**On the Publication of Defense of** **Japan 2016** **Gen Nakatani** Minister of Defense We are seeing an increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, as well as shifts in the global balance of power including in the Asia-Pacif c region. Since the beginning of this year, North Korea has repeatedly conducted military provocations, such as a nuclear test and ballistic missile launches. Such military actions by North Korea constitute a serious and imminent threat to security not only of Japan but also of the region and the international community. At the same time, Chinese and Russian military forces have intensif ed their activities in sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan. In the East China Sea, Chinese government vessels have repeatedly intruded into Japanese territorial waters and have been engaged in activities that are seen as promoting the Chinese government’s own assertions regarding the Senkaku Islands. In the South China Sea, China has continued large-scale and rapid land reclamations, established outposts, and utilized them for military purposes. By unilaterally altering the status quo and attempting to turn it into a fait accompli, these actions heighten tension in the region. Turning eyes to overseas, we can see international terrorist organizations including ISIL have increasingly gained power and Japanese nationals have fallen victim to their activities, which means threats can easily cross national borders today and no country can safeguard its security on its own. Against this backdrop, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) / the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) has a responsibility to assume any situations and take seamless responses in order to resolutely secure the lives, property, and freedom of the people as well as Japan’s territorial land, water, and airspace. The legislation for peace and security was passed in the Diet last year and entered into force this March. This legislation enables Japan to strengthen its ability to prevent wars from occurring, i.e. its deterrence, and implement seamless responses. To ensure that our deterrence functions adequately, it is essential that Japan continues to build a more effective Dynamic Joint Defense Force that is ready to respond to various situations appropriately. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is the centerpiece of Japan’s security and plays a critical role as the cornerstone of the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacif c region. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, it will become indispensable that Japan and the United States work together ----- Minister of Defense Nakatani encouraging the units deployed to provide disaster relief in the wake of the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake more closely and deal with any circumstances seamlessly from peacetime to contingencies. The legislation has signif cantly deepened trust between the two countries and further strengthened the Alliance. Sending this message out to the world will undoubtedly enhance our deterrence and further ensure Japan’s security. Our partnerships with other countries are also pivotal for security of Japan and for the peace and stability of the region. With an unprecedentedly increasing need for international cooperation in the f elds of security and defense, the MOD/SDF is proactively engaged in visible activities under the banner of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the principle of international cooperation, including defense cooperation and exchanges and international peace cooperation operations. Domestically, many areas of Japan underwent devastating damages due to the heavy rain in the Kanto and Tohoku regions in September 2015 and the Kumamoto Earthquake in April 2016. The MOD/ SDF deployed a number of personnel who worked tirelessly around the clock to rescue the lives of the affected people and to help rebuild their daily life. The SDF personnel’s commitment to saving lives while putting their own lives at risk provides reassurance to communities and has earned much praise and support of the Japanese people. Public understanding and support are indispensable for the defense policy of Japan and the activities of the MOD/SDF. Additionally, it is greatly signif cant to maintain the transparency of Japanese defense policy for gaining other countries’ further understanding and trust in Japan. In this year’s Defense of Japan, we tried to provide a clear explanation of the legislation for peace and security, including a column on this topic. In addition, we tried to make the MOD/SDF more familiar to the people by adding an opening article summarizing this past year’s activities of the MOD, and basic facts regarding the MOD/SDF as well as information on facilities and events at the end of the book. It is my sincere hope that this year’s Defense of Japan will be read by as many people as possible, and that they will deepen their understanding of, as well as agreement and sympathy with, the MOD/SDF. ----- ##### Defense Chronology G The security environment surrounding Japan has grown increasingly severe, and a variety of situations have occurred to threaten the peace, security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacifi c region as well as the entire international community. On the other hand, given the rapid advance in globalization, no single country can defend its own security by itself any longer. In order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community, the Legislation for Peace and Security, which enables seamless responses, is essential. G Therefore, the Government submitted two bills related to the Legislation for Peace and Security to an ordinary session of the Diet in 2015. After a total of about 216 hours of debate at the House of Representatives and the # 01House of Councilors, the two bills were enacted on September 19, 2015, and put into force on March 29, 2016. G Going forward, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) / the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) will appropriately fulfi ll its duties and continue to make thoroughgoing preparations in all ways possible while securing the safety of uniformed Prime Minister Abe responds to interpellations at SDF personnel and meticulously conducting verifi cation efforts, as well as the House of Councilors Special Committee education and training. on the Legislation for Peace and Security [Photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce] ----- The fi rst fl ight of the Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2) (April 2016) G On October 1, 2015, ATLA was established as an extra-ministerial organization, by bringing together and consolidating equipment procurement related departments regarding procurement, research and development in the Ministry of Defense (MOD). This has been implemented as a part of MOD reform along with the integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff. G ATLA has been established to aim at: (1) implementation of unifi ed project management throughout the life cycle from an integrative perspective; (2) smooth and prompt refl ection of the operational needs of units to the equipment to be procured; (3) active engagement in new areas (such as further internationalization of defense equipment and investment in cutting edge technology research); and (4) simultaneous achievement of acquisition reform and maintaining and strengthening defense production and # 02technological bases. G Currently, ATLA actively promotes various measures such as research and development (R&D) for ensuring technological superiority including the R&D on the Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2), project management with respect to equipment subject to a focus, and defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries. The logo of ATLA Minister of Defense Nakatani and Commissioner of ATLA Watanabe setting up the doorplate of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency ----- G Since the beginning of 2016, North Korea has repeatedly conducted provocations, such as its fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and repeated launches of ballistic missiles since February including the launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “satellite.” G The MOD/SDF, in close coordination with the relevant ministries and agencies and countries such as the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK), is taking all possible measures to ensure the peace and security of Japan, which include the collection and analysis of necessary information related to North Korea’s activities, surveillance of such activities, and mobilization and deployment of Aegis destroyers and PAC-3 units. Aegis destroyer being deployed # 03 T-4 taking off to conduct a radiation survey PAC-3 unit deployed to Ishigaki Island ----- **gy** The 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake G During the Kumamoto Earthquake in April 2016, in addition to the major earthquake with an epicenter in the Kumamoto region in Kumamoto Prefecture (maximum M7.3), a total of over 1,600 earthquakes (larger than intensity of 1) occurred centering around Kumamoto Prefecture and Oita Prefecture. The Kumamoto Earthquake caused enormous damage to the affected areas, including the collapse of buildings and facilities and the destruction of transportation infrastructure and lifelines. G Responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governors of Kumamoto and Oita Prefectures, the MOD/SDF conducted lifesaving operations and livelihood support for the victims (transportation of goods, provision of food and water, bathing services, and emergency medical support) by forming a GSDF, MSDF and ASDF joint task force and deploying approximately 814,000 personnel (accumulated number). In this mission, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel were also called to carry out the livelihood support. # 04 Lifesaving activities continued overnight SDF Ready Reserve Personnel boarding onto the ASDF C-130H at the Naha Air Base A private ship, Hakuo, which is on contract with the MOD to make use of the PFI Act, was used as a recreation facility for the victims at the Yatsushiro Port in Kumamoto Prefecture The Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in September 2015 G The Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster occurred in September 2015 caused heavy rain and associated large scale damage mainly in the northern Kanto region and the southern Tohoku region. In particular, in Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Miyagi Prefectures, enormous damage occurred due to the collapse of the river embankment, overtopping, and water leakage. G Responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governors of the three prefectures mentioned above, the MOD/ SDF sent approximately 7,540 personnel (accumulated number) to conduct rescue operations of isolated individuals and other operations. Particularly, in Joso City and its surrounding areas in Ibaraki Prefecture where extended areas were fl ooded due to the overfl ow from the Kinugawa River, evacuation assistance using boats, fl ood control activities using sandbags, water supply activities, bathing service assistance, and epidemic control operations were conducted, in addition to the rescue operation of isolated individuals. ----- In light of the “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, the MOD/SDF has implemented approximately 40 international peace cooperation activities globally such as in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Central America, and dispatched approximately 55,000 SDF personnel (accumulated number). Currently, Japan continues to dispatch SDF units to the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden as well as to UNMISS, and actively contributes to the peace and stability of international community in cooperation with other countries. Counter-Piracy Operations Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden For Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food as a maritime nation, it is crucial to ensure the safety of maritime traffi c. For this reason, Japan dispatches destroyers and P-3C fi xed wing patrol aircraft, and carries out warning and surveillance activities as well as escorting navigating vessels, based on the Anti-Piracy Measures Act enacted in July 2009. These measures are taken in order to deter piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden as well as ensuring the safety of the navigation of ships from various countries including Japan. (As of June 2016, two destroyers and two P-3C fi xed wing patrol aircraft are being dispatched) A destroyer (far right) escorting a ship and P-3C patrol aircraft United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Peace and stability in South Sudan, which gained its independence in July 2011, is very important for the stability of Africa, and it is a crucial issue to be handled by the international community. Responding to the dispatch request from the United Nations to UNMISS, Japan has dispatched engineering units and staff offi cers since November 2011 to contribute to the peace and stability of the country by carrying out the development of infrastructure such as roads and the shelters of internally displaced persons. (As of June 2016, approximately 350 personnel are dispatched as engineering unit and staff offi cers) SDF personnel carrying out an infrastructure improvement operation (road repair) # 05 SDF personnel conducting support for internally SDF personnel interacting with local residents displaced persons ----- **gy** G In October 2015, the SDF fl eet review was held by the MSDF at Sagami Bay (Kanagawa Prefecture), which attracted approximately 34,000 visitors, including visitors who attended the review and the rehearsal. Naval vessels from the naval forces of various countries including the United States, Australia, France, India, and the ROK participated in the fl eet review. Together with these participating vessels, the Japan-Australia joint exercise and the Japan-ROK search and rescue joint exercise were carried out. G The aim of a fl eet review is to raise the morale of SDF units and personnel with the Prime Minister, the supreme commander of the SDF, in attendance. Simultaneously, it also aims # 06 |epen the understanding trust of the people|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |trust of the people ing the SDF and serves opportunity to promote ational goodwill and se exchanges. op review, a fl eet review, an air review are hosted ally in rotation by the GSDF, F, and ASDF respectively. 16, the GSDF troop review e conducted.||| |||| |||SDF personnel listening to instructions given by Prime Minister Abe| and trust of the people regarding the SDF and serves as an opportunity to promote international goodwill and defense exchanges. - A troop review, a fl eet review, and an air review are hosted annually in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively. In 2016, the GSDF troop review will be conducted. SDF personnel listening to instructions given by Prime Minister Abe (From the front right) Prime Minister Abe, Deputy Prime Minister Aso, and Minister of Defense Nakatani are rendered a manning of the rail at the fl eet review Destroyers navigating in alignment ASDF’s Blue Impulse carrying out P-1 patrol aircraft shooting IR fl ares* a demonstration fl ight - Interference to avoid infrared-guided missiles ----- **Security Environment** **Surrounding Japan** **Overview** **Chapter 1** P. 2 The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. G Security challenges and destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacifi c region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious. There has been a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies, over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests. In addition, there has been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. G In particular, North Korea’s further progress with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles development, coupled with repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior that disregard the international community, constitute serious and imminent threats to the security of the region including Japan and of the international community. G Additionally, as China’s reinforcement of its military capabilities without transparency, along with active maritime advancement, rapidly shift the regional military balance, China’s attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas based on its own assertions as well as its risk of causing unintended consequences due to misunderstanding or miscalculation have become security concerns to the region including Japan and to the international community. G In a global security environment, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately explode into a challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The activities of international terrorist organizations continue to gain momentum. Today, the threat of terrorism is not confi ned to the Middle East and North Africa, but is expanding globally. The outcomes of Russia’s changes to the status quo in Ukraine have taken on an aspect of being entrenched. At the same time, China’s unilateral acts that alter the status quo and heighten tension in the South China Sea have left challenges for the international response, in the midst of China’s continued attempt to further create a fait accompli. With cyber attacks becoming more sophisticated and skillful, there are increasing risks to the stable use of cyberspace. G These security challenges and destabilizing factors in the international community are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more diffi cult for a single country to deal with them on its own. G Furthermore, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. Recent Security Related Issues around Japan reinforcement of military Prime Minister Abe offering fl owers at the site of the terror forces without transparency attacks in Paris in November 2015 [photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce] North Korea’s series of Intensification of Russian militarily provocative military activities rhetoric and behavior North Korea’s further progress with nuclear weapons and missiles development China’s broad and rapid reinforcement of military forces without transparency China’s rapid expansion/ intensification of activities in the East China Sea and attempts to change the status quo Sea lanes leading to Japan Continuation of frequent advancements Changes in the China-Taiwan military balance to the Pacific Ocean by the Chinese military (in favor of the Chinese side) Tendency towards increase in and China’s changes of the status quo and creation prolongation of gray-zone situations of a fait accompli in the South China Sea **Based on the GTOPO30 (USGS) and ETOPO1 (NOAA) models.** Fiery Cross Reef. The runway construction is believed to have been completed following rapid and large-scale land reclamation (as of May 2016). [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe] ----- Digest **European Region** **The United StatesArmy:** approx. 28,000 personnel **Chapter 2** P. 9 Navy: approx. 7,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel U.S. Forces G The patterns of U.S. involvement in the world are changing signifi cantly in a new security environment, including a shift in the global balance Marines: approx. 1,000 personnel Army: approx. 487,000 personnel Navy: approx. 323,000 personnel of power beginning with the military rise of China, attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine and the South China Sea, Total: approx. 64,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 307,000 personnel (Total in 1987: and the intensifi cation of the activities of international terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While faced approx. 354,000 personnel) Marines: approx. 183,000 personnel with a severe fi nancial situation, the United States is anticipated to continue to play a role in the peace and stability of the world by drawing U.S. European Command Total: approx. 1,301,000 personnel (Total in 1987: on its world-leading, comprehensive national power. approx. 2,170,000 personnel) G It is regarded that the United States sees violent extremist organizations such as ISIL and Al Qaeda as short-term security threats, and nations U.S. Central Command attempting to threaten the existing international order or the interests of the United States and its allies as mid- to long-term security threats.Asia-Pacific Region U.S. Northern Command Army: approx. 37,000 personnel G The United States intends to maintain the pivot to the Asia-Pacifi c region, continuing to rebalance towards the region to deepen relations with Navy: approx. 43,000 personnel its allies and other countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region and to enhance both the quantity and quality of U.S. assets deployed to the region. U.S. Africa Command U.S. Pacific Command Air Force: approx. 27,000 personnelMarines: approx. 24,000 personnel Mindful of China’s recent moves to unilaterally change the status quo and create a fait accompli in the South China Sea, the United States has Total: approx. 131,000 personnel U.S. SouthernCommand indicated that it would continue its Freedom of Navigation Operations to protect the rights and freedoms under international law.(Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel) G The United States promotes the Third Offset Strategy to develop military technologies in new fi elds to maintain and increase the superiority of the U.S. Forces, deeming that its military superiority is gradually eroding in light of recent trends, including China and other countries’ enhanced military capabilities. The Third Offset Strategy is aimed at gaining technological, organizational, and operational superiority in order to strengthen deterrence using conventional assets against great powers, and outlines that priority would be given to investing in humanmachine collaboration and combat teaming. Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of September 30, 2015), etc. U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacifi c Region2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam. **[Japan]** - Deploys F-22, MV-22/CV-22 Osprey, P-8, and Global Hawk - Deploys second TPY-2 radar - Additionally deployed one Aegis ship (normal ship) (June 2015) - Switched one Aegis ship (normal ship) with Aegis BMD destroyer (March 2016) - Additionally deploys two Aegis BMD destroyers (one already Seoul deployed in October 2015 and one to be deployed in summer 2017) ROK Japan **[Guam]** - Rotationally deploys submarines - Rotationally deploys bombers Okinawa - Established a facility for aircraft carrier’s temporary port of call - Deploys unmanned Philippines Guam reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4) Hawaii Manila **[Philippines]** - Signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for enhancing the presence of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014) - Announced US$79 million assistance and provision of one patrol vessel and one survey vessel (November 2015) Singapore - Implements joint patrol activities (March 2016–) Indonesia - Agreed on five locations such as Air Force bases, etc. to serve as hubs for implementing defense cooperation based on EDCA (March 2016) Jakarta - Regularly deploys A-10 ground attack aircraft, etc. (April 2016–) **[Singapore]** - Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat Darwin **[Australia]** Ships (LCS) (To deploy four LCSs by At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the following initiatives: end of 2017. The first ship started - Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia rotation in April 2013 and the - Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia トンガ second ship in December 2014.) Australia - Rotationally deployed P-8 (December 2015) In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a plan to deploy 60% of - Signed enhanced defense the assets of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as cooperation agreement proceed with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment. (December 2015) Canberra - A map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is used ----- **y** **g** **p** **North Korea** **Chapter 2** P. 18 **General Situation** G North Korea seems to be maintaining and reinforcing its so-called asymmetric military capabilities. It has repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior militarily, including conducting a nuclear test in January 2016 and repeating ballistic missile launches since February 2016. Such military activities by North Korea heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula and constitute a serious and imminent threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the region and the international community. Therefore, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them. **Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles** G North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016. It launched a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016 and has continued to repeatedly launch ballistic missiles since March 2016. G North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime. G North Korea asserts that the nuclear test conducted in January 2016 was a hydrogen bomb test. However, it is doubtful that a general hydrogen bomb test was conducted, considering the magnitude of the earthquake. In either case, North Korea’s activities to develop the hydrogen bomb must continue to be monitored. G In light of the technological maturity reached through North Korea’s previous four nuclear tests and other factors, it is possible that North Korea has achieved miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads. It is believed that, with the passage of time, there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead that includes Japan in its range. G North Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016 used a “Taepodong-2” variant, which seemed to be a similar type of the ballistic missile launched in December 2012. It is assessed that North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had been advanced by this launch. It is believed that a test launch of long-range ballistic missiles can contribute to the advancement of North Korea’s entire ballistic missile program and to the diversifi cation of attack measure. G North Korea is deemed to be continuing to develop submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), announcing in April 2016 that it once again conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM. At the military parade in October 2015, a new missile thought to be the “KN08” was showcased with a different-shaped warhead (the missile is reportedly called “KN14”) from the previous version. This is likely intended to diversify North Korea’s attack capabilities using ballistic missiles and improve their survivability. G Should North Korea succeed in extending the range of ballistic missile capabilities, miniaturizing nuclear warheads and mounting them on a ballistic missile, as well as have a false sense of confi dence and recognition that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States, this could lead to increases in and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan. G In the case of the ballistic missile launches since 2014, North Korea has launched multiple ballistic missiles using a Transporter-Erector-Launcher from locations and at timings as it chooses. The launches have demonstrated the improvements in the operational capabilities of North Korea’s ballistic missile units, including surprise attack capabilities. In this regard, the North Korean ballistic missile threat is increasing further. ----- G North Korea demonstrated that the Musudan it fi rst attempted to launch in April 2016 had its certain capability as an intermediate-range missile Digest in the June 2016 launch. In March 2016, North Korea disclosed the implementation of ballistic missile re-entry environmental simulations, a ground jet test of a high-power solid fuel missile engine, and a ground jet test of a new-type high-power engine of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). North Korea has shown readiness to acquire technologies to make practical use of new intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles and make them more sophisticated, presenting serious concerns for Japan and other relevant countries. G North Korea’s further development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, coupled with its repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior that disregard the international community, constitutes a serious and imminent threat to the security of the region including Japan and of the international community. Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles New York (Approx. 6,000 km) 10,000 km Taepodong-2 (Variant: Approx. 10,000 km+) Washington, D.C. Chicago Musudan (Approx. 2,500–4,000km) Taepodong-1 (Approx. 1,500 km+) 6,000 km Denver Nodong (Approx. 1,300 km) 4,000 km San Francisco Anchorage Scud ER (Approx. 1,000 km) 1,500 km Los Angeles 1,300 km Taepodong district Beijing Pyongyang Tokyo Hawaii Tongch’ang-ri district 1,000 km Okinawa Guam The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30 - The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience. **Domestic Affairs** G North Korea held the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) for the fi rst time in 36 years in May 2016. Kim Jong-un was appointed as KWP Chairman. Setting out that it was a “nuclear weapons state,” Chairman Kim Jong-un demonstrated to those in and outside of the country that North Korea was ready to continue with its nuclear and missile development, including upholding the “new strategic line” policy of economic development and the building of nuclear force. Prior to the Congress, North Korea conducted provocations at unprecedented frequency and content, including the launch of ballistic missiles. G The holding of the KWP Congress may be an indication that North Korea has shifted into high gear by establishing the “state”-run governance system centered on the party and led by KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un, in terms of its organization, personnel, among other dimensions, both in name and in substance. However, due to an atrophy effect created by the frequent executions, demotions, and dismissals of senior offi cials, there is likely growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of North Korea turning to military provocations without making adequate diplomatic considerations. **Relations with Other Countries** G The explosion of landmines in the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s area of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in August 2015 deeply stirred tensions between the ROK and North Korea that included shelling. Since January 2016, tensions between the two sides have heightened due to North Korea’s nuclear test and ballistic missile launches, as well as provocative rhetoric and behavior in protest against the U.S.-ROK combined exercise. G China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of infl uence on the country. Meanwhile, North Korea went ahead with a nuclear test and ballistic missile launches despite China’s request for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In this light, it is possible that North Korea-China relations are cooling. ----- **y** **g** **p** **China** **Chapter 2** P. 41 **General Situation** G There are high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues. G While advocating “peaceful development,” China continues to act in an assertive manner, particularly over maritime issues where its interests confl ict with others’, including its attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing order of international law. These actions include dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. China is poised to fulfi ll its unilateral demands without compromise, which has included making steady efforts to turn these coercive changes to the status quo into a fait accompli, raising strong concerns over China’s future direction. G During the fi fth plenary session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in October 2015, the idea of “sweeping lawbased governance of the country” was presented. China is thus anticipated to continue addressing corruption within the party and the military. G China is believed to be enhancing its asymmetric military capabilities to deter military forces of other countries from approaching and advancing to China’s surrounding region, and to inhibit their military activities in the region (so-called “A2/AD (anti-access/area-denial)” capabilities). **Military Affairs** G China has broadly and rapidly reinforced its military forces, and furthermore, rapidly expanded and intensifi ed its activities at sea and in airspace, including the East and South China Seas. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese military activities, together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, and must keep utmost attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns for the region and the international community. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specifi c information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities. G China’s announced national defense budget has increased at a rapid pace, recording double-digit annual growth nearly consistently since FY1989. The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has grown approximately 44-fold in 28 years since FY1988 and nearly 3.4-fold in 10 years since FY2006. G China is currently carrying out reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which some see as being the largest in the country’s history. These reforms have recently taken shape at a rapid pace, including: the establishment of the PLA Army Headquarters, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force; the replacement of the four general departments that were the headquarters for the entire PLA; and the creation of fi ve new theaters of operations. G China is thought to be strengthening its “A2/AD” capabilities through Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget and long-range cruise missile 9,500 China offi cially admitted the building 7,500 of a domestic aircraft carrier for the 6,500 6,000 5,000 company to purchase 24 Su-35 2,5002,000 500 |ion yuan)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Defense budget (in 100 million yuan) Year-on-year growth rate (%)|||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||| 89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 fi ghters, which are said to become (FY) next-generation fi ghters. Note: This basically shows the defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. Note that the FY2002 budget was calculated on the assumption that the disclosed rate and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001, because the FY2002 budget was not disclosed and discrepancies arise when the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. In FY2015 and FY2016, only the defense budget within the basic expenditures of the central government (part of the central fiscal expenditures) was announced. The FY2015 defense budget within central fiscal expenditures was calculated by adding the defense budget within the basic expenditures of the central government and the local relocation expenditure amount, etc. released separately at a later date. ----- Digest **Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Waters and Airspace** G The number of Chinese naval surface vessels advancing to the Pacific to the open ocean. contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island (AGI) Islands. It is of serious concern that recently China has unilaterally Recent Major Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan (The wakes shown are an illustration) Chinese naval vessels have sailed the following areas (*①-⑤, ⑦-⑨ several times): Guam ①Sailed through Soya Strait; ②Sailed through Tsugaru Strait; ③Sailed through Tsugaru Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, and then transited Osumi Strait from the Pacific Ocean to the East China Sea etc.; ④Conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone south of the Boso Peninsula (AGI); ⑤Sailed through Osumi Strait; ⑥Sailed between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island; ⑦Sailed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean; ⑧Sailed the Pacific Ocean southwest of the main island of Okinawa; ⑨Sailed between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami Island; ⑩Sailed in Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island; and then ⑪Sailed within Japan’s Okinotori Island contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island (AGI) Standoffs between Chinese and 3 Philippines/Vietnamese vessels in the Kitadaito Island South China Sea, and other activities 4 11 10 Okinawa 8 Tokyo 6 7 Kuchinoerabu 9 Island 5 12 South China Sea East China Sea Senkaku Taipei 2 Sea of Japan Islands 1 Ningbo - In January 2013, a Jiangkai I-class frigate is suspected to ⑫ Near the Senkaku Islands: have directed a fire-control radar at a helicopter based on an - Since December 2008, government vessels have intruded into Japan’s territorial waters; intermittently since MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea. September 2012; and repeatedly with what appear to be cannons since December 2015. - In January 2013, a Jiangwei II-class frigate directed fire- - In November 2015 and June 2016, an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous control radar at an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea. zone south of the Senkaku Islands. - In June 2016, a frigate entered the contiguous zone north of the Senkaku Islands. escalated activities in waters near Japan, such as activities that are seen as actions based on their own assertions related to the Senkaku Islands and further expansion of its naval vessels’ reach to include the Senkaku Islands. G As regards Chinese government vessels, their intrusion into Japanese territorial waters is becoming routinized. Government vessels carrying weapons that appear to be cannons have begun to intrude into Japanese territorial waters, and they are increasingly larger in size. China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Chinese government vessels to intrude into Japanese territorial waters. G In recent years, the number of scrambles by the ASDF against Chinese aircraft has increased dramatically. Recently, Chinese PLA aircraft have also been seen intensifying activities near the Senkaku Islands, fl ying in the southward direction. Utmost attention must continue to be paid to these activities. G One of the objectives of China’s maritime activities is likely to weaken the control of other countries over the islands to which China claims territorial sovereignty, while strengthening the claim of its territorial sovereignty, through various surveillance activities and use of force at sea and in airspace surrounding the islands. G China is known to be building 12 new offshore platforms in addition to the existing 4 platforms on the Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013 for the drilling of oil and natural gas. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral development and demanded the termination of such work. **Situation of Activities in the South China Sea and “Far Seas”** G Since 2014, China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation works on seven features in the Spratly Islands. China has built military facilities such as batteries and has developed infrastructures that could be utilized for military purposes, such as runways, hangars, harbors, and radar facilities. G In the Paracel Islands, China has similarly carried out land reclamation and infrastructure construction on features and promoted their use for military purposes. On Woody Island, China is known to have extended the runway, deployed J-11 and other fi ghters, and deployed arms likely to be surface-to-air missiles. G The Chinese Navy is thought to be shifting its naval forces towards “offshore waters defense and open seas protection,” and is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years. G China has reached an agreement with Djibouti to build facilities there for providing logistics support to its military forces. China also supports the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries. In this regard, the Chinese Navy could further build up its capabilities to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean and other distant waters. ----- **y** **g** **p** **Russia** **Chapter 2** P. 71 G Russia, while facing a severe economic situation, is making continued efforts to modernize its military forces. Russia also tends to intensify the activities of its military forces and expand their area of activity. G As regards the situation in Ukraine, the outcomes of Russia’s changes to the status quo by force or coercion have taken on an aspect of being entrenched, and the sense of being threatened by Russia’s activities is increasing especially in the West. Russia’s military intervention in Syria is drawing attention as a manifestation of the achievements of its series of military reform as well as a move to increase its international infl uence. G The newly revised National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world, and commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfi lled by Russia’s military force and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military confl ict by maintaining a suffi cient level of nuclear deterrent capability and the Russian Armed Forces (RAF). G Russia continues to station the RAF in the Northern Territories and has been increasing its activities in the territories under de facto occupation. **Southeast Asia** **Chapter 2** P. 90 G In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased January 2015 March 2015 May 2016 air force equipment such as fourth-generation modern fi ghters and submarines. G In the South China Sea, competing claims with China over sovereignty and other issues have heightened tension in the region. Against this backdrop, the international community’s deep concern over the unilateral changes to the status quo and their creation of a fait accompli is |Col1|Col2| |---|---| January 2015 March 2015 May 2016 Facilities such as a 3,000 m-runway are being built on the reef. September 2015 May 2016 quickly becoming ever more widespread. Some countries Subi Reef where rapid and large-scale reclamation is under way involved are making efforts to settle the issues in [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe] accordance with international law.* - In July 2016, in the arbitral proceedings pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the Philippines and China over the South China Sea, a fi nal ruling was rendered in which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions were ruled in favor of the Philippines. **Trends in Regional Confl ict and International Terrorism** **Chapter 3** P. 115 G The confl icts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world have arisen due to various problems, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and natural resources. In many cases, areas where internal or regional confl icts have created or expanded a governance vacuum have become a hotbed of the activities of terrorist organizations. In addition, some organizations operate across national borders and regions, and continue to pose imminent security challenges to the international community. G There has been a rise in young people who sympathize with the extremism of international terrorist organizations, including ISIL that has gained strength in Iraq and Syria, against a backdrop of societal disapproval and other issues. In an increasing number of cases, these people have joined the activities of international terrorist organizations and conduct “home-grown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism activities in their home countries. As evidenced by the simultaneous terrorist attacks in Paris and the terrorist attack in Jakarta, terror threats are spreading, not only in the Middle East and Africa, but also throughout the rest of the world. Furthermore, in light of the terror attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in July 2016, it can be said Japan is in a situation where it needs to squarely address the threat of international terrorism as its own challenge. G Some international terrorist organizations are capable of implementing terror attacks in locations far from their bases and use cyberspace and other means to form global networks within and outside their organization, or use advanced public relations strategies to skillfully promote themselves, recruit fi ghters and call for terror attacks. ----- Digest **Maritime** **Chapter 3** P. 141 G In the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their own assertions which are incompatible with the existing international law and order. G The United States continuously conducts its Freedom of Navigation Operations in order to counter excessive claims over maritime interests asserted by coastal states in the South China Sea. G China aims to build up the Chinese Navy’s capacity for continuously executing operations in more distant waters. China is building facilities for providing logistics support to the military in Djibouti, a country facing the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, China supports the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries. G The Arctic states have been proactively promoting efforts to secure their interests in resource development and use of the sea route. Countries such as Russia are promoting efforts to deploy new military capabilities. As regards non-Arctic states, China has shown active involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying a polar research vessel to the ocean. U.S. Navy missile destroyer USS Lassen which conducted a Freedom of Navigation Operation in October 2015 [U.S. DoD website] **Outer Space** **Chapter 3** P. 148 G Major countries are making efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C[4]ISR* functions. Such satellites include image reconnaissance satellites, satellites gathering radio wave information, military communication satellites, and positioning satellites. G Meanwhile, Chinese, Russian, and other countries’ development of anti-satellite weapons and scattering of space debris have come to be seen as a threat to the satellites of each nation. The risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges facing countries. - C[4]ISR: Command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance **Cyber** **Chapter 3** P. 153 G It is deemed that actors wishing to cause harm to nations, etc. have all realized that attacking through cyberspace is often easier than attacking directly using physical means. G Cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against communications networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries. With the suggested involvement of government organizations such as those of China, Russia, and North Korea, cyber attacks are becoming more sophisticated and skillful by the day, and cybersecurity has become one of the most important security issues for countries. **Military Science and Technology as well as Defense Production and** **Chapter 3** P. 159 **Technological Bases** G Scientifi c and technological advancements are triggering signifi cant and revolutionary changes also in the military area. In light of the capability enhancements made by China and other countries, the United States promotes the Third Offset Strategy to secure military superiority. G In the United States, a variety of DoD-related agencies provide funds including large-scale funding for research undertaken by entities such as companies and universities. G Western countries are increasing competitiveness through realignment of their defense industry as well as promoting equipment technology cooperation among their allies and partners, in order to adapt to the escalation of development and production costs of equipment due to their growing sophistication and complexity ----- **Japan s Security and Defense Policy** **and the Japan-U.S. Alliance** **National Security Strategy** **Chapter 1** P. 169 I The “National Security Strategy” developed in December 2013 expresses Japan’s fundamental principle of national security, which is that Japan Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP, and Annual Budget will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a NSS Basic policy for national security centered peace-loving nation and to contribute even more proactively in securing (approx. 10-year time frame) the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while based on NSS achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia- Prescribe future defense force and target levels Pacifi c region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the of defense force that Japan should achieve principle of international cooperation. achieve target levels of defense force I In order to achieve this principle, the strategy defi ned Japan’s national Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures security, such as the maintenance of sovereignty and independence, and quantity of major equipment defending territorial integrity, ensuring the safety of life, person and appropriate budget, develop specific projects properties of its nationals, economic development, and the maintenance and protection of the international order based on rules and universal values. appropriate annual budget as necessary Basic policy for national security centered NSS around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame) based on NSS Prescribe future defense force and target levels NDPG of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame) achieve target levels of defense force Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures MTDP and quantity of major equipment appropriate budget, develop specific projects Examine based on the current situations, Annual budget appropriate annual budget as necessary I Based on that, the strategy clearly defi nes the security environment surrounding Japan and national security challenges, and specifi es the strategic approaches centering on diplomatic and defense policies that Japan should implement, such as the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture to protect Japan. **National Defense Program Guidelines** **Chapter 2** P. 173 I The “National Defense Program Guidelines” developed in December 2013 based on the National Security Strategy defi nes basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specifi c Self-Defense Force (SDF) equipment. I Japan’s Basic Defense Policy The guideline specifi es (1) Japan’s own efforts, (2) strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and (3) active promotion of security cooperation as the basic principles from the perspective of proactive contribution to peace based on international cooperation. Submarine unit I Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force To build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, the MOD conducts capability assessments based on joint operations and builds a dynamic joint defense force, for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities. I Role of the Defense Forces Fighter aircraft (F-35A) G The following points will be emphasized as effective means of deterrence and response to various situations: (1) ensuring the security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters. G Promoting training and exercises, defense cooperation and exchanges, securing of maritime security, international peace cooperation activities, and capacity building assistance in order to stabilize the Asia-Pacifi c region and to improve the global security environment. I Structure of the Self-Defense Forces The “appendix” specifi es the target levels of the main formation and equipment. I Foundation to Maximize Defense Capability Also strengthen the foundations underpinning the defense force. ----- Digest **Medium Term Defense Program** **Chapter 2** P. 183 I The “Mid-Term Defense Program” (FY2014-FY2018) developed in December 2013 based on the “National Defense Program Guidelines” specifi es the review of major units, major projects concerned with the capability of the SDF, policies to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the maintenance scale of main equipment (“appendix”), and required expenses. I Reorganization of the Major SDF Units G The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF): Establish the Ground Central Command, transform two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades, and establish a coast observation unit and area security units G The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF): Retain four escort fl otillas (mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG)) and fi ve Amphibious vehicle (AAV7) escort divisions (consisting of other destroyers), and increase the number of submarines G The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF): At Naha Air Base, increase the number of fi ghter squadrons to two, and newly organize one airborne early warning squadron **Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2016** **Chapter 2** P. 189 I In 2016, based on the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program, and as the third year of their implementation, Japan is steadily carrying out defense development efforts to build up its defense capability. I Japan will improve its defense capabilities in order to seamlessly and dynamically fulfi ll its defense responsibilities, response to a variety of security situations, and (2) supporting (KC-46A; reference image) stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region. **Defense-Related Expenditures** **Chapter 2** P. 190 I In 2016, based on the increasingly severe security environment, in order to strengthen the posture of protecting the life and property of the people and Japan’s territorial land, sea, and air, Japan has increased defense-related expenditure, as in 2015 (increased 0.8% from the previous year) Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years 50,000 46,000 49,392 49,262 48,760 48,607 48,297 48,221 47,815 47,838 47,903 47,426 47,028 46,826 46,804 46,625 46,453 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the U.S. forces realignment expenses, and expenses associated with the acquisition of a new government aircraft. The total defense expenditures when including these items are 4,955.7 billion yen for FY2002, 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4 902 6 billi f FY2004 4 856 0 billi f FY2005 4 813 6 billi f FY2006 4 801 3 billi f FY2007 4 779 6 billi f FY2008 4 774 1 billi ----- **p** **y** **y** **p** **Human Foundation and Organization that Supports** **Chapter 2** P. 194 **the Defense Force** I For the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/SDF to exercise its defense capability effectively to the full extent, it is vitally important to enrich and enhance the human resource foundation supporting it. Also, the various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement without understanding and cooperation by each and every person and local governments. Therefore it is necessary to further deepen the trust between local communities and people, and the SDF. I Recruitment and Employment G Due to the declining birthrate and the popularization of higher education, the general recruitment condition of uniformed SDF personnel is increasingly severe. In light of this, the SDF is recruiting personnel with superior abilities and a strong desire to enlist from all over Japan under various categories. There are also systems in place such as the SDF Reserve Personnel system, under which they engage in their respective occupations in peacetime and serve as uniformed SDF personnel in cases such as the issuing of defense call-up orders. Female SDF personnel/pilot I Promotion of the Careers of Female Personnel G The MOD/SDF is implementing the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance,” which incorporates three reforms–“Working style reform,” “Reform to realize a successful career with a balanced life between childrearing and nursing, etc.,” and “Reform for promoting successful female personnel,” (the development of internal crèche facilities, etc.) in order to promote the work-life balance of the personnel in a unifi ed manner whilst further expanding the recruitment and promotion of female personnel. G As the result of reviewing the deployment restriction of female SDF personnel and lifting the restriction preventing women from working in fi ghter squadrons, anti-tank helicopter units and missile boats, female uniformed SDF personnel can now be assigned to all posts of the MSDF except for submarines, and all posts of the ASDF. I Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources Measures are being implemented with regard to personnel system reform, in order to respond to the advancement of equipment as well as diversifi cation and internationalization of SDF missions, from the perspective of ensuring the robustness of the SDF and making effective use of human resources under the constrained budget. New SDF members undergoing training **Legislation for Peace and Security** **Chapter 3** P. 208 I The Legislation for Peace and Security was passed and enacted in September 2015 and came into force in March 2016. I With the security environment surrounding Japan becoming increasingly severe, the Legislation for Peace and Security has historical signifi cance in further ensuring the peace and security of Japan through enhancing the deterrence and making contributions to the peace and stability of the region and the international community more proactively than ever before, and has been highly rated and supported by many countries and organizations in the world. I Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law G Establishment of the provisions for measures to rescue Japanese nationals overseas – In addition to the existing mission of “transportation of Japanese nationals and others overseas,” “rescue measures,” including guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals and others overseas, became possible. G Establishment of the provisions for the protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries – Enable SDF personnel to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan. G Expansion of the provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed Forces – Expand the range of scenes where the provision of supplies and services is possible as well as the scope of supplies and services available. I Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Inf uence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) G The name of situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security has been changed from “situations in areas surrounding Japan” to “situations that will have an important infl uence.” G “Armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the U.N. Charter,” etc. were added as the armed forces, etc. responding to situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security subject to Japan’s support. The law revision expanded the types of supplies and services the SDF can provide in situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security and also set forth the measures to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country. ----- I Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Act Digest G “Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security” (humanitarian relief support and safety-ensuring tasks not under the control of the United Nations) were added as operations Japan can participate in. In addition to the satisfaction of the Five Principles for Participation, Japan can participate in these operations based on U.N. resolutions or at the request of the United Nations, or other prescribed organizations. G The so-called “safety-ensuring operations” and the so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo” operations, etc. were added as tasks in U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., and the authority to use weapons was also reviewed. Prior Diet approval is required, in principle, for the “safety-ensuring operations.” I Revision of the Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations G “Survived-Threatening Situation[(*1)]” was newly added to the situations to which Japan has to respond under the Armed Attack Situations Response Act. G Necessary revisions were made to relevant laws to make it possible to issue an order for defense operations to respond to a “SurvivedThreatening Situation” for the SDF’s primary mission of the defense of Japan, and also to require prior Diet approval for this, in principle, in the same manner as for defense operations in the case of the armed attack situations, etc. I Enactment of the International Peace Support Act (New) G The International Peace Support Act is a newly enacted law that enables Japan to conduct cooperation and support operations, search and rescue operations and ship inspection operations for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for peace and security of the international community in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing[(*2)]. G The operations of armed forces of foreign countries need to have competent U.N. resolutions as well as meet some other requirements in order for Japan to provide support. The Act also sets forth measures in order to avoid “integration” with the use of force by a foreign country, such as those not allowing the SDF to conduct support activities “in the scene where no combat operations are conducted at that time” in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing. G Prior Diet approval is required without exception, and re-approval is necessary in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of the response measures. I Revision of the Act for Establishment of the National Security Council G Responses to “Survived-Threatening Situation,” “situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security” and “situations threatening international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing” were added as the items for deliberation. G “Rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas,” and “decisions on and changes in implementation plans for the implementation of safety-ensuring operations or “kaketsuke-keigo” operations were added as the items the National Security Council must deliberate without fail. *1 A situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness *2 Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, and the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the threat, and Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security Images of Situations and Conditions Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. Support activities (including logistics support) in situations Response to armed attack situations, etc [Self-Defense Forces Act] that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace [Legislation for Responses to Situations] Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (New) and security (Expansion) Responses to “Survived-Threatening Situation” (New) [Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security ・ “Use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions” Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment [Self-Defense Forces Act] (Revision of the Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security] Protection of weapons/other equipment of the U.S. and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) other countries’ armed forces (New) Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed ・ Clarification of the purpose of the revisionthe purpose of the Act） （Revision of (1) When an armed attack against Japan occurs or The “Three New Conditions”when an armed attack ・Forces in peacetime Expand situations where supplies/services can be provided, such as the guarding of facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Japan [Self-Defense Forces Act] (Expansion) ・・ Support activities for armed forces of foreign countries Expansion of the scope of support activities(not only the U.S.) (2) When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happinessensure Japan’s survival and protect its people Ship Inspection Operations (Expansion) (3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary [Ship Inspection Operations Act] ・ Enable ship inspection operations in situations that the international community is International Peace Cooperation Activities collectively addressing for international peace and security [International Peace Cooperation Act] U.N. PKO (Addition) ・ Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (e.g. security of specified areas including protection Support activities (including logistics support) to armed of local population) forces of foreign countries in situations that the ・ Review of authority to use weapons (small arms) to international community is collectively addressing for better align with current U.N. standard international peace and security (New) [International Peace Support Act (New)] Internationally coordinated operations for peace The exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not and security permitted for the purpose of the so-called defense of a foreign (Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework) country, namely, for the purpose of turning back an attack made against a foreign country. Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council] ----- **p** **y** **y** **p** **Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **Chapter 4** P. 228 I Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security. I The Japan-U.S. Alliance, centering on bilateral security arrangements, functions as “public goods” that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacifi c region and the world at large. I As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacifi c region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan. Prime Minister Abe shakes hands with U.S. President Obama on the occasion of his attendance at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in November 2015 [Photo courtesy of the Cabinet Public Relations Offi ce] **Outline of the New Guidelines** **Chapter 4** P. 230 I Defense Cooperation and the Objectives of the Guidelines The new Guidelines newly specifi ed the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation are retained in line with the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. I Strengthened Alliance Coordination Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism to be utilized from peacetime; development and update of bilateral plan. I Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security The new Guidelines present directions for achieving “seamless” cooperation, from peacetime to contingencies. I Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security The new Guidelines set forth specifi c forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation for regional and global peace and security. I Outer Space and Cyberspace Cooperation The new Guidelines newly incorporate cooperation in outer space and cyberspace. I Bilateral Enterprise The new Guidelines, in order to enhance the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation, newly incorporate initiatives in the three areas of defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security, and educational and research exchanges that serve as the foundation of security and defense cooperation. I Procedures for the Review The new Guidelines newly incorporate the implementation of the regular evaluation. **Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening the Alliance** **Chapter 4** P. 238 I Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting The Japan–U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (June 4, 2016) G Regarding the arrest of a member of the civilian component in Okinawa, the Ministers confi rmed their intent to continue to work closely together to devise a set of effective prevention measures, including the review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component. G The Ministers agreed that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. G In light of the developments regarding North Korea, the Ministers agreed to maintain close Japan-U.S. cooperation. G The Ministers affi rmed their intent to continue efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. G The Ministers agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for defense The Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore (June 2016) equipment and technology. G The Ministers agreed to continue to cooperate in mitigating the impact Oki ----- I Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance Digest G In order to respond to the increasingly severe security environment, Japan and the United States will establish a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including cooperation in “gray zone” situations, while enhancing the Japanese and U.S. presence in the Western Pacifi c. The two countries are continuing to promote the expansion of joint training and exercises as well as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and also the expansion of the joint use of facilities and areas of both countries that serve as the bases for these activities. G In November 2015, based on the new Guidelines, the two governments established the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) that enables bilateral information sharing and coordination at various levels from peacetime, and upgraded the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) for the development and update of bilateral plans. SDF members on the lookout in joint fi eld training exercises, Orient Shield, with the U.S. Army **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan** **Chapter 4** P. 253 I Signif cance of the Presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan For the Japan-U.S. Alliance to adequately function as a deterrence that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacifi c region, it is necessary to secure the presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan and to maintain a posture to respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies. For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. I Host Nation Support (HNS) The Government of Japan, while paying adequate attention to its tight fi scal conditions, has been providing HNS from the perspective that HNS is of extreme importance in supporting the smooth and effective operation of the U.S. Forces in Japan. In April 2016, the new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) related to HNS took effect. I Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan is extremely important in mitigating the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. The MOD plans to proceed with the U.S. Forces realignment and other initiatives while making continuous efforts to gain understanding and cooperation from local communities accommodating facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan. I Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa G The relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area (Nago City) is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces in Japan, and will fully contribute to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. The return of MCAS Futenma is also expected to be followed by further growth of Okinawa through the reuse of the area. Thus, the Government of Japan is making all-out efforts to realize the relocation of MCAS Futenma. G In December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States agreed on an early return of part of the land of MCAS Futenma as well as on an early return of part of the land of Makiminato Service Area. G Through the Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture, established in January 2016 to discuss ways to mitigate the impact on Okinawa and further develop Okinawa, the Government of Japan is holding discussions with Okinawa prefectural government on the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma and the early return of a major portion of Northern Training Area. As part of its initiatives to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a tangible manner, the Government of Japan is also addressing issues such as the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base, the reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa and its relocation to Guam and the training relocation of MV-22 Osprey aircraft. I Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to consolidate facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan and to proceed with the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Such measures are aimed at securing the stable presence of the U.S. Forces while maintaining its deterrence abilities and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. I Initiatives toward Prevention of Incidents and Accidents Caused by U.S. Forces Personnel On July 5, 2016, the Governments of Japan and the United States released the Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, including the Civilian Component. ----- **Property of the People as well as Securing Property of the People as well as Securing** **Territorial Land, Water, and AirspaceTerritorial Land, Water, and Airspace** **Organizational Structure Bearing Defense Capability** **Chapter 1** P. 278 I Reorganization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was implemented in October 2015 based on the “Direction of the Ministry of Defense Reform” (August 2013). G Unifi cation of work relating to actual operations into the Joint Staff G Establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency as a new extra-ministerial organization that brings together and consolidates departments in the MOD related to the procurement of equipment G Reform of the Internal Bureaus for strengthening the policy making function and the defense capability build-up function **Effective Deterrence and Response** **Chapter 1** P. 283 **Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan** I The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan in peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. I In 2015, SDF confi rmed intrusions of Chinese government ships into Japanese territorial seas. In addition, SDF confi rmed activities by Chinese Navy vessels including passage through the southwestern islands and several activities near the contiguous water zone of Japan. Due to those situations, the MOD/SDF is working to strengthen collaboration with relevant government ministries and agencies, by sharing information with the Japan Coast Guard. I In September 2015, a Russian aircraft (assumed) intruded into Japanese airspace off the MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft (upper) conducting warning coast of the Nemuro Peninsula, to which the ASDF responded by scrambling its fi ghters. and surveillance, and ASDF E-767 airborne warning and In FY2015 the ASDF aircraft scrambled 873 times. Of these, the number of times that the control system (AWACS) aircraft (lower) ASDF aircraft scrambled against Chinese aircraft was 571, which set a record high since the MOD began releasing the number of scrambles by country and region. The MOD/SDF continues its utmost efforts in warning and surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan and also engages in strict counter-measures to airspace intrusion. F-15 fi ghter scrambling Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War (Times) 1,000 **943** **944** Russia China Taiwan Other countries total **873** **812** **810** 800 **464** **567** 600 **415** **571** **425** **386** 400 **306** **311** **299** **96** **156** **220** **237** 200 **158** **31** **38** **359** **473** **264** **247** **248** **288** **193** **197** **124** 0 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (FY) Note: The peak of the cold war ----- **Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands** Digest **Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands** I In order to respond to attacks on the remote islands, it is important to position troops and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to detect signs at an early stage and to obtain and secure maritime and air superiority through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF from peacetime. If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be swiftly deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and, deter and remove enemy attacks through the joint operation combining all of the three services (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF). In case of an invasion of the islands, the SDF suppresses the enemy force by ground attack from aircraft and vessels, and then implements operations to retake the islands through the amphibious landing of GSDF units and other initiatives operations to retake. I For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, in January 2016, the ASDF newly established the 9th Air Wing, while the GSDF newly formed the Yonaguni coast observation unit in Yonaguni in March of the same year. Going forward, the SDF will station an security unit in the remote islands area in the southwestern region, establish an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade” (tentative name) equipped with a full function for amphibious operations, and acquire fi xed wing patrol aircraft (P-1), patrol helicopters (SH-60K), and other equipment. I For the purpose of ensuring capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, the improvement of Osumi class transport LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) and obtainment of V-22 Ospreys will be carried out. The ASDF 9th Air Wing Commander receiving the fl ag of the State Minister of Defense Wakamiya Western Army Commanding General receiving the fl ag of the Coast Observation Unit from the Minister of Defense Nakatani Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands Overall air defenseOverall air defense Secure and maintain marine superiority and air superiority Aerial refuelingAerial refueling SurfaceSurface vesselsvessels Maritime air supportMaritime air support Anti-surfaceAnti-surface warfarewarfare Strategy to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion SDF troops will be swiftly deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment Close Air SupportClose Air Support of enemy units and they will try to intercept and defeat any invasions. Landing by aircraft Response in the water Landing by Anti-submarine warfareAnti-submarine warfare amphibious vehicle Landing by boat Enemy submarines Submarine ----- **Securing Territorial Land, Water, and Airspace** **Japan’s Defense against Ballistic Missiles** **and Other Attacks** I Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and lower tier by Patriot PAC3, both interconnected through the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE). I In response to North Korea’s ballistic missile launch, which was purported to be an “earth observation satellite,” in February 2016, the Minister of Defense issued the Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles and the MOD deployed destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles and the PAC-3 units. At the same time, every necessary measure including dispatching the GSDF units to the Southwestern Islands was also taken in case any debris were to fall from the sky. GSDF personnel conducting a joint exercise with Fukuoka Prefectural Police **Initiatives towards Ensuring** **Maritime Security** I In order to maintain the order of “Open and Stable Seas” and to ensure the safety of maritime traffi c, the MOD/SDF promotes various kinds of initiatives such as conducting counter-piracy activities as well as providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and conducting joint exercises in close cooperation with the ally and others. I With regard to the relationship between Japan and China, MOD has had meetings the China defense authorities towards the commencement of the maritime and air communication mechanism in order to avoid and prevent unexpected contingencies. ASDF Patriot PAC-3 deployed in Camp Ichigaya for the destruction of ballistic missiles etc. **Response to Attacks by Guerillas,** **Special Operations Forces and Others** I Illegal activities by infi ltrated armed agents and sabotage carried out by guerillas or special operations forces can pose a serious threat to Japan’s peace and security, even if these are small-scale infi ltrations and attacks. I The MOD/SDF conducts joint exercises and training with relevant government and local government agencies such as police and the Japan Coast Guard, and strive to strengthen its cooperation with them. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) held in Indonesia **Responses in Space** I From the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space domain between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States, these two countries established the “Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)”in April 2015. The SCWG promotes reviews in broader fi elds such as: (1) promotion of policy-related consultation regarding space, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation for developing and securing experts, and (4) implementation of tabletop exercises. ----- **Response to Cyber Attacks** on cutting-edge technology. Personnel working at the Cyber Defense Group Digest **Response to Cyber Attacks** I The SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is monitoring MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock. In addition, the MOD/SDF is engaged in holistic measures including the development of intrusion prevention systems and defense systems for increasing the safety of information and communication systems, enactment of regulations stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, improving the human resources and technological bases, and promoting information sharing as well as conducting research **Response to Large-Scale Disasters** I When large-scale disasters natural disasters occur, the SDF, incooperates with local governments, engages in various activities such as search and rescue of disaster victims and missing ships or aircraft, fi ghting fl oods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods, etc. I During the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in September 2015, in Ibaraki, Tochigi, and Miyagi Prefectures, the SDF Rescue activities using a boat following the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in September 2015 conducted lifesaving operations and evacuation assistance using boats etc., mobilizing approximately 7,540 personnel accumulated number. Responding to the Kumamoto Earthquake disaster in April 2016, in Kumamoto and Oita Prefectures, approximately 814,000 personnel accumulated number conducted lifesaving operations and livelihood support for the victims (transportation of goods, provision of food and water, bathing service, medical treatment assistance, etc.). Search activities in Minamiaso following the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake **Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.** I The SDF will protect Japanese nationals overseas, etc., in the country to which it has been dispatched, and safely guide them to aircraft, ships, and vehicles and transport them. The SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating helicopter unit and unit personnel in charge of lead and transport Japanese evacuees, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including boarded aircraft), and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel for dispatch. I Since the transportation of Japanese nationals overseas requires close coordination between the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, joint exercises are carried out in peacetime and the SDF participates in the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra The exercise for transporting Japanese nationals overseas carried out in Cobra Gold Gold” in Thailand. ----- **Securing Territorial Land, Water, and Airspace** **Active Promotion of Security Cooperation** **Chapter 2** P. 311 I In today’s international community, it is extremely diffi cult for any country to ensure its own national security only by itself, and it has become inevitable that countries sharing strategic interests deal with the issues in a coordinated manner. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversifi ed, there are increasing opportunities for such forces to play an important role in promoting confi dence-building and friendly |relationships between nations such as supporting post-confl ict recon I Amid the situation where the necessity and potentiality of internatio the standpoint of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the to the peace, stability and prosperity of Japan, the Asia-Pacifi c regi SDF enhances bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and e cooperation activities, and other relevant efforts.|struction. nal cooperation in the security area are increasing, the MOD/SDF, from principle of international cooperation, is required to actively contribute on, and the entire international community. For this reason, the MOD/ xchanges, and at the same time actively promotes international peace e 2016) MMoonnggoolliiaa RReeppuubblliicc CChhiinnaa ooff KKoorreeaa More than 5 exchanges More than 3 exchanges MMyyaannmmaarr 2 exchanges LLaaooss 1 exchange TThhaaiillaanndd VViieettnnaamm PPhhiilliippppiinneess Cambodia MMaallaayyssiiaa SSiinnggaappoorree IInnddoonneessiiaa Timor-Leste AAuussttrraalliiaa etween defense authorities held ration America (excl. the U.S.) conventional Europe arious means Middle East and Africa quipment and Former Soviet Union countries long with this South Asia Pacific n the process Southeast Asia r establishing Mongolia The Third ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) held in Malaysia China Republic of Korea gh Dialogue such as its| |---|---| |Achievements in High-Level Defense Exchanges (January 2015 – Jun|| |UUnniitteedd KKiinnggddoomm GGeerrmmaannyy FFrraannccee IIttaallyy Number of bilateral agreements and IInnddiiaa memorandums in the field of defense concluded 20 Agreement 15 Memorandum, etc. 10 5 0 Before FY2010- FY2013- FY2009 FY2012 FY2015 Number of bilateral dialogues and consultations b Toward Strategic International Defense Coope 100 I With regard to 9d0efense exchanges and cooperation, in addition to bilateral dialogu8e0s and cooperation exchanges, Japan has combined v such as joint ex7e0rcises and capacity building assistance, defense e technology coo6p0eration to create deeper cooperative relationship. A initiative, multila50teral defense cooperation and exchanges are also i of developing t4o0ward strategic international defense cooperation fo order within the3 0region. 20 I Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and throu 10 G Japan has been working to strengthen multilateral cooperation|| America (excl. the U.S.) Europe Middle East and Africa Former Soviet Union countries South Asia Pacific Southeast Asia Mongolia 20 Republic of Korea I Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue 10 G Japan has been working to strengthen multilateral cooperation such as its 0 participation in the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus in November FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 (FY) 2015 and the holding of the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum in September of the same year. G Japan also actively engages in capacity building assistance in order to actively create stability within the region and improve the global security environment. ----- of India concerning the transfer of defense equipment and technology and the Agreement A scene from the capacity building assistance in Timor-Leste Digest I Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries G Australia: In November 2015, the Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. In December of the same year, new initiatives for strengthening JapanAustralia security and defense cooperation were approved in the Summit meeting G ROK: The Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in the ROK in October 2015, for the fi rst time in four years and nine months G India: In December 2015, during the Japan-India Summit Meeting, the two leaders signed Agreement between the government of Japan and the government of the Republic between the government of Japan and the government of the Republic of India concerning provided by three countries - Japan, the United States, and Australia security measures for the protection of classifi ed military information G China: The Japan-China Ministerial Meeting was held in November 2015 for the fi rst time in four years and fi ve months G Indonesia: In December 2015, the fi rst Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held G The Philippines: The Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was signed in February 2016 G United Kingdom: The second Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held in January 2016 G Canada: The Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial “2+2” Dialogue was held in April 2016 SDF personnel participating in multinutional exercise Khan Quest, in Mongolia Komodo 2016 in which a destroyer Ise participated The ASDF’s and the United States Air Force’s aircrafts conducting formation fl ying during the Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise Cope North Guam **Ensuring Maritime Security** I For Japan, as a major maritime state, strengthening the maritime order based on fundamental principles such as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity. For this reason, in cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF has engaged in anti-piracy operations, as well as promoting various initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this fi eld for those coastal states alongside the sea lanes, and making the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan. SDF destroyer providing direct escort to a cargo ship I For counter-piracy operations, Japan has participated in CTF151 and carried out it mission in cooperation with other participating countries. **Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities** I United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) Currently, Japan dispatches an Engineer Unit approximately 350 personnel and staff offi cers to engage in activities corresponding to the need of UNMISS such as improvement of main roads in South Sudan. I Cooperation to the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Area of Human Resources Development Japan has dispatched SDF personnel as lecturers to PKO SDF personnel engaging in road construction SDF personnel teaching how to operate for UNMISS heavy equipment operation as part of the Centers in different countries and instructors for the Project for ARDEC activities Africa Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC). In addition Japan co-hosted the United Nations Training of Trainers (TOT) with the United Nations. **Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation** I Japan plays an active role in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation in regard to weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles. ----- **Securing Territorial Land, Water, and Airspace** **Measures on Defense Equipment and Technologies** **Chapter 3** P. 356 **Promotion of Research and Development for** **Ensuring Technological Superiority** I Japan conducts research and development on defense equipment that integrate dual-use technologies in order to ensure technological superiority. In April 2016, the fi rst fl ight of the Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2) was carried out. I Considering application of defense equipment, the MOD’s own funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (competitive funding) was launched in FY2015 to discover ingenious research conducted by universities, public research institutes and companies etc., and to nurture promising research. In FY2015, nine research projects were selected. Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2) **Efforts toward Project Management, etc.** I The Department of Project Management was set up in the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency with the aim to manage the acquisition process of defense equipment throughout its lifecycle. The Department works to realize effective and effi cient acquisition of defense equipment with strategic perspective, by selecting twelve programs as subject for acquisition management. I The MOD intends to reduce the procurement cost and ensure stable procurement by the procurement of defense equipment and services based on long-term contracts, improved effi ciency in the maintenance of equipment, bulk purchase and other methods. C-2 (one of the selected programs for acquisition management) **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** I Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries in order to contribute to maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as promoting peace and international cooperation. I In order to ensure maintenance bases of Japan-U.S. common equipment, Japan has carried out a few initiatives such as promoting the involvement of Japanese industries in the manufacturing process and the establishment of common maintenance bases in preparation for the F-35A acquisition, and maintaining both the GSDF’s and the United States Marine Corp’s Osprey aircraft in GSDF Camp Kisarazu. Engineers from the japanese maintenance company (Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.) checking the structure of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys I In November 2015, with Australia, Japan submitted the review result of the Australian Future Submarine Program. (In April 2016, the Government of Australia made a decision on a French company to be their international partner for the Submarine Program) I With India, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was signed in December 2015, and it was expressed that potential and future projects including US-2 should be sought. I With the Philippines, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and TC-90 under consultation with the Philippines to transfer Technology Agreement was signed in February 2016, and in May 2016 it was agreed to put the transfer of MSDF’s training aircraft TC-90 to the Philippine Navy into practice ----- Digest **Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases** I In light of Japan’s recent severe fi scal condition, the realignment of Western defense industries, and the advance in international joint development and production projects, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was adopted in June 2014. The Strategy showed various measures for maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases, courses of action for each area of defense equipment, etc. **Interaction with Local Communities and Japanese Citizens** **Chapter 4** P. 374 **Collaboration with Local Communities** I The MOD/SDF conducts a range of cooperation activities to support the life of citizens, further deepening the mutual trust between local communities/citizens and the SDF, as well as largely contributing to the maintenance and activation of local communities. The GSDF personnel carrying out the disposal of MSDF aircraft in the mission of emergency transportation The ASDF Blue Impulse fl ying over Hakodate Station at the Hokkaido Shinkansen Launch Event unexploded ordinance from a remote island **A Variety of Public Relations Activities** I The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. For example, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. In addition, a troop review, a fl eet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively. In 2015, the SDF fl eet review was held at Sagami Bay. The FY2015 SDF Marching Festival The FY2015 Fleet Review ----- **Part** ###### I Security Environment Surrounding Japan **Chapter 1** **Overview** **Chapter 2** **Defense Policies of Countries** **Chapter 3** **Issues in the International** **Community** ----- **Chapter** **Overview** **1** **Section 1** **Trends in the International Community** The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, with various challenges and destabilizing factors becoming more tangible and acute. Even after the end of the Cold War, interstate confl icts remain in the periphery of Japan. While nations with large military forces are concentrated in this region, a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been suffi ciently institutionalized. Opaque and uncertain factors such as territorial disputes and reunifi cation issues remain. There has been also a tendency towards an increase in and prolongation of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty, and maritime economic interests.[1] In addition, there has been a noticeable trend among neighboring countries to modernize and reinforce their military capabilities and to intensify their military activities. In this regard, security challenges and destabilizing factors in the AsiaPacifi c region including the area surrounding Japan are becoming more serious. In particular, North Korea’s further progress in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles development through its fourth nuclear test and ballistic missile launches, coupled with repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior that disregard the international community, constitute serious and imminent threats to the security of the region including Japan and of the international community. Additionally, while China’s reinforcement of its military capabilities without transparency, along with active maritime advancements, has been rapidly shifting the regional military balance, China’s attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas based on its unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, have become security concerns to the region including Japan and to the international community, including the likelihood of increasing the risk of causing unintended consequences due to misunderstanding or miscalculation. In a global security environment, interdependence among countries has expanded and deepened with globalization and rapid advances in technological innovations. At the same time, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The activities of international terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),[2] continue to gain momentum. Today, the threat of terrorism is not confi ned to the Middle East and North Africa, but is expanding globally. Furthermore, while Russia has still been subjected to the sanctions by the international community, the outcomes of Russia’s changes to the status quo by force or coercion through so-called “hybrid warfare”[3] in Ukraine have taken on an aspect of being entrenched, and it is expected that the international community will make further efforts to improve the situation. Simultaneously, China’s unilateral acts that alter the status quo and heighten tension, such as large-scale and rapid land reclamation in the South China Sea, establishment of outposts there, and their use for military purposes, have left challenges for the international response, in the midst of China’s continued attempt to further create a fait accompli. In addition, the recent spate of cyber attacks has become more sophisticated and skillful by the day, with government involvement suspected in various attacks. In this context, So-called “gray-zone” situations concisely describe a broad range of situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies. For example, they could involve the following circumstances: 1) Confl icting assertions between states, etc., over territory, sovereignty, economic interests including maritime interests, and other forms of rights and interests; 2) Not relying only on diplomatic negotiation among parties for a party to make its country’s assertions or demands, or to have the other party accept said assertions or demands; and 3) Showing physical presence frequently, or attempting or making changes to the status quo in an area related to the dispute by using armed organizations or other means to the extent that it does not constitute armed attack, in order to appeal a party’s assertion or demand or to force acceptance of it. ISIL has become the common term in the documents of the international community, including United Nations Security Council resolutions. While various explanations have been offered for so-called “hybrid warfare,” in this white paper, the term is used to mean “aggression conducted by methods that are diffi cult to identify defi nitively as ‘armed ----- there are increasing risks to the stable use of cyberspace. Under these circumstances, the United States, while faced with a difficult financial situation, has made it clear that it would continue to give greater focus to the AsiaPacific region in its strategies, including the National Security Strategy, and strengthen its relations with allies in the region (rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region). In addition, the United States has made a clear commitment to continue playing a leading role in tackling global security challenges, based on the recognition that it is the only country capable of leading the international community. Furthermore, with expanding and deepening interdependence, major countries have a growing shared interest in building a more stable international security environment. Countries with a shared interest in resolving issues are increasingly collaborating to take proactive responses to achieve regional and global stability. For example, the international community is working together to protect the existing international order based upon law, including an open, free, and peaceful maritime order. The coalition and countries such as Russia are conducting military activities against ISIL as part of the “War on Terror.” Countries are also engaged in diplomatic efforts at the summit level to find solutions to the ever more complex and divisive regional conflicts. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the extension of the international influence of countries such as China, India, and Russia on the political, economic, and military fronts, and the relative change of influence of the United States. Increases in demand for natural resources, energy, and food stemming from economic growth in emerging countries and a larger middle class are expected to further intensify the international competition for these resources. Against this backdrop, changes in or denial of the existing regional and international order, or assertions and activities to secure economic interests could become more tangible and acute. This in turn could lead to increases in “gray-zone” situations and regional conflicts in the future. Additionally, the rapid spread of the Internet and information and communications technology (ICT) networks, including social media – one of the key factors of globalization – have given non-state actors a much greater ability to disseminate their opinions and assertions as well as mobilize supporters, and by extension, have significantly increased their influence on countries and the international community. For example, criticism of a nation sent out by an individual, or extremism disseminated by an international terrorist organization, have tended to propagate and spread explosively or be transmitted across the world by ICT networks. Controlling these activities have become increasingly challenging even for countries like authoritarian nations with strong control over their people, as well as for the international community that strives to contain the operations of international terrorist organizations. As a result, countries have been forced to pay greater consideration to public opinion on domestic governance and management of state affairs. At the same time, the international community is faced with more complex issues which need to be resolved and which are increasingly difficult to address. In addition, it is believed that national security decision-making is more complex than ever before, as some nations have important economic relationships despite differences in fundamental values and strategic interests as seen in the case of Europe and Russia with regard to the Ukraine issue in 2014, as well as the response of Europe, ASEAN member states, and other countries to China’s proposal to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. The security challenges and destabilizing factors in the international community which has these characteristics are complex, diverse, and wide-ranging, and it is becoming ever more difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. In this context, it is increasingly important for countries which share interests in regional and global stability to cooperate and actively respond to security challenges. Cross-cutting government efforts are also critical to overcome these challenges. ----- **Section 2** **Asia Pacifi c Security Environment** The Asia-Pacifi c is a unique region with a concentration of large-scale military forces. Recently, the shift in the global balance of power stemming from the increase in power of China and other nations is having an acute impact on military trends in the region. Under this situation, countries in the region have made efforts to enhance and strengthen specifi c and practical intra-regional coordination and collaboration with a particular focus on non-traditional security fi elds such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. On the other hand, this region abounds in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity. Also, views on security and perceptions of threats are different by country. Therefore, a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been suffi ciently institutionalized, and longstanding issues of territorial rights and reunifi cation continue to remain in the region. In the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues between the military forces of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. Furthermore, with regard to Japan, territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are inherent parts of the territory of Japan, remain unresolved. On top of this, recent years have seen a continued tendency towards the prolongation of “gray-zone” situations, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations in the absence of a clear path towards the resolution of the situations. In North Korea, it is deemed that following the change of regime that made Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Kim Jong-un the leader of the country, the regime continues to strengthen and tighten its grip to make KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un the sole leader. North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also furthering its development, deployment, transfer, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea continues to maintain and strengthen asymmetrical military capabilities.[4] In particular, it is regarded that North Korea has further advanced its entire ballistic missile program, including new ballistic missiles, through technological verifi cation conducted by launching a series of ballistic missiles. In addition, recently, North Korea has not only engaged in research and development of ballistic missiles, but has also intensifi ed activities to increase their operational capabilities, including surprise attack. North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defi ance of calls of restraint from the international community, and is believed to be seeking to acquire hydrogen bombs to further enhance its nuclear forces. Considering the technological maturity reached through the past four nuclear tests, it is possible that North Korea has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and enabled them to be equipped on ballistic missiles. With the passage of time, there will likely be a growing risk that North Korea would deploy ballistic missiles mounted with a nuclear warhead that have ranges covering Japan. North Korea has repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior against related countries including Japan, especially in 2013, emphasizing that Japan is within the range of its missiles, referring to specifi c Japanese cities. Such North Korean military trends constitute a serious and imminent threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the entire region and the international community. North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals, a grave issue concerning the sovereignty of Japan and the lives and security of the Japanese people, is yet to be resolved. A solution will require concrete actions by North Korea. Today, China has signifi cant infl uence in the international community. Accordingly, China is strongly expected to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner in regional and global issues. In the meantime, China has been continuously increasing its defense budget at a high level, and has been rapidly reinforcing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas, without suffi cient transparency. In particular, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activities by other countries in the region, denying access and deployment Asymmetrical military capabilities, in this context, refer to means of attack different from those of an opponent with superior conventional military capabilities. Such measures are exploited to compensate for ----- of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas (so-called “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” [“A2/AD”] capabilities[5]), and recently, pursuing large-scale military reforms designed to build its joint operations structure with actual combat in mind. In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities both in quality and quantity in the maritime and aerial domains in the region, including in the East and South China Seas. In particular, China has continued to take assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion, and has signaled its position to realize its unilateral assertions without making any compromises. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently by its government ships, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unintended consequences, such as its vessel’s direction of fire control radar at a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer, the flight of fighters abnormally close to SDF aircraft, and its announcement of establishing the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overflight over the high seas. In the South China Sea, China has continued to take unilateral actions that change the status quo and heighten tension, including large-scale and rapid reclamation of multiple features, establishment of outposts there, and their use for military purposes, based on China’s unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, and has made steady efforts to create a fait accompli. In addition, a Chinese fighter is alleged to have flown abnormally close to and conducted an intercept of a U.S. Forces aircraft. These Chinese activities represent security concerns of the region encompassing Japan, and of the international community. For this reason, China is urged to further increase transparency regarding its military and enhance its compliance with international norms. It is a key task to further strengthen mutual understanding and trust by promoting dialogue and exchanges with China, and make further progress on measures to build trust, such as measures to avoid and prevent unintended consequences in the maritime domain. Russia, while perceiving the buildup of an affluent nation as its task for the present, attaches importance to becoming an influential power in a multipolarizing world, based on the deployment of its new economic, cultural, and military might. Russia has promoted the strengthening of the readiness of its Armed Forces and the development and induction of new equipment, while continuing to give priority to its nuclear force. Recently, a confrontational relationship has developed between Russia and such countries as the United States and European nations over Ukraine which Russia deems is part of its sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Russia took actions intended to expand its international influence, including military interventions in Syria. Russia faces a severe economic situation due to falling crude oil prices, a plunging ruble, and the impacts of EU and U.S. economic sanctions, among other factors. Even as expenditure cuts are thus made in a wide range of areas, Russia has striven to secure defense spending with priority and has continued to modernize its Armed Forces. Recently, Russia has intensified its military activities not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the Arctic, Europe, the periphery of mainland United States, and the Middle East, and has been expanding the area of activities. In the Far East, the Russian Armed Forces have conducted largescale exercises. Furthermore, Russia’s changing of the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine has heightened the threat of Russian “hybrid warfare,” especially in Europe, and is perceived as a global issue that could affect the entire international community, including Asia. As seen above, in the Asia-Pacific region, where the security environment has increasingly grown severe, the presence of the U.S. Forces remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability. Accordingly, Japan and other countries, such as Australia and the ROK, have established bilateral alliances and partnerships with the United States, and allow the stationing and rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces in their territories. In addition, the U.S. Forces have recently taken measures to further strengthen their presence. As regards the responses to the unilateral changes in the status quo by force or coercion based on unique assertions, the international community centered around countries in the region are making concerted efforts to protect the existing international order based on law. See>> Fig. I-1-2-1 (Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)) Opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region have increased in recent years. Multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Anti-Access (A2) is a concept introduced by the United States. It refers to capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area. Area-Denial (AD) refers to capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed to limit an opposing force’s freedom of action within the operational area. Weapons used for A2/AD include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-satellite weapons, air-defense systems, ----- |Russian Fa|80,000 troops (12) 260 vessels - 600,000 tons 350 aircraft r East| |---|---| |orth Korea|1,020,000 troops (27) 780 vessels - 560 aircraft 104,000 tons| |---|---| Fig. I-1-2-1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength) **80,000 troops (12)** **260 vessels - 600,000 tons** **350 aircraft** **Russian Far East** **China** **1,020,000 troops (27)** **780 vessels -** **560 aircraft** **North Korea** **104,000 tons** **1,600,000 troops (151)** **10,000 marines (2)** **ROK** **495,000 troops (56)** **29,000 marines (3)** **880 vessels -** **1,502,000 tons** **240 vessels -** **211,000 tons** **620 aircraft** **2,720 aircraft** **Japan** **U.S. Forces in the ROK** **140,000 troops (15)** **17,000 troops (5)** **137 vessels -** **80 aircraft** **469,000 tons** **410 aircraft** **U.S. Forces in Japan** **Taiwan** **18,000 troops (1)** **130,000 troops (15)** **130 aircraft** **10,000 marines (3)** **U.S. 7th Fleet** **390 vessels -** **210,000 tons** **30 vessels -** **510 aircraft** **394,000 tons** **50 (carrier-based)** aircraft The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 Notes: 1. Source: “The Military Balance 2016,” documents published by the U.S. DoD, etc. 2. Figures for Japan indicate the strength of each SDF as of the end of 2015; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of ASDF aircraft (excluding transport aircraft) and MSDF aircraft (fixed-wing aircraft only). 3. Figures for the U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are those of the Army and Marine Corps personnel combined. 4. Combat aircraft include Navy and Marine aircraft. 5. Figures in parentheses show the total number of central units, such as divisions and brigades. That of North Korea shows only divisions. That of Taiwan includes military police as well. 6. The number of U.S. 7th Fleet vessels and aircraft indicates those which are forward-deployed in Japan and Guam. 7. Figures of combat aircraft of the U.S. Forces, Japan and the U.S. 7th Fleet include only fighters. Legend Ground forces Naval vessels Combat aircraft (200,000 troops) (200,000 tons) (500 aircraft) Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus), conferences hosted by nongovernmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, and bilateral and multilateral joint exercises are held. Promoting and developing such multilayered approaches among countries is also important to ensure stability in the region. ----- **Section 3** **Global Security Issues** A range of regional confl icts still exists across the globe, which have complex and diverse backgrounds and forms. Especially in the Middle East and Africa, against the backdrop of the turmoil, civil war, and regional confl ict that followed the “Arab Spring,” there is an increase in areas which lack national governance. In many cases, international terrorist organizations made inroads in these areas, expanded their organizations, and intensifi ed their activities. These cases have made regional confl icts more complex, making it increasingly challenging for nations and regional organizations with confl icts in their regions to address and resolve them, as well as for the international community. On the other hand, climate change and competition between sovereign nations to secure resources and energy could become more tangible, and cause regional disputes. They have become new factors that affect the global security environment. Furthermore, even as the various functions of military forces are utilized more to conduct prompt rescue activities in response to large-scale natural disasters and outbreaks of infectious diseases, the presence of countries with weak governance has made it more diffi cult to deal with risks such as the explosive outbreak and spread of infectious diseases. The proliferation of WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs is still viewed as a signifi cant threat to the international community. In particular, there are continuing concerns about the acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors, such as international terrorist organizations. In this regard, the international community continues to pursue efforts to counter terrorism activities that utilize nuclear materials and other radioactive substances. Meanwhile, with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, the United States, the European Union (EU), among other countries have imposed sanctions against Iran, while engaging in discussions with the country. In 2015, a fi nal agreement was reached on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, containing provisions on Iran’s implementation of measures to restrict uranium enrichment activities and ban the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Also, in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile issues, a new United Nations Security Council resolution was adopted following North Korea’s nuclear test and ballistic missile launches in 2016, which includes sanctions that ban the export and import of all items that could contribute to North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, initiatives which focus on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are under way, such as the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) entering into force between the United States and Russia in 2011. Furthermore, there has been a growing tendency for the threat of international terrorism to spread rapidly. The diversifi cation of actors that carry out acts of terrorism, coupled with the increasing complexity of regional confl icts, have made the prevention of terrorism even more challenging. Similar to ISIL, terrorist organizations with abundant funding and powerful and sophisticated military capabilities continue to step up their activities. Through ingenious public relations strategies using the Internet and other tools, they communicate their extremism and gain multiple followers and new members around the world. In addition, the United States, European nations, and elsewhere face concerns over the threat of so-called “home-grown” and “lone-wolf” terrorism – namely, acts of terrorism perpetrated in the home country singlehandedly or by a small number of people, including those who experienced combat in a confl ict area and returned to their home country, or those who have become infl uenced by extremism. As shown by the terror attacks in Paris in 2015 and the terror attacks in Brussels in 2016, the threat of international terrorism is not confi ned to the Middle East and North Africa, and is spreading globally. In view of incidents including the terrorist attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh in July 2016, it can be said that Japan is in a situation where it needs to squarely address the threat of international terrorism as its own challenge. Securing the stable use of not only conventional areas of activity – sea and airspace – but also new areas of activity such as outer space and cyberspace is becoming a signifi cant security challenge for the international community. Further developments in military and science technology and the recent dramatic advances in ICT are increasing the dependence of social infrastructure and military activities on outer space and cyberspace. On the other hand, the development of anti-satellite weapons by nations and the increasing number of cyber attacks, in some of which the involvement of government agencies is suspected, are heightening the risks to the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. In recent years, concrete initiatives have been under way in various countries aimed at strengthening an entire country’s capabilities to respond to cyber attacks including private companies ----- as well as acquiring capabilities to monitor threats to satellites and other space assets. There is also an effort in the international community to promote the rule of law, including establishing a code of conduct in outer space and cyberspace. With regard to the maritime domain, which has been regarded as a fundamental means for supporting international trade, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where countries unilaterally assert their rights and take actions based on their own assertion that is inconsistent with the existing order of international law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of navigation on and flight over the high seas. Recently, China has made further efforts to create a fait accompli through unilateral acts that alter the status quo and heighten tension, such as large-scale and rapid land reclamation in the South China Sea, establishment of outposts there, and their use for military purposes. In response to these situations, the international community has been taking various measures such as continuing to conduct antipiracy operations in relevant waters including off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, collaborating to protect the existing international order based on law including an open, free, and peaceful maritime order, and implementing initiatives designed to avoid and prevent unintended consequences in the maritime domain. As seen above, the international community today faces complex, diverse, and broad security challenges and destabilizing factors. Along with deterrence and handling of armed conflicts, the roles of military forces in responding to these challenges are becoming so diverse that they include a broad spectrum of activities from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance. Moreover, as opportunities for military forces to play such important roles increase, comprehensive responses are required that combine military capacity with other capacities such as diplomacy, law enforcement and justice, intelligence, and the economy. Developments in science and technology, as represented by the great leaps forward in ICT in recent years, have also had spillover effects on the military. The United States and other developed countries put emphasis on research and development of new technologies including those for precision guidance, unmanned vehicles, and stealth capability, while actively seeking international joint development and production to address rising development and production costs and the deterioration of the national fiscal situation. On the other hand, states and non-state actors without cuttingedge technology are anticipated to develop and acquire WMDs and asymmetrical means of attack such as cyber attacks, while acquiring the technologies of developed countries in an illicit manner. How these trends in military science and technology will unfold is expected to have significant effects on military strategies and military balance in the future. ----- **Chapter** **Defense Policies of Countries** **2** **Section 1** **The United States** **1 Security and Defense Policies** Following the end of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the patterns of U.S. involvement in the world are changing signifi cantly in a new security environment, including a shift in the global balance of power beginning with the military rise of China, attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in Ukraine and the South China Sea, and the intensifi cation of the activities of international terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While faced with a severe fi nancial situation, the United States is anticipated to continue to play a role in the peace and stability of the world by drawing on its world-leading, comprehensive national power. The National Security Strategy (NSS) released in February 2015 underscores that the United States would continue to play a leading role in tackling a variety of challenges, such as the threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and cyber attacks, as well as advance a rules-based international order and take collective action with its allies and partners, while continuing to pursue the four national interests outlined in the 2010 NSS: (1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners; (2) a strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy that promotes prosperity; (3) respect for universal values at home and around the world; and (4) a rules-based international order that promotes peace, security, and opportunity. As is outlined in its strategy documents,[1] the United States intends to maintain the pivot to the Asia-Pacifi c region, continuing to rebalance towards the region to deepen relations with its allies and other countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region and to enhance both the quantity and quality of U.S. assets deployed to the region. Mindful of China’s recent moves to unilaterally change the status quo and create a fait accompli in the South China Sea through reclaiming land, building bases there, and utilizing them for military purposes, the United States has indicated that it would continue its Freedom of Navigation Operations (see Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 [p. 144]) to protect the rights and freedoms under international law. Concurrently, the United States deals with security issues outside of the Asia-Pacifi c region. In response to the attacks in Iraq and Syria since 2014 by ISIL and other organizations, the United States, since August 2014, has led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), a military operation against ISIL that includes airstrikes (the activities of the military operation of the coalition against ISIL led by the United States are discussed in the next chapter, Section 1). With regard to Afghanistan, in October 2015, President Barack Obama revised the plan to withdraw U.S. troops by the end of 2016, announcing a new plan to maintain the current strength of 9,800 troops in 2016 and have 5,500 troops stationed in 2017 and beyond. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the deterrent of the U.S. Forces in Europe facing a large infl ux of refugees and an increasingly tense situation A U.S. Marine Corps personnel stands watch during Operation Inherent Resolve (military operation against ISIL) in Iraq in March 2016 [U.S. DoD website] The pivot to the Asia-Pacifi c was fi rst codifi ed in a strategy document in “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” released in January 2012. Since then, the policy of rebalancing i ----- in Ukraine due to Russia, the FY2017 budget request of the Department of Defense (DoD) has increased the budget related to the European Reassurance Initiative[2] to approximately US$3.4 billion, over four times more than the previous fiscal year’s allocation. Looking ahead, the focus will be on how the changes in the situation in the Middle East and Europe and the outcome of the presidential election in November 2016 will impact existing U.S. policies, including the Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. In other efforts, the United States also promotes the Third Offset Strategy (see Section 4 [p. 12]) to develop military technologies in new fields to maintain and increase the superiority of the U.S. Forces, deeming that its military superiority is gradually eroding in light of recent trends, including China and other countries’ enhanced “Anti-Access/Area-Denial” (“A2/AD”) capabilities. Additionally, the U.S. Forces makes active efforts to secure talent and improve its working environment as part of the Force of the Future[3] being implemented since Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter took office in February 2015. In December 2015, the U.S. Forces decided to open all positions to women personnel on the condition that they meet the requirements of the position. - 1 Understanding of Security explicitly refers to Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China as “revisionist states” that attempt to revise key aspects of the international order and are acting in a manner that threatens U.S. national security interests.[4] The strategy notes that there are increasing concerns about interstate war compared to the past ten years, and that violent extremist organizations such as ISIL are becoming imminent threats. In his State of the Union address in January 2016, President Obama placed greater emphasis on the threat posed by failing states than by “evil empires,” and vowed that ISIL and Al Qaeda pose a direct threat to U.S. citizens. In February 2016, Defense Secretary Carter identified that five issues were taken into account in compiling the DoD budget request, namely, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and terrorism, especially ISIL. Considering all of these aspects together, it is regarded that the United States sees violent extremist organizations such as ISIL and Al Qaeda as short-term security threats, and nations attempting to threaten the existing international order or the interests of the United States and its allies as mid- to long-term security threats. - 2 Defense Strategy The QDR released in March 2014 states that three pillars, which are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, would be emphasized in order to embody priorities outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance including rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region and maintaining a strong commitment to stability in Europe and the Middle East, namely: protect the homeland; build security globally; and project power and win decisively.[5] The QDR states that across the three pillars, the U.S. Forces are capable of simultaneously implementing the following undertakings, and if deterrence fails at any given time, the U.S. Forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—another aggressor in another region.[6] In the NSS released in February 2015, President Obama outlined that today the United States and the international community face challenges, including a rising risk of attacks on the United States and its allies due to violent extremism and the terrorist threat, escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, and the outbreak of infectious diseases. President Obama went on to state that the United States has a unique capability to mobilize and lead the international community to meet these challenges, and that strong and sustained U.S. leadership will safeguard U.S. security interests. The National Military Strategy released in July 2015 This initiative reassures allies and partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that the United States is committed to their security and territorial integrity. The initiative includes measures such as increasing the presence of the U.S. Forces in Europe, conducting further bilateral and multilateral training and exercises with NATO allies and other countries, and strengthening the prepositioning of U.S. equipment in Europe. The concrete measures proposed in the Force of the Future concept include: increasing opportunities for internships at the DoD for university students; promoting public-private exchanges (e.g., allowing talented engineers from the private sector to engage in specific projects of the DoD for a specified period only, or allowing DoD personnel to work in the private sector and bring advanced technologies back to the DoD); extending paid maternity leave; adding flexibility to be able to stay on a post at a station for family reasons; and enabling the receipt of pension without working for at least 20 years as was required. In July 2015, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford testified at his nomination hearing at the Senate that the greatest security threat was Russia due to its nuclear capabilities and aggressive behavior. He stated that if he had to rank countries in the order of their threat level, second would be China due to its growing military power, presence in the Pacific region, and its interest in such pursuits. The three pillars constitute primarily of the following: (1) Protect the homeland: Maintain the capability to deter and defeat attacks on the United States. Protection of the homeland includes assisting U.S. civil authorities in protecting U.S. airspace, shores, and borders, and in responding effectively to domestic disasters. (2) Build security globally: Continue a strong U.S. commitment to shaping world events in order to deter and prevent conflict and to assure the allies and partners of the shared security. (3) Project power and win decisively: The U.S. Forces deter acts of aggression in one or more theaters by remaining capable of decisively defeating adversaries, while projecting power to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The 2010 QDR stated that the U.S. Forces possess the capability of countering attacks by two countries while also being able to conduct a wide range of operations. The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states that the United States maintains forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’s aggressive objectives in one region while being capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs ----- 1) Defending homeland 2) Conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations 3) Deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement in multiple regions Furthermore, in order to achieve the three pillars, the DoD seeks innovative approaches to how it fights, how it postures its force, and how it leverages its asymmetric strengths and technological advantages. More specifically, the QDR mentions positioning additional forwarddeployed naval forces in critical areas, such as the AsiaPacific region, and deploying new combinations of ships, aviation assets, and crisis response forces. The QDR states that the Joint Force would: rebalance for a broad spectrum of conflict; rebalance and sustain its presence and posture abroad; rebalance capability, capacity, and readiness; and equip itself with advanced capabilities and readiness while scaling back the U.S. Forces. The QDR notes that even as budget and other resource cuts are made, the DoD would give priority to the following capability areas that are in close alignment with the pillars of the defense strategy: (1) missile defense; (2) nuclear deterrence; (3) cyber; (4) space; (5) air/sea; (6) precision strike; (7) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); (8) counter terror and special operations; and (9) resilience.[7] - 3 Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific Region Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), while enhancing its presence in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the QDR states that the centerpiece of the DoD commitment to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region is to update and enhance security initiatives with its allies in the region, including Japan. Additionally, the QDR notes that by 2020, the U.S. Forces would station 60% of the assets of the Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region. Concrete examples of the enhancement of the U.S. Force presence in the Asia-Pacific region include enhanced presence of the U.S. Forces in Australia, including through the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps to Northern Australia and increased access of U.S. Air Force aircraft to Australian Defence Force (ADF) facilities and areas in Northern Australia.[8] In addition, the United States has repeatedly conducted joint military exercises and provided military technologies and assistance to Southeast Asian countries to build trusting relationships and strengthen the readiness of these countries. The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy that the DoD released in August 2015 recognizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific region and its maritime territories, and identifies the DoD’s maritime objectives as: (1) safeguard the freedom of the President Obama announces maritime security assistance for the Philippines in November 2015 [Website of the U.S. Embassy in Manila] As indicated by the Defense Strategic Guidance, the QDR, and the NSS, the United States places emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and is continuing a policy to enhance its presence in the region. In November 2011, President Obama delivered a speech to the Australian Parliament, clearly stating, for the first time, that he would give top priority to the U.S. presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific region. The President indicated that the United States would maintain its strong presence in The capability areas constitute primarily of the following: (1) Missile defense: Increasing the number of Ground-Based Interceptors, deploying an additional radar in Japan, increasing the reliability, efficiency, and discrimination capabilities of interceptors, studying the best location for deploying Ground-Based Interceptors (2) Nuclear deterrence: Continuing to invest in modernizing delivery systems, warheads, command and control, and nuclear weapon infrastructure (3) Cyber: Forming a Cyber Mission Force by late September 2018 comprised of National Mission Teams (13 teams), Cyber Protection Teams (68 teams), Combat Mission Teams (27 teams), and Support Teams (25 teams) (a total of 133 teams) (4) Space: Diversifying and expanding the coverage of Space Situational Awareness, accelerating initiatives to counter adversary space capabilities including ISR and precision strike (5) Air/sea: Countering A2/AD threats by investing in combat aircraft, including fighters and long-range strike, survivable persistent surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare (6) Precision strike: Procuring advanced air-to-surface missiles and a long-range anti-ship cruise missile to improve the joint ability of U.S. Forces to attack airspace defended by the adversary (7) ISR: Making focused investments in systems that will function effectively in airspace defended by the adversary and areas that the U.S. Forces are denied entry or free maneuver, expanding use of space ISR systems (8) Counter terror and special operations: Increasing the Special Operations Forces (SOF) to 69,700 personnel, mobilizing more SOF to support the Joint Force to counter a range of challenges across the globe (9) Resilience: Improving the ability to maintain and restore the functions of air, naval, ground, space, and missile-defense capabilities against attacks, dispersing land and naval expeditionary forces, investing in capabilities to repair runways more quickly In November 2011, U.S. President Obama and then Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard jointly announced U.S.-Australia Force Posture Initiatives that include: (1) the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps to Darwin and other areas in Northern Australia for around six months every year where they would conduct exercises and training with the ADF; and (2) increased access of U.S. Air Force aircraft to ADF facilities and areas in Northern Australia, which would offer greater opportunities for joint training and exercises. The joint initiatives are described as part of the efforts to embody the basic concept of the force posture of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific region, which intends to pursue “a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable military presence.” ----- seas; (2) deter conflict and coercion; and (3) promote adherence to international law and standards. To achieve these objectives, the strategy states that the United States would deploy the U.S. Forces’ finest capabilities, assets, and personnel to the Asia-Pacific region and support the strengthening of maritime security capabilities of its allies and partners. Based on this concept, in November 2015, the United States announced assistance totaling US$259 million over the course of FY2015 and FY2016 to strengthen the maritime security capabilities of the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Accordingly, in the same month, President Obama announced the provision of US$79 million in assistance, one patrol vessel, and one survey vessel to the Philippines. In December 2015, Defense Secretary Carter and Minister of Defense Ng Eng Hen of Singapore signed an enhanced defense cooperation agreement to deepen their bilateral defense relationship. Furthermore, it was affirmed that the United States plans to simultaneously deploy to Singapore up to four Littoral Combat Ships (LCS)[9] by the end of 2017, with the second rotation now ongoing. In connection with Japan, the United States has made steady progress with the deployment of P-8 patrol aircraft to Kadena Air Base, temporary assignment of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base, deployment of a second TPY-2 radar[10] in Japan to the Kyogamisaki Communications Site, and the additional deployment of Aegis ballistic missile defense ships to Yokosuka.[11] The United States has underscored the importance of its commitment to the Asia-Pacific region not only to its allies and partners but also to China. The 2014 QDR states that the United States would sustain dialogue with China to improve the ability to cooperate in practical areas such as counterpiracy, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. At the same time, the United States would manage the competitive aspects of U.S.-China relations in ways that improve regional peace and stability consistent with international norms and principles. - 4 Third Offset Strategy In November 2014, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced the Defense Innovation Initiative and expressed his expectation that it would develop into a third offset strategy. Since the 1950s, the United States has invested in the development of military technologies in new fields in which adversaries do not have capabilities. Through a strategy of acquiring asymmetrical means to offset an adversary’s capabilities,[12] the United States has maintained military operational and technological superiority. Today, however, such U.S. superiority is gradually eroding as a result of potential adversaries modernizing their military forces and acquiring advanced military capabilities, and with technologies proliferating. The United States notes that this initiative was established to newly identify innovative ways to sustain and expand U.S. superiority, utilizing limited resources. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work, who is leading the work of establishing this initiative, states that the third offset strategy is aimed at gaining technological, organizational, and operational superiority over adversaries, in order to strengthen deterrence using conventional assets against great powers, taking Russia and China into account. He states that to this end, investments would be made with priority on human-machine collaboration and combat teaming.[13] In addition, Deputy Secretary Work explains that the competitive environments have changed significantly due to innovations in commercial technologies, and in order to follow and make use of commercial technologies, the United States must work more closely with the private sector. He further notes that the proliferation of technology could cause loss of superiority in a short timeframe. The FY2017 budget request sets forth the advancement of this initiative. The budget request identifies that the priority technology areas include: assured positioning, navigation, and timing; large displacement unmanned undersea vehicles; high speed strike weapons; and arsenal plane.[14, 15] 9 Fast and agile vessels designed to defeat asymmetrical threats with A2 capability in near-shore environments. 10 Radar whose purpose is to detect and track ballistic missiles (also called “X-band radar” as it operates in the “X-band” frequency). The United States notes that the additional deployment of this radar to Japan would provide enhanced early warning and tracking capability of any missile launched from North Korea. 11 In April 2014, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that two more Aegis ballistic missile defense ships would be deployed to Japan by 2017. One of the ships, the USS Benfold Aegis destroyer, was deployed to Yokosuka in October 2015. The other, USS Milius Aegis destroyer, will be deployed to Yokosuka in summer 2017. In March 2016, the United States deployed the USS Barry Aegis destroyer with ballistic missile defense capabilities to Yokosuka, which replaced the USS Lassen Aegis destroyer lacking ballistic missile defense capability. 12 Secretary Hagel stated that the previous two “offset strategies” were as follows: (1) in the 1950s, the United States offset the conventional capacity of the former Soviet Union by using the nuclear deterrent; and (2) in the 1970s, while the nuclear capabilities of the former Soviet Union achieved parity with those of the United States, the United States gained superiority over the former Soviet Union by acquiring new systems, such as extended-range precision-guided missiles, stealth aircraft, and ISR platforms. 13 According to the explanation by Deputy Secretary Work in his address in November 2015, specific examples include investments in: (1) learning machines; (2) human-machine collaboration; (3) assisted human operations; (4) human-machine combat teaming; and (5) networked autonomous weapons. 14 An arsenal plane turns an old aircraft into a platform and uses it as a “flying launch pad” to launch a variety of payloads. 15 The FY2017 budget request allocates approximately US$12.5 billion for science and technology, including US$2.1 billion for basic research and approximately US$3.0 billion for the Defense Advanced Research ----- The DoD said it would work to increase the number of personnel engaged in nuclear forces of the Air Force and Navy, improve the inspections regime, and improve career management, among other activities. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Nuclear Weapons) - 6 FY2017 Budget - 5 Nuclear Strategy While President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he notes that this will not be realized in the near future, and that a nuclear deterrent will be maintained as long as nuclear weapons exist. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in April 2010 states that the nuclear security environment is changing, and that nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China. The NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment: (1) preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons; (3) maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and (5) sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. In June 2013, President Obama delivered a speech on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Berlin, which was followed by the release of the Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy by the DoD on the same day. In the speech and report, the United States announced that it would negotiate with Russia to pursue up to a one-third reduction in U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons. In February 2014, following missteps by nuclear missile launch officers including possession of illegal drugs and misconduct related to proficiency tests, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel instructed an internal and external review of the entire DoD Nuclear Enterprise (Nuclear Enterprise Review [NER]). In November 2014, Secretary Hagel announced the results of the NER, in the form of a summary of an internal study report and a report of an external study conducted by retired military personnel and other reviewers. The NER found that while the existing nuclear forces of the U.S. Forces are meeting the demands of their mission, significant improvements are required to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the force in the future. The two reports made recommendations focusing around areas, such as improving oversight and management issues, increasing investment in the nuclear deterrent enterprise, and personnel and training including boosting morale. Based on these recommendations, the DoD decided to prioritize funding on actions that improve the security, ensure modernization of the force, and address shortfalls. As the budget deficit of the U.S. government is deepening in recent years, the Budget Control Act enacted in August 2011 established a significant cut in government spending by FY2021. In January 2012, the DoD announced that the reduction in defense spending in light of the act would amount to about US$487 billion over the 10 years from FY2012 to FY2021 (about US$259 billion over the five years from FY2013 to FY2017). In March 2013, the mandatory sequestration of government spending including defense spending started based on the provisions of the Budget Control Act. Mandatory sequestration for the FY2014 and FY2015 budgets was eased as a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act of the Democratic and Republican parties passed in December 2013. Furthermore, mandatory sequestration for the FY2016 and FY2017 budgets was eased as a result of the Bipartisan Budget Act passed in November 2015. However, the President and Congress have not reached any agreement on the handling of mandatory sequestration in FY2018 and beyond. The resumption of mandatory sequestration could put the U.S. Forces at considerably greater risk due to the changes in the security environment. In this regard, the trends in the defense budget require continued observation. For the FY2017 DoD budget request, the DoD allocated US$523.9 billion[16] for the base budget. For the overseas contingency operations budget, the DoD allocated a total of US$58.8 billion. This includes the quadrupling of the budget for the European Reassurance Initiative to US$3.4 billion in light of Russian activities in Eastern Europe and an approximately 1.5-fold increase in the budget for the operations to counter ISIL in Iraq and Syria to US$7.5 billion. The key principles of the defense budget are as follows: (1) seek a balanced force; (2) sustain readiness amid a severe budget situation; (3) accelerate the pace of institutional reform; (4) pursue investments in equipment acquisition and R&D; (5) take care of the people; and (6) support overseas operations. On this basis, the budget outlines that the DoD would: decrease the Army’s end strength to 460,000 active soldiers from the FY2016 level of 475,000 active soldiers; ----- continue to fund the overhaul/life extension of the USS The Impact of Budget Sequestration on the George Washington of the Navy, following on from the Defense Budget previous fiscal year, and maintain 11 aircraft carriers; (Base budget: $1 billion) keep the F-35, the KC-46, and the Long-Range Strike 630 Bomber (LRS-B) B-21[17] as the Air Force’s top three 610 FY2013 budget request modernization programs; and postpone the retirement of 590 Sequester-level the A-10 aircraft to 2022. 570 See>> Fig. I-2-1-1 (The Impact of Budget Sequestration on the Defense 550 Budget); Fig. I-2-1-2 (Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget) |budget: $1 billion)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |FY2013 budget request||| ||FY2013 budget request|| ||FY2017 budget request|| |Sequester-level|Sequester-level|| |||| |||| |||| |||| |||| |Fig. I-2-1-2|Changes in the U.S. Defense Budget| |---|---| |Defense budget (in $1 million) Year-on-year growth rate (%) ($1 million) (％) 800,000 20 700,000 15 600,000 10 500,000 400,000 5 300,000 0 200,000 –5 100,000 0 –10 12 13 14 15 16(FY) Notes: 1. Figures shown are narrowly defined expenses based on Historical Tables (Outlays), Budget of the United States Government, FY2015. 2. The amount for FY2016 is an estimate.|| The Impact of Budget Sequestration on the Fig. I-2-1-1 Defense Budget (Base budget: $1 billion) 630 610 FY2013 budget request FY2017 budget request 590 Sequester-level 570 550 530 510 490 470 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 (FY) Created based on the U.S. DoD FY2017 Budget Request. 17 The Long-Range Strike Bomber B-21 is a new long-range bomber that replaces the existing bomber, and is expected to become a main component of U.S. deep battle capabilities provided by conventional and ----- **2 Military Posture** - 1 General Situation In regard to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear force, the United States is moving ahead with its reduction based on a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that came into force in February 2011. In March 2016, it announced that its deployed strategic warheads[18] stood at 1,481, while its deployed delivery platforms stood at 741.[19] The United States is studying the concept of a Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), as an effort contributing to the nation’s new ability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.[20] In regard to Missile Defense (MD), the United States announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) in February 2010. On homeland defense, the review noted that the United States would use ground-based interceptors to respond to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) from North Korea and Iran, and that in regard to regional defense, the United States would expand investments in MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the MD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden. However, in January 2012, the United States announced that it would continue investments in MD programs in its homeland and Europe while reducing the spending for deployable regional MD systems with a view to increasing reliance on its allies and partners in the future. Further, in March 2013, the United States announced that it would additionally deploy groundbased interceptors in the U.S. homeland and mobile radars for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Japan in order to bolster homeland security in response to North Korea’s nuclear test and the advancement of its long-range ballistic missile development, while restructuring the program of the standard missile (SM-3) Block IIB scheduled for deployment in Europe. The operation of the U.S. Forces is not controlled by the individual branches of the broader armed forces, rather it is operated under the leadership of the Unifi ed Combatant Commands, comprising leaders from multiple branches of the armed forces. The Unifi ed Combatant Commands consist of three commands with functional responsibilities and six commands with regional responsibilities. The U.S. ground forces consist of about 480,000 |U.S. S of De|ecretary fense| |---|---| |U.S. Africa Command|U.S. Central Command|U.S. European Command|U.S. Northern Command|U.S. Pacific Command|U.S. Southern Command| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Fig. I-2-1-3|Structure of the Unif eid Combatant Command| |---|---| |President : Functional command : Geographic command U.S. Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Special U.S. Strategic U.S. Transportation Operations Command Command Command U.S. Africa U.S. Central U.S. European U.S. Northern U.S. Pacific U.S. Southern Command Command Command Command Command Command|| Army soldiers and about 180,000 Marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. As described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Army continues its transition to a smaller yet capable force fully prepared to conduct a full range of operations worldwide. The Marine Corps aims to acquire forces capable of responding to any threat as a “middleweight force,” bridging the seam between smaller special operations forces and larger heavy conventional forces. The U.S. maritime forces consist of about 940 vessels (including about 70 submarines) totaling about 6.2 million tons. The 6th Fleet is deployed in the East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and Africa; the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet in the eastern Pacifi c; the 4th Fleet in South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet in the western Pacifi c and Indian Ocean. The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,600 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the ROK. Moreover, in addressing the increasing threats in cyberspace, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was founded in order to oversee operations in cyberspace. The U.S. Cyber Command attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May 2010 and commended full capability in November in the same year.[21] See>> Fig. I-2-1-3 (Structure of the Unifi ed Combatant Command) 18 Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers (a deployed heavy bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead). 19 The fi gure as of March 1, 2016. 20 The concept is designed to cripple the A2 capabilities of an adversary and promptly strike a target anywhere in the world using non-nuclear long-range precision guided missiles that hit targets with high accuracy. 21 As cyber-related units, Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been ----- The U.S. Pacific Fleet consists of the 7th Fleet, which is responsible for the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, responsible for the East Pacific and Bering Sea. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in total controls about 200 vessels. The 7th Fleet is centered on a carrier strike group with main stationing locations in Japan and Guam. Their mission is to defend territorial lands, people, sea lines of communication, and the critical national interests of the United States and its allies. The 7th Fleet consists of an aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers and destroyers. The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force each in the U.S. mainland and Japan. Of this force, about 16,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which are equipped with F/A-18 fighters and other aircraft, in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the Western Pacific. The U.S. Pacific Air Force has three air forces, of which three air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters and C-130 transport aircraft) are deployed to the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings (equipped with F-16 fighters) to the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK. See>> Fig. I-2-1-4 (U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region) - 2 Current Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region The United States, a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by placing the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, in the region. The Pacific Command is a command with regional responsibilities for the largest geographical area, and its component commands include U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Forces Korea. In order to broaden the perspective of the U.S. Forces and promote better understanding of the U.S. Forces from allies, the Pacific Command headquarters accept personnel from allies in the region. Under this scheme, personnel from Canada and Australia are currently serving in the Pacific Command as deputy director level-officials. The Pacific Command consists of the U.S. Army Pacific, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Air Forces, which are all headquartered in Hawaii.[22] The Army Pacific’s subordinate commands include the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 8th U.S. Army in the ROK, which is the Army component of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, and the U.S. Army Alaska. Additionally, the Army Pacific assigns approximately 2,400 personnel to commands, such as I Corps Forward and the U.S. Army Japan Command in Japan.[23] 22 In 2013, the U.S. Army Pacific upgraded the rank of its Commander from lieutenant general to general, and thus the commanders of the Army Pacific, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Air Forces have all become four stars. 23 The figures of the U.S. Forces mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded in the published sources of the U.S. DoD (as of September 30, 2015), and could change according to ----- |U.S. Forces Army: approx. 487,000 personnel Navy: approx. 323,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 307,000 personnel Marines: approx. 183,000 personnel|Col2| |---|---| |Total: approx. 1,301,000 pers (Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 pers|onnel onnel| Fig. I-2-1-4 U.S. Forces Deployment Status and the Recent Trend of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region **European Region** Army: approx. 28,000 personnel Navy: approx. 7,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 29,000 personnel U.S. Forces Marines: approx. 1,000 personnel Army: approx. 487,000 personnel Navy: approx. 323,000 personnel Total: approx. 64,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 307,000 personnel (Total in 1987: Marines: approx. 183,000 personnel approx. 354,000 personnel) U.S. European Command Total: approx. 1,301,000 personnel (Total in 1987: approx. 2,170,000 personnel) U.S. Central Command **Asia-Pacific Region** U.S. Northern Command Army: approx. 37,000 personnel Navy: approx. 43,000 personnel Air Force: approx. 27,000 personnel U.S. Africa Command U.S. Pacific Command Marines: approx. 24,000 personnel Total: approx. 131,000 personnel U.S. SouthernCommand (Total in 1987: approx. 184,000 personnel) Notes: 1. Source: Documents published by the U.S. DoD (as of September 30, 2015), etc. 2. The number of personnel deployed in the Asia-Pacific region includes personnel deployed in Hawaii and Guam. **[Japan]** - Deploys F-22, MV-22/CV-22 Osprey, P-8, and Global Hawk - Deploys second TPY-2 radar - Additionally deployed one Aegis ship (normal ship) (June 2015) - Switched one Aegis ship (normal ship) with Aegis BMD destroyer (March 2016) - Additionally deploys two Aegis BMD destroyers (one already Seoul deployed in October 2015 and one to be deployed in summer 2017) ROK Japan **[Guam]** - Rotationally deploys submarines - Rotationally deploys bombers Okinawa - Established a facility for aircraft carrier’s temporary port of call - Deploys unmanned Philippines Guam reconnaissance aircraft (RQ-4) Hawaii Manila **[Philippines]** - Signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) for enhancing the presence of the U.S. Forces, etc. (April 2014) - Announced US$79 million assistance and provision of one patrol vessel and one survey vessel (November 2015) Singapore - Implements joint patrol activities (March 2016–) Indonesia - Agreed on five locations such as Air Force bases, etc. to serve as hubs for implementing defense cooperation based on EDCA (March 2016) Jakarta - Regularly deploys A-10 ground attack aircraft, etc. (April 2016–) **[Singapore]** - Rotationally deploys Littoral Combat Darwin **[Australia]** Ships (LCS) (To deploy four LCSs by At the November 2011 U.S.-Australia Summit, an agreement was reached on the following initiatives: end of 2017. The first ship started - Rotational deployment of the Marines to northern Australia rotation in April 2013 and the - Increased rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force aircraft in northern Australia トンガ second ship in December 2014.) Australia - Rotationally deployed P-8 (December 2015) In June 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Hagel announced a plan to deploy 60% of - Signed enhanced defense the assets of the U.S. Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific region as well as cooperation agreement proceed with the rotational deployment in the region and deployment of equipment. (December 2015) Canberra - A map created by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is used ----- **Section 2** **Korean Peninsula** On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two—north and south—for more than half a century. Even today, the ROK and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Peace **1 North Korea** - 1 General Situation and stability on the Korean Peninsula under such security environment is an extremely important challenge not only to Japan but also to the entire region of East Asia. See>> Fig. I-2-2-1 (Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula) economic diffi culties and has depended on the international community for food and other resources, it seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. North Korea deploys most of its military forces along the DMZ. According to the offi cial announcement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2016, the proportion of the defense budget in the FY2016 national budget was 15.8%. However, it is believed that this represents only a fraction of the real defense expenditures. Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by continuing to promote the development of WMDs and ballistic missiles, including conducting its fourth nuclear test in January 2016 and repeatedly launching ballistic missiles in and after February, and by maintaining largescale special operations forces. In addition, North Korea repeatedly uses provocative rhetoric and behavior against relevant countries, including Japan. In particular, from March to April 2013, North Korea underscored that it would exercise its right to preemptive nuclear attack against the United States and other countries, and that the strike zone of its ballistic missiles included Japan, naming specifi c cities.[5] In November 2014, the North Korean National Defense Commission released a statement protesting the adoption of a resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation by the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. The statement noted that like the United States and the ROK, Japan will have to be hit North Korea has been advocating the building of a strong socialist state in all areas—ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy,[1] and it adopts “military-fi rst (Songun) politics” to realize this goal. The “militaryfi rst (Songun) politics” has been defi ned as a basic form of socialist politics that leads the great undertaking of socialism to victory by giving priority to the military forces in all activities under the principle of militaryfi rst, and strengthening and relying on the actors in the revolution with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) acting as the central and main force.[2] Leader Kim Jong-un, Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP),[3] who is in a position to control the military, noted in his New Year Address[4] in January 2016: “The People’s Army should further develop itself into a revolutionary army of the Party”; and “[The munitions industry sector should] develop and produce a greater number of various means of military strike of our own style that are capable of overwhelming the enemy.” In his report on the work of the KWP Central Committee at the Seventh Congress of the KWP in May 2016, the Chairman stated, “It is necessary to uphold the military-fi rst revolutionary path as the constant strategic path, and strengthen the might of the military power in all of its dimensions.” As such, the Chairman makes references to the importance of military capabilities and regularly visits military organizations. In this light, it is conceivable that the Chairman will continue to attach importance to and rely on the military forces. Although North Korea has been facing serious North Korea used to insist that it would open the door to a “powerful and prosperous nation (Kangseong Daeguk)” in 2012, which marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il-sung. Recently, however, North Korea has been using mainly the expression, “powerful and prosperous country (Kangseong Kukka).” Written decision of the Seventh Congress of the Korean Workers’ Party, “Report on the Work of the KWP Central Committee” (May 8, 2016). Kim Jong-un was named “Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party” at the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016. For consistency purposes, “Chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party” is used for the title of Kim Jong-un in this white paper, including for matters predating Kim Jong-un’s appointment as KWP Chairman. Until 1994, the late President Kim Il-sung gave a “New Year Address” every year on January 1. From after his demise in 1995 to 2012, the KWP’s newspaper “Rodong Shinmun,” the Korean People’s Army’s newspaper “Korean People’s Army,” and the Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League’s newspaper “Youth Vanguard” jointly published a joint New Year Editorial. For example, a comment in the Rodong Shinmun dated March 31, 2013 states that U.S. mainland is located within the range of our attacks along with Yokosuka, Misawa, Okinawa and Guam. In addition, an article in the Rodong Shinmun dated April 10, 2013 claims that the entire territory of Japan cannot escape from North Korea’s retaliatory attacks, and in this context, the article listed the Japanese cities of ----- hard and sent to the bottom of the sea.[6] Additionally, an “important statement” of the Supreme Command of the KPA released in February 2016 notes its first target of attack would be the ROK Blue House, while secondary targets would include U.S. Force bases in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. mainland. In March 2016, North Korea reiterated provocative rhetoric and behavior this time against Japan, stating that U.S. Force facilities and areas in Japan are within the firing range of North Korea’s strike means, and that North Korea could instantly wipe out Japan if it is so inclined.[7] Such military trend in North Korea constitutes a serious and imminent threat to the security not only of Japan but also of the entire region and the international community. Needless to say, North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated. Sufficient attention needs to be paid to the development and deployment of ballistic missiles, the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, and the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea. Partly because North Korea maintains its extremely closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and intentions of its behavior. However, it is necessary for Japan to pay utmost attention to them. - 2 Military Posture scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage, to guerrilla warfare. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory. **(2) Military Capabilities** The North Korean Army comprises about 1.02 million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored forces including at least 3,500 tanks and artillery. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul. Despite limited resources, it is deemed that North Korea continues to selectively reinforce its conventional forces and improve its equipment, such as main battle tanks and multiple rocket launchers.[9] The Navy has about 780 ships with a total displacement of approximately 104,000 tons and is chiefly comprised of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile craft. Also, it has about 20 of the former model Romeo-class submarines, about 70 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces. The Air Force has approximately 560 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union. However, some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29 fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft are also included. North Korea has a large number of outdated An-2 transport aircraft as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operations forces. In addition, North Korea has so-called asymmetric military capabilities, namely, special operations forces whose size is estimated at 100,000 personnel.[10] In recent **(1) General Situation** North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all soldiers, modernizing all military forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country).[8] North Korea’s military forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with a total troop strength of roughly 1.19 million. While North Korea’s military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, most of its equipment is outdated. Meanwhile, North Korea has forces such as large 6 Statement of the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea released on November 23, 2014. 7 For example, “Once the fire is lit in the Korean Peninsula, not only the U.S. Forces’ bases of aggression in Japan but everything in Japan that would be used for war would burn down to ashes in an instant” and “Today, North Korea has the capability not only to instantly wipe out Japan, but also to retaliate by directly striking and demolishing Hawaii and the U.S. mainland as well if it is so inclined” (Rodong Shinmun dated March 10, 2016). A statement by the spokesperson of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea dated March 7, 2016 notes that all bases of aggression in Japan, the Pacific, and the U.S. mainland are within the firing range of various type strike means of North Korea. 8 The Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth plenary meeting of the fourth KWP Central Committee in 1962. 9 According to “The Military Balance 2014,” North Korea is replacing Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks with the Ch’onma-ho that North Korea independently produced based on the T-62. Furthermore, the Defense White Paper 2014 that the ROK Ministry of National Defense released in January 2015 refers to North Korea’s development of a new 300 mm multiple rocket launcher, as well as the significant increase in the number of tanks, armored cars, and multiple rocket launchers in North Korea’s possession. North Korea allegedly fired several rounds from the 300 mm multiple rocket launcher on three instances in March 2016 and launched a new short-range surface-to-air missile in April 2016. 10 It had been said that North Korea possessed two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the KWP. However, it has been reported that these organizations were consolidated in 2009 and the Reconnaissance General Bureau was established under the auspices of the military forces. The existence of the bureau was officially confirmed in March 2013 when Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported General Kim Yong-chol as the Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Moreover, James Thurman, then Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, stated, “North Korea possesses the world’s largest special operations force of over 60,000” in his speech at the Association of U.S. Army in October 2012. Additionally, the ROK Defense White Paper 2014 notes, “Special operation forces are currently estimated at 200,000 strong.” ----- |Col1|ROK|U.S. Forces in Korea| |---|---|---| |Approx. 1.19 million personnel|Approx. 628,000 personnel|Approx. 25,000 personnel| |Approx. 1.02 million personnel|Approx. 495,000 personnel|Approx. 17,000 personnel| |T-62, T-54/-55, etc. Approx. 3,500|M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Approx. 2,400|M-1| |Approx. 780; 104,000 tons|Approx. 240; 211,000 tons|Supporting corps only| |4 20|12 11 13|| ||Approx. 29,000 personnel|| |Approx. 560|Approx. 620|Approx. 80| |Mig-23 x 56 Mig-29 x 18 ft Su-25 x 34|F-4 x 70 F-16 x 164 F-15 x 60|F-16 x 60| |Approx. 25 million|Approx. 49 million|| |Army: 5–12 years Navy: 5–10 years Air Force: 3–4 years|Army: 21 months Navy: 23 months Air Force: 24 months|| Fig. I-2-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula Orang General Staff Office Navy Headquarters Toksan Chaho Pyongyang Defense Headquarters Kaechon Mayangdo Taejo Air Force Headquarters Pyongyang Chunghwa Nampo Hwangju Uijongbu U.N. Command Headquarters Mukho U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Sagot Seoul U.S. 2nd Infantry Division Command Headquarters Suwon Headquarters of U.S. Forces Korea Pyeongtaek Osan U.S. 7th Air Force Headquarters Kunsan Taegu Kwangju Busan Mokpo Chinhae North Korea ROK U.S. Forces in Korea Total armed forces Approx. 1.19 million personnel Approx. 628,000 personnel Approx. 25,000 personnel Ground troops Approx. 1.02 million personnel Approx. 495,000 personnel Approx. 17,000 personnel Army T-62, T-54/-55, etc. M-48, K-1, T-80 etc. Tanks M-1 Approx. 3,500 Approx. 2,400 Naval vessels Approx. 780; 104,000 tons Approx. 240; 211,000 tons Supporting corps only Destroyers 12 Navy Frigates 4 11 Submarines 20 13 Marines Approx. 29,000 personnel Combat aircraft Approx. 560 Approx. 620 Approx. 80 Mig-23 x 56 F-4 x 70 Air Force 3rd and 4th Mig-29 x 18 F-16 x 164 F-16 x 60 generation fighter aircraft Su-25 x 34 F-15 x 60 Population Approx. 25 million Approx. 49 million Army: 5–12 years Army: 21 months Reference Term of service Navy: 5–10 years Navy: 23 months Air Force: 3–4 years Air Force: 24 months Source: “The Military Balance 2016,” etc. years, North Korea is seen to be placing importance on and strengthening its cyber forces.[11] - 3 WMD and Ballistic Missiles including decreases in military assistance from the former Soviet Union due to the collapse of the Cold War regime, limitations placed on North Korea’s national defense spending due to its economic stagnation, and the rapid modernization of the ROK’s defense capabilities. It is thus speculated that North Korea is focusing its efforts on WMD and ballistic missile reinforcements in order to compensate for this shortfall. North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles While North Korea continues to maintain largescale military capabilities, its conventional forces are considerably inferior to those of the ROK and the U.S. Forces Korea. This is the result of a variety of factors, 11 The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 notes, “North Korea probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support its political objectives.” The annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (2015) submitted to Congress by the U.S. DoD also in February 2016 states, “North Korea probably views OCO [offensive cyber operations] as an appealing platform from which to collect intelligence and cause disruption in South Korea and other adversaries including the United States.” According to the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2014, North Korea has mobilized over 6,000 cyber warfare personnel and carries out cyber attacks which interfere with the ROK’s military operations and national ----- is considered to have made further strides through going ahead with the fourth nuclear test and repeating ballistic missile launches. Coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, North Korea’s development of WMDs and missiles poses a serious and imminent threat to the security of the region including Japan and the international community. Additionally, such development poses a serious challenge to the entire international community with regard to the non-proliferation of weapons, including WMDs. **(1) Nuclear Weapons** a. Recent Major Developments related to North Korea’s Nuclear Development With regard to the issue of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons, six rounds of the Six-Party Talks have been held since August 2003, aimed at taking peaceful measures to achieve the verifiable denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, the Joint Statement was adopted, which focused on the abandonment of “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” by North Korea. In 2006, the Talks were suspended with North Korea launching seven ballistic missiles and conducting a nuclear test,[12] along with the U.N. Security Council adopting Resolutions 1695 and 1718 in response. Later, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks. At the sixth round of the Talks in September 2007, the parties reached an agreement, which included completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and “a complete and correct declaration of all (North Korea’s) nuclear programs” by the end of the year. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed, and the Six-Party Talks has been suspended since December 2008. Subsequently, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1874 in June 2009 in response to North Korea’s ballistic missile launches and nuclear test in 2009,[13] Resolution 2087 in January 2013 in response to North Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in December 2012, and Resolution 2094 in March 2013 in response to North Korea’s nuclear test in February 2013. These resolutions have expanded and strengthened the sanctions against North Korea. In addition, in response to North Korea’s nuclear test in January 2016 and launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2270 in March 2016 that included the further addition and strengthening of sanctions against North Korea, such as a prohibition on exporting and supplying aviation fuel to North Korea and a prohibition on importing coal and iron ore from North Korea. North Korea announced in 2005 that it manufactured nuclear weapons, and declared itself a “nuclear weapons state” in 2012 in its revised constitution. In 2013, North Korea continued to take steps to boost its standing in the international community as a “nuclear weapons state.” In March 2013, it adopted the “new strategic line” policy of simultaneous economic and nuclear development. North Korea alleged that even if it does not increase defense spending, as long as robust nuclear deterrence is achieved by increasing the effectiveness of its war deterrent and defense force, North Korea would be able to concentrate on its economic development and on improving the people’s livelihood. North Korea reiterated that nuclear weapons were neither a political bargaining chip nor a thing for economic transactions. In April of the same year, North Korea adopted a law “On Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-Defense.”[14] In March 2016, in response to the new U.N. Security Council resolution, North Korea issued a statement saying, “The DPRK will, as ever, firmly hold the banner of the line of developing the two fronts, further bolster its self-defensive nuclear deterrence.”[15] During the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un delivered a report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, setting out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state” and stating, “We will consistently take hold on the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity.” As regards the objective of North Korea’s nuclear development, North Korea is deemed to be developing nuclear weapons as an indispensable deterrent for maintaining the existing regime in light of the following: North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime;[16] North Korea considers that it needs 12 On October 27, 2006, as a result of the independently collected information and its analysis as well as Japan’s own careful examination of the U.S. and ROK analyses, the Japanese government arrived at the judgment that the probability of North Korea conducting a nuclear test was extremely high. 13 Given that North Korea announced on May 25, 2009, via the Korean Central News Agency, that it had successfully conducted an underground nuclear test, and in light of the fact that the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with a waveform that differed from an ordinary waveform, which could possibly have resulted from a North Korean nuclear test, the Japanese government believes that North Korea conducted a nuclear test on that day. 14 According to a Korean Central News Agency report dated April 1, 2013, this law establishes that North Korea is a “nuclear weapons state,” and in order to further consolidate North Korea’s “position of nuclear weapons state,” it provides for bolstering the nuclear deterrence and nuclear retaliatory strike power both in quality and quantity, safekeeping and management of nuclear weapons and other assets, cooperation towards the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the provision of proactive supports for nuclear disarmament. 15 Statement by a spokesperson for the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea issued on March 4, 2016. ----- its own nuclear deterrence to counter the nuclear threat of the United States[17] and is in no position at least in the shortterm to overturn its inferiority in conventional forces visà-vis the United States and the ROK; North Korea asserts that the Iraqi and Libyan regimes collapsed due to their lack of nuclear deterrence;[18] and North Korea reiterates nuclear weapons will never be traded away at negotiations. b. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program Details of the current status of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program are largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the unclear status of past nuclear developments, and considering North Korea has already conducted four nuclear tests including the nuclear test in January 2016, it is conceivable that North Korea could have made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program. With regard to plutonium, a fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons,[19] North Korea has suggested its production and extraction on several instances.[20] Moreover, in June 2009, North Korea announced that it would weaponize all of its newly extracted plutonium.[21] In April 2013, North Korea announced its policy to readjust and restart all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, including the nuclear reactor, the disablement of which was agreed upon at the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks in September 2007. In November 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) opined that while lack of inspection makes it impossible to determine conclusively, multiple activities were observed from satellite imagery suggesting that the nuclear reactor was restarted.[22] Furthermore, in September 2015, North Korea stated that all nuclear facilities in Yongbyon including the nuclear reactor and the uranium enrichment plant were readjusted and started normal operation. Because the restarting of the reactor could lead to the production and extraction of plutonium by North Korea, such developments are causes of great concern. As for highly enriched uranium that can also be used for nuclear weapons, in 2002 the United States announced that North Korea acknowledged the existence of a uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons. Later in June 2009, North Korea declared the commencement of uranium enrichment. Furthermore, in November 2010, North Korea disclosed its uranium enrichment facility to American nuclear specialists and later announced that it was operating a uranium enrichment plant equipped with thousands of centrifuges. The expansion of this uranium enrichment plant has been suggested in August 2013; in this regard, North Korea could have increased its enrichment capabilities. The series of North Korean behaviors related to uranium enrichment indicate the possibility of the development of nuclear weapons using highly enriched uranium in addition to plutonium.[23] With regard to the development of nuclear weapons, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, February 2013,[24] and January 2016.[25] 17 For example, a statement issued by the National Defense Commission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on March 14, 2014 alleges that the United States threatens and intimidates North Korea with nuclear strikes, and that North Korea has come to possess nuclear deterrence out of necessity in order to protect the autonomy of its nation and people. 18 For example, a comment in the Rodong Shinmun dated December 2, 2013 contends that the situation in Iraq and Libya teaches an acute lesson that countries under the constant threat of U.S. preemptive nuclear attack have no choice but to become a victim of U.S. state terrorism, unless the countries have powerful deterrent capability. 19 Plutonium is synthetically produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium with neutrons, and then extracting it from used nuclear fuel at a reprocessing facility. Plutonium is then used as a basic material for the production of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, in order to use uranium for nuclear weapons, it is necessary to extract uranium 235 (U235), a highly fissile material, from natural uranium. This process is called enrichment. Generally, a large-scale enrichment facility that combines thousands of centrifuges is used to boost the U235 concentration to nuclear weapon levels (over 90%). 20 North Korea announced in October 2003 that it had completed the reprocessing of 8,000 used fuel rods that contain plutonium, and in May 2005 that it had completed extraction of an additional 8,000 used fuel rods. 21 Then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Armed Services Committee in April 2011 that “we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2014 estimates that North Korea has approximately 40 kg of plutonium. 22 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 notes, “North Korea has followed through on its announcement by expanding the size of its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor that was previously used for plutonium production.” It is said that if the reactor is restarted, North Korea would have the capability to produce enough plutonium (approximately 6 kg) to manufacture approximately one nuclear bomb in one year. 23 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2012 states, “the North’s disclosure (of a uranium enrichment facility) supports the U.S. longstanding assessment that North Korea has pursued uranium-enrichment capability.” The ROK Defense White Paper 2014 notes, “it is also assessed that a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program is underway.” 24 At around 11:59 am on February 12, 2013, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms that differed from an ordinary waveform and were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a nuclear test. On this basis, the government of Japan verified the facts in coordination with other relevant parties, including the United States and the ROK. Based on a comprehensive consideration of the aforementioned information, the Japanese government determined that North Korea conducted a nuclear test. North Korea announced that it “succeeded in the third underground nuclear test,” “the test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power,” “physically demonstrating the good performance of the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence that has become diversified.” 25 At around 10:30 am on January 6, 2016, the Japan Meteorological Agency detected seismic waves with an epicenter located in the vicinity of North Korea, which had waveforms different from an ordinary waveform and were unlikely those of a natural earthquake. On the same day, North Korea announced via the Korean Central News Agency that it successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test. Based on a ----- It is highly likely that North Korea has made strides in its nuclear weapons program, collecting the necessary data through these nuclear tests. Although North Korea asserts that the nuclear test conducted in January 2016 was a hydrogen bomb test,[26] it is doubtful that a general hydrogen bomb test was conducted, considering the magnitude of the earthquake.[27] On the other hand, North Korea has already conducted four nuclear tests in the past and is anticipated to achieve technological maturity. In this light, North Korea’s activities to develop nuclear weapons including the hydrogen bomb require continued attention. Since the nuclear test in January 2016, North Korea has continued to reiterate that it would further strengthen its nuclear assets, and therefore, a situation that raises serious concerns for the international community is expected to remain. It is believed that North Korea seeks to miniaturize nuclear weapons and develop them into warheads that can be mounted on ballistic missiles, as part of its nuclear weapons program. For instance, in March 2016, images were released showing KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un meeting with nuclear weapons engineers and others and observing an object North Korea claims to be a miniaturized nuclear warhead.[28] In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on a ballistic missile requires a considerably high degree of technological capacity. However, considering that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, as well as the technological maturity reached through North Korea’s previous four nuclear tests, among other factors, it is possible that North Korea has achieved the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and has developed nuclear warheads.[29] Taking into account that North Korea has not changed its stance of continuing its nuclear weapons program, it is believed that with the passage of time, there would be a greater risk of North Korea deploying a ballistic missile mounted with a nuclear warhead that includes Japan in its range. In this regard, related developments need to be monitored carefully. North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending the range of ballistic missiles that could become the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses a serious and imminent threat to the security of the region including Japan and of the international community, and significantly impairs peace and stability. Therefore, they can never be tolerated. **(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons** North Korea is an extremely closed regime. In addition, most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian uses, which in turn facilitates camouflage. For these reasons, details of the status of North Korea’s biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are unclear. However, with regard to chemical weapons, North Korea is suspected to have several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and already a substantial stockpile of such agents. North Korea is also thought to have some infrastructure for the production of biological weapons.[30, 31] **(3) Ballistic Missiles** As is the case with WMDs, many of the details of North Korea’s ballistic missiles are unknown, partly owing to the country’s extremely closed regime. It appears, however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency,[32] in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. In March, June, and July 2014 and 26 Regarding the nuclear test conducted on January 6, 2016, North Korea announced: “The first H-bomb test was successfully conducted”; and “The DPRK fully proved that the technological specifications of the newly developed H-bomb for the purpose of test were accurate and scientifically verified the power of smaller H-bomb.” Prior to this, on December 10, 2015, the Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un as saying, North Korea has “become a powerful nuclear weapons state that can reverberate the large explosion sound of a hydrogen bomb.” 27 In regard to North Korea’s nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (February 2016) states, “Although we are continuing to evaluate this event, the low yield of the test is not consistent with a successful test of a thermonuclear device.” Furthermore, in January 2016, the ROK National Intelligence Service reportedly briefed the National Assembly that because the power and seismic waves of the fourth nuclear test do not match up to those of the previous three nuclear tests, the test was unlikely a hydrogen bomb test. 28 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station on March 9, 2016, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un met with engineers and others from the nuclear weapons research team, provided guidance regarding the nuclear weapons program, and stated, “The nuclear warheads have been standardized to be fit for ballistic missiles by miniaturizing them.” 29 Over nine years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted four nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear weapons in the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China. The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2014 assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons also seems to have reached a considerable level.” In March 2016, the spokesperson of the ROK Ministry of Unification stated during his press conference that, “Considering the timespan since the first nuclear test, we perceive that North Korea has secured some level of miniaturization technology.” In addition, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense stated, “We assess that North Korea’s miniaturization technology has reached a considerable level. However, we view North Korea, at this point, does not have a miniaturized nuclear warhead nor has secured actual combat capability of KN08.” In March 2016, North Korea published photos of the object it claims is a “miniaturized nuclear warhead,” suggesting that it may be mounted on the new KN08 ICBM. 30 For example, the ROK Defense White Paper 2014 points out that, following the commencement of production in the 1980s, it is estimated that North Korea has a stock of 2,500-5,000 tons of various chemical weapons stored. It also notes that North Korea likely has the capability to produce a variety of biological weapons including anthrax, smallpox, and pest. Moreover, the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of May 2013 points out that, “North Korea probably could employ CW [chemical weapons] agents by modifying a variety of conventional munitions, including artillery and ballistic missiles.” 31 North Korea ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention. 32 North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry ----- March 2015, North Korea launched short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles believed to be the Nodong and Scud missiles, and since February 2016, has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles including the ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite.” North Korea often launches ballistic missiles to conduct military provocations against relevant countries, including Japan.[33] a. Toksa North Korea is thought to be developing a short-range ballistic missile “Toksa” with its range estimated to be approximately 120 km.[34] It is deemed that Toksa is the first ballistic missile owned or developed by North Korea which adopts a solid fuel propellant.[35] b. Scud It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C,[36] a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries. At present, North Korea is considered to deploy Scud ER (Extended Range) which has an extended range due to the extension of the scud’s body as well as the reduction in weight of the warhead, among other factors. The range of a Scud ER is estimated to reach 1,000 km,[37] and it is possible that a part of Japan falls within this range. |Fig. I-2-2-2|Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles| |---|---| |New York (Approx. 6,000 km) 10,000 km Taepodong-2 (Variant: Approx. 10,000 km+) Washington, D.C. Chicago Musudan (Approx. 2,500–4,000km) Taepodong-1 (Approx. 1,500 km+) 6,000 km Denver Nodong (Approx. 1,300 km) 4,000 km San Francisco Anchorage Scud ER (Approx. 1,000 km) 1,500 km Los Angeles 1,300 km Taepodong district Beijing Pyongyang Tokyo Hawaii Tongch’ang-ri district 1,000 km Okinawa Guam The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30 * The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.|| Fig. I-2-2-2 Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles New York (Approx. 6,000 km) 10,000 km Taepodong-2 (Variant: Approx. 10,000 km+) Washington, D.C. Chicago Musudan (Approx. 2,500–4,000km) Taepodong-1 (Approx. 1,500 km+) 6,000 km Denver Nodong (Approx. 1,300 km) 4,000 km San Francisco Anchorage Scud ER (Approx. 1,000 km) 1,500 km Los Angeles 1,300 km Taepodong district Beijing Pyongyang Tokyo Hawaii Tongch’ang-ri district 1,000 km Okinawa Guam The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30 33 An overview of North Korea’s short- and medium-range ballistic missile launches since 2014 is as follows. (1) On March 3, 2014, at around 6:20 am and around 6:30 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the east-northeast direction from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast on the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (2) On March 26, 2014, from around 2:30 am to 2:40 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Nodong missiles in the eastern direction from the vicinity of Sukchon in the western coast on the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that both missiles flew approximately 650 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (3) On June 29, 2014, at around 5 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the eastern direction from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast on the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that the ballistic missiles launched flew a maximum of approximately 500 km and all fell into the Sea of Japan. (4) On July 9, 2014, from around 4 am to around 4:20 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the northeast direction from the southwestern area of North Korea (approximately 100 km south of Pyongyang). It is estimated that both of the ballistic missiles launched flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (5) On July 13, 2014, from around 1:20 am to around 1:30 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the northeastern direction from the vicinity of Kaesong in the southern area of North Korea. It is estimated that both of the ballistic missiles launched flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (6) On July 26, 2014, at around 9:35 pm, North Korea launched one ballistic missile presumed to be a Scud missile in the eastern direction from the western coast of North Korea (approximately 100 km west of Haeju). It is estimated that the ballistic missile launched flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (7) On March 2, 2015, at around 6:30 am and around 6:40 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the east-northeastern direction from the vicinity of Nampo on the western coast of North Korea. It is estimated that both of the ballistic missiles launched flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (8) On March 10, 2016, at around 5:22 am and around 5:27 am, North Korea launched two ballistic missiles presumed to be Scud missiles in the east-northeastern direction from the vicinity of Nampo on the western coast of North Korea. It is estimated that both of the ballistic missiles launched flew approximately 500 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. (9) On March 18, 2016, at around 5:54 am, North Korea launched one ballistic missile presumed to be a Nodong missile in the eastern direction from the vicinity of Sukchon on the western coast of North Korea. It is estimated that the ballistic missile launched flew approximately 800 km and fell into the Sea of Japan. 34 In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, “North Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period.” 35 Generally, solid fuel propellant missiles are considered to be militarily superior because they are filled with a propellant in solid form in airframes and are capable of immediate launches compared with liquid fuel propellant missiles, making signs of their launches unlikely to be detected in advance. Furthermore, they are relatively easy to store and handle. 36 The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km, respectively. ----- c. Nodong North Korea is thought to have started developing longerrange ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, which is believed to be already deployed, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300 km, and may reach almost all of Japan. It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong.[38] In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong missiles.[39] Furthermore, the ballistic missiles presumed to be Nodong missiles that were launched towards the Sea of Japan in March 2014 marked the first time that the missiles were launched from the western coast of North Korea in the eastern direction, across the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, it is deemed that North Korea is building up its confidence in the performance and reliability of its ballistic missiles.[40] Although the details of Nodong’s performance have not been confirmed, Nodong may not have the accuracy to carry out precise strikes on specific target installations, as this ballistic missile is likely based on Scud technology. However, it has been suggested that North Korea is working to increase the Nodong’s accuracy. d. Taepodong-1 Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. It is estimated to have a range of at least approximately 1,500 km. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of a longer range missile, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2. e. Musudan North Korea is currently developing a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) “Musudan.” It has been suggested that Musudan is a revamped version of the Russian SLBM SS-N-6 that North Korea acquired in the early 1990s. It will be loaded onto a TransporterErector-Launcher (TEL), similar to its Scud and Nodong counterparts, to transport and operate. With the new missile allegedly having a range of between 2,500 and 4,000 km, it has been suggested that all parts of Japan and Guam may fall within its firing range.[41] In April 2016, North Korea is thought to have made its first attempt to launch a ballistic missile presumed to be the Musudan but it ended in failure. However, in June 2016, an IRBM presumed to be the Musudan that was launched from the vicinity of Wonsan in the eastern coast of North Korea reached an altitude exceeding 1,000 km (maximum height was 1,413.6 km according to North Korea’s announcement) and flew approximately 400 km before falling into the Sea of Japan.[42] With regard to the situation of this launch, it is believed that the missile was launched on a “lofted trajectory,” meaning it was launched at a steep angle to reach a higher altitude than a 38 Of the seven ballistic missiles North Korea launched in total in July 2006, the third missile is believed to be a Taepodong-2 fired from the Taepodong district in the northeastern coastal area. 39 All of the seven ballistic missiles launched were assumed to have landed in the military target practice area, for which a navigation warning was issued by the Japan Coast Guard upon notification by North Korea on June 22, 2009. 40 On March 18, 2016, North Korea again launched ballistic missiles presumed to be Nodong missiles in a similar manner. 41 In a statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, then Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, testified, “North Korea is now fielding a new intermediate range ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska.” Furthermore, the ROK’s Defense White Paper 2014 notes that, “In 2007, it [North Korea] fielded the Musudan missile (range of over 3,000 km). Following these deployments, North Korea has gained direct strike capabilities against South Korea, Japan, Guam, and other surrounding countries.” 42 On June 22, 2016, North Korea launched a ballistic missile presumed to be the Musudan at around 5:57 am and around 8:03 am, respectively. The ballistic missile launched at 5:57 am separated into multiple pieces and fell near the shore of the eastern coast of North Korea. It is estimated that the longest flight distance among the separated pieces was approximately 100 km. The ballistic missile launched at 8:03 am is as stated in the main text. On the following day, June 23, the Korean Central Broadcasting Station announced that the test launch of the “Hwasong-10” surface-to-surface intermediate long-range strategic rocket was conducted successfully and reported as follows: (1) The test launch was carried out by the high-angle launch system simulating the maximum range of the ballistic rocket; (2) the rocket reached the maximum height of 1,413.6 km along the planned flight orbit, flew, and accurately landed in the targeted waters 400 km forward; (3) the test launch confirmed the flying kinetic feature of the ballistic rocket and its stability and maneuverability as well as the technical features of the newly-designed rocket structure and its power system, and verified the heat-resisting property of the warhead in the re-entry stage and its flight stability; and (4) KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un who visited the site stated, “We have attained definite capability to attack in a full-fledged and realistic way the U.S. Forces in the Pacific operation ----- normal trajectory, while flying a shorter distance.[43] If this same ballistic missile presumed to be the Musudan were launched on a normal trajectory, it is estimated that its range would correspond to a range between approximately 2,500 and 4,000 km, the previously suggested range of a Musudan. In this light, it is considered that, through its launch in June, North Korea demonstrated that its missile had functions of an IRBM[44] to some level. While the failures of North Korea’s several Musudan launches[45] since April 2016 have suggested that there could be fundamental flaws with the engine and missile body, it cannot be ruled out that North Korea has striven to solve the problems through the failures and could have made some technical gains. It is very difficult to verify the intention of North Korea’s military activities because of its closed regime. In addition, it is believed that North Korea has constructed underground military facilities across the country, and the ballistic missiles such as Toksa, Scud, Nodong and Musudan, would be loaded onto TELs. These make it difficult to detect in advance individual and specific signs of the launch of missiles with TELs, such as detailed launch sites and timings.[46] f. Taepodong-2 Taepodong-2 is believed to be a missile which uses in its first stage, four engines, each of which is developed based on the technologies of Nodong, and the same type of engine in its second stage. Its range is estimated to be approximately 6,000 km for the two-stage type, while the range of its three-stage variant can be more than approximately 10,000 km assuming that the weight of the warhead is not over approximately one ton. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and fell near the launch site. In the launch of a missile disguised as a “Satellite” in April 2009, it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it from the same district. It is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000 km before falling into the Pacific Ocean. In April 2012, North Korea conducted a launch using what is believed to be a Taepodong-2 or its variant from the Tongch’ang-ri district on the northwestern coast of North Korea, which was disguised as a “Satellite.” The missile flew over a minute and then fell into the Yellow Sea by breaking into several pieces. The launch is thought to have been a failure.[47] In December 2012, North Korea again conducted a launch using a Taepodong-2 variant, which was disguised as a “Satellite,” from the Tongch’ang-ri district. In this launch, all falling objects are presumed to have fallen in the expected falling areas where North Korea had announced before the launch. An object including the possible third stage propelling device is presumed to have continued flight while changing its trajectory, and to have put an object into orbit around the Earth.[48] In February 2016, North Korea once again conducted a launch from the Tongch’ang-ri district using a Taepodong-2 variant, which seemed to be a similar type of the ballistic missile launched in December 2012, saying it was launching a “Satellite.” It is assessed that North Korea’s long-range ballistic missiles’ technological reliability had been advanced by this launch because it is estimated that (1) it successfully launched two similar types of ballistic missiles in a row; (2) the missile flew in almost the same way as the last launch; and (3) it put an object into orbit around the Earth.[49] Accordingly, it is believed that a test launch of long-range ballistic missiles can contribute to the development of shorter-range missiles in such ways as increasing the range and payload capability and improving the circular error probability (CEP). Also, the separation technology of multi-stage propelling devices and the technology of posture control and thrust modulation of long-range ballistic missiles can be applied to other middle-range and long-range ballistic missiles that North Korea is newly developing. Therefore, 43 It is not necessarily clear why North Korea launched the missile on a lofted trajectory. However, based on Korean Central Broadcasting Station’s report on June 23, 2016 that “The test-fire was successfully conducted without giving any slightest effect to the security of surrounding countries,” it is possible that North Korea aimed to minimize the anticipated backlash and criticism from the international community, including neighboring countries and the United States, should its missile overfly the territories of other countries including Japan. In general, it is considered that ballistic missiles launched on a lofted trajectory make interception more difficult. 44 IRBM generally refers to a ballistic missile with a range between approximately 3,000 and 5,500 km. 45 On April 28, 2016, North Korea launched a ballistic missile presumed to be the Musudan in the early morning and late afternoon, respectively, but the launches ended in failure. Additionally, in the early morning of May 31, 2016, North Korea launched an IRBM that could be a Musudan, but it ended in failure. Furthermore, on April 15, 2016, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that ended in failure. It is suggested that this missile was also a Musudan. 46 According to the U.S. DoD’s “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” of February 2016, North Korea possesses a maximum of 100 TELs in total for Toksas and Scuds, a maximum of 50 TELs for Nodongs, and a maximum of 50 TELs for IRBMs (understood as referring to Musudans). Furthermore, according to “IHS Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment China and Northeast Asia (2015),” North Korea possesses 700 to 1,000 missiles in total, 45% of which are presumed to be Scud-class, 45% Nodong, and the remaining 10% other intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles. 47 After the launch, North Korea announced that “the earth observation satellite failed to enter its preset orbit,” admitting the failure of the launch. 48 It has not been confirmed that the object put into orbit around the Earth is performing communication or is transmitting or receiving any signal to and from the ground. Therefore, it is not assessed that the object actually functions as a satellite. 49 In the case of the February 2016 launch of a ballistic missile, which North Korea disguised as a “Satellite,” once again no communication or transmission of signals between the object and the ground of any ii ----- Object likely from the Taepodong-2 variant launched by North Korea that washed ashore and was discovered in the coast of Tottori Prefecture [Photo courtesy of Tottori Prefecture] based on its appearance and other features, washed ashore and was discovered in the coast of Tottori Prefecture. As of the end of June 2016, the MOD is analyzing the details. g. KN08 The details of the new missile “KN08” which was showcased at the military parade in April 2012 and July 2013 are unknown. However, the missile is believed to be an ICBM.[51] At the military parade in October 2015, a new missile thought to be the “KN08” was showcased with a different-shaped warhead from the previous version.[52] The U.S. DoD reportedly calls the new missile, considered a variant of the “KN08,” the “KN14.” Whereas the Taepodong-2 is launched from a fixed launch pad, the “KN08” and “KN14” are carried by a TEL, making it difficult to detect signs of their launch in advance, and is likely intended to increase survivability. h. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) It has been suggested that North Korea is developing an SLBM and a new submarine which is designed to carry the SLBM. In May 2015, North Korea, along with photos, announced through its media that it conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM.[53] In January 2016, a documentary film on the activities of KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un in December 2015 showed footage of an ejection test of what is assessed to be an SLBM different from the one made public in May 2015. In April 2016, the launch may lead not only to the improvement of other types of its ballistic missiles including Nodong but also to the advancement of North Korea’s entire ballistic missile program including the development of new ballistic missiles such as Musudan, KN-08 and SLBM and diversification of attack measure. On the other hand, it is assessed that further verification of some relevant technologies would be required for the practical use of long-range ballistic missiles. For example, concerning the development of long-range ballistic missiles, North Korea may plan to verify technology required for protecting a re-entry vehicle from ultrahigh heating when the warhead re-enters into the atmosphere through further flight tests.[50] Furthermore, as launches from fixed launch pads are vulnerable to external attacks, North Korea may seek resiliency and survivability through building underground or silo launch facilities and launching from TELs. In June 2016, what appears to be a part of the fairing of the Taepodong-2 variant launched in February 2016, 50 On March 15, 2016, the Korean Central Broadcasting Station reported that a “simulated test of atmospheric re-entry of a ballistic vehicle” was conducted successfully under the leadership of KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un. 51 The “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of February 2015 notes that, “[North Korea] has publicly displayed its KN08 road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps towards fielding this system, although the system has not been flight-tested.” 52 Jane’s Defence Weekly dated October 13, 2015 notes that the “KN08” showcased at the military parade on October 10, 2015 had a larger third stage than the earlier version, and therefore, could have an extended range. It also suggests that low quality ablative materials cannot withstand high temperatures during re-entry, and thus, a blunter shape warhead may have been developed to reduce speed to protect the warhead. 53 An article dated October 28, 2014 published on the website (38North) of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University in the United States points out that a new test stand had been set up near the Sinpo shipyard in northern North Korea, which could be used for the initial stages of research, development, testing, and evaluation of a vertical launch tube system for submarines and surface combatants. In addition, the ROK Defense White Paper 2014 states that North Korea is believed to be building a new submarine that is capable of carrying ballistic missiles. With regard to the “underwater test-fire” of an SLBM that North Korea announced, the ROK Ministry of National Defense assessed that the test constituted an “ejection test” in the early stage of development and that another four to five years is needed to complete the development. Having said so, the Ministry expressed concern that North Korea’s development of an SLBM undermines the stability of Northeast Asia and urges North Korea to immediately suspend its development. According to “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (2015) submitted to Congress by the U.S. DoD in February 2016, North Korea ----- |Expect|ed Falling Area| |---|---| Fig. I-2-2-3 Launch of a Ballistic Missile which North Korea Disguised as a “Satellite” on February 7, 2016 It is estimated that North Korea put Possible 1st stage propelling device an object* into orbit with an presumed to have fallen after inclination of approx. 97.5 degrees[(*2)] separating into multiple pieces Approx. 0940i Possible interstage section between 1st and 2nd stage propelling devices[(*1)] Object including possible 3rd stage propelling device Approx. 0941i Missile launch Possible fairing Possible 2nd stage Approx. 390 km Approx. 500 km propelling device Approx. 0949i Expected Expected Japanese territory Expected Falling Area Falling Area Falling Area Approx. 0930i Approx. 0939i Approx. 0944i Distance from Tongch’ang-ri Approx. 500 km district Approx. 800 km Approx. 2,500 km Notes: 1. It is presumed that the possible 1st stage propelling device exploded into numerous pieces and fell after detachment from the main rocket body including the upper stages. 2. It is assessed that the object does not function as a satellite. Tongch’ang-ri district Possible interstage section Expected Falling Area between 1st and 2nd stages Possible fairing Expected Falling Area Object including possible 3rd stage propelling device Possible 2nd stage propelling device It is estimated that North Korea put an object* into orbit with an inclination of approx. 97.5 degrees. Expected Falling Area - It is assessed that the object does not function as a satellite. ----- **y** **North Korea’s Launch of a Ballistic Missile which was Disguised as a “Satellite”** **Column** **on February 7, 2016** On February 2, 2016, North Korea, intending to launch an “earth observation satellite” between February 8 and 25, set its expected falling areas and informed international organizations. Then, on February 6, North Korea notifi ed the organizations that it changed the timeframe of the launch to between February 7 and 14. On the following day, February 7, at approximately 9:30 am, North Korea launched a ballistic missile in the southern direction from the Tongch’ang-ri district on the northwestern coast. It is assessed that the trajectory of this missile was almost the same as the launch in December 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “the previous launch” in this column) despite some differences such as the falling areas. In addition, it is presumed that through this launch North Korea put an object into orbit around the Earth. However, it is not assessed that this object actually functions as an artifi cial satellite. (→ For the detailed fl ight pattern, see Fig. I-2-2-3.) Launching ballistic missiles and Satellite Launching Vehicles (SLVs) require the same technologies such as those for control of large-size propelling devices, separation of multi-stage propelling devices, and attitude and guidance control. Therefore, it is assessed that North Korea was able to demonstrate the technical challenges that have to be met for improving its ballistic missile capabilities through this launch following the previous launch. With regard to the shape and the type of the ballistic missile launched by North Korea, considering the status of its ballistic missile development, the exterior appearance of the ballistic missile unveiled this time by North Korea, and the trajectory in this launch, it is judged that what North Korea launched this time was a three-stage Taepodong-2 variant that seemed to be a similar type of ballistic missile used in the previous launch. Should the Taepodong-2 variant be actually used for its purpose as a ballistic missile, its range could extend to over 10,000 km assuming a warhead weight of approximately 1 ton or less. It is assessed that North Korea has improved the reliability of its ballistic missile-related technology in this launch, based on the following facts: (1) North Korea launched a similar type of multi-stage ballistic missile that was launched in the previous launch; (2) the missile fl ew in almost the same way as that in the previous launch; and (3) an object including the possible third stage propelling device continued fl ight after separation while changing trajectory and put an object into orbit around the Earth in a similar way seen in the previous launch. It is also estimated that the possible fi rst stage propelling device was divided into pieces after separation from the upper stage devices. North Korea may intentionally have broken the device in order to prevent others from collecting it because the Republic of Korea (ROK) collected and analyzed the possible fi rst stage propelling device that fell without signifi cant damage into the sea in the previous launch. Taking serious note of North Korea’s activities to develop ballistic missiles, Japan will seek to collect and analyze related information and take all possible measures to protect Japan’s peace and security, cooperating with the whole international community including the United States, the ROK, and other liked-minded countries. North Korea announced that it once again conducted a successful test launch of an SLBM.[54] If the images and footage released by North Korea are accurate, North Korea could have succeeded in using the “cold launch system” in which a missile is ignited after it is ejected into the air. Based on observations such as the shape of the fl ame coming out of the missile and the color of the smoke, it has been suggested that solid fuel may have been used for the launch in April 2016.[55] In July 2016, North Korea again launched a ballistic missile presumed to be an SLBM from the coast of Sinpo. In this regard, continued attention needs to be paid to related developments. It is deemed that through developing SLBM, North Korea intends to diversify its ballistic missile attack capabilities and improve survivability. See>> Fig. I-2-2-2 (Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles) i. Trends in and Outlook of Ballistic Missile Development North Korea has made rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches. It is believed that an underlying factor was North Korea’s imports of various materials and technologies from outside of the country. It is also noted that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missile airframes and related technologies, and that it promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation.[56] It is further pointed out that 54 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that on April 23, 2016 at around 6:30 pm, North Korea launched a missile presumed to be an SLBM from the Sea of Japan northeast of Sinpo, and that the missile is believed to have fl own approximately 30 km. The U.S. Strategic Command also announced that on the same day at 6:29 pm JST, it detected and tracked the launch of an SLBM by North Korea from the Sea of Japan. 55 It is suggested that North Korea’s SLBM is an improved version of the liquid-fueled SLBM “SS-N-6” made in the former Soviet Union. 56 For example, because Nodong is similar in shape to Shahab-3 of Iran and Gauri of Pakistan, analysts point out that Nodong airframes or related technologies may have been transferred. In addition, concerning the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles by North Korea, the “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence of January 2014 pointed out that “North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate the reach of the its proliferation activities.” Moreover, in the report entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” which was published by the U.S. DoD in March 2014, it was pointed out that North Korea uses various techniques to circumvent measures taken by each country on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including sending cargo through multiple front companies ----- North Korea conducts tests at transfer destinations and uses the results. Moreover, because a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile contributes to improving the performance of other shorter-range ballistic missiles and its related technologies could be applied to other new intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles being developed by North Korea, the launch of long-range ballistic missiles such as Taepodong-2, including the launches in December 2012 and February 2016, will likely further advance North Korea’s entire ballistic missile development. North Korea continues to claim that it would keep conducting “satellite launches” and would develop and launch more capable satellite launch vehicles. It is highly possible that North Korea will further develop its longrange ballistic missiles by repeating similar launches under the name of “satellite” launches to carry out further technical tests to bring its long-range ballistic missiles to the stage of practical use. It has been suggested that North Korea is carrying out modification for upsizing its launch tower in Tongch’ang-ri district.[57] While the missile launched in February 2016 was similar in size as the Taepodong-2 variant launched in December 2012, North Korea could launch larger long-range ballistic missiles in the future. Should North Korea make further progress in its longer-range ballistic missile capability and simultaneously achieve the miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquired nuclear warheads and so on, North Korea may come to have a one-sided understanding that it secured strategic deterrence against the United States. Should North Korea have a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, this could lead to increases in and the escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan. North Korea is presumed to have attempted its first Musudan launch in April 2016, and demonstrated its certain capability as an IRBM in the June 2016 launch. In March 2016, North Korea disclosed the implementation of ballistic missile re-entry environmental simulations, a ground test of a jet of a high-power solid fuel missile engine, and a ground jet test of a new-type high-power engine of ICBM. North Korea has shown readiness to acquire technologies to make practical use of new intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles and make them more sophisticated, presenting serious concerns for Japan and other relevant countries. Additionally, North Korea has intensified not only its research and development of ballistic missiles, but also activities intended to increase their operational capabilities. KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un has repeatedly instructed military units to conduct realistic military training that does away with formalistic practices. In the case of the ballistic missile launches since 2014, multiple ballistic missiles were launched using TEL in the early morning and late evening hours from locations which had never been used in the past. The launches revealed that North Korea has the capacity to launch ballistic missiles from locations and at timings as it chooses. The improvements in the operational capabilities of North Korea’s ballistic missile units, including surprise attack capabilities, demonstrate that the North Korean ballistic missile threat is increasing further. In this light, coupled with its nuclear issue, North Korea’s ballistic missile issue has become more realistic and imminent for the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan, and for the international community from the perspective of both the improvement of the capability and transfer and proliferation, and such developments are profoundly worrisome. See>> Fig. I-2-2-3 (Launch of a Ballistic Missile which North Korea Disguised as a “Satellite” on February 7, 2016) - 4 Domestic Affairs **(1) Developments Related to the Kim Jong-un Regime** After the demise of Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il in 2011, Kim Jong-un became the de facto head of the military, party, and the “state” by assuming the position of Supreme Commander of the KPA, First Secretary of the KWP, and First Chairman of the National Defense Commission by April 2012. The framework of the Kim Jong-un regime was laid out in a short period of time. Since the transition to the new regime, there has been a number of announcements of party-related meetings and decisions, and in May 2016, the Seventh KWP Congress was held for the first time since the last Congress in October 1980, 36 years earlier. These developments suggest that the “state” is run under the leadership of the party. Meanwhile, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un underscores the importance of military strength and makes frequent visits to military organizations. In this light, the Chairman is anticipated to continue to attach importance to military strength. 57 Articles dated October 1 and July 29, 2014 published on the website (38North) of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University in the United States point out that analyses of satellite images of the Tongch’ang-ri district show that the launch tower was raised to 55 m, enabling launches of rockets up to 50 m in height, larger than the Taepodong-2 variant (total height approx. 30 m) which was used in ----- Following the change in regime, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un has conducted frequent personnel reshuffles, including reshuffles of the top three military posts of the Director of the General Political Bureau, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. In turn, individuals whom Chairman Kim Jong-un selected were assigned to the key party, military, and cabinet posts. In addition, in December 2013, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission and Chairman Kim Jong-un’s uncle, was executed for “plotting to overthrow the state.” It is believed that through such measures, the Chairman endeavors to strengthen and consolidate a monolithic leadership system.[58] In 2014, the North Korean media stopped reporting the activities of Kim Kyong-hui, Secretary of the KWP and Kim Jong-un’s aunt. Meanwhile, the North Korean media began to report the activities of Chairman Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo-jong, as a senior member of the KWP.[59] These developments suggest that a generational change in the leadership may be taking place among the Kim dynasty. At the KWP Congress held in May 2016, Kim Jongun was named to the new post of KWP Chairman. In his report on the work of the KWP Central Committee, the Chairman set out that North Korea was a “nuclear weapons state,” and said the country would consistently uphold the “new strategic line” policy of economic development and the building of nuclear force as well as further boost its self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity. In this manner, the Chairman demonstrated, both to those in and outside of the country, North Korea’s readiness to continue with its nuclear and missile development. Prior to the Congress, North Korea conducted provocations at unprecedented frequency and content, including the launch of ballistic missiles. The holding of the KWP Congress may be an indication that North Korea has shifted into high gear by establishing the “state”-run governance system centered on the party and led by KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un, in terms of its organization, personnel, among other dimensions, both in name and in substance.[60] At the Supreme People’s Assembly convened in June 2016, it was decided that the National Defense Commission would be turned into the State Affairs Commission, and KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un was named Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, the new “highest position” of the “state” replacing First Chairman of the National Defense Commission. These changes are likely also manifestations of the governance system moving into full swing. However, with senior officials unable to dispute the decisions of KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un due to an atrophy effect created by the frequent executions, demotions, and dismissals of senior officials, combined with the alleged appointment of hardliner Kim Yongchol, Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, to replace Kim Yang-gon, Director of United Front Department in charge of ROK policy who died of a car accident in December 2015, there is likely growing uncertainty, including over the possibility of North Korea turning to military provocations without making adequate diplomatic considerations. In addition to this, it has been suggested that there is declining social control caused by widening wealth disparities and information coming in from other countries. In this regard, attention will be paid to the stability of the regime. **(2) Economic Conditions** In the economic domain, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialist planned economy and diminishing economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. Especially for food, it is deemed that North Korea is still forced to rely on food assistance from overseas.[61] Following North Korea’s various provocations including the nuclear test in January 2016 and launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016, the ROK decided to 58 Following the execution of Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, the North Korean media repeatedly calls for the strengthening of the “monolithic leadership system” and “single-minded unity.” For example, an editorial in the Rodong Shinmun dated January 10, 2014 urged the people to stay cautious even of trivial phenomena and elements which erode North Korea’s singleminded unity. In May 2015, it was suggested that Hyon Yong-chol, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, may have been executed on charges of treason. The ROK National Intelligence Service reportedly briefed the National Assembly that the Minister was executed in late April 2015. In July 2015, the North Korean media introduced Pak Yong-sik, previous Deputy Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army, with the title, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces. Additionally, since February 21, 2016, the North Korean media has introduced Ri Myong-su, previous Minister of People’s Security, as Chief of General Staff Department instead of Ri Yong-gil. Ri Yong-gil was announced as an alternate member of the KWP Politburo at the KWP Congress in May 2016. 59 According to the Korean Central Broadcasting Station, Kim Yo-jong was elected a member of the KWP Central Committee at the KWP Congress held in May 2016. The media has also shown her supporting KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un on the podium during the celebration parade following the KWP Congress. 60 Elections for members and alternate members of the KWP central leadership agencies (e.g., KWP Central Committee and KWP Politburo) were held during the KWP Congress. Pak Pong-ju, Premier, and Choe Ryong-hae, KWP Secretary, were newly elected as KWP Politburo Standing Committee members to form a five-member Standing Committee including: Kim Jong-un, KWP Chairman; Kim Yong-nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; and Hwang Pyong-so, Director of the General Political Bureau. All five members of the KWP Politburo Standing Committee are not genuine military personnel. Furthermore, the ranks of military personnel have fallen within the KWP Politburo, and Premier Pak Pong-ju has been added as a member of the KWP Central Military Commission. It is pointed out that these aspects show that a KWP-led governance system is shifting into high gear. 61 In April 2016, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) forecasted North Korea’s total production of principal foods to have been 5.40 million tons and estimated the necessary imported amount of grains to have been 0.694 million tons between November 2015 and October 2016. North Korea’s total food production fell for the first time since 2010 due to water scarcity and the ----- completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which makes up over 99% of inter-Korean trade, and furthermore, countries including Japan and the United States have strengthened their sanctions. Along with these measures, if China, North Korea’s largest trading partner,[62] and other relevant countries rigorously implement the sanctions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270 adopted in March 2016, an even more severe economic situation could beset North Korea. To tackle a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has made attempts at limited improvement measures and some changes to its economic management systems,[63] and promotes the establishment of economic development zones[64] and the enlargement of the discretion of plants and other entities over production and sales plans.[65] At the Seventh KWP Congress held in May 2016, the report on the work of the KWP Central Committee referred to the delays in the economic sector and identified the country’s economic revitalization and raising the people’s standard of living as the most important tasks. These all suggest North Korea is placing importance on the rebuilding of the economy. Nonetheless, North Korea is unlikely to carry out any structural reforms that could lead to the destabilization of its current ruling system, and thus, various challenges confront the fundamental improvement of its current economic situation. - 5 Relations with Other Countries resuming the Six-Party Talks. In response, North Korea has criticized the United States, claiming that its “hostile policy” towards North Korea and lack of trust between them stand in the way of the peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and asserts that the conclusion of a U.S.-North Korea peace agreement is necessary to build a relationship of trust.[66] As such, a significant gap has been observed between the two parties’ stances. Since the adoption of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087 in January 2013, North Korea, claiming that the “hostile policy” of the United States has entered a dangerous state, has contended that there can be no denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula before the denuclearization of the world. In this context, it has asserted that there would be no more talks for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, while leaving room for dialogue for ensuring peace and security in the region. The divide between the two parties’ positions has yet to be bridged. In June 2013, North Korea, in the form of an important statement by the spokesperson of the National Defense Commission, proposed to hold U.S.-North Korea senior-level talks. However, the United States has remained firm on its stance that North Korea must first take concrete steps to show it is headed towards denuclearization, and the talks have not materialized. North Korea has reacted sharply to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise, alleging that such activities were a manifestation of the U.S. “hostile policy” towards North Korea. In this regard, North Korea has repeatedly voiced strong criticisms against the United States and conducted military provocations such as ballistic missile launches.[67] When the U.S.-ROK combined exercise was carried out from March to April 2016, North Korea reiterated its hardline arguments, stating that its target of attack included the bases of the U.S. Forces in the Asia-Pacific region and the U.S. mainland. **(1) Relations with the United States** The United States has shown that its stance is to take steps to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. The United States consistently makes its position clear that North Korea needs to comply with the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and take specific measures to improve North-South relations before 62 Trade between China and North Korea accounted for around 64% of North Korea’s total trade in 2015. 63 For example, North Korea conducted a so-called currency revaluation (decreasing the denomination of its currency) at the end of 2009. The currency revaluation is said to have led to economic disorder, such as price escalation due to shortfall of supply, which in turn increased social unrest. 64 During the plenary meeting of the KWP Central Committee on March 31, 2013, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un instructed the establishment of economic development zones in each province. Pursuant to these instructions, the Economic Development Zone Law was enacted in May of that year. In November 2013, the establishment of 1 special economic zone and 13 economic development zones was announced. In January 2015, it was reported that development plans for 13 economic development zones were established. 65 While the details of the policy are not necessarily clear, it is understood that in the industrial sector, entities would be able to independently make production decisions and conduct sales outside the scope of the national plan, as well as determine employee remuneration and benefits based on the situation of the entities. In the agriculture sector, an autonomous business system would be introduced at the household level. It has been said that 1,000 pyeong (1 pyeong = approx. 3.3 m2) of land would be allocated per person, with 40% of the agricultural products going to the state and 60% going to individuals. 66 For example, during the 20th Ministerial Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) held on July 2, 2013, Pak Ui-chun, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea, delivered an address, stating, “The United States drop of its hostile policy should start from the conclusion of a peace treaty between the United States and the DPRK on the basis of the respect for the latter’s sovereignty and halt to all sanctions and military provocations against it.” 67 On the occasion of the U.S.-ROK combined exercise carried out from March to April 2013, coupled with the protests against U.N. Security Council resolutions, North Korea repeatedly made hardline arguments including nullification of the Korean War Armistice Agreement and suggestion of preemptive nuclear attack on the United States. During the U.S.-ROK combined exercise from February to April 2014, North Korea launched ballistic missiles and fired several rounds from multiple rocket launchers while criticizing the United States. On the occasion of the U.S.-ROK combined exercise held from March to April 2015, i ----- **(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea** Relations between the ROK and North Korea worsened under the administration of President Lee Myung-bak, spurred by the outbreak of incidents that heightened North-South military tensions, including the sinking of an ROK patrol vessel in March 2010[68] and the shelling incident of Yeonpyeong Island in November of the same year.[69] Even after the administration of President Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013, North Korea lodged protests against the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2087 in January 2013 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 in March 2013, as well as to the U.S.-ROK combined exercise conducted in March to April. North Korea adopted a hardline rhetoric, including abrogation of all agreements on North-South nonaggression.[70] Following the U.S.-ROK combined exercise that was conducted until the end of April 2013, North Korea gradually softened its provocative rhetoric and behavior against the ROK. By August, North Korea agreed to the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex[71] which had de facto suspended its operations. In addition, North Korea has held dialogues with the ROK, including the North-South separated family reunion meeting which was held for the first time in three years and four months in February 2014. However, when the U.S.-ROK combined exercise commenced at the end of February 2014, North Korea engaged in military provocations, including intrusion into the ROK’s airspace using small drones[72] and a large-scale maritime live-fire drill in an area near the northwest islands of the ROK covering Baengnyeong Island and Yeonpyeong Island.[73] In August 2015, landmines exploded in the ROK’s area of the DMZ, causing serious injuries to two ROK Force personnel. This incident deeply stirred tensions between the ROK and North Korea, with the ROK resuming loudspeaker broadcasts targeting the North for the first time in approximately 11 years and the shelling incident between the two sides. However, as a result of the talks between their senior officials, the two sides agreed on a joint press release that included the suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts.[74] In October 2015, a reunion of separated families was held, and tension temporarily subsided. Nonetheless, no concrete agreement was announced following the vice-ministeriallevel talks for improving relations. Moreover, after North Korea conducted a nuclear test in January 2016 and went ahead with the launch of a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016, the ROK took measures such as resuming loudspeaker broadcasts targeting North Korea, deciding to begin formal talks between the ROK and the United States regarding the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) by U.S. Forces Korea,[75] and deciding to completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. In response, North Korea declared the Kaesong Industrial Complex a military control zone, and announced that it would expel all ROK nationals from the zone and freeze their assets. When a U.S.-ROK combined exercise was carried out from March to April 2016, North Korea repeated provocative rhetoric and behavior, noting that the first target of attack would be the ROK Blue House, resulting in heightened tensions between the ROK and North Korea. Since the Seventh KWP Congress in May 2016, North Korea has proposed to the ROK to hold dialogue between their military authorities. However, the ROK has maintained that it would not agree to dialogue unless North Korea demonstrates its intention to denuclearize with actions. 68 On March 26, 2010, the ROK’s naval corvette Cheonan sank near the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea. In May 2010, a joint military-civilian survey group comprising experts from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden released survey results indicating that the ROK naval ship had split and sank as a result of a shock wave and bubble effect created by the underwater blast of a torpedo fired by a small North Korean submarine. 69 On November 23, 2010, North Korea bombarded Yeonpyeong Island as the ROK military engaged in firing exercises off the coast of the island facing the Yellow Sea, causing deaths and injuries on the ROK side including civilians. 70 In January 2013, North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea issued a statement saying that if the South “takes direct part in the U.N. ‘sanctions,’ the DPRK will take strong physical countermeasures against it.” Furthermore, in February of the same year, the Rodong Shinmun published an editorial saying, “(if ROK tightens sanctions as a countermeasure against the nuclear test, it) will not be able to avoid deadly retaliation.” 71 In April 2013, North Korea prohibited ROK nationals from entering the Kaesong Industrial Complex (located in the city of Kaesong in southwest North Korea, close to the military demarcation line with the ROK; many ROK companies operate businesses by employing North Korean workers), which commenced operations in 2004 as a North-South economic cooperation project; subsequently, North Korea withdrew all North Korean workers and announced the temporary suspension of the project. In May 2013, all personnel from the ROK also withdrew from the Complex. 72 On March 24, March 31, and April 6, 2014, crashed drones were discovered in Paju, Baengnyeong Island, and Samcheok, respectively. In May of the same year, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that a scientific study confirmed that the drones originated from North Korea and that the flights were clear military provocations in violation of the armistice agreement and North-South non-aggression agreement. North Korea criticized the ROK for fabricating the incidents, and asserts that the facts should be uncovered through a ROK-North Korea joint study. 73 According to an announcement by the ROK Ministry of National Defense, on March 31, 2014, North Korea fired roughly 500 rounds using its multiple rocket launchers and other systems, of which about 100 landed in the ROK’s sea area south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL). The ROK government issued an evacuation order to people living near Baengnyeong Island and other areas, and returned fire with about 300 rounds. No damages in the ROK were reported. 74 On August 25, 2015, the South and the North agreed on a joint press release consisting of six items. The North “expressed regret over the injuries of the soldiers of the South caused by the recent landmine explosions.” The South agreed that “as long as no abnormal incident occurs...[it would] suspend all loudspeaker broadcasts.” Additionally, the two sides agreed to arrange reunions of separated families and to hold meetings among authorities to improve inter-Korean relations. 75 A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes outside of the ----- **(3) Relations with China** The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force.[76] Currently, China is North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2015, trade volume between China and North Korea was very high, accounting for approximately 64% of North Korea’s total trade,[77] leading observers to point to North Korea’s dependence on China. Meanwhile, with regard to the situation in North Korea and its nuclear issue, China has expressed support for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. In addition, China endorsed U.N. Security Council Resolutions 2087 and 2094. Following the adoption of the two resolutions, China issued notices in February and April 2013, stating that China would thoroughly enforce the embargo of items set forth in both resolutions. When North Korea conducted a nuclear test in January 2016 and launched a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016, China initially expressed concerns towards excessive sanctions, saying a destabilization on the Korean Peninsula must be avoided. Nevertheless, China ultimately endorsed U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270 which included a significant strengthening of sanctions against North Korea. China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on the country. However, North Korea does not necessarily adopt actions which are in line with the position of China over nuclear and ballistic missile issues. Furthermore, Jang Song-thaek, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, who played a key role in economic cooperation with China was executed. Given such circumstances, North Korea-China relations and China’s influence on North Korea will continue to be followed. Since 2014, a possible cooling of North KoreaChina relations in the political and diplomatic domains has been noted, with mutual visits by senior officials becoming less frequent and President Xi Jinping paying a state visit to the ROK without visiting North Korea. Developments that hinted to the improvement of North Korea-China relations were observed temporarily. For example, Choe Ryong-hae, KWP Secretary, visited China for the “commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression” in September 2015. In October 2015, China’s Liu Yunshan, Politburo Standing Committee member, visited North Korea for the commemorative event of the 70th anniversary of the KWP. During his meeting with Liu Yunshan, KWP Chairman Kim Jong-un stated that North KoreaChina relations were strategic relations forged by blood and that the bilateral relationship would be further strengthened and developed. Nevertheless, North Korea went ahead with a nuclear test in January 2016 despite China’s request for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. In February 2016, North Korea launched a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” immediately after Wu Dawei, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, visited North Korea. In this light, it is possible that North Korea-China relations are cooling once again. In June 2016, KWP Deputy Chairman Ri Su-yong visited China and held talks with President Xi Jinping. However, whereas North Korea requested China’s understanding of the “new strategic line” policy, China urged self-restraint and dialogue. It is believed that a significant difference in view still remains between China and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear development. **(4) Relations with Russia** While North Korea and Russia became estranged with the end of the Cold War, they signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in 2000.[78] In August 2011, Kim Jong-il, then Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia. A Russia-North Korea summit was held for the first time in nine years, and the two sides agreed to cooperate on a gas-pipeline project, among other matters. In September 2012, after the transition to the Kim Jong-un regime, the two countries signed an agreement that wrote off 90% of the debt owed to Russia by North Korea, and in such ways, friendly relations have been maintained between the two countries. Furthermore, in September 2013, a railway opened for service connecting Khasan, a coastal area in the Russian Far East, and Rajin Port in northeastern North Korea. Since 2014, North Korea has further intensified its diplomacy with Russia, as 76 It includes a provision that if either of the signatories (China and North Korea) is attacked and enters into a state of war, the other would make every effort to immediately provide military and other assistance. 77 North Korea’s total trade here was calculated by summing North Korea’s total foreign trade excluding trade with the ROK released by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, and trade between North Korea and the ROK released by the Ministry of Unification of the ROK. 78 The previous treaty (Soviet-North Korea Friendship and Mutual Assistance Treaty) contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide ----- exemplified by the mutual visits of many senior officials as well as advances in economic cooperation.[79] Concerning North Korea’s nuclear issue, Russia, along with China, has expressed support for the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. After the nuclear test conducted by North Korea in February 2013, Russia issued a statement that condemned the test but opposed sanctions that could have implications on normal trade and economic relations with North Korea. When North Korea conducted a nuclear test in January 2016 and launched a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” in February 2016, Russia condemned North Korea for violating U.N. Security Council resolutions, while maintaing a cautious stance towards rigorous sanctions, saying that an economic collapse in North Korea should be avoided. Ultimately it agreed to the resolution by way of limiting the impact on Russia. **(5) Relations with Other Countries** Since 1999, North Korea has made efforts to establish relations with a series of West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with European countries[80] and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings. Meanwhile, it has been reported that North Korea has cooperative relationships with countries such as Iran, Syria, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Cuba in military affairs including arms trade and military technology transfer. In April 2013, North Korea’s attempt to export gas masks and other items to Syria was intercepted by Turkish authorities. In July of the same year, the North Korean vessel Chong Chon Gang sailing from Cuba to North Korea was seized by Panamanian authorities near the Panama Canal. As a result, contents of cargo that violated U.N. Security Council resolutions were confiscated, including MiG-21 fighters and a surface-to-air missile system. In recent years, North Korea is deemed to be strengthening its relations with African countries, with North Korean senior officials paying visits to African countries.[81] The underlying purposes for enhancing relations with these countries include the usual objective of deepening political and economic cooperation. In addition, it appears that North Korea hopes to acquire foreign currency by expanding its arms trade and military cooperation with African countries – activities which are becoming increasingly difficult due to sanctions based on U.N. Security Council resolutions and political turmoil in the Middle East.[82] The possibility that North Korea’s illegal activities would provide a funding source for nuclear and ballistic missile development is a cause for concern. 79 For example, in February 2014, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam visited Russia. In March 2014, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East Alexander Galushka visited North Korea, and the two sides signed minutes of talks (protocol) on cooperation in trade, economy, and science and technology. In April 2014, Deputy Prime Minister Yury Trutnev visited North Korea, and the two sides signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Trade of North Korea and the government of the Amur Oblast of the Russian Federation. In May 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed a law which ratified an agreement to write off North Korea’s debts. In September 2014, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Su-yong visited Russia. In November 2014, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Hyon Yong-chol and Secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party Choe Ryong-hae visited Russia. In 2015, Minister of Foreign Affairs Ri Su-yong and Minister of Foreign Trade Ri Ryong-nam visited Russia between February and March. In April 2015, Minister of the People’s Armed Forces Hyon Yong-chol visited Russia. In June 2015, Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly Choe Thae-bok visited Russia. In April and October 2015, Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East Galushka visited North Korea. Mutual visits by senior officials continue to be conducted frequently. 80 For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively. 81 For example, in May 2016, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam attended the inauguration ceremony of the President of Equatorial Guinea. He held talks with the President, as well as with the leaders of the Republic of Chad, the Gabonese Republic, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the Republic of Guinea, and the Republic of Mali who were attending the inauguration ceremony. 82 The final report of the U.N. Security Council’s Panel of Experts assisting the North Korea Sanctions Committee released in February 2015 makes references to possible transactions with an Ethiopian ammunition ----- **2 The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea** - 1 General Situation In 2005, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced the “National Defense Reform Basic Plan 2006-2020” for “the restructuring of the military from its current quantitative, conventional form centered on troops to a qualitative, high-tech military force structure that is information and technology intensive.”[84] In 2009, in light of the changes in the situation, such as the missile launches and nuclear test by North Korea, the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2009-2020 was announced. The Basic Plan identifi ed, among other measures, the scaling down of the initially planned reduction in the force strength and the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities. Meanwhile, in response to the sinking of the ROK patrol ship and the artillery shelling on Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, in August 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense released the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2012-2030, incorporating the enhancement of deterrence against North Korea and further streamlining of the military.[85] In March 2014, the Park Geun-hye administration unveiled the Defense Reform Basic Plan 2014-2030, which envisions longterm defense force enhancements for dealing with potential threats following the unifi cation on the Korean Peninsula, while maintaining a readiness posture against North Korean threats.[86] - 3 Military Posture of the ROK In the ROK, the administration of Park Geun-hye was inaugurated in February 2013. The Park administration maintains that forging trust through dialogue is most critical for improving the North-South relations. With regard to the nuclear issue, the administration sets out that North Korea’s nuclear development can never be tolerated and that the ROK would address this issue in concert with the international community. In August 2013, the ROK unveiled a policy called the “TrustBuilding Process on the Korean Peninsula,” which aims to realize denuclearization by building trust through efforts, including humanitarian initiatives and NorthSouth exchanges. The ROK states that it would make a decisive response to military provocations by North Korea and emphasizes the importance of building a solid posture to deter and address the threat of North Korea. The U.S. Forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefi re of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. Forces Korea have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed confl icts on the Korean Peninsula. - 2 Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK The ROK has a defensive weakness, namely, its capital Seoul, which has a population of approximately 10 million, is situated close to the DMZ. The ROK has set the National Defense Objective as follows: “to protect the country from external military threats and invasions, to support peaceful unifi cation, and to contribute to regional stability and world peace.” As one of the “external military threats,” the ROK, in its Defense White Paper, used to designate North Korea as the “main enemy.” However, the ROK presently uses the expression, “the North Korean regime and its armed forces…will remain as our enemies.”[83] The ROK’s military capacity is as follows. The ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and 2 marine divisions, totaling 520,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of 240 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 211,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) consist of approximately 620 combat aircraft. In recent years, the ROK has been focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to establish an omnidirectional defense posture to deal with future potential threats, not least threats from North Korea. The Navy has been introducing 83 The ROK’s Defense White Paper 2014 describes North Korea as follows: “North Korea poses a serious threat to our security by developing and increasing its large-scale conventional arsenal, nuclear program, missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, and by continually perpetrating acts of armed provocation such as the attack on the ROK Ship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo Island. As long as these threats persist, the North Korean regime and its armed forces, which are the entities who pose these threats, will remain as our enemies.” 84 An act on national defense passed in 2006 obliges the revision and supplementation of the National Defense Reform Basic Plan based on an analysis and assessment of the changes in conditions and the performance of national defense reform. 85 In order to reorganize the ROK Forces into a structure tailored to the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK Ministry of National Defense intends to greatly enhance its operational capability in the northwestern offshore island region, reorganize the upper command structure in preparation for the transition of the wartime OPCON, gradually promote troop reduction and reorganization, and signifi cantly expand capabilities to handle missile and cyber warfare. Moreover, in order to build a highly effi cient and advanced defense structure, it will promote streamlining, reorganize the human resource management system, and improve the military’s welfare and service environment. 86 In order to secure capabilities for responding to existing and potential threats, the ROK Ministry of National Defense plans to install three additional Aegis destroyers, develop and install next-generation ----- submarines, large transport ships, and domestically built destroyers. In February 2010, the first mobile force in the ROK was created.[87] In February 2015, a submarine command was created. In April 2012, the Air Force completed the introduction of F-15K fighters which had been implemented since 2002. The Air Force is currently promoting a program for the installation of the F-35A as a next-generation fighter with stealth property. In October 2012, the ROK government announced a revision of its missile guidelines stipulating the range of ballistic missiles it possesses; the revision includes the extension of their maximum range from 300 km to 800 km to enhance the deterrence against military provocation by North Korea. In addition, to address North Korean nuclear and missile threats, the ROK intends to expand the missile capabilities of the ROK Forces,[88] establish a system known as “Kill Chain” to conduct swift preemptive strikes using missiles and other assets,[89] and develop an indigenous missile defense system (Korea Air and Missile Defense [KAMD]).[90] In recent years, the ROK has actively promoted equipment export, which reached approximately US$3.6 billion on a contract value basis in 2014. Since 2006, the amount has increased by nearly 14-fold in eight years. It is reported that export items have diversified to include communication electronics, aircraft, and naval vessels.[91] Defense spending in FY2016 (regular budget) increased by about 3.6% from the previous fiscal year to nearly KRW 38.7995 trillion, marking the 17th consecutive year of increases since 2000. See>> Fig. I-2-2-4 (Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget) - 4 U.S.-ROK Alliance and U.S. Forces Korea Fig. I-2-2-4 Changes in the ROK’s Defense Budget Defense budget (in 100 million won) Year-on-year growth rate (%) (100 million won) (%) 400,000 20 350,000 300,000 15 250,000 200,000 10 150,000 100,000 5 50,000 0 0 11 12 13 14 15 16 (FY) Notes: 1. ROK Defense White Paper 2014 for FY2011 to FY2015. 2. The Ministry of National Defense website for FY2016. includes reference to building “a comprehensive strategic alliance,” which would expand the scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance from the Korean Peninsula to global and would widen the partnership of the two countries to encompass non-military areas. Furthermore, at the 42nd U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2010, a joint communiqué was released, which included the Guidelines for U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation for realizing the future vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance. At the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in May 2013, the two sides, in a joint declaration commemorating the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, affirmed to continue to strengthen their alliance in order to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. Through such measures, the two countries have striven to deepen their relations. In addition to agreements at the political and strategic levels, in March 2013, the two countries signed the ROK-U.S. Counter-Provocation Plan for dealing with North Korea’s provocations.[92] At the 45th SCM in October 2013, the two countries approved the Tailored Deterrence Strategy designed to enhance deterrence against North Korean nuclear and The United States and the ROK have taken various steps to deepen the U.S.