded as armed attack situations, etc., a series of measures are to be implemented to
ensure the stability of the people’s livelihood, including the stable supply of daily necessities, based on a variety of existing laws and regulations, taking thoroughgoing response measures to protect


-----

**Commentary**

**“What to Do if a Ballistic Missile were to Fall”**
**(Information from the Cabinet Secretariat)**

North Korea conducted ballistic missile launches at an unprecedented frequency of over 20 launches in 2016, and has continued to
launch missiles repeatedly in 2017 as well. In particular, ballistic missiles launched in August and September 2016 and in March and
May 2017 are presumed to have fallen within Japan’s exclusive economic zone in the Sea of Japan.
The Government has been steadily strengthening Japan’s capability to defend against ballistic missiles in order to protect the
lives, bodies and property of Japanese people from the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles, and is also maintaining high levels of
alert and vigilance. In tandem with these measures, when there is a possibility of a ballistic missile fl ying to Japan, or more specifi cally,
(1) When there is a possibility of a ballistic missile fl ying to Japanese territory and/or territorial waters; or
(2) When there is a possibility of a ballistic missile fl ying over Japan,
the Government will, through the J-Alert national instant warning system, send out urgent information to residents in regions that
need to stay alert to a ballistic missile and encourage them to evacuate underground or to sturdy buildings.
When J-Alert is used, the disaster prevention wireless communications system is automatically activated, via J-Alert receivers
installed at municipal government buildings, and the special siren (Civil Protection Siren) (Note) is sounded and messages are
broadcast through outdoor speakers for approximately 14 seconds. Urgent information is also transmitted via other means of
communication, including community FM broadcast and registration-based e-mail. Furthermore, J-Alert sends out urgent information
by NTT DOCOMO’s “Area Mail” and emergency alert e-mail to mobile phones and smartphones via mobile phone carriers.
J-Alert was used to disseminate civil protection information, including information on ballistic missiles, twice when ballistic
missiles were launched by North Korea in December 2012
and February 2016. When the ballistic missile passed over
Sakishima Islands, Okinawa Prefecture in February 2016,

**What to Do if a Missile were to Fall**

the Ministry of Defense began communicating information to
the Cabinet Secretariat immediately after the missile launch

A missile will make a landing shortly after it is fred.

was confi rmed, and information on the missile launch was If a missile could fall in Japan, J-Alert will be used to sound

a special siren and broadcast messages on the disaster

transmitted about four minutes after the launch. These were prevention wireless communications system. Also, urgent

information will be communicated by e-mail alerts and other

the only two cases of missiles that passed over Japan since means of communication.
J-Alert had been put into place across the nation.
In these two cases, North Korea notifi ed international **If the message is broadcast, take the following actions immediately.**
organizations in advance that it would launch a satellite. Even if

**If outdoors:**

North Korea launches a ballistic missile without advance notice,

Evacuate underground or to a sturdy

the Ministry of Defense will begin communicating information building nearby as much as possible.
to the Cabinet Secretariat immediately after the missile launch If there is no suitable building nearby,

take cover or lie fat on the ground with your head

is confi rmed. When there is a possibility of the missile fl ying to

protected.

Japan, J-Alert will immediately broadcast urgent information.

**If indoors:**

When there is a possibility of a North Korean ballistic

Stay away from windows as much as possible, and

missile fl ying into waters surrounding Japan, the Government go to a room that has no windows if you are able to.
will communicate information to alert ships and aircraft traveling
near Japan directly, or through business operators, by sending **Please remain calm and follow the instructions of authorities.**
out navigation warnings and fi sheries safety information.
The Government is fully prepared to take all necessary See the Civil Protection Portal Site (http://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp/) for more information.
measures with a sense of vigilance in order to be able to
respond to any situation.

Note: The sound of the Civil Protection Siren can be confi rmed at the Civil Protection Portal Site: http://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp/en/pc-index_e.html


-----

**Section 3** **[The Situation of the Self-Defense Forces after ]**
**the Enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security**


**Promotion of Various Preparations for New Missions Based on the Legislation for Peace and Security**
**1**


**1** **Promotion of Various Preparations**


**2** **Implementation of Training**


Since the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace
and Security on March 29, 2016, the MOD/SDF has
undertaken various preparations for a variety of new
missions based on the Legislation for Peace and Security,
such as activities to raise awareness of legal systems
and intra-unit rules that were established, education of
SDF personnel, as well as development of educational
materials necessary for the actual training of various
units and the nurturing of instructors.
In August 2016, as these preparations were all but
completed, each unit of the SDF set out to implement
necessary training in connection with the Legislation for
Peace and Security. In the area of Japan-U.S. and other
bilateral as well as multilateral joint trainings, Japan decided
to conduct necessary training on the Legislation for Peace
and Security after coordinating with the countries concerned.


In August 2016, the 11th Engineering Unit (a major unit of
the 9th Division of the GSDF Northeastern Army [Aomori
City]), to be dispatched on UNMISS (UN Mission in the
Republic of South Sudan), began training to prepare for
the dispatch, including training related to new missions
under the Legislation for Peace and Security.
In November 2016, in a Japan-U.S. joint fi eld training
exercise (Keen Sword 17), the SDF carried out training in
Japan-U.S. joint search and rescue activities in situations
that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace
and security, promoting mutual understanding between
Japan and the United States about rescue procedures.
In December 2016, the SDF conducted the fi rst
training of rescue of Japanese nationals overseas based
on Article 84-3 of the SDF Law as an effort to improve
its joint operation capabilities.


**i**

**In Support of Training that Covers the Legislation for Peace**
**and Security**

Takahiro Kaji, Captain
Evaluation and Support Division, International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit
GSDF Camp Komakado (Gotenba-shi, Shizuoka Prefecture)

Following the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security, new missions and authorities have been added to the international
missions of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).
The Training Unit, which supports education and training related to international missions and conduct relevant research, was
in a trial-and-error mode initially. By leveraging the know-how built up through past experiences and repeating desk studies and
practical tests, we made preparations to provide full support for the SDF personnel being dispatched.
I mainly supported the preparations for the 11th Engineering Unit deployed to South Sudan by leveraging my experience serving
in South Sudan. In October 2016, integrated training was implemented to help enable the engineering unit personnel to appropriately
address situations anticipated in the fi eld, including the new duties. Through this training conducted in the simulated local environment
of South Sudan, including linguistic differences, we were able to see
for ourselves a situation where the dispatched personnel execute such
missions as “kaketsuke-keigo” and joint protection of camps in an orderly
manner. Many SDF personnel said that “we are now ready to act with
confi dence when we are called upon to execute the new duties.” These
comments gave us a sense of achievement and reassurance.
Our Training Unit provides a variety of other education and training
in light of the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security. We
are proud to play a role in the execution of international missions, and
we are going to support the units and SDF personnel being dispatched
so that the GSDF can execute its international missions more safely and

The author (right) providing education for SDF personnel to be dispatched

more effectively. on an international mission after the training


-----

Furthermore, between January and February 2017,
the SDF participated in a multilateral joint exercise
(Cobra Gold 17). In the command point exercise, the
SDF conducted training related to cooperation and

**Assignment of New Mission for the South Sudan PKO**
**2**

**1** **Background**


On October 8, 2016, Minister of Defense Inada visited
South Sudan to inspect the activities of the 10th
Engineering Unit deployed there. The Minister also held
talks with key offi cials of the South Sudan Government
and then UN Secretary-General Special Representative
Roy of the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
(UNMISS), where they expressed their appreciation for
the activities of the SDF engineering unit and expectations
for its future activities. Through the visit, the Minister
confi rmed the relative stability of the capital city of Juba
and its vicinity, though the security situation of South
Sudan still remained very severe.
On October 23, 2016, Minister Inada visited the 11th
Engineering Unit to inspect the pre-deployment training
related to the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and joint
protection of camps. The Minister also received a report
on the training outcome from the Chief of Staff of the
Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) and confi rmed that the
capability of the unit to be dispatched had reached the level
that allows the unit to adequately conduct its new duties.
Following these events, after a comprehensive
consideration in light of the local situation and the
training for the new additional mission, the Government
decided to assign the duty of so-colled “kaketsuke-keigo”
starting with the 11th Engineering Unit to be deployed to
UNMISS, as well as the duty of joint protection of camps.
Following the deliberations and the approval obtained at
the 9-Minister Meeting of the National Security Council,
the Cabinet approved the revision of the Implementation
Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment
for UNMISS on November 15, 2016.


support operations and ship inspection operations under
the International Peace Support Act as well as training for
rescue of Japanese nationals overseas to improve its joint
operation capabilities.

Minister of Defense Inada receiving an honor guard from the dispatched troops in South Sudan
(October 2016)


Training for the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” during the dispatch preparation drills conducted
at the Iwatesan training area (Iwate Prefecture) (October 2016)

Minister of Defense Inada and GSDF Chief of Staff Okabe, who accompanied her,
being briefed on the pre-deployment preparation training drill at the Iwatesan training area
(Iwate Prefecture) for the 11th Engineering Unit to be deployed (October 2016)i


**2** **Fundamental Concept regarding the Assignment**
**of New Duties**

**2**


In making the Cabinet Decision above, the Government
indicated its basic concept regarding the so-called
“kaketsuke-keigo” and joint protection of camps.[1] The
outline of the basic concept is as follows:


-----

**(1) Premise**
The maintenance of security in South Sudan is, in
principle, the responsibility of the South Sudan police
and the South Sudan government forces, complemented
by troops of UNMISS. This responsibility should be
exclusively borne by the infantry unit of UNMISS. What
Japan deploys to South Sudan is the SDF engineering
unit, and thus the maintenance of security there is not the
duty of the unit.

**(2) So-Called “Kaketsuke-Keigo”**
“Kaketsuke-keigo” is to be conducted in very limited
situations, such as when those engaged in NGO activities,
etc. are attacked in locations close to the SDF engineering
unit and there are no UN units or others around to take
prompt actions. It is conducted in response to urgent
requests as a quick and temporary measure, within the
abilities of the unit in light of the humanitarian and urgent
nature of such measures.
A small number of Japanese nationals are staying in
South Sudan, centering on the capital city of Juba, and
we cannot rule out the possibility that these Japanese
nationals found themselves in contingent circumstances.
In the past, when SDF units were dispatched
to Timor-Leste and then Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of the Congo), Japanese nationals facing
contingent circumstances in those countries asked for
protection by SDF units.
On those occasions, the SDF units, while they were
not adequately trained for such protection operations and
their duties and authorities under law were limited, made
every effort to protect Japanese nationals within the limits
of their means, rushing to the scene and transporting them
to safe locations.[2]

If the SDF unit is near the scene, the unit cannot just
stand by and do nothing even though it has the ability to
help them.
Previously, however, a legal framework to deal with
such a situation did not exist, and as a result, the SDF
personnel at the scene managed to deal with the situation
by themselves. This should not happen essentially.
“Kaketsuke-keigo” is a mission entailing risks. As
long as Japanese nationals overseas have the possibility
of facing contingent situations, however, the Government
believes that (1) the official assignment of the solid duty of
“kaketsuke-keigo” and the necessary authority and (2) the
establishment of a steady structure with adequate training


beforehand, are conducive to not only contributing to the
safety of Japanese nationals overseas but also to reducing
risks to the SDF units.
Since SDF units have only self-protection
capabilities, “kaketsuke-keigo” represents only responses
that are feasible within their capabilities.
The military personnel of other countries usually
possess self-protection capabilities. Even then, if they are
in a crisis situation that they cannot handle by themselves,
it is basically the South Sudan government forces and
the UNMISS infantry troops that are mobilized for their
protection. The Government considers that the SDF
engineering unit that does not possess the capability
needed for the maintenance of security is not assumed to
conduct “kaketsuke-keigo” of the military personnel of
other countries.
In view of the track record of past activities, the area
of activities in South Sudan is limited to “Juba and its
surrounding area” starting with the 11th Engineering Unit
deployed in that country. The implementation of “kaketsukekeigo” is also limited to within this area of activities.

**(3) Joint Protection of Camps**
In the field of UN PKOs, etc., it is usual practice for
personnel of multiple countries to cooperate in their
activities. In South Sudan as well, the SDF unit and units
of Rwanda and some other countries share one camp as
their base of activities.
Even if such a camp is attacked by an armed group
and the personnel of other countries are in a crisis
situation, the SDF unit previously could not respond to
the situation in cooperation with other units and could not
participate even in the daily training.
However, as long as the SDF unit shares the same
camp with the military personnel of other countries, an
injury to the personnel of other countries could lead to
SDF personnel being attacked. The military personnel of
other countries and the SDF personnel share a common
destiny so to speak. If they coordinate their responses,
they can better enhance the security of both of them.
Furthermore, it is believed that as SDF personnel
and the military personnel of other countries would be
able to constantly engage in joint training, this would
facilitate communication and cooperation between Japan
and other countries in an emergency situation, leading to
the enhanced security of the camp as a whole.
As seen above, the joint protection of camps is


At the Diet, Prime Minister Abe has responded as follows: “In the past, when SDF units were dispatched to Timor-Leste and then Zaire, Japanese nationals facing contingent circumstances in those
countries asked for protection by SDF units. The SDF units, while they were not adequately trained and their duties and authorities were limited, made every effort to protect Japanese nationals. If the
SDF unit is near the scene, the unit cannot just stand by and do nothing even though it has the ability to help them. (Abridged) Previously, however, a legal framework to deal with such a situation did
not exist, and as a result, the SDF personnel at the scene managed to deal with the situation by themselves. This should not happen essentially.” (Prime Minister Abe’s response, Plenary Session of


-----

intended to enhance the personnel s own safety in a severe
security situation. The Government considers that the
SDF unit is able to conduct its activities more smoothly
and safely, which would contribute to reducing the risks
posed to the SDF unit.

See Section 2-1-4 (Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Act)

See


**3** **Termination of Operations of the SDF**
**Engineering Unit**


As already mentioned, the SDF s activities have
been conducted for over fi ve years, making it the longest
deployment of engineering units, and the road repair and
other activities they carried out mostly in the capital city
of Juba represent the largest achievement among Japan’s
previous PKO activities. Thus, the Government considers
that it can move on to a new phase regarding SDF
engineering activities in Juba. Taking such aspects into
account in a comprehensive manner, the SDF engineering
unit’s activities were terminated at the end of May 2017.
With this, the new duties such as the so-called “kaketsukekeigo” in international peace cooperation operations in
South Sudan came to an end.
Japan continues to dispatch SDF personnel to
UNMISS Headquarters, who continue to contribute to
UN PKO operations as members of UNMISS.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3-2-1 (United Nations Mission in the Republic

of South Sudan (UNMISS))

See

Reference 66 (Japan’s Basic Thinking Regarding the Termination of
Operations of the Engineering Unit of the Self Defense Force in the
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS))

**[The Operationalization of the Protection of Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the Armed Forces ]**
**3** **of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2)**


**(1) Basic Principles of Implementing Article 95-2**
a. Purpose of Article 95-2
This Article is to enable SDF personnel to carry out very
passive and limited use of weapons to the minimum
extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment
(“the weapons, etc.”) of units of the U.S. Forces, armed
forces of other countries or other similar organizations
(“the U.S. Forces, etc.”), that are concurrently engaged in
activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including
joint exercises but excluding activities conducted in
places where combat activities are actually occurring) in
cooperation with the SDF, from infringements which do
not amount to an armed attack, because the weapons, etc.
can be regarded as an important material means which
constitute the defense capability of Japan.
Through the provision of Paragraph 1 of the Article
that “excluding activities conducted in places where
combat activities are actually occurring,” it is ensured that
asset protection is not to be, nor to be legally regarded
as being integrated (“itaika”) with the use of force of
the U.S. Forces, etc. and that the SDF personnel never
respond to any combat activities by the use of weapons
pursuant to the Article. The SDF personnel thus never
conduct use of force and this prevents the situation from
evolving into combat activities as a result of the use of
d th i i f th A ti l


**3**


The deployment of the SDF engineering unit to UNMISS
marked a milestone of fi ve years in January 2017. South
Sudan is about to enter a new stage of nation building,
as the creation and deployment of the UN Regional
Protection Force is advancing efforts towards the further
stability of the security situation in Juba. Also, the
South Sudan Government has made progress in efforts
towards achieving domestic stability, announcing the
commencement of national dialogue for the purpose of
ethnic reconciliation.

**3** **of the United States and Other Countries (SDF Law Article 95-2)**

**1** **Background**


Since the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and
Security, the MOD/SDF provided necessary explanations
and coordination with the United States and also engaged in
the work to develop necessary rules and regulations in order
to ensure the appropriate operation of the system for the
protection of weapons, etc., of the units of the U.S. Forces and
the armed forces of other foreign countries (SDF Law Article
95-2). Upon completion of these works, in December 2016,
at the National Security Council the Government decided
on the Implementation Guidelines concerning Article 95-2
of the SDF Law, and started operating the article in relation
to the U.S. Forces. This operationalization helps further
strengthen coordinated surveillance between the SDF and
the U.S. Forces and also further enhances the deterrence and
response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.


**2** **The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2**
**of the SDF Law**

**2**


The Implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF
Law set forth the Government’s basic concept concerning the
article as well as the basic principles of the involvement of
the Cabinet and disclosure of information in implementing
the article. An outline of the guidelines is as follows:


-----

This use of weapons does not fall under use of
force” which is banned in Article 9 of the Constitution.
b. Activities that Contribute to the Defense of Japan
“Activities that contribute to the defense of Japan” in the
Article may include mainly the following ones, while the
Government of Japan is to examine each activity on a
case-by-case basis: (1) ISR activities including ballistic
missile alert; (2) transportation and replenishment
activities in “situations that will have an important
influence”; and (3) joint exercises to enhance capabilities
required for defending Japan.
c. Judgment on Whether or Not to Conduct Asset Protection
When the Minister of Defense receives a request from the
U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister subjectively should judge
whether the activities conducted by the units of the U.S.
Forces, etc. in cooperation with the SDF are “activities
that contribute to the defense of Japan” and whether
asset protection by the SDF personnel is necessary, by
considering the objective and content of the activities,
capability of the unit, types of weapons, etc. of the unit
and surrounding circumstances including possibility of
combat activity as well as the impacts on performance of
the SDF’s regular operations.

**(2) Involvement of the Cabinet**
Requests from the U.S. Forces, etc. based on Paragraph
2 of the Article should be deliberated in the National
Security Council (NSC) before the Minister of Defense
judges on conducting asset protection if the Minister
receives requests in the following cases. However, in case
there is no time for dealing with an urgent request by the
U.S. Forces, etc., the Minister should promptly report to
the NSC regarding judgment of providing asset protection.
(1) The U.S. Forces, etc. makes a request for the first


time after the operationalization of asset protection.
(2) The request is made for asset protection in the
territory of a third country.
(3) The request is recognized as peculiarly important,
although not falling under the above two categories.
In addition, in case asset protection under the
situations that will have an important influence[(*)] is
requested, the Prime Minister should clearly state it in
the Basic Plan and should ask for a Cabinet decision on it
after deliberations in the NSC.
(*) “Situations that will have an important influence” is provided in
Article 1 of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and
Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence
on Japan’s Peace and Security, Act No. 11 of 1999.
The National Security Council Board is to be held
flexibly and support the full National Security Council.
In addition, the relevant ministries and agencies are to
share information on requests for protection and closely
cooperate with each other.

**(3) Disclosure of Information**
In the implementation of Article 95-2, if an unusual
event occurs in conducting asset protection operation,
the Government promptly discloses such an event, and
releases a basic plan that specifies matters concerning
the implementation of asset protection operations in a
situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s
peace and security. The Government also strives for
appropriate disclosure of information in light of the Act
on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs
(Act No. 42 of 1999).

See Section 2-1-1 (2) (Establishment of Provisions for the Protection of

Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the United States
Forces and Other Foreign Countries (Article 95-2))


**Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)**
**4**


On September 26, 2016, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kishida and then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Kennedy
signed the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement (ACSA). ACSA was approved by the Diet on
April 14, 2017 and took effect on April 25, 2017.
The ACSA was prepared as a new agreement to
replace the previous Japan-U.S. ACSA to enable the
application of existing settlement procedures to the
provision of supplies and services from the SDF to the
U.S. Forces that become possible under the newly enacted
Legislation for Peace and Security.


The new ACSA enables the smooth and expeditious
provision of a broad range of supplies and services
between the SDF and the U.S. Forces, thereby raising the
levels of specific on-site cooperation between them.
Japan also signed similar agreements with countries
other than the United States in light of the Legislation for
Peace and Security, etc., which obtained Diet approval
along with the Japan-U.S. ACSA.

See Section 2-1-1 (3) (Development of Provisions concerning the

Expansion of the Provision of Supplies and Services to the United
States Armed Forces (Article 100-6))

Chapter 4, Section 2-3-2 (5) (Logistics Support)


-----

**Strengthening of the Japan-U.S.**

**Chapter**
### 4

**Alliance**


Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the JapanU.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own
efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security.
The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security
arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to
the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of
the Asia-Pacifi c region and the world at large.
As the security environment surrounding Japan
becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the
same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and
presence in the Asia-Pacifi c region, it has become more
important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance
for the security of Japan.
The military presence of U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)
not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also
functions as deterrence and response capabilities to
address contingencies in the Asia-Pacifi c region, and
serves as a core element of the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements.
In this manner, the stationing of USFJ based on the
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty not only contributes to the
interests of Japan but also to the interests of the United

**Section 1 Signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements**

**Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security**
**1**


In the current international community, a robust defense
system capable of responding to every contingency,
ranging from all types of armed attacks including the
use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by
military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security,
and sovereignty of the nation.
However, it is diffi cult even for the United States to
guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it
would be diffi cult for Japan to ensure its national security
solely through its unilateral efforts given its population,
land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not
necessarily contribute to regional stability.
C tl J h i t i d it d


Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Trump at the Japan-U.S. joint press conference
concerning the situation regarding North Korea (February 2017)

[photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce]

States, which has an interest in this region.
On the other hand, since the stationing of USFJ
impacts the living environment of local residents, efforts
that correspond to the actual situation of each region
must be made to mitigate the impact on regions such as
Okinawa.


security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the
world’s dominant military power, the United States, with
which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of
law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy as
well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security
of the world, and has strong economic ties.
Specifi cally, Japan and the United States will take
bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against
Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the
U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation
plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to
f t t l th d f bilit f th S lf


-----

Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military
strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to
defend Japan in the event of an armed attack. As a result,
the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer
grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires
will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words,

**Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan**
**2**


Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that
contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance
of international peace and security in the Far East is the
purpose of the use of facilities and areas by USFJ. This
provision is based on the recognition that the security of
Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far
East region to which Japan belongs.
In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many
states and the like with massive military power, including
some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue
nuclear development. In addition to issues or tension
caused by changes in the balance of power, situations that
we call “gray zones” over sovereignty of the territory or
vested interests are likely to arise, and this risks further
aggravation of the situation.
In such a security environment, the military
presence of USFJ provides deterrence against unexpected


this serves as deterrence against attacks.
Japan intends to create a seamless posture and
secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the
deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military as well as
maintaining its own adequate defense capability.

contingencies caused by various security issues or
destabilizing factors, not only protecting the interests of
Japan and the United States but also providing a great
sense of security to the nations in the region and thus
fulfi lling a role as public goods.
Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on
the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute the
foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace
and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These
arrangements, complemented by the alliances established
between the United States and other countries in the
region such as the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand
and the Philippines and also by the friendly relations
developed with other countries, play an indispensable
role in maintaining the peace and stability of the AsiaPacifi c region.


**Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment**
**3**


The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation
for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship
between Japan and the United States, not only in defense
but also in a wide range of areas, including politics,
economy, and society.
The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security
arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s
foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to
implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and
security of the international community, including
promotion of multinational security dialogue and
cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations.
Currently, we are confronted with global security
challenges that are extremely diffi cult for any single
country to tackle alone, including the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,
international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as
new risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space
and cyberspace, and it is important for countries to
k t th f ti Th t b d f d


between Japan and the United States are also playing an
important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to
effectively respond to such challenges.
In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are
working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to
strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination
lays the foundation for various forms of international
collaboration such as antipiracy, undertaken by the
SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of
the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements.
The peace and prosperity of the international
community are closely linked to those of Japan.
Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States,
which possesses preeminent international operational
capabilities, Japan is able to advance measures to further
stabilize the global security environment. This in turn is
enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.


-----

**Commentary**

**The Importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance**

**— The Value of Japan to the United States**

The United States has been a Pacifi c state for over a hundred years. Today, in the 21st century, the Asia-Pacifi c region is the center of
world economic growth, in addition to being a region home to various security challenges such as the nuclear weapons and missile
issues of North Korea. The national interests of the United States are increasingly closely intertwined with the peace and stability of
this region. Japan is an extremely important partner for the United States since it is an economic power that shares universal values
such as freedom, democracy, respect for basic human rights and rule of law, and has an outstanding Self-Defense Forces that has
built a close cooperative relationship with the U.S. Forces over a long period of time.
By stationing its forces in Japan, made possible by the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the United States can respond to a confl ict in this
region, should one occur, by deploying troops more swiftly than by sending troops from the U.S. mainland. The facilities of the U.S.
Forces in Japan also serve as the base for receiving military reinforcement from the U.S. mainland. Moreover, on a day-to-day
basis the United States can conduct a wide variety of activities that contribute to regional stabilization more effi ciently than if they
were initiated from the U.S. mainland, such as drills with the armed forces of allies and friendly countries, defense exchanges and
cooperation with other countries in the region, and disaster relief. In this manner, the Japan-U.S. Alliance, as the foundation of peace
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacifi c, contributes to the stabilization of the regional security environment, and thereby, plays a major role
in promoting the national interests of both Japan and the United States. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is not a framework under which only
one of the two partners benefi ts.
The fact that very soon after the inauguration of the new U.S. presidency in January 2017, new Defense Secretary Mattis visited
Japan and held a Defense Ministerial Meeting with Defense Minister Inada and President Trump held a summit meeting with Prime
Minister Abe indicates that the new U.S. administration regards Japan with importance. The Japan-U.S. Alliance that is the linchpin of
Japan’s diplomacy and security policy is now as strong as ever. In order to advance both Japanese and U.S. interests, it is essential
to continue to make the unwavering Japan-U.S. Alliance framework even sturdier and to bolster the deterrence and response
capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance underpinned by the relationship of trust with the new U.S. administration.


-----

**Section 2 Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance**


**Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance**
**1**


Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust
alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human
rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the
Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal
ideology and also contributed to the peace and stability in
the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978
with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan.
Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of
Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S.
Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffirming the
importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the
state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the
Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the final report was
compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion
of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the
Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee
(SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997)
approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines[1] and
expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas
surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security
environment, such as the end of the Cold War.
Afterwards, in light of further changes to the
security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks
in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December
2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and
other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue
on security from the perspective of how to make the
Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt
to the changing times. As a result of a number of these
Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S.
Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are:
confirmation of common strategic objectives to both
countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region (first stage) in February 2005; the
announcement of the results of the examination of the
roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United


States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives
(second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation
of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment
Implementation, a program for implementing specific
measures for the realignment of USFJ, (third stage) in
May 2006.

See Reference 22 (United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment

Implementation)

See


Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in
May 2007 reconfirmed and updated their common strategic
objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the
Agreement between the Government of Japan and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning
the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine
Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from
Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement),
which entered into force in May 2009.
At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries
reviewed and revalidated their common strategic
objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous
“2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime
security domain by defending the principle of freedom
of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation
with respect to protection of and access to outer space
and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas,
including an expansion of information sharing and joint
ISR activities.
In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in
April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that
they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United
States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
(Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering
significant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces
stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as
well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

See Reference 23 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

(April 27, 2012))

The major accomplishments at the “2+2” Meeting in
October 2013 are as follows:
(1) Agreed to complete work on the revision of the 1997
Guidelines before the end of 2014.


The 1997 Guidelines define the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed


-----

Fig. II-4-2-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States

|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|1960|Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty||The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force|
|1968 1969 1972 1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines|||(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan) Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan) (Okinawa is returned to Japan) (Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)|
|1978 and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation|||Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)|
|1991 1996 End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines 1997 2001|||(Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War) Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks) SACO Final Report Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.|
|2003 Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 2006 terrorist attacks in the United States|||The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks) Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation|


Fig. II-4-2-1


1951 The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed

1952 Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty The treaty enters into force

1958 Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)

Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

1960 The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force

and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

1968 (Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan)

1969 Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return

of Okinawa to Japan)

1972 (Okinawa is returned to Japan)

1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines (Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)

1978 and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)

1991 (Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War)

1996 End of the Cold War Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)

and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines SACO Final Report

1997 Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines)

2001 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.

2003 The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks)

Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11

2006 Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

terrorist attacks in the United States

The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)

The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)

2007 Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)

2010 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

2012 Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks)

2013 Agreement on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(1997 Guidelines)

2014 The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond

(Abe-Obama Talks)

2015 New security environment Japan-U.S. Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks)

and the establishment of the new Guidelines Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New Guidelines)

2017 Japan-U.S. Joint Statement (Abe-Trump)


(2) Agreed to further expand and deepen bilateral
cooperation in security and defense, including
cyberspace and outer space, and strengthen cooperation
in the region, including trilateral cooperation among
Japan, the United States and Australia as well as
among Japan, the United States and the ROK.
(3) Regarding USFJ realignment, Japan and the United
States renewed their strong determination to
complete the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp
Schwab, and agreed to continue to consult on other
possible measures while implementing the previous
agreements as early as possible and steadily from the
perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa.
The “2+2” Meeting, held in the milestone year marking
the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, took place
ahead of the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. The major
accomplishments of the “2+2” Meeting are as follows:
(1) Under the U.S. policy of rebalance and Japan’s policy
of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” the Ministers
reaffi rmed the Alliance’s commitment to maintaining


the security of Japan as well as the peace and security
of the international community and also reconfi rmed
the U.S. commitment to the Senkaku Islands
under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security.
(2) The Ministers approved the new Guidelines, and
confi rmed their intent to enhance the Japan-U.S.
Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities under
the new Guidelines.
(3) The Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress
in initiatives for bilateral security and defense
cooperation to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence
and response capabilities.
(4) The Ministers underscored the recent progress in
regional and international cooperation.
(5) The Ministers reaffi rmed the two governments’
continued commitment to USFJ realignment.

See Fig. II-4-2-1 (Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between

Japan and the United States)


-----

**Overview of the Revision of the 1997 Guidelines**
**2**


It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to
discuss and decide the roles each will fulfi ll in case of an
armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance,
with a view to responding rapidly to such an event.
The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring their
effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to rolesharing between Japan and the United States. Based on
that framework and the changing security environment
surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States
have continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans
for the two countries, held consultations on them, and
worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the
current situations.

**1** **Background to the Revision of the Guidelines**


the following seven objectives of the review of the 1997
Guidelines:
(1) Ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an
armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of JapanU.S. defense cooperation;
(2) Expanding the scope of cooperation to refl ect
the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,
encompassing such areas as counter-terrorism,
counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment
and technology enhancement;
(3) Promoting deeper security cooperation with other
regional partners to advance shared objectives and
values;
(4) Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation
and coordination to make them more fl exible, timely,
and responsive and to enable seamless bilateral
cooperation in all situations;
(5) Describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral
defense cooperation based on the enhancement of
mutual capabilities;
(6) Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense
cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective,
effi cient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic
security environment that includes challenges in
emerging strategic domains such as space and
cyberspace; and
(7) Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen
the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives.
Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in
October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the
2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United
States, Japan and the United States conducted extensive
work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines.
In October 2014, based on the agreement reached at
the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held in July
2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report
on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan- U.S. Defense
Cooperation.” In addition, in December 2014, the SCC
(“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the signifi cance of ensuring
consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and
Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the
discussions to work towards fi nalizing the revision of the
Guidelines during the fi rst half of 2015, taking into account
the progress of Japan’s legislative process.
As a result of the intensive bilateral work on the
i i f th G id li th J U S SCC d


**1**


Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various
issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become
more visible and aggravated in the security environment
surrounding Japan; such as more active military
activities of neighboring countries, new threats including
international terrorist organizations and risks against the
stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space
and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have
expanded to a global scale, as exemplifi ed by anti-piracy
activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities.
As a result, it had become necessary for the manner
of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these
changes in the security environment and the expansion of
the SDF’s activities and missions.
Against the backdrop of these changes in the security
environment, Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister
of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the
revision of the Guidelines and other matters. In addition,
at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in February 2013,
Prime Minister Abe stated to then U.S. President Obama
that, “in response to the changing security environment,
Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines
through discussions on the two countries’ views of the
roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).”
Against the background described above, at the
Japan-U.S. SCC or “2+2” Meeting in October 2013,
the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense
Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the
1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by
the end of 2014.
Th J i t St t t f th “2 2” M ti id tifi d


-----

the new Guidelines recommended by the SDC at the
“2+2” Meeting in April 2015, thereby accomplishing the
objective of revising the Guidelines as outlined by the
Ministers in October 2013.

See Reference 20 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative

Committee (April 27, 2015))

See

Reference 21 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(April 27, 2015))

**2** **Content of the Guideliness**


capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United
States also will continue to forward deploy combatready forces in the Asia-Pacifi c region and maintain
the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.

-  The Guidelines provide the general framework and
policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and
the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and
coordination.

-  The Guidelines promote domestic and international
understanding of the signifi cance of the Japan-U.S.
Alliance.

**(2) Basic Premises and Principles**
The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches
of the 1997 Guidelines as described below:

-  The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty and its related arrangements will
remain unchanged.

-  All actions and activities undertaken under the
Guidelines will be consistent with international law.

-  All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and
the United States will be in accordance with their
respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in
effect, and basic positions on national security policy.
Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance
with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its
exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its
three non-nuclear principles.

-  The Guidelines do not obligate either government to
take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other
measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights
or obligations for either government. Since the
objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an
effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two
governments are expected to refl ect in an appropriate
way the results of these efforts, based on their own
judgment, in their specifi c policies and measures.

See Reference 21 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(April 27, 2015))
Fig. II-4-2-2 (Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense
Cooperation)


**2**


The Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines,
update the general framework and policy direction for
the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest
a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater
shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and
enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all
phases, from peacetime to contingencies.

**(1) Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines**
The Guidelines newly specifi ed the matters to be
emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The
objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with
the approach of the 1997 Guidelines.

-  In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under
any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies,
and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous
Asia-Pacifi c region and beyond, bilateral security and
defense cooperation will emphasize:
-  seamless, robust, fl exible, and effective bilateral
responses;
-  synergy across the two governments’ national
security policies;
-  a whole-of-government Alliance approach;
-  cooperation with regional and other partners, as well
as international organizations; and
-  the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

-  The two governments will maintain their individual
defense postures based on their national security
policies. The United States will continue to extend
deterrence to Japan through the full range of


-----

Fig. II-4-2-2 Outline of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

|Item|Outline|Col3|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|See the main text for I. “Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines” and II. “Basic Premises and Principles.”||||
|III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination|Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. B. Enhanced Operational Coordination The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. C. Bilateral Planning In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be ref lected appropriately in the plans of both governments.|||
|IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security|● The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. ● The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as f lexible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels. A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime • The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan- U.S. Alliance. • The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and Exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities. B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security • The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important inf luence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be def ined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. • In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (2) Maritime Security; (3) Measures to Deal with Refugees; (4) Search and Rescue; (5) Protection of Facilities and Areas; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities. C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs • Principles for Coordinated Actions The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF. • Concept of Operations Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan Operations to Defend Have primary responsibility for conducting air Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF Airspace defense operations while ensuring air superiority operations Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan Operations to Counter Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF Ballistic Missile Attacks missile defense operations to defend Japan operations Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication Operations to Defend Have primary responsibility for the protection of Maritime Areas major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other operations associated operations Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces Operations to Counter Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel Ground Attacks ground attacks, including those against islands, Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF and have primary responsibility for conducting air operations defense operations while ensuring air superiority|||
|||Self-Defense Forces (SDF)|United States Armed Forces|
||Operations to Defend Airspace|Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan||
|||Have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations|
||Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks|Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan||
|||Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations|
||Operations to Defend Maritime Areas|Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication||
|||Have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations|
||Operations to Counter Ground Attacks|Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces||
|||Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands, and have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority|Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations|


Fig. II-4-2-2


**Item** **Outline**

See the main text for I. “Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines” and II. “Basic Premises and Principles.”

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound
policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing
Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.
A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism
In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require
an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational
coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.

III. Strengthened Alliance

The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication

Coordination

systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.
B. Enhanced Operational Coordination
The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed
Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities.
C. Bilateral Planning
In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be
refl ected appropriately in the plans of both governments.

-  The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to
contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will
promote further cooperation with partners.

-  The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of
information, as well as fl exible deterrent options and actions aimed at de-escalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic
messaging through appropriate channels.
A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime

-  The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-
U.S. Alliance.

-  The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. To these ends, the two governments
will take measures, including, but not limited to: (1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; (2) Air and Missile Defense;
(3) Maritime Security; (4) Asset Protection; (5) Training and Exercises; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.
B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security

-  The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be
defi ned geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’
respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.

-  In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance
Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited
to: (1) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations; (2) Maritime Security; (3) Measures to Deal with Refugees; (4) Search and Rescue;
(5) Protection of Facilities and Areas; (6) Logistic Support; and (7) Use of Facilities.
C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan
Bilateral actions remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.
1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated
The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations
necessary for the defense of Japan.

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs
Japan’s Peace and -  Principles for Coordinated Actions
Security The two governments will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks.

The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and
supplement the SDF.

-  Concept of Operations

**Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **United States Armed Forces**

Conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan

Operations to Defend

Have primary responsibility for conducting air Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF

Airspace

defense operations while ensuring air superiority operations

Conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan

Operations to Counter

Have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF

Ballistic Missile Attacks

missile defense operations to defend Japan operations

Conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of
communication

Operations to Defend Have primary responsibility for the protection of
Maritime Areas major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF

vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other operations
associated operations

Conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or
amphibious forces

Operations to Counter Have primary responsibility to prevent and repel
Ground Attacks ground attacks, including those against islands, Conduct operations to support and supplement SDF

and have primary responsibility for conducting air operations
defense operations while ensuring air superiority


-----

|Col1|Col2|Outline|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|||Self-Defense Forces (SDF)|United States Armed Forces|
|ISR Cross- Space / Domain cyberspace Operations Special operations Strike operations||Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks||
||ISR|In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets||
||Space / cyberspace|Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains||
||Special operations|Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate||
||Strike operations|May provide support, as necessary, for the strike operations of the United States Armed Forces|Involve the use of strike power, to support and supplement SDF|

|Item|Outline|
|---|---|
|IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security|Self-Defense Forces (SDF) United States Armed Forces Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of ISR intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets Cross- Space / Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains Domain cyberspace Operations Special Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate operations Strike May provide support, as necessary, for the strike Involve the use of strike power, to support and operations operations of the United States Armed Forces supplement SDF • Operational Support Activities The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection. D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan • When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. • The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. • Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support. E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan • When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. • The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.|
|V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security|● In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. ● When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. A. Cooperation in International Activities • The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. • Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief; (3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistic support. B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards.|
|VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation|A. Cooperation on Space • The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. • The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. • The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications. B. Cooperation on Cyberspace • The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions. • The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to whole-of-Japanese and U.S. government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises. • In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.|
|VII. Bilateral Enterprise|The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security C. Educational and Research Exchanges|
|VIII. Processes for Review|Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.|


**Item** **Outline**

**Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **United States Armed Forces**

Conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks

In cooperation with relevant agencies, strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of
ISR
intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets

Cross- Space /

Cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains

Domain cyberspace
Operations Special

Special operations forces cooperate during operations, as appropriate
operations

Strike May provide support, as necessary, for the strike Involve the use of strike power, to support and
operations operations of the United States Armed Forces supplement SDF

-  Operational Support Activities
The Guidelines identify the following operational support activities: (1) Communications and Electronics; (2) Search and Rescue; (3)

IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Logistic Support; (4) Use of Facilities; and (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection.
Japan’s Peace and D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan
Security -  When Japan and the United States decide to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full

respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a
third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter
further attacks.

-  The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign
country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn
fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.

-  Examples of cooperative operations are: (1) Asset Protection; (2) Search and Rescue; (3) Maritime Operations; (4) Operations to Counter
Ballistic Missile Attacks; and (5) Logistics Support.
E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan

-  When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in
cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in
accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities
through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate.

-  The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate
in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters.

-  In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a
foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

-  When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities, the two governments will cooperate closely with
each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below.
A. Cooperation in International Activities

-  The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the

V. Cooperation for Regional

United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable.

and Global Peace and

-  Common areas for cooperation will include: (1) Peacekeeping Operations; (2) International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief;

Security

(3) Maritime Security; (4) Partner Capacity Building; (5) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ; (6) Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance ; (7) Training and Exercises; and (8) Logistic support.
B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will
work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and
standards.

A. Cooperation on Space

-  The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space.

-  The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation.

-  The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and
timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications.
B. Cooperation on Cyberspace

-  The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two

VI. Space and Cyberspace

governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces

Cooperation

depend to accomplish their missions.

-  The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct
educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and systems, contribute to whole-of-Japanese and U.S.
government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises.

-  In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide
appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult
closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.

The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to
improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation:

VII. Bilateral Enterprise A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation

B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
C. Educational and Research Exchanges

Regular evaluations will be conducted on whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and the two
VIII. Processes for Review
governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary.


-----

**Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance**
**3**


The Guidelines defi ne that the two countries will work
on a variety of measures, including ISR activities, air
and missile defense, maritime security, and joint training
and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale
disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s
peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both
countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global
Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international
activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to
cooperate for Space and Cyberspace Cooperation which
are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop
and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense
equipment and technology cooperation for further
improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation.
Many of these items are incorporated into the NDPG
to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response
capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation
in a variety of areas.”

**1** **Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance**


**(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism**
In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. Governments
established the ACM in order to address seamlessly
and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace
and security or any other situation that may require an
Alliance response.
Based on the framework shown in Fig. II-4-2-4, this
mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects
related to activities conducted by the SDF and the U.S.
Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies.
This mechanism also contributes to timely information
sharing as well as to the development and maintenance of
common situational awareness.
The characteristics of the mechanism include


Aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and other U.S. Navy vessels and fi ghters and MSDF frigates
and ASDF fi ghters conducting Japan-U.S. joint exercises (April 2017)

that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from
peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural
disasters in Japan as well as for cooperation in the
Asia-Pacifi c region and globally; and (3) it enables
whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the
involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations.
These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S.
Governments to respond appropriately and promptly
when the need for coordination arises. For example, in
the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it
would require a diversity of coordination in the policy
and operational aspects related to activities of the SDF
and the U.S. Forces. The utilization of this mechanism
makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate
coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese
and U.S. organizations at various levels.
Since the establishment of the ACM, Japan and
the United States have been utilizing the mechanism to
coordinate closely, including in response to the 2016
Kumamoto Earthquake, the ballistic missile launches


Fig. II-4-2-3 The Situation Where the Alliance Coordination Mechanism Is Utilized (Image)


Fig. II-4-2-3


Situations in areas An armed attack
surrounding Japan against Japan

97 Guidelines Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

All phases from peacetime to contingencies

New Guidelines Alliance Coordination Mechanism


-----

Fig. II-4-2-4 The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)

|Joint Committee (JC)|Col2|
|---|---|
|Japan Side Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Representative)|U.S. Side Deputy Commander of USFJ (Representative)|
|Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement||

|Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|Director General-level|Japan Side Representatives from Cabinet Secretariat (including National Security Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed|U.S. Side Representatives from National Security Council,* Department of State,* American Embassy in Japan, Office of Secretary of Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States Pacific Command (USPACOM),* U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed|
|Director-level|||
|Action Officer level|||
|Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.|||

|Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2|
|---|---|
|Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)||
|Japan Side Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service|U.S. Side Representatives from USPACOM and USFJ|
|Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces||

|Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2|
|---|---|
|Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)||
|Japan Side Representatives from each component of SDF|U.S. Side Representatives from each component of U.S. Armed Forces|
|CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination. As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.||


Fig. II-4-2-4


Higher levels between the two nations including Minister/Secretary level

As needed

Joint Committee (JC) Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)

Japan Side U.S. Side Director Japan Side U.S. Side
Director-General of Deputy Commander General-level Representatives from Cabinet Secretariat Representatives from National Security
North American Affairs of USFJ (including National Security Secretariat), Council,* Department of State,* American
Bureau of Ministry of (Representative) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Embassy in Japan, Office of Secretary of
Foreign Affairs Director-level Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States
(Representative) other relevant ministries, departments, Pacific Command (USPACOM),* U.S.

and agencies* Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant

Action Officer *Representatives may participate as needed ministries, departments, and agencies*
level *Representatives may participate as needed

Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual

Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces

consultation regarding the implementation of

To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.

Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement

Mutual coordination and information exchange

Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)

Japan Side U.S. Side
Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of Representatives from USPACOM and USFJ
each SDF service

Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces

Mutual coordination and information exchange

Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)

Japan Side U.S. Side
Representatives from each component of SDF Representatives from each component of U.S. Armed Forces

CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination.
As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.


by North Korea, and Chinese activities in the waters and
airspace around the Senkaku Islands.

See Fig. II-4-2-3 (The Situation Where the Alliance Coordination

Mechanism Is Utilized (Image))
Fig. II-4-2-4 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism
(ACM))

**(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination**
Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S.
Governments recognize the importance of collocating
operational coordination functions. The SDF and the
U.S. Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust
information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to
support international activities.


relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as
conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S.
cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral
plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral
planning through this mechanism.

See Fig. II-4-2-5 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism

(BPM))

**2** **Cooperative Measures to Seamlessly Ensure**
**Japan’s Peace and Security**


**2**


**(1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance**
**(ISR) Activities**

With regard to joint ISR activities, from the perspective
that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad
Asia-Pacifi c region in cooperation between Japan and the
United States to enhance the effi ciency and effectiveness
of the activities of both countries, the two countries set
up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013
consisting of director-level defense offi cials from Japan
and the United States, which is further deepening the
cooperation between the two countries.
The expansion of these ISR activities will
function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure
i f ti i it th ti d bl th


**(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism**
Based on the Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S.
Governments established the Bilateral Planning
Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose
of implementing the development of bilateral plans in
peacetime in line with the Guidelines in order to enable
effective bilateral responses to contingencies relevant to
Japan’s peace and security.
In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism
performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level
di ti d i i d th i l t f


-----

Fig. II-4-2-5 The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)

|Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2”|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|Foreign Minister|Security Consultative Committee (SCC)|State Secretary|
|Defense Minister||Defense Secretary|


|Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)|Col2|
|---|---|
|Japan DG: North American Affairs Bureau MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD Joint Staff|U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, PACOM|
|Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters||


|Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF)|Col2|
|---|---|
|Japan Representatives of Cabinet Secretariat, NSS, MOFA, MOD|U.S. Representatives of U.S. Embassy JP, PACOM, USFJ|
|Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by RMAs, provision of additional information etc.||


|Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)|Col2|
|---|---|
|Japan Representatives of JSDF|U.S. Representatives of PACOM, USFJ|
|Conduct Bilateral Planning||


Fig. II-4-2-5

Prime Minister President

**Bilateral Planning Mechanism**

Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2”

Foreign Minister State Secretary
Security Consultative Committee (SCC)
Defense Minister Defense Secretary

Interagency Coordination as necessary

Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)

Japan U.S.

Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF) DG: North American Affairs Bureau Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant

MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD Secretary of Defense

Japan U.S.

Joint Staff U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, PACOM

Representatives of Representatives of
Cabinet Secretariat, U.S. Embassy JP, Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout
NSS, MOFA, MOD PACOM, USFJ the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures

and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters

Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies
(RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)
RMAs, provision of additional information etc.

Japan U.S.
Representatives of JSDF Representatives of PACOM, USFJ

Conduct Bilateral Planning

Coordination Command under the BPM JSDF/USF chain of command


**(3) Maritime Security**
The Guidelines allow Japan and the United States
to develop and enhance the sharing of maritime
surveillance information from peacetime and to
cooperate where appropriate for the maintenance and
enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United
States through ISR as well as training and exercises.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the
United States Navy plan to maintain and enhance both
countries’ presence in the Western Pacific through
multiple joint training and exercises.


U.S. Air Force’s Global Hawk in fl ight

establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all
phases from peacetime to contingencies.


**(4) Joint Training and Exercises**
Joint training and exercises in peacetime not only
contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing the
Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities by improving
interoperability through the deepening of mutual
understanding of tactics and other aspects and the
enhancement of mutual communication, but also
are useful in improving tactical skills on each side.
In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the
Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which
have vast experience in actual fi ghting, are invaluable
and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities.
In addition, holding bilateral exercises at
effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the
unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the
United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light
f th ti th MOD/SDF i ti i it


**(2) Missile Defense**
Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, JapanU.S. joint response capabilities have been enhanced by
sharing operation information and establishing response
procedures. For the repeated ballistic missile launches
by North Korea, Japan and the United States have
conducted coordinated responses utilizing the ACM.
Also, in the systems and technology fi eld, the cooperative
development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD)
interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA)
is steadily in progress.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks)


-----

**i**

**Participating in the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise**
**Keen Sword 17**

Taiga Terasaki, Captain
3rd Division Operations Training Offi cer, Western Army Infantry Regiment (Light)
GSDF Camp Ainoura (Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture)

I am a staff offi cer to the department responsible for planning in the Western Army Infantry Regiment (Light). This regiment has the
unique mission of defending islands. It will be revamped and reborn as the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment (name tentative),
which will be the core of the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (name tentative) to be newly organized at the end of FY2017.
The amphibious operation executed in Keen Sword 17 refers to landing, taking back and securing islands that have been
invaded. In this drill, our troops boarded MSDF transport vessels at Sasebo Port in Nagasaki Prefecture. After an approximately one
week’s voyage, we arrived in Guam and on Tinian Island, where we conducted drills for approximately fi ve days.
In a semitropical jungle environment where your whole body is breaking out in sweat, I could sense the personnel’s powerful
will to execute their missions and the challenger’s spirit towards the future as they uncomplainingly undertook their missions without
rest while assuming heavy burdens. I can vividly recall how this moved me. I also feel that we were able to understand each other’s
cultures and ways of thinking by collaborating with the MSDF, ASDF and the U.S. Marine Corps over a long period of time, and to build
even stronger ties by undertaking demanding drills together.
Finally, the demanding drills in the harsh environment on Tinian Island renewed our awareness of the mission of the SDF and
served as a good opportunity to make a further resolve to tackle our duties with all our strength and spirits.

Landing on Tinian Island by helicopter Landing forces preparing for the operation while
on the move by vessel


initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training
and exercises.
Joint training and exercises have been expanded
not only within Japan but also to the United States
by dispatching SDF units there. Ongoing efforts are
being made to enhance interoperability and JapanU.S. joint response capabilities at the military service
and unit levels, including the Japan-U.S. Bilateral
Regional Army command post exercises, special antisubmarine exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter
combat training.
Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command
post exercises and fi eld training exercises have been
conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint
Exercise. Most recently, fi eld training exercises (Keen
Sword 17) were carried out in October-November 2016
in the waters and airspace around Japan, bases of the
SDF and USFJ, and Guam and the Commonwealth of the
N th M i I l d


In March 2017, the MSDF conducted a Japan-U.S.
bilateral exercise in the waters around the East China
Sea with the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and other
vessels of the U.S. Navy. In April of the same year, the
MSDF also conducted a Japan-U.S. joint cruising drill
in the West Pacifi c to coincide with the navigation of the
USS Carl Vinson and other vessels, while the Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) conducted various tactical drills
in the airspace to the east of Okinawa with the F/A-18
fi ghters on USS Carl Vinson. These simultaneous drills
by the MSDF and ASDF with the U.S. aircraft carrier
sought to further enhance SDF tactical skills and bolster
collaboration with the U.S. Navy.
Furthermore, in June of the same year, the MSDF
conducted various tactical exercises with the aircraft
carrier USS Carl Vinson, USS Ronald Reagan and other
U.S. Navy vessels in the Sea of Japan and the ASDF
conducted various tactical exercises with the F/A-18
fi ht th USS C l Vi d th i th i


-----

Chief of Staff Kawano (front row, second from right) participating in Japan-U.S. joint tactic
meeting conducted during a Japan-U.S. joint consolidated exercise (November 2016)

over the Sea of Japan.
With the U.S. Air Force, the ASDF also conducted
various tactical exercises with U.S. Air Force B-1B
bombers in the airspace around Kyushu in September
2016 and March and May 2017.
The Japan-U.S. joint exercises were conducted
with the aim of enhancing the tactical skills of the SDF
and bolstering collaboration with the U.S. Forces. It
is believed that bolstering Japan-U.S. collaboration
and demonstrating bilateral ties as an outcome of
implementing these Japan-U.S. joint exercises have the
effect of further enhancing the deterrence and response
capabilities of the overall Japan-U.S. Alliance and
demonstrating Japan’s determination and high capacity
towards stabilizing the region in an increasingly severe
security environment for Japan.
In recent years, USFJ have also participated in
disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby
deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and
local governments.

See Reference 24 (Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2016)


U.S. Marines and GSDF personnel after landing during the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC)
in the United States with the U.S. Marine Corps

Its scope of application includes various occasions
such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime,
disaster relief activities, UN peacekeeping operations,
international disaster relief activities, situations in areas
surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either
the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to
provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle,
allows the requested party to do so.[3]

In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, the
two countries confirmed that they would expeditiously
work on the negotiations on the ACSA to operationalize
the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new
Guidelines. Subsequently, following the passage of the
Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015,
the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016,
ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into
force on April 15. This has enabled the same framework
as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA such as settlement
procedures to be applied to the provision of supplies and
services that had become possible under the Legislation
for Peace and Security.
In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, the
two countries confirmed that they would expeditiously
work on the negotiations on the ACSA to operationalize
the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new
Guidelines. Subsequently, following the passage of the
Legislation for Peace and Security in September 2015,
the new Japan-U.S. ACSA was signed in September 2016,
ratified by the Diet on April 14, 2017, and entered into
force on April 25. This has enabled the same framework
as the existing Japan-U.S. ACSA such as settlement
procedures to be applied to the provision of supplies and


**(5) Logistics Support**
Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted
through logistics support based on the Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[2] signed in 1996
and revised in 1999 and 2004, as a result of increased
opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.
The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to
the smooth and effective operation under the JapanU.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international
peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations.


The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services
between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications;
medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack


-----

services that had become possible under the Legislation
for Peace and Security.

See Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (3) (Development of Provisions concerning

the Expansion of the Provision of Supplies and Services to the

See

United States Armed Forces (Article 100-6))
Chapter 3, Section 3-4 (Conclusion of the New Japan-U.S.
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA))
Fig. II-4-2-6 (Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA))

**(6) Joint/Shared Use**
The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas
increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver
areas, ports, and airfi elds, which in turn enhances the
diversity and effi ciency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training
and exercises and expands the scope and raises the
frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF has only
a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including
Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban
areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/
shared use of facilities and areas of USFJ in Okinawa
will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in
Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint training
and exercises and interoperability between the SDF
and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and
contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in the


case of a disaster.
Thus, while taking into account the SDF defense
posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands,
and relations with local communities, Japan and the
United States are proactively engaged in consultations,
and specifi c initiatives are steadily progressing. For
example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since
March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the
ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012
and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force
Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In
addition, in December 2013 and between June and July
2014, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and
training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding
area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development
of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana
Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use
by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration.

**3** **Cooperation in Response to a Large-Scale**
**Disaster in Japan**


**3**


In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in
2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their


Fig. II-4-2-6 Scope of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

|Disaster relief|Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.|
|---|---|
|International disaster relief activities||
|U.S. Forces staying temporarily at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties||
|Guarding operation|Counter-piracy operations|
|Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc.|Removal of underwater mines|
|Protection of Japanese nationals overseas|Warning and surveillance activities|
|U.S. Forces staying temporarily at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties||

|Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security|Armed attack situations|
|---|---|
||Situations in which an armed attack is anticipated|
||Survival-threatening situations|


Fig. II-4-2-6


Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services

In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where
units of allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of
the operations.

Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Image of the circumstances and preconditions for the situations

Japan-U.S. bilateral drills

Multilateral drills with Japan & U.S. participation Armed attack situations

Disaster relief Transportation of Japanesenationals overseas, etc.

International disaster relief activities Situations in which an armed

U.S. Forces staying temporarily Situations that will have attack is anticipated
at Self-Defense Forces facilities for regular duties an important influence

on Japan’s peace and security

Guarding operation Counter-piracy operations

Destruction of ballistic missiles, etc. Removal of underwater mines Survival-threatening situations

Protection of Japanese Warning and
nationals overseas surveillance activities
U.S. Forces staying temporarily
at U.S. Forces facilities for regular duties

Peace Keeping Operation

Internationally coordinated operations
for peace and security

Situations threatening international peace
and security that the international

International humanitarian assistance

community is collectively addressing

From SDF conducting international
peace cooperation operations
to U.S. Forces responding to disasters

*1        : Activities that came under the scope of the agreement due to the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security.
*2  Provision of ammunition for all activities and situations other than armed attack situations, etc. falls under the scope of the new agreement .


-----

high-level joint response capabilities based on the strong
ties they had developed. The success of the joint response
between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through Operation
Tomodachi was the result of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Training
and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the
Alliance being deepened further in the future. Operation
Tomodachi involved the deployment of a large-scale force
at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000
personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft,
resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in
scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and
reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous
Japanese at large were fi lled with a deepened sense of
appreciation and trust for USFJ.
On the other hand, some issues have emerged,
such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities
of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster
within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint
guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S.
Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining
mechanisms for the sharing of information and more
effective coordination mechanism.
In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response
Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed
the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan, and the two countries
conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster
prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014
based on the scenario of an earthquake occurring in the
Nankai Trough. USFJ also participated in the Wakayama
Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training
(October 2014) and Michinoku ALERT 2014 (November
2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Northeastern
Army. In this manner, the SDF and USFJ have been
enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness.
In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016,
Japan-U.S. cooperation was manifested in the form of the
transportation of daily necessities by the Osprey (MV-22)
of the U.S. Marine Corps and the transportation of SDF
personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. The ACM was
utilized on that occasion, including the Japan-U.S. Joint
Coordination Offi ce locally established by the joint task
force organized for the earthquake response.

**4** **Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and**
**Security**


A group photo from Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training exercise in Guam (Cope North Guam)

activities and international peacekeeping operations
in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan
and the United States worked closely together at local
multilateral coordination centers to respond to the
typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November
2013. To respond to the outbreak of the Ebola virus
disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison offi cers to the
U.S. Africa Command in October 2014, coordinating
efforts and collecting information with relevant countries
including the United States, for close cooperation.
As for maritime security, both Japan and the
United States are making efforts as maritime nations to
maintain and develop “the open and stable seas” based on
fundamental rules such as securing the freedom and safety
of navigation, and the rule of law (e.g., peaceful dispute
resolution based on international law). The two countries
have been working closely together on various multilateral
maritime security cooperation initiatives supported
by such countries as those around sea lanes, including
participation in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 for
countering piracy since December 2013, the International
Minesweeping Exercise in the Persian Gulf hosted by
the United States in April 2016, the Multilateral Naval
Exercise KOMODO 16 (MNEK) hosted by the Indonesian
Navy in the same month, the ADMM-Plus Maritime
Security Field Training Exercises in May and November
2016, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime
Interdiction Training hosted by Singapore in September
2016, and the International Maritime Exercise hosted by
the United States in May 2017.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security)

Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (International Initiatives Aimed at
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction)

**(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises**
The Guidelines will enable Japan and the Unites States to
promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security
and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating
i t il t l ( J U S A t li J U S


**4**


**(1) Cooperation in International Activities**
The SDF has conducted activities in close cooperation
with the United States and other participating countries
through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism
S i l M A t i t ti l di t li f


-----

India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in
addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan
and the United States.

**5** **Space and Cyberspace Cooperation**


**(1) Cooperation on Space**
With regard to cooperation on space, based on the
agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in
November 2009 to promote cooperation in areas of
space security as part of initiatives to deepen the JapanU.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been
working together to discuss how they should cooperate
in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S.
Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the
participation of relevant ministries and agencies.
Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in
April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership
for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-of
government comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling
relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st whole
of- government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue
on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been
sharing information on their respective space policies and
discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis.
Moreover, based on the instructions given by the
Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015,
the two countries established the Space Cooperation
Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the
cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in
the area of space. The SCWG held its fi rst meeting in
October 2015, second meeting in February 2016, and
third meeting in February 2017. Going forward, Japan
and the United States will leverage this working group to
deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including
(1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing
information sharing, (3) working together to develop and
secure experts, and (4) implementing tabletop exercises.


The Guidelines released in April 2015 and the
CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the
prompt and appropriate development of an information
sharing structure and the protection of the critical
infrastructure upon which the SDF and the U.S. Forces
depend to accomplish their missions as examples of
cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. Governments.
In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and
the U.S. Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their
respective networks and systems and the implementation
of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also
cited. Going forward, Japan and the United States will
further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in
line with the direction presented by the Guidelines and
the CDPWG Joint Statement.

**6** **Initiatives to Further Improve the Effectiveness**
**of Bilateral Cooperation**


**6**


**(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**
Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense
equipment and technology while bearing in mind the
maintenance of the technological and production bases
and the mutual cooperation principle based on the
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense
Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United
States of America.
In view of the progress in technology cooperation
between Japan and the United States, the improvement
of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided
to transfer its military technology to the United States
regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports
and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the
Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military
Technologies to the United States of America.[4] In 2006,
the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms
and Military Technologies to the United States of America[5]
was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of
Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide
the United States with 20 items of arms and military
technologies, including military technologies related
to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the
United States consult with each other at forums such as
the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct
cooperative research and development regarding the
specifi c projects agreed upon at these forums.
At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in


**(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace**
Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense
Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in
October 2013 as a framework between the MOD and the
Department of Defense (DoD) to discuss a broad range
of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing
of information at the policy level, human resources
development, and technical cooperation.


The offi cial title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the
United States of America.

The offi cial title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan


-----

June 2016, the Ministers signed a Reciprocal Defense
Procurement Memorandum of Understanding (RDP
MOU).[6] The MOU promotes measures concerning the
procurement of equipment by Japanese and U.S. defense
authorities based on reciprocity (providing information
necessary to submit bids to businesses of the other
country, protecting submitted corporate information,
waiving restrictions on participation by businesses of the


other country, etc.).
Part III, Chapter 4, Section 4-2 (Deepening
Relationships with the United States regarding Defense
Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains
initiatives for the common maintenance infrastructure
for the 24 MV-22 Ospreys deployed by the U.S. Marine
Corps at MCAS Futenma and the Osprey planned to
be deployed by the GSDF[7] as well as initiatives for the


**Commentary**

**Ties that Support Steadfast Japan-U.S. Alliance**
**— JMSDF-USN Junior Offi cers Buddy Program**

JMSDF-USN Junior Offi cers Buddy Program was launched in FY2016 with the purpose to further strengthen the relationship between
the MSDF and the U.S. Navy. This program supports the development of more personal relationships between junior naval offi cers
stationed in Japan and junior MSDF offi cers and encourages activities that nurture individual connections. Programs such as regular
get-togethers and workshops at historic sites are organized to promote understanding between our two services. Social media and
other tools are used to maintain ties that will continue even after the junior offi cers are transferred to other assignments.
We would like to introduce the comments received from two junior offi cers from the U.S Navy.
The MSDF will remain actively engaged in this program in order to build the human foundation that undergirds the strengthening
and development of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.

**i**

Michael Madrid, Lieutenant Junior Grade, U.S. Navy
USS Donald Cook (Previous assignment: U.S. naval destroyer USS Mustin,
Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka)
Henry Lu, Ensign, U.S. Navy
USS Bonhomme Richard, Sasebo Naval Base

“The ties and mutual understanding that is generated from U.S.-Japan exchanges and shared experiences are useful
for enhancing interoperability between the U.S. Navy and the MSDF. I want to deepen U.S.-Japan ties and mutual
understanding through this undertaking.” (Lieutenant Junior Grade Michael)
“This program was a very good opportunity for me since I hadn’t had many chances to meet Japanese offi cers of
the same rank as me. I was able to further deepen my understanding of the Japanese people by having conversations
with them through SNS. I want to maintain the relationships that I built through this program.” (Ensign Henry)

At the junior offi cers exchange event in Yokosuka At the junior offi cers exchange event in Sasebo
Author (center: Lieutenant Junior Grade Michael) Author (fourth from right, front row: Ensign Henry)


The offi cial title is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement.

The GSDF plans to deploy 17 tiltrotors (V-22 Osprey), which are expected to supplement and enhance the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA), during the current Mid-Term Defense Plan i


-----

onsite maintenance locations (regional depots) in the
Asia-Pacifi c region for F-35 fi ghter aircraft.

See Reference 25 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)

See


**(2) Education and Research Exchange**
The Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual
cooperation relating to security and defense, and the two
governments will deepen exchanges between members
of relevant organizations, and strengthen communication
between each side’s research and educational institutions.


To this end, the MOD/SDF has been working on
education and research exchanges by accepting students
from abroad and holding Japan-U.S. bilateral or
multilateral seminars that include the United States so
that security and defense personnel can share knowledge
and enhance cooperation.

See Reference 47 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of

Newly Accepted Students in FY2016))

See

Reference 48 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry
of Defense)
Reference 49 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)

**Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States**
**4**


The sharing of information and views at every
opportunity and level between Japan and the United States
is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of
the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in
the further enhancement of close collaboration between
the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively
engaging in these initiatives.

See Reference 26 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2014))

Fig. II-4-2-7 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between
Japanese and U.S. Government Offi cials concerning Japan-U.S.
Security Issues)


**1** **Various Policy Consultations**


Japan and the United States have maintained close
coordination at multiple levels, including the summit level
and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened
and expanded cooperative relations for the peace,
stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but
also the entire international community, including the
Asia-Pacifi c region.
Close policy consultations on security are conducted
through diplomatic channels as well as between offi cials
in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels
in the Governments of Japan and the United States
through meetings such as the Japan-United States SCC
(“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and
the SDC. As the framework for ministerial consultations
among the top offi cials in charge of defense and foreign
affairs of the two countries, the SCC (“2+2” Meeting)
represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions
as an important consultative panel to discuss issues
related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security.
In addition, the MOD organizes Japan-U.S. defense
ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of
Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary
where discussions are made with a focus on the defense
policies of the respective governments and defense
cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of
Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work
together, and MOD offi cials, including the Administrative
Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint
Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International
Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have workinglevel meetings when necessary and exchange information
with the U.S. DoD and others under the Japan-U.S.
Security Arrangements.


**2** **Recent Major Policy Consultations, etc.**

**2**


**(1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on September**
**16, 2016 at the U.S. Department of Defense and on**
**December 7, 2016 at the Ministry of Defense**

Minister of Defense Inada and then U.S. Secretary of
Defense Carter held Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial
Meetings.
a. Overview and Regional Situation
The two ministers shared an understanding of the situation
in the region and confi rmed that the Senkaku Islands are
under the administration of the Government of Japan
and fall within the scope of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty. They also confi rmed once again that they
will oppose any unilateral attempts to undermine Japan’s
administration of these islands. They shared the view that
the building of outposts and the use of those outposts for
military purposes in the South China Sea pose concerns
to the international community as unilateral actions
that increase tensions in the region. At the meeting
in September 2016, the Ministers reaffi rmed that the
ruling issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at
The Hague in July 2016[8] is fi nal and legally binding on


-----

Fig. II-4-2-7 Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Offi cials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues

|Consultative Forum|Participants|Col3|Purpose|Legal Basis|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Japanese Side|U.S. Side|||
|Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting)|Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense|U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense1|Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security|Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty|
|Security Subcommittee (SSC)|Participants are not specif ied2|Participants are not specif ied2|Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States|Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others|
|Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)3|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff|Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM|Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies|Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996|
|Japan-U.S. Joint Committee|Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others|Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister at the U.S. Embassy, and others|Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement|Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement|


Fig. II-4-2-7


**Consultative** **Participants**
**Purpose** **Legal Basis**
**Forum** **Japanese Side** **U.S. Side**

Study of matters which would Established on the basis of
promote understanding between letters exchanged between the

Security Consultative U.S. Secretary of State, the Japanese and U.S. Governments Prime Minister of Japan and

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Committee (SCC) U.S. Secretary of and contribute to the strengthening the U.S. Secretary of State on

Minister of Defense

(“2+2” Meeting) Defense[1] of cooperative relations in the areas January 19, 1960, in accordance

of security, which form the basis of with Article IV of the Japan-U.S.
security and are related to security Security Treaty

Security Exchange of views on security Article IV of the Japan-U.S.
Participants are not
Subcommittee Participants are not specifi ed[2] issues of mutual concern to Japan Security Treaty and others
specifi ed[2]
(SSC) and the United States

Assistant Secretary Study and consideration of Established on July 8, 1976, as

Director-General of North American of State, Assistant consultative measures to Japan a subentry under the Japan-U.S.

Subcommittee for Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Secretary of Defense, and the United States including Security Consultative Committee
Defense Cooperation Director General of Bureau of Defense Representative from: guidelines to ensure consistent joint in its 16th meeting Reorganized
(SDC)[3] Policy, Ministry of Defense; U.S. Embassy in Japan, responses covering the activities of at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial

Representative from Joint Staff USFJ, Joint Staff, the SDF and USFJ in emergencies consultation on June 28, 1996

PACOM

Director-General of North American Affairs Deputy Commander Consultation concerning Article XXV of the Status of

Japan-U.S. Joint Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; of USFJ, Minister at implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement
Committee Director General of Bureau of Local the U.S. Embassy, and Forces Agreement

Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others others

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacifi c Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level offi cials of the two Governments, such as offi cials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.


all countries that are parties to the dispute, and that it is
important to conduct activities on the sea in accordance
with international law. The Ministers also agreed that the
development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by
North Korea is a major security threat to both Japan and
the United States.
Furthermore, the Ministers reaffi rmed the ironclad
commitment of the United States to Japan regarding
the extended deterrence, and also agreed to enhance the
Japan-U.S.-ROK and other trilateral defense cooperation
as well as cooperation within multilateral frameworks.
b. Reinforcement of the Deterrence and Response
Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
The Ministers welcomed the efforts underway based on
the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and
Security, such as the signing of the Japan-U.S. ACSA,
and confi rmed that they would make further use of the
ACM, which has functioned effectively in responding to
the series of provocations by North Korea.
The Ministers also affi rmed that efforts such as the
overall enhancement in Japan’s ballistic missile response
capabilities would contribute to further strengthen the
deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S.
Alliance in the Asia-Pacifi c region, and they agreed to
accelerate cooperation in this regard.
c. Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Others
The Ministers confi rmed to continue consultations at the
ki l l b d th J U S j i t t t t


released in July 2016 concerning the revision of the
treatment of the civilian component under the JapanU.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The Ministers
shared the position that the construction of the Futenma
Replacement Facility at Henoko is the only solution and
agreed to continue to cooperate in mitigating the impact
on Okinawa.
At the meeting in December 2016, they confi rmed that
Japan and the United States would cooperate to achieve the
return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area to
the Government of Japan on the 22nd of that month.

**(2) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (December 27, 2016)**
**(Security Field)**

Prime Minister Abe visited Pearl Harbor on the Island of
Oahu in Hawaii in the United States to pay his respects
to the war dead. There, he held his fi nal Summit Meeting
with then U.S. President Obama. Looking back on the
past four years of cooperation, the leaders agreed that the
value and signifi cance of the “Alliance of Hope” shall
remain unchanged and shared the understanding that it
is important to further bolster the Japan-U.S. Alliance
going forward.
At the meeting, they exchanged views regarding
the situation in the Asia-Pacifi c region such as North
Korea and the situation in East Asia and shared their
understanding. The leaders welcomed the achievement
f th t f j ti f th N th T i i


-----

Prime Minister Abe and then U.S. President Obama offering flowers at the USS Arizona Memorial in
Pearl Harbor (December 2016) [photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Office]

Area, which marks the biggest return since the reversion
of Okinawa, and the agreement in principle achieved on
the supplementary agreement on the civilian component
of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and agreed to cooperate in
mitigating the impact on Okinawa.

**(3) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting**
**(February 4, 2017)**

Minister of Defense Inada and U.S. Secretary of Defense
Mattis held the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting
in the MOD.[9]

a. Regional Situations
The Ministers shared the awareness that China’s activities
in the East and South China Seas are security concerns in
the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the Ministers agreed
that advancements in North Korea’s nuclear and missile
development pose a security threat to the stability of both
countries as well as the region.
U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis stated that the Senkaku
Islands are under the administration of the Government of
Japan and fall within the scope of Article 5 of the JapanU.S. Security Treaty and that the United States opposes any
unilateral attempt that undermines Japan’s administration
of the Senkaku Islands. Defense Minister Inada stated
that the actions of the U.S. Forces in the South China Sea
contribute to maintaining the maritime order based on
international law and conveyed support for the initiatives
by the U.S. Forces. The Ministers agreed to strengthen
their engagement in the South China Sea through capacity
building assistance and other measures. Furthermore,


Minister of Defense Inada (right) and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mattis holding Japan-U.S.
defense ministers’ joint press conference

they agreed to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation
including Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation as well as
cooperation involving multilateral frameworks.
b. Reinforcement of Deterrence and Response
Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
Defense Minister Inada explained that Japan will
proactively work towards peace and stability in the region
and will expand its role within the alliance and reinforce
Japan’s defense capabilities to meet this goal. U.S. Defense
Secretary Mattis stated that the United States remains
committed to Japan’s defense. He also emphasized that
the Asia-Pacific region is a priority for the United States
and that the United States will reinforce its commitment
to the region. They reaffirmed the importance of the
Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the ironclad commitment
of the United States towards extended deterrence. They
also agreed on the need to further strengthen deterrence
and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,
taking into account the Guidelines.
c. Okinawa and the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers agreed on Japan-U.S. collaboration
towards steady progress on the realignment of USFJ.
They shared the position that the relocation of MCAS
Futenma to Henoko is the only solution that allows the
return of MCAS Futenma and agreed to continue close
cooperation. Additionally, Defense Minister Inada
requested cooperation in mitigating the impact on
Okinawa and both Ministers agreed to cooperate in order
to ensure the stable stationing of USFJ.


At the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ joint press conference after the meeting, U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis stated with regard to host nation support for USFJ that Japan has been a model for cost


-----

**(4) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (February 10, 2017)**
**(Security Field)**

Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
with U.S. President Trump in Washington D.C.
The two leaders agreed to further strengthen the bonds
of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and affirmed that Japan and the
United States will play a leading role in ensuring peace and
prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world.
The leaders discussed the increasingly severe security
environment in the Asia-Pacific region, including the
issues of North Korea's nuclear and missile development
and unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the
East and South China Seas, and shared these concerns.
Furthermore, the leaders shared the recognition that the
presence of USFJ is important and that it is necessary
to continually strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance under
these circumstances. Moreover, both leaders recognized
the importance of strengthening multi-layered cooperation
with allies and like-minded countries, and building a
network with allies, centered on the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
In the joint statement issued on the same day, the
two leaders affirmed the strong determination of Japan
and the United States, under an increasingly severe
security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, to further
strengthen their efforts in the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which
is the cornerstone of peace, prosperity and freedom in the
region. In particular, the joint statement: 1) made specific
reference to a commitment to extended deterrence; and
2) affirmed that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
covers the Senkaku Islands and 3) that the construction of
the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko is the only
solution that allows the return of MCAS Futenma.

See Reference 27 (Joint Statement (February 10, 2017))

Moreover, on February 11, 2017, the two leaders
made a Japan-U.S. joint press announcement in Palm
Beach, Florida in light of North Korea’s ballistic missile
launch, during which Prime Minister Abe stated, “During
the summit meeting that I had with President Trump, he
assured me that the United States will always be with
Japan 100%. And to demonstrate his determination
as well as commitment, he is now here with me at this
joint press conference. President Trump and I, myself,
completely share the view that we are going to promote
further collaboration between the two nations and also
we are going to further reinforce our alliance.” President


Trump stated, I just want everybody to understand and
fully know that the United States of America stands
behind Japan, its great ally, 100%.”

**(5) Courtesy Call on Prime Minister Abe by U.S. Vice**
**President Pence (April 18, 2017) (Security Field)**

Prime Minister Abe received a courtesy call from U.S.
Vice President Pence.
Prime Minister Abe and U.S. Vice President Pence
exchanged views on various issues in the region, mainly
North Korea, which continues its provocations, and
shared the understanding that it is essential for both Japan
and the United States to collaborate closely on security
and the economy and bolster the Japan-U.S. Alliance
towards peace and stability in the region.
Regarding the issues of North Korea, they shared the
understanding that North Korea has reached a new level
of threat and agreed that in dealing with the North Korea
issue, close collaboration between Japan and the United
States is essential and the role of China is important and it is
necessary to urge China to play a larger role. Furthermore,
Prime Minister Abe stated that the abductions issue is a top
priority for the Abe administration, and they agreed that
Japan and the United States would continue to collaborate
towards its swift resolution.
Concerning the Japan-U.S. security relationship, they
agreed to hold an early Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting and to
undertake joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa.


**(6) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (May 26, 2017)**
**(Security Field)**

Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting
with U.S. President Trump in Taormina, Italy.
Concerning the issues of North Korea, the two leaders
affirmed that it is necessary to put pressure on North Korea
rather than to have dialogue with it at this juncture, and
that the role of China was important. The two leaders also
confirmed the importance of coordinating with countries
concerned such as the ROK in order to enhance pressure
on North Korea through further sanctions and close
coordination at the UN Security Council. Furthermore,
the leaders shared the view that Japan and the United
States would take concrete actions to enhance their
defense postures and capabilities in order to deter North
Korea’s threat.[10] Prime Minister Abe also stated that the


10 With regard to the activities that make up the “specific actions,” examples include the joint exercise between the MSDF/ASDF and the U.S. Navy that was conducted in the Sea of Japan and other areas
in June 2017 (see this Chapter, Section 2-3-2 (4)) and the ASDF PAC-3 rapid deployment exercise that has been conducted in Japan since the same month (see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3-1 (2)).
For the joint exercise with the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Forces sent equipment including the aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson and USS Ronald Reagan as well as the F/A-18 carrier-based aircraft, while the
SDF sent equipment including MSDF destroyers and ASDF F-15 fighters. Bolstering Japan-U.S. collaboration and demonstrating bilateral ties as an outcome of implementing the joint exercise have
the effect of further enhancing the deterrence and response capabilities of the overall Japan-U.S. Alliance and demonstrating Japan’s determination and high capacity towards stabilizing the region in
an increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan. The joint exercise was aligned with the objective of “enhancing the defense postures and capabilities of Japan and the United States


-----

powerful presence of the U.S. Forces in this region is
important from the perspective of regional security, and
that he expected U.S. cooperation.
Regarding the regional situation other than North
Korea, Prime Minister Abe stated that the U.S. deterrent
was the key to regional stability including Southeast
Asia, and with regard to the South China Sea, stated
that he valued the increased presence of the U.S. Navy
and strongly supported the U.S. Freedom of Navigation
operations by the U.S. Navy. The two leaders also
reaffirmed the close coordination between Japan and the
United States regarding the East China Sea.

**(7) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on June 3, 2017**
Defense Minister Inada and Defense Secretary Mattis
held a Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting on the
occasion of the Shangri-La Dialogue.
a. Regional Situations
The Ministers shared the recognition that the successive
ballistic missile launches, etc. by North Korea are a
flagrant provocation against Japan and the United States
as well as the regional peace and stability, and these are
utterly unacceptable. Defense Minister Inada expressed
her high regard for the visible commitment of the United
States to peace and stability in the region including
the dispatch of carrier strike groups, and stated that it
is important to intensify pressure on North Korea. The
Ministers reached the common understanding that it is
essential to continue to collaborate closely among Japan,
the United States and the ROK as well as between Japan
and the United States.
The Ministers reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands
fall within the scope of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty and confirmed that Japan and the United
States would deepen their cooperation with regard to
securing peace and stability in the East China Sea and
engaging in the South China Sea.
b. Enhancement of Deterrence and Response
Capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
The Ministers shared the recognition that it is necessary
to further enhance the deterrence and response
capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and welcomed
the joint exercises being conducted by the SDF and the
carrier strike group in the Sea of Japan as a contribution
to this. The Ministers agreed to continue to coordinate


Prime Minister Abe (right) shaking hands with U.S. Vice President Mike Pence (left),
who paid a courtesy call on the prime minister (April 2017)

[photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Office]

towards the early convocation of the Japan-U.S. Security
Consultative Committee (SCC).
c. Okinawa and the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan
The Ministers agreed to make steady progress on the
plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. U.S.
Defense Secretary Mattis expressed his commitment to
continue the close cooperation between Japan and the
United States.
The Ministers shared the common position that
relocation to Henoko is the only solution to achieve the
earliest possible relocation and return of MCAS Futenma
and agreed to continue to cooperate closely. Defense
Minister Inada requested cooperation for mitigating the
impact on Okinawa, and the Ministers agreed to cooperate
to ensure the stable stationing of USFJ.


**(8) Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talks (January 28,**
**March 7, and April 6 and 24, 2017)**

Prime Minister Abe and President Trump have held
several telephone talks on multiple occasions in addition
to face-to-face meetings concerning North Korea and
other important issues. Regarding the North Korea
issue, President Trump conveyed that all options are on
the table and that the United States stands behind Japan,
its ally, 100%. The two leaders also agreed that China’s
role is important and that Japan, the United States,
and the ROK would collaborate closely. Through such
telephone talks, the leaders work together closely and
maintain communications.


-----

**Section 3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan**


Measures such as realignment of USFJ are extremely
important in mitigating the impact on local communities,
such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence
capabilities of the U.S. Forces. The MOD will advance

**Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan**
**1**


**1** **Signifi cance of the Presence of the U.S. Forces**
**in Japan**


the U.S. Forces realignment and other initiatives while
making continuous efforts to gain the understanding and
cooperation of local communities accommodating USFJ
facilities and areas.

Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to
defend Japan, Article 6 allows the United States to use
facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of
Japan and international peace and security in the Far East,
and overall Japan-U.S. obligations are kept in balance.


**1**


As the security environment surrounding Japan is
becoming increasingly severe, for the Japan-U.S.
Alliance, which is based on the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements, to adequately function as a deterrence
that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as the peace
and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region, it is necessary to
secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan and to
maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas
from peacetime that enables USFJ to respond swiftly and
expeditiously to emergencies.
For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of USFJ, which is a
core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.
Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military
presence is necessary for a swift Japan-U.S. joint response
based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in
the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the
actions of USFJ in the defense of Japan will be assisted
by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and
USFJ will serve as the basis of such support.
In order for USFJ to carry out the abovementioned
role, it is essential that all the services of the U.S. Forces,
including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For
instance, when responding to armed aggression against
Japan in cooperation with the SDF, the U.S. Forces
primarily serve the role of “spear” through its offensive
power. When the U.S. Forces function as an offensive
power, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps stationed in Japan work in an integrated
manner to fully exert their functions.
In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security


**2** **Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of**
**the U.S. Forces in Japan**

**2**


The Status of Forces Agreement[1] (SOFA) stipulates
matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the
status of USFJ, including furnishing of facilities and areas
for use by the U.S. Forces (USFJ facilities and areas), and
satisfying the labor requirements of USFJ.


**(1) Furnishing of USFJ Facilities and Areas**
Japan furnishes USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S.
Forces under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance
with agreements reached through the Joint Committee
between the Governments of Japan and the United States.
The Government of Japan has entered into
agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners
of private and public lands on which USFJ facilities
and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of these
facilities and areas. However, should the Government
be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will
acquire title under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ
Land Release,[2] while compensating the landowners for
any loss they may have suffered in the process.[3]

**(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of USFJ**
USFJ require manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and
the SOFA stipulates that the requirements of USFJ shall be


The offi cial title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of
United States Armed Forces in Japan.

The offi cial title is the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United
States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.i


-----

Fig. II-4-3-1 U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2017)

|Burden fro|m|t|he Special Measures Agreement (¥15|5.7 billion)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||


Fig. II-4-3-1

Costs for Stationing of USFJ SACO-related costs Realignment-related
(MOD-Related Budget: ¥383.6 billion (1)+(2)) (¥2.8 billion) costs (¥201.1 billion)

Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ - Projects for land returns - Relocation of the U.S. Marines in

¥0.7 billion Okinawa to Guam ¥26.5 billion

(¥194.6 billion (1)) - Projects for training improvement - Projects for realignment in Okinawa

¥0.2 billion ¥63.6 billion

- Costs for taking measures to improve

- Projects for noise reduction - Projects related to the reform of U.S.

the living environment in areas - Costs for Facility Improvement Program ¥0.5 billion Army Headquarters ¥91.3 billion
surrounding the USFJ facilities ¥20.6 billion - Projects for the relocation of Carrier
¥63.9 billion - Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.) Air Wing ¥0.6 billion

- Rent for facilities ¥98.8 billion ¥26.7 billion - Projects for training relocation

- Relocation, etc ¥0.4 billion

(Local task force-related cost) ¥80 million

- Other costs (compensation for

- Projects for facilitating realignment

fishery, etc.) ¥25.9 billion

initiatives ¥12.1 billion

**Total: ¥189.0 billion (2)** **Total: ¥47.3 billion** **Total: ¥1.5 billion** **Total: ¥194.0 billion**

Non MOD-related budget Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥155.7 billion)

- Expenditures borne by other

- Labor costs (basic salary, etc.) - Training relocation costs: ¥1.3 billion - Training relocation costs

ministries (base subsidy, etc.)

¥121.9 billion (one of the projects aimed at ¥7.1 billion

- Estimated costs of government

- Utilities costs ¥24.7 billion enhancing training)

owned land provided for use as
USFJ facilities[3] - Training relocation costs (NLP) - Artillery live-fire training over - Aviation training relocation

¥0.8 billion Highway 104 as part of realignment
**Total: ¥147.3 billion** - Parachute training initiatives

Notes: 1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the

realignment-related costs.

2. The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the

realignment-related costs refer to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the
cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately.

3. The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥38.4 billion, FY2016 Budget) and the

estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥165.7 billion, FY2016 Estimated Costs).

4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.


satisfi ed with the assistance of the Government of Japan.
As of the end of FY2016, 25,507 USFJ local
employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”)
at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as
offi ce workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/
supply facilities, members of security guards and fi re
departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational
facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth
operations of USFJ, and support its activities.
The Government of Japan hires these employees
in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The
MOD supports the stationing of USFJ by performing
administrative work for personnel management, payment
of wages, health care, and welfare, etc.


that will contribute to mitigating the impact on local
communities associated with the initiatives for the
realignment of the U.S. Forces.

See Fig. II-4-3-1 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2017))

**4** **Host Nation Support (HNS)**


Host Nation Support (HNS) plays an important role to
ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the
Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices
and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in
the international economic situation, the Government of
Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in
FY1978. Then in FY1979, Japan began to bear costs for
the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP).
Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes
in economic conditions that affected both countries, the
employment stability of the employees was adversely
infl uenced, and there was even concern that it would
affect the activities of USFJ. Therefore in 1987, the
Governments of Japan and the United States concluded
an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding
Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)[4]


**3** **Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed**
**in Japan**

**3**


Various costs associated with USFJ include the costs of
stationing USFJ, costs for implementing the stipulations
of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
Final Report for mitigating the impact on the people of
Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures


The offi cial title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual


-----

**(4) Scale of Host Nation Support**
The amount of HNS in FY2020, the fi nal fi scal year of
the new SMA period, will be approximately 189.9 billion
yen, with the average amount for each fi scal year during
the same period coming to approximately 189.3 billion
yen (any change in wages based on recommendations
by the National Personnel Authority will be refl ected
appropriately in labor costs for each fi scal year).

**5** **New Special Measures Agreement**


The Governments of Japan and the United States signed
the new SMA in January 2016. Following approval by the
Diet, the new SMA took effect in April 2016.
The key points of the new SMA are as follows:
(1) Effective period: Five years (from FY2016 through
FY2020).
(2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear all or part of the labor
costs, utilities costs, and the costs incurred in training
relocation.
Policies for the implementation of the new SMA
concerning the labor costs and utilities costs adopted in
Notes are as follows:
❍ Labor costs: The upper limit of the number of workers
to be funded by Japan will be increased gradually from
the current 22,625 to 23,178.
❍ Over the new SMA period, the share of utilities costs
to be borne by Japan for each fi scal year will be
reduced from the current 72% to 61%, with the upper
limit for utilities costs to be funded by Japan set at
approximately 24.9 billion yen.
(3) Cost-saving efforts: It is clearly stipulated that the
United States will make further efforts to economize
the above-mentioned expenditures.

See Reference 28 (Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ)


as exceptional, limited and provisional measures under
the cost principle in the SOFA.
Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan
started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the
adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional
allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA)
was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of
Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and
utilities costs from FY1991. The fi nancial responsibility
of the Japanese Government was further expanded to
cover training relocation costs from FY1996.
The Government of Japan has been reviewing
HNS while paying full attention to its tight fiscal
conditions, and as a result, HNS has been on a steady
decline after peaking out in the FY1999 budget on an
expenditure basis.
With the SMA due to expire in March 2016, the “2+2”
Meeting held in April 2015 agreed to “start consultations
on future arrangements to provide an appropriate level
of host nation support.” Following this agreement, Japan
and the United States held consultations on a new SMA,
and in December 2015, the Governments of Japan and
the United States reached agreement as follows:

**(1) Labor costs**
The upper limit of the number of workers at welfare,
recreation, and morale facilities to be funded by Japan
will be reduced from 4,408 to 3,893, while the upper
limit of the number of workers engaged in activities such
as maintenance of assets and administrative works to be
funded by Japan, will be increased from 18,217 to 19,285.
As a result, the upper limit of the number of workers to
be funded by Japan will be increased from the current
22,625 to 23,178. These adjustments will be phased in
over the new SMA period from FY2016 to FY2020.


**(2) Utilities costs**
Over the new SMA period, the share of utilities costs
to be borne by Japan for each fi scal year is reduced
from the current 72% to 61%, with the upper limit for
utilities costs to be funded by Japan set at approximately
24.9 billion yen.

**(3) Costs for Facilities Improvement Program**
The amount of costs for the FIP will not fall below 20.6
billion yen in each fi scal year during the new SMA
period. For the period of the previous SMA, any amount
of reductions in the labor costs and the utilities costs was
to be appropriated for an increase in costs for the FIP.
But such appropriation will not be made during the new
SMA i d


**6** **USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local**
**Communities**

**6**


The social conditions surrounding USFJ facilities and
areas have changed signifi cantly, including, for example,
through urbanization over the past several decades. For
USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities
and be genuinely accepted by the Japanese people, it is
vital to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much
as possible and secure the understanding and cooperation
of the local communities in light of such changes. Japan’s
national land is narrow with limited plains, and there are
many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located
close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors
i l di th i t f th f iliti d d


-----

the takeoffs and landings of the U.S. Forces aircraft have
considerable impact on the residents’ living environment
and local development. It is therefore necessary to make


efforts to mitigate the impact in a way that is responsive
to the circumstances of each area.



**Deployment of New U.S. Forces Assets (F-35B) to Japan**
**2**


As a fi fth generation fi ghter, the F-35 has high stealth
performance and powerful fi re control capabilities. It has
three variants: F-35A, the normal takeoff and landing
variant; F-35B, the short takeoff and vertical landing
variant; and F-35C, the aircraft carrier variant.
It was confi rmed in the Japan-U.S. “2+2” joint
announcement in October 2013 that the deployment of
the F-35B fi ghter to Japan would begin in 2017 as its
fi rst forward deployment outside of the United States. In
January 2017, 10 F-35B fi ghters arrived in Iwakuni Air
Base to replace F/A-18 fi ghters. In August 2017, the AV8B fi ghters currently deployed there are scheduled to be
replaced by six F-35B fi ghters.
As the security environment surrounding Japan
is becoming increasingly severe, the Government of
Japan believes that the deployment of the F-35B, the
most up-to-date and high-performance fi ghter, to Japan
is a manifestation of the iron-clad commitment of the

**Progress of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan**
**3**


As for the realignment of USFJ, “the United States-Japan
Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap)
was set forth in May 2006. Subsequently, the Governments
of Japan and the United States have conducted full-fl edged
bilateral discussions concerning coordination of the plan for
the realignment, in view of factors including the following:
1) The necessity of implementing measures to promptly
and steadily enable the visible mitigation of the impact
on Okinawa; 2) The necessity of coordinating strategic
rebalance to the Asia-Pacifi c region and the realignment
package, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic
Guidance released in January 2012; and 3) The fact that
a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of
the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been demanded by
the U.S. Congress. The achievements thereof have been
announced as part of the Joint Statements of the “2+2”
Meeting and through other means.


United States to the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens the

F-35B deployed to the Iwakuni Air Base (January 2017) [Photo courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps]


deterrent of the Alliance, and contributes to the security
of Japan and the Asia-Pacifi c region.

the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the
command elements, but the United States decided to
alter the composition of the units. As a result, the U.S.
Government decided to deploy the Marine Air-Ground
Task Force (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground,
aviation and logistics support elements—in Japan, Guam,
and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In
addition, the Governments of Japan and the United States
decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine
Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting
land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress
on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF).


**2** **Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2015)**


The Ministers reaffi rmed the two governments’ continued
commitment to implement the existing arrangements as
soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability,
including training capability, throughout the process of
the USFJ realignment. The Ministers underscored their
commitment to maintaining a robust and fl exible force
t th t h d t b t th i th


**1** **Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2012)**

**1**


The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine
E diti F (III MEF) t ti d i Oki


-----

capacity to respond effectively to future challenges and
threat, while also mitigating the impact of the U.S. Forces
on local communities.

**Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa**
**4**


In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii,
and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential confl ict
areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including
the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the
same time has the advantage of having a certain distance
from these areas that would not heighten military tension
there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a
large number of small islands, is located roughly in the
center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length
of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan,
which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of
its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location
is extremely important from the perspective of security,
as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for
neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacifi c
from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacifi c
to the continent. Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces
in Okinawa—including the U.S. Marine Corps, which is
in charge of fi rst response for a variety of contingencies
and capable of high mobility and rapid response, and
also has readiness for wide-ranging missions—with the
above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further
ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance,
strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only
to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability
of the Asia-Pacifi c region.
On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities
and areas such as airbases, exercise fi elds and logistics
facilities. As of the end of January 2017, approximately
70.6% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use)
are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying
approximately 8% of the land area of the prefecture
and 15% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is
necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact
on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned
security standpoints.

See Fig. II-4-3-3 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the

Signifi cance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa)


See Reference 23 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative

Committee (April 27, 2012))

See

Reference 20 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative
Committee (April 27, 2015))
Fig. II-4-3-2 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of
USFJ and the SDF Described in the “United States-Japan Roadmap
for Realignment Implementation”)

**1** **Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and**
**Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa**

**1**


When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the
Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas
covering approximately 278 km[2] for exclusive use by
the U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.
However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to
strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and
reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the
lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture.
Both countries have continued their initiatives to
realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas,
centering on those subject to the strong local requests,
and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed
in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required
adjustments and procedures for the return of land.
Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would
also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa
Issues, including the return of Naha Port (Naha City).[5]

Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident
that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the
then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal
documents under the Act on Special Measures for
USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided
to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment,
consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact
should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold
consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas
in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the
Okinawa Action Council between the central government
and Okinawa Prefecture, and SACO between Japan and
the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report
was compiled in 1996.

See Reference 29 (Outline of 23 Issues)


The Three Okinawa Issues refer to the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfi eld, and the relocation of artillery live fi re training over Highway 104. The relocation (distribution and i


-----

Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in
Fig. II-4-3-2
“Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”

**1. Realignment in the Kanto Area1. Realignment in the Kanto Area**

[Yokota related] [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command]

Relocation of the Air Defense Command and

Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012)
center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
Partial return of airspace, (returned on September 25, 2008)
and placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Tokyo
Yokota RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc. Yokota

Fuchu

Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base [Camp Zama]
(specific conditions and modalities are considered between Sagamihara Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army,
Japan and the U.S.) Japan (Reorganized at the end of September 2008)

Relocation of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central

Zama Readiness Force (Completed on March 26, 2013)

[U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot]

Joint/shared use of heliport (Joint use started on

Establishment of facilities due to the realignment of U.S. Kanagawa March 26, 2013)
Army Japan Headquarters

Release of portions (5.4 ha) of housing area and others

(Facilities including the Training Center)

(Land return completed on February 29, 2016)

(Operations of the Training Center started in August 2011.
Development of the Training Assistance Center completed.)
Return of part of the land in front of JR Sagamihara Station
(approx. 15 ha)
Joint use of West Open-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) Legend:
(Joint use started on December 2, 2015) Implemented Continuing

**2. Realignment in Okinawa**

MCAS Futenma (total return, about 481 ha)

[Joint/Shared Use]

[Relocation within Okinawa Prefecture]
Transport capabilities using helicopters

Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training

Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab

-  Implemented on March 17, 2008

Henokosaki and adjacent water areas

JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture]
training with U.S. Forces, while taking into
account the noise impact on local communities Operations of air-refueling aircraft → MCAS Iwakuni

-  Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed on August 26, 2014

Contingency use → Tsuiki/Nyutabaru Air Base, etc.

[Land Returns]
Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan)
for returning of significant land area south of Camp Schwab
Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining
facilities and areas in Okinawa Replacement SDF bases in mainland, etc.

-  Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013 Camp Hansen Facility

Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Camp Courtney
Farm No. 1
(total return, about 16 ha) Kadena Air Base [Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps]

Replacement III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF),
Facility about 8,000 personnel and about 9,000 of

Makiminato Service Area their dependents will relocate to Guam
(Camp Kinser) To Guam, etc. -  “2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states
(total return, about 274 ha) that about 9,000 personnel and their dependents

Naha would be relocated outside of Japan and the

-  Return of north access road Camp Kuwae (Lester) authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps in Guam
(about 1 ha) on August 31, 2013 (total return, about 68 ha) will be about 5,000.

Naha Port
(total return, about 56 ha)

Legend:

A replacement facility will be constructed in the Urasoe- Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (partial return, about 153 ha+  ) Implemented Continuing Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base
Pier district under the Naha -  Return of West Futenma Housing Area (Areas indicated are based on the consolidation plan. See Fig.II-4-3-9 for the current status on the
Port and Harbor Plan (approx. 51 ha) on March 31, 2015 returning of land south of Kadena Air Base)


-----

**3. Relocation of Aircraft, etc.** TPY-2 Rader: deployment of so-called

“X-band Radar System”
(Deployment completed in June 2006)

**The relocation of flight training activities**

Chitose

**from Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to ASDF**
**bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu,**
**Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, as well as to Guam.**
*The relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed Misawa
upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in SharikiShariki
January 2011.

Legend:

Deployment of a TPY-2 radar

Implemented

Relocation of carrier-based aircraft (Deployment completed in December 2014)
squadrons to Iwakuni

Continuing

KomatsuKomatsu
HyakuriHyakuri

AtsugiAtsugi
KyogamisakiKyogamisaki

Iwakuni

Tsuiki

Nyutabaru Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons

and other units from Iwakuni to Atsugi
(“2+2” Joint Statement in 2013
confirmed the continued deployment of
these units in Iwakuni Air Base)

KanoyaKanoya

Relocation of training of MV-22 Osprey, etc.
(Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement
of September 2016)

KadenaKadena

Relocation of the KC-130 squadron
to Iwakuni Futenma
(Relocation completed in August 2014) The KC-130 squadron will deploy on a rotational

basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Relocation of the functions of aircraft for
contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru

Mariana
Islands

Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam

Part of future civilian aviation facilities were (Japan and the United States confirmed that
established within MCAS Iwakuni the CH-53D squadron will be relocated to
(Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport opened the U.S. mainland and then to Guam.)
December 2012) (Relocation to the U.S. mainland completed)

Saipan

Guam


50 km[2]) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that
time, exceeding the amount of land returned during
the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the
implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is
roughly 43 km[2].

See Reference 30 (The SACO Final Report); Reference 31 (State of

Progress of the SACO Final Report); Fig. II-4-3-4 (Facilities and
Areas Related to the SACO Final Report); Fig. II-4-3-5 (Changes in
Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use)
in Okinawa


**2** **Outline of SACO Final Report**

**2**


The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the
adjustment of training and operational procedures, the
implementation of noise abatement initiatives, and the
improvement of operational procedures regarding the
SOFA, and also refers to the related facilities and areas
covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO
Fi l R t t i t l 21% ( b t


-----

Fig. II-4-3-3 The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Signifi cance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa


Fig. II-4-3-3


**Geographical Advantage of Okinawa**

**Okinawa holds a position of** The main island of Okinawa is located roughly in the center of
**great strategic importance** the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes (*1)

for Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the
perspective of Japan’s security.
Okinawa is located close (but not overly so) to potential conflict
areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including
the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait.

Beijing Seoul ⇒ Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible to

expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at the
same time has sufficient distance so as not to heighten

Access from continental
Asia to the Pacific Tokyo military tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms

of protecting units.

Approximately 1,260 km Izu Islands In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s location is

strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific

Shanghai

from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to
the continent.

Approximately 3,220 km *1 Japan is dependent upon marine transportation for at least 99% of the total volume of its trade.

Approximately 630 km

Okinawa Ogasawara

Islands **The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa**

Hong Kong Taipei

It is essential to maintain defense capabilities for the area of the
Southwestern Islands in the main island of Okinawa, which is
important as a strategic location for Japan, for the security of

Japan’s sea lanes

Japan. The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps (*2), which is

Okinotorishima capable of rapid response and high mobility and also has readiness

Approximately 2,760 km for a wide variety of missions, ranging from armed conflicts to

natural disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical
advantages, plays an important role in ensuring not only the

Manila Saipan security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia.

*2 The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and

Guam air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid

response in the event of all kinds of situations.


Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO
Final Report

Fig. II-4-3-4

Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield

Northern Training Area

Camp Hansen

Aha Training Area

Senaha Communication
Station

Sobe Communication
Site Offshore Camp Schwab

Yomitan Auxiliary
Airfield Gimbaru Training Area

Torii Communication Kin Blue Beach Training Area
Station

Camp Zukeran

Kadena Air Base

Camp Kuwae MCAS Futenma

Makiminato
Service Area : Facilities and areas involved in land return

: Facilities and areas involved in land return

Naha Port Facility (Cancellation of joint use)

: Destination sites of other facilities relocation
programs


**3** **Return of a Major Portion of the Northern**
**Training Area**


Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ
Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa

|Area (km2)|Col2|
|---|---|
|Facilities/Areas||


Fig. II-4-3-5

400

353

350 Area (km[2])

Facilities/Areas

300 278

249 242

250

200 186

144

150

100 83

46 43

50 31

0

Right before May 1972 End of End of As of
the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 January 2017
of Okinawa


The returned land accounts for approximately
20% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in
Okinawa and the largest of its kind since the reversion of
Okinawa to the mainland, and had been an agenda for 20
years since the SACO Final Report in 1996.
Given the requests for an early return from the
local villages of Kunigami and Higashi, the Government
of Japan exerted its full efforts to achieve the earliest
possible return as a way of contributing to the mitigation
of the impact on Okinawa.
O th d b f th t P i Mi i t Ab


**3**


**(1) Achievement of Majority Return**
On December 22, 2016, the return of approximately 4,000
ha, a major portion of the Northern Training Area located
in the villages of Kunigami and Higashi, was achieved
b d th SACO Fi l R t


-----

and then U.S. Ambassador Kennedy made a JapanU.S. Joint Announcement. On the day of the return, a
ceremony was held in Okinawa, which was attended by
many offi cials including Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga,
Defense Minister Inada, then U.S. Ambassador Kennedy,
and Kunigami Village Mayor Miyagi and Higashi Village
Mayor Iju.
The Government of Japan is advancing measures
such as the removal of impediments, with a view to
realizing the earliest possible handover of the land to
ensure the smooth use of the returned land.

**(2) Construction Work for the Relocation of Helipads**
The condition for returning the Northern Training
Area was to relocate seven helipads to be returned in


Scene from the Return Ceremony of the Northern Training Area in December 2016


**Commentary**

**The Largest Return Since the Reversion of Okinawa to Japan**

The Northern Training Area is the largest of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa. It was agreed in the Special Action Committee
on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report of December 1996 that approximately 4,000 ha, the major portion of the training area, would be
returned under the condition that the helipads would be relocated within it.
Although not a legal requirement for the relocation work for the helipads, an environmental impact assessment was
conducted to give consideration to the preservation of the natural environment as much as possible. Based on its results, the
construction work was conducted with the greatest of care for preserving the natural environment, such as reducing the size of
the helipads, bringing in materials and equipment using routes that avoid settlements as much as possible, and refraining from
civil works during the breeding seasons of the Okinawa woodpecker and other valuable birds. In December 2016, 20 years after
the SACO Final Report, the return of approximately 4,000 ha, the major portion of the Northern Training Area, was realized with
the relocation of the helipads fi nally achieved.
The Yanbaru region in the northern part of the main island of Okinawa, where the Northern Training Area is located, is covered
by some of the largest subtropical laurel forests in Japan. It is an area where a large variety of endemic species thrive including the
Okinawa rail and the Okinawa woodpecker. The Yanbaru National Park was newly designated as a national park in September 2016,
and it was decided that it would be nominated for World Heritage as a natural site in January 2017. Kunigami Village and Higashi
Village, the local municipalities, aim to have the returned area included in the Yanbaru National Park and registered as a World
Heritage. The Government of Japan is taking measures to remove impediments to using the returned land such as soil contamination
surveys, with a view to achieving the handover of the land as early as possible.


-----

a. Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the
Impact on Okinawa
The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more signifi cance
than merely moving the facility from one location to
another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating
the impact on Okinawa. As such, the Government will
work as one to implement this initiative.
(a) Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma
MCAS Futenma fulfi lls the following functions relating
to the aviation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps
stationed in Okinawa: (1) Operation of the Osprey and
other aircraft; (2) Operation of air refueling aircraft;
and (3) Accepting a large number of transient aircraft
in contingencies. Of these three functions, only
(1) “operation of the Osprey and other aircraft” will be
relocated to Camp Schwab. As for (2) “operation of air
refueling aircraft,” all 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft
were relocated to MCAS Iwakuni (in Iwakuni City,
Yamaguchi Prefecture) in August 2014.
This marked the completion of a task that has
remained unresolved for 18 years since the SACO
Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of fi xedwing aircraft located in MCAS Futenma to be moved
outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also led to the
relocation of approximately 870 USFJ personnel, civilian
employees, and dependents.
Moreover, the function of (3) “accepting a large
number of transient aircraft in contingencies” will also be
transferred to Tsuiki Air Base and Nyutabaru Air Base.
(b) Landfi ll Area
The area required for the land reclamation to build the
FRF is approximately 160 ha, less than one-third of
the approximately 481 ha of MCAS Futenma, and the
new facility will be equipped with a signifi cantly shorter
runway at approximately 1,200 m (approximately 1,800 m
including the overruns) compared to the current runway
length of 2,740 m at MCAS Futenma.
(c) Flight Routes
Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which
enables the fl ight path for both takeoff and landing to
be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the
local community. In MCAS Futenma, fl ight paths used
daily for training and other purposes are located over
residential areas, whereas fl ight paths in the FRF will be
changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks.
For example, while more than 10,000 households are
located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near
MCAS Futenma, there will be zero households requiring
such insulation around the FRF. This means that the noise
levels experienced by all households will comply with the
i t it i li d t l i h i


the area to a preexisting training area. In this regard,
the Government of Japan reached an agreement with
the U.S. side to make considerations for the natural
environment and to relocate not all but six helipads,
which is the minimum necessary, and has steadily made
progress with the construction work.
Some protesters impeded the expeditious execution
of the construction work for the relocation of the
helipads, through repeated obstruction such as parking
cars and setting up tents in front of the entrance of the
Northern Training Area. Thus, not only the Okinawa
Defense Bureau but also the MOD headquarters and
other regional defense bureaus dispatched personnel to
support the relocation construction work.
Despite such efforts, the continuous obstruction
made it diffi cult to bring in material and equipment by
land, leading to a decision to transport them by helicopter.
However, some of the equipment was too heavy for
civilian helicopters to transport. For this reason, the
Ground Self-Defense Force’s CH-47JA helicopter was
used for their transportation in September 2016. In such
ways, utmost efforts were made towards the achievement
of the early return. As a result, the relocation of the
helipads was completed in December 2016.

**4** **History and Progress of the U.S. Forces**
**Realignment in Okinawa**


**4**


**(1) Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma**
The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative
not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefi nitely at
its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses
and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa
Prefecture. This is a fundamental idea shared between the
Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa.
As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the
Government of Japan has not changed its stance that
the current plan to construct the FRF at the Camp
Schwab Henokosaki area (Nago City) and adjacent
waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use
of MCAS Futenma.
The Government of Japan plans to make further
efforts to achieve the replacement and return of MCAS
Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact
on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS
Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area
and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa,
including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area
(approximately 481 ha with a land area 100 times larger
than Tokyo Dome).


-----

|Item|Area|Runway|
|---|---|---|
|eplacement facility|Approx. 160 ha (landfill area)|Approx. 1,200 m (1,800 m including overrun)|
|MCAS Futenma|1/3 Approx. 481 ha|2/3 Approx. 2,740 m|


Fig. II-4-3-6 Comparison between the Replacement Facility and MCAS Futenma

**Replacement facility (Henoko Cape)**

Camp Schwab

**N** Runway

Henoko

Nagashima

Toyohara

Birajima

Overrun

Naha

**N**

Okinawa

**Item** **Area** **Runway**

Approx. 1,200 m

Replacement Approx. 160 ha (1,800 m including
facility (landfill area) overrun)

1/3 2/3

MCAS

Approx. 481 ha Approx. 2,740 m

Futenma

**MCAS Futenma**


In the case that an aircraft encounters any contingency,
safety on the ground can be ensured by diverting the
aircraft offshore.
b. The Necessity of Relocating the Futenma Replacement
Facility within Okinawa Prefecture
The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air,
ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction
of those elements is indispensable for U.S. Marine Corps
operations characterized by great mobility and readiness,
so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be
located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing
aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near
the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise
work on a regular basis.
c. Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility
Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter
crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral
discussions on the realignment have been made towards
realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at
the earliest possible date in order to resolve the concern
of the residents living in the vicinity.
In the SCC (“2+2”) document compiled in October
2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped
confi guration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp
Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was
approved. However, since this L-shape meant that U.S.
military aircraft would fl y over settlements in Nago City
and Ginoza Village, a request was submitted to avoid
fli ht th ttl t I li ht f thi b d


negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities
including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in
the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a V-shape
confi guration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent
water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” With regard to
construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum
of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the
Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and the then Minister of
State for Defense in May 2006.
After the change of government in September 2009,
the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was
established. After reviews conducted by the Committee,
both governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May
2010, confi rmed the intention to locate the FRF in the
Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters,
and also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the
impact on Okinawa.
Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June
2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V”
shape, and the Ministers confi rmed their commitment to
complete the relocation project at the earliest possible date
after 2014 in order to avoid the indefi nite use of MCAS
Futenma and to remove the risks as early as possible.
During the deliberation process which led to these
conclusions, fi rst of all, it was determined that, from a
security perspective, the deterrence of the U.S. Forces,
including that of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in
Okinawa that is located in a crucial area for the security of
J t b l d hil th i i t bilit


-----

and uncertainty in the security environment in East Asia.
Furthermore, concern was expressed that the functions
of the U.S. Marine Corps such as mobility and readiness
would be weakened if the helicopter units stationed
at MCAS Futenma were to be detached from the other
Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or
out of the prefecture. Therefore, it was concluded that the
FRF had to be located within Okinawa Prefecture.
At the “2+2” Meetings in October 2013 and April
2015, which followed the “2+2” Meeting of April
2012, and the joint statement issued at the first JapanU.S. Summit Meeting during the Trump administration
in February 2017, the Governments of Japan and the
United States also confirmed that the plan to construct
the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent
waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use
of MCAS Futenma.

See Reference 32 (Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility)

Reference 33 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and

See

Areas South of Kadena);

Fig. II-4-3-6 (Comparison between the Replacement Facility and
MCAS Futenma)

d. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment
Procedures
After the MOD sent the environmental impact assessment
scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa
Prefecture and other parties, the MOD worked on revising
the document based on the opinions provided by the
governor. Finally, the MOD completed the environmental
impact assessment procedures by sending the revised
assessment document to related parties including the
governor in December 2012, while making the assessment
document available for public review. Throughout these
procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions
from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on six
occasions, made all the required revisions, and reflected
them in the content of the environmental assessment.
In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with
relevant laws, asked opinions and ideas from Okinawa
Prefecture over a sufficient period of time, and reflected
them in the assessment.
e. Promotion of the Futenma Replacement Facility
Construction Project
The Director General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau
submitted the land-fill permit request on public waters to
Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor
of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013.


However, Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the
land-fill permit by then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima
in October 2015, leading to the filing of three suits
over the revocation of the land-fill permit[6] between the
Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture.
Under these circumstances, the court came up with
a settlement recommendation, and the Government of
Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a court-mediated
settlement agreement in March 2016. In the settlement,
the Government of Japan and Okinawa mutually affirmed
that after the final judicial ruling is handed down by the
Supreme Court, they would abide by the ruling and take
steps in line with the spirit of the text of the ruling and
the reasons conducive to the text, and continue to take
responses in good faith by cooperating with each other in
accordance with the purpose of the ruling.
Pursuant to the provisions of the settlement
agreement, the Director General of the Okinawa Defense
Bureau immediately suspended the land-fill work while
the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism issued an instruction for correction based on the
Local Autonomy Act to current Governor Onaga to repeal
the revocation of the land-fill permit. Subsequently, in
December 2016, after examination by the Central and
Local Government Dispute Management Council and
deliberation by the Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch, the
Supreme Court set forth the decision that the revocation
of the land-fill permit by Governor Onaga was illegal.
In the judgment, the Supreme Court ruled that then
Governor Nakaima’s decision was not illegal. The court
stated that no circumstances could be found indicating
that then Governor Nakaima’s decision that the landfill was in compliance with the condition in Article 4
(1) (i) of the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned
Water Surface, “that it is appropriate and reasonable
as the use of national land,” had no foundation in fact,
or clearly lacked reasoning under socially accepted
conventions. The reasons given by the court include:
(1) the area of the replacement facilities and the landfill area will be significantly reduced from the area of
the MCAS Futenma facilities, and (2) aircraft flying
over residential areas can be avoided by the land-fill in
the coastal area that puts the runway extension out to
the sea, and the replacement facilities will be installed
using part of Camp Schwab, which is already provided
to the U.S. Forces.


(1) The suit, filed by the Government of Japan as plaintiff based on Article 245-8 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking a court ruling instructing a retraction of the revocation of the land-fill permit by
current Governor Onaga (the so-called subrogation suit); (2) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 251-5 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend the
validity of the revocation of the land-fill permit (the decision to suspend execution) by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as the illegal “involvement of the state”; and (3) the
suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend execution by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport


-----

a. Timing and Size of Relocation
The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000
personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III
MEF) and approximately 9,000 dependents will be
relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2”
Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing
of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014.
Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April
2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States
decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF
personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land
return south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on
the FRF and the United States reviewed the composition
of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated
to Guam. As a result, Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) is to be stationed and deployed in Guam,
approximately 9,000 personnel are to be relocated to
locations outside of Japan, the authorized strength of the
U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately
5,000 personnel, and the end-state for the presence of the
U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa is to be consistent with
the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned
in the Roadmap.
Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October
2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at
the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine
Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the
first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to promote
the implementation of the consolidation plan for facilities
and areas in Okinawa of April 2013.

See Fig. II-4-3-7 (Relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to

Guam and Other Locations)

b. Costs of the Relocation
Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an
agreement that, of the estimated US$10.27 billion (in
U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and
infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide
US$6.09 billion, including US$2.8 billion in direct
cash contribution, while the United States would fund
the remaining US$4.18 billion. In February 2009, the
Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed
“the Agreement Between the Government of Japan
and the Government of the United States of America
Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of the
III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa
to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The
Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken
by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s longterm funding for projects to which Japan provides direct
cash contributions. As part of measures based on this
A t th J G t h b idi


Work barge engaged in landfill work offshore at Henokosaki

Moreover, regarding whether the construction of
replacement facilities takes environmental protection and
other considerations into adequate account, the Supreme
Court, finding that construction methods, environmental
protection measures and countermeasures that can
conceivably be taken at this point in time have been taken
and that there is sufficient consideration for disaster
prevention, determined that it cannot be said that then
Governor Nakaima’s decision was illegal. The court did
not find that there was anything particularly unreasonable
in then Governor Nakaima’s decision-making process
and the content of the decision that the construction
met the condition of Article 4 (1) (ii) of the Act on
Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface, “the
land-fill gives sufficient consideration to the protection of
the environment and prevention of disasters.”
Following this Supreme Court ruling, on December
26, Governor Onaga retracted the revocation of the landfill permit and the Okinawa Defense Bureau resumed the
replacement facilities construction project the following
day. On April 25, 2017, it started the construction of the
seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation.
The Government of Japan views that both the national
government and Okinawa Prefecture will cooperate with
each other and act in good faith, according to the purpose
of the ruling of the Supreme Court and the settlement
to which the two parties agreed. The Government
intends to go forward with the project, while being fully
mindful of the safety of the work and taking the natural
environment and the living environment of the residents
into utmost consideration based on the relevant laws
and regulations.


**(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam**
Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006,
the Governments of Japan and the United States held
a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S.
F i Oki


-----

Fig. II-4-3-7 Relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and Other Locations


Fig. II-4-3-7


Approximately 5,000

Hawaii, etc.

Okinawa

Approximately 9,000 Marine Corps personnel
and their dependents Approximately 4,000

-  Approximately 10,000 Marine Corps Hawaii,
personnel to remain in Okinawa U.S. mainland, etc. Approximately 1,000

Guam

*The relocation is to begin in the first half of the 2020s
(The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013)


cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation
to the projects for which Japan has provided fi nancial
support since FY2009.[7]

Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April
2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel
to be relocated to Guam were revised and it was agreed
that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government
for the relocation was US$8.6 billion (in U.S. fi scal
year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s fi nancial
commitment, it was reaffi rmed that it was to be the direct
cash contribution of up to US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fi scal
year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam
International Agreement. It was also confi rmed that
Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing
projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized.
Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already
been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam
International Agreement would be counted as part of the
Japanese contribution.[8] Furthermore, as a new initiative,
a portion of the direct cash contribution of US$2.8 billion
mentioned above would be used to develop training areas
in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the United
States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs
and any additional costs would be borne by the United
States, and that the two governments were to complete a
bilateral cost breakdown.
At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol
Amending the Guam International Agreement was signed
to add the stipulations concerning the development of
training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training


areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions
remains unchanged at US$2.8 billion (in U.S. fi scal year
2008 dollars). Both countries also completed the process
of creating a detailed breakdown of required costs.
Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization
Act for U.S. Fiscal Year 2015 was enacted in December
2014, which lifted the freeze on the use of funds for the
relocation to Guam imposed by the U.S. Congress in U.S.
Fiscal Year 2012.
c. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment
Procedures
As for the environmental impact assessment for Guam,
the required procedures were conducted to refl ect the
revisions to the project made by the adjustments to the
plan for realignment, and the assessment was completed
in August 2015.
As for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact
Statement (CJMT-EIS), it is planned to be completed
in 2018.
d. Progress of the Guam Relocation Project
While the environmental impact assessment for Guam
was being conducted, the Government of the United
States implemented infrastructure development projects
at the Andersen Air Force Base and the Apra area of
the Naval Base Guam as projects unaffected by the
assessment. The U.S. Government is currently making
preparations for full-scale relocation construction work,
following the lifting of the freeze on the Guam relocation
funds pursuant to the National Defense Authorization
Act and the completion of the environmental impact
assessment for Guam. In January 2017, Defense Minister


As for projects for which Japan provides fi nancial support, cash contributions of approximately 124.2 billion yen have been provided to the U.S. side using the budgets from FY2009 to FY2016.

In line with this, the special provisions for the operations of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (investment and loan) that had been prescribed by the Act on Special Measures on Smooth


-----

Fig. II-4-3-8 Progress of the Guam Relocation Project

|Relocation Project Areas|Col2|Status of Progress of GOJ Funded Projects|
|---|---|---|
|(1) Andersen AFB (2) Andersen South Area||On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in progress.|
||(2) Andersen South Area|Training areas (*2) project is in contracting process.|
|(3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Finegayan||On-base infrastructure project (*1) is in contracting process.|
|(4) Naval Base Guam in Apra||On-base infrastructure project (*1) is complete.|
|||Headquarters building (*3) project is in contracting process.|


Fig. II-4-3-8

(3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications
Station Finegayan

(2) Andersen South

Ongoing construction of basic utilities at Andersen AFB

(1) Andersen Air (On-base infrastructure project）
Force Base

(4) Naval Base
Guam in Apra

Substation completed at Naval Base Guam in Apra

(As of February 28, 2017)

(On-base infrastructure project)

**Relocation Project Areas** **Status of Progress of GOJ Funded Projects**

(1) Andersen AFB On-base infrastructure project[ (*1)] is in progress.

(2) Andersen South Area Training areas[ (*2)] project is in contracting process.

(3) Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station Finegayan On-base infrastructure project[ (*1)] is in contracting process.

On-base infrastructure project[ (*1)] is complete.
(4) Naval Base Guam in Apra

Headquarters building[ (*3)] project is in contracting process.

*1 On-base infrastructure project includes site preparation and development of roads, water supply and sewerage system and telecommunication system for
construction of facilities such as offi ce buildings for the Marines.
*2 Training areas project is to develop facilities for the Marines to conduct basic training such as military operations in urban terrain and driver convoy course.
*3 The headquarters building project is to develop a headquarters building for the Marines.


Inada visited Guam to observe the progress of the Guam
relocation project.