-ROK alliance in recent years. At the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in June 2009, the two sides agreed on the Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. The vision 87 The primary missions of the Seventh Mobile Corps, which is the first mobile force established in the ROK, are described as the protection of sea lanes, deterrence against North Korea, and support for the government’s external policies. 88 In April 2012, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that the country has developed and already fielded missiles that include cruise missiles able to strike throughout North Korea. In February 2013, the ministry indicated that it would accelerate the development of 800 km-range ballistic missiles, possession of which was made possible by the revision of the missile guidelines in October 2012, and announced that it has fielded cruise missiles to be launched from vessels or submarines and capable of attacking the entire area of North Korea. Also in October, during an event commemorating the 65th anniversary of the founding of the armed forces, the ROK Forces displayed to the public for the first time the “Hyeonmu 2” ballistic missile, which is said to have a 300 km range, and the “Hyeonmu 3” surfaceto-surface cruise missile, which is said to have a 1,000 km range. In April 2014, the ROK conducted a successful test launch of a new ballistic missile with a range of 500 km. 89 The ROK Ministry of National Defense explains that the system is capable of detecting and identifying signs of missile launch, determining attack, and actual attacking instantaneously. It is noted that the system is comprised of ISR capabilities (reconnaissance drone and satellite), striking capabilities (F-35 fighter, air-to-surface missile, and new ballistic missile, etc.), and intercept capabilities (current PAC-2, as well as PAC-3 and indigenously built anti-air missile). 90 The ROK intends to develop the Kill Chain and KAMD systems by the mid-2020s. Meanwhile, the ROK Ministry of National Defense has denied participation in the U.S. missile defense system, and has underscored that the ROK was creating its own indigenous systems. The reported reasons include differences in threat perceptions between the United States and the ROK, concern over Chinese backlash, and cost effectiveness. 91 As for recent examples, in 2012, the ROK concluded an agreement to export three Type 209 submarines to Indonesia as well as an agreement to export four of the new Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) vessels to the United Kingdom. In 2014, the ROK concluded an agreement to export 12 FA-50 light attack aircraft to the Philippines. 92 The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff has announced that the plan contains consultative procedures as well as robust and thorough response methodologies for the United States and the ROK to take joint responses ----- have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when the ROK Forces meet conditions such as enhanced capabilities. Although this new approach does not present a specific deadline for the transition, the transition of OPCON could be delayed considerably given that the central challenges to enhancing the capabilities of the ROK Forces are deemed to be Kill Chain and KAMD, and that these systems have mid-2020s as the target completion date. Moreover, in June 2015, the ROK-U.S. Combined Division was formally launched. The Commanding General of the 2nd Infantry Division of the U.S. Forces concurrently serves as Commanding General of the ROK-U.S. Combined Division. In peacetime, they hold joint exercises, while in wartime, units of the U.S. Forces and the ROK Forces jointly carry out operations. With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea,[96] an agreement had been reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. However, the relocation to the Pyeontaek area had been delayed due to logistical reasons, including increases in relocation costs. The decision to postpone the transition of OPCON that was made at the 46th SCM has in turn necessitated some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison. In addition, the two countries decided that the counter-fires forces of the U.S. Forces Korea would remain in their location north of the Han River to counter the threat of North Korea’s long-range rocket artillery. These decisions have given rise to new factors that force the two countries to partially revise the plans. Accordingly, while the plans In response to North Korea’s nuclear test, a U.S. Air Force B-52 conducts a low-level flight in the vicinity of Osan, ROK with a ROK Air Force F-15K and a U.S. Air Force F-16 [Photo courtesy of the U.S. Air Force] other WMD threats.[93] At the 46th SCM in October 2014, the two countries agreed on “Concepts and Principles of ROK-U.S. Alliance Comprehensive Counter-missile Operations (4D Operational Concept)” to tackle North Korean ballistic missile threats. At the 47th SCM in November 2015, the implementation guidance on the 4D Operational Concept was approved.[94] Additionally, after North Korea went ahead with its nuclear test in January 2016, in February 2016 the United States and the ROK began formal talks regarding deployment of THAAD to U.S. Forces Korea, and in July 2016 the deployment was officially decided. In the U.S.-ROK combined exercise held from March to April 2016, around 290,000 ROK Forces personnel and around 17,000 U.S. Forces personnel participated, and a record number of troops and equipment were mobilized, including a carrier strike group for the first time since 2009. At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal with such issues as the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. Despite these efforts, however, the two countries are pressed to revise their plans. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK,[95] the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries 93 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 45th ROK-U.S. SCM, this strategy establishes a strategic framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the partnership between the United States and the ROK to maximize their deterrent effects. However, the details have not been made public. 94 According to the Joint Communiqué of the 46th SCM, the “Concepts and Principles” are designed to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy missile threats including nuclear and biochemical warheads. However, the details have not been made public. Furthermore, according to the “Strategic Digest 2015” of the U.S. Forces in the ROK, the “Concepts and Principles” apply from peacetime to war, and will guide operational decision-making, planning, exercises, capability development, and acquisitions. 95 The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency. In 2007, the two countries decided to dissolve the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command in April 2012 and to transition OPCON to the ROK. However, in June 2010, they agreed to postpone the transition timing to December 1, 2015 due to reasons, including North Korea’s increased military threat. 96 The United States intends to consolidate and relocate the bases of the U.S. Forces Korea which are scattered across the ROK, in order to ensure stable stationing conditions for U.S. Forces Korea and a balanced development of ROK land. The agreement between the United States and the ROK include: (1) an agreement to conduct the relocation to south of the Han River in two stages (June 2003); and (2) the withdrawal of 12,500 of the nearly 37,500 personnel out of the ROK (October 2004). The United States has thus been transforming its posture in accordance with these agreements. However, at the U.S.-ROK Summit Meeting in April 2008, the two countries agreed to maintain the current 28,500 as the appropriate troop level. Since then, the two countries have continued to affirm that maintaining ----- themselves would be maintained, their completion date was revised to “strive for completion in a timely manner.” In May 2016, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that “The relocation to Pyeontaek of most of the units including the U.S. Forces Korea command is scheduled to be completed by 2017.” These challenges are perceived to have significant impact on the U.S.-ROK defense postures on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, relevant developments need to be followed closely. - 5 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with China** China and the ROK have made continuous efforts to strengthen their relations. Following the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye government, in June 2013, President Park held a summit meeting with President Xi Jinping during her visit to China, and the two sides announced the Joint Statement on the Korea-China Future Vision. At the working-level, also in June, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff visited China for the first time in six years. Further, in December 2013, the first ChinaROK Dialogue on Diplomacy and Security was held between the directors-general of the foreign and defense ministries of the two countries, and the two sides agreed to hold the dialogue regularly. In July 2014, President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to the ROK and released a joint statement in which agreement was reached on items, including promoting bilateral dialogue in the areas of politics and security and realizing the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. In February 2015, the Minister of National Defense of China visited the ROK for the first time in nine years, and in September 2015, President Park Geun-hye visited China and attended the military parade that was part of the “commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression.” In this regard, a trend in deepening the bilateral relations was observed among government leaders and senior officials. Meanwhile, outstanding issues have emerged between China and the ROK. The “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (ADIZ) issued by China in November 2013 overlapped in some areas with the ROK’s ADIZ. Furthermore, it included the airspace above the sea areas surrounding the reef, Ieodo (Chinese name: Suyan Rock), regarding which China and the ROK have conflicting claims to the jurisdictional authority over the exclusive economic zone. Against this backdrop, the ROK government announced the expansion of its own ADIZ in December 2013 and enforced it from the same month. In addition, following North Korea’s nuclear test in January 2016 and launch of a ballistic missile in February 2016, the ROK began formal talks with the United States regarding deployment of THAAD by U.S. Forces Korea, and the deployment was officially decided in July 2016. China has protested that the deployment of THAAD to the ROK would undermine China’s strategic security interests. **(2) Relations with Russia** Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high-ranking military officials. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and military supplies. At the ROK-Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” In March 2012, the two countries held the first ROK-Russia defense strategic dialogue and agreed to regularize the dialogue. In November 2013, President Vladimir Putin visited the ROK, and a joint statement was issued in which the two sides agreed to strengthen dialogue in the areas of politics and security. **(3) Overseas Activities** Since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia in 1993, the ROK has participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level.[97] In July 2010, the ROK created the “International Peace Support Force,” a special unit 97 The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK Forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, an act concerning participation in U.N. PKO ----- for overseas dispatch. Since March 2013, the ROK has dispatched troops composed primarily of engineering units to the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Furthermore, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden where they have been engaged in the protection of ROKregistered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). Since January 2011, the ROK has dispatched a ROK special forces unit for the purpose of supporting the training of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) special forces units, joint exercises, and protecting ROK nationals in emergency situations. Additionally, in December 2013, the ROK dispatched a disaster recovery support unit consisting of approximately 500 personnel, including an engineering unit and medical personnel, to the Philippines in the wake of its typhoon disaster. ----- **Section 3** **China** **1 General Situation** China, the world’s most populous country, has a vast landmass surrounded by a long borderline shared with 14 countries as well as a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization. China’s pride in its unique history and semi-colonial experience in and after the 19th century is driving its desire for a strong nation and fueling its nationalism. In recent years, China has increased its presence in the international community. For example, China takes a proactive stance towards efforts in non-traditional security areas and makes personnel and fi nancial contributions to U.N. PKOs. In addition, China has been sending its ships continuously for counter-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, China has participated proactively in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. These activities have been highly appreciated by the international community. There are high expectations for China to recognize its responsibility in the international community, accept and comply with international norms, and play an active role in a more cooperative manner on regional and global issues. Yet, at the same time, there are disputes between China and other countries over various issues including human rights issues. While advocating “peaceful development,”[1] China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests confl ict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, including attempts at changing the status quo by coercion based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing order of international law.[2] These actions include dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. China is poised to fulfi ll its unilateral demands without compromise,[3] which has included making steady efforts to turn these coercive changes to the status quo into a fait accompli, raising strong concerns over China’s future direction. In addition, China faces various problems domestically. The spread of bribery and corruption among the central and local leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become a signifi cant political problem. Furthermore, China’s rapid economic growth has brought with it emerging problems such as regional disparities between urban-rural and coastalinland regions, the issue of the tax system that facilitates these disparities, wealth gaps among urban residents, infl ation, environmental pollution, and lack of agricultural and industrial water. More recently, China has witnessed a slowdown in its economic growth,[4] spurring turbulence in the markets including volatility in stock prices. In the future, China is also expected to face issues associated with the rapid aging of the population,[5] including pension The term China’s “peaceful development” began to come into formal use in around 2004. According to a paper presented by then State Councilor Dai Bingguo on March 11, 2011, “peaceful development” is thought to refer to China’s development whose nature is (1) peaceful, (2) independent, (3) scientifi c, (4) cooperative, and (5) common with other countries. For example, the justifi cation under international law for the “nine-dash line” asserted by China in the South China Sea is unclear, including under UNCLOS. Japan requests China to clarify to the international community the justifi cation for China’s assertions under international law. China strongly urges Japan, the United States, and other countries to respect China’s “core interests.” “Core interests” include “national sovereignty,” “national security,” “territorial integrity,” “national reunifi cation,” “national political system and social stability,” and “basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.” In particular, with regard to “territory,” some suggest that it refers to Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang and includes also China’s territorial claims in the East China Sea and South China Sea. According to the Ministry of National Defense of China, in June 2016, during his meeting with former GSDF Chief of Staff Yoshifumi Hibako who was visiting China, Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan stated to the effect that Japan was exaggerating “China’s military threat” by criticizing this and that about issues related to the “core interests” of China, including the East China Sea and South China Sea. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.9% year-on-year in 2015. While it was along the lines of the Chinese government’s target of about 7%, the growth was the slowest since 25 years ago in 1990. At the fi fth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee held in October 2015, the Chinese government decided to fully abolish the one-child policy which limited couples to one child as a general rule, ----- and other issues related to the social security system. The Chinese government has been tightening its control over society[6] as these potentially destabilizing factors to the government administration expand and diversify. However, it is suggested that controlling activities of the masses becomes increasingly diffi cult with the spread of the Internet, coupled with other factors. Additionally, China confronts issues concerning ethnic minorities in the country, with their staging protests and carrying out campaigns in pursuit of separation and independence in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and elsewhere. In the meantime, the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in November 2013 adopted the “Decision on Major Issues concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms” regarding reforms in a wide range of areas, such as economics, politics, culture, society, environment, and national defense and the military. Accordingly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is undergoing what can be described as its most signifi cant reforms since the founding of the country. Also, in China, under the policy of cracking down on both “tigers” and “fl ies,”[7] “corruption” has been subject to severe charges, including that conducted by former prominent leaders of the party and military such as Zhou Yongkang, then a Politburo Standing Committee member, as well as then-Vice Chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. During the fi fth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in October 2015, the idea of “sweeping law-based governance of the country” was presented as a guiding concepts of the 13th Five-year Plan (2016-2020). China **2 Military Affairs** - 1 Defense Policies is thus anticipated to continue addressing corruption within the party and the military. On the diplomatic fi eld, it is believed that, in order to maintain national stability, China strives to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining good relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, while deepening relations with neighboring countries, and is strengthening cooperation with developing countries. In addition, China seeks to promote multipolarization of the world through building China-led multilateral mechanisms[8] and to secure interests necessary for economic development such as natural resources and energy supply. On the military front, for over a quarter decade, China has strengthened its military forces broadly and rapidly by sustaining large increases in its defense budget. In particular, China gives priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue pertaining to the “core” interest of national sovereignty. It is deemed that China is strengthening its military forces for the time being with the aim of improving military capabilities to prevent Taiwan’s independence. As part of such efforts, China is believed to be enhancing its asymmetric military capabilities to deter military forces of other countries from approaching and advancing to China’s surrounding region, and to inhibit their military activities in the region (so-called “A2/ AD” capabilities[9]). Additionally, China has made active efforts to acquire capabilities for missions other than for dealing with a Taiwan contingency. As China now has considerable infl uence in the international community politically, economically, and militarily, other countries are closely watching its military trends. changes in the new security environment; to accomplish the strategic guideline of active defense[10] to realize the CCP’s goal of building a strong military; to accelerate the modernization of national defense and the military forces; to fi rmly protect its national sovereignty, security, and development interests; and to provide strong assurances for realizing the “Chinese dream” of the great revival of China regards that the buildup of strong defense capabilities and powerful military forces constitutes a strategic mission to modernize the state, and that it ensures the security of the state under “peaceful development.” China considers the main goal and mission of national defense policies as: to adapt to the 6 In November 2014, China fully revised the National Security Law and enacted the Anti-Spy Law for such purposes as preventing espionage in the country. In December 2015, China passed the Anti-Terrorism Law that contains provisions on media controls and Internet monitoring. In this way, China promotes the enactment of national security-related legislation. 7 On January 22, 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping said in a speech during the second plenary session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, “we must uphold the fi ghting of tigers and fl ies at the same time” to punish corruption. 8 China seeks to implement its own initiatives in the security realm; at the Conference on Interaction and Confi dence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), China criticized military alliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people of Asia.” In the international fi nance domain as well, China plays a leading role in establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 9 For a defi nition of the so-called “A2/AD” capabilities, see Part I Overview, Section 2, Footnote 5. 10 The strategic concept of active defense is seen as the essence of the CCP’s military strategic concept. It upholds the principles of defense, self-defense, and “post-emptive strike” (suppress the adversary after ----- the people of Chinese ethnicity. China contends that these defense policies are defensive in nature.[11] China has a policy to actively promote “Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” which mainly aims to encourage mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy to win local wars under informatized conditions. This is in response to global developments in military affairs observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War, and other wars. It is believed that China emphasizes not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It has incorporated the concept of “Three Warfares” — “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” — into the tasks of the political work of the military.[12] In addition, China has set forth a policy of close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors. Dealing with a Taiwan contingency is believed to be a top priority in China’s strengthening of military forces; more specifically, improving its capabilities to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for it. Furthermore, in recent years, China is working actively to acquire capabilities for missions other than dealing with a Taiwan contingency, and stresses use of the military in non-traditional security areas. With regard to China’s military strengthening, China proclaims that it would “realize the basic mechanization and achieve major progress in construction of informatization by 2020” and “by focusing on the capability to win local wars under informationized conditions, it will improve the abilities to accomplish diversified military missions and thoroughly complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century.”[13] These suggest that China’s military forces will be developed in tandem with the enhancement of its national strength. China has sustained large increases in its defense spending and broadly and rapidly reinforced its military forces, mainly its nuclear and missile force as well as its Navy and Air Force. As part of such efforts, it is understood that China is strengthening its so-called “A2/AD” capabilities. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities, enhance capabilities for extended-range power projection, conduct practical exercises, cultivate and acquire personnel for administering operations of informatized forces, improve the foundation of its domestic defense industry, and ensure law-based military governance. Furthermore, China has rapidly expanded and intensified its activities at sea and in airspace, including the East and South China Seas. China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, that is, for example, attempts at changing the status quo by coercion. China is also poised to fulfill its unilateral demands without compromise, which has included making steady efforts to turn these coercive changes to the status quo into a fait accompli. Japan has great concerns over such Chinese military activities, etc., together with the lack of transparency in its military affairs and security issues, and needs to keep utmost attention to them. These activities also raise security concerns for the region and the international community. - 2 Military Transparency China has not disclosed specific information on possession of weapons, procurement goals and past procurements, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget. Moreover, China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. China has released defense white papers including “China’s National Defense” every two years since 1998. China also conducts numerous dialogues with national defense authorities of other countries.[14] Furthermore, 11 See the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015). According to the defense white paper “China’s Peaceful Development” (September 2011), China pursues “peaceful development” but “never seeks hegemony,” while it is firm in upholding its “core interests” which include: “national sovereignty”; “national security”; “territorial integrity”; “national reunification”; “China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability”; and “the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.” 12 China amended the Regulations of the PLA on the Political Work in 2003 to add Media, Psychological, and Legal Warfares to the PLA’s political work. The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (August 2011) explains these warfares as follows: - Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China’s military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China’s interests. - Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations. - Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions. 13 The defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2008” also states the following target: “by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century.” It is regarded that this target takes into account the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (2049), one of “the two 100 years,” with the other being the 100th anniversary of the CCP (2021). 14 For example with Japan, in June 2015, the public affairs delegation of the Ministry of National Defense of China visited the MOD. Exchanges with the public affairs divisions of the MOD and SDF were held for ----- in August 2007, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted annual reports based on each framework. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense has been giving monthly press conferences by a spokesperson since April 2011. In November 2013, the position of spokesperson was newly established at seven departments, including the Navy and Air Force.[15] Such moves can be perceived on the one hand as efforts that contribute to the improvement of the transparency of military forces, and on the other as efforts to strengthen “Media Warfare.” However, China has not provided a detailed breakdown of its national defense spending. In the past, China disclosed the total amounts and general purposes for the following three categories: personnel; training and maintenance; and equipment.[16] Nonetheless, such explanations have not been offered in recent years. Moreover, in China’s defense white papers released in April 2013 and May 2015, the contents were limited to selective topics. While on some topics they gave more details than in the past, the papers made no reference to national defense spending that was described in previous defense white papers, and the overall volume of the text decreased. In this respect, transparency is declining in regard to national defense spending, and China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible nation in the international community. Incidents have been occurring that incite concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions, including Chinese explanations against the facts. For example, details have yet to be disclosed regarding the causes of the Chinese nuclear-powered submarine’s submerged navigation in Japan’s territorial waters in November 2004 although it constitutes a breach of international law. Furthermore, with respect to the incident of a Chinese naval vessel directing its fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer (January 2013), among other incidents, both the Chinese Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave explanations which were inconsistent with the facts; that is, they have denied the use of the radar itself. With regard to the incident in which Chinese fighters flew abnormally close to aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF (May and June 2014), the Chinese Ministry of National Defense gave explanations that were contrary to the truth; it claimed that Japanese aircraft “entered the airspace for the Chinese drills without reporting to China and conducted dangerous acts.” In recent years, amid the significant changes in the environment surrounding the military, including advances in military specialization and diversification of missions associated with military strengthening, some see that relations between the CCP leadership and the PLA have become increasingly complex. Others opine that the military’s level of influence on foreign policy decisions has been changing.[17] Attention will be paid to such situations also as an issue of crisis management. Chinese false explanations are also evident in China’s coercive, rapid, and large-scale development on features in the South China Sea.[18] In September 2015, at the U.S.-China summit meeting, President Xi Jinping stated, “China does not intend to pursue militarization.” However, in October 2015, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China commented, “China has military facilities of a defensive nature.” As China’s influence in the international community has risen politically, economically, and militarily, other countries are closely following China’s moves. In order to allay their concerns over China, it is becoming more important for China itself to improve the transparency of its national defense policy and military capabilities. It is strongly hoped that China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by such efforts as disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities. - 3 National Defense Budget China announced that its national defense budget for FY2016 was approximately 954.4 billion yuan.[19, 20] This initial budget amount represented a growth of 15 The seven departments are: then PLA General Political Department; then PLA General Logistics Department; then PLA General Armaments Department; PLA Navy; PLA Air Force; then PLA Second Artillery Corps; and People’s Armed Police. 16 The defense white papers “China’s National Defense in 2008” and “China’s National Defense in 2010” provided a breakdown of personnel expenses, training and maintenance costs, and equipment costs for the active force, reserve force, and militia, limited to the FY2007 and FY2009 defense budget expenditures, respectively. 17 For example, some point out that in recent years, the PLA increasingly expresses its position on security issues concerning national sovereignty or maritime interests. Others point out that the extent of the military’s involvement in the party’s decision-making process is limited because the number of PLA representatives to key decision-making bodies of the CCP is fewer than in the past. Meanwhile, the PLA has repeatedly stressed “absolute instruction of the forces by the party.” 18 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5(4); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-4; Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-3-7 and 3-3-8. 19 From FY2015, China releases the national defense budget amount as part of the basic expenditures of the central government, which do not include local relocation expenditures, among other expenses. 20 Converting national defense budgets of foreign countries into another currency simply by applying currency exchange rates does not necessarily reflect an accurate value due to differences in price level. If, hypothetically, China’s national defense budget for FY2016 was converted at a rate of 19 yen per yuan (FY2016 rate that the Japanese government uses for official purposes), this would result in approximately 18,132.7 billion yen. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that China’s military expenditures for 2015 were approximately US$215 billion, ranking it second place in the world ----- Fig. I-2-3-1 Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget (100 million yuan) (%) 10,000 40 9,500 9,000 Defense budget (in 100 million yuan) 8,500 Year-on-year growth rate (%) 30 8,000 7,500 7,000 25 6,500 6,000 5,500 20 5,000 4,500 15 4,000 3,500 3,000 10 2,500 2,000 1,500 5 1,000 500 0 0 89 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 (FY) Note: This basically shows the defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. Note that the FY2002 budget was calculated on the assumption that the disclosed rate and amount of growth represent increases from the actual defense expenditure in FY2001, because the FY2002 budget was not disclosed and discrepancies arise when the disclosed rate and amount of growth are applied to the initial budget of the previous year. In FY2015 and FY2016, only the defense budget within the basic expenditures of the central government (part of the central fiscal expenditures) was announced. The FY2015 defense budget within central fiscal expenditures was calculated by adding the defense budget within the basic expenditures of the central government and the local relocation expenditure amount, etc. released separately at a later date. approximately 7.6% (approximately 67.5 billion yuan)[21] compared to the initial budget amount for the previous fiscal year. China’s announced national defense budget has increased at a rapid pace, recording double-digit annual growth nearly consistently since FY1989.[22] The nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget has grown approximately 44-fold in 28 years since FY1988 and nearly 3.4-fold in 10 years since FY2006. China positions the buildup of defense capabilities as important a task as economic development. It is believed that China continues to invest resources in the improvement of its defense capabilities in tandem with its economic development. Attention will be paid to how the slowdown in China’s economic growth affects China’s national defense budget. In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures.[23] For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development (R&D) expenses. See>> Fig. I-2-3-1 (Changes in China’s Announced Defense Budget) - 4 Military Posture China’s military forces are composed of the PLA, the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP),[24] and the militia.[25] It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the CMC.[26] The PLA is defined as a people’s army created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Rocket Force (strategic missile force). **(1) Military Reform** China is currently carrying out reforms of the PLA which some see as being the largest in the country’s history. First, during the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee, the following were decided: adjusting functions and organizations of the CMC and other bodies; perfecting the system of instruction and management of forces; developing the CMC’s command structure for joint operations and command system for joint operations in theaters; and promoting reforms of joint operation exercises and logistical support 21 China announced that the rate of growth for its FY2016 national defense budget is “an increase of approximately 7.6% compared to the previous year.” This is the growth rate calculated by comparing the spending of FY2015 with the initial budget of FY2016. 22 China’s announced national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures achieved double-digit growth on the initial-budget basis every year from FY1989 to FY2015 except in FY2010. For FY2015 in which the defense budget was announced within the basic expenditures of the central government, this budget amount and the local relocation expenditure amount, etc. released separately at a later date were added together to calculate the national defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. 23 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) estimates China’s military-related defense spending as having been at least US$180 billion in FY2015. The same report indicates that China’s announced defense budget (US$144 billion) does not include major categories of expenditure such as R&D expenses and foreign procurement. 24 Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. According to the defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2002,” “it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.” 25 The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistics support for combat operations in wartime. The defense white paper “China’s National Defense in 2002” explains, “[u]nder the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.” According to a PLA Daily article dated October 9, 2012, “China now has six million primary militia members” as of 2010. 26 Formally, there are two CMCs—one for the CCP and another for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP ----- mechanisms. The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) also mentions the development of the CMC’s command structure for joint operations and command system for joint operations in theaters. China’s official position on a specific direction of the military reforms was unveiled in November 2015. At the CMC Reform Work Conference, President Xi Jinping announced that the military reforms would be carried out by 2020, which would include: implementation of the CMC’s centralized and unified leadership over the PLA; establishment of the Army’s headquarters; establishment of “theaters of operations” and a command structure for joint operations; reduction of troops by 300,000 personnel;[27] and streamlining of administrative and noncombatant personnel. Recently, these reforms have taken shape at a rapid pace. First, in late December 2015, a ceremony was held in Beijing for the establishment of the PLA Army Headquarters (PLAA),[28] Rocket Force (PLARF),[29] and Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).[30] Following this, on January 11, 2016, the four general departments[31] that were the headquarters for the entire PLA were replaced by 15 functional sections under the CMC, including the Joint Staff Department, Political Work Department, Logistic Support Department, and Equipment Development Department. On February 1, 2016, the PLA’s seven Military Regions[32] were abolished, and five theaters of operations were newly created, namely, the Eastern Theater, Southern Theater, Western Theater, Northern Theater, and Central Theater.[33] It is considered that these series of reforms are designed to build military forces that can fight and win wars by improving their joint operational capabilities and strengthening the military’s readiness, including the development of military capabilities and organizational management from peacetime. It is suggested that the realignment of the four general departments was aimed to decentralize the leading organs and strengthening the direct leadership of the CMC and its Chairman. China is expected to continue these reforms. Attention will be paid to the outcomes of the reforms, including their effects on the security of the region including Japan. **(2) Nuclear and Missile Forces** China has made independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the mid1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community. It is regarded that China’s nuclear strategy is to deter a nuclear attack on its land by maintaining a nuclear force structure able to conduct retaliatory nuclear attacks on a small number of targets such as cities in the adversary’s country, should China be subject to nuclear attack.[34] The unveiling of many strategic missiles[35] at the military parade in Beijing on the occasion of the “commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression” in September 2015, coupled with the establishment of the PLA Rocket Force of equal status as the Army, Navy, and Air Force as part of the ongoing military reforms, suggests that China will continue to attach importance to its nuclear 27 Earlier, on September 3, 2015, President Xi Jinping stated in his speech at the “commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression”: “I announce that China will cut the number of its troops by 300,000.” At a press conference held on the same day, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China announced a policy to complete the 300,000-troop reduction by the end of 2017. 28 The PLA was considered a large organization of the Army, and therefore, a headquarters of the Army did not exist. The ongoing reforms have given the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force (the Strategic Missile Force) the same status as the Army. The headquarters for each service previously consisted of commander and deputy commanders, political commissar and deputy political commissars, headquarters, Political Department, Logistics Department, and Armament Department. It has not been announced whether the new PLAA has been organized in a similar manner. 29 The establishment of PLARF is seen as a de facto elevation of the Second Artillery Force. 30 PLASSF is identified as a new force for maintaining national security. Reportedly it is in charge of cyber, outer space, and electronic warfare capabilities. 31 General Staff Department, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armament Department. 32 Shenyang Military Region, Beijing Military Region, Jinan Military Region, Nanjing Military Region, Guangzhou Military Region, Chengdu Military Region, and Lanzhou Military Region. 33 At a ceremony for the establishment of the theaters of operations, President Xi Jinping commented on the role of the theaters and of military services that, “The CMC conducts the overall management, theaters supervise operations, and military services build up forces.” 34 The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) states that “China has always pursued the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons and adhered to a self-defensive nuclear strategy that is defensive in nature. China...will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.” On the other hand, the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) states that there is some ambiguity over the conditions under which China’s “no first use” policy would or would not apply. 35 The ballistic missiles shown at the military parade in September 2015 were DF-15B (SRBM), DF-16 (SRBM), DF-21D (MRBM [ASBM]), DF-26 (IRBM [including ASBM]), DF-31A (ICBM), DF-5B (ICBM), and cruise ----- Fig. I-2-3-2 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing) Washington, D.C. London San Francisco North Pole Moscow Hawaii Beijing **2,500 km** New Delhi **2,800 km** Guam **4,000 km** Jakarta **5,400 km** **7,200 km** Canberra **11,500 km** **12,000 km** **13,000 km** 1,750–2,500 km Maximum range of DF-21, DF-21A/B/C 2,400–2,800 km Maximum range of DF-3, DF-3A 4,000 km Maximum range of DF-26 5,400 km Maximum range of DF-4 7,200–11,500 km Maximum range of DF-31, DF-31A 12,000–13,000 km Maximum range of DF-5, DF-5A/B Note: The above image shows a simplified indication of the potential reach of each type of missile taking Beijing as a central point. and ballistic missile forces. China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: ICBM; SLBM; IRBM/medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM); and short-range ballistic missile (SRBM).[36] The update of China’s ballistic missile forces from a liquid propellant system to a solid propellant system is improving their survivability and readiness.[37 ] Moreover, it is believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving accuracy, mounting warheads, and by other means. China’s main ICBM strategic nuclear asset had been the fixed-site liquid-fueled DF-5 missile.[38] However, it has been suggested that China has deployed the DF-31, which is a mobile-type ICBM with a solid propellant system mounted onto a TEL, as well as the DF-31A, a model of the DF-31 with extended range, and that China will increase the number of DF-31A in particular.[39] With regard to SLBM, it is considered that Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to carry the JL-2, whose range is deemed to be approximately 8,000 km, are currently operational. If the Jin-class SSBNs begin nuclear deterrence patrols, it is believed that China’s strategic nuclear capabilities will improve significantly.[40] As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific 36 In accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the United States and Russia eliminated all of their SRBMs and IRBMs/MRBMs by 1991. 37 For differences between the liquid-propellant system and solid-propellant system, see Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2, Footnote 35. 38 The DF-5B is thought to carry multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). 39 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) indicates that China is developing a new road mobile ICBM known as “DF-41,” which is capable of carrying MIRVs. 40 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) notes that four Jin-class SSBNs have already been commissioned and one i ----- Senkaku Islands, which are inherent territories of Japan. Furthermore, in order to acquire striking force that will be capable of penetrating layered anti-missile defenses, China is considered to be developing a hypersonic glide vehicle which is launched by a ballistic missile. Attention will be paid to the relevant developments.[46] China announced that it conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in January 2010 and 2013.[47] Attention will be paid to China’s future trends in ballistic missile defense.[48] See>> Fig. I-2-3-2 (Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)) **(3) Ground Forces** The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel[49] and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. China aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifically, it is improving mobility by such measures as switching from the past regionaldefense model to a nationwide-mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. China is also believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the Air Force), amphibious forces, and special operations forces and helicopter units. China undertakes efforts to make its military units multifunctional, to build a command system for improvement of its joint operational capabilities and efficient operations, and carries out reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. Since 2009, China has annually conducted mobile exercises that cut across multiple military regions such as Stride 2009, Mission Action (2010-2013), and Stride and Firepower (2014-). These are aimed at verifying and improving such capabilities necessary for deployment of Army units to distant areas, specifically as capabilities for the Army’s long-distance maneuver[50] and for logistical support including mobilization of region including Japan, China has the solid-propellant DF-21 and DF-26, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These missiles are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads.[41] China possesses ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and deploys the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) carrying conventional warheads, which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carrier.[42] The DF-26,[43] which has a range including Guam, is considered the “second-generation ASBM” developed on the basis of the DF-21D, and is thought to be capable to attacking moving targets. In addition to IRBM/MRBM, China possesses the DH-10 (CJ-10), a cruise missile with a range of at least 1,500 km, as well as the H-6 (Tu-16), a bomber that is capable of carrying this cruise missile. It is deemed that these missiles will complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan.[44] China is likely developing these ASBMs and long-range cruise missile assets to strengthen its “A2/ AD” capabilities. Concerning SRBM, China possesses a large number of solid-propellant DF-16, DF-15, and DF11, and they are believed to be deployed facing Taiwan.[45] It is believed that their ranges cover also a part of the Southwestern Islands including the area surrounding the 41 According to the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015), China identifies “possessing both nuclear and conventional missiles” as one of the strategies for enhancing the military capabilities of the then Second Artillery Force. 42 DF-21D is called the “carrier killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]). 43 DF-26 is called the “Guam killer” (Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission [November 2015]). 44 The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015) states that the H-6K bomber’s ability to carry the DH-10 (CJ-10) land attack cruise missile and the DF-26 (IRBM), which allow for more long-distance attacks, enables China to target as far as the second island chain including Guam. 45 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) states that as of late 2015, China possessed at least 1,200 SRBMs, including the DF-16. 46 In January, August, and December 2014, June, August, and November 2015, and April 2016 (total: 7 times), China reportedly conducted flight tests of its hypersonic glide vehicle “WU-14/DF-ZF,” which is said to travel at ultra-high speed and be difficult to intercept by a missile. 47 China has systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, such as the surface-to-air missiles of the HQ series, including HQ-9, and the SA-10/20 (S-300 series) surface-to-air missile imported from Russia. 48 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) writes that China has twice successfully intercepted a ballistic missile. In addition to these two tests, China claims that the test conducted in July 2014 was another missile interception technology test. However, it is pointed out that this was actually an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test. (See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 4-2-4, Footnote 27.) 49 It is believed that some of the removed personnel joined the People’s Armed Police.i ----- |Northe eadquart|rn Theater ers: Shenyang)| |---|---| ||| |Col1|Col2|Col3|aiwan (Reference)| |---|---|---|---| |Total military forces||Approx. 2.3 million troops A|pprox. 220,000 troops| |Ground forces|Group troops|Approx. 1.6 million troops A|pprox. 130,000 troops| ||Tanks, etc.|Type-99/A, Type-98/A, M- Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,200 vehicles A|60, M-48A/H and others pprox. 1,200 vehicles| |Maritime forces|Warships|Approx. 880 vessels / 1,502,000 tons Approx|. 390 vessels / 210,000 tons| ||Aircraft carriers, destroyers, and frigates|Approx. 70 vessels|Approx. 30 vessels| ||Submarines|Approx. 60 vessels|4 vessels| ||Marines|Approx. 10,000 troops|Approx. 10,000 troops| |Air forces|Combat aircraft|Approx. 2,720 aircraft|Approx. 510 aircraft| ||Modern fighters aircraft|J-10 x 347 Su-27/J-11 x 352 Su-30 x 97 J-15 x 14 (Fourth-g (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 810)|Mirage 2000 x 56 F-16 x 145 F-CK-1 (IDF) x 128 eneration fighters (total): 329)| |Reference|Population|Approx. 1.37 billion|Approx. 23 million| ||Term of service|2 years|1 year| Fig. I-2-3-3 Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army Central Theater (Headquarters: Beijing) Northern Theater (Headquarters: Shenyang) (Shijiazhuang) (Jinan) (Lanzhou) Western Theater (Headquarters: Chengdu) (Fuzhou) Southern Theater (Headquarters: Guangzhou) Eastern Theater (Nanning) (Headquarters: Nanjing) Notes: 1. G Theater headquarters Theater Army organization 2. Theater boundaries have not been officially announced. The above map is prepared based on U.S. DoD reports, media reports, etc. **China** **Taiwan (Reference)** Total military forces Approx. 2.3 million troops Approx. 220,000 troops Group troops Approx. 1.6 million troops Approx. 130,000 troops Ground Type-99/A, Type-98/A, M-60, M-48A/H and others forces Tanks, etc. Type-96/A, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,200 vehicles Approx. 1,200 vehicles Warships Approx. 880 vessels / 1,502,000 tons Approx. 390 vessels / 210,000 tons Aircraft carriers, Approx. 70 vessels Approx. 30 vessels Maritime destroyers, and frigates forces Submarines Approx. 60 vessels 4 vessels Marines Approx. 10,000 troops Approx. 10,000 troops Combat aircraft Approx. 2,720 aircraft Approx. 510 aircraft Air J-10 x 347 Mirage 2000 x 56 forces Su-27/J-11 x 352 Modern fighters F-16 x 145 Su-30 x 97 aircraft F-CK-1 (IDF) x 128 J-15 x 14 (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 329) (Fourth-generation fighters (total): 810) Population Approx. 1.37 billion Approx. 23 million Reference Term of service 2 years 1 year Source: “The Military Balance 2016,” etc. China’s total military forces to be cut by 300,000 troops by the end of 2017. militia and public transportation. Furthermore, the Navy and Air Force reportedly took part in Mission Action 2013, and since 2014, have conducted combined military branch and service exercises under Joint Action. These suggest that China intends to improve joint operational capabilities as well. See>> Fig. I-2-3-3 (Deployment and Strength of the People’s Liberation Army) ----- **(4) Naval Forces** The naval forces consist of three fleets: North Sea Fleet; East Sea Fleet; and South Sea Fleet. The Chinese Navy has approximately 880 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.5 million tons. The Navy is in charge of maritime national defense and protection of the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy mass produces the indigenous state-of-theart Yuan-class submarines,[51] as well as surface combatant ships[52] with improved air defense and anti-ship attack capabilities. It is also suggested that the Navy is developing cruisers equipped with vertical launch systems (VLSs) capable of launching the latest YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile. In addition, the Navy is increasing the number of large landing ships and supply ships. It commissioned a large hospital ship in October 2008. With regard to aircraft carriers, China renovated the Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier purchased from Ukraine. After trial navigations started in August 2011, the carrier was named “Liaoning” and was commissioned in September 2012.[53] It is thought that even after the commission, China continues trainings of carrier-based aircraft pilots using domestic J-15 carrierbased fighters and takeoff and landing tests on the “Liaoning.” In November 2013, the carrier sailed in the South China Sea for the first time and conducted sea trials in this area.[54] In late December 2015, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China officially admitted the building of a domestic aircraft carrier for the first time, announcing that the aircraft carrier “is being built in Dalian. It has a conventional power plant with a displacement of 50,000 tons” and “will adopt ski-jump takeoff mode.”[55] In view of these developments concerning the strengthening of the naval forces, China likely aims to build capabilities for conducting operations in more A hull reported to be of China’s indigenous aircraft carrier under construction (June 2, 2016) [IHS Jane’s] distant waters in addition to near sea defense.[56] It is necessary to continue to monitor the development of the Chinese naval forces.[57] **(5) Air Forces** The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 2,720 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth generation modern fighters is rising steadily. China imported from Russia and produced under license the Su-27 fighter, and imported from Russia the Su-30 fighter equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities. China also mass produces the J-11B fighter, which is allegedly an imitation of the Su-27 fighter, and the domestic J-10 fighter.[58] China’s domestic J-15 carrierbased fighter thought to be modeled on Russia’s Su-33 carrier-based fighter is also carried on the aircraft carrier Liaoning. In November 2015, China reportedly signed an agreement with a Russian state-run military company to purchase 24 Su-35 fighters, which is considered the newest fourth generation fighter. Additionally, China is developing the J-20 and J-31 fighters, which are said to become next-generation fighters.[59] The Chinese Air Force has H-6 bombers that are thought to carry nuclear weapons as well as cruise missiles, including the state-of-the-art YJ-12 air-to-ship missile. China is 51 These submarines are believed to be superior in quietness and to be equipped with an air independent propulsion (AIP) system. By carrying the necessary oxygen in advance, this system allows these submarines to remain submerged underwater for longer periods than previous submarines without accessing atmospheric oxygen by surfacing or other means. 52 For example, in recent years, China is considered to have significantly increased the number of: the Luyang III-class destroyer, a fleet air defense ship called the “Chinese Aegis” with reinforced radars and carrying a new model of the VLS capable of launching the latest YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile; the Jiangkai II-class frigate equipped with VLS; and the Jiangdao-class light frigate which is a corvette with enhanced anti-submarine warfare capabilities. 53 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) expresses the view that the aircraft carrier Liaoning will possibly be used for fleet air defense missions, but as it is incapable of long-range power projection compared to U.S. aircraft carriers, it will probably continue to play a role in training. It also notes that in 2015, the Liaoning certified domestically trained J-15 carrier-based fighter pilots for the first time, and the air wing is expected to deploy for combat in 2016. 54 In May 2013, it was reported that the first carrier air wing was officially established in China. 55 It is suggested that China is conducting research on the electromagnetic aircraft launch system in order to overcome the limitations of the ski-jump configuration, namely, few weapons and little fuel can be carried on the carrier-based fighter and fixed-wing early warning aircraft cannot be operated. 56 China’s defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifies “offshore waters defense and open seas protection” as a strategy for enhancing the military capabilities of the Navy. The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) also states that China continues its gradual shift from “near sea” defense to “far seas” protection. 57 According to the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015), “the traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned” and China will aim to “develop a modern maritime military force structure.” As implied by these references, it is deemed that China attaches importance to its maritime strategy. 58 Additionally, in April 2015, China flew a prototype of the J-11D fighter which was thought to carry a Chinese-made WS-10A turbofan engine, avionics, and weapon system. China is also developing the J-10B fighter, an upgraded J-10 fighter. “The Military Balance 2016” notes that approximately 50 J-10B fighters were being manufactured by the end of 2015. 59 In January 2011, a prototype of the J-20 fighter successfully conducted its first flight test. A total of nine prototypes are believed to have been made by the end of 2015. A prototype of the J-31 fighter has also been verified at the Zhuhai Airshow held in November 2014. It is suggested that in the future, the J-31 fighter could be turned into a carrier-based fighter or be exported. “The Military Balance 2016” anticipates ii ----- The new KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control system [IHS Jane’s] The attack UAV GJ-1 (“Yilong”) is displayed at a military parade [IHS Jane’s] also making continuous efforts to improve capabilities which are essential for operations of modern air forces by introducing the H-6U tanker and KJ-500[60] and KJ2000 Airborne Early Warning and Control system. Furthermore, it is reported that China is developing a new Y-20 large cargo aircraft[61] in order to enhance its transportation capability. In addition to domestically developing, producing and deploying a variety of aircraft and introducing them from Russia, China is deemed to be domestically developing a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),[62] including those capable of long-hour flights at high altitude for reconnaissance and other purposes (high-altitude long endurance [HALE]) and those capable of carrying missiles and other weapons for attack purposes. Some of these are thought to be being produced and deployed. Judging from the modernization of the air forces, it is believed that China is not only improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, but also aiming to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in areas which are further distant from China, and improving long-range transportation capabilities.[63] Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by the Chinese air forces. **(6) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities** China is said to have developed its space program in the shortest time in the world, and may be utilizing space for military purposes. China is considered to be developing directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers in order to restrict and interfere with the use of space-based assets by adversaries in wartime. In addition, China has interest in cyber space. Some have speculated that China is reinforcing its “A2/AD” capabilities by using cyber attacks to destroy an adversary’s network in the entire region. This can be attributed to the fact that information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, increasingly rely on satellites and computer networks. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 4 (Outer Space and Security); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 5 (Trends in Cyberspace) **(7) Establishment of Joint Operational Posture** In recent years, organizational reform has been under way to improve integrated and combined operations capability among the military services. For example, at the third plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in November 2013, China proposed a government policy to “enhance joint operations capability and reform the command system and organization.” As part of this, in November 2013, China has established the “East China Sea Joint Operational Command Center” allegedly to jointly operate the Navy and Air Force for such purposes as the effective surveillance of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone.”[64] The CCP 60 “The Military Balance 2016” states that at least two KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control systems are operational as of 2015. 61 On January 26, 2013, the Ministry of National Defense of China announced that for the first time it succeeded in a trial flight of the Y-20 large cargo aircraft developed by China. It is believed that since then China has continued to conduct related tests and trial flights. “The Military Balance 2016” notes that five aircraft at most have been included in the flight test program by the fourth quarter of 2015. It was reported that a Y-20 large cargo aircraft was formally deployed to a military force in June 2016. 62 HALE UAVs being developed by China include the Xianglong (Soar Dragon) considered the “Chinese Global Hawk.” The BZK-005 is a UAV that can be used for multiple purposes, such as reconnaissance, communications relay, and signals intelligence. It has been suggested that a UAV of unknown nationality that flew about 200 km north of the Senkaku Islands in September 2013 was the BZK-005. Some media have reported that this aircraft has been deployed to Woody Island of the Paracel Islands. Attack UAVs include the GJ-1 (“Yilong”) and CH-4 (“Caihong”), which are deemed to have taken part in the Peace Mission 2014 counter-terrorism combined exercise held in August 2014. “The Military Balance 2016” states that the GJ-1 is currently being operated by the Air Force. UAVs such as the BZK-005 and GJ-1 were unveiled at the military parade in September 2015. 63 In April 2014, Xi Jinping, CMC Chairman, visited an Air Force organization and referred to establishing an air force that “builds air-space capabilities and conducts offensive and defensive operations.” The defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) identifies “building air-space capabilities and conducting offensive and defensive operations” as a strategy for enhancing the military capabilities of the Air Force. 64 During his regular press conference on July 31, 2014, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China was asked whether the “East China Sea Joint Operational Command Center” had been i ----- also established the “Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center” to carry out decisionmaking at the highest strategic level. In November 2015, President Xi Jinping delivered an address regarding the specific direction of the military reforms, in which he elaborated on creating a sound command structure for joint operations of the CMC and establishing a command structure for joint operations in theaters of operations. In January 2016, the “four general departments” were dismantled, and the CMC introduced a system comprised of multiple sections. In February 2016, military regions were realigned into five new theaters of operations. As such, China may further develop its joint operational posture as military reforms make further progress. Furthermore, China has recently conducted drills aimed at the development of a joint operational posture, as demonstrated by long-distance mobile exercises which cut across military regions such as Stride and Firepower, as well as the joint exercises conducted among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and other units such as Mission Action 2013 and Joint Action. The above drills are considered to be intended to further facilitate coordination among the different military services as well as the mobilization of assets across theaters. The relevant developments will be a point to watch out for. - 5 Maritime Activities have been observed engaging in monitoring activities for the protection of its maritime rights and interests.[67] Extremely regrettable are such activities by China, which include: intermittent incursions into Japan’s territorial waters by Chinese government vessels; intrusion into Japan’s airspace; and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences, including a Chinese vessel’s direction of a fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer, the flight of Chinese military fighter jets abnormally close to an SDF aircraft, and activities that could infringe upon the freedom of overflight over the high seas, such as the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).” China is urged to act on the basis of the principle of the “rule of law.” See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section3 (Maritime Trends) **(2) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding Sea** **Areas** Regarding the activities of naval forces, the number of Chinese naval surface vessels advancing to the Pacific Ocean has increased in recent years, and such advancements continue to be conducted with high frequency.[68] Since 2008, Chinese naval fleets have transited the sea area between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island several times every year. Furthermore, every year since 2012, naval fleets have passed through the Osumi Strait and the sea area between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami Island near Iriomote Island. In March 2015, naval fleets navigated the sea area between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island westward. Naval fleets transited the Tsugaru Strait in October 2008 and February 2016 and the Soya Strait in July 2013, December 2014, and August 2015. In this regard, naval fleets are beginning to routinely pass through waters north of Japan. As such, the Chinese naval fleets’ advancements and homing routes to and from the Pacific Ocean continue to become diverse by incorporating the areas north of Japan, and it is understood that China seeks to improve its deployment capabilities to the open ocean. In October 2013, China conducted Maneuver 5, the first joint exercise by its three naval fleets in the western **(1) General Situation** In recent years, China is believed to be aiming to build up capabilities to conduct operations in more distant waters and airspace. Accordingly, China has rapidly expanded its maritime activities based on its sea and air powers both in qualitative and quantitative ways. In the sea areas and airspace surrounding Japan, Chinese naval vessels[65] and navy and air force aircraft have been observed conducting training exercises, such as carrierbased helicopter flights and fleet formation and maneuver exercises, as well as information gathering activities. A large number of Chinese government ships and aircraft that belong to maritime law enforcement agencies[66] 65 Examples of the activities of Chinese naval vessels are: a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine conducted “underwater navigation in the territorial waters of another country” in breach of international law in November 2004; it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Sovremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around said gas field in September 2005. 66 Surveillance and other activities at sea used to be conducted by “Maritime Police” (Haijing) of the Ministry of Public Security, “China Maritime Surveillance” (Haijian) of the State Oceanic Administration of the Ministry of Land and Resources, “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” (Yuzheng) of the Bureau of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture, “Maritime Safety Administration (Haixun)” of the Ministry of Transport, and the maritime anti-smuggling force of the General Administration of Customs, all of which were under the State Council. In March 2013, China decided to reorganize the four agencies, excluding “Maritime Safety Administration” into the new “State Oceanic Administration” and that the new organization would carry out surveillance and other activities under the name of “China Coast Guard” (Zhongguo Haijing) under the guidance of the Ministry of Public Security. In July of that year, the China Coast Guard was formally launched. It is believed that the State Committee of Border and Coastal Defense, under the guidance of the State Council and the CMC, is coordinating maritime activities by these maritime law-enforcement agencies and the Navy. 67 Concerning the PLA, there is a view that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, China intends to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international community tolerate and accept changes in the situation (Taiwan’s 2009 National Defense Report). 68 The number of advancements into the Pacific Ocean by Chinese Navy combatant vessels since 2008 was as follows: 2 times (2008); 1 time (2009); 3 times (2010); 2 times (2011); 7 times (2012); 11 times ----- Pacific Ocean. In December 2014, a similar joint exercise involving the three fleets was reportedly conducted.[69] In addition, Chinese naval vessels appear to conduct operations in the East China Sea continuously.[70] Stating its own position regarding the Senkaku Islands,[71] China alleges that patrols by Chinese naval vessels in the sea areas under its jurisdiction are completely justifiable and lawful. In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer and is suspected to have directed fire-control radar at a helicopter based on an MSDF destroyer.[72] Moreover, in June 2016, a Jiangkai I-class frigate of the Chinese Navy entered Japan’s contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands. This was the first time a Chinese Navy combatant vessel entered Japan’s contiguous zone. In recent years, Chinese Navy intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs) have also been found conducting multiple activities. A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly navigated back and forth outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015 and in waters outside of the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula in December 2015 and February 2016. In June 2016, the same type of AGI sailed in Japan’s territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and Yakushima Island and then sailed within Japan’s contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Subsequently, the vessel repeatedly conducted east-west passages outside the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. This was the first navigation in Japanese territorial waters by a Chinese Navy vessel in approximately 12 years. It is of serious concern that recently China has unilaterally escalated activities in waters near Japan, such as activities that are seen as actions based on their own assertions related to the Senkaku Islands and further expansion of its naval vessels’ reach to include the Senkaku Islands. With regard to activities of Chinese government vessels, in December 2008, China Maritime Surveillance vessels hovered and drifted inside Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands – operations which are not permitted under international law. In September 2010, Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and a Chinese fishing 12th offshore platform. Installation of a superstructure was confirmed in May 2016. trawler collided in Japan’s territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Subsequently, in August 2011 as well as in March and July 2012, “China Maritime Surveillance” vessels and “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” vessels intruded into Japan’s aforementioned territorial waters.[73] As these examples demonstrate, “China Maritime Surveillance” and “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” vessels have gradually intensified their activities in Japan’s territorial waters. Such activities increased considerably and Chinese government vessels began to intrude into the aforementioned territorial waters intermittently after September 2012, when the Japanese government acquired property rights to and ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands (Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). In April and September 2013, eight Chinese government vessels intruded into the aforementioned territorial waters simultaneously. The way in which government vessels have carried out operations intended to intrude into territorial waters since October 2013[74] suggested such operations had been routinized. In this light, an operations manual or other codes may have been developed. Since December 26, 2015, Chinese government vessels carrying weapons that appear to be cannons[75] have begun to repeatedly intrude into Japan’s territorial 69 Some news reports call this exercise “Maneuver 6.” Some of the vessels that participated in this exercise subsequently circled Japan by transiting the Soya and Tsushima Straits. 70 For example, a China Military Online article (October 21, 2015) reported that in recent years, the average number of days in a year that all major combatants in the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy conducted operations exceeded 150 days. 71 China makes its own assertion about the Senkaku Islands, which are an inherent part of the territory of Japan. In May 2013, a newspaper of the CCP carried an article which wrote, “It may be time to revisit the unresolved historical issue of the Ryukyu Islands,” and thus could be regarded as one that calls into question that Okinawa is part of Japan. The Chinese government explained that the article was written by researchers in their personal capacity. 72 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea). 73 In February 2012, a survey vessel of the Japan Coast Guard conducting a marine survey in Japan’s EEZ was demanded to stop the activity by two China Maritime Surveillance ships. Similar incidents occurred in May and September 2010. 74 While with some exceptions, two to three Chinese government vessels often intrude into Japan’s territorial waters two to three times a month from around 10 am for about two hours. 75 As of the end of June 2016, government vessels that have been confirmed to carry weapons that appear to be cannons are the “China Coast Guard 31239” and “China Coast Guard 31241.” It has been suggested that three Jiangwei I-class frigates belonging to the Chinese Navy were repaired to be handed over to the China Coast Guard. Similarly, it has been suggested that two Luda-class destroyers will be ----- larger-class vessel since August 2014. In February 2015, Fig. I-2-3-4 Recent Major Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan (The wakes shown are an illustration) **Chinese naval vessels have sailed several times in the following areas (examples of activities since 2014):** (1) Vessels sailed through Soya Strait in December 2014 (four vessels, westward) and in August 2015 (five vessels, eastward). (2) In February 2016, four vessels including Luhu-class destroyer sailed through Tsugaru Strait. (3) In December 2014, vessels transited Osumi Strait and moved from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and then sailed through Soya Strait westward. In August 2015, vessels transited Soya Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, and then navigated in the high seas of the Bering Sea. Subsequently, the vessels sailed the Pacific Ocean, transited between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island, and moved to the East China Sea. In February 2016, vessels sailed through Tsugaru Strait from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific Ocean, and then transited Osumi Strait from the Pacific Ocean to the East China Sea. (4) In December 2015 and February 2016, an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula. (5) Vessels transited Osumi Strait in June (three vessels, westward) and December 2014 (five vessels, eastward), in December 2015 (three vessels, eastward), and in February (four vessels, westward) and March 2016 (two vessels, eastward). (6) Vessels passed between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advanced to the Pacific Ocean in March (three vessels), May (two vessels), and June 2014 (three vessels), in February (two vessels), June (two vessels), July (three vessels), and December 2015 (three vessels), and in April (three vessels twice) and June 2016 (five vessels). (7) In March 2014, three vessels sailed the Pacific Ocean southwest of the main island of Okinawa. (8) Vessels transited between Yonaguni Island and Nakanokami Island in March 2014 (four vessels, northeastward), in August 2015 (three vessels, northward), and in April 2016 (three vessels, northward). (9) Government vessels have intruded into territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands since December 2008 and intruded into territorial waters intermittently since September 2012. In November 2015, an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. Since December 2015, government vessels carrying what appears to be cannons have repeatedly intruded into territorial waters. In June 2016, a frigate entered the contiguous zone north of the Senkaku Islands, and an AGI conducted round-trip passages in waters outside of the contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands. In addition, in March 2015, two vessels including Sovremenny-class destroyer (10) sailed between Amamioshima Island and Yokoatejima Island in the southwest direction. In June 2016, an AGI (11) sailed in territorial waters near Kuchinoerabu Island and then (12) in the contiguous zone north of Kitadaito Island. Furthermore, in January 2013, a Jiangkai I-class frigate is suspected to have directed fire-control radar at a helicopter based on an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea. In the same month, a Jiangwei II-class frigate directed fire-control radar at an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea. In the South China Sea, incidents have occurred, including standoffs between Chinese and Philippine vessels and Chinese and Vietnamese vessels. 3 Kitadaito Island 4 12 11 Okinawa 7 Tokyo 10 6 Kuchinoerabu 8 Island 5 9 South China Sea East China Sea Senkaku Taipei 2 Sea of Japan Islands 1 Ningbo ETOPO1 (NOAA) waters. Additionally, government vessels deployed to to the China Coast Guard[77] that was formally launched in seas near the Senkaku Islands are increasingly larger July 2013. In 2014, the Navy and the China Coast Guard in size, with at least one of the government vessels conducted a coordinated drill. Also, the Navy and the intruding into Japan’s territorial waters being a 3,000 t or Maritime Safety Administration conducted the joint drill three 3,000 t or larger-class government vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters simultaneously for the first time. China is also building the world’s largest 10,000 t-class patrol vessel, and two vessels[76] have reportedly already carried out sea trials. In this way, China is seen to be steadily strengthening an operational posture intended to use Chinese government vessels to intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. In October 2012, vessels of the East Sea Fleet of the Chinese Navy, along with “China Maritime Surveillance” and “China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command” vessels, conducted a joint exercise with a focus on maintaining and defending China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests. Furthermore, the Navy is believed to be supporting maritime law enforcement agencies both in terms of operation and equipment. For example, the Navy is thought to have handed over retired Navy vessels to the China Coast Guard[77] that was formally launched in July 2013. In 2014, the Navy and the China Coast Guard conducted a coordinated drill. Also, the Navy and the Maritime Safety Administration conducted the joint drill Poseidon 2014. See>> Fig. I-2-3-4 (Recent Major Chinese Activities in Waters near Japan) **(3) Situation of Activities in Japan’s Surrounding** **Airspace** In recent years, activities by Chinese Navy and Air Force aircraft, which appear to be gathering information about Japan of some form, have been intensified. The number of scrambles by the ASDF against Chinese aircraft is also increasing dramatically.[78] With regard to activities of air forces in the airspace above the East China Sea, Chinese aircraft have been diversifying their flight patterns. Multiple H-6 bombers in September 2007 and a Y-8 early warning aircraft in March 2010 flew into Japan’s ADIZ above the East China Sea and advanced near the Japan-China median line. In March 2011, a Y-8 patrol aircraft and Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft crossed the Japan-China median line 76 “China Coast Guard 2901” and “China Coast Guard 3901.” These government vessels allegedly carry a 76 mm cannon. 77 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3, Footnote 67. ----- An H-6 bomber flies over waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean (November 27, 2015) and approached within approximately 50 km of Japan’s airspace near the Senkaku Islands. In 2012, China intensified the activities of its aircraft, including fighters. In January 2013, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense made public the fact that Chinese military aircraft regularly conducted warning and surveillance activities and that Chinese fighters conducted activities believed to be Combat Air Patrols (CAP) in the East China Sea. In addition, in the same Chinese defense white paper, the phrase “air vigilance and patrols at sea” was added for the first time. On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government announced that it established the “East China Sea ADIZ” including the Senkaku Islands which China described as if they were a part of China’s “territory,” and that the Chinese Armed Forces would take “defensive emergency measures” in the case where aircraft does not follow the relevant rules set forth by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense.[79] On the same day, a Tu154 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft respectively flew over the East China Sea. On these, the Chinese Air Force announced that it conducted its first patrol flight since the establishment of the ADIZ. On December 26, 2013, the Chinese Armed Forces announced that in the one month that passed since the establishment of the ADIZ, a total of 87 reconnaissance aircraft, early warning aircraft and fighters were mobilized to the relevant airspace. In March and April 2011 and in April 2012, Chinese helicopters and other aircraft that appeared to belong to Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Fig. I-2-3-5 Chinese Aircraft (Times) 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 (FY) the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) flew close to MSDF destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance in the East China Sea.[80] Further still, in May and June 2014, two Su-27 fighters of China flew abnormally close to the aircraft of MSDF and ASDF that were conducting routine monitoring and surveillance activities in the East China Sea.[81] The Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced that SDF aircraft conducted dangerous acts against Chinese aircraft. However, the operations of SDF aircraft were legitimate in compliance with the international law. There is no truth to the Chinese assertion that SDF aircraft carried out dangerous acts. With respect to Chinese air forces’ advancement into the Pacific Ocean, ASDF’s scrambling fighters confirmed for the first time that a Y-8 early warning aircraft flew over waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean in July 2013. In 2015, similar flights were conducted by a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft on two consecutive days in February, by two H-6 bombers in May, by a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft, a Y-8 early warning aircraft, and two H-6 bombers (total: four aircraft) on two consecutive days in July, and by four H-6 bombers, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft, and a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft (total: six aircraft) in November,[82] respectively.[83] In late January 79 See Part 1, Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea). 80 For example, on March 7, 2011, a Chinese Z-9 helicopter that was believed to belong to the SOA flew as close as approximately 70 m and as low as approximately 40 m above the water around the Japanese destroyer Samidare, which was patrolling the waters in the central area of the East China Sea. On April 12, 2012, a Y-12 aircraft, which was believed to belong to the SOA, flew as close as approximately 50 m and as low as approximately 50 m above the water around the destroyer “Asayuki.” 81 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea). 82 In addition to the six aircraft, four H-6 bombers and a Y-8 early warning aircraft conducted operations near the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island during the same timeframe, although they did not fly over waters between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island.iliii ----- Fig. I-2-3-6 Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan (The fl ight paths shown are an illustration) November 2015*, four H-6 bombers and a Y-8 early Flew to the Pacific Ocean through airspace between the main island warning aircraft conducted operations near the main of Okinawa and Miyako Island island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Guam - a Y-8 airborne early warning aircraft (July 2013) - two H-6 bombers (September 2013) Tokyo - two Y-8 airborne early warning aircraft & two H-6 bombers (three November 2013, establishment of the consecutive days, October 2013) “East China Sea Air Defense - a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft & two H-6 bombers (March 2014) Identification Zone” was announced - two Y-8 airborne early warning aircraft, a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft & two H-6 bombers (December 6, 7, 10, and 11, 2014) Okinawa - a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft (two consecutive days, February 2015) A Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-8 - two H-6 bombers (May 2015) early warning aircraft flew over the East China East China Sea - a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft, a Y-8 airborne early warning Sea and Sea of Japan (January 2016) aircraft & two H-6 bombers (two consecutive days, July 2015) - four H-6 bombers, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft & Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft (November 2015*) - a Y-8 airborne early warning aircraft (April 2016) May and June 2014, over the East China Taipei - December 2012, fixed-wing aircraft of the State Oceanic Administration intruded into territorial airspace around the Sea, two Su-27 fighters came near Senkaku Islands for the first time (through March 2014, fixed-wing collision with MSDF’s and ASDF’s aircraft Ningbo aircraft of the SOA were frequently observed flying near the airspace) - June 2016, Chinese PLA aircraft flew southward towards the Su-30 fighters, J-11 fighters, KJ-2000 airborne early Senkaku Islands warning aircraft, etc. flew within the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” (November 2013, The following aircraft flew: announcement by the Chinese side) - a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft (two consecutive days, November 2013) - a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft & a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft (November 2013) The United States National Oceanic and - a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft (February 2014) Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 Qingdao - a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft (March 2014) - Same day activity 2016, a total of two aircraft, namely, a Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and a Y-8 early warning aircraft, fl ew over the Tsushima Strait before conducting operations in the Sea of Japan for the fi rst time. As such, China is further intensifying activities of its aircraft.