See Fig. II-4-3-8 (Progress of the Guam Relocation Project)

Reference 34 (Agreement between the Government of Japan and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning the
Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force
Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam)
Reference 35 (Protocol amending the Agreement Between the
Government of Japan and the Government of the United States
of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III
Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from
Okinawa to Guam)


**(3) Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base**
The Roadmap stated that following the relocation to the
FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of
III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and
areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling
the return of signifi cant land areas south of Kadena Air
Base. However, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it
was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both
the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa
t G d th lti l d t th f K d


Minister of Defense Inada being briefed by the U.S. military on the progress of the project
for relocation to Guam

In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it
was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three
categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate
return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of
functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return
ft th l ti b d


-----

Fig. II-4-3-9 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

Fig. II-4-3-9

Army POL Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 Camp Kuwae

FY2022 FY2025
16 ha 68 ha
or later or later

Camp Zukeran
(Lower Plaza Housing area)

Camp Zukeran (A portion of the warehouse area
of the Facilities and Engineering Compound) FY2024 23 ha

or later

FY2019 or later 11 ha [(Note 5)]

Camp Zukeran

- JC reached Agreement of Return
on September 19, 2013 (A part of Kishaba Housing area)

FY2024

Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.) 5 ha

or later

(FY2024 or later) 62 ha

Camp Zukeran
(Additional elements)

Makiminato Service Area
(The remainder) α ha [(Note 3)]

(FY2024 or later) 142 ha

Camp Zukeran (West

Futenma Air Station Futenma Housing area)

Makiminato Service Area Makiminato Service Area
(Area near Gate 5) (The north access road) FY2022 or later 481 ha Returned on March 31, 2015

Returned on August 31, 2013 1 ha

FY2014 or later 51 ha [(Note 4)]
2 ha

- JC reached Makiminato Service Area
Agreement of Return (Elements of MSA, including the preponderance of the storage area)
on July 11, 2013

FY2025
or later 129 ha Legend

: Returned or immediate return (65 ha)

Naha Port : Return after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (841 ha)

FY2028or later 56 ha : Return after the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps forces to locations outside of Japan (142 ha +more) Total: 1,048 ha + more

Notes: 1. The timing and year are based on the best case scenario, the timing may be postponed depending on the progress of the efforts, including relocation to outside of Japan.

Furthermore, the timing and fiscal year in parentheses do not take into account the length of time necessary for relocation to outside of Japan because, though the conditions
for returning the areas include relocation to outside of Japan, its plan is yet to be decided. Consequently, the timing and year may be subject to change according to the
progress of the relocation to outside of Japan.

2. Land area of each area is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys, etc.
3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns.
4. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (West-Futenma Housing area) was listed as 52 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but it was revised to 51 ha according to actual

measurements.

5. The area to be returned at Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound, etc.) was listed as 10 ha in the Consolidation Plan, but

it was revised to 11 ha based on the area to be returned in the JC agreement of September 2013.

6. JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee


Since the change of administration at the end of 2012,
Japan and the United States have continued consultation
under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate
all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces
on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an
early return of land areas south of Kadena, including
Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City
of which Okinawa has particularly made a strong request
for the return. As a result, both countries announced the
Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa
(Consolidation Plan) in April 2013, which stipulated the
return schedule, including the specifi c years of return.
The return of all land according to the plan will enable
the return of approximately 70% (approximately 1,048 ha,
the equivalent of 220 Tokyo Domes) of USFJ facilities and
areas located in densely populated areas in the central and
southern parts of the main island of Okinawa.
In the consolidation plan, both sides confi rmed that
they would implement the plan as early as possible. The
Government of Japan will continue to work with all its


strength so that land areas south of Kadena would be
returned at the earliest possible date.
Furthermore, following the announcement of the
consolidation plan, consultations have been held since
April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City
Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture,
Okinawa Defense Bureau, and Okinawa General Bureau[9]
in a bid to contribute to the promotion of the effective and
appropriate use of West Futenma Housing Area within
Camp Zukeran, and the MOD has also been providing
necessary cooperation.
Efforts have been made to enable the early return of
land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned
as soon as required procedures are completed (shown
in red in Fig. II-4-3-9), since the announcement of the
consolidation plan in April 2013. These efforts resulted
in the realization of the return of the north entrance of
Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August
2013 and West Futenma Housing Area within Camp
Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) at the end of March 2015.


-----

In December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the
United States also agreed on an early return of part of the
land of MCAS Futenma for use as land for a municipal
road, as well as on an early return of part of the land of
Makiminato Service Area for the purpose of widening a
national road to relieve traffi c congestion.
All-out initiatives are being continuously made
to steadily implement the return of land areas south
of Kadena Air Base under the consolidation plan and
mitigate the impact on Okinawa as early as possible,
and also to realize the respective returns of land in the
shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the
impact on Okinawa.

See Reference 33 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and

Areas South of Kadena)

See

Fig. II-4-3-9 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base)

**5** **Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces in Japan**


arrival of the CV-22s to the U.S. fi scal year 2020.
The CV-22 aircraft to be deployed to Yokota Air Base
will handle tasks for transporting personnel and supplies
for Special Operation Forces of the U.S. Forces to deal
with crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacifi c region,
including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters.
As Japan faces an increasingly tougher security
environment, the deployment of high-performance CV-22
from the perspective of the U.S. commitment to the AsiaPacifi c region and enhancing the readiness posture of the
United States will enhance the deterrence and response
capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to
the stability of the Asia-Pacifi c region.
The Government of Japan will continue to take
responses in a careful and sincere manner in order to obtain
the understanding and cooperation of local communities.

**(3) Safety of the Osprey**
Following the crash of an MV-22 in Morocco in April
2012 that occurred prior to the deployment of the MV22s to MCAS Futenma in September 2012, and the crash
of a CV-22 in Florida in June 2012, a Japanese analysis
and assessment team examined these accidents based on
Japan’s own viewpoints and knowledge and also looked
at the results of the investigations by the Government
of the United States, and confi rmed that these accidents
were caused largely by human factors and that there were
no safety problems with the aircraft itself.
In relation to the MV-22, operations commenced
in Japan after the two governments confi rmed at the
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee and on other occasions
that measures have been taken to address these human
factors in light of the lessons learned from the accidents
and agreed to implement specifi c measures to ensure the
safety of MV-22 operations in Japan.
In addition, in relation to the CV-22, the CV-22 and
the MV-22 offer the same propulsion system and have
a basically similar structure according to information
obtained from the United States. The Government of
Japan has also confi rmed that the United States will
ensure complete safety in operating the CV-22 in Japan
as in the case of the MV-22.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that full consideration
is given to local residents and that the Joint Committee
agreement is properly implemented for fl ight operations
of the MV-22 and the CV-22, the Government of Japan
has been continuously engaging with the U.S. side
through various opportunities, including the Japan-U.S.
Defense Ministerial Meetings.

See Reference 36 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces)


**5**


**(1) U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey Deployment**
**in Okinawa**

The Osprey is an aircraft that combines the vertical
takeoff/landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing
aircraft on the one hand and the speed and range of
fi xed-wing aircraft on the other. As the primary air unit
of the U.S. Marine Corps, the MV-22 that has been
developed for the U.S. Marine Corps plays an important
role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including
transportation of personnel and goods.
The U.S. Marine Corps was replacing aged rotarywing airplanes (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have
superior basic performance. In September 2013, all the
24 CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma were replaced
by MV-22s.
The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft compared
with the CH-46; it can fl y faster, can carry more payload,
and has a longer range. Its deployment to Okinawa will
strengthen the deterrence of USFJ as a whole and greatly
contribute to the peace and stability of the region.

**(2) CV-22 Osprey Deployment by U.S. Air Force to**
**Yokota Air Base**

In May 2015, the Government of the United States
announced that CV-22 aircraft, tailored to meet the
requirements of the U.S. Air Force, will be deployed
to Yokota Air Base (which encompasses Fussa City,
Tachikawa City, Akishima City, Musashi Murayama City,
Hamura City and Mizuho Town of Tokyo Prefecture),
with the fi rst three aircraft to be deployed in the latter half
of 2017 for completion of the deployment of a total of 10
aircraft by 2021. However, the Government of the United
St t d i M h 2017 th t it ld d l th


-----

**(4) MV-22 Emergency Water Landing**
a. Outline of the Accident
On December 13, 2016, when an MV-22 assigned to U.S.
MCAS Futenma was conducting nighttime aerial refueling
training, a proprotor of the MV-22 inadvertently contacted
the refueling hose of the MC-130 air refueling tanker after
finishing the refueling, damaging its blades and forcing the
MV-22 to conduct an emergency water landing off the east
coast of Nago City in Okinawa Prefecture.
Following this accident, the MOD requested
the assessment of the cause, sufficient provision of
information, and suspension of flights until the safety
was confirmed. The U.S. side suspended all flights of the
MV-22 in Japan.
Subsequently, the MOD was explained by the U.S.
side that elements vital to the safety of flights were
inspected for each of the MV-22 at MCAS Futenma and
no problems were found, that the cause of the accident was
deemed to be the proprotor blades coming into contact
with the refueling hose during aerial refueling, and that
the United States would keep aerial refueling suspended
and resume it only after group education, confirmation of
procedures, etc. had been completed. The MOD reviewed
the U.S. explanation in light of the MOD/SDF technical
expertise on the airframe structure of the MV-22, the
procedures to land safely when the propeller is damaged,
etc. On this basis, the MOD determined that the U.S.
explanation was reasonable and showed understanding
for resuming flights. The United States resumed the
flights excluding aerial refueling on December 19.
In resuming aerial refueling, Japan and the United
States conducted intensive consultations regarding the
assessment of the cause, measures to be taken, etc. In
this accident, nighttime aerial refueling, an operation that
requires a high level of skills on the part of the crew, was
conducted under challenging weather conditions including
strong winds and air turbulence. The accident could
have resulted from such external factors compounded
by human factors. In this light, the United States took
measures to prevent recurrence covering a wide range of
human and external factors that may cause accidents, such
as group education regarding aerial refueling, review of
procedures, and on-the-ground simulation. At the same
time, the MOD confirmed that all measures to prevent
recurrence had been taken by drawing on its technical
expertise and experiences. In addition, since the U.S.
side confirmed that they would continue to conduct aerial
refueling training only in places away from land, the
Government of Japan determined that effective measures
had been taken to prevent recurrence, and aerial refueling
d J 6 2017


b. The MOD s Response
The emergency water landing by the MV-22 caused a
great deal of anxiety among Okinawa and other local
governments and residents nationwide. The MOD
considers that ensuring safety is the most important
precondition for the flight of U.S. Forces aircraft,
including the MV-22, and will continue to request the
U.S. side to give the utmost consideration for safety in
order to minimize the impact on the local residents.

**(5) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in**
**Case of Disaster**

In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the
central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to
support Operation Damayan. The MV-22s were deployed
promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access,
and transported several hundred isolated victims and
about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014,
the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for
search and rescue activities in the wake of an accidental
sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the
Republic of Korea. Furthermore, in response to the large
earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22s
deployed in Okinawa were dispatched to the country to
transport personnel and supplies.
In Japan, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred
in 2016, MV-22s were dispatched to deliver daily
necessities to the disaster stricken areas.
In this manner, the MV-22 is capable of conducting
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities
immediately and over a large range when large-scale
disasters occur because of its high performance and
multi-functionality. It has also been used for disaster
prevention drills since 2014. In September 2016, two MV22s participated in the comprehensive disaster prevention
drills of Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture and conducted
delivery drills for isolated islands.
Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief activities, including search
and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large
range, in the case of a large-scale disaster.
As such, it is expected that the superior capabilities
of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be
showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well.

See Fig. II-4-4-10 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft)


-----

Fig. II-4-3-10 Usability of Osprey Aircraft

|Maximum speed|Approximately 520 km/h Maximum About t|speed wice|Approximately 270 km/h|
|---|---|---|---|
|Cruising speed|Approximately 490 km/h|Approximately 220 km/h||
|Range|Approximately 3,900 km|Approximately 700 km||
|Radius of action|Approximately 600 km Radius of (With 24 troops on board) About fou|action Approximately 140 km r times (With 12 troops on board)||
|Number of troops carried|24|12||
|Number of crew|3–4|3–5||
|Cargo (inside)|Approximately 9,100 kg|Approximately 2,300 kg||
|Cargo (outside)|Paylo Approximately 5,700 kg About thre|ad e times|Approximately 2,300 kg|
|Rotor diameter|Approximately 11.6 m|Approximately 15.5 m||
|Angle of flight|Approximately 7,500 m|Approximately 3,000 m||
|Own weight|Approximately 16,000 kg|Approximately 7,700 kg||
|Measurement|MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. 6.7 m 5.1 m 17.5 m 25.7 m|||


Fig. II-4-3-10

4,000km

3,000km

MV-22 radius of action

North Korea Tokyo Approximately 1,100 km (1 aerial refueling)

Republic

Beijing of Korea Osaka

Seoul

CH-46 radius of action Fukuoka 1,500km
Approximately 140 km

Kagoshima

MV-22 radius of action

China Okinawa Approximately 600 km (no refueling)

Shanghai

1,000km

MV-22 range Approximately 3,900 km

Taipei

CH-46 range Approximately 700 km

Saipan

Hong Kong

(1) All distances are in straight-line distance Manila Guam
(2) CH-46 has no aerial refueling function

Comparison of Basic Performance MV-22 CH-46

Maximum speed Approximately 520 km/h Maximum speed Approximately 270 km/h

About twice

Cruising speed Approximately 490 km/h Approximately 220 km/h

Range Approximately 3,900 km Approximately 700 km

Approximately 600 km Radius of action Approximately 140 km

Radius of action

(With 24 troops on board) About four times (With 12 troops on board)

Number of troops carried 24 12

Number of crew 3–4 3–5

Cargo (inside) Approximately 9,100 kg Approximately 2,300 kg

Payload

Cargo (outside) Approximately 5,700 kg About three times Approximately 2,300 kg

Rotor diameter Approximately 11.6 m Approximately 15.5 m

Angle of flight Approximately 7,500 m Approximately 3,000 m

Own weight Approximately 16,000 kg Approximately 7,700 kg

MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size.

Measurement

6.7 m 5.1 m

17.5 m 25.7 m


MV-22 (right) and MSDF ambulance (left) conducting emergency transportation drill for remote
islands during a Sasebo City Nagasaki Prefecture Comprehensive Drill


**6** **Consultation Structure for Mitigating the Impact**
**on Okinawa**

**6**


Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain
in Okinawa because of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa
and the slower progress of return of USFJ facilities and
areas compared to other areas of Japan even after the
occupation ended. In order to mitigate the concentrated
impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been
implementing initiatives towards the realization of the
SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is
committed to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa
th h th Oki P li C il it b itt


-----

operations in February 2017.
The Consultation between the Central Government
and Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of the Chief Cabinet
Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary (administrative) and the Governor
and Vice Governor of Okinawa, was established with
the purpose of holding consultations on measures for
the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa and measures
for Okinawa’s development. In the three meetings that
have been held since January 2016, discussion took place
on issues such as the relocation of MCAS Futenma and
the suspension of its operation within fi ve years and the
return of more than half of the Northern Training Area.

See Section 3-7 (Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities

and Areas)

See


**7** **Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously**
**Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces**


Maintenance staff working on MV-22 at the Osprey common maintenance base (Camp Kisarazu)

and other means,[10] while listening to the opinions of the
local residents.
At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting in
December 2013, the Governor of Okinawa presented
several requests, including cessation of the operation of
MCAS Futenma within fi ve years and its early return, the
re-deployment of about twelve MV-22s to bases outside
of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service
Area within seven years.
The Japanese Government as a whole is addressing
the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa by establishing
the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact
of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief
Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense,
the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan.
The MOD also created the Committee for Promoting
the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa
headed by the State Minister of Defense in January
2014 to continually work on the reduction of the impact
on Okinawa.
The Government of Japan is taking steps to promote
various efforts such as the training relocation of MV-22
through, among other means, the agreement of the JapanU.S. Joint Committee to relocate the training of aircraft
based at MCAS Futenma such as MV-22 to locations
outside of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense. In
October 2015, it decided to implement regular MV22 maintenance at GSDF Camp Kisarazu (Kisarazu
City, Chiba Prefecture) and commenced maintenance


**7**


For the return of lands in Okinawa provided for use by
the USFJ (“USFJ Land”), the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate
Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously
Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces stipulates
various measures concerning the USFJ Land agreed to
be returned. The MOD mainly conducts the following
initiatives, and will continue its initiatives to promote
the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by
coordinating and cooperating with related ministries,
the prefectural government and local municipalities.
The MOD:
(1) conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys,
etc., to be implemented by the prefectural government
and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are
agreed to be returned;
(2) conducts measures applying to all the returned
lands to remove impediments for use such as soil
contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only
those caused by the activities of the stationed forces,
before handing over the land to the owners of former
USFJ Land; and
(3) provides fi nancial benefi ts to alleviate the impact on
the owners of the returned lands and to promote use
of the land.


10 On March 19, 2013, a subcommittee was established under the Okinawa Policy Council in order to address issues concerning mitigation of the impact relating to U.S. bases and Okinawa


-----

**i**

**Message from the Mayor of Kisarazu City, Chiba Prefecture**

Yoshikuni Watanabe, Mayor of Kisarazu City

Kisarazu City is located on the southern part of the Boso Peninsula facing the Tokyo Bay. Approximately 135,000 people live in
this warm city covering 138.95 km[2]. It hosts GSDF Camp Kisarazu, which includes airport functions whose facilities and area are
controlled by USFJ and are jointly used mainly by the GSDF First Helicopter Brigade. An MSDF logistics depot and an ASDF base are
also located in the Camp Kisarazu neighborhood. We have a good, well-coordinated relationship with each Self-Defense Force service
not only for disaster prevention matters but also for all other aspects including various events held by our city.
In October 2014, the MOD explained that there were the plans to establish the Japan-U.S. common regular airframe
maintenance base in Camp Kisarazu for the MV-22 Osprey of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa and the MV-22 Osprey scheduled
to be deployed by the GSDF. Our fi rst and foremost concern was the safety and security of the people in the city. With regard to this
concern, the MOD responded to the request from the municipal administration and assembly and conducted a noise comparison
between large GSDF helicopters and the Osprey, established rules for providing information to ensure the safety and security of
the people, and concluded a memorandum with the U.S. Forces so that fl ight operations would be conducted with due care for
the safety and environment of the Camp Kisarazu neighborhood during regular maintenance. We believe that this is extremely
meaningful in ensuring safety and security of the people.
As a city hosting military bases, we understand the necessity of cooperating with Japan’s Security Arrangements centered on the
Japan-U.S. Alliance. It is our understanding that the establishment of the Japan-U.S. common regular airframe maintenance base at
Camp Kisarazu contributes to the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the mitigation of the
impact on Okinawa. We trust that regular airframe maintenance will be conducted appropriately according to the memorandum so
that there will be no impact on the daily life of the public. We intend to continue to deepen mutual understanding through dialogue
and coordination with the SDF and the USFJ.

Mr. Yoshikuni Watanabe (center), Mayor of Kisarazu City being briefed MV-22 on the tarmac in front of K Hangar at GSDF Camp Kisarazu
by an Osprey pilot


**Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa**
**5**


In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing
measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces
by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the
impact on local communities.


**1** **Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in**
**Kanagawa Prefecture**

**1**


Due to the strong desire from local public bodies and other
organizations, the Japanese and U.S. Governments, after
bilateral consultations, agreed on the return of six facilities
and areas in Yokohama City and on the construction of
h i it f d d t f b f th U S


-----

Fig. II-4-3-11 Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

|Location|Name|Location|Area (ha)|Plan for Land Return, etc.|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||Kamiseya Communication Station|Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 242 ha|Land return completed at the end of June 2015|
||Fukaya Communication Site|Izumi-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 77 ha|Land return completed in June 2014|
||Negishi Dependent Housing Area|Naka-ku, Minami-ku and Isogo ku, Yokohama City Area|About 43 ha|To be returned upon completion of construction of dependent housing in|
||Tomioka Storage Area|Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 3 ha|Land return completed in May 2009|
||Koshiba POL Depot|Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 53 ha|Land return completed in December 2005|
||Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex|Yokohama City Area|About 37 ha|Agreed in 2014 to change the number of housing units to be constructed from about 400, as initially planned, to 171|
||Detached part of|Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 1 ha|Return procedures to begin upon completion of the current use|


Fig. II-4-3-11

Location Name Location Area (ha) Plan for Land Return, etc.

Kamiseya Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Land return completed at the end of

About 242 ha

Communication Station Yokohama City Area June 2015

**Yokohama City,**
**Kanagawa** Fukaya Izumi-ku, About 77 ha Land return completed in June 2014
**Prefecture** Communication Site Yokohama City Area

Naka-ku, Minami-ku

**Asahi-kuAsahi-ku** Negishi and Isogo ku, About 43 ha To be returned upon completion of

**Seya-ku** Dependent Housing Area Yokohama City Area construction of dependent housing in

Kanazawa-ku,

**Izumi-kuIzumi-ku** **Minami-kuMinami-ku** **Naka-kuNaka-ku** Tomioka Storage Area Yokohama City Area About 3 ha Land return completed in May 2009

Kanazawa-ku,

**Totsuka-kuTotsuka-ku** **Isogo-kuIsogo-ku** Koshiba POL Depot Yokohama City Area About 53 ha Land return completed in December 2005

Agreed in 2014 to change the number

Ikego Housing Area

Yokohama City Area About 37 ha of housing units to be constructed from

and Navy Annex

**Kanazawa-Kanazawa-** about 400, as initially planned, to 171
**kuku** Detached part Kanazawa-ku, Return procedures to begin upon completion

About 1 ha

of Yokohama City Area of the current use

: Implemented : Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation


Fig. II-4-3-12 Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact


Fig. II-4-3-12


**Time** **Improvement**

December 2007 Reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) at Camp Zama

June 2008 Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot

September 2008 Reorganization of the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward)

August 2011 The operation of the Mission Command Training Center commenced

October 2011 Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama

June 2012 Agreed on the shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City

March 2013 The GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF Camp to Camp Zama

September 2014 Partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot

December 2015 The shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) commenced

February 2016 Partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama


Forces in the Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area
and Navy Annex.” Of the area of approximately 419 ha
to be returned, approximately 375 ha consisting of four
facilities and areas, including Kami Seya Communication
Station, have to date been returned.

See Fig. II-4-3-11 (Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in

Kanagawa Prefecture)

**2** **Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the**
**U.S. Forces in Japan as Stipulated in the Roadmap**

**2**


**(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and**
**Control Capability**

To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to
enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army
Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City and
Zama City in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into
the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) in


December 2007 and the reorganization took place at the
end of September 2008.
With the aim of strengthening coordination with the
reorganized USARJ headquarters so as to enable rapid
responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central
Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF
Camp Asaka (Asaka City, Wako City and Niiza City in
Saitama Prefecture and Nerima Ward, Tokyo) to Camp
Zama, where the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan
(USARJ) are located, at the end of FY2012.[11] In addition,
for more effective and effi cient use of Camp Zama and
the Sagami General Depot (SGD), measures were taken
for the partial return of respective facilities and areas. In
February 2016, the partial release of land (approximately
5.4 ha) at Camp Zama was realized and Zama General
Hospital was established on the returned site in April
2016. In addition, in December 2015, the shared use
of a portion of land at SGD (approximately 35 ha)


11 With the establishment of the Ground Component Command at the end of FY2017, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters located in Camp Zama will be abolished and a Japan-U.S. Joint
Headquarters (tentative name) that assumes a coordinating role between Japan and the United States will be established in the headquarters of the Ground Component Command. The headquarters


-----

**(3) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Commander**
**Fleet Activities, Yokosuka**

The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important
role in ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Pacific
region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S.
aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet.
The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to
ensure that all of its forward-deployed nuclear-powered
vessels,[13] including USS Ronald Reagan, while anchored
at Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka
City, Kanagawa Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety
policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally
be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and
repairing and refueling will not be carried out in Japan.
The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all
possible measures to ensure safety.

**(4) Measures relating to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and**
**MCAS Iwakuni**

a. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft
Naval Air Facility Atsugi (Ayase City, Yamato City and
Ebina City in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as
a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Naval Air Facility
Atsugi is located at the center of an urban district, the
noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular
has been a problem for a long time. It is necessary to
resolve such problems as soon as possible in order to
stably maintain the operations of aircraft carriers.
Thus, after the completion of the runway relocation
project[14] at MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi
Prefecture), which made aircraft operations possible with
less impact on the living environment of the surrounding
communities, it was decided that CVW-5 squadrons
would be relocated from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to
MCAS Iwakuni.
In order to mitigate impacts of the increased
operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the relocation,
the related measures listed in Fig. II-4-3-13 are to be
taken. As a result, the noise problems are expected to
be mitigated from the current situation, with the area
requiring residential noise-abatement work, or the socalled first category area, decreasing from approximately
1,600 ha to approximately 650 ha.

See Fig. II-4-3-13 (Measures Related to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and

MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc.)


with Sagamihara City was realized. In other areas, the
realignment projects associated with the improvement of
U.S. Army Japan command and control capability have
been undertaken as shown in Fig. II-4-3-12.

See Fig. II-4-3-12 (Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan

Command and Control Capability and Mitigation of Impact)

See


**(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace**
a. Commencement of the Operation of the Bilateral
Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) and the
Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ
Enhancement of coordination between the headquarters
of both countries, combined with the transition to joint
operational posture, is highly important to ensure a
response with flexibility and readiness of the SDF
and the U.S. Forces. Therefore, at the end of FY2011,
the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center
(BJOCC)[12] commenced its operations at Yokota Air
Base and the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ and
its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base.
These arrangements have made it possible to enhance
coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and
the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information
concerning air defense and BMD.
b. Yokota Airspace
To facilitate the operations of civilian airplanes in
Yokota airspace, where the U.S. Forces conduct radar
approach control, measures have been taken since 2006
to temporarily transfer the responsibility for air traffic
control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese
authorities, to deploy ASDF officers at the Yokota Radar
Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON), and to reduce
the airspace by about 40% (i.e., the release of air traffic
control from USFJ).
c. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base
At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it
was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota
Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference
was then established as a working panel attended by
relevant government ministries and agencies and the
Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The Governments
of Japan and the United States are also conducting a
study on the specific conditions and modalities, with the
understanding that both countries will not compromise
the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base.


12 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between the Japanese
and U.S. headquarters.

13 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and
operational capabilities.

14 A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1,000 m to the east (offshore), in response to the requests from Iwakuni City, etc. The new runway commenced its operations in


-----

Fig. II-4-3-13 Measures Related to Naval Air Facility Atsugi and MCAS Iwakuni and Their Status of Progress, etc.

|Measure|Status of Progress, etc.|
|---|---|
|Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni|To be completed by around 2017. In January 2017, explained to Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities that the relocation of carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni would commence in the latter half of 2017, etc. Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities expressed their approval by June 2017.|
|Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. from MCAS Iwakuni to Naval Air Facility Atsugi|Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense system, Japan and the United States conf rimed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni.|
|Relocation of KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni|Relocation completed in August 2014.|
|Rotational deployment of KC-130 to Kanoya Air Base and Guam|❍ In October 2015, Kanoya City expressed its understanding for rotational deployment of KC-130 to MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture). ❍ Japan and the United States are currently holding consultations over the specif ic timing of the commencement of rotational deployment. ❍ Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, conf irmed that training has already commenced.|
|Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam|Japan and the United States conf irmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam.|


Fig. II-4-3-13


**Measure** **Status of Progress, etc.**

To be completed by around 2017.

Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5)

In January 2017, explained to Yamaguchi Prefecture, Iwakuni City, and other municipalities that the relocation of

squadrons from Naval Air Facility Atsugi to MCAS

carrier-based aircraft to MCAS Iwakuni would commence in the latter half of 2017, etc. Yamaguchi Prefecture,

Iwakuni

Iwakuni City, and other municipalities expressed their approval by June 2017.

Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. from MCAS Iwakuni Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense
to Naval Air Facility Atsugi system, Japan and the United States confi rmed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni.

Relocation of KC-130 air refueling aircraft from
Relocation completed in August 2014.
MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni

❍ In October 2015, Kanoya City expressed its understanding for rotational deployment of KC-130 to MSDF
Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture).

Rotational deployment of KC-130 to Kanoya Air

❍ Japan and the United States are currently holding consultations over the specifi c timing of the

Base and Guam

commencement of rotational deployment.
❍ Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, confi rmed that training has already commenced.

Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Japan and the United States confi rmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will
Iwakuni to Guam return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam.

: Implemented : Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation


b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP)
The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework
to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be
established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at
the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June
2011, it was confi rmed that the Government of Japan will
explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered
to be the candidate site for a new SDF facility. This SDF
facility would be used to support operations in response
to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as
well as regular exercises and other activities, including
use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In
addition, the 2005 SCC document confi rmed that the
U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in
accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a
permanent FCLP training facility is identifi ed.
c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni
Considering that the local public entities, etc., including
Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been
working together to request the resumption of civil
aviation operations, it was agreed in the Roadmap
that “portions of the future civilian air facility will
be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this
agreement, Iwakuni Kintaikyo Airport was opened in
December 2012, resuming regular fl ights of civil aviation
aircraft for the fi rst time in 48 years.

**(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)**
Japan and the United States are set to continue close
coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their
respective BMD capabilities. In June 2006, an AN/TPY-2
radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed


to the U.S. Shariki Communication Site (Tsugaru City,
Aomori Prefecture).[15] Also in October 2006, U.S. Army
Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were
deployed to Kadena Air Base (Kadena Town, Okinawa
City and Chatan Town in Okinawa Prefecture) and
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Yomitan Village,
Okinawa City, Kadena Town, Onna Village and Uruma
City in Okinawa Prefecture). In December 2014, the
second TPY-2 radar in Japan was deployed to the U.S.
Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyotango City in
Kyoto Prefecture).
In addition, the United States deployed Aegis
destroyers with BMD capabilities to Commander Fleet
Activities, Yokosuka (Yokosuka City in Kanagawa
Prefecture) in October 2015 and March 2016. The
additional deployment is scheduled for around July 2017.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks)

**(6) Training Relocation**
a. Aviation Training Relocation (ATR)
Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ
facilities and areas—Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City
and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS
Iwakuni—would participate for the time being in
bilateral training with ASDF at ASDF facilities, training
relocation has been underway since 2007.[16] The MOD
has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the
training relocation.
In January 2011, at the Joint Committee, based on
the achievements at the “2+2” Meeting in 2010, both
governments agreed to include Guam as a new training
relocation site and to expand the scale of training.


15 The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.


-----

Moreover, at the Joint Committee in October 2011, they
agreed on details for training sites. After that, training
was relocated to Guam and other locations for the
first time, leading to a series of training conducted at
relocation sites.
Furthermore, in March 2014, both governments at
the Joint Committee agreed to add air-to-ground training
using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and
Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture). This agreement
resulted in air-to-ground training using the Misawa Airto-Ground Range in June 2014.
The training relocation contributes to enhancing
interoperability between the two countries, and also to
relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by
using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will
help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby
contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa.
In addition to assisting USFJ, the MOD/SDF is
conducting efforts to ensure the safety and security
of the local community, such as the establishment of a
liaison office, facilitating communication with related
government agencies, and response to requirements from
the local community. These efforts have been contributing
to successful training relocation.
b. Relocation of Training for MV-22, etc.
Having decided in the “2+2” joint statement of October
3, 2013 to reduce the MV-22’s amount of time located
and training in Okinawa and to utilize opportunities to
participate in various operations in mainland Japan and
across the region in order to increase training outside
of Okinawa Prefecture, including mainland Japan,
while maintaining the deterrent of the Alliance, the
Governments of Japan and the United States have been
moving forward with the implementation of training,
etc. for the MV-22 at MCAS Futenma outside of
Okinawa Prefecture.
On September 1, 2016, it was agreed at the JapanU.S. Joint Committee to relocate the training activities of

**Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan**
**6**


In order to smoothly implement the realignment of USFJ
based on the Roadmap, the Act on Special Measures on
Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United
States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special
Measures Act) was enacted in August 2007. Realignment
grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc.


An MV-22 Osprey landing at the Somagahara Exercise Area (Somagahara Maneuver Area)
(Gunma Prefecture) during the Forest Light 02 field exercise in Japan with the U.S. Marine Corps

Tilt-Rotar/Rotary wing aircraft, such as the AH-1 and CH53, and the MV-22 that are currently stationed at MCAS
Futenma out of Okinawa Prefecture at Japan’s expense in
order to further promote training outside of Okinawa and
mitigate the impact of training activities on Okinawa.
Based on this agreement, the first relocation exercise
(unilateral exercise by U.S. Forces) in which (16) MV22s participated was held in Guam for approximately
three weeks from September 12, 2016. For approximately
two weeks from March 6, 2017, six MV-22s arrived,
in conjunction with the field training in Japan with the
U.S. Marine Corps (Forest Light 02) and conducted
the first relocation exercise in mainland Japan (JapanU.S. joint exercise) at the Sekiyama Training Area
(Niigata Prefecture) and the Somagahara Exercise Area
(Somagahara Maneuver Area) (Gunma Prefecture). In
April 2017, it was announced that around three relocation
exercises are planned for FY2017.
The MV-22’s amount of time located and training
in Okinawa will continue to be reduced by relocating
exercises participated by the MV-22 that were originally
conducted in Okinawa to places such as mainland Japan
and Guam, and the Government will continue to promote
initiatives that contribute to further mitigating the impact
on Okinawa.

and other systems were established based on the law.
During a period of time before and after the
implementation of realignment (10 years in principle),
realignment grants[17] will be awarded to help cover the
expenses of projects[18] which contribute to increasing
the convenience of the lives of residents of local


17 Approximately 7.1 billion yen in the FY2017 budget
18 Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with U.S. air wings subject to realignment (replacement of


-----

municipalities affected by the realignment,[19] and to
stimulate local industries. To this end, they will be
awarded in accordance with progress made in the steps
of U.S. Forces realignment, after the Defense Minister
designates the specifi ed defense facilities and neighboring
municipalities affected by realignment. As of April 2017,
9 defense facilities in 15 municipalities are eligible to
receive the grant.
In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some
USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S.
Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam.
Since these developments may affect the employment

**Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas**
**7**


**1** **Initiatives to Conserve the Environments around**
**USFJ Facilities and Areas**

**1**


At the “2+2” meeting in September 2000, based on the
recognition that environmental conservation is important,
the governments of both nations agreed to make it a
common objective to ensure the health and safety of
residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas,
U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such
parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental
Principles.”[20] To follow up on this announcement, JapanU.S. consultations have been enhanced. Specifi cally, the
MOD has been working with relevant ministries and
agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of
the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS),[21]
exchange information on the environment, and deal with
environmental pollution.
Additionally, at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2010,
Japan and the United States discussed the possibility
of taking a “Green Alliance” approach and studied the
adoption of renewable energy for the U.S. Forces facilities
and areas under development in Japan.
Furthermore, the Governments of Japan and the
United States engaged in discussions aimed at the creation
of a framework for increased initiatives in managing
the environment associated with USFJ facilities and
areas. The Government of Japan then commenced
negotiations with the United States on an agreement that
supplements the SOFA on an environmental front, and
they reached substantive accord in October 2014, before


of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will
take measures to include education and skills training,
which is to help retain their employment.
The Realignment Special Measures Act was
supposed to cease to be effective as of March 31, 2017.
However, since there remain realignment projects that
require implementation, an act revising part of the Act
including a ten-year extension of the time limit of the Act
to March 31, 2027 was enacted.

See Reference 37 (Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth

Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in

See

Japan)

signing and effectuating the supplementary agreement
in September 2015. This supplemental agreement
represents an international commitment with legal
binding force and sets forth the following provisions
concerning environmental standards and access to U.S.
Forces facilities and areas:
(1) Japan and the United States shall share available and
appropriate relevant information;
(2) The United States shall release and maintain the
Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS),
and for these standards, Japan and the United States
shall adopt the more protective of Japanese, U.S. or
international agreement standards;
(3) Procedures shall be established and maintained to
allow appropriate access for the Japanese authorities
to USFJ facilities and areas when an accident with
an impact on the environment (leakage) actually
occurs or when the Japanese authorities conduct a
fi eld survey (including a survey on cultural assets) in
relation to the return of USFJ facilities and areas;
(4) Japan and the United States shall start consultations
at the Joint Committee on matters related to the
implementation of the agreement upon request from
either party.
This supplemental agreement is part of a more
comprehensive framework for recognizing the
signifi cance of environmental protection. This agreement
is the fi rst one to be created to supplement the SOFA
since the SOFA entered into force and has a historical


19 The specifi c scope of projects includes 14 projects identifi ed by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States
Forces in Japan, including education, sports, and cultural projects.

20 Consisting of four items; (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information sharing and access, (3) response to environmental contamination, and (4) environmental consultation.

21 JEGS is an environmental standard compiled by USFJ in order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect the natural environment and health of people, and stipulates the handling of


-----

signifi cance that differs in nature from conventional
improvements in the operations of the SOFA.

**2** **Other Measures**


by the SOFA and contains the following provisions:
(1) Clarifi cation of the scope of the civilian component
and the establishment of eligibility criteria for
contractor employees;
(2) Notifi cation, review, etc. of contractor employees;
(3) Exclusion of persons ordinarily resident in Japan
from the civilian component; and
(4) Establishment of a working group.
This is the second such supplementary agreement,
following Environmental Framework, which was
concluded in 2015.
It is hoped that the recurrence of incidents and
accidents by the civilian component of USFJ will be
prevented by further promoting cooperation between
Japan and the United States and further strengthening
management of the civilian component of USFJ through the
steady implementation of this supplementary agreement.
In light of the aforementioned joint statement,
training materials to deepen understanding about the
history and culture unique to Okinawa, designed for
all military personnel, the civilian component and their
families newly arriving in Okinawa, were revised taking
into account the views of Okinawa Prefecture and others.
In November 2016, the relevant local governments
observed the actual training using the materials.
In March 2017, the U.S. Forces in Okinawa invited
journalists to Camp Foster and showed them the training
for new arrivals using the materials.

See Reference 38 (Agreement between the Government of Japan and

the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation
with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to the
Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces in Japan,
Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United
States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of
United States Armed Forces in Japan)

Meanwhile, the Government of Japan prepared Crime
Prevention Measures in Okinawa in June 2016 under the
understanding that in order to never allow a recurrence of
similar tragic incidents, it is necessary for the Government
to promptly promote measures to deter crime and ensure
the safety and security of the people of Okinawa. The
pillars of the Measures consist of bolstering crime
prevention patrol operations and the establishment of a
safe and secure environment. The MOD is participating in
the Okinawa Local Safety Patrol Corps established in the
Okinawa General Bureau and will continue to cooperate
with relevant ministries and agencies to ensure the
implementation of effective measures.

See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 1-4 (Measures to Promote Harmony

between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas)


**2**


The Government of Japan has been taking measures for
the improvement of the living environment in regions
surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. The Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Communications also provides
municipalities with base grants, which have alternate
features in terms of municipal tax on real estate.
Moreover, in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas,
incidents and accidents caused by U.S. Forces personnel
and others have affected local areas and their residents,
so the Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take
effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such
as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing
strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan
is cooperating with USFJ in these prevention measures;
at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and
appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the
incidents and accidents.
The United States has also taken measures for its
part, putting in place its guidelines for off-duty action
(liberty policy), including measures such as nighttime
alcohol restrictions as well as curfews applying to U.S.
Forces personnel ranked below a certain rank.
Following the case which occurred in Okinawa in April
2016 where a member of the U.S. Forces civilian component
became a suspect of murder, the Governments of Japan and
the United States engaged in discussions to develop effective
prevention measures, and released the Japan-United States
Joint Statement[22] in July 2016 on clarifying the scope of the
civilian component, among other matters.
The Governments of Japan and the United States
conducted intensive discussions to establish a legally
binding document based on the joint statement, and
in January 2017 signed the Agreement between the
Government of Japan and the Government of the
United States of America on Cooperation with regard
to Implementation Practices Relating to the Civilian
Component of United States Armed Forces in Japan,
Supplementary to The Agreement under Article VI of the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan
and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities
and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces
in Japan, which immediately went into force.
This supplementary agreement supplements and
clarifi es the content of the “civilian component” prescribed


-----

**Commentary**

**Exchanges between Local Residents and the U.S. Forces**

For the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), it is imperative to obtain understanding and cooperation from citizens who live
near USFJ facilities. The MOD hosts Japan-U.S. friendship programs every year with the cooperation of local communities and the
U.S. Forces to promote exchanges between residents living near the USFJ facilities and areas and USFJ-related personnel through
sports and music events, etc. in order to deepen mutual understanding between Japan and the United States. The U.S. Forces also
conduct local exchange programs in collaboration with the communities.
For example, each year, in the vicinity (Tachikawa, Akishima, Fussa, Musashimurayama and Hamura cities and the Mizuho town)
of Yokota Air Base, where the USFJ headquarters, etc. are located, the U.S. Air Force Band of the Pacifi c-Asia stationed at Yokota Air
Base, local amateur bands and others hold the Japanese-American Friendship Music Festival, and the children on Yokota Air Base
visit Japanese schools and experience Japanese culture and school life through the Japanese-American School Exchange Program.
The U.S. Forces also conduct exchanges with participants from facilities for persons with disabilities near the bases. For
example, Yokota Air Base hosts the Special Olympics each year, whose mission is to promote self-reliance and social participation by
people with intellectual disabilities.
The MOD believes that maintaining these exchanges over the years is highly important in building good relationships between
local residents and the U.S. Forces. Therefore, we will continue to host Japan-U.S. friendship programs with the cooperation of local
communities and the U.S. Forces.

The 10th Japanese-American Friendship Music Festival The 8th Japanese-American School The 37th Kanto Plains Special Olympics
(held annually) Exchange Program (held annually)
(held two to three times a year)


-----

**Part**
## Ⅲ

Initiatives to Protect the Lives
and Property of the People as
well as Securing the Territorial
Land, Water and Airspace


Chapter 1
**Organizations Responsible for**
**the Defense of Japan, and**
**Effective Deterrence and Handling**

Chapter 2
**Active Promotion of Security**
**Cooperation**

Chapter 3
**Human Foundation and Organization**
**that Supports the Defense Force,**
**and Active Participation of Female**
**SDF Personnel**

Chapter 4
**Measures on Defense Equipment**
**and Technology**

Chapter 5
**Interaction with Local Communities**
**and Japanese Citizens**


-----

**g** **p**

**Chapter** **the Defense of Japan, and**
### 1

**Effective Deterrence and Handling**


**Section 1** **[Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/]**
**the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)**


**Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability**
**1**


**1** **Organization of the MOD/SDF**

**1**


To fulfi ll their mission of defending Japan, the Ministry of
Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)[1] consists
of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime
and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces.

See Fig. III-1-1-1 (Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense)

Fig. III-1-1-2 (Outline of the Ministry of Defense)


the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal
Bureaus shall, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who
is in charge of defense equipment administration, support
the Minister of Defense in accordance with their respective
responsibilities, by providing the Minister of Defense
assistance from a policy perspective – namely, to ensure that
the affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD are properly
carried out in accordance with laws and regulations in order
to accomplish the mission of the MOD. The Joint Staff is
a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning
the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides
centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the
Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective.
The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the
staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning
their respective services except operations of the SDF,
with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force
(GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the top ranking
expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these
services. In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the
support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the
support for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective
shall be provided in a well-balanced manner like the two
wheels of a vehicle, so to speak, in order for the Minister
of Defense to appropriately make decisions. This existing
concept regarding the support system for the Minister of
Defense has been made even more explicit by Article 12 of
the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act, which has been
amended to stipulate that the support for the Minister of
Defense provided by the Director-General of the Minister’s
Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau as
well as the Commissioner of ATLA shall be conducted
in cooperation with the support for the Minister by each


See


**2** **Systems to Support the Minister of Defense**

**2**


The Minister of Defense is responsible for issues related
to the defense of Japan as the head of the MOD, and is
in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with
the provisions of the SDF Law. The Minister is supported
by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary ViceMinisters of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the
Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers
to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of
Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on
basic principles concerning administrative affairs under
the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the
Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes
and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau
and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and
the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs,
who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties
such as those related to international affairs.
Moreover, the Internal Bureaus of the MOD, Joint
Staff, Ground Staff Offi ce, Maritime Staff Offi ce, Air
Staff Offi ce, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics
Agency (ATLA) as an external bureau have been
established in the MOD. The Internal Bureaus of the MOD
are responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the
SDF. The Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and


The MOD and the SDF form a single organization for national defense. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates


-----

Fig. III-1-1-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense

|Cabinet|Col2|
|---|---|
|Prime|Minister|


|Minister|of Defense|
|---|---|


|State Minist|er of Defense|
|---|---|


|Minister’s Secretariat|Bureau of Defense Policy|Bureau of Personnel and Education Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning|Bureau of Local Cooperation|SDF Ethics Review Board|Central Council on Defense Facilities|Defense Personnel Review Board|National Defense Academy|National Defense Medical College|National Institute for Defense Studies|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|


|Units and organizations of the Maritime Self-Defense Force|Units and organizations of the Air Self-Defense Force|SDF Intelligence Security Command|Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Supervised Units of Communication Systems|SDF Physical Training School|SDF Central Hospital|SDF Regional Hospitals|Provincial Cooperation Offices|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|


Fig. III-1-1-1

Cabinet

Prime Minister

Minister of Defense National Security Council

State Minister of Defense

Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people)

Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two)

Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense

Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense

Internal Bureaus Review Board, etc. Institutions Attached Organizations

Units and Organizations Cooperative Units Cooperative Organization

*Excluding temporary or special positions.


Chief of Staff, since 2015, when the Act was amended for
the establishment of ATLA and the reorganization of Joint
Staff, etc., as part of an initiative for the MOD reform.[2]

|Defense Council|Joint Staff|Ground Staff Office|Maritime Staff Office|Air Staff Office|Defense Intelligence Headquarters|Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|

|Regional Defense Bureaus (eight)|Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|
|---|---|


City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch
offi ces in charge of comprehensive defense administration.
In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the
burden on local communities hosting bases and inspecting
equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various
activities to obtain the understanding and cooperation of
both local public entities and local residents towards the
MOD/SDF activities.

See Part III, Chapter 5, Section 1 (Collaboration with Local Communities)


**3** **Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas**

**3**


The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight
locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City,
Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima



**Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces**
**2**


In order to rapidly and effectively fulfi ll the duties of the
SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations
system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are
operated integrally. The MOD/SDF is making efforts to


strengthen the foundation of the joint operations as well
as to enhance the functions of the Joint Staff in light of the
current security environment.


The Government has made remarks regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating: “Civilian control
means the priority of politics to the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and
control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees such as the
State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by
the Minister of Defense. The role of civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureaus in civilian control is to support the Minister of Defense, and there is no relationship in which civilian offi cials of the Internal


-----

Fig. III-1-1-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense

|Organization|Outline|
|---|---|
|GSDF*|● Regional Armies • Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups) • There are f ive regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ● Divisions and Brigades Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others ● Central Readiness Force Consisting of an airborne brigade, a helicopter brigade, the Central Readiness Regiment, the Special Operation Group, and the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit *By the end of FY2017, the Ground Central Command is planned to be established to enable swift and f lexible operations of GSDF units nationwide under integrated operations. Along with the establishment of this unit, the Central Readiness Force will be abolished.|
|MSDF*|● Self-Defense Fleet • Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of f ixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations ● Regional Districts There are f ive regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet|
|ASDF*|● Air Defense Command • Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division *The composition of the Air Defense Command will be changed during FY2017 to four air defense forces by abolishing the Southwestern Composite Air Division and establishing the Southwestern Air Defense Force. • Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ● Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including f ighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)|
|National Defense Academy of Japan (Yokosuka, Kanagawa)|● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel ● Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master’s degree|
|National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama)|● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses ● An institution for the cultivation of future SDF off icers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel ● Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine|
|National Institute for Defense Studies (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|● Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF • Conducts research and compiles data on military history • Educates SDF personnel and other senior off icials • Manages books and documents of historical value|
|Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)|● Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes security data • Collects various military intelligence, including signal, imagery and other information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organizations within the ministry • Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters|
|Inspector General’s Off ice of Legal Compliance (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|● Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position|
|Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)|● Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement of equipment|
|Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)|● Extra-ministerial organization that integrates and consolidates the departments within the Ministry of Defense related to procurement, research and development, etc.|


Fig. III-1-1-2

**Organization** **Outline**

- Regional Armies
- Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery
groups)
- There are fi ve regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions

- Divisions and Brigades

GSDF* Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others

- Central Readiness Force
Consisting of an airborne brigade, a helicopter brigade, the Central Readiness Regiment, the Special Operation Group, and the Central
NBC Weapon Defense Unit
*By the end of FY2017, the Ground Central Command is planned to be established to enable swift and fl exible operations of GSDF units
nationwide under integrated operations. Along with the establishment of this unit, the Central Readiness Force will be abolished.

- Self-Defense Fleet
- Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fi xed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and
the Fleet Submarine Force

MSDF*

- Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations

- Regional Districts
There are fi ve regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet

- Air Defense Command
- Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division
*The composition of the Air Defense Command will be changed during FY2017 to four air defense forces by abolishing the
Southwestern Composite Air Division and establishing the Southwestern Air Defense Force.

ASDF*

- Primarily responsible for general air defense duties

- Air Defense Force
Composed of key units such as air wings (including fi ghter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including
aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others)
National Defense Academy - An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel
of Japan - Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate
(Yokosuka, Kanagawa) and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master’s degree

National Defense Medical - An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses
College - An institution for the cultivation of future SDF offi cers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel
(Tokorozawa, Saitama) - Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine

- Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense

National Institute for Defense - Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF
Studies - Conducts research and compiles data on military history
(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo) - Educates SDF personnel and other senior offi cials

- Manages books and documents of historical value

- Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes security data

Defense Intelligence

- Collects various military intelligence, including signal, imagery and other information acquired by warning and surveillance activities;

Headquarters

comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organizations within the ministry

(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)

- Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters
Inspector General’s Offi ce of
Legal Compliance - Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position
(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)

- Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to

Regional Defense Bureau

acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement

(eight locations nationwide)

of equipment
Acquisition, Technology and

- Extra-ministerial organization that integrates and consolidates the departments within the Ministry of Defense related to

Logistics Agency

procurement, research and development, etc.

(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)

*See “Location of Principal SDF Units” at the end of the book.


**1** **Outline of Joint Operations System**


a joint task force[3] is organized, but also in cases where
a single SDF unit is employed to respond.

**(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and**
**Other Chiefs of Staff**

The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the
operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air
Staff Offi ces undertake functions for unit maintenance,
such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability,
and education and training.

See Fig. III-1-1-3 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief

of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air
Self-Defense Forces)


**1**


**(1) Role of the Chief of Staff**
a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations
concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports
the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s
perspective.
b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of
the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint
Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall
be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this,
the Minister’s commands and orders shall be delivered
through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where


This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specifi c duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command


-----

Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime,
and Air Self-Defense Forces

|ommand for affairs n operations|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations (such as human resources, education, training,* buildup of defense capabilities) Force provider|||
|Chief of Staff, GSDF|Chief of Staff, MSDF|Chief of Staff, ASDF|
|Ground Staff Office|Maritime Joint Staff Staff Office|Air Staff Office|

|Mobilization unit|Col2|
|---|---|
|Joint Task Force Commander|Commanding General, Army and Others|
|Commander, Self- Defense Fleet and Others|Commander, Air Defense Command and Others|


Fig. III-1-1-3


Prime Minister

Minister of Defense

Chain of command for affairs
Chain of command for operations other than operations

Responsibilities for Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations
force operations (such as human resources, education, training,*
Force user buildup of defense capabilities)

Force provider

Chief of
Joint Staff Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff,

GSDF MSDF ASDF

Joint Staff

Maritime

Ground Staff Air Staff

Joint Staff

Office Office

Staff Office

Basic Rule for Joint Operation

The Chief of Joint Staff solely
assists the Minister of Defense on Close coordination among
SDF operations from a military Mobilization unit the Chiefs of Staff
expert’s viewpoint
The Minister of Defense commands Joint Task Force Commanding General, Chief of Joint Staff clearly indicates the
SDF operations through the Chief Commander Army and Others integrated policies for rear support and
of Joint Staff other relevant activities
The Minister of Defense’s orders to Commander, Self- Commander, Air Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF,
the SDF are executed by the Chief Defense Fleet Defense Command MSDF and ASDF assists in rear support
of Joint Staff and Others and Others and other activities during operations

*The Chief of Joint Staff is responsible for joint training


**2** **Strengthening Integrated Operational Functions**

**2**


In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating
to the operations of the SDF and to make the process swifter,
in October 2015, the Bureau of Operational Policy was
abolished and some of this Bureau’s functions such as the
planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to unit
operations were transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy
in order to unite affairs concerning actual operations of the
units into the Joint Staff. This change has made the Joint
Staff assume work that the Internal Bureaus had previously
conducted, such as external explanations including remarks
at the Diet and communication and coordination with related
ministries and governmental agencies. Regarding this work,
therefore, the Administrative Vice Chief of Joint Staff, a
Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level post for civilian offi cials, has
been established to conduct external coordination duties,
etc., taking advantage of the expertise of civilian offi cials
concerning actual operations of the units. In addition, the
Joint Staff Councilor, a post for civilian offi cials at the level
of a division director and department director general has
been established and staffed with necessary subordinates to
assist the Joint Staff Councilor.


**3** **Establishment of Foundation to Enhance the**
**Joint Operations Systems**

**3**


Within the joint operations system, communication of
accurate commands and prompt information sharing
between the units in the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF
are crucial. The MOD/SDF is required to maintain a
command and control function utilizing an advanced
communications network and a system for sharing
intelligence in order to strengthen the joint operational
foundation. Thus, the MOD/SDF continues to develop a
wide-ranging and fl exible communications system that
uses advanced communications technology available
both within and outside Japan.
At the unit level, they are required to create plans
to be able to respond to various situations, while at the
same time they are also required to maintain conditions
to be ready for executing duties through joint training and
other means. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF
branches are stationed at major command headquarters
under normal circumstances, and the number of such
staff personnel is increased as necessary.
In addition, topics such as the improvement of
education and training, the SDF Headquarter structure,
the human resources development, and standardization
of equipment will continue to be reviewed, aiming for
a more effective joint operations system, and necessary
ill b t k t li thi


-----

**Reform of the Ministry of Defense**
**3**


process swifter, a review of the organization will be
conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations
will be unifi ed into the Joint Staff.
(4) Policy-planning functions will be enhanced in
response to the rapid increase in international affairsrelated work and the establishment of the National
Security Council. In addition, public relations
capability will also be strengthened.
Furthermore, it is also stated as important to establish
a series of truly effective reforms by avoiding stagnation
and confusion in operations, and seeking changes in
the mentality of both civilian offi cials and uniformed
personnel through steady and phased implementation
while the Internal Bureaus and the Staff Offi ces equally
support the Minister of Defense.

See Reference 39 (Direction of the MOD Reform (Outline))

See


**2** **Specifi c Initiatives**


**1** **Background and Direction of the Reform**


Following the considerations made by the “Council for
Reforming the Ministry of Defense,” which was held at
the Prime Minister’s Offi ce in 2007 in response to the
frequent incidence of scandals within the MOD/SDF, the
MOD made various initiatives aimed at the MOD reform,
including thorough adherence to rules and regulations,
and the establishment of operational management that
prioritizes the execution of duties, with the aim of total
optimization; additionally, in 2009, the establishment of
the Defense Council under law, the abolition of the post of
the Director of Defense and the establishment of the Senior
Adviser to the Minister of Defense (presently the Special
Adviser to the Minister of Defense) were implemented in
order to strengthen support for the Minister of Defense
and to ensure civilian control thoroughly.
Following this, in the “Direction of the MOD
Reform” arranged in August 2013 at the “Committee for
the Deliberations on the MOD Reform,” established in
the MOD in the same year, it was determined that the
following full-fl edged reform would be undertaken,
taking matters specifi ed in previous considerations
into account, and considering the following situational
changes, such as the increasing severity of the security
environment surrounding Japan; recognition of the
lessons learned relating to the unit operations in the Great
East Japan Earthquake and elsewhere; and the changes
in the policy environment, including the establishment of
the National Security Council.
(1) In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian
offi cials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts
will be established for uniformed personnel in the
Internal Bureaus and for civilian offi cials in each of
the Staff Offi ces and major commands.
(2) In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up
based on individual, vertically-divided optimization
for each GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and to ensure
that build-up is instead conducted based on total
optimization, a procedure will be established for
defense capabilities build-up based on the joint
operations. In combination with this, equipment
acquisition will be streamlined and optimized by
means of management of equipment throughout
its life cycle, and also organizational reform will
be conducted in order to contribute to the overall
optimization of defense capabilities.
(3) In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making
l ti t th ti f th SDF d t k th


**2**


In accordance with the “Direction of the MOD Reform,”
the following initiatives have been implemented.

**(1) Main Initiatives in FY2014**

-  Along with the establishment of permanent posts for
uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureaus and new
posts for civilian offi cials in the Joint Staff and the
main units of each branch of the SDF, a Vice-Minister
of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible
for the overall coordination of duties such as those
related to international affairs, has been established


**(2) Main Initiatives in FY2015**
a. Strengthening Integrated Operational Functions

-  As work related to actual operations have been unifi ed
into the Joint Staff, the Bureau of Operational Policy
has been abolished, and some of the functions of the
Bureau, such as the planning and drafting of laws
and regulations related to unit operations have been
transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy

-  Two new posts for civilian offi cials – Administrative Vice
Chief of Joint Staff (Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level) and
Joint Staff Councilor (division director and department
director general levels) - have been established
b. Reorganization of the Internal Bureaus, etc.

-  The Strategic Planning Division has been established
in the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to strengthen
the policy planning function
Th B f D f B ild Pl i h b


-----

established in order to strengthen the defense capacities
build-up function
c. The New Establishment of the Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics Agency

-  The ATLA has been established as an extra-ministerial
organization with the following four objectives, by

**Section 2 Effective Deterrence and Response**


In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely
and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of
the lives and property of the people as well as territorial
land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts
to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies
before they happen by building a comprehensive defense
architecture. If a contingency does occur, it is required to
respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold.


bringing together and consolidating the departments
of the MOD that had been related to the procurement,
research and development of equipment (the Internal
Bureaus, the respective Staff Offi ces, the Technical
Research and Development Institute, and the
Equipment Procurement and Construction Offi ce)

Therefore, it is important to ensure information
superiority[1] through continuous surveillance over a wide
region around Japan during peacetime. If a contingency
does arise, ensuring maritime superiority[2] and air
superiority[3] in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is
important to respond effectively and minimize the damage.

See Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces);

Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of

See

Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units)


**Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan**
**1**


Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is
surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest[4]
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is
engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and
surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters
and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace.

**1** **Warning and Surveillance in Waters and**
**Airspace Surrounding Japan**


contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

**(2) Response by the MOD/SDF**
The MSDF patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the
Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea from peacetime,
using P-3C patrol aircraft and other aircraft. The ASDF
uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, and early
warning and control aircraft amongst others, to carry
out warning and surveillance activities over Japan
and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. Warning
and surveillance activities in major channels are also
conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, GSDF
coastal surveillance units, and other assets. Furthermore,
warning and surveillance activities are carried out with


**1**


**(1) Basic Concept**
The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance
activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan
during peacetime so that it can respond to various


GSDF personnel conducting warning and surveillance MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control system aircraft
activities conducting warning and surveillance activities

To have an advantage over the opponent in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing, and conveying information.

Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by
the opposing force.

Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a signifi cant level of obstruction by the opposing force.


-----

established in order to strengthen the defense capacities
build-up function
c. The New Establishment of the Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics Agency

-  The ATLA has been established as an extra-ministerial
organization with the following four objectives, by

**Section 2 Effective Deterrence and Response**


In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely
and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of
the lives and property of the people as well as territorial
land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts
to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies
before they happen by building a comprehensive defense
architecture. If a contingency does occur, it is required to
respond seamlessly to the situations as they unfold.


bringing together and consolidating the departments
of the MOD that had been related to the procurement,
research and development of equipment (the Internal
Bureaus, the respective Staff Offi ces, the Technical
Research and Development Institute, and the
Equipment Procurement and Construction Offi ce)

Therefore, it is important to ensure information
superiority[1] through continuous surveillance over a wide
region around Japan during peacetime. If a contingency
does arise, ensuring maritime superiority[2] and air
superiority[3] in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is
important to respond effectively and minimize the damage.

See Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces);

Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of

See

Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units)


**Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan**
**1**


Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is
surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest[4]
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The SDF is
engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and
surveillance during peacetime over Japan’s territorial waters
and airspace, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace.

**1** **Warning and Surveillance in Waters and**
**Airspace Surrounding Japan**


contingencies immediately and seamlessly.

**(2) Response by the MOD/SDF**
The MSDF patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the
Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea from peacetime,
using P-3C patrol aircraft and other aircraft. The ASDF
uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, and early
warning and control aircraft amongst others, to carry
out warning and surveillance activities over Japan
and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. Warning
and surveillance activities in major channels are also
conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, GSDF
coastal surveillance units, and other assets. Furthermore,
warning and surveillance activities are carried out with


**1**


**(1) Basic Concept**
The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance
activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan
during peacetime so that it can respond to various


GSDF personnel conducting warning and surveillance MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control system aircraft
activities conducting warning and surveillance activities

To have an advantage over the opponent in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing, and conveying information.

Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by
the opposing force.

Air superiority refers to the condition in which one side can carry out airborne operations without suffering a signifi cant level of obstruction by the opposing force.


-----

Fig. III-1-2-1 Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan


Fig. III-1-2-1


Territorial waters
(Including inland waters) Sea areas Etorofu

around Hokkaido Island

Contiguous zone

EEZ
(Including contiguous zone)

E-2C Airborne E-2C Airborne
Early Warning AircraftEarly Warning Aircraft

P-1 Patrol Aircraft

Sea of Japan

Takeshima

E-767 Airborne WarningE-767 Airborne Warning
and Control System and Control System
Joint Staff, etc.

Hachijo
Island

P-3C Patrol Aircraft

Ogasawara
Islands Minami Torishima

Destroyer

Senkaku

East China Sea Islands SDF: Coast observation unit

Okidaitojima SDF: Radar site

SDF: Radar site (BMD response)

YonagunijimaYonagunijima

-  Schematic image of a surveillance range.

Okinotorishima It does not exactly match with the actual range.

-  Flow of information


the fl exible use of destroyers and aircraft as required.
Thus, the SDF maintains a defense and security posture
so that it can respond quickly to various contingencies in
areas surrounding Japan.
Amid such a situation, following September 2012
when the Government of Japan acquired property rights
to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri
Island, Minamikojima Island, and Kitakojima Island),
Chinese government vessels have carried out intermittent
intrusions into Japan’s territorial waters surrounding the
Senkaku Islands.[5] In 2016, there were twelve confi rmed
incidents of activities by Chinese Navy vessels including
passage through the Southwestern Islands such as the sea
areas between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako
Island. Furthermore, in June 2016, a Chinese Navy
combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone to the
north of the Senkaku Islands for the fi rst time. In the same
month, a Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessel
(AGI) sailed within Japan’s territorial waters west of
Kuchinoerabu Island (Kagoshima Prefecture) and entered
the Kitadaito Island contiguous zone, and then the vessel
further carried out round-trip passages in waters south
of the Senkaku Islands. Chinese Navy vessels continue
their activities in the sea areas surrounding Japan, and
six vessels including the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier


Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters

Fig. III-1-2-2 around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Coast

Guard Ships

Fig. III-1-2-2

(Times) As of June 22, 2017

20

**15**

15

**12** **12** **12**

**11** **11** **11**

**10** **10** **10**

10

5

0

Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr.

2014 2015 2016 2017


“Liaoning” passed through the sea area between the main
island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and entered the
western Pacifi c in December 2016. This was the fi rst time
that the entry of this aircraft carrier into the Pacifi c Ocean
was confi rmed. In July 2017, a Chinese Navy AGI entered
Japan’s territorial waters southwest of Matsumae-kojima
island in Matsumae, Hokkaido. This AGI later left the
territorial waters and sailed east through Tsugaru Strait,
advancing to the Pacifi c Ocean.
Since it is anticipated that the areas of activity by
Chinese government vessels and Navy vessels will continue
to further expand and their activities will become more


-----

**Commentary**

**A Sense of Urgency Accompanying the Warning and Surveillance**
**Duties in the East China Sea**

Japan is a maritime nation that has approximately 6,800 remote islands as part of its territory, as well as the sixth largest territorial
waters/exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In order to respond to various contingencies in the seas and airspace around Japan promptly
and seamlessly, the MOD/SDF vessels and aircraft habitually engage in warning and surveillance activities. Particularly in the East
China Sea, there have been an increasing number of cases in which foreign vessels, etc. conduct activities by unilaterally asserting
the rights of their country based on their own assertions that are incompatible with the existing order of international law. Thus, the
necessity for constant and continuous monitoring and surveillance by destroyers and other vessels is increasing.

**i**

Captain (MSDF) Masafumi Nishiwaki (former Commander, Escort Division 12),
Director of Welfare Division, Personnel and Education Department, Maritime Staff Offi ce

The MSDF conducts monitoring and surveillance activities around
the clock against foreign military vessels that navigate in the waters
surrounding Japan. Because it is diffi cult to predict for what purpose,
when, through which route, and for how long foreign military vessels
navigate in the sea around Japan, monitoring and surveillance activities
place an enormous burden on the crew members engaging in this duty
both physically and mentally.
Specifi cally, the crew may be required to cancel their holiday due to an
emergency situation, whether it is the Golden Week holiday in Japan or the

Captain Nishiwaki (far right) taking charge of

year-end/New Year’s holiday, in order to depart from their home port. Duties commanding at the top of the bridge
in the East China Sea, in particular, require their full attention due to the
necessity to pay close attention not only to the movement of foreign vessels but also to the handing of radars and weapons to
avoid an escalation of ongoing situations. Furthermore, the crew may encounter a situation where they run out of fresh food
products such as vegetables when the monitoring and surveillance activities continue for an extended period of time.
Considering such circumstances, commanders in the fi eld try to put efforts into reducing the crew members’
stress to the extent possible by giving them opportunities to rest and carry out physical exercises even while conducting
monitoring and surveillance.


active, Japan needs to follow their moves more closely.
Due to such circumstances, the MOD/SDF is
working to strengthen the collaboration with relevant
government ministries and agencies, for example by
routinely sharing information obtained through warning
and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard
from peacetime.

See Fig. III-1-2-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the

Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-1-2-2 (Number
of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands
by Chinese Coast Guard Ships)

**2** **Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in**
**Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace**

**2**


**(1) Basic Concept**
Under international law, countries have complete and
exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling
against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is
d t d t t i th i ht f li i


intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken
on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the
SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for
conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Law.
Under international law, countries have complete
and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Antiintrusion measures are conducted as an act to exercise
the right of policing intended to maintain public order.
Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, this measure
can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is
primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on
Article 84 of the SDF Law.

**(2) Response by the MOD/SDF**
The ASDF detects and identifi es aircraft fl ying in
airspace surrounding Japan using warning and control
radars as well as early-warning and control aircraft. If
any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial
i d t t d fi ht d th i ft bl


-----

to approach them in order to confi rm the situation and
monitor the aircraft as necessary. Furthermore, in the
event that this suspicious aircraft has actually intruded
into territorial airspace, a warning to leave the airspace
would be issued, among other responses.
In September 2016, aircraft of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), assumed to be fi ghter aircraft,
fl ew over and passed through the main island of Okinawa
and Miyako Island for the fi rst time. In November 2016,
four aircraft including Chinese military bombers fl ew
from the Pacifi c Ocean and passed through the main
island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. At the same time,
it was confi rmed that two fi ghter aircraft also joined these
four aircraft. In December of the same year, six Chinese


ASDF F-15J fi ghter scrambling


Fig. III-1-2-3 Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War

Fig. III-1-2-3

(Times)

1,200 **1,168**

1,000 **943**

**944**

**873**

**812** **810**

800

**464** **851**

**567**

600

**415** **571**

**425**

**386**

400 **306**

**311** **299**

**96** **156**

**237**

**220**

200 **158** **31** **38** **359** **473**

**264** **247** **248** **288** **301**
**193** **197**

**124**

0

1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 (FY)

Note: The peak durning the cold war

Russia China Taiwan Others Total


Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which
Scrambles Responded



Fig. III-1-2-4


Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ) of Japan
Fig. III-1-2-5
and Those of Neighboring Countries

Northern
Territories

Japanese
territorial
airspace

ROK ADIZ

Takeshima

“East China
Sea ADIZ“

- 

Senkaku Japan ADIZ Ogasawara

Taiwan ADIZ Islands Islands

Yonaguni Island

-  The ROK expanded its ADIZ in December 2013
Philippines ADIZ ADIZ: Air Defense Identification Zone


: Flight paths taken by Chinese aircraft
: Flight paths taken by Russian aircraft


-----

military aircraft including two fi ghter aircraft fl ew passed
the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. In January
2017, a total of eight Chinese military aircraft including
six bombers fl ew past the Tsushima Strait, and carried out
a round-trip fl ight between the East China Sea and the Sea
of Japan. In March 2017, a total of 13 aircraft including
Chinese military aircraft, presumably fi ghter aircraft, fl ew
past the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and


then returned. Furthermore, in May 2017, from a Chinese
government vessel that entered Japan’s territorial waters
near the Senkaku Islands, an object that appears to be a
drone fl ew in and intruded into Japanese airspace. With
respect to the Russian Armed Forces (RAF), there have
also been unusual cases, such as two Russian bombers
carrying out a long distance fl ight in the area surrounding
Japan in January 2017.


**Commentary**

**Record High Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) against Chinese**
**Aircraft and the ASDF’s Responses to the Situation**

Since 1958, the ASDF has taken every possible measure to prevent intrusion of territorial space by scrambling its fi ghter aircraft
to approach any suspicious aircraft heading towards Japan’s territorial airspace. In FY2016, ASDF fi ghter aircraft scrambled 1,168
times, which broke the previous record of 944 times in 1984 and was the most in the past 60 years. In FY1984 the Northern Air
Defense Force scrambled most often (439 times), while in FY2016 it was the Southwestern Composite Air Division that scrambled
most often (803 times), indicating that the security environment in the southwestern direction has become increasingly severe.
The increasing number of scrambles is due to the expansion and intensifi cation of activities of Chinese military aircraft. In the
airspace around Japan, along with the increase in the number of active Chinese military aircraft, Chinese military aircraft recently
has had a tendency to gradually expand their area of activity in the East China Sea in the eastward and southward directions. As a
result of this progressive expansion, the number of activities of Chinese military aircraft confi rmed in the airspace close to the main
island of Okinawa and the Southwestern Islands has been increasing further. This has led to the increase in the number of scrambles
by ASDF fi ghter aircraft.
Along with the expansion and intensifi cation of the activities of Chinese military aircraft, the number of scrambles conducted
by the Southwestern Composite Air Division in FY2016 accounted for more than 60% of the scrambles conducted nationwide. In
order to further enhance the airspace defense mechanisms in the southwestern region, the Southwestern Composite Air Division was
reorganized into the Southwestern Air Defense Force on July 1, 2017. The new organization will continue to play the core role in the
airspace defense in the southwestern region and conduct strict air defense missions including scrambles against aircraft intruding
into Japan’s territorial airspace at all hours.

**i**

Captain (ASDF) Hitoshi Senaga, Member of Aviation, 304th Squadron,
9th Air Wing Group (Naha City, Okinawa Prefecture)

The 9th Air Wing, located at the ASDF Naha Air Base, is the only fi ghter aircraft (F-15) unit in the southwestern region,
and its aircraft scrambled over 800 times in FY2016, such that scrambles were carried out almost daily. In addition, the
9th Air Wing performs most of the scrambles against Chinese aircraft, and we, the fi ghter aircraft pilots, are on Combat
Air Patrol (CAP) 24 hours a day all year round. What I always keep in my mind when scrambling to the scene to respond
to Chinese aircraft is to maintain a fi rm attitude that demonstrates intention to maintain airspace territorial integrity, as
well as take careful and strict actions in accordance with laws and regulations, and remain calm to be able to respond
appropriately to any situations while bracing myself for the duty. In an increasingly severe security environment in the
southwestern region, I perform my duty as always, keeping in mind that each and every action we take in the course
of our duties may potentially lead to a critical interstate situation. The
sense of relief I feel when I complete a duty and land home safely is
only temporary, as I must promptly start preparing for the next scramble.
When I think about the current situation in the airspace over the beautiful
sea (Churaumi) where I was born and grew up, I get emotional and a
strong sense of mission emerges within me. In this southwestern region,
which will face severer situations going forward, I am committed to
working towards my duties with even more strict and resolute attitude,
and contribute to the peace and security of Japan. Captain Senaga aboard F-15 conducting pre-fl ight checks


-----

As these cases indicate, the PLA and the RAF have
become more active in the areas surrounding Japan. In
response to these incidents, the ASDF has scrambled
its fi ghters. In FY2016, ASDF aircraft scrambled 1,168
times, which was an increase by 295 times compared with
the previous fi scal year and the most number of times
since 1958 when scrambles commenced. Among these,
the number of scrambles against Chinese aircraft was
851 times, which was an increase by 280 times compared
with the previous fi scal year, and set a record high.
Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea
Air Defense Identifi cation Zone” by China in November
2013, the MOD/SDF has implemented warning and
surveillance activities as before in the East China Sea,
including the zone in question, and has continued to
take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and
surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan.
The MOD/SDF also engages in strict airspace antiintrusion measures in accordance with international law
and the SDF Law.

See Fig. III-1-2-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold

War); Fig. III-1-2-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which

See

Scrambles Responded); Fig. III-1-2-5 (Air Defense Identifi cation
Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and Those of Neighboring Countries)

**3** **Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s**
**Territorial Waters**


the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese
territorial waters.

**(2) Response by the MOD/SDF**
The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities
for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation
that violates international law; and responding in shallow
water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking
foreign submarines navigating under the territorial
waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed
a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine
navigating under Japanese territorial waters around
the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the
MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations,
and MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the
submarine until it entered the high seas.
Afterwards, in May 2013, March 2014, and February
2016, although there was no confi rmed intrusion into
the territorial waters of Japan, the MSDF P-3C, etc.
observed submarines navigating underwater in the
contiguous water zone. Although international law does
not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in
the contiguous zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a
posture to appropriately deal with such activities.


**4** **Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels**

**4**


**(1) Basic Concept**
The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is
primarily responsible for responding to suspicious
armed special operations vessels (unidentifi ed vessels).
However, in the event that it is deemed extremely diffi cult
or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a
situation, an order for maritime security operations will
be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in
cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.


**3**


**(1) Basic Concept**
With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater
in Japan’s territorial waters,[6] an order for maritime
security operations will be issued. The submarine will
be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and
show its fl ag, in accordance with international law, and
in the event that the submarine does not comply with

MSDF SH-60K patrol helicopter descending on the deck of a Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel
Kiso during joint exercises carried out in Wakasa Bay (October 2016)


**(2) Response by the MOD/SDF**
In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an
unidentifi ed vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an
unidentifi ed vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in
2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF has
strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries
and agencies by conducting joint exercises with the Japan
Coast Guard on a regular basis.
In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following
steps: (1) deployment of guided-missile patrol boats;
(2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit;[7]


The term “territorial waters” also includes inland waters

A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security


-----

(3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns;
(4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment
(fl at-nose shells);[8] (5) improving the suffi ciency ratio of
military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment
for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. Furthermore,


based on the Manual on Joint Strategies concerning
Unidentifi ed Vessels” jointly prepared by the then Japan
Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the
MSDF also makes an effort to strengthen cooperation
between these two organizations.


**Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands**
**2**


Fig. III-1-2-6 Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands


Fig. III-1-2-6


Overall air defenseOverall air defense

Secure and maintain marine
and air superiority Aerial refuelingAerial refueling

SurfaceSurface
vesselsvessels Deployment of units to remote island

Maritime air supportMaritime air support

Anti-surfaceAnti-surface
warfarewarfare

Operation to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion

SDF troops are to be swiftly deployed and concentrated
in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the Close Air SupportClose Air Support
deployment of enemy units and the troops try to intercept Landing
and defeat any invasions. by aircraft

Response in the water

Landing by

Anti-submarine warfareAnti-submarine warfare amphibious

vehicle

Landing
by boat

Submarine
Enemy submarine


enemy attacks. If there is an invasion of the islands, the
enemy will be brought under control by ground fi re from
aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will
be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of
SDF forces and other initiatives. Furthermore, a precise
response will be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles and other weapons.

**2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**


**1** **Basic Concept**

**1**


Japan has a number of remote islands. In order to respond
to attacks on these islands, it is important to position units
and so forth in accordance with the security environment,
and also to detect signs at an early stage through persistent
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
conducted by the SDF in peacetime as well as obtaining
and securing maritime and air superiority.
If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops
will be deployed and concentrated in an area expected
to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units,
and, through the joint operation involving all the SDF
forces (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF), deter and remove


**2**


For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, in
January 2016, the ASDF relocated one fi ghter squadron
to the Naha Air Base to increase the number of fi ghter
squadrons to two, and established the 9th Air Wing. The


-----

Fig. III-1-2-7 Deployment Status of Major Units in the Southwestern Islands


Fig. III-1-2-7


(As of April 1, 2017)

MSDF Amami Naval Base Facility
ASDF Amami Communication Wing

ASDF 55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.

Amami Oshima

Okinoerabujima

ASDF 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.

GSDF 15th Brigade
MSDF Fleet Air Wing 5

Kumejima ASDF Southwestern Composite

Air Division, etc.

Senkaku Islands Approx. 420 km

Main Island of Okinawa

Approx. 290 km

Approx. 150 km
Approx. 210 km

Ishigaki
Yonaguni Island Miyako Island
Island

Approx. 110 km Approx.

Approx.
130 km
120 km ASDF 53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, etc.

SDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit

-  The Southwestern Air Defense Force was established on July 1, 2017.

[Legend]

: GSDF Units : MSDF Units : ASDF Units


equipment. Through these initiatives, the MOD/SDF
will continue persistent ISR operations, and develop an
immediate response posture in the case of contingencies.
Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift
and large-scale transportation and deployment of units,
initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment
capabilities through: the improvement of Osumi class
transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank); a review of the role
of multipurpose vessels; and the introduction of V-22
Ospreys and C-2 transport aircraft.
In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys,
the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA
International AIRPORT was the best airfi eld to be used
as the deployment site for V-22 Ospreys due to positional
relationships with relevant units in joint operations, the
length of the runway, and the geographic environment that
can reduce burdens borne by the local community. The
MOD/SDF hopes to gain understanding from the local
community through providing in-depth explanations.[9]

In addition, the SDF conducts various training
exercises to improve its capability for amphibious
operations. For example, the SDF carried out a JapanU.S. bilateral joint exercise (fi eld exercise) called “Keen


GSDF personnel on boats readying for departure from MSDF transport ship Osumi
(November 2016)

ASDF also formed the Southwestern Air Defense Force
in July 2017. The GSDF newly formed the Yonaguni coast
observation unit and other units on Yonaguni in March
of the same year. Going forward, the GSDF will deploy
some units including an area security unit in charge of the
initial responses in Amami Oshima, Miyako Island, and
Ishigaki Island, as well as establishing an “Amphibious
Rapid Deployment Brigade (provisional name)”
equipped with a full function for amphibious operations.
In addition, the MSDF will acquire P-1 fi xed wing patrol
aircraft, SH-60K rotary wing patrol helicopters, and other


At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22


-----

**i**

**Opinions of Local Government Leaders on the Strengthening**
**of the Defense System in the Southwestern Islands:**
**A Message from the Mayor of Yonaguni Town**

Shukichi Hokama, Mayor of Yonaguni Town, Okinawa Prefecture
Yonaguni Island is located at the westernmost point of Japan where the sun sets later than any other place in the country. The
distance from Tokyo to Yonaguni Island is approximately 1,900 km and from the main island of Okinawa approximately 500 km.
Conversely, the island is only approximately 110 km away from Taiwan, and the mountain range in Taiwan can be viewed several
times a year from Yonaguni Island.
Living in such a border island, we often actually feel that the security environment is becoming increasingly severe. The people
in this town have been wishing for the deployment of the SDF for a considerable length of time. For this reason, since April 1973
when the town council adopted a resolution for the “Request for the SDF Deployment,” we have continued to engage in activities to
realize the deployment of the SDF.
In March 2016, the Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit and other relevant units
were newly established, and Yonaguni welcomed SDF personnel and their families
as residents of the town. Since then, people in the town have actively interacted with
each other, the issue of one-room primary schools was resolved through the moving
in of the SDF personnel’s children, and the town has become full of energy. When a
disaster relief dispatch was carried out in response to water accidents in April 2016,
the SDF dealt with the situation in a swift manner. This made me keenly aware that
the existence of the SDF close to home would ensure the safety and security of the
people of the town.
Yonaguni will celebrate the 70th anniversary of its organization into a town in Shukichi Hokama, Mayor of Yonaguni Town
December 2017. As a mayor of Yonaguni always acting with a sense of responsibility Mayor Hokama giving an address at an event on the fi rst
and mission, I will continue to protect the “Border Island, Yonaguni Island” where we anniversary of Camp Yonaguni
can coexist and mutually interact, together with the SDF personnel at the camp in
order to maintain the safety and security of the people of Yonaguni.


**Commentary**

**Establishment of the SDF’s First Full-Scale Amphibious**
**Operations Unit, Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade**

The amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be newly formed at the end of FY2017, is a full-scale amphibious operations
unit that belongs to the GSDF for the fi rst time. Its primary duty is to conduct full-fl edged amphibious tactics for quick landing,
recapturing, and securing in the case of illegal occupation of remote islands. In developing amphibious tactical functions, which
the GSDF has not had previously, the GSDF is currently working on various educational and training activities. For example, GSDF
personnel undergo rigorous training every day such as the one using an amphibious vehicle (AAV7), and another involving dropping
from a helicopter to the sea surface followed by waterway infi ltration training utilizing a boat, in addition to learning and acquiring
a variety of skills required for activities at sea. The GSDF also actively participates in both domestic and international exercises and
make efforts to accumulate relevant know-how, in order to improve cooperation with the MSDF, the ASDF, and the U.S. Forces.
Establishing the amphibious rapid deployment brigade will enhance the SDF’s capabilities for the defense of remote islands and
Japan’s deterrence capabilities. In addition, the brigade is expected to conduct a wide range of activities in disaster relief dispatches,
including prompt relief activities from the sea.

Scenes from a joint amphibious operation exercise with the U.S. Forces


-----

**Commentary**

**Strengthening of Transportation Capabilities in Various**
**Operations Accompanying C-2 Transport Aircraft Deployment**

C-2 transport aircraft, a successor of C-1 transport aircraft, is a domestically manufactured
transport aircraft that began to be developed in 2001. Following its fi rst fl ight in 2010, the fi rst
mass-produced C-2 transport aircraft was delivered to the ASDF in June 2016, and test fl ights
have been conducted at the ASDF Gifu Air Base since then. In March 2017, the fi rst three C-2
transport aircraft were deployed to the ASDF Miho Air Base located in Tottori Prefecture.
In comparison with C-1 transport aircraft, C-2 transport aircraft is capable of loading
approximately three times more freight, and its range is extended approximately four times
longer. Therefore, it has become possible to load large-sized equipment that could not

C-2 transport aircraft

previously be loaded onto transport aircraft, such as the Patriot system, UH-60J helicopters,
amphibious vehicles, mobile combat vehicles and fi eld operation vehicles. The MOD/SDF has
promoted the introduction of C-2 transport aircraft primarily to deal with attacks against Japan’s remote islands, considering the
severe security environment surrounding the country. At the same time, C-2 transport aircraft is expected to play an active role in
disaster response and international peace cooperation operations by utilizing such large-scale and swift transportation capabilities.

Comparison of Size of Payload Bay of Transport Aircraft

C-17

C-17

2.7 m
3.12 m

4.00 m

5.49 m

-  Does not include space above the ramp door.

-  Does not include area that is unusable due to the structure of the body on the left-hand and
right-hand sides of the ceiling area, except for C-17.

Comparison of payload (approx. three times larger than C-1) Comparison of the range (approx. four times more than C-1)


Sword 17”[10] between October and November 2016, and States with the U.S. Marine Corps in February 2017.
a Japan-U.S. joint fi eld exercise (Iron Fist) in the United See Fig. III-1-2-7 (Deployment Status of Major Units in the Southwestern Islands)


**Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks**
**3**


Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the
response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary
amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law
in 2005, and in the same year, the Security Council
and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative
development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor.
To date, Japan has steadily built up its own multi-tier
defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such
means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to


the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).[11] Moreover, in light
of the further progress made in North Korea’s overall
ballistic missile development, Japan will accelerate
its efforts and review for the overall enhancement of
its capability to respond to ballistic missiles, while it
will continue to conduct studies on the United States’
advanced initiatives and equipment.

See Reference 40 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan)


10 Keen Sword 17 is the largest bilateral joint exercise between Japan and the United States. In FY2016, it was conducted for approximately two weeks from October 30 to November 11 in waters and
airspace surrounding Japan, at the SDF bases and U.S. military bases in Japan, and in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Approximately 25,000 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF,
approximately 20 vessels, and approximately 260 aircraft participated in this exercise. They practiced the SDF’s joint operation including defense of Japan’s remote islands and the Japan-U.S. Joint
Response in armed attack situations, and conducted various exercises aimed at the maintenance and enhancement of their capabilities.

11 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft and other


-----

Fig. III-1-2-8 Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image)

Fig. III-1-2-8

**Mid-course phase**
In this phase, the rocket engine burns
out and the missile is flying in outer
space (exoatmosphere) inertially

**Detection/Discrimination/**

**Boost phase**

**Tracking**

In this phase, the

**Terminal phase**

rocket engine is

This phase covers the

burning and

part from atmospheric

accelerating the

re-entry to the impact

missile

**ASDF**
**ASDF Air control and**
**Patriot PAC-3**
**warning radar**

**Ballistic missile**

**(FPS-5, FPS-3 Upgraded)**

**JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense**
**Ground Environment)**
**MSDF Aegis**
**BMD destroyer** **Commander, Joint Task Force-BMD**

Commander, Air Defense Command


**1** **Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense**


are to be taken under a unifi ed command through
JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role
in dealing with damage caused by the impact of a fallen
ballistic missile.

See Fig. III-1-2-8 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD (image))

**(2) Response by the MOD/SDF**
Since the beginning of 2016, the threat of North Korean
ballistic missiles has risen with ballistic missile launches
being conducted at frequencies and of a content not seen
before. The ballistic missiles launched during 2016 totaled
more than 20, including a ballistic missile disguised as
a “Satellite,” Scud and Nodong missiles that are already
deployed, as well as Musudan under development and
SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile).
Since the start of 2017, North Korea has not changed
its stance of continuing its activities for nuclear and
missile development, and has repeatedly launched
ballistic missiles including possibly new models.
Considering such a situation, the MOD/SDF
continues to conduct thorough going intelligence
collection, warning and surveillance activities, and other


**1**


**(1) Basic Concept**
Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with
the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers
and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected
and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground
Environment (JADGE).[12]

In case ballistic missiles or other objects[13] are
launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be
dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for
armed attack situations. On the other hand, if ballistic
missiles are launched towards Japan, and the situation
is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the Minister
of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures to
destroy the ballistic missiles with suffi cient consideration
taken to carrying out prompt and appropriate response
and ensuring civilian control.
As a response against ballistic missiles or other
objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the
Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its
Commander, and various postures for effective defense


12 JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and it
provides fi ghters instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in
responses to ballistic missiles.


-----

Fig. III-1-2-9 Overall Enhancement of Japan’s Capabilities to Respond to Ballistic Missiles (SSA) System


Fig. III-1-2-9


GIncreasing the Number of Aegis-Equipped Destroyers with Ballistic Missile Defense Capabilities to Eight

Aegis-Equipped Destroyers

<Current> <Image of the defense structure around 2021>

DDG “Kongou” Class × 4 DDG “Kongou” Class × 4

+

DDG “Atago” Class × 2

DDG “Kongou” Class New type vessel × 2

DDG “Kongou” Class

DDG “Kongou” Class

DDG “Atago” Class

Image

Image

Currently, in the case of protecting all of Japan, three destroyers In the defense structure around 2021, continuous protection of
are necessary. However, since those destroyers may undergo all of Japan with two destroyers will be feasible even taking
regular inspections in turn, there is a difficulty in maintaining into consideration the inspections of the destroyers.
continuous protection.

GIntroduction of Advanced PAC-3 (PAC-3 MSE)

Altitude

Coverage of PAC-3

Coverage of
PAC-3MSE PAC-3MSDF Missile

(the photo showing the same-type equipment)

Enhancement of simultaneous Distance
engagement capability (image)


necessary activities in order to be able to respond to any
situation, while closely cooperating with the United
States and the Republic of Korea (ROK).
Further cooperation with the U.S. Government
including the U.S. Forces in Japan is essential for effi cient
and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related
measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD
operational and relevant information, and the expansion
of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the JapanU.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting).
Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with
the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by
means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW)[14]
from the U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered
by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2
radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan
by the U.S. Forces. Maintenance, enhancement and
validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities
have been actively conducted through training and other
activities. Since 2010, BMD exercise has been held


between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their
ships and other equipment via a network and conducting
a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve
tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination.
However, it is important that not only the bilateral
cooperation between Japan and the United States but also
the Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation is strengthened. For
this reason, Japan conducted the Japan-U.S.-ROK joint
missile warning exercise, PACIFIC DRAGON 2016, in
waters off Hawaii in June 2016, followed by the trilateral
Japan-U.S.-ROK Missile Warning Exercise in waters
near Japan in November 2016 as well as in January
and March 2017 to strengthen the cooperation among
the three countries. In addition, the General Security of
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)[15] entered
into effect on November 23, 2016. As GSOMIA serves
as a framework for protecting various confi dential
information including information regarding North
Korea’s nuclear and missile threat directly exchanged
between Japan and the ROK, which will be required for


14 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed
to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch. (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996.)

15 The offi cial name is the “Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Protection of Classifi ed Military Information,” which was signed by


-----

|(missile System シ ス specif テ Design ム ication 設 setting 計 and 設ミ ( 定サ workshare) 及イ びル 配仕 分様 ) Le主ad導ing Sサupポpoーrtinトg|Nノoーseズ coコnーeン|
|---|---|
||Kキinネetiテc wィッarクhe弾ad頭|
||Gミuサidaイnルce誘 se導cti部on|
||T第hi3rd段 sロtagケe ッroトckモeーt mタotor|
||Upper stage separating 上段分離部 section|
||S第ec 2o段ndロ sケtagッeト roモckーetタ motor|
||Second stage steering 第2段操舵部 section|
||Bブoーostスerタ|
||L軽ig量htwキeャighニt cスanタister|


**Commentary**

**Development of Interceptor Missiles (SM-3 Block IIA) with**
**Enhanced Capabilities for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)**

SM-3 Block IIA is being developed as a new interceptor missile for BMD.
SM-3 Block IIA is a missile that will be launched from Aegis destroyers, and intercept incoming ballistic missiles.
With much greater capability than its predecessor SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IIA will also have extended coverage of defense.
In addition, it will have improved capabilities to deal with incoming ballistic missiles taking a higher trajectory (lofted trajectory) than
a normal trajectory. Therefore, mass production and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA will drastically strengthen Japan’s preparedness
against ballistic missiles.
SM-3 Block IIA is a missile jointly developed by Japan and the United States. Japan-U.S. collaboration and cooperation for the
research and development of this project has contributed to strengthening the tie between the two countries. The Japan-U.S. joint
development project also has great signifi cance for the defense industry in Japan when considering the advanced technologies and
know-how that are fostered through development and production.
In the test launch conducted in February 2017, SM-3 Block IIA successfully intercepted a mock ballistic missile as a target, and
its development has now entered the fi nal phase. Both Japan and the United States are making ongoing efforts to realize the early
completion of the development.

シ Nose coneノーズコーン
ス
テ Kinetic warheadキネティック弾頭
ム
設 Guidance sectionミサイル誘導部
計

設 ミ Third stage rocket motor第3段ロケットモータ
定 サ
及 イ
び配 ル仕 Upper stage separating section上段分離部
分 様

Second stage rocket motor第2段ロケットモータ Missile integration/ミサイル統合 Leading 主導 Supportingサポート

Second stage steering 第2段操舵部 Verifi cation for the entire missile / 全機レベル試験

Leading 主導 section

Launch tests発射試験

Boosterブースタ

Supportingサポート

Lightweight canister軽量キャニスタ

Workshare between Japan and the United States for the development of SM-3 Block IIA Launch test of SM-3 Block IIA
(conducted off Hawaii, United States in February 2017)


**(3) Strengthening of the BMD System**
In light of the severe security environment, the MOD
conducts a project for improving its capabilities for
responding to ballistic missile attacks. Specifi cally, of
the six MSDF Aegis-equipped destroyers, the MOD is
currently refurbishing two without BMD capabilities,
Atago and Ashigara, to give them BMD capabilities.
The MOD also decided to acquire additional two Aegisequipped destroyers with BMD capabilities using
the FY2015 and FY2016 budgets. This will increase
the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers with BMD
capabilities from the present four to eight by FY2020.
Meanwhile, Japan and the United States are jointly
developing advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM3 Block IIA), which will be the successor of SM-3 Block
IA to be mounted on Aegis-equipped destroyers, in order
t d l ith f t th t d b i i l d d


practical and effective responses to various situations,
further strengthening of the Japan-U.S.-ROK relationship
will be expected.
The SDF engages in various training on a daily basis
to improve its capability to counter ballistic missiles. In
particular, taking into consideration the series of ballistic
missile launches recently conducted by North Korea, the
Minister of Defense announced the implementation of PAC3 maneuver deployment training nationwide sequentially
from June 2017 in an effort to strengthen the SDF’s
capability to counter ballistic missiles and to enhance a
sense of security and relief among the people of Japan.

See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (North Korea); Part III, Chapter 2,

Section 1-4-2 (Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation and
Exchanges); Reference 40 (History of Efforts for BMD Development
in Japan); Reference 41 (Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles)


-----

and diverse ballistic missile attacks.
At the National Security Council 9-Minister Meeting
in December 2016, a decision was made to transition to
joint production and the deployment phase. At the same
time, expenses to acquire SM-3 Block IIA were budgeted
for the fi rst time in the FY2017 budget. Acquisition
and deployment of SM-3 Block IIA are planned to be
implemented in FY2021.
In comparison with the previous SM-3 Block IA,
SM-3 Block IIA will have not only extended interceptable
altitude and coverage of protection, but also have enhanced
defeating capability and simultaneous engagement
capability. In addition, it is expected that the interception
capabilities of SM-3 Block IIA will be enhanced against
ballistic missiles equipped with interception avoidance
measures such as a decoy and ballistic missiles launched
with an intention to avoid being intercepted by taking a
higher than nominal trajectory (lofted trajectory).[16]

Going forward, there will be eight Aegis-equipped
destroyers with BMD capabilities, and SM-3 Block IIA
will also be deployed. By around FY2021, there will be a
strengthened system designed to continuously protect the
whole of Japan.
With regard to Patriot PAC-3, necessary expenses have
been appropriated in the supplementary budget for FY2016
to enable the acquisition of the enhanced capability type,
PAC-3 (MSE) (Missile Segment Enhancement), as soon
as possible. Introduction of PAC-3MSE will realize the
extension of interception altitude from about 10 km to 2030 km, meaning that the coverage of protection (area) will
expand more than twice compared with the current PAC-3.
As indicated in the National Defense Program
Guidelines, the MOD intends to continue strengthening
the readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and
sustainable response capability of the BMD system, and
will take all possible measures to protect the lives and
property of the people in Japan.
Additionally, the MOD has conducted studies
on a future ballistic missile interception system since
FY2014. The FY2017 budget allows for expenses for the


implementation of simulations, including measures to
improve defense capabilities of ballistic missiles.

See Fig. III-1-2-9 (Overall Enhancement of Japan’s Capabilities to

Respond to Ballistic Missiles)

See


**2** **Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-**
**U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation**


**2**


**(1) Missile Defense of the United States**
The United States is developing a multi-tier missile
defense system that combines defense systems suited for
each of the following phases of the ballistic missile fl ight
path to provide a mutually complementary response:
(1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and
(3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have
developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile
defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the
United States has been deployed in our country in a stepby-step manner.[17]

**(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.**
The Government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative
research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in
FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving
initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the
Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start JapanU.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic
missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a
technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006
with a view to expanding the coverage of protection[18] and
dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced
and diverse ballistic missiles attacks.
In February and June 2017, Japan and the United
States conducted sea launch tests of SM-3 Block IIA off
the coast of Hawaii in the United States. These tests were
intended to intercept a target, a mock ballistic missile,
by an SM-3 Block IIA launched from an Aegis-equipped
destroyer. In FY2017, the two countries will carry out data
analyses of these sea launch tests and aim to complete
development by the end of the fi scal year.


16 By taking a higher trajectory than minimum energy trajectories (trajectories that enable effi cient fl ying of a missile and maximize its range), it takes a shorter range than the maximum range, but the
falling speed of the missile becomes faster.

17 Specifi cally, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006, and BMD-capable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in Japan
and surrounding areas. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) was deployed in Aomori Prefecture.
Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014.

18 With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued
in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based
on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain conditions. This decision was formally announced
in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011.
The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the


-----

**Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others**
**4**


Fig. III-1-2-10 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces


Fig. III-1-2-10


Patrol helicopter

Enemy aircraft
Fixed-wing patrol aircraft

Observation helicopter Search and destruction

Reconnaissance aircraft at sea by MSDF and ASDF

Destroyer

Guerillas and

Enemy Submarine special forces landing
submarine Depot ship

Base for underwater vehicles
used in landing operations

Search and

Underwater scooters used destruction at Warning and
in landing operations the water’s edge surveillance

Light armored

Protection of Air vehicle Reconnaissance
important facilities defense unit

Infantry unit Mobile Combat

Search and Vehicles
destruction in

Short range Tanks Obstacle mountainous areas Fighting helicopter
surface-to-air Multipurpose
missiles Search and helicopter

Base

destruction
in urban areas

Shovel car

Mobile Combat Vehicle
Tank

Bulldozer
Mortar

Establishment Consequence Infantry unit Wheeled
of positions management armored vehicle

Base Leading local residents

for evacuation, etc. Police

NBC NBC attack
reconnaissance

Howitzer

vehicle Rescuing hostage Special

operations unit

Mortar Decontamination vehicle


In Japan where most of the towns and cities are highly
urbanized, even small-scale infi ltrations and attacks can
pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security.
These cases refer to various mode and forms including illegal
activities by infi ltrated foreign armed agents[19] etc., and
sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces,
which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan.

**1** **Basic Concept**


implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confi rmed that
an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the
SDF will respond under a defense operation order.

**2** **Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special**
**Operations Forces**


**2**


Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces
include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and
other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations
of dignitaries. In the event that an armed attack is carried
out against Japan by guerillas or special forces, the SDF
will respond under a defense operation order.
In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces,
the MOD/SDF responds with a particular emphasis on
the establishment of a relevant information gathering
posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in
coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and
destroy of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts
will be made for early detection of attacks and indications


**1**


In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and
the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police
primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF
will collect relevant information and reinforce the security
of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can
be dealt with by the general police force, various forms
of assistance such as transportation of police offi cers and
provision of equipment to the police force will be carried
out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police
force, then public security operations by the SDF will be


-----

through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the
SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities such as
nuclear power plants and necessary posture for protection
will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in
the event of an infi ltration of our territory by guerrillas
or special operations forces, they will be searched for
and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and
others and combat units will be promptly deployed to
besiege and capture or to destroy them.

See Fig. III-1-2-10 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by

Guerillas and Special Forces)

See

**3** **Response to Armed Agents**


**(1) Basic Concept**
While the police assumes primary responsibility for
responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF
will respond in accordance with situational developments.
When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police
force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations
of the SDF, the Basic Agreement[20] concerning cooperation
procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as
local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and
prefectural police forces, have been concluded.[21]


examples of an incident in which these weapons were used.

**(1) Basic Concept**
In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a
way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will
conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and
rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of
NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an
armed attack but against which the general police alone
cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct
public security operations to suppress the armed group
and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies.
Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under
the category of defense operations or public security
operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF
and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will
cooperate with relevant organizations in information
gathering concerning the extent of the damage,
decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and
injured, and medical activities through disaster relief
dispatches and civil protection dispatches.


**(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives**
The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF
Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon
Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as
well as increasing the number of chemical and medical
protection unit personnel, in order to improve the
capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also,

GSDF helicopter transporting offi cers of the Riot Police Unit during joint exercises involving three
prefectural police departments in the Hokuriku region and the GSDF 14th Infantry Regiment at
the Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (November 2016)


**(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives**
The GSDF continues to conduct exercises nationwide with
the police of each prefecture and has been strengthening
such collaboration by, for example, conducting fi eld
exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country
since 2012.[22] Furthermore, joint exercises in dealing
with suspicious vessels are also continuously conducted
between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard.

**4** **Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical**
**Weapons**


**4**


In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the
danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical)
weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate
mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area,
and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as
related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries
under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin
gas attack[23] on the Tokyo subway in 1995 is one of the


20 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission
(concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000).

21 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents.
22 The GSDF also conducted exercises at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013,
at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015, at
Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2016, and at Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant (Shizuoka Prefecture) in 2017.

23 An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number
of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and


-----

the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action
in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow
operations to begin within approximately one hour.

**Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security**
**5**

**1** **Basic Approach by the Government**


The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that Japan
will play a leading role in maintaining and developing
“Open and Stable Seas,” and will take necessary measures
to address various threats in sea lanes of communication,
including counter-piracy operations, ensuring safe maritime
transport and promoting cooperation with other countries
by conducting bilateral/multilateral joint exercises related
to maritime security. In addition, it is stated that Japan will
provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea
lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their
maritime law enforcement capabilities.
The new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy,[24] which was
given Cabinet approval in April 2013, states the following
initiatives for ensuring the security of the oceans:
reinforcement of the wide-area continuous surveillance
system; programmed improvement of warships, aircraft
and other vehicles; strengthening of the system of
collaboration between the SDF and Japan Coast Guard;
and development of a system of collaboration to ensure
order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands. In
addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that in
order to contribute to the creation and development
of order on the ocean, it will make use of fora such as
multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences to contribute
to international rules- and consensus-building.


The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective
equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

MSDF Chief of Staff Murakawa (right) and Admiral Swift, Commander of the U.S. Pacifi c Fleet
(left) on board a U.S. Navy barge for a memorial ceremony at the USS Arizona Memorial
(January 2017)


Seas” and to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the
MOD/SDF promotes various kinds of initiatives such as
implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity
building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing
joint training using a variety of opportunities.
In addition, in relation to China, consultation meetings
have been held between the defense authorities of both
countries towards the commencement of early implementation
of the maritime and air communication mechanism in order to
avoid and prevent unexpected situations.

See Chapter 2, Section 1-4-4 (Japan-China Defense Exchanges and

Cooperation); Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security)

**Responses in Space**
**6**


gathering capabilities as well as command and control,
and information and communications capabilities.
Under such circumstances, for Japan whose
defense force is built in line with the basic principles
of exclusively defense oriented policy, the use of space,
which does not belong to any territories of any nations


**2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**

**2**


In order to maintain the order of “Open and Stable


**Responses in Space**
**6**

Utilization of satellites enables the remote sensing of,
communication at, and positioning on any area on Earth.
Thus, countries around the world actively use outer space
and make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety
of satellites such as imagery satellites, communication
satellites, and positioning satellites to enhance information


24 Based on changes in the situation regarding the ocean, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy specifi es the following targets for Japan as an oceanic state and has set out initiatives to be pursued intensively:
(1) international cooperation and contribution to the international community, (2) wealth and prosperity through ocean development and use, (3) shift from a country protected by the ocean to a country


-----

Fig. III-1-2-11 Image of the Use of Space

Fig. III-1-2-11

Early warning satellite

Communications satellite
Meteorological satellite

Geostationary orbit

Altitude approx. 36,000 kmAltitude approx. 36,000 km

(following the direction(following the direction

of the Earth’s rotation)of the Earth’s rotation)

Positioning satellite

Distance
to the moon
Approx. Altitude approx. 20,000 km
380,000 km

Outer Space

- Freedom of use, exploration and entry

- Not subject to state acquisition

- Prohibition on the deployment of
weapons of mass destruction

Approx. 36,000 km

Imagery Satellite, etc.

(approx. 1/10
of the distance
to the moon)

Altitude up to 1,000 km

International Space Station
(altitude approx. 400 km)

Airspace

- Sovereignty over territorial airspaces is
vested in each state.

- The upper limit of territorial airspace is

General aircraft (altitude approx. 10 km)

not defined.


and is not constrained by such factors as the surface of
the terrain, is extremely important when: collecting
information to detect indications of various incidents in
advance and strengthening the surveillance activities in
its surrounding seas and airspace; and ensuring means of
communication by the SDF in their international peace
cooperation activities and other activities.

See Fig. III-1-2-11 (Image of the Use of Space)


and strengthen the industrial base, and has the following
goals: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Promoting the
use of space in the civilian sector; and (3) Maintaining
and strengthening of space industry and scientifi c/
technological bases.
Responding to Japan’s progress in development and
use of outer space, the Diet approved two laws—the Act
on Ensuring Appropriate Handling of Satellite Remote
Sensing Data (Remote Sensing Data Act) and Act on
Launch of Artifi cial Satellites and Launch Vehicles and
Control of Artifi cial Satellites (Space Activities Act) in
November 2016.
Space Activities Act stipulates matters necessary to
secure public safety and provide prompt protection of
the victims from damages in Japan’s space development
and use, such as a permission system for rocket
launch, obligation for compensation, and government
compensation. Remote Sensing Data Act stipulates
matters necessary for ensuring proper handling of satellite
remote sensing records (so-called satellite imagery).
The Cabinet Offi ce is working on the establishment of
enforcement orders and regulations, aiming to put the
laws into force in November 2017.


**1** **The Whole-of-Government Approach**

**1**


The Offi ce of National Space Policy[25] established in the
Cabinet Offi ce in July 2012 engages in the planning,
drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to
the Government’s development and use of space. In light
of the environmental changes surrounding space policy
and the new security policies stated in the NSS that was
approved by the Cabinet in 2013, the Basic Plan on Space
Policy[26] was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters
for Space Development established within the Cabinet in
January 2015. This Basic Plan was prepared as a 10-year
development plan focusing on the next approximately 20
years to improve predictability of industries’ investments,


25 In April 2016, the Offi ce of National Space Policy was reorganized into the National Space Policy Secretariat.


-----

Fig. III-1-2-12 Initiatives for the Development of the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System


Fig. III-1-2-12


SSA System by the Ministry of Education, Culture,

SSA System by the MOD (Image) Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)/JAXA

(renovation and update of existing facilities)

Space debris etc.

Avoid if there is
any risk of collision,
etc.

Optical Monitoring Facility (Ibara City, Okayama Prefecture)
*Facility to monitor objects in geostationary orbit

Cooperation

Suspicious
satellite

Examples of
a sensor system

Radar Monitoring Facility
(Kagamino-cho, Okayama Prefecture)

Radar Optical telescope Operation system U.S. *Facility to monitor objects in geostationary orbit

Armed Forces

Analysis System (Tsukuba City, Ibaraki Prefecture)

Information sharing

➢ In cooperation with MEXT/JAXA, complete the development of the MOD’s SSA System by FY2022 <Basic Plan on Space Policy>
➢ Started the overall system design in FY2016
➢ Planning to undertake the development of operation systems and sensors in or after FY2017


consultation regarding space, (2) closer information
sharing, (3) cooperation for nurturing and securing experts,
and (4) implementation of tabletop exercises.
Furthermore, the MOD/SDF launched an X-band
defense communications satellite called Kirameki-2,
owned and operated by the MOD for the fi rst time,
in January 2017 to be used for the information
communications of extremely important command and
control in unit operations. Going forward, in light of the
future increase in required communication for the building
of a dynamic joint defense force, the MOD will conduct
steady maintenance of Kirameki-1 and Kirameki-3 to
realize integrated communications as well as high-speed
and large capacity communications, thereby aiming for
the early realization of a three-satellite system with all of
the three X-band defense communications satellites.

**3** **Development of the Space Situational**
**Awareness (SSA) System**


**2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**


The use of space is extremely important for the MOD/
SDF to conduct a range of tasks effectively and effi ciently.
Thus, in developing the SDF system in outer space, the
NDPG stipulates that the MOD/SDF ensures the effective
and stable use of space so that satellites can continuously
exercise their capabilities even in contingencies. This
is to be done by strengthening information gathering
capabilities using multiple types of satellites with
various sensors, reinforcing command, control and
telecommunications capabilities, and enhancing the
survivability of satellites through such initiatives as Space
Situational Awareness (SSA). In implementing these
initiatives, the MOD/SDF will form organic partnerships
with relevant institutions and organizations both in Japan
and the United States.
Refl ecting the formulation of the National Security
Strategy (NSS) and the NDPG, the MOD revised the
“Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of
Space” in August 2014. Also, from the perspective of
further promoting cooperation in the space fi eld between
the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, the
two countries established the “Space Cooperation Working
Group (SCWG)” in April 2015 and so far held three
meetings. The SCWG continues to promote consideration
i b d fi ld h (1) ti f li l t d


**3**


When using outer space, it is necessary to ensure its
stable use. However, there has been a rapid increase in
the volume of space debris in outer space, raising the
risk of signifi cant damage to satellite functions caused
by collision between debris and satellite. In addition, it
is speculated that the development and verifi cation test
f kill t llit hi h h th t t tifi i l


-----

**Commentary**

**Launch of “Kirameki-2” X-band Defense Communications Satellite**

In January 2017, the MOD/SDF launched an X-band defense communications satellite called
Kirameki-2, the fi rst satellite owned and operated by the MOD/SDF, from the Tanegashima
Space Center in Kagoshima Prefecture.
Previously, the MOD/SDF has used satellite communication services provided by
three private X-band communications satellites. However, with the end of the design life
of these satellites approaching, a new arrangement is gradually being developed for the
SDF to possess and operate three successor satellites. X-band communications satellite
has the features of satellite communication, i.e., it is relatively unaffected by topography
and has a wide coverage. X-band communications satellite also has the features of X-band
communications, i.e., it is stable and unlikely to be affected by weather and other factors.
These features enable timely and appropriate communications among geographically
dispersed SDF units. For this reason, Kirameki-2 will be used for communicating information

Launch of Kirameki-2

such as orders and coordination of the SDF units’ operations, and will function as an (Tanegashima Space Center)
extremely important communication infrastructure for the security of Japan.
This initiative will bring about the following three improvements: (1) ensure smooth
communication between the units of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, (2) enhance communication
capacity, allowing for the transmission of larger image/video data than before, and (3) ensure
communication requirements for the units, etc. engaging in duties across a wide area
including overseas.

Kirameki-2 (image)


satellite to disturb, attack, and capture it, is underway,
increasing the threat to the stable use of outer space.
Refl ecting such a situation, the MOD, based on the Basic
Plan on Space Policy and in cooperation with relevant
domestic organizations such as the Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the United States, aims
to build a system for Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
for monitoring outer space and accurately recognizing
the situation. The designing of the whole system and
the basic designing of each asset comprising the system
is scheduled to take place in FY2016 and FY2017,
respectively.
Going forward, the MOD plans to consider the
development of a satellite, which contributes to Japan’s
use of outer space including the SDF’s activities, and a


sensor system, which can perform constant surveillance
against space debris and suspicious satellites. In doing
this, it is necessary to build an effective operational
system in which relevant governmental agencies and
organizations are integrated. In this respect, considering
the fact that JAXA is promoting a plan to develop
mainly a radar with an ability to monitor a low altitude
orbit altitude under 1,000 km and an optical telescope
with an ability to monitor a geostationary orbit (altitude
approximately 36,000 km), the MOD will primarily
review the development of radars with an ability to
monitor a geostationary orbit.

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 3 (Build-Up of Defense Capability in

FY2017); Fig. III-1-2-12 (Initiatives for the Development of the
Space Situational Awareness (SSA) System)


-----

**Response to Cyber Attacks**
**7**


Fig. III-1-2-13 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks


Fig. III-1-2-13


2) Responses by special units to cyber attacks

-  24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as
advanced measures against cyber attacks (virus analysis) by the Cyber 3) Development of a response posture to
Defense Group (Joint Staff), System Protection Unit (GSDF), Communication cyber attacks

1) Ensuring safety of information

Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF) -  Establishment of security measures criteria

systems

of information systems

-  Introduction of firewall and virus detection -  Establishment of security measures with
software which MOD/SDF staff should comply

-  Separate the network into the Defense -  Development of response posture at the
Information Infrastructure (DII) open system time of cyber attack occurrence
and close system -  Establishment of the Cyber Policy Review

-  Implementation of system audit, etc. Committee

Internet

DII opennetwork Comprehensive Defensive The Six Pillars of

DII closed
network Measures against Cyber Attacks 4) Research of cutting-edge technology

6) Coordination with other
organizations and agencies -  Research on technology to develop the

cyber training environnent

-  Information sharing with the
National center of Incident Cyber Training Environment
readiness and Strategy for
Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed Simulated attacks

Simulated environment

Forces, and other relevant nations

5) Development of human resources Defense

-  For the purpose of human resources development, implementing
studying abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie
Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, Control and evaluation
as well as education at professional courses at the SDF Research

-  For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at -  Allows for counter-cyber attack
workplace and professional education at the National Defense Academy training in a simulated environment


Information and communications technology has
developed and been rapidly and widely adopted.
As a result, it is now an essential infrastructure for
socioeconomic activities. On the other hand, there is a
possibility that people’s life and economic activities will
be severely affected if the computer systems or networks
fail. The same is true of both the MOD/SDF. If the critical
functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack,
there is a possibility that problems that threaten the core
of Japan’s defense may arise.

**1** **The Whole-of-Government Approach and Other**
**Initiatives**


was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security
of Japan by clarifying the basic principles of Japan’s
cyber security measures and the responsibilities of local
governments, as well as by comprehensively and effectively
promoting the measures regarding cyber security.
In response to this, in January 2015, the Cyber
Security Strategic Headquarters was established in the
Cabinet and the National center of Incident readiness
and Strategy for Cyber Security (NISC)[28] was established
in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for
planning and promotion of cyber security-related policies
and serves as the control tower in taking measures and
responding to signifi cant cyber security incidents in
government organizations and agencies, as well as
critical infrastructures. Furthermore, in September
2015, the Cyber Security Strategy was formulated for
the comprehensive and effective promotion of measures
pertaining to cyber security, with the aims: to create
and develop free, fair and safe cyber space; to enhance
the vitality of the economy and society and realize


**1**


With regard to cyber attacks, the number of cases recognized
as threats to Japanese governmental organizations and
agencies in FY2015 reached approximately 6,130,000,
and these threats have become increasingly serious.[27]

In order to deal with the increasing threat to cyber
security, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic Act


27 Cybersecurity Annual Report 2015 (submitted at the “Information Security Policy Council” on June 13, 2016).

28 With the enactment of the Cyber Security Basic Act in January 2015, the National Information Security Center (NISC) was reorganized as the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for
Cybersecurity (NISC). The NISC is responsible for the planning and promotion of cybersecurity-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to signifi cant


-----

Fig. III-1-2-14 Image of Penetration Test

Fig. III-1-2-14

I Enhancement of Security Level

Whether invading into various types Since the same methods as actual cyber attacks are used in penetration
of command system, etc. is possible tests, vulnerability that could not be ascertained in other vulnerability

tests can be discovered.

The degree of bearable attacks

The degree of damages occurring

The security level of information communication networks, etc.
owned by the MOD/SDF can be enhanced.

I Enhancement of the Capacity to Counter Cyber Attacks

Whether the attacks spread to The modes of cyber attacks with the potential to successfully invade
other command systems, etc. and the scale of anticipated damages, etc. can be ascertained.

Effectiveness of response measures and prevention measures taken
by the System Protection Unit of each SDF branch can be strengthened.


their sustainable development; to realize society in
which citizens can live safely and with peace of mind;
to contribute to peace and stability of the international
community as well as the security of Japan.


for cyber defense, enactment of regulations,[29] stipulating
postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks,
and development of human resources and technological
bases, as well as research on cutting-edge technology.
The FY2017 budget sets out to further strengthen the
operation and system of the “Cyber Defense Group” in
order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber
attacks, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated
and skillful by the day. Specifi cally, the MOD/SDF will
develop a structure in which practical cyber training is
conducted using a cyber training space that simulates
the SDF’s command and control system as well as
information communications networks, and a system in
which penetration tests are conducted to examine the
vulnerability of the SDF’s command and control system,
etc., using the same method as actual cyber attacks.
Along with these initiatives, an increase in the number of
personnel is also planned.

See Fig. III-1-2-13 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with

Cyber Attacks); Fig. III-1-2-14 (Image of Penetration Test); Reference
42 (Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense)

**(3) Cooperation with the United States**
Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including
joint response, between Japan and its ally the United
States is vital, the two countries set up the Cyber Defense
Policy Working Group (CDPWG) as a framework
between the defense authorities of Japan and the United
States. Under this framework, meetings have been held
fi ve times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion
of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer
sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises
incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters


**2** **Initiatives of the MOD/SDF**

**2**


**(1) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach**
Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry
of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the fi ve government
agencies that cooperate particularly closely with the
NISC, participates in cyber attack response training and
personnel exchanges, and provides information about
cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the
NISC as well as sending personnel to the CYber incident
Mobile Assistant Team (CYMAT).


**(2) Unique Initiatives by the MOD/SDF**
As unique initiatives by the MOD/SDF, the SDF C4
(Command, Control, Communication & Computers)
Systems Command and other systems are monitoring
MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock.
In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established
under the SDF C4 Systems Command to enhance and
strengthen the system.
In addition, the MOD/SDF is engaged in holistic
measures including the introduction of intrusion
prevention systems in order to increase the safety of
information and communication systems, development of
defense systems such as the security and analysis device


-----

**i**

**The Forefront of Cyber Attack Responses**

Colonel (ASDF) Seiji Terakawa, Commanding Offi cer of the Cyber Defense Group,
DF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command (Ichigaya)

The MOD/SDF makes use of cyberspace in every aspect of its work
such as policymaking, unit operations, personnel management,
public relations, and research and development. Therefore, ensuring
the stable use of cyberspace is an essential element that directly
affects the execution of the MOD/SDF’s duties.
Utilizing the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), which
is an SDF-wide shared network, as the main system, the Cyber
Defense Group conducts 24-hour monitoring of cyber attacks
under normal circumstances. If any attacks are detected, we work
as a unit to implement response measures including an analysis of
viruses and logs, blocking of attacks, and cooperation with relevant

Members of the Cyber Defense Group participating in a cyber exercise

divisions and departments.
In particular, as methods used in cyber attacks have become increasingly sophisticated and skillful in recent years, we, who deal
with cyber attacks everyday at the forefront of cyber defense, continue to improve our capacities to counter cyber attacks on a daily
basis. This is done, for example, by developing our original tools to fi nd cyber attacks from attackers that are diffi cult to detect, while
feeling a real threat of those attacks.
In FY2017, there are plans to develop implementation systems for practical cyber training and penetration tests. The MOD/SDF,
in preparation for such developments, is stepping up efforts to train SDF personnel and enhance their practical capabilities.


such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts.
Moreover, in May 2015, the two countries announced
a joint statement on the specifi c future direction of
the cooperation.
In addition, Japan’s cooperation with the United
States is to be further strengthened by such means as
participation in the “Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a
whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding
of the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the
defense authorities since 2002, and dispatching liaison
offi cers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution.

**(4) Cooperation with Other Countries etc.**
Japan has held cyber dialogues with the respective defense
authorities of the United Kingdom, Australia, Estonia,
and others to exchange views on threat awareness and
relevant initiatives taken by each country. With NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Japan carries
out initiatives looking at possible future operational
cooperation, such as establishing a cyber dialogue between
defense authorities called the Japan-NATO Expert Staff
Talks on Cyber Defense and participating in the cyber
defense exercise (Cyber Coalition) hosted by NATO as
an observer. Furthermore, Japan has participated in the
I t ti l C f C b C fli t (C C ) d


a cyber defense exercise (Locked Shields) organized by
the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence
(CCDCOE) based in Estonia.
In addition, the IT Forum has been held between the
defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia
to exchange views on initiatives in the information
communications area including cybersecurity and current
trends in technology.
Considering the fact that cyber attacks occur beyond
national borders, it is important to promote cooperation
pertaining to cybersecurity between countries other than
the United States. Japan will continue to strengthen
international cooperation in the cyber fi eld through
exchanges of views with defense authorities of other
countries and relevant organizations such as the Cooperative
Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), and
active participation in cyber defense exercises.
In Japan, in July 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council”
(CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of
around ten companies in the defense industry with a
strong interest in cyber security. Efforts are being made
to improve capabilities to deal with cyber attacks by
the MOD/SDF, and the defense industry, through joint
exercise and other initiatives.


-----

**Response to Large-Scale Disasters**
**8**


When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF
works in collaboration with municipal governments,
engaging in various activities such as the search and
rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft,
controlling fl oods, offering medical treatment, preventing
epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel
and goods.


**1** **Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches**


In principle, disaster relief dispatch is conducted as
follows: prefectural governors or other offi cials ask the
Minister of Defense, or an offi cer designated by the
Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc. in the event of
natural disaster; and then the minister or the designated
offi cer will dispatch the units if it is deemed to be


Fig. III-1-2-15 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal

|Municipal mayor|Col2|
|---|---|
|||


Fig. III-1-2-15

Outbreak of
a disaster

In case of particular urgency with no time to
wait for a request from prefectural governors

Ask the prefectural governor to submit a request - Prefectural governors Request for withdrawal

- Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard

- Director General of the Regional Coast Guard

Municipal mayor

Headquarters

1) Procedure for request

- Director of the Airport Administrative Office

Direct notification - Normally requested in written
(In case asking request is not possible) Request for dispatch form

- Requested verbally or by

The Minister of Defense or the individuals designated by the Minister telegram or telephone in

case of emergency (a written

Order to dispatch Order to dispatch Call up[1] request should later follow)

2) Content of request

Dispatch of units Dispatch of units Call up in such cases as - Conditions of the disaster and
(discretionary dispatch) disasters reasons for the request

SDF ready reserve - Desired duration for dispatch
personnel - Desired area for dispatch
SDF reserve personnel

and desired activities

- Other items for reference

Disaster relief operations

- Disbandment of call up[2]

- Order for withdrawal

Disbandment of call up[2]

Withdrawal of units

Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary
with the approval of the Prime Minister.

2. Disbandment of call-up of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense.


Fig. III-1-2-16 State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard)


Fig. III-1-2-16


**Common to All**
The state of readiness with which SDF troops can begin gathering information immediately after an earthquake of seismic intensity
fi ve-lower or higher occurs.

**FAST Force (GSDF)**
First response units throughout Japan (about 3,900 personnel, about 1,100 vehicles, and about 40 aircraft) are on standby around-
the-clock and will be deployed in an hour upon receiving an order as a standard procedure.
Various units including helicopters (video transmission), chemical protection, and bomb disposal are on standby in each regional army.

**FAST Force (MSDF)**
Vessels on standby: Designate one response vessel in each regional district
Aircraft on standby (about 20 aircraft): Deploy in 15 minutes to two hours in each base as a standard

**FAST Force (ASDF)**
Standby for scrambling against intrusions into airspace
Standby for aircraft rescue and emergency transport duties (about 10–20 aircraft): Deploy within 15 minutes to two hours in each base
as a standard

-  When an earthquake of seismic intensity fi ve-upper or higher occurs, the mission of standby aircraft will be diverted to information
collecting


-----

necessary for responding to the disaster.[30] This is because
the course of action considered to be most appropriate
is that prefectural governors and other offi cials grasp the
overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster
relief capabilities fi rst, and then decide whether to make
a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. However,
when a warning declaration is issued based on the Act
on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for
Large-Scale Earthquakes[31] or a declaration of a nuclear
emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness,
the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear
disaster dispatch upon the request of the Director of the
Seismic Disaster Warning Headquarters and the Director
of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters
(the Prime Minister).
The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial
response to ensure that disaster relief operations are
conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.”

See Fig. III-1-2-15 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch

and Withdrawal)

See

Fig. III-1-2-16 (State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard))

**2** **Response of the MOD/SDF**


Fig. III-1-2-17 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2016)

|Description|Number of dispatches|Total number of personnel|Total number of vehicles|Total number of aircraft|Total number of vessels|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Responses to storm, f lood, and earthquake disasters|10|8,045|2,511|148|0|
|Transporting emergency patients|409|1,977|0|432|0|
|Search and rescue|25|4,880|398|74|11|
|Assisting f iref ighting|57|2,530|265|31|0|
|Other|14|15,691|2,650|40|0|
|Total|515|33,123|5,824|725|11|
|Kumamoto Earthquake|—|Approx. 814,200|—|2,618|300|


Fig. III-1-2-17

**Total** **Total** **Total** **Total**

**Number of**
**Description** **number of** **number of** **number of** **number of**
**dispatches**

**personnel** **vehicles** **aircraft** **vessels**

Responses to
storm, fl ood,

10 8,045 2,511 148 0

and earthquake
disasters

Transporting
emergency 409 1,977 0 432 0
patients

Search and
25 4,880 398 74 11
rescue

Assisting
57 2,530 265 31 0
fi refi ghting

Other 14 15,691 2,650 40 0

Total 515 33,123 5,824 725 11

Kumamoto Approx.
— — 2,618 300
Earthquake 814,200

*Disaster relief dispatches for the Kumamoto Earthquake are excluded from the FY2016 record.


on the same day, the SDF carried out rescue operations
for isolated individuals, searches for missing persons,
water supply assistance, bathing assistance, fl ood
control activities, and transportation of personnel and
goods until September 6 and September 18 in the
Kamikawa region and the Tokachi region, respectively.
The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was
approximately 1,705 personnel, 790 vehicles, 19 aircraft,
and 5 patrol boats.
b. Disaster Relief Dispatch for Earthquake Disaster with
an Epicenter in the Central Region of Tottori Prefecture
On October 21, 2016, an earthquake with an epicenter in
the central region of Tottori Prefecture (M6.6) occurred,
and the maximum seismic intensity of six lower was
observed in Kurayoshi City, Yurihama-cho and Hokueicho, Tottori Prefecture. As this earthquake caused
water outage in Kurayoshi City, the SDF, responding
to a disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor
of Tottori Prefecture on the same day, carried out water
supply assistance and maintenance activities for public
facilities and their surroundings until October 28, 2016.
The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was
approximately 620 personnel, 140 vehicles, and 13 aircraft.
c. Disaster Relief Dispatch in Response to Bird Flu Outbreak
During the period from November 2016 to March 2017,
the occurrence of highly pathogenic avian infl uenza was
confi rmed at poultry farms in Hokkaido, Miyagi, Chiba,
Niigata, Gifu, Saga, Kumamoto and Miyazaki Prefectures,
requiring epidemic control measures to be taken such


**2**


**(1) Response to Natural Disasters**
a. Disaster Relief Dispatch for Heavy Rain Disaster
Caused by Typhoon No. 10
(1) On August 30, 2016, road fl ooding, landslide and
other damages occurred due to Typhoon No. 10, and
some individuals in Hashino-cho in Kamaishi City
and Iwaizumi-cho in Shimohei-gun, Iwate Prefecture
became isolated. On the same day, the SDF,
responding to a disaster relief dispatch request from
the Governor of Iwate Prefecture, started to carry
out rescue operations for isolated individuals, water
supply assistance, elimination of road obstacles,
transportation of personnel and goods, meal providing
assistance, and bathing assistance, which continued
until September 16, 2016. The scale of this disaster
relief dispatch was approximately 2,090 personnel,
690 vehicles, and 77 aircraft.
(2) On October 31, 2016, heavy rainfall due to Typhoon
No. 10 also caused the isolation of individuals and
water outages within the Tokachi and Kamikawa
regions in Hokkaido. In response to a disaster relief
dispatch request from the Governor of Hokkaido made


30 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Offi ce may request a disaster relief dispatch.
With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may exercise authority based on the SDF Law;
(2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention
dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary.

31 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake prediction was reported by the Director-General of the Japan Meteorological Agency


-----

**i**

**Rescue of Isolated Individuals in Iwate Prefecture**
**– Disaster Relief Dispatch Following Typhoon No. 10**

Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF) Akira Mase, Commanding Offi cer of the 1st Battalion, 9th Artillery Regiment, 9th Division
(Takizawa City, Iwate)

In August 2016, a large typhoon, Typhoon No. 10, passed through the Tohoku
region for the fi rst time on record. Coastal areas, primarily Iwaizumi-cho in
Shimohei-gun, Iwate Prefecture, suffered catastrophic damages, and the 1st
Battalion of the 9th Artillery Regiment was dispatched in response to a disaster
relief dispatch request from the Governor of Iwate Prefecture. Initially many roads
were fl ooded and blocked by landslides in Iwaizumi-cho. This prevented the use
of vehicles to rescue isolated individuals and made the overall conditions diffi cult.
An evacuation instruction had also been issued for the subsequent Typhoon No.
12 approaching Japan. Therefore, it was indeed a race against time in that the
havoc wreaked would have been worse if the isolated individuals in dangerous
areas were not rescued quickly. All SDF personnel on this mission were fully
committed to performing their duties based on a shared understanding of Lieutenant Colonel Mase (upper center) deployed to rescue

isolated individuals (September 2016)

“rescuing the affected individuals as quickly as possible,” and demonstrated the
results of their daily training. This made me feel that we did contribute to the safety and security of many local residents.


**i**

**Rescue of Isolated Individuals in Hokkaido**
**– Disaster Relief Dispatch Following Typhoon No. 10**

Captain (GSDF) Masayuki Hatori, Commanding Offi cer of the 1st Company, 5th Tank Battalion, 5th Brigade
(Shikaoi-cho, Kato-gun, Hokkaido)

In the early hours of August 31, 2016, Shimizu-cho in Kato-gun, Hokkaido
was hit by heavy rain from Typhoon No. 10. In response to a request for
disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Hokkaido, the 1st Company
of the 5th Tank Battalion to which I belong was dispatched.
As a commanding offi cer of the Company assigned to the
post only in August 2016, I took command of the rescue of isolated
individuals as the damage situation gradually became clearer. I came
away from this disaster relief dispatch convinced that our activities
were successful because of the daily education and training of the
SDF and the cooperation with local communities. I was also able to
witness fi rsthand that our activities were contributing to the security

Captain Hatori (center) making on-site arrangements prior to conducting

and safety of the Japanese people. rescue operations for isolated individuals (September 2016)


as euthanization of poultries. In response to the request
for disaster relief dispatch from the governors of these
prefectures, the SDF carried out euthanization of poultries.
The SDF was dispatched for a total of 10 times
(one dispatch to Hokkaido, Miyagi, Chiba, Gifu, Saga
and Kumamoto Prefectures as well as two dispatches to
Niigata and Miyazaki Prefectures) with approximately
9,105 personnel and approximately 1,500 vehicles.
d. Disaster Relief Dispatch in Response to Forest Fire
Among the forest fi res that occurred nationwide between
A il d M 2017 i l di th i I t


Fukushima, Nagano and Shizuoka Prefectures, the
respective local governments carried out fi refi ghting
activities but struggled to control the fi re. Thus, the
SDF in response to a request for disaster relief dispatch
from the governors of these prefectures conducted aerial
fi refi ghting activities.
The SDF was dispatched for a total of fi ve times (one
dispatch to Iwate, Nagano and Shizuoka Prefectures as well
as two dispatches to Fukushima Prefecture), comprising
approximately 2,735 personnel, approximately 555
hi l d 182 i ft A i t l 9 881 5 t


-----

Aerial rescue personnel of the MSDF Helicopter Rescue Squadron 73 transporting an emergency
patient from the deck of the passenger vessel Asuka II to a search and rescue aircraft using
a hoist (May 2017)

of water was sprinkled, with water sprinkling being
conducted 2,483 times.

See Fig. III-1-2-17 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2016));

Reference 43 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years))

See


**(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients**
The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients
from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient
medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients).
In FY2016, out of a total of 516 cases of disaster relief
dispatches, 409 cases involved the transportation of
emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands
such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and
Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo),
and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing
the majority of such cases.
In addition, the SDF carries out sea rescues upon
requests by the Japan Coast Guard on such occasions as
transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating
areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of
other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons
including a short flight range; emergencies of vessels
due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing.
Furthermore, the SDF conducts wide-area medical
transport operations for serious-case patients, by C-130H
transport aircraft, utilizing its mobile medical units in
certain occasions.
Furthermore, in FY2016, the SDF carried out
57 dispatches of firefighting support, with 53 cases
responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities.


SDF personnel transporting emergency patients using mobile medical units at ASDF Komaki
Air Base (October 2016)

local governments, and nuclear operators, to confirm
the effectiveness of local governments’ evacuation plan
and to strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in
a nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October
2014, SDF personnel (5 personnel as of April 1, 2017)
were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section
in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet
Office as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of
nuclear disaster response capabilities.


**(4) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters**
In the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the
MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift
transportation and deployment of sufficiently sized
units in their initial response. By establishing a rotating
staffing posture based on a joint operational approach,
the MOD/SDF will ensure that it is able to sustain a
well-prepared condition for a long-term response. In
doing so, the MOD/SDF will fully take into account the
lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake
and other disasters.
The MOD/SDF is in the process of formulating various
contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes,

GSDF vehicle being loaded into an MSDF transport ship Osumi during the Remote Island
Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX) (August 2016)


**(3) The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster**
In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has
formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.”
The SDF also participates in general nuclear disaster
ti d ill j i tl i l t d b th t


-----

Rescue 28, an exercise in preparation for the predicted
earthquake along the Nankai trough implemented by
the GSDF Middle Army in July 2016, and an exercise
in preparation for the predicted Tokyo Inland earthquake
implemented by the GSDF Eastern Army in March 2017.

See Reference 44 (Implementation and Participation Record of Major

Drills Related to Disaster Dispatch (FY2016))

See


**(6) Collaboration with Local Governments and Other**
**Relevant Organizations**

It is important for the SDF to strengthen collaboration
with local governments and other relevant organizations
under normal circumstances for the purpose of conducting
disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF
implements various measures including: (1) Establishment
of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and
Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF
Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment
of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster
prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and
mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the
GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefectural
Government; and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF
personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in
accordance with requests from local governments. As of the
end of March 2017, as many as 402 retired SDF personnel
are working in disaster prevention and other sections in
271 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the
country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very
effective way of strengthening collaboration between the
MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was
confirmed through the experiences of the Great East Japan
Earthquake and other disasters. In particular, each GSDF
regional Army establishes a forum for interaction with
senior directors for crisis management and other officials
from local governments and exchange information
and opinions to strengthen collaboration with those
local governments.

See Reference 74 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed

SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local
Government)


GSDF 1st Helicopter Brigade transferring air transported patients to an ambulance at Haneda
Airport during a medical activity exercise for large-scale earthquakes (August 2016)

which are under consideration at the Central Disaster
Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense
Disaster Prevention Plan to respond to such earthquakes.


**(5) Exercises Involving the SDF**
In order to respond to large-scale and various other
disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner, the SDF
carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also
actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized
by the Japanese Government or local government and is
seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and
agencies, and local governments.
a. Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR)
From June to July 2016, the SDF conducted a command
post exercise and a tabletop exercise in preparation for
the predicted Nankai Trough earthquake to enhance the
SDF’s earthquake response capability.
b. Remote Island Disaster Relief Exercise (RIDEX)
In September 2016, the SDF participated in a general
disaster prevention training planned and organized
by Okinawa Prefecture and conducted a field training
exercise to deal with sudden large-scale disasters in a
remote island to strengthen collaboration with relevant
organizations and maintain as well as enhance the SDF’s
ability to respond to disasters in remote islands.
c. Other
The SDF worked to enhance their earthquake response
capability, for example, by conducting the Nankai


**Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.**
**9**


In the event of natural disasters, insurgencies, and other
emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order
SDF units to rescue or transport Japanese nationals and
other people overseas upon request from the Minister
for Foreign Affairs to guard, rescue or transport Japanese
ti l t d b t lt ti ith


the Minister, on the basis of Article 84-3 (measures to
rescue Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) or Article 84-4
(transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.) of the SDF
Law. Provisions on measures to rescue Japanese nationals
overseas, etc. were newly established in the Legislation
f P d S it t d i S t b 2015


-----

For the prompt, appropriate and reliable
implementation of these activities regarding Japanese
nationals overseas, the SDF is prepared to dispatch its
units swiftly. Specifi cally, the SDF maintains operational
readiness, with the GSDF designating a helicopter
unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF
designating vessels such as transport ships (including
ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift
units and personnel for dispatch.
Since the rescue and transport of Japanese nationals
overseas require close coordination among the GSDF,
MSDF and ASDF, exercises are carried out constantly with
respect to the transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.
In August 2016, an exercise for the transport of Japanese
nationals overseas was conducted in Djibouti with the aim
of strengthening cooperation between the SDF and the
U.S. Forces. Furthermore, in December 2016, the SDF
carried out an exercise for the rescue of Japanese nationals
overseas to practice for the fi rst time the whole process of
the rescue of Japanese nationals overseas.
In the annual lateral joint exercise “Cobra Gold” that
took place in February 2017 in Thailand, the MOD/SDF
participated in the exercise for the rescue of Japanese
nationals overseas. In cooperation with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Embassy in Thailand,
and others, the staff of the embassy and their family
members also participated in the exercise. In the exercise,
MOD/SDF practiced the whole process of the rescue
measures, and strengthened collaboration between the
MOD/SDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding

**Readiness against Invasion**
**10**


The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness
against land invasions involving the mobilization of large
ground forces, which was expected primarily during the
Cold War, will be retained.
In case Japan faces a full-scale invasion, the SDF
will respond to the situation in an aligned and systematic
manner based on their integrated operations. Their
operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial
air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting
waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the
land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime
communication, based on the characteristic of their
purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces
will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and


SDF personnel guiding people to ASDF C-130H transport aircraft during an exercise for the
rescue of Japanese nationals overseas in the annual Cobra Gold exercise in Thailand
(February 2017)

the measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas.
With respect to the terrorist attack in Dhaka,
Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, a government
aircraft was sent from the ASDF Special Aircraft Group
(belong to the Chitose Air Base) to Dhaka for the purpose
of transporting Japanese victims and others involved
based on Article 84-4 of the SDF Law (Transportation of
Japanese nationals overseas), and the bodies of Japanese
victims (seven nationals), their families, and other
involved parties were transported to Japan. In relation to
the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of
the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft C-130H were
sent to transport four embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti.

See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Outline of the Act for the Development

of the Legislation for Peace and Security)


deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the
SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

**1** **Air Defense Operations**


**1**


Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is
surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars,[32]
it is expected that Japan will be repeatedly hit by rapid
and surprise aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the
case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs.
Operations for aerial defense[33] can be categorized into
comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by
the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by


32 Aerial attacks are important elements infl uencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations.

33 A special characteristic of aerial defense operations is that initial response is critical and can infl uence the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial response


-----

Fig. III-1-2-18 Example of Air Defense Operations


Fig. III-1-2-18


Interception
order

Detect

Airborne Warning
and Control System
(AWACS) [1]

Destroy Combat air patrol

(CAP) [2]

Aerial refueling/transport

Intercept aircraft (KC-767)

Detect

Warning and

Detect Destroy control radar

Destroy Cruise missile launched by an enemy

Scrambing fighters Intercept

Identification of
friend or foe

Flow of air defense operations

Interception
order

Air Defense Direction Center (DC)
Air wing command post

Notes: 1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense
ground environments
2. Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft


**i**

**For the Commencement of the Operation of F-35A**

Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF) Nakano, ASDF Air Defense Command

F-35A has high stealth capabilities as well as a remarkably improved system in comparison
with former fi ghters.
On November 17, 2016, the ASDF received the fi rst F-35A. As of May 2017, the ASDF is
conducting training for pilots using four F-35A aircraft at the Luke Air Force Base in Arizona,
United States in preparation for the commencement of the operation of F-35A.
It was fi ne weather on the day of the fi rst fl ight, February 7, 2017. I applied myself
methodically to the preliminary training using high performance simulators, etc. and managed
to complete the fi rst fl ight of F-35A without any trouble. I really felt that the F-35A was a
fantastic fi ghter with excellent maneuverability and situational recognition ability, which was
realized by utilizing advanced technologies at their highest level. The fi rst fl ight turned a new
page in the history of the ASDF, while it has also become an unforgettable experience in my Lieutenant Colonel Nakano aboard F-35A

conducting pre-fl ight checks

career as a pilot.
Going forward, F-35A will be deployed at the ASDF Misawa Air Base. I am sure that
F-35A will make signifi cant contributions to Japan’s peace and stability along with other
equipment possessed by the ASDF. I will continue using the skills and knowledge acquired
through the training in the United States and the mutual relationship of trust cultivated with
U.S. Forces personnel, and intend to contribute to building an even more robust Japan-
U.S. relationship.

F-35A in fl ight training


-----

Fig. III-1-2-19 Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan


Fig. III-1-2-19


Airborne warning and
control system

Anti-air warfare Fighters

Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Air defense in Enemy aircraft

the surrounding waters

Response in the main channel

Enemy surface
vessels

Anti-surface

Mine deployment warfare warfare

Patrol helicopter

Surface-to-ship Aegis-equipped destroyer
missile

Response in the waters

Fixed-wing patrol aircraft

Minesweeper

Anti-mine warfare

Anti-submarine warfare

Response in coastal waters Submarine

Enemy submarine


the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops.
Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy
aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory,
prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and
preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory
of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to
infl ict signifi cant damage on the enemy thus making the
continuation of their aerial attack diffi cult.

See Fig. III-1-2-18 (Example of Air Defense Operations)

**2** **Defense Operations Protecting Waters**
**Surrounding Japan**


See


Fig. III-1-2-19 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas
Surrounding Japan)


**3** **Operations Protecting the Land**


In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries
are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by
the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne
troops from the air.
For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to
be diffi cult to exert systematic combat capabilities while
they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before
or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land,
we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our
enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points
as much as possible and attack them at an early stage.

See Fig. III-1-2-20 (Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing

of Invading Forces)

**4** **Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime**
**Transportation**


**2**


If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is an
island country, aerial attacks are expected to be combined
with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy
destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to
enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory.
Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding
Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters
around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial
defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the
waters around our country by combining these multiple
operations, blocking the invasion of our enemies, and
tt ki d d l ti th i b t biliti


**4**


Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much
of its resources and food, making maritime transportation
routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our
existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country
d d tt k t iti t t ti


-----

Fig. III-1-2-20 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces


Fig. III-1-2-20


Fighters

Response in coastal waters Assault

helicopter

Surface-to-ship missile Surface ship

Unmanned
reconnaissance aircraft

Surface-to-air missile

Response in sea waters

Response to enemy
heliborne units

Mobile Combat
Vehicles

Surface-to-air
missile

Surveillance radar

Tank

Response in sea waters

Armored Artillery
vehicle

Response in urban areas

Response to enemy
airborne unit

Guiding evacuees


routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous
warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come
and assist in the defense of Japan.
In operations to ensure the safety of our maritime
transportation, the SDF combines various operations
such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine

**Response to Other Events**
**11**


**1** **Response to Situations that will Have an Important**
**Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security**

**1**


In the event of situations that will have an important
infl uence on Japan’s peace and security, the MOD/SDF will
provide materials and services as rear area support activities
and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship
inspection activities as stipulated in the Act Concerning
Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations
that will Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and
Security and the Ship Inspection Operations Act.


operations to patrol,[34] defend SDF ships, and protect
straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes[35] to directly
defend Japanese ships, etc. Aerial defense (anti-air
operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation
routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from
fi ghter jets and other aircraft is provided as required.


See


Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Outline of the Act for the Development
of the Legislation for Peace and Security)


**2** **Military Intelligence Collection**

**2**


For formulating defense policy accurately in response
to the changes in the situation and for operating
defense capabilities effectively in dealing with various
contingencies, it is necessary to grasp mid- to long-term
military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and
to detect the indications of those situations at an early


34 The act of systematically monitoring a specifi c area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.ii


-----

Fig. III-1-2-21 Dispatched Defense Attachés

Fig. III-1-2-21

FinlandFinland[ *re-dispatch scheduled in FY2017]

Kazakhstan

Sweden

Poland Delegation of Japan Delegation of Japan Mongolia

to the Conference on to the Conference on

Ukraine Disarmament (Geneva)Disarmament (Geneva)

Germany (2)

Netherlands

Russia (3)

United
Kingdom (2)

Belgium China (3)

France (2) Republic of Korea (3) United States (6)

Permanent MissionPermanent Mission

Austria Vietnam Vietnam [*dispatch of additional one ] of Japanof Japan

personnel scheduled in FY2017 to the United Nationsto the United Nations

Italy Myanmar (New York)(New York)

Thailand

Morocco Philippines Philippines [*dispatch of additional one ]

personnel scheduled in FY2017

Algeria

Malaysia

Egypt

Singapore

Nigeria Australia (3)

Indonesia

Djibouti

Saudi

Ethiopia Arabia India (3) Brazil

Kenya Turkey Pakistan [Legend]

South Africa Lebanon Afghanistan Dispatch destination

Jointly administered country

Jordan Iran

Figure in parentheses shows the number of defense attachés dispatched.

Israel United Arab Emirates No figure indicates one dispatched defense attaché.

Kuwait As of April 1, 2017 (64 defense attachés dispatched to 44 embassies and 2 delegations of Japan)


stage. To this end, the MOD/SDF always makes efforts
to collect information swiftly and accurately by using
various methods.
Some examples of intelligence collection methods used
by the MOD/SDF include: (1) collecting, processing and
analyzing signals emanating from military communications
and electronic weapons in the air over Japanese territory;
(2) collecting, interpreting, and analyzing data from various
imagery satellites (including Information Gathering
Satellite)[36]; (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships,
aircraft and other vehicles; (4) collecting and organizing
a variety of open source information; (5) information
exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and
(6) intelligence collection conducted by defense attachés
and other offi cials.
As the security environment surrounding Japan has
become increasingly severe, strengthening intelligence
capabilities is considered to be an increasingly important
issue. For this reason, the MOD is currently promoting
comprehensive enhancement of its intelligence capabilities
at all stages, including collecting, analyzing, sharing, and
securing intelligence. Specifi cally, the MOD will move


forward with the high-level use of geospatial data such as
visualization of situations by fusing various information,
securing highly competent analysts by such means as
integrating and strengthening educational curricula, and
enhancing the dispatch posture of defense attachés.
Under such a situation, in light of the importance of
the Middle East areas and the necessity of intelligence
gathering regarding the activities of ISIL and international
terrorism, defense attachés were newly dispatched to
Jordan and the United Arab Emirates in March 2017.
Another defense attaché has also been dispatched to
Mongolia to promote strengthening of the intelligence
gathering system and defense cooperation in the AsiaPacifi c region. Additional dispatch of defense attachés
to the Philippines and Vietnam, which are located in
important sea lanes for Japan, during FY2017 is also
planned, while there is a plan to resume the dispatch of
defense attachés to Finland that has been suspended since
2014 in order to respond to the recent changes in the
situation in Europe, including the deteriorating situation
in Ukraine.

See Fig. III-1-2-21 (Dispatched Defense Attachés)


-----

**Active Promotion of**

**Chapter**
### 2

**Security Cooperation**


In situations where international cooperation in the
security and defense areas is required, and from the
perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based
on the principle of international cooperation, the MOD/
SDF is required to actively contribute to the security of
Japan as well as the peace and stability of the region.
Furthermore, active contribution of the MOD/SDF is also
necessary in ensuring the peace, stability, and prosperity


of the entire international community. Specifi cally,
Japan plans to enhance bilateral and multilateral defense
cooperation and exchanges, and more actively promote
the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN
PKO), counter-piracy operations, international peace
cooperation activities, and other relevant missions as
avenues to address global security issues.


**Section 1 Towards Strategic International Defense Cooperation**



**Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue and Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**
**1**


Amid the ongoing change in the region, which comprises
the balance of power at the global level, peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region is important not only
for the security of Japan, but increasingly across the
international community. While some nations possess
large-scale military power over the region, a framework
for regional security cooperation has not yet been
suffi ciently institutionalized. Also, due to the political,
economic and social systems of the countries, visions of
security vary from country to country. Furthermore, there
have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral
actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion
without paying respect to existing international law. The
issues involving the South China Sea, in particular, cause
concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea,
freedom of navigation and overfl ight, and stability in the
Southeast Asian region. Thus, responses to these issues
have become an important challenge in terms of ensuring
the regional stability. For such a situation, strategic
international cooperation,[1] which promotes bilateral and
multilateral security cooperation and exchanges more
strategically and effectively, is necessary. The need for
such cooperation is increasing in order to build trust
between the relevant countries and establish a foundation


on which each country works in cooperation to resolve
shared regional security issues.
Regarding the form of defense cooperation and
exchanges, Japan has long strived to alleviate any
conditions of confrontation and tension, as well as
fostering a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere
by building face-to-face relationships through bilateral
dialogues and exchanges. In addition, recognizing the
increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has
recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from
traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased
manner by appropriately combining various means
including joint exercises and capacity building assistance,
defense equipment and technology cooperation, and
establishing institutional frameworks such as the
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA).
In addition, multilateral security cooperation and
dialogue in the region are in the process of evolving
from that focused on dialogue, to cooperation that
seeks to build order in the region. It is important to
promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation
and exchanges in a multi-layered and practical manner,
leading to the improvement of regional and global
security environment.


On December 16, 2015, at the Meeting of the Ministry of Defense and SDF Senior Personnel, Prime Minister Abe said, “I would like you to advance strategic international defense cooperation, boldly


-----

Fig. III-2-1-1 Number of high-level bilateral dialogues and consultations (June 2016–June 2017)


Fig. III-2-1-1


More than 5 exchanges
More than 3 exchanges
2 exchanges
1 exchange

Finland
Sweden Russia

United
Kingdom Netherlands Canada

France Germany Mongolia Republic

of Korea

Italy Turkey United States

Jordan Qatar China

Saudi Myanmar
Arabia India Laos

Oman Thailand Vietnam
Djibouti Cambodia Philippines

South Sudan Malaysia Brunei

Maldives Sri Lanka

Indonesia

Singapore

Timor-Leste

Australia

New Zealand

-  “High-level” refers to Minister, State Minister, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice-Minister,
Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chief of Staff of each SDF branch.


Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges (June
2016 – June 2017))
Fig. III-2-1-2 (Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges)


See


Reference 45 (Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues
(Asia-Pacifi c Region, Last Five Years)); Reference 47 (Exchange
Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students
in FY2016))


**Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue**
**2**


Initiatives under the multilateral framework such as the
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)-Plus and
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),[2] which is a security
cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacifi c region, have
made steady progress and serve as an important foundation
for cooperation and exchange in the areas of security
and defense. Japan has contributed to the enhancement
of multilateral cooperation in the region, for example,
by annually holding the Japan-ASEAN Defense ViceMinisterial Forum and the Tokyo Defense Forum.

See Reference 45 (Record of Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia
Pacifi c Region, Last Five Years); Reference 46 (Situations Concerning
the Conclusion of Agreements); Reference 47 (Exchange Student
Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016));
Reference 48 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry
of Defense); Reference 49 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)


Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Kuroe paying a courtesy call on General Chaichan,
Permanent Secretary for Defense of Thailand

The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacifi c region through dialogue and cooperation on the political and security sectors, has been held since 1994. The ARF
currently comprises 26 countries and 1 organization as members, and holds various inter-governmental meetings that are attended by both foreign affairs offi cials and defense offi cials to exchange
opinions on the regional situation and security areas. The 26 countries consist of 10 ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia
(since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), in addition to Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, the United


-----

Fig. III-2-1-2 Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges

|Classif ciation|Type|Signif icance|Major initiatives|
|---|---|---|---|
|Bilateral|Exchange between Defense Ministers and high-level off icials|Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are important common interests to both sides, as well as enhancing the following defense exchanges.|● Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries ● Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s State Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice- Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Chief of Joint Staff, Off ciers at the GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Chief level|
||Regular consultation between defense off icials|Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges through continuous and direct exchanges of views between national defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries.|● Consultations between Director-General-level off icials, Deputy Director-General-level off ciials, and their counterparts ● Dialogue between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries.|
||Exchange between units|Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries through bilateral exercises and events for exchanges.|● Personnel exchanges ● Mutual visits to vessels of training squadrons and aircraft, and bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations|
||Exchange of students|In addition to the original educational purposes, deepening the understanding of the other countries’ defense policies and the situation of their defense units, as well as building mutual trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel exchange and establishing human networks.|● Mutual acceptance of students • National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan National Defense Academy, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff College, Joint Staff College ● Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations|
||Research exchanges|Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of both countries through frank exchange of opinions for the maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges.|● Research exchanges between Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in other countries|
|Multilateral|Security dialogue|Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of situations and on security policy among related countries as well as exchanging views and discussing on a wide range of multilateral issues.|● Dialogues at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Experts’ Working Groups (Maritime security, Military medicine, Counter-terrorism, Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, Peacekeeping operations, Humanitarian Mine Action, Cyber security ● Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense Japan • Japan-ASEAN Defence Vice-Ministerial Forum • Tokyo Defense Forum • Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacif ci (MCAP) • International Symposium on Security Affairs ● Multinational Dialogues held by Defense Authorities • Asia-Pacif ic Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD) • Pacif ci Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) • Western Pacif ic Naval Symposium (WPNS) • The Pacif ic Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) • Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX) • Asia-Pacif ic Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC) ● Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors • IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue) • Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue) • Munich Security Conference • Halifax International Security Forum • The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)|
||Multilateral exercises and seminars|Improving skills and contributing to enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation through multilateral exercises and seminars.|● Personnel exchanges ● Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief, minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations|


Fig. III-2-1-2

**Classifi cation** **Type** **Signifi cance** **Major initiatives**

Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through - Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense

Exchange

frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries

between

defense policies that are important common interests to both - Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s State Minister of

Defense Ministers

sides, as well as enhancing the following defense exchanges. Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister, Administrative Vice
and high-level

Minister, Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, Chief

offi cials

of Joint Staff, Offi cers at the GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Chief level
Regular Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges through - Consultations between Director-General-level offi cials, Deputy
consultation continuous and direct exchanges of views between national Director-General-level offi cials, and their counterparts
between defense defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of - Dialogue between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and
offi cials mutual trust and cooperation between related countries. their counterparts in foreign countries.

Bilateral Exchange Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of mutual - Personnel exchanges

between trust and cooperation between related countries through - Mutual visits to vessels of training squadrons and aircraft, and
units bilateral exercises and events for exchanges. bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations

In addition to the original educational purposes, deepening - Mutual acceptance of students
the understanding of the other countries’ defense policies and - National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan National

Exchange of

the situation of their defense units, as well as building mutual Defense Academy, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff College, Joint

students

trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel Staff College
exchange and establishing human networks. - Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations

Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of - Research exchanges between Japan’s National Institute for

Research

both countries through frank exchange of opinions for the Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in

exchanges

maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges. other countries

- Dialogues at the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
- Experts’ Working Groups (Maritime security, Military
medicine, Counter-terrorism, Humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, Peacekeeping operations, Humanitarian Mine
Action, Cyber security

- Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense
Japan
- Japan-ASEAN Defence Vice-Ministerial Forum
- Tokyo Defense Forum
- Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacifi c

Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of (MCAP)
situations and on security policy among related countries as - International Symposium on Security Affairs

Security dialogue

well as exchanging views and discussing on a wide range of - Multinational Dialogues held by Defense Authorities

Multilateral multilateral issues. - Asia-Pacifi c Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD)

- Pacifi c Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)
- Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (WPNS)
- The Pacifi c Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS)
- Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)
- Asia-Pacifi c Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)

- Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors
- IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)
- Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)
- Munich Security Conference
- Halifax International Security Forum
- The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)
Multilateral Improving skills and contributing to enhancement of mutual - Personnel exchanges
exercises trust and cooperation through multilateral exercises and - Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief,
and seminars seminars. minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations

See>>Reference 45 (Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacifi c Region, Last Five Years); Reference 48 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense;
Reference 49 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues)


**1** **Initiatives under the ASEAN Defence Ministers’**
**Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) Framework**


ADMM-Plus is highly signifi cant from the perspective of
encouraging the development and deepening of security
and defense cooperation in the region, and the MOD/
SDF is participating in and providing support for its
initiatives. The following meetings and working groups
have been established under the ministerial meetings in
the ADMM-Plus: (1) ASEAN Defence Senior Offi cials’
Meeting (ADSOM) Plus; (2) ADSOM-Plus Working
Groups (ADSOM-Plus WG); and (3) Experts’ Working
Groups (EWG).
Japan has also actively contributed to the activities
of the EWGs. Japan and Singapore served as co-chairs


**1**


The countries of ASEAN hold the ASEAN Defence
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which is a ministerial
level meeting between defense authorities in the ASEAN
region, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus), which contains an additional eight nonASEAN member states[3] including Japan to the members.
The ADMM-Plus is the only offi cial meeting for the
defense ministers in the Asia-Pacifi c region including
the countries outside the ASEAN region. Thus, the


-----

of the EWG on Military Medicine from July 2011 until
March 2014, while Japan and Laos served as co-chairs
of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Relief from July 2014 to March 2017. In the EWG on
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, Japan
conducted the following activities: (1) Specifi ed issues
which will have to be solved between the disaster-affected
country and the assisting countries if they don’t have a
specifi c agreement; (2) Prepared Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) for the Multi-National Coordination
Center (MNCC) to amplify the effects of the activities
by assisting foreign forces; and (3) Compiled a booklet
of the best practices focusing on redeployment cases that
provide clues on criteria to decide redeployment when
conducting disaster relief activities.
The validity of the said SOP was verifi ed through
a command post exercise in the multilateral exercise
called ADMM-Plus Military Medicine – Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief Joint Exercise (AM-HEx
2016), co-hosted with the EWG on Military Medicine
in Thailand in September 2016. Subsequently, it was
adopted during the meeting of the EWG on Humanitarian
Assistance and Disaster Relief in December 2016.

See Fig. III-2-1-3 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN

Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus))

**2** **ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)**


Organizational Chart and Overview of

Fig. III-2-1-3 the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus

(ADMM-Plus)

|ASEAN Def Officials’ M (ADSO • Held annual • Vice-Ministe General leve|ence Senior eeting Plus M-Plus) ly r and Director l|
|---|---|


Fig. III-2-1-3

ASEAN Defence Ministers’ <Participating countries>
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan,

New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia,

- Held once every two years

United States

- Ministerial level

ASEAN Defence Senior
Officials’ Meeting Plus
(ADSOM-Plus)

- Held annually

- Vice-Minister and Director
General level

Experts’ Working
ADSOM-Plus Working Group Group (EWG)

- Held annually

- Director level

Overview of Experts’ Working Group (EWG)
Establishing EWGs in the seven specific regional security fields
Co-chaired with non-ASEAN countries
Promoting information sharing, workshops and seminars, and multinational joint exercises
Submitting recommendations and reports

EWGs
(1) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(2) Maritime security
(3) Military medicine
(4) Counter-terrorism
(5) Peacekeeping operations
(6) Humanitarian mine action
(7) Cyber Security


**3** **ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal**
**Meeting and the Vientiane Vision**


**3**


**(1) ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting**
**and the Vientiane Vision**

Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the JapanASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2013, the
fi rst ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting
took place in Myanmar in November 2014. This meeting,
in which exchanges of opinions were conducted regarding
cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as


**2**


Regarding the ARF, which is engaged mainly by
diplomatic authorities, in recent years, concrete efforts
have been made for specifi c initiatives[4] in non-traditional
security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security,
and peacekeeping and peace building, and the MOD is
making active contributions to this forum as well. For
example, in the maritime security fi eld, an Inter-Sessional
Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) has been
held since 2009.[5] At the ISM on MS, a collection of best
practices concerning support for capacity building in the
fi eld of maritime security was formulated on the basis
of a summary compiled by Japan. In the fi eld of disaster
relief, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel and
aircraft to participate in ARF Disaster Relief Exercises
(ARF-DiREx) (conducted every two years) since 2009.


Defense Minister Inada attending the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting in Laos
(November 2016)

In addition to Ministers’ meetings at the foreign minister level, the Senior Offi cials’ Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional
Support Group on Confi dence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, ARF
Defense Offi cials’ Dialogues (DOD) is held ahead of the main meeting.


-----

**i**

**Lao People’s Army’s Views on the Co-Chairmanship between Lao People’s**
**Army and Japan Self-Defense Forces on ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-**
**Plus Experts’ Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief**

Colonel Phayvanh Chanthaphomma
Deputy Director General of Foreign Relations Department
Co-Chair on ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR

The Lao People’s Army expresses its pleasure and privilege to be the co-chair on the ADMM-Plus EWG on HADR 2014-2016 in
the 2nd cycle with the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Japan is one of the countries equipped with advanced technology, substantial
expertise and experiences in HADR. Hence, this co-chairmanship was of great signifi cance for the Lao People’s Army to exchange
information and learn lessons from the Japan Self-Defense Forces on capacity building as well as preparation of effective response
to emergency situations caused by natural disasters.
During the tenure of the co-chairmanship, the Lao PDR and Japan as co-chairs carried out their tasks with strong commitment
and accountability as exemplifi ed in various activities successfully organized including meetings, workshops, planning conferences
and Table-Top Exercise. The co-chairs also drafted important documents specifi cally the SOP on Multinational Coordination Centre
(MNCC). Such commitment and efforts substantially contributed to the success of the 2nd cycle of the co-chairmanship.
The Lao People’s Army sincerely conveys its appreciation and gratitude to the Ministry of Defense of Japan for the consistent
support accorded to the Lao People’s Army, especially the conduct of HADR capacity building workshops for the Lao military personnel.
The aforementioned capacity building programme created favorable conditions for the Lao military personnel to successfully
participate in the ADMM-Plus Military Medicine and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 2016 (AM-HEx 2016) in Thailand
with the ADMM-Plus Member Countries. The Lao People’s Army is convinced that the friendship and bilateral ties between the Lao
PDR and Japan as well as the two defense forces will be further strengthened in order to together contribute to the promotion of
regional and global peace, security and stability.

Army Colonel Chanthaphomma chairing the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance The Lao People’s Army Medal* (This medal was awarded from the Ministry of
and Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus (August 2015) National Defense of Lao PDR to the MOD in November 2016.)

-  This medal is presented to those who have contributed to the peace, independence, democratic integration, and the prosperity of Lao PDR.


humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)
and maritime security, was a breakthrough opportunity,
bringing together defense ministers from Japan and the
ASEAN member states for the fi rst time in the nearly 50
years of friendship and cooperation between Japan and
ASEAN. This marked an important fi rst step towards
strengthening defense cooperation in the future.
In November 2016, the second ASEAN-Japan Defence
Ministers’ Informal Meeting was held in Vientiane,
Laos. In that meeting, Defense Minister Inada proposed
Japan’s own initiative called the “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s
Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” as a
id li f J ASEAN d f ti hi h


was welcomed by all ASEAN member states.
The “Vientiane Vision” is the fi rst of its kind to
present, in a transparent manner, an overall picture of
the priority areas of the future direction of ASEAN-wide
defense cooperation. Specifi cally, in addition to defense
cooperation with individual ASEAN member states,
Japan will promote defense cooperation to contribute
to ASEAN-wide capacity building by focusing on
three points: (1) Consolidating the order based on the
principles of international law; (2) Promoting maritime
security; and (3) Coping with increasingly diversifying
and complex security issues.
I D b 2016 J t bli h d th C itt


-----

for Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation, led by the
Japanese State Minister of Defense, in order to promote
practical defense cooperation based on the vision by
combining various means such as: (1) promotion of
international law; (2) capacity building cooperation;
(3) defense equipment and technology cooperation;
(4) joint training and exercises; and (5) human resource
development and academic exchange.
Under this vision, Japan participated in a command
post exercise of the U.S.-Philippines joint exercise
Balikatan in May 2017. At the same time, Japan also
participated in a medicine and construction program
from the perspective of capacity building assistance for
the fi rst time and, together with Australia that was also
participating in the exercise Balikatan, contributed to the
improvement of the comprehensive HA/DR capabilities
of the Philippines. Furthermore, Japan implemented
the Japan-ASEAN Ship-Rider Cooperation Program on
board the destroyer Izumo cruising at international waters
surrounding Singapore in June 2017. This program
consisted of a combination of navigation communication
exercises and seminars on maritime security and HA/DR,
and was conducted as the fi rst Japan-ASEAN cooperation
program. Japan also invited observers from all ASEAN
member states to the Joint Exercise for Rescue for the
fi rst time and conducted various programs.

See Reference 50 (Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation

Initiative with ASEAN)

**(2) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum**
Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan-ASEAN
Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum, with the purpose of
strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships
through establishing human networks between Japanese
and ASEAN vice-ministerial level offi cials.
The 8th meeting was held in Sendai in September
2016, which was attended by the vice-ministerial level
offi cials from ASEAN member states and the ASEAN
Secretariat. Under the title of “To Improve Security
Environment in the Region: Enhancement of Defense
Cooperation between ASEAN and Japan,” participants
exchanged opinions on the three themes of: (1) “Current
regional security status”; (2) “United efforts to tackle
common challenges”; and (3) “Future of Japan-ASEAN
defense cooperation.” At the forum, participants
confi rmed the signifi cance of cooperation in the region,
including maritime security and the disaster relief fi elds
in response to the increasingly complex security issues
that are becoming diffi cult to deal with by a single
country alone. At the same time, they also agreed on the
i t f th l f l d th f l l ti


Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Manabe (sixth from left) attending the 8th
Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum held in Sendai (September 2016)

of disputes. On this basis, the participants concurred
that cooperation contributing to capacity enhancement
of ASEAN as a whole is important in order to deal with
diverse security issues, in addition to cooperating with
each ASEAN member state, and shared the view that
they would further promote Japan-ASEAN defense
cooperation in this direction.


**(3) Tokyo Defense Forum, etc.**
The MOD has held the Asia-Pacifi c Defense Forum
(Tokyo Defense Forum) every year since 1996 with
the participation of offi cers in charge of defense policy
(Director-General level offi cials) from the countries in the
region. At the forum, defense policies of the participating
countries and confi dence-building measures in the region
are discussed.
The 21st Forum was held in March 2017 with the
participation of 26 countries in total, consisting of France
and the United Kingdom in addition to 24 countries from
the Asia-Pacifi c region, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat,
the European Union (EU), and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). At this forum, a
broad range of discussions took place on the topics of:
(1) “Peacekeeping Operations: Upcoming Challenges
and Ways to Cooperate Ahead”; and (2) ”Domestic
Challenges of Defense Authorities.”
In addition, since 2001, the MOD has invited to
Japan key fi gures who are primarily involved in security
policy from countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region, with the
objective of promoting understanding of Japan’s security
and defense policy as well as the current status of the SDF.

**4** **Other**


**4**


**(1) International Conferences Hosted by International**
**Organizations**

State Minister of Defense Wakamiya attended the United
N ti P k i D f Mi i t i l h ld i


-----

Chief of Joint Staff Kawano (left) having a meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Dunford (right) during the 19th Annual Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD) (September 2016)

GSDF Chief of Staff Okabe (left) shaking hands with Chief of the Australian Ground
Forces Campbell (right) at the Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX) 2016 (September 2016)


State Minister of Defense Wakamiya making remarks at the United Nations Peacekeeping
Defense Ministerial (September 2016)

London in September 2016 and delivered a speech at the
session on “Improving Peacekeeping—Women, Peace
and Security.” State Minister of Defense Wakamiya
also held bilateral meetings with defense ministers and
others attending the meeting, and exchanged opinions
on the regional situations, security policies and the UN
peacekeeping operations. This meeting was a follow-up
to the fi rst and second Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping
hosted by the United States in September 2014 and
2015, respectively, and defense ministers and others
from approximately 80 countries and organizations
participated in the meeting.


**(2) International Conferences Hosted by Private**
**Organizations**

In the fi eld of security, not only inter-governmental
international conferences but also international
conferences organized by private organizations are held
in which various people such as government offi cials,
scholars, and journalists participate, and such conferences
provide a forum for sharing challenges and exchanging
opinions on medium- to long-term security issues. The
leading international conferences are the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security
Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)[6] and the Munich Security
Conference,[7] one of the most prestigious meetings among
the security meetings in Europe and the United States.

6 This is a multilateral conference initiated by IISS, a private British think tank, in which defense
ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related
issues and regional defense cooperation. Since the fi rst conference in 2002, it has been
held in Singapore every year and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, from the name of
the hotel at which it takes place.

7 One of the most prestigious international meetings in Europe and the United States hosted
by private organizers, which has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962.
Offi cials at the ministerial level from major European countries as well as the leaders,
ministers, parliamentary members, and key executives of international organizations usually


Then MSDF Chief of Staff Takei (center) having a meeting with the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
(far left) and the First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy (far right) in the Japan-U.S.-U.K. Trilateral
Maritime Talks (October 2016)

State Minister of Defense Wakamiya and ASDF Chief of Staff Sugiyama (center) attending
a symposium of the Air Force Forum in Japan (AFFJ) (October 2016)


-----

Then State Minister of Defense Wakamiya attended
the 53rd Munich Security Conference held in February
2017. This conference accommodated over 600
participants including leaders and ministers from the
United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France
and other countries, and a wide range of discussions
were carried out on various security issues such as
the situation in Europe, the situation in East Asia, and
international terrorism.
At the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017,
Defense Minister Inada delivered a speech at the second
plenary session on “Upholding the Rules-Based Regional
Order.” The Minister also held bilateral and trilateral
meetings with other participating countries to exchange
opinions on regional situations and defense cooperation
including the situations in North Korea and the East
and South China Seas, and to confi rm the measures for
strengthening future cooperation with the countries.

**(3) Inter-Service Branch Initiatives**
In September 2016, the Chief of Joint Staff participated in
the 19th Annual Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD),
a meeting of the chiefs of staff from the countries in the
Asia-Pacifi c region, in which the participants conduct
free exchanges of opinions on the security of this region.
The Chief of Joint Staff carried out bilateral talks with
the Chiefs of Defense from 19 countries including the
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, out of the
29 participating countries, to nurture mutual trust and
enhance security relations.
The GSDF Chief of Staff participated in the Chief of
Army’s Exercise (CAEX) 2016, which takes place every
two years and is hosted by the Australian Ground Forces,
in September 2016. Through CAEX, the GSDF Chief of


Staff exchanged a wide range of opinions regarding issues
specifi c to ground-to-ground units in the region with the
Chiefs of Ground Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c region.
The Chief of Staff of the MSDF attended the JapanU.S.-U.K. Trilateral Maritime Talks, which was held for
the fi rst time in history in October 2016. In this meeting,
the MSDF Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations,
and the First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy gathered
together and agreed that the naval forces of the three major
maritime nations would cooperate with each other for the
improvement of the maritime security environment that is
undergoing fundamental changes. A joint message of the
three countries was also issued to the world.
In October 2016, the ASDF invited nine Air Force
Chiefs of Staff and Commanders from eight countries
to hold the Air Force Forum in Japan (AFFJ). In this
event, two-party talks with the ASDF Chief of Staff,
a symposium, and a visit to Iruma Air Base involving
an exhibition of Japanese equipment such as C-2
transport aircraft were carried out. Participants of the
forum shared information regarding the overall security
environment in the Asia-Pacifi c region, situational
awareness, and relevant issues, and agreed to strengthen
the relationship among the air forces of the participating
countries through exchanging opinions on capacity
building assistance as well as on defense equipment and
technology cooperation. In addition, in May 2017, the
ASDF Chief of Staff delivered a lecture on HA/DR at
the Philippine Air Force’s Annual Air Force Symposium
in the Philippines, shared information and strengthened
relationships with the Commander of the 5th Air Force
of the U.S. Air Force and the Chiefs of Air Staff from
the ASEAN member states and others participating in
the forum.


**Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation**
**3**


The security environment surrounding Japan has become
increasingly severe. As it is not possible for a country
alone to maintain its peace and stability, it is indispensable
for the international community to unite to resolve global
issues. Under such a circumstance, capacity building
assistance especially in the security and defense-related
areas is increasingly becoming important. For this
reason, defense authorities of Southeast Asian and other
countries request the MOD to provide capacity building
assistance and express expectation for cooperation at
various opportunities such as international conferences
and bilateral meetings. The MOD/SDF is working to
f th t th d d d f ti d


**KeyWord** Capacity building assistance

Capacity building assistance is designed to proactively create stability
within the region and improve the global security environment by

enhancing the capacity of recipient countries through continuous

human resource development and technical assistance in security

and defense fi elds on a regular basis. In particular, in the security

and defense fi elds such as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and

unexploded ordnances, military medicine, maritime security, and UN

peacekeeping operations, the MOD/SDF provides assistance to the
armed forces and military-related organizations of other countries by

utilizing their own capabilities.


-----

Fig. III-2-1-4 Recent Implementation of the Capacity Building Assistance (June 2016 – June 2017)


Fig. III-2-1-4


Thailand Kazakhstan Mongolia Laos Vietnam

Aviation safety Military medicine Civil engineering Humanitarian assistance Aviation safety, Aviation

and disaster relief medicine, Air rescue

Myanmar

Philippines

Humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief Humanitarian assistance
Underwater medicine and disaster relief
Aviation meteorology
International aviation law Vessel diesel engine maintenance

Military medicine (*)

Malaysia

Cambodia

Humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief

Indonesia Timor-Leste Papua New Guinea Civil engineering

Civil engineering Humanitarian assistance

Oceanography (*) and disaster relief
International maritime law (Vehicle maintenance) Military music

*Collaborative project with the United States and Australia


**(2) Specifi c Activities**
Through the capacity building assistance program, which
was launched in 2012, Japan has provided assistance in
various areas such as HA/DR, peacekeeping operations,
maritime security, and international law to 12 countries
mainly in the Asia-Pacifi c region.

See Fig. III-2-1-4 (Recent Implementation of the Capacity Building

Assistance (June 2016 – June 2017)), Fig. III-2-1-5 (Past Capacity
Building Assistance Activities), Reference 51 (Status of Capacity
Building Assistance)

The MOD/SDF’s activities consist of long-term
dispatch programs and short-term dispatch programs. The
long-term dispatch programs involve dispatching a team
composed of defense offi cials, SDF personnel, and staff
from NGOs for a long period in order to conduct largescale and systematic human resource development, such
as lectures and practical training. The short-term dispatch
programs involve dispatching SDF personnel with relevant
knowledge necessary to deliver specifi c lectures at seminars
for a short period. In addition, as an invitation program, the
MOD/SDF invites practitioners from the recipient country
t J idi t iti f th t i t SDF


exchanges by combining capacity building assistance and
other practical and diverse means.

**1** **Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity**
**Building Assistance**


**1**


**(1) Purpose of Implementing Capacity Building Assistance**
Providing assistance for capacity building has the
following objectives: (1) enabling recipient countries to
contribute to improving the global security environment;
(2) strengthening bilateral relationships with recipient
countries; (3) strengthening the relationships with other
supporting countries such as the United States and
Australia; and (4) promoting Japan’s efforts to work
proactively and independently to realize regional peace
and stability, thereby gaining trust in the MOD/SDF, as
well as Japan as a whole. In addition, these initiatives
also facilitate the improvement of the SDF capabilities.


-----

Fig. III-2-1-5 Past Capacity Building Assistance Activities

|FY Country|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Timor-Leste|Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|||||
|||||Civil engineering||
|Cambodia|Civil engineering|||||
|Viernam|Underwater medicine|Underwater medicine|||Underwater medicine|
||PKO||||PKO|
|||Aviation safety|Aviation safety|Aviation safety||
|||Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief||||
||||International aviation law|||
|||||Aviation medicine||
|Indonesia|Oceanography|||Oceanography||
||||International aviation law|||
||||||International maritime law|
|Mongolia|Military medicine|||||
||||Civil engineering|||
|Myanmar|||Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|||
||||Underwater medicine|||
||||Aviation meteorology|||
||||||International aviation law|
|Papua New Guinea|||Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|||
|||||Military music||
|Philippines|||Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|||
|||||International aviation law||
||||||Diesel engine maintenance|
|Malaysia||||International aviation law||
||||||Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|
|Laos||||Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief||
|Thailand|||||International aviation law|
||||||Aviation safety|
|Kazakhstan|||||Military medicine|
|ASEAN countries||||Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief||


Fig. III-2-1-5

**Country** **FY** **2012** **2013** **2014** **2015** **2016**

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

**Timor-Leste**

Civil engineering

**Cambodia** Civil engineering

Underwater medicine Underwater medicine Underwater medicine

PKO PKO

Aviation safety Aviation safety Aviation safety

**Viernam** Humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief

International aviation law

Aviation medicine

Oceanography Oceanography

**Indonesia** International aviation law

International maritime law

Military medicine

**Mongolia**

Civil engineering

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Underwater medicine

**Myanmar**

Aviation meteorology

International aviation law

Humanitarian assistance

**Papua New Guinea** and disaster relief

Military music

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

**Philippines** International aviation law

Diesel engine maintenance

International aviation law

**Malaysia** Humanitarian assistance

and disaster relief

**Laos** Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

International aviation law

**Thailand**

Aviation safety

**Kazakhstan** Military medicine

Humanitarian assistance
**ASEAN countries**
and disaster relief

Note: : Japan’s own projects, : Projects implemented in cooperation with other countries providing assistance, Green letters: ASEAN member states


training facilities and undergo training.
In the long-term programs, the MOD/SDF has
provided technical assistance regarding engineering
activities such as road construction in Mongolia, which
builds on previous assistance, assistance for engineering
activities in exercise HARII HAMUTUK in Timor-Leste
hosted by the Australian Armed Forces, and assistance
to the military band in Papua New Guinea, which will
be serving as the chair of the Asia-Pacifi c Economic
Cooperation (APEC) in 2018.
In the short-term dispatch programs, seminars were
conducted on the following areas: aviation meteorology,
international aviation law and underwater medicine in
Myanmar; HA/DR in Laos; HA/DR, vessel diesel engine
maintenance, assistance in a medical program in the U.S.Philippines joint exercise (Exercise Balikatan) in the
Philippines; aviation safety, aviation medicine, and air
i Vi t HA/DR i M l i d Ti L t


international maritime law in Indonesia; and aviation safety
in Thailand. In addition, training in the civil engineering
area and training for military band were conducted in
Cambodia and Papua New Guinea, respectively.
In the invitation program, the following training
have been implemented: HA/DR training for personnel
from Myanmar and Timor-Leste; military music training
for military band personnel from Papua New Guinea;
oceanography training for personnel from Indonesia;
aviation medicine training for personnel from Vietnam;
and medical activities training for personnel from
Kazakhstan, which is the fi rst training offered for military
personnel from Central Asia.

**(3) Cooperation with Relevant Countries**
In efforts to stabilize the regional security environment,
cooperation with other supporting countries is essential.
I ti l it b ildi ti b t


-----

**i**

**Establishing a Military Band in Papua New Guinea**
**– The GSDF’s First Ever Participation in a Capacity Building Assistance Program in Music**

Captain Yosuke Moriya, GSDF Central Band (Nerima-ku, Tokyo)

The Capacity Building Assistance Program for the Papua New Guinea
Defense Force was launched in 2016 to train their military band
from zero, so that it can perform the national anthems of the APEC
member states at various ceremonies during the Economic Leaders’
Meeting to be held in Papua New Guinea in 2018. I was dispatched
to Papua New Guinea as the leader of a team of fi ve instructors from
January 2017, and taught 42 members of the military band on how
to play musical instruments, music theory, and solfège (score reading
and ear training).
The training started with most trainees not being familiar even
with the word “do, re, mi.” Playing the national anthems of all the
APEC member states at ceremonies requires a reasonably high level

An ensemble training

of skills. Since we had only 18 months or so until APEC, we practiced
the basics thoroughly so that the band can continue to conduct effective training even while we have returned to Japan and are
temporarily away. Although it must have been very tough for them to have to practice the basics which are unexciting and boring, the
band was always enthusiastic, applied itself actively to learning knowledge and skills, and steadily enhanced their capabilities. When
we are dispatched again in six months’ time, I believe that their performance techniques will have improved further and we should
be able to start giving them full-fl edged guidance on performing music.
While performing at APEC is a very large goal, I hope that the Papua New Guinean Band will develop into an outstanding military
band that wins the hearts of many people in the country, and will perform on the same stage as the GSDF Central Band.


Japan, the United States and Australia is considered to be
a priority area of engagement.
In the joint statement of the Japan-U.S. Security
Consultative Committee (SCC) of April 2015, it is
stated that the two countries would strengthen their
continued close coordination on cooperation including
capacity building assistance to realize peace, stability
and prosperity in the region. Furthermore, at the JapanU.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in September 2016 and
February 2017, the two ministers agreed to strengthen
the involvement of the two countries in the situation
surrounding the South China Sea through capacity
building assistance programs, etc., as an initiative to
contribute to the stability of the region.
As part of the Japan-Australia personnel exchange,
the MOD has received offi cers from the Australian
Department of Defence to its Capacity Building
Assistance Offi ce in International Policy Division three
times from July to September 2013, from February 2015
to August 2016, and from August 2016 for 18 months
(tentative), one offi cer in each period. Meanwhile, the
MOD dispatched offi cers, to the Australian Department
of Defence twice from July to September 2015, and from
August 2016 for one year (tentative).
F th t th J A t li D f


Ministerial Meeting in August 2016, the two ministers
welcomed the progress in the Japan-Australia defense
cooperation in a range of areas such as capacity building
assistance, and agreed to continue developing a more
robust cooperation.
In addition, at the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting
in January 2017, the two leaders confi rmed that they
would instruct their defense ministers to pursue deeper
defense cooperation through capacity building assistance
among other measures in 2017. Accordingly, at the JapanAustralia Defense Ministerial Meeting in April 2017, the
two ministers agreed to launch a consultation mechanism
between the defense authorities to further deepen JapanAustralia collaboration in capacity building assistance.
At the Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial
Meeting in May 2015, the three ministers agreed to
advance continuous trilateral cooperation in the area
of maritime security. Specifi c examples of cooperation
include the participation of both the SDF and the U.S.
Forces in the capacity building assistance program
“HARII HAMUTUK” in Timor-Leste hosted by the
Australian Defense Force twice in October 2015 and
October 2016, and the provision of technical assistance
in engineering and construction to the engineering
it f Ti L t D f F Al i M 2013


-----

Leste, Vietnam, Palau and Indonesia to conduct support
activities. In 2017, Japan hosted a seminar on Women,
Peace and Security (WPS) in Sri Lanka, while SDF
medical personnel, GSDF engineering personnel, and
MSDF vessels were dispatched to Malaysia and Vietnam
to conduct activities.

**3** **Multilateral Joint Training**


**(1) Signifi cance of Multilateral Joint Training in the**
**Asia-Pacifi c Region**

In the Asia-Pacifi c region, the MOD/SDF has actively
participated in multinational training in non-traditional
security fi elds, such as HA/DR, as well as Non-combatant
Evacuation Operation (NEO), in addition to traditional
training that had been conducted in preparation for
combat situations. It is important to participate in such
multilateral training exercises so as not only to raise the
skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative
platform with the countries involved. In light of this
perspective, the MOD/SDF intends to continue to actively
engage in such training.

See Reference 52 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years))


ASDF personnel giving training on the procedures for creating weather maps as part of the
capacity building assistance (aviation meteorology area) for the Myanmar Air Force (February 2017)

March 2015, and March 2016, experts from both the
United States and Australia participated in a seminar on
underwater medicine held in Vietnam.
Moreover, in the Joint Statement of the JapanU.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) of
January 2016, it is stated that the two countries would
explore further coordination to enhance the capability
of Southeast Asian countries, especially in maritime
security, maritime safety, marine conservation, and
cybersecurity. In the same month, the two countries
jointly held a seminar on HA/DR in the Philippines for
ASEAN member states. At the joint seminar, the MOD’s
activities for international disaster relief and capacity
building assistance were presented.
It is important to conduct capacity building assistance
in an effective and effi cient manner while closely
coordinating and mutually complementing the programs
of other countries that also implement similiar assistance.

**2** **Pacifi c Partnership**


**(2) Initiatives towards Multilateral Training**
a. Participation in, and Hosting of, Multilateral Joint
Training and Exercises
The SDF, coinciding with the visit of the French cruiser
Jeanne d’Arc to Japan, participated in the Japan-FranceU.K.-U.S. joint exercise carried out in the waters surrounding
Japan as well as Guam and Tinian in May 2017.
Moreover, between January and February 2017, the
SDF participated in the annual Cobra Gold exercise, a
multilateral joint training exercise co-hosted by the United
States and Thailand. The SDF engaged in command
post exercises related to counter-piracy operations and
cooperation assistance operations for foreign militaries,
conducted fi eld training for protecting Japanese nationals
overseas, and also participated in the public health and
construction activities of the humanitarian and civic
assistance projects.
The MSDF participated in a multilateral maritime
exercise hosted by the U.S. Navy (RIMPAC 2016) in
Hawaii and the seas and airspace surrounding the U.S.
West Coast area from June to August 2016 and the Royal
Australian Navy-hosted multilateral naval exercise
(Exercise Kakadu 2016) in the waters surrounding
Darwin (Australia) in September 2016. Furthermore,
MSDF destroyer Teruzuki participated in a multilateral
exercise hosted by the Royal Malaysian Navy in March
2017 hil MSDF d t I d S i


**2**


The Pacifi c Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is
an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from
the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region
to provide medical care, conduct facility repair activities,
and engage in cultural exchange, as well as to strengthen
collaboration with the participating countries and facilitate
international peace cooperation activities, through
cooperation with the government, military, international
organizations, and NGOs in each of those countries.
Since 2007, Japan has dispatched SDF medical
personnel, units, and other assets as part of this initiative.
In 2016, SDF medical personnel, GSDF engineering
l d MSDF l di t h d t Ti


-----

Opening ceremony of the annual exercise Cobra Gold held in Thailand (February 2017) Vessels from participating countries making a fl eet formation around USS John C. Stennis
(center far left) at RIMPAC 2016 (behind the aircraft carrier, MSDF destroyer Hyuga) (July 2016)


participated in a multilateral exercise hosted by the
Republic of Singapore Navy in May of the same year.
In December 2016, the ASDF participated in the
HA/DR joint training for Operation Christmas Drop in
the Federated States of Micronesia and other countries,
and in February 2017 co-hosted the Japan-U.S.-Australia
joint exercise (Exercise Cope North Guam) and the
Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise for HA/DR.
b. Multinational Tabletop Exercises, etc.
Initiatives have also been made to invite observers from
other countries since September 2001, when observers
from eight Asia-Pacifi c countries participated in the fourth
Japan-Russia Search and Rescue training hosted by Japan.
In addition, the GSDF has hosted the Multinational
Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacifi c (MCAP) every
year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperative
initiatives, inviting offi cers from the respective countries

**Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**
**4**


In promoting cooperation and exchanges in the area of
security, it is necessary to strengthen them based on a
combination of the most optimal means, while also taking
into account the actual situation of the partner countries
and their relationship with Japan. Therefore, not only
comprehensive efforts based on a multilateral framework
but also bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges also
play an important role to realize them.


Aircraft of participating units conducting formation fl ying led by the U.S. Air Force’s B1
bomber aircraft (far left) in Exercise Cope North Guam 2017
(bottom right of B1, ASDF F-15 and F-2 fi ghters) (February 2017)

involved. In 2016, with participants from 22 countries
and international organizations, the GSDF held group
discussions on the theme of “the Role of Ground Forces
in the Event of a Large-Scale Earthquake Disaster” and
training on the disaster-affected areas in Kumamoto.


also strategic stakes and interests. In particular, in recent
years, as responsible countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region,
Japan and Australia are strengthening mutual cooperation
focused primarily on areas such as HA/DR activities and
cooperation with respect to capacity building assistance.
Defense cooperation between Japan and Australia
started with the cooperation for the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The
two countries have built up cooperation since then
through the United Nations integrated Mission In TimorLeste (UNMIT), Humanitarian and Reconstruction
Assistance in Iraq, and various international disaster
relief operations. When the Great East Japan Earthquake
occurred in March 2011, the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) dispatched three out of four transport aircraft it
owns to Japan to engage in a disaster relief mission. The


**1** **Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**

**1**


**(1) Signifi cance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**
**with Australia**

Australia is a special strategic partner for Japan in the AsiaPacifi c region: both Japan and Australia are allied with
the United States and share not only universal values[8] but


-----

degree of cooperation between the two countries has been
deepened and it is becoming more practical. For example,
in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South
Sudan (UNMISS), Japan accepted two ADF personnel
dispatched to engage in the UNMISS operations from
January 2017 into the Japanese camp.
Against the background of the deepening defense
cooperation between Japan and Australia, the two countries
announced in 2007 the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration
on Security Cooperation, Japan’s first such joint
declaration focusing on security with a country other than
the United States. Japan and Australia have also developed
the foundation for cooperation such as the Japan-Australia
ACSA,[9] the Japan-Australia Information Security
Agreement, and the Agreement between the Government
of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the
Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology.
Regarding the Japan-Australia ACSA, in January
2017, a new agreement for expanding the situations in
which the provision of goods and services is possible was
signed by the two countries, followed by the establishment
of relevant laws and regulations. The new agreement was
concluded in light of the expansion of cases in which
the SDF and the ADF conduct operations together due
to the further advances in their defense cooperation and
exchanges, and the development of the Legislation for
Peace and Security in Japan.
Japan will continue deepening its cooperation
relationship with Australia, a “Special Strategic Partner,”
which has both intention and ability to jointly contribute
to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

**(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation**
**and Exchanges**

In August 2016, Defense Minister Inada held a defense
ministerial meeting with Australian Minister for Defence
Payne. This was her first ministerial meeting since taking
office that invited a foreign defense minister to Tokyo.
The two ministers exchanged opinions regarding the
regional situations including the situations in North
Korea and the East and South China Seas, welcomed the
deepening of the Japan-Australia defense cooperation in
a wide range of areas and at all levels through capacity
building assistance, joint exercises, and unit exchanges,
and agreed to develop a more robust defense cooperation
between the two countries going forward.


Defense Minister Inada attending the Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (August 2016)

In January 2017, Prime Minister Abe held the
Japan-Australia Summit Meeting with Australian Prime
Minister Turnbull when he visited Sydney, Australia. In
this meeting, the two leaders reaffirmed that the “Special
Strategic Partnership” between Japan and Australia had
become stronger and more important than before, and
agreed to further deepen the defense cooperation between
the two countries in the areas of joint exercises and
capacity building assistance. Also, in the presence of the
two leaders, the new Japan-Australia ACSA was signed
to facilitate mutual logistics support between the SDF
and the ADF. Overall, the meeting generated positive
results in a wide range of areas.
Meanwhile, the leaders expressed their expectations
towards concluding negotiations on an agreement to
reciprocally improve administrative, policy and legal
procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises
between Japan and Australia, as early as possible,
preferably in 2017.
Furthermore, at the Japan-Australia “2+2” Meeting
held in Tokyo in April 2017, the two sides identified a
series of new initiatives to further strengthen the defense
cooperation between the two countries, including
pursuing the implementation of a joint exercise in Japan
in 2018 participated by fighter aircraft of the ASDF and
the Royal Australian Air Force.
From July to August 2016, the ASDF participated
in an observer program conducted at the same time
as a multinational joint exercise hosted by the Royal
Australian Air Force, and in September an MSDF
destroyer and aircraft participated in the Australian Navyhosted Multinational Maritime Exercise. Moreover, the
MSDF Chief of Staff and the ASDF Chief of Staff visited


Official title: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and
the Australian Defence Force.

In addition to the activities this agreement currently applies to, the following activities and situations will also be newly subject to the agreement: (1) Internationally coordinated operations for peace and
security; (2) Situations threatening international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing; (3) Perilous situations; (4) Armed attack situations, etc.; (5) Activities in
situations threatening survival; (6) Rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas; (7) Counter-piracy activities; (8) Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects; and (9) Intelligence


-----

Australia in January and February 2017, respectively, for
meetings with their Australian counterparts in order to
further enhance their mutual understanding and trust.

See Reference 53 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with

Australia (Past Three Years))

See


**(3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the United**
**States, and Australia**

Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States,
and share universal values. They cooperate closely in
order to resolve the various challenges the Asia-Pacifi c
region and the international community are facing. In
order to ensure the effectiveness and effi ciency of such
cooperation, it is important to proactively promote
trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose
presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability.
The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum
(SDCF), which is a Director General-level meeting
among the three countries of Japan, the United States and
Australia, has been held eight times since April 2007.
At the SDCF held in October 2016, the three
countries signed a Trilateral Information Sharing
Agreement, which will expedite the sharing of classifi ed
information for the cooperative activities regarding joint
exercises and operations among the three countries. The
utilization of this agreement is expected to further deepen
the collaboration among the three countries.
Furthermore, at the Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense
Ministerial Meeting on the margins of the 16th ShangriLa Dialogue in June 2017, the three ministers agreed to
promote further development of the trilateral defense
cooperation including joint exercises, operations, and
capacity building assistance.
With regard to training and exercises, the ASDF
participated in the Japan-Australia Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Relief Joint Exercise (Operation Christmas
Drop) in December 2016 and jointly held the Japan-U.S.Australia joint exercise (Exercise Corp North Guam) in
February 2017, while the GSDF participated in the fi eld
exercise (Exercise Southern Jackaroo) with the U.S. Forces
and the ADF in May 2017. Through these various training
and exercise opportunities among Japan, the United States
and Australia, Japan continues to make efforts to improve
mutual understanding and interoperability.


important neighboring country, which shares strategic
interests, and is extremely vital to Japan in geopolitical
terms. In addition, the two countries share many strategic
interests as allies of the United States. Therefore, even
if diffi cult issues occasionally arise, close collaboration
between the two countries on the security front has
enormous signifi cance for the peace and stability of the
Asia-Pacifi c region.
Both Japan and the ROK confront wide-ranging
and complex security challenges including not only
the nuclear and missile issue of North Korea, but also
counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, large-scale
natural disasters, counter-piracy measures, and maritime
security. In order for the two countries to deal effectively
with such security challenges, it is important to carry out
not just exchanges for increasing mutual understanding
and trust building but also more broad-ranging and
concrete defense cooperation. To this end, it is important
to conclude the ACSA going forward.

**(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation**
**and Exchanges**

(i) Overview
Since 2015, defense cooperation and exchanges with
the ROK have gradually been revitalized at various
levels including high-level exchanges involving Defense
Ministers and Chiefs of Joint Staff, and unit exchanges.
Particularly, in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear
and missile issues, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation
with the ROK in the security and defense areas. Following
North Korea’s nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches,
the Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial teleconference was
carried out swiftly in January, February and September
2016 as well as March and May 2017 so that the two
countries could closely cooperate in addressing North
Korea’s nuclear and missile issues.
In June 2017, during the Japan-ROK Defense
Ministerial Meeting held on the sidelines of the 16th
Shangri-La Dialogue, the two ministers appreciated the
close responses taken by the two countries such as the
Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial teleconference following
North Korea’s nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches,
and affi rmed their understanding of the importance of
close Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK collaboration and
cooperation. The two ministers also exchanged opinions
regarding the Japan-ROK defense cooperation and
exchanges, and agreed to promote cooperation including
dialogues between the defense authorities of the two
countries and mutual visits of vessels and aircraft. Going
forward, further development of the bilateral cooperation
d h i t d


**2** **Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation**
**and Exchanges**

**2**


**(1) Signifi cance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**
**with the Republic of Korea**

F J th R bli f K (ROK) i th t


-----

(ii) Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information
Agreement
Based on the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement
Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by
North Korea signed in December 2014, the defense
authorities in Japan and the ROK have exchanged and
shared confi dential information regarding North Korea’s
nuclear and missile issues via the United States. On
the other hand, in light of the increasingly serious
situation surrounding North Korea with its frequently
repeated ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, the
General Security of Military Information Agreement
was concluded in November 2016 to further promote
cooperation between Japan and the ROK. This agreement
will serve as a framework to appropriately protect
classifi ed information exchanged between the Japanese
and ROK Governments, and is expected to promote
smoother and swifter information exchanges between the
two governments.

See Reference 54 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the

ROK (Past Three Years))

See


**(3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the U.S.,**
**and the ROK**

Since Japan, the United States, and the ROK share
common interests pertaining to the peace and stability of
this region, it is important that opportunities are seized to
promote close cooperation in addressing various security
issues including the issues regarding North Korea.
Japan, the United States, and the ROK have
conducted Trilateral Defense Ministers’ Meetings on


the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue. At the working
level, these three countries have coordinated with each
other while closely sharing information at various levels
through such opportunities as the Director-General level
and the Director level meetings, video conferences, and
chief-of-staff level meetings based on the framework of
the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT).
Most recently, a Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial
Meeting was held on the margins of the 16th Shangri-La
Dialogue in June 2017, where the three ministers shared
the view that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile
programs constituted an imminent threat to regional and
global security. Regarding trilateral defense cooperation,
the three ministers credited to the progress made in the
recent joint exercises and training such as the JapanU.S.-ROK missile warning exercises, and reconfi rmed
their intention to continue implementing these initiatives.
At the working level, in April 2017, a Director-General
level plenary meeting was held in Tokyo, at which the
three sides urged North Korea to abandon its nuclear and
ballistic missile development programs, cease provocative
acts that only heighten regional tensions, and comply with
international obligations and commitments. Also at the
Chief of Defense level, the Chief of Joint Staff visited the
United States in October 2016 to attend the Japan-U.S.ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting, and had discussions on
the trilateral cooperation to address the increasing threat of
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles.
In addition, the Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation
relationship has been transforming into a more substantive
relationship. For example, the trilateral Missile Warning


**Commentary**

**Commentary: Third Japan-U.S.-ROK Annual Chief of Defense**
**Conference (Japan-U.S.-ROK CHOD)**

In October 2016, the Chief of Joint Staff of the SDF visited the United
States to participate in the Japan-U.S.-ROK Annual Chief of Defense
Conference, and had meetings with the Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In the Japan-U.S.-ROK CHOD, discussion took place on trilateral
cooperation to respond to the nuclear test on September 9, 2016 and
the series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea, and agreement
was reached that the three countries would continue to further
cooperate with each other to enhance regional peace and stability.
It was the third Japan-U.S.-ROK CHOD held since the fi rst
conference was held in Hawaii in July 2014. The latest conference,

From right: Commander Harris of the U.S. Pacifi c Command, Chief of Staff

for the fi rst time, was attended by the Commander of the U.S. Pacifi c Kawano, Chairman Dunford of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman Lee of the

ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander Brooks of the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces

Command and the Commander of the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces in Chief of Joint Staff Kawano participating in the Japan-U.S.-ROK Annual Chief
addition to the Chiefs of Defense. of Defense Conference [Photo provided by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff]


-----

**(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation**
**and Exchanges**

At the Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting in July
2016, the two ministers reaffi rmed the importance of
the bilateral defense exchanges, and agreed to conduct
the Naval Exercise Malabar as a Japan-U.S.-India
trilateral exercise from the following year to strengthen
cooperation and build on exchanges in a wide range of
areas, including by participating in HA/DR exercises as
observers. Moreover, the two ministers referred to the
fi nal award of the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China
Sea in the same month and reconfi rmed the signifi cance
of ensuring maritime security and stability. In May 2017,
Indian Minister for Finance, Defence and Corporate
Affairs Jaitley visited Japan and agreed to further promote
joint exercises and unit-to-unit exchanges.
Service components also discussed concrete measures
and future direction for promoting service-to-service
cooperation and exchanges on various occasions such as
the Ground Component Staff Talks in November 2016, the
GSDF Chief of Staff’s visit to India in April 2017, Indian
Navy Chief’s visit to Japan, and the ASDF Chief of Staff’s
visit to India, both held in December 2016. At the JapanIndia Summit Meeting in November 2016, the two leaders
welcomed these discussions in the joint statement by stating
that, “the two sides now have institutional wide ranging
dialogue mechanism in place covering all three services.”
With regard to exercises and training, the MSDF
participated in Malabar 2016 in the waters between
Sasebo and Okinawa in June 2016, while in December
of the same year the MSDF carried out goodwill training
with the Indian Navy’s vessels on its journey home from
counter-piracy operations.
Furthermore, service-to-service exchanges have
also been carried out more actively including a visit to
India by the ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling and transport
aircraft in July 2016, ground component expert-to-expert
exchanges on counter-terrorism in December of the same
year, and a visit of the helicopter crew of the Indian Air
Force to the ASDF Air Rescue Squadron in March 2017.

See Reference 55 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with

India (Past Three Years))

**4** **Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation**

**4**


**(1) Signifi cance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation**
**with China**

Stable relations between Japan and China are an
essential factor for the peace and stability of the Asia

Exercise was conducted in June and November 2016
as well as January and March 2017, while a maritime
interdiction exercise was carried out in October 2016,
and an anti-submarine warfare exercise was implemented
in April 2017 for the fi rst time as the Japan-U.S.-ROK
joint exercise. Using various opportunities, the JapanU.S.-ROK security cooperation must be continuously
strengthened in various areas in the coming future.

**3** **Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**


**(1) Signifi cance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges**
**with India**

India, which is becoming increasingly infl uential against
a backdrop of what is projected to become the world’s
largest population as well as its high economic growth
and latent economic power, is located in the center of sea
lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa,
making it an extremely important country geopolitically
for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India, which share
universal values[10] as well as common interests in the
peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world,
have established the “Special Strategic and Global
Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have also
been strengthening their relations in the area of security
in recent years.
Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan
and India have steadily deepened since October 2008
when the two countries signed the Joint Declaration on
Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Meetings
and consultations at various levels such as the ministerial
and Chief of Staff level as well as service-to-service
exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises
have been regularly conducted. Moreover, in September
2014, the two countries signed the Memorandum on
Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges, and
December 2015, saw the conclusion of the Agreement
between the Government of Japan and the Government
of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment
and Technology as well as the General Security of
Military Information Agreement, further solidifying the
institutional basis of the Japan-India defense cooperation
and exchanges. These agreements have strengthened their
relationship as two partners that are capable of dealing
with regional and global issues, as well as the foundation
of this partnership.


-----

Pacifi c region. From broad and medium- to long-term
perspectives, it is necessary for both countries to strive to
build and enhance the “Mutually Benefi cial Relationship
Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in
all areas, including security. In particular, Japan will
continue to encourage China to play a responsible and
constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability
and prosperity, to comply with international norms of
behavior, as well as to improve transparency with regard
to its advancing military capabilities in the context of
its rapidly increasing military budget. As part of such
efforts, through continuing and promoting defense
exchanges, Japan will urge China to demonstrate greater
transparency in its military and security policies, and
promote measures such as establishing a framework to
avert or prevent unexpected situations.

**(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges**
Japan-China defense exchanges became stagnated
following Japan’s acquisition and ownership of the three
Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island,
and Minamikojima Island) in September 2012, but have
gradually resumed since the latter half of 2014.
In November 2015, the Japan-China Defense
Ministerial Meeting was held for the fi rst time in four
years and fi ve months on the margins of the ADMMPlus Meeting. The two ministers held a frank exchange of
views regarding various issues between the two countries,
and shared the view on the importance of the early
commencement of the operation of the “Maritime and Air
Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s
defense authorities” as well as the development of JapanChina defense exchanges. Regarding the “Maritime and Air
Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s
defense authorities,” which aims to avoid unexpected
collisions and prevent unforeseen consequences in
waters and airspace from escalating into military clashes
or political issues, at the Japan-China Summit Meeting
in September 2016, the two leaders agreed to accelerate
the consultation between the two countries to realize the
early commencement of the mechanism. In November of
the same year, the sixth Joint Working Group Meeting on
this mechanism was held. Through these consultations
and meetings, Japan continues to make adjustments
with the Chinese side concerning the details of the early
commencement of the operation of the mechanism.
Meanwhile, the fi fth and sixth meetings of the JapanChina High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs were
held in September and December 2016, respectively, and
the 14th Japan-China Security Dialogue was held in
N b 2016


As part of initiatives to build a Mutually Benefi cial
Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,”
it will be essential to strive to promote mutual trust and
understanding between Japan and China through dialogue
at various levels and in a range of areas, while also actively
promoting concrete cooperation in non-traditional security
areas, such as counter-piracy measures.

See Reference 56 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with

China (Past Three Years))

See


**5** **Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges and Cooperation**


**5**


**(1) Signifi cance of Defense Exchanges and Cooperation**
**with Russia**

Russia has great infl uence on the security of Europe,
Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacifi c region, and is an
important neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore
very important for Japan to promote mutual trust with
Russia through defense exchanges. As Japan-Russia
relations have continuously been developing in a wide
range of areas, the MOD/SDF continuously conduct,
in accordance with the Memorandum on Japan-Russia
Defense Exchanges established in 1999 (revised in
2006), various dialogues between defense authorities,
annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement
on Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas,
and bilateral search and rescue exercises.
Regarding Japan’s relationship with Russia, the
Government of Japan intends to take an appropriate
response while emphasizing the solidarity of the G7
(Group of Seven), taking the Ukrainian situation and
other factors into account. In light of this, the MOD has
also taken this into account in its exchanges with Russia.
Simultaneously, it is important to maintain constant
contact at the working level in order not to cause any
unforeseen circumstances and unnecessary confl icts
with Russia, a neighboring country. The MOD considers
these points in a comprehensive manner and advances
exchanges with Russia accordingly.

**(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges**
At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013,
the two leaders affi rmed the importance of expanding
cooperation between Japan and Russia in the fi eld of
security and defense, amid the growing role of the AsiaPacifi c region and major changes in the international
security environment, and agreed to set up the Japan-Russia
“2+2” Meeting. At the fi rst Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting
in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct
unit exchanges between ground forces and mutual dispatch
of exercise observers on a regular basis, and bilateral
i b t t i it f th MSDF d


-----

Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as the regular
hosting of the Japan-Russia Cyber Security Meeting.
In addition, at the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in
December 2016, the two leaders welcomed the holding of
dialogues between the national security councils of both
countries as well as defense exchanges, and agreed to
continue these dialogues and exchanges going forward.
Under such a circumstance, the MSDF carried out the
16th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises
in January 2017 in Maizuru.
At the second Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in March
2017, the two countries exchanged opinions regarding
the regional situation, etc., and agreed to continue
conducting defense exchanges such as working-level
meetings, unit-to-unit exchanges, and Japan-Russia
Search and Rescue Training. With respect to the activities
of the Russian Armed Forces to improve armaments on
the Four Northern Islands, including the deployment of
surface-to-ship missiles on the Northern Territories and
the deployment of divisions on islands that may contain
the Four Northern Islands, the Japanese side expressed
that they are incompatible with Japan’s stance that the
Northern Territories are an inherent part of the territory
of Japan and therefore it is regrettable.

See Reference 57 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with

Russia (Past Three Years))

**6** **Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN**
**Member States**

**6**


ASEAN member states continue to experience rapid
economic growth and are garnering international
attention for their potential as a growth center that is open
to the world. Such ASEAN member states and Japan are
traditional partners with a history of exchanges and a
close economic relationship going back some 50 years.
ASEAN member states, located in geopolitically
important areas occupying strategic points on Japanese
sea lanes, are also playing an important role in ensuring
the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as the entire
region. Therefore, it is important that Japan strengthens
cooperation in the security and defense areas and enhance
the relationship of trust with ASEAN member states.
Based on this principle, Japan has been working to
foster trust and deepen mutual understanding with the
ASEAN member states through high-level and workinglevel exchanges, as well as promoting substantial
cooperation such as capacity building cooperation,
joint exercises, and defense equipment and technology
cooperation. In addition to these bilateral cooperation
efforts, Japan has also strengthened cooperation under
ltil t l f k h ADMM Pl d ARF


At the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers Informal
Meeting in Laos in November 2016, Defense Minister
Inada announced the “Vientiane Vision” as a guideline for
the Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation going forward.
The vision for the fi rst time provided, in a transparent
manner, an overall picture of the priority areas of the future
direction of ASEAN-wide defense cooperation, and was
welcomed by all ASEAN member states.
From the viewpoint of actively promoting such
bilateral and multilateral cooperation and stabilizing the
security environment of the Asia-Pacifi c region, Japan
strives to strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges
with ASEAN member states.

See Section 1-2 (Multilateral Security Dialogue Hosted by the MOD/

SDF); Fig. III-2-1-4 (Recent Implementation of the Capacity Building

See

Assistance (June 2016 – June 2017)); Fig.III-2-1-5 (Past Capacity
Building Assistance Activities); Reference 51 (Status of Capacity
Building Assistance); Reference 58 (Recent Defense Cooperation and
Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years))

**(1) Indonesia**
Indonesia is the world’s largest island nation with the
biggest territorial land and population among the ASEAN
member states, and conducts active defense exchanges
and cooperation with Japan. During the Japan-Indonesia
Summit Meeting in March 2015, President Joko and
Prime Minister Abe agreed to strengthen their Strategic
Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy, and also
reaffi rmed their intention to hold the Japan-Indonesia
Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”
Meeting). At the “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo for the
fi rst time in December of the same year, the two countries
agreed to start negotiations on an agreement on the
transfer of defense equipment and technology, actively
participate in a multilateral naval exercise (Komodo
2016), further advance capacity building assistance,
among other matters. The Joint Statement of the JapanIndonesia Summit Meeting in January 2017 confi rms the
importance of continuing dialogues between their foreign
and defense authorities at various levels, including the
regular holding of the Japan-Indonesia “2+2” Meeting
and the holding of foreign and defense authorities’
meetings in order to further promote close cooperation in
the security and defense fi elds. Similarly, at the working
level, exchanges at various levels have been carried out,
including consultations between foreign and defense
authorities, consultations between defense authorities,
and various educational and academic exchanges.
With regard to service-to-service exchanges,
the Chief of Joint Staff visited Laos and Indonesia in
December 2016, and an MSDF destroyer participated in
the Exercise Komodo carried out in the seas and airspace
di I d i i A il f th t


-----

implement search and rescue and humanitarian assistance
exercises, while in February 2017 the MSDF Overseas
Training Cruise Squadron made a port call at Jakarta.
In January 2017, the ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling
and transport aircraft visited Indonesia and carried out
service-to-service exchanges.
Furthermore, Japan and Indonesia have also been
working on strengthening cooperation through capacity
building assistance in oceanography, international
maritime law, and international aviation law.

**(2) Vietnam**
With Vietnam, which is a coastal country in the South China
Sea with a population of approximately 90 million, Japan
has developed cooperation and exchanges between their
defense authorities. At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting
held in March 2014, the two leaders agreed to elevate the
relationship between the two countries to an “Extensive
Strategic Partnership.” In addition, Prime Minister Abe
visited Vietnam in January 2017 and confirmed at the
Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting that they would strengthen
cooperation in the security and defense areas.
During the Defense Ministerial Meeting in November
2015, the two ministers agreed to strengthen the defense
cooperation between the two countries through a
number of initiatives such as: port calls of the MSDF at
the Cam Ranh Bay International Port situated at a key
strategic location in the South China Sea; continuation of
cooperation in peacekeeping operations; implementation
of naval exercises regarding HA/DR; expansion
and enhancement of capacity building assistance;
commencement of working-level consultations regarding
defense equipment and technology cooperation.
Based on the agreement reached at this meeting, an
MSDF vessel made a port call for the first time at the
Cam Ranh Bay International Port in April 2016, and
the Chief of Joint Staff visited Vietnam in July 2016 to
view Pacific Partnership 2016 (multilateral training). In
December 2016, the ASDF transport unit visited Vietnam
and conducted unit exchanges with the Vietnam Air
Defense and Air Force.
It remains vital that Japan and Vietnam strengthen
their relationship in order to achieve more concrete,
practical cooperation, based on the memorandum on
defense cooperation and exchanges as the cornerstone of
their cooperation and exchanges.


relationship is progressing steadily based on the
memorandum. With Singapore and Japan regularly
conducting discussions between their defense authorities,
15 rounds have already taken place. Moreover, Japan’s
Minister of Defense attends the Shangri-La Dialogue
organized by the IISS almost every year, where highlevel exchanges between the Japanese and Singaporean
defense ministers are carried out actively in which Japan’s
security policy is also explained.
At the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2017,
Defense Minister Inada held a meeting with Singaporean
Defense Minister Ng. The ministers exchanged opinions
on the regional situation, defense cooperation and
exchanges, and other topics and confirmed that the
two countries would continue to seek to strengthen the
bilateral relationship.
Moreover, in May 2017, the MSDF Chief of Staff
participated in the Republic of Singapore Navy’s (RSN)
50th anniversary maritime review, and the MSDF vessels
Izumo and Sazanami were also dispatched to participate
in the review.
Additionally, port calls during international
cooperation operations such as UN peacekeeping
operations and counter-piracy activities and service-toservice exchanges are also actively conducted.

**(4) The Philippines**
Between Japan and the Philippines, along with highlevel exchanges, there have been frequent visits by naval
vessels, working-level exchanges including consultations
between their defense authorities, and service-to-service
exchanges. At the defense ministerial meeting held in
January 2015, the two ministers signed a memorandum on
defense cooperation and exchanges. This memorandum
shows the intentions of the two countries to conduct
cooperation in non-traditional security areas such
as maritime security, in addition to holding defense
ministerial meetings and vice-ministerial consultations


**(3) Singapore**
In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in
Southeast Asia with which Japan signed a memorandum
d f ti d h d ti


-----

on a regular basis; reciprocal visits between the Chief
of Staff of the Joint Staff, Chiefs of Staff of the SDF,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Commanders of each service; and participation in
training and exercises.
In addition, at the Japan-Philippines Summit
Meeting in November 2015, the two leaders reached an
agreement in principle regarding the defense equipment
and technology transfer agreement, which was later
signed in February 2016.
Furthermore, at the Japan-Philippines Summit
Meeting in September 2016, the two leaders agreed to
embody the transfer of MSDF’s TC-90 training aircraft
to the Philippines in order to enhance the capabilities of
the Philippines in HA/DR, transportation, and maritime
situational awareness. At the summit meeting with
President Duterte in January 2017, the two countries
agreed that they would promote defense cooperation in
various fields such as capacity building assistance, defense
equipment cooperation, and training and exercises.
In March 2017, in the presence of Japanese State
Minister of Defense Wakamiya and the Filipino Defense
Minister Lorenzana, two of the MSDF’s TC-90 training
aircraft were transferred to the Naval Base Heracleo
Alano, Sangley Point. The remaining three aircraft are
planned to be transferred by the end of FY2017. This
transfer does not only involve the transfer of the aircraft;
it represents a cooperation that includes training for the
Philippine Navy pilots and maintenance support for the
Philippine Navy maintenance personnel.
Meanwhile, in June 2017, President Duterte became
the first foreign leader to board the MSDF destroyer Izumo
while making a port call at the Port of Subic Bay and view the
medical equipment on the destroyer. In addition to praising
the advanced capability of the destroyer to provide HA/DR,
President Duterte conducted a personal and frank exchange

Chief of Air Staff Sugiyama having a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Johm Rungswan,
the first National Defense Academy graduate (the 26th class) who assumed the position of


of opinions on the Japan-Philippines bilateral relationship
and the international situation with Special Advisor to the
Prime Minister Kawai. After viewing the destroyer, the
Filipino President remarked that “Japan is a historically
important friend that I would like to get along with.”
Furthermore, in regard to service-to-service
exchanges, the Japanese Chief of Joint Staff held a
meeting with the Chief of Defense of the Philippines
when he visited the Philippines to participate in the CHOD
Conference in September 2016. Additionally, the ASDF
transport unit (KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft)
visited the Philippines and carried out unit exchanges in
July 2016, and the personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and
ASDF participated in the U.S.-Philippine joint exercise
(Exercise Balikatan 2017) in May 2017. In the same month
of the same year, the ASDF Chief of Staff visited the
Philippines and conducted high-level exchanges between
the Philippine Air Force Commander and other officers.

See Chapter 4, Section 4-3 (Building New Defense Equipment and

Technology Cooperation)

See


**(5) Thailand**
With Thailand, Japan has a long history of defense
cooperation and exchanges based on the traditionally
good relationship between the two countries, including
the commencement of the dispatch of Defense Attachés
and consultations between defense authorities at an
early stage. As for the acceptance of foreign students to
the National Defense Academy, a Thai student became
the first foreign student to be accepted in 1958, and
since then Thailand has sent the largest cumulative
number of students. The MOD/SDF, since 2005, has
been participating in the multilateral military exercise
Cobra Gold hosted by the United States and Thailand.
In February 2016, the Chief of Staff of Joint Staff visited
this exercise and carried out high-level exchanges.
In April 2016, Japan held a human resource
development seminar related to international aviation law,
as the first capacity building assistance for Thailand, while
in May Japan organized an invitation program regarding
aviation safety for the Royal Thai Air Force Safety
Center. In June 2016, then Defense Minister Nakatani
visited Thailand to pay a courtesy call on Prime Minister
Prayut Chan-o-cha and hold meetings with Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense Prawit Wongsuwon and
others, during which the two countries agreed to strengthen
bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges.
As for service-to-service exchanges, the Chief of
Air Staff visited Thailand in November 2016 and held
a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Johm Rungswan, the
fi t N ti l D f A d d t t b


-----

Royal Thai Air Force Commander. Commander Johm
visited Japan in May 2017 to hold a meeting with the
Chief of Air Staff, and they shared an understanding
that strengthening the Japan-Thailand service-to-service
relationship would be an important factor contributing
to the peace and stability of the region. In addition,
the ASDF U-4 multi-purpose support aircraft visited
Thailand and conducted unit exchanges in January 2017.

**(6) Cambodia**
Since dispatching the SDF for UN peacekeeping
operations to Cambodia for the first time in 1992,
Japan’s capacity building assistance for Cambodia
commenced in 2013 and defense cooperation and
exchanges between the two countries have made steady
progress. At the Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting in
December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded
to “strategic partnership.” After the summit, then Defense
Minister Onodera signed the Memorandum on Defense
Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of
Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defence
of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Japan has also taken steps
to strengthen cooperation through capacity building
assistance such as practical training for road construction.
As for service-to-service exchanges, the MSDF
Overseas Training Cruise Unit made a port call at
Sihanoukville in February 2017, and conducted unit
exchanges for the purpose of enhancing goodwill with
the Royal Cambodian Navy.


MSDF destroyer Teruzuki receiving a visit from the Malaysian Prince while visiting Malaysia to
participate in the international fleet review hosted by the Royal Malaysian Navy, etc. (May 2016)

Union Minister for Defence, and to pay a courtesy call
on State Counselor and Foreign Minister Aung San
Suu Kyi. In September 2016, as a keynote speaker for
the Japan-ASEAN Vice-Ministerial Forum, Lieutenant
General Sein Win became the first defense minister from
Myanmar to visit Japan and held a meeting with Defense
Minister Inada. The two ministers agreed to have a shared
recognition of the importance of promoting regional
peace and stability through dialogues and cooperation.
The Commander of the Myanmar Air Force visited
Japan in July 2015 and October 2016 and the Deputy
Commander of the Myanmar Armed Force who also
serves as the Myanmar Armed Forces Commander visited
Japan in August 2015, demonstrating the deepening of
the high-level exchanges between the two countries. In
March 2016, the ASDF transport unit visited Myanmar
and carried out its first unit exchanges with the Myanmar
Air Force. Moreover, Japan is also making efforts
to strengthen cooperation through capacity building
assistance for aviation meteorology and other areas.


**(7) Myanmar**
Regarding Japan’s relations with Myanmar, Japan has
been promoting exchanges since Myanmar’s transition
from military rule to democratic government in March
2011, such as realizing the Administrative Vice-Minister
of Defense’s first visit to the country and inviting
Myanmar to participate in multilateral conferences
hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the first consultation
between defense authorities was held in the capital city
Naypyidaw, during which the two countries exchanged
opinions regarding the procedures for their future defense
exchanges and agreed to further promote exchanges.
Furthermore, in November 2014, then Defense Minister
Eto held a meeting with Defense Minister Wai Lwin of
Myanmar, the chair country, while attending the JapanASEAN Ministerial Roundtable and confirmed their
intention to promote defense exchanges.
In June 2016, then Defense Minister Nakatani visited
Myanmar to hold separate meetings with Senior General
Min Aung Hlaing, Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar
D f S i d Li t t G l S i Wi


**(8) Laos**
Defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and
Laos have made gradual progress since 2011, when the
Defense Attaché to Vietnam was also appointed as Defense
Attaché to Laos. In April 2013, the National Defense
Academy accepted students from Laos for the first time, and
in August 2013, the first Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial
Meeting was held. Since 2014, Japan and Laos have served
as co-chairs of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief of the ADMM-Plus, and the relationship
between the defense authorities of the two countries
has made significant strides through cooperation under
multilateral frameworks. Also in November 2016, Defense
Minister Inada became the first Japanese defense minister
to visit Laos, and exchanged views with the Minister
f N ti l D f Li t t G l Ch


-----

regarding policies for further defense cooperation such
as high-level exchanges and capacity building assistance
as well as agreed to promote defense cooperation and
exchanges between the two countries. Following this, the
fi rst visit to Laos by a Japanese Chief of Joint Staff was
made in December 2016.
In addition, the ASDF transport unit (KC-767 aerial
refueling/transport aircraft) visited Laos, and carried out
unit exchanges with the Laos Air Force. With regard to
capacity building assistance, the GSDF provided training
on HA/DR to the Lao People’s Army engineering unit
and medical unit in August 2016.

**(9) Malaysia**
Regarding Japan’s relations with Malaysia, a JapanMalaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on the
sidelines of the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017.
The two ministers exchanged views regarding bilateral
defense cooperation and exchanges, and agreed to
continue to coordinate between the two countries.
As for service-to-service exchanges, in April 2016
and March 2017, vessels from the MSDF and the Royal
Malaysian Navy conducted a goodwill exercise in waters
surrounding Malaysia. In February 2017, the Commander
of the Malaysian Navy visited Japan and exchanged
opinions on maritime security with the Chief of Staff of
the MSDF. With regard to the ASDF, airlift units (U-4
multipurpose support aircraft) visited Subang for serviceto-service exchanges in January 2017.
Furthermore, the MSDF Overseas Training Cruise
Squadron, accompanied by a practice submarine, made a
port call at Kota Kinabalu in April 2017. In this way, efforts
are being made in various fi elds to strengthen the relationship
between the SDF and the Malaysian Armed Forces.


Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kobayashi delivering an address at the completion
ceremony of a capacity building assistance program (civil engineering) held in Mongolia
(September 2016)

**7** **Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Other**
**Asia-Pacifi c Countries**


**7**



Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges (June
2016 – May 2017)); Fig. III-2-1-4 (Recent Implementation of the
Capacity Building Assistance (June 2016 – June 2017)); Fig. III2-1-5 (Past Capacity Building Assistance Activities); Reference
51 (Record of Capacity Building Assistance Activity); Reference
59 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other AsiaPacifi c Countries (Past Three Years))


See


**(1) New Zealand**
With New Zealand, a memorandum on defense
cooperation and exchange was signed in August 2013.
During the Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two
countries agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA.
Furthermore, on the occasion of the 16th ShangriLa Meeting in June 2017, a Japan-New Zealand Defense
Ministerial Meeting was held. Appreciating the active
personnel exchanges conducted at various levels between
the two countries, the two ministers agreed to further
promote defense cooperation including service-to-service
exchanges involving vessels and aircraft.
Between the services, the MSDF destroyer Takanami
participated in the international fl eet review and the
ADMM-Plus maritime security fi eld exercise conducted
in New Zealand in November 2016, and two P-1 patrol
aircraft participated in a multinational joint exercise hosted
by New Zealand. When an earthquake occurred in the
South Island of New Zealand in November, one P-1 patrol
aircraft that had been dispatched checked the disaster
situation as part of an international disaster relief activity.
Also, the New Zealand Air Force’s transport aircraft
visited Japan to conduct the fi rst unit exchanges between
their air forces in October 2016. In February 2017, the
Chief of Air Staff visited New Zealand for the fi rst time in
12 years to participate in the Air Show (Air Tattoo) hosted
b th R l N Z l d Ai F d h d


**(10) Brunei**
Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei, during the Second
ADMM-Plus meeting held in Brunei in August 2013, then
Defense Minister Onodera held talks with Brunei’s Minister
of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views
on the initiatives of the ADMM-Plus. In addition, aircraft
from all of the SDF’s three forces participated in a joint
exercise of the EWGs on Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief and Military Medicine held in June 2013
in Brunei for the fi rst time based on the framework of the
ADMM-Plus, while in May 2016 the MSDF destroyer
Ise participated in a joint exercise held in Brunei, which
served as a co-chair of the EWG on Maritime Security
of the ADMM-Plus. During the joint exercise, Sultan of
Brunei Hassanai Bolkiah visited the MSDF destroyer Ise.


-----

opinions with the Royal New Zealand Air Force
Commander and agreed to deepen defense cooperation.
Japan sent a KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft to
participate in the air show and carried out unit exchanges.

**(2) Mongolia**
Following the signing of a memorandum on JapanMongolia defense cooperation and exchanges in January
2012, Japan and Mongolia have promoted high-level
exchanges and worked to strengthen cooperation through
capacity building assistance. The two countries have
striven to enhance cooperation through capacity building
assistance. In addition, at the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue
in May 2015, the Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial
Meeting was held and opinions were exchanged regarding
bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. At the
meeting held between the Chief of Joint Staff and the
Chief of Defense in October of the same year, agreement
was reached to promote security cooperation in the area
of peacekeeping operations.
In September 2016, Parliamentary Vice-Minister
of Defense Kobayashi visited Mongolia to attend the
completion ceremony of a capacity building assistance
program (civil engineering).


Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa, the fi rst Japanese senior offi cial to visit Sri
Lanka, paying a courtesy call on its President (December 2016)

**8** **Signifi cance of Defense Cooperation and**
**Exchanges with European Countries**


**8**


Europe shares universal values with Japan and plays a central
role in working to address common challenges to global
security, focusing primarily on non-traditional security
areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy, as
well as international peace cooperation activities. In this
regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with
European countries provides the foundations for Japan to
become actively involved in dealing with these challenges,
and is important for both Japan and Europe.

See Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges (June

2016 – June 2017)); Reference 60 (Recent Defense Cooperation
and Exchanges with European Countries (Past Three Years))

**(1) The United Kingdom**
The United Kingdom, being a major power that has
infl uence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world,
has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On
the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests
as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important
allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is
extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation
with the United Kingdom by working together on global
issues such as international peace cooperation activities,
counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, and
through exchanges of views on regional situations.
With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United
Kingdom, a Defense Cooperation Memorandum was
signed in June 2012. Following this, the bilateral
Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and
Technology came into effect in July 2013, and the JapanU.K. Information Security Agreement entered into force in
January 2014, leading to the development of a foundation
for defense equipment and technology cooperation as well
i f ti h i b t th t t i


**(3) Timor-Leste**
In June 2016, for the fi rst time in 14 years, then Defense
Minister Nakatani visited Timor-Leste to which the SDF
had been dispatched as part of the UN peacekeeping
operations to support the country’s independence since
2002. Minister Nakatani and Minister Cristovão agreed
that the two countries would continue and deepen
exchanges between defense authorities through capacity
building assistance, dispatch of students from Timor-Leste
to the National Defense Academy and other schools, and
port calls by MSDF vessels. In September 2016, destroyer
Fuyuzuki made a port call at Timor-Leste.

**(4) Sri Lanka**
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa became
Japan’s fi rst parliamentary vice-minister to visit Sri Lanka
in December 2016. As for service-to-service exchanges, six
rounds of search and rescue exercises, etc. were conducted
using vessels of the Sri Lanka Navy and MSDF vessels in the
same year, and in November 2016 the MSDF participated
in the International Maritime Conference (Galle Dialogue
2016) hosted by the Sri Lanka Navy.


-----

**i**

**After Participating in the Japan-U.K. Joint Exercise,**
**Guardian North 16**

Wing Commander Roger Elliot, then Commanding Offi cer of II (Army Cooperation) Squadron, Royal Air Force

The Guardian North 16 exercise was one of the highlights for the Royal Air Force during its three-month dispatch to Asia, while the
exercise was the most challenging for the Typhoon fi ghter unit of any exercise conducted since its operation commenced over a
decade ago. II (AC) Squadron fl ew a distance of about 10,000 nautical miles from their base camp and arrived in Japan to participate
in this exercise. The Royal Air Force had previously dispatched Typhoon fi ghter aircraft to various areas and regions, but never had
we dispatched aircraft to such a distant place and faced various issues along the way. However, we arrived in Japan safely and were
able to conduct the exercise, thanks to the warm support received from everyone at the ASDF Misawa Air Base, in addition to the
cooperation between the ASDF and the Royal Air Force.
Guardian North 16 was an effective exercise and also a good opportunity for the two air forces to learn about each other. My
memories of Guardian North 16 are of the passion of the people who welcomed us in Misawa, their hospitality, the fantastic culture of
Japanese cuisine, and the hot spring in Towada Hachimantai. The best memory, however, is of fl ying over Japan with the 3rd Air Wing
and other ASDF personnel. We are looking forward to the day when we can welcome the SDF personnel and fl y together over the U.K.

Wing Commander Elliot: photo center A scene from the joint exercise


At the Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting in May 2014, in
order to enhance their cooperation in the security fi eld, the
two prime ministers agreed to hold the Japan-U.K. “2+2”
Meeting, to begin negotiations towards the conclusion
of an ACSA, and to promote joint exercises between
the SDF and the British Armed Forces. Following this,
the fi rst “2+2” Meeting was held in January 2015. At
the meeting, the two countries agreed to strengthen
cooperation in the security and defense fi elds, and at
the same time, shared strategic situational awareness.
During the second “2+2” Meeting in January 2016, the
two countries confi rmed: (1) the progress made on two
joint research projects in relation to defense equipment
and technology cooperation, and that they would start a
new joint research on personnel vulnerability evaluation;
(2) that they would pursue the visit to Japan of the Typhoon
aircraft of the Royal Air Force by the end of 2016 and
Japan-U.K. joint exercises during the International Mine


Countermeasures Exercise in the Persian Gulf; (3) that
they would promote bilateral coordination to enhance
the capability of Southeast Asian states; and (4) that they
would aim to conclude the ACSA as early as possible.
Following this, a director-level Working Group
meeting on capacity building assistance between the defense
authorities of Japan and the United Kingdom was held in
June and October 2016 in both countries. Additionally, from
October to November 2016, the Royal Air Force Typhoon
fi ghter jets squadron visited the ASDF Misawa Base to
conduct joint exercises with the ASDF. This exercise was
the fi rst joint exercise based in Japan that the ASDF carried
out with foreign military forces other than the U.S. Forces.
In January 2017, the Japan-U.K. ACSA[11] was signed,
which was followed by the development of relevant laws
and regulations. The conclusion of the ACSA enables the
two countries to make mutual arrangements between the
SDF and the British Armed Forces involving supplies and


11 The ACSA applies to the following activities: (1) joint exercises; (2) UN peacekeeping operations; (3) internationally coordinated peace and security operations; (4) humanitarian international relief
operations; (5) operations to cope with large-scale disasters; (6) protection measures or transportation of nationals of either party or others for their evacuation from overseas; (7) communication and


-----

services such as water, food, fuel and transportation, through
a unified procedure in the case of joint exercises and largescale disaster responses, etc., which will further facilitate and
strengthen the Japan-U.K. strategic partnership.
In addition, in July 2015, unit-to-unit exchanges
were carried out in the United Kingdom in which ASDF
KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft participated in
the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT). In December
of the same year, the Chief of Staff of the ASDF and
Chief of the Air Staff of the Royal Air Force participated
in panel discussions during the Japan-U.K. Security
Dialogue of the Third Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI) held at the RUSI Asia Headquarters. Moreover,
goodwill training with the vessels of the MSDF and the
Royal Navy was conducted in the Gulf of Aden in the
same month of the same year. In this manner, progress has
been made in the exchanges between the two countries.

**(2) France**
France is a major power that has influence not only in
Europe and Africa, but also in the world. It historically
has had a close relationship with Japan and is also
positioned as a special partner.
The first Japan-France “2+2” Meeting was held in Paris
in January 2014, followed by the visit of French Minister
of Defense Le Drian to Japan in July of the same year when
the Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and
exchanges was signed. At the second “2+2” Meeting held
in Tokyo in March 2015, the two countries underscored the
threat of terrorism, and confirmed to strengthen bilateral
intelligence exchange and cooperation in Africa and the
Middle East to fight against terrorism in cooperation
with the international community as well as strengthen
bilateral cooperation in the areas of defense equipment and
technology cooperation and maritime security. In addition,
the two countries signed the Agreement concerning the
Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. In January
2017, at the third “2+2” Meeting in Paris, the two countries
confirmed that they would: (1) commence negotiations
for the Japan-France ACSA; (2) materialize cooperation
regarding unmanned underwater vehicles for mine
detection, as the first concrete cooperation project in the
defense equipment and technology field; and (3) promote
joint exercises. The two countries also expressed their
expectations for fleshing out their cooperation in the field
of space such as the Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
system. On this basis, in March 2017, the second meeting
of the Japan-France Comprehensive Dialogue on Space
was held. In the meeting, the “Technical arrangement
concerning information sharing regarding SSA between
th l t th it i J d th Mi i t f D f


Defense Minister Inada attending the third Japan-France “2+2” meeting held in Paris
(January 2017)

of the French Republic” was signed to strengthen the
Japan-France SSA cooperation, and the two countries
agreed to promote specific cooperation.
In June 2017, a Japan-France Defense Ministerial
Meeting was held on the margins of the 16th ShangriLa Dialogue. The two ministers reaffirmed the
importance of France’s involvement in the Asia-Pacific
region. Furthermore, they agreed to further strengthen
defense cooperation and exchanges between the two
countries, such as joint exercises and defense equipment
and technology cooperation, while welcoming the
implementation of the joint exercise conducted by Japan,
France, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The SDF has also been participating in the
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief training hosted
by the French Armed Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise
Équateur/ Croix du Sud) since 2014.


**(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**
When Prime Minister Abe visited Europe in May 2014,
he held a meeting with then North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Secretary General Rasmussen at
NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership
and Cooperation Programme (IPCP).
Based on the IPCP, female GSDF personnel were
dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time in
December 2014 as part of the Japan-NATO cooperation in
the field of women, peace and security. At the same time,
the MOD/SDF has participated in the annual meeting of
the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP)
since 2015.
In January 2017, Defense Minister Inada visited
NATO Headquarters in Brussels for the first time in 10
years and held a meeting with NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg. In the meeting, the importance of the JapanNATO cooperation in dealing with today’s security
issues was confirmed, and the two leaders reaffirmed
th ti f ti i i fi ld h


-----

maritime security including counter-piracy operations,
cybersecurity, HA/DR, and mainstreaming women,
peace and security. With regard to the dispatch of a
liaison offi cer to the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE), which had been proposed by
the NATO side, Defense Minister Inada in the meeting
announced Japan’s intention to dispatch a liaison offi cer,
and a liaison offi cer was newly assigned to SHAPE in
February 2017.
In addition, General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the
Military Committee, NATO made an offi cial visit to
Japan in June 2016 for a meeting with the Chief of Joint
Staff, and both sides confi rmed their intention to continue
maintaining close cooperation based on the IPCP.

**(4) Other European Countries**
With regard to Japan’s relationship with Germany, on
the occasion of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue held in
Singapore in May 2015, a Japan-Germany Defense
Ministerial Meeting was held for the fi rst time in six years
with Minister of Defense von der Leyen. In addition,
the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff visited Germany in
September 2016, and other high-level and working-level
exchanges have been deepening.
With Italy, the two countries have been promoting
institutional development for facilitating defense
cooperation and exchanges, including the entry into force
of the Japan-Italy Information Security Agreement in
June 2016 and the signing of the Agreement concerning
the Transfer of the Defence Equipment and Technology
in May 2017. In June 2016, a Japan-Italy Defense
Ministerial Meeting was held on the margins of the 15th
Shangri-La Dialogue. Welcoming the milestone year of
the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Japan and Italy, the two ministers
agreed to advance the Japan-Italy defense cooperation
and exchanges, such as a port call by the MSDF
Overseas Training Cruise Unit to Italy and defense
equipment and technology cooperation. In May 2017,
Minister of Defense Pinotti visited Japan for a Defense
Ministerial Meeting. At the meeting, the two ministers
signed a memorandum concerning defense cooperation
and exchanges, and confi rmed that they would further
promote defense cooperation and exchanges between the
two countries, including in the area of defense equipment
and technology.
With the Netherlands, the General Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands visited
Japan in October 2015 and held talks with the Chief
of Joint Staff. The two sides agreed to cooperate
k i ti d t i


operations. Also, in December 2016, Minister of
Defense Hennis-Plasschaert visited Japan, and at the
Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting, the
two ministers signed a memorandum regarding defense
cooperation and exchanges.
With Scandinavian countries, in addition to MilitaryMilitary Talks (MM) at the director-general level, Japan
and these countries have striven to strengthen their
relationship through high-level exchanges such as visits
to Sweden and Finland by the Vice-Minister of Defense
for International Affairs in February 2017, a visit to
Sweden by the Chief of the Joint Staff in February 2017,
and a visit to Japan by the Commander of the Finnish Air
Force in March 2017.

**9** **Other Countries**


**9**


See Fig. III-2-1-1 ((Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges (June

2016 – June 2017)); Reference 61 (Recent Defense Cooperation

See

and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years))

Between Japan and Canada, high-level exchanges, talks
between defense authorities, and other exchanges have
been conducted. Most recently, in June 2016, a JapanCanada Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on the
sidelines of the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue. The two
ministers confi rmed that both Japan and Canada are
Pacifi c nations and partners sharing fundamental values.
The ministers welcomed the steady implementation of
defense exchanges between the two countries including
regular meetings and reciprocal visits of vessels, and
agreed to continue advancing the bilateral exchanges
further under the new Canadian administration as well.
In March 2015, the fi rst Defense Ministerial Meeting
with Minister of Defense Pinzón of Colombia was held
during his visit to Japan. In December 2016, the Japanese
and Colombian ministers signed a memorandum on
defense exchanges and agreed to proceed with specifi c


Chief of Joint Staff Kawano (left) shaking hands with the Minister of Defense of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia Prince Mohammed bin Salman (right) (January 2017)


-----

exchanges going forward.
With Brazil, the GSDF Chief of Staff made his first
visit to the country in February 2016 and agreed to move
the exchanges between the GSDF and the Brazilian Army
into full swing.
As a capacity building assistance program for
Kazakhstan, the MOD invited five officers from the
Kazakhstan Ministry of Defense to Japan in October 2016.
These officers were provided with explanations mainly
about Japan’s initiatives in the medical field, as well as
opportunities to visit facilities and view equipment used
by the SDF, and observe practical war surgery training.
With regard to Middle Eastern countries, between
Japan and Turkey, the Administrative Vice-Minister of
Defense conducted talks with then Undersecretary of the
Ministry of National Defence Ümit Dündar in July 2012,
during which they signed a Statement of Intent to promote
defense exchanges and cooperation. In March 2013, then
Minister of National Defence Yilmaz visited Japan and a
Japan-Turkey Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. At
this meeting, the two ministers agreed to hold a meeting
between their defense authorities at the earliest possible
date and promote a variety of defense exchanges. In
addition, the GSDF Chief of Staff visited Turkey in May
2016 and agreed to advance defense cooperation and
exchanges between the two ground forces.
Between Japan and Jordan, a memorandum on
defense cooperation and exchanges was signed when
King Abdullah visited Japan in October 2016. Also in
February 2017, the MOD officially invited to Japan the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordanian
Armed Forces. In a meeting with the Chief of Joint Staff,
the two sides agreed to continue promoting bilateral
exchanges based on the memorandum.
Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meetings were held
in April 2013 and February 2014. During the meetings,
the two leaders reconfirmed their intention to promote
dialogue and defense exchanges in the security field, and
continue engaging in talks and cooperation at various
levels including the commencement of a dialogue
between the security councils of the two countries in
order to enhance the comprehensive bilateral partnership.
In September 2016, Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense, visited
Japan. A Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial
Meeting was held, and the memorandum between Japan
and Saudi Arabia on cooperation in the field of defense
was signed. As for service-to-service exchanges, the
Chief of Joint Staff visited Saudi Arabia in January 2017
and held a meeting with the Chief of General Staff. In
th ti th t Chi f d t f th t


Defense Minister Inada receiving an explanation from the crew during her visit to the DAPE
(Deployment Airforce for Counter-Piracy Enforcement) in Djibouti (August 2016)

bilateral defense exchanges through the defense attaché
and military attaché dispatched by each country.
Prime Minister Abe visited the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in succession in May and
August 2013, and shared the view regarding the necessity
of promoting cooperation with those countries in the
security and defense fields. In April 2012 and February
2015, a memorandum on defense exchanges was signed
with Bahrain and Qatar, respectively. In terms of serviceto-service exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff visited Qatar
in January 2017 and, during the meeting with the Chief
of Staff, they agreed to continue Arabic language training
assistance for the SDF personnel serving at educational
institutions of the Qatar Armed Forces.
With Oman, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with
Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the Sultan of Oman, in January
2014. Both leaders agreed to enhance cooperation in
the field of maritime security, including counter-piracy
measures for ensuring the security and safety of sea lanes,
as well as promoting defense exchanges. As for serviceto-service exchanges, the Chief of Joint Staff visited
Oman in February 2017 for a meeting with the Chief of
Staff, and the two chiefs shared an understanding of the
importance of the sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the
Arabian Sea.
Djibouti is currently the only country where an SDF
base is located overseas and counter-piracy operations
are carried out. In August 2016, Defense Minister
Inada visited Djibouti, and the two countries shared the
view concerning the importance of the SDF’s activities
contributing to the safety of ships navigating in the Gulf
of Aden. In addition, the GSDF Chief of Staff officially
invited the Commander of the Djiboutian Army to Japan
in November 2016, and training for the operation of
heavy equipment was conducted with the Djibouti Armed
Forces from January to March 2017 as an assistance
program to improve its disaster response capabilities, in
ff t t t th th J Djib ti l ti hi


-----

**Section 2 Ensuring Maritime Security**


For Japan, a major maritime state, strengthening order
on the seas based on such fundamental principles as the
rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as
ensuring safe maritime transport, is a foundation of its
peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. In
cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF
engages in anti-piracy operations, as well as promotes


various initiatives including assistance for capacity
building in this fi eld for coastal states, and making the
most of various opportunities to enhance joint training
and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate
vicinity of Japan.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5 (Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime

Security)

See

**Counter-Piracy Operations**
**1**


piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the
Gulf of Aden.
To date, approximately 30 countries, including the
United States, have dispatched their warships to the
waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
As part of its counter-piracy initiatives, the European
Union (EU) has been conducting Operation Atalanta
since December 2008, in addition to the counter-piracy
operations conducted by the Combined Task Force
151 (CTF 151)[2] that was established in January 2009.
Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) commenced Operation Ocean Shield in August
2009 but ended this activity in December 2016. CTF 151
and the EU have been conducting their operation, and
other countries have been dispatching their assets to the


Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the
seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime
transportation to import most of the resources and food
necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime
nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored.

**1** **Basic Approach**


The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement
agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with
piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely
diffi cult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by
itself, the SDF is to take action as well.


**2** **Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy**
**and Initiatives by the International Community**

**2**


For Japan and the international community, the waters
off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are
extremely important, connecting Europe and the
Middle East with East Asia. Regarding the waters in
this area, successive United Nations Security Council
resolutions[1] were adopted, such as United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted
in June 2008 in response to the frequent occurrence
of and rapid increase in the piracy incidents with the
purpose of acquiring ransoms by detaining hostages
caused by pirates, who are armed with machine guns
and rocket launchers. These resolutions have requested
that various countries take actions, particularly the
dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter


Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in
the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number
of incidents in Southeast Asia)


Fig. III-2-2-1


(Number of incidents)

**237**

250

**218** **219**

Southeast Asia
Somalia and

200 surroundings

**141141 147[147]**

150

**128**

**102** **111** **104**

100 **83**

**70** **70** **68**

**54** **75**

**48** **80**

50

**22**
**51** **46** **11**

**15** **0** **2**

0
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

(Year)

Notes: The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).


Other United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are: Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions
1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013), Resolution 2184 (adopted in 2014),
Resolution 2246 (adopted in 2015) and Resolution 2316 (adopted in 2016).

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the headquarters of which is located in Bahrain, announced the establishment of the CTF in January 2009 as a multilateral combined task force for counter

-----

area. The international community continues to have a
critical interest in and take actions to tackle the acts of
piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
As these initiatives by the international community
have proved to be effective, the number of acts of piracy
occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in
the Gulf of Aden has hovered at a low level in recent
years. However, the assumed root causes of piracy such
as poverty in Somalia have still remained unsolved. In
addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability
to crack down on piracy is also still insuffi cient, if the
international community reduces its counter-piracy
efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Therefore,
there is no great change in the situation in which Japan
must carry out its counter-piracy operations. Moreover,
the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other entities
are continuously requesting that the SDF continue making
every effort in relation to their counter-piracy operations.

See Fig. III-2-2-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in

the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in

See

Southeast Asia))

**3** **Japanese Initiatives**


certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry
small arms for the purpose of security operations.

See Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces);

Reference 18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of

See

Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units); Reference 62 (Outline of
a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy)

**(2) Activities by the Self-Defense Forces**

See Fig. III-2-2-2 (SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations)

Fig. III-2-2-3 (Structure of the Deployed Forces)


See


a. Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement
The Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy
Enforcement (DSPE) is a unit that conducts counterpiracy measures using destroyers. The DSPE strives to
ensure the safety of ships navigating in the area in two
different manners – direct escort of private vessels across
the Gulf of Aden, and zone defense in allocated areas
in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, there are JCG offi cers
aboard the destroyer.[4]

In the direct escort, the destroyer and private vessels
to be escorted fi rst gather at one of the two assembly points
designated at the eastern and western ends of the Gulf of
Aden on the agreed date and time, and then the destroyer
escort the private vessel to the other assembly point. When
the destroyer escorts the convoy, the helicopters carried
on the destroyer also monitor the surrounding area from
the sky as necessary. In this way, it takes around two days
to sail approximately 900 km,[5] while it ensures that the
convoy is safe and secure all day and night. Moreover, as
for the zone defense, the destroyer is deployed to waters
allocated in coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters,
and conducts warning and surveillance operations.[6]

In recent years, while there are still ongoing requests

Crew member of MSDF destroyer Yudachi upon completing a mission of the Deployment Surface
Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement and being reunited with his family for the fi rst time
in six months (September 2016)


**3**


**(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-Piracy Operations**
In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security
Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-affi liated
vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two Japanese destroyers
began providing direct escort to Japan-affi liated vessels,
while P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and
surveillance operations in June the same year.
In view of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the AntiPiracy Measures Act[3] in July the same year in order to
deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy.
This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all
nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their fl ag
states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to
a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in
order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as
approaching civilian vessels.
Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures
concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in
Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came
into force on November 2013, which made it possible to
have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided


Offi cial name: Acts on Punishment of and Measures Against Acts of Piracy

Eight JCG offi cers are onboard and conduct judicial law enforcement activities, including arresting and interrogating pirates, as required.