[84] Regarding Japan’s airspace over and around the Senkaku Islands, territorial airspace intrusion by a fi xedwing aircraft of the SOA in December 2012 marked the fi rst such instance by a Chinese aircraft. Subsequently, fi xed-wing aircraft of the SOA were frequently observed fl ying near the airspace up through March 2014.[85] See>> Fig. I-2-3-5 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Chinese Aircraft); Fig. I-2-3-6 (Recent Chinese Activities in Airspace near Japan) Recently, Chinese PLA aircraft have also been seen fl ying in the southward direction near the Senkaku Islands. In June 2016, ASDF fi ghters scrambled against Chinese PLA aircraft that fl ew southward closer to the Senkaku Islands. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense released an offi cial announcement stating that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against Chinese PLA aircraft.[86] However, SDF aircraft conduct scrambles in accordance with international law and the Self Defense Forces Law, and it is not true that SDF aircraft conducted provocations against Chinese PLA aircraft. With stronger interests, attention will need to be paid to activities carried out by Chinese PLA aircraft recently near the Senkaku Islands. **(4) Situation of Activities in the South China Sea** China has also been intensifying its activities in the South China Sea, including waters around the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, over which territorial disputes exist with neighbors, including some ASEAN member states. In March 2009 and December 2013, a Chinese naval vessel and other vessels approached and intercepted a U.S. Navy vessel navigating in the South China Sea.[87] In August 2014, a PLA fi ghter is alleged to have fl own abnormally close to and intercepted a U.S. Forces aircraft.[88] It is also reported that Chinese naval vessels fi red warning shots at fi shing boats of neighboring countries. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been growing friction between China and its neighboring countries over the South China Sea, as illustrated by protests by Vietnam and the Philippines against China’s 84 On March 30, 2015, the spokesperson of the PLA Air Force announced that Air Force aircraft fl ew over the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines before conducting their fi rst drill in the West Pacifi c. An announcement was also made that a similar drill would be conducted on August 14 of the same year as well. On May 21, 2015, the same spokesperson announced that for the fi rst time PLA Air Force aircraft fl ew over a strait between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island before conducting a drill in the West Pacifi c. An announcement was also made that a similar drill would be conducted on November 27 of the year as well. 85 Some reports point out that China is constructing a heliport and radar installations on the Nanji Islands facing the East China Sea. 86 Regarding the scramble by ASDF fi ghters against Chinese PLA aircraft that fl ew southward towards the Senkaku Islands on June 17, 2016, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense released the following offi cial announcement: “Chinese fi ghter jets were approached by two Japanese F-15 fi ghter jets in high speed. They conducted provocations and used fi re-control radars against us. The Chinese PLA responded decisively and took measures such as tactical maneuver. Consequently, the Japanese fi ghter jets fl ew away after fi ring infrared jamming shells.” 87 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East China Sea and South China Sea). ----- Fiery Cross Reef. Rapid and large-scale land reclamation and the construction of a runway and other facilities are under way. (Left: as of August 14, 2014; center: as of March 18, 2015; right: as of May 1, 2016) [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/DigitalGlobe] Johnson South Reef. Facilities including (probable) radars are being built. (As of February 9, 2016) [CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/DigitalGlobe] development activities on the features in these waters, including land reclamation and various infrastructure development on the features. Since 2014, China has pressed ahead with rapid and large-scale land reclamation works[89] on seven features in the Spratly Islands.[90] China has built military facilities such as batteries and has developed various infrastructures that could be utilized for military purposes, such as runways, hangars, harbors, and radar facilities.[91] In Fiery Cross Reef, a large harbor capable of receiving surface combatants is being built. In January 2016, China declared completion of a 3,000 m-long runway which fighters and bombers can take off from and land on. Despite protests from neighboring countries, China went ahead with aircraft test flights there. In April 2016, a Navy patrol aircraft on patrol over the South China Sea landed at Fiery Cross Reef to evacuate urgent patients.[92] Likewise, in Subi and Mischief Reefs, China is thought to have conducted large-scale reclamations and be building large runways.[93] Building of facilities, such as harbors, helipads, and radars, has also proceeded on the four other features. In the Paracel Islands, China has similarly carried out land reclamations and promoted their use for military purposes. In Woody Island, China has extended the runway since 2013. In October 2015, China deployed J-11 and other fighters, and in February 2016, the deployment of equipment likely to be surfaceto-air missiles was confirmed. In recent years, Chinese vessels have allegedly been conducting what are likely to be survey activities in the Scarborough Shoal, where a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012.[94] The possibility of 89 The U.S. DoD’s “The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” (August 2015) states, “As of June 2015, [China] had reclaimed more than 2,900 acres of land” and “China has now reclaimed 17 times more land in 20 months than the other claimants combined over the past 40 years, accounting for approximately 95% of all reclaimed land in the Spratly Islands.” The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2016) notes, “China paused its land reclamation effort in the Spratly Islands in late 2015 after adding more than 3,200 acres of land.” 90 The seven features are: Johnson South Reef; Cuarteron Reef; Gaven Reefs; Hughes Reef; Fiery Cross Reef; Mischief Reef; and Subi Reef. 91 According to the outcome documents that the Chinese and U.S. governments released respectively following the China-U.S. summit meeting in September 2015, President Xi Jinping asserted, “Relevant construction activities that China is undertaking in the Spratly Islands do not target or impact any particular country, and China does not intend to pursue militarization.” However, in October 2015, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China denied “militarization,” but stated, “China has a number of necessary military facilities of a limited and purely defensive nature.” Furthermore the Ministry of National Defense announced in April 2016 that Fan Changlong, CMC Vice Chairman, had visited the Spratly Islands. 92 China is believed to have conducted three test flights at Fiery Cross Reef on January 2, 3, and 6 of 2016. In response, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam expressed strong opposition on January 2, and the Philippines protested in writing on January 8. Additionally, on April 17, 2016, a Chinese Navy patrol aircraft on patrol over the South China Sea evacuated a construction worker at a construction site on the Spratly Islands whose life was thought to be in danger due to disease as well as two other patients, from the airport in Fiery Cross Reef to an airport in Sanya, Hainan. 93 The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) view that the construction of runways is proceeding at a fast pace, describing that the runway presumably being built at Subi Reef is 3,250 m long and 55 m wide, and the runway presumably being built at Mischief Reef is 2,644 m long and 55 m wide. 94 Chinese government ships have begun to drive away Philippine law enforcement vessels and fishing boats approaching the Scarborough Shoal since a standoff took place between Chinese and Philippine government ships in April 2012. Subsequently, Philippine ships are said to be unable to approach the Scarborough Shoal. ----- **y** **Security Impacts of China’s Land Reclamation Work in the Spratly Islands** **Column** A number of countries are conducting development work on features of the Spratly Islands which stretch across central to southern South China Sea. This column focuses on rapid and large-scale land reclamation and infrastructure construction on the features that China has went ahead with in recent years and examines its impacts on security. First of all, if harbors on the Spratly Islands China has been building secure its ability to deploy, replenish, and maintain PLA and government vessels, it will be able to continuously station and deploy them in all areas of the South China Sea. This could signifi cantly improve its ability to conduct surveillance as well as operations in the sea. Secondly, building of a runway on Fiery Cross Reef will enable China to forward deploy and replenish a variety of air assets. Furthermore, installation of radar facilities on the Spratly Islands will considerably improve China’s surveillance capability in the South China Sea. These circumstances may improve its power projection capability throughout the area, allow China to acquire air superiority effortlessly, and by extension, increase its “A2/AD” capabilities. In addition, China is building runways on Subi and Mischief Reefs as well. When complete, they could further enhance China’s presence in the airspace of the area, and then China may declare a “South China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone” in the future. Upholding the “principle of the freedom of the high seas” and ensuring security of sea lanes in the South China Sea are of critical concern to Japan. Should China proceed with land reclamation work on the features and utilize them for military purposes, there may be negative security consequences including further heightening of tension with neighboring countries as well as increasing risks to stable use of sea lanes. Issues surrounding the South China Sea are of concern for the entire international community due to their direct implications for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacifi c region. In this regard, it is necessary to keep monitoring the situation in the sea, including activities of China there. new land reclamations in the shoal in the future has been suggested as well.[95] It has been pointed out that if China conducts land reclamations and installs radar facilities and other equipment in the Scarborough Shoal, it could possibly increase its ability to track the situation in the coastal areas of the Philippines and adjacent waters. Attention must continue to be paid to the status of Chinese activities in these waters. Such activities by China constitute acts that unilaterally change the status quo and further advance its efforts to create a fait accompli. Japan is deeply concerned about these activities, and the concern is shared with the international community, including the United States.[96] In response to the growing international concerns over the development on the features, China asserts that a number of ASEAN member states including the Philippines and Vietnam are illegitimately occupying features of the Spratly Islands and carrying out largescale construction work to build fi xed facilities such as airstrips[97] However, China’s development work on the features is of a scale incomparable to the activities carried out by other countries[98] and is being conducted at a rapid pace. In any case, the issues over the South China Sea are of concern to the entire international community due to their direct implications for peace and security of the Asia-Pacifi c region. Countries concerned including China are urged to refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the “rule of law.” 95 On March 17, 2016, with regard to China’s activities near the Scarborough Shoal, U.S. Chief of Naval Operation John Richardson stated, “I think we see some surface ship activity and those sorts of things, survey type of activity, going on. That’s an area of concern...a next possible area of reclamation.” According to media reports, it has also been suggested that, “China will start reclamation at the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea later this year and may add an airstrip to extend its air force’s reach over the contested waters.” 96 As regards U.S. concerns, for example, on November 7, 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter stated at the Reagan Defense Forum that, “The United States, joins virtually everyone else in the region, in being deeply concerned about the pace and scope of [China’s] land reclamation in the South China Sea, the prospect of further militarization, as well as the potential for these activities to increase the risk of miscalculation or confl ict among claimant states.” On November 21, 2015, at the Halifax International Security Forum, Commander Harry Harris of the U.S. Pacifi c Command noted that “Tensions in the region were signifi cantly heightened” because of China’s development work on the features in the South China Sea, and that it “raised concerns” among nations including the United States. In June 2016, Secretary Carter stated at the Asia Security Summit that, “China’s actions in the South China Sea are isolating it... if these actions continue, China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.” As regards the concerns of the international community, for example, on May 26, 2015, President of the European Council Donald Tusk criticized China over its land reclamation on the features in the South China Sea, stating that “construction activities on the sea” “will make it much more diffi cult to solve the problem” in the region. At the G7 Summit held in Elmau, Germany on June 7-8, 2015, a Leaders’ Declaration was released stating that, “[w]e strongly oppose...any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, such as large scale land reclamation.” Furthermore, the Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Summit adopted on November 23, 2015 stated, “We shared the concerns expressed by some Leaders” on “the increased presence of military assets” and “further militarisation of outposts” in the South China Sea. The Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat announced on February 27, 2016 expressed that the ministers were “seriously concerned” over the situation in the South China Sea and affi rmed the “importance of non-militarisation” in the region. Additionally, the G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Maritime Security released on April 11, 2016 included the following text: “We are concerned about the situation in the...South China Sea” and “We express our strong opposition to any intimidating, coercive or provocative unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions.” The G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration included the following statements regarding maritime security: “We reaffi rm the importance of states’ making and clarifying their claims based on international law”; “seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means including through juridical procedures including arbitration”; and “We are concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas.” 97 Remark by the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on April 29, 2015. According to CSIS/AMTI information from May 2016, Vietnam reclaimed over 120 acres of land on a total of ten features in the last two years. ----- following which, in January 2016, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China announced that China and Djibouti held consultations and reached agreement regarding the building of “security facilities.”[104 ] Some indicate that under the “String of Pearls” strategy, China supports Indian Ocean countries to build port infrastructure to secure places for making port calls and strengthen the defense of China’s sea lanes.[105] **(6) Objectives of Maritime Activities** Taking into consideration such factors as the situation of the development of Chinese naval and air forces, activities in sea areas and airspace, statements in defense white papers, China’s geographical location and economic globalization, the maritime activities of the Chinese Navy, Air Force and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives. The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to defend its territory, territorial waters and territorial airspace. Behind this objective is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology. The second is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. In trying to prevent foreign intervention into Taiwan surrounded by the sea in all directions through China’s use of force, China needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea and airspace. The third is to weaken the control of other countries over the islands to which China claims territorial sovereignty and to strengthen the claim through various surveillance activities and use of force at sea and in airspace surrounding the islands. The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying for the drilling in the East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that in addition to the existing 4 platforms, China is building 12 new offshore platforms on the See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3 (Maritime Trends) **(5) Situation of Activities in the “Far Seas”** The Chinese Navy is thought to be shifting its naval forces towards “offshore waters defense and open seas protection,”[99] and is steadily increasing its capabilities to conduct operations in more distant seas such as the Indian Ocean in recent years. For example, since December 2008, Chinese Navy vessels sail in the Indian Ocean to the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to take part in international anti-piracy efforts. In 2010 and 2013, a Chinese Navy’s hospital ship carried out “Mission Harmony,” a medical service mission to assist countries, including those off the coast of the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the Chinese Navy sent its vessels through Sunda Strait to the eastern Indian Ocean as part of an exercise from January to February 2014. Outside of the Indian Ocean, in September 2015, five Chinese vessels[100] sailed in the high seas in the Bering Sea and entered U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands.[101] Activities of Chinese Navy submarines are also beginning to be spotted continuously in the Indian Ocean. From the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2014, a Chinese Navy’s Shang-class nuclear submarine reportedly conducted operations in the Indian Ocean. From September to October 2014, a Song-class submarine conducted operations in the Indian Ocean and called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka, twice in the same year. This marked the first time that a Chinese submarine entered port overseas.[102] In May 2015, a Yuan-class submarine reportedly called at a port in Karachi, Pakistan. Additionally, China has been securing overseas bases of activities such as harbors, which would help support its far seas operations. For example, it has been pointed out from previously that a PLA base would be built in Djibouti located in a strategic position in East Africa facing the Gulf of Aden.[103] In December 2015, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Djibouti, mentioned at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation that, “The PLA base will be established in a section of the new Doraleh port under construction,” 99 See the defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015). 100 The vessels are part of the fleet that participated in the China-Russia naval combined exercise, Joint Sea 2015 (II), conducted off the coast of Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan from August 20 to 28, 2015. The vessels presumably sailed the Soya Strait and then headed towards the Bering Sea. 101 Under international law, military vessels, like general ships, are granted the right of innocent passage to traverse the territorial waters of a coastal state, so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of this state. According to the United States, the coastal state in this case, the Chinese vessels’ navigation did not violate international law. 102 On September 25, 2014, the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China formally admitted for the first time that a Chinese submarine called at a port in Colombo, Sri Lanka. 103 For example, in May 2015, Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of Djibouti, is said to have revealed that Djibouti and China were negotiating about building of a military base. 104 The Chinese word for “security” has the meaning of “support.” 105 China is collaborating on port development projects and other programs with local governments at such ports as Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, Chittagong Port in Bangladesh, and ----- Chinese side of the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since June 2013. In May 2016, superstructures were installed on 2 of the 12 platforms at which only a foundation had been installed. Japan has repeatedly lodged protests against such unilateral development by China and demanded the termination of such work.[106] The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications. In the background is the fact that its sea lanes of communications, including its crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important for the globalizing Chinese economy. The question of which parts of its sea lanes of communication the Chinese Navy deems it should defend depends on such factors as the international situation at the time. However, given the recent strengthening of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they will develop a capacity to defend areas past China’s near seas to the “far seas.” Given these objectives and recent trends in China’s activities in sea areas and airspace, it is believed that China plans to further expand the sphere of its maritime activities, and further intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan, including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well as the South China Sea and the airspaces over these sea areas. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to activities such as operations of naval vessels and Navy and Air Force aircraft, various surveillance operations near Japan, developments of facilities that serve as bases for these activities,[107] and evolution of China’s interpretation regarding the nature and scope of rights in China’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and other areas.[108] Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected situations at sea. For example, in April 2014, China, together with other countries such as Japan and the United States, agreed to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards of behavior in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) member states have unexpected encounters. In September 2014, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities agreed in principle to resume consultations to swiftly begin the implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism, which China had not agreed to since September 2012. Following this, the fourth Joint Working Group meeting was held in January 2015, and the fifth Joint Working Group meeting was held in June 2015.[109] At the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Malaysia in November 2015, the two sides confirmed that they would aim to swiftly begin the implementation of the Mechanism.[110] Additionally, in November 2014, President Obama and President Xi Jinping announced that they agreed on two confidence-building measures[111] in order to lower the risk of unintended encounters between the United States and China, and in September 2015, announced that they agreed on additional annexes.[112] - 6 International Military Activities In recent years, the PLA has begun emphasizing nontraditional security missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and antipiracy. In order to carry out these missions, it has actively dispatched its units overseas. It is believed that in the background of the PLA’s stance on international military activities is the expansion of China’s national interests beyond its national borders, which in turn increased its necessity to protect and promote its national interests overseas, as well as China’s intent to raise its stature by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the 106 With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, in September 2010, China unilaterally announced postponement of the negotiation to conclude an international agreement with Japan for implementing the so-called “June 2008 Agreement.” While the negotiation has not been resumed yet, it is pointed out that China is highly likely carrying out gas production in the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) and elsewhere. Meanwhile, China’s SOA announced that the “Haiyangshiyou 981” oil rig succeeded in its first drilling in the South China Sea in May 2012. 107 China is reportedly constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island. Experts point out that the base is in a strategically important location that secures access to the South China Sea as well as the western Pacific, and that China is advancing construction work in order for the base to play a role as a major hub of the South Sea Fleet, including for the deployment of aircraft carrier. 108 It is pointed out that, in recent years, China aims to limit military activities of other countries in coastal areas of China’s EEZs by employing its own interpretations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For instance, the Chinese government announced in a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 26, 2010 that it is opposed to unsanctioned military activities by any country in coastal areas of China’s EEZs. 109 Since 2008, Japanese and Chinese defense authorities have conducted three rounds of consultations. In June 2012, the two sides agreed to hold regular meetings, set up a hotline, and establish a “maritime communication mechanism” to allow for direct communication between vessels and aircraft. The purpose was to deepen mutual understanding and mutual trust, strengthen defense cooperation, avoid unexpected incidents, and prevent unexpected situations at sea and in airspace from developing into military confrontations or political issues. At the fourth Joint Working Group meeting, the two sides agreed to change the name of the mechanism to “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” to clarify that aircraft are included. At the fifth Joint Working Group meeting, the two sides agreed to accelerate the related preparatory work to begin the implementation of the Mechanism. 110 This was the first Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting in four years and five months. At the meeting, Minister of Defense Nakatani looked forward to developing a good environment for enhancing the bilateral relations through collaboration between defense authorities and promotion of defense exchanges. In addition, the Minister stated his views regarding the issues between Japan and China and held a candid exchange of views. The two ministers affirmed the importance of deepening Japan-China defense exchanges to strengthen their relations, including swiftly beginning the implementation of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between their defense authorities. 111 The first measure concerns mutual notification of military activities, and the second measure concerns rules of behavior to avoid incidents at sea and in airspace.l ----- international community. China vows to consistently support and actively participate in U.N. PKOs. According to the Ministry of National Defense of China, it has sent more than 351,000 military personnel to them. According to the U.N., as of late April 2016, China has contributed a total of 3,042 troop personnel, police officers, and military observers to U.N. PKOs,[113] including UNMISS,[114] and has significantly increased its share of the PKO budget.[115] In this manner, China has actively made personnel and financial contributions and has a growing presence in U.N. PKO. It is deemed that partly underlying China’s proactive attitude towards U.N. PKOs is China’s wish to strengthen its relations with the regions where PKOs are conducted, particular with African nations, by way of these activities. Since December 2008, the Chinese Navy has conducted its first mission in distant waters, dispatching vessels to the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden in order to escort Chinese and other ships. The Chinese Navy is hence improving its capacity to continuously execute naval operations in more distant waters, demonstrating that China is placing a greater emphasis on protecting its sea lanes of transportation. China has reached an agreement with Djibouti, a country facing the Gulf of Aden, to build facilities there for providing logistics support to its military forces. China also supports the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries. In this regard, the Chinese Navy could further build up its capabilities to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean and other distant waters. In view of the deteriorating situation in Libya, China carried out an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals from the country from February through March 2011. In this operation, China dispatched a Navy vessel and Air Force transportation aircraft to Libya. This is the military’s first participation in an evacuation operation of Chinese nationals living overseas. In addition, from November to December 2013, China dispatched a hospital ship to conduct medical relief activities in the Philippines. From March to September 2014, China dispatched a Navy vessel, Air Force transport aircraft, among other assets for the search of the Malaysian airliner that went missing in March 2014. In December 2014, a Chinese Navy vessel helped supply water in Malé, the capital city of the Maldives. In response to the Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa, China provided assistance to Sierra Leone and Liberia centered on medical assistance, including the dispatch of units to help fight Ebola. From March to April 2015, based on the worsening situation in Yemen, the Chinese Navy’s counter-piracy forces docked at the ports of Aden, Al Hudaydah, and elsewhere for the evacuation of Chinese nationals and foreign nationals, including one Japanese national, living in Yemen. China’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities have received international praise. It has been pointed out, however, that through such activities, China aims to build a pacifist and humanitarian image of its military forces and demonstrate, both domestically and internationally, its intent to place priority on military operations other than war. It is also suggested that China hopes to test its ability to project its military power to distant locations. - 7 Education and Training In recent years, the PLA has conducted practical exercises including large-scale exercises such as joint exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, confrontation exercises, landing exercises, and exercises that cut across military regions, as well as night-time exercises and joint exercises with other countries in order to strengthen its operational capabilities. The goal of “being able to fight and winning battles” was repeatedly mentioned in statements by General Secretary Xi Jinping as well as in the military training instructions given by the general staff. This is construed as evidence that the military is promoting implementation of more practical exercises.[116] The whole PLA military training conference in 2006 emphasized promotion of a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect since 2009, highlights training for military operations other than war (MOOTW), education in knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training, 113 According to media reports, a total of ten Chinese officers and soldiers have been killed in the line of duty while carrying out U.N. PKO missions as of April 2016. In May 2016, a Chinese U.N. PKO unit that was deployed to Mali was attacked by Islamic extremists, killing one and wounding five officers and soldiers. 114 In September 2014, China’s State Council and CMC decided to deploy 700 infantry personnel to South Sudan. From January to March 2015, China’s first U.N. PKO operational units arrived in South Sudan. 115 China’s share of the U.N. PKO budget was approximately 6.6% in FY2015, ranking it sixth. China’s share then increased significantly to approximately 10.2% in FY2016, exceeding Japan and ranking China second after the United States. 116 The 2015 military training instructions continued to promote practical trainings. They pursued the realization of military governance based on law, showing that the “rule of law” element presented at the fourth l ----- and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint exercises by different services. In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, it launched a human resource strategy project to develop human resources capable of directing joint operations/ informatized operations and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards. It is believed that its objective is to secure highly capable human resources. On the other hand, in recent years, a variety of issues have been raised in relation to benefits, including remuneration, the personnel development system, and the treatment of veterans.[117] China has been developing a mobilization system to make effective use of civilian resources in the case of war and other emergencies. In February 2010, China enacted the National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization, and in July of the same year, put the law into effect. China outlined the promotion of “rule of law” at the fourth plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in 2014 and is proceeding to develop various related laws. In November 2014, China revised the existing National Security Law and enacted the Anti-Spy Law to strengthen the domestic espionage prevention mechanisms, and the law entered into force on the same day. Following this, in July 2015, a new National Security Law was enacted that covers not only security from external threats, but a comprehensive range of national security areas including stability, security, and development. In December 2015, China passed the Anti-Terrorism Law, which will strengthen state control, and this law entered into force on January 1, 2016. Attention will be paid to how the security-related legislation will be implemented. - 8 National Defense Industry Sector While China imports highly sophisticated military equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, China is believed to place emphasis on their indigenous production. The country manufactures much of its military equipment domestically and actively carries out R&D of new equipment. China’s national defense industry sector appears to be making advances due to the improvement of private industry infrastructures accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector serves the role of supporting the strengthening of Chinese military forces.[118] Growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors. However, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. Under the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, a department of the State Council, China has formed ten corporations to develop and produce nuclear weapons, missiles, rockets, aircraft, vessels, and other conventional weapons. In doing so, China promotes, in particular, two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for developing the national economy, and, in turn, civilian technologies are absorbed for a buildup of national defense. As a result, specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the shipbuilding industry. Furthermore, China encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dualuse industries. China is thus thought to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries. 117 The report “China’s Incomplete Military Transformation” (February 2015) by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission and the RAND Corporation identifies the weaknesses of the PLA as the following: (1) organizational structure (e.g., party-military relations); (2) organizational culture (e.g., corruption); (3) force structure (size of the PLA, recruitment system, veteran’s benefits); (4) command structure (e.g. military regions); and (5) human capital (e.g. decline in the quality and mindset of new soldiers stemming from the one-child policy, etc.). 118 The U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” (May 2015) states that China’s advanced technology acquisition strategy continues to ----- **3 Relations with Other Countries** - 1 General Situation China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests confl ict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, including attempting to change the status quo by coercion. China is poised to fulfi ll its unilateral demands without compromise, which has included making steady efforts to turn this status quo into a fait accompli. In addition, China has acted to create its unique international order. In May 2014, President Xi Jinping criticized military alliances and proposed “the security of Asia by the people of Asia” at the CICA. Furthermore, China has proposed to build a “New Model of MajorCountry Relations” with the United States,[119] and calls on the United States to respect China’s “core interests.” Some have speculated that through this concept, China attempts to have the United States accept the partitioning of U.S. and Chinese interests in the Asia-Pacifi c. On the other hand, China recognizes that a peaceful and stable international environment is necessary for maintaining sustainable economic development and enhancing China’s overall national power. Based on such recognition, in its relationships with other countries, China proactively carries out military exchanges including reciprocal visits by senior military offi cials and joint military exercises. In recent years, China has been engaged in dynamic military exchanges not only with major powers such as the United States and Russia and with its neighboring countries including Southeast Asian countries, but also with countries in Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the objectives of China’s promotion of military exchanges are thought to include alleviating other countries’ concerns regarding China by strengthening its relations with these countries, creating a favorable security environment for China, enhancing China’s infl uence in the international community, securing stable supplies of natural resources and energy, and building foreign bases. China is believed to consider military exchanges as a strategic means to safeguard its national interests, and as such, to position military exchanges as an element in China’s overall diplomatic strategy. Moreover, China has set forth the “One Belt, One Road” concept[120] as its foreign policy. In the international fi nance domain, China plays a leading role in the establishment of the New Development Bank (BRICS Development Bank) and AIIB. - 2 Relations with Taiwan China upholds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the “one-China” principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon its efforts for peaceful unifi cation, and expresses that it would take up policies and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people’s interest and to protect their due authority. Meanwhile, China is strongly opposed to any foreign intervention in the unifi cation of China as well as any move towards the independence of Taiwan, and on this basis, has repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, clearly lays out the nonrenunciation of the use of military force by China.[121] Former President Ma Ying-jeou (Kuomintang) of Taiwan advocated a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development by expanding economic exchanges with China and maintaining the status quo rather than gaining independence. As a result, the bilateral relationship deepened primarily along the economic realm, which included the entry into force of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). In February 2014, the Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Offi ce of the State Council of China and the Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan held the fi rst ministerial meeting between China and Taiwan in Nanjing. In November 2015, President Xi Jinping and President Ma Ying-jeou held the fi rst China-Taiwan summit meeting since the two have split. Nevertheless, Tsai Ing-wen (Democratic Progressive Party) won a landslide victory over Zhu Lilun (Kuomintang) in the presidential election in January 2016. Furthermore, DPP won a sweeping victory in the Legislative Yuan elections held on the same day. The inauguration of the DPP 119 “New Model of Major-Country Relations” dates back to 2012, when then Vice President Xi Jinping visited the United States and utilized the term during his talks with President Obama. China explains that the concept is based on: (1) no confl ict, no-confrontation; (2) mutual respect; and (3) win-win cooperation. 120 According to an announcement by China’s National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce (March 2015), the “One Belt, One Road” concept is a Chinese initiative designed to establish a contemporary silk road, and is a collective term for the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) that President Xi Jinping announced in succession from September to October 2013. The priority areas are: (1) policy coordination; (2) facilities connectivity; (3) unimpeded trade; (4) fi nancial integration; and (5) people-to-people bond. 121 The law stipulates, “[in] the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunifi cation should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures ----- government led by new President Tsai Ing-wen in May 2016 may have implications on China-Taiwan relations. On the security front, while China urges that the two make contact and hold exchanges over military issues at an appropriate time in order to explore the creation of mechanisms for building mutual trust over military security, Taiwan has shown a cautious stance, stating that the conditions are not yet met.[122] Regarding the Senkaku Islands, China and Taiwan have their own assertions,[123] and Taiwan has expressed reluctance to work with China. Attention will be paid to the developments related to future China-Taiwan relations, including the trends of political dialogues on military and other affairs. - 3 Relations with the United States relationship exactly entails.[126] Regarding the Senkaku Islands, the United States has reiterated that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applies to the islands.[127] China protested, stating that it would never accept any word or deed that includes the islands within the scope of the treaty (statement by a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010). With regard to the issues over the South China Sea, the United States is concerned about such dimensions as obstruction to the freedom of navigation in maritime transport routes, restrictions on the activities of U.S. Forces, and the worsening security situation in the entire region. The United States has requested China to comply with international norms, and has repeatedly criticized China’s unilateral and assertive actions.[128] The United States implements the Freedom of Navigation Operation[129] in the South China Sea to counteract excessive claims to maritime interests by China and other countries. China and the United States have deepened military exchanges and conducted various policy dialogues. China has dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. In November 2013, the U.S. and Chinese armies conducted a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise. In addition, from June 2014, Chinese navy vessels participated in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) for the first time. However, while China wishes to develop relations between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, it asserts that there are a number of issues that must be resolved in order to realize the sound development of the relations. The issues include U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft within China’s EEZs, legal hurdles in mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in China on the part of the United States.[130] Some unstable facets have been observed in military exchanges of the two There are various outstanding issues between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.-China relationship is essential for China to develop its economy, it is believed that China will continue to aspire to maintain stable relations with the United States. The United States states that it welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China, and that it will continue to further deepen cooperative relations between the two countries. At the same time, the United States calls on China to uphold international rules and norms on global issues, including maritime security, international trade, and human rights, and states that it would continue to closely monitor China’s military modernization and expanding presence in Asia.[124] Furthermore, the United States sees China as one of the “revisionist states” that are challenging international norms, and perceives that it poses serious security concerns.[125] Conversely, China seeks to establish what it calls a “New Model of MajorCountry Relations” based on mutual respect and “winwin” cooperation. However, the United States and China have not necessarily reached a consensus on what this 122 For China’s stance, see the remarks made by then CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. For Taiwan’s stance, see the QDR released by the Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan on March 13, 2013. 123 Taiwanese authority vessels intruded into Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands three times in 2012. 124 U.S. National Security Strategy (February 2015). 125 U.S. National Military Strategy (July 2015). 126 The United States is cautious on the concept of the “(New Model of) Major-Country Relations” that describes the United States and China as having an “equal” and “special” relationship. The United States has shown intent not to utilize the term “core interests” and align itself with China’s unilateral assertions. 127 In April 2014, President Obama became the first U.S. President in history to clearly state that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty applied to the Senkaku Islands. 128 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3, Footnote 91. 129 As part of the Freedom of Navigation Operation of the U.S. Forces, U.S. Navy vessel USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands in October 2015. The U.S. Navy vessel USS Curtis Wilbur sailed within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands in January 2016. The U.S. Navy vessel USS William P. Lawrence sailed within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef of the Spratly Islands in May 2016. 130 According to remarks by then CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in a meeting with then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009). Then Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Department Ma Xiaotian stated at the 11th round of the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks held in December 2010 that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. laws that impose restrictions on contacts between the military forces of the two countries, and the frequent military reconnaissance operations conducted by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft in coastal areas of China’s EEZs constituted key obstacles to developing stable ----- countries.[131] For example, China notified suspensions of the major military exchanges with the United States when the U.S. DoD notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010. On the other hand, the United States asserts that U.S.-China relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing misunderstanding. With regard to military exchanges, it is believed that the aim of the United States is to improve the current situation, wherein such exchanges are frequently suspended once problems arise, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining more stable channels of decision-making for mutual understanding. In recent years, for instance, Strategic Security Dialogues have been established in 2011 in the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,[132] and these dialogues have been held annually. In addition, in November 2014 and September 2015, it was announced that an agreement was reached on confidence-building measures aimed at lowering the risk of unintended encounters between the United States and China.[133] - 4 Relations with Russia years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China. However, it is suggested that China has shown strong interest in continuing to import Russia’s advanced equipment. For example, in November 2015, China reportedly signed an agreement with a Russian state-run military company to purchase 24 Su-35 fighters, which are considered 4.5-generation fighters. It is also suggested that an agreement was reached between China and Russia regarding the import of the S-400 surface-toair missile system.[136] At the same time, it is pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia and of differentiating the performance of the weapons it exports. It is also suggested that Russia has concerns about competing with China in arms exports. China and Ukraine have deep ties in the field of arms procurement, as indicated by China’s purchase of the Ukrainian unfinished Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Varyag, which became the basis of the aircraft carrier Liaoning. In this regard, attention will also be paid to the situation in Ukraine. Military exchanges between China and Russia take place in such forms as routine mutual visits by senior military officers and joint exercises. For example, the Ever since the China-Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, China and Russia have placed importance on their bilateral relationship. They have emphasized the deepening of their “strategic partnership” since its establishment in the mid-1990s. In 2001, the ChinaRussia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation[134] was concluded. In 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries came to a settlement. The two countries have a common view on promoting the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order, and have further deepened their relations. On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including fighters, destroyers, and submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China.[135] Meanwhile, their trade amounts are said to be declining in recent 131 When the U.S. DoD notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan in December 2015, while China expressed strong opposition, no major military exchanges between China and the United States were cancelled. 132 At the eighth U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in June 2016, talks took place regarding topics such as the issues of the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear development, investment agreement, and excessive production of steel. 133 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5(6). 134 Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace. 135 According to SIPRI, Russia accounts for 59% of China’s arms exports from 2011 to 2015. 136 It is suggested that China is plagiarizing, copying, and reverse-engineering military science technologies, including redesigning its own J-11B fighter based on the Russian-made Su-27 fighter. Feeling strong discontent and casting doubts over China, it is suggested that Russia is cautious about supplying state-of-the-art equipment to China, such as the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 surface-to-air missile. For example, Russia has allegedly requested that the agreement regarding the supply of Su-35 fighters requires the payment of a vast amount of compensation if China copies and produces the fighter. It has also ----- two countries have held the large-scale naval combined exercise Joint Sea every year since 2012.[137] These exchanges will likely enable China to not only deepen mutual understanding and confidence-building between their militaries, but also learn about the operation methods of Russian-made weapons and the operational doctrine of the Russian Armed Forces. Furthermore, China holds the counter-terrorism combined exercise Peace Mission among China and Russia or among the member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that includes China and Russia.[138] While counter-terrorism is the purpose of these exercises, they have dimensions of practical military exercises. For example, fighters and attack UAVs participated in Peace Mission 2014 conducted in August 2014. With the leaders and military forces of both countries participating in their respective commemorative events for the 70th anniversary of war victories in 2015, the two countries continue to enjoy good military relations.[139] - 5 Relations with Other Countries including Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, in accordance with UNCLOS.[141] In July 2016, a final ruling was rendered in which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions were ruled in favor of the Philippines. China has said it will not accept the ruling, and attention needs to be paid to forthcoming developments. China is actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and the ROK), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In October 2013, President Xi Jinping visited Indonesia and Malaysia, and Premier Li Keqiang visited Brunei, Thailand and Vietnam. While China has deepened its economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN member states through diplomatic forums, more recently, it has proactively advanced cooperation in the area of national security by enhancing exchanges of military personnel such as mutual visits of their senior military officials and exchanges and cooperation between military departments. **(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries** The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders, and there are lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Therefore, China is deeply concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states such as terrorism by Islamic extremists. Such concerns of China appear to be reflected in China’s engagement in SCO, which was established in June 2001. Moreover, China is strongly interested in the abundant energy and natural resources of Central Asia, with a view to diversifying its supply source and procurement methods of these resources. China promotes cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations. **(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries** As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has continuously developed bilateral relations with the countries through active mutual top-level visits and other means. For example, China has had good relations with Myanmar and has assisted in developing Myanmar’s infrastructure such as pipelines for petroleum or natural gas, ports, and railroads. It also has supplied key military equipment. Some point out that this close relationship is associated with Myanmar’s location which provides China the shortest access to the Indian Ocean.[140] Meanwhile, some ASEAN countries have shown alarm over China’s advancements in the South China Sea. For example, China’s drilling in the oil and gas fields in the Paracel Islands in May 2014 has escalated tension between China and Vietnam. In addition, the Philippines has instituted arbitral proceedings against China regarding their disputes over the South China Sea, 137 The Joint Sea exercise was held in April 2012, July 2013, May 2014, and May and August 2015 in the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok, northern East China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Peter the Great Gulf, respectively. It is suggested that Joint Sea in 2016 will be held in the South China Sea. 138 The Peace Mission exercise was held among China and Russia in August 2005, July 2009, and July to August 2013, and among the SCO member countries including China and Russia in August 2007, September 2010, June 2012, and August 2014. 139 President Xi Jinping attended the commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of victory day held in Moscow in May 2015, and the PLA participated in the military parade. President Putin attended the “commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression” held in Beijing in September 2015, and the Russian Armed Forces participated in the military parade. 140 Some observers also believe that Myanmar is attempting to end its excessive dependence on China in terms of diplomacy. ----- **(3) Relations with South Asian Countries** China has traditionally maintained a particularly close relationship with Pakistan, and mutual visits by their leaders take place frequently.[142] Their cooperation in the military sector, including exporting weapons and transferring military technology, is also considered to be deepening. As the importance of sea lanes increases for the globalizing Chinese economy, it is believed that the importance of Pakistan is rising for China, partly because of the geopolitical features of Pakistan which faces the Indian Ocean. China and India have undemarcated areas,[143] and it is deemed that “problems” over this area have arisen between the two countries even in recent years.[144] On the other hand, China has recently striven to improve its relationship with India, while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Identifying China’s relationship with India as a strategic partnership, the leaders of the two countries actively conduct mutual visits. It is believed that the deepening of bilateral relations is attributed to the importance China places on the economic growth of both countries as well as China’s response to strengthening U.S.-India relations. In recent years, China has also been deepening its relations with Sri Lanka. China constructed a deep sea port in Hambantota. In addition, the Chinese and Sri Lankan governments are jointly carrying out a port city development project in Sri Lanka’s major city of Colombo. Initially after taking office, President Maithripala Sirisena, who had campaigned to shift from a diplomacy oriented towards China to a diplomacy oriented towards all countries and won the election in January 2015, suspended infrastructure development projects financed by China. Subsequently, however, it has been confirmed that Sri Lanka is moving to resume these projects. Furthermore, it has been suggested that Sri Lanka is considering withdrawing its policy to ban Chinese submarines from making port calls as the President had initially announced. Additionally, China is deepening its relations with Bangladesh, such as by developing the harbor in Chittagong where a naval base is located and exporting arms.[145] With regard to military exchanges, China has conducted a variety of joint exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003, including joint naval search and rescue exercises and counter-terrorism exercises. **(4) Relations with EU Countries** For China, the European Union (EU) countries are now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, through diplomatic opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.[146] Regarding information technology, avionics, and AIP systems for submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than China or Russia which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China were lifted, the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China and would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. For this reason, Japan has consistently expressed to the EU its objection to the lifting of the arms embargo on China, as well as requested EU member states to carry out more rigorous management of the exports of arms, dual-use goods, and their technologies to China. Continuous attention will need to be paid to future discussions within the EU. **(5) Relations with Middle East and African Countries, Pacific** **Islands, and Central and South American Countries** China has been enhancing its relations with Middle Eastern and African nations in the economic realm, including providing active assistance for their infrastructure development and investment in their resource and energy development, and has been further expanding its influence in the region. In recent years, not only interactions among state leaders[147] and senior military officials but also arms exports and exchanges between military forces are actively conducted.[148] Underlying these moves could be China’s aim to ensure a stable 142 In April 2015, Xi Jinping made the first official visit to Pakistan by a Chinese President in nearly nine years. During the summit meeting, Xi Jinping underscored China’s intention to build a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and strengthen their security cooperation. China identifies CPEC, a ground transport route that starts from the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, as a flagship project of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, and announced that China would invest US$46 billion in CPEC. 143 They include the Kashmir region and the state of Arunachal Pradesh. 144 According to a press conference by the spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense of China in August 2013. In September 2014, when President Xi Jinping visited India, Prime Minister Modi expressed concern over the PLA’s cross-border activities in the Kashmir region and underscored the need for the resolution of the issue. 145 According to SIPRI, Bangladesh accounts for 20% of China’s arms exports from 2011 to 2015, which is the second largest share. For example, in December 2015, two Jiangdao-class light frigates were sold from China to Bangladesh. 146 For example, in November 2010, then Chinese President Hu Jintao visited France, and on this occasion, China and France announced a joint statement that included text supporting the lifting of the arms embargoes against China. It is deemed that some EU countries have positive opinions about the lifting of their arms embargoes against China. 147 In January 2016, President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran, and announced economic assistance of about 6.3 trillion yen for the Middle East. ----- supply of energy and natural resources and to secure overseas hubs in the future.[149] China has strengthened its engagement in the region, actively sending personnel to U.N. PKO missions in Africa and holding the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Summit in Africa for the fi rst time in December 2015. As regards China-Australia relations, a Chinese company’s agreement with the Northern Territory government of Australia to lease Darwin Port has raised debates over security.[150] China has also been boosting its relations with the Pacifi c islands. It has been developing oil, natural gas, and cobalt mines in Papua New Guinea and has signed an agreement on military cooperation with the country. Proactive and continuous economic assistance has also been implemented in other islands. Furthermore, military exchanges are being promoted with Fiji and Tonga.[151] China has striven to further deepen its relations with Central and South American countries. Chinese senior military offi cials have continuously visited countries, such as Argentina and Brazil. In 2011, the Chinese Navy’s hospital ship conducted a medical service mission in this region. In January 2015, China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) held their fi rst ministerial meeting. **4** **[Military Capabilities of Taiwan]** - 1 Relations with China - 6 International Transfer of Weapons China’s arms export total has surpassed its arms import total since 2010. China has expanded provision of weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft to developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas. Specifi cally, it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Ghana, and Kenya, to Central and South American countries including Venezuela, and to Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Iran. Some experts claim that China transfers weapons in order to strengthen its strategic relationships with allies, enhance its infl uence in the international community, and secure energy and natural resources. Some observers point out that China supplies weapons to countries that struggle with democracy or have human rights problems.[152] Attention will be paid to whether China will increase the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community. crushing defeat to the Democratic Progressive Party in the nine-in-one local elections in November 2014. Against this backdrop, in November 2015, President Ma Ying-jeou and President Xi Jinping held the fi rst Taiwan-China summit meeting since Taiwan and China split. Both leaders reaffi rmed the “one-China” principle and agreed to establish a ministerial-level hotline. The Taiwanese people had a generally positive response to the meeting, according to a public opinion poll conducted by a Taiwanese media company.[153] Nevertheless, the meeting did not increase support for the ruling Kuomintang party. In the presidential election Under President Ma Ying-jeou, based on the basic policy of “no unifi cation, no independence, and no use of force,” Taiwan has made clear that it would not advocate independence and has adopted a collaborative stance towards China. In particular, Taiwan and China have deepened their economic relations. However, from March to April 2014, students against the approval of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement staged the Sunfl ower Student Movement and occupied the Legislative Yuan. Amid rising dissatisfaction with the government, the ruling party Kuomintang suffered a 149 China has reached an agreement with Djibouti, a country facing the Gulf of Aden, to build facilities there for providing logistics support to its military forces. 150 In November 2015, at the U.S.-Australia summit meeting in Manila, U.S. President Obama reportedly told his counterpart that the United States would have liked a “heads up” about Australia’s lease of Darwin Port to a Chinese company and to “Let us know next time.” 151 From August to September 2014, China’s hospital ship conducted the medical service mission Harmonious Mission 2014, offering services in Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea. 152 It has been confi rmed that Chinese-made equipment (FN-6 portable air defense missile system) were among the weapons utilized by ISIL. 153 According to a public opinion poll conducted by one of the major television broadcasters in Taiwan, TVBS, around 41% of the respondents “supported” and around 28% “did not support” the meeting between ----- held in January 2016, Tsai Ing-wen, Chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won a landslide victory over Zhu Lilun of Kuomintang and was elected the new President. In the Legislative Yuan elections held on the same day, whereas Kuomintang took no more than 35 seats, DPP won 68 seats, gaining more than a majority of the seats, to clinch a victory. With regard to Taiwan-China relations, new President Tsai Ing-wen, who took office on May 20, adopts the position that Taiwan will “work to maintain peace and stability in cross-Strait relations.” However, she has not outlined a clear stance regarding the “1992 Consensus,”[154] which positions China as the political foundation of cross-Strait relations.[155] Attention will paid to how Taiwan-China relations evolve under the new administration led by President Tsai Ing-wen. - 2 Military Capabilities of Taiwan With regard to Taiwan’s military power, at present, ground forces, including the Navy Marine Corps, have a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. It is believed that approximately 1.66 million reserve personnel of the air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kiddclass destroyers which were imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Ching-kuo fighters, among other assets. - 3 Military Balance between China and Taiwan While China has continued to increase its defense budget by a significant margin, Taiwan’s defense budget has remained mostly unchanged for nearly 20 years. As of 2015, China’s announced defense budget was roughly 14 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget.[156] While the PLA proceeds to enhance its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military still struggles to modernize its equipment. The U.S. DoD has notified Congress of possible arms sales to Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act.[157] Taiwan wishes to purchase the F-16C/D fighter,[158] conventional-powered submarine, and other arms from the United States, and continued attention needs to be paid to related developments. Taiwan also promotes the independent development of military equipment. Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles, Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles, and Hsiung Feng IIE surface-to-surface cruise missiles with long-range attack capabilities are deployed. Additionally, Taiwan is thought to be developing the Tien Kung III surface-to-air missile in order to acquire anti-ballistic missile capability. Furthermore, in order to counter large vessels including aircraft carriers, Taiwan is moving to induct a new model of indigenous stealth high-speed missile ships mounted with Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship missiles. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows: Taiwan, under the policy of building the “hard rock” defense advocated by President Ma Ying-jeou, has identified prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conflict, and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and adopted the military strategy of “resolute defense and credible deterrence.” Taiwan, for improving the expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aimed to transform its armed forces consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014. However, in September 2013, the Ministry of National Defense announced that the transformation into all-volunteer forces would be postponed until the end of 2016. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to the introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of joint operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August 2009, the Taiwanese armed forces identify disaster prevention and relief as one of their major missions. 154 Some say in 1992, the Taiwanese and Chinese liaison institutions for cross-Strait exchanges reached a common recognition affirming the “one-China” principle. 155 On May 20, 2016, new President Tsai Ing-wen stated in her inaugural address: “In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.” 156 This figure was obtained by comparing China’s announced FY2015 defense budget of approximately 889.6 billion yuan and Taiwan’s announced FY2015 defense budget of approximately 312.8 Taiwan dollars by converting them into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for FY2015 released by the Central Bank of Taiwan (US$1 = 6.2264 yuan = 31.898 Taiwan dollars). China’s actual defense budget is reportedly larger than the amount announced, and therefore, the actual difference in the defense budgets of China and Taiwan could be greater. 157 Recently, the U.S. DoD notified Congress of possible sales to Taiwan of PAC-3 missiles, UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and other assets in January 2010, possible arms sales including equipment necessary to upgrade F-16A/B fighter aircraft in September 2011, and possible sales of two Oliver Hazard Perry-class missile frigates, 36 AAV7 amphibious vehicles, and other assets in December 2015.i ----- 1) Regarding ground forces, while China possesses an overwhelming number of troops, their capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited at this point in time. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities in recent years, such as building large landing ships.[159] 2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, which overwhelms Taiwan in terms of quantity, has also been steadily strengthening its naval and air forces in recent years in terms of quality, where Taiwan had superiority over China.[160] 3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, Taiwan has been strengthening its ballistic missile defense, including upgrading PAC-2 to PAC-3 and newly inducting PAC3. China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles and other assets with ranges covering Taiwan and continues to increase them. Taiwan is deemed to have few effective countermeasures. In addition to the size of forces and performance and quantity of military equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as the objectives and characteristics of envisioned military operations, the operational posture, proficiency in military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as China is rapidly strengthening its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China. Attention must be paid to the strengthening of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan. See>> Fig. I-2-3-7 (Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget); Fig. I-2-3-8 (Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan) |Fig. I-2-3-7|Changes in Taiwan’s Defense Budget| |---|---| |Defense budget (in 100 million Taiwan dollars) (100 million Year-on-year growth rate (%) Taiwan dollars) (%) 4,000 30 3,500 25 3,000 20 2,500 15 2,000 10 1,500 5 1,000 0 500 –5 0 –10 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 (FY) Source: Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan’s “National Defense Reports” and the website of the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan|| |Fig. I-2-3-8|Changes in the Number of Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan| |---|---| |(Number of Aircraft) 850 800 750 China (Su-27/J-11, Su-30, J-10, J-15) 700 650 Taiwan (F-CK-1 (IDF), F-16, Mirage2000) 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 12 13 14 15 16 (Year) Source: “The Military Balance” (of respective years)|| 159 The Ministry of National Defense of Taiwan states in the 2015 National Defense Report published in October 2015: “The PLA plans to complete the establishment of a formidable military arsenal for conducting military operations against Taiwan before 2020.” 160 China has 810 fourth-generation fighters, whereas Taiwan has 329. In addition, China has about 70 destroyers and frigates and about 60 submarines, whereas Taiwan has about 30 and 4, respectively. ----- **Section 4** **Russia** **1 General Situation** Under President Vladimir Putin who reassumed offi ce in May 2012, Russia, having allegedly completed the phase of reconstruction and strengthening, sets an agenda of building a rich and prosperous Russia, and at the same time, attaches importance to becoming an infl uential power amid a new balance of economic, civilizational, and military forces.[1] “The collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.”[2] President Putin, who made this remark, aims to realize the concept of the Eurasian Union[3] encompassing the areas of the former Soviet Union. The President has made clear Russia’s confrontational stance against the West, noting that the West is responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, and that the West exercises infl uence directly or indirectly on the former Soviet Union countries that Russia considers are under its sphere of infl uence.[4] With regard to the situation in Ukraine, marked by an intensifi cation of tension since February 2014, efforts to implement the ceasefi re agreement (Minsk Protocol)[5] in eastern Ukraine have led to a reduction in the intensity of the fi ghting and to a signifi cant decrease in the number of confl ict casualties since September 2015. Nevertheless, no major progress has been made in the political process such as holding local elections in the areas controlled by separatists or expanding the local self-government, as were set out in the Minsk Protocol. The West has alleged that the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) made a clear direct intervention in the situation in Ukraine. While Russia is seen to have attempted to change the status quo by force or coercion by engaging in “hybrid warfare,” Russia has continued to assert the legitimacy of its unilateral actions. The outcomes of these changes have taken on an aspect of being entrenched, and it is expected that the international community will make further efforts to improve the situation.[6] These series of acts by Russia have led to increased awareness of the threat posed by Russian “hybrid warfare,” especially in Europe.[7] In addition, Russia has conducted military intervention in Syria since September 2015. While Russia withdrew its major air forces in March 2016, its swift deployment of military forces to remote areas and execution of operations for a certain period of time can be construed as a manifestation of the achievements of Russia’s series of military reforms. Furthermore, the display and use of various state-of-the-art equipment in Syria were likely not unrelated to Russia’s recent expansion of arms export destinations to not only the existing countries of India and China, but also to Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central America and the Caribbean. Moreover, Russia’s military intervention in Syria is drawing attention as constituting Russia’s move to exit its international isolation that resulted from the Ukrainian crisis and increase its international infl uence. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 At the same time, Russia continues to face a severe economic situation due to the effects of the falling prices of crude oil—Russia’s key export—as well as the depreciation of Russia’s currency the ruble, and the economic sanctions by the West and other countries in response to the situation in Ukraine. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine is believed to have cooperated on the development of Russia’s ICBM. It is suggested that the suspension of Ukraine’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (December 2012). Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (April 2005). In an article in the Izvestia dated October 4, 2011, then Prime Minister Putin proposed the creation of a “Eurasian Union” that would strengthen intraregional economic partnerships based on a customs union and a common economic space. Annual Address to the Federal Assembly by President Putin (December 2014). The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verifi cation by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self-government in certain areas of the Donetsk and the Lugansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verifi cation by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in Donetsk and Lugansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations. During a press conference on December 17, 2015, President Putin stated, “We’ve never said there are no people there [in Ukraine] who deal with certain matters, including in the military area, but this does not mean that regular Russian troops are present there.” Russia has taken actions which, some suggest, were aimed at maintaining the status quo, such as the announcement of the de facto “completion of the annexation” through the dissolution of the Ministry of Crimean Affairs in July 2015, a ministry that was established for the economic integration of the Crimean Peninsula, along with the repeated visits to Crimea by President Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Due to the complex nature of hybrid warfare that combines economic, intelligence operation, and diplomatic aspects, some suggest that the rising threat of hybrid warfare will drive closer cooperation between ----- technical support following the deterioration of the bilateral relation could impair the operations of Russian equipment that rely highly on Ukraine. Under these circumstances, attention is being paid on how President Putin, while maintaining his power base, **2 Security and Defense Policies** - 1 Basic Posture will deal with Russia’s diplomatic isolation and economic hardships, as well as promote economic structural reforms and measures aimed at the modernization of Russia’s military forces and its effort to expand international infl uence.[8] The doctrine continues to regard nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It states that Russia will maintain a suffi cient level of nuclear deterrent capability and reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other WMDs are used against it or its allies, or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons are used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled. Furthermore, defending Russian interests in the Arctic was newly added as one of the military’s tasks in peacetime. As for Russia’s defense budget, the FY2016 budget registered a year-on-year decrease (-1.0%) for the fi rst time, after the FY2011-FY2015 budgets continued to record year-on-year double-digit growths. So far, Russia has given priority to securing its defense budget amid a severe fi nancial situation. The decreased growth rate shows Russia’s increasingly severe economic situation, which is anticipated to have implications including delays in equipment procurement. See>> Fig. I-2-4-1 (Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget)[9] Against the backdrop of foreign policy factors, including the Ukrainian crisis and the military intervention in Syria, Russia set out its objectives and strategic priorities of domestic and foreign policies in the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” revised in December 2015. The National Security Strategy construes that Russia has an increasingly greater role in a multipolarizing world. The Strategy perceives increased activity of NATO and expansion of its member states as threats to national security, and expresses its vigilance against the U.S. deployment of missile defense (MD) systems to Europe and the Asia-Pacifi c region for undermining global and regional stability. In the defense domain, the Strategy commits to giving continued priority to the role fulfi lled by Russia’s military force, and to ensuring strategic deterrence and preventing military confl ict by maintaining a suffi cient level of nuclear deterrent capability and the RAF. The Russian Federation Military Doctrine, revised in December 2014 as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere, states the existing view that while the probability of an outbreak of a large-scale war is decreasing, military risks to Russia are increasing, such as the movement of NATO’s military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders including the expansion of NATO, and the establishment and deployment of strategic MD systems. In addition, the doctrine expresses growing alarm, defi ning the following as new military risks: NATO’s military buildup; the realization of the U.S. Global Strike concept; rise of global extremism (terrorism); inauguration of governments in neighboring countries that carry out policies Russia’s interests; and the incitement of ethnic, social, and religious confrontations in Russia. - 2 Military Reform Russia has implemented full-scale military reform since 1997 by presenting the three pillars of reform: downsizing; modernization; and professionalization. Moreover, based on the policy statement, “Future Outlook of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,” that was approved by then President Dmitry Medvedev in September 2008, Russia is advancing measures including troop reductions, structural reform (from the divisionbased command structure to a brigade-based one[10]), 8 In his campaign platform papers published after January 2012, then Prime Minister Putin listed his policies: to expand the public’s participation in politics; to prevent corruption; to exit the resource-dependent economy and strengthen domestic industries to modernize the economy; and to develop a middle class that plays a leading role in the society. 9 Russia compiles three-year budgets to plan budgets based on a medium-term outlook. For the FY2016 budget, however, Russia shifted to a single-year budget planning due to the diffi culties of forecasting the economic situation. President Putin signed the FY2016 draft budget in December 2015. According to the Russian Federal Treasury, the FY2016 defense budget increased 1.0% from the previous fi scal year to 3.1493 trillion rubles. 10 The command structure is reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment, to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command–brigade. Although this was said to be completed in December 2009, in May 2013 the Guards Tamanskaya Motorized Rifl e Division and the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, which had been reorganized into brigades under then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov, were reactivated and participated in a victory parade. Furthermore, in the January 25, 2016 edition of Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), a newspaper of the military, Gen. Oleg ----- strengthening of combat readiness, and modernization of the RAF such as the development and introduction of new equipment. Regarding the downsizing of the military forces, it was decided that RAF would have a strength of one million personnel as of 2016.[11] Since December 2010, Russia reorganized its six military districts into four military districts (Western, Southern, Central and Eastern Districts). On this basis, Russia established a joint strategic command in each military district and is carrying out integrated operations of its entire military forces, such as the ground force, naval force, and air force under the control of the Military District Commander. In December 2014, the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic became operational.[12] Regarding the modernization of the military forces, based on the State Armaments Program (GPV: Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya) 2011-2020 that appeared to have been approved by the President by the end of 2010, Russia intends to further modernize its equipment and invest approximately 20 trillion rubles (approximately 42 trillion yen) to increase its percentage of new equipment up to 70%[13] by 2020. Regarding the professionalization of the military forces, in order to make the combat readiness of the permanent readiness units effective, Russia promotes the introduction of a contract service system which selects **3 Military Posture and Trends** Russia’s military force is comprised of forces such as the RAF, the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB), and the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation.[15] The RAF consists of three services and two independent forces: Land Force; Navy; Aerospace Force;[16] Strategic Missile Forces; and Airborne Forces.[17] See>> Fig. I-2-4-2 (Location and Strength of Russian Military) Fig. I-2-4-1 Changes in Russia’s Defense Budget Defense budget (in 100 million rubles) Year-on-year growth rate (%) (100 million rubles) (%) 35,000 35 30,000 30 25,000 25 20,000 20 15,000 15 10,000 10 5,000 5 0 0 –5 12 13 14 15 16 (FY) Note: Official figures announced by the Russian government. personnel who would serve under contracts from the conscripted military personnel. In 2015, the number of contract servicemen exceeded the number of conscripted personnel for the fi rst time.[14] In the context of the gradual increase in diffi culties in securing the defense budget due to the recent severe economic situation, attention will be paid to the trends related to Russian efforts to improve the capacity of conventional forces and maintain the strategic deterrence capability provided by nuclear weapons. - 1 Nuclear Forces Russia emphasizes its nuclear forces to secure its global position, to strike a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States and to supplement its inferiority in conventional forces. It is thus believed that Russia is making efforts to maintain readiness of its nuclear forces unit. Russia still possesses ICBMs, SLBMs, and long 11 It was decided that the total military force would be one million personnel as of 2016 by an executive order of December 2008 (the strength was approximately 1.13 million as of 2008). Russia is thought to have achieved troop reduction to one million personnel already as of 2011. However, since then, the number of personnel has continued to fall below one million due to the reduced military service period to one year, combined with the stagnant growth in the number of contract servicemen. 12 The Northern Joint Strategic Command is a unifi ed force led by the Northern Fleet and consists of fl eets, ground forces, and air forces. Its area of operation covers the seas and remote islands extending from the Barents Sea to the East Siberian Sea, and the Arctic coast. 13 In his campaign platform paper on national defense policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin indicated that he would strengthen military power, including nuclear force, aerospace defense, and naval power by spending approximately 23 trillion rubles (approximately 48 trillion yen) in ten years. In December 2015, Deputy Minister of Defence Yuri Borisov told TASS that Russia started working on the GPV 2018-2025 whose preparation had been postponed. 