During the non-monsoon seasons (March-May, September-November), when acts of piracy occur over a larger area due to calmer seas, the escort route is extended by approximately 200 km to the east.

Since December 2013, the DSPE has conducted zone defense by participating in CTF 151, in addition to direct escort missions that had been carried out previously, in order to implement more fl exible


-----

Fig. III-2-2-2 SDF’s Counter Piracy Operations

Fig. III-2-2-2

Activities by other countries

[Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Naval Vessels Patrol Aircraft
One Destroyer

Direct Escort Zone Defense

(approx. 200 personnel/eight Coast Guard Officers aboard)

National Tasking CTF151 CTF151

Direct escort National Tasking (Japan, China, ROK, India, etc.) (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, (Japan)
Escorting private vessels using the escort method (right figure) Turkey, etc.)

EUNAVFOR EUNAVFOR

Zone defense CTF151 (Germany, Spain, Netherlands,Italy, etc.) (Germany, Spain)
Warning and surveillance activities within specific waters (left figure)

(Note) The scale of deployed forces depends on the timing as the operations are carried out

(*) One vessel system (one for direct escort and one for zone defense) has been deployed by all the participating countries in rotation.
since December 14, 2016. Direct escort is carried out as a major activity, and zone
defense is conducted during the non-escort operation period.

Escort Route
(900-1,100 km)
During the non-monsoon period
(March-May and
September-November), the escort route
is extended approx. 200 km to the east

Djibouti

[Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement]
Two P-3C patrol aircraft (approx. 60 personnel)

[Deployment Support Group for Counter Enforcement] Surveillance flight CTF151
(approx. 110 personnel) Somalia Provision of information regarding the airspace
Implementation of guard/maintenance at SDF over the escort route.
operational facility.

Potions Copyright©2016 GeoCatalog Inc.
Source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, GeoEye, Getmapping, AeroGRID, IGP, UPR-EGP, and the GIS Community

0 50 100 200km


for escort from vessels that are vulnerable to piracy such
as tankers with relatively low speed and low broadside,
the demand for direct escort has been decreasing. This
is partly due to the existence of other initiatives for selfdefense of private vessels involving the boarding of
private armed security guards.
As this trend was expected to continue, the
Government of Japan determined that the SDF would
decrease the planned number of direct escorts and carry
out zone defense during the period when direct escort is
not conducted. Accordingly the Government of Japan
changed the number of the deployed destroyers from
two to one for operations off the coast of Somalia and in
the Gulf of Aden from December 2016: (1) based on the
number of destroyers in recent years, the planned number
of direct escorts in a month would be decreased, and at
the same time, (2) during the period when direct escort is
not conducted, zone defense would be carried out instead.
b. Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement
The Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement
(DAPE) is a unit conducting counter-piracy activities

|Naval Vessels|Col2|Patrol Aircraft|
|---|---|---|
|Direct Escort National Tasking (Japan, China, ROK, India, etc.)|Zone Defense CTF151 (Japan, ROK, Pakistan, Turkey, etc.) EUNAVFOR (Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, etc.)|CTF151 (Japan) EUNAVFOR (Germany, Spain)|


Photograph commemorating the total number of identifi ed vessels and ships reaching 180,000
in the mission of the Deployment Air Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement (August 2016)

using the P-3C patrol aircraft (two aircraft dispatched).
The unit conducts warning and surveillance operations
in the fl ight zone that is determined in coordination with
the CTF 151 headquarters[7] and confi rms any suspicious
boats. At the same time, the unit also provides information
to the destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and
civilian vessels, responding by such means as confi rming


In addition, DAPE has been participating in CTF 151 since February 2014. This participation enabled the force to acquire information that was previously not accessible. Moreover, it became possible
to conduct more fl exible warning and surveillance activities. For example, aircraft can be deployed as needed even to areas that are highly susceptible to acts of piracy, and as a result, coordination


-----

Fig. III-2-2-3 Structure of the Deployed Forces

|Commander, Dep Force for Counter P|loyment Surface iracy Enforcement|
|---|---|


|Commander, Dep for Counter Pira|loyment Air Force cy Enforcement|Commander, Dep Group for Counter|Col4|loyment Support Piracy Enforcement|
|---|---|---|---|---|
||||||
||||||
||||||


Fig. III-2-2-3

MSDF personnel

GSDF personnel

Commander, Self Defense Fleet

MSDF and GSDF personnel

Commander, Deployment Surface Commander, Deployment Air Force Commander, Deployment Support Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)
Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement for Counter Piracy Enforcement Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement Deployed unit at the Headquarters

Headquarter Headquarter Total of less than 20 personnel

Squadron Support and Operation Guard Military

1 destroyer

(2 P-3Cs) logistics units units units Police units

Total approx. 200 personnel Total approx. 60 personnel Total approx. 110 personnel (about 30 maritime, about 80 ground)

Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard [Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement]

Escort private ships with destroyers and conduct zone defense within CTF 151

[Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement]

Special Boarding Unit personnel aboard Conduct surveillance flight over the Gulf of Aden by P-3C patrol aircraft
1 or 2 patrol helicopters, as well as 1 [Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement]
or 2 special boats Facilitate communication and coordination with relevant authorities of Djibouti and conduct duties

related to necessary support for the DAPE to conduct counter-piracy operations

[CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters]
SDF personnel serving as CTF 151 commander and command center officers facilitate coordination
among units of countries participating in CTF 151

- In addition, Airlift Squadron comprised of C-130H transport aircraft under the Air Support Commander will
provide airborne transportation of materials etc. when necessary.


the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if
requested. The information gathered by SDF P-3Cs is
constantly shared with other related organizations, and
contributes signifi cantly to deterring acts of piracy and
disarming vessels suspected of being pirate ships.
c. Deployment Support Group for Counter Piracy
Enforcement
In order to improve the operational effi ciency and
effectiveness of the DAPE, the Deployment Support
Group for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DGPE) carries
out activities such as maintenance of the facility set up
in the northwest district of Djibouti International Airport.
d. Transport Unit
The Airlift Squadron regularly operates ASDF
transport aircraft to carry out air transport of materials
required by the DAPE and the DGPE.
e. Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Deployed unit at
the Headquarters
In order to strengthen coordination with the units of
other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations
and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counterpiracy operations, the MOD decided to dispatch SDF
personnel serving as the CTF 151 commander and the
headquarter staff in July 2014, and has dispatched SDF
personnel to the CTF 151 Headquarters where an offi cer
from other countries serves as the commander since
August 2014. During the period from May to August
2015, the SDF also dispatched a CTF 151 commander
for the fi rst time,[8] while between March and June
2017 a CTF 151 commander as well as staff were also

|Operation units|Guard units|Military Police units|
|---|---|---|
|Total approx. 110 personnel (about 30 maritime, about 80 ground)|||


dispatched to the Headquarters.
f. Achievements
As of May 31, 2017, the DSPE has escorted 3,791
vessels. Under the protection of the SDF destroyers,
not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates
and these vessels have all passed safely across the Gulf
of Aden.
As for the DAPE, it commenced the counter-piracy
operations in June 2009. As of May 31, 2017, the DAPE
has conducted the following activities: aircraft have
fl own 1,810 missions with their fl ying hours totaling
13,890 hours; approximately 150,200 ships conducted
identifi cation tasks; and information was provided to
vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging
in counter-piracy operations on around 12,720 occasions.
The activities conducted by the DAPE account for
approximately 70-80% of the warning and surveillance
operations carried out in the Gulf of Aden by the
international community.

**4** **Praise for Japan’s Endeavors**


**4**


The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been
highly praised by the international community. For
example, national leaders and others have expressed
their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly
well-received by the United Nations Security Council
Resolution. Moreover, the destroyers, which are
engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many


-----

**i**

**As the Commander of the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151)**

Rear Admiral Tatsuya Fukuda, Commander, CTF 151 (Commander, MSDF Escort Flotilla 4)

For approximately four months from early March to the end of June 2017, I had served as commander of CTF 151 in Bahrain
and engaged in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden conducted by participating vessels and
aircraft from the naval forces of various countries. I was the second MSDF personnel to serve as Commander, CTF 151. At the CTF
Headquarters, 25 staff offi cers from 11 countries around the world worked together and made their best efforts to perform their
duties while overcoming language and cultural barriers among them.
As the counter-piracy operations carried out so far have proved to be effective, the number of piracy incidents occurring
in this area has hovered at an extremely low level in recent years. In the meantime, the threat of piracy still exists against the
background of the domestic situation in Somalia, and in fact, several incidents of hijacking of private vessels have occurred since
March 2017. Continuing counter-piracy activities in this area is essential to prevent the recurrence of these piracy incidents, and it
is no exaggeration to say that the importance of such activities is increasing more than ever before.
Japan, a maritime nation and a country striving for stable seas, has a signifi cant responsibility in the establishment of the global
maritime security. As the world’s pre-eminent “Leading Navy,” the MSDF will continue to play an active role in establishing regional
and maritime security by engaging in various operations including counter-piracy operations.

Staff offi cers of the CTF 151 Headquarters and Rear Admiral Fukuda Rear Admiral Fukuda (right) taking over as Commander of CTF 151 from his
(sixth from left in the front row) in Bahrain predecessor, Commodore of the Pakistan Navy


messages from the captains and ship owners of the
vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their
gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of

**Contribution to the Maintenance of Public Safety and Order on the Seas through Maritime Training**
**2**


**1** **Training Conducted by the SDF and Counter-Piracy**
**Teams from Various Countries in the Gulf of Aden**

**1**


In accordance with the agreement reached at the meeting
between Prime Minister Abe and then NATO Secretary
General Rasmussen in May 2014, the SDF’s deployed
unit and NATO’s counter-piracy unit, with the objective
of enhancing their cooperation and tactical skills
required for counter-piracy activities, implemented
joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden in September and
November of the same year. In addition, since October
2014 th SDF h d t d j i t i l ith


Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue
escorting ships there.

the EU surface forces and counter-piracy units of
Turkey, Pakistan and other countries.
These training exercises conducted in the Gulf of
Aden have an essential signifi cance in that they strengthen
the cooperation between the SDF and counter-piracy
teams from various countries and regional organizations,
and contribute to the maintenance of public safety and
order on the seas.


-----

that was hosted by the U.S. Navy and carried out in the
waters and airspace surrounding Hawaii and the west
coast of the United States. In September 2016, the MSDF
also participated in the Multinational Maritime Exercise
hosted by the Royal Australian Navy in the surrounding
water of Darwin (Australia). Furthermore, in November
2016, the MSDF participated in the Royal New Zealand
navy-hosted International Fleet Review, ASEAN Defense
Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus maritime security
fi eld training exercise, and the Multinational Maritime
Exercise hosted by the Royal New Zealand Navy.
Through the participation in these exercises, the MSDF
improves its tactical skills as well as advancing mutual
understanding and strengthening of trust relationships
with other participating countries.
Strengthening cooperation with other participating
countries through these joint exercises contributes to the
maintenance of maritime security, which has extremely
high signifi cance.

See Section 1-2 (Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework

and through Dialogue)

See

Reference 52 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years))

**Initiatives in the Asia-Pacifi c Region**
**3**


contribute to the creation and development of maritime
order, Japan would ensure international collaboration
and promote international cooperation by making use of
fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences
to contribute to international rule-making and consensus
building. In response to this, the MOD has been working
on cooperation for maritime security within regional
security dialogue frameworks such as the ADMM Plus
and the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security
(ISMMS).

See Section 1-2 (Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework

and through Dialogue); Section 1-3 (Promoting Capacity Building
Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation)


**2** **Participation in the U.S. Hosted International Mine**
**Countermeasures Exercise and Other Exercises**

**2**


The MSDF has participated in every multilateral mine
countermeasures exercise[9] in the waters around the Arabian
Peninsula hosted by the U.S. Navy since its fi rst exercise
in 2012, and this includes its participation in the Fourth
International Mine Countermeasures Exercise in 2016. In
addition, the MSDF also dispatched personnel to the fi rst
International Maritime Exercise (command post exercise)
hosted by the United States and conducted in Bahrain
in May 2017. Participating in this exercise assists in the
enhancement of the tactical skills of the MSDF and the
strengthening of trust among the participating countries.
At the same time, the exercise also contributes to the
maintenance of maritime security, while also contributing
to the improvement of the global security environment.

**3** **Strengthening of Cooperation in Maritime**
**Security through Joint Training, etc.**


**3**


During June to August 2016, the MSDF participated in
the Rim of the Pacifi c Joint Exercise (RIMPAC2016[10])

**Initiatives in the Asia-Pacifi c Region**
**3**

The National Security Strategy and the National Defense
Program Guidelines state that Japan will play a leading
role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable
Seas,” including maritime security cooperation with
other countries.
Accordingly, the MOD/SDF implements capacity
building assistance in maritime security for Indonesia,
Vietnam and Myanmar, thereby assisting countries
such as coastal states enhance their capabilities, and
strengthening cooperation with partners that share the
same strategic interests as Japan.
In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy
approved by the Cabinet in April 2013 states that to


9 The exercise took place in May 2017, and command post exercises were carried out.

10 RIMPAC has been held almost every other year since 1971, and the 25th exercise took place this year. The MSDF began participating in RIMPAC in 1980, making this year its 19th participation. From


-----

**Section 3 Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities**


The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international
peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic
initiatives, including the use of Offi cial Development


Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental causes
of confl icts, terrorism and other problems.



**Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities**
**1**


**1** **Framework of International Peace Cooperation**
**Activities and the Signifi cance of Stipulating such**

**1**

**Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF**


items of each country more specifi cally in order to ensure
the fl exibility and readiness of international peacekeeping
activities. In light of this change, Japan registered
engineering units and command center staff offi cers in
March 2016.
Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing informationgathering abilities and protection abilities, which are
required for the SDF units to carry out their missions while
ensuring the safety of personnel and unit in international
peace keeping activities, etc. In addition, in order to
respond to various environments and prolonged missions,
the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport,
deployment, and information communication, as well as
developing a structure of logistic and medical support for
conducting smooth and continuous operations.
With regard to the education necessary for engaging


The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by engineering units and command center staff offi cers in
the MOD/SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace March 2016.
cooperation operations such as United Nations peacekeeping Meanwhile, the SDF is enhancing informationoperations (the so-called UN PKO); (2) international gathering abilities and protection abilities, which are
disaster relief operations to respond to large-scale natural required for the SDF units to carry out their missions while
disasters overseas; (3) activities based on the former Special ensuring the safety of personnel and unit in international
Measures Act on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance peace keeping activities, etc. In addition, in order to
in Iraq; and (4) activities based on the former Anti-Terrorism respond to various environments and prolonged missions,
Special Measures Act, and the former Replenishment the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport,
Support Special Measures Act. In 2007, international deployment, and information communication, as well as
peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as developing a structure of logistic and medical support for
supplementary activities,[1] were upgraded to become one of conducting smooth and continuous operations.
the primary missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of With regard to the education necessary for engaging
Japan and the maintenance of public order.[2]

International Peace Cooperation Activities
See Fig. III-2-3-1 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted Fig. III-2-3-1 Conducted by the SDF

by the SDF)

Fig. III-2-3-1

Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference
18 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF
Personnel or SDF Units); Reference 63 (Summary Comparison of Laws Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in
Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 64
(The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities) International Disaster Relief Activities


**2** **Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and**
**Accurately Carry Out International Peace**

**2**

**Cooperation Activities**

To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is
important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future
operation. For this reason, all three branches of the SDF,
namely the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, designate dispatch
stand-by units, and the designated units are always ready
to be deployed.
In September 2015, the UN launched the
Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) so
the UN Headquarters to be able to grasp the registered


International Peace Cooperation Activities

Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in
the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations”

International Disaster Relief Activities

Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of
International Disaster Relief Teams”

Cooperation and Support Activities, etc. for the Armed Forces
of Foreign Countries

Activities in accordance with the “Act Concerning Cooperation and
Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in
Situations that the International Community is Collectively
Addressing for International Peace and Security”

Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq

Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support
Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009)

Activities to Respond to International Terrorism

Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on
the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for CounterTerrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010)

Legend : Activities based on time-limited acts
: Activities based on permanent acts


Activities prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Law (miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions

Missions defi ned in Article 3 of the SDF Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas
surrounding Japan (in 2007) and international peace cooperation activities. In accordance with the entry into force of the Legislation for Peace and Security in 2016, “situations in areas surrounding l


-----

in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF
International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit at
Camp Komakado (Shizuoka Prefecture) provides training
for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace
cooperation activities, as well as supports their training.
In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and
Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College offers
not only a basic education courses on international peace
cooperation activities, but also specialized education
to train personnel who can be appointed as contingent
commanders of UN PKO missions and staff offi cers of
mission headquarters. These specialized courses are
conducted by using UN standard training materials and
foreign instructors. Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC
has provided education involving personnel from foreign
militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies.
This initiative represents the approach taken by the MOD/
SDF, which emphasize the necessity of collaboration
and cooperation with other related ministries and
foreign countries, based on the current situation of more
multi-dimensional and complicated international peace
cooperation activities. The initiative aims to contribute to
more effective international peace cooperation activities
by enhancing the collaboration in the fi eld of education.


**3** **Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched**
**SDF Units**

**3**


SDF personnel are expected to fulfi ll their assigned duty
under severe working conditions while being far away
from their home country and their families. Therefore, it
is extremely important to make necessary arrangements
so that dispatched SDF personnel can effectively carry out
their assigned duty while maintaining both their physical
and mental health. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has
implemented various measures to support families to reduce
anxiety for the dispatched SDF personnel and their families.
In addition, the SDF also provides the following
mental health checkups on an ongoing basis for all the
personnel to be sent: (1) a pre-dispatch course to acquire
necessary knowledge on stress reduction; (2) mental
health assessment conducted several times during the
pre-dispatch to post-dispatch period; (3) counseling on
anxiety, trouble and other matters among the dispatched
personnel provided by mental health personnel being
dispatched; (4) dispatch of mental healthcare support
teams from Japan consisting mainly of medical offi cers
with specialized knowledge; (5) education before
returning to Japan for reducing stress upon return;
(6) temporary health checkups after returning to Japan.



**Initiatives to Support UN Peacekeeping Operations, etc.**
**2**


As a means to promote peace and stability in confl ict
regions around the world, UN Peacekeeping Operations
(PKO) have expanded their missions in recent years to
include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC),
the promotion of political processes, providing assistance
in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
(DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector
Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights,
and other fi elds, in addition to such traditional missions
as ceasefi re monitoring. To date, there are 16 UN PKO
missions ongoing (as of the end of May 2017).
International organizations, such as the Offi ce
of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and
restoration activities for the victims of confl icts and
large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and
from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.
Japan has been promoting international peace
cooperation activities in various regions including
Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and
S th S d f th 20 d th lt f


these activities have been highly praised both inside and
outside of Japan. From the perspective of “Proactive
Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of
international cooperation, and in light of the appreciation
and expectations from the international community, Japan
will continue to actively engage in international peace
cooperation operations in a multilayered way. In this
regard, to maximize the effect of Japan’s contribution to
the international community, it is necessary to deliberate
more deeply about how the SDF should contribute
to the international community. Therefore, regarding
international peace cooperation operations and other
relevant missions, the SDF will continue to proactively
take part in peacekeeping activities utilizing their
accumulated experiences and advanced skills in fi elds
such as engineering, as well as by expanding the dispatch
of SDF personnel to further responsible positions,
such as mission headquarters and the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations in the UN. As such, the SDF
places more emphasis on taking more of a leading role,
and the MOD will be proactively involved in Japan’s
i iti ti f i t ti l t ib ti


-----

**1** **United Nations Mission in the Republic of South**
**Sudan (UNMISS)**

**1**


**(1) Background to the Decision to Dispatch Personnel**
**to UNMISS**

The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was
established following the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of
Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army in January 2005.
Beginning in October 2008, Japan dispatched
two GSDF offi cers to UNMIS headquarters as staff
offi cers (logistics and information staff offi cers), but
UNMIS ended its mission in July 2011 following South
Sudan’s independence. Meanwhile, with the objective
of consolidating peace and security as well as helping
establish necessary conditions for the development of
South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in the Republic
of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established. The Japanese
Government was requested by the UN to cooperate with
UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF
engineering units. The Cabinet approved the dispatch of
two staff offi cers (logistics and information staff offi cers)
to UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it
decided to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, then
Coordination Center, and an additional staff offi cer
(engineering staff offi cer). In addition, the Cabinet also
approved the dispatch of one staff offi cer (air operations
staff offi cer) in October 2014.


In South Sudan, State Minister of Defense Wakamiya encouraging the 11th Engineering Unit
deployed to South Sudan (January 2017)

South Sudan shares borders with six countries and is
positioned in a highly important location, connecting the
African continent on all four points of the compass. The
peace and stability of South Sudan is not only essential
for the country itself; it is also a condition leading to peace
and stability in its neighboring countries, and by extension,
Africa as a whole. It is thus a crucial issue that should be
dealt with by the international community. The MOD/SDF
has accumulated experience through past PKO, and has
contributed to the peace and stability of South Sudan by
providing personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure
development, on which the UN places great expectations.

See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-7 (Situation in Sudan and South

Sudan); Fig. III-2-3-2 (South Sudan and Its Surrounding Area);
Reference 65 (Background Related to South Sudan)


**(2) Activities by the SDF**
In January 2012, a then Coordination Center of the SDF
was established for the fi rst time in the SDF’s participation
in UN PKO, both in the South Sudan capital city of Juba
and in Uganda, in order for coordination of the activities
conducted by the dispatched engineering unit to begin.
Since the commencement of its engineering activities
within UN facilities in Juba in March 2012, the dispatched
engineering unit has steadily expanded its activities in order.
The SDF has continued to dispatch over 300 personnel
after the second unit took over in June of the same year,
and carried out activities with great signifi cance such as
repairing roads and constructing facilities for displaced
people while ensuring the safety of the personnel.
On November 15, 2016, the Cabinet approved
the changes to the International Peace Cooperation
Assignment Implementation Plan for South Sudan
after the deliberations by the National Security Council
(9-minister meeting). After the 11th rotation took over
in December 2016, the dispatched unit was assigned the
task of so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations, which
was approved by the Legislation for Peace and Security,
as well as the task to carry out joint protection of camps.
Si th 11th it h d d t i i


Fig. III-2-3-2 South Sudan and Its Surrounding Area


Fig. III-2-3-2


Egypt

Libya

Saudi Arabia

Sudan Eritrea

Chad

Ethiopia

Republic of

Central Africa South Sudan

Juba

Democratic Republic of the Congo Uganda

Somalia

Kenya

[Cited from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website]


-----

kaketsuke-keigo and other tasks in the pre-deployment
training, the unit had suffi cient level of profi ciency to
conduct new tasks.
To enable appropriate responses to be taken in an
emergency situation, four doctors (previously three)
were included in the 11th rotation.[3] At the same time,
additional items were included in the personal fi rst aid
kit carried by all of the personnel, giving them the same
functions as those of the U.S. Army. In this way, the
medical functions of the 11th unit were further enhanced[4]
to ensure full preparedness for the mission.
The deployment of SDF engineering units marked a
milestone of fi ve years in January 2017 since the dispatch of
the fi rst engineering rotation. In all of the PKOs conducted
by Japan, the unit has made a record number of achievements.
The major achievements include a total of approximately 260
km of road repair and a total of approximately 500,000 m[2] of
development. The nation-building process of South Sudan
is entering into a new phase due to the efforts made by the
international community. Specifi cally, while in 2016 the UN
decided on the establishment of a new PKO unit with the duty
to improve security in the capital city of Juba and its early
deployment was a pending issue, the deployment of the unit
is being commenced and the initiatives to realize stability
in South Sudan are making gradual progress. Additionally,
to address the major issue of promoting domestic ethnic
reconciliation in South Sudan, the Government of South
Sudan decided in 2016 to conduct a national dialogue and
announced its commencement, which is seen as a progress
in political process towards domestic stability.
Meanwhile, the unit’s activities have made the largest
achievements among the PKO conducted by Japan.

Fig. III-2-3-3 Organization of UNMISS


Commander of the engineering unit deployed to South Sudan returning the unit fl ag to Defense
Minister Inada at the Return of Colors Ceremony (May 2017)

Therefore, Japan considered that it could move on to a
new phase regarding engineering activities in the capital
city of Juba that the SDF was in charge of. Considering
the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner,
on March 10, 2017, the Government of Japan came to the
conclusion that the SDF engineering unit would withdraw
from Juba around the end of May, and Minister of
Defense Inada issued an assignment termination order on
March 24, 2017. SDF personnel engaged in withdrawal
work, then sequentially withdrew from South Sudan by
the end of May 2017, and terminated the operations by
the engineering unit in UNMISS.
In response to a request from the UN to transfer items
possessed by the dispatched engineering unit such as heavy
machinery, vehicles, and residence-related containers,
Japan transferred these items to UNMISS with no charge,
intending to make Japan’s cooperation with UNMISS
more effective. Prior to this transfer of items, the MOD,
responding to a request from UNMISS, provided training
on the operation and maintenance of heavy machinery to
UNMISS personnel, so that UNMISS would be able to
conduct engineering activities in a smooth manner using
these heavy machinery and other equipment even after the
withdrawal of the Japanese unit.
These dedicated activities by the dispatched
engineering unit were highly appreciated and valued by
the UN and South Sudan. Japan continues to dispatch SDF
personnel to the UNMISS Headquarters and contributes
to the activities of UNMISS as its member.

See Part II, Chapter 3, Section 3 (Implementation Status After the Legislation

for Peace and Security), Fig. III-2-3-3 (Organization of UNMISS), Fig.
III-2-3-4 (Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineering
Unit Deployed in South Sudan); Reference 65 (Background Related to
South Sudan), Reference 66 (Japan’s Basic Thinking Regarding the
Termination of Operations of the Engineering Unit of the Self Defense
Force in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)).

|Chief|of Staff|
|---|---|

|Force Co|mmander|
|---|---|

|Di Miss|rector of ion Support Division|
|---|---|


Fig. III-2-3-3


Assignment of Japanese Personnel

United Nations Headquarters

António Guterres, Secretary-General
of the United Nations

Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General
David Shearer, Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Deputy Special

Deputy Special Representative
Representative of of the Secretary- Director of
the Secretary- Chief of Staff Force Commander General, UN Mission Support
General Resident & Division
(Political) Humanitarian

Coordinator

Analysis Center(1 IntelligenceJoint MissionStaff Officer) HeadquartersStaff Officer)(1 LogisticsLogisticsMilitary Engineering Section(1 EngineeringStaff Officer) Aviation SectionStaff Officer)(1 AviationOperation

Note: Double lines indicate a department/division in which Japanese personnel are placed.


In the 10th rotation (approx. 350 personnel) that was dispatched to South Sudan, three out of ten medical personnel were doctors.

Up to and including the 10th rotation, the SDF personal fi rst aid kit contained the fi rst aid items bag, tourniquet, emergency dressing, chest seal, hemostatic gauze, artifi cial respiration sheet, gloves


-----

**i**

**Activities Conducted by the Dispatched Unit in South Sudan**

Captain (GSDF) Ryohei Tsuchiya, Operation/Training Offi cer, 3rd Section,

Unit Headquarters, Dispatched Engineering Unit in South Sudan (11th rotation)

I was a member of the dispatched engineering unit in South Sudan and was in charge
of the operation and training of the unit. This was my fi rst overseas mission, and I
found it very fulfi lling to engage in activities by representing Japan. At the same time,
I performed my duties with a sense of vigilance every day in order to ensure that the
unit can carry out its activities effectively while assuring its safety.

Captain Tsuchiya (left) conducting coordination work

The 11th rotation to the engineering unit including me was assigned the new with UNMISS Headquarters staff
tasks of “kaketsuke-keigo” and joint protection of camps. Though we never did
execute these new missions during our period of dispatch, we underwent a series of training both before and while we were
dispatched, such that we were ready to respond at any time should an order be issued.
In March 2017, it was announced that the dispatched engineering unit’s activities at UNMISS were completed, and the unit was
set to withdraw from South Sudan by the end of May. Our unit worked collectively to carry out engineering activities so that we can
bring a successful conclusion to the activities of the engineering units over the past fi ve years and four months. I am proud that we
were able to complete all of the tasks that were given to us by UNMISS.
We withdrew and left Juba after we passed on the skills and know-how we had acquired to UNMISS offi cers, such as by
providing training on the operation of equipment to be transferred to UNMISS. I am grateful for those who have made achievements in
international missions and accumulated lessons learned, as well as everyone involved in the operation and our families for supporting
us so that we can focus on our mission. It is my hope that initiatives will continue to be taken for the realization of peace and stability
in South Sudan.

**i**

**Activities of Staff Offi cers at the UNMISS Headquarters**

Lieutenant Colonel Nobuhiro Narusawa, Information Staff Offi cer, UNMISS

I have been working in South Sudan’s capital city of Juba since June 2016 as the eighth
rotation of staff offi cers (information staff offi cer) from Japan to UNMISS headquarters.
I work at the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC). This is an organization
composed of civilian, police, and military personnel. At the department with which I am
affi liated, my main duties include building a database on various information collected
by UNMISS, and preparing statistical materials with data on the security situation
throughout South Sudan and the number of internally displaced people (IDPs). These
duties are carried out with Majors from the Indian Army and the Australian Army as Lieutenant Colonel Narusawa (front) on duty at JMAC
well as a Bangladeshi civilian offi cer.
As offi cers working here have different nationalities and various backgrounds,
the contents of and the ways of coordinating intelligence work are not the same as in
Japan, and every time I fi nd a lot of fresh inspirations.
In addition to myself, there are three other SDF personnel at UNMISS headquarters
working in South Sudan: a logistics staff offi cer; an engineering staff offi cer; and an
air operations staff offi cer. All of us reside in the United Nations compound within the
Tomping area where we are helping each other.
We, the four staff offi cers at the mission headquarters, appreciate the
opportunity in which we have been able to engage in the UN missions and operations
for international contribution through the work at UNMISS. We will remain vigilant to
complete our duties even after the withdrawal of the engineering unit, and ensure that Lieutenant Colonel Narusawa: second from left
we pass on the mission to our successors.


-----

Fig. III-2-3-4 Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineering Unit Deployed in South Sudan

|National Conting (Commander, E|ent Commander ngineering Unit)|
|---|---|

|Engineering Platoon|Liaison Section|
|---|---|


Fig. III-2-3-4


: Orders concerning the activities and duties of the engineering unit Minister of Defense
: SDF chain of command (Collaboration among each force)

Chief of Staff, Joint Staff

UNMISS

Central Readiness Force Self Defense Fleet Air Support Command

National Contingent Commander
(Commander, Engineering Unit)

About 350 personnel

Engineering Unit Commander: Colonel

Unit Headquarters Support Unit for H.Q. Engineering Equipment Platoon Engineering Platoon Liaison Section Security unit Military Police

*Excludes commands relating

Note 1: The above shows the formation of the dispatched engineering unit in South Sudan, which withdrew in May 2017 (from the 5th unit onwards). to judicial police duties
Note 2: The Liaison Section was abolished on March 24, 2017, and the Withdrawal Support Unit was established instead.


**(3) Cooperation between Japan and Australia in UNMISS**
To date, the MOD/SDF has cooperated closely with the
Australian Defense Forces (ADF) in the fi eld, such as
in activities to provide humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance in Iraq and UN PKO. The cooperative
relationship between Japan and Australia continued
in UNMISS. For example, two ADF personnel had
been dispatched since August 2012, and supported
coordination between the engineering unit and UNMISS.
Moreover, at the request of the ADF, the MOD/SDF
accepted two ADF personnel, who were dispatched to
carry out UNMISS duties, to the camp of the Japanese
dispatched unit from January to May 2017. During this
time, support was provided based on the Japan-Australia
ACSA to implement various procedures smoothly.

**2** **Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to the**
**UN Secretariat**

**2**


Currently two SDF personnel (one director level and one
action offi cer level) are dispatched to the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) for a two-year
period to engage in policy formulation and planning for
UN PKO. In addition, one civilian offi cial is dispatched to
the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) to engage in
duties such as the UN Project for Africa Rapid Deployment
of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC), which is one of the
Triangular Partnership projects.[5]

See Reference 67 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to

International Organizations)


education and training for UN peacekeepers to contribute
to peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of
the centers. Starting with the deployment to the Cairo
Regional Center for Training on Confl ict Resolution
and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in November
2008, a total of 29 SDF personnel (25 deployments
and eight countries in total), including two female SDF
personnel, were dispatched by June 2017. The SDF
personnel provided education based on their experiences
and lessons gained through SDF activities overseas, to
include lectures concerning the importance of building
relationships with local population in international peace
cooperation activities, and the international disaster relief
activities in which the SDF has engaged.

See Reference 67 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to

International Organizations)

**4** **Support to the UN Project for Africa Rapid**
**Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC)**

**4**


Japan has so far earned unquestionable trust in the areas
of facilities and transport that are essential for promoting


**3** **Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Centers**

**3**


To support PKO undertaken by African and other
countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel
as instructors to PKO centers in Africa that provide


GSDF personnel giving instructions on how to operate a road roller to the Kenya Defence Forces
personnel in the United Nations Project for Africa Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities


A partnership for supporting the capability enhancement of the personnel from UN PKO troop contributing countries through cooperation among the UN, UN PKO troop contributing countries, and third


-----

smooth peacekeeping operations. To continue to support
the swift implementation of peacekeeping operations
and implement high quality activities, Prime Minister
Abe expressed Japan’s active support at the PKO
Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by
through the ARDEC.
In the ARDEC, the UN Department of Field Support
(DFS) procures heavy equipment and carries out training for
engineers using funds provided by Japan. From September
to October 2015, Japan dispatched GSDF personnel as
instructors to the International Peace Support Training

**International Disaster Relief Operations**
**3**


In recent years, the role of advanced capabilities in military
affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for
its use in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are
growing. To contribute to the advancement of international
cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in international
disaster relief operations proactively from the viewpoint
of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the
global security environment.
To this end, the SDF maintains their readiness to take
any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief
operation plans. In consultation with the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting
international disaster relief operations, which fully
utilize their functions and capabilities, while taking into
consideration specifi c relief requests by the governments of
affected countries and disaster situations in these countries.

See Reference 64 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation

Activities)


Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi (Kenya). The dispatched GSDF
personnel provided training on the operation and maintenance
of heavy equipment for 10 personnel participants from four
countries in East Africa. Also from June to October 2016,
two training sessions were conducted at the IPSTC to which
GSDF personnel were dispatched (for the second training
one civilian offi cial was also dispatched for administration/
coordination role) and provided training for approximately
60 participating personnel. The MOD will also actively
support training to be implemented going forward.

in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international
disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services,
such as fi rst-aid medical treatment and epidemic
prevention; (2) transport of personnel and equipment
by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply
activities using water-purifying devices. In addition, the
SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster
relief personnel and equipment to the affected area.
The Central Readiness Force and regional units of
the GSDF and other relevant GSDF units maintain their
readiness to ensure that they can carry out international
disaster relief operations in an independent manner
anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of the
MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also
constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel
and their supplies to disaster affected areas. Furthermore,
in April 2015, the MOD/SDF also improved its readiness
to be able to swiftly respond to a request for search
activities using P-3C patrol aircraft.


**1** **Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law**


Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatch
of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief
Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international
disaster relief activities in response to requests from
the governments of affected countries and international
organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team
Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to
participate in international disaster relief activities and to
transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose.

See Reference 17 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces)

**2** **International Disaster Relief Operations by**
**the SDF and SDF’s Posture**


**3** **International Disaster Relief Activities in**
**Response to Earthquake in New Zealand**

**3**


Following the devastation caused by an earthquake that
hit New Zealand’s South Island on November 13, 2016,
the MOD received a request from the Government of
New Zealand on November 15 to survey the situation
of the damages. As a result of consultations with the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, the MOD decided on the
implementation of International Disaster Relief Activities
by the SDF.
From November 15 for four days, one MSDF P-1
patrol aircraft conducted fl ights to survey the damage
situation, which was being dispatched to New Zealand to
participate in a multilateral joint exercise.


**2**


Responding to specifi c relief requests by the governments
f ff t d t i d th l f di t it ti


-----

**Section 4 Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation**


Causing anxiety not only to Japan, but also countries
across the globe, North Korea’s launches of ballistic
missiles and nuclear tests have demonstrated that the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
and missiles, which serve as their means of delivery,
still pose a pressing challenge to peace and stability of
the international community. Moreover, many countries
are working on the regulation of certain conventional
weapons, considering the need to maintain a balance


between humanitarian perspectives and defensive
requirements.
One of the initiatives to deal with these issues is
the development of an international framework for arms
control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, and Japan is
playing an active role in this effort.

See Fig. III-2-4-1 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non
Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass

See

Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.)



**Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation**
**1**


Japan actively participates in international initiatives
for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in
regard to WMDs, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, as well as missiles as a means of
delivery and associated technologies and materials.
Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the
fi eld of chemical protection since the negotiating stage
and dispatching GSDF personnel who are experts on
protection against chemical weapons to the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which
was established to continuously implement verifi cation
measures following the entry of the CWC into force.
Furthermore, small quantities of the chemical substances
under the regulation of the CWC are synthesized at
the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order
to conduct protection research. Thus, the school has
undergone inspections nine times in total since its
establishment, in accordance with the CWC regulations.
Moreover, the whole of the Japanese Government


is working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned
chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC,
and the Ministry has seconded nine personnel, including
GSDF personnel, to the Cabinet Offi ce to work on this
project. Since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in
chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to
conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 16
occasions. In addition, the MOD has been cooperating
in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of
regulations and decisions, by dispatching offi cials to
major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), as well as international export control
regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). At the
same time, SDF personnel were dispatched to training to
foster substitute inspectors[1] provided by the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

See Reference 67 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to

International Organizations)


Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons,
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.

|Category|Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.|Col3|Col4|Col5|Conventional Weapons|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Nuclear Weapons|Chemical Weapons|Biological Weapons|Delivery Systems (Missiles)||
|Conventions on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, etc.|Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)|Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)|Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)|The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)|Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)|
|Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Non-Proliferation|Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)|Australia Group (AG)||Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)|Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)|
|New International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction|Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540|||||


Fig. III-2-4-1

**Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.**
**Category** **Biological** **Delivery Systems** **Conventional Weapons**
**Nuclear Weapons** **Chemical Weapons**
**Weapons** **(Missiles)**

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)

Treaty on the Non- Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention)

The Hague Code

Conventions on Arms Proliferation of Nuclear Anti-Personnel Mine Ban

Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons of Conduct Against

Control, Disarmament and Weapons (NPT) Convention (Ottawa Treaty)

Convention (CWC) Convention (BWC) Ballistic Missile

Non-Proliferation, etc. Comprehensive Nuclear- U.N. Register of Conventional Arms

Proliferation (HCOC)

Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) U.N. Report on Military Expenditures

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
Export Control Frameworks Nuclear Suppliers Group Missile Technology
Australia Group (AG) Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
Aimed at Non-Proliferation (NSG) Control Regime (MTCR)

New International Initiatives

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

Aimed at Non-Proliferation of

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540

Weapons of Mass Destruction


Experts in relevant fi elds registered with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization, in preparation for the implementation of On-site Inspections (OSI) following the effective date


-----

Furthermore, Japan has signed various conventions
on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects (CCW),[2] based on humanitarian perspectives and
security needs. Japan has signed the Convention on Cluster
Munitions (Oslo Convention),[3] which was adopted outside
the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention
into force in August 2010, it was stipulated that the use of
all cluster munitions in the possession of the SDF would
be immediately prohibited and that they must be discarded
within eight years. The disposal of all cluster munitions

**International Initiatives Aimed at Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**
**2**

**1** **Proliferation Security Initiative**


Deeply concerned about the development of WMDs and
missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United
States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)[5] in
May 2003, and sought the participation of other countries
therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on
PSI; PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability
to thwart the proliferation of WMDs and related items and
meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations.
Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September
2003), the MOD/SDF has collaborated with relevant
organizations and countries, dispatching MOD offi cials and
SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in
ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004.
Japan has hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises
twice, working in partnership with relevant organizations
such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National
Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan
Coast Guard, and hosted the PSI air interdiction exercise
in July 2012 for the fi rst time.


possessed by the SDF was completed in February 2015.
Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in
the initiatives of the international community that focus
on the problem of anti-personnel mines by submitting
annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional
stocks to the UN.[4]

In addition, the MOD/SDF participates in the UN
Register of Conventional Arms and the UN Report on Military
Expenditures with the purpose of increasing the transparency
of military preparedness and military expenditure, and
provides the requisite reports. It also dispatches personnel as
needed to governmental expert meetings and other meetings
for reviewing and improving these systems.

Based on the proliferation cases in the areas
surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of
preventing the proliferation of WMDs in peacetime and
improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD
strives to conduct activities to strengthen non-proliferation
frameworks including PSI, as well as participating in and
holding various relevant exercises and meetings.

See Fig. III-2-4-2 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise

(Since 2012))


**2** **United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540**
**Regarding the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of**

**2**

**Mass Destruction**

In April 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously
adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding
the non-proliferation of WMDs, which lays the foundations
for the international community to deal with the acquisition,
development, use, and proliferation of WMDs by non-state
actors. Japan supports the adoption of this resolution and
hopes that all UN member countries will comply with it.


Fig. III-2-4-2 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2012)

|Date|Exercise|Location|Participation of MOD/SDF|
|---|---|---|---|
|July 2012|PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan|Japan|Joint Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau|
|September 2012|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK|Republic of Korea|1 destroyer, 1 patrol aircraft (P-3C)|
|February 2013|PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE|UAE|Dispatch of observer|
|August 2014|PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the U.S.|United States|1 destroyer|
|November 2015|PSI exercise hosted by New Zealand|New Zealand|Joint Staff|
|September 2016|PSI exercise hosted by Singapore|Singapore|Joint Staff|


Fig. III-2-4-2

**Date** **Exercise** **Location** **Participation of MOD/SDF**

Joint Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army,
July 2012 PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan Japan
Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau

September 2012 PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK Republic of Korea 1 destroyer, 1 patrol aircraft (P-3C)

February 2013 PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE UAE Dispatch of observer

August 2014 PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the U.S. United States 1 destroyer

November 2015 PSI exercise hosted by New Zealand New Zealand Joint Staff

September 2016 PSI exercise hosted by Singapore Singapore Joint Staff


CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects

Major producers and owners of cluster munitions such as the United States, China and Russia have not signed the Oslo Convention.

The MOD nominated retired SDF personnel to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) from 1999 to December 2006, to support antipersonnel mine removal activities in Cambodia; these
retired SDF personnel were dispatched to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) as maintenance and transport advisors within JICA’s long-term expert dispatch framework.

An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while


-----

**that Supports the Defense Force,**

**Chapter3** **and Active Participation of Female**

**SDF Personnel**


**Section 1** **[Human Foundation and Organization that Supports ]**
**the Defense Force**


In order to exert its defense capabilities with the maximum further enhances and strengthens its human foundation and
effectiveness, it is extremely important that the MOD/SDF organization, which supports the defense force.


**Recruitment and Employment**
**1**


See Fig. III-3-1-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF)

See

For this reason, the MOD/SDF holds recruiting
meetings at schools and also maintains Provincial
Cooperation Offi ces in 50 locations throughout Japan
to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with
the understanding of educators and support from
recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments
are also carrying out some of the administrative activities
regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel
and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, such as
announcing the recruitment period and promoting the
SDF as a workplace, for which the MOD allocates them
the requisite budget.


**1** **Recruitment**


It is vital to secure highly qualifi ed personnel for the
MOD/SDF to carry out various missions appropriately.
Expectations from the public for the MOD/SDF have
continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the recent
economic and employment upturn, as well as the
advancement of declining birthrate and popularization
of higher education, the environment surrounding the
recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel is severe. In
such a situation, it is necessary for the MOD/SDF to
recruit excellent human resources with a strong desire
to enlist, by explaining suffi ciently to them the missions,
roles, duties, and working conditions of the SDF.


Fig. III-3-1-1 Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF


Fig. III-3-1-1


The number of 18–26 year-olds Number of newly-employed

(thousand people) personnel (people)

20,000 The number of 18–26 year-olds: About 17 million 30,000

⇒ About 11 million (down by about 40%) The number of newly-employed personnel

19,000 The number of 18-26 year olds (thousand people)

18,000 About 17 millionpeople 25,000

The number of newly-employed personnel: varies from year to year

17,000 (approximately equal to or larger than that of FY1994)

20,000

16,000

About 14,000
people

15,000 15,000

About 12,000
people

14,000

10,000

13,000

About 11 million

12,000 people

5,000

11,000

10,000 0

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (FY)

Material sources: Data before FY2014 (excluding data for FY2005 and FY2010) are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920–2000” and “Annual Report on Population Estimates,”
Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
Data for FY2005 and FY2010 are the proportionally adjusted populations of unknown age ascertained by the National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research based on “Population Census,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

Data from FY2015 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in April 2017), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.


-----

Fig. III-3-1-2 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel

|Col1|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
|Leadin|g|Private|
||||


Fig. III-3-1-2

<Rank>

General (GSDF, ASDF),
Admiral (MSDF) to SecondLieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Officer
Ensign (MSDF)

Warrant Officer Warrant Officer (Note 1)

Sergeant Major (GSDF),
Chief Petty Officer (MSDF),
Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)
Master Sergeant (GSDF)
Petty Officer First Class (MSDF) Officer Candidate
Master Sergeant (ASDF) Enlisted (upper)
Sergeant First Class (GSDF)
Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF)
Technical Sergeant (ASDF)
Sergeant (GSDF)
Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF) (Note 5)
Staff Sergeant (ASDF)

(Note 3) (Note 2)

Leading Private (GSDF)
Leading Seaman (MSDF) Leading Private
Airman First Class (ASDF) (Note 4) SDF

Personnel (u)
in short-term
service

Private First Class (GSDF)
Seaman (MSDF) 3rd Class
Airman Second Class (ASDF)

Candidate
for SDF

Private (GSDF) Personnel (u)
Seaman Apprentice (MSDF) 2nd Class (3 months)
Airman Third Class (ASDF)

1st Class

Aged 18 or older and under 27 Senior high school, and others

Junior high school,
and others

Legend : Exam or selection :Employment exam :Appointment after completing the program

Notes: 1. Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine.
2. Student candidates for enlistment (upper) refers to a candidate who has been appointed as an officer with the premise that he/she will be promoted to a fixed-term position of “Enlisted (upper).”

Until FY2006, there were two programs consisting of “Student candidates for enlistment (upper)” and “Enlisted (upper) candidates.” However, these two programs were reorganized and combined,
and since 2007, candidates have been appointed as “General candidates for enlistment (upper)”.

3. As for the SDF candidates, in order to enhance the initial education of SDF personnel in short-term service, in July 2010, it was decided that their status for the first three months of their

enlistment would be as non-SDF personnel, and they would engage exclusively in fundamental education and practice as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel.

4. GSDF High Technical School trains people to be SDF personnel who will be capable not only of operating and making full use of equipment in the GSDF but also of conducting missions in the
international community. For SDF students, starting from FY2010 appointments, their status was changed from SDF officer to “students,” which is a new non-regular status. New students receive a
high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning. From the FY2011 appointments, a new recommendation system was introduced in which those
who are considered appropriate to be a GSDF High Technical School student are selected from among the candidates based on the recommendation of the principal of their junior high school etc.,
in addition to the conventional general examination.

5. A three-year program ended in FY2013. A new four-year program was established at the National Defense Medical College, Faculty of Nursing in 2014.


**2** **Employment**


Fig. III-3-1-3 Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel


Fig. III-3-1-3


**2**


**(1) Uniformed SDF personnel** **Mandatory**
Based on a voluntary system that respects individuals’ General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF) Sho
free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under General (ASDF) Shoho
various categories. Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF) Issa 56

See Fig. III-3-1-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Personnel) Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF) 55

Due to the uniqueness of their duties, personnel Major (ASDF)
management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade Nii
that of general civilian government employees,[1] including Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Sani
“Early Retirement System” and “Fixed Term System” to Warrant Offi cer (GSDF), Warrant Offi cer (MSDF), 54
maintain the SDF’s strength. Warrant Offi cer (ASDF)
After employment, uniformed SDF personnel are Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)
assigned their branch of service and duties at units all (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)
around Japan, in accordance with their choice or aptitude, Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF) 53
following basic education and training at respective Staff Sergeant (ASDF)
training units or schools of respective SDF services. Airman First Class (ASDF)

See Reference 68 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Second Class (ASDF) Isshi —

Personnel) Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Nishi
Reference 69 (Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed Third Class (ASDF)

|Rank|Designation|Mandatory Retirement Age|
|---|---|---|
|General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)|Sho|60|
|Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)|Shoho||
|Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)|Issa|56|
|Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)|Nisa|55|
|Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)|Sansa||
|Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)|Ichii|54|
|First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)|Nii||
|Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)|Sani||
|Warrant Off icer (GSDF), Warrant Off icer (MSDF), Warrant Off icer (ASDF)|Juni||
|Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Off icer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Socho||
|Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Off icer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Isso||
|Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Off icer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Niso|53|
|Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Off icer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)|Sanso||
|Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)|Shicho|—|
|Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)|Isshi||
|Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)|Nishi||


Fig. III-3-1-3 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel)

1 SDF personnel are designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of


**Mandatory**
**Rank** **Designation**
**Retirement Age**

General (GSDF), Vice Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF) Sho
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major 60
Shoho
General (ASDF)

Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF) Issa 56
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF),
Nisa
Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)
55
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF),
Sansa
Major (ASDF)

Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF) Ichii

First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade
Nii
(MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)

Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second
Sani
Lieutenant (ASDF)

Warrant Offi cer (GSDF), Warrant Offi cer (MSDF), 54
Juni
Warrant Offi cer (ASDF)

Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Offi cer (MSDF),
Socho
Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)

Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Offi cer First Class
Isso
(MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)

Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Offi cer Second
Niso
Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)
53
Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Offi cer Third Class (MSDF),
Sanso
Staff Sergeant (ASDF)

Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF),
Shicho
Airman First Class (ASDF)

Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman
Second Class (ASDF) Isshi —

Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman
Nishi
Third Class (ASDF)

Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold the rank of General
(GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff
Offi ce, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ASDF Chief of Staff, is 62.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF personnel who hold positions such as
physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police offi cer, or information
analyst, is 60.


-----

**(2) SDF Reserve Personnel, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel,**
**and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel**

It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed
SDF personnel promptly depending on situational
changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required
number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains
the following three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel
system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and
the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.[2]

See Fig. III-3-1-4 (Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel)

See

SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF
personnel upon the issuance of a defense call-up order
or other orders, and carry out logistical support and base
guard duties. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel become
uniformed SDF personnel and are assigned to carry out
their mission together with incumbent uniformed SDF
personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance
of a defense call-up order or other orders. SDF Reserve
Personnel candidates, some of whom are recruited
among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF
personnel, are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after
completing the necessary education and training.
Previously, it was stipulated that SDF Reserve
Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel who
received a disaster and other call-up orders[3] would begin
their service as SDF personnel five days or later (ten days
in the case of a defense call-up order for SDF Reserve
Personnel) after the issuance of the order. However, based
on the performance of calling up the SDF Ready Reserve
Personnel in response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in


April 2016,[4] the Order for Enforcement of the SDF Law
was partially revised in August 2016 to make it possible
to shorten the number of days, provided that those
personnel have no objection.
As SDF Reserve Personnel and others work in their
civilian jobs under normal circumstances, they need to
adjust their work schedule to participate in periodic training
exercises. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from
the companies that employ these personnel are essential
for the smooth operation of the systems.
For this purpose, the MOD provides a special
subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready
Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow
such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days
a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such
companies. Also, the MOD issues special certificates[5] to
companies that create an environment for SDF Reserve
Personnel they employ to participate in training sessions.
Moreover, the MOD takes various measures to gain
understanding and cooperation from the companies that
employ SDF Reserve Personnel. For example, the MOD
has been developing a framework[6] that allows the MOD/
SDF to provide such information as the scheduled term of
a training call-up and scheduled term that SDF Reserve
Personnel are called up to perform actual operations
and are appointed as uniformed SDF personnel, when
requested by their employers.
Also, the MOD promotes the use of SDF Reserve
Personnel in a wide range of fields, such as the appointment
of retired SDF pilots, who are to be reemployed in the


Students graduating from the National Defense Academy to become SDF personnel SDF Ready Reserve Personnel carrying out water supply assistance activities

Many other countries also have reserve personnel systems.

The call-up orders refer to the defense call-up order, civil protection call-up order, and disaster call-up order for SDF Reserve Personnel as well as the defense call-up order, civil protection call-up order,
security call-up order, and disaster call-up order for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel; they do not include the training call-up orders for SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.

In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in April 2016, a call-up order for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel was issued for the second time in the SDF’s history, and 162 Ready Reserve Personnel
engaged in activities such as livelihood support to the affected people. In this case, a considerable number of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel who had received the call-up order arrived at their
respective SDF units prior to the date they were supposed to appear.

A system for recognizing companies that cooperate with the SDF Reserve Personnel program was introduced in FY2015. In that fiscal year, the directors of Provincial Cooperation Offices gave out
certifications and issued special certificates to those companies. In FY2016, the Minister of Defense gave out certifications. The certified companies are listed on the websites of the MOD and the
Provincial Cooperation Offices.

A bill for the partial revision of laws including the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, which included the development of a framework to provide such information, was passed at the


-----

Fig. III-3-1-4 Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

|Col1|Col2|SDF Reserve Personnel|SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|SDF Reserve Candidate Personnel|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Basic concept|● After the issuance of defense call-up order and others, serve as SDF Personnel|● Serve as SDF Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability|● Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or MSDF upon completion of education and training||
||Candidate|● Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|● Former SDF Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|(Common to General and Technical Employment Categories) ● Those with no experience as SDF personnel (including those with less than a year of SDF experience)||
||Age|● Enlisted (Lower): 18–37 years old ● Off icer, Warrant Off icer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of two years added to respective retirement age|● Enlisted (Lower): 18–32 years old ● Off icer, Warrant Off icer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of three years subtracted from respective retirement age|● General: 18–34 years old; Technical: between the age of 18 and 53–55 depending on technical skills possessed||
||Employment|● Employed by screening, based on application ● Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training|● Employed by screening, based on application|● General: Employed by examination, based on application ● Technical: Employed by screening, based on application||
||Rank designation|● Former SDF Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ● Former SDF Reserve Personnel and Former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel. Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ● Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel • General: Private • Technical: Designated based on skills|● Former Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle ● Former Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle|● Not designated||
||Term of service|● Three Years/One term|● Three Years/One term|● General: Within of three years ● Technical: Within of two years||
||Education/ Training|● Although the Self-Defense Forces Law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year as a standard|● 30 days per year|● General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course) ● Technical: 10 days within two years (training to serve as SDF Personnel by utilizing their special skills)||
||Promotion|● Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulf illed the service term (actual serving days)|● Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulf illed the service term (actual serving days)|● Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion||
||Benef its, allowances, and other terms|● Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ● SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month|● Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day ● SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ● Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term ● Special subsidy for corporations employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month|● Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ● Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty or any other duties are not required||
||Call-up duty and other duties|● Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|● Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|● Education and training call-up||


Fig. III-3-1-4


**Commentary**

**The 20th Anniversary of the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel**
**System and Comments of Ready Reserve Personnel**

SDF Ready Reserve Personnel actively serve on the front line with the standing SDF personnel in various situations. The SDF Ready
Reserve Personnel system was introduced in FY1997 and will celebrate its 20th anniversary in FY2017.
SDF Ready Reserve Personnel have been called in twice so far in the wake of natural disasters to conduct activities such as livelihood
support for the affected people. They play an active part as a component of the human infrastructure supporting Japan’s defense capability.

**i**

Sergeant First Class (GSDF) Masao Yamashita, Ready
Reserve Personnel, 24th Infantry Regiment
(Miyazaki Prefecture)
I joined the SDF as Ready Reserve Personnel in March 1999,
and 18 years have passed since then. I am truly grateful
to my company and family for their understanding, which has enabled me to
balance my work at my company and my duties with the SDF.
I left the SDF due to personal circumstances, but I applied to become SDF
Ready Reserve Personnel as soon as the system was launched. Since I had to
leave the SDF despite my intention to serve as SDF personnel, I was eager to Sergeant First Class Yamashita, Ready Reserve

Personnel, on duty

contribute to the SDF for which I have admiration. For this reason, I still continue
serving as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel.

Sergeant First Class (GSDF) Hiroko Takahara, Ready Reserve Personnel,
48th Infantry Regiment (Gunma Prefecture)
I serve as SDF Ready Reserve Personnel while being a housewife. When the Great East
Japan Earthquake occurred, I was also affected. My house was washed away by the
tsunami, and I was at a loss right after the disaster. However, when I happened to fi nd
things I had used in SDF training in my collapsed house, I calmed myself down and
responded to a disaster call-up order to engage in relief activities in the affected areas.
The experience of participating in the disaster relief dispatch made me aware of the
duties and missions of SDF personnel, and still remains in my mind as my pride. Sergeant First Class Takahara, Ready

Reserve Personnel, during training


-----

private sector, to SDF Reserve Personnel through the
reemployment system.[7]

**(3) Administrative Offi cials, Technical and Engineering**
**Offi cials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel**

There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel —
administrative offi cials, technical and engineering offi cials,
instructors, and others[8] — in addition to uniformed SDF
personnel in the MOD/SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly
recruited from those who have passed the Recruitment
Examination for Comprehensive and General Service
National Public Employees conducted by the National
Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed
the Recruitment Examination for Ministry of Defense
Specialists conducted by the MOD. After participating in
the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in
this process work in a wide range of fi elds.
Administrative offi cials are engaged in defenserelated policy planning in the Internal Bureaus of the


MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Agency (ATLA); analysis and research at the Defense
Intelligence Headquarters; and administrative works at
the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other
locations throughout the country.
Technical and engineering offi cials are working in the
Internal Bureaus of the MOD, ATLA, the SDF bases, the
Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout
the country. They are engaged in constructing various
defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.),
carrying out R&D, effi cient procurement, maintenance and
improvement of a range of equipment, as well as providing
mental health care for SDF personnel.
Instructors conduct advanced research on defense
and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at
the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National
Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical
College, and other organizations.

See Reference 70 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel)

See

**Daily Education and Training**
**2**


professional knowledge and skills, or that it is diffi cult
for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the
SDF, the MOD/SDF commissions education to external
institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic
companies and research institutes.


**1** **Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel**


Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed
SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential
for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose,
the respective SDF training units and schools provide
opportunities for phased and systematic education
according to rank and duties to nurture necessary qualities
and instill knowledge and skills.
A considerable extent of human, temporal, and
economic efforts such as securing instructors with
special skills, and improving equipment and educational
facilities, are necessary for providing education. In
the event that personnel need to further improve their


**2** **SDF Training**

**2**


**(1) Training by Each SDF**
Training conducted by units in each service can be
broadly divided into training for individual SDF
personnel to improve the necessary profi ciency for
their respective fi elds, and training for units to enhance


Newly joined members of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF conducting basic training

The reemployment system for SDF pilots aims to prevent the outfl ow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF pilots
over a certain age as pilots of commercial airlines, and is also signifi cant from the perspective of the development of the airline industry in Japan as a whole.

Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called ”SDF personnel,” which include administrative offi cials, technical and engineering offi cials, instructors, and others


-----

their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is
conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational
classifi cation and individual ability. Training for units
is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small
to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training
including coordination between units is also conducted.
In addition to training for national defense, the
MOD is endeavoring to improve training corresponding
to the diversifi ed SDF roles required in recent years,
such as peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster
relief operations. Moreover, in order to strengthen
joint operational capabilities and to respond to various
situations, the MOD is making efforts to widen the scope
of joint exercises and bilateral and multilateral exercises
participated by the individual SDF services.[9]

See Reference 71 (Major Exercises Conducted in FY2016)

See


**(2) Training Environment**
SDF training has been planned and conducted under
conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat


situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF
makes maximum use of its limited domestic training areas,
including further use of the prime training environment
of Hokkaido stated in the National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG) and other guidelines. They also strive
to carry out more practical combat training by conducting
joint exercises and other training and exercises in the
United States and surrounding sea and airspace where they
can secure training conditions not available in Japan.

See Reference 72 (Results of Firing Training and Related Training by

Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States

See

(FY2016))

**3** **Safety Management Initiatives**


Any accident that can cause injury to the public, damage
to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel,
must be avoided at all costs. Therefore, during routine
training, the MOD/SDF makes a united effort to ensure
the constant management of safety by giving utmost
attention to ensuring safety.


**Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources**
**3**


**1** **Measures for Personnel System Reform and for**
**the Improvement of Pay and Conditions**

**1**


With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the
fi xed number of SDF personnel has been constantly
reduced. On the other hand, there has been the need
for further skilled and professional personnel in order
to respond to the advancement of equipment as well as
diversifi cation and internationalization of SDF missions.
In light of such circumstances, it is stated in the
NDPG that measures are to be implemented with


regard to personnel system reform in order to ensure the
robustness of the SDF and to make effective use of human
resources under the constrained budget. Specifi cally, the
MOD will implement the following measures to ensure
an appropriate age distribution, taking into account the
various missions and characteristics of each branch of the
SDF: the retirement age of 60 will be reviewed; an early
retirement system will be proactively adopted; more
suitable management of personnel will be implemented;
and the reemployment of aircraft pilots in the private sector

SDF personnel picking up goods sent by their families at the camp in South Sudan


SDF personnel talking with his family by video conference on an MSDF destroyer dispatched
to the Gulf of Aden


Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response training which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other additional training
includes International Peace Cooperation Exercises that assumes SDF’s international peace cooperation activities and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the treatment of


-----

**i**

**Implementation of the Family Support Training,**
**“Bonding of Echigo”**

Colonel Yutaka Okada, then Commanding Offi cer of the Operation Unit, GSDF Camp Takada (Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture)

When a large-scale natural disaster occurs, SDF personnel are sent on disaster relief dispatches, even if they themselves or their
families are also victims of the disaster. Therefore, the MOD/SDF offers family support measures in collaboration with relevant
external groups and organizations such as the JSDF Family Association and Taiyukai (a public interest incorporated association
for retired SDF personnel and candidate reserve personnel). This is to ensure that SDF personnel can commit themselves to their
missions without worrying about their families while they are on duty. In Niigata Prefecture, GSDF Camp Takada plays a central role
in this initiative and conducted a family support training called “Bonding of Echigo,” the largest-scale training of its kind, in 2016.
The training was conducted based on a scenario in which an earthquake with a seismic intensity of 7 occurred in Niigata
Prefecture. It reconfi rmed the collaboration procedure between the SDF and relevant external groups/organizations for confi rming
the safety of disaster-affected families, and also identifi ed issues to be examined. I, as a coordinator for the prefecture, worked in
close cooperation with the Commanding Offi cers of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF within the prefecture, and the presidents of the JSDF
Family Association and Taiyukai to deepen the understanding and shared perception of the situation among the people involved. At
the same time, we also aimed to establish “a human relationship
with confi dence and trust of the people involved” and “a mutual
relationship of trust that enables consultations with each other with
true intentions anytime.”
Despite being the fi rst initiative of its kind carried out by Niigata
Prefecture, “Bonding of Echigo” succeeded in holding passionate
exchanges of honest opinions by all of the participants and unifying
their views on the direction of future collaboration and other matters.
Following the training, inquiries were received from all over Japan, and
we have felt fi rst hand that “bonding” for family support is expanding
nationwide. I expect that family support initiatives will further evolve
at the national level, making the best use of the achievements of Colonel Okada (center) giving a presentation at the Family Support Training
“Bonding of Echigo.” “Bonding of Echigo”


will be carried out. Furthermore, fi nal promotion rates of
offi cers, warrant offi cers, sergeants and petty offi cers will
be reviewed, and in order to maintain the strength of the
SDF, more appropriate personnel management, which
takes into account physical attributes, will be adopted.
Furthermore, due to the harsh environmental
circumstances under which uniformed SDF personnel
have to perform their duties, the MOD/SDF strives to
provide salaries, allowances, welfare and other benefi ts
that refl ect the special nature of their duties in order
to let uniformed SDF personnel concentrate on their
duties with pride, relieved of anxiety. The MOD/SDF
also promotes measures relating to awards and honors,
beginning with the expansion of the system of Defense
Meritorious Badges.

**2** **Initiatives to Support Families**


include receiving cooperation in confi rming the safety of
the family members of SDF personnel. All of these are
conducted as routine initiatives. Furthermore, specifi c
welfare services for SDF personnel deployed overseas
include facilitating direct communication between SDF
personnel and their families in Japan by means such
as e-mail and video conference systems. Support for
sending comfort items from their families on a later
day is also provided. Moreover, briefi ng sessions for
families of the dispatched personnel are held to provide
them with a variety of information, and a consultation
desk exclusively for families of the dispatched personnel
(family support centers) and similar facilities have been
established to answer the various questions and concerns
raised by the families.

**3** **Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline**


**2**


**3**


In addition to exchanges between units and personnel’s
families, as well as between the families, the MOD
in cooperation with relevant external groups and
organizations is also actively working to develop a
family support system to be implemented in the event of
l l t l di t d th t hi h ill


The MOD/SDF strives to foster well-disciplined personnel
by impressing in them an awareness of compliance with
the law through setting up such campaign periods as
the “Anti-Drug Abuse Month,” “Self-Defense Forces
Personnel Ethics Week,” “Self-Defense Personnel Sexual
H t P ti W k ” d “S lf D f


-----

Personnel Power Harassment Prevention Week.
With regard to the prevention of power harassment in
particular, the MOD established a directive in April 2016
with the aim of creating a healthy work environment in
which its personnel can fully perform their abilities and
their individuality and dignity are respected. Measures to
prevent power harassment include providing education
to personnel, assigning counsellors to units and
organizations around the country, and setting up hotlines
connected to the Internal Bureaus, as well as the Staff
Offi ces of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF.

**4** **Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel**


SDF personnel suicides was a record 101 in FY2005, but
have subsequently declined, with 65 suicides in FY2016.
The suicide of SDF members is truly a great tragedy for both
the individuals themselves and their bereaved families. It also
represents a great loss to the MOD/SDF in terms of the loss
of capable personnel, and the MOD/SDF is taking ongoing
measures to prevent suicides, including the following
initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling
system (internal/ external counselors, a 24-hour telephone
counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists
at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to
raise awareness about mental health for commanders as well
as enlisted personnel; and (3) Establishment of a campaign
period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring
by commanders of the mental health condition of their
subordinates whose working environment has been changed
due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various
reference materials.


In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies in order to
express condolences are carried out by each unit to which
the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged.
Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements
of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty,
and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial
ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the
Memorial for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty
conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister.[10]

**6** **Dealing with Retirement and Re-Employment of**
**SDF Personnel**


**6**


In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed
SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under
the early retirement system) or in their 20s (most uniformed
SDF personnel serving under the fi xed-term service system).
Therefore, many of them need to fi nd another job after
retirement in order to secure their livelihoods.
Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility
of the Japanese Government (the MOD) as the employer,
and is crucially important both for resolving any concerns
that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future
as well as for securing qualifi ed human resources, the MOD
conducts support measures such as occupational training
useful for their re-employment. The measures to support
the re-employment of retired uniformed SDF personnel
is also important from the perspective of enabling them
to give back to society with their various skills, thereby
reinforcing human resources infrastructure.
As the MOD does not have the authority to provide
them with employment placement, the Foundation for
the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job
consultation services with permission from the Minister
of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.
Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent
abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness
and responsibility gained through their work performance,
education, and training. Furthermore, they have various
qualifi cations and licenses acquired through their duties
and vocational training. Therefore, they are making
positive contributions in a broad range of sectors,
including manufacturing and service industries, as
well as fi nance, insurance, real estate, and construction
industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention
and risk management at local governments. Based on


**5** **Commemorating Personnel who Perished in**
**the Line of Duty**

**5**


Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve
in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety
Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today,
SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble
mission of protecting the peace and independence of
Japan. They have been devoting themselves unstintingly
to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations
and trust of Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and
with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time
period, however, more than 1,900 personnel have lost
their lives in the line of duty.


10 The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument
with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members,
the Prime Minister, high-ranking offi cials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of
Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the l


-----

the NDPG, the MOD has promoted further utilization of
retired uniformed SDF personnel in the areas of disaster
prevention and crisis management at local governments,
and has provided supports for these retired personnel’s
re-employment in the sectors that lack suffi cient human
resources in collaboration with relevant ministries and
agencies. The MOD will make further efforts to improve
the re-employment environment for retired SDF personnel.

See Reference 73 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support)

Reference 74 (Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed

See

SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local
Government)

For the purpose of ensuring an environment where
uniformed SDF personnel can devote themselves to
their duties without any concerns, the MOD allows
uniformed SDF personnel to be reappointed for fi xed
terms within three years before the age of 60 (one year
for SDF administration offi cials and others). The MidTerm Defense Program (MTDP) states that the SDF will
actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced
knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel
prove benefi cial to the SDF’s strength.
Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of
SDF personnel, new regulations about re-employment
were introduced in October 2015 replacing the former
prior approval system. As are the cases in other national
government employees, the following three regulations were


put in place in order to ensure the trust of the public regarding
the fairness of offi cial duties: 1) regulation on requesting
re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel
and requesting information; 2) regulation on seeking
employment opportunities at companies in which retired
personnel had a stake whilst in offi ce; and 3) regulation on
re-employed personnel making requests.[11] In order to ensure
strict observation of these regulations, bodies comprised of
academic experts with no history serving as SDF members
(Defense Personnel Review Board’s Separate Meeting
for Monitoring Reemployment and Cabinet Offi ce’s Reemployment Surveillance Commission) monitor the situation
and any violation will be met with penalties. Additionally,
for the purpose of appropriate implementation of unifi ed
management and disclosure of re-employment information
by institutionalizing notifi cation and announcement of
such information by the Cabinet, it has been decided that
information on the re-employment status of retired SDF
personnel who were in managerial positions (equivalent to
the position of Senior Coordinator in the MOD or higher) is
to be published every fi scal year by the Cabinet. In response
to the introduction of this system in FY2015, notifi cations
of re-employment of the retired SDF personnel who were
in managerial positions submitted during FY2015 were
compiled, and a total of 136 cases were offi cially announced
in September 2016.


**i**

**First Retired SDF Personnel to Become a Disaster Prevention**
**Offi cial in Okinawa Prefecture!**

Masahito Ujiie (former Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF)), Deputy Chief of the General
Affairs Department, Tomigusuku City, Okinawa Prefecture

I joined the SDF in 1977 and completed my 40-year career with the SDF in February
2017. I spent most of that time fl ying across Japan as an aviation pilot, and also planning,
coordinating, and implementing various missions and trainings as an SDF offi cer. In
particular, the duties while stationed in Okinawa included air transportation of emergency
patients, and I was dispatched for 216 air transports.
Air transportation of emergency patients refers literally to transporting emergency
patients by air from an isolated island in Okinawa Prefecture to its main island where
large hospitals are located. Through this duty, I began wondering, “Are there any other Mr. Ujiie on his job at Tomigusuku City Hall
jobs through which I can contribute to other people further, or any other jobs in which I can make use of my skills?”
In considering my own re-employment, I consulted with an offi cer in charge at an SDF Provincial Cooperation Offi ce. Then, I
was asked, “Do you prefer local government or a private company?” Without hesitation, I answered that I prefer working at a local
government where I would be able to contribute directly to the local people.
From April this year, I am serving as a Deputy Chief of the General Affairs Department at Tomigusuku City Hall. I am also the fi rst
retired SDF personnel to be tasked with disaster prevention in Okinawa Prefecture. Going forward, I will work hard to ensure the safety
and security of the people in Tomigusuku City by making use of my experience with the SDF, and through assisting the Mayor in an
emergency as well as planning and implementing disaster prevention drills. I thank everyone who helped me with my re-employment.


-----

**Section 2** **[Promotion of Work-Life Balance and More Active ]**
**Participation of Female Personnel**


The security environment surrounding Japan has become
increasingly severe, and both the number and the duration
of situations requiring the MOD/SDF’s commitment are
increasing. On the other hand, it is anticipated that a
rising number of MOD staff, both male and female, who
deal with such situations will face time constraints due to
childcare, nursing care and other reasons.
Amid such challenging circumstances, ensuring
preparedness to consistently respond to various situations
requires creating an environment that enables staff to
be sound both mentally and physically, maintain high
morale, and fully demonstrate their abilities. On the
basis of this view, the MOD/SDF promotes initiatives to

**Working Style Reform**
**1**


**(1) Value and Mentality Reform**
In order to implement working style reform, a focus
needs to be placed especially on reforming the values
and mentality of staff in managerial positions regarding
working style. In FY2016, the MOD/SDF carried out
educational initiatives such as seminars and lecture
meetings for raising awareness concerning working style
reform and the concept of work-life balance. The MOD/
SDF also implements the “Take more annual leave”
promotional campaign to encourage staff to take a longer
leave during holiday seasons, and a business review
campaign, with an intention to reform values related to
working style.


achieve work-life balance of its staff members.
Also, the MOD/SDF has been proactively encouraging
the active participation of female personnel, and the
number of female personnel is on the rise.
The MOD/SDF has been conducting a variety of
initiatives in order to promote work-life balance and the
further expansion of the recruitment and promotion of
female personnel in a unified manner, such as formulating
various plans[1] that include three reforms: (1) working
style reform; (2) reform to combine a successful career
with childrearing and nursing care; and (3) reform for
promoting active engagement of female personnel.

for enhancing work-life balance in July and August 2016,
the “Competition for initiatives to promote Working
Style Reform at the Ministry of Defense” was held.
The competition received 97 applications from various
organizations, and the Minister of Defense and the State
Minister of Defense respectively honored particularly
excellent proposals, and used them to help achieve work
reform of each workplace.


**(3) Flexible Working Hours and Location**
Realizing more flexible working hours and work locations
is necessary in light of factors such as operational
fluctuations and time constraints faced by individuals.
For this reason, the MOD/SDF introduced the flextime
system in 2016 and enabled its staff to choose flexible
working hours by dividing early/late shifts into multiple
periods. In addition, telework, a work style that allows
working at home has become available in the Internal
Bureau in FY2017 after two years of test introduction
from FY2015. Organizations other than the Internal
Bureaus aim to begin adopting this work system from
FY2019 and are scheduled to pilot telework after FY2017.


**(2) Work Reform in the Workplace**
It is important that initiatives for the promotion of worklife balance are appropriate for the actual circumstances
of individual workplaces, and that staff members
themselves consider specific measures for improving
their workplace environment. This approach will lead to
developing effective initiatives and workplace climate.
Based on this perspective, during the campaign period


(1) “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance at the MOD” (January 2015), (2) “Action Plan of the MOD Based on the Law to Promote the Role
of Women in the Workforce (FY2016-FY2020)” (April 2016), and (3) “Action Plan to Support a Good Work-Life Balance of the Personnel of the MOD based on the Act on Advancement of Measures


-----

**Commentary**

**Messages from the Winners of the “MOD Work Style Reform**
**Promotion Initiatives Competition”**

In December 2016, at the MOD, the Minister of Defense and the State Minister of Defense honored departments that implemented
particularly outstanding initiatives for the enhancement of operational effi ciency and improvement of workplace environment in order
to promote work-life balance through work style reform (the conferment was conducted for the fi rst time). In March 2017, the second
conferment, similar to the fi rst one, hosted by the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs at the Cabinet Secretariat was carried out, and the
following departments were awarded (Minister in Charge of Civil Service Reform Award, Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs Award, etc.).

**i**

Kenta Fujimatsu, Administrative Offi cer (Grade 2), Offi ce for Information Systems, Department of Information
and Communications, Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, MOD
(Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)

The Department of Information and Communications, Bureau of Defense
Buildup Planning received the Minister of Defense Award/ Cabinet
Bureau of Personnel Affairs Award
In my department, we worked on the production and distribution
of educational materials, which summarize the know-how on personal
computer operation, while also trying to make them visually attractive,
such as by employing “Walabi-chan,” the MOD mascot character for
work-life balance promotion. We sought to establish knowledge by
providing training, preparing tests, and setting up a consultation desk, A meeting on information literacy education
etc. We will continue to make an effort to enhance operational effi ciency
through the enrichment of educational materials and implementation of
educational activities to improve the literacy of SDF personnel.

Admiral Seiichi Doman, District Commandant, MSDF Yokosuka District Headquarters
(Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture)

MSDF Yokosuka District Headquarters received the State Minister of
Defense Award/ Minister in Charge of Civil Service Reform Award
The MSDF Yokosuka Regional District established the Work Style
Reform Promotion Committee in view of reforming the awareness of all
personnel. The Committee takes steps to improve working style based
on hearings conducted through direct visits to units. It also publishes
an internal PR newsletter “Work Style Reform News” to inform the
personnel of the improvememt plans. Building upon this award, the Photo taken at the conferment of the Minister in Charge
Yokosuka Regional District will further promote the creation of a good of Civil Service Reform Award (Admiral Doman: third
environment, which enables all of the personnel to engage in their duties from right in the front row)
with confi dence and to have a fulfi lling life with their families.

Master Sergent Koji Hino, Engine Platoon, Repair Unit, Support and Logistics Group, ASDF Fifth Air Wing
(Shintomi-cho, Koyu-gun, Miyazaki Prefecture)

Engine Platoon, Repair Unit, Support and Logistics Group, ASDF Fifth Air
Wing received the State Minister of Defense Award
We are responsible for the maintenance of aircraft engines. With
the slogan of “An enriching personal life leads to better quality work;
transforming overtime hours into personal time,” we have worked on the
preparation of a maintenance procedure manual and other documents
to reduce overtime hours, while improving the reliability of work. We will
continue to promote improvement activities and strive to create a better
workplace environment. (Master Sergent Hino: second from left)


-----

**Reform to Combine a Successful Career with Childrearing and Nursing Care**
**2**


In order for MOD/SDF staff, both male and female, to
be successful in their careers while realizing work-life
balance, it is necessary to establish a system that enables
balancing work with childrearing/nursing care, and to
ensure childcare services tailored to the irregular working
patterns unique to the SDF.

**(1) Development of an Environment that Enables Staff**
**to Realize a Successful Career While Engaging in**
**Childrearing and Nursing Care**

The MOD/SDF has developed various schemes, which
enable staff to balance work with childrearing/nursing
care, such as ensuring substitute personnel for staff who
take childcare leave and other leaves. In particular, the
ministry is encouraging its male staff to take childcare
leave to promote their participation in family life.
The MOD also implements measures such as
distributing e-mail newsletters to help its staff to return to
work smoothly after childcare leave and ensuring regular
communication with their workplaces.


SDF personnel using the internal crèche facility at ASDF Iruma Air Base


**(2) Ensuring Childcare Services**
To allow SDF personnel who are rearing children to
concentrate on their duties, it is important to ensure
childcare services that are tailored to the irregular working
patterns unique to the SDF. Since April 2007, the MOD/SDF
has set up workplace nurseries at GSDF Camp Mishuku,
GSDF Camp Kumamoto, GSDF Camp Makomanai,
GSDF Asaka dormitory district, MSDF Yokosuka Naval
Base district, and ASDF Iruma Air Base. Additionally, in
April 2017, a workplace nursery was opened at Ichigaya
district where the MOD is located, while another nursery is
planned to open within National Defense Medical College


SDF personnel conducting temporary childcare training at GSDF Camp Koriyama in the event
of emergency operations

by the end of FY2017. The MOD/SDF is examining a plan
to establish more workplace nurseries.
In addition, in the event of emergency operations
such as disaster relief dispatch, the MOD promotes
measures to provide temporary care within SDF camps
and bases for children of SDF personnel who have no
alternative but to attend to duties with their children.



**Reform for Promoting the Careers of Female Personnel**
**3**


For the further expansion of the recruitment and promotion
of female personnel in a unified manner, the MOD/SDF
has been making various efforts to advance the careers of
motivated and qualified female personnel by setting up
specific goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion
of female personnel based on the “Action Plan for
Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees
and Work-Life Balance.” Moreover, the MOD formulated
the “Initiative to Promote Active Engagement of Female
SDF Personnel – Aiming for Attractive SDF that Adapts
t th Ti d E i t” (th “I iti ti ”) i A il


2017 to specify its conceptual policy for promoting the
active participation of female SDF personnel.

**(1) Significance of Promoting Active Engagement of Female**
**SDF Personnel and Personnel Management Policy**

The “Initiative” outlines the significance of promoting the
active engagement of female personnel and the MOD/SDF
personnel management policy. Specifically, with SDF
duties becoming increasingly diverse and complex, SDF
personnel are required to have multifaceted capabilities
i l di hi h l l f k l d d i i ki


-----

ability, and skills than before. In addition, due to
the declining birthrate and greater advancement into
higher education, it is anticipated that the number of
SDF personnel involved in childcare, nursing care,
and other responsibilities will signifi cantly increase. In
light of these changes, the SDF is required to evolve
from a conventional organization with an emphasis on
homogeneity among the members, into an organization
that is capable of incorporating diverse human resources
in a fl exible manner.
At the present moment, the largest human resource
that the SDF has not been able to fully utilize is women,
who account for half of the population targeted for
recruitment. Promoting the active engagement of
female SDF personnel has the following signifi cance:
(1) securing useful human resources; (2) utilizing diverse
perspectives; and (3) refl ecting values of the nation.
For this reason, the MOD/SDF has decided to open up
a path for female personnel with motivation, ability,
and aptitude to have opportunities to demonstrate their
abilities in various fi elds, and aim for doubling the ratio
of female SDF personnel.
In terms of employing and promoting female SDF
personnel, the MOD/SDF sets out a personnel management

Fig. III-3-2-1 Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel


policy to ensure equal opportunity between men and
women and assign the right person to the right place based
on the person’s motivation and ability/aptitude.

**(2) Removal of the Assignment Restriction of Female**
**SDF Personnel**

While the SDF has been accepting female SDF personnel
since its establishment in 1954, assignment of female
personnel had been restricted in some units, such as the
GSDF infantry companies and tank companies. However,
the Initiative, formulated in April 2017, virtually removed
the restriction on the assignment of female personnel
across the SDF.[2]


**(3) Expansion of the Recruitment of Female Personnel**
(a) Female SDF Personnel
As of the end of March 2017, the number of female
SDF personnel is about 14,000 (about 6.1% of total SDF
personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March
2007, about 4.9% of total SDF personnel), this is a rise of
1.3 percentage point, indicating that the ratio of female
SDF personnel has been on the rise in recent years.
In order to increase the proportion of female SDF
personnel among total SDF personnel to over 9%


Fig. III-3-2-1


(Number) (%)

15,000 7.0

14,000

GSDF personnel

13,000 MSDF personnel Recruitment of women started 6.0

for aviation students of

12,000 ASDF personnel the MSDF and the ASDF

Total number of female SDF personnel /
Total number of SDF personnel Recruitment of women

11,000 started for students the of 5.0

the National Defense Academy

10,000

9,000

4.0

8,000

Recruitment of

7,000 women started

for students the of 3.0

Recruitment of women the National Defense

6,000 started in the general Medical College

service area of

5,000 the MSDF and the ASDF

2.0

4,000

Recruitment of
women started in

3,000 the general service

area of the GSDF

2,000 1.0

1,000

0 0.0

54 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 (FY)

Note: As of the end of March 2017, the total number of female SDF personnel is 13,707 (approximately 6.1% of the total number of the current SDF personnel)


With regard to part of the GSDF NBC Weapon Defense Unit, the GSDF Tunnel Company, and MSDF submarines, the assignment restriction has not been removed due to reasons in relation to protecting


-----

(b) Female Administrative Officials, Technical and
Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Others
As of the end of March 2017, the number of female
civilian personnel - administrative officials, technical
and engineering officials, and instructors, and others

-  is approximately 3,200 (about 23.4% of total civilian
personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March
2007 when females made up 22.6% of the total civilian
personnel), this is a rise of 0.8 percentage point, indicating
that the ratio of female civilian personnel is on a rising
trend in recent years.
With regard to recruitment, in line with the overall
government target, the MOD has set up its goal of
ensuring that women account for over 30% of recruits in
and after FY2016. Regarding promotion, as a goal to be
achieved by the end of FY2020, the proportion of women
of the Division-Director level at local organizations and
Assistant-Division-Director level at the ministry proper
or equivalent should be approximately 5%, and the
proportion of women of the Division-Director level at the
ministry proper or equivalent should be approximately
2%, and the proportion of women of the Unit-Chief
level at the ministry proper or equivalent should be
approximately 20%.


by 2030, the MOD/SDF plans to ensure that women
account for more than 10% of total newly employed SDF
personnel in and after FY2017. Specifically, the increase
in the number of female recruits will be realized by
measures such as the elimination of the gender quota and
the increase in the scheduled number of female recruits.
In addition, with regard to promotion, the proportion of
women among SDF personnel with a rank of field officer
or higher will be increased from 3.1%. As for the careers
of the personnel anticipated to reach a rank of field officer
or higher in the future, an emphasis is given on assigning
them to a commander or assistant commander post at the
rank of company officer, with the hope of allowing them
to gain experience.
Furthermore, in addition to these specific numerical
targets, the “Initiative” formulated in April 2017 indicates
that the MOD aims to double the percentage of female
personnel in the overall SDF personnel and halve the
mid-career retirement rate.

See Fig. III-3-2-1 (Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel)


See


-----

**Section 3 Enhancement of Medical Functions**


For the SDF to perform its mission, SDF personnel must
remain in good health through appropriate management of
their health. Also, it is important that the SDF always seeks
to enhance its capabilities in military medicine, such as
first aid capabilities for protecting the lives of the personnel
engaging in a variety of services as much as possible.
Under the circumstance where the SDF’s missions
are becoming more diverse and internationalized, it

**SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with Enhanced Functions**
**1**


The role of SDF hospitals is to admit and treat injured
SDF personnel and other persons transported from their
area of activity in various emergency situations, while in
normal circumstances these hospitals provide medical
care to SDF personnel and their families. These hospitals
also play the role of educational institutions that train
medical personnel and maintain and enhance their skills.


is important to appropriately and accurately carry out
medical activities such as medical care in disaster relief
dispatches and international peace cooperation activities.
The MOD/SDF, therefore, is enhancing and
strengthening its capabilities in military medicine to be
able to appropriately carry out a variety of its missions,
including in response to various emergency events and
international peace cooperation activities.

For this reason, based on the NDPG, etc., the MOD
aspires to establish a high-quality medical care system
through measures such as promoting the centralization
of SDF hospitals with increased performance levels,
by consolidating 16 SDF hospitals located nationwide
into roughly 10 locations to develop more efficient and
higher-quality hospitals.


**Strengthening the Function of the National Defense Medical College**
**2**


As the only educational institution for the training of
physicians as well as public health and registered nurses
under the jurisdiction of the MOD/SDF, the National
Defense Medical College plays the role of training and
producing the primary medical staff for the medical
activities of the SDF as well as maintaining and improving
their skills.
In such a situation, the NDPG, etc. states that the
MOD/SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality
medical care system, including improved management
of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. At the
same time, based on the NDPG which notes that the function
of the National Defense Medical College would be Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa delivering an address for the entrance
strengthened as the training and research center for defense ceremony at the National Defense Medical College (April 2017)
medicine, the MOD intends to strengthen the organizational its training and research functions, and strengthen its
structure of the National Defense Medical College, enhance cooperation with all three branches of the SDF.


**Enhancement of Education of Medical Officers and Nurses**
**3**


While greater abilities are required of personnel engaged
in medical care, such as medical officers, due to the
diversification of missions, only 80% of the positions
h b fill d i th f di l ffi i


particular. Such low sufficiency is caused by medical
officers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of
which is the lack of opportunity to engage in medical
t i i d ti Th MOD/SDF ill k ff t t


-----

**i**

**To Become a Nursing Offi cer**

Kyoka Kondo, SDF, Nursing offi cer candidate, Nursing School, National Defense Medical College
(Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture)

We entered Nursing School at the National Defense Medical College
in April 2014 as the fi rst class of SDF nursing offi cer candidates.
Our graduation is scheduled in March 2018. I have been studying
studiously every day and also gaining various experiences in military
training and daily life. After graduation, I hope to become a nursing
offi cer who can serve as a nurse and a public health nurse, making
an active contribution not only within Japan but also in the world. A
nursing offi cer has both the role of a nurse and SDF personnel. I think
that nursing offi cers should be able to provide emotional and moral
support to patients and other SDF personnel. I believe providing
emotional support consists of fully understanding and having trust

Ms. Kondo conducting group work at the advance education

in others, while offering moral support is based on mutual trust and for training
comprehension. Rapport is the cornerstone of our mission. Taking
pride as the fi rst class of nursing offi cers of Nursing School at the National Defense Medical College, along with having heartfelt
appreciation to our seniors, our mission should not only be to follow the footsteps of our senior nursing offi cers, but also to open a
new vista with our own might and courage. I am determined to be a nursing offi cer who is needed not just as “one of many out there”
but as “the nursing offi cer.”


implement various measures to prevent medical offi cers
from leaving the SDF by enhancing clinical education
after graduation from the National Defense Medical
College and other institutions, promoting various
initiatives for ensuring more opportunities for medical
offi cers to engage in medical practice, helping them
acquire and improve specialized knowledge and skills in
areas such as infectious diseases, as well as increasing
their motivation for work.
Furthermore, with the aim of training and securing
high-quality nurses who are capable of fully responding


to the diversifi cation of missions and the sophistication
of medical technology, a four-year “nursing program”[1]
was established in the School of Medicine at the National
Defense Medical College in April 2014 for the training of
public health/registered nurses. The fi rst batch of students
will graduate from the College in March 2018.
Moreover, medical personnel and medical staff are
educated and trained at medical care-related schools
and other relevant institutions so that the SDF can
perform diverse missions and missions under special
circumstances.



**Enhancement of First Aid Capabilities on the Frontline**
**4**


Based on the NDPG and other guidelines stating that
the MOD “conducts a review on emergency medical
treatment on situational responses and improves fi rst aid
capabilities on the frontline,” the MOD/SDF has conducted
research on relevant initiatives taken by the U.S. Forces
and carried out reviews for appropriate and accurate
life-saving activities. For the purpose of deepening this


review, the “Committee on accurate life-saving for the
MOD/SDF fi rst aid activities on the frontline” comprised
of external experts, was held at the MOD in April 2015,
and a report[2] was prepared in September 2016 based on
the discussions in the Committee. The MOD/SDF is
working to develop a framework for providing maximum
protection for the lives of the personnel injured on the


The nursing program consists of two training courses: one for fostering SDF offi cers who are certifi ed nurses or public health nurses; and the other for fostering technical and engineering offi cials
with the same qualifi cations.i


-----

frontline as much as possible. Specifically, since 2017,
the MOD commenced specific education and training
for SDF personnel who are certified as both Licensed
Practical Nurses and Emergency Life-Saving Technicians
to acquire necessary knowledge and skills, so that the
SDF personnel with these qualifications will be able to
provide specialized relief treatments[3] on the spot to SDF
personnel who were injured on the frontline, prior to their
transfer to SDF hospitals and other medical facilities.

**Improving the Capabilities to Deal With Infectious Diseases**
**5**


In light of the response to the Ebola virus disease
outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the Ministerial Meeting
on Measures on Emerging Infectious Diseases was
established in September 2015 under close cooperation
among relevant administrative bodies, for the entire
government to advance effective and comprehensive
measures on infectious diseases that could be a global
threat. In the same month of the same year, a decision was
made on the Basic Guidelines for Strengthening Measures
on Emerging Infectious Diseases. This basic guideline
stipulates that, “The Government of Japan will promote
the improvement of the ability to address emerging
infectious diseases at the Ministry of Defense and the
Japan Self-Defense Forces by training human resources
who have expertise that is necessary to contribute to the
Japan Self-Defense Forces’ overseas activities and by
accelerating the establishment of a framework including
the National Defense Medical College.” In response to
this, the MOD/SDF conducts various reviews on the


GSDF personnel conducting training in medical evacuation of injured people

enhancement of capabilities to respond to infectious
diseases, a potential global threat. Based on these reviews
as well as other factors, the MOD/SDF is currently
improving the necessary facility equipment at the National
Defense Medical College Hospital and the SDF Central
Hospital. The aims of this improvement are to provide
personnel training for the enhancement of capabilities
to deal with infectious diseases and develop readiness
for offering medical treatment to patients affected by
Class I infectious diseases,[4] which are classified as the
most dangerous category of infectious diseases. The SDF
Central Hospital was designated as a medical institution
for Class I infectious diseases in April 2017.
In addition, the MOD also conducts research on
advanced initiatives implemented by the French Armed
Forces and the Italian Armed Forces, and collects
information by seizing opportunities such as defense
medicine exchanges for the purpose of contributing to the
enhancement of capabilities to deal with infectious diseases.


First aid treatment for those with symptoms such as airway obstruction and tension pneumothorax caused by injuries, and other treatments such as administration of analgesic for pain relief.

Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, smallpox, South American hemorrhagic fevers, plague, Marburg disease, and Lassa disease (Article 6, Act on the Prevention of Infectious


-----

**Measures on Defense**

**Chapter**
### 4

**Equipment and Technology**


While defense equipment has become more advanced and
complex, the defense industry in Japan has been exposed
to harsh conditions due to a decrease in the number of units
procured caused by Japan’s severe fi nancial conditions
and an increase in imports of foreign-made equipment. In
addition, other countries are aiming to acquire advanced
military capabilities utilizing the latest technologies. In order
to ensure the quality of defense capabilities suffi ciently and
to enhance deterrence as well as response capabilities amid
the situation in which rapid advancements in technological
innovation have a signifi cant infl uence on the global security
environment, it is crucial that Japan ensure technological

**Section 1** **[Promotion of Research and Development for ]**
**Ensuring Technological Superiority**

**Necessity of Ensuring Technological Superiority**
**1**


As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes
increasingly severe, it is necessary to ensure technological
superiority by effectively utilizing Japan’s advanced
technological strength in order to protect the lives
and property of Japanese people in any situation.
Particularly in recent years, with the rapid advances in
technological innovation, it is forecast that we will see the
operationalization of so-called game-changing technology
that will completely transform combat aspects in the future,
and the United States and other countries are proceeding
hastily with research and development.

See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6 (Trends Concerning Military Science and

Technology as well as Defense Production and Technological Bases)

Thus, as a nation, strategically working on the ways
to ensure technological superiority has become a pressing
issue from the perspective of ensuring Japan’s security.


superiority over other countries. Hence, Japan is required to
further develop defense equipment and technology policies
while also taking into account these points.
Amid such a situation, it is indispensable to work
on (1) strategic research and development for ensuring
Japan’s technological superiority, (2) maintenance and
strengthening of defense production and technological
bases, (3) strengthening of project management, and
(4) promotion of defense equipment and technology
cooperation, in order to maintain an environment in which
defense equipment that meets the SDF’s operational
needs will be procured into the future.

The state-of-the-art military technologies in each country
are sensitive technologies that shall not be easily shared
with other countries. From the perspective of Japan, for the
areas, which should strategically maintain their domestic
technology platforms, it is necessary to promote research
and development domestically. In the case that international
joint development, etc. is carried out when acquiring
equipment, it is important that Japan owns cutting-edge
technology (key technology). This requires not only research
and development by the MOD, but also the promotion
of research and development by both the public and
private sectors together. Unless Japan possesses such key
technology, it will be unable to have bargaining power for
securing a leading position in conducting price negotiations
for equipment procurement and in implementing defense
equipment and technology cooperation.


**Defense Technology Strategy, etc.**
**2**


For the purpose of ensuring Japan’s technological
superiority, inventing as well as delivering advanced
equipment in an effective and effi cient manner, and


dealing with various policy issues pertaining to defense and
civilian technologies, the MOD formulated the Defense
Technology Strategy[1] in August 2016, which presented the


-----

specifi c direction for various measures that should be
addressed strategically. In light of the National Security
Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines
(NDPG), this strategy provides the specifi c direction
for measures that should be addressed strategically, and
based on this the MOD promotes various measures.

**1** **Overview of Defense Technology Strategy**


**(1) MOD Technology Policy Objectives**
The following two objectives of the MOD technology
policy are designed to strengthen the technical capabilities,
which are the foundation of Japan’s defense capabilities, to
make the foundation more robust:
(i) Ensuring technical superiority
(ii) Delivering superior defense equipment through
effective and effi cient research and development


of the international community or ensuring Japan s
technological superiority. The MOD also establishes
intellectual property management taking into account
the transfer of defense equipment and promotes the
utilization of intellectual property.

**2** **Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook**


The Medium- to Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook[3]
presents an outlook of the technologies that can be applied
to equipment expected to be established in roughly the
next 20 years, and indicates technology fi elds that need
to be developed in order to ensure Japan’s technological
superiority, with a particular focus on advanced technology
fi elds that have the potential to become game changers. It is
expected that making this Outlook public will facilitate the
integration of superior civilian advanced technologies and
the development of technologies outside of the ministries
aimed at defense equipment applications.
This Outlook selects and makes a comprehensive
assessment of 57 cases of “future equipment technologies”[4]
and 21 cases of “potential technologies,”[5] and on that basis,
identifi es the following four technology fi elds as the focus
of research and development going forward:
(i) Efforts for unmanned technology
(ii) Efforts for smart and network technology
(iii) Efforts for high-power energy technology
(iv) Efforts to improve the function and performance of
legacy systems


**(2) Specifi c Measures to be Promoted**
The following three measures are promoted to achieve
the objectives indicated in the previous paragraph.
(i) Grasping Technological Information
With regard to various scientifi c technologies that support
defense technologies, the MOD grasps the current
situation and trends both in and outside of Japan including
dual-use technology in the public and private sectors and
cutting-edge scientifi c technology. In addition, the MOD
develops and publishes the Medium- to Long Term
Defense Technology Outlook (see Paragraph 2 below)
to identify advanced technology fi elds, which have the
potential to become game changers.[2]

(ii) Development of Technologies
The MOD formulates the “Research and Development
Vision” (see Paragraph 3 below) that promotes mediumto long-term research and development. At the same time,
it also promotes research and development that serve as
the foundation of defense force building and initiatives
such as “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for
Security,” which puts into perspective the identifi cation
and development of advance technology expected to be
used for technology exchange with relevant domestic/
overseas agencies and defense purposes.
(iii) Protection of Technologies
The MOD implements technology control for proper
technology transfer to prevent situations in which
Japan’s technology leaks without the country’s intention,
undermining the maintenance of the peace and security


**3** **“Research and Development Vision”**


The “Research and Development Vision” provides
the direction of medium to long-term research and
development by clarifying technical challenges regarding
equipment that are deemed to become important, and
presenting a concept for defense equipment that looks
ahead to the future and a roadmap for research and
development to achieve the concept.
The MOD publishes research and development
visions and shares them with the defense industry, with
the aim of increasing predictability for relevant companies


**KeyWord** Dual-use technology

Technology that can be used for both civilian and defense purposes.


A game changer here refers to technology fi elds that have the potential to completely transform the future military balance.

The offi cial title is the Fiscal Year 2016 Medium- to Long-Term Technology Outlook

Technology fi elds with future importance and element technology

Technologies, which are in the basic research stage at this point in time, but which will dramatically enhance the function of existing equipment, etc. and have the potential for inventing new equipment, if


-----

and realizing more effective and efficient research and
development. So far, the Ministry has prepared and
published the “Future Fighter Vision” in August 2010
and the “Research and Development Vision of Future
Unmanned Equipment: Focusing on Unmanned Aerial

**Initiatives regarding Research and Development**
**3**


The MOD invents equipment that meets the needs of the
SDF indicated in the Medium Term Defense Program
(MTDP), including (1) improvement of air defense
capability, (2) enhancement of intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, (3) unmanned
equipment that can be used flexibly at times of various
contingencies including large-scale disasters, and
(4) enhancement of the capacity of existing equipment.
The MOD also makes proposals regarding highly
promising technologies based on technological trends,
as well as adopting advanced technologies and dual-use
technologies for prototyping, and conducts testing and
evaluation of the prototype equipment.
Particularly for improving air defense capability,
with regard to future fighters, the MOD conducts
demonstrational research on the high-mobility stealth
fighter “Advanced Technology Demonstrator (ATD-X)”
to be able to take into account the development (including
the possibility of international joint development) of
fighters as an option before the retirement of F-2 fighters.
Along with this research, the MOD also carries out
strategic studies such as research on technology related to
radomes that have complex shapes for enhanced stealth
property, and integrated fire control technology for
expanded shooting opportunities and improved shooting
efficiency through cooperation among multiple aircraft.
This will enable the fighter-related technology to be
compiled and advanced within Japan. The decision on
the development will be made by FY2018 and necessary
measures will be taken accordingly. Furthermore, the


Vehicle in August 2016.
The MOD will continue to establish and publish
research and development visions for equipment that
requires development and enhancement of technological
bases while ascertaining trends in defense technologies.

MOD carries out a study on the element technology based
on the high-power laser system, which can be applied to
close air defense of vessels and bases, and a study on the
technology, which induces malfunction or destruction
of electronic equipment built into incoming missiles to
neutralize the missiles by generating and irradiating highpowered directed microwaves.
To improve ISR capabilities, the MOD conducts
research aiming to load dual wavelength infrared sensors
with superior detecting and discriminating capabilities
onto “advanced optical satellites,” which are currently
being planned by the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and to operate
them in the space environment. The MOD also promotes
research on high mobility powered suits and the
environmental awareness enhancement technology for
remote control vehicles that can be used flexibly at times
of various contingencies including large-scale disasters.
Furthermore, in the area of advanced research,
which has the potential to ensure technological
superiority, the MOD conducts research regarding the
element technology of the next generation of night vision
devices, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) missiles, which
induce the malfunction and destruction of sensor and
electronic equipment, and also research regarding the
electromagnetic acceleration system that utilizes electric
energy to accelerate the speed, extend the range and
realize the higher power of bullets, which are not feasible
using conventional gunpowder.


**Active Utilization of Civilian Technology**
**4**


The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA)
and domestic research institutions, such as universities
and independent administrative institutions, proactively
engage in research collaborations and technological
information exchanges in order to ensure that advanced
civilian technology is incorporated and efficient research
and development is conducted. In FY2015 the MOD
launched a competitive research funding program called
“Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security”
t di ti h ti iti d t d i


universities, research institutes, companies, etc., which
are expected to apply defense equipment in the future and
to promote promising research seeds.
While total of 19 research projects were awarded
by FY2016, this program was expanded in FY2017 in
order to enable the awards of larger-scale and longer-term
research projects (total budget of 11 billion yen).
In the basic research areas, free thinking of
researchers leads to innovative and creative results. For
thi it i t i i l t


-----

freedom of research when sponsoring research, so that,
for example, researchers will be able to publish all of
their research results to have a wide range of academic
discussions. Hence, in this program the MOD will neither


restrict contractors publication of research results, nor
designate research results as confi dential, never providing
any confi dential data to researchers. In actuality, some
research results have already been published through oral


Fig. III-4-1-1 FY2016 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security”

|Research Title|Brief Summary|Representative Institution for the Project|
|---|---|---|
|Zero-phonon-line pumped new high-power Yb:YAG ceramic lasers|This project aims to establish practical and stable Yb: YAG ceramic laser by introducing low heat loss excitation method, and by controlling temperature distribution in the laser medium using a high performance cooling system.|Institute for Laser Technology|
|Porous assembly nanocrystals catalytically active for hydrolysis|This project aims to realize materials that absorb and decompose various organic compounds by producing nanocrystals of coordination polymer and constructing aggregates of the nanocrystals.|Osaka City University|
|Environmentally-benign lightweight thermoelectric battery with fail safe concept|This project aims to implement high durability and fail-safe function in engine waste heat- driven power generation system using light weight and environmentally conscious MgSi 2 thermoelectric materials.|Tokyo University of Science|
|Control of radio-frequency wave using atomically-thin oxides and its application to cloaking technology|This project aims to realize microwave control technology over a wide frequency range by utilizing atomically-thin oxides, which is ultra thin layered crystals with functions of high conductivity, high dielectricity, and ferromagnetism.|National Institute for Materials Science|
|Research of small and wide band undersea antennas for long range and high-capacity transmission in undersea environment|This project aims to develop near-f ield antenna in practical size, which enables eff icient and practical electromagnetic wave communication in the sea.|NEC Corporation|
|Tactile sensing by ultra multi-degree-of- freedom micro mesh-robot|This project aims to develop a palm-sized mesh-robot, which is built by combining a number of micro robots with multiple degrees of freedom and ultra compact size in mesh form, and realize tactile sensing by using the mesh-robot.|Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology|
|Bio-inspired high speed bubble coating of underwater mobile|This project aims to reduce the frictional drag of underwater vehicles by forming a coating f ilm on the surface, which keeps an air layer in water.|National Institute for Materials Science|
|Frictional drag reduction by microbubbles injection to turbulent boundary layers|This project aims to clarify the mechanism of the friction drag reduction effect of ships by coating with microbubbles based on an aquarium experiment and numerical analysis.|Hokkaido University|
|Improvement of crack and corrosion resistance by ultra-high temperature and high pressure cavitation|This project aims to enhance the durability of metal surface used under harsh environments through micro-forging that uses ultrasound superimposed water jet peening.|Tokyo University of Science, Yamaguchi|
|Additive manufacturing of functionally gradiented material by Laser Metal Deposition|This project aims to establish additive manufacturing technology to laminate different metal powders with restraining generation of intermetallic compounds based on the Laser Metal Deposition method.|Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.|


Fig. III-4-1-1


**Representative Institution**
**Research Title** **Brief Summary**
**for the Project**

This project aims to establish practical and stable Yb: YAG ceramic laser by introducing low

Zero-phonon-line pumped new high-power

heat loss excitation method, and by controlling temperature distribution in the laser medium Institute for Laser Technology

Yb:YAG ceramic lasers

using a high performance cooling system.

This project aims to realize materials that absorb and decompose various organic

Porous assembly nanocrystals catalytically

compounds by producing nanocrystals of coordination polymer and constructing aggregates Osaka City University

active for hydrolysis

of the nanocrystals.

This project aims to implement high durability and fail-safe function in engine waste heat-

Environmentally-benign lightweight
thermoelectric battery with fail safe concept driven power generation system using light weight and environmentally conscious Mg2Si Tokyo University of Science

thermoelectric materials.

Control of radio-frequency wave using This project aims to realize microwave control technology over a wide frequency range by

National Institute for Materials

atomically-thin oxides and its application to utilizing atomically-thin oxides, which is ultra thin layered crystals with functions of high

Science

cloaking technology conductivity, high dielectricity, and ferromagnetism.

Research of small and wide band undersea

This project aims to develop near-fi eld antenna in practical size, which enables effi cient and

antennas for long range and high-capacity NEC Corporation

practical electromagnetic wave communication in the sea.

transmission in undersea environment

This project aims to develop a palm-sized mesh-robot, which is built by combining a number

Tactile sensing by ultra multi-degree-of- Tokyo University of Agriculture

of micro robots with multiple degrees of freedom and ultra compact size in mesh form, and

freedom micro mesh-robot and Technology

realize tactile sensing by using the mesh-robot.

Bio-inspired high speed bubble coating of This project aims to reduce the frictional drag of underwater vehicles by forming a coating National Institute for Materials
underwater mobile fi lm on the surface, which keeps an air layer in water. Science

Frictional drag reduction by microbubbles This project aims to clarify the mechanism of the friction drag reduction effect of ships by
Hokkaido University
injection to turbulent boundary layers coating with microbubbles based on an aquarium experiment and numerical analysis.

Improvement of crack and corrosion

This project aims to enhance the durability of metal surface used under harsh environments Tokyo University of Science,

resistance by ultra-high temperature and high

through micro-forging that uses ultrasound superimposed water jet peening. Yamaguchi

pressure cavitation

Additive manufacturing of functionally This project aims to establish additive manufacturing technology to laminate different metal
gradiented material by Laser Metal powders with restraining generation of intermetallic compounds based on the Laser Metal Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
Deposition Deposition method.


**i**

**Applying for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for**
**Security” Program**

Takao Sawa, Senior Technical Scientist, Affi liation: Marine Technology and Engineering Center, Japan Agency for
Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC)

JAMSTEC, an organization operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, contributes to the fundamental research and
development on marine, and the cooperative activities on the academic research related to
the ocean for the benefi t of the peace and human welfare.
Dual-use technology is taken into account in this program, whose application guideline
clearly states that “the program also expects research results to be widely utilized in the
civilian sector,” and “the research contractor can keep intellectual property under prescribed
conditions.” This means that the benefi ts and rights of JAMSTEC are guaranteed in the
program, compared to other competitive research funding programs. It is essential for
researchers to build up a cooperative relationship with other agencies, not to mention the
importance of obtaining research funding. This is why I decided to apply for the program.
My research entitled “Research of underwater optical wireless robust communications
with photomultiplier tubes” concerns technology aiming to achieve high-speed underwater
optical wireless communications. For example, a large amount of data communications will Test device used in this research and the author

(research representative)

be needed when watching videos on a smartphone. The research aims to achieve such high
speed data communications even underwater where radio waves hardly propagate. In sea trials, underwater robots for observation
and measuring devices will be utilized to support the trial. Since underwater is often cloudy, making it diffi cult for light to pass through,
underwater optical communications is realized by selecting suitable optimum color and by using highly sensitive photomultiplier tubes.


-----

presentations, publications, etc. From the perspective of
smooth implementation of research projects, program
offi cers, who are in charge of managing research progress,
are assigned in the same manner as competitive research
funding programs being conducted by other government
ministries and agencies. The program offi cers provide
support including checking research progress and
processing budget execution procedures.
Active utilization of advanced civilian technology
through such programs is not only essential for securing
the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people

**Section 2** **[The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, ]**
**and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases**


Excellent defense production and technological
bases are indispensable in inventing superior defense
equipment in an effective and effi cient manner, while
ensuring technological superiority, based on the


into the future, but is also benefi cial for the development of
Japan’s science, technology and innovation in non-defense
areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative
technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances
in science and technology as a whole including civilian
technology, such as the development of the Internet and
GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote
relevant measures.

See Fig. III-4-1-1 (FY2016 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative

Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (Competitive Funding))

See


**[The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, ]**
**and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases**

Defense Technology Strategy. For this reason, the MOD
established the Strategy on Defense Production and
Technological Bases in 2014 to maintain and strengthen
the bases.


**The Current Status of Japan’s Defense Production and Technological Bases**
**1**


The term “defense production and technological bases”
refers to the human, physical and technological bases
for development, production, operation, sustainment and
maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense
equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In
Japan, most of those bases are covered by companies (the
defense industry) that manufacture defense equipment and
associated items. Therefore, a broad range of companies,[1]
which own specialized and advanced skills and facilities
are involved in the defense production and technological
bases. In addition, volume effi ciency of defense production


is unlikely to be expected due to its market being limited
to the demand from the MOD. The degree of defense
demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales that
accounts for the entire company sales) is approximately
3% on average, indicating that the defense business does
not comprise the main business in many companies.[2]

On the other hand, per unit cost and maintenance/
sustainment costs are increasing due to the advances in
recent defense equipment, while simultaneously imports
of foreign-made equipment, such as U.S.-made aircraft,
are also.


Fig. III-4-2-1 Current Status of the Procurement Unit Price of Defense Equipment

Fig. III-4-2-1

Status of Procurement: Unit Price Increase in procurement unit price due to high performance

Type-74 Tank: Approximately 0.39 billion yen Oyashio class: Approximately 52.0 billion yen E-2C: Approximately 9.94 billion yen
(contracted in FY1989) (1.23 times increase) (contracted in FY1990)
(3.2 times increase) Soryu class: Approximately 63.6 billion yen (2.61 times increase)
Type-10 Tank: Approximately 1.26 billion yen (contracted in FY2016) E-2D: Approximately 25.97 billion yen
(contracted in FY2016) (contracted in FY2016)


For example, it is said that there are approximately 1,100 fi ghter aircraft-related companies, approximately 1,300 tank-related companies, and approximately 8,300 destroyer–related companies.

According to the survey on defense demand dependence conducted with 46 defense-related companies based on their sales performance in FY2015. Although relatively small in scale, some
companies possess important technologies for supporting the defense industry with over 50% of the defense demand dependence, in which case the scale of defense demand has a signifi cant


-----

presentations, publications, etc. From the perspective of
smooth implementation of research projects, program
offi cers, who are in charge of managing research progress,
are assigned in the same manner as competitive research
funding programs being conducted by other government
ministries and agencies. The program offi cers provide
support including checking research progress and
processing budget execution procedures.
Active utilization of advanced civilian technology
through such programs is not only essential for securing
the lives and peaceful livelihood of the Japanese people

**Section 2** **[The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, ]**
**and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases**


Excellent defense production and technological
bases are indispensable in inventing superior defense
equipment in an effective and effi cient manner, while
ensuring technological superiority, based on the


into the future, but is also benefi cial for the development of
Japan’s science, technology and innovation in non-defense
areas as well, similar to how investment in innovative
technology by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) of the United States facilitated advances
in science and technology as a whole including civilian
technology, such as the development of the Internet and
GPS. From this perspective, the MOD intends to promote
relevant measures.

See Fig. III-4-1-1 (FY2016 Awarded Research Projects for the “Innovative

Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (Competitive Funding))

See


**[The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases, ]**
**and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases**

Defense Technology Strategy. For this reason, the MOD
established the Strategy on Defense Production and
Technological Bases in 2014 to maintain and strengthen
the bases.


**The Current Status of Japan’s Defense Production and Technological Bases**
**1**


The term “defense production and technological bases”
refers to the human, physical and technological bases
for development, production, operation, sustainment and
maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense
equipment required for the MOD/SDF’s activities. In
Japan, most of those bases are covered by companies (the
defense industry) that manufacture defense equipment and
associated items. Therefore, a broad range of companies,[1]
which own specialized and advanced skills and facilities
are involved in the defense production and technological
bases. In addition, volume effi ciency of defense production


is unlikely to be expected due to its market being limited
to the demand from the MOD. The degree of defense
demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales that
accounts for the entire company sales) is approximately
3% on average, indicating that the defense business does
not comprise the main business in many companies.[2]

On the other hand, per unit cost and maintenance/
sustainment costs are increasing due to the advances in
recent defense equipment, while simultaneously imports
of foreign-made equipment, such as U.S.-made aircraft,
are also.


Fig. III-4-2-1 Current Status of the Procurement Unit Price of Defense Equipment

Fig. III-4-2-1

Status of Procurement: Unit Price Increase in procurement unit price due to high performance

Type-74 Tank: Approximately 0.39 billion yen Oyashio class: Approximately 52.0 billion yen E-2C: Approximately 9.94 billion yen
(contracted in FY1989) (1.23 times increase) (contracted in FY1990)
(3.2 times increase) Soryu class: Approximately 63.6 billion yen (2.61 times increase)
Type-10 Tank: Approximately 1.26 billion yen (contracted in FY2016) E-2D: Approximately 25.97 billion yen
(contracted in FY2016) (contracted in FY2016)


For example, it is said that there are approximately 1,100 fi ghter aircraft-related companies, approximately 1,300 tank-related companies, and approximately 8,300 destroyer–related companies.

According to the survey on defense demand dependence conducted with 46 defense-related companies based on their sales performance in FY2015. Although relatively small in scale, some
companies possess important technologies for supporting the defense industry with over 50% of the defense demand dependence, in which case the scale of defense demand has a signifi cant


-----

exposure to changes in the international environment
such as the realignment of the Western defense industries
and advances in international joint development and
production projects. Amidst these situations, there are
new changes emerging in the political framework, such
as the transfer of defense equipment and technology
based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense
Equipment and Technology (see Section 4), which was
approved by the Cabinet in April 2014.

See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6-2 (Trends Concerning Defense

Production and Technological Bases)

See

Section 4-1 (The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment
and Technology)


See Fig. III-4-2-1 (Current Status of the Procurement Unit Price of Defense

Equipment)

See

Fig. III-4-2-2 (Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment,
etc.)

In addition, while research and development expenditure
is increasing, the ratio of research and development
expenditure to defense-related expenditure has leveled off.

See Fig. III-4-2-3 (Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure)

See

Furthermore, Japan’s defense production and
technological bases also face challenges in retaining and
passing on skills and techniques, and there have been
emerging issues, for example, with some companies
pulling out of the defense business. There has also been


Fig. III-4-2-2 Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc.

Fig. III-4-2-2

(100 million yen)

10,000

Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures (100 million yen) 8,750

8,141

7,862 7,794

8,000

7,387 7,352 7,199 7,459 7,431 [7,527 7,502] 7,612

6,636 [6,757]

6,422 [6,554 6,508 6,662 6,686 6,680 6,795 6,993]

6,177 [6,365]

6,000 5,730

5,333

4,763 [4,902]

4,393

4,000

2,000

0

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 (FY)

Notes: 1. “Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment” refers to the budget for repair costs for equipment, consumable goods costs, and service costs (referring to
the amount calculated by excluding repair costs for the extension of vessel life and modernization of aircraft from the repair costs of each SDF unit).
2. Amounts represent contractual fi gures.


Fig. III-4-2-3 Current Status of Research & Development Expenditure


Fig. III-4-2-3


Defense R&D Budget of Major Countries (FY2016) Percentage of R&D Budget out of Defense Budget of Major Countries (FY2016)

(100 million yen) (%)

-  FY2015 -  FY2015

80,000 15

77,761

12.53

6,000

10

7.86*

4,000

2,936*

2,479* 5 4.49*

2,000

1,150 1,005 1,066 2.03 2.31* 2.41 2.28

127*

0 0

USA UK France ROK Sweden Germany Japan USA UK France ROK Sweden Germany Japan

Source: “OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators”, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database ©SIPRI 2017”


-----

**The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases**
**2**


**1** **Context of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense**
**Production and Technological Bases, etc.**

**1**


In light of the current situation, for the purpose of
maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production
and technological bases, which is important and an
essential element supporting Japan’s defense capability,
the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological
Bases” was adopted in June 2014. The Strategy responded
to the National Security Strategy and the National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG), replacing “Kokusankahoshin
(guideline for domestic development/production).”[3]

See Reference 5 (National Security Strategy (Outline))

Reference 6 (NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for

See

FY2014 and beyond)

**2** **Overview of Defense Production and**
**Technological Bases**


**(2) Goals and Signifi cance of Maintaining and Strengthening**
**Defense Production and Technological Bases**

Through the maintenance and strengthening of defense
production and technological bases, the MOD intends to (1)
ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially contribute to
deterrence enhancement, and maintain and improve bargaining
power, and (3) contribute to the sophistication of the domestic
industry in Japan driven by cutting-edge technology.

**(3) Basic Stance for Promoting Measures**
For the promotion of measures, it is necessary to take into
account the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing
long-term partnership between the private and public
sectors; (2) strengthening international competitiveness;
and (3) ensuring consistency with effective and effi cient
acquisition of defense equipment.


**2**


**(1) Context of Formulation of the Strategy on Defense**
**Production and Technological Bases**

“The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological
Bases” has made the following three points clear: (1) the
context of the formulation of the strategy on defense production
and technological bases and the status of this strategy;
(2) characteristics of defense production and technological
bases; and (3) changes in the security environment surrounding
defense production and technological bases.


**(4) Methods of Defense Equipment Procurement**
With regard to defense equipment procurement, currently
multiple methods, such as domestic development,
international joint development and production, licensed
domestic production, utilization of commercially produced
goods, and imports, are adopted. These methods directly
affect defense production and technological bases. According
to the characteristics of defense equipment, it is necessary
to select the acquisition method appropriately, including
international joint development and production, which


Fig. III-4-2-4 Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases

|Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases|Col2|
|---|---|
|Improve contract system|● Utilize negotiated contracts ● Introduce longer-term contracts (multi-year procurements) ● Establish f lexible systems for taking orders such as joint ventures ● Decrease procurement cost and improve companies’ incentives to reduce cost ● Enhance project management throughout equipment’s life-cycle|
|Measures regarding Research and Development (R&D)|● Formulate a R&D vision ● Develop ability to survey technological information including civilian advanced technology ● Strengthen cooperation with universities and research institutes ● Cooperation with and utilizing R&D programs including those that cover dual-use technology ● Fund advanced research with promising output for defense ● Strengthen cooperation with overseas organizations|
|Defense equipment and technology cooperation|● Deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States ● Establish new defense equipment and technology cooperation ● Contributing to international logistics systems ● Improving bases for defense equipment and technology cooperation ● Promote application of defense equipment to civilian use ● Technology control and information security|
|Measures regarding defense industry organization|● Promote understanding of signif icance of defense business and industry ● Maintain resilient supply chains ● Defense industrial organizations and applications of contract systems|
|Strengthen MOD’s structure|● Implementation of efforts such as unif ication of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of MOD reform ● Implementation of strengthening inspection and audit functions as well as the training of human resources in project management and procurement|
|Measures through cooperation with relevant ministries|● Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries|


Fig. III-4-2-4


**Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases**

-  Utilize negotiated contracts

-  Introduce longer-term contracts (multi-year procurements)

Improve contract system -  Establish fl exible systems for taking orders such as joint ventures

-  Decrease procurement cost and improve companies’ incentives to reduce cost

-  Enhance project management throughout equipment’s life-cycle

-  Formulate a R&D vision

-  Develop ability to survey technological information including civilian advanced technology

Measures regarding Research and -  Strengthen cooperation with universities and research institutes
Development (R&D) -  Cooperation with and utilizing R&D programs including those that cover dual-use technology

-  Fund advanced research with promising output for defense

-  Strengthen cooperation with overseas organizations

-  Deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States

-  Establish new defense equipment and technology cooperation

Defense equipment and technology -  Contributing to international logistics systems
cooperation -  Improving bases for defense equipment and technology cooperation

-  Promote application of defense equipment to civilian use

-  Technology control and information security

-  Promote understanding of signifi cance of defense business and industry

Measures regarding defense

-  Maintain resilient supply chains

industry organization

-  Defense industrial organizations and applications of contract systems

-  Implementation of efforts such as unifi cation of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of MOD reform

Strengthen MOD’s structure -  Implementation of strengthening inspection and audit functions as well as the training of human resources in project management

and procurement

Measures through cooperation with

-  Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries
relevant ministries


-----

became more agile and fl exible due to the Three Principles
on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology.

**(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening**
**Defense Production and Technological Bases**

In order to carry out the maintenance and strengthening
of defense production and technological bases, the MOD
will promote the following measures with a focus on
variation and effi ciency, while considering Japan’s severe
fi nancial condition: (1) improvement of the contract
system; (2) efforts regarding research and development;
(3) promotion of defense equipment and technology
cooperation; (4) initiatives regarding defense industrial
organizations including the building of a robust production
and technology platform through understanding actual
conditions of supply chain; (5) strengthening of the MOD’s
structure through the establishment of ATLA, etc.; and
(6) collaborative measures with other relevant ministries.