14 Reasons behind the promotion of the contract service system may include a decrease in the population suitable for military service and the shortening of the conscription period (since January 2008, the conscription period has been shortened to 12 months). At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu stated that personnel strength adequacy was around 92.5% and contracted soldiers totaled approximately 352,000. The Regulation on the Military Service was amended in January 2015, enabling those who have no citizenship of any country as well as foreign citizens to serve as contracted soldiers. 15 In April 2016, President Putin signed an executive order that directed the establishment of the Federal National Guard Service of the Russian Federation to ensure national and public security and to protect human rights and freedoms, setting forth that the Federal National Guard Service would be formed on the basis of the internal troops of the Interior Ministry. 16 Formed on August 1, 2015 by merging the previous Air Force and Aerospace Defense Forces. Minister of Defence Shoigu explained that the realignment was implemented because of “the increasing importance of the aerospace theater,” and perceives that “this organizational realignment is the best method for streamlining Russia’s aerospace defense system.” ----- range bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks) following only the United States in scale. Russia is obligated to reduce strategic nuclear arms pursuant to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty concluded with the United States.[18] Russia is working on accelerating the development and introducing new weapons under the policy to prioritize the modernization of nuclear forces based on its GPV. In March 2011, Russia started the deployment of RS-24, which is considered a multi-warhead version of the “Topol-M” ICBM.[19] SSBN building and deployment are in progress. For example, in January 2013, Yuri Dolgoruky, the first of the Borey-class SSBN, which is believed to carry the new-type SLBM “Bulava,” was delivered to the Northern Fleet. Additionally, Alexander Nevsky, the second of the SSBNs, and Vladimir Monomakh, the third of the SSBNs, were incorporated to the Pacific Fleet in December 2013 and December 2014, respectively.[20] In October 2015, a training of the command of units was conducted involving the launch of an ICBM, SLBMs, and cruise missiles from long-range bombers, surface vessels, and from the ground.[21] As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia scrapped ground-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the United States, and removed tactical nuclear weapons from naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of other nuclear forces. Under such circumstances, in July 2014, the U.S. Government concluded that Russia possesses groundlaunched cruise missiles (GLCM) in violation of the INF Treaty and notified the Russian government. The Russian side denies this. - 2 Conventional Forces and Other Issues Russia is considered to be developing and procuring conventional forces in accordance with its GPV. Close attention will need to be paid to Russia’s development, procurement, and deployment of new equipment, such as the “fifth generation fighter”[22] and the T-14 Armata tank,[23] in addition to the introduction of the Su-35 fighter and the surface-to-surface missile system “Iskander.” Along with carrying out a range of exercises,[24] since February 2013, the RAF have been conducting surprise inspections designed to validate the combat readiness of the military districts, etc. for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union.[25] These inspections are contributing to the improvement of long-distance mobilization capability of the RAF.[26] Outside of Russia, the RAF has continued to participate in the counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, and 18 In April 2010, Russia and the United States signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I), and the treaty came into force in February 2011. Each side is obligated to reduce deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after the entry into force of the treaty. In April 2016, the United States announced that Russia’s deployed strategic warheads was 1,735 and their deployed delivery platforms was 521 as of March 1, 2016. 19 In March 2011, the first regiment of RS-24 missiles was operationally deployed in the division in Teykovo, Ivanovo oblast in northeast Moscow. At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that six rocket regiments equipped with RS-24 were put on combat duty in 2015. In addition, it is believed that Russia is developing a new heavy ICBM “Sarmat” that can destroy robust ICBM launch sites and be equipped with many warheads, a light-weight mobile solid-fuel ICBM RS-26 “Rubezh”, as well as new warheads aimed at enhancing the capability to penetrate MD. “Rubezh” was scheduled to be deployed to Irkutsk in 2015. 20 Eight Borey-class SSBNs are planned to be built by 2020. As of December 2015, three have been commissioned and three are under construction. Construction of the seventh Borey-class SSBN, Imperator Aleksandr III, was launched in December. The fourth Borey-class SSBN, Knyaz Vladimir, is scheduled to be commissioned in 2017. The test launches of the Bulava started in September 2005. By November 2015, 23 test launches have been conducted, 15 of which have been successful. While the test launch of the Bulava from Alexander Nevsky in September 2013 is deemed to have failed due to problems with the missile’s nozzle, the same test launch was conducted successfully in September 2014. 21 In an exercise to inspect the command system, under instructions from the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation, the ICBM “Topol” was launched from Plesetsk Cosmodrome, and SLBMs were launched from the nuclear-powered submarines Bryansk and Podolsk in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. Additionally, cruise missiles were launched from the small missile vessel Veliky Ustyug, Tu-160, and “Iskander.” 22 According to media reports, in January 2015, President Yury Slusar of Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation stated that Russia’s PAK FA (Future Air Complex for Tactical Air Forces) “fifth generation fighters” have begun to be delivered to the Air Force for test flights. In September 2015, Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Force Viktor Bondarev stated that PAK FA would be supplied to units in 2017. In July 2015, Deputy Minister of Defence Borisov stated that Russia would reduce the number of aircraft to be procured and that only one squadron (12 aircraft) would be purchased over the next several years. 23 A new tank fitted with an unmanned turret that was unveiled for the first time during the Victory Day Parade on May 9, 2015. In addition to this tank, Russia is currently developing a family of crawler and wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled howitzers. The GPV 2011-2020 plans to renovate 2,300 tanks, 3,000 self-propelled artillery, and 30,000 other armored fighting vehicles by 2020. 24 As it proceeds with its military reform, Russia has conducted large-scale exercises for verification and other purposes in recent years. In the military districts, field training exercises are held every year on a rotational basis. Caucasus 2012 was carried out in the Southern Military District in September 2012. In addition, Zapado 2013 was carried out in the Western Military District and in the territories of Belarus in September 2013 and Vostok 2014 in the Eastern Military District in September 2014. In September 2015, Tsentr 2015 was conducted in the Central Military District, which was participated by around 95,000 personnel, over 7,000 equipment and military machinery, around 170 aircraft, and 20 vessels. In December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that, as a result of combat training, compared to 2014, the flight time of pilots increased by 10%, the number of navigation days of surface vessel and submarine crew increased by 7%, and the traveling distance of the operators of combat vehicles increased by 22%. Meanwhile, there have been crashes involving the Tu-95 long-range bomber, the Mig-29 fighter, and other aircraft since 2015. Some have attributed the reasons to extra burden placed on aging airframes and surpassing their maintenance capability limit because of large-scale exercises and surprise inspections, along with actual combat and surveillance activities. 25 Surprise inspections were conducted at the Central and Southern Military Districts in February 2013, Southern Military District in March 2013, Western Military District in May 2013, Eastern and Central Military Districts in July 2013, strategic nuclear units in October 2013, and Western and Central Military Districts from February to March 2014. In September 2014, a surprise inspection of the Eastern Military District was conducted, which transitioned to the Vostok 2014 large-scale exercise. 26 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the surprise inspections held five times a year on average would enable the commanders of ----- Fig. I-2-4-2 Location and Strength of Russian Military **Northern Joint Strategic Command** **Baltic Fleet** **Kaliningrad** **Northen Fleet** **Severomorsk** **Black Sea Fleet** **Sevastopol** **(in Ukraine)** **Western Military District** **(Western Joint Strategic Command)** **(HQ: Saint Petersburg)** **Eastern Military District** **Caspian Flotilla** **(Eastern Joint Strategic Command)** **(HQ: Khabarovsk)** **Astrankhan** **Central Military District** **(Central Joint Strategic Command)** **(HQ: Yekaterinburg)** **Southern Military District** **(Southern Joint Strategic Command)** **(HQ: Rostov-on-Don)** **Pacific Flotilla** **Vladivostok** The United States Geological Survey: GTOPO30; and the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Center: ETOPO1 Russia Total military forces Approx. 800,000 troops Ground troops Approx. 270,000 troops Ground T-90, T-80, T-72, etc. Approx. 2,700 forces Tanks (Not including mothballed tanks. Approx. 20,200 including mothballed tanks) Warships Approx. 1,010 vessels Approx. 2,049,000 tons Aircraft carriers 1 vessel Cruisers 4 vessels Maritime Destroyers 14 vessels forces Frigates 32 vessels Submarines 69 vessels Marines Approx. 35,000 troops Combat aircraft Approx. 1,340 aircraft 158 MiG-29 aircraft 32 Su-30 aircraft 112 MiG-31 aircraft 18 Su-33 aircraft Modern fighter aircraft 200 Su-25 aircraft 57 Su-34 aircraft 199 Su-27 aircraft 36 Su-35 aircraft Air forces (4th generation fighter aircraft: Total 812) 16 Tu-160 aircraft Bombers 60 Tu-95 aircraft 63 Tu-22M aircraft Population Approx. 142.40 million Reference Term of service 1year (In addition to conscription, there is a contract service system) Source: “The Military Balance 2016,” etc. Ground troops include 240,000 ground force personnel and 34,000 airborne unit personnel. ----- maintained deployment of vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.[27] In September 2013, a Kirov-class missile cruiser was deployed to the eastern Arctic for the first time, where it conducted military exercises. In September 2014, the flotilla of the Northern Fleet transported equipment and supplies to the New Siberian Islands in the eastern Arctic to build a facility.[28] The RAF has been intensifying its activities in the Arctic, which include not only such deployment and exercises of naval vessels and resumption of military facility operation, but also strategic nuclear deterrence patrols by strategic nuclear submarines and patrol flights by long-range bombers. In April 2015, Russian aircraft including the Tu95 long-range bomber conducted patrol flights over the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean.[29] Furthermore, in July and November 2015, the Tu-95 long-range bomber approached the airspaces of U.S. mainland and Guam.[30] Also, in connection with the military intervention into Syria, the missile cruiser Varyag belonging to the Pacific Fleet was deployed to the Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Syria in January 2016.[31] The RAF has thus intensified activities not only in the Asia-Pacific, but also in the Arctic, Europe, and areas near the U.S. mainland. In particular, Russia’s vessels and aircraft tend to expand their area of activity.[32] As for the future of RAF, there are uncertain elements which may be influenced by Russia’s future economic and social development and trends in Russia’s diplomatic relations with European and other countries; therefore, it is necessary to keep our attention on future developments. 27 Russia’s naval fleet in the Mediterranean which is said to have completed its formation on June 1, 2013, is considered a permanent operational force. 28 The Russian Ministry of Defence plans to rebuild 10 radar sites and 13 airports to improve its military facilities in the Arctic. For example, the Temp Airport on the New Siberian Islands (Novosibirsk) located in the Eastern Arctic, has been closed since 1993, but in October 2013, its operation was restored with the support of the Northern Fleet. 29 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced that on April 4, 2015, two Tu-95 long-range bombers that departed Engels base conducted patrol flights over the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, and the Atlantic Ocean, escorted by Mig-31 fighters, and that on this occasion, the bombers were followed by Typhoon fighters of the U.K. Royal Air Force and the F-16 fighters of the Royal Danish Air Force. 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers flew near Alaska and over northern California on Independence Day in the United States on July 4, 2015. Two of these bombers flew within 50 miles of the coast of California. On November 25, 2015, two Tu-95 long-range bombers flew in international airspace near Guam. 31 The missile cruiser Moskva belonging to the Black Sea Fleet was deployed to the coast of Syria in order to strengthen the aerial defense capabilities of the RAF deployed to Syria. However, the Varyag belonging to the Pacific Fleet was dispatched to replace the Moskva. 32 It is deemed that the RAF intends to maintain and enhance their combat readiness, as well as use diversionary approach towards the West and other countries in connection with the situation in Ukraine, and l ----- **4 Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan** - 1 General Situation Russia newly established the Eastern Military District and the Eastern Joint Strategic Command in 2010.[33] Land Forces, the Pacifi c Fleet, and the Air Force and Air Defense Units have been placed under the Military District Commander, who conducts unifi ed operation of these services. The current presence of the RAF in the Far East region is signifi cantly smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian armed forces in the vicinity of Japan are generally increasing its activity. Given that the RAF set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear units and dealing with confl icts through the intertheater mobility of its round-the-clock readiness units, it is necessary to keep our attention on the positioning and trends of the RAF in the Far East region while also keeping in mind the trends of units in other regions. **(2) Ground Forces** As part of its military reforms, Russia is thought to be reorganizing the command structure from a divisionbased to a brigade-based one, while also shifting all of its combat forces into permanent readiness units. The Eastern Military District now consists of eleven brigades and one division with approximately 80,000 personnel in total. In addition, it has a naval infantry brigade equipped with amphibious operations capability, and therefore, has amphibious operations capability. The Eastern Military District has introduced new equipment, such as the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system and the “S400” surface-to-air missile system. **(3) Naval Forces** The Pacifi c Fleet is stationed or deployed at its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fl eet is comprised of approximately 260 ships with a total displacement in the region of approximately 600,000 tons, including approximately 20 major surface ships and approximately 20 submarines (approximately 15 of which are nuclear powered submarines) with a total displacement of approximately 300,000 tons. **(1) Nuclear Forces** As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s and approximately 30 Tu-95 long-range bombers are deployed mainly along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Additionally, the Delta III-class SSBNs carrying SLBMs are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. By and large strategic nuclear units are believed to be maintaining readiness posture. In a surprise inspection conducted in October 2013 and a fi eld training exercise conducted in May 2014 for the strategic nuclear unit, the Delta III-class SSBNs launched SLBMs in the Sea of Okhotsk. The second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky was incorporated to the Pacifi c Fleet in December 2013 and the third of the SSBNs Vladimir Monomakh in December 2014. Subsequently, Alexander Nevsky was brought to the Pacifi c in September 2015, and Vladimir Monomakh is also scheduled to be brought to the Pacifi c in 2016.[34] **(4) Air Forces** In the Eastern Military District, Russia deploys approximately 350 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy combined. Existing models are being refurbished and new models, such as the Su-35 fi ghters, are being introduced[35] to improve their capabilities. - 2 Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern Territories Since 1978 during the former Soviet Union era, Russia has redeployed ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan. While the Russian troop strength is thought to be far less than that at peak times, 33 The Eastern Military District’s headquarters is in Khabarovsk. 34 At the Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that the second of the Borey-class SSBNs Alexander Nevsky and the third SSBN Vladimir Monomakh joined the formation of the permanent readiness units in 2015.i ----- one division with mainly defensive duties is still stationed in Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. Furthermore, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are deployed.[36] After then President Medvedev visited Kunashiri Island for the first time as head of state in November 2010,[37] Russian ministers and others have made repeated visits to the Northern Territories. Between July and September 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev and six minister-level dignitaries also visited Etorofu Island, among other areas. Russia is proceeding with the replacement of equipment and construction of facilities for its units located in the Northern Territories.[38] In April 2015, an exercise was conducted with the participation of over 5,000 troops from the Eastern Military District on Sakhalin, the Northern Territories, and the Chishima Islands. In this regard, Russia continues to increase its activities. As described above, Russia continues to station RAF in the Northern Territories, which are inherent territories of Japan, and has recently been increasing the RAF’s activities in the territories under de facto occupation. Some point out that such developments reflect the Russian people’s heightened awareness of territorial integrity due to the Ukrainian crisis, as well as the rising military importance of the Northern Territories adjacent to the Sea of Okhotsk, an operating area of strategic nuclear submarines. It is necessary to keep our attention on Russia’s activities on the Four Northern Islands, with the hope that an early solution can be found to the Northern Territories issue. - 3 Operations in the Vicinity of Japan In the vicinity of Japan, the RAF has been generally increasing its activities, including exercises and drills which are believed to be conducted for objectives such as verifying the results of the military reform. In September 2014, the large-scale exercise Vostok 2014, considered the largest and the most important of the RAF exercises and drills conducted that year, was carried out in the Eastern Military District. Over 155,000 personnel, over 4,000 combat vehicles, approximately 80 vessels, and approximately 630 aircraft participated in the exercise.[39] It is regarded that its purpose was to verify the combat readiness and mobilization postures of the units in the Far East strategic front, including the Arctic. The exercise included units from not only the Eastern Military District, but also the Western and Central Military Districts. The various units conducted longdistance maneuvers covering a distance of 12,000 km at most. Furthermore, the exercise trained coordination among the Ministry of Defence and other ministries, agencies, and local governments. The number of exercises carried out by the Russian Land Forces in the areas adjacent to Japan has decreased from the peak. However, its activities are generally increasing. With regard to naval vessels, their activities are generally increasing in recent years. For example, joint exercises and counter-piracy operations have been carried out by Pacific Fleet vessels involving long distance voyages, and nuclear-powered submarines are carrying out patrols.[40] In September 2011, 24 naval vessels including a Slava-class guided missile cruiser passed through the Soya Strait in succession. This was 36 The 18th Machine Gun and Artillery Division, which is comprised of two regiments, is one of the few division units making up the RAF since most divisions were transformed into brigades due to military reform, and is stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. The Division aims to prevent landings, and participated in surprise inspections conducted in the Eastern Military District and elsewhere in July 2013. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500. At the Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodionov revealed that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 personnel by 1995. In July 2005, when then Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clarifying Russia’s intention to maintain the status quo. In February 2011, a senior official of the General Staff was said to have stated that troops on the Northern Territories would be maintained at around 3,500 personnel in the process of reorganizing divisions into brigades. In May 2014, Commander Sergey Surovikin of the Eastern Military District announced the buildup of military facilities on the Northern Territories. In August 2014, Russia opened a new airport in Etorofu Island. Through such measures, Russia has stepped up its activities in the Northern Territories under de facto occupation. 37 After the visit, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were visited by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov in December 2010, by then Regional Development Minister Viktor Basargin in January to February 2011, followed by then Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov in May 2011. Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev visited Kunashiri Island and Suisho Island of the Habomai Islands in September 2011. In addition, in January 2011, Deputy Minister of Defence Dmitry Bulgakov, and in February 2011, then Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island and inspected the units stationed there. Furthermore, Prime Minister Medvedev and three ministers visited Kunashiri Island in July 2012. In July 2015, Minister of Healthcare Veronika Skvortsova visited Kunashiri Island and Shikotan Island, and in August 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev, Minister for the Development of Russian Far East Galushka, and Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov visited Etorofu Island. In September 2015, Minister of Agriculture Alexander Tkachev visited Etorofu Island, and Minister of Transport Maksim Sokolov visited Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island. 38 At a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence of Russia in December 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu stated that a total of 392 buildings and facilities are planned to be built with regard to the construction in military areas on the Four Northern Islands and the Chishima Islands. Subsequently, at a meeting held at the Ministry of Defence in January 2016, the Minister noted that completing infrastructure construction in the areas was one of the priorities for 2016. At a meeting of the Defence Ministry Board in March 2016, the Minister stated that the surface-to-ship missiles “Bal” and “Bastion,” among other assets, would be deployed to the areas in 2016, and that the Pacific Fleet would conduct a three-month survey mission to study the feasibility of future deployment of Pacific Fleet forces. 39 The large-scale exercise Vostok 2014 was conducted over a vast area extending from the Arctic to the coastal area. In the Kamchatka Peninsula, ALCM launches were carried out from long-range bombers, as well as launches of SLCMs from Oscar II-class nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN). In Wrangel Island in the Arctic, night-time parachute landings and survival drills were conducted. In the Sakhalin, the Naval Infantry conducted landing drills as well as drills to prevent the landings of opposing forces. In the coastal and inland areas, drills including the launches of short-range ballistic missiles and GLCMs using the “Iskander” surface-to-surface missile system, as well as drills that made use of private infrastructure, such as takeoff and landing drills of the Su-25 attack aircraft using roads for motor vehicles were conducted. 40 The number of cases of the Russian naval fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and released in FY2015 is as follows: 22 cases ----- the fi rst time since the end of the Cold War that such a major transit of this strait by Russian naval vessels was confi rmed.[41] In recent years, ten or more Russian naval vessels have passed through the Soya Strait two or three times a year. In May 2016, under the command of the Deputy Commander of the Pacifi c Fleet, an expedition unit comprised of approximately 200 personnel began survey activities on Matsuwa Island located roughly in the middle of the Chishima Islands. The objective is to study the feasibility of deploying the Pacifi c Fleet’s forces there in the future. Continued attention needs to be paid to the relevant developments.[42] Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of the patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing fl ights by long-range bombers and carrying out fl ights of Tu-95 long-range bombers and Tu-160 longrange bombers which are refueled in mid- fl ight and supported by A-50 early warning aircraft and Su-27 fi ghters.[43] Activities such as fl ights close to Japan’s airspace as well as exercises and drills are generally increasing, as exemplifi ed by the unusual fl ights of Russian aircraft detected on seven consecutive days and the fl ights by six individual Tu-95 long-range bombers on a single day between March and April 2014.[44, 45] While Russian aircraft activities in FY2015 decreased compared to that in the previous fi scal year, **5 Relations with Other Countries** - 1 General Situation Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Fig. I-2-4-3 Russian Aircraft (Times) 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 (FY) a Russian aircraft (presumably) incurred into Japanese airspace in September 2015 for the fi rst time in almost two years. Tu-95 long-range bombers conducted long distance fl ights along the perimeter of Japan in December 2015 and January 2016. In this regard, Russian aircraft have generally maintained the same level of activities as that of recent years, excluding the sharp increase that occurred immediately after the Ukrainian crisis, and has been generally increasing its activity. See>> Fig. I-2-4-3 (Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft) directional diplomacy by ruling out futile confrontation and acquiring as many partners as possible around the world.[47] For this reason, Russia has been working on deepening its economic partnerships with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[48] Furthermore, Russia aspires to deepen its relations with the Asia-Pacifi c countries, seen as drivers of the global economy,[49] and in recent years, has attached importance to China and India as Russia considers the realization of its national interests as a guiding principle of its foreign policy, recognizing that Russia’s international position as one of the poles of infl uence is rising amid the trend towards multi-polarity.[46] Moreover, based on its National Security Strategy, Russia engages in open, rational, and pragmatic diplomacy to protect its national interests. It aims to pursue multi 41 Some of the 24 naval vessels participated in the exercise conducted in the eastern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and other places. 42 In May 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced that under the command of Vice Admiral Andrei Ryabukhin, Deputy Commander of the Pacifi c Fleet that arrived in Matsuwa Island, an expedition comprised of approximately 200 personnel including representatives from the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Russian Geographical Society, the Eastern Military District, and the Pacifi c Fleet began conducting survey activities. Colonel-general Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Eastern Military District, stated at a military meeting of the district that six Pacifi c Fleet vessels and over 200 personnel participated in an expedition by the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Geographical Society to Chishima, Etorofu, and Kunashiri Islands, and that its primary objective was to study the feasibility of establishing a Pacifi c Fleet base in the future. 43 The Russian Ministry of Defence announced in January 2014 that surveillance fl ights of two Tu-95 long-range bombers took place with the assistance of Su-27 fi ghters and A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft. 44 In April 2014, Deputy Minister of Defence Anatoly Antonov stated that “Russian Air Force aircraft operated in strict compliance with the international law.” The Deputy Minister also asked the Japanese Ministry of Defense to “alter its attitude towards cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defence.” 45 When Tu-95 long-range bombers took a route that circled the area encompassing Japan in September 2011, they were refueled in mid-fl ight by an IL-78 air tanker in the temporary danger zone set by Russia. In addition, when Tu-95 long-range bombers fl ew in the vicinity of Japan in February 2012 and February 2014, other aircraft such as A-50 Early Warning Aircraft fl ew with them. Two Su-27 fi ghters and two Tu-95 long-range bombers invaded Japanese airspace in February 2013 and August 2013 respectively. 46 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (February 2013). 47 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “With a view to protecting its national interests Russia is pursuing an open, rational, and pragmatic foreign policy ruling out futile confrontation (including a new arms race). (Abridged) The Russian Federation’s objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world.” 48 In October 2011, eight CIS countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia) signed the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement. ----- countries with which to strengthen bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Russian efforts to strengthen its cooperative relations with the West are still facing challenges after the Ukrainian crisis. However, with regard to the Syrian situation, cooperation between Russia and other countries is gaining momentum towards stabilizing Syria and countering international terrorist organizations, including ISIL. Attention will be paid to how Russia would balance its posture and develop its relations with other countries in terms of economic-centered and benefit-focused foreign policy, and Russia’s politics and diplomacy which include the security domain. - 2 Relations with Asian Countries India maintain a close relationship under a strategic partnership, with the leaders of both countries paying mutual visits. In October 2013, President Putin held talks with then Prime Minister Singh when he visited Russia, during which they reached an agreement on enhanced military cooperation including arms exports. In December 2014, President Putin, during his visit to India, held talks with Prime Minister Modi, and the two sides agreed to build a new Russian-made nuclear power plant, among other matters. In January 2015, Minister of Defence Shoigu, during his visit to India, held talks with Minister of Defence Parrikar, and the two sides discussed military and military technology cooperation between the two countries. Both countries are strengthening their military technology cooperation, including the joint development of the fifth generation PAK FA fighter and the “BrahMos” supersonic cruise missile.[55] Additionally, since 2003 Russia and India have been conducting INDRA antiterrorism exercises involving the Armies and Navies of both countries. Regarding the relationship with Japan, Russia states that it will develop mutually beneficial cooperation and is intensifying its approach in many fields including politics, economy and security. - 3 Situation in Ukraine Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and the relationship with Asian countries is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East,[50] counter-terrorism, and security.[51] In the executive order concerning foreign policy issued in May 2012, President Putin upheld his policy to participate in the integration process of the Asia-Pacific region in order to accelerate socioeconomic development in the East Siberia and Far East regions, and stated that Russia would make efforts to develop relationships with Japan, the ROK, and other countries, along with China,[52] India, and Vietnam. To achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnerships, Russia places particular emphasis on developing a comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with China as a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability, and in assigning an important role for the privileged strategic partnership with India.[53] Under this policy, Russia has participated in various frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region.[54] The APEC Summit was held in Vladivostok in September 2012. Among these different countries, Russia and In Ukraine, armed conflicts between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces continued even after the ceasefire agreement of February 2015 (package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements).[56] Since September 2015, however, the implementation of the ceasefire agreement led to a reduction in the intensity of the conflict and to a significant decrease in the number of war casualties. In October 2015, a summit meeting was held among Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine, and agreement was reached on the commencement of the withdrawal of light weapons and expanding the authority of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission. Nonetheless, 50 Russia is currently developing resources in Siberia and Sakhalin. 51 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in February 2013). In his campaign platform paper on foreign policy published in February 2012, then Prime Minister Putin expressed his recognition that the importance of the entire Asia-Pacific region was rising. 52 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-3 for the relationship with China. In November 2013, President Putin made official visits to Vietnam and the ROK. 53 The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015) states that, “The Russian Federation will develop its comprehensive partnership relationship and strategic cooperative relationship with the People’s Republic of China as a key factor for maintaining global and regional stability. The Russian Federation will assign an important role to the privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India.” 54 Russia has participated in regional frameworks, such as the APEC, the ARF, the SCO, and the East Asia Summit (EAS; since 2011). 55 Aside from this cooperation, it has been reported that in March 2015, India requested Russia to lease another Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine in addition to the one already on lease. 56 The package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements consists of the following items: (1) implementation of ceasefire starting from February 15, 2015 00.00 AM (local time); (2) withdrawal of heavy weapons to create a security zone with widths ranging from 50 to 140 km; (3) monitoring of the ceasefire by the OSCE; (4) launch a dialogue on local self-government of areas controlled by separatists; (5) ensure pardon and amnesty; (6) ensure release of all hostages; (7) ensure humanitarian assistance; (8) resumption of socio-economic systems in the East, including social transfers such as pension; (9) reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area; (10) withdrawal of foreign armed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries from Ukraine; (11) carrying out constitutional reform, providing for decentralization as a key element, and adopting legislation on the special status of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions (local self-government) by the end of 2015; (12) discuss local elections with representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions; and (13) intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment ----- Putin denied intrusion into Turkish airspace by a RAF aircraft; he strongly condemned Turkey’s response, requested an apology, and decided on economic sanctions against Turkey. This incident has deteriorated TurkeyRussia relations. Since the beginning of its airstrikes, Russia increased the level of its military intervention, which included long-range attacks using cruise missiles launched from submarines and destroyers and the mobilization of strategic bombers and Su-35 fighters. Then, in March 2016, Russia withdrew its major units, stating that the expected purpose had been achieved. Nonetheless, Russia still stations its forces at military bases in Syria and continues to utilize them, suggesting that the Russian military operation is ongoing. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 The objectives of Russian military intervention may include: (1) to sustain the Assad administration which is friendly to Russia; (2) to defend Russian interests including its military bases in Syria; (3) to address the threat of international terrorist organizations including ISIL; and (4) to secure influence in the Middle East. Thus far, Russia seems to have contributed to the recovery of the Assad administration’s areas of control and protecting Russian interests. Additionally, the use of cruise missiles and strategic bombers in the attacks has, in turn, demonstrated Russia’s long-range precision strike capabilities. Considering the significant influence of Russia’s military intervention on the course of the Assad administration, coupled with the expanding partnerships between Russia and surrounding countries such as Iran and Iraq, Russia’s influence on future stability in Syria and on anti-ISIL military operations cannot be neglected. the separation provided for in the Minsk agreements has not resulted in major advances in the political process, including the holding of elections in areas controlled by separatists. As can be seen from the above, the outcomes of the changes to the status quo in the Crimean Peninsula and eastern Ukraine via Russia’s “hybrid warfare” have taken on an aspect of being entrenched. Under these circumstances, it will take some time to find a solution to the Ukrainian crisis. Continued attention needs to be paid to the situation in Ukraine, also due to the risk of military confrontation recurring between Ukrainian troops and separatist armed forces. - 4 Situation in Syria In September 2015, Russia began airstrikes in Syria, explaining that President Assad of Syria requested assistance. The West condemned Russia for attacking not only terrorist organizations including ISIL, but also Syrian dissidents that are opposed to the Assad regime.[57] ISIL declared it would retaliate against Russia. In October 2015, a Russian passenger aircraft crashed after departing from Egypt, killing 224 passengers and crew. Russia concluded that this incident was a terrorist attack conducted by ISIL, declared retaliation against ISIL, and strengthened its airstrikes by mobilizing strategic bombers and other assets. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 Alongside these developments, in November 2015, a Turkish military aircraft shot down a RAF aircraft flying near the Syrian-Turkish border, reason being that the Russian aircraft intruded into Turkish airspace. President 57 In October 2015, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey issued a joint declaration calling on Russia to cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians i ----- - 5 Relations with Commonwealth of Independent States Russia positions the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS as the top foreign policy priority. Russia considers that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS,[58] and has dispatched troops to be stationed in Ukraine (Crimea), Moldova (Transnistria[59]), Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), which withdrew from the CIS in August 2009.[60] In November 2014, Russia and Abkhazia concluded an alliance and strategic partnership treaty.[61] In such ways, Russia has been working on ensuring its military influence.[62] Due to increasing activities by Islamic armed insurgents in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia has been pursuing military cooperation primarily on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized the Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[63] Furthermore, in June 2009, a permanent joint rapid reaction force was established to strengthen the functions of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force.[64] In addition, out of concern that the worsening security in Afghanistan could lead to the destabilization of Central Asia, Russia and Central Asian countries support Afghanistan while considering measures to strengthen the security of the Afghan border.[65] - 6 Relations with the United States President Putin has striven to deepen cooperative relations with the United States in the economic domain, while opposing the United States on any action Russia considers as “a U.S. attempt to encroach on Russia’s strategic interests.” Meanwhile, in response to the Ukrainian crisis, the Obama administration has strongly condemned Russia’s violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and has imposed severe economic sanctions on Russia.[66] In this regard, U.S.Russia relations have deteriorated compared to when the Obama administration was inaugurated.[67] Russia strongly opposed the deployment plan of the MD system in Europe by the United States, stating that it would have a negative impact on Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. In September 2009, the United States announced that it was reviewing the proposed deployment of the MD system in Europe,[68] which was cautiously welcomed by Russia. However, Russia’s understanding is that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) effective from February 2011 would be invalidated if the United States developed, both quantitatively and qualitatively, its MD capabilities and threatened Russia’s potential strategic nuclear strength.[69] Russia has striven to keep the United States in check in response to the recent progress of the U.S. MD plan in Europe, indicating that Russia 58 In August 2008, following the conflict with Georgia, then President Medvedev indicated that one of the five principles of Russia’s foreign policy was that there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. 59 In Transnistria, located on the eastern side of the Dniester River, ethnic Russian residents declared separation and independence from Moldova in 1990, but it was never recognized as such by the international community. Following the “annexation” of Crimea into Russia, in March 2014 the “Parliament” of Transnistria urged Russia to also incorporate the region. Moreover, during a telephone conference between President Putin and President Barack Obama in March 2014, President Putin pointed out that Transnistria was experiencing a blockade. A Russian unit of approximately 1,500 troops is currently stationed in Transnistria. 60 After the conflict with Russia in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the CIS in August 2009, but Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the Georgian territory and continues to have troops stationed in the regions. In the parliamentary election in October 2012 “Georgian Dream,” an opposition alliance with a campaign promise of improving Georgia-Russia relations, defeated the ruling “United National Movement” that adopts an anti-Russian policy. In the presidential election of October 2013, Giorgi Margvelashvili, backed by “Georgian Dream,” was elected and became president in November of the same year. In his inauguration speech, President Margvelashvili stated that he was ready to deepen the dialogue with Russia, expressing his intention to continue with pro-Euro, pro-U.S. lines while pursuing improvement of the relationship with Russia. 61 Russia’s “Military Doctrine” revised in December 2014 states that Russia would promote cooperation with the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia aimed at shared defense and security. 62 While some CIS countries continue to prioritize their relations with Russia, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, others attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova have taken mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. In September 2012, Kyrgyzstan and Russia agreed on a 15-year extension of the period of the use of Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan, which otherwise would end in 2017. In October 2012, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to extend the lease of the base of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan until 2042. In December 2013, Su-27 fighters of the Russian naval force were deployed in Belarus for the first time. 63 In May 1992, leaders of six countries (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Toshkent, Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the treaty, which came into effect in April 1994. However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in 1999 without renewing it. In May 2002, CST was reorganized into the CSTO. Uzbekistan returned to CST in August 2006 but gave notice to suspend its participation in CSTO in June 2012, effectively withdrawing from the organization. 64 Learning from the fact that CSTO could not sufficiently respond to the request by Kyrgyzstan for the peace-keeping activities at the time of the ethnic conflict in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, CSTO has been discussing improvement in the efficiency of its crisis response system. The CSTO Summit Meeting in December 2011 warned against the foreign forces’ stationing in a member state by requiring the consent of all member states when any member state builds a base of a third country. CSTO joint exercises, Vzaimodeistvie (cooperative operation), were implemented in Kazakhstan in October 2009 and October 2010, in Armenia in September 2012, and in Belarus in September 2013. 65 At the Expanded Meeting of the Russian Defence Ministry Board in December 2013, President Putin said that the withdrawal of the ISAF from Afghanistan in 2014 would be a destabilizing element not only to Afghanistan but also to Central Asia and could pose a threat to the national interests and security of Russia. 66 The United States has gradually expanded the list of Russian individuals and companies subject to asset freezes and entry bans. The United States has also expanded the targets of its loan suspensions and asset freezes to include key industry sectors, including finance, energy companies, state-owned banks, and state-owned defense technology companies. 67 In April 2016, during a telephone conference with Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Secretary of State Kerry registered strong objections to unsafe maneuvers executed by RAF Su-24 fighter bombers and Ka-27 helicopters flying close to the U.S. Aegis vessel USS Donald Cook in the high seas of the Baltic Sea. In the same month, a RAF Su-27 fighter allegedly approached and intercepted a RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft of the U.S. Forces over the high seas in the Baltic Sea. Russia has reportedly argued that these flights were legitimate actions. 68 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 for the U.S. deployment plan of the MD system in Europe. ----- may withdraw from the New START.[70] With regard to the military exchanges with the United States, Russia was considered as seeking establishment of a cooperative relationship with the United States to some extent, as exemplified from Russian vessels’ participation in RIMPAC in waters around Hawaii for the first time in July 2012. However, following Russia’s actions in connection with the situation in Ukraine, the United States announced suspension of the military exchanges with Russia in March 2014.[71] In addition, the United States dispatched a missile destroyer to the Black Sea and provided non-lethal weapons to the Ukrainian government.[72] In February 2015, as the tense situation in eastern Ukraine continued, the United States stepped up its activities to keep Russia in check, including suggesting to provide lethal weapons to the Ukrainian government. As regards the situation in Syria, relevant countries including both the United States and Russia as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to aim for the cessation of hostilities in all areas of Syria from February 2016.[73] On February 22, 2016, a joint statement and an annex on the cessation of hostilities in Syria were issued at the initiative of the United States and Russia. As these developments suggest, there has been some signs of cooperation. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 - 7 Relations with Europe and NATO Through the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), Russia has worked with NATO as an equal partner in the areas of mutual interest, such as by participating in certain decision-making processes. However, following the Ukrainian crisis, NATO and European countries suspended their practical cooperation with Russia, including that in the military domain, except for the NRC’s ambassador-level meetings.[74] Additionally, NATO and European countries have maintained a severe diplomatic stance towards Russia while working with the Ukrainian government. At the NRC summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, Russia and NATO stated that both sides would work towards building a true and modernized strategic partnership. They are now searching for possibilities of dialogue and cooperation in fields such as MD, Afghanistan, cooperation on counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy measures. With regard to MD cooperation, no progress was made on Russia-NATO relations. For example, the talks at the meeting of NRC defense ministers held in June 2011 highlighted the difference in position between NATO advocating MD cooperation in which only information and data would be exchanged under the two independent systems of NATO and Russia, and the position of Russia aiming at “sector MD” in which both sides operate integrally by setting zones for 70 Russia has demanded a legal guarantee that the MD plan of the United States is not targeted at Russia, and claimed that the United States is not considering Russia’s concerns. Russia issued an executive statement in November 2011, mentioning countermeasures such as deployment of operational early-warning radars and the possibility of its withdrawal from the New START. In November 2013, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that if the Geneva agreement on Iran’s nuclear issues was implemented, the U.S. MD system in Europe would not be needed. 71 Following the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia, then U.S. Department of Defense Spokesperson Kirby announced in March 2014 that the United States would cease all military exchange with Russia, including joint exercises with the RAF, consultations, and port calls. 72 The United States provided non-lethal weapons such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents, countermortar radars, uniforms, first aid equipment, and other related items to Ukraine. 73 The main points of the agreement are as follows: (1) full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 that provides for the political transition process in Syria; (2) cease attacks on the Syrian Armed Forces by the Syrian opposition; (3) cease attacks on the Syrian opposition by the Syrian Armed Forces and the RAF; and (4) refrain from acquiring territory from other parties to the ceasefire. It was decided that the agreement would be implemented from 00:00 on February 27. The agreement does not apply to ISIL, Al-Nusra Front, and other terrorist organizations designated by the U.N. Security Council. 74 NATO issued a statement condemning Russia over the situation in Ukraine, and has deployed additional military forces to countries in Eastern Europe and the Baltic. However, there are discrepancies among ----- each country’s responsibility under a unified MD system of NATO and Russia. Meanwhile, there remains an unsolved issue between Russia and NATO regarding the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.[75] Furthermore, the Ukrainian crisis has presented a threat to NATO’s eastern border for the first time since the Cold War. Consequently, some of NATO’s member states in Eastern Europe and the Baltic harbor national security concerns. For this and other reasons, NATO continues to take steps to ensure the effectiveness of its collective defense.[76] Meanwhile, Russia has actively conducted air activity that can be deemed provocative in Europe, especially near the Baltic countries.[77] With France, on the other hand, the agreement on France’s export of Mistralclass amphibious assault ships to Russia was annulled smoothly based on a two-way agreement. Additionally, Russia is engaging in a cooperative behavior to some extent in Syria following the terror attacks in Paris. In this regard, Russia takes varying responses depending on the country. - 8 Exportation of Arms Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country’s export value has been increasing in recent years.[78] In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboron Export State Corporation as part of its ongoing initiatives to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards its military industry as an integral part of the nation’s military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev. Russia exports equipment such as fighters and vessels to countries including India, China, Algeria, ASEAN member states, and Venezuela.[79] Among Russia’s arms export deals in 2015, of note was the signing of a contract for the Su-35 fighter[80] and the “S-400” surface-to-air missile system for China. It has been pointed out that this deal was made possible because the interests of China and Russia coincided: while China promotes indigenous weapons production, it still needs Russian technology for state-of-the-art equipment, whereas Russia aims to avoid diplomatic isolation caused by the Ukrainian crisis and to gain economic profit through arms exports.[81] 75 At the 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, an agreement was reached on changing the troop ceilings set formerly by blocks to those set by country and territory and on complying with the current CFE Treaty until the adapted CFE Treaty comes into effect. Russia was dissatisfied with the fact that despite its ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty, NATO member states refused to ratify the Treaty on the grounds that the RAF were not withdrawing from Georgia and Moldova. Therefore, in December 2007, Russia suspended the implementation of the CFE Treaty and halted inspections based on this treaty. Presently, only four countries have ratified the adapted CFE Treaty—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—and it has not yet come into effect. In addition, Russia has proposed dissolving the existing security framework that has NATO at its center and creating a new European security treaty that would provide new fundamental principles for security in Europe and the Atlantic region. 76 At NATO’s Wales Summit in September 2014, the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was adopted as a measure to strengthen NATO’s collective defense. The RAP includes the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as an initial response force of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a command and control presence on the territories of eastern Allies to facilitate the rapid increase of troops, the development of host facilities, the advance deployment of equipment and supplies, and the enhancement of exercise plans focused on collective defense. Bulgaria, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania have expressed their intention to provide facilities. Subsequently, at the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in June 2015, the ministers approved that NRF would consist of up to 40,000 personnel, and that the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) supporting the deployment of the VJTF would be established in Bulgaria, the Baltic countries, Poland, and Romania. At the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in October 2015, the ministers approved the establishment of NFIUs in Hungary and Slovakia. 77 In October 2014, NATO announced that the Russian Air Force conducted significant military maneuvers over the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Atlantic Ocean, and Black Sea on October 28 and 29. NATO criticized that this air activity represents an unusual level of activity over European airspace. Following the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in October 2015, the NATO Secretary General stated in his remarks as follows: “The ministers agreed that Russia’s military escalation in Syria raises serious concerns. I call on Russia to play a constructive role in the fight against ISIL. But Russian actions and the support to the (Assad) regime are not helpful. The recent violations of Turkish airspace are unacceptable. NATO will continue to follow the developments closely. And we stand in strong solidarity with Turkey.” 78 According to SIPRI, Russian arms exports between 2011 and 2015 increased by 28% compared to that of the period between 2006 and 2010. Russia has the second largest share of arms exports in the world (25%) after the United States. 79 Russia concluded sales contracts with Indonesia for Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003 and 2007 and has delivered the fighters. Furthermore, it was reported in 2016 that Russia plans to sell ten Su-35 fighters to Indonesia. Russia concluded sales contracts with Malaysia and Vietnam for Su-30 fighters in 2003, and has delivered the fighters to these countries. There are also reports of a sales contract with Vietnam in 2009 for Su-30 fighters and Kilo-class submarines. In January 2014, the first of the Kilo-class submarines, Hanoi, arrived in Vietnam. With regard to India, aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, which had been refurbished in Severodvinsk, was delivered to India, renamed as INS Vikramaditya, which arrived in India in January 2014. Moreover, in 2006, Russia concluded sales contracts with Algeria and Venezuela for arms, including Su-30 fighters, and has delivered some of these arms. Russia’s exports to China have included Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Against the backdrop of the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China, some point out that the value of Russian exports to China has been declining in recent years. Nevertheless, Russia has continued to export equipment such as aircraft engines for repair purposes. With regard to Iran, Russia started exporting the “S-300” surface-to-air missile system in April 2016. 80 According to news reports, a contract was signed to export 24 Su-35 fighters for approximately US$2 billion and 32 S-400 launchers for approximately US$3 billion. The first four Su-35 fighters are scheduled for delivery by the end of 2016. ----- **Section 5** **Australia** **1 General Situation** Australia shares universal values with Japan, such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy. It is allied with the United States, as are Japan and the ROK. In Australia, a federal election was held in September 2013. Tony Abbott, the head of the Liberal Party of the conservative coalition which won control of the lower house, took offi ce as Prime Minister, resulting in a change of government from the Labor Party to the conservative coalition.[1] The Abbott administration criticized the defense spending cuts of the previous administration, and signaled its intention to actively make investments which are deemed necessary for building a stronger defense force. This policy has continued under the Turnbull administration inaugurated in September 2015. The Defence White Paper released in February 2016 during the Turnbull administration states that over the next two decades, the Australian government will make important **2 Security and Defense Policies** The Australian government launched its fi rst National Security Strategy (the Strategy) in January 2013.[2] The Strategy provides a blueprint for national security over the next decade, presenting the recognition that responding to the economic and strategic changes in the Asia-Pacifi c region is vital to the national security of Australia. The Strategy defi nes four objectives for the country’s national security: (1) to ensure a safe and resilient population; (2) to protect and strengthen Australia’s sovereignty; (3) to secure Australia’s assets, infrastructure and institutions; and (4) to promote a favorable international environment. On this basis, the Strategy outlines the following priorities investments to maintain a high level of capability of the ADF, setting out a plan to continue to increase the troop strength and acquire high performance equipment. The white paper states explicitly that defense funding would be increased over the next decade, setting a specifi c target to reach 2% of Australia’s GDP by 2020. With regard to Australia’s international relationships, the white paper sets forth that Australia would aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the IndoPacifi c, including Japan, while continuing to give highest priority to its alliance with the United States. To achieve its strategic defense objective of contributing military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order, Australia makes proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the international community through the deployment of ADF to overseas operations, among other efforts. for the next fi ve years: (1) enhanced engagement in the Asia-Pacifi c region;[3] (2) integrated cyber policy and operations;[4] and (3) effective partnerships.[5] In February 2016, the Australian government released its seventh new Defence White Paper.[6] This white paper presents an outlook of Australia’s security environment over the next two decades. It then outlines the direction of Australia’s defense strategy for dealing with this environment, and the development of the defense force pursuant to this strategy. Specifi cally, the white paper maintains that while there is little prospect of a military attack on In this election, the conservative coalition comprised of the Liberal, National, and other parties won 90 out of the 150 lower house seats. As a result, Tony Abbott, the head of the Liberal Party, which had the most seats among the member parties of the conservative coalition that secured a majority in the lower house, was inaugurated as the 28th Prime Minister of Australia. This strategy is based on the National Security Statement, announced in December 2008, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the National Security Community. The national security strategy is scheduled to be revised every fi ve years. This includes: deepening the Australia-U.S. alliance; enhancing bilateral cooperation with infl uential regional countries such as China, Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, and India; and promoting the superiority and effectiveness of multilateral forums. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) integrates the capabilities of Australia’s Department of Defence, Attorney-General’s Department, and Federal Police and the cyber-related personnel of the Australian Crime Commission. This includes sharing information securely and quickly with domestic and international partners and strengthening information sharing between government and business. The Defence White Paper of Australia presents the government’s future plan and measures for national defense. It was previously published in 1976 (Fraser Liberal Party administration), 1987 (Hawke Labor Party administration), 1994 (Keating Labor Party administration), 2000 (Howard Liberal Party administration), 2009 (Rudd Labor Party administration), 2013 (Gillard Labor Party administration), and 2016 ----- Australian territory in the period to 2035, Australia will face new complexities and challenges.[7] Based on this understanding, three strategic defense interests are identifi ed, namely: a secure, resilient Australia (including the security of sea lanes); a secure nearer region; and a stable Indo-Pacifi c region and rules-based global order. Additionally, three strategic defense objectives are given, which are: (1) Deter, deny, and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national interests; (2) Make military contributions to support the security of maritime Southeast Asia and support the governments of South Pacifi c countries to build and strengthen their security; and (3) Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global **3 Relations with Other Countries** In the new Defence White Paper, Australia subscribes to the view that Australia’s security and prosperity are directly linked to the development of the nearer region, the Indo-Pacifi c region, and the global strategic environment. Based on this view, Australia will build and maintain international security relationships to achieve its strategic defense objectives. In particular, Australia will aim to mature and deepen practical engagement with partners across the Indo-Pacifi c region, including Indonesia, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, India, and China, while continuing to give the highest priority to its alliance with the United States. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) order. To maintain the ADF’s high level of capability needed to achieve these objectives, the government will make important investments. In addition to increasing the troop strength by approximately 4,400 personnel,[8] Australia will acquire high performance equipment, including 12 new submarines,[9] 3 air warfare destroyers (Aegis vessels), 72 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, and 7 MQ4C unmanned patrol aircraft. Simultaneously, Australia will seek to strengthen ISR capabilities, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber security capabilities, as well as strengthen the functions of its bases in northern Australia and elsewhere. To support these programs by funding, the white paper also presents the concrete target of increasing defense funding to reach 2% of GDP by 2020. States of America (ANZUS)[10] is based on shared values and will continue to be the centerpiece of Australia’s defense policy. Australia notes that the United States, which remains the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades, will continue to be its most important strategic partner, and the active presence of the United States will continue to underpin the stability of the region. It is stated that Australia thus welcomes and supports the critical role of the United States in ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacifi c region. Since 1985, the two countries have been regularly convening the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) to discuss major diplomatic and security issues. On the operational front, the two countries have made efforts to increase interoperability through joint exercises, including Exercise Talisman Saber.[11] Since April 2012, the U.S. Marine Corps have conducted rotational deployments to northern Australia.[12] On the equipment front, the two countries have been simplifying the export procedures associated with - 1 Relations with the United States In the Defence White Paper, Australia states that its alliance with the United States pursuant to the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United 7 The white paper identifi es six factors that will shape the security environment of Australia over the next two decades: (1) the roles of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacifi c region and the relationship between them; (2) challenges to the stability of the rules-based global order; (3) the threat of terrorism to Australians at home and abroad; (4) state fragility caused by uneven economic growth, crime, social, environmental and governance challenges, and climate change; (5) the pace of military modernization and the development of more capable regional military forces; and (6) the emergence of new complex, non-geographic threats (e.g., cyber threats). With regard to (5), the white paper notes that in the Indo-Pacifi c region, half of the world’s submarines and at least half of the world’s advanced combat aircraft will be operating and more countries may acquire ballistic missile technology. 8 According to the white paper, over the next decade, the number of active duty ADF personnel would be increased to approximately 62,400 personnel from the current approximately 58,000 personnel. If this is realized, the ADF would return to its largest size since 1993. 9 The Defence White Paper refers to the submarines to be acquired as “regionally superior submarines.” It explains that Australia would select the submarine classifi cation by the end of 2016, and that the fi rst submarine would begin entering service in the early 2030s. Japan, Germany, and France participated in the submarine Competitive Evaluation Process. In April 2016, the Australian government announced that the French company DCNS was chosen as the partner for building the submarines. 10 A trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. Since 1986, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand due to its adoption of a non-nuclear policy. The treaty is thus effective only between Australia and the United States and between Australia and New Zealand. 11 Exercise Talisman Saber, started in 2005, is a biennial combined Australia-U.S. training activity designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability. About 33,000 U.S. Forces and ADF personnel participated in the exercise held in July 2015. 12 By way of the Force Posture Initiatives of November 2011, the United States and Australia announced that the U.S. Marine Corps would conduct rotational deployments approximately every six months to Darwin and northern Australia. Accordingly, approximately 200 U.S. Marines were deployed in 2012 and 2013, 1,150 Marines in 2014 and 2015, and approximately 1,250 Marines in 2016. The Defence White Paper ----- equipment deals pursuant to the Australia-U.S. Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty that entered into force in May 2013. In addition, the two countries are examining the joint development of the F-35 JSF and missile defense cooperation.[13] Furthermore, bilateral cooperation is being advanced in areas such as ISR, space,[14] and cyber.[15] Since the Abbott administration that was inaugurated in September 2013, Australia has continued to pursue the further deepening of bilateral relations. In August 2014, the two sides signed the Force Posture Agreement which provides a legal framework for the rotational deployment of the U.S. Marine Corps. From October 2014, the ADF has been participating in the combat mission of the U.S.-led operation against ISIL. In July 2015, the two countries conducted a training in which B-52 strategic bombers of the U.S. Forces were flown from the U.S. mainland to drop bombs on an air weapons range in Australia and then returned to the United States. At the 30th AUSMIN in October 2015, the two sides signed a joint statement on defense cooperation[16] to serve as a guideline for future defense cooperation, and reaffirmed their strong bilateral cooperation. - 2 Relations with China enhance mutual understanding, facilitate transparency, and build trust. Based on such a policy, Australia and China continuously hold dialogues among their defense authorities,[17] along with exchanges to develop the cooperative relations between their defense forces, including joint exercises and mutual visits by vessels.[18] Meanwhile, like the previous Abbott administration, the Turnbull administration has been making Australia’s position on China very clear. The Joint Statement of the AUSMIN in October 2015, referring to China by name, expresses strong concerns over recent land reclamation and construction activity in the South China Sea, and calls on all claimant states to halt militarization. When the United States conducted the Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea in the same month, Minister for Defence Marise Payne of Australia issued a statement expressing strong support for rights to freedom of navigation and overflight under international law.[19] In the Defence White Paper, Australia asserts that it will be important for regional stability that China provides reassurance to its neighbors by being more transparent about its defense policies, and expresses particular concern with the unprecedented pace and scale of China’s land reclamation activities in the South China Sea. That said, in October 2015, the government of the Northern Territory leased to a Chinese company the rights to operate the commercial wharfs of the Darwin Port, also utilized by ADF and U.S. Force vessels. The fact that the Australian federal government did not lodge objections, saying there were no security concerns, led to people expressing uneasiness within and outside of Australia.[20] In the Defence White Paper, Australia states that its relationship with China is crucial in different ways from its relationship with the United States, and that it welcomes China’s continued economic growth and the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. It goes on to say Australia is committed to continuing the development of Australia’s defense relations with China, and working to 13 While Australia considers that the threat of an ICBM attack on Australia is low, it deems there is a possible threat of an attack on Australian territory by a long-range or submarine-launched ballistic missile or cruise missile, as well as attack on the deployed ADF by a short-range ballistic missile or cruise missile. To counter such threats, Australia and the United States have launched a working group to study options that could contribute to missile defense in the region. 14 Since signing the Space Situational Awareness Partnership in November 2010, Australia and the United States have promoted space cooperation, including the relocation of the U.S. C-band ground-based radar system and the Space Surveillance Telescope to Australia. 15 At the AUSMIN in September 2011, the two nations signed a joint statement on cyberspace and confirmed that, mindful of their longstanding defense relationship and the ANZUS Treaty, the two would consult together and determine appropriate options to address threats in the event of a cyber attack that threatens the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of either Australia or the United States. 16 The statement envisions that greater competition for resources and territorial disputes will increase the possibility of miscalculation and the potential for conflict in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions, and states that the two countries would further deepen their defense relationship to deal with this. Specifically, the statement sets forth: deeper interoperability; strengthened policy and intelligence cooperation; increased collaboration in science and technology, capability development, and defense industry engagement; and coordinated multilateral engagement. 17 In July 2014, Fan Changlong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, visited Australia, and held talks with Prime Minister Abbott, Minister for Defence David Johnston, and others. The two sides agreed to hold a U.S.-China-Australia trilateral joint exercise. In addition, Australia and China have regularly convened the Defence Strategic Dialogue since 1997. At the 18th Dialogue held in December 2015, Gen. Fang Fenghui, then Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army of China, visited Australia and held talks with Australian officials, including Air Chief Marshal Mark Binskin, Chief of the Defence Force, and Dennis Richardson, Secretary of the Department of Defence. 18 In August 2015, following on from the previous year, KOWARI 2015, the second survival training among the United States, China, and Australia, was conducted in northern Australia, with ten personnel participating from each country. In September 2015, Exercise Pandaroo designed to build teamwork, friendship, and trust between the Australian and Chinese forces was carried out in southeastern Australia, with ten personnel participating from each country. In November, two vessels of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) visited Zhanjiang, Guangdong Province in China, and conducted a joint exercise with Chinese Navy vessels including a live firing exercise. In January 2016, three Chinese Navy vessels visited Brisbane, Australia and conducted navigation training with ADF vessels. 19 In response to China’s announcement of the “East China Sea ADIZ” in November 2013, Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop issued a statement saying Australia has made clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea. 20 In addition, opposition parties and think tanks raised concerns over the fact that this Chinese company is thought to have close ties with the Communist Party of China and the People’s Liberation Army, and ----- - 4 Relations with Southeast Asia and South **Pacific Countries** In the Defence White Paper, Australia regards a secure nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and South Pacific as its strategic interest. In particular, Australia considers that instability and conflicts in Southeast Asia have the potential to threaten Australia’s security and economic relations with countries. Furthermore, Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asian countries and maritime trade that transits Southeast Asia. In this regard, Australia perceives that the security of these sea lanes must be ensured alongside freedom of navigation. Based on this understanding, Australia seeks to make military contributions to support the maritime security of Southeast Asia and support the governments of South Pacific and other countries to build and strengthen their security. Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia in the security and defense fields following the signing of the Lombok Treaty in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to strategic partnership in March 2010, and the conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement in September 2012.[22] In recent years, however, issues have emerged, including differences in their responses to stowaways from Indonesia, the case of wiretapping of the Indonesian President and others by Australia’s intelligence agency, and the issue of the execution of Australian nationals in Indonesia.[23] Consequently, cooperative relations in the security and defense fields stalled intermittently between the two countries. Subsequently, in the second half of 2015, mutual visits by ministers and higher-level officials resumed, including the visit to Indonesia by Prime Minister Turnbull. The third Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) was held in December 2015, and the bilateral relationship is seeing further improvements. With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out regular joint combined exercises in the South China Australia and India’s first combined naval exercise AUSINDEX 2015 [Australian Department of Defence] - 3 Relations with India In the Defence White Paper, Australia states that it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the IndoPacific region, and that it sees India as a key security partner. Australia notes that it aims to further mature its defense relationship with India in support of their shared strategic interests. The Australia-India relationship was elevated to strategic partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by senior military officers, interactions among military services, and mutual dispatches of students to military educational organizations. More recently, in November 2014, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover research, development, and industry engagement, to hold regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks between each of their military services. Accordingly, in June 2015, two Indian Navy vessels made a goodwill visit to Australia, and in September 2015, the first bilateral combined naval exercise AUSINDEX 15 was conducted off the east coast of India.[21] See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 7-1-2 (Military Affairs) 21 From Australia, three RAN vessels including a submarine and one patrol aircraft participated. From India, three Indian Navy vessels and one patrol aircraft participated. 22 The Lombok Treaty is a security cooperation framework that espouses wide-ranging cooperation in the defense field. It entered into force in February 2008. The Defense Cooperation Arrangement covers strengthened cooperation in counter-terrorism and maritime security. 23 To deal with the increasing number of stowaways from Indonesia, the Abbott administration has taken responses, such as turning them away at sea prior to their landing in Australia. This has prompted backlash from the Indonesian government. In November 2013, it was reported that an Australian intelligence agency wiretapped the telephone calls of Indonesia’s previous President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mrs. Yudhoyono, ministers, and others. The Indonesian government lodged strong protests, including summoning the Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and demanding an apology to the Australian government. The government also announced the suspension of military exchanges and intelligence cooperation with Australia. In April 2015, two Australians were executed in Indonesia for helping to smuggle drugs, and ----- Sea and other areas[24] under the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.[25] Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a secure maritime trading environment. As regards Malaysia, Australia stations the ADF in Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Base Butterworth, and contributes to maintaining regional security and stability through patrol activities in the South China Sea and the northern Indian Ocean.[26] Australia plays a leading role in assisting Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste, and the South Pacific countries in fields such as security maintenance, coping with natural disasters, and maritime patrol.[27] In particular, in the field of maritime patrol, Australia still regularly deploys ADF assets to the South Pacific to assist with patrol activities. In addition, in June 2014, Australia unveiled a plan to replace the 22 patrol vessels it provided to these countries in the past. With New Zealand, Australia has an alliance pursuant to the ANZUS Treaty. The two countries hold regular meetings by their leaders and defense ministers, and have maintained close cooperative relations in the security and defense fields through joint exercises and joint activities in the region. See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6 (Security and Defense Policies of Each Country) - 5 Overseas Activities In the Defence White Paper, Australia identifies the following strategic defense objective: Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order. In line with this objective, as of late June 2016, about 2,350 of Australia’s approximately 56,750 force strength[28] are deployed and are conducting operations overseas. In Iraq, to support the airstrikes conducted by the U.S. Forces against ISIL in northern Iraq, Australia began air-dropping humanitarian supplies in August 2014 and participating in combat missions such as airstrikes from October 2014. In addition, Australia has been advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces on the military front since May 2014. As of late June 2016, about 780 personnel (of which approximately 400 personnel are engaged in assistance in the United Arab Emirates), six F/A-18 fighter/attack aircraft, one E-7A early warning and control aircraft, one KC-30A refueling aircraft, among other assets are executing this mission. In Afghanistan, since October 2001, approximately 1,550 ADF personnel on average have engaged annually in reconstruction assistance activities and the trainings of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). With the completion of ISAF’s activities in the end of 2014, about 270 ADF personnel now train, advise, and assist NATOled Afghan forces. 24 In October 2014, Exercise Bersama Lima was held in the Malay Peninsula and the neighboring waters and airspace, in which approximately 500 personnel, vessels, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated. In Exercise Bersama Shield held in May 2015, approximately 380 personnel, vessels including a submarine, and patrol aircraft of the ADF participated. 25 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-2, Footnote 10. 26 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-6. 27 Australia has extended proactive assistance for the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the momentum for independence heightened in Timor-Leste. The ADF led the International Stabilization Force (ISF) since 2006, and with the stabilization of the security situation in Timor-Leste, the withdrawal of the ADF was completed in March 2013. In the Solomon Islands, the ADF extended assistance for their stabilization since July 2003 through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The ADF withdrew from the country in August 2013, when the military activities of RAMSI were completed. ----- **Section 6** **Southeast Asia** **1 General Situation** Southeast Asia occupies a strategic position for traffi c, linking the Pacifi c and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It is an important region for Japan which relies on maritime transport for many of the supplies needed for economic activities and the lives of the Japanese people. The countries in Southeast Asia are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened interdependence within the region and with countries outside the region. In late 2015, the establishment of |Fig. I-2-6-1 Comparison of Forc|es Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2016| |---|---| **ROK** Ground forces **1.6 million troops** Combat aircraft Ground forces approx. 2,720 aircraft **495,000 troops** Combat aircraft approx. **620 aircraft** Vessels National Defense Budget **211,000 tons** approx. U.S.$ 35.6 bn Vessels National Defense Budget (38.7995 trillion won) **1.502tons million** approx. U.S.$ (954.4 billion yuan)151.1 bn **China** Ground Combat forces aircraft **140,000** approx. troops **410 aircraft** Vessels National Defense Budget **All of Southeast Asia** **469,000** approx. U.S.$ 40.5 bn tons (4.8607 trillion yen) (137 vessels) **1.655Ground forces million troops** **Japan** Combat aircraft approx. **840 aircraft** National Defense Budget Vessels approx. U.S.$ 37.7 bn **628,000 tons** Notes: 1. Source: “The Military Balance 2016,” etc. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size. There are limits to the comparisons of national defense budgets which have simply been converted into U.S. dollars when the different elements are taken into consideration, such as each country’s exchange rate fluctuations and price levels. However, as the purchasing power parities of Southeast Asian countries are not published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (except Indonesia), this figure intentionally represents the national defense budgets of Japan and other countries that have been converted into U.S. dollars using the exchange rate published by the Ministry of Finance of Japan. 2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each SDF as of the end of FY2015; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fixed-wing aircraft only). The Japanese national defense budget is the initial budget excluding the cost of the SACO, the share of the U.S. Forces realignment costs. The Japanese national defense expenditures are the initial budget excluding SACO-related expenses (4.6 billion yen), excluding the portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community (142.6 billion yen) out of the U.S. Forces realignment expenses and expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft. 3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister’s Budget Report to the National People’s congress in 2016. 4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from ROK Ministry of National Defense sources from 2016, etc. 5. The national defense budget for all of Southeast Asia represents the sum of the 2015 figures for each country according to “The Military Balance 2016.” However, the sum uses 2014 figures from “The Military Balance 2015” for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 6. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated using the FY2016 Ministry of Finance exchange rates of 120 yen to 1 dollar, 19 yen to 1 yuan, and 110 yen to 1,000 won. 7. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2016 figures using the FY2016 Ministry of Finance exchange rate of 120 yen to 1 dollar. ----- the ASEAN Community was declared as an outcome of the strides made in ASEAN cooperation towards its integration. Meanwhile, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial disputes over the South China Sea, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed. Furthermore, in recent years, there is a concern about nationals embarking to Iraq and Syria for the purpose of joining ISIL and engaging in terrorism after returning to **2 Security and Defense Policies of Each Country** - 1 Indonesia their countries.