See Fig. III-4-2-4 (Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense

Production and Technological Bases)

See


**(6) Courses of Actions for Each Defense Equipment Sectors**
With regard to the main defense equipment sectors
(such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft,
explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics
and command control systems, unmanned equipment,
space systems and cyber), the MOD will analyze the
current situation of defense production and technological
bases. At the same time, it will also take the following
actions. Based on the priority matters for developing the
SDF’s structure indicated in NDPG, the MOD will present
the future direction of the maintenance and strengthening
of defense production and technological bases and the
acquisition plan for each defense equipment sectors, and
thereby, seek to increase predictability for companies.

See Fig. III-4-2-5 (Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors

(Outline))


See


Fig. III-4-2-5 Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors (Outline)

|Ground equipment|● With regard to tanks and artillery, making use of its world-class level of strength in this area, the MOD will maintain its production and technological bases to the appropriate level. In addition, production and technological bases for mobile combat vehicles etc., will be built. ● Through further promotion of standardization (categorization), effective and eff icient acquisition as well as the maintenance and strengthening of production and technology bases of wheeled vehicles will be implemented. ● Regarding amphibious capabilities, aspects of Japan’s technological weakness will be reinforced as necessary, while defense equipment and technology cooperation that make use of our strengths will be promoted.|
|---|---|
|Supplies, etc.|● Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, the relevant foundations will be maintained, thereby making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies. ● As for f ields where Japan can excel, such as chemical protection equipment, adapting equipment for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be considered.|
|Ships|● With regard to vessels, in order to enable the MOD to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, production and technological bases will be maintained and strengthened through the entry of multiple prime enterprises. ● Consideration will be given to the bulk order of multiple escort ships with a standardized design. In doing so, a review of the format of contracts will also be considered, taking into account the effects of lowering prices. ● Since the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the number of submarines will be increased to 22, the existing bases will be maintained and strengthened through continuous research and development for enhancing capabilities.|
|Aircraft|● For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the MOD will make efforts to promote the industrial participation of Japanese companies in production and to prepare for the start of Regional MRO&U for F-35 aircraft in the Asia-Pacif ic region. As for future f ighter aircraft, necessary measures including empirical research will be taken so as to maintain the option of the development of future f ighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. ● With regard to transport aircraft and amphibian rescue aircraft, multifaceted use of the results of development such as the possibility of adaptation for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be promoted. For rotary-wing aircraft, keeping both the civilian and defense demand in mind, international joint development and production will be considered as an option based on the technologies cultivated through licensed domestic production and domestic development.|
|Explosives|● A certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will continue to be made possible and bases, which ensure the necessary scale of explosives in various situations, will be maintained.|
|Guided weapons|● In order to improve air defense performance, technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant technological bases. A vision for research and development for the implementation of technological examinations of future guided weapons will be established including propulsion devices such as f ixed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve the performance of various types of guided weapons such as the extension of their launch range. ● Regarding international joint development as one option, eff icient acquisition methods will be selected based also on the enhancement of interoperability with allied and friendly nations. ● Along with the continuous promotion of SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) between Japan and the United States, necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases will be taken, considering the sustainment and enhancement of production and technological phases.|
|Communications electronics and command control systems|● Research and development on cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of the detection performance of f xied warning and control radar systems as well as the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems. At the same time, the technological bases will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge civilian technology. ● Because systems capable of responding to battles based around network data are necessary for future command control systems, civilian technological bases, which are progressing at a signif icant pace, will be adopted to ensure a system replacement at the appropriate timing ref lecting the latest technological standards. ● Defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as civilian use of wireless software technology, radar technology, which uses high-output semiconductors, and other technologies will be promoted.|
|Unmanned equipment|● In light of the trend towards defense technology such as future battle conditions, smarter technologies and networking, a vision for research and development will be established and proactive research will be implemented for the enhancement of technological bases in order to present a direction of unmanned equipment whilst taking the perspective of integrated operation into account. ● Defense equipment and technology cooperation such as research collaboration with research institutions and joint research and development with other countries will be advanced in order to raise the level of Japan’s technological bases.|
|Cyber and space systems|● While cooperating with the MOD’s initiatives to increase its capability to respond to cyber attacks and policies relating to the use of space development, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of defense production and technological bases, which will be required in the future, will be discussed.|


Fig. III-4-2-5



-  With regard to tanks and artillery, making use of its world-class level of strength in this area, the MOD will maintain its production and technological bases
to the appropriate level. In addition, production and technological bases for mobile combat vehicles etc., will be built.

-  Through further promotion of standardization (categorization), effective and effi cient acquisition as well as the maintenance and strengthening of

Ground equipment

production and technology bases of wheeled vehicles will be implemented.

-  Regarding amphibious capabilities, aspects of Japan’s technological weakness will be reinforced as necessary, while defense equipment and technology
cooperation that make use of our strengths will be promoted.

-  Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, the relevant foundations will be maintained, thereby
making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies.

Supplies, etc.

-  As for fi elds where Japan can excel, such as chemical protection equipment, adapting equipment for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology
cooperation will be considered.

-  With regard to vessels, in order to enable the MOD to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, production and technological bases will
be maintained and strengthened through the entry of multiple prime enterprises.

-  Consideration will be given to the bulk order of multiple escort ships with a standardized design. In doing so, a review of the format of contracts will also

Ships

be considered, taking into account the effects of lowering prices.

-  Since the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the number of submarines will be increased to 22, the existing bases will be maintained and
strengthened through continuous research and development for enhancing capabilities.

-  For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the MOD will make efforts to promote the industrial participation of Japanese companies in production and to
prepare for the start of Regional MRO&U for F-35 aircraft in the Asia-Pacifi c region. As for future fi ghter aircraft, necessary measures including empirical
research will be taken so as to maintain the option of the development of future fi ghter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development
of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it.

Aircraft

-  With regard to transport aircraft and amphibian rescue aircraft, multifaceted use of the results of development such as the possibility of adaptation for
civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be promoted. For rotary-wing aircraft, keeping both the civilian and defense demand
in mind, international joint development and production will be considered as an option based on the technologies cultivated through licensed domestic
production and domestic development.

-  A certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will continue to be made possible and bases, which ensure the necessary scale of explosives in
Explosives
various situations, will be maintained.

-  In order to improve air defense performance, technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant
technological bases. A vision for research and development for the implementation of technological examinations of future guided weapons will be
established including propulsion devices such as fi xed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve the performance of various types of
guided weapons such as the extension of their launch range.

Guided weapons -  Regarding international joint development as one option, effi cient acquisition methods will be selected based also on the enhancement of interoperability

with allied and friendly nations.

-  Along with the continuous promotion of SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) between Japan and the United States, necessary measures for
the transition to the production and deployment phases will be taken, considering the sustainment and enhancement of production and technological
phases.

-  Research and development on cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of the
detection performance of fi xed warning and control radar systems as well as the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems. At the same time, the

Communications technological bases will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge civilian technology.
electronics and -  Because systems capable of responding to battles based around network data are necessary for future command control systems, civilian technological
command control bases, which are progressing at a signifi cant pace, will be adopted to ensure a system replacement at the appropriate timing refl ecting the latest
systems technological standards.

-  Defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as civilian use of wireless software technology, radar technology, which uses high-output
semiconductors, and other technologies will be promoted.

-  In light of the trend towards defense technology such as future battle conditions, smarter technologies and networking, a vision for research and
development will be established and proactive research will be implemented for the enhancement of technological bases in order to present a direction of

Unmanned

unmanned equipment whilst taking the perspective of integrated operation into account.

equipment

-  Defense equipment and technology cooperation such as research collaboration with research institutions and joint research and development with other
countries will be advanced in order to raise the level of Japan’s technological bases.

-  While cooperating with the MOD’s initiatives to increase its capability to respond to cyber attacks and policies relating to the use of space development,

Cyber and space

from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of defense production and technological bases, which will be required in the future, will

systems

be discussed.


-----

cooperation involving joint research and development
with other countries (see Section 4).

-  Grasping the supply chain in the defense industry and
responses to risks in order to maintain and strengthen
defense production and technological bases.

-  Adopting a new procurement method for acquiring an
escort ship (new destroyer) to ensure future technologies
and price competitiveness while maintaining defense
production and technological bases, as well as using
advanced design and construction technology.

**(2) Future Initiatives**
With the understanding that defense production and
technological bases are an important and indispensable
foundation supporting Japan’s defense capabilities, ATLA
plays the main role in promoting measures for defense
equipment and technology while cooperating with relevant
ministries, government agencies, and private companies,
etc. These measures include swift application of quickly
progressing advanced civilian technologies, promotion
of defense equipment and technological cooperation as a
package including maintenance, etc., early detection of risks
pertaining to supply chains, and promotion of the matching
of small and medium sized enterprises with the MOD/SDF.


**3** **Initiatives in Line with the Strategy on Defense**
**Production and Technological Bases**

**3**


**(1) Past Initiatives**
Based on the Strategy on Defense Production and
Technological Bases, the MOD has implemented various
measures contributing to the maintenance and strengthening
of defense production and technological bases, such as the
improvement of contract system including the Long-term
Contract Act, and the establishment of ATLA, which was
formed by integrating the organizations involved in the
procurement of defense equipment.
In addition, the following new measures are also
taken in ATLA.

-  Formulation of Defense Technology Strategy, Mediumto Long-Term Defense Technology Outlook and the
Research and Development Vision for ensuring the
technological superiority, and implementation of the
“Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security.”

-  Formulation of the Acquisition Strategic Plan for
promoting project management and improvement of
contract systems (see Section 3).

-  Participation of Japanese companies in the international
F-35 Program and defense equipment and technology


**i**

**The Defense Industry that Supports the Improvement**
**of Defense Capability**

Kazuichi Ando, Adviser, Marketing Department-Industrial Products, Industrial Rubber Products Division,
Meiji Rubber & Chemical Co., Ltd.

Meiji Rubber & Chemical Co., Ltd. was established in 1900 and became
the fi rst navy-designated factory in Japan in the following year. We at
that time produced rubber lining for propeller thrust axis of submarines,
battery containers, and tires for fi ghter aircraft, as well as other products.
Since World War II, we have mainly produced civilian goods. Today
our products cover a wide range of areas such as rubber products for
printing machines and elevating machines, rolling mills for paper/iron
manufacturing, and resin products including bottle containers/pallets.
With regard to products for the government (products for the
MOD), we produce anti-vibration rubbers for ships and rubber parts
for tanks. In particular, we are proud of the history of our engagement
in the production of rubber parts for tanks, which are suspension parts
for successive tanks (type-61, 74, 90 and 10). These parts are track Deburring work for track rollers after rubber bonding, and fi nished products
rollers that are equivalent to tires for automobiles, crawler belts that are
usually called crawler or track belt, rubber pads that are mounted to a track shoe composing crawler belts to protect paved road while
driving on it, and anti-vibration rubbers for engine mount in the car.
Rubber products require repeated trial and error as well as conducting evaluations of prototype to design compounded rubber most
suitable for specifi c terms of use, whereby they are developed to be a product with specifi cation that meets the optimum condition. We
take pride in the long-held recipe of compounded rubber, which has been developed since its establishment, and sees it as the company’s
asset. Lastly, Meiji Rubber & Chemical has built a production system that positions defense-related products as the most important
product management products. Going forward, we will continue to take responsibility and pride in producing defense equipment, maintain
the production bases, and strive to enhance the technical capability of the company.


-----

**Section 3 Efforts toward Project Management, etc.**


**Project Management throughout Its Life Cycle**
**1**


**1** **Acquisition of Defense Equipment through**
**Focused Project Management**

**1**


Since defense equipment is becoming more advanced
and complex in recent years, the cost of the entire life
cycle of the equipment has tended to increase (equipment
design, research and development, full rate production
and acquisition, and maintenance). For acquiring the
necessary number of equipment when it is needed, it is
extremely important to streamline the process throughout
the life cycle of equipment.
Therefore, for important defense equipment, the
Department of Project Management was set up in ATLA
to realize the most effi cient acquisition in accordance with
operational needs by managing the costs and schedule
throughout the life cycle of equipment.
In November 2015, to realize the effi cient acquisition
of equipment that will enable effective and effi cient
operation and maintenance, the MOD selected 12
equipment for project management and designated a Project
Managers (PM) responsible for project management
for each equipment. At the same time, the Ministry also
established the Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is
composed of offi cials from relevant departments within
the Ministry. In 2016, for the equipment of project
management, the MOD prepared the Acquisition Strategy
to state the basic matters necessary to practice project
management systematically, such as the purpose of the
acquisition program and acquisition policy, and the cost
of the life cycle. The MOD practices project management
in accordance with this Strategy and works to realize the
most strategically effi cient equipment acquisition.
Specifi cally, in light of acquisition plans prepared by
each service and the status of these plans, ATLA checks
the progress of each acquisition program and the status
of cost from a comprehensive perspective. ATLA also
carries out a comparison between these statuses and the
Acquisition Strategy, and reviews the Acquisition Strategy
as necessary. In the case where a signifi cant excess of life
cycle costs is expected, appropriate measures will be taken
including a drastic review and termination of the project.


In FY2017, ATLA is conducting a review of the
Acquisition Strategy such as updating the standards of
life cycle costs to meet mass production specifi cations, as
Medium range SAM (improved version) has now moved
from the development phase to the mass production
and deployment phase. Regarding equipment that has
not yet been selected for project management, ATLA is
also considering designating them as new project and
semi-project.[1]

See Fig. III-4-3-1 (Equipment for Project Management)

See


**2** **Initiatives to Promote and Strengthen Project**
**Management**


**2**


The following initiatives are being conducted to promote
and strengthen project management.

**(1) Cost and Schedule Management Using WBS**
For project management of certain kinds of equipment,
especially for the management of cost and schedule of
the equipment, the MOD promotes the introduction of the
cost and schedule management method for visualizing
the progress by each Work Breakdown Structure (WBS),[2]
to detect early the signs of cost increase and schedule
delay so that swift measures can be taken.


**(2) Method for More Accurate Cost Estimate**
Costs such as life cycle cost are estimated based on actual
cost data of similar equipment developed or introduced
in the past. However, as a larger amount of cost data is
needed for a more accurate estimate, the MOD has built
a cost database and promotes the collection of cost data.
Since accumulating suffi cient amount of cost data takes
time, using statistical methods is also considered.

**(3) Development and Accumulation of Expertise**
**through Strengthened Cooperation with Research**
**and Educational Institutions, etc.**

For further improving the management skill as of project
managers and for developing human resources among


Semi-project is an acquisition project of specifi c equipment with a limited application of project management without the designation of PM and IPT, focusing on risks in costs, schedules and other
risk factors

WBS is a hierarchical structure used to practice project management that systematically divides the project into manageable units, in which the schedule and cost of each deliverable (components


-----

Fig. III-4-3-1 Equipment for Project Management

Fig. III-4-3-1

SM-3 Block IIA Medium Range SAM Global Hawk (Long Endurance UAV) AAV7 (Amphibious Vehicle)
(First Phase Ground (improved) (Photo of Same Model)
Test Launch) (Test Launch)

New Destroyer *[1] GSDF New Utility Helicopter Osprey (Tilt-Rotor Aircraft) Enhanced SH-60K
(Conceptual Image) (Conceptual Image) (Photo of Same Model) (Conceptual Image)

P-1 C-2 F-35A Future Fighter Aircraft *[2]
(Photo shows the same model type) (Conceptual Image)

*1 New Destroyers: New destroyers with combined features of enhanced response capabilities to deal with diverse duties and a compact hull and manpower-saving.
*2 Future Fighter Aircraft: Successor aircraft to F-2 fighter (under study)


those who engages in project management, the MOD
strengthens collaboration with research and educational
institutions on project management by regular training
sessions on project management methods used overseas
and in the private sectors.


Hereafter, the Ministry will have the viewpoint of
project management from the planning stage of defense
equipment to promote effective and effi cient acquisition
throughout the life cycle of the equipment. This will be
done by conducting research on cases where existing
technologies to promote the development of product
families of equipment were applied to cases in other
fi elds, and considering the reduction of acquisition
costs, while at the same time giving consideration to the
network trends.


**3** **Effective and Effi cient Acquisition from**
**a Comprehensive Perspective**

**3**


Acquisition of defense equipment based on a comprehensive
perspective is required to build a Dynamic Joint Defense
Force.
So far, based on the integrative point of view, the
Ministry has been striving to reduce development,
acquisition, and maintenance expenses through (1) making
the equipment function integrated, and (2) procuring
common equipment and supplies in bulk, standardizing
some components, and development of product families, etc.[3]


**KeyWord** Development of product families

This refers to adding different variations to the functions and
performance of equipment to enable them to respond to different

operational demands, while standardizing their basic component parts.


Examples of “procuring common equipment and supplies in bulk,” “standardizing some components,” and “development of product families” are small arms, vehicles, and chemical supplies used
by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), short-range surface-to-air missiles used by the GSDF and ASDF, and anti-ship


-----

**i**

**Working As a Project Manager**

Colonel Tetsuji Nagasawa, Project Planning Coordinator, Assistant to Director of Integrated Equipment Planning
(Ichigaya), Department of Project Management, ATLA

Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (middle-range SAM

[improved version]) is GSDF’s new surface-to-air missile with
improved capability to deal with missiles fl ying at low altitude and
high speed. Middle-range SAM (improved version) was selected
for project management focused equipment in November 2015,
and I was assigned as project manager responsible for the overall
coordination of the middle-range SAM project to realize smooth and
effi cient project management.
Since this was ATLA’s fi rst time performing project management,
I had a hard time moving the project forward while reaching a
consensus among the relevant parties within the MOD, such as the Colonel Nagasawa reporting to the Commissioner of ATLA

(Colonel Nagasawa: fourth from left)

Internal Bureaus and Ground Staff Offi ce.
Research and development of middle-range SAM (improved version) was underway when it was selected for project management
focused equipment. Nevertheless, I drew up an Acquisition Strategic Plan by coordinating closely with stakeholders and reported to
the Minister regarding the results of the analysis and evaluation conducted from the perspectives of performance, costs and other
factors. We got approval that there were no issues with the progress of middle-range SAM project.
In proceeding with the coordination, I realized that sharing information and understanding within the MOD through the integrated
project team is important.
Going forward, as mass production of middle-range SAM (improved version) will gain momentum, it will be important to conduct
project management more effectively by focusing on proper cost management and responses to risks, and continuously seeking
cooperation and proper collaboration.


**Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters**
**2**

**1** **Reviewing Acquisition Systems**

For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, which is
a prompt response to swiftly changing surroundings, the
MOD has been holding meetings of the Comprehensive
Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007, besides the
Contractual Systems Study Groups has been held since
2010 to review acquisition systems. Since FY2016, a
special research offi cer system[4] has been adopted in order
to surely embody the review results.


**2** **Long-Term Contracts, etc.**

**2**


The production of defense equipment requires a signifi cant
amount of time. Therefore, if a certain set amount is to be
procured in bulk, in many cases a contract for more than
fi ve years is needed. With regard to defense equipment


MSDF C-130R transport aircraft through which the MOD seeks to improve its availability ratio
and reduce cost by concluding PBL long-term contracts

and services, economies of scale[5] tend not to work mainly
due to the following reasons: (1) the annual procurement
quantity is small; (2) the MOD is the only customer; and


This is a system to conduct research, which contributes to the acquisition system of defense equipment, by inviting experts such as associate professors from different universities specializing in
the areas of concern in order to review and reconsider an effective procurement system, based not only on the viewpoints of the Ministry of Defense personnel but also on theories that have been
proposed in the fi eld of business administration and economics.


-----

(3) companies that provide such defense equipment, etc.,
are limited. In addition, it is diffi cult for companies to
systematically move forward with their businesses with
a high degree of predictability, which is peculiar to the
defense industry.
For this reason, the upper limit of acts that incur
national debt prescribed in the Public Finance Act as
within fi ve years in principle was changed to within ten
years for specifi c equipment through the enactment of
the Long-term Contract Act.[6] The introduction of this
change regarding long-term contracts will make stable
procurement possible, leading to the realization of the
systematic improvement of defense capability. At the
same time, for companies, given that the procurement
amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel
and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk
orders, will be made possible. Furthermore, this will
prevent subcontractors from withdrawing from the
defense industry.

See Fig. III-4-3-2 (Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect)

See

In the FY2017 budget, six GSDF CH-47JA transport
helicopters are to be procured in bulk based on a longterm contract.

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (3 Initiatives for greater effi ciency)

In addition, by realizing longer-term multiple-year
contracts utilizing the PFI Act,[7] it achieves the planned
acquisition and execution of budgets through the
standardization of investment amounts of the national
expenditure and draws out certain benefi ts such as
cutting equipment procurement costs by reducing risks
for those taking orders and by promoting the entry of


new suppliers. As projects using the PFI Act, the MOD
launched the “project of development and operation of
X-band satellite communications” in January 2013 and
the “project of operation and management of private
ships” in March 2016.
In addition, regarding procurement of certain
equipment with which little competitiveness can be
expected due to its characteristics, and companies that
work on cost reduction using the MOD’s programs, the
MOD promotes limited tendering contracts while ensuring
transparency and fairness as well as clarifying and
putting the subject into patterns, from the perspective of
the implementation of smooth and effi cient procurement,
and the enhancement of the company’s predictability.
Specifi cally, as a new initiative, in acquiring new
destroyers with the combined features of improved
capabilities to respond to various missions planned
during FY2018 and a compact hull, the MOD has adopted
a procurement method to acquire the new destroyer
effi ciently equipped with the necessary functions and
to maintain and strengthen the construction technology
base since February 2017. This is done by selecting a
party that has made the best proposal with respect to the
MOD’s requirements as a procurement counterparty, with
the runner-up also involved in designing and building
facilities as a subcontractor.

**3** **Decrease Procurement Cost and Improve**
**Companies’ Incentives to Reduce Cost**


**3**


With regard to the procurement of defense equipment,


Fig. III-4-3-2 Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect

|FY2017|FY2018|FY2019|FY2020|FY2021|FY2022|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||Delivery of three helicopters||
|||||||
|Conclusion of a contract|||||Delivery of three helicopters|
|||||||


|FY2017|FY2018|FY2019|FY2020|FY2021|FY2022|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||
|||||||


Fig. III-4-3-2


[Traditional procurement (image)]

FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022

Delivery of three Total of
helicopters approx. 53.1
Conclusion of Delivery of three billion yen
a contract helicopters

Conclusion of
a contract

Reduction of
8.6 billion yen
(Reduction
by 16.2%)

[Procurement based on long-term contracts (image)]

FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020 FY2021 FY2022

Total of
approx. 44.5
billion yen

Conclusion of Delivery of Delivery of

a contract three helicopters three helicopters


“Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specifi c Defense Procurement” (enacted in April 2015)


-----

there is a large variety of equipment without a market
price, and therefore, they tend to have high prices. In
light of this characteristic, it is necessary to achieve both
the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of
companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously.
Thus, the MOD has been striving to achieve the reduction
of procurement prices by confi rming the actual costs
incurred and ensuring that no excessive business profi t will
be added after the execution of the contract through cost
audit contracts with a special provision requiring respective
companies to conduct a review of the contract sum and
return any excessive profi t (audit contracts incorporating a
provision requiring the return of excessive profi t).
However, it has also been noted that these contracts
diminish the companies’ motivation for cost reduction as
they would be required to return excessive profi ts after

**Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives**
**3**


**1** **Effective and Effi cient Maintenance and**
**Replenishment**


the completion of the contract payment at the end of the
fi scal year. Therefore, the MOD conducts a review of a
new incentive contract system in which public and private
sectors jointly carry out the management of contract
implementation to minimize the risk of it, and in which a
certain percentage will be given back to the companies if
the cost reduction has been performed.
In addition, using special research offi cers
and companies with expertise, the MOD conducts
examinations of frameworks for reviewing cost reduction
measures based on a public-private partnership, and
new methods for more effi cient and reduced equipment
procurement costs by encouraging competition among
companies by way of the MOD’s active evaluation of
business partners.

contract system. In the FY2017 budget, reduction of
development expenses is expected by developing new
ship-to-air missiles based on surface-to-air missiles as an
effort to promote product families of equipment.
The MOD also carries out bulk purchases, seeking
greater effi ciency by budgeting and entering into contracts
for defense equipment, supplies, and components based
on the approach of consolidating the quantities required
for several years into a single specifi c fi scal year. In the
FY2017 budget, some reduction in expenses is expected
due to a bulk purchase of high-performance 20mm
autocannons for destroyers, computer software licenses,
and other equipment.
In addition, the MOD plans to immediately facilitate
the compilation of a database on the breakdown of
procurement price and actual price of major equipment
in the past. By using this database, the Ministry expects
not only to verify the validity of procurement prices, but
also to enhance the accuracy and effi ciency of life cycle
cost estimation for new equipment.

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (3 Initiatives for Increasing the Effi ciency

of Procurement)


**1**


With regard to periodic maintenance checks of defense
equipment, the MOD has been working to achieve
greater effi ciency by extending the interval between the
maintenance checks, after making suffi cient effort to
ensure safety. In the FY2017 budget, some cost reductions
are expected by reviewing the method of maintenance
and development of transport helicopter engines.
In addition, the MOD embarks on the introduction of
Performance Based Logistics (PBL)[8] from the perspective
of improving the equipment availability ratio and longterm cost reductions. In the FY2017 budget, cost savings
as well as improvement of equipment availability and
securing of preparedness for timely and appropriate parts
supply can be expected by concluding PBL contracts on
the maintenance of MSDF transport aircraft (C-130R)
and other aircraft.

See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 4 (3 Initiatives for Increasing the Effi ciency

of Procurement)

**2** **Achieving Further Effi ciency in the Acquisition**
**of Defense Equipment**


**2**


**3** **Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency**

**3**


The MOD implements measures for making contracts
more appropriate and strengthening checking functions
to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency
in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials.


When acquiring defense equipment, the MOD aims
to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance
expenses by procuring common equipment and supplies
in bulk, standardizing some components, and developing
product families, etc., in addition to a review of the


PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation according to the level of equipment performance achieved, in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive


-----

Fig. III-4-3-3 Inspection and Audit Functions regarding the Procurement of Defense Equipment


Fig. III-4-3-3


Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics Agency (ATLA)

Other organizations Commissioner, ATLA
and agencies Third-party organization

Assistant Commissioner

Inspector General’s Office
of Legal Compliance (Director,) Audit and Evaluation Division Defense Procurement Council

(Deliberation conducted

H Directly reports the results and H 25 staff members (regular staff as of the end by external experts)
improvement plans of defense of FY2016)
inspections to the Minister of Defense. H Internal inspection: inspection carried out from H Seven external experts including

the perspectives of compliance and the prevention university professors, lawyers, and

Defense of collusive bidding.
inspection H Internal audit: an audit regarding accounting and certified public accountants.

tasks such as project management, research and H Study and deliberation will be

Auditing Division at development and procurement Internal conducted on rules regarding procurement, project management,
the Minister’s Secretariat Human Resources H 14 staff members inspection single bidder projects, and

H Conducts an audit of ATLA as necessary. Development Center (regular staff as of the end of FY2016) Internalaudit specifications, etc.

Audit Training and education regarding compliance, etc. Study anddeliberation

Internal and external multi-layered checks and
mutual supervision within the organization

implementationReportingstatus Project ManagementDepartment of Audit Firm

(Project Management Group)

Corporations Equipment development

Contracts, etc. Department of officer, etc. of rulemaking andoperation statusUnderstanding Equipment PolicyDepartment of H management and operational Evaluation on the operation of project

Procurement Operations Department of Evaluation status, etc.
(Practical Development and Technology Strategy H Use of the results of evaluation for
Procurement Group) Applicationfor various Procurement ManagementDepartment of the improvement of duties and enhancement of internal audit

approvals, etc. (Rulemaking Group) capabilities.


As a part of the effort to “make public procurement
more appropriate” across the whole government, the
MOD continues to carry out the introduction and
expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system[9]
and make bidding procedures more effi cient. In addition
to these, based on refl ection on the past, Strengthening
system investigation, reviewing penalties, ensuring
the effectiveness of supervision and inspection, and
other measures have steadily been carried out in order
to prevent recurrence of incidents such as overcharging
and falsifi ed results of product testing by defense-related
companies. Through these measures, the MOD strives to
surely prevent recurrence of scandals, enhance fairness
and transparency, and make contracts more appropriate.
In addition, ATLA carries out multilayered checks
through both internal and external checking systems
for stricter checks – namely, ATLA conducts internal
inspections, etc., by establishing the inspection and audit
department, and through deliberations in the Defense


Procurement Council, which consists of inspectors and
external experts, and defense inspection conducted by
the Inspector General’s Offi ce of Legal Complaints.
Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education
department and strives to enhance compliance awareness
by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance
for ATLA personnel.
However, despite these efforts, it was revealed
through the special defense inspection conducted by
the Inspector General’s Offi ce of Legal Compliance
in December 2016 that fairness was not suffi ciently
ensured in the procedure of selecting a model of the
MSDF multipurpose helicopter (ship-based). The MOD
conducts reviews of its checking function with respect
to model selection and has made the model selection
procedure notifi cation process more rigorous, etc., as
measures to prevent the recurrence of the scandal, and
strives to further enhance fairness and transparency.

See Fig. III-4-3-3 (Inspection and Audit Functions regarding the

Procurement of Defense Equipment)


Unlike the automatic bid system which focuses only on price, this is a system which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and


-----

**Section 4 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**


Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense
Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation
in defense equipment and technology with other countries
in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and
enhancement of defense production and technological
bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of peace
and international cooperation. Japan will continue to

**Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology**
**1**


**1** **Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles**
**on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology**

**1**


Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner,
in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports
and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand,
in individual cases, such as the participation of domestic
companies in the joint development of Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) by Japan and the United States, it has
taken separate measures in which arms exports are dealt
with outside the Three Principles.[1]

Amidst this situation, in April 2014, based on the
National Security Strategy, the Government formulated
the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment
and Technology as new principles replacing the Three
Principles on Arms Exports etc.[2] and its implementation
guidelines. These clarifi ed the concrete standards,
procedures and limitation.

See Reference 75 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment

and Technology)


realize effective defense equipment and technological
cooperation through the strengthening of intelligence
gathering such as the needs of its counterparts,
cooperation including assistance for maintenance and
repair of equipment, and strengthening of cooperative
posture between the public and private sectors.

**2** **Main Contents of the New Three Principles**


**(1) Clarifi cation of Cases Where Transfers are**
**Prohibited (the First Principle)**

The cases where overseas transfers of defense equipment
are prohibited are clarifi ed as follows: (1) in the case of
violating the obligations based on agreements signed by
Japan and other international agreements; (2) in the case
of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of
the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of
transferring to the countries in confl icts.

See Fig. III-4-4-1 (The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are

Prohibited”)


**(2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be**
**Permitted As Well As Strict Examination and**
**Information Disclosure (the Second Principle)**

The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to
(1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace
contribution and international cooperation, or (2) cases
that contribute to the security of Japan. The Government
will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of
the destination and end user whilst ensuring transparency,
and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment


Fig. III-4-4-1 The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited”

|Situation|Specif ic examples|
|---|---|
|(1) Violation of obligations under treaties concluded and other international arrangements|Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms Trade Treaty, etc.|
|(2) Violation of obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions|Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), etc.|
|(3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a conf lict|Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack|


Fig. III-4-4-1

**Situation** **Specifi c examples**

(1) Violation of obligations under treaties concluded Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms
and other international arrangements Trade Treaty, etc.
(2) Violation of obligations under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), etc.
Security Council Resolutions

Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or
(3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a confl ict
restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack


In December 2011, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports
based on the premise of strict control, with regard to (1) cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation, and (2) cases regarding international joint development and production of
defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan’s security.

The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help peace
contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that


-----

Fig. III-4-4-2 The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be Permitted”

|Situation|Specif ic examples|
|---|---|
|(1) Contribution to the proactive advancement of peace contribution and international cooperation|Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation and when: ● the recipient is a foreign government, or ● the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution|
|(2) Contribution to the security of Japan|Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that: ● are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., ● contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., and of the following: • overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services implemented by the SDF in accordance with laws, • provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S., • provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed forces, or • defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or ● are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are: • temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items, • export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public off icials, or • export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas|


Fig. III-4-4-2


**Situation** **Specifi c examples**

(1) Contribution to the Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers have
proactive advancement positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation and when:
of peace contribution and -  the recipient is a foreign government, or
international cooperation -  the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution

Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s
security, and that:

-  are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,

-  contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S.,
and of the following:

-  overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services implemented by the SDF
in accordance with laws,

-  provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S.,

(2) Contribution to the -  provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed forces, or
security of Japan -  defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or

minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or

-  are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as
“the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or
for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are:

-  temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the
SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items,

-  export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public offi cials, or

-  export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas


and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. In
addition, it has been decided that important cases would
be deliberated at the National Security Council and along
with this, information concerning the cases that were
deliberated would be disclosed.

See Fig. III-4-4-2 (The Second Principle “Limitation to Cases Where

Transfers May Be Permitted”)

**(3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose**
**Use or Transfer to Third Parties (the Third Principle)**

Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology


will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control
is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige
the government of the recipient country to gain its prior
consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third
parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate
for the active promotion of peace contribution and
international cooperation, cases involving participation
in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases
where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control
may be ensured with the confi rmation of the control
system at the destination.

**Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**
**2**


**2** **Production, Sustainment and Maintenance of**
**Common Equipment between Japan and the**

**2**

**United States**


**1** **Joint Research and Development, etc.**

**1**


Since 1992, Japan has implemented 21 joint research
projects and 1 joint development project with the United
States. At present, 4 joint research projects (joint research
on hybrid electric propulsion, joint research on highspeed multi-hull vessel optimization, joint research
on the comparison of exposure to jet fuel and noise in
unit operation, and joint research on Chemical Agent
Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader) and 1 development
project (Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an
Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor) are underway. In
addition, with regard to the transfer of software and parts
related to the Aegis System from Japan to the United
States, Japan affi rmed in July 2015 that this overseas
transfer falls under the case, which may be permitted,
based on deliberations at the National Security Council.

See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3-2 (Missile Defense of the United

States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation)
Reference 25 (Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects)


**(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production**
**of the F-35A and the Establishment of Regional**
**Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade**
**(MRO&U) Capability**

In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A fi ghter
aircraft as the next-generation fi ghter aircraft to succeed
the F-4 fi ghter aircraft. At the same time, the Government
decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to
have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside
from several complete aircraft, which shall be imported.
In light of this decision, the Japanese Government has
been working to enable the involvement of Japanese
industries in the manufacturing process in preparation
for the acquisition of F-35A fi ghter aircraft from FY2013
onwards. So far the Japanese Government has decided
th f d ti ti i ti b J


-----

industries including the Final Assembly and Check Out
(FACO) for airframe and engines, the manufacture of some
engine parts (19 items) and radar parts (7 items), and the
manufacture of some Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture
System (EODAS)[3] parts (3 items).
Possessing the skills and facilities required for FACO
for airframe and engines is important for Japanese companies
in implementing effective operational support for the F-35A
fighter aircraft such as for the following reasons:
❍ The ability to offer a swift response within Japan in
the event that an airframe and engines suffer damage
and require work that cannot be carried out by the SDF
unit itself, including the repair or replacement of major
structural components, such as main wings, fuselage,
and turbines without transporting the airframe and
engines overseas; and
❍ The ability to carry out refurbishment work domestically,
in the event that performance improvements to the
F-35A fighter aircraft are sought in future.
In addition, participation of Japanese companies in
the implementation of FACO and parts production will
have significance in that they will be able to come in
contact with the system integration technology of stealth
fighter as well as the cutting-edge fighter technology
and know-how. Therefore, it will also contribute to
strengthening of defense production and technological
bases. The F-35A fighter aircraft on which FACO was
conducted for the first time in Japan is scheduled to be
completed by June 2017 and deployed to ASDF air bases
after implementing test flights, etc.
As global operation of F-35 fighter aircraft is
anticipated, the U.S. Government plans to establish
maintenance depot (regional Maintenance, Repair,
Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability) mainly for
airframe and engine in the North America, Europe, and
the Asia-Pacific regions. In December 2014, with regard
to regional MRO&U in the Asia-Pacific region for F-35,
the U.S. Government announced the following decisions:
(1) Regional MRO&U Capability for airframe will be
provided to Japan and Australia with both capabilities
required not later than early 2018;[4] (2) With regard to the
regional MRO&U Capability for engine, initial capability
will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan
providing additional capability at least 3-5 years later.[5]
Establishing a maintenance depot that utilizes the


F-35A fighter aircraft whose final assembly was conducted in Japan for the first time

FACO facility for airframe and engine within Japan, and
contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacific region are
significant from the perspectives of securing the operational
support system for F-35A fighter aircraft in Japan,
maintaining the foundation of the Japanese defense industry,
strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening
equipment cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.


**(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of a Common**
**Maintenance Base of the Japan-U.S. Osprey**

As the Planed Maintenance Interval (PMI) of the U.S. Marine
Corps Osprey (24 aircrafts) deployed at Futenma is scheduled
to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Navy carried out a
public tender to select a maintenance company and decided
to select Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.[6] as the maintenance
company for this purpose in October 2015. In February
2017, the PMI commenced at GSDF Camp Kisarazu.
The MOD intends to establish common maintenance
base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Osprey by
allowing the maintenance company to use the hangar at
GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S.
Marine Corps Osprey and also to implement the future
aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Osprey at the same camp
from the following perspectives: (1) Smooth introduction
of the GSDF Osprey (V-22);[7] (2) Smooth and effective
operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements; and
(3) Enhanced efficiency in maintenance. The establishment
of common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu
would be extremely significant in that it will lead to the
realization of the reduction of Okinawa’s burden as well
as the “Strengthening the basis to repair and maintain
common equipment” stated in the new guideline.


Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS), comprising six built-in cutting edge infrared sensors per aircraft, realizes 360-degree spherical situational awareness, and enables missile
detection and tracking.

The regional MRO&U for airframe in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture)

The regional MRO&U for engine in Japan is scheduled to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho factory in Tokyo)

The company was renamed SUBARU Corporation on April 1, 2017.

GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47J) in terms of cruising speed and range. In June 2015, a


-----

**Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**
**3**


**1** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation**
**with Major European Countries, etc.**

**1**


Defense equipment and technology cooperation with
major European countries, which have competitive defense
industries, will contribute to the strengthening of security
and defense cooperation with these countries as well as the
maintenance and strengthening of the defense production
and technological base in Japan. Therefore, Japan seeks
to establish and deepen relationships with these countries.


**(2) France**
Japan and France established a committee on cooperation
in the fi eld of defense equipment and a committee on
export control in January 2014, and signed the Agreement
concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and
Technology[11] in March 2015. In addition, during the
Third Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’
Meeting in January 2017, the two countries confi rmed
their expectations for early materialization of the
cooperation regarding unmanned underwater vehicle
(UUV) for mine detection.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((2) France)


**(1) United Kingdom** (UUV) for mine detection.
In July 2013, the Governments of Japan and the United See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((2) France)

See

Kingdom concluded a bilateral Agreement on the Transfer
of Defense Equipment and Technology.[8] In the same **(3) Italy**
month, the two countries also started joint research on At the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting held in March 2017,
chemical and biological protection technology, marking the two countries agreed to start negotiations on an
the fi rst time that Japan had engaged in such research agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and
with a country other than the United States. technology, and signed the Agreement[12] in May 2017.
Also, in July 2014, technology information on air- See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((4) Other European Countries)
to-air missile seeker technology[9] for joint research with
the United Kingdom was determined by the National

**2** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation, etc.,**

Security Council as a case where overseas transfer may be

**with Partner Countries in the Asia-Pacifi c Region**

**2**

permitted as stipulated in the Three Principles on Transfer
of Defense Equipment and Technology. Responding to As partner countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region have expressed
the said decision, in November of the same year, a letter their interest and expectation regarding defense equipment
of arrangement was formulated in relation to “Japan- and technology cooperation with Japan, the MOD proactively
U.K. co-operative research project on the feasibility of seeks to build relationships with these countries.
a joint new air-to-air missile” and the joint research was
commenced. In July 2016, the joint research on personnel **(1) Australia**
vulnerability evaluation (PVE) in relation to the research With Australia, the Agreement between the Government
and development of personal equipment was launched. of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the
Furthermore, an arrangement on the Japan-U.K. joint Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[13] was
preliminary study on potential collaborative opportunities signed in July 2014. In addition, Japan commenced the
for future combat air system (FCAS)[10]/future fi ghter joint research in the fi eld of marine hydrodynamics in
between the defense authorities of the two countries was December 2015.
signed in March 2017. Based on the agreement of this Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence
arrangement, the two countries will conduct information Ministerial Meeting held in October 2014, it was agreed
exchanges regarding future fi ghter and the FCAS that to seek multifaceted defense equipment and technology
are under study by Japan and the United Kingdom cooperation, including the following: (1) exploration of
respectively, and exchange opinions about the potential potential cooperation opportunities in the F-35 program;
for future collaboration. (2) acquisition reform dialogue with the Defence

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((1) The United Kingdom) Material Organisation of Australia; (3) at the request


8 Offi cial name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military
Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items

9 A missile component device for searching, detecting and tracking targets.

10 Generic name of the whole future fi ghter aircraft system in the United Kingdom.

11 Offi cial name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology

12 Offi cial name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technologyi


-----

of the Australian side, exploration of the possibility of
Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine
Program; (4) defense technology exchanges with the
Defence Science and Technology Organisation of
Australia (marine hydrodynamics field and exchanges
among engineers and scientists); and (5) talks between
defense industries in both countries.
Furthermore, based on a request from the
Government of Australia during the Japan-Australia
Defense Ministerial telephone conference in May 2015,
Japan submitted the proposal for the Future Submarine
Program in November 2015. Afterwards, in April 2016,
the Government of Australia announced that they selected
a French company as their international partner for the
Program. The Government of Australia explained this
decision by stating that this company had demonstrated
the most suitable capabilities to fulfill the overall requests
on capabilities which were specific to Australia.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation

and Exchanges)

See


**(2) India**
With India that has been considering the acquisition of
amphibious search and rescue aircraft, the establishment
of the Joint Working Group (JWG) to facilitate bilateral
cooperation for the US-2 rescue aircraft was decided
during the Japan-India Summit Meeting held in May
2013. So far, three JWG meetings have been held. At
the Summit Meeting in December 2015, the Agreement
between the Government of Japan and the Government
of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment
and Technology[14] was signed. In August 2016, the second
Japan-India JWG on Defence Equipment and Technology
Cooperation was held, and discussions for determining
specific items are underway.
At the Summit Meeting in November 2016, Prime
Minister Modi expressed the view that US-2 amphibian
aircraft was technically impressive. In addition, in the
Japan-India Joint Statement signed after the meeting,
Prime Minister Modi conveyed his appreciation for Japan’s
readiness to provide its state of the art defence platforms
such as US-2 amphibian aircraft. This symbolizes the
high degree of trust between the two countries, and the
distance that Japan and India have covered in advancing
their bilateral defence exchanges.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-3 (Japan-India Defense Cooperation

and Exchanges)


State Minister of Defense Wakamiya shaking hands with the Secretary of National Defense
of the Philippines in front of a TC-90 training aircraft to be lent to the Philippinesi

**(3) ASEAN Countries**
Between Japan and ASEAN member states, exchanges
of views take place regarding defense equipment and
technology cooperation in non-traditional security
sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
and maritime security through the Japan-ASEAN
Defense Vice-Ministerial Meetings and other occasions.
Participating countries have expressed their expectation
for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these
issues. In the “Vientiane Vision” announced by Japan at
the ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting
held in November 2016, it is stated that Japan’s defense
equipment and technological cooperation with ASEAN
countries would be promoted with a focus on the following
three points: (1) equipment and technology transfer,
(2) human resources development, and (3) holding
seminars on defense industries. As a specific initiative
with the Philippines, an official agreement was made
on the transfer of MSDF’s TC-90 training aircraft to
the Philippine Navy at the Japan-Philippines Summit
Meeting in September 2016, and TC-90 pilot training
has been conducted for pilots from the Philippine Navy
at the MSDF Tokushima Air Base since November
of the same year. Since February 2017, training for
maintenance personnel from the Philippine Navy was
carried out, and maintenance and repair assistance by a
Japanese maintenance company has also been provided.
Furthermore, two aircrafts were transferred to the
Philippine side in March 2017, and the remaining three
aircraft is planned to be transferred by the end of FY2017.
Between Vietnam, the Terms of Reference (TOR) for
regular consultations concerning defense equipment and
technological cooperation was signed during the JapanVietnam Defense Vice-ministerial Level Meeting in
November 2016, while with Indonesia a seminar on the
defense industry on the theme of maritime security was


-----

**i**

**Educational Support for Philippine Navy Pilots:**
**Transfer of MSDF Training Aircraft TC-90**

Lieutenant Commander Ryan Tumanda and Lieutenant
Commander Zyril Villacorta, Philippine Navy

The transfer of TC-90 is a pioneer project for defense equipment
and technology transfer between the Government of Japan and
the Government of the Philippines. As part of the agreement for
transferring fi ve TC-90 aircraft to the Philippines, training for Philippine
Navy pilots and maintenance personnel has been conducted.
We are greatly honored to have been selected by the Philippine
Navy to participate in the recent MSDF training. Being able to learn

From left, Lieutenant Commander Tumanda and Lieutenant Commander

about the maneuverability and operating procedure of TC-90 from Villacorta
MSDF pilots was a wonderful experience, which also expanded our
horizons. We think that MSDF instructors’ high skills and professionalism in relation to TC-90 maneuvering are worthy of respect,
and we cannot say enough about how lucky we were to receive guidance from them. While acquiring the maneuverability of TC-90
was quite challenging, we felt that it was a fantastic opportunity for us to deepen our knowledge about maneuvering aircraft. This
transfer will dramatically improve the capability of the Philippine Navy in performing various maritime activities. TC-90 will not only
complement islander aircraft (*) currently operated by the Philippines, but will also serve as appropriate transfer aircraft with a view to
acquiring maritime patrol aircraft. With respect to the transfer of TC-90, the Government of the Philippines and the Philippine people,
as well as us, are grateful to the Government of Japan and all of the people of Japan.

(*) Aircraft operated by the Philippine Navy for nearly 40 years.


**i**

**Training for Philippine Navy Maintenance Personnel:**
**Transfer of MSDF Training Aircraft TC-90**

Takashi Murakami, Section Chief, Technology Team, Technology Development Offi ce, Aircraft Maintenance Group,
Jamco Corporation

Jamco performs aircraft maintenance and manufactures aircraft
interior equipment and components. I belong to the department in
charge of the overall aircraft maintenance technology within the
Aircraft Maintenance Group. I have been involved in the transfer
of TC-90 to the Philippines due to the company’s involvement in
the remodeling, renovation, and periodic repair of TC-90. In this
connection, I served as a training instructor for Philippine Navy
maintenance personnel.
A major difference between TC-90 and the aircraft (Islander)
possessed by the Philippine Navy is that the former is turboprop

Mr. Murakami, fi rst from right, giving training and guidance to Philippine Navy

aircraft while the latter is reciprocating aircraft. During the training, maintenance personnel
Philippine Navy personnel worked hard to acquire the skills for
maintaining the aircraft while struggling with the differences between the two aircraft. The personnel participating in the training
will be instructing others in their home country, so they requested my explanation of any unsure points until they understood them
completely. Some of them listened to the explanation standing so as not to fall asleep. I was greatly impressed by their serious attitude
towards the training.
Since TC-90 maintenance skills cannot be acquired overnight, I imagine that the Philippine Navy will need to make a great deal
of efforts. If there are opportunities for us to support the Philippine Navy using our technology, we will be happy to do everything we
can. We will feel privileged to play a role as a bridge of friendship between Japan and the Philippines through such initiatives.


-----

held in July 2016. Going forward, the MOD will continue
to promote cooperation for humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief as well as the maritime security area
through these initiatives.

See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 (Defense Cooperation and

Exchanges with ASEAN Countries);

See

Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-2-3 ((3) Japan–ASEAN Defense ViceMinisterial Forum)

**3** **Establishment of Regulations on Equipment**
**Cooperation with Developing Countries**


leasing any governmental properties including the SDF s
equipment to other countries. Therefore, a transfer for
lower price than the current price is not allowed unless
otherwise provided.
Under these circumstances, to respond to the needs
of such friendly nations, a special provision to Article 9,
Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act[15] was created in the
SDF. This provision enables the MOD to grant or transfer
to the governments of developing states the SDF’s
equipment which are no longer used for a lower price
than the current price. (Legislation for the partial revision
of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense
and other Acts including this provision was approved in
May 2017).
Even in the case of granting or transferring equipment
for lower price than the current price pursuant to this
provision, whether or not to transfer such equipment and
to which government such equipment to be transferred
will be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of
the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment
and Technology and other regulations. In addition, an
international agreement must be concluded between
the Governments of Japan and the recipient countries to
prevent extra-purpose use and third party transfer of the
transferred equipment without the prior consent of Japan.[16]

**Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use**
**4**


F7-10 engine for which a contract for civilian use was signed


**3**


Surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment,
it has become even more important for Japan that the
nations which have a cooperative and friendly relationship
with Japan in terms of security and defense have appropriate
capabilities. It is also critical to develop a foundation that
will serve as the basis for the international community to
cooperate towards improving the security environment.
Among these friendly nations, some have diffi culties in
acquiring the adequate level of defense equipment by their
own because of their economic and fi nancial situations.
Some of these states are requesting to use SDF’s equipment
which are no longer used. However, Article 9, Paragraph 1
of the Public Finance Act stipulates that the Government
shall receive reasonable consideration when transferring or

**Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use**
**4**

With regard to aircraft involving many technological
bases shared between the defense and the civilian sectors,
the MOD has been considering the civilian use of aircraft
developed by the MOD from the perspective that taking
measures to contribute to the revitalization of the civilian
sector will contribute to maintaining and activating the
production and technological bases of Japanese aircraft,
and by extension, to maintaining and strengthening the
defense production and technological base in Japan. In
August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for
the development of a concrete system for converting
aircraft to civilian use, while in 2011, it also developed the
application procedure for private companies interested in
civilian use. So far, technical data related to the civilian
use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the F7-10
engine that are mounted on P-1 maritime patrol aircraft
have been disclosed and released in response to requests
from the implementing companies. In December 2016,
ATLA and IHI Corporation, a manufacturing company of


F7-10 engine, signed a contract for the civilian use of the
F7-10 for sales to JAXA for the fi rst time in Japan.
The MOD will consider the possibility of civilian use
of equipment other than aircraft based on the intention of
the defense industry.


15 Article 9, Paragraph 1 of the Public Finance Act (Act 34 of 1947)
Governmental assets, unless otherwise provided, may not be exchanged and used as other means of payment, or transferred or leased without reasonable consideration.


-----

**Technology Control**
**5**


In promoting defense equipment and technology
cooperation internationally, the MOD will properly
evaluate the sensitivity and strategic value of defense
technology and dual-use technology, and protect these
technologies that should be protected as strengths of


Japan. At the same time, from the perspective of Japan’s
security, the MOD will strengthen technology control in
cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, in order to avoid the risk of the diversion of
technologies into weapons.



**Participation in International Defense Equipment Exhibitions**
**6**


From the viewpoint of promoting defense equipment
and technology cooperation, ATLA participates in
international defense equipment exhibitions to introduce
Japan’s defense equipment policies and advanced
technology. These initiatives have led to the deep
understanding of foreign government officials regarding
Japan’s equipment policies and technology.
So far, ATLA has participated in Eurosatory in
France and Langkawi International, Maritime and
Aerospace exhibition (LIMA) in Malaysia to exhibit
the policy measures taken by ATLA, the outcomes of
research and development regarding domestic equipment,
and advanced technology possessed by Japanese
manufacturers. Domestically, ATLA also participated in
the Japan International Aerospace Exhibition 2016 that
took place at Tokyo Big Sight in October 2016. At the
exhibition, the Commissioner of ATLA delivered his
keynote speech, while ATLA also invited the leaders
of equipment acquisition organizations from Europe,
ASEAN, and other regions (from 15 countries in total)
to provide a tour at the exhibition venue, hold bilateral
meetings in collaboration with JSDF, and conduct a tour
of C-2 transport aircraft. Furthermore, ATLA participated
in MAST Asia 2017 held at Makuhari Messe in June
2017. Also ATLA held bilateral and multilateral meetings
for promoting defense equipment and technology
cooperation going forward. The Commissioner of
ATLA and other officials participated in symposiums to
disseminate information on Japan’s measures concerning
defense equipment and technology.


ATLA official giving an explanation on the F7-10 engine at the Japan International
Aerospace Exhibition

Heads of equipment acquisition organizations and Air Force Chiefs of Staff from various
countries observing a C-2 transport aircraft


-----

**Interaction with Local Communities**

**Chapter**
### 5

**and Japanese Citizens**


Various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement
without the understanding and cooperation of each
and every person and local governments. Therefore it

**Section 1 Collaboration with Local Communities**

**Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society**
**1**


The MOD/SDF conducts activities to support the lives
of citizens in a range of fields, in response to requests
from local governments and relevant organizations.
Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust
in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and
confidence.
The GSDF handles the disposal of unexploded
ordnance found throughout Japan. In FY2016, there
were approx. 1,379 such cases (approx. 42.1 tons).
In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture
accounted for approx. 61% of the total cases. The MSDF
clears and disposes of underwater mines and other
dangerous explosives, and approx. 23,598 explosives
(approx. 4.2 tons) were handled in FY2016.
The SDF camps and bases allow the local residents
access to their facilities to the extent that it does not
interfere with unit activities, thus striving to foster friendly
interaction with local communities. The SDF also provides
transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic
events. In addition, it supports regional medical treatment
efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF


is necessary to further deepen the trust between local
communities and people, and the SDF.

hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for
emergency patients from isolated islands. Furthermore,
based on national policy,[1] the MOD/SDF ensures
opportunities for local small and medium sized enterprises to
receive orders, while taking effi ciency into account, by such
measures as the promotion of separated/ divided ordering[2]
and the securing of competition amongst companies within
the same qualifi cation and grade divisions.[3]

See Reference 76 (Activities in Civic Life);

Reference 77 (Activities Contributing to Society)


ASDF Blue Impulse fl ying over the Kumamoto Castle
at the Kumamoto Revival Flight Festival


MSDF underwater disposal personnel preparing for mine bombing An emergency patient being transported on an ASDF U-125A search and rescue aircraft

“The Contract Basic Policy of the Government regarding Small and Medium Enterprises in FY2015” (Cabinet decision on August 28, 2015)

For example, this is a method through which grouping of products, etc. takes place when putting up the order for general competitive bidding, and then a successful bidder for the groups is decided.


-----

**Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF**
**2**


Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation,
the cooperation from local governments and relevant
organizations is vital to secure highly qualifi ed personnel
and to support the reemployment of uniformed SDF
personnel who retire at a relatively young age under the
SDF’s early retirement system.
The SDF camps and bases maintain close relations
with local communities, and therefore, various forms of

**Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents**
**3**


Regional Defense Bureaus established in eight locations
nationwide make efforts to build cooperative relationships
with their respective local communities, through
collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation
Offi ces. Specifi cally, Regional Defense Bureaus hold
seminars on defense issues for local residents and provide
explanations about the annual white paper, Defense
of Japan, to local governments in order to gain wide
understanding on defense policies. They also host JapanU.S. friendship programs for citizens who live near U.S.
Forces facilities and areas in Japan, U.S. Forces personnel,
and the families to interact with each other through sports
and music. Furthermore, Regional Defense Bureaus
provide necessary explanations and conduct coordination
for relevant local governments when implementing the
realignment of the U.S. Forces, the reorganization of
SDF units, deployment of equipment, and training. They
also conduct the necessary liaison and coordination in
the event of disaster, accident, or any other emergency
situation, such as major earthquakes.


support and cooperation from the local community are
indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities,
including education and training, and disaster dispatch.
Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international
peace cooperation operations and other duties receive
support and cooperation from the relevant organizations
for the procedures involved.

**Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents**

In recent years, cases of interference against SDF
and U.S. Forces aircraft by kite fl ying and laser irradiation
have frequently occurred in the areas surrounding air
stations in Atsugi and Futenma, including the case in
November 2016 which led to an arrest of an individual
on suspicion of laser irradiation against SDF aircraft in
fl ight. These are extremely dangerous and malicious acts
that may disrupt a pilot’s ability to control aircraft and
result in a catastrophe such as a crash. From the viewpoint
of preventing unforeseen accidents in advance, as well as
ensuring the safety of the area and the safe operation of
aircraft, the MOD disseminates information regarding the
risks involved in those acts to local residents by putting up
posters and requests their cooperation in reporting to the
police while closely cooperating with relevant ministries
and agencies as well as relevant local governments.
Additionally, the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil
Aeronautics Act was revised in December 2016, making
these interference acts subject to regulation as well as
fi nes and other penalties.


**Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas**
**4**


aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause
noise and other issues, impacting the living environment
of local residential communities.

See Fig. III-5-1-1 (Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots))

Fig. III-5-1-2 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan
(Exclusively Used Facilities))


**1** **Scale and Features of Defense Facilities**


The uses of defense facilities are diverse, and they often
require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January
1, 2017, approx. 28% of the land area of the facilities and
areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan is
jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S.
Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose to enhance
the diversity and effi ciency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training
and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted
establishment and operations of defense facilities have
emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of
th d f f iliti Al th bl i th t f t


**KeyWord** Defense facilities

This is a generic term referring to the facilities used by the SDF as

well as the facilities and areas used by the U.S. Forces in Japan in

accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.


-----

Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in
Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)


Fig. III-5-1-1 Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)

|T|otal area: Approx. 1,089km2|
|---|---|

|Col1|Total area: Approx. 264km2|
|---|---|

|(as of January 1, 2017)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Other regions 10% Approx. 111km2 Kanto region 5% Approx. 57km2 Kyushu region 12% Approx. 135km2 Tohoku region 14% Approx. 147km2 Chubu region 16% Approx. 178km2|||||||||
|Hokkaido region 42% Approx. 460km2|||||||||
|accounting for approx. 0.3% otal area: Approx. 1,089km2 of Japan’s land area|||||||||
|Maneuver Areas 75% Approx. 813km2|||||||||
|Airfields 7% Approx. 81km2 Barracks 5% Approx. 55km2 Others 13% Approx. 140km2|||||||||

|(as of January 1, 2017)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Other regions 8% Approx. 22km2 Tohoku region 9% Approx. 24km2 Kanto region 12% Approx. 32km2||||||
|Okinawa Prefecture 70.6% Approx. 186km2||||||
|Total area: accounting for 0.07% of Approx. 264km2 Japan’s land area||||||
|Maneuver Areas 47% Approx. 124km2||||||
|Airfields 23% Approx. 60km2 Warehouses 15% Approx. 40km2 Others 15% Approx. 40km2||||||


Fig. III-5-1-1


Fig. III-5-1-2


(as of January 1, 2017)

Other regions 10% Approx. 111km[2]
Kanto region 5% Approx. 57km[2]
Kyushu region 12% Approx. 135km[2]
Tohoku region 14% Approx. 147km[2]

Chubu region
16% Approx. 178km[2]

Distribution Hokkaido region
by region 42% Approx. 460km[2]

accounting for approx. 0.3%
Total area: Approx. 1,089km[2]
of Japan’s land area

Distribution Maneuver Areas 75% Approx. 813km[2]
by use

Airfields 7% Approx. 81km[2]

Barracks 5% Approx. 55km[2]

Others 13% Approx. 140km[2]

0 20 40 60 80 100

(%)

Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.


(as of January 1, 2017)

Other regions 8% Approx. 22km[2]

Tohoku region 9% Approx. 24km[2]

Kanto region 12% Approx. 32km[2]

Distribution Okinawa Prefecture 70.6%
by region Approx. 186km[2]

Total area: accounting for 0.07% of
Approx. 264km[2] Japan’s land area

Distribution Maneuver Areas 47%
by use Approx. 124km[2]

Airfields 23% Approx. 60km[2]

Warehouses 15% Approx. 40km[2]

Others 15% Approx. 40km[2]

0 20 40 60 80 100

(%)

Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.


Fig. III-5-1-3 Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

|Purpose|Measures|Description of Measures|
|---|---|---|
|Preventing Noise Problems|Subsidies to f inance sound insulation work|● Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly ● Housing|
||Compensation for relocations|● Compensation for relocating buildings ● Land procurement ● Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated|
||Improving green belts|● Planting trees, installing grass f ields|
|Preventing Impact Besides Noise|Subsidies to f niance impediment prevention work|● Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities|
|Reducing Impediment Related to Living and Business|Subsidies for building facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives|● Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, f ire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. ● Agricultural facilities, f ishing facilities|
|Reducing Impact on Surrounding Areas|Provision of specif ied defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants|● Improving public facilities such as traff ci facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities ● Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.*|


Fig. III-5-1-3


**Purpose** **Measures** **Description of Measures**

-  Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical

Subsidies to fi nance sound facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service
insulation work centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly

-  Housing

Preventing Noise Problems -  Compensation for relocating buildings

-  Land procurement

Compensation for relocations

-  Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the
area where housing, etc., is to be relocated
Improving green belts -  Planting trees, installing grass fi elds
Preventing Impact Subsidies to fi nance impediment -  Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities
Besides Noise prevention work

Reducing Impediment Subsidies for building facilities -  Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fi re departments, parks, waste disposal facilities,
Related to Living and meant to stabilize people’s welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc.
Business lives -  Agricultural facilities, fi shing facilities

Provision of specifi ed defense -  Improving public facilities such as traffi c facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities

Reducing Impact on

facilities environs improvement -  Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance

Surrounding Areas

adjustment grants for school buildings, etc.*

-  Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011)


See


Fig. III-5-1-3 (Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities
and Surrounding Areas)
Reference 78 (Outline of Measures to Improve the Living
Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities)


**2** **Initiatives to Promote Harmony between Defense**
**Facilities and Surrounding Areas**

**2**


Defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the
defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security
Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s
security. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain conditions
for constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony
between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas
as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of
the local residents. For that purpose, the MOD has taken
measures to promote harmony between defense facilities
and surrounding areas since 1974, based on the Act on
Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around
D f F iliti (Li i E i t I t A t)


**(1) Measures based on the Act on Improvement of Living**
**Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities**

Based on the Living Environment Improvement Act, the
MOD has implemented various measures to prevent,
alleviate, and mitigate impact such as aircraft noise in
the surrounding areas caused by the SDF or U.S. Forces
activities, or by establishing and operating defense
facilities including airfi elds. Furthermore, taking into
consideration the requests from the relevant local
governments, the MOD partially revised the Living
E i t I t A t i 2011 d d t d


-----

review to enable the Specifi ed Defense Facilities Environs
Improvement Adjustment Grants to be applied to socalled soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses.
In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be
eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway
to provide sound insulation at residences and efforts are
being made to ensure its further progress.
Regarding the Specifi ed Defense Facilities Environs
Improvement Adjustment Grants, the MOD has
implemented initiatives such as the PDCA Cycle process
since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of
these grants.

See Reference 79 (Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment,

etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities)

See


**(2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense**
**Facilities and Surrounding Areas**

In response to the requests by related local governments,
the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve
more effective and effi cient measures to harmonize


defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the
severe fi scal situation.

See Fig. III-5-1-4 (FY2017 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near Bases

(Based on Expenditures))

See


FY2017 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas
near Bases (Based on Expenditures)

|Project|Mainland|Okinawa|
|---|---|---|
|Projects for preventing disturbances|82|17|
|Sound insulation projects|403|83|
|Measures related to relocations|36|1|
|Subsidies for stabilizing people’s livelihoods|234|51|
|Road improvement projects|56|6|
|Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants|205|33|
|Other projects|13|1|


Fig. III-5-1-4


(100 million yen)

**Project** **Mainland** **Okinawa**

Projects for preventing
82 17
disturbances

Sound insulation projects 403 83

Measures related to relocations 36 1
Subsidies for stabilizing
234 51
people’s livelihoods

Road improvement projects 56 6
Environs Improvement
205 33
Adjustment Grants

Other projects 13 1


**Commentary**

**Initiatives Taken by Local Authorities in the Vicinity of**
**Defense Facilities**

To ensure the stability of the lives and the enhancement of the welfare of local residents, local authorities in the vicinity of defense
facilities conduct various initiatives to improve the living environment utilizing the national subsidy provided by the MOD to deal with
obstacles resulting from the presence of defense facilities.
For example, if the lives of local residents are affected by the presence of defense facilities, the national subsidy is used to install
fi refi ghting vehicles and other equipment in order to facilitate fi refi ghting activities.
In addition, using the national subsidy, the MOD conducts noise insulation work at schools and hospitals that require a quiet
environment, so as to prevent and reduce the noise generated by the takeoff and landing of aircraft at the airfi elds of the SDF and the
U.S. Forces in Japan. The MOD also provides assistance for noise insulation work at private residences.

An example of a fi refi ghting vehicle Example of noise
that was installed insulation work Ventilation

Sound
absorption Temperature holding

Sound and dehumidifi cation
insulation

(Photo provided by Kumejima Town, Okinawa) (Photo provided by Oarai Town, Ibaraki)
In Kumejima, the town where the Kumejima Air-to-Ground Range is located, Noise insulation work involves the installation of soundproof sashes (sound
the MOD prepared a high standard ambulance car for the Kumejima Fire insulation), installation of air-conditioning equipment to keep the sealed
Fighting Headquarters to facilitate their fi refi ghting activities. indoor environment comfortable (ventilation, temperature holding and

dehumidifi cation), and the installation of sound absorption materials on the
room walls and ceilings (sound absorption).

As these examples demonstrate, cooperation with relevant local authorities is essential for facilitating harmony between defense
facilities and their surrounding communities.


-----

**Section 2** **[Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, ]**
**and Related Activities**


**Various Public Relations Activities**
**1**


As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out
without the understanding and support of the Japanese
people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking
easily comprehensible public relations activities and to
gain the trust and cooperation of the public.
According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the SelfDefense Forces and Defense Issues” conducted by the
Cabinet Offi ce (in January 2015), the public expectations
and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing
as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both
domestically and internationally. In light of this result,
the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR
activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding
of the current status of the MOD/SDF.
In addition, given that understanding and support
from foreign countries are also of utmost importance
for the SDF to conduct its missions successfully, it is
essential that the MOD strengthens efforts to provide
information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF


initiatives, including about SDF activities abroad.

See Reference 80 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and

Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Offi ce of Cabinet Offi ce))

See


**1** **Information Communication for Domestic and**
**International Audiences**


**1**


The MOD/SDF conducts PR activities using the Internet
such as offi cial websites, video distribution, and social
media (Social Networking Service)[1] as well as actively
distributes information through various means including
television broadcasting, large-sized billboards, and the
showing of PR videos on trains.
The MOD has also been making great efforts to
provide accurate information in a more extensive and
timely fashion, by creating brochures, PR videos, and
manga editions of the defense white paper, as well as
providing assistance in editing the PR magazine MAMOR
and cooperation on media coverage.
Furthermore, based on the increasing interest in the


**i**

**International Public Relations Initiatives:**
**Participation in the Basel Tattoo 2016 in Switzerland**

Lieutenant Chiaki Iwata, Band Section, MSDF Band Tokyo

In July 2016, the MSDF Band Tokyo (Tokyo Band) participated in
the Basel Tattoo 2016. The Basel Tattoo (BT) is an internationally
recognized music event falling under the patronage of the Swiss
Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sports (DDPS).
Tattoo refers to military music festival.
At the BT2016, the Tokyo Band gave a drill performance and
a joint performance with the Band of Her Majesty’s Royal Marines.
The Tokyo Band’s drill performance (*) started solemnly with the
Tokyo Olympic Games Fanfare, followed by the singing of a Japanese
soul song, “Furusato,” and a resounding performance of traditional Lieutenant Iwata giving a salute during the band’s drill performance
Japanese musical instruments. Lastly, the Tokyo Band gave a
performance to the MSDF offi cial march “Gunkan (Warship),” forming an anchor shape that revolved in perfect order. This received
shouts of “fantastic” and a big round of applause from the audience and other people. While we had some anxieties about the joint
performance with the Band of Her Majesty’s Royal Marines as the detailed arrangements for the performance could not be fi nalized
partly due to cultural differences, the two bands managed to put on a splendid performance on stage.
Music is described as a global common language. During the BT this year, through such music we successfully raised the profi le
of not only the SDF but also Japan towards the world. Hoping that the “power of music” of our band will serve as a bridge to peace,
we are committed to putting utmost effort into our daily training.

(*) A performance style that deploys various formations according to different songs.


-----

MOD/SDF initiatives by the international community,
the MOD has been striving to gain the understanding
of people in other countries by publishing the monthly
English magazine, “Japan Defense Focus.” It is proactively
transmitting information to the international community
through efforts such as providing international media
with opportunities for press coverage, enhancement of the
English section of the MOD website, publishing English
versions of the defense white paper and brochures, as
well as producing PR videos.

**2** **Events and PR Facilities**


The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform
nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These
activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise,
cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration
fl ights and boarding experiences on aircraft. In addition,
at camps and bases throughout the country, events
including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on
occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation.
In some instances, they also hold parades throughout
the cities, with cooperation from the local communities.
Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the
SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at
Nippon Budokan arena every year. The festival attracted
approximately 40,000 visitors in total in 2016.
Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop
review, a fl eet review, and an air review are hosted in
rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively.
In 2016, a troop review was held by the GSDF at Asaka
Training Area, and approximately 4,000 personnel and
offi cers from all three SDF branches, approximately 250
vehicles, and approximately 50 aircraft including MV22 Osprey participated in the review. It reinforced the
mission of the SDF personnel and uplifted their morale,
while also appealing to Japanese people the SDF’s
strength and the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance. The troop
review attracted approximately 40,000 visitors, including


A scene from the FY2016 troop review

visitors who attended the review and the rehearsal. In
2017, an air review by the ASDF is planned to take place.
The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the
public. For instance, the number of visitors on the facility
tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya district
(Ichigayadai Tour) reached 400,000 as of the end of March
2017. Each SDF service also has a large-scale PR facility
in addition to PR facilities and archives at the SDF camps
and bases open to the public. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF
provides cooperation for shooting fi lms and TV programs
such as the fi lm “Shin Godzilla” (Godzilla Resurgence).


**3** **Trial Enlistment Programs**


The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours for
undergraduate and graduate students as well as women[2]
and Enlistment Experience Programs for groups,
companies and other organizations.[3] These programs are
intended to promote participants’ understanding of the
SDF by offering opportunities to experience the daily
life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct
contact with SDF personnel. In FY2016, approximately
140 people participated in SDF Life Experience Tours.
From the private sector, the SDF received approximately
1,400 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and
approximately 22,000 employees experienced SDF life.

**Initiatives for Information Disclosure**
**2**


administrative documents properly. In light of respecting
individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection
of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs,
the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the


**1** **Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure**
**System and Personal Data Protection System**

**1**


In accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held
by Administrative Organs in 2001, the MOD discloses its


Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women, etc. is available on the MOD/SDF website.i


-----

personal information under its jurisdiction, and discloses
such information upon due request.

See Reference 81 (Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of

Defense (FY2016))

See

**Engagement in Policy Evaluation**
**3**


The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various
policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2016,
the MOD conducted policy evaluations of R&D programs


**2** **Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower**
**Protection System**

**2**


The MOD sets up a system to handle public interestrelated information disclosures by its offi cials, employees
and outside workers, establishing an internal contact
desk for dealing with information disclosure that is in the
public interest and whistleblower protection.


and projects concerning taxation special measures as well
as the major policies and programs of the NDPG and the
Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP).


**i**

**Brilliant Performance by SDF Personnel on the Olympic Stage**

Second Lieutenant (GSDF) Hirooki Arai, Second Training Division, SDF Physical Training School (Camp Asaka) - Bronze
medalist in the male 50 km race walk event, Rio 2016 Summer Olympic Games
I participated in the male 50km race walk event at the 2016 Rio Olympics. On the day of the event, the weather condition was tough
with strong sunshine. Although I was temporarily disqualifi ed due to an accident involving contact with a Canadian athlete during the
race, I was able to win the bronze medal in the end. The Tokyo Olympic Games will be held in 2020. I will do my best to become an
athlete who can give people dreams and hopes through race events. I appreciate your continuous support.

First Lieutenant Keishin Yoshida, Cold Weather Special Physical Training Offi ce, SDF Physical Training School (Camp
Makomanai) - Member of the SDF ski team aiming to be selected for the PyeongChang 2018 Winter Olympic Games
In aiming for participating in the Olympic Games and winning an Olympic medal, the most important thing is to keep calmness and to
maintain health conditions. Even if you are an excellent athlete, you cannot compete with other top athletes in the world unless you
create an environment that enables you to do your best. In addition to training my body by working out from summer, I will discipline
my mind to have the strength to be able to do my best in any situation.
Your support will give me strength. I appreciate your support.

Second Lieutenant Arai competing with other First Lieutenant Yoshida treading with all his might
athletes at the Rio Olympics [Jiji Press]


-----

Reference


**Part I** **Security Environment Surrounding Japan**
Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals by Country and
Their Major Means of Delivery......................................................442
Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions
(Approximate Numbers)...............................................................442
Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and
Regions (Approximate Numbers)..................................................442
Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan..........443
**Part II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance**
Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline)..............................................443
Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014
and beyond..................................................................................446
Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018).......................451
Reference 8 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned..........................456
Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications............456
Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service......................457
Reference 11 Guided Missile Specifications.......................................................457
Reference 12 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures
(Original Budget Basis).................................................................458
Reference 13 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on
General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)...........................459
Reference 14 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures
(Original Budget Basis).................................................................459
Reference 15 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries........................460
Reference 16 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s
Survival and Protect its People.....................................................460
Reference 17 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces.................................462
Reference 18 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of
Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units......................................464
Reference 19 Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented
by the National and Local Governments (FY2016).........................466
Reference 20 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee...............466
Reference 21 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(April 27, 2015)............................................................................467
Reference 22 United States–Japan Roadmap for
Realignment Implementation........................................................471
Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee...............472
Reference 24 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2016.....................473
Reference 25 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects..................474
Reference 26 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2014)................474
Reference 27 Joint Statement February 10, 2017..............................................477
Reference 28 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ....................477
Reference 29 Outline of 23 Issues.....................................................................478
Reference 30 The SACO Final Report.................................................................478
Reference 31 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report...................................480
Reference 32 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility........................481
Reference 33 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and
Areas South of Kadena.................................................................483
Reference 34 Agreement between the Government of Japan and
the Government of the United States of America Concerning
the Implementation of the Relocation of III
Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents
from Okinawa to Guam................................................................483
Reference 35 Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government
of Japan and the Government of the United States of America
Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine
Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents
from Okinawa to Guam................................................................484
Reference 36 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces...................485
Reference 37 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth
Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces
in Japan.......................................................................................486
Reference 38 Agreement between the Government of Japan and
the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation
with Regard to Implementation Practices Relating to
the Civilian Component of the United States Armed Forces
in Japan, Supplementary to the Agreement under Article VI
of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan
and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and
Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan
(signed on January 16, 2017).......................................................486


**Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as**
**Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace**
Reference 39 Direction of the MOD Reform (Outline)..........................................487
Reference 40 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan.........................487
Reference 41 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles..........................................488
Reference 42 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense
on Cybersecurity..........................................................................488
Reference 43 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)..................489
Reference 44 Implementation and Participation Record of
Major Drills Related to Disaster Dispatch (FY2016).......................489
Reference 45 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues
(Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)............................................489
Reference 46 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements...................490
Reference 47 Exchange Student Acceptance Record
(Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016).........................491
Reference 48 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry
of Defense...................................................................................491
Reference 49 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues............................................492
Reference 50  Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative
with ASEAN..................................................................................494
Reference 51 Status of Capacity Building Assistance.........................................494
Reference 52 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years).................497
Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia
(Past Three Years)........................................................................499
Reference 54 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK
(Past Three Years)........................................................................499
Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India
(Past Three Years)........................................................................500
Reference 56 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China
(Past Three Years)........................................................................501
Reference 57 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia
(Past Three Years)........................................................................501
Reference 58 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with
ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years).............................................501
Reference 59 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with
Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years).............................503
Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European
Countries (Past Three Years).........................................................504
Reference 61 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with
Other Countries (Past Three Years)...............................................506
Reference 62 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and
Response to Acts of Piracy...........................................................506
Reference 63 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International
Peace Cooperation Activities........................................................507
Reference 64 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities.......507
Reference 65 Background Related to South Sudan............................................509
Reference 66 Japan’s Basic Thinking Regarding the Termination of
Operations of the Engineering Unit of the Self Defense Force
in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)
(Provisional Translation)...............................................................509
Reference 67 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International
Organizations...............................................................................510
Reference 68 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel........511
Reference 69 Status of Application and Recruitment of
Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2016)..............................................511
Reference 70 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel...............................512
Reference 71 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2016.........................................512
Reference 72 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch
of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States
(FY2016)......................................................................................513
Reference 73 Main Measures for Re-employment Support................................513
Reference 74 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel
in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government........513
Reference 75 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment
and Technology............................................................................514
Reference 76 Activities in Civic Life...................................................................515
Reference 77 Activities Contributing to Society..................................................516
Reference 78 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment
in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities..................................516

Reference 79 Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment,
etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of
Defense Facilities (April 27, 2011)................................................517
Reference 80 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces
and Defense Issues” (excerpt)
(Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office).....................................518
Reference 81 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry


-----

Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery

|Col1|Col2|United States|Russia|United Kingdom|France|China|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Missiles|ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)|450 Minuteman III:  450|324 SS-18:  54 SS-19: 30 SS-25: 90 SS-27:  78 RS-24:  72|―|―|52 DF-5 (CSS-4):  20 DF-31 (CSS-10): 32|
||IRBM MRBM|―|―|―|―|160 DF-4 (CSS-3):  10 DF-21 (CSS-5):  134|
|||||||DF-26 16|
||SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles)|336 Trident D-5:  336|192 SS-N-18:  48 SS-N-23:  96 SS-N-32:  48|48 Trident D-5: 48|64 M-45: 16 M-51:  48|48 JL-2 (CSS-NX-14):  48|
|Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles||14|13|4|4|4|
|Aircraft||78 B-2:  20 B-52:  58|76 Tu-95 (Bear): 60 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16|―|63 Mirage2000N:  23 Rafale:  40|60 H-6K: 60|
|Number of warheads||Approx. 4,500|Approx. 4,490 (including Approx. 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads)|215|300|Approx. 260|



Notes:
1. Data is based on “The Military Balance 2017,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2016, etc.
2. In January 2017, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of September 1, 2016 —the number of deployed
strategic nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,367 and the delivery vehicles involved 681 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,796 and the delivery vehicles
involved 508 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2016, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 1,930 (including 180 tactical nuclear warheads).
3. In November 2015, the U.K.’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed
is to be no more than 180.
4. According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 100-120 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 110-130, Israel a maximum of 80, and North Korea 10.


Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries
and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

|Country or Region|Military Service System|Regular (10,000 persons)|Col4|Reserves (10,000 persons)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|United States|Volunteer|138||84|
|Russia|Conscription / Volunteer|83||200|
|United Kingdom|Volunteer|15||8|
|France|Volunteer|20||3|
|Germany|Volunteer|18||3|
|Italy|Volunteer|17||2|
|India|Volunteer|140||116|
|China|Conscription|218||51|
|North Korea|Conscription|119||60|
|Republic of Korea|Conscription|63||450|
|Egypt|Conscription|44||48|
|Israel|Conscription|18||47|
|Japan|Volunteer|Ground|14|3.2 (0.4)|
|||Maritime|4.2|0.05|
|||Air|4.3|0.06|



Notes:
1. Data from “The Military Balance 2017” and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as
of the end of FY2016. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel
and is not included in the total figure.
3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type
of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.
4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the
conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly
introduced as a replacement of the former.
5. China has announced that the PLA would be reduced by 300,000 troops by the end of 2017.


Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions
(Approximate Numbers)

|Ground Forces|Col2|Naval Forces|Col4|Col5|Air Forces|Col7|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Country or Region|Ground Forces (10,000 persons)|Country or Region|Tonnage (10,000 tons)|Number of Vessels|Country or Region|Number of Combat Aircraft|
|India|120|United States|625.2|893|United States|3,581|
|China|115|Russia|205.2|1,054|China|2,722|
|North Korea|102|China|163.0|744|Russia|1,325|
|Pakistan|56|United Kingdom|61.3|136|India|917|
|Republic of Korea|50|India|49.0|286|Republic of Korea|618|
|United States|48|France|37.7|288|Egypt|603|
|Vietnam|41|Indonesia|26.2|171|North Korea|563|
|Myanmar|38|Italy|22.9|181|Taiwan|507|
|Iran|35|Turkey|21.7|208|Israel|473|
|Egypt|31|Republic of Korea|21.3|240|Pakistan|471|
|Indonesia|30|Germany|20.7|125|France|408|
|Russia|27|Australia|20.6|103|Turkey|377|
|Turkey|26|Taiwan|20.5|392|Saudi Arabia|349|
|Thailand|25|Spain|18.9|172|Iran|335|
|Sudan|24|Brazil|18.0|110|United Kingdom|308|
|Japan|14|Japan|47.9|134|Japan|400|



Notes:
1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from “The Military Balance 2017” and other sources,
and data on naval forces is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2016–2017 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2016, and
combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat
aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.


-----

Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan

Ground Forces Maritime Forces Air Forces

(10,000 persons) (10,000 tons) (Number of Combat Aircraft)

250 250 8,000


200

150


200

150


6,000

4,000


100

50


100

50


2,000


1997
2007
2017


1997
2007
2017


1997
2007
2017


Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan


Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline)

(Approved by the National Security Council
and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)
**I. Purpose**
❍ As Japan’s security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify
its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should
pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for
national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous
and peaceful society.
❍ In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive
role as a major global player in the international community.
❍ The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents
guidelines for policies in areas related to national security.
❍ With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as
with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national
security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a wholegovernment approach.
❍ When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due
consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its
diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as
a whole, based on the Strategy.
❍ The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade.
Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry
out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate
manner.
**II. Fundamental Principle of National Security**
1. Principles Japan Upholds
❍ Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values,
such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule
of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural
standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high
technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from
an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has
pursued “Open and Stable Seas.”
❍ Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the
end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an
exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power
that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles.
❍ Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the
Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as
well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has
also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international
community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of
developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle
of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other
countries.
❍ Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating
with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed
to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace
cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered
atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and
non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to
realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.”
❍ Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peaceloving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute
even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the
international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based
on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of
national security that Japan should stand to hold.
2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives
National Interests
❍ To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity;
to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure
its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich
culture and tradition.
❍ To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic
d l h b lid i i d i ( hi d i


is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an
international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability).
❍ To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values,
such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the
rule of law.
National Security Objectives
❍ To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security
and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan;
at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such
threat and to minimize the damage.
❍ To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent
the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening
the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships
between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region,
and promoting practical security cooperation.
❍ To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable,
and prosperous international community by strengthening the international
order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in
the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further
personnel contributions.
**III.** **Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security Challenges**
1. Global Security Environment and Challenges
(1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation
❍ The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise
of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is
increasing its presence in the international community. The United States,
which has the world’s largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy
to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the
Asia-Pacific region.
❍ The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation
has increased the relative influence of non-state actors, and the threat of
terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding.
(2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related
Materials
❍ The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as
ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea,
and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international
community.
(3) Threat of International Terrorism
❍ International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to
the advancement of globalization.
❍ Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually
taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international
terrorism both at home and abroad.
(4) Risks to Global Commons
❍ In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to
global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been
spreading and become more serious.
❍ In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases
of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with
respect to natural resources and the security of respective states.
❍ Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk
of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat.
❍ There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer
space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite
collisions amongst others.
❍ Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and
obstruct military systems are becoming more serious.
(5) Challenges to Human Security
❍ Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country—namely,
poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious
diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security,
and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are
emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the
very survival and dignity of individuals.
❍ These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the
international community.
(6) The Global Economy and Its Risks
❍ Th i k f th i f i i i f t t th


-----

entire global economy is growing.
❍ Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade
rules are becoming apparent.
❍ The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an
intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources
by emerging countries are observed.
2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region
(1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region
❍ The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with
large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional
cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently
institutionalized.
(2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions
❍ North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear
weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea
has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of
provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby increasing
the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other
countries is being substantially aggravated.
❍ As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation
in North Korea needs to be closely monitored.
❍ North Korea’s abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty as
well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for
the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility.
(3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas
❍ There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international
norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global
issues.
❍ China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range
of areas without sufficient transparency.
❍ China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status
quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible
with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial
domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g.,
intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku
Islands, establishment of its own “Air Defense Identification Zone”).
❍ The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the
military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both
orientations towards stability and potential instability.
**IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security**
1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles

-  To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own
capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also
steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to
future developments.

-  Enhancing Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its
diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths
and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region and the international community at large.

-  In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security
objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with
the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative
relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the
cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse
resources and promote comprehensive policies.
(1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment
❍ The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable
international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats.
❍ It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security
environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive
role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a
“Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international
cooperation.
❍ It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to
deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the
international community.
❍ By highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft
power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs
to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of
Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities.
❍ Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international
organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of
Japanese staff in such institutions.
(2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan
❍ Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a
highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic
environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure
operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations.
❍ Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local
governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan
will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding
seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to largescale natural disasters.
❍ In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which
plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure
for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important
functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective.
❍ With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of
the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to
maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will
work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own
ff t i l di b lli ti i il d f (BMD) d t ti f th


people.
(3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial Integrity
❍ Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies
responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime
surveillance capabilities.
❍ Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies
to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations.
❍ Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and
development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national
security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such
as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense
facilities.
(4) Ensuring Maritime Security
❍ As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and
developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order
based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the
freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of
disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force.
❍ Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a
comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying
attention to the establishment of international networks.
❍ Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea
lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law
enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the
sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.
(5) Strengthening Cyber Security
❍ Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and
strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect
cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of
cyberspace; and to guard Japan’s critical infrastructure against cyberattacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected.
❍ Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will
comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to
expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc.
❍ Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance
international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense cooperation.
(6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism
❍ Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against
international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities
in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living
abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and analyzing
intelligence on the situation of international terrorism.
(7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities
❍ Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities
from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open
source intelligence.
❍ Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing
capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote all-source
analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the
Government’s disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the
NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy
formulation.
(8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
❍ From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the
principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute
more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through
utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and
production of defense equipment and other related items.
❍ While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on
Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the
Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer
of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment.
In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases
where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be
allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over
transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer.
(9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security
Purposes
❍ Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering
satellites and in making effective use of satellites. Japan will also enhance a
system for space situational awareness.
❍ Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a
manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term,
including the development of technologies.
(10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities
❍ Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including
dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan’s technological
capabilities.
❍ Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make
effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the efforts
of industries, academia, and the Government.
❍ Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding technologies in
diplomacy.
2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance

-  Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation
on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the
two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader
international community.

-  The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing
towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and
strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners.

-  In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace


-----

stability, and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region and the international
community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. Alliance.
(1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a
Wide Range of Areas
❍ Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S.
Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the
concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles,
missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies
in line with the Strategy.
❍ Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the
Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. on operational
cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to
contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, and strengthening
its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD,
maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and large-scale disaster response
operations.
(2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces
❍ While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing
deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S.
Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements,
in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including
Okinawa.
3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for
Peace and Stability in the International Community

To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself
in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside
the region through the following approaches.
❍ Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the AsiaPacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic interests.
— ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security cooperation.
Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together closely in addressing
North Korean nuclear and missile issues.
— Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership
by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security
cooperation.
— ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative
relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional
partnership lasting more than 40 years. Japan will also provide further
assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its
unity.
— India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas,
including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global
Partnership.
❍ Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based
on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as well as a
medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a
responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability
and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly but in a calm manner to
China’s recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion.
❍ Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding
issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in
accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, Joint
Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant Security Council resolutions.
❍ Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security
and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole.
❍ In promoting these efforts, Japan will actively utilize and engage in
multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks.
❍ Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards
ensuring the stability of the region.
❍ European countries are partners for Japan which together take a leading
role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international
community. Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe,
including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE.
❍ Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging countries,
not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global
challenges.
❍ Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with
the Gulf States, encompassing political and security cooperation beyond
natural resources and energy. In addition, Japan will play a proactive role
in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East.
❍ Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation
of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process.
4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the
International Community

As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international
cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the
international community.
(1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations
❍ Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance
and restoration of international peace and security.
❍ Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council reform,
including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent
categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council.
(2) Strengthening the Rule of Law
❍ In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan
will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning
stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions are duly reflected.
❍ Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea,
outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of
legal systems


(3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and Non Proliferation
❍ Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of nuclear
weapons.”
❍ Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and non-proliferation,
including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile
development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the
maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S.
alliance.
(4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation
❍ Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other
international peace cooperation activities.
❍ Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and
make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance.
❍ Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in
various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations
concerned.
(5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism
❍ Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other
countries on the situation on international terrorism and international
counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international
legal framework.
❍ Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc.
5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues
Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international
economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the
international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following
measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that
could hinder peace and stability of the international community.
(1) Sharing Universal Values
❍ Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal
values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,
Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues.
❍ Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting
democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights.
❍ Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women.
(2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human
Security
❍ It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address development
issues as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle
of international cooperation.
❍ Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and
play a leading role in the formulation of the next international development
goals.
❍ Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human
security in the international community.
(3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing
Countries
❍ Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries,
including students and administrative officials, and provide them education
and training. Japan will further promote human resource development in order
to ensure that these personnel can contribute to development in their home
countries.
(4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System
❍ Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through
the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP.
Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the
Asia-Pacific region.
(5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues
❍ Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable
supply of energy and other natural resources.
❍ In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for
countering global warming.
(6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges
❍ Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges.
❍ Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture.
6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and
Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding

-  In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic
foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be
effectively demonstrated.

-  It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies both at
home and abroad to ensure national security.
(1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases
❍ Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of
defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production
and technological bases, including through strengthening international
competitiveness.
(2) Boosting Communication Capabilities
❍ It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate
its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the
understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations
with other countries.
❍ With the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower, Japan
will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner
through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information
technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information
dissemination in foreign languages.
❍ Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think
tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and
train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations
efforts and other areas.
❍ By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s


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position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate
understanding in the form of international opinion.
(3) Reinforcing the Social Base
❍ It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace
and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare
of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and
immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and
complexity.
❍ Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love
for the country and region.
❍ Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security
on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding
of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan.
(4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base
❍ Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at
institutions of higher education.
❍ Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of
higher education, think tanks, etc.
❍ Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government
officials.

Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014
and beyond

(Approved by the National Security Council
and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013)
Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and
Beyond are included in the reference.
Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond
(approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as of the end of
FY2013.
(Additional reference)
National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond
**I. NDPG’s Objective**
In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of
Japan sets out the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond” as
new guidelines for Japan’s national defense, based on “Defense Capability Build-up
in FY2013” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013)
and the “National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and
the Cabinet on December 17, 2013).
**II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan**
1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing
risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a
single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or
destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization
of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the
further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change
of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to
continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it retains the
largest national power.
There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as
an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure
peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic
interests.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic
missiles continues to be a deep concern despite non-proliferation efforts by the
international community. The presence of countries with weak governance and
failed states feeds the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These
problems continue to pose imminent security challenges.
In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of
the world, and there have been cases where coastal states unilaterally asserted
their rights and took action based on their own assertion concerning international
maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas.
Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons
is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community
including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation. In
addition, military strategies and military balance in the future are anticipated
to be significantly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies
such as those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth
capability and nanotechnology.
2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries
are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve
security challenges. Specific and practical cooperation and collaboration have
progressed to settle challenges particularly in non-traditional security fields.
In the meantime, gray-zone situations over territory, sovereignty and maritime
economic interests tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into
more serious situations.
North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is
also proceeding with the development, deployment and proliferation of WMDs
including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which may be used to deliver
such weapons, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through
these activities, North Korea is maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical
military capabilities.
North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by
conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by escalating its
provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other countries. Such North
Korean military trend constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not
only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore,
Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities.
In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missile development has presumably
entered a new stage as technological improvements have been made to extend


the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile
launches. Also, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls for
restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out
that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped
them on ballistic missiles. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development,
coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile
attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security.
As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more
cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously
increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military
in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making
efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military
activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment
of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly
stated the purposes and goals of the military buildup and therefore, transparency
concerning its military and security is not fully achieved.
In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in
the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea
and the South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with
regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified
by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace
around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and
violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could
cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an “Air
Defense Identification Zone” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the
freedom of overflight above the high seas.
China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and
aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels
and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and are expanding their operational
areas which include areas north of Japan.
As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to
pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional
and global security.
As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform
and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening their readiness and
introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces have been
active.
The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater
emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region (the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region)
and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region
despite fiscal and various other constraints in order to maintain the stability
and growth of the region while enhancing its relationships with its allies and
expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its
stance clear to prevent coercive actions that aim at changing the status quo in the
region in cooperation with allies and partners.
3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands
and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime state and dependent
largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources.
Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic, through strengthening
an “Open and Stable Seas” order based upon such fundamental principles as
the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and
prosperity.
Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration of
industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the
presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in
coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East
Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous damage and the impact may
spread not only nationwide but also to other countries. The possibility of
future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland
earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to
prepare for large-scale disasters.
4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between
major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably
remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging
and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment
surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, since the formulation of
“National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond” (approved by
the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). As the security
challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult
for a single country to deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances,
it is increasingly necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the
non-military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding to
shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional
and global stability.
**III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy**
1. Basic Policy

In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic
and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace”
based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role
it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in
securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while
achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region
by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with
the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone.
Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense
architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various
situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively
promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries
while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek
to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise
their capabilities.
Wh i l ti th d th C tit ti J ill


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efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic
principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming
a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the
principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles.
With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence
provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order
to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will
closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses
through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection
of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in
international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts so as to achieve
the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons.
2. Japan’s Own Efforts

Recognizing that a country’s security depends first and foremost on its independent
efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own initiative to prevent various
situations and will seamlessly respond to them as the situation evolves with the
National Security Council as the control tower, while maintaining cooperation
with its ally, partners and other countries concerned.
(1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture
Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently
develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ
it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations.
Japan will also ensure close regular interagency cooperation in normal times.
In the event of various situations, the Government, under strong political
leadership, will appropriately and promptly make decisions. Japan will
seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government
approach, to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its people and
the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination
with local governments, private sectors, and others.
Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond to a
variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance the capability to
quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign countries in an emergency
situation and ensure their safety.
In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the
effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing
various related plans and formulating and reviewing them as well as expanding
the use of simulations, comprehensive training and exercises.
(2) Japan’s defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force
Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and
represent Japan’s will and ability to deter threats from directly reaching Japan
and defeat them if threats should reach Japan.
In the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan,
defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment.
To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and
flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive
perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments
of the Self-Defense Force’s (SDF’s) total functions and capabilities against
various situations.
Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan,
the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various
situations, including “gray zone” situations which require SDF commitment.
The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both
increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter “ISR”) activities. Moreover,
the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the
development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including
advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and
rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will
and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In dealing
with situations, depending on their development, minimizing damage by
effective response through achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority
is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of the Japanese people, and
the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace.
Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability
by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to
conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations,
as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and
quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force.
At the same time, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution
to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will
strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships in order
to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which is closely related to
its own security. Japan will also engage in international peacekeeping and
other similar activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, nontraditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster
Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve
the international security environment) and other efforts more proactively
than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in light of the
diversified roles and increased opportunities of the defense force.
From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security environment,
the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize particularly important
functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation as a whole.
The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting
a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting
to situations as they demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint
Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness,
sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology
and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of
infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation.
3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
The Japan-U S Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U S Security Treaty


together with Japan s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan s national
security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements
functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only
of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.
Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, the
U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region
while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with its allies, including Japan,
and partner countries. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes
increasingly severer, it has become more important than ever for Japan’s security
to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective.
(1) Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the JapanU.S. Alliance

In order to ensure Japan’s national security by maintaining and strengthening
the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific region,
Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,
further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence
provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance’s contingency response
capabilities, while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for
these efforts.
At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security
environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the
western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S.
ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including
cooperation in responding to “gray-zone” situations.
To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises,
joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the
U.S. It will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy
coordination including contingency response and medium-to long-term
strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning, and Extended Deterrence
Dialogue.
(2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields
The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the
world, including the Asia-Pacific region, by strengthening cooperation not
only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, HA/DR,
peacekeeping and counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space
and cyberspace.
As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation
between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of
the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ facilities and areas, greatly
contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan
Earthquake.
In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S.
cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for
intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field
of defense equipment and technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance.
(3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S. Forces in
Japan

Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing
of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation
Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement
the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local
communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In
particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a
critically important location in terms of national security and where the
stationing of U.S. forces significantly contributes to the deterrence of the
Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ
facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air
Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures, in
light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and areas there.
4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation
(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region
In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been taken
mainly in non-traditional security fields, including disaster relief. Multilateral
frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense
Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS)
have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN
has been making progress. However, security challenges are becoming more
serious than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of further
cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of
confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region.
Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea
(ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East
Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for
further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement
on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing
agreement.
Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with which
Japan shares security interests and security cooperation has been advancing,
and strengthen cooperation in fields such as international peacekeeping
activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so
as to improve interoperability with Australia.
Moreover, efforts will be made to promote the partnerships among U.S.
allies in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening cooperative relationships
under trilateral frameworks among Japan, the U.S. and ROK and among
Japan, the U.S. and Australia.
As Chinese activities have a significant impact on regional security,
Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China in order to
enhance mutual understanding and will develop confidence-building measures
to prevent unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in
dealing with the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on
the sea and in the air surrounding Japan.
Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia including the


-----

Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ( 2+2 ), high level
exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen understanding
about the intention of Russian military activities and develop mutual trust
with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises
with Russia to promote regional stability.
Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries
in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote
joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance. In addition,
Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these countries in the field of
disaster management in light of the increasing frequency and growing scale
of disasters in the region. Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in
a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training
and exercises as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping
activities.
As capacity building assistance is effective in stabilizing the security
environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, Japan will
promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including
the Official Development Assistance, and aligning it with joint training and
exercises and international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also strengthen
cooperation with relevant countries which actively provide such support,
thereby expanding the range of countries receiving support as well as its
scope.
Under ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in
the Asia-Pacific region, Japan in cooperation with the United States and
Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships
in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint
training and exercises and play a major role in enhancing confidence-building
measures among countries in the region, attaching importance to multilateral
frameworks such as the ARF and the ADMM Plus.
(2) Cooperation with the international community
It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges
on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, there
are increasing opportunities for such forces to play an important role not
only in preventing and responding to conflicts and maintaining peace but
also in supporting post-conflict reconstruction, building peace and promoting
confidence-building and friendly relationships.
Therefore, Japan will promote various initiatives to improve the global
security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international
community.
Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms
control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance in
order to respond to global security challenges, including regional conflicts,
expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and problems related to the sea, outer space and
cyberspace, while regularly cooperating with its ally and relevant countries
with which it shares security interests and with international organizations
and other relevant bodies.
In this respect, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation with the
European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and with the
United Kingdom, France and other European countries and will work with
them in responding to these challenges. Japan will also promote cooperation
and exchanges with regard to equipment and technology with these countries
and organizations.
In order to stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region
and improve the global security environment based on the policy of “Proactive
Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation,
Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities,
including international peace cooperation assignments and emergency
relief activities, in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure
close cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, with
comprehensive consideration given to the significance of the dispatch of SDF
units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units and Japan’s political and
economic relationships with recipient countries.
With regard to international peace cooperation activities and other
similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively conduct
activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase the number of SDF
personnel it dispatches to assume positions of responsibility at organizations
such as the local mission headquarters and the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, Japan will conduct a study on various
challenges it has to overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a
broad range of fields, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute
to the training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding
by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge.
**IV. Future Defense Forces**
1. The Role of the Defense Force

Japan’s future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2) above,
and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following
fields, and will maintain the necessary posture.
(1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations
In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner,
and certainly protect the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of
its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through
persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an
understanding of military developments in other countries and to detect any
signs of development at an early stage.
Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to
tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various
situations from occurring.
At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations
including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to
ti l dd t t d it ti


Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each
situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or
concurrent manner.
When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are
emphasized in particular:
a. Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan
In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive area around Japan, Japan
will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any incursions
into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond effectively and promptly
to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty.
Furthermore, should the acts in question become protracted or escalate,
Japan will respond seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible
measures for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding
Japan.
b. Response to an attack on remote islands
In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and
defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority,
with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to
the units deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment.
Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture
them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be
dealt with appropriately.
c. Response to ballistic missile attacks
Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch and
facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multi-layered
defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will take steps to
minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special
operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will
protect key facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy
the infiltrating units.
d. Responses in outer space and cyberspace
In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up persistent
ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede efficient action by
the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation arise, Japan will identify the
event without delay and swiftly repair any damage, while taking necessary
steps to contain it. Moreover, in light of society’s growing dependence on
outer space and cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s
capabilities when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant
organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing to
comprehensive, government-wide initiatives.
e. Responses to major disasters
Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and deploy the
requisite units and take all possible measures as part of its initial response,
and maintain its presence in the longer term, when required. Moreover, as
well as providing a meticulous response to the needs of disaster-stricken
citizens and local government bodies, Japan will engage in appropriate
partnerships and cooperation with local governments and the private sector,
in order to save lives, carry out emergency repairs, and provide livelihood
support.
(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific and improvement of global security
environments

Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the timely and
appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities,
Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific
region as a whole including the vicinity of Japan.
Moreover, working in partnership with its ally and partners, Japan
will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral
defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity
building assistance, effectively fulfilling its key role in initiatives focused
on the stabilization of the security environment, including the building and
strengthening of intra-regional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific
region.
As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to respond
appropriately to global security issues including regional conflicts, the
expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will strengthen various
initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as
well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy
initiatives and capacity building assistance, thereby working on improvement
of the global security environment.
Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when
engaging in the aforementioned initiatives.
a. Holding training and exercises
As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training
and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint
training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly
demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on
regional stabilization. In addition, it will build and strengthen cooperative
relationships with relevant countries.
b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange
Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other
countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to
stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote
multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, such as building and
strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security
issues of common interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of
the seas, outer space and cyberspace.
c. Promoting capacity building assistance
Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage
in capacity building assistance such as human resource development
and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability
of developing countries themselves thereby improving the security


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environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the
Asia-Pacific region.
d. Ensuring maritime security
As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an
“Open and Stable Seas” order which serves as the cornerstone of peace
and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety
of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in
cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts
including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this field and
enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities
in waters other than those surrounding our country.
e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities
Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other
relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace
cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities to meet diverse
needs, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis
on playing more of a leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its
readiness posture to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the
situation, Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted
overseas deployment.
f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and
nonproliferation

Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament activities
undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. In doing so, Japan
will make active, effective use of the SDF’s knowledge, including through
personnel contribution. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles that can serve as their means of delivery, as well as
the proliferation of arms and goods and technology which could be diverted
to military use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of
Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will
cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations and other
relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives.
2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces
(1) Basic approach
The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the
abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan has conducted
capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various
potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should
be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force.
Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense
capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities
to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite
for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including
defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF
will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a
consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation.
At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style
invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess
the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to
unforeseen changes in the situation in the future and to maintain and inherit
them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency
and rationalization.
(2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized
From the perspective of efficiently developing an effective defense force, the
SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in
particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability
with the U.S. forces.
a. ISR capabilities
In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various situations,
while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will implement extensive
persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft and vessels in the seas and
airspace surrounding it, and the SDF will adopt a flexible approach to
boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations.
b. Intelligence capabilities
Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing
information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so
that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to signs of various
situations and take necessary measures based on medium-to long-term
military trends mainly in its vicinity.
In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information
collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT,
as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles.
Also, the SDF will engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial
intelligence capabilities to combine various types of intelligence on images
and maps to exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a
framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of highly capable
personnel in information gathering analysis.
c. Transport capability
In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment
capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will
strengthen integrated transport capacity including maritime and airborne
transport capacity, with collaboration with the civilian transport sector. In
doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying roles
and assignments among various means of transport, considering their
respective characteristics.
d. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities
In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units
nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner, the SDF will take steps
to deploy the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense
Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main
headquarters of each service, making effective use of the knowledge and
experience held by each respective service Furthermore the SDF will


facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF s units such as
basic operational units (divisions and brigades) through the establishment
of a new central headquarters to control all of the regional armies, as well
as greater efficiency and streamlining of the command and control function
in each regional army headquarters, and other measures.
Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its
information and communications capabilities that are prerequisites for
supporting nationwide operation, starting with the communications
infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three
services.
e. Response to an attack on remote islands
In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is a
prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, the SDF
will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and
missiles, etc.
Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to seek to
interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands at sea, the SDF will newly
develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the
SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay in the case of an invasion
of any remote islands.
Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities,
so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a
situation in the southwestern region.
In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense
posture in remote islands in the Pacific.
f. Response to ballistic missile attacks
To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will
pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against the
threat of ballistic missiles.
With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness,
simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to
strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.
Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and
the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance
as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response
capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to
address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and
take means as necessary.
g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace
While strengthening information collection capability using satellites
equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing command, control and
telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will secure effective, stable use
of outer space so that satellites can continuously exercise their capabilities
even in contingencies by enhancing the survivability of satellites through
such initiatives as space situational awareness. In implementing such
initiatives, the SDF will form organic partnerships with research and
development institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S.
As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent
surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest equipment
will be continuously developed and secured in order to prevent actions that
hinder efficient SDF activities.
h. Responses to major disasters, etc.
In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough
earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear emergency, it is of
vital importance to respond swiftly from the initial stages of the impact
and carry out such tasks as information gathering on the extent and nature
of the damage from the air by aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency
repairs. In this regard, the SDF will develop a response posture sustainable
for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of
appropriately size units, and by establishing a rotating staffing posture
based on a joint operational approach.
i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other
similar activities

In international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities, the
SDF will strengthen the necessary protective capabilities to carry out its
operations, ensuring the safety of personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF
will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information
communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and
other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service
structure for smooth and continuous operation.
From the standpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation
activities more effectively, Japan will consider measures for making more
effective use of the SDF Operational Facility for Deployed Air Force for
Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti.
Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering capability
required for operations, the SDF will enhance its education, training
and personnel management systems in order to facilitate the continuous
dispatch of adequate personnel for overseas cooperation activities.
3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces

The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF are
outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specifics of major organizations and equipment
in the future are as shown in the Annex table.
(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with
an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will
maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment
divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished
with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will
maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order
to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations, amphibious
operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against NBC
(nuclear biological and chemical) weapons and international peace


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cooperation activities.
Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-proficient rapidly
deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and move via
the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (2) c. above, the GSDF
will maintain half of these in Hokkaido, given the excellent training
environment there.
The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern region
will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent stationing of the
units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the deploy ability of the
aforementioned units, and the establishment of organic partnerships and
networks with the MSDF and ASDF.
b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in order
to prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands while still at sea, as far as
possible.
c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in order to
effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas,
working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to
in (3) d. below.
d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic
operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable
ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and
rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units
will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics.
(2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF)
a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopter
units strengthened by increased numbers of equipment, including the new
destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compacttype hull, in order to effectively conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine
operations etc., thereby facilitating agile response in such areas as the
defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traffic, and
international peace cooperation activities etc.
Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d.
below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegis-equipped destroyers capable
of providing Japan with multi-layered defense against ballistic missile
attacks.
b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by increased
numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the
seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad underwater
intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas.
c. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units in order to
effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as
well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence gathering and
warning and surveillance in those seas.
d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively conduct
minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in collaboration
with the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with
the compact-type hull referred to in a. above.
(3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)
a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of
warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and control
units will be equipped with ground-based warning and control radar that
can detect and track any ballistic missiles flying into Japanese air space,
as well as providing persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the
surrounding areas. Air warning units will be enhanced in order to conduct
effective warning, surveillance and control in the air over long periods in
the event of “gray zone” situations.
b. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by highly capable
fighter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan based on a
comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircrafts and relevant
support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain enhanced aerial
refueling and transport units that will enable fighter aircraft units and air
warning units, etc. to carry out various operations sustainably in the air
space surrounding Japan.
c. The ASDF will maintain air transport units in order to effectively carry out
the mobile deployment of ground-based units etc., and international peace
cooperation activities etc.
d. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing
multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together
with the Aegis destroyers referred to in (2) a. above, as well as protecting
key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to
in (1) c. above.
**V. Basic Foundations for SDF**
To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely
and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to upgrade the main elements of
the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to strengthen the various
foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as
effectively as possible. The key aspects of this are as follows.
1. Training and Exercises

Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and
examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to enhance
and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the tactical skills
in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the
excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership
with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic
implementation of more practical training and exercises.
In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the exercise areas,
etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through
the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to
relationships with the local community, so that timely and appropriate training
and exercises can be carried out, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and
exercises.
2 O ti l I f t t


The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of
military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions that
serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be deployed
swiftly and respond to various situations effectively.
Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently
dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program, as
well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency callup of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness.
The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian airports
and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis,
in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational
infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation.
Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order
to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their
families while they are away.
The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in
terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability
of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade SDF
equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition.
3. Personnel and Education

Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and missions more
diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to
reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops
and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into
consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength
and morale.
Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate
composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions
and characteristics of each branch of the SDF.
The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human
resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion
of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to
strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and
training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and
agencies, retain adequate personnel who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well
as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond
flexibly and rapidly to various situations as part of the government.
In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting from
social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of higher
education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to
spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.
Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to
secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign at a
younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for reemployment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant
organizations.
In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are
becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote
utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional
skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the sufficiency of
reserve personnel.
4. Medical

In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability to
engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation responses and
international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an efficient
and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading
of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the
management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will
also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as
medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians.
The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of emergency
medical treatment on situation responses, and improve first aid capabilities on the
frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes
into account the viewpoints of enhanced joint capabilities.
5. Defense Production and Technological Bases

Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases
is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep
of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits
the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to
enhancing deterrence.
At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe fiscal situation and rises
in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly sophisticated and complex,
the numbers of units of procured equipment are on the decline. Moreover, the
environment surrounding Japan’s defense production and technological bases is
becoming more severe. For instance, the competitiveness of foreign companies is
growing, as a result of the advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring
and consolidation of the defense industry.
In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate a
strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and
technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in international
joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian
use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay.
With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation, there
are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner through,
for example, the utilization and provision to disaster-stricken countries and
others of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to sites by the
SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become the mainstream to participate in
international joint development and production projects in order to improve the
performance of defense equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the
equipment. In this context, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to
Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to
engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by


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utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development
and production of defense equipment and other related items.
Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the
Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played
so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas
transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment.
In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where
transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with
strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of
unauthorized use and third party transfer.
6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, including
in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen
project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment through introducing
a project manager system, as well as through considering the possibility of
further introducing long-term contracts and further upgrading the contract
system to provide cost reduction incentives to companies, aiming to improve
cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle of equipment.
Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness and
response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective
use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue
greater transparency in the acquisition process and increased rationalization
of the contract system, and strive to achieve more rigorous procedures for the
acquisition of equipment.
7. Research and Development

The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading
defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to
guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the
SDF is prioritized in view of the severe fiscal situation.
In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Defense will promote research and
development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account
the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, costeffectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development,
with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan’s
technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas.
From the aspect of security, it is necessary to utilize civilian technology
effectively also in the field of security through regularly assessing the trend
in science and technology including information related to technological
development as well as consolidating the capabilities of the government,
industry and academia. Under such recognition, the Ministry of Defense will
strive to make effective use of civilian technology that can also be applied to
defense (dual-use technologies), by enhancing partnerships with universities and
research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to prevent
the outflow of advanced technologies.
The Ministry of Defense will examine its research and development
initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives.
8. Collaboration with Local Communities

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration
with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the
fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various
situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc. are exceedingly
important from the perspective not only of the effective improvement and smooth
operation of defense facilities, but also of the recruitment of SDF personnel, as
well as the provision of re-employment support for them.
Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas
around defense facilities, with a view to their improvement and operation, the
Ministry of Defense and SDF will routinely engage in various measures such
as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities,
in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and
communities.
Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to
the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and
supports community medicine through emergency patient transport using
SDF search and rescue aircraft in others, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF
will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of
units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., in order to secure the
understanding of local governments and residents. At the same time, in operating
the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry of Defense will pay attention to
the contribution of the operation to the local economy.
9. Boosting Communication Capabilities

The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and
communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range
of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital
to effectively conduct SDF duties.
10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base
The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related matters
at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and
crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening
the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems, with a particular focus
on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense will
promote various partnerships, including education and research exchange with
other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as
universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas.
11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its
work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian
officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense
capability, strengthening SDF’s joint operation functions and enhancing policymaking and communication functions.
**VI. Additional Points**
1. These Guidelines set out the form of Japan’s defense force over the next decade
Th N ti l S it C il ill d t l t ti i


the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth,
swift and accurate transition to the future defense force will be facilitated through
validations based on joint operational capability assessment while advancing
such initiatives in a timely and appropriate manner.
2. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and
verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that
time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised adequately.
3. In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve
greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb
costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan’s
defense force as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function.

|Category|Col2|Col3|Present (as of the end of FY2013)|Future|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|GSDF|Authorized Number of personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||approx. 159,000 approx. 151,000 approx. 8,000|159,000 151,000 8,000|
||Major units|Rapid Deployment Units|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade|
|||Regional Deployment Units|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades|
|||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|
|||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|
|MSDF|Major units|Destroyer Units Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Patrol aircraft Units|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 5 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|
||Major equipment|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Combat Aircraft|47 (6) 16 approx.170|54 (8) 22 approx.170|
|ASDF|Major units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 1 squadron 3 squadrons 6 groups|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons — 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 6 groups|
||Major equipment|Combat aircraft Fighters|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280|



Notes:The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013)
are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300
and approx. 300 in the future.
Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/
formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers), Air
Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specifi ed above.


Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)

(December 17, 2013 Approved by
National Security Council and the Cabinet)
The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the National
Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National
Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has been established as
shown in the attached document.
(Attachment)
Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)
**I. Program Guidelines**
In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance with
the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by
the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) (hereinafter
“NDPG2013”), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. It will provide
an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities
based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they
demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through
optimal resource allocation. At the same time, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force
will serve as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities,
sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities, with a
consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF structure, a highly effective
joint defense force will be efficiently developed by comprehensively prioritizing
i l l i f i d bili i id ifi d h h j i i


-----

based capability assessments of the SDF s overall functions and capabilities against
various scenarios.
Given the considerations mentioned above, the SDF will effectively and
efficiently build, maintain and operate defense forces based on the following program
guidelines:
1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its responsibilities
including providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security
situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global
security environment. With a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF
will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities. In addition, defense forces
will enhance their capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic
missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and
international peace cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the
international society to improve the international security environment such as
U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/
DR), and others in the fields of non-traditional security). The SDF will steadily
develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these functions and
capabilities.
2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure
maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective
deterrence and response to various situations, including defense posture buildup
in Japan’s southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the
establishment of rapid deployment capabilities.
At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion
such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will establish the
minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen
changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain them, and thereby
further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization of
its activities.
3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining
the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and
improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense
capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment
life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce
the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness.
4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and
internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF’s strength and the
effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures,
including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel,
in order to reform its personnel management system.
5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to strengthen
deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in conjunction
with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region,
Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation and consultations with the
United States in a wide range of areas including the revision of the Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan will also actively facilitate measures
for furthering smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan.
6. Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan’s public finance, Japan
will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup of its
defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the
Government.
**II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units**
1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), given
the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for the purpose
of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations of basic operational
units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades, an armored division, and divisions/
brigades) and various units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish
the Ground Central Command. In addition, the GSDF promote efficiency and
rationalize the command and control function of each regional army headquarters,
as well as review other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of
such efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary
units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command.
In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with
an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform
two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions
and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility
and ISR capabilities. By establishing a coast observation unit, area security
units in charge of initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the
remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop
sufficient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to land,
recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an
amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of several regiment-scale units
specializing in amphibious operations will be established.
From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while
thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such
as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF will steadily implement
programs towards successive formation of units equipped with newly-introduced
mobile combat vehicles and removal of tanks deployed in basic operational units
stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate
tanks located in Kyushu into newly organized tank units under direct command
of the Western Army. In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that
concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations
other than Hokkaido into field artillery units to be newly organized under the
direct command of the respective regional armies.
2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the
security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of various
operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations,
as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the
Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four flotillas mainly consisting
f h li t d t (DDH) d t A i i d d t (DDG)


Five divisions will consist of other destroyers as well. Necessary measures to
increase the number of submarines will also be continued.
3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air SelfDefense Force (ASDF) will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base, and
newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air
Base.
To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities and ensure
sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions
will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills.
4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be
approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel,
and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number
of active-duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be
approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013.
**III. Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities**
1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations
(1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan
In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas
and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, the SDF
will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD),
submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K),
and conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, fixedwing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J), as well as take
necessary measures after fully reviewing the value of ship-based unmanned
aerial vehicles with patrol capabilities. With a view to increasing the number
of destroyers, the SDF will also introduce new, compact-type hull destroyers
with additional multifunctional capabilities. The SDF will procure new
airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft,
and fixed air defense radar, as well as continuously improve its existing
airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). In addition, the
introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles will support the establishment of a
joint unit with persistent ISR capabilities in broad areas. The SDF will also
undertake organizational reform that integrate ground-based aerial search and
rescue functions into the ASDF, which are currently performed by both the
MSDF and ASDF.
(2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands
(a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure
With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out regular
and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the
case of various contingencies, the SDF will deploy a coast observation
unit to Yonaguni Island. Considering the current operational situation of
the existing AWACS (E-767) and airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C),
the SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft
or airborne early warning aircraft as stated in (1), and establish one
squadron consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air
warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section II-3. By
preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote
islands in the southwestern region, a fully-prepared surveillance posture
will be maintained.
(b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority
For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including cruise
missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the number of fighter
aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two as stated
in Section II-3, continue to facilitate procurement of fighter aircraft
(F-35A), modernize its fighter aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air
combat capabilities and network functions of its fighter aircraft (F-2). In
addition, after considering its options, it will take necessary measures to
replace fighter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more
capable fighter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-range
surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve its surfaceto-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new
advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for
response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense
(BMD). The SDF will also procure new aerial refueling/transport
aircraft, and continuously work to equip transport aircraft (C-130H)
with aerial refueling capabilities and procure rescue helicopters (UH60J). In addition, the SDF will examine what is the appropriate air
defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific.
(c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy
In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security
of maritime traffic, the SDF will effectively conduct various activities
including holding persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations;
procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD),
submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters
(SH-60K); and conducting service- extension activities on existing
destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol
helicopters (SH-60J) as stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce
new compact-type hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In
addition, the SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters
required for enabling destroyer units to sustainably conduct activities
as situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean
(MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-to-ship
guided missiles.
(d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response
In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation
and deployment operations and improve effective response capabilities,
transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) will
continue to be procured. Besides the ship-based multipurpose
helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft
that complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters
(CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF
ill t k ft id i th ibilit f


-----

multipurpose helicopters that will success the existing multipurpose
helicopters (UH-1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities,
the SDF will avoid functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and
assignments among the various means of transportation.
The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment capabilities,
by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles that support units’
amphibious landing efforts on remote islands, and refitting existing
Tank Landing Ships (LST). The SDF will consider what the role
should be of a multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and
control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can
be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations, and
reach a conclusion regarding its acquisition. With a view to efficiently
conducting large-scale transportation movements in coordination with
the SDF’s transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures
after considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities
including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the private
sector and reserve personnel.
Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be introduced
in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment
divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and rapid deployment
regiments that immediately respond to various situations will be
organized. The SDF will also establish area security units in charge of
initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well
as conduct maneuver deployment training for prompt unit deployment
to remote islands. While improving guidance capability of existing
precision-guided bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles,
the SDF will also promote the development of improved capabilities of
ship-to-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their firing range.
(e) Development of C3I
From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, aimed at
establishing a command and control system which enables the dynamic
operation of units across the country so as to immediately concentrate
necessary units into the area to be dealt with, such as remote islands,
the SDF will take steps to station GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel
in the main headquarters of each of the other services, making
effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective
service. In addition, as stated in Section II-1, the SDF will expedite
the establishment of the Ground Central Command, while promoting
efficiency and rationalizing the command and control functions of each
regional army headquarters, as well as reviewing the functions of some
regional army headquarters.
With regard to the information and communications capabilities
which serve as a foundation for nation-wide operations, and the goal of
strengthening the communications infrastructure on remote islands, the
SDF will extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF
to Yonaguni Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication
equipment at Naha Air Base. The SDF will strive to enhance data link
functions among the three services, upgrade the field communications
systems, continue to promote the utilization of outer space for defenserelated purposes, and develop an X-Band communications satellite
with high performance. The SDF will take additional necessary
measures after considering the necessity of further enhancements to its
communications systems.
(3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks
Given North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will
pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against
the threat of ballistic missiles.
For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture for the
entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will procure
additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and continue to improve the
capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in (2)(b), the SDF will pursue
further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so
as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can
be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In
addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities,
the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and
control systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as
procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems.
Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative
development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA),
the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary measures for the
transition to the production and deployment phases. The SDF will conduct
bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S.
bilateral BMD response posture, and make an effort to establish the basis for
deployment of the SDF to respond to a ballistic missile attack.
The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture
of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. Also, based
on appropriate role-sharing between Japan and the U.S., with a view to
strengthening the deterrence capacity of Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole by
enhancing Japan’s own deterrence and response capabilities, the MOD will
study its possible response capability to address the means of ballistic missile
launches and related facilities, and will take necessary measures.
In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces
concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue to
procure a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC
reconnaissance vehicles, and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in order to
improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear
power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units. In sensitive locations
such as where a number of nuclear power plants are located, the SDF will
conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures,
and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in
areas neighboring nuclear power plants


(4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace
(a) Promoting Utilization of Outer Space
The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities
through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors,
and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated
X-Band satellite communications system. With a view to ensuring the
constant availability of these capabilities in a variety of contingencies,
the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and
research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency
of its satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic
organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies and
knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate cooperation
including in the area of personnel development with such organizations.
(b) Response to Cyber Attacks
To continuously ensure sufficient security against cyber attacks, with
consideration to enhancing capabilities through joint operations and
efficiency in resource allocations, the SDF will establish the necessary
system by such measures as to enhance the survivability of the command
and control systems and information communication networks of the
three services, to strengthen capabilities for information gathering and
research and analysis, and to develop a practical training environment
where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through
its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers
have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition
of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace. In addition, the
SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks, response measures
and technological trends, including through cooperation with the private
sector, and strategic talks and joint exercises with allies.
Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise on
a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are increasingly
sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to develop personnel
with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving
the in-house curriculum for specialized education, expanding learning
opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and
cultivating expertise through personnel management efforts.
To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through
a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close
coordination with relevant government agencies by regularly providing
expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve training and exercises.
(5) Response to Large-scale Disasters
In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough
earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will
respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of
SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on a joint
operational approach. These efforts will enable a sustained response over the
long term. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance
learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, to gather information on the
extent and nature of the damage by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact
and immediately engage in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting
people’s lives, In addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction
activities including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private
sector’s efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials. With
close coordination and cooperation with relevant government agencies, local
governments and private sector organizations, the MOD will promote such
measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and
exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF’s
disaster and deployment operations is affected.
(6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities
Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for MOD/SDF
to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will strengthen all stages of its
intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing
intelligence.
With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, with
a view to flexibly meeting the demands of changes in the security environment,
the MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence
gathering facilities, and actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial
vehicles so as to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from
the diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a related move, the
MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by such means
as visualization and prediction of situations with a variety of information and
intelligence overlaid on a map or image, while promoting the comprehensive
and efficient geospatial database development. The MOD will take measures
to enhance its HUMINT gathering capabilities including by increasing the
number of personnel to be newly dispatched as Defense Attachés. It will also
reinforce its posture for gathering and analyzing information from overseas
through cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system
for collecting public information.
In an effort to meet the increasingly complex and diverse needs from
policy departments and operational sides, in a timely and precise manner,
in the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the
MOD will strengthen its comprehensive information gathering and analysis
capabilities, through such efforts as the review of its recruitment efforts
and the composition of its human resources to develop highly competent
analysts, integration and enhancement of its cross-organizational intelligence
curriculum, and regularization of the efforts to place the intelligence side
personnel for a given period in the policy departments and operational sides.
Considering the importance of information security, under the current
severe fiscal situation, and in pursuit of more efficient intelligence gathering,
the MOD will promote the all-source analysis expected to create great
synergies, through seeking to enhance the posture of and the effective
collection management, and facilitating complete information sharing
between those who need to know including relevant government agencies


-----

2. Stabilization of the Asia Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security
Environments

From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle
of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region, Japan
will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various
activities including training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as
well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities to properly
address global security challenges. The following elements will be particularly
important to these efforts:
(1) Holding Training and Exercises
In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and
exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and
exercises in the Asia-Pacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our
nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization.
In addition, it will seek to improve interoperability and build and strengthen
practical cooperative relationships with relevant countries.
(2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries
and international organizations is important as the cornerstone of efforts to
stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote
bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels
not limited to high-level exchanges, but including unit-level exchanges, such
as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wideranging security issues of common interest including HA/DR, maritime
security, and ensuring the stable use of outer space and cyberspace.
(3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance
By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will help
countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such fields as HA/
DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and military medicine,
so as to stabilize the security environment, as well as strengthen relations with
defense authorities of those countries. Cooperating with partners actively
engaged in capacity building such as the United States and Australia, with due
consideration for coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Official
Development Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and efficient
support in capacity building.
(4) Ensuring Maritime Security
For the purpose of maintaining “Open and Stable Seas”, which serve as the
cornerstone of Japan’s peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime state, and
ensuring security of maritime traffic, the MOD will further cooperate with
allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the
Gulf of Aden, as well as help gulf countries improve their own capabilities.
In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as the Indian Ocean and the South
China Sea, the SDF will also leverage a variety of opportunities to promote
combined training and exercises with countries which share Japan’s goal of
maintaining maritime security.
(5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities
To immediately commence international peace cooperation activities, the
SDF will reinforce its emergency response and transport capabilities. To
steadily engage in its activities for the long term, the SDF will work to further
ensure the safety of its activities by strengthening information-gathering and
equipment protection capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve
communications, supplies, military medicine, and support for families of
military personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which
are highly appreciated at the SDF’s activity areas, the SDF will work to
facilitate international peace cooperation activities that more effectively meet
the needs of the SDF’s activity areas. Japan will strengthen the development
of personnel who can play an active role in the field of international peace
cooperation activity, and will send more personnel to mission headquarters
of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping
operations which would help Japan in making more contribution in the field.
The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its
curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant government agencies,
foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such
as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also
candidates from various backgrounds.
To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations,
Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation in such
operations.
(6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation
In order to contribute to various activities in the field of arms control and
disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations, Japan
will continue its active engagement including its contribution of personnel
to these efforts. Given that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles that serve as their means of delivery pose a severe threat to the peace
and stability not only to Japan, but also to the international community as a
whole, in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations,
Japan will facilitate efforts towards nonproliferation such as participation in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
3. Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability
(1) Training and Exercises
To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence
effectiveness, the SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral
training and exercises will be conducted in a tailored and visible way.
Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF
will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies.
Along with these efforts, the SDF will expand the use of the good training
environment in Hokkaido, by SDF units across the country, to conduct
effective training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active
use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit
mobility. Doing so will enable nation-wide deployment of well-trained units
stationed in Hokkaido. To carry out effective training and exercises in the
SDF’s southwestern region where only limited space is available for SDF


training, and accounting for relations with local communities, the MOD will
continue effort to expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the
SDF. In addition, actively engaging in bilateral trainings at home and abroad
with U.S. Forces such as the U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to promptly
develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities.
Seeking to respond to various situations with a whole-of-government
approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police and
firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. In addition, the
government will conduct various simulation exercise and comprehensive
training and exercises regarding various situations including civil protection
on a regular basis in a tailored manner.
(2) Operational Infrastructure
Given that SDF camps and bases are indispensable for rapid deployment
and response to various contingencies as well as for ensuring a sustained
response posture for the long term, the resiliency of military camps and
bases will be enhanced. In particular, the SDF will strengthen its capabilities
to immediately rebuild various camp and base support functions such as
runways, information-communication infrastructure, and stable fuel supply.
For the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency
situations, necessary measures will be taken with consideration especially to
developing a deployment structure in the southwestern region. In addition, for
the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, the SDF will store necessary
ammunition and spare ports in locations most appropriate for operations, as
well as steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding
SDF camps and bases. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response
posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military
personnel will be promoted.
To keep availability ratio of equipment at higher standards with
lower costs, the MOD will conduct research as to what activities hamper
improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term contracts
raise predictability and enhance cost-effectiveness, the MOD will expand the
use of its new contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under
which the price is to be determined according to realized performance.
(3) Personnel and Education
Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and
internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long-standing
perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops
and the effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal situation, taking into
consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical
strength and morale.
(a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution
Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of achieving
a composition of ranks that enables the three services to accomplish their
respective missions in the most appropriate and sustainable way, the
SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers
of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers equipped with
necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner highquality privates/seaman/airman.
To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing
the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution
in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and
private/seaman/airman ranks, by encouraging early retirement and
more appropriately managing its privates/seaman/airman. While taking
into consideration the status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF
will conduct research on new systems for early retirement including
systems used by other countries. With a view to maintaining the proper
age distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures to
allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the SDF
will review the final promotion rate of officers, warrant officers and
sergeants/petty officers, and manage personnel more appropriately with
consideration to personnel’s physical strength so as to maintain SDF’s
strength.
(b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources
In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including its
female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel
possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such
personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF’s strength.
To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale
and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to
honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious
Badge program.
In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF
will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to the
Joint Staff Office and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate
personnel in the government who have a broad outlook and ideas, as
well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can
respond flexibly and rapidly to a variety of situations.
(c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support
In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from social
factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased pursuit of higher
education, in order to continue to secure competent personnel in the
coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public understanding of
national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations
to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with
relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, so as to spread
the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option.
As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) to
provide financially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign at a younger
age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening collaboration with local
governments and relevant organizations, through sharing the knowledge,
skills and experience of retired SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will
facilitate such efforts as measures to provide more incentives for companies


-----

to employ retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired
SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment
environment.
(d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff
In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are
becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote
the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas To
that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel and
their assignment to duties commensurate with their specialized knowledge
and skills including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and
will also improve training for call-ups. Aiming at active use of the private
sector’s transport capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize
reserve personnel including those who have experience as ship crew. The
SDF will also encourage the appointment of reserve personnel equipped
with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to
the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be
taken as well with broad consideration to using reserve personnel, including
for call-ups in various situations. Furthermore, to increase the adequacy of
reserve personnel, the SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the
reserve program, and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve
personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel.
(4) Medical
In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military medicine
capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range of missions in
responses to various situations and international peace cooperation activities,
the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and
promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment
rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities,
the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure,
including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical
College Hospital. By reinforcing education for medical officers, nurses and
emergency medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel
with more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider
such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on
situation responses, and improve frontline first aid capabilities, and will put in
place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the need for
enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore, the SDF will also reinforce the
functions of the National Defense Medical College, establishing it as a hub for
education, and research in the field of defense medical science.
(5) Defense Production and Technology Base
Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology base is
essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment of equipment,
but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational
environment in Japan, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing
deterrence. Given that and Japan’s intention to maintain and reinforce abovementioned base, the MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future
vision for Japan’s defense production and technology base as a whole.
With a view to enhancing the technological capability and improving
productivity of Japan’s defense production and technology base, as well as
increasing global competitiveness, Japan will actively promote cooperation on
defense equipment and technology development, such as through international
joint development and production with other countries including the United
States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields where Japan
enjoys an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies, the
MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft developed by
the MOD/SDF, to civilian uses.
The MOD will promote international joint development and production
and civilian uses of defense equipment in a way that benefit both manufacturers
and the government.
(6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment
To carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, a project
manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project
management including insertion of a technological perspective throughout
the life-cycle of equipment design, R&D, full rate production, acquisition,
sustainment, capability upgrade and eventual disposal. In relevant efforts,
the MOD will establish a database of past contracts, which it will use to
develop a simulation model for price estimation, so as to enable independent
estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private
sector’s knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel
to positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise
in the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In
addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a
significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost derived from the
analysis concerned and the real value of the life-cycle costs.
To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring
transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be
sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify contract types
and allow for the efficient acquisition of various equipment, the government
will take necessary measures after considering further development of its
contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, introduce longerterm contracts, which raise the predictability for companies and lead to lower
costs, and establish a flexible system for accepting orders such as, the use
of a consortium that enables convergence of technologies from respective,
globally competitive companies.
(7) Research and Development (R&D)
Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan’s severe fiscal situation,
the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of
the SDF.
In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote
technical review of next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles in view of


replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle range surface to air guided
missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition,
the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to
accumulate and enhance fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to
keep an option for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including
the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the
F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will take
necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will
promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed
air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through
simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct
research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in case of
various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote
R&D to improve existing equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft.
With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing technological
advantage in the areas of strategically important fields, the MOD will set a
vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and longterm R&D with regard to development of major equipment, in order to
systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term
perspectives. It will do this while considering the latest trends in science and
technology, changes in battle field techniques, the potential for international
joint research and development, and availability of effective joint operations
among major pieces of equipment.
From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to
actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use
technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities
and research institutions, while strengthening the function of technology
control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. In doing so, the MOD
will always pay attention to keeping abreast of scientific technological trends
including information relevant to technological development and gathering
industry-academic-government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will
also promote to have military technologies employed in civilian activities.
In order to achieve effective and efficient R&D in consideration of the
items stated above, the MOD will re-examine its research and development
posture, and take necessary measures.
(8) Collaboration with Local Communities
As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such efforts
as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment and reemployment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated harmonization
between defense facilities and their surrounding local communities, the
MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense
facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public
relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure
the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities.
Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution
to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas,
and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient
transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give
consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units,
and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to
secure the understanding of local governments and residents. In these efforts,
based on the governmental contract policies vis-a-vis small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), while considering efficiencies, the MOD will promote
various measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities
for local SMEs to receive orders.
(9) Boosting Communication Capabilities
Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign
countries are of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of
SDF missions, the MOD will strive to provide information actively and
effectively via various media sources such as social media networks with due
consideration to consistency in the information content. Efforts to provide
information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF activities abroad will be
facilitated by such means as improvement of its English web site.
(10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base
To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and crisis
management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of education on
security-related matters at educational institutions, including by MOD
personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers as experts
in security and crisis management. The role of the National Institute for
Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank associated with the MOD will be
strengthened, through such efforts as facilitating coordination with policymaking divisions by relocating the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the
MOD’s headquarters is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges
with foreign research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the
NIDS in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the
MOD faces in a timely and appropriate manner.
(11) Promoting Reform of the MOD
The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work
methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian
officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-up of defense
capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making
and communication functions. In doing so, with the intention of optimizing its
defense force build-up, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense
build-up with a focus on joint operation-based capability assessments, and take
measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in acquisition of equipment,
keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also,
to enhance the prompt and efficient operation of the SDF, by such effort as
integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office,
the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint
Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization
or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy.


-----

**IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan U.S. Alliance**
1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the AsiaPacific region and to ensure Japan’s national security, Japan will continue the
revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation while
strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts.
Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR
activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S.
forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational
cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning,
and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue.
Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counterpiracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counterterrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace.
Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative
relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and
information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation.
2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan

From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more
smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS).
**V. Quantities of Major Procurement**
The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in
Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces described in the Annex
Table of NDPG2013 over 10-year time frame, this program will focus on build-up of
defense forces the best adapted to the current security environment.
**VI. Expenditures**
1. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments
described in this program amount to approximately ¥24, 670 billion in FY2013
prices.
2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the
Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further
streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement
reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will
be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970 billion over the next five
years.
3. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration
to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment,
trends in technological standards including information communication
technology, and fiscal conditions.


**VII. Other**
While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement
specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO
(Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on
local communities, including those in Okinawa.

|Service|Equipment|Quantity|
|---|---|---|
|GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (expect mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31|
|MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9|
|ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education|
|Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3|



Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol
Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above.


Reference 8 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned

|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of March 31, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Type|Recoilless Guns|Mortars|Field Artillery|Rocket Launchers, etc.|Anti-aircraft Machine Guns|Tanks|Armored Vehicles|
|Approximate number owned|2,500|1,100|430|100|50|660|980|



Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.


Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications


||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|(As of March 31, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Service|Type|Model|Use|Number Owned|Maximum Speed (knots)|Crew (number)|Full Length (m)|Full Width (m)|Engine|
|GSDF|Fixed-wing|LR-2|Liaison and Reconnaissance|8|300|2 (8)|14|18|Turboprop, twin-engines|
||Rotary-wing|AH-1S|Anti-tank|59|120|2|14|3|Turboshaft|
|||OH-6D|Observation|44|140|1 (3)|7|2|Turboshaft|
|||OH-1|Observation|37|140|2|12|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines|
|||UH-1H /J|Utility|131|120|2 (11)|12/13|3|Turboshaft|
|||CH-47J/JA|Transport|57|150/140|3 (55)|16|4/5|Turboshaft, twin-engines|
|||UH-60JA|Utility|40|150|2 (12)|16|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines|
|||AH-64D|Combat|13|150|2|18|6|Turboshaft, twin-engines|
|MSDF|Fixed-wing|P-1|Patrol|11|450|11|38|35|Turbofan, quadruple-engine|
|||P-3C|Patrol|62|400|11|36|30|Turboprop, quadruple-engine|
||Rotary-wing|SH-60J|Patrol|34|150|3|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engine|
|||SH-60K|Patrol|52|140|4|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engine|
|||MCH-101|Minesweeping and transport|8|150|4|23|19|Turboshaft, triple engine|
|ASDF|Fixed-wing|F-15J/DJ|Fighter|201|mach 2.5|1/2|19|13|Turbofan, twin-engine|
|||F-4EJ|Fighter|52|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine|
|||F-2A/B|Fighter|92|mach 2|1/2|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine|
|||F-35A|Fighter|4|mach 1.6|1|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine|
|||RF-4E/EJ|Reconnaissance|13|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine|
|||C-1|Transport|17|mach 0.76|5 (60)|29|31|Turbofan, twin-engine|
|||C-130H|Transport|14|320|6 (92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple-engine|
|||KC-767|Aerial refueling transport|4|mach 0.84|4-8 (200)|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine|


-----

|Service|Type|Model|Use|Number Owned|Maximum Speed (knots)|Crew (number)|Full Length (m)|Full Width (m)|Engine|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|ASDF|Fixed-wing|KC-130H|Addition of aerial refueling functions transport|2|320|6 (92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple-engine|
|||E-2C|Early warning|13|330|5|18|25|Turboprop, twin-engine|
|||E-767|Early warning and control|4|450|20|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine|
||Rotary-wing|CH-47J|Transport|15|150|3 (55)|16|4|Turboshaft, twin-engine|


Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported.
2. F-4EJs include 48 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

3. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2016.


Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service

||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Category|Destroyer|Submarine|Mine warfare ship|Patrol combatant craft|Amphibious ship|Auxiliary ship|
|Number (vessels)|46|17|25|6|11|29|
|Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)|255|50|26|1|28|125|



Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.


(As of March 31, 2017)

Auxiliary ship

29

125


Reference 11 Guided Missile Specifications

||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Use|Name|Service|Weight (kg)|Full Length (m)|Diameter (cm)|Guidance System|
|Antiballistic|Patriot (PAC-3)|ASDF|Approx.300|Approx.5.2|Approx.26|Program + command + radar homing|
||SM-3|MSDF|Approx.1,500|Approx.6.6|Approx.35|Command + IR image homing|
|Antiaircraft and antimissile|Patriot (PAC-2)|ASDF|Approx.900|Approx.5.3|Approx.41|Program + command + TVM|
||Improved Hawk|GSDF|Approx.640|Approx.5.0|Approx.36|Radar homing|
||Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)||Approx.570|Approx.4.9|Approx.32|Radar homing|
||Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)||Approx.100|Approx.2.7/ 2.9|Approx.16|Image + IR homing Radar homing|
||Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)|GSDF/ ASDF|Approx.100|Approx.2.7|Approx.16|IR homing|
||Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)|GSDF|Approx.12|Approx.1.4|Approx.8|Image + IR homing|
||Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B)||Approx.13|Approx.1.5|Approx.8|IR image homing|
||Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)||Approx.12|Approx.1.4|Approx.8|Image + IR homing|
||Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile||Approx.100|Approx.2.9|Approx.16|Active radar homing|
||Surface-to-air missile for base air defense|ASDF|Approx.100|Approx.2.9|Approx.16|Active radar homing|
||Standard (SM-1)|MSDF|Approx.590|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Radar homing|
||Standard (SM-2)||Approx.710|Approx.4.7|Approx.30|Command + radar homing|
||Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)||Approx.230|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing|
||Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)||Approx.300|Approx.3.8|Approx.25|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||RAM (RIM-116)||Approx.73|Approx.2.8|Approx.13|Passive radar homing + IR homing|
||Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)|ASDF|Approx.230|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing|
||Sidewinder (AIM-9L)||Approx.89|Approx.2.9|Approx.13|IR homing|
||Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)||Approx.91|Approx.3.0|Approx.13|IR homing|
||Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)||Approx.220|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing|
||Type-99 air-to-air missile (B) (AAM-4B)||Approx.220|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing|
||Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)||Approx.95|Approx.3.1|Approx.13|IR homing|
|Antiship|Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)|GSDF|Approx.660|Approx.5.1|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||Type-12 surface-to-ship missile||Approx.700|Approx.5.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing + GPS|
||Harpoon (SSM)|MSDF|Approx.680|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||Harpoon (USM)||Approx.680|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||Harpoon (ASM)||Approx.530|Approx.3.8|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)||Approx.660|Approx.5.1|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)||Approx.510|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)|ASDF|Approx.600|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing|
||Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)||Approx.540|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + IR image homing|
||Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B)||Approx.530|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS|
|Antitank|Type-87 anti-tank missile|GSDF|Approx.12|Approx.1.1|Approx.11|Laser homing|
||Type-01 light anti-tank missile||Approx.11|Approx.0.9|Approx.12|IR image homing|
||TOW||Approx.18|Approx.1.2|Approx.15|IR semi-automatic wire guidance|


-----

|Use|Name|Service|Weight (kg)|Full Length (m)|Diameter (cm)|Guidance System|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Antilanding craft and antitank|Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile|GSDF|Approx.33|Approx.1.6|Approx.15|IR semi-automatic wire guidance|
||Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)||Approx.59|Approx.2.0|Approx.16|Inertial guidance + IR image Optic f bier TVM|
||Middle range multi-purpose missile||Approx.26|Approx.1.4|Approx.14|IR image homing Laser homing|
||Hellf ire|MSDF|Approx.47|Approx.1.6|Approx.18|Laser homing|
||Maverick||Approx.300|Approx.2.5|Approx.31|IR image homing|


Reference 12 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)


(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

|IItteemm FFiissccaall YYeeaarr|GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)|Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|General Annual Expenditures (C)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Defense- Related Expenditures (D)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)|Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/ B)|Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1955|75,590|9,915|△0.8|8,107|△2.8|1,349|△3.3|1.78|13.61|16.6|
|1965|281,600|36,581|12.4|29,198|12.8|3,014|9.6|1.07|8.24|10.3|
|1975|1,585,000|212,888|24.5|158,408|23.2|13,273|21.4|0.84|6.23|8.4|
|1985|3,146,000|524,996|3.7|325,854|△0.0|31,371|6.9|0.997|5.98|9.6|
|1995|4,928,000|709,871|△2.9|421,417|3.1|47,236|0.9|0.959|6.65|11.2|
|2009|5,102,000|885,480|6.6|517,310|9.4|47,028 47,741|△0.8 △0.1|0.922 0.936|5.31 5.39|9.1 9.2|
|2010|4,752,000|922,992|4.2|534,542|3.3|46,826 47,903|△0.4 0.3|0.985 1.008|5.07 5.19|8.76 8.96|
|2011|4,838,000|924,116|0.1|540,780|1.2|46,625 47,752|△0.4 △0.3|0.964 0.987|5.05 5.17|8.62 8.83|
|2012|4,796,000|903,339|△2.2|512,450|△5.2|46,453 47,138|△0.4 △1.3|0.969 0.983|5.14 5.22|9.06 9.20|
|2013|4,877,000|926,115|2.5|527,311|2.9|46,804 47,538|0.8 0.8|0.960 0.975|5.05 5.13|8.88 9.02|
|2014|5,004,000|958,823|3.5|564,697|7.1|47,838 48,848|2.2 2.8|0.956 0.976|4.99 5.09|8.47 8.65|
|2015|5,049,000|963,420|0.5|573,555|1.6|48,221 49,801|0.8 2.0|0.955 0.986|5.01 5.17|8.41 8.68|
|2016|5,188,100|967,218|0.4|578,286|0.8|48,607 50,541|0.8 1.5|0.937 0.974|5.03 5.23|8.41 8.74|
|2017|5,535,000|974,547|0.8|583,591|0.9|48,996 51,251|0.8 1.4|0.885 0.926|5.03 5.26|8.40 8.78|



Notes: 1. The fi gures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.
2. The upper fi gures for defense-related expenditures for FY2009 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion
yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2017), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion
meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion
yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen in FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen
in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in FY2016, and 21.6 billion yen in FY2017), while the lower fi gures include them.


-----

Reference 13 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)


(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

|IItteemm FFiissccaall yyeeaarr|Annual Expenditures on General Account|National Defense|Composition Ratio|Social Security|Composition Ratio|Education and Science|Composition Ratio|Public Works|Composition Ratio|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|2009|885,480|47,028 47,741|5.3 5.4|248,344|28.0|53,104|6.0|70,701|8.0|
|2010|922,992|46,826 47,903|5.1 5.2|272,686|29.5|55,872|6.1|57,731|6.3|
|2011|924,116|46,625 47,752|5.0 5.2|287,079|31.1|55,100|6.0|49,743|5.4|
|2012|903,339|46,453 47,138|5.1 5.2|263,901|29.2|54,057|6.0|45,734|5.1|
|2013|926,115|46,804 47,538|5.1 5.1|291,224|31.4|53,687|5.8|52,853|5.7|
|2014|958,823|47,838 48,848|5.0 5.1|305,175|31.8|54,421|5.7|59,685|6.2|
|2015|963,420|48,221 49,801|5.0 5.2|315,297|32.7|53,613|5.6|59,711|6.2|
|2016|967,218|48,607 50,541|5.0 5.2|391,738|33.1|53,580|5.5|59,737|6.2|
|2017|974,547|48,996 51,251|5.0 5.3|324,735|33.3|53,567|5.5|59,763|6.1|



Notes: 1. The education and science expenditures for FY2010 are post-overhaul fi gures.
2. The upper fi gures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in
FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2017), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on
the local community) (60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen
in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen in FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen in
FY2016, and 21.6 billion yen in FY2017), while the lower fi gures include them.


Reference 14 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)


(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

|FFiissccaall yyeeaarr IItteemm|2013|Col3|2014|Col5|2015|Col7|2016|Col9|2017|Col11|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
||Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|
|Personnel and provisions|19,896|42.5 41.9|20,930|43.8 42.8|21,121|43.8 42.4|21,473|44.2 42.5|21,662|44.2 42.3|
|Materials|26,908 27,642|57.5 58.1|26,909 27,918|56.2 57.2|27,100 28,680|56.2 57.6|27,135 29,069|55.8 57.5|27,334 29,589|55.8 57.7|
|Equipment acquisition|7,442|15.9 15.7|7,964|16.6 16.3|7,404|15.4 14.9|7,659|15.8 15.2|8,406|17.2 16.4|
|R&D|1,541|3.3 3.2|1,477|3.1 3.0|1,411|2.9 2.8|1,055|2.2 2.1|1,217|2.5 2.4|
|Facility improvement|950|2.0 2.0|950|2.0 1.9|1,293|2.7 2.6|1,461|3.0 2.9|1,571|3.2 3.1|
|Maintenance|11,134|23.8 23.4|11,361|23.7 23.3|11,808|24.5 23.7|11,707|24.1 23.2|10,888|22.2 21.2|
|Base countermeasures|4,381|9.4 9.2|4,397|9.2 9.0|4,425|9.2 8.9|4,509|9.3 8.9|4,529|9.2 8.8|
|The cost for SACO-related projects|88|0.2|120|0.2|46|0.1|28|0.1|28|0.1|
|U.S. Forces realignment related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)|646|1.4|890|1.8|1,426|2.9|1,766|3.5|2,011|3.9|
|Introduction of government aircraft|—|—|—|—|108|0|140|0.3|216|0.4|
|Others|1,460|3.1 3.1|760|1.6 1.6|758|1.6 1.5|744|1.5 1.5|723|1.5 1.4|
|Total|46,804 47,538|100.0|47,838 48,848|100|48,221 49,801|100|48,607 50,541|100|48,996 51,251|100|



Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.
2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.
4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfi elds and barracks.
5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.
6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.
7. The “others” category in FY2013 includes an expenditure amounting to 68.9 billion yen which is necessary to be carried over to the Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake.
8. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
9. The upper fi gures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, 2.8 billion yen in FY2016,
and 2.8 billion yen in FY2017), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion
yen in FY2015, 176.6 billion yen in FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen in FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015, 14.0 billion yen
in FY2016, and 21.6 billion yen in FY2017), while the lower fi gures include them.


-----

Reference 15 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

|FFiissccaall yyeeaarr CCoouunnttrryy|2013|2014|2015|2016|2016|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Japan (100 million yen)|46,804 47,538 0.8% 0.8%|47,838 48,848 2.2% 2.8%|48,221 49,801 0.8% 2.0%|48,607 50,541 0.8% 1.5%|48,996 51,251 0.8% 1.4%|
|U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)|607,795 △6.6%|577,897 △4.9%|562,499 △2.7%|565,375 1.01%|573,010 1.01%|
|China (100 million yuan)|7,202 10.7%|8,082 12.2%|8,896 10.1%|9,544 7.6%|10,444 7.1%|
|Russia (100 million RR)|21,036 16.1%|24,791 17.9%|31,814 28.3%|37,753 18.7%|28,358 △24.9%|
|Republic of Korea (100 million won)|344,970 4.7%|357,057 3.5%|374,560 4.9%|387,995 3.6%|403,337 4.0%|
|Australia (1 million Australian dollar)|25,434 5.0%|29,303 15.2%|32,695 11.6%|32,882 0.6%|35,191 7.0%|
|U.K. (1 million GBP)|34,800 1.6%|34,500 △0.9%|35,200 2.0%|35,000 △0.6%|35,500 1.4%|
|France (1 million euro)|38,092 0.3%|38,921 2.1%|36,791 △5.5%|39,939 8.6%|— —|



Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.
3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2017 are estimated values.
4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People’s Congress (However, since FY2015, only the defense
expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. For FY2015, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated
by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released.) In addition, through FY2015, the rate of growth over the previous year was calculated from the central government
expenditure. For FY2016, as only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure was released, the rate of change was calculated by comparing with the FY2015 and FY2017 defense
expenditure (886.9 billion yuan and 1.0226 trillion yuan) in the central ministry expenditure.
5. Russia’s defense expenditure is based on the FY2013-2016 expenditures and the FY2017 budget amount (as of February 2017) in the Information on Excecution of Budgets of the Russian Federation
released by the Federal Treasury (initial).
6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence.
7. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2012 are based on U.K. Defence Statistics 2013 published by the Ministry of Defence. The figures for FY2013 and after are based on the initial budget in the
budget message.
8. The French defense expenditure for FY2017 is undisclosed as of June 2017.
9. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (8.8 billion yen for FY2013, 12.0 billion yen for FY2014, 4.6 billion yen for FY2015, 2.8 billion yen for FY2016, and 2.8 billion yen
for FY2017), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment from which the expenses to reduce the burden on the local community (64.6 billion yen for FY2013, 89.0 billion yen for FY2014,
142.6 billion yen for FY2015, 176.6 billion yen for FY2016, and 201.1 billion yen for FY2017), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen for
FY2015, 14.0 billion yen for FY2016 and 21.6 billion yen for FY2017), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them.


Reference 16 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure
Japan’s Survival and Protect its People

(Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on
July 1, 2014)
Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peaceloving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to a basic policy of
maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military
power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles, Japan has fl ourished as an economic power through continuous efforts
of its people and built a stable and affl uent livelihood. Japan, as a peace-loving
nation, has also been cooperating with the international community and international
organizations including the United Nations (U.N.), and has proactively contributed to
their activities, adhering to the Charter of the United Nations. The course that Japan
has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered signifi cant praise and respect from
the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further fortify
such a position.
During the 67 years since the Constitution of Japan came into effect, the security
environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally transformed and is continuing
to evolve, and Japan is confronted by complex and signifi cant national security
challenges. There exist no prospects of the realization of the so-called formal “U.N.
forces”, an ideal proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, even
when considering only the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War, the shift in
the global power balance, rapid progress of technological innovation, development
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats
such as international terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the AsiaPacifi c region, and there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where
they originate in the world, could have a direct infl uence on the security of Japan.
Furthermore, in recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access
to the sea, outer space and cyberspace have been spreading and become more serious.
No country can secure its own peace only by itself, and the international community
also expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world,
in a way commensurate with its national capability.
Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival as well
as securing its people’s lives are the primary responsibility of the Government. In
order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to
fulfi ll its responsibility, the Government, fi rst and foremost, has to create a stable
and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by
advancing vibrant diplomacy with suffi cient institutional capabilities, and has to
pursue peaceful settlement of disputes by acting in accordance with international law
and giving emphasis to the rule of law.
Moreover, it is important to appropriately develop, maintain and operate Japan’s
own defense capability, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which
is Japan’s ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with other partners both
within and outside the region. In particular, it is essential to avoid armed confl icts
before they materialize and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating


the effectiveness of the Japan-United States security arrangements and enhancing the
deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the security of Japan and peace
and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure
the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even
more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the
policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international
cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless
responses.
In accordance with the basic orientation presented by Prime Minister Abe at the
May 15 press conference which took place after the report of “the Advisory Panel
on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security” was submitted on the same day,
discussions have been repeatedly held in the ruling parties and examination has
also been conducted by the Government. Based on the result of the discussions of
the ruling coalition, the Government will promptly develop domestic legislation
necessary for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people, in accordance
with the following basic policies:
1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack
(1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding
Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable
to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In
such situations of infringement that does not amount to an armed attack, it
is an even more important task to prepare and ensure seamless and suffi cient
responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant
agencies, including police organizations, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF),
premised on the basic allocation of their roles.
(2) Specifi cally, in order to respond to various unlawful acts, under the basic
policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are
to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and
authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all
areas, which include enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities,
strengthening collaboration among agencies including information sharing,
examining and developing concrete response guidelines, accelerating
procedures to issue orders, and improving exercises and training.
(3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to a situation where an
infringement from the outside that does not amount to an armed attack occurs
in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present
nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in
which police agencies cannot respond because of the weapons possessed by the
armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application
of related provisions to order public security operations or maritime security
operations in advance and establish a common understanding among relevant
agencies. At the same time, in order to avoid the spread of damages caused
by unlawful acts while internal administrative procedures are taken, the
Government will also make concrete considerations on measures for issuing
orders swiftly and accelerating procedures in light of circumstances.
(4) f i ’ i i i i f h S d


-----

the United States armed forces to respond seamlessly in close cooperation
to a situation where an attack occurs against the units of the United States
armed forces currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense
of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack depending on its
circumstances. Assuming a situation where an infringement that does not
amount to an armed attack occurs in the course of various peacetime activities
carried out in coordination between the SDF and the United States armed
forces and referring to the concept of “use of weapons” for the purpose of
protecting its own weapons and other equipment under Article 95 of the SDF
Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out
very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to
protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States armed
forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities
which contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line
with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law, premised on request or
consent by the United States.
2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community
(1) So-called Logistics Support and “Ittaika with the Use of Force”
A. So-called logistics support is an activity that does not in itself constitute
a “use of force”. For instance, when international peace and security
are threatened and the international community is united in responding
to the situation in accordance with a U.N. Security Council resolution,
there exist situations in which it is necessary for Japan to conduct
such support activities to armed forces of other countries carrying out
legitimate “use of force” based on the resolution. As for Japan’s support
activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities
to “rear area” or so-called “noncombat area”, etc. have been established
in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “ittaika with the use of
force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise,
in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid
Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of
force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support
activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“ittaika with
the use of force”) by other countries.
B. The SDF, even under such legal frameworks, has steadily accumulated
its records of various support activities, and the expectations to and
trust in Japan have been growing. Amid a major change in the security
environment, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace”
based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to
enable the SDF to play sufficient roles in wide-ranging support activities
for peace and stability of the international community. It is also vital
from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan’s peace and security to enable the
carrying out of such activities more than before without hindrance.
C. The Government, while premising on the theory of so-called “Ittaika
with the use of force” itself, based on the accumulation of discussions
related to the “ittaika with the use of force” and considering factors such
as the SDF’s actual experiences to date and the reality of U.N. collective
security measures, no longer takes the current framework uniformly
limiting SDF’s activities to such areas as “rear area” or so-called “noncombat area” where the issue of “ittaika with the use of force” does not
arise. Instead, the Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support
activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which
is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted”
by a foreign country are not regarded as “ittaika with the use of force”
by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is
based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing
legislation which enables necessary support activities to armed forces of
foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or
for peace and stability of the international community:
(a) Do not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat
activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign
country to which Japan provides support.
(b) Immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where
Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where
combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of
the situation.
(2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities
A. To date, Japan has developed necessary legislation and has conducted
international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In
conducting such activities, Japan has limited the right of SDF personnel
to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation
activities to so-called self-preservation type and protection of its own
weapons and other equipment since use of weapons associated with socalled “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant
unit or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of
execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by
Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons are directed against
“a state or a quasi-state organization.”
B. From the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the
principle of international cooperation, Japan needs to enhance its efforts
to promote the peace and stability of the international community. To
that end, it is important to be able to participate in international peace
cooperation activities including peace keeping operations (PKOs)
sufficiently and proactively. Moreover, given that many Japanese
nationals are actively working overseas and face risks of being involved
in emergency situations such as terrorism, it is necessary to enable
the rescuing of Japanese nationals abroad by use of weapons subject
to the consent of acceptance from the territorial State which, under
international law, has the obligation to extend protection to foreigners
who are within its territories.
C. Based on the above, the Government will proceed with developing
legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF’s


use of weapons associated with so called kaketsuke keigo and the use
of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international
peace cooperation activities that do not invoke “use of force” including
U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as police-like activities that do not
invoke “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with
a consent from the territorial State, through ensuring that “a state or a
quasi-state organization” does not appear as the adversary:
(a) As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., since “consent by the
State to which the areas in which activities are conducted belong”
and “consent by the parties to the conflict to activities conducted”
are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs,
“a quasi-state organization” other than parties to the conflict who
have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected
to appear as the adversary. For more than 20 years, this has
been demonstrated by Japan’s experience of U.N. peacekeeping
operations, etc. When the use of weapons for the execution of
missions is expected to exceed selfpreservation and protection of
its own weapons and other equipment including when the SDF
is tasked with the maintenance of order such as the protection of
population, which is deemed as an important mission in recent
U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is necessary that consent from the
parties to the conflict is stably maintained, especially because of the
nature of the activities.
(b) When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not
involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals
in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s
Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area
within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is
valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This
means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area.
(c) The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent
ofacceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the
consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc. based on
deliberations etc. at the National Security Council.
(d) Use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent
constraint of the strict principle of proportionality which is similar
to the principle of police proportionality.
3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution
(1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan
and secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situations,
the Government has examined what constitutional interpretation would be
appropriate, as sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the
constitutional interpretation to date were maintained. In this regard, logical
consistency and legal stability are required for the Government’s constitutional
interpretation.

Accordingly, it is necessary to draw a logical conclusion for securing
the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limit of the basic
logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the
Government to date.
(2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of
force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered
in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the
Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution
which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article
9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from
taking measures of self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security
and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only
when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where
the people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally
overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding
these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent
necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic,
of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to
“use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and
clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective
Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the
Committee on Audit of the House of Councilors on October 14, 1972.

This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution
(3) To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic
logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However,
in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan
has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in
the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation,
and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc. as mentioned at the
outset, in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country
could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and
manner, etc.

Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts,
should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary
responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations
developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still
required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure
Japan’s survival and protect its people.

Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of
the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion
that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an
armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with
Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear
danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel
the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people use of force to


-----

the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the
Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic
of the Government’s view to date.
(4) As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while
observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international
law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In
certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the
Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective selfdefense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by
an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under
the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which
are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other
words for defending Japan.
(5) Moreover, even when “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution, since
they are carried out to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, it
is natural to require an assurance of democratic control. The Government will
stipulate in the draft legislation that prior approval of the Diet is in principle

Reference 17 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces


required upon issuing orders of operations to the SDF for carrying out use
of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs
not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the
procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and
regulations.
4. The Way Forward for Developing Domestic Legislation
When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make a
decision in accordance with deliberations, etc. at the National Security Council.
Including such procedures, domestic legislation which serves as the legal basis is
necessary in order to enable the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Based on
the basic policies described above, the Government will herewith commence the
tasks of drafting legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations in
order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. The Government
will give adequate consideration, and as soon as it completes its preparation, it
will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations.

|Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions|
|---|---|---|---|
|Defense operation (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 76)|(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan’s survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required|❍ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self- defense) ❍ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation)1 ❍ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, civil protection, etc.)1|
|Establishment of defense facilities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-2)|When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)1 (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister)|❍ Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty|
|Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-3 and U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act)|When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation|(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies — not required; services — required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)2 (3) Cabinet decision: supplies — not required; services — required (approval of the Prime Minister)|❍ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act ❍ Provision of services as a related measure ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty|
|Civil protection dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 77-4)|When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief (Prime Minister)|❍ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.)3 ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons|
|Public security operation by order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 78)|When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance) (3) Cabinet decision: required|❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons ❍ Control over the Japan Coast Guard|
|Information gathering before public security operation order (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 79-2)|When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: consultation between the Minister of Defense and the National Public Safety Commission|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life and body or other personnel on duty|
|Public security operation by request (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 81)|When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (4) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission|❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons|


When special measures are deemed necessary to (1) Authorized by: Prime Minister ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law
prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (interrogation; measures such as evacuation,

Guarding operation attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in (3) Cabinet decision: required etc.; entry (all only when police officers are
(Self-Defense Forces Japan (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults not present); crime prevention and control)
Law Article 81-2) with the National Public Safety Commission after ❍ Use of weapons

hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural
governor


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|Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions|
|---|---|---|---|
|Maritime security operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82)|When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister; when the response is for a submerged submarine, approval of the Prime Minister is not subject to Cabinet decision)|❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons|
|Counter-piracy operations (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-2 and Anti-Piracy Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister|❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons|
|Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 82-3)|When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory from the damage caused by the missiles|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister|❍ Use of weapons|
|Disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83)|When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters4|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)|❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)|
|Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-2)|When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large- Scale Earthquakes)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)|❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)|
|Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 83-3)|When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters is established by Cabinet decision) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)|❍ Same as in disaster relief dispatch|
|Action against violation of territorial airspace (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84)|When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required|❍ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.)5|
|Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-2)||(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required|❍ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea|
|Measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-3)|Emergency situations overseas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to conduct rescue measures such as guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty, and to execute duties|
|Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4)|Natural disasters, unrest, and other emergency situations overseas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: as necessary (4) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty|
|Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security|(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister; services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking measures in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty|
|Logistics support and other activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Support Act, and Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community|(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister; services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required with no exception) (3) Cabinet decision: required (approval of the Prime Minister to implement response measures, for the draft basic plan and for the prescribed implementation guidelines pursuant to the basic plan)|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty|


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|Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions|
|---|---|---|---|
|International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Disaster Relief Law)||(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: not required (4) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs||
|International peace cooperation activities (Primary operations of peacekeeping force and “safety-ensuring” operations) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)|United Nations peacekeeping operations and internationally coordinated operations for peace and security (so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations of peacekeeping activities)|(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: required (only if the operations are conducted by SDF units, etc.; prior consent required in principle) (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty ❍ Use of weapons to execute duties (when conducting so-called “safety-ensuring” operations)|
|International peace cooperation activities (Operations other than primary operations of peacekeeping force) (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5 and International Peace Cooperation Act)|United Nations peacekeeping operations, internationally coordinated operations for peace and security, and international humanitarian assistance (operations other than the so-called primary operations and “safety-ensuring” operations of peacekeeping activities)|(1) Authorized by: Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister) (SDF personnel dispatched individually) Minister of Defense (SDF personnel dispatched as a unit) (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Cabinet decision: required (for implementation of international peace cooperation operations and the draft implementation plan) (4) Additional requirements: request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty ❍ Use of weapons for so-called “kaketsuke- keigo”|


(All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law)
Notes: 1. Measures based on an assumption of direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not applicable to the situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening
Japan’s survival.

2. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the
Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).

3. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.

4. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry’s facilities.

5. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.”


Reference 18 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel or SDF Units

|Type of Operation|Provision|Content|
|---|---|---|
|Defense operation|Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.|
||Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.|
|Establishment of defense facilities|Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Civil protection dispatch|Article 92-3 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant cast guard officers, are not present.|
|Public security operation|Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.|
||Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.|
||Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.|
|Information-gathering duties before public security operation order|Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Guarding operation|Article 91-2 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.|
||Article 91-2 (3), Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.|
|Maritime security operation|Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.|
||Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.|
|Counter-piracy operations|Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.|
|||If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.|
|Destruction measures against ballistic missiles|Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.|
|Action against violation of territorial airspace|Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law|The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.1|


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|Type of Operation|Provision|Content|
|---|---|---|
|Measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas|Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self- defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad|Article 94-6, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security - Logistics support activities, etc.||SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law - Ship inspection operations||SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Article 25 and 26, International Peace Cooperation Act – International peace cooperation operations||SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces’ units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “kaketsuke-keigo (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request)” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries|Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Guarding facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries|Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other foreign armed forces, which are actually engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including joint exercises and training, and excluding the activities carried out in the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted), may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situations when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Guarding facilities|Article 95-3, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding the SDF facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Maintenance of internal order|Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.|
|Article 12, The U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act||SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably depending on necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of other the SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Article 37, Maritime Transportation Restriction Act||Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.|
|Article 152, Prisoners of War Act||SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|
|Article 11, International Peace Support Act||SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.|


Note: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.”


-----

Reference 19 Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2016)

**Prefectures that Conducted Joint Exercises More than Once**

Field exercise Fukushima Prefecture (2009, 2016), Tochigi Prefecture (2009, 2014), Chiba

Simulation exercise (2007, 2010, 2013), Oita Prefecture (2008, 2014, 2016), Kagoshima

|Types of Exercise|Date|Location|
|---|---|---|
|Field exercise|November 4, 2016|Toyama Prefecture|
||November 15, 2016|Tokyo|
||February 2, 2017|Kyoto Prefecture|
||February 2, 2017|Kagoshima Prefecture|
|Simulation exercise|November 10, 2016|Shizuoka Prefecture|
||November 22, 2016|Osaka Prefecture|
||November 24, 2016|Oita Prefecture|
||January 17, 2017|Yamagata Prefecture|
||January 18, 2017|Iwate Prefecture|
||January 19, 2017|Mie Prefecture|
||January 20, 2017|Hiroshima Prefecture|
||January 23, 2017|Shiga Prefecture|
||January 24, 2017|Shimane Prefecture|
||January 26, 2017|Aichi Prefecture|
||January 27, 2017|Okayama Prefecture|
||January 31, 2017|Fukui Prefecture|
||February 6, 2017|Nagasaki Prefecture|
||February 7, 2017|Fukuoka Prefecture|
||February 8, 2017|Fukushima Prefecture|
||February 9, 2017|Kanagawa Prefecture|
||February 10, 2017|Tokushima Prefecture|
||February 14, 2017|Ehime Prefecture|



Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007. Seven times Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)
Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008.

Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009.

Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010. 2016)

Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011.

Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012. Eleven times Fukui Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,

Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2013. 2015, 2016)

|Number of Times Conducted|Location|
|---|---|
|Twice|Fukushima Prefecture (2009, 2016), Tochigi Prefecture (2009, 2014), Chiba Prefecture (2007, 2013), Nagano Prefecture (2007, 2008), Osaka Prefecture (2006, 2016), Shimane Prefecture (2007, 2016), Hiroshima Prefecture (2007, 2016), Kagawa Prefecture (2009, 2013), Nara Prefecture (2008, 2015), Yamanashi Prefecture (2009, 2015)|
|Three times|Hokkaido Prefecture (2006, 2011, 2015), Aomori Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2013), Akita Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2015), Saitama Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2010), Niigata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2013), Gifu Prefecture (2007, 2011, 2014), Shizuoka Prefecture (2007, 2015, 2016), Aichi Prefecture (2007, 2013, 2016), Kyoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2016), Hyogo Prefecture (2009, 2011, 2015), Okayama Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2016), Yamaguchi Prefecture (2007, 2008, 2015), Nagasaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2016), Kumamoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2013), Oita Prefecture (2008, 2014, 2016), Kagoshima Prefecture (2007, 2012, 2016), Okinawa Prefecture (2009, 2012, 2013)|
|Four times|Iwate Prefecture (2009, 2010, 2015, 2016), Ibaraki Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2010, 2014), Kanagawa Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2015, 2016), Mie Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2015, 2016), Shiga Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2014, 2016), Tottori Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2006, 2008), Fukuoka Prefecture (2006, 2011, 2014, 2016), Saga Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2011, 2014), Miyazaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014)|
|Five times|Yamagata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016), Tokyo (2006, 2009, 2013, 2015, 2016)|
|Seven times|Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)|
|Nine times|Tokushima Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016), Ehime Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)|
|Eleven times|Fukui Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016)|


Implemented in 13 Prefectures in FY2014.

Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2015.


Reference 20 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

**** **(April 27, 2015)**

**A STRONGER ALLIANCE FOR A DYNAMIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

**The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation**

**1. OVERVIEW**
Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani,
Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter convened the
Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in New York on April 27, 2015.
In light of the evolving security environment, the Ministers reconfirmed the Alliance’s
commitment to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of international peace
and security.
The Ministers announced the approval and release of new, revised “Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (the Guidelines), which update the roles and
missions of the two countries and promote a more balanced and effective Alliance to
meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. The Ministers discussed a
variety of regional and global challenges, initiatives to enhance bilateral security and
defense cooperation in various areas, promotion of enhanced regional cooperation,
and moving forward on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.
As articulated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States is
actively implementing its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Central to this is the
ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S.
military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional. Japan highly values U.S.
engagement in the region. In this context, the Ministers reaffirmed the indispensable
role of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in promoting regional peace, security, and prosperity.
As Japan continues its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” based on
the principle of international cooperation, the United States welcomes and supports
Japan’s recent monumental achievements. Among these are: the cabinet decision
by the Government of Japan on July 1, 2014, for developing seamless security
legislation; the creation of its National Security Council; the Three Principles
on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; the Act on the Protection of
Specially Designated Secrets; the Basic Act on Cybersecurity; the new Basic Plan on
Space Policy; and the Development Cooperation Charter.
The Ministers affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthened by the new
Guidelines and the two countries’ respective security and defense policies, continues
to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a
platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment.
The Ministers also reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands are territories under the
administration of Japan and therefore fall within the scope of the commitments under
Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and that they
oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these
islands.
**2. THE NEW GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION**
The Guidelines, which were first approved on November 27, 1978, and revised on
September 23, 1997, have provided a general framework and policy direction for
the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as ways of cooperation and
coordination. At the SCC meeting in Tokyo on October 3, 2013, the Ministers shared
views on the evolving security environment and directed the Subcommittee for
Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines
to ensure that the Alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing
peace and security


Today, the SCC approved the SDC’s recommended new Guidelines, which
accomplishes the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new
Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework
and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest
a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by
modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all
phases, from peacetime to contingencies.
Recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the new
Guidelines and Japan’s efforts to develop seamless security legislation, the Ministers
acknowledged that such legislation would make bilateral efforts under the new
Guidelines more effective. The United States welcomes and supports the ongoing
efforts to develop the legislation, which is to reflect Japan’s policy of “Proactive
Contributions to Peace” and its July 2014 cabinet decision.
The core of the Guidelines continues to be the steadfast commitment to Japan’s
peace and security. The new Guidelines detail the ways and means through which
the two governments continue to strengthen their ability to fulfill that commitment
through seamless, robust, flexible, and effective Alliance responses while expanding
bilateral cooperation across a range of other areas, such as:
Alliance Coordination Mechanism: Under the new Guidelines the two
countries are establishing a standing, whole-of-government mechanism for Alliance
coordination, enabling a seamless response in all phases, from peacetime to
contingencies.
Regional and Global Cooperation: The new Guidelines enable the Alliance to
make greater contributions to international security initiatives wherever appropriate
in a way consistent with Japanese laws and regulations, such as peacekeeping
operations, maritime security, and logistic support. The Ministers reiterated
the importance of cooperating with regional and other partners as well as with
international organizations.
New Strategic Cooperation: A dynamic world requires a modern Alliance, and
the new Guidelines lay a foundation for the two countries to cooperate in space and
cyberspace and in conducting operations intended to have effects across domains.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: The new Guidelines describe
ways the two governments can work together to improve further the effectiveness
of bilateral cooperation in responding to a large-scale disaster in Japan or around
the world.
A Strong Foundation: The new Guidelines also describe programs and activities
that pay dividends in every aspect of bilateral cooperation, including defense
equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information
security, and educational and research exchanges.
The Ministers confirmed their intention to start bilateral work under the
new Guidelines. In this context, the SCC directed the SDC to implement the new
Guidelines, including establishing the standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism
and upgrading the Bilateral Planning Mechanism, thereby strengthening bilateral
planning. The Ministers also expressed their intention to negotiate expeditiously
an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics
cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines.
**3. BILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION**
The Ministers noted with satisfaction ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance’s
deterrence and response capabilities by enhancing bilateral security and defense
cooperation in a variety of areas. The Ministers:

-  confirmed the strategic importance of deploying the most modern and advanced
U S capabilities to Japan which enhances Alliance deterrence and contributes to


-----

the security of Japan and the Asia Pacific region. In this context, the Ministers
welcomed the deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to Kadena
Air Base, the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned
aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base, the deployment of the USS Green Bay, an
upgraded amphibious transport ship, and U.S. plans to deploy Marine Corps
F-35B aircraft to Japan in 2017. In addition, the Ministers welcomed U.S. plans
to deploy additional Aegis ships to Yokosuka Naval Base by 2017, as well as the
swap-out of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington with the more advanced
USS Ronald Reagan later this year;

-  committed to continued engagement through the bilateral Extended Deterrence
Dialogue, which reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to
Japan, including through discussion of nuclear and conventional capabilities;

-  stressed the importance of sustained cooperation in enhancing Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) capabilities, particularly the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2
radar (X-band radar) system to Kyogamisaki in December 2014 and the planned
deployment of two additional BMD-capable destroyers to Japan by 2017. Working
in concert, these assets are to directly contribute to the defense of Japan and the
United States;

-  highlighted enhanced collaboration on space security, particularly in the areas
of resiliency and developing capabilities, through the whole-of-government
Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space and the Space Security Dialogue.
The Ministers also highlighted increased cooperation resulting from the Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency’s provision of space situational awareness (SSA)
information to the United States, as well as the establishment of a new framework
to discuss space-related issues between the two defense authorities;

-  called for continued progress in cooperation on cyberspace issues, particularly
in the areas of threat information sharing, mission assurance, and critical
infrastructure protection, through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Cyber
Dialogue and the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group;

-  lauded enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
cooperation, particularly the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global
Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base and Japan’s plans to procure
advanced ISR platforms;

-  praised expanded logistics and defense equipment cooperation, as reflected by
Japan’s new Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology
and the recent U.S. decision to establish an F-35 regional maintenance, repair,
overhaul, and upgrade capability in Japan. The Ministers highlighted strengthened
defense equipment cooperation through the linkage of the Systems and
Technology Forum and the Alliance Roles, Missions, and Capabilities dialogue,
which facilitates joint research and development of advanced capabilities; and

-  affirmed the importance of enhanced information security cooperation, as reflected
by continued progress through the Bilateral Information Security Consultations
and by Japan’s implementation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated
Secrets. As a result of this legislation, the Government of Japan has put in place the
policies, practices, and procedures necessary to facilitate the secure exchange of
sensitive information in peacetime and during contingencies.
In addition, the Ministers affirmed that host nation support has demonstrated
continued Japanese support for the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in
Japan, which contributes to Japan’s peace and security in an increasingly complex
security environment. The Ministers, noting that the current host nation support
commitment, as stipulated in June 2011 SCC documents, expires in March 2016,
expressed their intention to start consultations on future arrangements to provide an
appropriate level of host nation support.
Recognizing the expanding scope of bilateral activities, the Ministers affirmed
their intent to consider at the earliest opportunity an appropriate bilateral consultation
framework that would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Alliance
management processes.
**4. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION**
Recognizing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the
Asia-Pacific region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable
international security environment, the Ministers highlighted recent progress in the
following areas:

-  Increased cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations, as
reflected by close coordination in responding to the November 2013 typhoon in
the Philippines;

-  Continued close coordination on partner capacity building, particularly in
Southeast Asia, including through the provision of coastal patrol vessels and other
maritime security capacity building endeavors; and

-  Expanded trilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly with key partners
such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, as well as the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations. The Ministers highlighted the recent signing of a
trilateral information sharing arrangement with the ROK concerning the nuclear
and missile threats posed by North Korea, and resolved to utilize the framework
as the foundation for expanded trilateral cooperation into the future. The Ministers
also affirmed their intention to pursue closer cooperation with Australia on
capacity building activities in Southeast Asia, and on security and defense issues
through the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum.
**5. REALIGNMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN**
The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to implement
the existing arrangements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan as soon as possible,
while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the
process. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and
flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to
respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact
of U.S. forces on local communities. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the
relocation of the KC-130 squadron from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma
to MCAS Iwakuni and confirmed their commitment to continue aviation training
relocation, including to locations outside of Okinawa, through efforts such as the
development of training areas and facilities.
As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers reconfirmed that the plan to
construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki


area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political,
financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma.
The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ unwavering commitment to the plan
and underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion and the longdesired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. The United States welcomes the steady
and continuing progress of FRF construction projects.
The Ministers also reconfirmed the importance of land returns south of Kadena
Air Base based on the 2006 “Roadmap” and the April 2013 Consolidation Plan,
and reiterated the two governments’ determination to work continuously on the
implementation of the plan and anticipated the update of the plan by Spring 2016.
The Ministers highlighted the on-time return of the West Futenma Housing Area of
Camp Zukeran on March 31 of this year, which marked the most significant land
return completed to date in accordance with the plan.
The Ministers confirmed that the two governments are steadily implementing
the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside
of Japan, including Guam, based upon the amended Guam International Agreement.
The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to
protect the environment and confirmed the importance of making further efforts
in environmental matters. To that end, the Ministers welcomed progress on a
supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship
and confirmed their intention to continue negotiating the ancillary documents of the
Agreement as expeditiously as possible.

Reference 21 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(April 27, 2015)

**I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines**
In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from
peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous
Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will
emphasize:

-  seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses;

-  synergy across the two governments’ national security policies;

-  a whole-of-government Alliance approach;

-  cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international
organizations; and

-  the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
The two governments will continuously enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national
security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National
Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines”. The United
States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of
capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to
forward deploy combat-ready forces in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain the
ability to reinforce those forces rapidly.
The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”)
provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions
of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination,
with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense
cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict,
secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international
understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
**II. Basic Premises and Principles**
The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will
be consistent with the following basic premises and principles.
A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental
framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged.
B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under
the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter
of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement
of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant
international agreements.
C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be
in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then
in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct
actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the
maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three
non-nuclear principles.
D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative,
budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create
legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the
Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral
cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate
way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific
policies and measures.
**III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination**
Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two
governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and
operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies.
The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple
levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that
end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance
information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government
Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two
governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism,
enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning.
A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism
Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on
h d i f J d h U i d S I d dd


-----

seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan s peace and
security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the
two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This
mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to
activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also
will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development
and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective
coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and
infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication
systems) and conduct regular training and exercises.

The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for
coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within
the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures,
contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime.
B. Enhanced Operational Coordination
Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive
command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and
the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued
importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen
cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
Forces.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate
coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international
activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in
close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective
chains-of-command.
C. Bilateral Planning
The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to
ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness
of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses,
the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying
operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as
appropriate.

The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for
contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded
Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the
respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from
relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee
(SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating
the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as
necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body.

Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both
governments.
**IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security**
Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on
Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the
two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all
phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an
armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments
also will promote further cooperation with partners.
The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based
on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation
and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses.
Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance
Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to:

-  assess the situation;

-  share information; and

-  develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible
deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at de-escalation.
To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate
strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially
affect Japan’s peace and security.
A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime
In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security, the two
governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including
through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the
Japan-U.S. Alliance.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible
situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including,
but not limited to, the following:
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats
to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in
intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and
protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining
common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination
and cooperation among relevant agencies.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities
based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This
will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive
manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect
Japan’s peace and security.
2. Air and Missile Defense
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain
and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic
missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate
t d l i biliti i t bilit t k


and real time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive
improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles.
Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in
responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities.
3. Maritime Security
The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures
to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including
freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States
Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as
maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain
through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and
enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating
with relevant agencies, as necessary.
4. Asset Protection
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide
mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in
activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner,
including during training and exercises.
5. Training and Exercises
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct
effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and
outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability,
and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance
deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate
to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are
available, accessible, and modern.
6. Logistic Support
Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic
support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces
and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support
where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance,
transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as
set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal
Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SelfDefense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of
America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related
arrangements.
7. Use of Facilities
In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency
of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two
governments will enhance joint/shared use and cooperate in ensuring the
security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared
for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site
surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate.
B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security
The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important
influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined
geographically. The measures described in this section include those that
may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and
regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation.
Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions
will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations.
In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the
two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to
ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination
Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on
their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below.
1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third
country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating
its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected
area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and
cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants.
These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities
such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary
manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation
assistance to third-country noncombatants.

The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination
through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry
out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation
means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing,
safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance
coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as
appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises.
2. Maritime Security
Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will
cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may
include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships
based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under
international law.
3. Measures to Deal with Refugees
If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes
likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain
Japan’s peace and security while handling refugees in a humane manner
consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary
responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States
will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan.
4. Search and Rescue
The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as
appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in
cooperation with relevant agencies will provide support to combat search


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and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to
Japanese laws and regulations.
5. Protection of Facilities and Areas
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are
responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation
with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan
will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close
cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces.
6. Logistic Support
The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which
includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation,
engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective
and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of
operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan
will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local
government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of
Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate,
subject to Japanese laws and regulations.
7. Use of Facilities
The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of
facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with
the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two
governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and
areas.
C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan
Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core
aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation.
When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments
will take steps to deter the armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while
making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan.
When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will
conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage
and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary
measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV.
1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated
When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments
will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government
approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations,
and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack
and to de-escalate the situation.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution
of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its
support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may
include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas;
mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance,
transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection
of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs
a. Principles for Coordinated Actions
If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and
deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly
the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to
Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment
of peace and security in the region.

Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the
citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel
an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The SelfDefense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive
operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well
as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate
closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States
Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to
defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional
environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes
peace and security.

Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be
required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ
a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-ofcommand, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination
Mechanism.

The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including
those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as
required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate
these deployments.

The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide
defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response to an armed
attack against Japan.
b. Concept of Operations
i. Operations to Defend Airspace
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and
surrounding Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for
conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For
this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions,
including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and
cruise missiles.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to
support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.
ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will


conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks
against Japan.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic
missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile
attack, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile
attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in
ballistic missile defense operations.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for
conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to
support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.
iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and
to secure the safety of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility
for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships
and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated
operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take
necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense,
anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air
warfare, and air interdiction.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to
support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing
support to adversaries involved in the armed attack.

The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through
information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant
agencies.
iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan
by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces.

The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for
conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including
those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces
will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the
Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not
limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne
invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment.

The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant
agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks
by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in
Japan, including those that involve infiltration.

The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to
support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations.
v. Cross-Domain Operations
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack
against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be
designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously.

Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions
described below.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces,
in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen
their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence,
and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets.

The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations
involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the SelfDefense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such
operations, the Self-Defense Forces may provide support, as necessary.
These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as
appropriate.

The two governments will cooperate to address threats in
the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral
cooperation set out in Chapter VI.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces’
special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as
appropriate.
c. Operational Support Activities
The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in
support of bilateral operations.
i. Communications and Electronics
The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective
use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
will ensure effective communication between the two forces and
maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under
common situational awareness.
ii. Search and Rescue
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in
cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide
mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat
search and rescue, as appropriate.
iii. Logistic Support
When operations require supplementing their respective logistics
resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based
on their respective capabilities and availability


-----

The two governments will make appropriate use of the
authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as
well as private sector assets, to provide support.
iv. Use of Facilities
The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional
facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and
its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance
cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas.
v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection
The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for
emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains
primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission
capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan’s
request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or
attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure
the protection of Japan, as appropriate.
D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan
When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the
use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for
sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an
armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not
come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed
attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated
through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism.

Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other
countries taking action in response to the armed attack.

The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving
the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a
foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result,
threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally
its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s
survival, and to protect its people.

Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below:
1. Asset Protection
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate
in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not
be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. Search and Rescue
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in
cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support
in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as
appropriate.
3. Maritime Operations
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety
of sea lines of communication.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in
cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to
protect ships and vessels, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in
cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of
shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed
attack, as appropriate.
4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks
The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will
cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance
with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange
information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.
5. Logistics Support
When operations require supplementing their respective logistics
resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their
respective capabilities and availability.

The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities
and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private
sector assets, to provide support.
E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan
When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary
responsibility for responding to the disaster. The Self-Defense Forces, in
cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors,
will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery
from a large-scale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan’s peace and security
and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed
Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will
provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include
search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness
and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments
will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as
appropriate.

To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’
cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in
Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through
information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may
participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding
in responding to large-scale disasters.
**V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security**
In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take
a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace,
security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.
F ll h lf t b th t i h k d t th t d li


effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world.
When each of the two governments decides to participate in international
activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments,
including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will
cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the
activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and
security of both countries.
A. Cooperation in International Activities
The two governments will participate in international activities, based on
their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and
the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent
practicable.

The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance
Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and
multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and
the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as
appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments
will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly
included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two
governments in regional and international activities will include:
1. Peacekeeping Operations
When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations
authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as
appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces
and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may
cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other
personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate.
2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/
disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from
governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of
large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will
cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing
interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United
States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include
mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and
execution.
3. Maritime Security
When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security,
the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples
of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea
lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism
activities.
4. Partner Capacity Building
Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining
and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two
governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate,
by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the
objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic
security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include
maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and
improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations.
5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation
of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate,
all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of
noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals.
6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
When the two governments participate in international activities, the
Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate
in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and
availability of their assets.
7. Training and Exercises
In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and
participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen
interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also
will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and
exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and
the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures.
8. Logistic support
When participating in international activities, the two governments will
cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan
will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws
and regulations.
B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation
The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral
security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will
reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional
and other partners, as well as international organizations.
The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and
international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon
international law and standards.
**VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation**
A. Cooperation on Space
Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments
will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible,
peaceful, and safe use of space.

As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency
f th i t d h it ti l ti


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Reference 22 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment
Implementation

 (Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)
**Overview**
On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC)
members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and
related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.– Japan Alliance:
Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members
directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives
and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March
2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.
**Finalization of Realignment Initiatives**
The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented,
these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.
The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation
of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise
specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise
from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their
realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29,
2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens
on local communities.
**Key Implementation Details**
1. Realignment on Okinawa
(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)
 The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that
combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko
Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having
a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each
runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see
attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed
operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and
environmental impacts.
 In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp
Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration
of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
 Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
 Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally
capable.
 Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru
and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site
surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
 Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be
examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate
arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
 In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
 The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.
(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam
 Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and
their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam
by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will
include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters,
3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support
Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine
Regiment Headquarters.
 The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney,
Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service
Area.
 The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist
of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground,
aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
 Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure
development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide
$6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash
contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable
the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents
that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund
the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the
relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in
fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road.
(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities
 Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the
transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas
on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant
land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
 Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In
this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will
be examined:
 Camp Kuwae: Total return.
 Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities
and infrastructure to the extent possible.
 MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
 Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
 aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including
additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
 Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
 All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated
for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be
relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of
designated facilities.


The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish
and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events
that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its
use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging
threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in
maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology
that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including
hosted payloads.

To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to
cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space
in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing;
space situational awareness; meteorological observation; command, control,
and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems
that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems
are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces
will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If
damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant
capabilities.
B. Cooperation on Cyberspace
To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments
will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely
and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share,
as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in
cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education.
The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the
services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed
Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information
sharing with the private sector, as appropriate.

The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will:

-  maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems;

-  share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity;

-  ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission
assurance;

-  contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and

-  conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity
in all situations from peacetime to contingencies.

In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against
critical infrastructure and services utilized by the Self-Defense Forces and the
United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility
to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will
provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share
relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious
cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take
place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult
closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond.
**VII. Bilateral Enterprise**
The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation
of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness
of bilateral cooperation:
A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation
In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and
maintenance, the two governments will:

-  cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation
of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment
and services;

-  strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual
efficiency and readiness;

-  facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition,
interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and

-  explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment
and technology.
B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security
Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two
governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing
at all levels, including the national strategic level.

In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information
sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in
strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of
classified information.

The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation
with partners on information sharing.
C. Educational and Research Exchanges
Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security
and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of
relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s
research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring
foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and
reinforce cooperation.
**VIII. Processes for Review**
The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate
whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances.
The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate
manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship
occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.


-----

 While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the
recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be
reevaluated.
 Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no
facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
 ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces,
taking into account noise impacts on local communities.
(d) Relationships among Initiatives
 Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are
interconnected.
 Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on
completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from
Okinawa to Guam.
 The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1)
tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s financial
contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure
on Guam.
2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability
 U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed
by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force
subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters
will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
 Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle
command training center and other support facilities will be constructed
within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
 In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and
effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
 Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment
(approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail
(approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to
Sagamihara Housing Area.
 A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD
(approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required
for contingency or training purposes.
 Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will
be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units
within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land
returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.
3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace
 ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to
Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be
developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
 A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at
Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination
function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and
systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of
shared use equipment and systems.
 The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian
aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational
requirements.
 Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation
entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
 Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September
2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
 Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air
traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of
Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
 Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire
Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related
airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures
that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and
Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take
into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach
control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from
experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in
Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
 The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and
modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be
completed within 12 months from commencement.
 The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use
must not compromise military operations and safety or the military
operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
 Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult
and then make appropriate decisions on civilian- military dual-use.
4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air
Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
 The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi
Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and
C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1)
completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and
the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
 Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate
MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into
account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
 The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters,
maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will
regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF
Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft,
necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
 U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni
to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam


 Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill
safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF,
and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through
coordination by the Joint Committee.
 A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing
practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site
by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
 Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS
Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
 As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective
ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
 The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has
been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility
modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes
operational in summer 2006.
 The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
 U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S.
facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
 Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan
FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be
developed.
 Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities — Kadena, Misawa, and
Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following
SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru.
Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral
training and exercises in the future.
 The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities
as necessary after conducting site surveys.
 Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently
available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training
requirements.
 In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft
for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12
aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
 At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint
Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will
be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for
joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
 The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate,
bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

(Attached conceptual diagram omitted)

Reference 23 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee

**** **(April 27, 2012)**

**Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)**

**Preamble**
(1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans
outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap.
(2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from
Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on
the Futenma Replacement Facility.
(3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled
with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and promotion of bilateral
dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the
overall U.S.-Japan Alliance.

**I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa**
(1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in
Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia.
(2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations
outside of Japan.
(3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with
the levels in the Realignment Roadmap.
(4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam.
(5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of
Marines to Guam is $8.6 billion. Japan’s financial commitment will be the fiscal
spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to $2.8 billion in U.S.
fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan)
will not be utilized.

Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the
aforementioned commitment.

**II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity**
(1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will take various
measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with
patrol boats).
(2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by
the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012.

**III. Land Returns in Okinawa**
(1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures:

Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the
warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of
Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5)

(ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa:

Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the
storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp


-----

Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank
Farm No.1

(iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps’ relocation to locations
outside of Japan:

Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area
(2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas
remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012.

**IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma**
(1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable
solution.

Reference 24 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2016


(2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary
to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect
the environment.
(END)
For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website.
(http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html)


|Joint Training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference|
|Japan-U.S. Joint Exercise (field exercise)|Oct. 30- Nov. 11, 2016|Japan’s surrounding sea and airspace, SDF bases, U.S. Forces Japan bases, as well as Guam, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and their surrounding sea, airspace, etc.|Each Staff Officer, Defense Intelligence Headquarters Regional, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Sasebo District, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Totaling approximately 25,000 personnel Totaling approximately 20 vessels Totaling approximately 260 aircraft|Headquarters of the U.S. Forces Japan, Fifth Air Force, U.S. Naval Forces Japan, U.S. Army Japan, III Marine Expeditionary Force, 7th Fleet Amphibious Force, etc. Totaling approximately 11,000 personnel|Exercise and training for SDF joint operations including remote island defense in an armed attack situation and anticipated armed attack situation; joint responses with the U.S. Forces; and responses in a situation that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security|

|Ground Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference|
|Field training with U.S. Army Part 2|May 31- Jun. 16, 2016|Joint Base Elmendorf- Richardson, Alaska and surrounding training area|1st Airborne Brigade Totaling approximately 80 personnel|Major units of 4-25 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 120 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan- U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability|
|Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (YS-70)|Jun. 12-22, 2016|Joint Base Lewis- McChord, Washington|Western Army, Ground Staff Office, etc. Totaling approximately 150 personnel|I Corps, U.S. Army, Pacific Command, etc. Totaling approximately 200 personnel|Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army|
|Field training with U.S. Marines (RIMPAC 2016)|Jun. 24- Aug. 8, 2016|Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay in Oahu, Hawaii, Pohakuloa Training Area in the Island of Hawaii, and their surrounding sea and airspace|Western Army Headquarters, Western Infantry Regiment, Central Readiness Force, etc. Totaling approximately 50 personnel|Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command, 3rd Marine Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 600 personnel|Training for Japan-U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability and staff capacity pertaining to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|
|Field training with U.S. Marines Part 1|Aug. 29- Sep. 8, 2016|Ohjojihara Maneuver area|Sixth Division Totaling approximately 400 personnel|Major units of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 200 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan- U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability|
|Field training with U.S. Army Part 1|Aug. 29- Sep. 21, 2016|Aibano Maneuver area and Camp Imazu|Third Division Totaling approximately 900 personnel|Major units of 2-27 Infantry Battalion, 3-25 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 450 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan- U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability|
|Field training with U.S. Army|Sep. 6-23, 2016|Yakima Training Center, Washington|Eighth Division Totaling approximately 300 personnel|2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, major units of 2-1 Infantry Battalion Totaling approximately 230 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan- U.S. coordination, enhancement of interoperability|
|Japan-U.S. joint Regional Army command post exercise (YS-71)|Nov. 30- Dec. 13, 2016|Camp Kengun, etc.|Western Army, etc. Totaling approximately 5,000 personnel|I Corps, U.S. Army, Pacific Command, U.S. Army Japan, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, etc. Totaling approximately 1,600 personnel|Capacity maintenance and enhancement for command and staff activities of the Regional Army|
|Field training with U.S. Marines in the U.S.|Jan. 30- Mar. 10, 2017|Camp Pendleton, California and U.S. naval facility in San Clemente Island, etc.|Western Army Headquarters, Western Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 350 personnel|1st Marine Expeditionary Force Totaling approximately 500 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination|
|Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 2|Mar. 6-17, 2017|Sekiyama Maneuver area, Soumagahara Maneuver area, and Camp Soumagahara|Twelfth Brigade Totaling approximately 300 personnel|2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division Totaling approximately 450 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination|


**Maritime Self-Defense Force**

|Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Japan-U.S. joint overseas cruise training|Mar. 29- Apr. 4, 2016|Around Okinawa, etc.|1 vessel|Several vessels|Joint cruise training|
|Minesweeping special training|Jul. 15-30, 2016|Mutsu Bay|23 vessels, 10 aircraft|1 vessel, 3 aircraft, approximately 7 underwater disposal personnel|Minesweeping training|
|Antisubmarine special training|Aug. 22-26, 2016|Sea area south of Kyushu|2 vessels, several aircraft|4 vessels, several aircraft|Antisubmarine training|
|Medical special training|Oct. 20, 2016|Berkey Field at U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base, U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital, Self-Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka|Yokosuka District Headquarters, Self- Defense Forces Hospital Yokosuka, Base Service Activity Yokosuka, Medical Service Unit Yokosuka Totaling approximately 150 personnel|Commander, Fleat Activities Yokosuka, U.S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, etc. Totaling approximately 300 personnel|Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination in the medical area|
|Minesweeping special training|Nov. 17-30, 2016|Sea of Hyuga|21 vessels, 3 aircraft|1 vessel, approximately 8 underwater disposal personnel|Minesweeping training|


Commander, U.S. 7th Fleat

Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense

Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan

Japan-U.S. joint command Fleet Headquarters, Command and Staff Training and exercise for Japan-U.S.
Feb. 6-16, 2017 U.S. Naval Academy Commander, U.S. Pasific Fleat
post exercise College, etc. coordination, etc.

U.S. Naval Academy, etc.

Totaling approximately 40 personnel

Totaling approximately 60 personnel


-----

|Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Japan-U.S. joint cruise training|Mar. 7-13, 2016|Sea area west of Kyushu, etc.|2 vessels|Several vessels|Joint cruise training|
||Mar. 27-29, 2016|Sea area west of Kyushu, etc.|5 vessels|Several vessels||

|Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference|
|Air defense combat training Aerial refueling training Tactical air transport training|Jun. 3-18, 2016|Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Joint Base Elmendof-Richardson, their surrounding airspace, etc.|12 Aircraft|Several aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|
|Air defense combat training|Jul. 15-19, 2016|Airspace around Okinawa|4 Aircraft|10 Aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|
|Fighter combat training, etc.|Jul. 25-29, 2016|Airspace off Komatsu|6 Aircraft|5 Aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|
|Interceptor combat training|Sep. 13, 2016|Airspace around Kyushu|2 Aircraft|2 Aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|
|Air defense combat training|Oct. 12, 2016|Airspace around Okinawa|8 Aircraft|10 Aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|
|Air rescue response training|Oct. 17-21, 2016|Ukibaru Jima training area and sea and airspace surrounding Ukibaru Jima|4 Aircraft|3 Aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|
|Fighter combat training, etc.|Dec. 5-16, 2016|Airspace west of Hokkaido and airspace off Misawa|4 Aircraft|4 Aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|
|Air defense combat training Search and rescue training Aerial refueling training|Dec. 16, 2016|Airspace around Okinawa|11 Aircraft 1 Fire unit|27 Aircraft|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills|


Reference 25 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

|Item|Summary|Date of conclusion of intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development|Completion date|
|---|---|---|---|
|Ducted rocket engine, advanced steel technology, fighting vehicle propulsion technology using ceramic materials, eye-safe laser radar, ejection seat, advanced hybrid propulsion technology, shallow water acoustic technology, ballistic missile defense technology, low-vulnerability gun propellant for field artillery, software radio, advanced hull material/structural technology, sea-based radar system, combat system for ship, palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, image gyro for airborne applications||Completed||
|SM-3 Block IIA|Development of advanced missile interceptor|June 2006|Ongoing|
|Hybrid electric propulsion|Research on technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor|November 2012|Ongoing|
|High-speed multi-hull vessel optimization|Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area|March 2014|Ongoing|
|Comparison of operational jet fuel and noise exposures|Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel|November 2015|Ongoing|
|Chemical Agent Detector-kit Colorimetric Reader|Research on automatically interpreting the colorimetric response of the Chemical Agent Detector-kit|February 2017|Ongoing|



Reference 26 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2014)


|Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results|
|---|---|---|---|
|Apr. 6, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue • Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Agreed to advance trilateral cooperation, including cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia and among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, and also to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Secretary Hagel stated that he plans to deploy two additional BMD (ballistic missile defense)-equipped Aegis ships to Japan by 2017 • Minister Onodera explained the gist of “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” and secretary welcomed Japan’s effort in this area • Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would further accelerate specific cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa • Welcomed the recent progress in the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan|


May 31, Japan-U.S. Defense Minister of Defense -  Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas
2014 Ministerial Meeting/ Onodera -  Minister Onodera welcomed the temporary deployment of Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base and the additional deployment of a second AN/
Singapore Secretary of TPY-2 radar system to Japan

Defense -  Agreed to continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries
Hagel -  Minister Onodera explained that the Japanese government has begun domestic discussions on Japan’s defense policy. The U.S. welcomed

and supported such efforts by Japan

-  Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense
cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

-  Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan

-  Agreed to promptly and steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including construction of the Futenma
Replacement Facility

-  Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will accelerate specific cooperation in mitigating the impact on Okinawa


-----

|Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results|
|---|---|---|---|
|Jul. 11, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Agreed in addition to close bilateral cooperation between Japan and the U.S. to advanc trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK and Japan, the U.S., and Australia • The Japanese side explained the purport of the Cabinet decision on the development of a new security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. • Agreed to release an interim report on the work to revise the Guidelines at an appropriate timing • Agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology • Agreed to proceed swiftly and steadily with the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab • Welcomed the relocation of KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni • The Japanese side raised the issue of noise caused by the flight of transient aircrafts at MCAS Futenma, among other matters. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.|
|Apr. 8, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands • Agreed that they would continue to oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in any area, including the East China Sea • Confirmed strong intent to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the process of the revision of the Guidelines • The Japanese side explained the status of discussions pertaining to the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. • Instructed their respective authorities to consider establishing a new framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities, bearing in mind that risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace are common security challenges to the two countries • Welcomed the progress on the efforts to develop a maintenance base shared by the two countries, namely, the U.S. decision to establish a regional depot for the F-35 in Japan, and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side requested continued cooperation to mitigrate impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.|
|Apr. 27, 2015|Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting/ New York|Minister of Defense Nakatani Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Carter Secretary of State Kerry|• Released the new Guidelines, and confirmed that they would further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance • Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands (reiterated in the Joint Statement) • Shared recognition on the importance of “rule of law,” including the recent situation in the South China Sea, and agreed that unilateral attempts to alter the status quo cannot be neglected and they would work with the international community to advance various efforts • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side requested cooperation to mitigaty the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side is committed to mitigating impact. • Confirmed intent to continue negotiation on the ancillary documents of a supplementary Agreemet on cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship as quickly as possible|
|Apr. 28, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Exchanged views on the situation in the South China Sea, and agreed to continue to strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Agreed to further advance Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation • Confirmed that the new Guidelines will strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the importance of swiftly implementing the new Guidelines • The Japanese side explained the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported Japan’s efforts in this regard. • Welcomed the establishment of the “Space Cooperation Working Group” as a framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue efforts such as realizing bilateral plans pertaining to U.S. base the consolidation in Okinawa. • Agreed to seek early agreement on a framework for reciprocal defense procurement and to further deepen equipment and technology cooperation.|
|May 30, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and other areas • Agreed to further advance trilateral defense cooperation, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation • Agreed to continue strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in terms of contributing to regional peace and stability • The Japanese side explained the recent Cabinet decision on the Legislation for Peace and Security and the commencement of Diet deliberations • Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, such as establishing the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expeditious negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement • Welcomed the fact that the outcome of the discussions in the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group was compiled, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyberspace • The Japanese side stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa. • The Japanese side is explaining to the Japanese people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan from 2017 would enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region but the Japanese side requested provision of necessary information from the viewpoint of ensuring safety. The U.S. side stated that it would provide necessary information and ensure the safe operation of the Osprey, including the MV-22 already deployed to Japan.|
|Nov. 3, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Malaysia|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Agreed to oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas. The Japanese side stated that it will support the U.S. Forces’ activities in the South China Sea. • In light of North Korea’s posture to continue activities for launching long-range ballistic missiles, confirmed that Japan and the United States will closely cooperate on this matter • Agreed to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation with the ROK, Australia, and the Philippines • The Japanese side explained the recent enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and the U.S. side stated that they support and welcome the enactment • Welcomed the establishment of the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM). Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa, and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter. • The Japanese side requested that the U.S. Force minimize the impact on the local residents in the relevant areas associated with their operation and give maximum consideration to the aspect of safety. The U.S. side expressed its intention to always ensure maximum safety of both the local residents and the U.S. Forces personnel. • Regarding the Host Nation Support (HNS), agreed that they would continue to hold consultations between the two countries, and make efforts to reach an early agreement • In light of the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology|


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|Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results|
|---|---|---|---|
|Jun. 4, 2016|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed their intention to devise a set of effective prevention measures, including the review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component • Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas • With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) • Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines • Welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP-MOU), and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology • The Japanese side stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it fully understands Japan’s position and would maintain close cooperation with Japan. • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including training relocation to outside of Okinawa Prefecture. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate with Japan. • Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area|
|Sep. 15, 2016|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter|• Reconfirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas • With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks • Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security which recently came into force, and also confirmed that they would continue to make efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines • Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016 • The Japanese side stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution.The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter. • Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area|
|Dec. 7, 2016|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Carter|• Agreed to oppose North Korea’s nuclear and missile development as well as unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China Seas • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks • Agreed that Japan and the United States will continue to collaborate closely with the existing strong Japan-U.S. Alliance serving as the foundation • Welcomed the efforts under way based on the new Guidelines and the Legislation for Peace and Security, including the signing of the Japan-U.S. ACSA and the commencement of Japan-U.S. joint training in accordance with the Legislation for Peace and Security • Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed that they would continue to hold working-level consultations in light of the joint announcement of July 2016 • Confirmed that Japan and the United States will cooperate to realize the return of a majority of the Northern Training Area in December 2016 • With regard to the Futenma Replacement Facility, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter|
|Feb. 4, 2017|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared the view that China’s activities in the East and South China Seas pose security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region • Shared the view that advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile development constitute grave security threats to the stability of Japan and the United States and the region • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to strengthen engagement in the East China Sea • Agreed to strengthen trilateral defense cooperation including Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation as well as cooperation under multilateral frameworks • The Japanese side stated that it will strengthen its defense capabilities and expand Japan’s role in the Alliance • The U.S. side stated that it will remain committed to the defense of Japan, and underscored that the U.S. commitment to the region will be enhanced through its ongoing presence • Confirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, including the United States’ unwavering commitment to extended deterrence • Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance while taking into account the Guidelines established in 2015 • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the steady progress of the realignment of the U.S. Forces Japan. The U.S. side stated that it seeks to advance the realignment through Japan-U.S. collaboration. • With regard to the relocation of MCAS Futenma, shared the position that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan|
|Jun. 3, 2017|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore|Minister of Defense Inada Secretary of Defense Mattis|• Shared the view that North Korea’s successive ballistic missile launches and other acts are flagrant provocations against the stability of Japan and the United States and the region and are absolutely intolerable, and that it is important to have close Japan-U.S.-ROK collaboration in addition to Japan-U.S. collaboration • The Japanese side highly praised the United States’ visible commitment to the peace and stability of the region, including the dispatch of its carrier strike group, and stated that it is important to strengthen pressure on North Korea • Confirmed the U.S. position regarding the Senkaku Islands • Confirmed that Japan and the United States will deepen their cooperation on ensuring peace and stability in the East China Sea and regarding engagement in the South China Sea • Shared the view on the need to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and welcomed the joint training between the SDF and the carrier strike group being conducted in the Sea of Japan as an activity contributing to this end • Agreed that they will continue to coordinate for the prompt holding of a Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting • Agreed to make steady progress on the plan for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and the U.S. side announced its commitment to continue to promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation • Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and agreed that they would continue to cooperate closely on this matter • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, and the two sides agreed to cooperate to ensure the stable stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan|


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Reference 27 Joint Statement  February 10, 2017

President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe held their first official
meeting today in Washington D.C. and affirmed their strong determination to further
strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance and economic relationship.
**U.S.-Japan Alliance**
The unshakable U.S.-Japan Alliance is the cornerstone of peace, prosperity, and
freedom in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. commitment to defend Japan through the
full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, is unwavering.
Amid an increasingly difficult security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, the
United States will strengthen its presence in the region, and Japan will assume larger
roles and responsibilities in the alliance. The United States and Japan will continue
to implement and expand defense cooperation as laid out in the 2015 U.S.-Japan
Defense Guidelines. The United States and Japan will further enhance cooperation
with allies and partners in the region. The two leaders underscored the importance of
maintaining international order based upon the rule of law.
The two leaders affirmed the commitment of the United States and Japan to the
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, to ensure the long-term, sustainable presence
of U.S. forces. They affirmed that the United States and Japan are committed to the
plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab/Henoko
area and in adjacent waters. It is the only solution that avoids the continued use of
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma.
The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral
action that seeks to undermine Japan's administration of these islands. The United
States and Japan will deepen cooperation to safeguard the peace and stability of
the East China Sea. The two leaders underscored the importance of maintaining
a maritime order based on international law, including freedom of navigation and
overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. The United States and Japan oppose
any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or
force. The United States and Japan also call on countries concerned to avoid actions
that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea, including the militarization of
outposts, and to act in accordance with international law.
The United States and Japan strongly urge North Korea to abandon its nuclear
and ballistic missile programs and not to take any further provocative actions. The
U.S.-Japan Alliance is fully capable of ensuring the security of Japan. The United
States is fully committed to defending its homeland, forces, and allies, through the
full range of U.S. military capabilities. The two leaders affirmed the importance of
an early resolution of the abductions issue. They also affirmed the importance of
trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The
United States and Japan are also committed to rigorous implementation of the U.N.
Security Council resolutions on North Korea.

Reference 28 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ


The United States and Japan will strengthen their bilateral technological
cooperation on defense innovation to meet the evolving security challenges. The
United States and Japan will also expand bilateral security cooperation in the fields of
space and cyberspace. The United States and Japan also strongly condemn terrorism
in all forms and manifestations and will enhance our cooperation to fight against
terrorist groups that pose a global threat.
The two leaders instructed their foreign and defense ministers to convene a
Security Consultative Committee (SCC: “2+2”) meeting to identify ways to further
strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance, including through the review of the respective
roles, missions, and capabilities of the two countries.
**U.S.-Japan Economic Relations**
The United States and Japan represent 30 percent of the world’s GDP and share
an interest in sustaining a strong global economy, ensuring financial stability, and
growing job opportunities. To advance these interests, the President and the Prime
Minister reaffirmed their commitments to using the three-pronged approach of
mutually-reinforcing fiscal, monetary, and structural policies to strengthen domestic
and global economic demand.
The two leaders discussed opportunities and challenges facing each of their
economies and the need to promote inclusive growth and prosperity in their countries,
the Asia-Pacific region, and the world. They emphasized that they remain fully
committed to strengthening the economic relationships between their two countries
and across the region, based on rules for free and fair trade. This will include setting
high trade and investment standards, reducing market barriers, and enhancing
opportunities for economic and job growth in the Asia-Pacific.
The United States and Japan reaffirmed the importance of both deepening their
trade and investment relations and of their continued efforts in promoting trade,
economic growth, and high standards throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Toward
this end, and noting that the United States has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, the leaders pledged to explore how best to accomplish these shared
objectives. This will include discussions between the United States and Japan on a
bilateral framework as well as Japan continuing to advance regional progress on the
basis of existing initiatives.
In addition, the two leaders expressed interest in exploring cooperation across
sectors that promote mutual economic benefits to the United States and Japan.
The two leaders decided to have their countries engage in an economic dialogue
to discuss these and other issues. They also reaffirmed their intent to continue
cooperation in regional and global fora.
**Invitations to Visit Japan**
Prime Minister Abe invited President Trump for an official visit to Japan during
the course of this year, and also welcomed an early visit of Vice President Pence to
Tokyo. President Trump accepted these invitations.

|Item|Outline|Grounds|
|---|---|---|
|Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)1|Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ|Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement|
|Labor costs|Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)|Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement|
||Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987|Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)|
||Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1996)|Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)|
||The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625 during the SMA period|Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)|
||The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be increased in stages from 22,625 to 23,178 during the SMA period|Special Measures Agreement (FY2016)|
|Utilities costs|Electricity, gas, water supply, sewage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)|Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)|
||The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001|Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)|
|Utilities costs|The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel, etc., equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010|Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)|
||The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ will be phased in from current 76% (approximate) to 72% over the new SMA period.|Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)|
||The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to approximately 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ each year will be reduced from 72% to 61%.|Special Measures Agreement (FY2016)|
|Training relocation costs|Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the GOJ have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996|Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)|


Notes: Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the “Criteria for adopting FIP projects” to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows:
1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily
considering necessity, urgency, and other factors. 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity
and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others). In Japan-U.S. agreements including the Special Measures Agreement (FY2016),
it was agreed that the amount of FIP funding will not be less than 20.6 billion yen each year.


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Reference 29 Outline of 23 Issues


|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of June 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Facility|Scope|Area (ha)|Classification||||Remarks|
||||SCC|Gun-Ten- Kyo|Governor|U.S. Forces||
|<Already returned>||||||||
|Army POL Depots|1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City|4|||◎||Returned on December 31, 1990|
|Camp Zukeran|2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)|0.1||◎|||Returned on September 30, 1991|
||20. Awase Meadows Golf Course|47|||◎||Returned on July 31, 2010|
|Northern Training Area|3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district|480||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1993|
||4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line|(256)|◎|||||
|Camp Schwab|5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)|1|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993|
|Makiminato Service Area Annex|6. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on March 31, 1993|
|Naha Cold Storage|7. In whole|Building|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993|
|Sunabe Warehouse|8. In whole|0.3||||◎|Returned on June 30, 1993|
|Yaedake Communication Site|9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)|19|◎||||Returned on November 30, 1994|
|Onna Communication Site|10. In whole|62|||||Returned on September 30, 1995|
||11. Eastern part|(26)|◎|||||
|Kadena Air Base|12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)|2||◎|||Returned on January 31, 1996|
|Chibana Site|13. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on December 31, 1996|
|Camp Hansen|14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)|3||◎|||Returned on December 31, 1996|
||23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)|162|◎||||Returned on June 30, 2014 (55ha) Returned on June 30, 2017 (107ha)|
|Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))|74|○||||Returned on March 25, 1999|
||15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)|3|○|◎|||Returned on March 25, 1999|
||(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)|9|○||||Returned on March 31, 2005|
||(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)|58|○||||Returned on October 31, 2006|
|Torii Communication Station|16. Kadena bypass|4||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1999|
|Deputy Division Engineer Office|17. In whole|4|◎||||Returned on September 30, 2002|
|Camp Kuwae|(19. Southern side of the eastern part)|2|○|○|||Returned on December 31, 1994|
||18. Northern part (Ihei)|38||◎|||Returned on March 31, 2003|
||(18. Along Route 58)|(5)|○|||||
||16 facilities, 20 issues|973|7|7|3|3||
|<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>||||||||
|Camp Kuwae|19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)|0.5|◎||||Change agreed on December 21, 2001|
|MCAS Futenma|21. Lands along eastern side|4||◎|||Release agreed on March 28, 1996|
|Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area|43|◎||||Release agreed on March 28, 1996|
||3 facilities, 3 issues|48|2|1|0|0||
|Total|17 facilities, 23 issues|1,021|9|8|3|3||


Notes: 1. For the “Area” column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
2. A single circle in the “Classification” column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
3. The numbers in the “Scope” column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues.
4. “SCC” in the “Classification” column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa
which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. “Gun-Ten-Kyo” indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa’s governor. “Governor” indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of
Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. “U.S. Forces” indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.


Reference 30 The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)
The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in
November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The
two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the
people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance.
The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth
by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of
the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop
recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on
ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and
adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with
their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was
scheduled to conclude after one year.
The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO
Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and
instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete
implementation schedules by November 1996.
The SACO together with the Joint Committee has conducted a series


of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and
measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim
Report.
Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry
and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans
and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce
the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa.
At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and
readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force
protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of
the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and
areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.
Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed
the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored
their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt
implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With
this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary
forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where
specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed.
Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.


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The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to
make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and
status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S.
forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed
that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination
at the Joint Committee.
The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security
Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint
Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The
SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related
issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to
the SCC on this subject.
In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on
Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the
international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral
policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable
security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the
SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at
the same time.
**Return Land:**
— Futenma Air Station — See attached.
— Northern Training Area
Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres)
and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with
the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following
conditions:

-  Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298
acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order
to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.

-  Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining
Northern Training Area.
— Aha Training Area
Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and
release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the
intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water
access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
— Gimbaru Training Area
Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to
finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is
relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated
to Camp Hansen.
— Sobe Communication Site
Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention
to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and
associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
— Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield
Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to
finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is
relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
— Camp Kuwae
Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish
the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to
Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or
other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
— Senaha Communication Station
Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the
intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities
and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station.
However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
— Makiminato Service Area
Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the
Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within
the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
— Naha Port
Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx.
57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx.
35ha /87 acres).
— Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)
Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return
portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by
the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition,
approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing
consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).
**Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:**
— Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of
artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to
maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.
— Parachute drop training
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
— Conditioning hikes on public roads
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.
**Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:**
— Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and
Futenma Air Station


Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air
Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in
March 1996 have been implemented.
— Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni
Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from
Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.
— Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base
from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation
schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation
schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base
necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena
Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the
end of December 1996.
— Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the
intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
— Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum
extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.
**Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:**
— Accident reports
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation
reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In
addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will be
made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the
Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or
facilities.
— Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
— Visits to U.S. facilities and areas
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas
announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces
official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces
vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.
— Supplemental automobile insurance
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally,
on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the
SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.
— Payment for claims
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under
paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

-  Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated
by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted
under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished
as rapidly as possible.

-  A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese
authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in
advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.

-  In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S.
Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment.
Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to
make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference
in amount.
— Quarantine procedures
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the
Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.
— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp
Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the
United States.
— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint
Committee

**The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station**
**(an integral part of the SACO Final Report)**
 (Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)
1. Introduction
a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996,
Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale
reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September
19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been
working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station
and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while
maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The
Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine
three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base;
2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a seabased facility (SBF).
b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to
pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged
to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the
Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In


-----

addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military
base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.
c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the
supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma
Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical
experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan
for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of
this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design,
construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG
will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.
2. Decisions of the SCC
a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational
functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500
meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying
operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) — capable runway
(approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect
support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, qualityof-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to
support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field
aircraft operations.
b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this
base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these
aircraft and their missions.
c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft,
maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at
Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may
be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer
of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational
flexibility currently available.
e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate
replacement facilities are completed and operational.
3. Guiding Principles
a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be
maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout
the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities
will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency
planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of
the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and
contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities
unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life
considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and
is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the

Reference 31 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report


location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea lane
deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects,
noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel
access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform,
aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and
ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF
and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support
will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and
other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully selfsupporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities
for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two
Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the
design/acquisition decision.
f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa
informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and
schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods
Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of
Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group”
comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government.
These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are
technically feasible.
a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules) — supported by a number
of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.
b. Pontoon Type — platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a
calm sea protected by a breakwater.
c. Semi-Submersible Type — platform at a wave free height, supported by
buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
5. The Next Steps
a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible
and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997.
This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development
and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance
specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis,
and final concept and site selection.
b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities
at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of
required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and
transfer of operations to the new facility.
c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant
milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

|Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress|
|---|---|
|Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)|• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc. • February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) • December 2016: Major portion (approximately 4,010 ha) was returned|
|Aha Training Area (Return of total area)|• December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)|
|Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)|• January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen • July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)|
|Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)|• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen • June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m2) was returned • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Sobe Communication Site [approximately 53 ha])|
|Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)|• October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated • July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha) • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield [approximately 191 ha])|
|Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)|• March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station • September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) • October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station|
|MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation|
|Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*|• March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38 ha) • January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities • February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished • March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened • December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished • April 2017: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center, alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) were furnished * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation|
|Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation|
|Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation|


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|Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress|
|---|---|
|Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*|(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation|
|Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104|• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997|
|Parachute Drop Training|• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000|
|Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base|• July 2000: Furnished|
|Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base|• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp • July 2013: Parking space, etc. were furnished • July 2014: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc. • December 2016: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the furnishing of maintenance hangar, etc. • January 2017: Relocation completed • March 2017: Maintenance hangar, parking apron, etc. were furnished|
|Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base*|* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. * August 2014: Relocation of all 15 aircraft from MCAS Futenma to Iwakuni Air Base was completed|

|Reference 32|Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility|
|---|---|
|Month & Year|Background|
|April 1996|Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.|
|December 1996|SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).|
|November 1999|Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use|
|December 1999|Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab|
|July 2002|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.|
|November 2003|Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.|
|August 2004|A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.|
|October 2005|“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)|
|April 2006|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).|
|May 2006|• “2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved “Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. • “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.|
|August 2006|Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”|
|August 2007|The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.|
|April 2009|Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.|
|September 2009|Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.|
|November 2009|Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.|
|December 2009|Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.|
|May 2010|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”|
|August 2010|Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report|
|June 2011|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.|
|December 2011– January 2012|The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.|
|February 2012|The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.|


“2+2” Joint Statement
April 2012 → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution.
Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.


-----

|Month & Year|Background|
|---|---|
|December 2012|Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.|
|March 2013|Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.|
|April 2013|Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → M CAS Futenma can be returned in FY2022 or later through relocation, etc.|
|October 2013|“2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma|
|December 2013|Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project|
|July 2014|Started the construction of replacement facilities|
|October 2014|Joint press release by Japan and the United States → Reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma|
|April 2015|“2+2” Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma|
|October 2015|• Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project • The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism recognized the request of the Okinawa Defense Bureau and decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit|
|November 2015|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed an administrative suit seeking a retraction of revocation of the landfill permit|
|March 2016|• The government announced it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation • Landfill work was suspended • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit • Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism|
|April 2016|• Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution and that the Government decided to accept a court-suggested settlement under the philosophy of ‘’haste makes waste,’’ and stated that it would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and will continue to make joint efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. stated that its understands the court-suggested settlement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe’s strategic decision, and said that the U.S. will continue its efforts through close cooperation.|
|June 2016|• The Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council notified the results of the review • Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it fully understands the views of the Japanese Government and will continue to work closely with Japan.|
|July 2016|• The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act|
|September 2016|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Japan stated that its position remains unwavering that the relocation to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. stated that it will continue to work closely with Japan.|
|December 2016|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely • The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Governor of Okinawa in a suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act (finalized victory of the national government) • Governor of Okinawa retracted the revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project • Resumed the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Japan explained that its position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, that construction has resumed following the Supreme Court ruling, and that the Government will steadily move forward with the construction|
|February 2017|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Shared the position that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution, and agreed to continue to work together closely • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Confirmed that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution|
|April 2017|Began construction of the seawall, the main part of the public waters reclamation|


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Reference 33 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena

|Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Returned The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2014 or later A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2019 or later 1|Col2|Col3|
|---|---|---|
||West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|Returned|
||The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|Returned|
||Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2014 or later|
||A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2019 or later 1|
|Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement Facilities in Okinawa are Provided Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) JFY2025 or later Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later A part of Kishaba Houising area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later 2,3 Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area JFY2025 or later Naha Port JFY2028 or later Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 JFY2022 or later Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma JFY2022 or later|||
||Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)|JFY2025 or later|
||Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later|
||A part of Kishaba Houising area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later|
||The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later 2,3|
||Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area|JFY2025 or later|
||Naha Port|JFY2028 or later|
||Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1|JFY2022 or later|
||Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma|JFY2022 or later|
|Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) － The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2024 or later 4|||
||Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|－|
||The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2024 or later 4|



Note:
1: Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing.
2: Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate
timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.
3: Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing.
4: Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation.


Reference 34 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the
Government of the United States of America Concerning
the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine
Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents
from Okinawa to Guam

 (Signed on February 17, 2009)
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of
America,
Affirming that Japan–the United States security arrangements, based
on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the
United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are
the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives,
Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–the United States Security
Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that
the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security
Consultative Committee Document, “United States – Japan Roadmap for
Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”)
will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden
on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the
basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance,
Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward
presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance
of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent
capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region,
Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force
reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on
Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary
Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their
approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by
2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such
relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena,
Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps
CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to
Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station
Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family
support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational
basis for training and operations to Maritime Self- Defense Forces Kanoya
Base and Guam,
Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated
ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar
($10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development
costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion,
ninety million United States dollars ($6 090 000 000) (in U S Fiscal Year


2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States
dollars ($2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities
and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing
the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be
realized rapidly,
Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States
will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development
costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008
dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars
($3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United
States dollars ($1,000,000,000) for a road,
Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall
package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected,
specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on
completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from
Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam
is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma
Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund
development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam,
Have agreed as follows:

Article 1
1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount
of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000)
(in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of
America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000
III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa
to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to paragraph 1.
of Article 9 of this Agreement.
2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each
Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan
through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further
arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal
year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”).

Article 2
The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures
for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United
States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of this Agreement.

Article 3
The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government
of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated
in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma
Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the
Government of the United States of America.


-----

Reference 35 Protocol amending the Agreement between the
Government of Japan and the Government of the United
States of America Concerning the Implementation of the
Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel
and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

 (Signed on October 3, 2013)
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of
America,
Recalling the Joint Statement of Japan-the United States Security
Consultative Committee, dated April 27, 2012, which announced, inter
alia, that the two governments are to consult regarding further actions
to be taken in light of the Agreement between the Government of Japan
and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the
Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force
Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, signed at
Tokyo on February 17, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”),
Desiring to amend the Agreement, Have agreed as follows:

Article 1
The fifth to ninth paragraphs of the preamble of the Agreement shall be deleted,
and the following six paragraphs shall be inserted immediately after the fourth
paragraph:
“Recalling that Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee
decided to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap and, as part of the
adjustments, decided to delink both the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary
Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel from Okinawa to Guam
and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenma
Replacement Facility, in its Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Joint Statement”),
Recognizing that the Joint Statement confirmed that a total of approximately
9,000 personnel of III MEF, along with their dependents, are to be relocated from
Okinawa to locations outside of Japan,
Reaffirming that the Joint Statement confirmed that, of the preliminarily
estimated eight billion, six hundred million United States dollars ($8,600,000,000)
(in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure
development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan is to provide
up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars
($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) (equivalent to three billion,
one hundred twenty-one million, eight hundred eighty-seven thousand, eight
hundred fifty-five United States dollars ($3,121,887,855) in U.S. Fiscal Year
2012 dollars) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure
in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to enable the
III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such
force relocation be completed as soon as possible,
Reaffirming further that the Joint Statement confirmed that the United States
is to fund the remaining costs and any additional costs for the III MEF relocation
to Guam,
Recalling that the Joint Statement announced that the two Governments
are to consider cooperation in developing training areas in Guam and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by the
Japan Self-Defense Forces and United States forces,
Recalling that, under the plans outlined in the Roadmap as adjusted, the
Joint Statement, and the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa
published in April, 2013, a part of the consolidation and land returns south of
Kadena depends on the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from
Okinawa,
and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on
Japan’s direct cash contributions to fund development of required facilities and
infrastructure as well as necessary measures by the Government of the United
States of America,”

Article 2
The phrase “approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately
9,000 dependents” in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement shall be replaced
by the phrase “the III MEF personnel and their dependents”.

Article 3
The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 2 of the Agreement
shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”.


Article 4
The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash
contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and
infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation.

Article 5
The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants
in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash
contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably.

Article 6
The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as
its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America
shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as
its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the
technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing
authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in paragraph 1. (a) of Article
7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United
States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in
an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects.

Article 7
1. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be
agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further
arrangements.

(b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United
States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide
cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall
open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese
cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year.
2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually
committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method
of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing
authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of
Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight
hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year
2008 dollars).
3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions
after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents
releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further
financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the
same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America
shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as
provided in paragraph 3. (b) of this Article.

(b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the
consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the
unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese
fiscal year.
4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest
accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan,
except as provided in paragraph 4. (b) of this Article, after the completion
of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the
Government of the United States of America from any further financial
and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese
cash contributions.

(b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the
consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan,
interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by
Japanese cash contributions.
5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the
Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United
States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese
cash contributions.

Article 8
The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the
Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States
of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and
infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate
actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration.

Article 9
1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this
Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States
of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.
2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall
be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible
progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the
Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan’s
financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap.

Article 10
The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation
of this Agreement.

Article 11
This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in
accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall
enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are
exchanged.


Article 4
Article 3 of the Agreement shall be deleted.

Article 5
The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 4 of the Agreement
shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”, and the following sentence
shall be inserted at the end of Article 4 of the Agreement:
“Such facilities may include training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands.”

Article 6
Article 4 of the Agreement shall be renumbered as Article 3, and the following
Article shall be inserted immediately after renumbered Article 3:
“Article 4
The Government of the United States of America, with the intent to provide
reasonable access, shall favorably consider requests by the Government of


-----

Japan to use training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, including those whose development has been funded with
Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest.”


Article 8
It is confirmed that the Agreement as amended by this Protocol applies to cash
contributions made either before or after the entry into force of this Protocol
by the Government of Japan in accordance with paragraph 1. of Article 1 of
the Agreement, their accrued interest, and the projects funded by the cash
contributions.

Article 9
This Protocol shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in
accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Protocol shall
enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are
exchanged and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement.


Article 7
Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the
following:
“2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall
be subject to the availability of funds for the Relocation, which may include (1)
United States funds and (2) Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph
1. of Article 1 of this Agreement.

Reference 36 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces

|June 6, 2011|The U.S. Department of Defense announced that the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma would be replaced with the MV-22 Osprey in the latter half of 2012.|
|---|---|
|June 13, 2012–|Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, etc. to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.|
|June 29-|Host Nation Notification and U.S. Department of Defense press release regarding the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to Okinawa • Deployed a squadron in October 2012 (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in late July). • Deployed an additional squadron in summer 2013. • The results of the investigation of the crash accident were provided to the Government of Japan; the MV-22 Osprey did not conduct any flights in Japan until the safety of flight operations was reconfirmed.|
|July 23|Off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.|
|September 19|Released the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” (that safety was confirmed by the government). The Joint Committee agreed on matters related to the Osprey’s operations.|
|October 6|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.|
|January 28, 2013|The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.|
|April 30|The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).|
|July 30|The second squadron off-loaded at MCAS Iwakuni.|
|September 25|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.|
|May 11, 2015|The U.S. Department of Defense announced that it would deploy the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.|
|December 13, 2016|Emergency landing of an MV-22 Osprey off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture.|
|February 1, 2017|Periodic aircraft maintenance of the MV-22 Osprey was commenced at Camp Kisarazu.|
|March 14|Informed relevant local governments and other organizations that the U.S. Department of Defense announced the postponement of the arrival of the CV-22 Osprey that were to be deployed at Yokota Air Base.|


-----

Reference 37 Outline of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan

1. Purpose

It is critically important to realize the realignment of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ), in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace and
security in Japan and to mitigate the impact of defense facilities on surrounding residents by all of Japan. In this light, the purpose of this Act is to
contribute to the smooth implementation of USFJ realignment by taking the following special measures, etc.


2. Special Measures, etc.

(1) Realignment grants for municipalities incurring greater impacts

In connection with the realignment of USFJ, the national government designates defense facilities for which it is deemed that consideration must be paid to
their increasing impacts on the stability of the lives of the residents in the surrounding areas. Realignment grants are awarded to municipalities in the area
of such defense facilities, in order to cover the expenses of the projects that contribute to making the residents’ lives more convenient and to developing
industries, if the grants are considered necessary to help carry out the USFJ realignment smoothly and infallibly.

The national government takes into consideration the extent that the stability of the lives of the residents is impacted, and awards the realignment grants

based on both the progress of the measures for achieving realignment and the length of time that has passed since the measures were first implemented.


(2) Public project special provisions for areas incurring particularly large impacts

Designate areas that include municipalities incurring particularly large impacts as Special Area for Development concerning Realignment, and promote the
development of these areas by establishing special provisions for cost sharing by local governments when developing roads, ports, and other infrastructure.
Set up at the MOD the Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces comprised of relevant
ministers, and at the Council’s meetings discuss matters such as the designation of the Special Area for Development concerning Realignment and the
establishment of the development plan for the area (Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment).


(3) Measures for USFJ local employees


Implement skills education and training that contribute to the continuous employment of USFJ local employees.

3. Expiration of the Law


This Act expires on March 31, 2027; provided, however, that the realignment grants will be awarded until March 31, 2032 at the latest based on
the situation of the realignment.

Notes: 1. At the time of its enactment this Act was set to expire on March 31, 2017. However, the term of validity has been extended by 10 years to March 31, 2027 pursuant
to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017.
2. At the time of its enactment, this Act provided for the special measures, etc. under this Act in 2. (1) to (3) above, as well as for special provisions for the operations of
the Japan Bank for International Cooperation for the implementation of investments and loans for family housing and infrastructure development related to USFJ
relocation to the United States of America (Guam) for the promotion of said relocation.
However, the said provision was abolished pursuant to the law for the partial revision of this Act which entered into force on March 31, 2017, after the 2+2 Joint
Statement of April 2012 limited Japan’s financial commitment for the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam to direct cash contribution and it was
confirmed that other forms of financial assistance (investments and loans) would not be utilized.


Reference 38 Agreement between the Government of Japan and
the Government of the United States of America on
Cooperation with Regard to Implementation Practices
Relating to the Civilian Component of the United
States Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the
Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United
States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and
the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan
(signed on January 16, 2017)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America
(hereinafter referred to as the “United States Government”), hereinafter referred to
as the “Parties”;
Confirming that the United States armed forces in Japan (hereinafter referred
to as the “United States armed forces”) under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as
the “Treaty”) and the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities
and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (hereinafter referred
to as the “Status of Forces Agreement”), both signed at Washington on January 19,
1960, contribute to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace
and security in the Far East;
Bearing in mind the “Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing
Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S.
Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component” announced by the
Parties on July 5, 2016, and its recognition of the spirit of Alliance cooperation and the
mutual commitment of Japan and the United States to strengthen the Alliance further
and to enhance deterrence in a complex regional and global security environment;
Acknowledging the essential role of members of the civilian component defined
in subparagraph (b) of Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter
referred to as the “Civilian Component”)in fulfilling the United States’ obligations
under the Treaty, as well as the importance of training and education processes for
United States personnel with Status of Forces Agreement status;
Wishing to strengthen cooperation between the Parties by establishing a
framework, including this Agreement which supplements the Status of Forces
Agreement, with regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian
Component;
Affirming the continuing effectiveness of the Joint Committee provided for in
paragraph 1 of Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement (hereinafter referred
to as the “Joint Committee”) as the means for consultation between the Parties on all


matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of the Status of
Forces Agreement; and
Convinced that enhanced cooperation with regard to implementation practices
relating to the Civilian Component further contributes to achieving the objective of
the Treaty and strengthening the Alliance;
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
The purpose of this Agreement is to enhance cooperation between the Parties with
regard to implementation practices relating to the Civilian Component.

ARTICLE 2
The Parties shall establish a Working Group within the framework of the Joint
Committee. Through the Working Group, the Parties shall retain the right to initiate
consultations regarding implementation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE 3
The Parties shall continue to cooperate fully, through the framework of the Joint
Committee, to clarify the scope of the Civilian Component, which plays an essential
role in fulfilling the United States’ obligations under the Treaty.
1. The United States Government will designate members of the Civilian Component
consistent with the categories of persons that the Parties shall direct the Joint
Committee to develop.
2. The Parties also shall direct the Joint Committee to develop criteria that the
United States Government will use in evaluating contractor employee positions
for eligibility to receive designation as members of the Civilian Component. Such
criteria are to be established so that those who are eligible to receive designation
as members of the Civilian Component have skills or knowledge required for the
accomplishment of mission requirements.

ARTICLE 4
Through the framework of the Joint Committee, the Parties also shall cooperate to
strengthen mechanisms and procedures to ensure that persons ordinarily resident in
Japan are excluded from being members of the Civilian Component.
ARTICLE 5
1. The Parties, through the framework of the Joint Committee, shall establish a
procedure so that the Government of Japan is notified promptly of contractor
employees who have been designated as members of the Civilian Component.
The Parties shall consult in the Working Group upon the request of either Party
regarding such notification.
2. Upon the development of criteria as directed in Article 3, the United States
Government is to establish and maintain procedures for formalized regular


-----

reviews of contractor employees who are designated as members of the Civilian
Component to ensure that they are in fact eligible for such status.
3. The Parties, through the Working Group referred to in Article 2, shall establish
procedures for regular reports regarding the Civilian Component. The United
States Government is to provide such reports to the Government of Japan.

ARTICLE 6
If any dispute arises between the Parties relating to the implementation of this
Agreement, the Parties shall settle it in accordance with the procedures for resolving
matters set out in Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement.

ARTICLE 7
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.
2. This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Status of Forces Agreement
remains in force.
3. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 of this Article, either Party may terminate this
Agreement by giving one year’s written notice through diplomatic channels to the
other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose,
have signed the present Agreement.
DONE in duplicate at Tokyo in the Japanese and English languages, both texts
being equally authentic, this sixteenth day of January 2017.

Reference 39 Direction of the MOD Reform (Outline)

(August 30, 2013 Ministry of Defense)

The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe; there
has been awareness of the lessons learned from the operations of units through the
Great East Japan Earthquake and other incidents; and the political environment has
been changing, such as the move towards establishing the National Security Council
(NSC), and taking comprehensive, exceptional measures relating to the Three
Principles on Arms Exports.


The MOD reform will undertake full fledged reform based on these changes
in the situation, taking into adequate account the matters highlighted in previous
considerations. The direction of the reform is as follows:
(1) Remove the barriers between civilian officials and uniformed personnel
In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed
personnel, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the
Internal Bureau while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in
each of the Staff offices and major commands.
(2) From partial to total optimization (defense capabilities build-up)
Vertical divisions between the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces will
be eliminated, and a procedure will be established for defense capabilities buildup based on joint operations. In addition, further efficiency and optimization in
equipment acquisition will be attempted, based on consistent management across
the life-cycle of the equipment, contributing to the total optimization of defense
capabilities.
(3) Make accurate decisions more swiftly (joint operations)
In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations
of the SDF and make the decision-making process swifter, a review of the
organization will be conducted so that duties concerning actual operations will
be unified into the Joint Staff.
(4) Further enhancement of policy-planning and public relations capability
The policy-planning capability will be strengthened to cope with the drastic
increase in international affairs-related work and the founding of the NSC.
Together with this, the public relations capability will be enhanced.

In order to ensure that reforms are truly effective, it is vital to change the
mentality of both the civilian officials and the uniformed personnel. Furthermore,
it is necessary to advance reforms smoothly, to avoid disruption and stagnation
in response to contingencies. Accordingly, it is important to establish a series
of reforms through steady and phased implementation while the Internal
Bureau and Staff offices concurrently support the Minister of Defense. Reform
is, ultimately, something that is implemented without end. It is natural that it
should be constantly examined, while efforts are made for further reform and
improvement.


Reference 40 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

|1993|May 29: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that fell into the Sea of Japan|
|---|---|
|1995|Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense|
|1998|August 31: North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory|
||The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system|
|1999|Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles|
|2002|Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD|
|2003|The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started|
|2005|Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD|
|2006|July 5: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, six of which fell into the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediate after the launch|
|2007|The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started|
|2009|March 27: First shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 5: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over the Tohoku region and passed through to the Pacific Ocean July 4: North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan|
|2012|March 30: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued April 13: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew a minute or longer, then separated into several parts and fell into the Yellow Sea December 7: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued December 12: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which felw over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacifci Ocean|
|2014|North Korea launched ballistic missiles in March, June, and July March 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 26: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 600 km and fell into the Sea of Japan June 29: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 9: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 13: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan July 26: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan|
|2015|March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan|


-----

|2017|North Korea launched ballistic missiles beginning in February February 12: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan March 6: Launched four ballistic missiles, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell into the Sea of Japan (three in the Japanese EEZ) April 5: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 60 km and fell into the Sea of Japan April 16: Launched a ballistic missile that exploded immediately after launch April 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which fell inland approximately 50 km from the launch site May 14: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan May 21: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan May 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan July 4: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan|
|---|---|


North Korea launched over 20 ballistic missiles including those claimed to be “satellites” in a single year
February 3: Shoot-down order for ballistic-missiles, etc. issued
February 7: North Korea launched a ballistic missile that it claimed was a “satellite,” which flew over Okinawa Prefecture and passed through to the Pacific Ocean
March 10: Launched two ballistic missiles, both of which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
March 18: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
April 15: Launched a ballistic missile
April 23: Launched a ballistic missile
April 28: Launched two ballistic missiles
May 31: Launched a ballistic missile
June 22: Launched two ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 100 km and fell near the east coast of North Korea
The second flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan

2016

July 9: Launched a ballistic missile
July 19: Launched three ballistic missiles, the first of which flew approximately 400 km and fell into the Sea of Japan; the second failed to fly on and did not fall into the Sea
of Japan, the details being unclear; and the third flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
August 3: Launched two ballistic missiles, one of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan while the other exploded immediately
after the launch
August 24: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
September 5: Launched three ballistic missiles, all of which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan
October 15: Launched a ballistic missile
October 20: Launched a ballistic missile
December 22: At the Nine Ministers’ Meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), it was decided that the ballistic missile defense enhanced-capability interceptor missile
(SM-3 block IIA) would progress to the joint production and deployment stage

North Korea launched ballistic missiles beginning in February
February 12: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
March 6: Launched four ballistic missiles, which flew approximately 1,000 km and fell into the Sea of Japan (three in the Japanese EEZ)
April 5: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 60 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
April 16: Launched a ballistic missile that exploded immediately after launch

2017

April 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which fell inland approximately 50 km from the launch site
May 14: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
May 21: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan
May 29: Launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan
July 4: North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which flew approximately 900 km and fell in the Japanese EEZ in the Sea of Japan


Reference 41 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles

|SDF takes measures on the order of the Minister of Defense|Col2|SDF takes measures on the order|
|---|---|---|
|||of the Minister of Defense|


Not recognized as armed attack

When the possibility that ballistic Although the ballistic missiles are not expected to
missiles may fly toward Japan is fly over Japan, a rapid change in circumstances
acknowledged may create an emergency situation which makes

it difficult to obtain an approval from the Prime
Minister in time

Minister of Defense orders destruction Minister of Defense orders destruction measures
measures upon approval of in advance as provided in the emergency response
the Prime Minister procedure (approved by the Cabinet in 2007)


Article 76 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 1) Article 82-3 of the SDF Law (Paragraph 3)
(Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) (Destruction measures against ballistic missiles)


If armed attack is recognized
(Declared intent to attack,
imminent missile launch)

An armed attack situation is
recognized and a defense operation
order is issued

Take measures in the framework
of defense operation

Article 76 of the SDF Law
(Issuance of Defense Operations Orders)


Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military

❍ Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the
specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection
such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies.
❍ In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their
responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defined with a
provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet.


Reference 42 Efforts in Recent Years by the Ministry of Defense on Cybersecurity

|2012|April: Agreed in a Japan-US Summit Meeting to start a comprehensive dialogue on cybersecurity in order to strengthen the engagement of the governments as a whole June: Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) established in the National Information Security Center (NISC) September: “Towards the Stable and Effective Utilization of Cyberspace by the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces” formulated|
|---|---|
|2013|May: The First Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue was held in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting July: The MOD and defense industry members deeply interested in cybersecurity established the Cyber Defense Council (CDC) August: Agreed at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers’ Meeting to consider a new framework for cooperation between the defense authorities from the perspective of further promoting Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the cybersecurity area October: Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) established between the Japanese and U.S. defense authorities|
|2014|March: Cyber Defense Group newly formed under the Command Control Communication Computers Systems Command November: The Basic Act on Cybersecurity enacted|
|2015|January: Cybersecurity Strategy Headquarters established under the Cabinet January: National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) established in the Cabinet Secretariat May: Joint statement issued by the CDPWG September: Cybersecurity Strategy established by Cabinet Decision|
|2016|April: MOD established Deputy Director-General for Cybersecurity and Information Technology|


-----

Reference 43 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)

|FY|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016|Kumamoto Earthquake* (28)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Number of Dispatches|520|555|521|541|515|—|
|Personnel|12,410|89,049|66,267|30,035|33,123|814,200|
|Vehicles|2,068|7,949|9,621|5,170|5,824|—|
|Aircraft|684|1,255|1,232|888|725|2,618|
|Vessels|1|51|0|2|11|300|



-  Kumamoto Earthquake is excluded in compiling FY 2016 dispatch results


Reference 44 Implementation and Participation Record of Major Drills Related to Disaster Dispatch (FY2016)

(1) Implementation of integrated disaster prevention exercises by the Self-Defense (8) Participation in training for medical responses in case of large-scale earthquakes
Forces (training for responding to Nankai Trough Megathrust Earthquake) (9) Participation in training in collaboration with the Shizuoka Prefecture
(2) Implementation of operational training by the Ministry of Defense Disaster comprehensive disaster reduction drills
Countermeasures Headquarters (10) Participation in training in collaboration with the Nine Cities and Prefectures
(3) Participation in “Disaster Prevention Day” operational training by the joint disaster prevention training
Government Headquarters (11) Participation in training in collaboration with the Tokai Region wide-area
(4) Participation in government’s role-playing simulation exercise collaboration disaster prevention training
(5) Participation in Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise (12) Participation in other general disaster prevention training implemented by local
(6) Participation in integrated training in preparation for large-scale tsunamis government, etc.
(7) Participation in nuclear disaster prevention training

Reference 45 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)


||Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2011 – Jun. 30, 2016)|
|---|---|---|---|
||Dialogue||Date|
|Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia- Pacific Region|Intergovernmental|❍ ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) • Ministerial Meeting • Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM Plus) • Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM Plus WG) • Experts’ Working Group (EWG) • Maritime Security EWG • Military Medicine EWG • Counter-Terrorism EWG • Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG • Peacekeeping Operations EWG • Humanitarian Mine Action EWG ❍ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Meeting among defense authorities|(Aug. 2013, Nov. 2015) (Apr. 2012, Apr. 2013, Apr. 2014, Feb. 2015, Apr. 2016, Apr. 2017) (Feb. 2013, Mar. 2013, Feb. 2014, Jan. 2015, Feb. 2016, Mar. 2017) (Sep.2012, Nov. 2012, May 2013, Sep. 2013, Feb. 2014, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, Feb. 2015, Sep. 2015, Oct. 2015, Mar. 2016, Nov. 2016) (Jul. 2012, Oct.2013, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, May 2015, Sep. 2015, Jan. 2017) (Apr. 2012, Mar. 2013, Oct. 2014, Oct. 2015, Dec. 2016) (Aug. 2012, Jan. 2014, Jul. 2014, Dec. 2014, Aug. 2015, Dec. 2015, May 2016, Dec.2016, May 2017) (Jun. 2012, Nov. 2012, Apr. 2013, Feb. 2014, Sep. 2014, Mar. 2015, Sep. 2015, Oct. 2016, May 2017) (Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, Oct.2015, Oct. 2016, May 2017) (May 2012, Nov. 2012, Apr. 2013, May 2013, Dec. 2013, Apr. 2014, Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2015, Apr. 2016, May 2016, May 2017, Jun. 2017)|
||Hosted by the private sector|• IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)|(Jun. 2012, Jun. 2013, Jun. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2016, Jun. 2017)|
|Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense|❍ ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting ❍ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum ❍ Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges ❍ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) ❍ International Seminar for Military Science ❍ International Conference of Cadets||(Nov. 2014, Nov. 2016) (Mar. 2013, Feb. 2014, Oct. 2014, Sep. 2015, Sep. 2016) (Mar. 2013) (Oct. 2012, Oct. 2013, Mar. 2015, Mar. 2016, Mar. 2017) (Jul. 2012, Jul. 2013, Jul. 2014, Jun. 2015) (Feb. 2013, Mar. 2014, Mar. 2015)|


-----

Reference 46 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements

|Col1|Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement|Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)|Information Security Agreement|Security and Defense Cooperation Documents|Foreign and Defense Ministerial level Meetings (“2 + 2”), etc.|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|United States|Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983 Established the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006|Signed in April 1996 and entered into force in October 1996 Signed in April 1998 and revised in September 1999 Signed in February 2004 and revised in July 2004 Signed in September 2016 and entered into force in April 2017|Signed and entered into force in August 2007|Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960|(f ive most recent cases) May 2006, May 2007, Jun. 2011, Oct. 2013, Apr. 2015|
|Australia|Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in December 2014|Signed in May 2010 Entered into force in January 2013 Signed in January 2017|Signed in May 2012 Entered into force in March 2013|Signed memorandum in September 2003 Revised memorandum in December 2008|Jun. 2007, Dec. 2008, May 2010, Sep. 2012, Jun. 2014, Nov. 2015|
|United Kingdom|Signed and entered into force in July 2013|Signed in January 2017|Signed in July 2013 Entered into force in January 2014|Signed memorandum in January 2004 Revised memorandum in June 2012|Jan. 2015, Jan. 2016|
|France|Signed in March 2015 Entered into force in December 2016|Agreed to begin negotiations at the “2+2” in January 2017|Signed and entered into force in October 2011|Signed exchange of notes in April 2002 Revised annex statement in August 2003 Signed statement of intent in July 2014|Jan. 2014, Mar. 2015, Jan. 2017|
|India|Signed in December 2015 Entered into force in March 2016|—|Signed and entered into force in December 2015|Signed memorandum in September 2014|(vice ministerial-level meetings) Jul. 2010, Oct. 2012, Apr. 2015, Mar. 2017|
|Republic of Korea|—|Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011|Signed and entered into force in November 2016|Signed statement of intent in April 2009|—|
|Indonesia|Agreed to begin negotiations at the “2+2” Meeting in December 2015|—|—|Signed memorandum in March 2015|Dec. 2015|
|Philippines|Signed in February 2016 Entered into force in April 2016|—|—|Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015|(vice ministerial-level meetings) Agreed to establish meetings in Jun. 2014|
|New Zealand|—|Agreed to consider at Japan-New Zealand Summit Meeting in July 2014|—|Signed memorandum in August 2013|—|
|Germany|—|—|—|—|—|
|Italy|Signed in May 2017|—|Signed in March 2016 Entered into force in June 2016|Signed statement of intent in June 2012 Signed memorandum in May 2017|—|
|Canada|—|Agreed to begin negotiations for conclusion at the Japan- Canada Vice-Minister level “2+2” dialogue in August 2011 Agreed substantively in May 2017|—|—|(vice ministerial-level meetings) Aug. 2011, Mar. 2014, Apr. 2016|
|Russia|—|—|—|Signed memorandum in August 1999 Revised memorandum in January 2006|Nov. 2013, Mar. 2017|
|NATO NA TO|—|—|Signed and entered into force in June 2010|Announced Individual: Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between Japan and NATO in May 2014|—|


NA TO


-  Signed Memorandum with Singapore, Viet Nam, Mongolia, Bahrain, Cambodia, Sweden, Spain, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Colombia and the Netherlands; signed statement of intent with Turkey

-  Agreed with Malaysia to begin negotiations on defense equipment and technology transfer agreement in May 2015


-----

Reference 47 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2016)

|CCoouunnttrryy IInnssttiittuuttiioonn|Thailand|Philippines|Indonesia|Singapore|Malaysia|Vietnam|Cambodia|Timor- Leste|Laos|Myanmar|India|Pakistan|Republic of Korea|Mongolia|Australia|United States|United Kingdom|Germany|France|Canada|Sub total|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|National Institute for Defense Studies|1||||||||||1||||1|2|||||5|
|National Defense Academy|5|2||||8|3|2|2|3|||1|3|1|8|||8||46|
|Ground Self- Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|1|||||1|1|||2|1|4|3|1||3|||||17|
|Maritime Self- Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|2|2||||||||1|||2||1||||||8|
|Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|2|||||||||2|1||3|||1|||||9|
|Joint Staff College|2|||1|1|1||||3|||3|||2|2|||2|17|
|Total|13|4|0|1|1|10|4|2|2|11|3|4|12|4|3|16|2|0|8|2|102|



Reference 48 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense


(Number of students)

[Germany] France Canada Sub total

5

8 46

17

8

9

2 17

0 8 2 102

|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|(Apr. 1, 2011 – Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Security Dialogue|||Outline|Recent Situations|
|Hosted by Ministry of Defense|Internal Bureau and others|Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level off icials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.|The 8th forum was held in Sendai in September 2016, with the participation of vice-ministerial level off icials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries. Candid and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding the topics of “Current Regional Security Status,” “United Efforts to Tackle Common Challenges,” and “Future of ASEAN-Japan Defense Cooperation” under the theme “To Improve Security Environment in the Region: Enhancement of Defense Cooperation between ASEAN and Japan.”|
|||Tokyo seminar on common security challenges|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. It is a seminar open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as common security challenges and policies for promoting regional cooperation thereby making a venue for open discussion toward the promotion of regional cooperation.|With the participation of intellectuals from inside and outside Japan and defense authorities, discussions were held on the topic entitled “Security in the Asia-Pacif ci Region: The Future Role of Japan and ASEAN.” The event contributed to efforts to improve the security environment and promoted regional dialogue and cooperation in March 2013.|
|||Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacif ic Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level off icials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacif ic region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense off icials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote conf idence building focusing on the defense f ield.|With the participation of 26 countries, 24 in the Asia-Pacif ic region and France and the U.K., the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the 21st Forum was held in March 2017. Opinions were exchanged on “Peacekeeping Operations: Upcoming Challenges and Ways to Cooperate Ahead” and “Domestic Challenges of Defense Authorities.”|
|Hosted by Ministry of Defense|GSDF|Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacif ic (MCAP)|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting off icers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacif ic region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.|In August 2016, with the participation of 22 countries from the Asia-Pacif ci region and other regions, group discussions under the theme of “The Role of Army Types during Large-Scale Disasters.” In addition, training for areas affected by the Kumamoto Earthquake and other activities were held.|
|||Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting off icers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacif ic region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.|The 20th Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST) meeting was held in November 2016. The participants were working-level off ciers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 19 countries in the Asia-Pacif ci region and Europe. Views were exchanged under the theme “Logistics Cooperation in International Emergency Assistance Activities.”|
|||Army Command and General Staff College Seminar|Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of army colleges from the Asia-Pacif ic region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.|With the participation of students from army colleges in 19 countries in the Asia- Pacif ic region, the 16th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held in August 2016. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Leadership Teamwork in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Multilateral Environment.”|
||MSDF|Asia Pacif ic Naval College Seminar|Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of naval college staff from the Asia- Pacif ic region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange and mutual understanding between participating countries.|The 20th seminar was held in February 2017 with the participation of Navy military personnel from 15 countries, the personnel from National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), parsonnel from Osaka University graduate school, and the Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation. Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of “Strengthening Maritime Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacif ic Region.” In addition, unit and cultural study tours were also held to deepen the understanding of the MSDF as well as Japanese culture and history.|
||ASDF|Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Staff College Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2015, with the participation of off icials related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacif ic region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on off icer’s education. (From 1996 to 2014, this seminar was held as International Air Force Education Seminar.)|Air staff college personnel and researcher from four countries were invited in October 2016 for keynote speeches and presentations. And they exchanged the views on the theme of “The Strategic Role of Air Power.”|
|||International Air Command and Staff Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with the participation of students of air staff college students from the Asia-Pacif ci region. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.|With the participation of air staff college students in 21 countries, the 16th seminar was held in October 2016. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Air Power and Multilateral Cooperation.”|


-----

|Col1|Col2|Security Dialogue|Outline|Recent Situations|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Hosted by Ministry of Defense|National Defense Academy|International Seminar on Defense Science|Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting military academy representatives from the Asia-Pacific regions.|The 21st International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2016, inviting 10 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Commitment to national cybersecurity by military academy and services in education and research.”|
|||International Cadets’ Conference|Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from the Asia-Pacific region. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.|In March 2017, 19 countries were invited to the 20th conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of “The Time We Become Leaders.”|
||National Institute for Defense Studies|International Symposium on Security Affairs|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold debates and offer reports on security in the public for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.|In July 2016, notable researchers and practitioners from the United States, ROK, and Japan were invited to this symposium to exchange opinions under the theme “The Future Security Environment Surrounding North Korea.”|
|||International Security Colloquium|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with offciials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.|In July 2016, researchers and practitioners from the United States and ROK were invited to this colloquium, and opinions were exchanged among the invited foreign experts together with Japanese experts under the theme “The Future Security Environment Surrounding North Korea.”|
|||International Forum on War History|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.|In September 2016, researchers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan were invited to this forum to exchange opinions under the theme “Japan’s Alliances from a Historical Perspective.”|
|||Asia-Pacific Security Workshop|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia-Pacific region faces in common.|In January 2017, researchers were invited from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Australia, and the United States, to exchange opinions on the theme of “Security outlook of the Asia Pacifci countries and its implications for the defense sector.”|


Reference 49 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues

|Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Col2|Col3|Overview|
|---|---|---|---|
|Hosted by the Government|Internal Bureau and others|Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)|ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated in the forum since the second meeting in 1993.|
||Putrajaya Forum||This event, hosted by the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security and participated in by national defense experts from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has participated since the first forum in 2010.|
||Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD)||This event, hosted by the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia (organized by the Indonesian Defence University) and participated in by the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff from ADMM-Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has participated since the first dialogue in 2011.|
||Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)||This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia-Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has participated since the first meeting in 2012.|
||Joint Staff|Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)|CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.|
|||Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)|PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan’s participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.|
|Hosted by the Government|GSDF|Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.|
|||Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)|PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has participated in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.|
|||Land Forces Pacific (LANPAC)|LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the first event of which was held in April 2013. The GSDF Chief of Staff was officially invited to the second symposium held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the “Current situation and the future of Japan-U.S. Cooperation” which gained support from the U.S. Army Pacific Commander and other participants from different countries.|
|||Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)|CAEX is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.|
|||PACOM Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)|Held for the first time in May 2015, hosted by the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific from the perspective of contributing to the amphibious operations capacities of friendly countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to contribute to regional stability through strengthening relations with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and enhancing interoperability. It has been held annually since then. Japan has participated from the first meeting.|
|||Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)|Hosted by AUSA, the annual meeting provides opportunities for exchanging opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and since 2014 the Chief of the Staff of the GSDF participated in the meeting twice to deliver speeches.|


-----

|Hosted by the Government|MSDF|International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)|ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy Chief of Staff of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.|
|---|---|---|---|
|||Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)|WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.|
|||International MCM Seminar|This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan’s MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.|
|||Asia Pacific Submarine Conference|Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.|
|||Indian Ocean Naval Symposium|This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.|
||ASDF|Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.|
|||PACRIM Airpower Symposium|This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995.|
|||Air Power Conference (APC)|APC is a conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange international views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.|
|||International Conference on Air & Space Power (ICAP)|These international conferences on air and space are hosted by Turkish Air War College. ICAP, on the theme of the future of the air forces, and ISAW, on the theme of the history of the air forces, are respectively held every other year. Japan has participated since their first conferences in 2013.|
|||International Symposium on the history of Air Warfare (ISAW)||
||Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence|Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)|Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.|
||National Institute for Defense Studies|ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting|Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001.|
|||NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)|CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries taking turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013).|
|Hosted by the Private Sector|IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.|
||Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010. The Summit did not take place in 2011.|
||Munich Security Conference||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010.|
||Halifax International Security Forum||Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.|
||The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)||Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.|


Other Multilateral Security Dialogue Overview


-----

Reference 50  Vientiane Vision: Japan s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN

Introduction

Ø “Vientiane Vision: Japan’s Defense Cooperation Initiative with ASEAN” is Japan’s own initiative for the future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation
Ø Annually follow up the implementation of the specific and practical activities listed in the Vision through the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum
starting from 2017

Contents

1. Background of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation
(1) The Asia-Pacific region faces increasingly serious challenges for the security, which makes more difficult for any single country to respond alone
(2) ASEAN is a hub for the regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region with an increasing importance. Japan and ASEAN have traditionally maintained strong
ties; Further enhancement of bilateral/multilateral cooperation is crucial in ensuring a stable regional security environment
(3) Japan welcomes the establishment of ASEAN Community at the end of 2015 and supports its centrality and unity. Since the establishment, ASEAN-Wide
multilateral cooperation has become even more important, in addition to bilateral cooperation with its individual member states

2. Evolution of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: deepening “exchanges” toward “cooperation”
(1) Starting defense exchanges from 1990s: enhancing mutual understanding and confidence through defense exchanges
(2) Developing defense cooperation from 2000s: more practical/ operational defense cooperation with ASEAN member states
(3) Deepening defense cooperation from 2010s: starting new projects such as capacity building cooperation with further specific and practical activities and
promoting multilateral cooperation through regional frameworks such as ADMM-Plus

[Reference] Development of Japan-ASEAN Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

High-level exchanges Working-level exchanges Capacity building cooperation

200 40 15

30

10

100 20

5

10

0 0 0

90s 00s -2016 90s 00s -2016 2012FY 2013FY 2014FY 2015FY

3. Future Direction of Japan-ASEAN Defense Cooperation: Toward the “ASEAN-Wide” Practical Cooperation
(1) Purpose: In addition to the cooperation with “Individual ASEAN Member States,” “ASEAN-Wide” cooperation will be expanded through promoting practical
cooperation with a view to 1. respecting and promoting shared principles such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights, 2. promoting and enhancing the
rule of law, 3. supporting ASEAN efforts to strengthen its centrality and unity which is a cornerstone of regional cooperation
(2) Direction: In order to contribute to regional peace, security and prosperity, future Japan-ASEAN defense cooperation will be focused on the following three points
Ø To consolidate the order based on the principles of international law governing peaceful conduct among states, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to uphold
principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space
Ø To promote maritime security which is a foundation for the regional peace and prosperity, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities for
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Search and Rescue (SAR) at sea and air space
Ø To cope with increasingly diversifying and complex security issues, Japan supports ASEAN efforts to build up capabilities in various fields
(3) Measures: Conducting practical defense cooperation by effectively combining the following diverse measures
1) Promotion of International Law (PIL): sharing understanding and experience regarding international law, especially in the field of maritime security, through i.e.
conducting researches and sponsoring seminars, etc., with a view to its effective implementation.
2) Capacity Building Cooperation (CBC): conducting CBC in various fields such as HA/DR, PKO, landmine and UXO clearance, cybersecurity, defense buildup
planning (sharing know-how), etc.
3) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (DETC): transferring equipment and technology, developing human resources regarding DETC, holding
seminars on defense industries, etc.
4) Joint Training and Exercises (JTE): continued participation in multilateral joint training and exercises, inviting ASEAN observers to Self- Defense Forces’ training, etc.
5) Human Resource Development and Academic Exchange (HRD/AE): Inviting Opinion Leaders from ASEAN, etc.

[Present] [Future]
Mainly bilateral/ country by country, In addition to the cooperation with “Individual ASEAN Member States,”
field by field cooperation “ASEAN-Wide” cooperation will be expanded through combining

diverse measures

2) CBC

Individual Defense 1) PIL 3) DETC
Cooperation

5) HRD/AE 4) JTE

(4) The JMOD institutional development to better address “ASEAN-Wide” practical cooperation based on the Vision


Reference 51 Status of Capacity Building Assistance


|Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|(June 2012 – June 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Country|Period|Description|Format|Benef iciary|Dispatched personnel|
|Mongolia|October 2012|Seminar on military medicine|Short-term|Central hospital of the Mongolian Armed Forces, etc.|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative off icial|
||November 2013|Training on military medicine at GSDF Central Hospital, etc.|Invitation|General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital|—|
||June - July 2014|Human resource development in civil engineering|Long-term|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University|9 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative off icial|
||July 2014|Seminar on military medicine|Short-term|General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital|3 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative off icials|


-----

|Country|Period|Description|Format|Beneficiary|Dispatched personnel|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Mongolia|February - March 2015|Training on civil engineering at GSDF Engineer School|Invitation|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University|—|
||March 2015|Training on military medicine at GSDF Sapporo Hospital|Invitation|General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital|—|
||July - September 2015|Human resource development in civil engineering|Long-term|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University|15 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||February 2016|Training on civil engineering at GSDF Engineer School|Invitation|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University|—|
||July - September 2016|Human resource development in civil engineering|Long-term|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit and Mongolian National Defense University|19 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
|Vietnam|October 2012|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Vietnamese Navy, etc.|3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2013|PKO training|Invitation|Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People’s Army|—|
||May 2013|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Vietnamese Navy|2 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||September 2013|Seminar on underwater medicine|Invitation|Vietnamese Navy|—|
||September 2013|Seminar on aviation safety|Short-term|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|5 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||February 2014|Training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Invitation|Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam|—|
||March 2014|Training on aviation safety, etc.|Invitation|Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam Air Defence and Air Forces|—|
||March 2014|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Vietnamese Navy, etc.|3 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||November 2014|Seminar on aviation safety|Short-term|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||February 2015|Seminar on international aviation law|Short-term||2 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2015|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Vietnamese Navy, etc.|4 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||November 2015|Seminar on aviation safety|Short-term|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||November 2015|Seminar on aviation medicine|Short-term|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2016|PKO training at United Nations|Invitation|Peacekeeping Center of Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People’s Army|2 Joint Staff personnel, 1 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2016|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Vietnamese Navy, etc.|3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||April 2016|PKO training by engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan|Invitation|Peacekeeping Center of Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People’s Army|1 Joint Staff personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||November 2016|Seminar on aviation safety|Short-term|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||November 2016|Seminar on aviation medicine|Short-term|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2017|Training on aviation medicine|Invitation|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|—|
||June 2017|Seminar on air rescue|Short-term|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force and related organizations|4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
|Timor-Leste|December 2012 - March 2013|Human resource development in vehicle maintenance|Long-term|Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 4 private-sector organization members|
||October 2013 - March 2014|Human resource development in vehicle maintenance|Long-term|Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members|
||June 2014|Training on logistics support by GSDF|Invitation|Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|—|
||September - November 2014|Human resource development in vehicle maintenance|Long-term|Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters and Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 3 private-sector organization members|
||July 2015|Instruction of vehicle maintenance|Short-term|Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|5 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||October - November 2015|Instruction of civil engineering (hosted by the Australian Defence Force)|Long-term|Timor-Leste Defence Force engineers|8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||February 2016|Instruction of vehicle maintenance|Short-term|Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||August 2016|Instruction of vehicle maintenance|Short-term|Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|6 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||October – November 2016|Technical instruction of engineering activities (hosted by the Australian Defence Force)|Long-term|Timor-Leste Defence Force engineers|7 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||December 2016|Training on vehicle maintenance by GSDF|Invitation|Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|—|
||February 2017|Instruction of vehicle maintenance|Short-term|Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||January - March 2013|Human resource development in civil engineering|Long-term|National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia|4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members|
||December 2013 - March 2014|Human resource development in civil engineering|Long-term|National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia|16 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members|
||September – October 2014|Human resource development in civil engineering|Invitation|Cambodian Ministry of National Defense Engineer Department, Cambodian Army Headquarters Engineer Corps|—|
||October - November 2014|Human resource development in civil engineering|Long-term|National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia|3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||November 2015|Human resource development in civil engineering|Short-term|National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia|3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|


National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, 7 GSDF personnel, i
February 2017 Human resource development in civil engineering Short-term


-----

|Country|Period|Description|Format|Beneficiary|Dispatched personnel|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Indonesia|February 2013|Seminar on oceanography|Short-term|Indonesian Navy|3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||July 2013|Seminar on oceanography|Short-term|Indonesian Navy|1 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||February 2014|Training on oceanography|Invitation|Indonesian Navy|—|
||February 2015|Seminar on international aviation law|Short-term|Indonesian Ministry of Defense|2 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2016|Seminar on oceanography|Short-term|Indonesian Navy|2 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||January 2017|Training on oceanography|Invitation|Indonesian Navy|—|
||March 2017|Seminar on international maritime law|Short-term|Indonesian Ministry of Defense and Indonesian Navy, etc.|5 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
|Myanmar|December 2014|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Myanmar Army and Navy, etc.|3 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||January 2015|Seminar on aviation meteorology|Short-term|Myanmar Air Force|4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2015|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Myanmar Army|1 GSDF personnel 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||August 2015|Training on aviation meteorology at ASDF units/facilities, etc.|Invitation|Myanmar Air Force|—|
||September 2015|Training on underwater medicine at MSDF units/facilities, etc.|Invitation|Myanmar Navy|—|
||October 2015|Training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at GSDF units/facilities, etc.|Invitation|Myanmar Army|—|
||December 2015|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Myanmar Army and Navy, etc.|4 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||March 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Myanmar Army|3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||December 2016|Seminar on underwater medicine|Short-term|Myanmar Army and Navy, etc.|4 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||February 2017|Seminar on aviation meteorology|Short-term|Myanmar Air Force, etc.|6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||February 2017|Seminar on international aviation law|Short-term|Myanmar Air Force, etc.|6 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||March 2017|Training on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at SDF Central Hospital, GSDF units/facilities, etc.|Invitation|Myanmar Army|—|
|Papua New Guinea|July 2014|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Papua New Guinea Defence Force|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||June – August 2015|Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Invitation|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|—|
||March 2016|Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Invitation|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|—|
||August 2016|Guidance on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Short-term|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||October – November 2016|Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Invitation|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|—|
||January – March 2017|Guidance on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Long-term|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|5 GSDF personnel|
||May – July 2017|Guidance on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Invitation|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|—|
|Philippines|February 2015|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Invitation|Philippine Air Force|—|
||June 2015|Seminar on international aviation law|Short-term|Philippine Air Force|3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||June 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Philippine Army|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||July 2016|Seminar on diesel engine maintenance|Short-term|Philippine Navy|3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||May 2017|Instruction of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (medical)|Short-term|Philippine Army, etc.|2 Joint Staff personnel, 2 GSDF personnel|
|Malaysia|June 2015|Seminar on international aviation law|Short-term|Royal Malaysian Air Force|3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||October 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Royal Malaysian Army|2 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
|ASEAN member states|January 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for ASEAN member states hosted by Japan and the United Kingdom|Short-term|ASEAN governments, militaries, and civil organizations|2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
|Laos|February 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People’s Army|1 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
||June 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People’s Army|3 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||August 2016|Instruction of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Short-term|Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People’s Army|6 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
|Thailand|April 2016|Seminar on international aviation law|Short-term|Royal Thai Armed Force|3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials|
||May 2016|Training on aviation safety by ASDF units, etc.|Invitation|Royal Thai Air Force|—|
||April 2017|Seminar on aviation safety|Short-term|Royal Thai Air Force|5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official|
|Kazakhstan|October 2016|Seminar on military medicine|Invitation|Kazakhstan Ministry of National Defence|—|


-----

Reference 52 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)


||Col2|Col3|Col4|(Apr. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017))|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Exercise||Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.|
|Cobra Gold||February 2015 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, India, Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, China, Malaysia, etc.|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.|
|||January - February 2016 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, India, Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, China, Malaysia|Joint Staff Offcie, Ground Staff Offcie, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.|
|||January - February 2017 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China, India|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Northeastern Army, Middle Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau, etc.|
|Pacific Partnership||May – July 2014 (Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Malaysia, Chile, ROK|1 vessel, 1 aircraft (personnel transportation) Approximately 40 personnel|
|||May – August 2015 (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Philippines)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore|1 vessel Approximately 60 personnel|
|||July – August 2016 (Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Palau, Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand|1 vessel Approximately 70 personnel|
|||March – May 2017 (Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Vietnam)|Japan, U.S., Australia, U.K., ROK|2 vessels Approximately 70 personnel|
|ARF-DiREx||May 2015 (Malaysia)|Japan, U.S., India, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mongolia, Laos, etc.|Approximately 10 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Internal Bureau, Eastern Army, Air Training Command, SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Ominato Hospital|
|ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercises||April – May 2014 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Canada, France, EU|7 personnel|
|ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise||September 2016 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, Australia, New Zealand, Russia|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Internal Bureau|
|ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Counterterrorism Exercise)||May 2016 (Brunei and Singapore)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand, ROK, China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Russia|1 vessel|
|ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Mahi Tangaroa 16)||November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)|Japan, U.S., Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, etc.|1 vessel|
|Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise|Garuda Canti Dharma|August – September 2014 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, ROK, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Mongolia, Australia, Jordan, etc.|Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Offcie, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force|
||Keris Aman|August 2015 (Malaysia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, ROK, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Australia, etc.|5 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force|
||Shanti Prays III|March – April 2017 (Malaysia)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, Cambodia, ROK, Nepal, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, etc.|Central Readiness Force 2 personnel|
|Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)||June – July 2014 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., etc.|8 personnel|
|||June – July 2015 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Approximately 40 personnel|
|||May – June 2016 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Approximately 50 personnel including observers|
|Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Convention||May 2014 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Philippines, Brunei, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Canada, U.K., France|Approximately 30 personnel|
|||May 2015 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, ROK, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Canada|Approximately 30 personnel|
|||April - May 2016 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., ROK, China, Australia, UAE, etc.|Approximately 30 personnel|
|||April - May 2017 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, UAE, etc.|Approximately 20 personnel|
|KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy||March – April 2014 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Singapore, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Russia, etc.|1 vessel|
|||April 2016 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, China, Russia, etc.|1 vessel|
|Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training||June 2013 (Waters and airspace around Guam)|Japan, U.S., Australia|1 vessel 2 aircraft|
|||August 2014 (Waters and airspace around Guam)||2 aircraft|
|||September 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)||1 vessel|
|||December 2015 (Waters around Micronesia)||1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel|
|||January – February 2016 (Waters around Singapore - India)||1 vessel|
|||December 2016 (Waters around Micronesia)||1 aircraft Approximately 25 personnel|
|||July 2014 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel|
|||June 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)||1 vessel|
|||October 2016 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel|
|||November 2016 (Waters around Japan)||1 vessel|
|||January 2017 (Waters around Japan)||1 vessel|
|||March 2017 (Waters around Japan)||1 vessel|


April 2017 1 vessel
(Waters west of Kyushu) 1 aircraft


-----

|Exercise|Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.|
|---|---|---|---|
|Japan-U.S.-Canada Trilateral Training|March 2016 (Waters off the Sanriku Coast)||2 aircraft|
|Japan-U.S.-Australia-ROK-Canada Joint Training|September 2016 (Waters around Hawaii)||1 vessel|
|Japan-Canada-Singapore Trilateral Training|June 2017 (Waters south of Shikoku)||1 vessel|
|U.S. and India-Hosted Maritime Joint Exercise (Exercise Malabar)|July 2014 (Waters south of Shikoku – east of Okinawa)|Japan, U.S., India|2 vessels Several aircraft|
||September – November 2015 (Waters and airspace east of India)|Japan, U.S., India|1 vessel|
||June 2016 (Waters east of Sasebo - Okinawa)|Japan, U.S., India|1 vessel 3 aircraft|
|Multilateral Training (TGEX KOA KAI EAST)|October – December, 2014 (Waters around San Diego)|Japan, U.S., Canada|1 vessel|
|Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)|August – September 2014 (Waters around Australia)|Japan, Australia, etc.|1 vessel 2 aircraft|
||September 2016 (Waters around Australia)|Japan, U.S., Australia, etc.|1 vessel 2 aircraft|
|U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise|October – November 2014 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|2 vessels|
||April 2016 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|2 vessels|
|U.S.-Hosted International Maritime Exercise|May 2017 (Bahrain)|Japan, U.S., etc.|Several personnel|
|Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise|August 2015 (Waters around Singapore and Indonesia)|Japan, Indonesia, Singapore, etc.|3 vessels|
||June 2017 (Waters around Guam)|Japan, U.S., etc.|5 personnel|
|Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise|May 2016 (Waters around ROK)|Japan, U.S., ROK, Malaysia, Australia, Singapore|2 vessels|
|Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)|February 2015 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel|
||February 2016 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel|
||February 2017 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||Approximately 20 aircraft Approximately 480 personnel|
|Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Exercise Southern Jackaroo)|May 2014, May 2015, May 2016, May 2017 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Approximately 100 personnel|
|Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Exercise Talisman Saber)|July 2015 (Australia)||Approximately 40 personnel|
|Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Michinoku Alert)|November 2014 (Tohoku)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Northeastern Army Approximately 12,500 personnel, approximately 1,700 vehicles|
|Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Northern Rescue 2015)|August 2015 (Hokkaido)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Northern Army Headquarters Approximately 3,300 personnel, approximately 300 vehicles|
|Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Nankai Rescue 2017)|July 2016 (Central District)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Middle Army 5,500 personnel, approximately 700 vehicles, 10 aircraft|
|RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)|June – August 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, China, ROK, U.K., etc.|2 vessels, 3 aircraft, Western Army, etc.|
||June – August 2016 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)|Japan, U.S., India, Indonesia, ROK, China, Philippines, Malaysia, Australia, Columbia, Chile, etc.|2 vessels, 2 aircraft, Western Army, etc.|
|Japan-Australia-New Zealand Joint Training|August 30, 2014 (Surrounding airspace of Darwin)|Japan, Australia, New Zealand|2 aircraft|
|New Zealand Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Ngatahi)|November 2016 (Waters and airspace around New Zealand)|Japan, New Zealand, etc.|2 aircraft|
|Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)|August 25-September 5, 2014 (New Caledonia)|Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France|4 personnel|
||November 2016 (New Caledonia)|Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France|5 personnel|
|Multilateral Training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Équateur 2015)|September 28-October 7, 2015 (New Caledonia)|Japan, U.S., Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Canada, Chile, U.K., France|7 personnel|
|Japan-France-U.K. Joint Training|May 2015 (Waters west of Kyushu)|Japan, U.S., France|1 vessel, 2 aircraft|
|Japan-France-U.K. Joint Training|May 2017 (Waters west of Kyushu – Guam – Northern Mariana Islands)|Japan, France, U.K., U.S.|220 personnel, 1 vessel, 2 aircraft|
|Pakistani Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Training (Aman-17)|February 2017 (Surrounding airspace of Pakistan)|Japan, Pakistan, etc.|2 aircraft|
|Malaysian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise|March 2017 (Waters around Malaysia)|Japan, Malaysia, U.S., etc.|1 vessel|
|Multilateral Counter-Piracy Joint Training|April 2017 (Gulf of Aden)|Japan, U.S., U.K., ROK|1 vessel, 1 aircraft|


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Reference 53 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)

|Col1|Col2|(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|
|High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015 Aug. 2016 Jan. 2017 Apr. 2017|Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (5th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ 2+2” Meeting: 1) Agreement reached to strongly oppose the use or force of power to change the status quo unilaterally, 2) Confirmed a substantive agreement on the Agreement negotiation regarding the transfer of the defense equipment and technology ✰ Defense Ministerial Meeting: Agreement reached to promote the strengthening of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation such as an expansion of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting) ✰ Issued Joint Statement (signed defense equipment transfer agreement, approved proposals to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, and decided to commence negotiations to create an agreement for facilitating Japan-Australia joint activities and training, etc.) Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Examined possibility of potential cooperation on F-35, examined possibility of submarine cooperation, technical exchanges (e.g., marine hydrodynamics), etc. Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✰ Confirmed the importance of joint exercises and further deepening defense equipment and technology cooperation Visit to Australia by Minister of Defense (6th “2+2” Meeting) ✰ 1) Shared grave concern over large-scale land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and agreed to comply with freedom of navigation and of overflight, 2) Agreed to further enhance joint exercises and promote cooperation in the fields of capacity building assistance, cyber, and outer space Visit to Japan by Prime Minister of Australia (Summit Meeting) ✰ Issued Joint Statement (Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond) Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Agree to further progress in defense cooperation through capacity building support, joint exercises, etc. Visit to Australia by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting) ✰ Sign Japan-Australia ACSA Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Australia (7th “2+2” Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Identified series of new initiatives for further strengthening Japan-Australia defense cooperation|
||Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff (Sep. 2014, Jun. 2015, Sep. 2016), Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff (Nov. 2014, Jan. 2017), Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff (Feb. 2015, Mar. 2016, Feb. 2017), Visit to Australia by Chief of Joint Staff (Aug. 2014)||
||Visit to Japan by Australian Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Aug. 2015), Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army (Apr. 2016), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy (Mar. 2015), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force (Oct. 2014), Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army (Apr. 2016)||
|Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Sep. 2015)||
|Unit-level exchange, etc.|Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF) (Aug. 2014, Oct. 2015, Apr. 2016), Dispatching ASDF aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767) to Australia (Feb. 2015, Mar. 2016, Feb. 2017), Shooting competition organized by the Australian Army (May 2014, Apr. 2015, Apr. 2016)||
||Aug. 2014 Aug. – Sep. 2014 Oct. 2015 Jan. – Feb. 2016 Apr. 2016 May 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Dec. 2016 Dec. 2016|Visit to Hamamatsu and Chitose Air Bases by Royal Australian Air Force aircraft (E-7A) Participation in the Royal Australian Navy hosted multinational joint maritime exercise “Kakadu 14” Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise 2015 Participation in Japan-U.S.-Australia joint cruising exercise Participation in Japan-Australia Trident exercise 2016 Joint exercise with Australian Navy submarines Participation in multinational joint exercise Kakadu 2016 hosted by the Australian Navy Visit to U.S. Yokota Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (KC-30A) and implementation of exchanges between inflight refueling and airlift troops Visit to Chitose Air Base by Australian Air Force aircraft (government plane: B-737) and implementation of exchanges between special airlift troops Participation in Exercise Southern Jackaroo, U.S.-Australia military training exercise hosted by Australia Army|
|Japan – U.S.– Australia trilateral cooperation|Oct. 2014 May. 2015 Feb. 2016 Oct. 2016|Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Joint Statement issued and agreement reached to further deepen the trilateral defense cooperation Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)|
||Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (GSDF) (May 2014, May 2015, Jul. 2015, May 2016, May 2017), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF) (Aug. 2014, Sep. 2014, Feb. 2016), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF) (Feb. 2015, Feb. 2016, Feb. 2017) Japan-U.S.-Australia humanitarian assistance and disaster relief/trilateral disaster relief exercises (Dec. 2015, Dec. 2016)||
||Jul. 2014 Feb. 2015 Jul. 2015 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2017|2nd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force) 3rd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Townsville) (GSDF Chief of Staff) 4th Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))|



Reference 54 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)


(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)

(Jun. 1, 2014–Jun. 30, 2017)

|High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 May 2015 Sep. 2015 Oct. 2015 Oct. 2015 Jan. 2016 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016 Mar. 2016 Apr. 2016 Sep. 2016|Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue)) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Halifax International Security Forum) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue)) Visit to the ROK by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Issued first joint press release. Agreed on the importance of Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation regarding issues of concern for the security of the two countries. Visit to the ROK by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ The two ministers agreed to strengthen the system for emergency communication between the MOD and the ROK Ministry of National Defense. Visit to the ROK by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by ROK Army Chief of Staff Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (ROK (Seoul Defense Dialogue))|
|---|---|---|


-----

|High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Sep. 2016 Mar. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017|Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))|
|---|---|---|
|Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Apr. 2015 Aug. 2015|10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul) 21st Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Seoul)|
|Unit-level exchange, etc.|Oct. 2015 Nov. 2015 May 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Feb. 2017|Japan-ROK joint search and rescue exercise (MSDF), participation of ROK naval vessels in Fleet Review Participation of the ROK Navy Band in Japan Self-Defense Force Marching Festival Participation of MSDF vessels in Pacific Reach (MSDF) hosted by the ROK Visit to the ROK by Western Army Commanding General (GSDF) Visit to the ROK by Sasebo District Commandant (MSDF) Visit to Atsugi Air Base by ROK Navy P-3C (MSDF) Visit to Japan by Commander of the 2nd Operations Command of the ROK (GSDF)|
|Japan – U.S.– ROK trilateral Cooperation|Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015 Jan. 2016 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Dec. 2016 Mar. 2017 Mar. 2017 Apr. 2017 Apr. 2017 May 2017 Jun. 2017|Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The Ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation including North Korea, while agreeing to continue the close Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation. Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Hawaii) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (MSDF) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ The three ministers once again emphasized their resolute position that they do not accept North Korea’s continued possession and development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. They agreed to continue to hold consultations on the security issues facing the three countries and to coordinate among the three countries. Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ The three ministers instructed their working-level officials to study ways of promoting communication and coordination among the trilateral defense authorities. They agreed to conduct the first Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon 2016 (exercise held in June 2016). Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon 2016 Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (maritime interdiction exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Seoul) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (anti-submarine exercise) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Tokyo) Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ The three countries recognized that they face common security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region and reaffirmed the importance of continuing cooperation between the three countries including consultations among their defense authorities.|


Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)


|Col1|Col2|(Jun. 1, 2014-Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|
|High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Mar. 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015 Feb. 2016|Visit to Japan by Prime Minister of India (Summit Meeting) ✰ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and both sides reaffirmed the importance of their bilateral defense relationship and agreed to launch working-level consultations on defense equipment cooperation. Memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. Visit to Japan by Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of India (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries which have shared interests in the maritime security domain, as well as defense cooperation and exchange, etc. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✰ The Japanese side requested cooperation on advancing US-2 cooperation. Both sides confirmed importance of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges. Visit to Japan by Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army Visit to India by Prime Minister of Japan (Summit Meeting) ✰ Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and Agreement concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information were signed. Visit to India by MSDF Chief of Staff|
|High-level talks between heads of defense|Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Dec. 2016 Dec. 2016 Apr. 2017 May 2017|Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Agreement reached to strengthen Japan-India and Japan-U.S.-India cooperation, including regular participation in Exercise Malabar as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation. Visit to India by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) (Delhi) ✰ Agreed to steady implementation of cooperation and exchange projects at each level from high level exchanges to expert-to-expert exchanges. Visit to India by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of the Navy Staff, Indian Navy Visit to India by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of India (Defense Ministerial Meeting)|
|Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Aug. 2014 Mar. 2015 Apr. 2015 Feb. 2016 Mar. 2017|3rd meeting of the US-2 Joint Working Group Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation 3rd Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 4th Defence Policy Dialogue 1st Japan-India Air Component Staff Talks 4th Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, 5th Defence Policy Dialogue|


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Jul. 2014 Exercise Malabar (in waters around Japan)
Oct. 2015 Exercise Malabar (in waters east of India)
Oct. 2015 Participation of Indian naval vessels in Japan Self-Defense Forces Fleet Review
Dec. 2015 Expert-to-expert exchanges in aviation safety (Japan)
Feb. 2016 MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Indian Navy (in waters east of India)
Mar. 2016 Expert-to-expert exchanges between test pilots (India)

Unit-level exchange, etc. Mar. 2016 Unit-to-unit exchanges between U-4 transport aircraft crews (in India)

Mar. 2016 Expert-to-expert exchanges between test pilots (Japan)
Jun. 2016 Exercise Malabar (Sasebo and in waters east of Okinawa)
Jun. 2016 Unit-to-unit exchanges involving Indian Air Force transport aircraft crews in ASDF bases.
Jul. 2016 ASDF KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft dispatched to India.
Dec. 2016 Japan-India goodwill exercise
Mar. 2017 Unit-to-unit exchanges in the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief area (Japan)


Reference 56 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)

|Col1|Col2|(Jun. 1, 2014–Jun. 30, 2016)|
|---|---|---|
|High-level talks between heads of defense|Mar. 2015 May 2015 Nov. 2015 Jun. 2016 Nov. 2016|13th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense deputy ministers) (Tokyo) Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✰ The two sides confirmed that they would swiftly begin operations of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism and on the importance of deepening bilateral defense exchanges Japan-China Defense Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) 14th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense deputy ministers) (Beijing)|
|Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Jan. 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Nov. 2016|4th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo) 5th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing) 6th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Tokyo)|



Reference 57 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)


(Jun. 1, 2014–Jun. 30, 2016)

|Col1|Col2|(Jun. 1, 2014–Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|
|High-level talks between heads of defense|May 2015 Mar. 2017|Japan-Russia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Russia (2nd Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2), Defense Ministerial Meeting)|
|Unit-level exchange, etc.|Oct. 2014 Dec. 2014 Jan. 2017|15th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army 16th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises|


Reference 58 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)


|Col1|Col2|Col3|(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|
|High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|Cambodia|Oct. 2014 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016|Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) Japan-Cambodia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Cambodia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Air Force (AFFJ)|
||Indonesia|Jun. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 May 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Dec. 2015 Dec. 2015|Visit to Indonesia by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Indonesia (Summit Meeting) ✰ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Indonesia by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Indonesia (1st Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Agreement reached to initiate negotiations for an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, and on MSDF’s participation in multilateral exercise KOMODO 2016 Visit to Japan by Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff|
||Indonesia|Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016|Visit to Japan by Indonesian Army Chief of Staff Visit to Indonesia by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Indonesian Army Chief of the General Staff Visit to Indonesia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia Visit to Japan by Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff (AFFJ) Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Joint Staff|
||Laos|Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 Feb. 2016 Apr. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016|Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✰ Concurred that the two countries would continue to coordinate and cooperate with each other through the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief EWG Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Laos (2nd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting)) Visit to Laos by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Laos by Chief of Joint Staff|


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|Malaysia|Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017|Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia Visit to Japan by Chief of Navy of Malaysian Navy Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))|
|---|---|---|
|Myanmar|Jul. 2014 Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jul. 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Apr. 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016|Visit to Myanmar by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services of Myanmar Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by Minister of Defense (1st ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting) Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force Visit to Japan by Deputy Commander-in-chief of Defence Services of Myanmar and the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Secretary of National Defense Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force (AFFJ)|
|Philippines|Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 Mar. 2015 May 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 May 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Feb. 2017 Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017 Apr. 2017 May 2017|Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to Japan by Philippine Secretary of National Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Army Visit to Japan by President and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) ✰ Concurred that the two countries would enhance capacity building assistance and deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFFJ) Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff|
|Singapore|Oct. 2014 May 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 May 2015 Jun. 2017 Jul. 2017|Visit to Japan by Chief of Air Force of the Republic of Singapore Air Force Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Singapore by Chief of Joint Staff (14th Shangri-La Dialogue) Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))|
|Thailand|Nov. 2014 Jul. 2015 Jul. 2015 Feb. 2016 Mar. 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Aug. 2016 Nov. 2016 Mar. 2017 May 2017|Visit to Japan by Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Thailand by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Army Commander Visit to Thailand by Minister of Defense (Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander|
|Vietnam|Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Feb. 2015 May 2015 Sep. 2015 Oct. 2015 Nov. 2015 Jul. 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jun. 2017|Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Commander of Air Defense and Air Force Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People’s Navy Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense (Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff (Pacific Partnership) Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence|


Jun. 2014 Visit to Malaysia by MSDF Chief of Staff
May 2015 Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2015 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Nov. 2015 Visit to Japan by Chief of Defence Force, Malaysian Armed Forces
Nov. 2015 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))

Malaysia Nov. 2015 Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Aug. 2016 Visit to Malaysia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Malaysia
Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Chief of Navy of Malaysian Navy
Jun. 2017 Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))

Jul. 2014 Visit to Myanmar by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
Sep. 2014 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services of Myanmar
Oct. 2014 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence
Nov. 2014 Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Nov. 2014 Visit to Myanmar by Minister of Defense (1st ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting)
Jul. 2015 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force

Myanmar Aug. 2015 Visit to Japan by Deputy Commander-in-chief of Defence Services of Myanmar and the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army

Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence
Apr. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Jul. 2016 Visit to Myanmar by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Secretary of National Defense
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Myanmarese Deputy Minister of Defence
Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force (AFFJ)

Sep. 2014 Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff
Oct. 2014 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense
Jan. 2015 Visit to Japan by Philippine Secretary of National Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting)
✰ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges
Feb. 2015 Visit to the Philippines by MSDF Chief of Staff
Mar. 2015 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Mar. 2015 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force
May 2015 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff
May 2015 Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2015 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Army
Jun. 2015 Visit to Japan by President and Philippine Secretary of National Defense
Aug. 2015 Visit to the Philippines by Chief of Joint Staff

Philippines Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense

Sep. 2015 Visit to the Philippines by GSDF Chief of Staff
Nov. 2015 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus))
✰ Concurred that the two countries would enhance capacity building assistance and deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation
May 2016 Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference
Aug. 2016 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense
Oct. 2016 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Air Force (AFFJ)
Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Commanding General of the Philippine Navy
Feb. 2017 Visit to Japan by Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense
Mar. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense
Apr. 2017 Visit to the Philippines by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2017 Visit to the Philippines by ASDF Chief of Staff

Oct. 2014 Visit to Japan by Chief of Air Force of the Republic of Singapore Air Force
May 2015 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2015 Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))
May 2015 Visit to Singapore by Chief of Joint Staff (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)
Jul. 2015 Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Singapore Feb. 2016 Visit to Singapore by ASDF Chief of Staff

Jun. 2016 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jul. 2016 Visit to Singapore by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2015 Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff
Jun. 2017 Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jul. 2017 Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))

Nov. 2014 Visit to Japan by Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence
Jul. 2015 Visit to Japan by Thai Chief of Defence Forces
Jul. 2015 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Feb. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Chief of Joint Staff
Mar. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs

Thailand May 2016 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Army Commander

Jun. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Minister of Defense (Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Aug. 2016 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Nov. 2016 Visit to Thailand by ASDF Chief of Staff
Mar. 2017 Visit to Thailand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
May 2017 Visit to Japan by Royal Thai Air Force Commander

Jun. 2014 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue))
Jul. 2014 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
Oct. 2014 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Commander of Air Defense and Air Force
Feb. 2015 Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Feb. 2015 Visit to Japan by Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People’s Navy
May 2015 Visit to Vietnam by ASDF Chief of Staff
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence

Vietnam

Oct. 2015 Visit to Japan by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army
Nov. 2015 Visit to Vietnam by Minister of Defense (Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting)
Jul. 2016 Visit to Vietnam by Chief of Joint Staff (Pacific Partnership)
Aug. 2016 Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs
Sep. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
Nov. 2016 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence
Jun. 2017 Visit to Japan by Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence

Nov. 2014 Visit to Brunei by Chief of Joint Staff
Sep. 2015 Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei

Brunei Feb 2016 Visit to Brunei by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs


-----

|Col1|Cambodia|Sep. 2014|3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 4th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Tokyo)|
|---|---|---|---|
||Indonesia|Nov. 2014 Oct. 2016|6th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 7th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)|
||Philippines|Mar. 2015 Feb. 2017|Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Manila) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)|
||Singapore|Dec. 2014 Apr. 2017|14th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Singapore) 15th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)|
||Thailand|Mar. 2015 Aug. 2016|12th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 12th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 13th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 13th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Thailand)|
||Vietnam|Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Dec. 2015 Nov. 2016|5th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Hanoi) 6th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Tokyo)|
||Myanmar|Mar. 2017|2nd Japan-Myanmar-Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)|
|Unit-level exchange, etc.|Southeast Asian Member States and Multilateral Exchanges etc.|Aug. 2014 Feb. 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Jul. 2015 Aug. 2015 Dec. 2015 Jan. – Feb. 2016 Feb. 2016 Mar. 2016 Apr. 2016 May 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Dec. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017 Mar. – Apr. 2017 May 2017 May 2017|GPOI Capstone exercise (Indonesia) Participation in Cobra Gold 15 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Participation in 4th ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx2015) hosted by Malaysia and China (Malaysia) Participation in Japan-Philippines joint exercise (coast of Manila) Participation in Japan-Philippines joint exercise (coast of Palawan) Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Ho Chi Minh) (ASDF) Participation in Pacific Partnership 2015 (Philippines) GPOI Capstone exercise (Malaysia) Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise (Singapore, Indonesia) Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Ho Chi Minh) (ASDF) Participation in Cobra Gold 16 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Participation in Japan-Vietnam goodwill exercise (Vietnam) (MSDF) Japan-Laos unit-to-unit exchanges (Vientiane) (ASDF) Japan-Myanmar unit-to-unit exchanges (Mingaladon) (ASDF) Multilateral joint exercise Komodo hosted by the Indonesian Navy (Indonesia) ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Exercise (Brunei, etc.) Japan-Philippines unit-to-unit exchanges (Clark) (ASDF) ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Exercise (Thailand) Japan-Vietnam unit-to-unit exchanges (Da Nang) (ASDF) Japan-Laos unit-to-unit exchanges (Vientiane) (ASDF) Japan-Indonesia unit-to-unit exchanges (Halim) (ASDF) Japan-Thailand unit-to-unit exchanges (Chiang Mai) (ASDF) Japan-Malaysia unit-to-unit exchanges (Subang) (ASDF) Participation in Cobra Gold 17 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) GPOI Capstone exercise (Nepal) MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Singapore Navy (Singapore) (MSDF) Participation in U.S.-Philippines joint naval exercise Balikatan 2017 (Philippines)|


Reference 59 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years)


|Col1|Col2|Col3|(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|
|High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|Timor-Leste|Mar. 2015 Jun. 2016|Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Timor-Leste)|
||Mongolia|Jun. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Oct. 2015 Oct. 2015 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016|Visit to Mongolia by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Vice Minister of Defense of Mongolia (19th Tokyo Defense Forum) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Mongolia by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Chief of the General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Mongolia by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Mongolia by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Mongolia Air Force Commander|
||New Zealand|Jun. 2014 Aug. 2014 Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 Jun. 2016 Feb. 2017 May. 2017 Jun. 2017|Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of Army of the New Zealand Defence Force Visit to New Zealand by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by New Zealand Secretary of Defence Visit to Japan by New Zealand Air Force Commander Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM-Plus)) Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to New Zealand by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue))|
||Sri Lanka|Jun. 2014 Dec. 2016|Visit to Sri Lanka by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Sri Lanka by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense|
||Maldives|Dec. 2016|Visit to the Maldives by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense|
|Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|New Zealand|Sep. 2014 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2017|8th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Auckland) 9th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo) 10th Japan-New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Wellington)|
||Pakistan|Nov. 2014 Aug. 2016|7th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 8th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Islamabad)|
||Mongolia|Dec. 2014 Jan. 2016|2nd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 2nd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities (Ulan Bator) 3rd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 3rd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and security authorities (Tokyo)|


-----

|New Zealand|Oct. 2016 Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 Feb. 2017 Jun. 2017|Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H) Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy Multilateral joint exercise hosted by New Zealand Navy Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise|
|---|---|---|
|Pakistan|Mar. 2015 Feb. 2016 Jan. 2017 May 2017|Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise Japan-Pakistan goodwill exercise Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)|
|Sri Lanka|Apr. 2015 Nov. 2015 Mar. 2016 May 2016 Jul. 2016 Dec. 2016 Apr. 2017|Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise|
|Maldives|Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015|Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise|
|Philippines|Sep. 2016 Jan. 2017 May 2017|Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise|
|Malaysia|Aug. 2015 Apr. 2016 May 2017|Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise|
|Brunei|May 2017|Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise|


Aug.2014 Japan-Australia-New Zealand joint exercise
Nov. 2015 PSI Exercise
Oct. 2016 Visit to Komaki Air Base by New Zealand Air Force aircraft (C-130H)

New Zealand Nov. 2016 Participation in international naval review hosted by New Zealand Navy

Nov. 2016 Multilateral joint exercise hosted by New Zealand Navy
Feb. 2017 Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to New Zealand
Jun. 2017 Japan-New Zealand goodwill exercise

Mar. 2015 Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise
Feb. 2016 Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise

Pakistan

Jan. 2017 Japan-Pakistan goodwill exercise
May 2017 Visit to ASDF units, etc. by Pakistan Air Force (Ichigaya, Hamamatsu)

Apr. 2015 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Nov. 2015 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Mar. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise

Sri Lanka May 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise

Jul. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Dec. 2016 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise
Apr. 2017 Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise

Aug. 2014 Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise
Maldives
Apr. 2015 Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise

Sep. 2016 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise
Philippines Jan. 2017 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise
May 2017 Japan-Philippines goodwill exercise

Aug. 2015 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise
Malaysia Apr. 2016 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise
May 2017 Japan-Malaysia goodwill exercise

Brunei May 2017 Japan-Brunei goodwill exercise


Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (Past Three Years)


|Col1|Col2|Col3|(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|
|High-level exchanges between heads of state and defense|United Kingdom|Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Sep. 2015 Jan. 2016 Jun. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Apr. 2017|Visit to the U.K. by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the Air Staff Visit to the U.K. by Minister of Defense (1st Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Confirmed the progress of defense equipment and technology cooperation, and exchanged opinions regarding strengthening cooperation on global security issues, regional situations, etc. Visit to the U.K. by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by U.K. Secretary of State for Defence (2nd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Confirmed the two countries would strengthen cooperation on defense equipment and technology, joint exercises, capacity building assistance for Southeast Asia, ACSA, etc. Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to the U.K. by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of the Air Staff Visit to Japan by U.K. Minister of State for Defence|
||France|Jun. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Mar. 2015 Jan. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jun. 2017 Jun. 2017|Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense Visit to France by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of France (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of France (2nd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Signed defense equipment and technology transfer agreement, and exchanged opinions regarding Japan-France security and defense cooperation, security policies, regional situations, etc. Visit to France by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense Visit to France by Minister of Defense (3rd Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Agreed to begin negotiations on ACSA, and affirmed that the two countries would promote the materialization of the first cooperation program in the equipment and technology field as well as joint training Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (16th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by State Minister of Defense|
||Germany|May 2015 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2016 Sep. 2016 Sep. 2016 Feb. 2017|Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Germany by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference) Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense Visit to German by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Germany by State Minister of Defense (Munich Security Conference)|
||Italy|Feb. 2015 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016 May 2017|Visit to Italy by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Italy by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Italy (Defense Ministerial Meeting)|
||Spain|Aug. 2014 Nov. 2014|Visit to Spain by State Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Spain (Defense Ministerial Meeting)|
||Belgium|Feb. 2015|Visit to Belgium by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense|
||Netherlands|Oct. 2015 Dec. 2016|Visit to Japan by Netherlands Chief of Defence Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Netherlands (Defense Ministerial Meeting)|
||Sweden|Mar. 2015 Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017|Visit to Japan by Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces Visit to Sweden by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Sweden by Chief of Joint Staff|
||Finland|Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 Feb. 2017 Mar. 2017|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Finland (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Finland by Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland Visit to Finland by Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by Finland Air Force Commander|
||Estonia|May 2015|Visit to Estonia by State Minister of Defense|


-----

|Col1|Bulgaria|May 2015|Visit to Bulgaria by State Minister of Defense|
|---|---|---|---|
||Latvia|May 2015|Visit to Japan by State Secretary of Defence of Latvia|
||Poland|Jun. 2015|Visit to Japan by Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Poland|
||Georgia|Nov. 2015|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Georgia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and signed a memorandum on defense exchanges|
||Czech Republic|Dec. 2015|Visit to Japan by Minister of Defence of Czech Republic (Japan- Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges|
||NATO|Jun. 2016 Jan. 2017|Visit to Japan by Chairman of the NATO Military Committee Visit to NATO by Minister of Defense (talks with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg)|
|Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|United Kingdom|Sep. 2015 Oct. 2016|14th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 15th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 11th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London)|
||France|Nov. 2014 Sep. 2015 Jul. 2016|17th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 16th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 18th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tokyo) 19th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 17th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Paris)|
||Germany|Oct. 2014 Jun. 2016|14th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 15th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 13th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Berlin)|
||Italy|Dec. 2015|3rd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)|
||Spain|Oct. 2016|1st Japan-Spain Consultation between defense authorities (Madrid)|
||Poland|Sep. 2014 Mar. 2016|1st Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Warsaw)|
||Sweden|Oct. 2015|3rd Japan-Sweden Consultation between defense authorities (Stockholm)|
||Finland|Oct. 2015|1st Japan-Finland Consultation between defense authorities (Helsinki)|
||Norway|Nov. 2014|2nd Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)|
||NATO|Feb. 2016 May 2017|14th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo) 15th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo)|
||EU|Nov. 2016|1st Japan-EU Security and Defense Meeting (Belgium)|
|Unit-level exchange, etc.|NATO|Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014|Japan-NATO bilateral exercise Japan-NATO bilateral exercise|
||EU|Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 Mar. 2015 Jan. 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016 Jul. 2016 Sep. 2016 Nov. 2016 Jan. 2017|Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise (twice) Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise|
||United Kingdom|Jul. 2014 Jul. 2015 Apr. 2016 Jul. 2016 Jul.-Aug. 2016 Oct.-Nov. 2016 Nov. 2016 May 2017|Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to the U.K. Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise Dispatch of ASDF’s KC-767 aerial refueling and transport aircraft to the U.K. Port call in London by MSDF training squadron Japan-U.K. bilateral exercise Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. multilateral exercise|
||France|May 2015 Mar. 2016 May 2016 May 2017 Jun. 2017|Japan-U.S.-France trilateral exercise Japan-France goodwill exercise Japan-France goodwill exercise Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. multilateral exercise Dispatch of MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft to France (participation in International Paris Air Show)|


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Reference 61 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)


|Col1|Col2|Col3|(Jun. 1, 2014 – Jun. 30, 2017)|
|---|---|---|---|
|High-level exchanges between heads of defense and others|Turkey|May 2015 May 2016 Jun. 2016|Visit to Japan by Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Visit to Turkey by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Turkey by MSDF Chief of Staff|
||Canada|Nov. 2014 Oct. 2015 Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Jun. 2016|Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Canada (Halifax International Security Forum)) Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force Visit to Japan by Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Canada (3rd Japan-Canada Foreign and Defense Vice-Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)) Visit to Japan by Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))|
||Brazil|Aug. 2014 Feb. 2016|Visit to Brazil by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Brazil by GSDF Chief of Staff|
||Colombia|Mar. 2015|Visit to Japan by Defense Minister of Colombia (Defense Ministerial Meeting)|
||Middle East/ Africa|Aug. 2014 Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jan. 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015 May 2016 Aug. 2016 Sep. 2016 Oct. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2017 Feb. 2017 Feb. 2017|Visit to South Africa by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Chief of Djibouti Navy Visit to Djibouti and South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Bahrain by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Jordan by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Turkey by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Egypt by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by UAE Air Force Commander Visit to Djibouti by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to Japan by Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to South Sudan by Minister of Defense (Defense Ministerial Meeting) Visit to South Sudan by State Minister of Defense Visit to Saudi Arabia by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Qatar by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Oman by Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff of Jordan|
|Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Canada|Jun. 2014 Dec.2016|8th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)|
||Turkey|Jan. 2015|2nd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)|
||Jordan|Apr. 2015|1st Japan-Jordan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)|
||Saudi Arabia|Jun. 2015 Nov. 2016|1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Security Dialogue (Riyadh), 2nd Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities|
||Egypt|Oct. 2015|1st Japan-Egypt Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, Japan-Egypt Consultation between defense authorities|
||Kuwait|Mar. 2016|1st Japan-Kuwait Security Dialogue (Tokyo)|
||UAE|Dec. 2015|1st Japan-UAE Security Dialogue (Abu Dhabi)|
||Qatar|Jun. 2014 Nov. 2015|1st Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-Qatar Security Dialogue (Doha)|
||Bahrain|Dec. 2015 Dec. 2016|2nd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Manama) 3rd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Tokyo)|
|Unit-level exchange, etc.|Turkey|Nov. 2014 Jun. 2015 Dec. 2015 Jun. 2016|Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise Japan-Turkey goodwill exercise Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise|
||UAE|Jan. 2017 Apr. 2017|Japan-UAE unit-to-unit exchanges (Al Ain) (ASDF) Japan-UAE goodwill exercise|
||Saudi Arabia|Apr. 2017|Japan-Saudi Arabia goodwill exercise|


(3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 3 years
**4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy**
(1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of
piracy.
(2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions
of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties.
In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently
conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to
attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no
other means, maritime safety officials may use weapons to the extent that is
found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
**5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy**
(1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of
Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime
Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create
a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the
outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency).
(2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against
pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters.
(3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and
when the action against pirates was concluded.
(4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of
the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply
mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel.


Reference 62 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and
Response to Acts of Piracy

**1. Purpose of the Legislation**
To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective
response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea,
in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the
economy of Japan and the people’s lives.
**2. Definition of Acts of Piracy**
Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are
aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on
high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan’s territorial
waters, etc.:
(1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a
vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5)
for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive
access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons
**3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy**
A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows:
(1) 2 (1) – (4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not
less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less
than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life
imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death.
(2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than
5 years


-----

Reference 63 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

|Item|International Peace Support Act|International Peace Cooperation Act|Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)|Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Purpose|❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community|❍ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts towards international peace|❍ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq|❍ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan|
|Provisions in the SDF Law|❍ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|❍ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law|❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law|
|Major Activities|❍ Cooperation and support activities1 ❍ Search and rescue activities1 ❍ Ship inspection operations3|❍ International peacekeeping activities ❍ Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security ❍ International humanitarian assistance ❍ International election monitoring activities ❍ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities|❍ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ❍ Support activities for ensuring security|❍ Replenishment support activities|
|Areas of Operation|❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. ❍ High seas and the airspace above|❍ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)|❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq)2 ❍ High seas and the airspace above2|❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required)2 ❍ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above2|
|Diet Approval|❍ Prior approval required without exception|❍ To be discussed in advance in the Diet in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety-ensuring operations4|❍ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures4|(Note 5)|
|Diet Report|❍ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|❍ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay|❍ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|❍ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay|



Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place.
2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented.
3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries.
4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.
5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered
necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval.


Reference 64 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

**(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq** (As of June 30, 2017)

|Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|GSDF|Southeast Iraq, etc.|Jan. 2004 – Jul. 2006|Approx. 600|• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.|
||Kuwait, etc.|Jun.– Sep. 2006|Approx. 100|• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others|
|MSDF|Persian Gulf, etc.|Feb. 20 – Apr. 8, 2004|Approx. 330|• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF’s activities|
|ASDF|Kuwait, etc.|Dec. 2003 – Feb. 2009|Approx. 210|• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance|



**(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law**

|Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|MSDF|Indian Ocean|Nov. 2001– Nov. 2007|Approx. 320|• Materials supplies for foreign vessels|
|ASDF|U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.||−|• Transportation of materials|


**(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law**

|Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|MSDF|Indian Ocean|Jan. 2008 – Feb. 2010|Approx. 330|• Materials supplies for foreign vessels|



**(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)**

|Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|MSDF (Maritime Force)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden|Mar. 2009 – Dec. 2016|Approx. 400|Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.|
|||Dec. 2016 –|Approx. 200|Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.|
|MSDF (Air Unit)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|May 2009 – Jul. 2014|Approx. 120|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.|
||Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Jul. 2014 – Jul. 2015|Approx. 70|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.|
||Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Jul. 2015 –|Approx. 60|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.|
|MSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul. 2014 –|Approx. 30|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.|
|MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)|Bahrain, etc.|Aug. 2014 –|Under 20|Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151|


Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of
MSDF
Djibouti Jul. 2012 – Jul. 2014 3 Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct
(Local Coordination Center)


-----

|GSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul. 2014 –|Approx. 80|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.|
|---|---|---|---|---|


GSDF (Air Unit) Djibouti May. 2009 – Jul. 2014 Approx. 70 Security of activity base and P-3C


**(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities**

|Col1|Col2|Col3|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|PKO|United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)|Ceasefire monitors|Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993|8|16|• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border|
|||Engineer unit|Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993|600|1,200|• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities|
|PKO|United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)|Headquarters staff|May 1993 – Jan. 1995|5|10|• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters|
|||Transport coordination unit|May 1993 – Jan. 1995|48|144|• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport|
|Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees|Rwandan refugee relief unit|Sep.– Dec. 1994|260||• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies|
|||Air transport unit|Sep.– Dec. 1994|188||• Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations|
|PKO|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 1996 – Feb. 2009|1st-3th personnel:  2|38|• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters|
||||Feb. 2009 – Jan. 2013|14th-17th personnel:  3|||
|||Transport unit|Feb. 1996 – Aug. 2012|1st-33rd personnel:  43|1,463|• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance|
||||Aug. 2012 – Jan. 2013|34th personnel:  44|||
|Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste|Air transport unit|Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000|113||• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel|
|Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees|Air transport unit|Jan. 2001|138||• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR|
|PKO|United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor- Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor- Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004|1st rotation: 10 2nd rotation: 7|17|• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters|
|||Engineer unit|Mar. 2002 – Jun. 2004|1st and 2nd rotation:  680 3rd rotation:  522 4th rotation:  405|2,287|• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance • Public welfare support operations|
|Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees|Air transport unit|Mar. – Apr. 2003|50||• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR|
|Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims|Air transport unit|Jul. – Aug. 2003|98||• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims|
|PKO|United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)|Arms monitors|Mar. 2007– Jan. 2011|6|24|• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force|
|PKO|United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)|Headquarters staff|Oct. 2008– Sep. 2011|2|12|• Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector • Database management|
|PKO|United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013|2|12|• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items|
|||Engineer unit|Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013|1st rotation:  203 2nd rotation:  346 3rd and 4th rotation:  330 5th and 6th rotation:  317 7th rotation:  297 Withdrawal support unit:  44|2,184|• Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.|
|PKO|United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)|Military liaison officer|Sep. 2010 – Sep. 2012|2|8|• Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste|
|PKO|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Headquarters staff|Nov. 2011 –|4|29|• Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics • Management of database • Planning and coordination of engineering duties • Planning and coordination of aircraft operation supports|
|||Engineer Unit|Jan. 2012 – May 2017|1st rotation:  239 2nd – 4th rotation:  349 5th and 6th rotation:  401 7th – 10th rotation:  353 11th rotation:  354 Withdrawal support unit:  58 (Number of personnel for 1st to 4th rotations includes personnel at the local support coordination center)|3,912|• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) • Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics|
|||Local support coordination center|Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2013|1st rotation: approx. 30 2nd – 4th rotation:  approx. 20|approx. 90|• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics|



Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia,
Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).

2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.


-----

|(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|||Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks|
|International disaster relief activities in Philippines (typhoon disaster)|Local operations coordination center|Nov. 12 – Dec. 13, 2013|1,086|• Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others|
||Medical assistance unit/Air support unit|||• Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid materials|
||Maritime dispatched unit|||• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.|
||Airlift unit|||• Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.|
|International disaster relief activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (search)|Local support coordination center|Mar. 11– Apr. 28, 2014|137|• Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and relevant countries|
||MSDF Patrol aircraft unit|||• Rescue operations including searching|
||ASDF Airlift unit|||• Rescue operations including searching|
|International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)|Local coordination center|Dec. 5 – 11, 2014|4|• Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities|
||Air transport unit||10|• Transport activities|
||Epidemiological study support|Apr. 21 – May 29, 2015|1|• Support for WHO’s epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone|
|International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)|Local support coordination center|Jan. 3 – 9, 2015|3|• Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries|
||International disaster relief surface force||Approx. 350|• Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501|
|International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)|Joint operations coordination center|Apr. 27 – May 22, 2015|4|• Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries|
||Medical support unit||Approx. 110|• Medical treatment for affected people|
||Air transport unit||Approx. 30|• Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment|
|International disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)|Air patrol unit|Nov. 15 – 18, 2016|Approx. 30|• Evaluation of damages by aircraft (one P-1 aircraft)|


Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.
2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.


Reference 65 Background Related to South Sudan

|2005|January: The Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army signed North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) March: The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) established with mission of supporting CPA implementation, etc.|
|---|---|
|2008|October: Began dispatching (logistics staff and information staff) to UNMIS|
|2011|July: UNMIS mission completed with South Sudan independence. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is newly established with the purpose of establishing peace and security and supporting nation building in South Sudan November: Cabinet decision to dispatch staff officers (logistics staff and information staff) to UNMISS December: Cabinet decision to dispatch engineering unit, etc. and staff officers (engineering staff) to UNMISS|
|2012|January-March: Engineering unit, etc. (First rotation Unit) dispatched to South Sudan’s capital Juba May-June: Engineering corps, etc. (Second rotation Unit) dispatched (unit replaced approximately every six months thereafter)|
|2013|May: Government of Japan announced expansion of geographical areas of activities for engineering corps December: Clashes in Juba between President’s supporters and anti-government forces December: Transfer of 10,000 bullets to UN in response to request from UN etc. (returned the following year)|
|2014|May: UNMISS mandate renewed (from nation building to focus on protecting civilians) May: Then Minister of Defense Onodera visits South Sudan October: Cabinet decision to dispatch staff officers (air transport staff) to UNMISS|
|2015|January: Then Minister of Defense Nakatani visits South Sudan August: Government and anti-government forces sign the agreement concerning the resolution of conflicts|
|2016|April: Southern Sudan Provisional Government is established July: Clashes in Juba between government and anti-government forces August: UNMISS mandate renewed (establishment of regional protection force) October: Minister of Defense Inada visits South Sudan November: New tasks such as the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” conferred on engineering unit|
|2017|March: Announcement that engineering unit would be withdrawn by the end of May (dispatch of staff officers will be continued) May: Engineering unit’s activities ended. Unit disbanded after the Return of Colors ceremony.|



Reference 66 Japan’s Basic Thinking Regarding the Termination of
Operations of the Engineering Unit of the Self Defense
Force in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS) (Provisional Translation)

March 10, 2017
Cabinet Secretariat
Cabinet Office
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defense
1. Since January 2012, the Government of Japan has dispatched the engineering
units of the Self Defense Force (SDF) to the United Nations Mission in South
Sudan (UNMISS), which was established to support the nation-building of the
Republic of South Sudan, the newest country in the world. Since the engineering
unit was dispatched, five years have passed with the total number of personnel
reaching approximately 4,000, making it the longest deployment. (Before
UNMISS, the longest deployment of engineering units was to the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which lasted for 2 years and 11
months.)
2. Throughout its deployment, the SDF engineering unit has steadily implemented
its mission amidst a severe environment in line with its initial purpose of


contributing to the nation-building of newly-independent South Sudan.

The SDF engineering unit’s achievements, including road repair for improving
the livelihood of local residents and construction of facilities for internally
displaced people in South Sudan, are the largest among previous deployments to
UN Peacekeeping Operations,.

The SDF engineering unit’s major activities demonstrate the scale of its
achievements, larger than any past deployment of Japan to UN PKOs—for
instance, approximately 210 km of road repairs and 500 thousand square meters
of land development.
3. Such dedication by the SDF engineering unit has been appreciated and highly
praised by the United Nations as well as by South Sudan. His Excellency Salva
Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, has commended Japan
in particular, in his address on the occasion of the opening of the Transitional
National Legislature of the Transitional Government of National Unity, that he
would like to “personally thank and appreciate the Japanese Government and
people for their continued support to the government and the people of South
Sudan,” through Japan’s development programs.
4. As the deployment of the SDF engineering unit to UNMISS has marked a
milestone of five years in January 2017, making it the longest deployment of an
engineering unit, the Government of Japan has been reviewing a possible way
f d i h i


-----

5. As the period of dispatch of the SDF to UNMISS authorized by a cabinet decision
is to expire at the end of March 2017, the Government of Japan has summarized
the result of the review as follows.
(1) The nation-building process of South Sudan is entering a new stage with the
efforts of the international community, as illustrated below:
-  Last year, the UN established a Regional Protection Force (RPF) responsible
for providing a secure environment in and around Juba, and decided to
increase the force level of UNMISS. Although the prospect for an early
dispatch of the RPF had been uncertain, the deployment process has started,
advancing efforts for stability in South Sudan.
-  In addition, in South Sudan, promoting reconciliation among different ethnic
groups and advancing the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in
South Sudan is imperative. Towards this end, the Government of South Sudan
decided last year to initiate the process of national dialogue, and recently has
announced to start it in March. This illustrates the progress in the political
process towards stability in the country.
(2) On the other hand, as mentioned above, the SDF has contributed to UNMISS
more than to any other past PKO activity. This is demonstrated by the more
than five years of activities of the engineering unit—the longest deployment
for an engineering unit—and their many activities including to improve roads
in Juba, the capital. In light of these activities, Japan considers that it can
move on to a new phase regarding engineering activities in Juba.
6. Considering the above-mentioned issues in a comprehensive manner, Japan
has come to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to shift the focus of its
assistance from engineering activities by the SDF to support for self-reliance of
the government of South Sudan.
7. Specifically, the SDF engineering unit will withdraw from Juba around the end
of May after the current 11th rotation of the SDF engineering unit completes
its current task of road repair . Japan has decided that it would be appropriate
to proactively contribute to a new phase of the nation-building of South Sudan
through continuing and expanding the following activities:
-  Support for the progress in the political process in South Sudan such as
assistance for monitoring the implementation of the Agreement on the
Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan through the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD).
-  Support for the national dialogue including assistance for various domestic
groups in South Sudan such as religious and youth groups to enable their
participation.
-  Human resources development such as capacity building of public financial
management abilities for government officials and enhancement of police
capabilities.
-  Humanitarian assistance including food assistance.
8. The end of the SDF engineering unit’s activities do not mean the end of Japan’s
assistance for South Sudan. Japan will continue to contribute to peace, stability


and the nation-building of South Sudan in various ways.
9. Furthermore, Japan will continue to contribute to the activities of UNMISS
through dispatching staff officers to its headquarters. Japan will also ensure
smooth coordination in ending the activities of its engineering unit, such as by
transferring the unit’s heavy machinery to UNMISS.

Besides Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, Bangladesh, and China have been
engaged in engineering activities in South Sudan. In addition, the UK has also
started deployment of its engineering unit. Japan will continue to make possible
contribution to their activities through close coordination with these countries at
UNMISS headquarters.
10. Regarding the conclusion to terminate the SDF engineering unit’s activities,
Japan has already explained its conclusion to the UN, the Government of South
Sudan, and countries concerned. In response, Mr. Salva Kiir, President of South
Sudan, Mr. Herve Ladsous, the Under-Secretary General for the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, and Mr. David Shearer, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for UNMISS stated that they highly valued and appreciated the
SDF for their dedicated activities and that they respect the conclusion made by the
Government of Japan.
11. Under the banner of the Proactive Contribution to Peace, building on the past
experiences of peacekeeping operations and making use of its own strengths,
Japan will continue to contribute proactively in the field of international peace
cooperation such as through enhancing capacity building and dispatching units
and personnel.
Reference 1: Comparison of Japan’s engineering activities between past UN
peacekeeping missions and under UNMISS.
-  Period: approximately 5 years and 2 months (about 5 times of UNTAC in
Cambodia)
-  Number of personnel: 3,854 (about 1.7 times of UNTAET and UNMISET in East
Timor)
-  Major engineering activities:
-  Road repairs: about 210 kilometers (double of UNTAC work)
-  Land development: about 500,000 square meters (about 4 times of MINUSTAH
work)
-  Building facilities: 94 locations (about 4 times of MINUSTAH work)
Reference 2: In his speech to the Transitional National Legislature of the Transitional
Government of National Unity on February 21, President Salva Kiir stated, “I want to
take this opportunity to personally thank and appreciate the Japanese Prime Minister,
Shinzo Abe, and the Japanese government and people for their continued support
to the government and the people of South Sudan through developmental programs
and in the Security Council. I am also grateful to the Japanese Ambassador to South
Sudan, Mr. Kiya Masahiko for his exemplary diplomatic engagement efforts, which
have strengthened bilateral relations between our countries.


Reference 67 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations



**(1) Dispatch of Personnel to United Nations Agencies**


(As of June 30, 2017)

|Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel|
|---|---|---|
|Jun. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 – Jul. 31, 2007|Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)1|
|Jun. 23, 1997 – Jun. 23, 2000|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)|
|Oct. 1, 2002 – Jun. 30, 2007|Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)|
|Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 11, 2009|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)|
|Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)|
|Aug. 27, 2013 – Aug. 31, 2016|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)|
|Dec. 2, 2002 – Jun. 1, 2005|Military Planning Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008|Military Planning Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|Jan. 16, 2011 – Jan. 15, 2014|Military Planning Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|Sep. 18, 2013 – Sep. 17, 2016|Force Generation Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|Jun. 1, 2015 –|Senior Military Liaison Officer, Africa I Division, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)|
|Aug. 29, 2016 –|Military Planning Service, Office of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|Feb. 11, 2017 –|Strategic Support Service, Logistics Support Division, Department of Field Support, United Nations (New York)|1 administrative official|


Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007.

**(2) Dispatch of Instructors and Others to PKO Centers, etc.**

|Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel|
|---|---|---|
|November 21 – 30, 2008|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|May 22 – June 6, 2009|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)|
|August 28 – September 5, 2009|Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|April 10 – 17, 2010|Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) (Egypt)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)Note|
|August 14 – 30, 2010|Peacekeeping School in Bamako (Mali)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)|
|November 15 – 20, 2011|Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)|
|July 31 – August 5, 2012|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)l|


-----

|Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel|
|---|---|---|
|March 9 – 14, 2013|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)|
|August 28 – September 1, 2013|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|October 5 – 9, 2013|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)|
|March 8 – 13, 2014|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)|
|March 23 – May 25, 2014|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|August 12, 2014|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya) (dispatched to give lecture in South Sudan)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|October 5 – 9, 2014|International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) (Kenya)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)|
|October 6 – 23, 2014|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|March 19 – April 1, 2015|UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)|
|June 4 – July 1, 2015|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|September 5 – 20, 2015|South African National Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC) (South Africa)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)|
|October 22 – November 7, 2015|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|March 21 – April 1, 2016|UN Peacekeeping Centre (India)|1 MSDF personnel (Captain)|
|May 31 – June 17, 2016|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|November 4 – 19, 2016|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|March 6 – 19, 2017|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|
|June 2 – 18, 2017|Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) (Ethiopia)|2 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)|


Note: First dispatch of female SDF personnel.


Reference 68 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel

****

|Category|GSDF|Col3|MSDF|Col5|ASDF|Col7|Joint Staff etc.|Col9|Total|Col11|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Authorized|150,863||45,364||46,940||3,987||247,154||
|Actual|135,713||42,136||42,939||3,634||224,422||
|Staffing Rate (%)|90.0||92.9||91.5||91.1||90.8||
||||||||||||
|Category|Non-Fixed-Term Personnel||||||||Fixed-Term Personnel||
||Officer||Warrant Officer||Enlisted (upper)||Enlisted (lower)||||
|Authorized|45,524||4,940||140,005||56,685||||
|Actual|42,444|(2,150)|4,632|(45)|137,951|(7,901)|16,402|(1,244)|22,993|(2,367)|
|Staffing Rate (%)|93.2||93.8||98.5||69.5||||



Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget.


(As of March 31, 2017)


|Reference 69 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed|Col2|Col3|SDF Personnel (FY2016)|Col5|Col6|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Classification|||Number Applied|Number Recruited|Competition Ratios|
|Officer candidates||GSDF|2,879 ( 399)|206 ( 21)|14.0 ( 19.0)|
|||MSDF|1,527 ( 207)|120 ( 22)|12.7 ( 9.4)|
|||ASDF|2,105 ( 456)|69 ( 11)|30.5 ( 41.5)|
|||Total|6,511 ( 1,062)|395 ( 54)|16.5 ( 19.7)|
|Non- commissioned officers|Technical Petty Officer|MSDF|48 ( 8)|7 ( 1)|6.9 ( 8.0)|
||Technical Sergeant|ASDF|0|0|—|
||GSDF personnel (Nursing)|GSDF|16 ( 11)|3 ( 2)|5.3 ( 5.5)|
|Aviation students||MSDF|597 ( 50)|71 ( 3)|8.4 ( 16.7)|
|||ASDF|2,833 ( 281)|66 ( 6)|42.9 ( 46.8)|
|||Total|3,430 ( 331)|137 ( 9)|25.0 ( 36.8)|
|Non-commissioned officer candidates||GSDF|13,485 ( 2,057)|2,991 ( 199)|4.5 ( 10.3)|
|||MSDF|3,927 ( 522)|1,263 ( 45)|3.1 ( 11.6)|
|||ASDF|6,900 ( 1,289)|757 ( 202)|9.1 ( 6.4)|
|||Total|24,312 ( 3,868)|5,011 ( 446)|4.9 ( 8.7)|
|Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)||GSDF|18,667 ( 2,485)|5,164 ( 749)|3.6 ( 3.3)|
|||MSDF|4,804 ( 519)|1,008 ( 116)|4.8 ( 4.5)|
|||ASDF|5,596 ( 882)|1,438 ( 81)|3.9 ( 10.9)|
|||Total|29,067 ( 3,886)|7,610 ( 946)|3.8 ( 4.1)|


-----

|Col1|Classification|Col3|Number Applied|Number Recruited|Competition Ratios|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|National Defense Academy Students|Recommended|Humanity and social science|152 ( 46)|20 ( 8)|7.6 ( 5.8)|
|||Science and engineering|260 ( 33)|82 ( 8)|3.2 ( 4.1)|
|||Total|412 ( 79)|102 ( 16)|4.0 ( 4.9)|
||Selective exam|Humanity and social science|95 ( 15)|10 ( 3)|9.5 ( 5.0)|
|||Science and engineering|111 ( 7)|30 ( 3)|3.7 ( 2.3)|
|||Total|206 ( 22)|40 ( 6)|5.2 ( 3.7)|
||General exam (first term)|Humanity and social science|6,624 ( 2,734)|68 ( 10)|97.4 ( 273.4)|
|||Science and engineering|8,889 ( 1,693)|224 ( 26)|39.7 ( 65.1)|
|||Total|15,513 ( 4,427)|292 ( 36)|53.1 ( 123.0)|
||General exam (second term)|Humanity and social science|219 ( 44)|9 ( 3)|24.3 ( 14.7)|
|||Science and engineering|521 ( 60)|28 ( 3)|18.6 ( 20.0)|
|||Total|740 ( 104)|37 ( 6)|20.0 ( 17.3)|
|National Defense Medical College students|||6,815 ( 2,117)|84 ( 21)|81.1 ( 100.8)|
|National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)|||2,207 ( 1,784)|74 ( 68)|29.8 ( 26.2)|
|GSDF High Technical School Students|Recommended||150|64|2.3|
||General exam||2,571|251|10.2|
||Total||2,721|315|8.6|


Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females.
2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2016.


Reference 70 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel



|Special Service|Col2|Col3|Regular Service|Col5|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength|
||Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense||Administrative Officials, and others  29|Part-Time Officials|
||SDF Personnel||||
||Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense|Candidates for SDF Personnel|||
||Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs|Reserve Personnel  47,900|||
||Director General, and others  630|Ready Reserve Personnel 8,075|||
||Administrative Officials, and others 20,390|Candidate Reserve Personnel 4,621|||
||SDF Regular Personnel 247,154|National Defense Academy students|||
|||National Defense Medical College students|||
|||GSDF High Technical School students|||
|||Part-Time Officials|||



Note: Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations


(As of March 31, 2017)


Reference 71 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2016

|❍ Integrated training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note|
|Training for transportation of overseas Japanese nationals and others|Aug. 23 – Sep. 1, 2016|Camp Utsunomiya, Komaki Airbase, Republic of Djibouti, etc.|Joint Staff, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Central Readiness Force, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 150 personnel and 1 aircraft|To enhance ability to deploy units overseas and their operational capabilities relating to transport of overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and U.S. Forces|
|Training for protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others|Dec. 12 – 16, 2016|Soumagahara Training Area, Iruma Airbase, etc.|Each Joint Staff, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, etc. Approximately 490 personnel, 3 aircraft, 1 transport vessel, and approximately 20 vehicles|To enhance joint operations capabilities relating to protection measures for overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and relevant organizations|
|SDF joint exercise (command post exercise)|Jan. 23 – 27, 2017|MOD Ichigaya area and the locations of other participating Units in exercise, etc.|Internal Bureaus, each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, regional units, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 8,700 personnel|To maintain and enhance the SDF’s joint operations capabilities through studying and practicing SDF joint operations|


|❍ GSDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note|
|Army Corps field training exercise (Northern Army)|Sep. 26 – Oct. 5, 2016|Northern Regional Army District|Northern Army Headquarters, 2th Division, 7th Division, 5th Brigade, 11th Brigade, 1st Artillery Brigade, 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, etc. Approximately 12,000 personnel, 3,000 vehicles and approximately 40 aircraft|To maintain and enhance Army’s capability to respond to various situations|
|Army Corps field training exercise (Western Army)|Oct. 10 – 31, 2016|Western Regional Army District|Western Army, Central Readiness Force, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Kanto Logistics Depot, Kansai Logistics Depot, etc. Approximately 15,000 personnel, 3,500 vehicles and approximately 45 aircraft||
|Army Corps field training exercise (Middle Army)|Jul. 5 – 9, 2016|Middle Regional Army District|Middle Army key units Approximately 5,500 personnel, 700 vehicles and approximately 10 aircraft||


-----

|Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)|Jun. 21 – Aug. 2, 2016|Middle-Northern Regional Army Districts (Hamataiki Training Area, Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)|14th Brigade Headquarters Approximately 1,800 personnel, approximately 640 vehicles and 8 aircraft|To enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility|
|Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Sep. 21 – Oct. 5, 2016|Northeastern-Northern Regional Army Districts (Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division Approximately 1,000 personnel, 200 vehicles||
|Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Nov. 3 - 13, 2016|Northern-Eastern Regional Army Districts (Kita-Fuji Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 11th Brigade Approximately 410 personnel and 180 vehicles||
|Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 4 – Nov. 6, 2016|Northeastern-Western Regional Army Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division Approximately 500 personnel and 150 vehicles||
|Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 19 – Nov. 15, 2016|Northern-Western Regional Army Districts (Hijudai Training Area, etc.)|Key units of one tank regiment of the 2nd Division, 1st Artillery Brigade, Northern Army Engineer Troop, etc. Approximately 700 personnel and 300 vehicles||


|❍ MSDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note|
|MSDF exercise (map exercise)|Sep. 26 – Oct. 9, 2016|Maritime Staff Office, MSDF Staff College and the locations of other participating Units|Maritime Staff Office, Commands of the Self-Defense Fleet, District Headquarters, Material Command, etc. Approximately 3,000 personnel|To conduct drills for unit operations, maritime operations, etc.|


Reference 72 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2016)

|Col1|Name of Training|Date|Location|Dispatched Unit|
|---|---|---|---|---|
|GSDF|HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live- fire training|Oct. 11 – Dec. 21 2016|McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|16 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 520 personnel|
||Surface-to-ship missile unit level live-fire training|Oct. 1 – Nov. 1 2016|Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.|2 surface-to-ship missile regiments and artillery training unit Approximately 240 personnel|
|MSDF|(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Jul. 22 – Oct. 21 2016|Sea areas surrounding Hawaii|1 submarine|
||(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Oct. 14 – Jan. 14 2016|Sea areas surrounding Hawaii|1 submarine|
||(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of Escort Flotilla|Feb. 24 – Mar. 18 2016|Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam|4 destroyers|
|ASDF|Annual practice by antiaircraft units|Aug. 31 – Nov. 18 2016|McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|6 Air Defense Missiles groups, Air Defense Missile Training Group Approximately 370 personnel|


Reference 73 Main Measures for Re-employment Support

|Items|Measures for employment support|Description|
|---|---|---|
|Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel|Occupational aptitude testing|Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes|
||Technical training|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement (large sized vehicle operation, large sized special motor vehicle operation, crane operation, boiler maintenance, nursing care [home helper], information processing, chief warehouse manager [new in FY2017], third-fifth grade maritime officer [new in FY2017], maritime II-category special radio operator [new in FY2017], etc.)|
||Disaster prevention and risk control training|Provide uniformed SDF officer retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan|
||Correspondence courses|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public qualification (financial planner, electrician, hazardous materials engineer (class B), real estate transaction specialist, medical clerk, childminder [new in FY2017], third grade maritime officer [new in FY2017], etc.)|
||Business management training|Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement|
||Career guidance|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and attitude toward reemployment|
||Outsourcing career counseling, etc.|Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel|
|Measures for internal support personnel|Training for support personnel|Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel|
|Measures for promotion outside of SDF|Support publicizing to business owners|Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of retiring uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire|
||Inviting business owners on unit tours|Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the employment support situation, etc.|



Reference 74 Employment Situation of Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel in Disaster Prevention-related Bureaus in Local Government

||(as of March 31, 2017: 402 persons)|
|---|---|
|Prefectural Government|Government Employment situation|
|Hokkaido|Hokkaido Prefectural Government (three persons), Sapporo City Government (two persons), Hakodate City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Kushiro City Government, Obihiro City Government (two persons), Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Rumoi City Government, Tomakomai City Government, Bibai City Government, Ashibetsu City Government, Akabira City Government, Nayoro City Government (two persons), Chitose City Government (four persons), Takigawa City Government, Sunagawa City Government, Noboribetsu City Government, Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kitahiroshima City Government, Hokuto City Government, Matsumae Town Office, Nanae Town Office, Shikabe Town Office, Naganuma Town Office, Kamifurano Town Office, Bihoro Town Office, Engaru Tow Office (two persons), Shiraoi Town Office, Abira Town Office, Shinhidaka Town Office, Memuro Town Office, Kushiro Town Office, Shibecha Town Office, Teshikaga Town Office|
|Aomori|Aomori Prefectural Government, Aomori City Government (two persons), Hirosaki City Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Misawa City Government, Ajigasawa Town Office, Fukaura Town Office, Oirase Town Office, Sannohe Town Office|
|Iwate|Iwate Prefectural Government, Morioka City Government, Miyako City Government, Hanamaki City Government, Tono Town Office, Hachimantai City Government, Takizawa City Government, Yamada Town Office|


-----

|Prefectural Government|Government Employment situation|
|---|---|
|Miyagi|Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government, Natori City Government, Tagajo City Government, Iwanuma City Government, Oohira Village Office, Minamisanriku Town Office|
|Akita|Akita Prefectural Government, Yokote City Government, Odate City Government, Yuzawa City Government, Daisen City Government, Senboku City Government|
|Yamagata|Yamagata Prefectural Government, Yamagata City Government, Sakata City Government, Tendo City Government, Higashine City Government, Asahi Town Office|
|Fukushima|Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government|
|Ibaraki|Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Ryugasaki City Government, Shimotsuma City Government, Jyoso City Government, Ushiku City Government (two persons), Moriya City Government|
|Tochigi|Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government|
|Gunma|Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government, Numata City Government, Shibukawa City Government|
|Saitama|Saitama Prefectural Government, Saitama City Government, Fukaya City Government, Soka City Government, Asaka City Government, Wako City Government|
|Chiba|Chiba Prefectural Government, Ichikawa City Government, Funabashi City Government, Tateyama City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons), Mobara City Government, Narita City Government, Narashino City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Urayasu City Government, Isumi City Government, Oamishirasato City Government|
|Tokyo|Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons), Shinagawa Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office, Arakawa Ward Office, Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Adachi Ward Office|
|Kanagawa|Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (eight persons), Kawasaki City Government (three persons), Sagamihara City Government, Yokosuka City, Kamakura City Government, Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Ebina City Government, Zama City Government|
|Niigata|Niigata Prefectural Government, Tsubame City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Sado City Government, Tainai City Government|
|Toyama|Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government|
|Ishikawa|Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Komatsu City Government, Kaga City Government, Nomi City Government|
|Fukui|Fukui Prefectural Government (two persons), Fukui City Government, Awara City Government, Takahama Town Office|
|Yamanashi|Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Fujiyoshida City Government, Minami-alps City Government|
|Nagano|Nagano Prefectural Government, Matsumoto City Government, Ina City Government, Chino City Government|
|Gifu|Gifu Prefectural Government (two persons), Gifu City Government, Minokamo City Government, Kakamigahara City Government, Kaizu City Government|
|Shizuoka|Shizuoka Prefectural Government (six persons), Shizuoka City Government, Hamamatsu City Government, Atami City Government, Shimada City Government (two persons), Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Izu City Government, Makinohara City Government, Oyama Town Office|
|Aichi|Aichi Prefectural Government, Toyohashi City Government, Kariya City Government, Nishio City Government, Gamagori City Government, Tokai City Government, Obu City Government, Takahama City Government, Toyoake City Government, Aisai City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Miyoshi City Government, Ama City Government, Nagakute City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Oharu Town Office, Kanie Town Office, Tobishima Village Office, Higashiura Town Office, Minamichita Town Office (two persons), Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office|
|Mie|Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Yokkaichi City Government, Ise City Government, Kuwana City Government, Nabari City Government, Owase City Government, Kameyama City Government, Toba City Government, Shima City Government|
|Shiga|Shiga Prefectural Government, Konan City Government|
|Kyoto|Kyoto Prefectural Government, Yawata City Government, Kyotango City Government, Kizugawa City Government, Seika Town Office (two persons)|
|Osaka|Osaka Prefectural Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Kaiduka City Government, Hirakata City Government, Ibaraki City Government, Izumisano City Government, Tondabayashi City Government, Kawachinagano City Government, Matsubara City Government, Daito City Government, Izumi City Government, Takaishi City Government, Shijonawate City Government, Osakasayama City Government, Toyono Town Office|
|Hyogo|Hyogo Prefectural Government, Miki City Government, Kawanishi City Government, Yabu City Government|
|Nara|Nara Prefectural Government (two persons), Nara City Government (three persons), Gojo City Government (two persons)|
|Wakayama|Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Hashimoto City Government, Koya Town Office|
|Tottori|Tottori Prefectural Government (three persons), Tottori City Government, Yonago City Government, Sakaiminato City Government, Yurihama Town Office, Hokuei Town Office|
|Shimane|Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government|
|Okayama|Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government|
|Hiroshima|Hiroshima Prefectural Government (two persons), Hiroshima City Government, Kure City Government, Higashihiroshima City Government, Hatsukaichi City Government, Kaita Town Office|
|Yamaguchi|Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Nagato City Government, Shunan City Government, Waki Town Office|
|Tokushima|Tokushima Prefectural Government (three persons), Komatsushima City Government, Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Awa City Government, Miyoshi City Government|
|Kagawa|Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Zentsuji City Government|
|Ehime|Ehime Prefectural Government, Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government|
|Kochi|Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government|
|Fukuoka|Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government (two persons), Tagawa City Government, Kasuga City Government, Onojo City Government, Munakata City Government (two persons), Dazaifu City Government, Itoshima City Government, Nakagawa Town Office, Kasuya Town Office, Chikuzen Town Office|
|Saga|Saga Prefectural Government (three persons), Karatsu City Government, Yoshinogari Town Office|
|Nagasaki|Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Nagasaki City Government, Sasebo City Government (two persons), Shimabara City Government, Omura City Government (three persons), Matsuura City Government, Iki City Govervment, Minamishimabara City Government|
|Kumamoto|Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Ozu Town Office, Takamori Town Office|
|Oita|Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Oita City Government, Beppu City Government, Saiki City Government, Kitsuki City Government|
|Miyazaki|Miyazaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons), Nobeoka City Government (two persons), Nichinan City Government, Kobayashi City Government, Hyuga City Government, Kushima City Government, Saito City Government, Ebino City Government, Tsuno Town Office|
|Kagoshima|Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Tarumizu City Government, Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Soo City Government, Kirishima City Government|



-  Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2017 (part-time personnel included).


Reference 75 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and
Technology

(Approved by the National Security Council
and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014)
The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of
defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime
Minster Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki
administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan
has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy
guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries


have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government
has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of
each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result
of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations.
Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end
of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively
national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat
to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same
time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by
complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to
make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation.
Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself and the international


-----

community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the
world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the
evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has
taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and
the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and
prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as
peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace”
based on the principle of international cooperation.
From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security
by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National
Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s
existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology,
and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due
consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by
consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past
exemption measures.
An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology
contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace
and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace
and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international
disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and
piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as
“peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes
to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States
as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing
Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s
enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and
production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the
performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs.
On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology
has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international
community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment
and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is
recognized.
In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving
nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has
taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense
equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas
transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same
manner as defense equipment and technology.
**1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited**
Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted
when:
1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international
agreements that Japan has concluded,
2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council
resolutions, or
3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a
conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is
taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the
event of an armed attack).

Reference 76 Activities in Civic Life


**2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as strict**
**examination and information disclosure**
In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will
be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while
ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment
and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active
promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s
security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development
and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area
including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —
enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—
supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of
its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will
conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user,
and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise
concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive
judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control
regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations.
Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the
viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council
(NSC). As for the cases that were deliberated at the NSC, the Government will
disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information
Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999).
**3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or transfer to third**
**parties**
In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and
technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured.
More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of
the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and
transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the
confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the
transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution
and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an
international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery
of parts etc. to a licenser.
Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided
by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in
accordance with the decision.
For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers
to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1,
Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of
1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat;
and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or
use of arms.
The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the
international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the
principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive
role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as
sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force
of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control
regimes.

|Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records|
|---|---|
|Disposal of Unexploded Bombs1|❍ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ❍ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total of 1,379 disposal operations (average of approximately 27 operations per week), weighing approximately 42.1 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 25.6 tons, (accounting for about 61% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)|
|Removal of Underwater Mines2|❍ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others. ❍ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. ❍ Disposal operations in FY2016: a total 23,598 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 4.2 tons in total (1 underwater mines disposed). (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)|
|Medical Activities3|❍ Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (seven out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ❍ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services. ❍ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs. ❍ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. ❍ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.|
|Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings4|❍ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services. ❍ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.|
|Exchanges with Local Communities|❍ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. ❍ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.|


Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.

4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.


-----

Reference 77 Activities Contributing to Society

|Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records|
|---|---|
|Acceptance of Other Parties for Education and Training1|❍ The SDF, responding to requests from other parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel ❍ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, and education on chemical disasters response are provided to police officers, Japan Coast Guard Personnel and firefighters. Aircraft-maneuvering training is provided to police officers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy accept employees of private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries for education.|
|Transportation Work2|❍ GSDF, MSDF and ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister. ❍ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)|
|Ceremonial Work at National Events3|❍ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard4 forming a line for guests5 and firing a gun salute for them6 ❍ Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.|
|Cooperation in Antarctic Research Expedition7|❍ Since the seventh expedition in 1965, the SDF has extended cooperation such as operating its icebreaker and has contributed significantly to Antarctic research projects, which marked their 50th anniversary in FY2007. The new icebreaker “Shirase” went into service in 2009, and the SDF will continue to provide support for such projects in the future. ❍ In cooperating in the 7th Antarctic Research Expedition since November 2015, the SDF has transported expedition members and approximately 1,040 tons of supplies to Showa Station, and provided cooperation for the hydrographic survey planned by the expedition team.|
|Other Cooperation|❍ Acting on requests from the Japan Metrological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions. ❍ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps. ❍ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)8 ❍ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support for flights of private chartered aircraft to Iwoto island, and the dispatch SDF of music bands.|



Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.

3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.

4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect.

5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them.

6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.

7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.


Reference 78 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities


(Cause of Disturbance)

Activities by SDF
and others


(Type of Disturbance) (Measures)

Devastation of training areas Subsidy for disturbance prevention

(Noise abatement works): Subsidy for noise-abatement work for schools, hospitals, etc.

Class 1 Area Subsidy for noise-abatement work for housing[1]

Compensation for relocation and others Subsidy for improvements of public facilities at relocation site

Noise Class 2 Area

Purchase of land Free use of purchased land

Class 3 Area Maintenance of greenbelts

Loss sustained in running agricultural, fisheries, and forestry businesses Compensation for loss[2]
(Limited to loss resulting from SDF activities)


Disruption of everyday life or
business activities


Subsidy for improvement of public welfare facilities


Establishment and
operation of defense
facilities


Effect on living
environments and
development projects


Cities, towns, and
villages related to
Specified Defense Facilities


Provision of Specified Defense Facility
Environs Improvement Adjustment Grant


Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area
Areas around air bases are classified as follows according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise:
Class 1 Area: Areas where WECPNL is 75 or higher
Class 2 Area: Section of Class 1 Areas where WECPNL is 90 or higher
Class 3 Area: Section of Class 2 Areas where WECPNL is 95 or higher

-  Criteria used for area classifications until 2012 are: WECPNL at 75 or higher, 90 or higher, and 95 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class
3 Areas, respectively.
Criteria used for area classifications in 2013 and beyond are: Lden at 62 or higher, 73 or higher, and 76 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and
Class 3 Areas, respectively.
(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated,
taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.

(3) Lden
The equivalent noise level over a day being assessed by weighing noises measured early evening and at night.
Notes: 2. If losses are caused due to acts of the U.S. Forces in Japan, they are compensated according to the Act on Compensation of Special Losses Caused by Act of

United States Forces and Other Forces stationed in Japan.


-----

Reference 79 Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (April 27, 2011)


**Review of the calculation of the ordinary amount issued under the Financial**
**Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defense**
**Facilities**

(1) Revision of calculation method


**Review of the uses of Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of**
**Surroundings of Specified Defense Facilities**


uBackground

uDiversification of local needs (demand for allocation to soft business)
uEvaluation results of the “business classification” by the Government
Revitalization Unit ð “To make the uses more free and improve usability”


� Change in the budget allocation for calculation elements

(budget allocation for “operation” will be increased)


� Establishment of new training points relating to large-scale or specific

training (amount will be increased if joint Japan-US training, large scale
exercises, etc., are held)


Before revision After revision



Special grant Special grant
amount: 30%

5/10 Operation

points

Ordinary grant

amount: 70% 2.5/10 Area points

Population

2.5/10 points


Special grant

5/10 Operation

points

0.5/10 Training points
2.0/10 Area points

Population

2.5/10

points


(2) Consideration for cities, towns and villages with high population density

(population density points will be added)


(3) Consideration for the particularity of US Forces operations

(points will be added to facilities used by stationed forces)


(4) Appropriate reflection of the effects of operations (number of flights point

and exercising personnel points will be subdivided)


**Before revision**

Improvement of public-use facilities

Public-use facilities:
Transportation and communications facilities, sports and recreational facilities,
environmental health facilities, education and cultural facilities, medical
facilities, social welfare facilities, facilities associated with fire-fighting,
facilities that contribute to the stimulation of industry

**After revision**

Improvement of public-use facilities

So-called soft business (Newly added)

Soft businesses such as the following are envisioned:

-  Assistance for medical expenses (medical expenses for elementary school
pupils and younger, examination costs for pregnant women, etc.)

-  Assistance for the cost of running community buses (operational costs for
welfare buses, etc.)

-  Assistance for the cost to conduct a diagnosis of earthquake resistance for
schools and other facilities (cost of diagnosing the earthquake resistance of
elementary / junior-high school buildings, etc.)


Defense facilities and cities, towns and villages newly designated as Specified Defense Facilities and Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities,
Towns and Villages, respectively

Kasumigaura Air Base Ami, Inashiki District, Ibaraki Matsushige, Itano District,

|Specif ied Defense Facilities|Specif ied Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages|
|---|---|
|Matsushima Air Base|Ishinomaki|
|Iwo To Air Base|Ogasawara, Tokyo|
|Naval Air Facility Atsugi|Fujisawa|
|Ashiya Air Base|Mizumaki, Onga District, Fukuoka Prefecture|
|Torishima Range|Kumejima, Shimajiri District, Okinawa Prefecture|
|Shimokita Test Center|Higashido¯ri, Shimokita District, Aomori Prefecture|

|Specif ied Defense Facilities|Specif ied Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages|
|---|---|
|Sagami General Depot|Sagamihara|
|Tokushima Air Base|Matsushige, Itano District, Tokushima Prefecture|
|Metabaru Air Base|Yoshinogari, Kanzaki District, Saga Prefecture|
||Kamimine, Miyaki District, Saga Prefecture|
|Northern Training Area|Kunigami, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture|
||Higashi, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture|

|Specif ied Defense Facilities|Specif ied Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages|
|---|---|
|Kasumigaura Air Base|Tsuchiura|
||Ami, Inashiki District, Ibaraki Prefecture|
|Utsunomiya Air Base|Utsunomiya|
|Soumagahara Air Base|Shinto¯, Kitagunma District, Gunma Prefecture|
|Kisarazu Air Base|Kisarazu|
|Camp Zama|Sagamihara|
||Zama|


-----

Reference 80 Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)

Outline of the survey period: January 8–18, 2015

Respondents: Japanese citizens aged 20 years or older in Japan

Valid responses (rate): 1,680 (56.0%)

Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel

For details, refer to http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/index.html


1 Interest in the SDF and defense issues

(%)

80

60

40

30

20

10


2 Impression toward the SDF

(%)

60

50

40

0

Good impression (subtotal)[1]

91.7

82.2 84.9 92.2

68.8 69.2 75.4 74.3 [76.7] 76.8 80.5 80.3 80.9

71.3

67.5

58.9

Bad impression (subtotal)[2]

24.3

17.5 19.4

11.7 12.9 14.1

14.1 17.6 13.4 16.7 15.6 13.4 10.5 10.0 4.8

5.3


Notes: 1. Total of “good impression” and “somewhat good impression” (Total of “good
impression” and “do not have bad impression” until the survey of February 2006).
2. Total of “somewhat bad impression” and “bad impression” (Total of “do not have
good impression” and “bad impression” until the survey of February 2006).


Interested (subtotal)[1] 69.8 71.5

67.3 67.4

57.0 57.8 64.7
59.4

50.4 49.6 50.3 54.9 56.8

47.7 48.1 47.8 43.4 40.8 41.6 41.2 38.9

34.4

31.9

30.2 29.2 28.2

Not Interested (subtotal)[2]


Notes: 1. Total of “very interested” and “somewhat interested” (Total of “very
interested” and “slightly interested” until the survey of November 1984).
2. Total of “hardly interested” and “not at all interested.”
3. For gender- and age-specific information, see:
http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/zh/z01.html.