[1] In order to cope with these issues, the countries in Southeast Asia are working to build military forces for national defense and maintenance of domestic public security, as well as for addressing new security issues such as terrorism and piracy. Recently, against the backdrop of economic development, the countries have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their naval and air forces, as well as strengthening their maritime law enforcement capacities. See>> Fig. I-2-6-1 (Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2016) through efforts including conducting related exercises. While no major terror attacks had occurred in Indonesia in recent years, terrorist bombing attacks took place in January 2016 in central Jakarta, which killed and injured several people.[6] Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries, and adopts an independent and active foreign policy. With the United States, it is strengthening its cooperative relationship in such fi elds as military education and training and military equipment procurement, and carries out joint training with the United States. These include the “Cooperation Afl oat Readiness Indonesia is a country of importance in Southeast Asia with the world’s largest Muslim population, vast land and territorial waters, and strategic importance for maritime traffi c. Although Indonesia does not confront any immediate external military threats, it faces internal concerns, including the activities of Islamic extremists,[2] such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and secession and independence movements in Papua Province. Under the banner of the maritime nation concept, President Joko Widodo who took offi ce in October 2014 strives to revive maritime culture, address territorial disputes through maritime diplomacy, and strengthen maritime defense capabilities. As part of its military force reform, Indonesia aims to meet the requirements for minimum defense capabilities—what it calls Minimum Essential Force (MEF)—and build the MEF over a period of four years. However, Indonesia has indicated that its maritime defense capabilities, in particular, are still very much inadequate.[3] Accordingly, Indonesia has announced a defense budget increase as well as a policy to bolster its deployment of assets to the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea and other locations.[4] Furthermore, Indonesia established the Joint Special Operations Command in the Indonesian National Armed Forces[5] to counter terrorism. Indonesia also aims to increase its response capabilities As of November 2015, approximately 700 Indonesian nationals reportedly embarked for Iraq and Syria to join ISIL. It has also been suggested that nationals embarked from Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. For details, see Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-3 “Trends in the Spread of International Terrorism.” In October 2014, Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Moeldoko commented that the country had only yet reached 38% of the target to achieve MEF in the next four years. Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy Marsetio has stated that the country’s maritime defense capabilities are very much inadequate, and that 12 submarines and 16 frigates are necessary. It is believed that on December 15, 2015, Minister of Defense Ryamizard Ryacudu unveiled a plan to deploy a fi ghter squadron and small vessels to the Natuna Islands as well as increase the number of troops stationed there from the current 800 to around 2,000, including the special operations force of the Air Force, for the purpose of “being prepared for a range of threats such as illegal operations and illicit intrusion.” On June 9, 2015, Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Moeldoko formed the Joint Special Operations Command. Comprised of personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force who have received counter-terrorism training, it is believed to be based in Sentul, West Java and is ready to be mobilized 24 hours a day. On January 14, 2016, multiple explosions and gunfi re took place in central Jakarta, killing 8 people including 4 bombers and injuring more than 20 people. ISIL’s Indonesia branch issued a statement ----- and Training (CARAT)”[7] and the “Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT)”[8] exercises. In October 2015, President Joko visited the United States. The two leaders discussed the strengthening of the comprehensive partnership between the two countries, and welcomed the signing of the Joint Statement for Comprehensive Defense Cooperation between the Secretary of Defense and the Minister of Defense that took place at the same timing.[9] With China, the counter-terrorism training Sharp Knife has been held among the special operation forces of the two countries since 2011, and Sharp Knife Airborne among the airborne units of the air forces of the two countries since 2013. In March 2015, President Joko visited China as a state guest, and affirmed with President Xi Jinping that they would deepen bilateral relations under the framework of comprehensive strategic partnership. See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 5-3 (Relations with Other Countries); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((1) Indonesia) - 2 Malaysia and mutual visits by dignitaries take place frequently. In September 2015, Malaysia and China conducted their first bilateral field training exercise Peace and Friendship 2015 in the Strait of Malacca. Furthermore, in November 2015, when the Commander of the Chinese Navy visited Malaysia, the two countries are said to have agreed on making use of the Port of Kota Kinabalu for port calls by Chinese Navy vessels.[12] On the other hand, in connection with the recent continued anchoring of Chinese government vessels around the South Luconia Shoal over which Malaysia claims sovereignty, Malaysia has announced that its Navy and maritime law enforcement agencies would conduct around-the-clock monitoring, and that Malaysia would firmly defend its sovereignty. Along with strengthening its maritime defense force, in recent years Malaysia has striven to bolster its defense posture in eastern Malaysia, announcing in October 2013 that it would construct a new naval base in Bintulu close to the James Shoal and the South Luconia Shoal.[13] See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((9) Malaysia) - 3 Myanmar Malaysia, which is located at the center of Southeast Asia, considers itself to have common strategic interests with its neighboring countries. Although Malaysia does not acknowledge any imminent external threats at present, it believes that its forces should maintain a level of readiness for dealing with all military threats, and therefore, places importance on “Independence,” “Total Defence,” “Commitment to the Rule of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA),”[10] “Cooperation to the U.N. for World Peace,” “Measures against Terrorism,” and “Defence Diplomacy” in its defense policy. Malaysia and the United States hold joint exercises such as CARAT and SEACAT, and promote military cooperation including capacity-building in the maritime security field.[11] Despite competing claims over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and other matters, Malaysia and China have strong ties, especially their economic relationship, Myanmar shares borders with China and India, which are steering the changing balance of power in the international community, and is located on the border of South Asia and Southeast Asia. In light of these factors, Myanmar is noted for its strategic significance. In Myanmar, the armed forces had control over the government following the collapse of the socialist regime in 1988. However, with an economic slowdown caused by the economic sanctions imposed by the West against the military government, coupled with isolation from the international community, a road map to democracy was unveiled in 2003.[14] The road map to democracy was completed following the inauguration of the Thein Sein administration in March 2011. In the first general elections held in November 2015 following the transition to civilian rule, the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by President Aung San 7 A general term that refers to a series of bilateral exercises that the United States conducts with Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Timor-Leste. 8 A general term that refers to counter-terrorism joint exercises that the United States conducts with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. 9 On October 26, 2015, the Joint Statement for Comprehensive Defense Cooperation was signed between U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter and Minister of Defense Ryamizard during his visit to the United States. The joint statement consists of five pillars: maritime; peacekeeping; HA/DR; defense modernization; and countering transnational threats. In November 2015, when President Obama unveiled his policy of strengthening assistance for Southeast Asian countries, the President stated that the United States would expand cooperation on Indonesia’s coastal patrol and ISR capacity-building, among other areas, and provide US$21 million of assistance to Indonesia over two years until 2016. 10 Entered into force in 1971. This agreement states that Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom will discuss what response should be adopted in the event of aggression towards or the threat of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The five countries carry out various exercises based on these arrangements. 11 In November 2015, Minister of Defence Hishammuddin Hussein, joined by U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter who was visiting Malaysia, boarded and toured a U.S. aircraft carrier in the South China Sea. In the same month, when President Obama unveiled his policy of strengthening assistance for Southeast Asian countries, the President stated that the United States would provide assistance of US$2.5 million to Malaysia over two years until 2016. The President then announced that the United States would expand bilateral cooperation in such areas as port security and joint exercises. 12 Admiral Wu Shengli, Commander of the Chinese Navy, visited Malaysia from November 9 to 11, 2015. When the Commander held talks with officials including Malaysia’s Deputy Minister of Defence and Chief of Navy, the two sides agreed that they would deepen the relations between their military forces and promote practical cooperation in all directions. In addition, the two sides are said to have agreed on making use of the Port of Kota Kinabalu in the state of Sabah, Malaysia for port calls by Chinese vessels as part of their defense cooperation. 13 In October 2014, Prime Minister Najib Razak announced that Malaysia would relocate Squadron Hawk (light attack aircraft) from the Malay Peninsula to the Labuan Air Base facing the South China Sea, and that Malaysia would upgrade the runway at the airport in Lahad Datu in the state of Sabah in the northeastern area of Borneo. 14 Consists of seven steps: reconvening of the National Assembly; stepwise implementation of processes necessary for democratization; drafting a new constitution; a national referendum on the constitution; ----- widespread concerns among the international community about their impacts on the democratization of Myanmar. With regard to the Rohingya issue, since 2015 the drifting of approximately 7,000 people near the Strait of Malacca has developed into a crisis. Following talks to discuss responses by the relevant countries, it was decided that countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia would permit the temporary acceptance of these people, on the condition that they return to their country in the future. However, Myanmar does not recognize the Rohingya people as its citizens, and thus, their legal status as stateless people is further complicating this issue. With regard to foreign policy, Myanmar upholds the principle of independence and non-alignment. On the other hand, China is thought to be an especially important partner to Myanmar since its period of military rule. With economic support from China, a gas pipeline and a port, among other infrastructure, are being built. On the military front, China is regarded as a major supplier of equipment. In June 2014, previous President Thein Sein visited China, and the two sides agreed to deepen cooperation in such areas as defense practices, law enforcement, and security. In June 2015, NLD President Aung San Suu Kyi visited China, and in a meeting with President Xi Jinping, the two countries agreed that they would enhance their friendly relations. Furthermore, Myanmar is strengthening its cooperative relationship with India both in the economic and military areas. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((7) Myanmar) - 4 The Philippines Suu Kyi secured a victory.[15] In March 2016, Htin Kyaw was elected President at the Assembly of the Union. In the same month, he was appointed President, and a new administration was inaugurated. Since the previous Thein Sein administration, the government of Myanmar has actively taken steps towards democratization, including the release of political prisoners and ceasefire agreements with ethnic minorities.[16] The international community has shown some level of appreciation for these steps, with the West including the United States successively easing economic sanctions on Myanmar. Following the inauguration of the new administration, the United States and other countries have issued statements welcoming the advances made towards democratization and expressing high expectations for the administration of the government. With regard to the efforts for a ceasefire agreement with ethnic minorities, in October 2015 the government signed a national ceasefire agreement with eight of the 16 armed ethnic minority groups with which negotiations were undertaken. Nevertheless, challenges still remain for the new administration, with eight other groups refusing to sign the ceasefire agreement, as well as fighting breaking out with groups that are not participating in the negotiations and are excluded from the agreement. Additionally, including in the years preceding the previous administration, nuclear issues and military ties with North Korea have been raised as matters of concern.[17] The conflicts between Rohingya Muslim ethnic minorities and Buddhists since 2012 have led to The Philippines perceives that it confronts new security challenges, including non-traditional threats, such as transnational crime. At the same time, it identifies that long-standing issues, such as the territorial disputes over the South China Sea and terrorism perpetrated by domestic anti-government armed groups, constitute major security concerns. In the first presidential election in six years held in May 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was elected. As regards domestic security issues, over the last approximately 40 years, armed conflicts have repeatedly broken out between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in particular. With the support of the activities of the International 15 On November 20, 2015, the Union Election Commission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar announced the results of the November 8 general elections. The results confirmed that NLD won 390 of the 491 contested seats, while the ruling party Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) gained no more than 41 seats. 16 About 30% of Myanmar’s population is ethnic minorities, some of which demand secession or greater autonomy for their regions. In the 1960s, the government of Myanmar implemented oppressive policies involving human rights violations such as forced labor and forced migration, which led to armed conflicts with armed groups of ethnic minorities. 17 It is reported that at talks with then President Lee Myung-bak of the ROK in May 2012, President Thein Sein admitted that some weapons trading took place with North Korea in the past 20 years and indicated that the country would not engage in such trade in the future. He denied cooperation with North Korea on nuclear development. Moreover, it has been reported that, at the 11th IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (Asia Security Summit) held in June the same year, then Defence Minister Hla Min disclosed that while the previous government attempted to start academic research on nuclear technology, this research was ----- Monitoring Team (IMT),[18] the peace process is seeing progress, including the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and the partial decommissioning of MILF forces and weapons.[19] On the other hand, military clashes have occurred between the government army and National Police, and armed forces opposing the peace talks.[20] It is deemed that time will be required to achieve practical peace. The Philippines and the United States, with a historically close relationship, consider that the U.S.Philippines alliance is a lynchpin for the peace, stability, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries have maintained a cooperative relationship under their mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the withdrawal of the U.S. Forces in 1992.[21] The two countries have conducted the largescale military exercise Balikatan every year since 2000 as well as the CARAT and SEACAT joint exercises. In November 2015, when President Obama visited the Port of Manila during his visit to the Philippines, the President announced support for areas including equipment cooperation, capacity-building in coastal security, and joint exercises, stating that as an ally the United States was committed to further strengthening and expanding their existing security cooperation. In January 2016, the Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)[22] signed between the two countries in April 2014 for strengthening their cooperation on such areas as the capacity enhancement of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and disaster relief was constitutional. In the same month, the two countries held a Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) in Washington, D.C. and discussed South China Sea issues, approach to strengthening their defense cooperation, among other matters. In March 2016, the two countries agreed on five locations for carrying out defense cooperation based on the EDCA. In April 2016, the two countries announced The U.S. and Philippine Defense Secretaries shake hands aboard an Osprey over the waters of the South China Sea (background: USS John C. Stennis) (April 15, 2016) [Photo courtesy of the U.S. Marine Corps] the continuation of joint patrols in the South China Sea and routine deployments of U.S. aircraft and other assets to Clark Air Base.[23] It is expected that concrete steps would be taken, including the development of facilities in the Philippines for the rotational deployment of the U.S. Forces in accordance with the EDCA. In this regard, attention will be paid to related developments from the perspective of the strengthened presence of the U.S. Forces in the Philippines. The Philippines and China have competing claims over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. In recent years, the two countries have stepped up their activities to assert their sovereignty, with both countries lodging protests against the other’s actions and assertions. Against this backdrop, seeking a settlement under international law, in January 2013, the Philippines launched arbitral tribunal proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS against China. The Philippine effort aimed at peaceful settlement has received support from many countries including the United States. The arbitral tribunal rendered its final ruling in July 2016. See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea) See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((4) The Philippines) 18 Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, and the EU are the member states of the IMT. (As of March 2015) 19 In October 2012, the Framework Agreement for the realization of a final agreement on the Mindanao peace process was signed. In January 2014, the government of the Philippines and MILF signed the Annex on Normalization. The goal of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed in March 2014 is to launch an autonomous government in 2016 after formulating the Bangsamoro Basic Law, holding a referendum in order to demarcate a jurisdictional domain, abolishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and establishing the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA). 20 In January 2015, in Mindanao, an exchange of fire occurred between the Philippine National Police that were mobilized to arrest JI suspects, and the MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). This incident reportedly left casualties on both sides. 21 In 1947, a military base agreement was concluded that allows the U.S. Forces to use Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station for 99 years. A military assistance agreement was also concluded in 1947, followed by the mutual defense treaty in 1951. With the revision of the 1966 military base agreement, the time limit for the stationing of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station were returned in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Subsequently, the two countries concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, establishing the legal status of U.S. Forces personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines. 22 The EDCA is designed to enable the U.S. Forces to utilize and develop facilities in the Philippines, preposition equipment, among other activities. It was agreed that the bases in the Philippines to be utilized by the U.S. Forces would be decided through consultations after the EDCA was concluded and would be stated in an annex to the agreement. After the signing in 2014, the consultations regarding the annex had been suspended as litigation procedures were instituted in the Philippines on the grounds that the EDCA was unconstitutional. 23 At the 2+2 talks held on January 12, 2016 (EST), the ministers welcomed the decision that the EDCA was constitutional, and reaffirmed their commitment to continue strengthening their alliance in terms of ensuring both countries’ mutual defense and security as well as jointly contributing to regional peace, stability, and economic prosperity. On March 17-18, 2016 (EST), a strategic dialogue among foreign and defense authorities was held in Washington, D.C. The two sides agreed on the following five EDCA Agreed Locations: Antonio Bautista Air Base; Basa Air Base; Fort Magsaysay; Lumbia Air Base; and MactanBenito Ebuen Air Base. On April 14, 2016, Secretary of Defense Carter who was visiting the Philippines during the Balikatan exercise announced that the United States would continue the joint patrols in the South China Sea since March, and following the termination of Balikatan, would continue to station five A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft, three H60G Pave Hawk helicopters, and one MC-130H Combat Talon aircraft ----- of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTAF) and developing the defense industry. Attacks and bombing incidents by Islamic extremists seeking secession and independence have become a frequent occurrence in southern Thailand. The government identifies the swift restoration of peace and security of the lives and property of the people in southern Thailand as an urgent task. In August 2013, the submission of an amnesty bill[27] by opposition parties to the House of Representatives sparked large-scale anti-government demonstrations, mainly in the capital city of Bangkok. The House was dissolved in December 2013, and a declaration of a state of emergency was issued in January 2014. In May 2014, following the declaration of martial law nationwide, forces led by the RTAF launched a coup d’état and seized power over the nation. Subsequently, then Commander-in-Chief Prayuth Chan-o-Cha of the Royal Thai Army established the National Council for Peace and Order that he chairs. In August 2014, he was elected interim Prime Minister. Based on the roadmap for transitioning to civilian rule, the Prayuth administration established the National Reform Council and the Constitution Drafting Committee in succession in October 2014, and aims to hold general elections and transition to a new administration under a new constitution. Meanwhile, in September 2015, the draft of the new constitution was rejected by the National Reform Council. As a result, a national referendum on the draft new constitution was scheduled for August 2016, which is expected to delay the general elections to 2017 or thereafter. In August 2015, bombings took place in Thailand’s capital city of Bangkok that resulted in many casualties and wounded. Twenty people died, including foreign nationals.[28] In addition, undemarcated border issues exist between Thailand and neighboring countries including Myanmar and Cambodia. Under its flexible omni-directional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States, and China. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, - 5 Singapore Given its limited land area, population, and resources, Singapore’s existence and development depend on the peace and stability of the region in a globalized economy. Singapore gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-fifth of its national budget. Singapore identifies deterrence and diplomacy as twin pillars of its national defense policy. Singapore emphasizes the importance of cooperative relations with ASEAN and the FPDA,[24] and has concluded defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region. With the aim of contributing to peace and stability in the region, Singapore supports U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and permits it to use military facilities in Singapore. In 2013, U.S. littoral combat ships (LCSs) began their rotational deployments.[25] In December 2015, the P-8 patrol aircraft of the U.S. Forces were deployed to Singapore for around one week for the first time. The two countries have committed to continuing to carry out similar deployments routinely.[26] In addition, Singapore conducted joint exercises with the United States, such as CARAT and SEACAT. With China, active mutual visits by their dignitaries have taken place, and in November 2014, Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen visited China. During his talks with Minister of National Defense Chang Wanquan, the two sides agreed to develop their defense cooperation and promote joint training. In November 2015, President Xi Jinping of China visited Singapore. In May 2015, the two countries conducted their first bilateral naval joint exercise China-Singapore Cooperation 2015. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((3) Singapore) - 6 Thailand Thailand’s defense policy includes: strengthening defense cooperation through ASEAN, international organizations, and other entities; defense that makes comprehensive use of political, economic, and other national strengths; and effective defense aimed at increasing the readiness 24 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-2, Footnote 10. 25 Based on an agreement reached in April 2013. In December 2013, LCS USS Fort Worth arrived in Singapore for the second rotational deployment. 26 In December 2015, Minister of Defence Ng Eng Hen of Singapore visited the United States. The two sides signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and concurred that in accordance with this Agreement, they would strengthen their defense cooperation in the five areas of military, policy, strategy, technology, and the non-traditional security area of piracy and terrorism. 27 The bill gives amnesty to those who were arrested in the political upheaval since the military coup d’état in 2006. It is deemed that the bill would allow former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who has been convicted but is living overseas, to return to Thailand. 28 On August 17, 2015, two bombings took place in a commercial area in central Bangkok (sightseeing location Erawan Shrine at the Ratchaprasong Intersection), killing 20 people and injuring many including Japanese nationals. On the following day, August 18, a bombing took place at a dock along the Chao Phraya River in Bangkok (no casualties and wounded). On the same day, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-ocha issued a statement saying, “The incident has made it clear that there are elements who have intent to make political gains to undermine the Thai economy and tourism industry. The government is fully committed to the investigation of the perpetrators.” That same day, the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army denied the possibility that Islamic extremists aiming to secede and gain independence in ----- Thailand and its ally,[29] the United States, have maintained a cooperative relationship. They have conducted the multinational joint exercise Cobra Gold since 1982, as well as the CARAT and SEACAT joint exercises.[30] Thailand and China have also promoted military exchanges, conducting joint exercises such as Blue Strike among their marines and Falcon Strike[31] among their air forces. In April 2012, the two countries agreed on the joint development of multiple rocket launchers. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((5) Thailand) - 7 Vietnam Party of Vietnam (CPV) was held after five years since the previous Congress. The Congress decided that Nguyen Phu Trong would remain CPV General Secretary, among other decisions, and a new leadership was established.[32] General Secretary Trong in his second term identified that his focal missions for the next five years would include the following: enhance party building; carry out political reform; accelerate national modernization; and maintain the country’s independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity. Vietnam and the United States have strengthened their military relations in recent years.[33] This has taken such forms as joint exercises with the U.S. Navy and port calls by U.S. Navy vessels in Vietnam. In June 2015, Minister of National Defence Thanh and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter, who was visiting Vietnam, signed a joint statement spelling out promotion of consultations and dialogues and engagement in maritime security.[34] In July 2015, General Secretary Trong, making his first visit to the United States as CPV General Secretary, held talks with President Obama. In the area of defense, the two sides confirmed that they would continue to cooperate on maritime security, carry out defense equipment trade, and cooperate on the transfer of defense science technologies.[35] In June 2016, during his visit to Vietnam, President Obama announced that the United States would fully lift its arms embargo on Vietnam. Vietnam and Russia continue to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense. In March 2013, Minister of Defence Sergey Shoygu visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed to jointly construct vessel replenishment facilities along Cam Ranh Bay. In 2014, Russian IL-78 aerial refueling tankers landed at Cam Ranh International Airport for the first time for the refueling flights for Russia’s Tu-95MS strategic bombers.[36] As Vietnam perceives that it confronts diverse and complex security challenges. It considers that the issues in the South China Sea have serious impacts on the maritime activities of Vietnam, and non-traditional threats, such as piracy and terrorism, are matters of concern. During the Cold War era, the former Soviet Union provided the most significant assistance to Vietnam. Until 2002, Russia had a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay. After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations with other countries, including establishing diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and seeks to actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries. Vietnam established a PKO Center in May 2014 and began deploying personnel for U.N. PKO in June 2014. Following this, Vietnam announced that it would gradually scale up its personnel contributions. As such efforts exemplify, Vietnam is committed to making contributions to the international community. In January 2016, the Congress of the Communist 29 Thailand and the United States have an alliance based on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, of 1954 and the Rusk-Thanat communiqué of 1962. 30 In May 2014, following the coup d’état in Thailand, the United States announced it would suspend joint exercises and freeze military assistance. However, multinational joint exercise Cobra Gold was held in February 2015, and bilateral joint exercise CARAT was held in August 2015. 31 From November 12 to 30, 2015, the first joint exercise between Chinese and Thai air forces, Falcon Strike-2015, was held at the Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base in Thailand. From China, six J-11B fighters participated, and from Thailand, five JAS-39 Gripen fighters participated. In addition, in the air show of the closing ceremony of the exercise, from China, seven J-10 fighters of the August 1st Aerobatics Team participated, and from Thailand, two F-16 fighters participated. 32 President Truong Tan Sang, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Minister of National Defence Phung Quang Thanh, among others were not reelected and retired from office. In April 2016, President Tran Dai Quang, Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Minister of National Defense Ngo Xuan Lich, and others were appointed at the Vietnamese National Assembly. 33 In 1984, the United States invoked an arms embargo on Vietnam on the grounds of its human rights issue. In 2007, the arms embargo was lifted excluding lethal weapons. In October 2014, the United States announced the lifting of its embargo on the sale of maritime security-related lethal weapons to Vietnam. In November 2015, when President Obama unveiled his policy of strengthening assistance for Southeast Asian countries, the President stated that the United States would provide approximately US$40 million of assistance to Vietnam over two years until 2016. The President then announced the bolstering of maritime ISR capabilities and the expansion of cooperation on bilateral exercises focusing on HA/DR. 34 On June 1, 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter and Vietnamese Minister of National Defence Thanh signed a joint statement in Hanoi. They confirmed that the two countries would, among other things: (1) promote senior-level consultations and defense policy dialogues and mutually carry out U.N. PKO; (2) mutually carry out search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief; and (3) promote maritime security. The United States affirmed that it stood ready to share its experience and information, conduct personnel training, and provide equipment that contribute to maritime security and law enforcement. 35 In July 2015, CPV General Secretary Trong of Vietnam visited the United States for the first time as General Secretary and held talks with President Obama. At the joint press conference following the meeting, the two sides announced that they would: strengthen their defense and security relations; promote economic, trade, and investment cooperation; and increase mutual visits by senior officials and bilateral consultations. The two sides also announced the signing of the “United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement,” “Memorandum on U.N. PKO Cooperation,” and agreements pertaining to trade promotion, infectious disease measures, and grant assistance related to civil aircraft. 36 In March 2015, it was reported that U.S. DoD authorities, while stating the relevant facts, requested Vietnam to prevent the recurrence of this activity. In addition, a senior official of the U.S. Pacific Command allegedly stated that the Russian military aircraft that received refueling from the aerial refueling tankers arriving from the Cam Ranh base conducted provocative flights. In January 2015, the Russian Ministry i ----- these examples demonstrate, the two countries have been carrying out new military cooperation. In recent years, the two countries have also promoted cooperation in the energy sector, such as nuclear power generation. Vietnam is nearly dependent on Russia for its defense equipment. See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries) Vietnam and China, under their comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership relations, proactively conduct exchanges among their senior government offi cials. However, the two countries have competing claims concerning issues such as sovereignty over the South China Sea. In April 2015, CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited China for the fi rst time in three and a half years. Following his talks with President Xi Jinping, the two sides issued a joint statemen[37] on strengthening exchanges and cooperation between their military forces and managing the differences in opinion to prevent their development into disputes, among other matters. In November 2015, President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, and the two sides agreed that differences in **3 Military Modernization in the Region** In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have increased their defense spending against the backdrop of economic development and other reasons, and are modernizing their military forces focusing on inducting equipment such as submarines and fi ghters including fourth-generation modern fi ghters. The underlying factors noted are increases in defense spending, the relationship between Southeast Asian countries in the sense that they react to neighboring states’ development of military capabilities, response to the expansion of China’s infl uence, and the inadequate role of regional security organizations to nurture relationships of trust.[39] Many Southeast Asian countries procure much of their defense equipment from a wide range of countries. As such, there are perceived diffi culties in achieving consistent operations and maintenance in the respective countries. Indonesia has introduced a total of 16 Russian Su27 fi ghters and Su-30 fi ghters by 2013. Moreover, in September 2015, Indonesia allegedly decided to purchase opinion regarding maritime issues would be dealt with appropriately. They also signed a joint statement that included commitments to peacefully resolving the South China Sea issues among the parties to the issues. Vietnam and India have been deepening their cooperative relationship in a broad range of areas, including security and economy. In the area of defense cooperation, it is noted that the Indian Armed Forces support the training of Vietnam’s Navy submarine personnel and Air Force pilots, and Indian Navy vessels make friendly visits to Vietnam. Furthermore, when Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh visited India in May 2015, the two sides signed the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Cooperation for the period 20152020.[38] Cooperation in the area of energy between India and Vietnam is also deepening, with a joint development program for oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. See>> Part I, Chapter 2 Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea) See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 ((2) Vietnam) Su-35 fi ghters from Russia under its plan to upgrade its F-5 fi ghters. It is also believed that Indonesia agreed to purchase two Kilo-class submarines from Russia. In 2011, an agreement was reached regarding the U.S. provision of 24 F-16 fi ghters, three of which were delivered in July 2014. In 2013, Indonesia agreed to purchase 8 AH-64 attack helicopters. With the ROK, Indonesia concluded an agreement in December 2011 to purchase three ROKmade 209-class submarines. The two countries started joint development of the KF-X fi ghter, and in October 2014, concluded a basic agreement which sets forth the details of their cost sharing and bilateral cooperation. In addition, Indonesia is domestically building two frigates based on the Dutch Sigma-class vessel. In 2009, Malaysia introduced two Scorpène-class submarines (jointly developed by France and Spain) as its fi rst submarines. In November 2014, Malaysia reportedly concluded an agreement to purchase six corvettes from the ROK. Furthermore, Malaysia announced a plan to 37 The joint statement’s references to the military fi eld include maintaining high-level contacts and military and security dialogue between the two countries, strengthening friendly exchanges between their border patrol forces, properly dealing with differences in opinion, exchanging military experiences with party and political tasks, deepening cooperation on personnel training, and continuing joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and vessel exchanges. In the joint statement, with regard to the South China Sea dispute, the two sides also affi rmed the importance of executing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and swiftly establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). 38 The statement was agreed upon in May 2015, when Minister of National Defense Phung Quang Thanh of Vietnam visited India and held talks with Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar. While the content of the Joint Vision Statement has not been disclosed, it is said to cover the period 2015-2020, with maritime security cooperation constituting the main pillar. On the same day, the two sides also signed an MOU on strengthening the cooperation between their coast guards. ----- build six indigenous LCSs and started building one of them. It also introduced 18 Russian-made Su-30 fi ghters by 2009 and is selecting a successor to its Mig-29 fi ghters that are scheduled to be decommissioned in 2015. The Philippines has taken steps in recent years to modernize its defense equipment against the backdrop of confl icts over territorial rights in the South China Sea. After the F-5 fi ghters were decommissioned in 2005, the Philippines did not have any fi ghters for some length of time. However, in November 2015, the Philippines introduced the fi rst 2 of the 12 FA-50 light fi ghters for which a purchase agreement had been concluded with the ROK. As for naval forces, the Philippines received two Hamilton-class frigates from the United States in 2011 and 2012, and is expected to receive three more of the same-class frigate. In June 2014, it was reported that the ROK would provide decommissioned Pohangclass corvettes. By January 2015, seven Italian AW109 multi-purpose helicopters tailored to wide-ranging naval missions, such as maritime patrol, have been delivered. Additionally, the Philippines has announced plans to procure equipment, such as attack helicopter, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, transport vessel, and amphibious vehicle. Singapore is actively striving to modernize its forces. By 2012, Singapore introduced two Archerclass (Västergötland-class) submarines from Sweden. In December 2013, Singapore concluded an agreement to purchase two German 218SG-class submarines, and announced a plan to build eight indigenous patrol vessels. With regard to fi ghters, Singapore inducted U.S.-made **4 Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea** In the South China Sea, ASEAN countries and China have competing claims to such areas as the Spratly Islands[40] and the Paracel Islands.[41] Under these circumstances, China’s unilateral, large-scale, and rapid land reclamation and building of facilities have heightened tension in the region, increasing international concern over freedom of navigation in the seas and other dimensions. Against this backdrop, the international community’s deep concern over the unilateral changes in the status quo and their creation of a fait accompli is quickly becoming ever more widespread. In recent years, the relevant countries and others are increasing their activities in the South China Sea in F-15 fi ghters and participates in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. Thailand has an aircraft carrier but does not own submarines. In July 2014, Thailand established the Submarine Squadron Headquarters, and has started the evaluation work to procure new submarines. In July 2015, it was reported that the Royal Thai Navy decided on a plan to purchase Chinese-made submarines. While it was deemed that subsequently, Minister of Defence Prawit Wongsuwon instructed the reconsideration of the plan, it is thought that in July 2016, he decided to purchase three Yuan-class submarines from China. With regard to frigates, in September 2012, the Cabinet approved a plan to introduce two frigates, and concluded an agreement to purchase an ROK-made frigate for the fi rst frigate. In addition, by 2013, Thailand has introduced 12 Swedishmade JAS-39 Gripen fi ghters. In December 2009, Vietnam concluded a contract to purchase six Russian-made Kilo-class submarines and introduced four of them by June 2015. In 2013, it was reported that Vietnam concluded a contract to purchase two Dutch-made Sigma-class corvettes. Furthermore, Vietnam reportedly concluded a contract to purchase 24 Russian-made Su-30 fi ghters from 2009 to 2011, and concluded a contract to additionally purchase 12 of the same fi ghter by 2013. Following the United States’ lifting of its embargo, attention will be paid to the trends in the equipment that Vietnam introduces from the United States, primarily in terms of the strengthening of Vietnam’s maritime defense capabilities. support of their territorial claims. China enacted the Act on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China in 1992, which stated that the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands are the territories of China. In addition, China attached a map of the “ninedash line” to a verbal note addressed to the United Nations in 2009, in which it made claims to the parts of the South China Sea that purportedly came under China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction. There were objections to the ambiguity of the justifi cations to this “nine-dash line” under international law, and this has given rise to competing claims with Southeast 40 The area surrounding the Spratly Islands is expected to have offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. The area is also a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fi shery resources. ----- Asian countries over the sovereignty and other aspects of the South China Sea. To date, China has not offered any concrete explanations regarding the relationship between the “nine-dash line” and relevant international norms. In June 2012, China announced the establishment of Sansha City in Hainan Province, which claims to have jurisdiction over the islands of the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and their surrounding waters. In November 2013, Hainan Province amended its regulation on the implementation of China’s fishing law, stipulating that foreign fishing vessels that wish to carry out fishing activities in waters under the jurisdiction of Hainan Province must obtain permission from the relevant departments under China’s State Council. In January 2016, China set out a maritime policy for the next five years beginning from 2016, which stated that China would build a “Spratly Islands ecosystem protection zone.” In March 2009, the Philippines passed the so-called Archipelagic Baselines Law, stating that the Philippines has sovereignty over part of the Spratly Islands and the Scarborough Shoal pursuant to UNCLOS.[42] In May 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly requested to the U.N. an extension of the continental shelf of the sea area that includes part of the Spratly Islands. In June 2012, Vietnam adopted the Maritime Law (effective January 2013) that asserts its sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Some of the countries concerned in the South China Sea have reportedly resorted to the use of force on the opposing country’s vessels, including seizing vessels and firing warning shots, and the concerned countries have mutually lodged protests against these actions. In May 2014, China’s unilateral commencement of oil drilling in waters near the Paracel Islands triggered confrontations between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels, and many vessels reportedly sustained damages due to collisions. In July 2015, a Vietnamese fishing vessel was rammed by a Chinese vessel and sunk near the Paracel Islands. Similar incidents are believed to have taken place in September 2015 and January and March 2016. In November 2015, a Chinese vessel allegedly appeared several kilometers off the coast of Thitu Island of the Spratly Islands occupied by the Philippines and anchored there for approximately ten days.[43] In January 2016, a Vietnamese fishing vessel operating near the Spratly Islands reportedly collided with a Taiwanese coast guard vessel. In the same month, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, alleging that Subi Reef. Rapid and large-scale land reclamation is under way. (Top left: as of January 26, 2015; top center: as of March 5, 2015; bottom left: September 3, 2015; bottom center: as of May 1, 2016) A 3,000m runway and other facilities are being built on the reef. (Right: as of May 1, 2016) (CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/DigitalGlobe) 42 According to the Republic Act No. 9522. This law gives the location of the baselines of the archipelago in terms of latitude and longitude, including of Luzon Island, Palawan Island, and Mindanao Island. However, for the Spratly Islands (Filipino name: Calayan Islands) and the Scarborough Shoal (Filipino name: Bajo de Masinloc), the law states that the baseline is based on the “Regime of Islands” under Article 121 of UNCLOS and does not give the geographical location of the baseline. 43 Thitu Island (Filipino name: Pag-asa Island) is a feature located near Subi Reef where China is building a runway. The mayor with jurisdiction over the island spotted the China Coast Guard vessel. This was i ----- China’s oil drilling rig “Haiyang Shiyou 981” conducted activities in an area north of the Paracel Islands where Vietnam and China have overlapping claims to the continental shelf, requested China to suspend its operations and withdraw the rig.[44] See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5 (Maritime Activities) Furthermore, some of the countries concerned in the South China Sea conduct land reclamations and build facilities on the features they respectively occupy, including the Spratly Islands. Since 2014, China has went ahead with its large-scale and rapid land reclamations and the building of facilities, such as harbors and runways, on seven features of the Spratly Islands. China has officially admitted to the installation of military facilities. In January 2016, China went ahead with test flights of requisitioned private aircraft at an airstrip built on Fiery Cross Reef. In response, Vietnam expressed strong protest and requested the prevention of its recurrence. Similarly, the Philippines expressed its intention to protest. In October 2015, Taiwan completed a 12.7 m-high lighthouse on Itu Aba Island of the Spratly Islands.[45] In December 2015, Taiwan completed a deep-water wharf on the same island cable of anchoring 3,000 t-class vessels. In January 2016, then President Ma Ying-jeou of Taiwan visited Itu Aba Island. In this connection, Vietnam lodged representations to Taiwan, saying it was a “serious violation of sovereignty.” U.S. government officials have also expressed despair. Meanwhile, by 2015 Vietnam has reclaimed approximately 86,000 square meters on the West London Reef and Sand Cay of the Spratly Islands combined. It is suggested that Vietnamese construction work includes the building of military facilities.[46] At the same time, in 2011, the Philippines unveiled a plan to repair the harbor and runaway on Thitu Island of the Spratly Islands. It has also announced a plan to install monitoring equipment on the same island to track private aircraft by the end of 2016.[47] In December 2015, 47 young people and others of the Philippines, in protest against Chinese claims, landed on Thitu Island and stayed there for approximately one week, to which China expressed strong dissatisfaction. Under these circumstances, in 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)[48] aimed at peacefully resolving the issues over the South China Sea. Official talks are now ongoing for establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC), which goes into further detail than the DOC and is deemed to have legal binding force. The issues surrounding the South China Sea have been discussed repeatedly at ASEAN-related meetings and other fora, with a view to achieving their peaceful resolution. However, as exemplified by the unprecedented situation in the past that led to the failure to adopt an ASEAN joint statement, there have been instances in which consensus was not reached among the member states. Nevertheless, there were also instances in which ASEAN adopted a unified response. For example, at the ASEAN Summit in April 2015 and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August 2015, members expressed that they “share the serious concerns” on the land reclamations being undertaken in the Spratly Islands. At the ASEAN Summit in November 2015, members shared concerns regarding the possibility of further militarization in the South China Sea. At the East Asia Summit held in the same month that was also attended by non-ASEAN countries, members took note of the serious concerns regarding developments related to the situation in the South China Sea. The Chairman’s Statement included reference to the fact that the members welcomed assurances given by President Xi Jinping of China during his visit to the United States in September 2015 that China “does not intend to pursue militarization in the South China Sea.”[49] Some countries involved are also making efforts to settle the issues in accordance with international law. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute over China’s assertions and actions in the South China Sea. In July 2015, the Philippines presented oral arguments in The Hague in the Netherlands to determine whether or not the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction over the submissions made by the Philippines. In October 2015, the arbitral tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction with 44 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, on January 16, 2016, China’s oil rig “Haiyang Shiyou 981” was found 21.4 nautical miles east of the assumed median line where the Vietnamese and Chinese continental shelves overlap. It is believed that representations were lodged to China on January 18. 45 Itu Aba Island (Taiwanese name: Taiping Dao) is the only feature occupied by Taiwan on the Spratly Islands and has a 1,200 m-long runway. 46 According to an article of the CSIS and AMTI. It is reportedly known that approximately 65,000 square meters were reclaimed on West London Reef (Vietnamese name: Da Tay) from January 2010 to April 2015 and approximately 21,000 square meters on Sand Cay (Vietnamese name: Dao Son Ca) from August 2011 to February 2015. 47 According to an article mentioning comments made by Civil Aviation Authority officials of the Philippines. The monitoring equipment is believed to be the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast system (ADS-B) that can receive data such as location information transmitted from private aircraft. 48 The DOC includes commitments to resolve territorial and other disputes by peaceful means, and to reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct would further promote peace and stability in the region and work towards the attainment of this objective, based on the principles of international law. ----- respect to some of the matters.[50] In response, China issued a statement saying that this decision was “invalid and has no binding force,” and reiterated its position that it would not participate in the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal, however, expressed the opinion that China’s non-participation would not affect the implementation of the proceedings. The decision of the arbitral tribunal has legal binding force between the parties to the dispute.[51] In November 2015, the Philippines presented oral arguments for this case, and in July 2016, the tribunal rendered a fi nal ruling in which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions were ruled in favor of the Philippines.[52] In response, China once again issued a statement noting that the ruling was invalid and had no binding force and that China opposed and refused to accept it. Pursuant to **5 Regional Cooperation** The ASEAN Community established on December 31, 2015 is comprised of three pillars, namely, cooperation by the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The fi rst of these, the ASEAN PoliticalSecurity Community (APSC), adopts the principle of building on what has been constructed over the years in the fi eld of political and security cooperation through ASEAN’s initiatives, and of aiming to ensure a peaceful life in a democratic and harmonious environment. To live up to this principle, the APSC Blueprint 2025, which was adopted at the 27th ASEAN Summit in November 2015, describes the following two major concepts. The fi rst is to become a community in which people live in a safe and harmonious security environment and share the values of tolerance and moderation by 2025. The second is to respond to challenges against regional peace and security and play a central role in the regional architecture, while at the same time, working with countries outside of the region to contribute to world peace, security, and stability. UNCLOS provisions, the award of the arbitral tribunal is fi nal and is legally binding on the parties to the dispute, and therefore, it is necessary that the parties adhere to the award. The issues surrounding the South China Sea are a matter of concern for the whole international community, and are directly related to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. As such, attention will continue to be paid to trends in the countries concerned, as well as the direction of dialogues aimed at the resolution of the issues. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East and South China Seas); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4 (Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) The Blueprint identifi es four characteristics of measures that are designed for realizing these concepts: (1) aiming to become a rules-based, people-oriented, people-centered community, adhere to and promote ASEAN fundamental principles by implementing the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN agreements to date, among other actions; (2) aiming to become a peaceful, secure, and stable region, strengthen mechanisms such as the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), and the ARF; (3) aiming for dynamic and outward-looking ASEAN centrality, strengthen the initiatives under ASEAN-led mechanisms and strengthen dialogue and cooperation with countries outside of the region; and (4) aiming for strengthened ASEAN institutional capacity and presence, streamline ASEAN work processes and raise institutional presence regionally and internationally. ASEAN member states also utilize ASEAN as the multilateral security framework of the region that it has been over the years. ASEAN holds mechanisms such as the ARF and ADMM, which provide opportunities for 50 According to information made public by the arbitral tribunal, of the 15 submissions made by the Philippines, the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal has been recognized thus far for submissions such as those concerning decisions regarding whether or not the features, etc. occupied by China meet the requirements of territorial waters or of EEZ/continental shelf (e.g., Mischief Reef and Subi Reef are low-tide elevations and do not meet the requirements of territorial sea), those contending that China interfered with or posed danger to the activities of Philippine fi shing vessels, and those contending that China violated obligations to protect and preserve the environment. 51 With regard to the binding force of the decisions of the arbitral tribunal, UNCLOS contains provisions, such as “Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal...shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute” and “Any such decision shall have no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular dispute” (Article 296 and Annex VII, Article 11). 52 With regard to the “nine-dash line” and China’s claim to historic rights, the arbitral tribunal found that China’s claims to historic rights with respect to the maritime areas encompassed by the “nine-dash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the limits of China’s maritime entitlements under UNCLOS. With regard to the legal status of features, the arbitral tribunal found that all of the features in Scarborough Shoal and the Spratly Islands (including Itu Aba Island [Taiwanese name: Taiping Dao]) have no EEZ or continental shelf. With regard to the legality of Chinese activities, the tribunal found that China has unlawfully prevented Filipino fi shermen from engaging in traditional fi shing at Scarborough Shoal, violated its obligations to protect the marine environment through its largescale land reclamations, artifi cial island-building, and other activities, violated its obligations pertaining to navigation safety by virtue of the dangerous navigation by its law enforcement vessels, breached the Philippines’ sovereign rights through its land reclamations at Mischief Reef, and violated its obligations by aggravating and extending the disputes through its dredging, airstrip construction, and other activities ----- dialogue on security issues. Furthermore, ASEAN has made efforts to improve the security environment in the region and promote mutual trust, for example, by holding the ASEAN Militaries’ Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-Top Exercise (AHR). In addition, ASEAN attaches importance to expanding its relations with countries outside of the region. It holds the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), a platform that adds eight non-ASEAN countries including Japan to ADMM,[53] and holds HA/DR exercises.[54] Moving forward, ASEAN member states are expected to further develop such initiatives as dialogues, HA/DR exercises, and expansion of relations with non-ASEAN countries, in accordance with the principle and concepts of APSC. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 ((8) Southeast Asia) 53 In addition to the framework of the ADMM Plus, defense ministers’ meetings are held between the United States and ASEAN, China and ASEAN, and Japan and ASEAN. In April 2014, a U.S.-ASEAN defense ministers’ meeting was held in the United States for the first time. 54 In May 2015, the fourth ARF Disaster Relief Exercise was held in Malaysia. The exercise was participated by more than 2,000 personnel from ARF member countries, including co-organizers Malaysia and China ----- **Section 7** **South Asia** **1 India** - 1 General Situation With a population of more than 1.2 billion on its vast land, India is the world’s largest democratic country. It has achieved steady economic growth in recent years, and has signifi cant infl uence in the South Asian region. Also, it is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, which is of strategic and geopolitical importance in terms of sea lines of communication, connecting the Asia-Pacifi c region with the Middle East and Europe. India shares borders with many countries, and has non-demarcated border issues with China and Pakistan. India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, cultures, and languages,[1] and there are concerns about the activities of ultra-leftists and secession and independence movements, as well as the movements of Islamic extremists stationed across the India-Pakistan border. On the diplomatic front, the Modi administration that was inaugurated in May 2014 has maintained the neighborhood fi rst policy, which emphasizes strengthening relations with South Asian countries, while expanding the focus of strengthening India’s external relations to the Asia-Pacifi c region, in accordance with the “Act East” policy.[2] In addition, the administration has carried out proactive foreign policy, placing priority also on India’s relations with the United States, Russia, Europe, among other areas. In the defense domain, maintaining preparedness at its land borders and addressing the threat of terrorism remain major concerns. At the same time, the administration has also recently attached importance to ensuring maritime security, especially in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, the administration has made efforts aimed at modernizing its military by expanding foreign companies’ direct investment in India’s defense industry under the “Make in India” initiative and promoting the domestic production of equipment through enhancing technological cooperation with other countries. Moreover, the administration has deepened collaboration with other countries to strengthen maritime security cooperation. In February 2016, India held an international fl eet review for the fi rst time in 15 years, inviting 24 foreign military vessels from 21 countries.[3] - 2 Military Affairs India’s security environment is directly linked to its neighboring countries and the regions of West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Indian Ocean; and India recognizes that strategic-economic factors impose upon them an increasingly larger responsibility. In view of the multifaceted security concerns and the global dimensions of the challenges, India has strengthened cooperative relations with other countries and has long been actively participating in U.N. PKOs. In order to respond rapidly and effectively to diversifi ed security issues, the government and defense forces remain fully prepared to tackle all challenges. Based on the nuclear doctrine of 2003, India adheres to the following policies: minimum nuclear deterrence, the no-fi rst-use nuclear policy, no use against non-nuclear weapon nations, and maintaining the unilateral moratorium The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million, although the majority of the country’s population is Hindu. It is regarded that based on the progress of the “Look East” policy intended to strengthen India’s relations with ASEAN, the “Act East” policy which advocates a more practical approach has been adopted since the inauguration of the Modi administration. On February 6, 2016, the Indian Navy held an international fl eet review off the coast of Visakhapatnam in eastern India participated by 70 Indian vessels as well as 24 vessels from 21 countries including the United States, China, Brazil, Malaysia, Vietnam, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The destroyer Matsuyuki participated from the MSDF. President Pranab Mukherjee of India, who reviewed the international fl eet, li ----- on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test in 1998.[4] India promotes the development and deployment of various ballistic missiles. In 2015, India conducted launch tests including of “Prithvi 2,” “Agni 3,” and “Agni 5,” and reportedly started developing “Agni 6,” which is alleged to have a range of up to 10,000 km. It is deemed that the country aspires to extend the ranges of ballistic missiles and make other performance improvements. In regard to cruise missiles, India jointly develops “BrahMos” with Russia and deploys them. India is also developing a ballistic missile defense system.[5] In recent years, India has been injecting efforts into modernizing its naval and air forces in particular. As a part of these efforts, it is expanding procurement of equipment from foreign countries as well as joint development with them, and has emerged as the world’s largest arms importer.[6] With respect to its naval capabilities, India has introduced one British-built aircraft carrier INS Viraat, and in November 2013, the Russian-built conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya. It is also building one indigenous conventional powered aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.[7] With regard to submarines, India acquired one Russian-built Akula-class nuclear-powered attack submarine INS Chakra in April 2012 under a lease arrangement. In December 2014, India commenced sea trials of its first indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant. Furthermore, in 2009, India concluded an agreement with the United States to purchase eight P-8 patrol aircraft. India has so far deployed all eight aircraft to a base in southern India facing the Bay of Bengal. As for its air force, in addition to remodeling its existing fighters, in May 2015 India decided to purchase 36 French Rafale fighters as part of its medium multi-role Fig. I-2-7-1 Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate) Approx. 550,000 troops Approx. 59 vessels Approx. 94,000 tons Approx. 460 aircraft Pakistan Approx. 1.15 million troops Approx. 243 vessels Approx. 480,000 tons Approx. 980 aircraft India [Legend:] Ground forces (200,000 troops) The United States Geological Survey: Naval vessels (100,000 tons) GTOPO30; and the United States National Combat aircraft (200 aircraft) Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: ETOPO1 Notes: 1. Figures based on “The Military Balance 2016,” etc. 2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft. combat aircraft induction project.[8] With Russia, India has concluded an agreement in December 2012 to purchase 42 additional Su-30 fighters. India has also been deepening military technological cooperation with Russia, including the joint development of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft based on the PAK FA being developed by Russia. With the United States, India has concluded an agreement in 2010 to purchase ten C-17 transport aircraft and has inducted all of these aircraft by 2014. In addition to aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, India undertakes the development and indigenous production of tanks and light combat aircraft. However, delays in their development present challenges for India’s domestic production of equipment. See>> Fig. I-2-7-1 (Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate)) The Bharatiya Janata Party led by Prime Minister Modi referred to revising the nuclear doctrine in its 2014 election manifesto. However, following criticism from inside and outside the country, Prime Minister Modi later reportedly indicated that the party does not intend to revise the policy. Regarding missiles that India possesses, the following have been indicated: “Prithvi 2”: a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 250-350 km “Agni 1”: a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 700-1,250 km “Agni 2”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,000-3,500 km “Agni 3”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 3,000-5,000 km “Agni 4”: a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 4,000 km “Agni 5”: a mobile, three-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 5,000-8,000 km “Agni 6”: a three-stage solid/liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 8,000-10,000 km “BrahMos”: a solid/Ramjet supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 300-500 km Ballistic missile defense system: India is developing a two-stage intercept system consisting of a missile for high altitude interception (PAD) up to 80 km in altitude and a missile for low altitude interception (AAD) up to 30 km in altitude According to SIPRI. The indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant is 262.5 m long, has a standard displacement of 40,642 t, and is scheduled to be commissioned in 2018. The aging aircraft carrier INS Viraat is scheduled to be decommissioned in 2016 without waiting for the commissioning of INS Vikrant. With the induction of Russian-built aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, 23 MiG-29 fighters have also been inducted from Russia to serve as carrier-based aircraft. Since 2007, India has implemented a project to induct 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). In 2012, India announced that it selected the French Rafale aircraft. In April 2015, during his visit to ----- **(2) Relations with the United States** India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States. The United States is also promoting engagement with India in line with the expansion of the relationship derived from the economic growth of India. The two countries conduct joint exercises, such as Malabar,[12] on a regular basis. In addition, in recent years, the United States has become one of India’s major equipment procurement destinations.[13] In January 2015, President Obama visited India to attend its Republic Day celebrations as Chief Guest. The leaders agreed that they would expand technology cooperation to include co-development and co-production of equipment. Furthermore, the leaders affirmed that they would deepen cooperation in the field of maritime security, and agreed that cooperation between their navies would be expanded, including upgrading their bilateral naval exercise Malabar that is conducted between the two countries. In December 2015, Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar of India visited the United States. The two sides held talks on strengthening various defense cooperation, and confirmed the progress made in the technology cooperation consultations related to aircraft carriers and jet engines conducted by their joint working group. In such ways, their cooperation in the field of security has expanded. **(3) Relations with China** See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian Countries) - 3 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with Pakistan** India and Pakistan have disputes over the sovereignty of Kashmir,[9] and have had three armed conflicts of significant scope. The territorial dispute over Kashmir has long been in contention between India and Pakistan, with dialogues repeatedly resuming and suspending.[10] More recently, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s swearingin ceremony in May 2014. In December 2015, on his return from visiting Afghanistan, Prime Minister Modi made a surprise informal visit to Pakistan that had not been announced in advance. In this regard, both countries have demonstrated readiness to improve their relations. Meanwhile, it remains uncertain whether bilateral dialogues would be sustained, with the postponement of their vice foreign ministerial meeting in both August 2014 and January 2016.[11] Armed clashes between the two militaries have repeatedly taken place in the Kashmir region. The large-scale armed clashes in October 2014 reportedly killed and injured civilians. The Kashmir issue thus remains a concern for both countries. Furthermore, in January 2016, armed forces intruded into an Indian Air Force base adjacent to the Kashmir area, killing and wounding security personnel and others. While it has been suggested that this incident was a terrorist attack conducted by Islamic extremists, India has claimed that it was a trans-boundary terrorist attack launched by Pakistan and requests Pakistan to take appropriate steps. **(4) Relations with Russia** See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-5-2 (Relations with Asian Countries) 9 India asserts the accession of Kashmir to India, based on the Instrument of Accession document by which the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India at the time of Pakistan’s independence, and contends that this matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations on the basis of the 1972 Simla Agreement (an agreement on the peaceful resolution of disputes and the withdrawal of their military forces that was reached following a summit meeting held in Simla in northern India). On the other hand, Pakistan declares that this should be decided through a referendum, in line with a 1948 U.N. resolution. The two countries have taken a significantly different fundamental stance towards the resolution of the dispute. 10 Dialogue between the two countries was suspended due to the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, but it resumed following the February 2011 talks by their Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In 2011, both countries affirmed the importance of peacefully settling all outstanding issues between the two countries through dialogue. Pakistan then decided to grant India most-favored nation status. 11 In December 2014, Minister of State for External Affairs Vijay Kumar Singh attributed the postponement of the meeting in August that year to the meeting between Pakistan’s High Commissioner and Kashmiri leaders of organizations which seek Kashmir’s secession from India. The meeting was ultimately held in March 2015. It is suggested that the meeting in January 2016 was postponed due to the attack on the Indian Air Force base that occurred in the same month. 12 The Malabar was initially a bilateral naval exercise between the United States and India. Then, Japan, Australia, and Singapore joined Malabar 07-2, and Japan participated in Malabar 09, Malabar 14, Malabar 15, and Malabar 16. ----- **2** **Pakistan** - 2 Military Affairs Pakistan takes the position that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense. In the past, the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclear-related materials and technologies.[15] Pakistan has been actively proceeding with the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and has conducted a number of test launches in recent years. In 2015, Pakistan conducted two test launches of the ballistic missile “Shaheen 3” in March and December, and a test launch from an aircraft of the cruise missile “Raad” in January 2016. It is deemed that Pakistan has steadily increased the military capabilities of its ballistic and cruise missiles.[16] Pakistan is the world’s fi fth largest importer of weapons, importing most of its weapons from China and the United States.[17] Pakistan concluded a contract to purchase four Sword-class frigates from China, which have already been delivered. Pakistan jointly develops the JF-17 fi ghter aircraft with China and has inducted 49 aircraft through indigenous production. Pakistan is also considered to have recently conducted negotiations with China to newly purchase four frigates and eight submarines. Pakistan has inducted 18 F-16C/D fi ghter jets by 2011 from the United States. - 1 General Situation Wedged between the powerful South Asian nation of India and politically-unstable Afghanistan, and sharing borders with China and Iran, Pakistan is placed in a geopolitically signifi cant and complex position. In particular, Islamic extremists conduct activities across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and Pakistan’s attitude towards the war against terrorism draws much attention from the international community. While supporting the United States’ war against terrorism in Afghanistan, the government of Pakistan has been struggling as its domestic security situation has worsened, with issues such as growing anti-U.S. sentiment and retaliatory terrorism by Islamic extremists. Prime Minister Sharif who took offi ce in June 2013 conducted peace consultations holding up a policy of dialogue with armed forces. However, these forces committed a series of terrorist attacks, and in June 2014, the Pakistan Armed Forces launched a military operation against these forces. Following a school attack in Peshawar in the same year, upon revising the Constitution, Pakistan developed the National Action Plan that includes establishing a special military tribunal to try terrorist suspects, and announced that the Armed Forces would continue with and step up its mop-up operation. Subsequently, while it appears that terrorist attacks have decreased considerably, other attacks have been never ceasing. In January 2016, an attack targeting a university in Charsadda in northeast Peshawar occurred, killing and injuring many students and others.[14] 14 On January 20, 2016, an armed group attacked Bacha Khan University using guns and bombs, killing 21 people including students and injuring dozens. A faction of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility. In the attack against a military-run school in Peshawar in December 2014 believed to be perpetrated by TTP, a total of 148 people reportedly died, including students. 15 Pakistan is believed to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s and conducted its fi rst nuclear test near the Changai District of the Balochistan Province in 1998. In 2004, it came to light that nuclearrelated technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. Khan and other scientists, who had led the nuclear program in Pakistan. 16 Regarding missiles that Pakistan possesses, the following have been indicated: “Nasr” (Hatf 9): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 60 km “Ghaznavi” (Hatf 3): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 290 km “Shaheen 1” (Hatf 4): a mobile, single-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 750 km “Ghauri” (Hatf 5): a mobile, single-stage liquid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 1,300-1,800 km “Shaheen 3” (Hatf 6): a mobile, two-stage solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a range of about 2,750 km “Raad” (Hatf 8): a cruise missile with a range of about 350 km “Babur” (Hatf 7): a supersonic cruise missile with a range of about 750 km ----- dialogue was held again in January 2015. During his visit to Pakistan, Secretary Kerry welcomed the mopup operation conducted by Pakistan’s Armed Forces against insurgents, and announced the provision of about US$250 million to assist temporary displaced persons (TDPs). In October 2015, Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan visited the United States. During his meeting with President Obama, the two sides confirmed that the efforts of the two countries and the U.S. military assistance were contributing to improving Pakistan’s counter-terrorism capabilities. Meanwhile, Pakistan urges the United States to immediately end its drone attacks on Islamic extremists in Pakistani territory, and the Pakistan government has protested repeatedly.[18] The United States, on the other hand, condemns Pakistan for providing safe zones to Islamic extremists in Afghanistan, which poses threats to the United States. Attention will be paid to developments related to the relationship between the two countries, including their stance on the war on terror. **(3) Relations with China** See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-3-5 ((3) Relations with South Asian Countries) - 3 Relations with Other Countries **(1) Relations with India** See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 7-1-3 ((1) Relations with Pakistan) **(2) Relations with the United States** Besides supporting the activities of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan cooperates with the war on terror by launching mop-up operations against Islamic extremists in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. Recognizing the efforts of Pakistan, the United States designated it as a “major non-NATO ally” in 2004. The two countries conducted strategic dialogues from 2010, and the United States provided Pakistan with military support. However, these were suspended after U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated as a consequence of the Osama Bin Laden mop-up operation conducted by the U.S. Forces in the territory of Pakistan in May 2011. In October 2013, dialogue was resumed after summit meetings were held between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Sharif of Pakistan. In January 2014, a strategic dialogue was held between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan Sartaj Aziz for the first time in three years. This 18 In November 2011, NATO forces conducted airstrikes on border posts in Pakistan, causing casualties to Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan strongly condemned this action and retaliated by closing the ground supply route for ISAF. Additionally, it is reported that at an all-party conference organized by the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties in September 2013, the government adopted a resolution asserting that the ----- **Section 8** **Europe** **1 General Situation** With the end of the Cold War, while many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared, diverse security challenges have emerged, such as outbreaks of regional confl ict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and an increasing number of cyberspace threats. With regard to terrorism in particular, the outbreak of domestic incidents of terrorism, including the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the terror attacks in Brussels in March 2016, has made counter-terrorism efforts an urgent task.[1] In addition, in recent years, the increasingly severe fi nancial situation has had a signifi cant impact on the security and defense policy of each country. Under these circumstances, the growing tense situation in Ukraine has made it imperative that countries reexamine their existing strategies and design new concepts to deal with Russia’s changes to the status quo by force or coercion and with “hybrid warfare.” Furthermore, following the “Arab Spring” democratization movement that spread across the Arab world from 2010 to 2012, refugees from the Middle East has continued to rise amid the sharp increase in the number of people fl eeing their countries to escape suppression and persecution. The number of refugees and migrants crossing into Europe has soared especially since last year, with the prolongation of the Syrian civil war, making border security a challenge. To respond to such challenges and situations, Europe has sought to further strengthen and expand multilateral frameworks, such as NATO and the EU.[2] At the same time, it is working to contribute to the security and stability of the international community by proactively participating in activities |Fig. I-2-8-1|Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States|ates Joined the EU in May 2004 U in July 2013 82 Joined NATO in 1999 April 2009 amp secured victory.| |---|---|---| |Current members Expansion situation of the member st NATO (28 countries) U.K. France Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands U.S. Austria Luxembourg Canada Finland Spain Portugal Norway Sweden Greece Czech Republic Iceland Ireland Hungary Poland Turkey Malta Denmark Slovakia Albania Cyprus Lithuania Estonia Latvia Romania Bulgaria Slovenia Croatia Original EU members Joined the EU by 1995 EU (28 countries) (*As of March 2016) Joined the EU in January 2007 Joined the E Original NATO members Joined NATO by 19 Joined NATO in March 2004 Joined NATO in Note: On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom conducted a national referendum to decide whether the country should leave the EU, and the pro-Brexit c||| Countries such as France, Belgium, and Denmark are reviewing their security arrangements and strengthening their immigration control, due to acts or attempted acts of terrorism that occurred in those countries. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1. NATO has continued expanding towards Central and Eastern Europe with the aim of stabilizing the entire European and Atlantic regions. In December 2015, NATO Foreign Ministers invited Montenegro to begin accession talks. If Montenegro accedes to NATO, its membership will increase for the fi rst time since Albania and Croatia in 2009. Currently, two countries—Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—have been approved to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is a program that provides support to future member states in their preparation to enter NATO (conditionally for Bosnia and Herzegovina). The participation in the MAP of six other countries—Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova—is currently undecided, as these countries support initiatives for integration into the European ----- outside the European region. Moreover, initiatives are made at the national level for reviewing security and defense strategies, reforming national defense systems, **2 Enhancement of Multinational Security Frameworks** - 1 Security and Defense Policy of NATO/EU and strengthening bilateral[3] and multilateral[4] defense and security cooperation. See>> Fig. I-2-8-1 (Expansion Situation of NATO/EU Member States) capacity by combining the concepts of Smart Defence and CFI in reducing defense budgets in each country.[9] Following Russia’s “hybrid warfare” over Ukraine as well as the frequent “abnormal fl ights” of Russian Armed Force aircraft over the European front, including the Baltic states, NATO and member states reaffi rmed the threat posed by Russia. In April 2014, they suspended practical cooperation with Russia and took other steps, including expanding its Baltic air policing mission.[10] Furthermore, at the NATO Summit held in Wales in September 2014, leaders adopted a joint declaration demanding Russia to retract its “annexation” of Crimea and adopted the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) for enhancing existing readiness forces.[11] Nonetheless, differences are observed in how member states regard Russia due to factors such as their geographic proximity to the country. Meanwhile, as the threat of terrorism spreads within Europe and Syrian and other refugees cross into Europe, we are recently seeing signs among member states to improve relations with Russia, with an eye to strengthening international collaboration on counter-ISIL efforts.[12] With regard to ISIL, while no military action has been taken under the NATO framework, the Wales Summit Declaration strongly condemned ISIL’s violent Founded for the core task of collective defense among member states, NATO has expanded the scope of its activities to confl ict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. In the NATO Summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept[5] for the fi rst time in 11 years to propose a guideline for the next decade for the creation of a more effi cient and fl exible alliance. In recent years, NATO has been promoting the concept of Smart Defence[6] as the national defense budgets of member states are declining and gaps in military capability are widening among member states, in particular between European countries and the United States.[7] This concept is aimed at ensuring greater security with fewer resources through multinational coordination. At the NATO Summit held in May 2012, the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) was set up.[8] CFI is intended to provide a framework for conducting joint exercises and drills among member states. Furthermore, it is designed to strengthen joint drills among member states and with partner countries, enhance interoperability, and make use of advanced technology. CFI is considered to be aimed at maintaining NATO’s readiness and military 3 For example, the United Kingdom and France signed treaties relating to bilateral defense and security cooperation, and on the shared use of nuclear facilities, at a summit meeting held in November 2010. In addition, at a U.K.