3 Defense capabilities of the SDF


4 Evaluation of the SDF disaster relief activities

Appreciate (Total) 98.0 Do not appreciate (Total) 1.3

Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not



(Eligible number
of people)

Total (1,680)


(Eligible number
of people)

|very mu appreciated a certain degree|Col2|uch apprecia|
|---|---|---|
|Don’t know||－|
|64.9|33.2||
||||



6 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities


|Should be decreased|Col2|Col3|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|Should be decreased Should be increased Current strength is sufficient||||
|||||
|29.9|59.2|||
|||||


5 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF

Appreciate (Total) 89.8 Do not appreciate (Total) 7.3

Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not

of people)


0.7 1.3


－



(Eligible number
of people)

Total (1,680)



0.8




6.5


1.0

|apprec|very muc ciated a certain degree|Col3|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
||Don’t know|||
|39.2||50.6||
|2.9||||

|Should make more efforts Should maintain Should reduce the amount|Col2|Col3|Col4|
|---|---|---|---|
|more efforts maintain the amount in engaging current of efforts in proactively engagement engaging from level current level||||
||||3.|
|25.9|65.4|||
|4.6||||


Reference 81 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2016)

|Col1|Col2|Ministry of Defense Headquarters|Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches|Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|Total|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|1. Number of disclosure requests||2,125|2,569|273|4,967|
|2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure Requests accepted Requests partially accepted Requests declined||2,049|2,739|189|4,977|
||Requests accepted|1,054|1,139|51|2,244|
||Requests partially accepted|909|1,571|109|2,589|
||Requests declined|86|29|29|144|
|3. Number of administrative protests||3,694|5|3|3,702|


4. Number of lawsuits 6 0 0 6


-----

Defense Chronology


|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1952|Apr. 28 Apr. 28 May 01 May 26 May 27 Jul. 21 Jul. 26 Jul. 31 Aug. 01 Oct. 15 Oct. 30 Oct. 31 Nov. 01 Nov. 12|Japan–U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty enter into force Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ Abolished May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Germany European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force Japan–U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed National Safety Agency Law promulgated National Safety Agency established; Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency; Coastal Safety Force inaugurated National Safety Force inaugurated Inauguration of fourth Yoshida Cabinet; Kimura becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Japan–U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed|
|1953|Jan. 01 Apr. 01 May 21 Jul. 27 Aug. 12 Sep. 27 Oct. 01 Oct. 30 Dec. 25|Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established Inauguration of fifth Yoshida Cabinet Korean War Armistice Agreement signed USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed Ikeda–Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored|
|1954|Jan. 21 Mar. 01 Mar. 01 Mar. 08 May 14 Jun. 02 Jun. 09 Jul. 01 Jul. 21 Sep. 03 Sep. 08 Dec. 02 Dec. 10|U.S. launches world’s first nuclear submarine (USS Nautilus) U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self- Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed Chinese People’s Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed Hatoyama Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1955|Mar. 19 Apr. 18 May 05 May 06 May 08 May 14 Jul. 31 Aug. 06 Aug. 31 Nov. 14 Nov. 22 Dec. 19|Inauguration of second Hatoyama Cabinet; Sugihara becomes Minister of State for Defense Africa–Asia conference held at Bandung West Germany formally admitted to NATO Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies Protests begin at Sunagawa Base Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO starts) Sunada becomes Minister of State for Defense First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Japan–U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed Inauguration of third Hatoyama Cabinet; Funada becomes Minister of State for Defense Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated|
|1956|Feb. 09 Feb. 14 Mar. 23 Apr. 17 Apr. 26 Jul. 02 Jul. 26 Sep. 20 Oct. 19 Oct. 23 Oct. 29 Dec. 18 Dec. 23|House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councilors, February 10) Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki USSR announces dissolution of Cominform First Japan-made destroyer Harukaze completed National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese–Soviet relations Hungarian Revolution Second Middle East War (Suez War; through November 6) Japan joins the U.N. Ishibashi Cabinet established; Prime Minister concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1957|Jan. 31 Feb. 02 Feb. 25 Mar. 15 May 15 May 20 Jun. 14 Jun. 21 Jul. 10 Aug. 06 Aug. 26 Aug. 27 Sep. 10 Oct. 04 Nov. 23|Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense Kotaki becomes Minister of State for Defense Kishi Cabinet established House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Basic Guidelines for National Defense National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on First Defense Build-up Plan Kishi–Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued Inauguration of reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Tsushima becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan–U.S. Security Council inaugurated USSR announces successful ICBM test Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura National Defense Council decision to produce P2V-742 aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17 USSR launches the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1 World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration|


1958 Jan. 01 Japan becomes non-permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council
J 01 E E i C it (EEC) t t


|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1958|Jan. 14 Jan. 31 Feb. 17 Apr. 18 Jun. 12 Aug. 23 Sep. 11 Oct. 04 Oct. 23 Dec. 17|First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28) U.S. successfully launches an artificial satellite ASDF begins airspace anti-intrusion measures House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs Inauguration of second Kishi Cabinet; Sato becomes Minister of State for Defense Chinese People’s Liberation Army attack on Quemoy intensifies Fujiyama–Dulles talks (Washington, D.C.); agreement on revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Commencement of Japan–U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Dulles talks with Chiang Kaishek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM|
|1959|Jan. 12 Mar. 30 Jun. 18 Aug. 25 Sep. 18 Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Nov. 06 Dec. 01 Dec. 16|Ino becomes Minister of State for Defense Tokyo District Court rules the stationing of U.S. Forces unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case Inauguration of second reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Akagi becomes Minister of State for Defense China–India border dispute USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete military reductions at U.N. Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon Vera U.S.–Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David National Defense Council decision to produce 200 F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on November 10 Antarctica Treaty signed Supreme Court reverses original ruling in the Sunagawa case|
|1960|Jan. 11 Jan. 19 Feb. 13 May 01 May 24 Jul. 19 Jul. 20 Dec. 08 Dec. 20|Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho New Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed (enters into force June 23) France conducts its first nuclear test in the Sahara U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace Disaster relief teams dispatched after the earthquake and tsunami in Chile Ikeda Cabinet established; Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM Inauguration of second Ikeda Cabinet; Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense Formation of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front|
|1961|Jan. 13 Apr. 12 May 16 Jul. 06 Jul. 11 Jul. 18 Jul. 18 Aug. 13|National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20 USSR successfully launches manned spacecraft Military junta seizes power in a coup in ROK Soviet–North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Fujieda becomes Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Second Defense Build-up Plan Construction of Berlin Wall|
|1962|Jul. 18 Jul. 23 Aug. 15 Oct. 15 Oct. 20 Oct. 24 Oct. 28 Nov. 01 Nov. 09|Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (second term); Shiga becomes Minister of State for Defense International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva International Conference GSDF completes 13 division organization Type 61 tank first introduced China–India border dispute (through November 22) U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20) Premier of the Soviet Union Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba Defense Facilities Administration Agency established Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)|
|1963|Jun. 20 Jul. 18 Aug. 08 Aug. 14 Sep. 16 Dec. 09 Dec. 17|Agreement signed for U.S.–Soviet hotline Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (third term); Fukuda becomes Minister of State for Defense Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.–USSR– U.K. (enters into force on October 10) Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Malaysian Federation established Inauguration of third Ikeda Cabinet ROK transits to civilian government, Park Chung-hee becomes President|
|1964|Jun. 15 Jul. 18 Aug. 02 Oct. 16 Nov. 09 Nov. 12|Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan Inauguration of third reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Koizumi becomes Minister of State for Defense Gulf of Tonkin incident China successfully carries out its first nuclear test Sato Cabinet established U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time|
|1965|Feb. 07 Feb. 10 Jun. 03 Jun. 22 Sep. 01 Nov. 10|U.S. starts bombing of North Vietnam Diet debate on Mitsuya study Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Matsuno becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan–ROK Basic Treaty signed Second India–Pakistan conflict (to September 22) Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)|
|1966|May 16 Jul. 01 Aug. 01 Oct. 27 Nov. 29 Dec. 03|Cultural Revolution starts in China France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined April 4, 2009) Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Kambayashiyama becomes Minister of State for Defense China successfully carries out its first nuclear missile test National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuda becomes Minister of State for Defense|


1967 Jan. 27 Outer Space Treaty signed
Feb. 17 Inauguration of second Sato Cabinet
Mar. 14 National Defense Council decision adopted on Key matters
for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan (Cabinet
decision on March 14)

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1945|Aug. 15 Aug. 17 Aug. 17 Aug. 28 Sep. 02 Oct. 09 Oct. 15 Oct. 24 Nov. 30|World War II ends Higashikuninomiya Cabinet established Republic of Indonesia declares independence Provisional government of People’s Republic of Vietnam established GHQ established Shidehara Cabinet established General Staff Office and Military Command abolished United Nations established Army and Navy Ministries abolished|
|1946|Jan. 04 Jan. 10 Jan. 27 Feb. 26 Mar. 05 Apr. 05 Apr. 24 May 03 May 22 Oct. 01 Nov. 03 Dec. 19|GHQ orders purge from public office First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14) GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands Far East Commission formed Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech First meeting of Allied Council on Japan Civil administration of Okinawa established International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened Yoshida Cabinet established International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg renders judgment The Constitution of Japan promulgated First Indochina War starts (through 1954)|
|1947|Mar. 12 May 03 Jun. 01 Jun. 05 Aug. 15 Aug. 15 Oct. 05 Dec. 17|Truman Doctrine announced The Constitution of Japan takes effect Katayama Cabinet established Marshall Plan announced India and Pakistan gain independence First India–Pakistan conflict (through 1965) Cominform established Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)|
|1948|Mar. 10 Apr. 01 Apr. 27 May 14 Jun. 11 Jun. 26 Aug. 15 Sep. 09 Oct. 19 Nov. 12|Ashida Cabinet established USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949) Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated Israel gains independence; First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949) U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution Berlin airlift starts Republic of Korea (ROK) declares independence North Korea established Second Yoshida Cabinet established International Military Tribunal for the Far East renders judgment|
|1949|Jan. 25 Feb. 16 Apr. 04 Apr. 21 May 06 Jul. 05 Jul. 15 Aug. 17 Sep. 24 Oct. 01 Oct. 07 Dec. 07|Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) established Inauguration of third Yoshida Cabinet North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) (NATO established) Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany) Shimoyama incident Mitaka incident Matsukawa incident USSR declares possession of atomic bomb People’s Republic of China established German Democratic Republic established (East Germany) Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan|
|1950|Jan. 27 Feb. 14 Jun. 21 Jun. 25 Jun. 28 Jul. 07 Jul. 08 Aug. 10 Aug. 13 Aug. 14 Sep. 07 Sep. 15 Oct. 25 Nov. 24 Dec. 18|U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan Korean War (ends July 27, 1953) Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Police Reserve National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima U.N. troops land at Inchon Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces|
|1951|Jan. 23 Jan. 29 Mar. 01 Apr. 11 Jul. 04 Aug. 30 Sep. 01 Sep. 08 Oct. 20 Oct. 26 Dec. 26|Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations) Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (second term) Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers dismissed U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed Australia– New Zealand–U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty 49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan; Japan–U.S. Security Treaty concluded Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councilors approval given November 18) Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (third term)|
|1952|Jan. 19 Feb. 28 Apr. 26 Apr. 28|ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line) Japan–U.S. Administrative Agreement signed Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard Japan–Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded|


-----

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1981|Jan. 06 Apr. 22 Jul. 07 Jul. 13 Oct. 01 Nov. 30 Dec. 13|February 7 decided as Northern Territories Day (Cabinet understanding) Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation Tokyo High Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgment in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits (GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3) Inauguration of reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet; Ito becomes Minister of State for Defense Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military Council of National Salvation|
|1982|Feb. 15 Apr. 02 Apr. 25 May 15 Jun. 06 Jun. 08 Jun. 09 Jun. 29 Jul. 23 Aug. 17 Sep. 09 Oct. 12 Oct. 20 Nov. 27|(GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Takigahara, through February 19) Falklands dispute (ends June 14) Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula Use of some sections of land within facilities and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law Israeli forces invade Lebanon BWC enters into force in Japan Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.–Soviet Union (Geneva) 1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and approved by National Defense Council U.S.–China Joint Statement about U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan Supreme Court renders judgment on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case China successfully tests SLBM water launch Yokohama District Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit Nakasone Cabinet established; Tanikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1983|Jan. 01 Jan. 14 Mar. 23 Jun. 12 Sep. 01 Oct. 09 Oct. 25 Nov. 08 Dec. 12 Dec. 27|U.S. establishes new Unified Combatant Command (Central Command) Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S. (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary) U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Director Tanigawa first Minister of State for Defense to inspect Northern Islands KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fighters near Sakhalin 19 ROK Government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorists U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada Signing of negotiation statement for sharing military technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Fuchu, through December 15) Inauguration of second Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1984|Jan. 01 Jun. 11 Oct. 16 Nov. 01|Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN on January 7) (MSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Yokosuka, through June 15) Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet; Kato becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1985|Mar. 12 Apr. 02 Jun. 04 Aug. 12 Sep. 18 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|U.S.–Soviet Union arms control talks begin USAF begins to station F-16 fighters at Misawa China announces the reduction of one million personnel from the People’s Liberation Army Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the JAL aircraft crash National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program; National Defense Council decision and Cabinet understanding adopted on introduction of Patriots Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet (second term)|
|1986|Feb. 24 Apr. 09 Apr. 26 Jul. 01 Jul. 22 Aug. 10 Aug. 15 Sep. 05 Sep. 22 Oct. 15 Oct. 27|First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint command post exercise (Hinoki-cho, headquarters of USFJ, etc., through February 28) Tokyo High Court renders judgment in first Atsugi Air Base noise suit Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union Security Council Establishment Law enacted Inauguration of third Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San Francisco, through August 11) Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm) USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise (eastern and southern part of Honshu island, etc., through October 31)|


1987 Jan. 24 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity
Jan. 30 Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing
of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective
June 1)
May 27 Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees
of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair
exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls
(COCOM) to Communist areas
May 29 Director Kurihara first incumbent Director to visit China
(through June 4)
Jul. 15 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 1st Yokota Air
Base noise suit
Jul. 20 U.N. Security Council adopts Iran–Iraq Conflict Cease Fire

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1967|Mar. 29 Jun. 05 Jun. 17 Jul. 01 Aug. 08 Nov. 25|Sapporo District Court renders judgment on Eniwa Case Third Middle East War (through June 9) China successfully carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Formation of European Community (EC) Formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet|
|1968|Jan. 16 Jan. 19 Jan. 23 Feb. 26 May 13 Jun. 26 Jul. 01 Aug. 20 Aug. 24 Nov. 30|Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. troops east of Suez U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea New Japan–U.S. nuclear agreement signed First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Arita becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1969|Jan. 10 Mar. 02 Apr. 15 Jun. 10 Jul. 25 Nov. 21|National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island) North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane South Vietnam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government U.S. President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine) Sato–Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)|
|1970|Jan. 14 Jan. 24 Feb. 03 Feb. 11 Mar. 05 Mar. 31 Apr. 16 Apr. 24 Jun. 23 Aug. 12 Oct. 20 Nov. 25|Inauguration of third Sato Cabinet; Nakasone becomes Minister of State for Defense Formation of integrated WPO (Warsaw Pact) forces (involving seven countries) Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force Yodo hijacking U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks China successfully launches its first satellite Automatic extension of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty West Germany–USSR sign non-aggression pact Publication of “The Defense of Japan,” the first white paper on defense Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya|
|1971|Feb. 11 Jun. 17 Jun. 29 Jul. 05 Jul. 30 Aug. 02 Aug. 09 Sep. 30 Oct. 25 Nov. 24 Nov. 27 Dec. 03 Dec. 03 Dec. 05|Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed Inauguration of third reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi) Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense India–Soviet Friendship Treaty signed U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan House of Representatives resolution on nonnuclear weapons ASEAN declares SEA neutrality Third India–Pakistan conflict Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense ASDF frist domestic supersonic aircraft ASDF XT-2 delivered|
|1972|Jan. 07 Feb. 08 Feb. 27 Apr. 10 Apr. 18 May 15 May 26 Jul. 03 Jul. 04 Jul. 07 Sep. 29 Oct. 09 Dec. 21 Dec. 22|Sato–Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan U.S. President Nixon visits China; China–U.S. Joint Communique Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on SDF deployment in Okinawa Return of Okinawa SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit of U.S. President Nixon to USSR India–Pakistan truce signed ROK and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peaceful unification Tanaka Cabinet established; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, Key Matters for Inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, and Measures to Enhance Civilian Control East–West Germany Basic Treaty signed Inauguration of second Tanaka Cabinet|

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1973|Oct. 17 Nov. 07 Nov. 25|Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO Inauguration of second reshuffled Tanaka Cabinet|
|1974|Jan. 05 Jan. 18 Apr. 20 Apr. 25 May 18 Jul. 03 Oct. 08 Nov. 11 Nov. 13 Nov. 15 Nov. 23 Dec. 09|Japan–China Trade Agreement signed Israel and Egypt sign Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Treaties Japan–China Aviation Agreement signed National Defense Medical College opens India carries out its first underground nuclear test U.S. President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize Inauguration of second reshuffled second Tanaka Cabinet (second term); Uno becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan–China Marine Transport Agreement signed U.N. forces in Korea discovers a North Korean infiltration tunnel U.S. President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement on SALT II Miki Cabinet established; Sakata becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1975|Apr. 01 Apr. 23 Apr. 30 Aug. 01 Nov. 17|Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29) U.S. President Ford declares end of Vietnam War South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki) First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), held annually since|
|1976|Apr. 05 Jun. 04 Jun. 08 Jul. 02 Jul. 08 Aug. 05 Aug. 18 Sep. 06 Sep. 15 Oct. 29 Nov. 05 Dec. 24|Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident) Publication of second white paper on defense, “The Defense of Japan” (henceforth published annually) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unified Vietnam) proclaimed Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) established Sapporo High Court renders judgment in Naganuma Nike suit U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom by North Korea MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport Inauguration of reshuffled Miki Cabinet National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977 National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on Immediate-term Defense Build-up and Handling Major Items in Preparations for Defense Forces Fukuda Cabinet established; Mihara becomes Minister of State for Defense|
|1977|Feb. 17 Jun. 30 Jul. 01 Aug. 01 Aug. 10 Nov. 28 Dec. 29|Mito District Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective) Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200- mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study Inaguruation of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Kanemaru becomes Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of F-15s and P-3C|
|1978|Apr. 12 Aug. 12 Sep. 21 Nov. 03 Nov. 27 Nov. 27 Dec. 05 Dec. 07 Dec. 25|Chinese fishing fleet infringes on waters around Senkaku Islands Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China signed in Beijing Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study Vietnam–Soviet Friendship Agreement signed (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1) Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28 Afghanistan–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Relations and Cooperation signed Ohira Cabinet established; Yamashita becomes Minister of State for Defense Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia (withdrawal completed on September 26, 1989)|
|1979|Jan. 01 Jan. 07 Jan. 11 Feb. 11 Feb. 17 Mar. 26 Jun. 18 Jul. 17 Jul. 25 Nov. 09 Dec. 27|U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifies termination of the U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty after one year Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced National Defense Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on introduction of E-2C Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran Sino–Vietnamese War (through March 5) Egypt–Israel peace treaty signed SALT II signed Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980– FY1984) Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26) Inauguration of second Ohira Cabinet; Kubota becomes Minister of State for Defense Soviet Union invades Afghanistan|
|1980|Feb. 04 Feb. 26 Apr. 11 May 18 Jul. 17 Jul. 17 Aug. 18 Aug. 19 Aug. 21 Sep. 03 Sep. 22|Hosoda becomes Minister of State for Defense Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18) Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific Ocean for the first time House of Councillors establishes special committee for Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Territories issues Suzuki Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced Soviet nuclear submarine has an accident off the main island of Okinawa First meeting of the Japan–U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (Washington, D.C., through September 4) Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war|


1973 Jan. 23 14th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee
meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan
(Kanto Program)
Jan. 27 Vietnam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect
on January 28)
Feb. 01 Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength
Feb. 21 Laos Peace Treaty signed
Mar. 29 U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Vietnam
May 29 Yamanaka becomes Minister of State for Defense
Jun. 22 General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union
visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war
signed
Jul. 01 Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa
Sep. 07 Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional
(Naganuma Judgment)
Sep. 21 Japan–North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations
Oct. 06 Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25)
Oct.08 Japan–Soviet summit (Moscow)


-----

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1987|Aug. 26 Oct. 06 Oct. 21 Nov. 06 Nov. 29 Dec. 08 Dec. 18|Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted First Japan–U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7) Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and announced Takeshita Cabinet established; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists over the Bay of Bengal INF Treaty signed Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas|
|1988|Mar. 02 Mar. 14 Apr. 12 May 29 Jun. 01 Jul. 23 Aug. 17 Aug. 20 Aug. 24 Sep. 20 Oct. 17 Nov. 29 Dec. 07 Dec. 27|Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Spratly Islands Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries U.S.–Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged) Supreme Court renders judgment on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka) First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada) Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran–Iraq War Tazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised Military Bases Agreement Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops Inauguration of reshuffled Takeshita Cabinet|
|1989|Jan. 07|Demise of Emperor Showa|
|1989|Feb. 15 Feb. 24 Mar. 09 Mar. 09 Mar. 15 Mar. 30 Apr. 01 May 10 Jun. 03 Jun. 04 Jun. 20 Jun. 22 Jun. 24 Aug. 10 Sep. 26 Nov. 09|Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan Emperor Showa’s funeral Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started (Vienna) Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) started (Vienna) Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court renders judgment in the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit New BADGE system begins operations Consumption Tax Law enforced START-I reopened at U.S.–Soviet foreign ministers conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through May 11) Uno Cabinet established; Yamasaki becomes Minister of State for Defense Chinese martial law units fire on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident) Supreme Court renders judgment in the Hyakuri Base suit Yokohama District Court renders judgment in the Atsugi Air Base suit to vacate the premises Zhao Ziyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin Kaifu Cabinet established; Matsumoto becomes Minister of State for Defense Vietnam completely withdraws from Cambodia GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall)|
|1990|Feb. 13 Feb. 20 Feb. 28 Mar. 03 May 29 Jun. 19 Jun. 21 Aug. 02 Aug. 02 Oct. 03 Oct. 16 Oct. 24 Nov. 10 Nov. 12 Nov. 23 Dec. 20 Dec. 29|U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. troops in Europe Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide “military technology related to FS-X” to U.S. Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ishikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan–U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, G.H.W. Bush, Palm Springs, through March 4) Naha District Court renders judgment in administrative handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Japan–U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items) Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security Iraq invades Kuwait U.S. President G.H.W. Bush gives speech at Aspen German unification Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet USSR conducts underground nuclear tests in the Arctic Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled Coronation of Emperor Great Thanksgiving Festival Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ikeda becomes Minister of State for Defense|


1991 Jan. 17 Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of the Gulf
Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters
Jan. 17 Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and
Iraq, Operation Desert Storm
Jan. 24 Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts
to restore peace in the Gulf region
Jan. 25 Cabinet decision adopted on ordinance on interim
measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees
(promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled
April 19)
Mar. 13 Kanazawa District Court renders judgment on the first
trial for the lawsuit pertaining to noise generated by the
Komatsu Air Base
Mar. 31 WPO (Warsaw Pact structures) dismantled
Apr. 11 Gulf War formally ended
Apr. 24 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
on “Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf”
Apr. 26 Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart
for the Persian Gulf


|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1991|Jun. 03 Jul. 31 Sep. 06 Sep. 11 Sep. 17 Oct. 09 Nov. 05 Nov. 05 Nov. 26 Dec. 05 Dec. 08|Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Fugendake on Mt. Unzen U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states Miyazawa Cabinet established U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time House of Representatives establishes the Committee on National Security Miyazawa Cabinet established; Miyashita becomes Minister of State for Defense Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of Ukrainian Republic CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at summit (Brest, Belarus)|
|1992|Feb. 07 Feb. 25 Apr. 01 Apr. 01 Apr. 27 May 22 May 23 May 25 Jun. 19 Aug. 10 Aug. 24 Sep. 17 Sep. 19 Sep. 30 Nov. 09 Nov. 24 Dec. 03 Dec. 11 Dec. 16 Dec. 18 Dec. 21|Twelve EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty) China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency First female students enter National Defense Academy of Japan Tokyo District Court renders judgment in suits pertaining to the surrender of land for Atsugi Air Base North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fire guns START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet States including Russia IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities (through June 5) Announcement of “International Peace Cooperation Law” (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of “Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams” International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force China and the ROK establish diplomatic relations Departure commences of 1st Cambodia Dispatch Facilities Battalion (All units returned to Japan by September 26, 1993) Departure of Electoral Observer to Cambodia (Narita) U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines) CFE Treaty becomes formally effective U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal from Philippines complete) U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military action by multinational forces in Somalia Inauguration of reshuffled Miyazawa Cabinet; Nakayama becomes Minister of State for Defense U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy peacekeeping operations in Mozambique Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 2nd Atsugi Air Base noise suit|
|1993|Jan. 03 Jan. 13 Feb. 25 Mar. 12 Mar. 25 Apr. 08 May 04 May 04 May 11 May 14 May 29 Jun. 01 Jun. 09 Jun. 11 Jul. 12 Aug. 04 Aug. 09 Sep. 01 Sep. 13 Sep. 23 Oct. 12 Nov. 01 Dec. 02|U.S.–Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed Japan signs CWC Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit and 1st Yokota Air Base noise suit North Korea announces secession from NPT Aegis ship (Kongo) enters service Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Cambodia Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II) Death of Superintendent Haruyuki Takada, a civilian police officer in Cambodia Mozambique Dispatch Transport Coordination Unit begin departing for Mozambique (All units returned home by January 8, 1995) United Nations Operation in Mozambique headquarters staff depart for Mozambique North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.–North Korea consultations Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12) Signing of peace treaty in Rwandan civil war Hosokawa Cabinet established; Nakanishi becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. DoD announces the Bottom Up Review Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Japan–Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed Maastricht Treaty comes into effect; European Union established Aichi becomes Minister of State for Defense|


1994 Feb. 23 “Advisory Group on Defense Issues” inaugurated under
the Prime Minister
Feb. 24 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement
in 1st Kadena Air Base noise suit
Feb. 25 Defense Agency’s “Defense Posture Review Board”
inaugurated
Mar. 23 First female aviation students join MSDF
Mar. 24 First female aviation students join ASDF
Mar. 30 Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 2nd Yokota Air
Base noise suit
Apr. 28 Hata Cabinet established; Kanda becomes Minister of
State for Defense
Jun. 08 U.S. DoD submits “Report on Activities and Programs for
Countering Proliferation” pertaining to weapons of mass
destruction such as nuclear weapons
Jun. 30 Murayama Cabinet established; Tamazawa becomes
Minister of State for Defense


|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1994|Sep. 22 Oct. 21 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 05 Dec. 18 Dec. 20 Dec. 26|U.S. DoD announces “Nuclear Posture Review” U.S.-North Korea talks, both sides sign “Framework Agreement” relating to support for North Korean light water reactors, and provision of substitute energy First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17) Commander of U.S.–ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces START-I comes into force Russia starts military operations against Chechnya First visit to Japan by the ROK’s naval training vessel (Harumi, through December 23) Kanazawa branch of Nagoya High Court renders judgement in 1st Komatsu Air Base noise suit|
|1995|Jan. 17 Mar. 09 Mar. 20 May 11 May 19 Jun. 05 Jul. 28 Aug. 01 Aug. 08 Sep. 04 Sep. 15 Oct. 27 Nov. 17 Nov. 19 Nov. 28 Dec. 14 Dec. 14 Dec. 14 Dec. 15 Dec. 20 Dec. 26|Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin- Awaji Earthquake (through April 27) Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23) NPT extended indefinitely Enactment of “Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use by United States Forces in Japan” (effective June 20) The defense authorities of Japan and the ROK both issue the “letter concerning the prevention of accidents between aircraft of the Japan Self-defense Forces and military aircraft of the Republic of Korea” Vietnam officially joins ASEAN 1st KEDO Meeting (Japan–U.S.–ROK) held (New York) Inauguration of reshuffled Murayama Cabinet; Eto becomes Minister of State for Defense Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention Announcement of “Law Relating to the Treatment of Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International Organizations” (effective January 1, 1996) Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996 Security Council of Japan decision adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) (Cabinet decision on December 15) Security Council of Japan makes decision “Regarding upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter” (December 15, Cabinet approval); Model of Next-Generation Support Fighter “F-2” decided Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris 10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non- Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations Tokyo High Court renders judgement on remanded appeal trial for 1st Atsugi Air Base noise suit|
|1996|Jan. 11 Jan. 26 Jan. 31 Mar. 08 Mar. 23 Apr. 12 Apr. 15 Apr. 16 Apr. 17 Jul. 12 Jul. 20 Jul. 26 Jul. 29 Aug. 28 Aug. 28 Sep. 10 Sep. 18 Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Oct. 03 Nov. 07 Nov. 18 Dec. 02 Dec. 24|Hashimoto Cabinet established; Usui becomes Minister of State for Defense START-II ratified by U.S. Senate SDF units dispatched to United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) China carries out three missile firing exercises in total, naval and air force live-fire drills and, ground, naval and air force integrated exercises in the waters close to Taiwan March 8–25 Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections; Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied) Signing of Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective October 22) Cabinet decision adopted on promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna) U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30, Russian Navy’s 300th anniversary naval review) China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45th), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6) Supreme Court renders judgement in lawsuit regarding mandamus pertaining to proxy signature with regard to the Act on Special Measures Concerning USFJ Land Release U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) North Korean minisubmarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory (clearing operation completed November 7) Hong Kong protest vessels (Baodiao) etc., intrude into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of the provisional government Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed Inauguration of second Hashimoto Cabinet; Kyuma becomes Minister of State of Defense Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia- Herzegovina SACO final report approved by Japan–U.S. Joint Security Council Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters|


1997 Jan. 02 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the
Russian Nakhodka shipwreck and oil spill disaster
(through March 31)


-----

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1999|Nov. 22 Nov. 22 Dec. 17 Dec. 20 Dec. 27 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000) Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in place of UNSCOM Rule over Macao transferred to China Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the “Joint Response Manual for Suspicious Ships” Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station Cabinet decision adopted on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station|
|2000|Jan. 17 Feb. 16 Apr. 01 Apr. 05 Apr. 14 May 07 May 08 Jun. 16 Jul. 04 Jul. 21 Jul. 21 Aug. 25 Sep. 13 Oct. 12 Oct. 12 Nov. 20 Dec. 05 Dec. 15|Anti-personnel mine disposal begins First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17) Enactment of the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act” Mori Cabinet established Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II) Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force Inauguration of second Mori Cabinet; Torashima becomes Minister of State for Defense Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23) U.S.–Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Strategic Stability announced Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.–North Korea Joint Communique Terrorist attack on the U.S.S Cole, an American destroyer, in Yemen The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF Inauguration of second reshuffled Mori Cabinet; Saito becomes Minister of State for Defense Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005)|
|2001|Feb. 05 Feb. 09 Feb. 10 Mar. 01 Mar. 07 Apr. 01 Apr. 01 Apr. 26 May 14 Jun. 15 Aug. 08 Sep. 11 Sep. 12 Sep. 19 Sep. 21 Oct. 01 Oct. 02 Oct. 06 Oct. 07 Oct. 08 Oct. 29 Nov. 02 Nov. 16 Nov. 25 Nov. 27 Dec. 05 Dec. 20 Dec. 22 Dec. 22 Dec. 29|SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11), following the major earthquake which hit western India on January 26 Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005) Collision between Ehime Maru and U.S. submarine The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect Former Maritime Self-Defense official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes Koizumi Cabinet established; Nakatani becomes Minister of State for Defense Diplomatic relations established between North Korea and EU Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established Disaster relief teams dispatched for submarine rescue ship Chihaya to cooperate in raising the Ehime Maru (returned December 16) Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur U.N. Security Council adopts resolution condemning the terrorist attacks Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S. First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality of National Defense U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12) U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan (October 19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, first ground fighting) Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti- Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the first meeting Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002) Cabinet decision adopted on basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities Exchange of fire in the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba|


2002 Jan. 29 U.S. President G.W. Bush depicts “Axis of Evil” in the State
of the Union Address
Feb. 15 Cabinet decision adopted on international cooperation
execution plan for Timor-Leste
Mar. 02 680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch
Engineering Group to Timor-Leste (through June 25, 2004)
Mar. 06 Kanazawa District Court renders judgement in 2nd
Komatsu Air Base noise suit
Mar. 27 Introduction of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel
System
Apr. 22 2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the
first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through
May 2)
May04 Independence of Timor-Leste

|2002|May 20 May 24 May 30 Jun. 13 Jun. 29 Jul. 16 Jul. 29 Sep. 04 Sep. 17 Sep. 20 Sep. 30 Oct. 01 Oct. 13 Oct. 15 Oct. 16 Oct. 16 Oct. 31 Nov. 01 Nov. 14 Nov. 18 Nov. 21 Dec. 02 Dec. 12 Dec. 16 Dec. 17|The United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor- Leste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement in 4th Yokota Air Base noise suit U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL U.S. Government releases “National Strategy for Homeland Security” Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed Incident in central Sea of Japan (response to a suspicious ship) Japan–North Korea Summit held Kim Jong- Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions U.S. Government announces “National Security Strategy” Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ishiba becomes Minister of State for Defense Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and Planning Branch) (through July 6) First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay) Five of those abducted return to Japan U.S. Government issues statement that North Korea admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, during Assistant Secretary of State Kelly’s visit to North Korea Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 3rd Atsugi Air Base noise suit Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in the suit pertaining to the surrender of land for Sobe Communication Site Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect classified information (defense secrets) KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December First SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido NATO Prague Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe SDF personnel dispatched for the first time to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (December 5) in Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system|
|---|---|---|

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|1997|Jan. 20 Apr. 29 May 12 Jun. 09 Jul. 01 Jul. 03 Jul. 16 Sep. 11 Sep. 23 Nov. 10 Dec. 03 Dec. 03 Dec. 04 Dec. 19|Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters CWC enters into force Russia–Chechnya peace treaty signed Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through June 2002) Hong Kong reverts to China The first artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa conducted on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji, through July 9) North Korean soldiers cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops Inauguration of second reshuffled Hashimoto Cabinet Guidelines for New Japan–U.S. defense cooperation approved by Security Consultative Committee (SCC) China–Russia summit talks: China–Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China– Russian eastern border declared Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony in Ottawa (121 nations) Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996– FY2000)|
|1998|Mar. 26 Apr. 28 May 11 May 22 May 28 Jun. 06 Jun. 12 Jun. 12 Jun. 22 Jul. 27 Jul. 29 Jul. 30 Aug. 31 Aug. 31 Sep. 01 Sep. 02 Sep. 24 Sep. 30 Oct. 21 Nov. 14 Nov. 15 Nov. 20 Dec. 17 Dec. 22 Dec. 22 Dec. 25|Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13) Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 1st Kadena Air Base noise suit Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30) U.N. Security Council resolution adopted that condemns nuclear tests by India and Pakistan Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Government Reform Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12) A North Korean submarine intrudes into the east coast of ROK, seized by ROK forces China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, “Defense of China” Bilateral search and rescue exercise between MSDF/ ASDF and Russian Navy — the first full-fledged bilateral exercise between Japan and Russia Obuchi Cabinet established; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost sharing after North Korean missile launch Temporary freezing of Japan–North Korea normalization talks Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented Japan–ROK Fisheries Agreement concluded (Takeshima Issue shelved) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded KEDO signed Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations in region November 18–December 1, return to Japan December 5) First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima) Norota becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20) Cabinet decision adopted on introduction of information gathering satellite Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO) Security Council approves Japan–U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies|
|1999|Jan. 14 Mar. 01 Mar. 23 Mar. 29 Apr. 01 May 24 May 28 Jun. 15 Jul. 23 Aug. 05 Aug. 25 Sep. 02 Sep. 23 Sep. 29 Sep. 30 Oct. 05|Inauguration of reshuffled Obuchi Cabinet Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force in Japan Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24) GSDF establishes first brigade Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet) Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the “Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement” (adding cooperation for operations to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan) approved in Diet (effective September 25) Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan promulgated (enters into force August 25), Act for Partial Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act promulgated and enters into force Shooting incident between North Korean Naval ships which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South Korean Naval ships Tokyo High Court renders judgment in second Atsugi Air Base noise suit First Bilateral Exercise of Search and Rescue Exercise between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu) The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a new military demarcation line on the sea SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22) Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura (through October 3) Inauguration of second Obuchi Cabinet; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense|


Year Date Major Events

2002 May 20 The United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-
Leste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission
Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET)
May 24 Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions
May 30 Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement
in 4th Yokota Air Base noise suit
Jun. 13 U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Jun. 29 Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North
Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL
Jul. 16 U.S. Government releases “National Strategy for
Homeland Security”
Jul. 29 Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed
Sep. 04 Incident in central Sea of Japan (response to a suspicious
ship)
Sep. 17 Japan–North Korea Summit held Kim Jong- Il, the North
Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions
Sep. 20 U.S. Government announces “National Security Strategy”
Sep. 30 Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ishiba
becomes Minister of State for Defense
Oct. 01 Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and
Planning Branch) (through July 6)
Oct. 13 First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)
Oct. 15 Five of those abducted return to Japan
Oct. 16 U.S. Government issues statement that North Korea
admitted to having a program to enrich uranium for
nuclear weapons, during Assistant Secretary of State
Kelly’s visit to North Korea
Oct. 16 Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 3rd Atsugi
Air Base noise suit
Oct. 31 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement
in the suit pertaining to the surrender of land for Sobe
Communication Site
Nov. 01 Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect
classified information (defense secrets)
Nov. 14 KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of
heavy oil to North Korea from December
Nov. 18 First SDF and police authority hold joint command post
exercise in Hokkaido
Nov. 21 NATO Prague Summit decides new membership for seven
countries in Central and Eastern Europe
Dec. 02 SDF personnel dispatched for the first time to the U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)
Dec. 12 North Korea announces it will resume operation and
establishment of nuclear-related facilities
Dec. 16 Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense
systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to
revision (December 5) in Implementation Plan based on
the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
Dec. 17 U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system
2003 Jan. 10 North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Jan. 24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security established
Jan. 28 Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of
Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air
Station Replacement
Feb. 08 Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some
exceptions)
Mar. 20 U.S. and U.K. Forces begin military operations in Iraq
Mar. 27 Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency
Establishment Act, etc. (changes in SDF personnel quota
and number of Ready Reserve personnel) enters into force
Mar. 30 International peace cooperation activities are conducted
for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee
relief returns to Japan on April 2)
Apr. 21 ASDF in-flight refueling training (through May 1)
May 01 U.S. President G.W. Bush declares termination of major
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
May 13 Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgement
in 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit
May 31 U.S. President G.W. Bush proposes Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) for the first time
Jun. 01 U.S.–Russia leaders talk, enforcement of Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Strategic Offensive Reductions
Jun. 06 Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws
passed in the House of Councillors plenary session
Jun. 13 Cabinet decision adopted on Bill Concerning the Special
Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance
in Iraq
Jul. 04 Cabinet decision adopted on “Implementation Plan for
International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi
Afflicted Persons”
Jul. 17 International peace cooperation activities are conducted
for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief
of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18)
Jul. 26 Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and
Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed in the House of
Councillors plenary session
Jul. 29 Cabinet decision adopted on changes to the
implementation plan of the International Peace
Cooperation Operations in the Golan Heights
Aug. 27 First Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through
August 29)
Sep. 11 Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial
Zone
Sep. 12 First joint exercise of PSI held in the Coral Sea northeast
of Australia (through September 14)
Sep. 14 Government survey mission dispatched to Middle East
countries, including Iraq
Sep. 22 Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet (second term)
Sep. 30 Cabinet decision adopted on establishment of award for
people engaged in dangerous activities (November 3,
2003 Former SDF personnel are conferred the award for
people engaged in dangerous activities for the first time)
Oct. 07 Joint communique signed for the first time at Japan–
China–ROK Summit meeting
Oct. 10 Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for
another two years
Oct. 15 China launches its first manned spacecraft Shenzhou 5
Nov. 15 SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq
Nov. 19 Inauguration of second Koizumi Cabinet
Nov. 29 Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death
in the central region of Iraq
Dec. 04 Australia decides to participate in missile defense
program
Dec. 18 Iran signs IAEA agreement
Dec. 19 Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass
d t ti


-----

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|2007|Jan. 23 Feb. 13 Mar. 05 Mar. 13 Mar. 23 Mar. 28 Mar. 30 Mar. 30 Apr. 16 Apr. 16 May 01 May 18 May 29 May 29 Jun. 01 Jun. 28 Jul. 04 Jul. 14 Jul. 20 Jul. 31 Aug. 10 Aug. 27 Aug. 29 Sep. 01 Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Oct. 03 Oct. 17 Nov. 01 Nov. 16 Nov. 21 Nov. 28 Dec. 13 Dec. 18 Dec. 19 Dec. 24 Dec. 24|U.N. Security Council decides to set up the U.N. Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to oversee disarmament in Nepal North Korea agrees to disable all of its nuclear facilities during the Six-Party Talks First Aviation Training Relocation associated with realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Tsuiki, through March 8) Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed Emergency response procedures for destruction measures against ballistic missiles are prepared Establishment of the Central Readiness Force A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Iruma Base SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers (through January 18, 2011) Japan–U.S.–India naval drill conducted for the first time Nagoya District Court, Kanazawa Branch renders judgment on the third and fourth trials for the suit pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) announces the joint statement “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States–Japan Security and Defense Cooperation” ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility Russia announces that it succeeded in launching a new intercontinental ballistic missile Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th Yokota Air Base noise suit Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance and the Local Defense Bureau, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, etc) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted Russia succeeds in the experimental launch of new submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM), Bulava Koike becomes Minister of Defense Russian President Putin signs presidential order on the termination of the execution of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Enactment of the “Basic Act on Ocean Policy” The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1769 on the dispatch of the U.N./AU Joint PKO Unit (UNMID) to the Darfur region in Sudan Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S. General Security of Military Information Agreement Inauguration of reshuffled Abe Cabinet; Koumura becomes Minister of Defense Enactment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created Fukuda Cabinet established; Ishiba becomes Minister of Defense Second session of the Sixth Round of the Sixth Six-Party Talks held (Beijing) (through September 30) (October 3, Sixth Six-Party Talks Agreement “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” published) The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” is announced First Japan–U.S.–Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF, U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Council for MOD Reform established The USS Kitty Hawk is denied docking in Hong Kong and returns to Yokosuka via the Taiwan Strait (through November 25) Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the first time (through December 1) Russia seizes four Japanese fishing vessels off Kunashiri Island Review of USFJ Local Employee Wages (Abolishment of USFJ Differential, etc.) Aegis vessel MSDF Kongo conducts a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S. forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ realignment “Improvement of next fixedwing aircraft” and “Important issues among contents of Defense Capability Buildup in FY2008” Cabinet decisions adopted on “Changes of emergency response measures on destruction measures by ballistic missiles”|
|2008|Jan. 16 Jan. 25 Feb. 19 Feb. 20 Feb. 21 Mar. 14 Mar. 18 Mar. 26 Apr. 24 May 12 May 30 Jun. 24 Jun. 26|Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January 24, 25) New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed Collision between Aegis vessel MSDF and fishing boat U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down out-of-control satellite outside the earth’s atmosphere with an SM-3 Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean (through January 15, 2010) Demonstration by Buddhist monks in the regional capital of Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region, China Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. reorganization of the SDF Command and Communication Unit) Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack M7.8 earthquake occurs in Sichuan Province, China The Convention on Cluster Munitions is adopted at an international conference in Dublin First visit of MSDF vessel to China (through June 28) Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea|

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|2003|Dec. 19 Dec. 26 Dec. 30|Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions) ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (January 1–2, 2004)|
|2004|Jan. 22 Feb. 03 Feb. 09 Feb. 09 Feb. 25 Mar. 04 Mar. 22 Mar. 26 Apr. 15 Apr. 15 Apr. 28 May 20 May 22 Jun. 01 Jun. 01 Jun. 14 Jun. 14 Jun. 18 Jun. 23 Jun. 28 Jul. 20 Aug. 13 Sep. 27 Oct. 04 Oct. 06 Oct. 25 Oct. 25 Nov. 07 Nov. 10 Nov. 16 Dec. 26 Dec. 27 Dec. 10 Dec. 28|ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8) Second Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through February 29) Disaster relief teams dispatched for the first time in response to bird flu (Tanbacho, Kyoto Prefecture, through March 11) EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development of the structure and organization of EU rapid response capabilities Diet decides on installation of ballistic missile defense system (FY2004 draft budget passed in the House of Councillors plenary session) First transport of Japanese nationals living overseas implemented, 10 nationals transported from Iraq to Kuwait Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Defense Agency/SDF U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) transfers defense and security authority to Timor-Leste Japan–North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang). Five family members of abductees return to Japan Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated (sovereignty transferred on June 28), and Iraqi Governing Council dissolved U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in House of Councillors plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed Cabinet agreement for SDF’s activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces) Third Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through June 26) Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, patrols commenced by the navies of three countries, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa Inauguration of second reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ohno becomes Minister of State for Defense Final report by “Council on Security and Defense Capabilities” The U.S. and ROK announce a plan of three stage reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in the ROK by 2008 PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan for the first time (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27) EU leaders sign the EU Constitution Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary commemorative troop review Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan’s territorial waters–Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12) Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine’s intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster China releases a white paper, “China’s National Defense in 2004” Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005” and “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005–FY2009” MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand’s Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia’s Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)|
|2005|Jan. 04 Jan. 19 Feb. 10 Feb. 17 Feb. 19 Mar. 08 Mar. 14 Mar. 14 Mar. 16 Mar. 25 Apr. 25 Jul. 14 Aug. 05 Sep. 09|SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (All teams returned home by March 23) The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged submarines in Japan’s territorial waters North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement implying its manufacture of nuclear weapons (May 11, announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods) Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 2nd Kadena Air Base noise suit Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) — common strategic objectives confirmed “ROK’s Government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft approaching Takeshima without authorization” National People’s Congress adopts “Anti-Secession Law” A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20) Shimane Prefecture establishes “Takeshima Day” Cabinet decision adopted on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians Disaster relief teams dispatched after the railroad accident on JR West’s Fukuchiyama Line Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in the East China Sea An MSDF vessel dispatched to conduct international disaster relief activity in Connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All units returned home by August 10) First China-Russia joint military exercises “Peace Mission 2005” (through August 25)|

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|2005|Sep. 09 Sep. 19 Sep. 21 Oct. 12 Oct. 20 Oct. 29 Oct. 31 Oct. 31 Nov. 09 Nov. 11 Nov. 16 Nov. 27 Nov. 30 Dec. 01 Dec. 14 Dec. 16 Dec. 24|Five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class,are navigating in the sea area surrounding “Kashi” gas field near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea Joint statement adopted at Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks Inauguration of third Koizumi Cabinet SDF units dispatched for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to large-scale earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All units returned home by December 2) GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attacks for the first time Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) joint announces “Japan–U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” Inauguration of third reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year) First session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through November 11)” Cabinet decision adopted on “the Government’s actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee held on October 29, 2005” India and Pakistan complete the opening of five areas on the effective control line in Kashmir to enable disaster rescue activities for the sufferers from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc. Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 4th Yokota Air Base noise suit Partial revision of the Act on Remuneration of Defense Agency Personnel (revised remuneration) enters into force The first East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur) U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the human rights situation in North Korea Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on “Japan–U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense”|
|2006|Jan. 10 Feb. 03 Feb. 04 Mar. 06 Mar. 16 Mar. 27 Apr. 23 May 01 May 05 May 11 May 15 May 27 May 29 Jun. 01 Jun. 16 Jun. 19 Jun. 20 Jun. 23 Jun. 29 Jul. 05 Jul. 13 Jul. 31 Aug. 16 Aug. 29 Aug. 29 Sep. 20 Sep. 26 Oct. 09 Oct. 13 Dec. 19|Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment The United States releases “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) Japan–North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/ missile issues are held (through February 6) At the Japan–China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (through March 7) The United States announces the National Security Strategy Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles, etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ The Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) announces the “United States– Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” Peace agreement between Sudanese Government and certain rebel forces in Darfur Conflict The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State for Defense sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ U.S. rescinds designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Java, Indonesia First P-3C visit to Australia SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java (through June 22) Nepalese Government and Maoists sign peace accord Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announces that the authority to maintain public order in the province of Muthannna is transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces Agreement concerning provision of arms and military technologies to the United States is signed Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, joint document “The Japan- U.S. Alliance of the New Century” announced North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd Atsugi Air Base noise suit Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (inc. reinforcement of facilities administration function of the agency, establishment of the Equipment headquarters and reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices) A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia U.S. Navy, deploys Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 at Yokosuka naval facility The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station established, and its first meeting held Chinese Navy performs joint search and rescue exercises with U.S. Navy (sea around San Diego) Abe Cabinet established; Kyuma becomes Minister of State for Defense North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test U.N. General Assembly adopts draft resolution condemning abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea|
|2007|Jan. 09 Jan. 09 Jan. 12|Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of the Defense Agency into the Ministry of Defense and stipulation of the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities as its primary mission) Kyuma becomes Minister of Defense China conducts an anti-satellite test|


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|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|2010|Dec. 17|Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond and the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011 to FY2015)|
|2011|Jan. 11 Jan. 14 Jan. 14 Jan. 21 Jan. 27 Jan. 28 Feb. 04 Feb. 05 Feb. 08 Feb. 22 Feb. 23 Mar. 11 Mar. 11 Mar. 11 Mar. 12 Mar. 16 Mar. 16 Mar. 17 Mar. 19 Apr. 05 Apr. 11 Apr. 15 Apr. 27 May 02 Jun. 01 Jun. 21 Jun. 22 Jun. 24 Jun. 28 Jul. 08 Jul. 09 Jul. 11 Jul. 14 Aug. 10 Aug. 24 Sep. 02 Sep. 09 Sep. 19 Sep. 27 Sep. 29 Sep. 30 Oct. 10 Oct. 11 Oct. 24 Oct. 31 Nov. 15 Nov. 22 Dec. 18 Dec. 20 Dec. 20 Dec. 27 Dec. 28|China conducts test flight of fighter aircraft touted as the next-generation stealth aircraft U.N. Security Council chairman’s statement concerning the conclusion of the UNMIN mandate is adopted Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet (second term) Signing of the new Special Measures Agreement in connection with cost-sharing arrangements on the stationing of U.S.Forces in Japan (comes into effect on April 1) Supreme Court renders judgement in 2nd Kadena Air Base noise suit Prime Minister Kan attends the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Davos meeting) (through January 30) The United States releases “National Security Space Strategy” (NSSS) New START comes into effect The United States releases the “National Military Strategy” Iranian naval ships pass through Suez Canal Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in New Zealand (through March 3) Four pirates that had shot at Japanese vessels off the Oman Coast in the Arabian Sea were arrested under the Anti-Piracy Law Great East Japan Earthquake strikes Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through August 31) Nuclear disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through December 26) Cabinet decisions adopted on first disaster call-up of SDF reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch GSDF ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel (through August 31) U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1973 allowing use of force against Libya The coalition force led by the U.S., U.K., and France commence military operations against Libya U.S. President Obama gives speech in Prague Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake established Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch MSDF and ASDF reserve personnel (through August 31) Partial revision to the Environmental Improvement Law (extended target projects for subsidies to improve the environment surrounding specified defense facilities) U.S. President Obama announces the killing of Osama bin Laden, leader of the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda SDF activity base in Djibouti initiates operation Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” in Washington, D.C.) joint statement; release of “Toward a Deeper and Broader Japan–U.S. Alliance: Building on 50 years of Partnership” U.S. President Obama announces guidelines to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan Exercise of the Basic Act on Reconstruction First meeting of the headquarters for reconstruction measures U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1996 to establish UNMISS Independence of the Republic of South Sudan U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1997 to terminate UNMIS U.S. DoD releases “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” Conducts its first navigation Chinese aircraft carrier Varyag The Chinese fisheries patrol ships enter Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Noda Cabinet established; Ichikawa becomes Minister of Defense 24 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait Detection of cyber attacks against defense industry Japan-Philippines Summit (Tokyo), Japan-Philippines joint statement made Chinese space laboratory “Tiangong 1” launched Cabinet decisions adopted on “Promotion of the operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System project” and “Promoting development and utilization of aerospace” ATR to Guam as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through October 28) Supreme Court renders judgement in 1st Futenma Air Station noise suit Signing and entry into force of the Japan-France Information Security Agreement NATO ends operations in Libya Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF personnel as headquarters staff for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (departing Japan on November 28) Six Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq Decision made by the Security Council and seconded by the Cabinet regarding “acquisition of the next-generation fighter aircraft” Cabinet Decision on dispatching engineer units, etc. for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (deployed from January 11, 2012) (Operation completed on May 31, 2017) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc. Environmental impact statement for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture (through January 6, 2012)|


2012 Jan. 05 U.S. announces the defense strategic guidance
Jan. 11 1st Advance unit for UNMISS starts departing Japan
Jan. 13 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet; Tanaka becomes
Minister of Defense
Feb. 10 Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency
Mar. 16 Chinese government ship “Haijian” enters Japan’s
territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands
Mar. 26 Transfer of ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base
Mar. 27 Prime Minister Noda attends the Nuclear Security Summit

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|2008|Jun. 26 Jun. 26 Jul. 07 Jul. 12 Jul. 15 Jul. 17 Aug. 02 Aug. 08 Aug. 10 Aug. 29 Sep. 09 Sep. 24 Sep. 25 Sep. 25 Oct. 03 Oct. 10 Oct. 19 Oct. 22 Oct. 24 Nov. 02 Dec. 02 Dec. 03 Dec. 20 Dec. 23 Dec. 26|North Korea submits its nuclear program Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 1st Futenma Air Station noise suit G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through July 9) Publication of the Press Communique of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released Tokyo High Court renders judgement in 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Hayashi becomes Minister of Defense Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1 U.S. President G.W. Bush announces reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and increase of troops in Afghanistan Aso Cabinet established; Hamada becomes Minister of Defense Commissioning of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington China launches a manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 7,” and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the first time U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism Four Chinese naval warships including a destroyer sail through Tsugaru Strait for the first time Japan–India Summit Meeting: Japan–India Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed SDF personnel dispatched to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (through September 30, 2011) Four Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean for the first time U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1846 on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions signed Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005– FY2009) ASDF Airlift Wing that was deployed under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq returns to Japan Chinese naval fleet of three destroyers sets off to Somalia for escort mission|
|2009|Jan. 08 Jan. 15 Jan. 27 Jan. 31 Feb. 10 Feb. 17 Feb. 17 Feb. 27 Mar. 06 Mar. 13 Mar. 13 Mar. 14 Mar. 27 Mar. 30 Apr. 03 Apr. 05 Apr. 05 Apr. 06 Apr. 10 May 04 May 15 May 19 May 25 Jun. 02 Jun. 11 Jun. 16 Jul. 04 Jul. 14 Jul. 17 Jul. 24 Jul. 28 Jul. 31|ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri) Ministry of Defense decides on “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space” Japanese fishing boat No. 38 Yoshimaru caught by Russian Coast Guard in Sea of Japan Provisional government in Somalia, Ahmed elected as new president Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the redeployment group Signing of the “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” U.S. President Obama decides to increase the number of troops dispatched to Afghanistan by approximately 17,000 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 2nd Kadena Air Base noise suit U.S.–Russia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, agreement to “reset” bilateral relations (Geneva) Cabinet decision adopted on Anti-Piracy Measures Law SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security operations as part of anti-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden 2 MSDF ships are dispatched to protect vessels with ties to Japan from the piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued MSDF ships begin escort missions for the purpose of protecting Japan-affilliated vessels from the piracy Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace U.S. President Obama delivers speech in Prague SDF action order for termination of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued Supreme Court renders judgement in 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit 1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines) Order issued for P-3C to be dispatched to Djibouti for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” comes into force North Korea conducts the underground nuclear test Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated Commencement of warning and surveillance flights in the Gulf of Aden by P-3Cs Provisional government of Somalia declares a state of emergency due to outbreak of fighting North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan Ratification of Convention on Cluster Munitions Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their Possession Anti-Piracy Measures Law enacted, Order issued for anti-piracy operations The exterior of the body of oil tanker “M. STAR” damaged in an explosion at the Straits of Hormuz Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq|

|Year|Date|Major Events|
|---|---|---|
|2009|Aug. 01 Sep. 16 Sep. 17 Sep. 30 Oct. 01 Oct. 05 Oct. 20 Oct. 27 Nov. 10 Nov. 11 Nov. 12 Nov. 23 Dec. 01 Dec. 03 Dec. 05 Dec. 17|Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. establishment of the Defense Council and the Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the Defense Councilors System) Hatoyama Cabinet established; Kitazawa becomes Minister of Defense U.S. President Obama announces review of MD deployment in Europe M7.6 earthquake occurs off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia China conducts 60th Anniversary Military Parade SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia (though October 17) 1st Ministry of Defense Policy Meeting Destroyer collides with ROK cargo ship in the Kammon Straits North and South Korean ships engage in fire in the Yellow Sea Government Revitalization Unit “project screening” (through November 27) Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Emperor of Japan’s coronation Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) receives the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea Lisbon treaty comes into effect Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Supreme Court) START I lapses Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted on the build-up of defense capability for FY2010|
|2010|Jan. 11 Jan. 12 Jan. 17 Jan. 19 Jan. 29 Feb. 05 Feb. 27 Mar. 07 Mar. 11 Mar. 26 Mar. 26 Apr. 01 Apr. 02 Apr. 06 Apr. 12 May 01 May 19 May 23 May 26 May 27 May 28 Jun. 08 Jun. 09 Jun. 25 Jun. 28 Jul. 01 Jul. 13 Jul. 29 Aug. 01 Aug. 31 Sep. 07 Sep. 07 Sep. 10 Sep. 17 Sep. 28 Oct. 01 Oct. 19 Nov. 01 Nov. 19 Nov. 23 Dec. 07|China announces that it has performed missile interception test M7 earthquake occurs in Haiti Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in Haiti (February 14, operation completed) “2+2” joint statement on the 50th anniversary of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty First test flight of Russian fifth-generation fighter PAK FA Decision made to dispatch SDF units to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (February 6, deployment commences) (January 25, 2013, operation completed) U.S. announces “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) and “Ballistic Missile Defense Review” (BMDR) Russia publishes new Navy doctrine ASDF Hyakuri Base, joint civilian use of runway ROK naval patrol ship “Cheonan” sank in the Yellow Sea by a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (new establishment of the 15th Bridge and reorganization of the Youth Technical School) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of GSDF students) In Thailand, Thaksin supporters occupy the center of cities such as Bangkok. On April 10, they clash with Thai Government security forces (through May 19) U.S. announces “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR) 1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., through April 13) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to foot and mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27) Signing of Japan–Australia ACSA MOD/SDF participate in Pacific Partnership 2010 (through July 15) Enactment of the “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” U.S. announces “National Security Strategy” (NSS) Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Kan Cabinet established U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding additional sanction on Iran Signing and entry into force of the Japan-Nato Information Security Agreement Release of the U.S. “National Space Policy” (NSP) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of SDF recruits) Cabinet decision adopted on “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 1st Futenma Air Station noise suit Coming into effect of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Air transport activities by helicopter in aid of flood disaster in Pakistan (through October 10) Release of the “Future Direction of Procurement Reform” by the Comprehensive Procurement Reform Promotion Committee Chinese fishing boat collides with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in waters near the Senkaku Islands Cabinet decision adopted on dispatch of SDF officers as key military contact personnel (military observers) to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (dispatched on September 27) Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet North Korea holds conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea and a Plenary Meeting of Central Committee; Kim Jong-un is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition of the lowest enlisted ranks) The United Kingdom releases “Strategic Defence and Security Review” (SDSR) Russian President Medvedev visits the Kunashiri Island NATO adopts New Strategic Concept North Korea shells the ROK’s Yeonpyeong island Establishment of a governmental committee to review information security, as a result of the leakage of the video showing the fishing boat collision off the Senkaku Islands|


-----

Year Date Major Events


Year Date Major Events


|2013|Jul. 13 Jul. 22 Jul. 24 Aug. 21 Aug. 22 Aug. 27 Aug. 30 Sep. 01 Sep. 08 Sep. 09 Sep. 10 Sep. 27 Oct. 03 Oct. 03 Oct. 16 Oct. 23 Oct. 30 Nov. 08 Nov. 12 Nov. 15 Nov. 22 Nov. 23 Nov. 24 Dec. 04 Dec. 08 Dec. 13 Dec. 15 Dec. 15 Dec. 17 Dec. 23 Dec. 23 Dec. 27|Chinese naval fleets sail through Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk China Coast Guard sign put up Chinese early warning aircraft passes between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advances to the Pacific Ocean for the first time Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Russian bombers intrude into Japan’s airspace Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean “Direction of the MOD Reform” released Council on Security and Defense Capabilities holds first meeting Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unidentified nationality flies over the East China Sea 1st meeting of MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games held U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2118 on elimination of Syrian chemical weapons Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”, Tokyo) Signing of the “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam” Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon No. 26 (through November 8) Five Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Typhoon No. 30 Haiyan hit Leyte Island, Philippines Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to typhoon disaster in the Philippines (through December 18) Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decides on detailed terms of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, etc. Revisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (e.g., expanded category of people who may be transported by the JSDF, in the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas) promulgated and entered into force China announces establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., China, Russia) reach first phase agreement for the comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue National Security Council established The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identification Zone Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets promulgated Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing Confrontations occur between forces aligned with the president and forces aligned with the former vice president National Security Council and Cabinet decisions adopted on “National Security Strategy,” “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond,” and “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)” Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned (incorporated into Pacific Fleet) Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approves application for public water reclamation for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project|
|---|---|---|


2014 Jan. 01 Entry into force of the Japan-U.K. Information Security
Agreement
Jan. 07 National Security Secretariat launched
Jan. 15 Collision accident between transport vessel and fishing
vessel in the Hiroshima Bay
Jan. 22 Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of
Bases on Okinawa established
Jan. 28 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2134 approving
deployment of EU units to Central Africa
Feb. 14 Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of
MCAS Futenma on Okinawa established
Feb. 15 Disaster relief teams dispatched after heavy snowfall
disaster (through February 23)
Mar. 01 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific
Ocean
Mar. 03 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Mar. 04 The United States releases QDR, releases FY2014 budget
proposal
Mar. 11 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the
missing Malaysian Airplane (through April 28)
Mar. 18 Russian “annexation” of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea
Mar. 19 A submarine seen navigating underwater in Japan’s
contiguous zone (waters east of Miyako Island)
Mar. 24 Prime Minister Abe attends 3rd Nuclear Security Summit
(Hague, through March 25)
Mar. 26 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Apr. 01 Partial enforcement (establishment of Faculty of Nursing
at National Defense Medical College) of partially amended
laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
Apr. 01 Cabinet decision adopted on “Three Principles on Transfer
of Defense Equipment and Technology”
Apr. 10 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2149 approving
PKO deployment to Central Africa
Apr. 14 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the bird flu
outbreak in Kumamoto Prefecture (through April 16)
Apr. 28 U.S. and Philippines sign Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement: (EDCA)
May 02 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific
Ocean
May 07 Collision and confrontation between Chinese and
Vietnamese vessels occur
May 14 “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the
relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to
Guam” comes into force
May 15 The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis
for Security submits its report

|2012|Mar. 30 Apr. 13 Apr. 13 Apr. 17 Apr. 27 Apr. 29 May 17 Jun. 04 Jul. 01 Jul. 03 Jul. 11 Jul. 12 Jul. 12 Aug. 10 Sep. 07 Sep. 11 Sep. 23 Sep. 25 Oct. 01 Oct. 16 Nov. 26 Dec. 04 Dec. 07 Dec. 12 Dec. 13 Dec. 26 Dec. 31|SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated April 13) North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission Ten-month extension of SDF dispatch to support the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (through February 28, 2013) Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee “2+2” joint statement Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Signing of the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (second term); Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense 26 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait (through July 2) First PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Hokkaido, through July 5) Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law for Establishment of Cabinet Office South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the MOD/JSDF” is released Government’s purchase of the three Senkaku Islands SDF dispatch to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ended The first Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” commissioned Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (third term) Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island for the first time Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Launch of capacity building program in East Timor SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated December 12) North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands) Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes Minister of Defense UNMIT ends|
|---|---|---|

|2014|May 19 May 20 May 21 May 24 May 27 May 31 Jun. 07 Jun. 11 Jun. 11 Jun. 19 Jun. 21 Jun. 29 Jun. 29 Jul. 01 Jul. 08 Jul. 09 Jul. 13 Jul. 25 Jul. 26 Aug. 01 Aug. 06 Aug. 8- Aug. 10 Aug. 12 Aug. 17 Aug. 17 Aug. 19 Aug. 20 Aug. 28 Sep. 01 Sep. 03 Sep. 03 Sep. 10 Sep. 11 Sep. 18 Sep. 19 Sep. 22- Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Sep. 29 Oct. 03 Oct. 26 Nov. 16 Nov. 21 Nov. 23 Nov. 24 Nov. 28 Dec. 01 Dec. 01 Dec. 04 Dec.4- Dec. 06 Dec. 10 Dec. 19 Dec. 24 Dec. 24 Dec. 26 Dec. 31|U.S. Department of Justice indicts Chinese PLA officers and others for conducting cyber attacks China-Russia joint maritime military exercise “Naval Interaction 2014” (East China Sea) (through May 26) Yokohama District Court renders judgement in 4th Atsugi Air Base noise suit Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2155 that extends UNMISS mandate and limits it to four areas including civilian protection, etc. Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister Onodera attend 13th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacifci Ocean Japan-Australia “2+2” (Tokyo) Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases released Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (response to early retirement system) North Korea launches two ballistic missiles ISIL declares establishment of “Islamic State” and caliphate Cabinet decision adopted on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People” Japan-Australia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed North Korea launches two ballistic missiles North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs) North Korea launches a ballistic missile Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (quota for SDF personnel posts of Internal Bureau, establishment of Air Tactics Development & Training Wing, etc.) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall in Yamaguchi Prefecture (through August 8) U.S. Central Command begins airstrikes on ISIL in Northern Iraq Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply supports in Kochi Prefecture (through August 14) Russian Armed Forces conduct exercises in the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto Prefecture Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Tamba City, Hyogo Prefecture Chinese fighter jets fly abnormally close to U.S. Forces’ patrol aircraft Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11) MOD formulates “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space (revised)” Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo); “Tokyo Declaration for Japan-India Special Strategic and Global Partnership” Eto becomes Minister of Defense Inauguration of the second Abe Cabinet U.S. President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply supports in Ebetsu City, Hokkaido (through September 13) U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2177 on Ebola virus disease countermeasures; UNMEER’s establishment is announced Russia begins large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” (through September 25) The United States and other coalition countries begin airstrikes on ISIL in Syria Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Mt. Ontake (through October 16) Afghanistan’s new government is launched Cabinet decision adopted on “Establishment of the Headquarters for Creating a Society where All Women Shine” Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Nakaima in Okinawa gubernatorial election “Global Hawk” is decided as the model of unmanned aerial vehicle Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to an earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near Takeshima Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, through December 11) SDF personnel dispatched to NATO for the first time Russia establishes the Northern Joint Strategic Command Five Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Chinese People’s Liberation Army begins exercise in Western Pacific. Subsequently, some vessels transit Soya Strait (December 24) and Tsushima Strait (December 27) and circle Japan Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy snowfall in Tokushima Prefecture (through December 11) Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets enters into force Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Inauguration of the third Abe Cabinet, Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect Deployment of U.S. Forces TPY-2 (“X-band radar”) to Kyogamisaki is completed Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11)|
|---|---|---|


Year Date Major Events

2012 Mar. 30 SDF action order for implementation of destruction
measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated
April 13)
Apr. 13 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a
“Satellite”
Apr. 13 Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National
Defense Commission
Apr. 17 Ten-month extension of SDF dispatch to support the
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)
(through February 28, 2013)
Apr. 27 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee “2+2” joint
statement
Apr. 29 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the
Pacific Ocean
May 17 Signing of the Japan-Australia Information Security
Agreement
Jun. 04 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (second term);
Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense
Jul. 01 26 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait (through
July 2)
Jul. 03 First PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan
(Hokkaido, through July 5)
Jul. 11 Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement
Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the
Senkaku Islands
Jul. 12 One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the
Senkaku Islands
Jul. 12 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law
for Establishment of Cabinet Office
Aug. 10 South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima
Sep. 07 “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the
MOD/JSDF” is released
Sep. 11 Government’s purchase of the three Senkaku Islands
Sep. 23 SDF dispatch to the United Nations Integrated Mission in
Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ended
Sep. 25 The first Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” commissioned
Oct. 01 Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (third term)
Oct. 16 Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters
between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island
for the first time
Nov. 26 Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding
Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the
Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
Dec. 04 Launch of capacity building program in East Timor
Dec. 07 SDF action order for implementation of destruction
measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated
December 12)
Dec. 12 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a
“Satellite”
Dec. 13 A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first
time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands)
Dec. 26 Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes
Minister of Defense
Dec. 31 UNMIT ends
2013 Jan. 16 Abduction of Japanese nationals in Algeria
Jan. 19 A Chinese naval vessel may direct fire-control radar at a
helicopter based on a JMSDF destroyer
Jan. 20 SDF dispatch to the United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF) ended (ceremony to return
unit flag)
Jan. 20 As a measure for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals
Overseas (TJNO) prescribed in the Self-Defense Forces
Act, SDF transports Japanese victims of the Algerian
hostage crisis from Algeria to Japan (return home on
January 24)
Jan. 23 Australia announces the National Security Strategy
Jan. 25 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet decisions adopted
on build-up of defense capability for FY2013
Jan. 25 “Basic Plan on Space Policy” is decided by the Strategic
Headquarters for Space Development
Jan. 27 China announces that it has performed missile
interception test
Jan. 30 A Chinese vessel directs fire-control radar at a JMSDF
destroyer in the East China Sea
Jan. 31 Three Chinese vessels sail northeast of Miyako Island to
the Pacific Ocean
Jan. 31 Japan–Australia ACSA enters into force
Jan. 31 Partial enforcement (regarding Japan-Australia ACSA)
of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense
Forces Act, etc.
Feb. 01 Partial enforcement (regarding pilot allowance) of partially
amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc.
Feb. 07 Russian fighters intrude into Japan’s airspace
Feb. 12 North Korea’s underground nuclear test
Feb. 15 First meeting of a panel of experts on the establishment of
a Japanese National Security Council (NSC)
Feb. 20 Naha District Court renders judgment on Henoko
environmental assessment case
Feb. 23 Meeting between U.S. President Obama and Prime
Minister Abe
Mar. 01 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on participation
of Japan’s industries in the production of the F-35A
Mar. 15 SDF dispatch for the MINUSTAH mission ended (ceremony
to return unit flag)
Mar. 22 Entry into force of Japan-Australia Information Security
Agreement
Mar. 26 Partial enforcement (regarding shift of Air Rescue Wing’s
affiliation) of partially amended laws, including the Self-
Defense Forces Act, etc.
Mar. 30 Four Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of
Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean
Apr. 02 North Korea announces that it will readjust and restart
the graphite moderated reactor that was mothballed and
disabled under an agreement reached at the Six-Party
Talks in October, 2007
Apr. 26 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy”
Apr. 29 France releases “White Paper on Defence and National
Security”
May 07 Two Chinese vessels sail northeast of the Yonaguni Island
to the Pacific Ocean
May 27 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of
Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific
Ocean
Jun. 18 Afghanistan starts final phase of transition of security
responsibilities from the International Security Assistance
Force
Jul. 04 Signing of the Japan-U.K. Agreement Concerning the
Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies and the Japan-
U.K. Information Security Agreement
Jul. 05 China-Russia joint naval exercise. “Naval Interaction
2013” (th h J l 11)


-----

Year Defense Domestic International


|2015|Jan. 15 Jan. 18 Jan. 18 Jan. 19 Jan. 21 Jan. 21 Jan. 29 Jan. 29 Feb.02 Feb.08 Feb. 20 Mar. 13 Mar. 13 Mar. 13 Mar. 14 Mar. 20 Mar. 30 Apr.08 Apr. 21 Apr. 27 Apr. 27 Apr. 28 Apr. 30 May 29 May 30 May 30 May 30 May 31 May 31 Jun.03 Jun.07 Jun. 29 Jul.03 Aug. 18 Sep.01 Sep.01 Sep. 10 Oct.01 Oct.01 Oct. 18 Oct. 20 Oct. 23 Nov.03 Nov.03 Nov.04 Nov.06 Nov. 12 Nov. 22 Nov. 22 Dec.04 Dec. 12 Dec. 17|Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the bird flu outbreak in Okayama Prefecture (through January 19) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the bird flu outbreak in Saga Prefecture (through January 20) Defense Minister Nakatani visits Djibouti Defense Minister Nakatani visits South Sudan First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (London) Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (U.K.) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Memorandum on Japan-Philippines Defense Cooperation and Exchanges is signed Disaster relief teams dispatched to help remove snow to eliminate isolated areas as a result of the severe snowstorm in Rausu Town, Hokkaido (through February 3) Inaugural airborne exercise under Japan-U.S. joint exercise (North Wind 2) (through February 22) Memorandum on Japan-Qatar Defense Exchange is signed Second Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Tokyo) Japan-Colombia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Timor Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) National Defense Medical College instructor dispatched to support WHO’s epidemiological studies on the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa, etc. (through May 29) Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to earthquake in Nepal (through May 22) The new “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” is approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting (“2+2,” New York) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Promulgation and enforcement of the Special Measures Act on the Number of Years of the National Subsidization of Specific Defense Procurements (so-called “Long-term Contract Act”) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption at Kuchinoerabu Island (through June 1) Defense Minister Nakatani attends 14th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) (through May 31) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Singapore) Pacific Partnership 2015 (through August 14) Dispatched MSDF personnel as commander of Combined Task Force (CTF 151) for counter-piracy operations (through August 27) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Joint disaster response exercise with U.S. Forces (TREX) SDF Joint Exercise for Rescue (through July 3) Disaster relief teams dispatched to support search of missing persons in Mt. Ontake (through August 7) Joint exercise in the United States (Dawn Blitz 2015) (through September 9) Exercise for medical activities in the aftermath of large-scale earthquakes Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply supports in Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture (through September 2) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rain in Kanto and Tohoku in September 2015 (through September 19) Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (unification of actual unit operations into Joint Staff, establishment of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, etc.) Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office are abolished; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency is established FY2015 SDF Fleet Review Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) SDF Joint Exercise (Field Training Exercise) (through November 13) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia) 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM- Plus) (Kuala Lumpur) (through November 4) Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur) Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vietnam) Japan-Georgia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (Sydney) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney) Japan-Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-India Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (New Delhi) Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)|Jan.09 Jan. 16 Jan. 17 Jan. 18 Feb.09 Feb. 10 Feb. 10 Feb. 27 Mar.06 Mar.09 Mar. 20 Mar. 23 Mar. 24 Mar. 27 Apr. 28 May 13 May 14 May 14 May 20 May 25 May 29 Jun.04 Jun.07 Jun.07 Jun.08 Jun. 11 Jul. 30 Aug.03 Sep. 15 Sep. 19 Sep. 26 Sep. 27 Sep. 27 Sep. 28 Sep. 28 Sep. 28 Sep. 28 Sep. 29 Oct.05 Oct.06 Oct.07 Oct.08 Oct. 15 Oct. 27 Oct. 28 Nov.01 Nov.01 Nov.02 Nov. 10 Nov. 13 Nov. 15 Nov. 15 Nov. 15 Nov. 15 Nov. 16 Nov. 16 Nov. 19 Nov. 26 Dec.04 Dec. 12 Dec. 12 Dec. 18|“Basic Plan on Space Policy” is decided by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Cairo) Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Amman) Japan-Israel summit meeting (Jerusalem, through January 19) Japan-Thailand summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Qatar summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Poland summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Laos summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Germany summit meeting (Tokyo) The Ruling Coalition on the Development of Security Legislation presents “Concrete Vision for the Development of Security Legislation” Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Portugal summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Japan-Belgium summit meeting (Tokyo) Cabinet decision on “Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Bill” Cabinet decisions on “Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law,” “The Government’s Responses to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group,” and “Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self-Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas” Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Malaysia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-EU Summit (Tokyo) Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-France summit meeting (Germany) Japan-Germany summit meeting (Germany) Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Germany) Naha District Court’s Okinawa Branch renders judgment in 3rd Futenma Air Station noise suit Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 4th Atsugi Air Facility noise suit Japan-Italy summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Tokyo) Legislation for Peace and Security (“Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Bill”) is passed in the House of Councillors plenary session Prime Minister Abe visits the United States (through September 29) Japan-Qatar summit meeting (New York) Japan-Iran summit meeting (New York) Japan-Russia summit meeting (New York) Japan-Ukraine summit meeting (New York) Japan-Bangladesh summit meeting (New York) Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (New York) Signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Environmental Stewardship relating to the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, Supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces Agreement (SOFA) Japan-France summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Sri Lanka summit meeting (Tokyo) Inauguration of the third reshuffled Abe Cabinet Japan-Turkey summit meeting (Tokyo) Yamaguchi District Court’s Iwakuni Branch renders judgment in 1st Iwakuni Air Base noise suit Cabinet verbal understanding regarding “Revocation of reclamation approval based on the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Surface pertaining to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project” Written notice regarding start of construction work related to Futenma Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture Japan-China-ROK summit meeting (Seoul) Japan-China summit meeting (Seoul) Japan-ROK summit meeting (Seoul) Japan-Netherlands summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Turkey summit meeting (Istanbul) Japan-Australia summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Japan-EU summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Japan-Russia summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Japan-Germany summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Japan-Saudi Arabia summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Manila) Suit is instituted for “Case regarding retraction order request for revocation of the landfill permit based on provisions of Article 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act” (“administrative suit”) Japan-U.S. Joint Press Release “Implementation of Bilateral Plans for Consolidating Facilities and Areas in Okinawa” Japan-India summit meeting (New Delhi) Signing and entry into force of the Japan-India General Security of Military Information Agreement Japan-Australia summit meeting (Tokyo)|Jan.01 Jan.02 Jan.07 Jan. 29 Feb.02 Feb.06 Feb. 12 Feb. 13 Feb. 14 Feb. 26 Mar.02 Mar. 18 Apr.02 Apr. 23 Apr. 26 May 08 May 09 May 11 May 21 May 25 May 26 Jun. 12 Jul.01 Jul.07 Jul. 18 Jul. 29 Aug.01 Aug.05 Aug. 17 Aug. 20 Aug. 20 Aug. 22 Aug. 25 Aug. 26 Sep.03 Sep. 15 Sep. 30 Sep. 30 Oct.03 Oct. 10 Oct. 26 Oct. 29 Oct. 31 Nov.03 Nov.07 Nov.08 Nov. 11 Nov. 13 Nov. 15 Nov. 18 Nov. 22 Nov. 23 Nov. 24 Nov. 24 Nov. 24 Nov. 27 Dec.02 Dec.07 Dec.07 Dec. 13 Dec. 16 Dec. 21 Dec. 23 Dec. 24 Dec. 26 Dec. 30 Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Dec. 31|NATO begins “Resolute Support Mission” ISIL releases video of Japanese hostages (videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals subsequently released on January 24 and February 1) Shooting incident against a publisher (Charlie Hebdo), etc. in Paris African Union decides to establish a Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram U.S. President Obama presents his budget for FY2016 The United States releases “National Security Strategy” (NSS) Minsk agreement II (German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders agree on new ceasefire agreement) Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean China’s intelligence gathering aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (February 15) Saudi Arabia begins airstrikes on Houthis in Yemen North Korea launches two ballistic missiles An armed group attacks Bardo Museum in Tunisia (three Japanese nationals killed) EU3+3 and Iran agree on “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” U.S. DoD releases “The DoD Cyber Strategy” ASEAN Summit (Kuala Lumpur) (through April 27) U.S. DoD releases “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” North Korea announces SLBM launch test was conducted successfully China-Russia naval combined exercise Joint Sea 2015 (I) is held (Mediterranean Sea) (through May 21) Two Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson announces first flight by Chinese Air Force aircraft in this airspace) Signing of India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Cooperation (Vietnamese Minister of National Defence visits India) China releases defense white paper, “China’s Military Strategy” Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey releases National Military Strategy Oral arguments in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the Philippines (The Hague) (through July 13) Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean China’s intelligence gathering aircraft, early warning aircraft, and two bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (July 30) Russia creates Aerospace Force by merging the Air Force and Aerospace Defense Forces France and Russia agree to annul agreement on France’s delivery of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships Seven Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait northward. Subsequently, China-Russia naval combined exercise, Joint Sea 2015 (II), is held (Sea of Japan) (August 20-28). Following the exercise, five vessels sail Soya Strait eastward (August 29), sail in the high seas in the Bering Sea (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 2), and enter into U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 4). Shelling incident occurs between North Korea and the ROK U.S. DoD submits Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy to Congress Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island Agreement on inter-Korean joint press statement (August 25 agreement) Signing of agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan China holds commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victories against Japanese aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. In an address, President Xi Jinping announces reduction in troop strength by 300,000. Presumed Russian aircraft intrudes into Japanese territorial airspace over the coast of the Nemuro Peninsula Russia’s second Borey-class SSBN Alexander Nevsky arrives in Kamchatka Russia begins airstrikes on ISIL forces, etc. in Syrian territory Shooting attack in Bangladesh (one Japanese national is killed; ISIL Bangladesh claims responsibility for the attack in a statement) North Korea holds commemorative event of the 70th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) U.S. naval destroyer USS Lassen sails within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation The tribunal rules that it has jurisdiction with respect to some of the matters in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the Philippines (The Hague) A Russian jetliner crashes in the Sinai Peninsula, killing all passengers and crewmembers. ISIL’s Sinai Province claims responsibility for the incident. ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) (Kuala Lumpur) (through November 4) China and Taiwan hold first summit meeting since their split Myanmar general election (opposition party NLD wins majority) A Chinese Navy AGI repeatedly conducts east-west passages near the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands (through November 12) Terror attacks in Paris, France. ISIL France claims responsibility for the attacks in a statement. G20 Antalya Summit (Antalya, Turkey) (through November 16) APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Manila) (through November 19) East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Summit (November 21-22) The United Kingdom releases “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015” (NSS-SDSR 2015) Oral arguments in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the Philippines (The Hague) (through November 30) CMC Reform Work Conference is held, and President Xi Jinping delivers address on the direction of military reforms (through November 26) Turkish Armed Forces shoots down Russian Armed Forces aircraft saying it violated Turkish airspace China’s four bombers and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island through to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson of China announces flight by PLA Air Force aircraft). At around the same time, four bombers and early warning aircraft conduct operations near the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. Shooting terror attack in California, United States Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean U.S. P-8 aircraft are deployed to Singapore (through December 14) Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean The United States decides to sell weapons including two missile frigates to Taiwan and notifies Congress Two Russian bombers conduct flight along the perimeter of Japan A Chinese Navy AGI repeatedly conducts northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through December 26) Russia-India joint statement (includes cooperation on military technology, joint development of military equipment, etc.) A China Coast Guard vessel carrying weapons that appear to be cannons intrudes into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time The leaders of Russia, France, Germany, and Ukraine agree to extend ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine that was set to expire in end of 2015 China announces its first domestic aircraft carrier is being built in Dalian, Liaoning Province China establishes PLA Army Headquarters, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force Russia revises National Security Strategy|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|


Jan.01 U.S. bombers conduct low-level flight over the Osan Air Base in the ROK
Jan.02 China conducts aircraft test flights to Fiery Cross Reef (January 3 and 6)
Jan.06 North Korea conducts fourth nuclear test which it called a “hydrogen bomb test”
Jan.08 The ROK declares setting of new air defense identification zone. It also resumes loudspeaker
broadcasts targeting North Korea.
Jan. 11 Chinese Ministry of National Defense announces organizational realignment of the Central
Military Commission (dismantlement of four general departments, CMC’s introduction of
multiple section system)


2016 Jan.06 Special survey of radioactivity related to North
Korea's nuclear test (through January 15)
Jan.08 Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defensce Ministerial Meeting
(Tokyo)
Jan.08 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone
Conference

Jan.09 1st escort flotilla U.S. deployment exercise in FY2015
(Guam) (through January 30)


Jan.04 Convocation of the 190th Ordinary Diet Session
Jan. 22 Cabinet decision on 5th Science and Technology
Basic Plan
Jan. 22 The New Special Measures Agreement (SMA)
between Japan and the United States is signed
Jan. 28 Council between the Government and Okinawa
Prefecture is established


-----

Year Defense Domestic International

2016 Jan.09 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Feb.02 Judgment is rendered on appeal suit requesting Jan. 12 U.S. President Obama delivers State of the Union address
Jan. 12 Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise (command post termination of the monitoring activities of the Appeal U.S.-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Washington, D.C.)
exercise) (through February 2) Intelligence Security Command Jan. 14 Terror attacks occur in Jakarta, Indonesia. ISIL Indonesia claims responsibility for the attacks
Jan. 19 MOD/SDF participate in multinational exercise Cobra Feb. 19 Decision is rendered on the immediate appeal in a statement.
Gold 2016 (through February 19) against decision to dismiss petition against order of Jan. 16 Legislative Yuan and presidential elections are held in Taiwan, confirming change in
Jan. 25 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water provisional disposition to suspend construction of government to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the first time in eight years.
supply supports due to heavy snowfall, etc. (through SDF camp in Yonaguni Island Jan. 16 Western countries lift sanctions against Iran related to its nuclear development program
February 1) Feb. 29 Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Tokyo) Jan. 20 Shooting terror attacks occur at a university in Pakistan
Jan. 27 “X-2” is established as the Advanced Technology Mar.04 The government announces it would accept the Jan. 21 The United States begins airstrikes on ISIL in Afghanistan
Demonstrator model court’s settlement recommendation in the “Case Jan. 25 At the National Maritime Work Conference, China’s State Oceanic Administration Director
Jan. 31 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment regarding retraction order request for revocation announces priorities of the next five years would include building a “Spratly Island reef
of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law of the landfill permit based on provisions of Article ecological protected area”
Feb.Feb.03Feb.07Feb.0810 Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Joint Chiefs of Staff Video-Teleconference is held(establishment of 9th Air Wing)SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issuedJapan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone ConferenceSDF action order for termination of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued Mar.Mar.Mar. 161923 245-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act” (“administrative suit”) and suspends landfill workMinister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issues correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture for revocation of the landfill permitSigning of the Japan-Italy Information Security AgreementOkinawa Prefecture applies for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council regarding the correction instruction issued Jan.Jan.Jan.Jan.Feb.01Feb.0226273031 Two Russian bombers conduct flight along the perimeter of JapanFour Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait northwardA U.S. naval destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation OperationChina’s intelligence gathering aircraft and early warning aircraft pass Tsushima Strait for the first time through to the Sea of JapanChinese Ministry of National Defense dismantles seven Military Regions and announces the establishment of five theaters of operationsFour Chinese vessels sail through Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean
Feb. 12 State Defense Minister Wakamiya attends Munich by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport Feb.04 A Chinese Navy AGI conducts round-trip northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous
Security Conference (through February 14) and Tourism zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through February 8)
Feb. 29 Japan-Philippines Agreement Concerning the Mar. 29 Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security Feb.07 North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite”
Mar. 16 Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Manila)20th Tokyo Defense Forum (Forum for Defense (“Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Act”) Feb.07Feb.09 ROK decides to begin formal consultations on THAAD deployment by U.S. Forces KoreaU.S. President Obama presents his budget for FY2017
Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region) is held (through March 18) Mar. 31 Japan-U.S.-ROK summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Feb. 10 The ROK decides to completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in response to North Korea’s nuclear test and long-range missile launch
Mar. 28 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment Mar. 31 Japan-ROK summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Feb. 11 North Korea declares the Kaesong Industrial Complex a military control zone and expels all
of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law Mar. 31 Japan-Canada summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) ROK nationals from the zone
(establishment of JGSDF Camp Yonaguni, etc.) Apr.01 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Feb. 12 U.S. DoD submits “Annual Report: Military and Security Developments Involving the
Mar. 30 Japan-Poland defense authorities' consultations Apr.01 Cabinet decision adopted on “Basic Plan on Space Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” to Congress
Apr.06 U-125 accident Policy” Feb. 15 U.S.-ASEAN summit meeting (California) (through February 16)
Apr. 14 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016 Apr.08 Japan-Estonia summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 15 A submerged submarine sails Tsushima Strait southwestward from the Sea of Japan to the
Kumamoto Earthquake (through May 30) Apr. 28 Alleged murder case involving a civilian component East China Sea
Apr. 17 Cabinet decision regarding disaster relief call-up of member of the USFJ in Okinawa Prefecture Feb. 16 Locations of equipment deemed to be surface-to-air missile in Woody Island, Paracel Islands
ready reserve personnel in the wake of the 2016 May 06 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Sochi) are confirmed
Kumamoto Earthquake May 13 Japan-Kuwait summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 17 Terror attack occurs in Ankara, Turkey
Apr. 17 Disaster relief call-up order for to ready reserve May 24 Japan-Canada summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb. 25 Australia releases “2016 Defence White Paper”
personnel is issued (through May 9) May 25 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Ise Shima) Mar.07 U.S.-ROK Key Resolve and Foal Eagle combined exercise (through April 30)
Apr. 18 Disaster relief teams dispatched to remove fallen May 26 G7 Ise-Shima Summit (through May 27) Mar. 10 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
trees in Hiroo Town, Hiroo District, Hokkaido (through May 27 U.S. President Obama visits Hiroshima Mar. 18 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
April 21) Jun 07 Entry into force of the Japan-Italy Information Mar. 18 The United States and the Philippines agree to utilize five Philippine bases for carrying out
Apr. 22 First flight of Advanced Technology Demonstrator Security Agreement defense cooperation based on the EDCA
(X-2) Jun. 21 Central and Local Government Dispute Management Mar. 22 Terror bombing attacks occur in Brussels, Belgium
MayApr. 2302 Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs attends ADSOM Plus (Lao PDR) (through April 25)Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Telephone Jul. 1 U.S. returns FAC3162 Yugi Communication Site (Hachioji City, Tokyo)Council announces ruling Mar.Mar. 2831 Two Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific OceanU.S.-China summit meeting (Washington, D.C.)
Conference Jul. 14 Prime Minister Abe visits Mongolia and attends the Mar. 31 Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C.) (through April 1)
Jun.03 Defense Minister Nakatani attends 15th Asia Security 11th ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) Summit Meeting Apr.07 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and
Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) (through June 5) (through July 16) advance to the Pacific Ocean
Jun.04 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jul. 15 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) Apr.08 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and

advance to the Pacific Ocean

Jun.04 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan- Jul. 15 Japan-Bangladesh summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar)
U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jul. 15 Japan-China summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) Apr. 15 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Jun.04 Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jul. 15 Japan-EU summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) Apr. 17 Chinese naval patrol aircraft lands in Fiery Cross Reef in Spratly Islands and evacuates sick people
Jun.04 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Jul. 15 Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) Apr. 20 China’s early warning aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island
Jun.04 Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Jul. 16 Japan-Cambodia summit meeting (Ulaanbaatar) through to the Pacific Ocean
DoD and the Japanese MOD concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement is signed Jul. 22 Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism files a suit with the Naha branch of the Apr. 20 China releases images from President Xi Jinping’s visit to the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center
Jun.05 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Fukuoka High Court seeking confirmation of the Apr. 23 North Korea launches an SLBM
Jun.06 Defense Minister Nakatani visits Myanmar, Thailand, violation of law for the failure to act
and Timor-Leste (through June 10) Aug.03 2nd Reshuffled 3rd Abe Cabinet is established Apr. 28 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Jun. 13 MOD/SDF participate in Pacific Partnership 2016 Aug. 25 Prime Minister Abe attends TICAD VI (6th Tokyo Apr. 29 Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan is established
(through August 24) International Conference on African Development) May 02 China deploys landing ship to Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands
Jun. 28 Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise (PACIFIC and visits Nairobi in the Republic of Kenya (through May 06 7th KWP Congress (through May 9)
DRAGON2016) (Hawaii) August 29) May 10 A U.S. destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands in the South
Jun. 29 FY2016 SDF Joint Exercise for Rescue (through Aug. 28 Japan-Kenya summit meeting (Nairobi) China Sea as part of the “Freedom of Navigation Operation”
July 8) Sep.02 Japan-Russia summit meeting (Vladivostok) May 14 An expedition unit comprised of approximately 200 personnel led by the Deputy Commander
Jul. 11 ASDF aircraft dispatched to Juba, the capital of South Sep.04 Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Hangzhou) of the Russian Pacific Fleet arrives in Matsuwa Island of the Chishima Islands and
Sudan, to transport Japanese nationals overseas Sep.05 Japan-Brazil summit meeting (Hangzhou) subsequently begins survey activities
due to the situation dererionation in South Sudan (through July 26) Sep.05 Japan-China summit meeting (Hangzhou) May 17 A Chinese PLA fighter jet flies abnormally close to a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea
Jul. 13 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) Sep.06 ASEAN-related summit meeting (Vientiane, Laos) (through September 9) May 19 Russia-ASEAN summit meeting (through May 20)
Aug.03 Inada becomes Minister of Defense Sep.06 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Vientiane); May 20 Tsai Ing-wen, Chairperson of DPP, becomes President of Taiwan
Aug. 15 Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Meeting (Djibouti) transfer of TC-90, etc. to the Philippines is officially May 22 U.S. President Obama visits Vietnam (through May 25), fully lifts arms embargo on Vietnam
Aug. 16 Japan-Pakistan Defense Dialogue agreed May 23 China and Russia hold first joint missile defense exercise (through May 28)
Aug. 20 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Sep.06 Japan-Lao PDR summit meeting (Vientiane) May 24 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) (through May 27)
supply supports in Shibetsu City, Hokkaido Sep.07 Summit meeting with the State Counsellor of May 25 Hibatullah Akhundzada is chosen as new Emir of the Taliban in Afghanistan
Aug. 23 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi (Vientiane) May 31 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
supply supports in Biei Town, Kamikawa County, Sep.07 Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Vientiane) Jun.03 15th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore) (through June 5)
Hokkaido (through August 28) Sep.07 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Vientiane) Jun.06 8th U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (Beijing) (through June 7)
Aug. 23 FY2016 1st training of transport of Japanese Sep.07 Japan-ROK summit meeting (Vientiane) Jun.07 A Chinese PLA fighter jet conducts dangerous flight, approaching a U.S. Air Force
nationals overseas Sep.07 Japan-India summit meeting (Vientiane) reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea
Aug. 25 Trainings for new duties based on the Legislation for Peace and Security begin Sep. 16 Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in favor of the central government in the Jun.08Jun.09 New Zealand releases “Defence White Paper 2016”A Chinese naval combatant vessel enters the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands for
Aug. 25 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the first time
Aug. 26 Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water the failure to act Jun. 12 Shooting terror attack in Florida, United States
supply supports in Akadaira City in Hokkaido (through Sep. 19 Prime Minister Abe visits New York (through Jun. 14 Police workers are killed in Magnanville in western Paris
August 27) September 21) Jun. 15 A Chinese naval intelligence gathering vessel sails in Japan’s territorial waters near
Aug. 30 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy Sep. 19 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (New York) Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture and then sails within
Aug. 31 rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Iwate Prefecture (through September 16)Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall due to Typhoon 10 in Hokkaido (through September 18) Sep.Sep.Sep.Sep. 20212121 Third Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders MeetingJapan-Turkey summit meeting (New York)Japan-Iran summit meeting (New York)Japan-Cuba summit meeting (Havana) Jun. 16 Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducts east-west passages outside the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands. (June 19 through 20)Five Chinese naval vessels sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
Sep.01 Operational training by the MOD Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters Sep. 23 Okinawa Prefecture files an appeal with the Supreme Court regarding the suit seeking confirmation of the Jun. 22 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles
Sep.02 Japan-Saudi Arabia Defense Ministerial Meeting violation of law for the failure to act Jun. 23 Group in favor of separation from EU wins national referendum in the U.K.
(Tokyo) Sep. 28 Japan-Singapore summit meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 28 Bombing at Istanbul Airport in Turkey
Signing of memorandum of understanding on Oct. 14 Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Jun. 30 The new Duterte administration is established in the Philippines
defense exchange between Japan and Saudi Arabia Oct. 19 Japan-Brazil summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul.02 Australian federal election is held; Prime Minister Turnbull is to remain in office
Sep.03 ADMM-Plus Military Medicine and Humanitalian Oct. 26 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul.02 Bangladeshi militants take hostages (7 Japanse nationals are killed); ISIL claims responsibility
Assistance and Disaster Relief Joint Exercise 2016 Signing of detailed arrangements for the transfer on the Internet
(Thailand) (through September 9) of TC-90, etc. Jul.05 Chinese military exercise in South China Sea (through July 11)
Sep.08 State Minister of Defense Wakamiya attends UN PKO Oct. 27 Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul.07 Collision between the Sudan Armed Forces and anti-mainstream groups occurs in South
summit follow-up meeting (U.K.) Oct. 28 Signing and entry into force of the Japan-U.S.- Sudan's capital, Juba
Sep.08 Japan-ROK Defense Vice-Ministerial Consultation Australia Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Jul.08 The U.S. and ROK decide on the deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea
Meeting (Seoul) Nov.02 Meeting with State Counsellor of Myanmar Aung San Jul.08 NATO Warsaw summit meeting (through July 9)
Sep. 10 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Suu Kyi (Tokyo) Jul.09 North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile
Conference Nov.07 Japan-Kazakhstan summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul. 12 China conducts test flight over the Subi Reef and Mischief Reef (through July 13)
Sep. 12 First relocation of trainings of rotary-wing and tilt- Nov.08 Ballot counting of U.S. presidential election Jul. 12 The arbitral tribunal renders a final award in which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions
rotor aircraft to outside of Okinawa Prefecture due to the realignment of U.S. Forces (through October 5) Nov. 10 Prime Minister Abe has a Telephone conference with U.S. President-elect Trump are ruled in favor of the Philippines with regard to arbitral proceedings pursuant to the South China Sea
Sep.Sep. 1520 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.)8th Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum (Sendai) (through September 21) Nov.Nov.Nov. 111416 Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo)Japan-Germany summit meeting (Tokyo)Japan-Malaysia summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul.Jul.Jul. 131516 Germany releases “Defense White Paper 2016”Terror attack with a truck occurs in Nice, FranceCoup d'etat attempt in Turkey fails

Nov. 17 Prime Minister Abe meets with U.S. President-elect Jul. 18 Chinese Air Force announces that it will be conducting combat patrol in the South China Sea

Sep. 21 Japan-Myanmar Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Trump (New York) on a regular basis


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Year Defense Domestic International


|2016|Sep. 22 Sep. 26 Oct.08 Oct. 14 Oct. 17 Oct. 21 Oct. 22 Oct. 23 Oct. 27 Oct. 28 Oct. 30 Nov.01 Nov.09 Nov. 15 Nov. 15 Nov. 16 Nov. 16 Nov. 25 Nov. 28 Nov. 29 Nov. 30 Dec.03 Dec.07 Dec.07 Dec.09 Dec. 13 Dec. 13 Dec. 16 Dec. 16 Dec. 19 Dec. 19 Dec. 21 Dec. 22 Dec. 22 Dec. 22 Dec. 22 Dec. 27|Search and rescue of U.S. military aircraft off the east coast of Okinawa Prefecture Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) (Tokyo) Defense Minister Inada visits South Sudan's capital, Juba Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Joint Staff Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.K. joint exercise “Guardian North 16” (through November 6) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to 2016 Tottori Earthquake (through October 28) Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (maritime interdiction operations exercise) (through October 23) Troop review in commemoration of the SDF anniversary Signing of memorandum of understanding on Japan- Jordan defense cooporation and exchange Signing of agreement on sharing of information among Japan-U.S.-Australia defense authorities Japan-U.S. joint exercise (field training exercise) “Keen Sword 17/28FTX” (through November 11) Cabinet Decision regarding changes to the procedures for responding to piracy (reducing the number of ships to engage in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden from two to one) Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise) (through November 10) MSDF aircraft conducts the international disaster relief activity in response to the 2016 New Zealand Earthquake (through November 18) Cabinet Decision on changes in the “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)” (mission of “kaketsuke-keigo” was added) 2nd ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting (Vientiane) Japan-Lao PDR Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vientiane) 6th working group consultation meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between the defense authorities of Japan and China (Tokyo) Japan-China Security Dialogue (Beijing) Dispatch of disaster relief teams in response to bird flu in Niigata Prefecture (through December 4) Signing of memorandum of Japan-Columbia defense cooperation and exchange (Tokyo) Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Disaster relief teams dispatched for search and rescue of U.S. military aircraft off the coast of Tosa Shimizu in Kochi Prefecture (through December 8) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kobayashi joins the Manama Dialogue (Bahrain) (through December 10) Japan-Netherlands Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Signing of memorandum of defense cooperation and exchange between Japan and the Netherlands Emergency water landing of MV-22 Osprey (off the coast of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) (Seoul) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird flu in Shimizu Town, Kamikawa County in Hokkaido (through December 22) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird flu in Kawaminami Town, Koyu County in Miyazaki Prefecture (through December 21) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa visits Sri Lanka (through December 21) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa visits the Republic of Maldives (through December 22) Return of a major portion of the Northern Training Area based on the SACO Final Report (1996) The implementation Guidelines for Article 95-2 of the SDF Law (decided by the National Security Council) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to fire in Itoigawa City in Niigata Prefecture (through December 23) Transition to the joint production and deployment phases of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA) (decided at the National Security Council) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird flu in Nankan Town of Tamana County in Kumamoto Prefecture (through December 28)|Nov. 17 Nov. 18 Nov. 19 Nov. 19 Nov. 20 Nov. 20 Nov. 21 Nov. 23 Dec.01 Dec.01 Dec.01 Dec.08 Dec. 15 Dec. 20 Dec. 26 Dec. 27 Dec. 27|Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders judgement in 2nd Futenma Air Station noise suit Japan-Peru summit meeting (Lima) Japan-Columbia summit meeting (Lima) Japan-Russia summit meeting (Lima) Japan-China summit meeting (Lima) Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Lima) Japan-Argentina summit meeting (Buenos Aires) Signing and entry into force of Japan-ROK General Security of Military Information Agreement Japan-Singapore summit meeting (Tokyo) Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court renders judgement in 3rd Futenma Air Station noise suit Japan-France defense equipment and technology agreement takes effect Supreme Court renders judgement in 4th Atsugi Air Facility noise suit Japan-Russia summit meeting (Yamaguchi Prefecture) (through December 16) Supreme Court dismisses Okinawa's appeal in the suit seeking confirmation of the violation of law for the failure to act Governor of Okinawa Onaga withdraws his cancellatioin of the landfill approval Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Hawaii) Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister Inada visit Arizona Memorial (Hawaii) Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility is resumed|Jul. 18 Jul. 19 Jul. 24 Jul. 25 Jul. 26 Aug.01 Aug.03 Aug.05 Aug. 12 Aug. 14 Aug. 15 Aug. 18 Aug. 20 Aug. 22 Aug. 24 Aug. 31 Sep.04 Sep.05 Sep.09 Sep. 12 Sep. 17 Sep. 25 Sep. 26 Sep. 29 Sep. 29 Oct.07 Oct.07 Oct.09 Oct. 13 Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 17 Oct. 19 Oct. 20 Oct. 20 Oct. 21 Oct. 24 Oct. 27 Nov.01 Nov.08 Nov. 13 Nov. 15 Nov. 18 Nov. 19 Nov. 22 Nov. 25 Dec.01 Dec. 10 Dec. 12 Dec. 15 Dec. 16 Dec. 17 Dec. 18 Dec. 19 Dec. 19 Dec. 20 Dec. 25 Dec. 27 Dec. 30|Incident in which passengers in a train are stabbed occurs near Würzburg in southern Germany North Korea launches three ballistic missiles Terror attack by a suicide bomber occurs near an open music festival in the State of Bavaria in southern Germany South Sudan's First Vice President Machar is dismissed and replaced by Taban Deng Hostage incident occurs in a church in Rouen in northern France U.S. Forces begins airstrikes on ISIL-controlled regions in Sirte in northern Libya (through December 21) North Korea launches two ballistic missiles (one of them fell into Japan's EEZ) 200 to 300 Chinese fishing vessels operate in the waters near the Senkaku Islands. Chinese government vessels intrude into Japan's territorial waters following the fishing vessels for the first time (total of 15 vessels in 5 days / through August 9) Three Chinese naval vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Three Chinese naval vessels sail west bound toward the Sea of Japan from the Sea of Okhotsk U.S. Forces deploys B1B bombers to Guam A Chinese early warning aicraft and two bombers fly over Tsushima and advance to the Sea of Japan Three Chinese naval vessels pass through the Tsushima Strait in the southwestern direction U.S.-ROK bilateral exercise “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” (through September 2) North Korea launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile Police officers are shot in Copenhagen, Denmark G20 (Summit on the Financial Market and the World Economy) Hangzhou Summit (Hangzhou, China) (through September 5) North Korea launches three ballistic missiles (fell into Japan's EEZ) North Korea conducts its fifth nuclear test China-Russia joint maritime exercise “Joint Sea 2016” (in the South China Sea) (through September 19) Bombing in New York, U.S. Four Chinese bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets (probable) pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean (fighter jets [probable] are observed for the first time passing) Third Russian Borey-class SSBN “Vladimir Monomakh” arrives in Kamchatka U.S.-ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting (through October 1) Indian Army announces it hit terrorist bases on the Pakistan side of the line of control in Kashmir (tensions remain) The U.S. concludes Russian involvement in the Democratic National Committee cyber attacks The U.S. lifts economic sanctions on Myanmar Attack on a U.S. naval vessel occurs in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen King Bhumibol of Thailand passes away North Korea launches a ballistic missile Operation to recapture ISIL-controlled Mosul begins China launches manned spaceflight “Shenzhou 11” U.S.-ROK foreign and defense ministerial meeting (2+2) (Washington, D.C.) North Korea launches a ballistic missile Three Chinese naval vessels pass through the Osumi Strait and advance to the Pacific Ocean A U.S. destroyer sails around the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea as part of the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” Sixth plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (through October 27) China's early warning aircraft and intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Islad and advance to the Pacific Ocean Battle in the City of Mosul begins Presidential candidate Trump wins U.S. presidential election Earthquake occurs in New Zealand Russia deploys aircraft carrier “Kuznetsov” in combat for the first time in the history of the Russian Navy The Russian Forces announces the deployment of surface-to-ship missile on the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri Peru APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting (through November 20) Russian patrol helicopter flies near Japan's airspace over the Senkaku Islands Two bombers, two intelligence gathering aircraft, and two fighter jets fly over the sky between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly from the south of Sakishima Islands) Prince of Thailand's accession to the throne Two Chinese fighter jets, two bombers, and two intelligence gathering aircraft fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (four aircraft except the fighter jets fly toward the Bashi Channel) Vice Prime Minister English becomes Prime Minister of New Zealand Capture of U.S. unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) by China in the South China Sea UNMISS Mandate is extended for one year (December 15, 2017) Libyan Government of National Accord declares the liberation of Sirte in Northern Libya from ISIL Hostage situation occurs in a tourist site in Jordan A truck drives into pedestrians in Berlin, Germany's capital Russian Ambassador is murdered in Turkey's capital Ankara Tsai Ing-wen, Chairperson of DPP, holds telephone conference with then U.S. President-elect Trump Six Chinese naval vessels including an aircraft carrier sail between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance into the Pacific Ocean (first time a Chinese aircraft carrier is observed sailing into the Pacific Ocean) “China's Space Activities in 2016” is released Russia and Turkey-led ceasefire agreement between the Assad regime and the opposition parties takes effect in all regions of Syria (excluding ISIL, etc.)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|


2017 Jan.05 Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Paris)
Jan.06 Resumption of aerial refueling training by the Osprey
of the U.S. Forces
Jan.06 3rd Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministerial
Meeting (“2+2”) (Paris)
Jan. 14 Signing of Japan-Australia Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) (Sydney)
Jan. 14 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to
bird flu in Yamagata City, Gifu Prefecture (through
January 16)
Jan. 15 State Minister of Defense Wakamiya visits South
Sudan and Bahrain (through January 17)
Jan. 21 Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ballistic missile
information sharing exercise) (through January 23)
Jan. 23 FY2016 SDF joint exercise (command post exercise)
(through January 27)
Jan. 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird
flu in Kijo Town in Koyu County, Miyazaki Prefecture
(through January 26)
Jan. 24 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to
heavy snow in Chizu Town in Yazu County, Tottori
Prefecture

Jan. 24 Launch of X-band communications satellite
“Kirameki 2”
Jan. 26 Signing of Japan-U.K. Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA) (London)
Feb.04 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
Feb.04 Test launch of advanced interceptor missiles for
BMD (Hawaii)


Jan. 12 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Manila)
Jan. 14 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Sydney)
Jan. 15 Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Jakarta)
Jan. 16 Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Hanoi)
Jan. 16 Signing of the Agreement on Cooperation with
regard to the Implementation Practices relating to
the Civilian Component of the U.S. Armed Forces in
Japan, Supplementary to the Status of U.S. Forces
Agreement (SOFA)
Jan. 20 193rd session of the Diet is convened
Jan. 28 Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk
Feb. 10 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.)
Feb. 23 Okinawa branch of Naha District Court renders
judgement in 4th Kadena Air Base noise suit
Mar.06 First relocation of training involves Tilt-Rotor/Rotary
wing aircraft to main land Japan from Okinawa
Prefecture in the context of the realignment of U.S.
Forces (through March 17)
Mar. 13 Japan-Saudi Arabia summit meeting (Tokyo)
Mar. 15 Japan-Mozambique summit meeting (Tokyo)
Mar. 20 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Hannover)
Mar. 20 Japan-France summit meeting (Paris)
Mar. 21 Japan-EU summit meeting (Brussels)
Mar. 21 Japan-Italy summit meeting (Rome)
Agreed to commence negotiation concerning the
conclusion of Japan-Italy defense equipment and
technology transfer agreement
Mar. 27 Transfer of MSDF TC-90 to the Philippines
Mar. 27 Completion of development of future transport
aircraft (XC-2)


Jan.02 Chinese Navy announces its aircraft carrier “Liaoning” conducted training in the South China
Sea
Jan.05 Chinese naval vessels sails through the Tsugaru Strait westward
Jan.09 Six Chinese bombers, an early warning aircraft, and an intelligence gathering aircraft fly over
the Tsushima Strait and advance to the Sea of Japan
Jan. 10 Chinese naval vessels sail through the Tsushima Strait
Jan. 11 The ROK release “Defense White Paper 2016”
Jan. 20 Trump becomes President of the U.S.
Jan. 24 Two Russian bombers fly and circle around Japan
Jan. 27 U.S. President Trump signs a memorandum on the rebuilding of the U.S. Forces
Jan. 28 U.S. President Trump signs a memorandum requesting the establishment of comprehensive
plans to destroy ISIL
Jan. 29 Iran conducts test launch of a mid-range ballistic missile
Feb.08 U.S. Navy P-3 patrol aircraft and Chinese military aircraft fly abnormally close to each other
(South China Sea)
Feb. 12 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Feb. 28 U.S. President Trump delivers address to Congress
Mar.01 U.S.-ROK joint military exercise (ROK) (through April 30)
U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson participates in the exercise
Mar.02 A Chinese early warning aircraft, six bombers (probable), and six fighter jets (probable) fly
between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean
(total of 13 aircraft, the largest fleet so far)
Mar.06 North Korea launches four ballistic missiles (three of them fell into Japan's EEZ)
Mar. 10 President of the ROK Park Geun-hye is dismissed
Mar. 16 The Trump administration submits the FY2018 budget blueprint to Congress
Mar. 22 North Korea launches a ballistic missile
Mar. 22 An attack with a car occurs in central London, U.K.
Apr.03 Bombing occurs on subway in St. Petersburg, Russia
Apr.05 North Korea launches a ballistic missile


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|2017|Feb.04 Feb. 18 Feb. 20 Feb. 22 Mar.05 Mar.07 Mar.07 Mar.09 Mar. 10 Mar. 14 Mar. 16 Mar. 20 Mar. 20 Mar. 24 Mar. 24 Mar. 24 Mar. 27 Mar. 31 Apr.03 Apr. 12 Apr. 14 Apr. 19 Apr. 19 Apr. 20 Apr. 22 May 03 May 03 May 08 May 08 May 15 May 15 May 22 May 30 May 31 Jun.03 Jun.03 Jun.03 Jun.03 Jun.03 Jun.03 Jun.03 Jun.03 Jun.04 Jun.04 Jun. 20|Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird flu in Kohoku Town, Kishima County in Saga Prefecture (through February 6) State Minister of Defense Wakamiya attends the 53rd Munich Security Conference (Munich) Japan-Finland Vice-Ministerial Consultation Japan-Sweden Vice-Ministerial Consultation Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the crash of rescue helicopter of Nagano Prefecture (through March 6) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conference Japan-India Vice-Ministerial Dialogue on defense policies Dispatch of MSDF personnel as commander of combined task force for counter-piracy (CTF151) (through late June) Termination of dispatch of SDF units to United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) is announced Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ballistic missile information sharing exercise) Conclusion of arrangements regarding Japan-U.K. joint study on the possibility of cooperation with the U.K. on future fighter jets GPOI Capstone Multilateral Exercise (Nepal) (through April 3) Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird flu in Kurihara City in Miyagi Prefecture (through March 27) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to bird flu in Asahi City, Chiba Prefecture (through March 25) Cabinet Decision on changes to “Implementation Plans for the International Peace Cooperation Assignment for UNMISS” Disaster relief teams dispatched for rescue operations in response to an avalanche in Nasu Town, Nasu County in Tochigi Prefecture Enforcement of the law for partial amendment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law (validity is extended for 10 years, etc.) Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral exercise (ASW exercise) (through April 5) Defense Minister Inada pays courtesy call on Sri Lankan prime minister (Tokyo) Pacific Partnership 2017 (through May 18) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT) (Tokyo) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo) Disaster relief teams dispatched for rescue operations in Futaoijima, Shimonoseki City, Yamaguchi Prefecture Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Miyazawa visits Djibouti and Bahrain (through May 7) Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. joint exercise (through May 22) Japan-France-U.K.-U.S. joint exercise (through May 22) Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conference Search of missing GSDF aircraft (LR-2) in Hakodate City, Hokkaido (through May 16) Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Return of Colors ceremony of JSDF engineering dispatched to South Sudan Dispatch of SDF units to UNMISS is terminated Dispatch of rescue teams in response to the crash of a civilian aircraft (light aircraft) (through June 4) Defense Minister Inada attends the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue (hosted by IISS) (through June 4) Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) FY2017 SDF Joint Exercise for Rescue (through June 23)|Apr.04 Apr.06 Apr.09 Apr. 12 Apr. 13 Apr. 18 Apr. 24 Apr. 27 Apr. 28 May 11 May 17 May 19 May 22 May 26 May 26 May 26 May 26 May 27 May 30 Jun.06 Jun.07 Jun. 20 Jun. 27|Japan-Australia summit telephone talk Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Japan-Sri Lanka summit meeting (Tokyo) 100th Anniversary Ceremony of the America-Japan Society U.S. Vice President Pence pays courtesy call on Prime Minister Abe Japan-U.S. summit telephone talk Japan-Russia summit meeting (Moscow) Japan-U.K. summit meeting (U.K.) Japan-ROK summit telephone talk Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Argentina summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Italy defense equipment and technology transfer agreement is signed Prime Minister Abe attends G7 Taormina Summit and visits Malta (through May 28) Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Taormina) Japan-EU summit meeting (Taormina) Japan-France summit meeting (Taormina) Japan-Malta summit meeting (Malta) Japan-ROK summit telephone talk Japan-Viet Nam summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Lao PDR summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Guinea summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Czech summit meeting (Tokyo)|Apr.06 Apr. 16 Apr. 20 Apr. 26 Apr. 29 May 10 May 14 May 14 May 14 May 17 May 18 May 19 May 21 May 22 May 23 May 23 May 24 May 25 May 25 May 29 May 30 May 31 Jun.02 Jun.03 Jun.04 Jun.05 Jul.02 Jul.04|The U.S. launches strikes on Syria North Korea launches a ballistic missile China launches its first unmanned cargo spacecraft “Tianzhou 1” China's first domestically built aircraft carrier is launched North Korea launches a ballistic missile Moon Jae-in becomes President of the ROK North Korea launches a ballistic missile Macron becomes President of France China hosts an international conference pertaining to “One Belt, One Road” Chinese fighter jets intercepts a U.S. military radiation-detecting aircraft (East China Sea) An object believed to be a small unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) flies over the front of the bridge of a Chinese government ship which is within Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Hassan Rowhani is re-elected as the President of Iraq North Korea launches a ballistic missile Terror attack by a suicide bomber occurs in Manchester, U.K. The Trump administration submits FY2018 budget proposal to Congress with a 10% increase in defense budget Martial law is declared in Mindanao in the Philippines The U.S. conducts the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” in the South China Sea. A U.S. destroyer sails within 12 nautical miles of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as part of the “Freedom of Navigation Operation” (reported). A Chinese fighter jet intercepts a U.S. naval patrol aircraft (South China Sea) NATO Brussel summit meeting North Korea launches a ballistic missile (fell into Japan's EEZ) The U.S. successfully intercepts ICBM target for the first time Bombing in Afghanistan's capital Kabul The 16th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore) (through June 4) A car runs into pedestrians and a bombing occurs in central London, U.K. President Duterte of the Philippines goes aboard MSDF JS Izumo Montenegro joins NATO A Chinese naval intelligence gathering ship sails within Japan's territorial waters near the southwest of Kojima Island, Matsumae Town, Hokkaido North Korea launches a ballistic missile (lands in Japan's EEZ)|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|


Year Defense Domestic International


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(As of March 31, 2017)
**Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces**

Minister of Defense

Chief of Staff, Joint Staff

Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, GSDF

Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF

Ground Staff Office

Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office

Northern Army Headquarters (Sapporo) Middle Army Headquarters (Itami)

Northern Army 2nd Division Division Headquarters (Asahikawa)3rd Infantry Regiment (Nayoro)25th Infantry Regiment (Engaru)26th Infantry Regiment (Rumoi)2nd Tank Regiment (Kamifurano) Middle Army 3rd Division Division Headquarters (Senzo)7th Infantry Regiment (Fukuchiyama)36th Infantry Regiment (Itami)37th Infantry Regiment (Shinodayama)3rd Field Artillery unit (Himeji) Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force Headquarters (Yokosuka)Escort Flotilla 1 (Yokosuka)Escort Flotilla 2 (Sasebo) Escort Division 1 (Yokosuka)Escort Division 5 (Sasebo)Escort Division 2 (Sasebo) Yokosuka District Yokosuka District Headquarters Minesweeper Division 41Other units Air Defense CommandAir Defense Command Headquarters (Yokota) Northern Air Defense Force 3rd Air Wing (Misawa)Northern Aircraft Control and 2nd Air Wing (Chitose)Northern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Misawa)Northern Air Defense Control Group (Misawa)42nd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Ominato) Air Support Command 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma)Air Support Command Headquarters (Fuchu)1st Tactical Airlift Group (Komaki)

2nd Field Artillery Regiment (Asahikawa)2nd Logistics Support Regiment (Asahikawa) 3rd Logistics Support Regiment (Senzo)Other units Escort Division 6 (Yokosuka) Kure District Headquarters Warning Wing (Misawa) 45th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Tobetsu) 3rd Tactical Airlift Group (Miho)

5th Brigade Other unitsBrigade Headquarters (Obihiro)4th Infantry Regiment (Obihiro)6th Infantry Regiment (Bihoro)27th Infantry Regiment (Kushiro)5th Field Artillery Regiment (Obihiro)5th Logistics Support Unit (Obihiro)Other units 10th Division Division Headquarters (Moriyama)14th Infantry Regiment (Kanazawa)33rd Infantry Regiment (Hisai)35th Infantry Regiment (Moriyama)10th Field Artillery Regiment (Toyokawa)10th Logistics Support Regiment (Kasugai)Other units Escort Flotilla 3 (Maizuru)Escort Flotilla 4 (Kure)Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka) Escort Division 3 (Maizuru)Escort Division 7 (Ominato)Escort Division 4 (Kure)Escort Division 8 (Sasebo)Kure Fleet Training GroupYokosuka Fleet Training Group Sasebo District Kure District Sub Area Activity Hanshin (Kobe)Sub Area Activity Shimonoseki (Shimonoseki)Sub Area Activity Okinawa (Uruma)Sasebo District Headquarters Minesweeper Division 42Other unitsMinesweeper Division 46Minesweeper Division 43 18th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Wakkanai)26th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Nemuro)28th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Abashiri)29th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okushiritou)33rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kamo)36th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Erimo)37th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Yamada) Air Traffic Control Service Group (Fuchu, Each region)Air Weather Service Group (Fuchu, Each region)Flight Check Squadron (Iruma)Special Airlift Group (Chitose)

7th Division Division Headquarters (Higashi Chitose)11th Infantry Regiment (Higashi Chitose)71st Tank Regiment (Kita Chitose)72nd Tank Regiment (Kita Eniwa) 13th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Kaitaichi)8th Infantry Regiment (Yonago)17th Infantry Regiment (Yamaguchi)46th Infantry Regiment (Kaitaichi) Sasebo Fleet Training GroupMaizuru Fleet Training GroupOminato Fleet Training Group (Mutsu) Other unitsCoastal Defense Group Tsushima (Tsushima) 3rd Air Defense Missile Group 1st Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Chitose)Other units9th, 10th Fire Unit (Chitose) Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki)Air Training Command Headquarters
11th Brigade1st Field Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose) 73rd Tank Regiment (Minami Eniwa)7th Field Artillery Regiment (Higashi Chitose)7th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Shizunai)7th Logistics Support Regiment (Higashi Chitose)Other unitsBrigade Headquarters (Makomanai)10th Infantry Regiment (Takikawa)18th Infantry Regiment (Makomanai)28th Infantry Regiment (Hakodate)11th Field Artillery unit (Makomanai)11th Logistics Support Unit (Makomanai)Other units1st Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kita Chitose)2nd Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Bibai)3rd Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kamifurano)1st Field Artillery Group (Kita Chitose) 14th Brigade8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara)Middle Air Group (Yao)4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo) 13th Field Artillery unit (Nihonbara)13th Logistics Support Unit (Kaitaichi)Other unitsBrigade Headquarters (Zentsuji)15th Infantry Regiment (Zentsuji)50th Infantry Regiment (Kochi)14th Field Artillery unit (Matsuyama)14th Logistics Support Unit (Zentsuji)Other units6th Engineer Group (Toyokawa)7th Engineer Group (Okubo)Other units Missile System Training Center (Yokosuka)Escort Division 11 (Yokosuka)Escort Division 12 (Kure)Escort Division 13 (Sasebo)Escort Division 14 (Maizuru)Escort Division 15 (Ominato)Replenishment-at-Sea Squadron 1 (Yokosuka)Drone Support Squadron 1 (Kure)Other units Ominato DistrictMaizuru District Headquarters (Kashiwa)Maizuru District HeadquartersOminato District HeadquartersSub Area Activity Hakodate (Hakodate)Coastal Defense Group Yoichi (Yoichi-cho, Yoichi-gun)Base Facility Wakkanai (Wakkanai)Other units Minesweeper Division 44Minesweeper Division 45Patrol Guided Missile Boat Division 1Other units Central Air Defense Force (Chitose)6th Air Defense Missile Group (Misawa)Other unitsNorthern Air Civil Engineering Group (Misawa, Chitose)6th Air Wing (Komatsu)7th Air Wing (Hyakuri)Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma)Central Air Defense Force Headquarters (Iruma)1st Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Kasatoriyama)23rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Wajima)20th, 23rd Fire Unit (Yakumo)11th, 24th Fire Unit (Naganuma)Other units21st, 22nd Fire Unit (Shariki)Other unitsCentral Air Defense Control Group (Iruma) Air Training Command 4th Air Wing (Matsushima)11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama)12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita)13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya)Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami, Kumagaya)Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru)(Hamamatsu)1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu)

1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose) 4th Field Artillery Group (Kamifurano)Other units1st Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Higashi Chitose)4th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Nayoro)Other units Middle Army Combined Brigade (Otsu)Other units 47th Infantry Regiment (Kaitaichi)49th Infantry Regiment (Toyokawa)Other units Fleet Air Force Headquarters (Ayase)Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya) Air Patrol Squadron 1 (Kanoya) Air Training Command Air Training Group Shimofusa (Kashiwa)Air Training Group Tokushima Air Training Squadron 203Air Training Squadron 202 27th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Ohtakineyama)5th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kushimoto)22nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Omaezaki)35th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kyogamisaki) Other units and organizationsAir Development and Test Command Headquarters (Fuchu)

Northern Air Group (Okadama)3rd Engineer Brigade (Minami Eniwa)Northern Army Combined Brigade (Higashi Chitose) 12th Engineer Group (Iwamizawa)13th Engineer Unit (Horobetu)14th Engineer Group (Kamifurano)Other units52nd Infantry Regiment (Makomanai)Other units Western Army Western Army Headquarters (Kengun)4th Division Division Headquarters (Fukuoka)16th Infantry Regiment (Oomura)40th Infantry Regiment (Kokura)41st Infantry Regiment (Beppu)4th Field Artillery Regiment (Kurume)4th Logistics Support Regiment (Fukuoka) Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe)Fleet Air Wing 4 (Ayase)Fleet Air Wing 5 (Naha)Fleet Air Wing 21 (Tateyama) Air Patrol Squadron 2 (Hachinohe)Air Patrol Squadron 3 (Ayase)Air Station Iwo-to (Ogasawara)Air Patrol Squadron 5 (Naha)Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 21 (Tateyama) (Itano-gun Matsushige-cho)Air Training Squadron Ozuki (Shimonoseki)Headquarters (Kure) Air Training Squadron 201Air Training Squadron 211 (Kanoya) 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Iruma) 44th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mineokayama)46th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Sado)2nd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Iruma)Other units1st Fire Unit (Narashino, Ichigaya)2nd Fire Unit (Takeyama) Air Development and Test Command Electronics Development and Test Group (Fuchu)Aero-Medical Laboratory (Iruma, Tachikawa)Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu)

Other units 8th Division Other unitsDivision Headquarters (Kita Kumamoto) Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 23 (Maizuru)Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 25 (Mutsu) Training Squadron Training Division 1 (Kure)Other units 3rd Fire Unit (Kasumigaura)4th Fire Unit (Iruma) Air Communications and System Wing (Ichigaya, Each region)

Northeastern Army Headquarters (Sendai) 12th Infantry Regiment (Kokubu) Helicopter Rescue Squadron 73 Other units Aero Safety Service Group

Northeastern Army 6th Division Division Headquarters (Jinmachi)20th Infantry Regiment (Jinmachi)22nd Infantry Regiment (Tagajo)44th Infantry Regiment (Fukusima)6th Field Artillery Regiment (Koriyama)6th Logistics Support Regiment (Jinmachi) 24th Infantry Regiment (Ebino)42nd Infantry Regiment (Kita Kumamoto)43rd Infantry Regiment (Miyakonojo)8th Field Artillery Regiment (Kita Kumamoto)8th Logistics Support Regiment (Kita Kumamoto)Other units Fleet Air Wing 22 (Omura)Fleet Air Wing 31 (Iwakuni) (Tateyama)Helicopter Rescue Squadron 72 (Omura)Air ASW Helicopter squadron 22 (Omura)Air ASW Helicopter squadron 24 (Komatsushima)Air Rescue Squadron 71 (Iwakuni) Communications Command (Ichigaya)MSDF Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo) MSDF Ship Supply Depot (Yokosuka)MSDF Air Supply Depot (Kisarazu) 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Gifu)Central Air Civil Engineering Group (Iruma, Each region)12th Fire Unit (Aibano)13th, 15th Fire Unit (Gifu)14th Fire Unit (Hakusan)Other units (Tachikawa)Air Material Command (Jujo, Each region)Other units and organizations

9th Division Other unitsDivision Headquarters (Aomori)5th Infantry Regiment (Aomori) 15th Brigade Brigade Headquarters (Naha)51st Infantry Regiment (Naha)15th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Yaese) Air Reconnaissance Squadron 81 (Iwakuni)Air Training Support Squadron 91 (Iwakuni) Other units and organizations Other unitsWestern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Kasuga)

21st Infantry Regiment (Akita)39th Infantry Regiment (Hirosaki)9th Artillery Regiment (Iwate) 15th Helicopter Unit (Naha)15th Logistics Support Unit (Naha)Other units Air Development Squadron 51 (Ayase)Air Service Squadron 61 (Ayase) Western Air Defense Force 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru)8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) Western Air Defense Control Group (Kasuga)
9th Logistics Support Regiment (Hachinohe) Western Aircraft Control and 13th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Takahatayama)

Northeastern Army Combined Brigade (Sendai) Other units38th Infantry Regiment (Tagajo) Western Field Artillery Unit (Yufuin) 5th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kengun)Other units Mine Countermeasure Helicopter Squadron 111 (Iwakuni) Warning Wing (Kasuga) 43rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Sefuriyama)7th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Takaoyama)

Northeastern Field Artillery Unit (Sendai)5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Hachinohe)Northeastern Air Group (Kasuminome)2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka) Other units4th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Hachinohe)Other units10th Engineer Group (Funaoka)11th Engineer Group (Fukushima)Other units 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka)Western Air Group (Takayubaru)5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori) 3rd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Iizuka)7th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Takematsu)Other units2nd Engineer Group (Iizuka)9th Engineer Group (Ogori)Other units Fleet Submarine Force Headquarters (Yokosuka)Submarine Flotilla 1 (Kure)Submarine Flotilla 2 Other unitsSubmarine Division 1 (Kure)Submarine Division 3 (Kure)Submarine Division 5 (Kure)Submarine Division 2 (Yokosuka) 2nd Air Defense Missile Group 9th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Shimo-Koshikijima)15th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Fukuejima)17th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mishima)19th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Unishima)3rd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kasuga)Other units5th, 6th Fire Unit (Ashiya)

Other units Western Army Combined Brigade (Ainoura) 19th Infantry Regiment (Fukuoka) (Yokosuka) Submarine Division 4 (Yokosuka) (Kasuga) 7th Fire Unit (Tsuiki)

Eastern Army Headquarters (Asaka) Other units Training Submarine Division 1 (Kure) 8th Fire Unit (Kouradai)

Other units Other units

Eastern Army 1st Division Division Headquarters (Nerima)1st Infantry Regiment (Nerima)32nd Infantry Regiment (Omiya)34th Infantry Regiment (Itazuma) Central Readiness Force Central Readiness Force Headquarters (Zama)1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) Mine Warfare Force (Yokosuka) Submarine Training Center (Kure)Minesweeper Division 1 (Yokosuka)Minesweeper Division 2 (Sasebo) Western Air Civil Engineering Group (Ashiya, Each region)Other units

1st Field Artillery unit (Kitafuji) Minesweeper Division 3 (Kure) *[1] Southwestern Composite Air Division Headquarters (Naha)*[2]

12th Brigade 1st Logistics Support Regiment (Nerima)Other unitsBrigade Headquarters (Somagahara) Special Operation Group (Narashino)1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) Mine Warfare Support Center (Yokosuka)Minesweeper Division 101 (Kure)Landing Ship Division 1 (Kure) Southwestern Composite Air Division 9th Air Wing (Naha)Southwestern Aircraft Control 56th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Yozadake)Southwestern Air Defense Control Group (Naha)

2nd Infantry Regiment (Takada) Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya) and Warning Wing (Naha) 53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Miyakojima)
13th Infantry Regiment (Matsumoto)30th Infantry Regiment (Shibata)12th Field Artillery unit (Utsunomiya)12th Helicopter Unit (Somagahara) Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit (Omiya)International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit (Komakado) Fleet Intelligence Command (Yokosuka) Operational Intelligence Center (Yokosuka)Basic Intelligence Center (Ichigaya)Electronic Intelligence Center (Yokosuka) 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kumejima)55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okinoerabujima)4th Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Naha)

2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo)Eastern Air Group (Tachikawa) 12th Logistics Support Unit (Shinmachi)Other units NBC Counter Measure-Medical Unit (Asaka)Signal Brigade (Ichigaya)Ground Research & Development Command (Asaka) Oceanography ASW Support Command (Yokosuka) ASW Evaluation Center (Yokosuka)Oceanographic Observation Okinawa (Uruma)Anti-Submarine Warfare Center (Yokosuka) 5th Air Defense Missile Group (Naha) Other units16th, 18th Fire Unit (Chinen)17th Fire Unit (Naha)19th Fire Unit (Onna)

1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) 4th Engineer Group (Zama)5th Engineer Group (Takada) Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) Oceanographic Observation Shimokita (Higashidoori Shimokita-gun,Aomori Prefecture) Southwestern Air Civil Engineering Group (Naha)Other units

Eastern Army Combined Brigade (Takeyama)Other units Other units31st Infantry Regiment (Takeyama)48th Infantry Regiment (Somagahara)Other units Other units and organizations Fleet Research and Development Command (Yokosuka) Other unitsC4I Systems Center (Yokosuka)Surface Systems Center (Yokosuka)Other unitsAir Systems Programming Center (Ayase) Tactical Air Training Group (Yokota, Each region)Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Hyakuri)Other unitsAir Rescue Wing (Iruma, Each region)

Airborne Warning and Control Wing (Hamamatsu, Each region) *1 The Southwestern Air Defense Force was established on July 1, 2017.

Other units *2 The Southwestern Air Defense Force Headquarters was established on

July 1, 2017.


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Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2017)


- 

Yonagunijima

- 

-  Southwestern Air Defense Force established on July 1, 2017.


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Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Japan(Excluding Okinawa Prefecture) (As of March 31, 2017)

|Kyogamisaki|Col2|
|---|---|
|14th Missile Defense Battery TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”)||
|||


|Sasebo|Col2|
|---|---|
|U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo 7th Fleet Amphibious assault ship (USS Bonhomme Richard→ USS Wasp [planned]) Dock landing ship Minesweeper Transport landing ship, etc.||
|||


|Atsugi|Col2|
|---|---|
|Naval Air Facility, Atsugi Carrier Air Wing 5 F/A-18 strike fighter (carrier-based aircraft) EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft E-2 airborne early warning and control aircraft C-2 transport aircraft, etc.||


US Army US Navy

**Shariki**

US Air Force US Marines

10th Missile Defense Detachment **Misawa**

TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”) 35th Fighter Wing

F-16 fighter

RQ-4 Global Hawk

(rotational deployment)

**Kyogamisaki** Naval Air Facility, Misawa

Patrol Reconnaissanse Force,

14th Missile Defense Battery

5th/7th Fleet

TPY-2 radar (“X-band radar”)

P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft, etc.

Joint Tactical Ground Station

**Iwakuni**

**Yokota**

Marine Aircraft Group 12

**U.S. Forces, Japan Headquarters**

F/A-18 strike fighter

5th Air Force Headquarters

AV-8 strike aircraft

374th Airlift Wing

EA-6 electronic warfare aircraft

KC-130 tanker/transport aircraft C-130 transport aircraft

F-35B fighter C-12 transport aircraft

C-12 transport aircraft, etc. UH-1 helicopter, etc.

( CV-22 tiltrotor aircraft to be deployed)

**Zama**
**U.S. Army, Japan**

I Corps (Forward)

**Yokosuka**

U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo

**Atsugi** **Commander, Naval Forces Japan**

Naval Air Facility, Atsugi Commander Fleet Activities, Yokosuka

Amphibious assault ship

Carrier Air Wing 5 7th Fleet

(USS Bonhomme Richard→

USS Wasp [planned]) F/A-18 strike fighter (carrier-based aircraft) Aircraft carrier (USS Ronald Reagan)

Dock landing ship EA-18 electronic warfare aircraft Cruiser

E-2 airborne early warning and control aircraft Amphibious command ship (USS Blue Ridge)

Transport landing ship, etc. C-2 transport aircraft, etc. Destroyer, etc.


Souce: the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.

|Col1|35th Fighter Wing F-16 fighter RQ-4 Global Hawk (rotational deployment)|
|---|---|

|Col1|Joint Tactical Ground Station|
|---|---|
|||


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Locations of Major U.S. Forces Stationing in Okinawa (As of March 31, 2017)

|18th Wing F-15 fighter KC-135 air refueling aircraft HH60 helicopter E-3 airborne early warning and control aircraft, etc.|Col2|
|---|---|


|1-1 Air Defense Artillery Patriot PAC-3|Col2|
|---|---|
|||


US Army US Navy **Camp Hansen**

US Air Force US Marines 12th Marine Regiment (Artillery)

**Torii Station**

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Headquarters

10th Area Support Group
1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)

**Kadena Air Base**

18th Wing

F-15 fighter **Camp Schwab**

KC-135 air refueling aircraft

4th Marine Regiment (Infantry)

HH60 helicopter

E-3 airborne early warning and control aircraft, etc.

Fleet Activities Okinawa
Patrol Squadron

P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft

P-8A patrol aircraft, etc.

**Camp Courtney**

1-1 Air Defense Artillery

Patriot PAC-3 III Marine Expeditionary

Force Headquarters
3rd Marine Division Headquarters

**Camp Foster**

**White Beach Area**

1st Marine Aircraft Wing Headquarters

Port facility

Oil storage facility

**MCAS Futenma**

Marine Aircraft Group 36

CH-53 helicopter

**Camp Kinser** AH-1 helicopter

UH-1 helicopter

3rd Marine Logistics Group Headquarters MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft, etc.


Note: Based on information on the U.S. Forces Japan website and other sources.


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