-France summit meeting held in January 2014, the Declaration on Security and Defence was adopted, and the two countries agreed on conducting joint development of anti-ship missiles and joint research on unmanned combat air vehicles, as well as on aiming to begin deploying a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force by 2016. With regard to unmanned combat air vehicles, in November 2014, the U.K. and French governments reached agreement on contracts related to the development of unmanned combat air systems. 4 For example, in September 2010, the four European countries of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium established the European Air Transport Command (EATC) to jointly deploy transport aircraft of the respective countries such as C-130 and A-310, as well as approximately 150 aerial refueling aircraft. Luxemburg joined EATC in 2012, Spain in July 2014, and Italy in December 2014. 5 The Strategic Concept is an offi cial document defi ning the objectives, characteristics, and basic national security responsibilities of NATO. The document has so far been formulated seven times (1949, 1952, 1957, 1968, 1991, 1999, and 2010). In the Strategic Concept, NATO identifi es major threats including the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missiles, terrorism, confl ict and instability beyond NATO borders, and cyber attack. The document prescribes NATO’s core tasks as follows: (1) collective defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the basic treaty of NATO; (2) crisis management including preventing confl ict and post-confl ict stabilization and reconstruction assistance; and (3) cooperative security including active contribution to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. 6 As regards concrete efforts undertaken under this concept, at the NATO Summit held in Chicago in May 2012, leaders declared that NATO gained an interim missile defense capability to defend the people and the territory of NATO against ballistic missile attacks by linking together interceptor missiles and radars of the member states under NATO’s command and control. In addition, 13 member states of NATO signed a procurement contract for fi ve Global Hawks (RQ-4), which will constitute the core of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system that uses unmanned aircraft. 7 At present, the United States accounts for about 70% of the total defense spending of all NATO member states. NATO guidelines set forth that member states shall spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense. Nonetheless, in 2014, only 3 (United States, United Kingdom, and Greece) out of 28 member states fulfi lled this criterion. 8 As regards concrete efforts undertaken based on this concept, at the NATO Summit held in Wales in September 2014, leaders approved a Readiness Action Plan (RAP). It was unveiled to respond to the impacts of Russia’s strategies as well as the threats emanating from the Middle East and North Africa. RAP presented that NATO forces would have continued presence in eastern allies, that the response capabilities of the existing multinational NATO Response Force (NRF) would be enhanced signifi cantly, and that the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) that can be mobilized in two to three days would be created. The NRF is said to consist of 40,000 personnel as of April 2016, and the VJTF is expected to become a multinational force consisting of 20,000 personnel in total (including 5,000 land force personnel) who will acquire operational capabilities by the end of 2016. From October to November 2015, Exercise Trident Juncture was conducted to verify the functions of the VJTF. 9 While cuts to defense spending had continued among NATO member states, the Annual Report released in January 2016 states that the cuts have practically stopped among European member states and Canada and that further increases in defense spending are necessary. 10 NATO patrols in Baltic airspace, which commenced in 2004 assigning a mission to a country with 4 aircraft, has been reinforced since the crisis in Ukraine. Patrols were conducted by four countries with 16 aircraft, but in September 2015, the mission was reduced to two countries with 8 aircraft. 11 See Footnote 8 for more information on RAP. 12 For example, France held talks with President Putin of Russia following the terror attacks in November 2015, and the two sides agreed to exchange intelligence between their military forces. The United Kingdom, in its strategy document SDSR2015, states that the issues of Ukraine would signifi cantly change the rules-based international order, while it also states that the country would seek ways to cooperate with Russia i ----- acts and affirmed that NATO would activate its collective defense if any ally were attacked by ISIL. The EU tries to enhance its initiatives in security under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).[13] The first security strategy document adopted in 2003, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” states that the EU aims to enhance its capabilities to deal with new threats, would make a contribution to its security through involvement in its immediate neighborhood, and would play a leading role in building an international order based on effective multilateralism by working with the United States, other partner countries, and international organizations including the U.N.[14] Triggered by the reduction of defense expenditure in EU countries and the capacity gap among members,[15] the concept of “pooling and sharing” has been promoted, in which member states jointly manage and use more military capacities. Cooperation has been promoted in the areas of air-to-air refueling, unmanned aerial vehicle, satellite communication, and cyber defense. The EU intends to make sure all the initiatives within this concept will complement, rather than interfere with, the activities covered by the NATO framework such as the Smart Defence initiative. Following the adoption of a resolution about strengthening CSDP at the European Council Meeting (EU Summit) held in December 2013, the European Council adopted the EU Maritime Security Strategy[16] in June 2014. At the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting in November 2014, the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework[17] was adopted. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the EU has The European Union Naval Force Mediterranean rescues refugees in the Mediterranean Sea [EU NAVFOR SOPHIA] condemned the military responses of Russia and implemented economic sanctions against Russia.[18] In addition, to support the economic and political reforms in Ukraine, the EU continues its engagement in nonmilitary affairs, including the provision of large-scale financial assistance to Ukraine.[19] To deal with the threat of ISIL, the EU extends funds to carry out humanitarian assistance for Syria and Iraq. Additionally, the EU works with countries in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa to provide capacitybuilding assistance in counter-terrorism measures, among other activities. In November 2015, in accordance with a request from France after the terror attacks in Paris, the EU, for the first time, activated the “mutual assistance clause”[20] stipulating a mutual defense obligation, and EU member states expressed their support to France.[21] In May 2015, the EU started Operation Sophia conducted by European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) to respond to the surge of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea into Europe. The first phase focusing on the monitoring of smuggling 13 The EU, although it has a property of non-binding multilateral cooperation, introduced the CFSP, which covers all areas of foreign and security policy based on the Treaty of Maastricht, which took effect in 1993. In June 1999, the European Council decided to implement the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to offer peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance activities in conflict areas, as a part of the CFSP framework. The Treaty of Lisbon, made effective in 2009, renamed the ESDP to CSDP and clearly positioned it as an integral part of the CFSP. 14 In June 2015, a report analyzing the changes in the global situation since 2003 entitled “Strategic Assessment” was submitted to the leaders of the EU and its member states. Based on this assessment, the leaders and others instructed the establishment of a global strategy by June 2016, which will serve as a guideline for future foreign and security policies. The “Strategic Assessment” report analyzes the current global situation from the perspectives of (1) connectivity, (2) contention, and (3) complexity. The new global strategic document that will be prepared on the basis of this report will examine six policy areas of (1) security and defense, (2) counter-terrorism and organized crime measures, (3) cyber security, (4) energy and climate change, (5) migrant and refugee issues, and (6) humanitarian assistance and economic prosperity. 15 The European Defence Agency (EDA), an organization established to improve the EU’s defense capabilities, reports that the military operations in Libya and elsewhere revealed the EU’s lack of air-to-air refueling capability and precision-guided weapons and its dependency on the United States. 16 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-3-3. 17 Its purpose is to implement the Cybersecurity Strategy that the European Commission released in February 2013. The Framework mainly focuses on: (1) supporting the development of member states’ cyber defense capabilities; (2) promotion of civil-military cooperation; and (3) improved education and training opportunities. 18 The EU takes measures, such as capital regulations and ban on exports of equipment and dual use goods, along with asset freezes and travel bans. 19 The EU will extend 11 billion euros of assistance between 2014 and 2020. In addition, in response to a request for assistance from the Ukrainian government, the EU has decided to provide additional assistance of 1.8 billion euros between 2015 and 2016. As of December 2015, 2.21 billion euros has been provided. 20 Article 42, Paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a mutual defense obligation, where if a EU member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 21 On November 17, 2015 after the terror attacks, Minister for Defence Jean-Yves Le Drian of France requested the application of the “mutual assistance clause” at the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting. The application was agreed upon unanimously. Based on the application of the clause, France requested other EU member states to: (1) contribute to counter-ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria; and (2) help reduce the military burden of France by contributing to France’s counter-terrorism operations in Mali, Central Africa, and other areas. Nevertheless, the extent of cooperation has remained relatively small, except for ----- and human trafficking networks was completed in October 2015. The operation has entered the second phase involving the search, seizure, and diversion on the high seas of vessels suspected of being used for smuggling and human trafficking. In June 2016, the United Kingdom conducted a national referendum to decide whether or not the country should leave the EU. The victory of the pro-Brexit camp could provide increased momentum for other countries to exit the EU. In this regard, attention will be on the future developments, including decline in centripetal force of the EU. **2 NATO/EU’s Activities Outside the Region[22]** - capabilities. Since then, it has been actively committed to the operations in crisis management and maintenance of peace and order[24] by, for example, sending troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Central Africa. Since February 2013, the EU has been implementing a training mission to support training Malian troops and realignment in Mali, where Islamic guerrillas and others pose serious threats. Also, in January 2014, the EU decided to dispatch security forces to Central Africa, where the situation has been of constant tumult. The forces commenced operations in April 2014 and completed its mission by March 2015. In the same month, the EU launched a military advisory mission (EUMAM) to support preparations for security sector reform in Central Africa. In addition, NATO and the EU have actively been engaged in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Since October 2008, NATO has deployed ships of the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG), comprised of the navies of member states, to these waters for anti-piracy operations. In Operation Ocean Shield which NATO has been conducting since August 2009, it has the task of carrying out anti-piracy operations by ship, as well as helping requesting countries develop their capacities to combat piracy. Since December 2008, the EU has been engaged in the antipiracy campaign, Operation Atalanta, in these waters, its first maritime mission. The vessels and aircraft dispatched from member states are engaged in escorting ships and surveillance activities in the waters.[25] Since August 2003, NATO had been leading ISAF in Afghanistan. Its mission was completed in December 2014. In place of this mission, since January 2015, NATO has been leading the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), whose primary tasks are to provide training, advice, and assistance to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). NATO still deploys approximately 12,000 personnel to Afghanistan. At the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting held in December 2015, ministers agreed to sustain NATO presence in Afghanistan during 2016. NATO is continuing its mission within the Kosovo Force (KFOR) framework such as maintaining security since June 1999 in Kosovo, which declared independence in February 2008.[23] In 2003, the EU led peacekeeping operations for the first time in Macedonia by using NATO’s equipment and 22 While NATO has mainly focused on leading military operations, the EU has undertaken a number of civilian missions. Meanwhile, the EU keeps the EU Battle Groups on standby on a rotating schedule in order to lead peacekeeping missions when NATO is not involved (the number of countries on duty varies by the size of their forces). The division of roles between NATO and the EU is to be defined on a case-by-case basis. 23 In July 2013, NATO announced that the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) possess full operational capabilities in line with NATO standards to carry out their existing missions. 24 These are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of: 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue mission; 2) peacekeeping mission; and 3) combat mission in crisis management, including peacemaking. 25 To tackle piracy in this area, the EU has undertaken “European Union Training Mission to Somalia” and “Regional Maritime Capacity Building Mission for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean” in addition to Operation Atalanta. Based on a comprehensive approach, the EU not only implements piracy countermeasures, but is also working to develop and strengthen its coastal policing and judicial ----- **3 Security / Defense Policies of European Countries** - 1 The United Kingdom After the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom, perceiving that there is no direct military threat against the country, has advanced national defense reform with particular focus on improving its overseas deployment capability and readiness, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. Against this backdrop, in November 2015, the Cameron administration released the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS-SDSR2015) in the face of destabilization in the Middle East, including the rise of ISIL, the crisis in Ukraine, and the threat posed by cyber attacks. Recognizing that the United Kingdom confronts threats from both states and non-state actors, the NSS-SDSR2015 sets out the challenges that the United Kingdom should address in the coming decade as follows: terrorism and extremism; resurgence of state-based threats; technological developments including cyber threats; and the erosion of the rules-based international order. While the previous SDSR2010 committed to cutting the troop strength, reducing key equipment, and reviewing procurement plans due to pressure to decrease defense spending,[26] the NSS-SDSR2015 calls for ending the defense spending cuts and explicitly proposes to increase the defense force in order to develop capacities to address the entire list of expanded threats.[27] The NSS-SDSR2015 lays out that the United Kingdom would continue to be a key player in the international community, and promote procurement of equipment and formation of units with high readiness and mobility, in view of dealing with threats such as terrorism and cyber security.[28] Since September 2014, the United Kingdom has conducted airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq. In addition, it carries out ISR activities using unmanned aerial vehicles, provides education and training to forces engaged in ground war such as the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, a military organization of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as extends humanitarian assistance to refugees. Furthermore, following the terror attacks in Paris, the United Kingdom decided in December 2015 to extend the scope of the airstrikes from Iraq to Syria, and commenced airstrikes in Syria on the day after the Parliament gave its approval.[29] With regard to the Asia-Pacifi c region, the NSSSDSR2015 presents the view that the region offers signifi cant economic opportunities for the United Kingdom, and has considerable infl uence on the future integrity and credibility of the rules-based international order. It then expresses commitment to attaching importance to working with the United Kingdom’s security partners including Japan. In particular, it considers Japan as the United Kingdom’s closest security partner in Asia. Based on this view, in this region, the United Kingdom conducts Operation Patwin, a natural disaster assistance mission to the Philippines, participates in the multilateral combined exercise RIMPAC, and conducts goodwill trainings with Japan.[30] In June 2016, the pro-Brexit camp secured victory in the national referendum held to decide whether or not the United Kingdom should leave the EU. In this light, attention will be given to the impacts this will have in many domains, including security and defense. - 2 France Since the end of the Cold War, France has focused on maintaining independence of its defense policies, while having led initiatives to enhance the defense structure and capability in Europe. It has worked on the development of its military capacity by reducing military personnel and integrating military bases, dealing with operational requirements to strengthen its defense capability, as well as enhancing its intelligence capabilities and modernizing equipment required in the future. The White Paper on Defence and National Security published in April 2013 for the fi rst time in fi ve years 26 The SDSR2010 committed to decreasing defense spending by 8% by FY2014, including at least 4.3 billion pounds in non-front line savings, excluding spending for operations such as in Afghanistan. The SDSR2010 decided to decrease, by 2015, Royal Navy personnel by 5,000, Army personnel by 7,000, and Royal Air Force personnel by 5,000, along with reduction of the holdings of main battle tanks by 40%. In the Army realignment plan “Army 2020” released later in July 2013, the United Kingdom was to reduce the Army’s active military personnel from 102,000 to 82,000 by 2020, while increasing reservists from 15,000 to 30,000 by 2018. 27 The NSS-SDSR2015 will maintain the size of the Armed Forces personnel and increase the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force by 700 personnel combined. It also decided to build two aircraft carriers, introduce nine new maritime patrol aircraft, and maintain a fl eet of four strategic nuclear submarines. Underpinned by a stable economy, the NSS-SDSR2015 is to maintain defense expenditure amounting to 2% of GDP which is the NATO’s target and to further increase defense spending, especially equipment procurement spending. 28 The NSS-SDSR2015 is to add two Typhoon squadrons, establish a F-35 squadron capable of operating from new aircraft carriers, create two strike brigades of up to 5,000 personnel, and have a system that can deploy an expeditionary force of around 50,000 personnel overseas by 2025. 29 As of March 2016, the United Kingdom has mobilized ten Tornado fi ghters and six Typhoon fi ghters. ----- larger budget for equipment, the maintenance of defense industry capabilities, among other items.[32] France has been conducting airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq since September 2014 and in Syria since September 2015.[33] Following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, France applied the state of emergency law domestically, and decided to deploy 10,000 military personnel to maintain domestic security and suspend troop reductions. Outside of France, the country enhanced its airstrikes against ISIL in Syria and deployed mobile units including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, France has continued to provide education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, as well as humanitarian assistance for refugees. France, which has territories in the Asia-Pacific region, expresses the view in its White Paper on Defence and National Security, that the region is a key actor of growth worldwide, but at the same time is a region where there is significant tension and many conflicts. In October 2015, the Floréal-class frigate Vendémiaire made a port call to display presence and conducted a goodwill training with the MSDF. France actively participates in multilateral exercises, including Croix du Sud and Equateur.[34, 35] - 3 Germany outlines that although France does not face any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory, there is growing diversity in the types of threats it faces as a result of globalization. These include international terrorism, cyber threats, organized crime, and the proliferation of WMDs. It continues to position (1) intelligence, (2) nuclear deterrence, (3) protection, (4) prevention, and (5) deployment[31] as the five key mechanisms of the national security strategy, and states that France would use a combination of these mechanisms to respond to changes in the strategic environment over the coming 15 years. Regarding France’s foreign relations, it positions NATO’s functions as follows: (1) means of securing collective defense of member states; (2) an important instrument of the strategic partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic; and (3) a common framework for military action in dealing with threats and crisis. On the other hand, with regard to the EU, the White Paper clearly stipulates France’s leadership role in strengthening defense and security capabilities, and aims to drive forward the CSDP in a practical and realistic manner. In May 2015, the Parliament enacted the 20152019 Military Programming Law, the updated version of the 2014-2019 Military Programming Law, in order to implement plans laid out in the White Paper for realizing the national security strategy. This law stipulated a While Germany has been implementing a large-scale reduction of its military personnel since the end of the Cold War, it has been gradually expanding the dispatch of its federal forces overseas. At the same time, Germany has advanced the reform of its defense forces to enable them to execute multiple responsibilities encompassing conflict prevention and risk management in the context of multilateral organizations, including NATO, the EU, and the United Nations.[36] The Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien (VPR) (Defense Policy Guidelines), formulated in 2011 for 31 In its White Paper on Defence and National Security released in April 2013, France identified the following regions as priority regions: (1) the periphery of Europe; (2) the Mediterranean basin; (3) part of Africa (from Saharan Africa to Equatorial Africa); (4) the Persian Gulf; and (5) the Indian Ocean. In these regions, France will maintain independent or multinational operational capabilities. In Saharan Africa, the French forces are singlehandedly engaged in a particularly large military operation called Operation Barkhane, which has its command center in Chad’s capital city of N’Djamena. 32 The White Paper on Defence and National Security presented that military personnel would be reduced by 24,000. On this basis, the government planned to cut 25,800 military jobs between 2015 and 2019. However, following the acts of terrorism against Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, that same month President Francois Hollande held a Defense Council meeting and decided to scrap the loss of 7,500 jobs. In May 2015, the Council of Ministers decided on the 2015-2019 military programming proposal whose main components include: (1) the long-term deployment of 7,000 military personnel in France; (2) a 3.8 billion euro total increase in the 2016-2019 defense budget; and (3) an increase in the number of Reserves and the number of days of activities. 33 As of May 2016, France has mobilized 17 aircraft, 1 frigate, and 1,000 personnel. 34 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 3-5 regarding the maritime security strategy of France. 35 At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2016, Minister for Defence Le Drian affirmed France’s renewed commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, stating, “Could we not have European navies coordinate in order to ensure as regular and as visible a presence as possible in the maritime areas of Asia? I will soon detail this proposal to my European counterparts.” 36 Germany decreased its military personnel strength which was once more than 500,000 at the time of its reunification to 250,000 by 2010. Since July 1994, when the Federal Constitutional Court judged that dispatching the federal forces to international missions under multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations and NATO was constitutional, Germany has gradually expanded dispatch of its federal forces to participate in various international operations, including security maintenance and reconstruction activities in the Balkan Peninsula and Afghanistan, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in ----- the first time in eight years, states that the possibility of attacks on Germany by conventional forces remains low, and that risks and threats would come from failed states, international terrorism, natural disasters, cyber attacks, and proliferation of WMDs. It then indicates Germany’s active participation in the prevention and containment of crisis and conflict. It also states that promotion of military collaboration, standardization, and interoperability within the NATO and EU frameworks is essential, in addition to taking cross-government measures. The amended Military Law, which was enacted in April 2011, stipulates the suspension of conscription for basic military service and the reduction of total personnel from 250,000 to 185,000, while it also aims for the sustainable deployment of military personnel, and thereby, enable the continuous deployment of up to 10,000 personnel. Work on the next defense white paper, expected for completion in 2014, had been postponed in order to reexamine the crisis in Ukraine, the rise of ISIL, and the equipment procurement of the Bundeswehr. In February 2015, Germany announced that it started working on the white paper. It is expected to be released in summer 2016. In Iraq, Germany has thus far provided education and training to the Iraqi Security Forces and Peshmerga, supplied equipment and ammunition, extended financial assistance for humanitarian assistance, as well as conducted training of Kurdish troops in Germany. In December 2015, following the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015, the Cabinet approved plans to provide logistics support to the French Armed Forces and the Coalition that are conducting counter-ISIL military operations. This expanded German engagement in counter-ISIL military operations, albeit the commitment is limited to logistics support missions, such as reconnaissance and aerial refueling.[37] With regard to the Asia-Pacific region, Germany expresses the view that the region, in terms of its population and economy, plays a central role in international politics, while on the other hand, the region faces issues such as being home to two-thirds of the world’s poor. Germany’s military engagement in the region is limited to dispatches in response to natural disasters and goodwill visits, and does not include joint training. 37 The Cabinet approved the following commitment during the 12-month period from early January to end of December 2016: (1) dispatch the frigate Augsburg to escort the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle; (2) deploy Tornado fighters (up to six fighters) and aerial refueling aircraft to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; and (3) deploy up to 1,200 personnel to areas of ISIL’s operations in Syria, their airspace, the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea to collect intelligence using reconnaissance satellites and share this intelligence with relevant countries. Furthermore, Germany strives to reduce the operational burden of France by increasing the number of German personnel participating in the U.N. PKO in Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali [MINUSMA]) and training personnel ----- **Issues in the International** **Chapter** **3** **Community** **Trends in Regional Confl ict and International Terrorism** **Section 1** **(with a Focus on the Middle East and Africa)** **1 General Situation** In a global security environment, there is a growing risk that unrest or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The conf icts occurring in recent years in various parts of the world are not necessarily of the same nature. An array of problems is at the root of conf icts, including ethnicity, religion, territory, and resources. The impacts of climate change and other global issues have also been suggested as causes of conf icts.[1] Conf icts can take diverse forms, from armed conf icts, to the continuation of military standoffs. Furthermore, human rights violations, refugees, hunger, poverty, and other consequences of conf icts can have impacts affecting not only the countries in the conf ict but also a wider area. In many cases, areas where civil wars or regional conf icts have created or expanded a governance vacuum have become a hotbed of the activities of terrorist organizations. Among them are organizations which operate across national borders and regions, which continue to pose imminent security challenges to the international community. The presence of states with weak governance has made it diff cult to tackle risks such as the explosive outbreak and spread of infectious diseases. Particularly in states with unstable political situations and weak governance, which are often found in the Middle East and Africa, border control is inadequate, leading to cross-border movement of terrorist organization members and weapons, as well as narcotics that are a funding source for terrorist organizations, posing threats to the region. Furthermore, this region has seen renewed f ghting even after a temporary ceasef re is achieved pursuant to a peace agreement or other arrangements between the parties in conf ict. The “Arab Spring,”[2] which grew into a full-scale movement in 2011, encouraged transitions to democratic systems in countries in the Middle East and North Africa. However, political turmoil associated with the change in government created clashes between tribes, religions, and political parties, and these clashes have still not ended in some countries. The underlying factors are deemed to include public dissatisfaction, especially among young people, with economic and social disparities as well as with high unemployment rates. Furthermore, in developed countries, such as the United States and European countries, there has been a rise in young people who sympathize with the extremism of international terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)[3] that has gained strength in Iraq and Syria, against the backdrop of dissatisfaction towards estrangement from society, discrimination, poverty, and disparities. In an increasing number of cases, these people have joined the activities of international terrorist organizations as f ghters and conduct “home-grown” and “lone-wolf”[4] terrorism activities in their countries, which in turn have heightened the risk of terrorism in developed countries. As evidenced by the simultaneous terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in March 2014 regards climate change as one of key factors that will shape the future security environment. It claims that climate change may accelerate instability and confl ict by causing water scarcity, sharp increases in food costs, and other effects. In addition, the Summary for Policymakers in the Working Group II report on impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability of the Fifth Assessment Report which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published in the same month described that climate change may indirectly increase the risk of confl ict by exacerbating poverty and other causes of confl ict. The Arab Spring is a term generally used to refer to the series of democratization movements that were undertaken on a full-fl edged basis in Middle Eastern and North African countries starting in early 2011, causing political regime changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. In 2011, Tunisia held National Constituent Assembly elections for creating a new constitution, which was adopted by the assembly in January 2014. In December 2014, Beji Caid Essebsi took offi ce as President following the election results. Libya held General National Congress elections for the establishment of a new constitution in July 2012, but its democratization process including formulation of a new constitution still faces a variety of challenges. ISIL is an outgrowth of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), an Al Qaeda terrorist organization which was established in 2004 in Iraq. ----- act of terrorism in Jakarta in January 2014,[5] the global expansion of such extremism has resulted in growing terror threats not only in the Middle East and Africa but also in the rest of the world. In countries, such as Mali and Central African Republic, the people’s dissatisfaction with politics and economics under their weak governance systems as well as clashes over territories and resources have caused confl icts. The rapid, vast outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa in 2014 threatened the stability of the affected countries and spread the disease to other countries including Western nations, shedding light on the seriousness of the risk posed by the spread of infectious diseases. It has become increasingly important for the international community to examine the shape of tailored international frameworks and involvement measures, and seek out appropriate responses for addressing these complicated and diverse destabilizing factors. The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising expectations for peacekeeping efforts, and, as a result, many U.N. PKOs have been established. Their missions have recently come to include a wide range of activities including those by civilians and police, encompassing such traditional roles as the monitoring of a ceasefi re or military withdrawal as well as the monitoring of disarmament, security sector reform, the monitoring of elections and administrative activities, and humanitarian assistance (e.g., return of refugees to their homeland). In **2 Current Situation of Regional Confl icts and the International Response** - 1 Situations in Syria and Iraq in Response to **the Rise of ISIL** this situation, the importance of the roles related to the protection of civilians and peace-building increases, and it leads to activities with a stronger mandate authorized under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter.[6] At the same time, U.N. PKOs face challenges including the availability of required equipment, the protection of personnel safety, and the improvement of troop capabilities.[7] See>> Fig. I-3-1-1 (List of Peacekeeping Operations) In addition to the U.N. PKO framework, multinational forces authorized by the U.N. Security Council and regional organizations engage in confl ict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. In Africa, regional organizations such as the African Union (AU)[8] roll out their activities based on U.N. Security Council resolutions, and their activities are sometimes handed over to U.N. PKO later. The international community also offers recommendations and training assistance and supplies equipment from a long-term perspective, prompting African nations to help themselves so that they can enhance local government organizations and improve the capabilities of their military and security organizations.[9] Furthermore, the entire international community is undertaking various efforts in response to the rise of ISIL, including the adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution to prevent the international movement of terrorist fi ghters, military actions such as the United States-led Coalition’s airstrikes on ISIL, and humanitarian assistance by partner countries that support the counterterrorism effort. outbreak of anti-government demonstrations across the country calling for democratization and the resignation of President Assad. As a result, the clashes between the military and the opposition parties[10] have continued to take place throughout the country.[11] Taking advantage **(1) Political Turmoil in Syria and the Rise of ISIL** In Syria, since March 2011, the government has mobilized military and security forces in response to the 5 See “3 Trends in Global Terrorism” for the recent state of international terrorism, including the simultaneous terrorist attacks in Paris. 6 As of the end of June 2016, 16 U.N. PKOs are operating globally, including about 104,000 military and police personnel and about 16,000 civilian personnel (as of the end of July 2015) from 123 countries. Out of these U.N. PKOs, there are 12 operations in the Middle East and Africa. Ten U.N. PKOs are granted robust mandates under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter. (See Fig. I-2-1-1) 7 “A New Partnership Agenda Charting a New Horizon For U.N. Peacekeeping” was published in July 2009 to evaluate major policy and strategic dilemmas faced by U.N. PKOs and discuss solutions among stakeholders. 8 The world’s largest regional organization comprised of 54 countries and regions in Africa. It was established in July 2002 by reorganizing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (established in May 1963). Its objectives include achieving the integration and solidarity of African nations and people, accelerating political, economic, and social integration of Africa, and promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa. 9 For example, organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union are implementing initiatives in countries including Somalia and Mali. 10 According to an announcement by the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in January 2016, the clashes in Syria killed more than 250,000 people. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, over 11 million people have become refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). 11 In addition, Syria faces the issue of the Assad administration’s use of chemical weapons. In August 2013, when the United States, which called for a military response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and Russia, which sought to place Syrian chemical weapons under the control of the international community, were at odds, chemical weapons were used in the suburbs of Syria’s capital city Damascus, which killed many civilians. Following this attack, U.S. President Barack Obama who had stated previously that the use of chemical weapons would cross a red line, assessed that the Syrian government used chemical weapons. The President stated he decided that military action should be taken against the Assad administration, further heightening military tension. In September 2013, following negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov of Russia, the United States and Russia agreed on a framework which demanded that the Syrian government declare its chemical weapons stockpiles as well as accept international inspections, aimed at the complete destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. The Syrian government submitted a list of its chemical weapons stockpile to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and took responses which were set out in the framework, including accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Due to these responses, military action by the United States and other countries against the Assad administration was averted. Pursuant to OPCW decisions and related U.N. Security Council resolution, international efforts were made ----- |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |10|United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)|May 1948| |11|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)|Jun 1974| |12|United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)|Mar 1978| |Asia|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Mission|Date Established| |13|United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)|Jan 1949| |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |1|United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)|Apr 1991| |2|United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)|Sep 2003| |3|United Nations Operation in Côte d’lvoire (UNOCI)|Apr 2004| |4|African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)|Jul 2007| |5|United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)|Jul 2010| |6|United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)|Jun 2011| |7|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Jul 2011| |8|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)|Apr 2013| |9|United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)|Apr 2014| |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |14|United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)|Mar 1964| |15|United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)|Jun 1999| |Col1|Mission|Date Established| |---|---|---| |16|United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)|Jun 2004| Fig. I-3-1-1 List of Peacekeeping Operations 15 12 14 11 13 10 16 1 8 4 6 2 3 9 7 5 Note: According to the United Nations (as of the end of June 2016). **Africa** **Middle East** Mission Date Established Mission Date Established United Nations Mission for the Referendum in United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 1 Apr 1991 10 May 1948 Western Sahara (MINURSO) (UNTSO) United Nations Disengagement Observer 2 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) Sep 2003 11 Jun 1974 Force (UNDOF) United Nations Operation in Côte d’lvoire United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 3 Apr 2004 12 Mar 1978 (UNOCI) (UNIFIL) African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation 4 Jul 2007 in Darfur (UNAMID) **Asia** United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 5 Jul 2010 Mission Date Established the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) United Nations Military Observer Group in United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei 13 Jan 1949 6 Jun 2011 India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) (UNISFA) United Nations Mission in the Republic of 7 South Sudan (UNMISS) Jul 2011 **Europe/CIS** United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission Date Established 8 Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Apr 2013 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 14 Mar 1964 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated (UNFICYP) 9 Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic Apr 2014 United Nations Interim Administration Mission (MINUSCA) 15 Jun 1999 in Kosovo (UNMIK) **The Americas** Mission Date Established United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 16 Jun 2004 (MINUSTAH) ----- of the instability after the “Arab Spring” democratic movement, al-Nusrah Front,[12] designated by the United States as a terrorist organization related to Al Qaeda, and ISIL[13] have gained strength in Syria. Meanwhile, following the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in December 2011, the security situation in Iraq deteriorated rapidly against the backdrop of political feuds and religious confrontations. In January 2014, ISIL, which had increasingly gained strength from its stronghold in Syria, seized the unstable situation in Iraq to begin invading areas in western Iraq, and occupied Fallujah, a city west of the capital city of Baghdad. In June 2014, ISIL took control of the second largest city, Mosul, in northern Iraq. Following this, ISIL’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a self-proclaimed “caliph,”[14] unilaterally declared the establishment of the “Islamic State” and has called on Islam followers throughout the world to pledge their allegiance to him. **(2) Trends in Military Operations against ISIL** In August 2014, ISIL launched an offensive against the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northern Iraq, and made advances towards Erbil where the U.S. Consulate and other facilities are located. Based on this situation, the United States and other countries[15] began airstrikes on ISIL in order to protect U.S. citizens in Iraq, among other purposes.[16] In an address on the U.S. strategy for ISIL delivered in September 2014, President Obama stated that the military action would be extended to cover Syria.[17] The Coalition’s military action in Iraq includes providing education, training,[18] and providing equipment,[19] as well as extending military supports, such as operation assessments and advice, to the forces fighting the ground war, including the Iraqi Security Forces (including paramilitary troops and the police, in addition to the Iragi forces) and the Kurdistan regional government’s military organization known as Peshmerga. At the same time, in coordination with its own airstrikes and relevant forces, the Coalition works to thwart the advancement of ISIL and recapture some of the strategic areas.[20] Although the Iraqi Security Forces were reportedly plagued with problems such as weak command functions and low morale,[21] primarily among the Iraqi forces, they appear to have improved their operational capabilities, through the Coalition’s education and training, among other means. In contrast, the Peshmerga has experience with the Iraq War. The Peshmerga is considered to have relatively advanced training and a functioning chain of command, and plays a critical role in the military action against ISIL. In April 2015, with the support of Shiite militias and others, the Iraqi Security Forces succeeded in recapturing Tikrit,[22] a key area that continues onto Mosul. In November and December 2015, the Iraqi forces recaptured Sinjar and Ramadi,[23] key points for transit between Syria and Iraq, from ISIL. In March 2016, furthermore, the Iraqi Security Forces launched an operation to recapture Mosul and strengthened an offensive in the areas surrounding the city. In June, the Iraqi Security Forces recaptured Fallujah, which is symbolic as the first Iraqi city where ISIL took control and established a foothold. In this way, ISIL is gradually being driven back in Iraq. In Syria, meanwhile, Al Qaeda affiliate al-Nusrah Front and other opposition parties expanded their control to the vicinity of Latakia, a northwestern Syrian city where the majority of residents are supporters of the Assad administration, from around March 2015 and advanced close to Latakia in September. Under such circumstances, Russia sent its air force and other units to Syria, launching airstrikes[24] in an apparent bid to support the survival of the Assad administration and 12 In April 2013, ISIL announced unilaterally that it would absorb and merge with al-Nusrah Front. Following protests from al-Nusrah Front, the Al Qaeda core conducted mediation. However, ISIL did not comply with the mediation, and its relations with the Al Qaeda core have deteriorated. On February 2, 2014, Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri released a statement on the Internet declaring that Al Qaeda severed ties with ISIL: “ISIL is not a branch of the Al Qaeda group...does not have an organizational relationship with it and (Al Qaeda) is not the group responsible for their actions.” 13 For organizational characteristics of ISIL, see “3 Trends in the Spread of International Terrorism.” 14 The term means “successor” in Arabic. After Prophet Muhammad died, the term has been used to refer to those who led the Islamic community. Since then, a number of the heads of hereditary dynasties, including the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, utilized this title. 15 The United States has simultaneously announced airstrikes for humanitarian purposes, namely, to release the minority Yazidi sect who have been subject to ISIL’s persecution. According to the Combined Joint Task Force, as of June 1, 2016, Coalition forces as a whole have executed over 12,600 airstrikes. 16 In addition to the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Jordan participated in the airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq as of June 2016. 17 President Obama stated that the military action would be extended to cover Syria to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL. President Obama announced that the United States would not only lead a broad coalition to conduct airstrikes, but also provide military supports to the Iraqi Security Forces fighting a ground war and to moderate opposition parties in Syria. As of April 2014, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, the Netherlands, Bahrain, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were participating in airstrikes against ISIL in Syria. In addition, Russia has been conducting airstrikes in Syria separately from the Coalition. 18 The Coalition has completed the training of 22,120 Iraqi Securities Forces and Peshmerga members (as of May 10, 2016) through its operations. 19 In 2014, the United States provided over 1,500 Hellfire missiles to the Iraqi government. In 2015, the United States provided 250 MRAP (including the distribution to the Kurdish Autonomous Region) and several tens of thousands of small arms and ammunition, among other assets. In May 2015, the United States decided to provide 2,000 anti-tank rockets. In addition, in January 2016, the United States decided to sell 5,000 Hellfire missiles, ammunition and missiles for F-16 fighter aircraft, and other arms to Iraq. 20 The forces have recaptured 25,000-26,000 km[2] or about 45% of the 55,000 km[2] area held by ISIL in Iraq (April 2016 U.S. Central Command announcement). 21 In May 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that “the Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight,” whereas U.S. Vice President Joe Biden stated that the Iraqi forces have made “enormous sacrifice and (shown) bravery.” 22 After the recapture, new problems have emerged, including confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis. 23 Ramadi suffered ISIL attacks before falling under ISIL control in May 2015. ----- A U.S. B-52 long-range bomber is deployed to the Middle East for operations against ISIL [U.S. DoD website] protect Russian interests.[25] After concluding that the October 2015 crash of a Russian airliner was a terrorist attack by ISIL, Russia used various platforms including strategic bombers and precision satellite-guided bombs[26] to enhance airstrikes.[27] It has been noted that Russia was supporting the Assad administration through information cooperation with Iraq and Iran. As a result of the Russian military intervention, Syrian opposition parties and ISIL have weakened, and the Syrian government forces have recovered their strength and enhanced their offensive against opposition parties.[28] Since September 2014, the Coalition, including the United States, has implemented airstrikes on ISIL in Syria.[29] However, the challenge was how to nurture ground forces that can counter ISIL.[30] Under such circumstances, the Syrian Democratic Forces, including Kurdish forces controlling areas in Northern Syria near Syria’s border with Turkey, approached Ar-Raqqah, known as an effective foothold for ISIL, in May 2016. The Syrian Democratic Forces are conducting ground operations in coordination with Coalition airstrikes. Coupled with the Syrian government forces’ action to recover control from opposition parties, ISIL is being driven back in Syria as well as Iraq.[31] The Australian Defence Force offers training to the Iraqi forces [Australian Department of Defence website] **(3) Future Outlook on ISIL** ISIL has been extending its infl uence not only in Iraq and Syria but also in other countries, reportedly having 38 branches in a total of 13 countries.[32] Through cooperation with local terrorist organizations and other measures, ISIL is deemed to be building bases in regions where state control is insuffi cient.[33] Anti-ISIL military operations by the Washington-led Coalition and Russia have fragmented ISIL’s command and control functions and ISIL members’ morale through the killing of ISIL fi ghters, including commanders, and airstrikes on oil facilities. As a result, ISIL’s governance is believed to have been compromised. It has been noted that ISIL has been gradually driven back and weakened in Iraq and Syria.[34] As ISIL has lost areas under its control in Iraq and Syria, ISIL fi ghters are feared to be spreading outside these countries. An early end to the Syrian civil war, the enhancement of the Iraqi forces and many other challenges need to be solved to eliminate ISIL from Iraq and Syria. Future trends involving ISIL are still uncertain. **(4) Syrian Peace Process** The United States, the European Union (EU), and other countries are requesting President Assad to step down 25 Russia dispatched Su-24, Su-25, Su-30 and other fi xed-wing fi ghters, as well as Mi-24, Ka-52 and other attack helicopters, among other aircraft, to Latakia. 26 In addition to airstrikes with strategic bombers, Russia has used cruisers deployed in the Caspian Sea and Kilo-class submarines deployed off Syria for Kalibr cruise missile attacks. 27 In response to ISIL’s attacks, Peshmerga, the military organization of the Kurdistan regional government, arrived in Ayn al-Arab via Turkey. In addition, forces opposed to the Syrian regime, such as the Free Syrian Army, reportedly participated in the operation against ISIL in Ayn al-Arab. 28 For example, in January 2015, ISIL announced that armed groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan swore allegiance to ISIL and that it would name this region ISIL Khorasan Province. 29 In the airstrikes in Syria, airstrikes were also conducted against the Khorasan group which was considered to threaten U.S. interests along with ISIL. 30 U.S. Forces had initially attempted to train some 5,400 moderate opposition members in Syria. However, those subjected to the fi rst training were limited to 54 persons, most of whom have been detained or killed. (Testimony at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on September 16, 2015) 31 The government forces have recaptured 9,000-9,200 km[2] or about 30% of the total ISIL-controlled area in Syria (April 2016 U.S. Central Command announcement). 32 As of June 2014, in addition to branches that the ISIL core had approved in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Russia, Pakistan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen, self-declared ISIL branches are deemed to exist in Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, France and Belgium. 33 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Worldwide Threat Assessment 2015” (January 2015). In Egypt, Ansar Bayt al Maqdis has been active on the Sinai Peninsula. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, Paragraph 2, Item 6 “Situation in Egypt.” For ISIL operations in Libya, see Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, Paragraph 2, Item 3 “Situation in Libya.” 34 U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter stated that the United States cannot commit to completing the military action against ISIL in three years (March 11, 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Carter’s testimony to the ----- and are imposing sanctions against Syria, including an oil embargo. They have also supported the Syrian National Coalition, established as an opposition party in November 2012. In January 2014, while the first direct peace talks between the Assad administration and the opposition parties were held under the mediation of the U.N., the talks achieved no concrete progress. In January 2015, peace talks on Syria were convened for the first time in about one year with the mediation of Russia. However, the Syrian National Coalition and other groups did not participate. The talks failed to achieve concrete progress. In June 2015, individual talks between Staffan de Mistura, U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria, and relevant countries commenced in Geneva. While both the Assad administration and the opposition parties participated in the talks, they fell short of reaching any agreement. In the absence of progress in the peace process, the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), including the United States, Russia and the EU, met in Vienna in November 2015 to discuss the realization of an early ceasefire and a government transition process and reached a concrete agreement including a government transition schedule. In December, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2254[35] as a roadmap for the peace process. In February 2016, the United States and Russia agreed on a cessation of hostilities other than those against terrorist organizations such as ISIL and alNusrah Front in Syria. Later, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2268 on the cessation of hostilities in Syria. However, ceasefire violations have been identified mainly in Aleppo, northern Syria. The future of Syria, including a possible final end to the Syrian civil war, thus remains uncertain. **(5) Growing Number of Refugees and their Impact on Europe** Against the backdrop of the unrest in the Middle East Situation, a growing number of refugees and immigrants mainly from the Middle East and North Africa have recently fled to Europe mainly via a route through the Mediterranean Sea or a route that passes through Turkey and Greece heading north on the Balkan Peninsula. In 2015 alone, more than 1 million refugees and immigrants fled to Europe, with the international community, including Europe, struggling with how to respond. The refugee problem has led to increased terror threats in Europe, as ISIL and other terrorists have concealed themselves among the refugees, flowing into Europe and joining potential terrorists in various parts of Europe to form networks. The terrorists who attacked Paris in November 2015 included at least one terrorist who was identified as having hidden among refugees and immigrants to enter Europe. European countries thus face various challenges including the acceptance of many refugees, the prevention of ISIL fighters’ flow into Europe, the crackdown on refugee smuggling boats and the rescue of refugees on smuggling boats that capsize in the Mediterranean Sea. In a bid to resolve problems brought about by the rapid influx of refugees and immigrants, the United Kingdom, France and other European countries are making diplomatic efforts such as engaging in the Syrian peace process and participating in military operations against ISIL to stabilize Syria and Iraq.[36] - 2 Situation in Yemen **(1) Political Turmoil** In Yemen, anti-government demonstrations from February 2011 following the Arab Spring democratic movement, as well as international pressure,[37] led to a peaceful government transition from then President Ali Abdullah Saleh to new President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi implemented the national dialogue process. Nevertheless, from August 2014, demonstrations led by the opposition insurgent group Houthis,[38] based in northern Yemen, occurred in the capital city of Sana’a. In September 2014, clashes broke out between the Houthi militia and Yemeni public security forces, leading to the Houthis’ occupation of key government buildings in the city. Following an armed clash that occurred in January 2015, President Hadi and others submitted their letters of resignation, creating further tension in the situation. In February 2015, the Houthis forced the dissolution of the parliament and announced the establishment of a transitional national council and a presidential council. 35 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 calls for (1) establishing inclusive and non-sectarian governance and setting a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution within six months, and (2) holding free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, within 18 months. 36 However, it has also been pointed out that Russian airstrikes have resulted in increasing the number of refugees and immigrants. 37 In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait established in 1981 for their coordination, integration and cooperation in all fields including defense and economic policies, proposed a GCC initiative including a clause that the president would avoid indictment in exchange for transferring the post to the vice president. 38 The Houthis are followers of the Zaydi branch of Shiite Islam and are based in Saada governorate in northern Yemen. In 2004, the Houthis staged an armed uprising as an anti-government group, and an armed l ----- **(2) Military Intervention in Yemen and Islamic** **Extremists’ Expansion of Power** Later, President Hadi withdrew his resignation and based his government in Aden in southern Yemen. Meanwhile, the Houthis advanced into the Red Sea’s coastal areas and key cities between the capital city of Sana’a and Aden. In response to this situation, President Hadi’s faction requested the support of Arab countries. Then, in March 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition launched airstrikes against the Houthis in the so-called Operation Decisive Storm. In this operation, Saudi Arabia allegedly conducted airstrikes against the bases of the Houthis and the Yemeni military that support the Houthis, destroying ballistic missiles and other assets. Nonetheless, there were civilian and other casualties in Yemen and near the Saudi Arabian border, attributed to their involvement in the exchange of rocket fire and airstrikes, prompting the international community to express strong concerns to both sides. In April 2015, Operation Renewal of Hope was launched with the aim of settling the conflict through political dialogue. In addition, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2216,[39] implementing initiatives to bring the situation to a close. Nevertheless, the Houthis continued attacks on border areas in Saudi Arabia,[40] while Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries[41] continued airstrikes against the Houthis. Meanwhile, Yemen has become a foothold for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is based in southern Yemen. Amid the politically unstable situation following the Houthis’ takeover of government, Islamic extremists gained strength, with ISIL setting up a branch in Yemen and conducting terror attacks on key government officials and Shiite mosques.[42] AQAP and ISIL have taken advantage of the confusion to recruit fighters and gained strength, creating a new matter of concern.[43] **(3) Trends in Peace Talks** Although ceasefires and peace talks have been implemented under mediation by the United Nations since June 2015,[44] no final peace agreement has been reached. Some observers pointed out that the recent confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia[45] impeded progress in peace talks. In April 2016, however, a ceasefire took effect again, paving the way for peace talks to resume. Peace talks, though suspended intermittently for the reason of ceasefire violations, have continued. - 3 Situation in Libya **(1) Collapse of the Gaddafi Regime** The anti-government demonstrations that erupted in February 2011 spread throughout Libya, leading the Gaddafi regime to crush the demonstrations by force. In response, a multinational force led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France commenced military action.[46] In October 2011, the National Transitional Council consisting of anti-Gaddafi forces announced the death of Colonel Gaddafi and declared the liberation of all of Libya. In July 2012, elections for a General National Congress were held. However, progress has not been made in the rehabilitation of the military and public security.[47] Militia and tribal leaders exert strong influence,[48] and while receiving their support, secular and Islamic groups struggle for power. In March 2014, a no-confidence motion was passed against Prime Minister Zeidan. In June 2014, elections for the Council of Representatives were held. Nonetheless, confrontation between Islamic and secular groups intensified. Consequently, Libya became fragmented with two assemblies existing in parallel – the Islamic groups’ General National Congress based in the capital city of Tripoli and the secular groups’ 39 The resolution provides for the withdrawal by the Houthis and others from government buildings they seized, the return of weapons they acquired from Yemeni forces, an arms embargo, a freeze on assets and other measures. 40 In June 2015, the Houthis and Yemeni forces units supporting former President Saleh fired a Scud missile at Khamis Mushait in southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi forces fired two Patriot missiles to intercept the Scud and identified and destroyed the Scud launching site in southern Saada governorate. It has been suggested that the Yemeni Scud missile was purchased from North Korea. 41 In addition, Egypt, among other countries, dispatched naval ships. 42 For example, in March 2015, suicide bombings took place simultaneously at two Shiite mosques in Sana’a, killing 142 people. Later, ISIL claimed responsibility for the attacks. 43 AQAP took control of Zinjibar in southern Yemen in December 2015. 44 The first round of peace talks under the mediation by the United Nations took place in Geneva. Both the Yemeni government and anti-government forces participated in the talks and had indirect consultations, but fell short of reaching any final agreement. In Switzerland in December 2015, the Yemeni government and anti-government forces held the second round of peace talks, realizing their first direct negotiations. Although a ceasefire was agreed on before the second round, repeated ceasefire violations occurred, leading the second round to be suspended without any major achievement. The two sides’ negotiating teams stayed in different rooms and held talks via the United Nations. 45 In January 2016, rioters set fire to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Iran to protest the Saudi government’s execution of Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr and others for leading anti-government demonstrations in eastern Saudi Arabia in 2011. In response, Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Iran and ordered the Iranian diplomatic mission to leave within 48 hours. In the same month, meanwhile, Iran claimed that Saudi air force planes bombed the Iranian Embassy in Yemen, injuring security personnel and the building. However, the dominant view is that there was no major damage. 46 The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, authorizing every measure to protect civilians. The resolution became the grounds for the military action. 47 According to The Military Balance 2011 and 2014, Libyan troop strength has decreased from 76,000 before the Arab Spring to 7,000 as of 2014. ----- Council of Representatives based in Tobruk in eastern Libya which has the support of the United States and other countries. In December 2015, the United Nations mediated an agreement to form a national consensus cabinet. In March 2016, the national unified government entered Tripoli, launching a process to establish an administration. Given many challenges including the creation of a security force, the national unified government is expected to face problems in establishing domestic governance and security. **(2) Islamic Extremists’ Expansion of Power** Amid the political instability, Islamic extremists have gained strength in Libya.[49] In December 2014, the U.S. African Force pointed out that there was an ISIL training camp in eastern Libya, indicating that the ISIL camp was kept under its surveillance. From January 2015, ISIL-related organizations in Libya conducted a series of terrorist attacks.[50] In response, the Egyptian and Libyan governments carried out anti-ISIL retaliatory airstrikes. ISIL has three branches in Libya now, with the number of its fighters almost doubling from the previous year to about 6,000. The ISIL branches in Libya are considered the most developed ones.[51] Based in Sirte, in particular, they have allegedly been gaining strength mainly through attacks on coastal oil facilities. Under such circumstances, a large number of refugees and immigrants from North Africa, including Libya, have been using smuggling boats to land in Europe. It has been pointed out that ISIL fighters have concealed themselves among these refugees and immigrants.[52, 53] In May 2016, a ministerial meeting supporting the national unified government came up with a policy of easing an embargo on lethal weapons to fight against ISIL. The international community is expected more than ever to take anti-ISIL initiatives in Libya. - 4 Situation in Afghanistan **(1) Trends after U.S. Terrorist Attacks** In Afghanistan, following the so-called 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) that the U.S. Forces launched in November 2001 has been engaged in the mop-up operation of the Taliban and other groups. Furthermore, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have conducted security duties. These efforts have been reducing the Taliban’s assault capabilities. Nevertheless, the Taliban allegedly maintains the capability to conduct intermittent attacks. In September 2015, the Taliban occupied provincial government, police headquarters and central government office buildings in Kunduz, northern Afghanistan, regaining strength.[54] In September 2014, the Ghani administration was inaugurated based on the results of the presidential elections in Afghanistan in April and June 2014, putting an end to problems left by the previous Karzai administration regarding the stationing of foreign forces in Afghanistan.[55] **(2) Security Situation after Completion of ISAF Mission** In December 2014, ISAF’s mission was completed. In January 2015, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM)[56] was launched, which primarily provides education, training, and advice under the leadership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additionally, the U.S. Forces, while providing training to Afghan forces as a member of NATO, implements Operation Freedom Sentinel (OFS) against terrorism. In October 2015, given the deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan, U.S. President Obama announced that the U.S. troop 49 In September 2012, an Islamic extremist group attacked the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, killing four Americans, including the Ambassador. In January 2014, the U.S. Department of State designated Ansar al-Sharia, an offshoot of Al Qaeda that is deemed to have been involved in this incident, as a terrorist organization. 50 In January 2015, an armed group attacked an upscale hotel in the capital city of Tripoli, killing at least 13 people. ISIL’s “Tripoli Province” claimed responsibility for the attack. In February 2015, an extremist organization that has sworn allegiance to ISIL posted a video on the Internet of what is believed to be the murder of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. 51 Congressional testimony by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence on global threat assessment in February 2016. 52 For refugees, see Paragraph 1 “Situations in Syria and Iraq in Response to the Rise of ISIL” and Part I, Chapter 2, Section 8 “Europe.” 53 For the flow of refugees and immigrants to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa, see Paragraph 1 “Situations in Syria and Iraq in Response to the Rise of ISIL.” 54 The Taliban has vowed to continue fighting until foreign forces withdraw completely. 55 The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and Afghanistan, which sets forth the legal framework of the stationing of the U.S. Forces in 2015 and beyond, and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the support mission in Afghanistan led by NATO forces in 2015 and beyond were signed before being approved by both the upper and lower houses of Afghanistan’s parliament in November 2015. 56 As of March 2016, about 13,000 troops were participating in the RSM. Based in Kabul, they were active in five locations (Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and Laghman). See Part I, Chapter 2, ----- strength in Afghanistan would be kept at about 9,800 for 2016 before being reduced to 5,500 from 2017. In June 2016, however, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter indicated that the U.S. Forces would expand its missions in Afghanistan to cover (1) close air support to increase firepower and (2) accompanying and advising Afghan ground and air units. As there are destabilization factors including the Taliban’s expansion of influences, there is a possibility that U.S. Forces may again expand engagement in Afghanistan. In July 2016, President Obama reaffirmed the policy of maintaining the troop strength at around 8,400 through the end of his administration. As ISAF completed its mission in December 2015, its security authorities in Afghanistan were transferred to ANDSF, which is appreciated as having a certain level of security capability in drafting operational plans and cracking down on armed insurgents. The Afghan Ministry of Defense decided on a new national military strategy in August 2015, implementing various initiatives.[57] As ANDSF has problems with logistics, morale, air capabilities and leadership, the Taliban is expanding its own areas of control.[58] Meanwhile, ISIL has established a Khorasan branch in Afghanistan and its vicinity and claimed responsibility for a terror attack in Jalalabad in April 2015. However, its attacks in Afghanistan have been sporadic, leading observers to view ISIL as posing no major threats to Afghanistan.[59] Afghanistan faces not only security problems but also a plethora of challenges related to reconstruction, including preventing corruption, enhancing the rule of law, strengthening the crackdown on narcotics trafficking, and promoting regional development. Ensuring peace and stability in Afghanistan is a common challenge of the international community, which requires continuing engagement with the country. - 5 Situation of the Middle East Peace Efforts In the Middle East, there have been four wars between Israel and Arab countries since the foundation of Israel in 1948. Meanwhile, a peace process between Israel and Palestine made temporary progress including the 1993 Oslo Agreement, but has fallen short of achieving peace.[60] In July 2013, Middle East peace talks between Israel and Palestine resumed for the first time in nearly three years at the strong urging of the United States. Nevertheless, the peace talks had to be discontinued in March to April 2014 owing to various developments, including Israel’s suspension of the release of Palestinian prisoners, Palestine’s international treaty accession applications, and the agreement reached between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) dominated by the Fatah and the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas that has effective rule over Palestine and the Gaza Strip[61] to form a national unity cabinet. In this context, in June to July 2014, tensions grew between Israel and Palestine, developing into an armed clash.[62] In July 2014, Israeli forces launched a ground operation.[63] Later in the month, Israel and Palestine agreed to a ceasefire, accepting a request from Egypt to do so.[64] Meanwhile, in Europe, national parliaments have begun to call for the recognition of a Palestinian state since October 2014.[65] Furthermore, in January 2015, the International Criminal Court (ICC)[66] accepted Palestine’s 57 The strategy defined such priority goals as the organizational strengthening of the Defense Ministry and the national forces, and the increased professionalism of the forces. In addition, to improve the literacy rate, which has posed as a challenge, efforts are under way including the implementation of various curriculums. 58 In July 2015, the death of supreme Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar was confirmed. While the Taliban has elected Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour as its new supreme leader, an internal strife between pro- and anti-Omar groups has been confirmed. The Taliban has mounted offensives in northern, southern and western parts of Afghanistan, as well as in Kabul, effectively expanding areas under its control. 59 This is according to the “Worldwide Threat Assessment 2016” by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (released in February 2016). According to a report released in December 2015 by the Soufan Group, a think tank studying regional conflicts, some 50 ISIL fighters from Afghanistan are operating in Syria and Iraq. 60 Between Israel and Palestine, a peace process through full-fledged negotiations started through the 1993 Oslo Agreement. In 2003, both Israel and Palestine accepted a roadmap for realizing a peace initiative featuring their coexistence. However, its implementation has made little progress. Following rocket attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip, Israeli forces launched a large-scale military action from late 2008 to early 2009 that included airstrikes on the Gaza Strip and the mobilization of ground forces. In November 2012, Israeli forces again conducted airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. By 2012, Israel thus conducted two major clashes on the Gaza Strip. In both cases, fighting ceased under mediation by Egypt and others. 61 Hamas does not recognize Israel. 62 Following the murder of Israeli boys in June 2014, Palestinian boys were killed in an alleged retaliation in July 2014, increasing tensions between Israel and Palestine. Later in the month, sporadic rocket attacks on Israel came from the Gaza Strip, leading to a clash between both sides. 63 According to the U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report (August 2014), at least 2,133 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip died in the fighting. 64 The main components of the ceasefire agreement are: (1) opening of the crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel; (2) speedy entry of humanitarian assistance supplies, relief supplies, and supplies necessary for reconstruction; (3) fishing permissions from six nautical miles; and (4) indirect negotiations between the two parties over other topics (e.g., construction of an airport and seaport in the Gaza Strip, disarmament of Hamas) in one month’s time after ceasefire is ensured. However, the consultations in (4) have remained at a standstill. 65 Sweden has recognized a Palestinian state. The U.K., French and Spanish parliaments have taken relevant actions such as the adoption of a resolution calling for the recognition of a Palestinian state. 66 The International Criminal Court is the first permanent international criminal judicial body in history to prosecute and punish, based on international law, individuals who committed the most serious crimes of ----- application to accede to the ICC and opened a preliminary examination into whether or not Palestine conducted war crimes.[67] Palestine officially acceded to the ICC in April 2015. Israel has protested such moves by the international community. In September 2015, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas touched on the potential abolition of the Oslo Agreement in his address to the U.N. General Assembly. Israel-Palestine relations are thus beginning to deteriorate. As Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon,[68] the international community needs to take further initiatives. - 6 Situation in Egypt for national reconciliation, and former Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was elected. In a parliamentary election held from October to December 2015, the “For the Love of Egypt” alliance of groups supporting the Sisi administration’s policies won.[71] In response to situations in neighboring countries including Yemen, where tensions are high, meanwhile, Egypt has been proactively procuring military equipment from foreign countries. As Egypt plans to procure two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships[72] from France, Egyptian Navy troops have reportedly undergone relevant training. Furthermore, Egypt has enhanced counterterrorism measures, including crackdown operations, in light of the rise in terror attacks by Islamic extremists in the Sinai Peninsula in recent years. Recently, however, ISIL’s Sinai Province[73] has gained strength, carrying out repeated terror attacks on security forces and other targets. The group is said to have implemented operations based on very advanced, organized plans, including an attack on a coast guard ship in August 2015.[74] In October, a Russian jetliner crashed due to the explosion of a bomb set on the aircraft, killing all 224 passengers and crewmembers. Later, ISIL’s Sinai Province claimed responsibility for the incident. It has been pointed out that airport workers supported the ISIL attack. This kind of incident has become a new matter of concern that suggests that the ISIL network has been gradually penetrating into Egypt. In addition to the Sinai Peninsula, terror attacks have occurred in the Egyptian capital of Cairo.[75] ISIL claimed responsibility for these attacks, indicating that ISIL threats have been spreading not only in the Sinai Peninsula but also in the rest of Egypt. In January 2011, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship ended in response to anti-government demonstrations under the “Arab Spring” democratization movements.[69] Mohamed Mursi from the Muslim Brotherhood[70] was elected as the new president through the presidential election in June 2012. In June 2013, however, large-scale demonstrations demanding the resignation of President Mursi occurred due to an economic impasse and the chasm between Islamic groups and liberal, secular groups, which resulted in a large number of victims from clashes between some demonstrators and groups supporting the President. While this sort of disorder spread in the country, the national forces intervened in July 2013 and dismissed President Mursi, establishing a provisional government. In May 2014, a presidential election was held in line with the roadmap drafted by the provisional government, which addresses the comprehensive democratization process 67 In the preliminary examination, the ICC collects evidence, conducts hearings with relevant stakeholders of both parties, among other activities. No deadlines for the preliminary examination are provided in the ICC Rome Statute. 68 Israel and Syria disagree on issues such as the return of the Golan Heights that Israel has occupied since the Third Middle East War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been deployed in the Golan Heights to observe the implementation of the ceasefire and military disengagement between the two countries. Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization. Military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) are also active in this region. 69 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-1, Footnote 2. 70 A Sunni political organization established in Egypt in 1928 as an organization targeting the general public to “revive Islam.” In the 1950s, it became a target of a clampdown for plotting the assassination of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. However, by the 1970s, the organization became moderate to the extent of conducting political activities through parliament. Meanwhile, extremist organizations were derived, with Muslim Brotherhood serving as the parent organization. 71 It has been pointed out that many winners in the election were those who had been close to the Mubarak administration, including former security and military force executives. 72 In December 2010 after their long negotiations, Russia and France agreed on a contract for Russia to purchase two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. In response to the Ukraine crisis in 2014, however, the French and Russian governments agreed to cancel the contract in August 2015. As French President Francois Hollande and Egyptian President Sisi agreed later to enhance cooperation in military fields, including counterterrorism, Egypt agreed in principle in September 2015 to procure the two ships. Egypt has also procured Mig-29 fighter aircraft and Ka-52 attack helicopters from Russia. 73 The predecessor of ISIL’s Sinai Province is said to have been Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, an Islamic extremist organization based in the Sinai Peninsula that aimed to overthrow Israel. It is deemed that the organization intensified its terrorism activities targeting Egyptian security authorities following the collapse of the Morsi government in July 2013. 74 According to “Worldwide Threat Assessment 2016” by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. ----- specific ethnic groups spread to different areas, resulting in a large number of casualties, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Under these circumstances, on December 24, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2132 and decided to enhance UNMISS by increasing the maximum military personnel by 5,500. In addition, the “Intergovernmental Authority on Development” (IGAD)[80] assisted by the U.N. and the AU initiated efforts to start dialogues among South Sudanese leaders and enable their reconciliation. The IGAD helped the government and anti-government group to sign an agreement in January 2014 on ceasing hostile activities in South Sudan. As confrontation between the government and anti-government group intensified due to repeated ceasefire violations, however, the U.N. Security Council in May 2014 adopted Resolution 2155, which stipulated that the mandate of UNMISS would be restricted to the four areas of the protection of civilians, monitoring and investigating human rights, creating the conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance, and supporting the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Later, IGAD added international organizations (the U.N., AU, and EU), the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, China, and African countries (South Africa, Chad, Algeria, Nigeria, and Rwanda) to its mediation mission and continued the mediation. In August 2015, the government and anti-government group reached an agreement on the resolution of clashes in South Sudan, including the establishment of a transitional government. In response to the agreement, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2241 in October 2015 to add support for the implementation of the agreement and other missions to the UNMISS mandate, and Resolution 2252 in December to extend the mandate until the end of July 2016. Later, efforts to implement the agreement were made. On April 29, 2016, a transitional government of national unity was established. - 7 Situation in Sudan[76] and South Sudan The North-South civil war that continued since 1983 between the government of Sudan, composed of Arab Muslims in the north, and anti-government groups, composed of African Christians in the south, concluded with the establishment of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 under the mediation of neighboring countries, the United States, and others. As a result of a referendum in accordance with the rules of the CPA in January 2011, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence on July 9, 2011. On the same day, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1996 in order to maintain peace and stability, and to support the establishment of an environment contributing to help with the further development of South Sudan.[77] After the independence, Sudan and South Sudan held negotiations over the issues of demarcation, such as the treatment of the Abyei area,[78] the distribution of oil income,[79] and other problems under the mediation of the international community including the AU. The two countries signed a series of agreements regarding security measures in the border area, oil production, and other issues in September 2012 as well as a document specifying an agreement implementation schedule in March 2013. The President of South Sudan dismissed the Vice President in July 2013, bringing to the surface a political conflict between the two groups. In December of the same year, fighting broke out among the President’s security forces in the capital city of Juba, which evolved into clashes between the pro-President faction (government) and the pro-Vice President faction (anti-government group). Subsequently, following an outbreak of the clashes between the South Sudanese government and the anti-government group, fighting and violent acts targeting 76 Since around 2003, the Darfur region in the west of Sudan has experienced heightened conflicts between the Arab Sudanese government and African anti-government groups. In response to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) entered between the government and some anti-government groups in 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 in order to establish the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2007. In 2011, the government and an anti-government group, “Liberation and Justice Movement” (LJM), signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). However, other anti-government groups rejecting the implementation of this document still continue to fight against the government forces. 77 The initial mandate period was one year with up to 7,000 military personnel and up to 900 police personnel. Specifically, according to the initial mandate, UNMISS would: (1) support peace consolidation and thereby foster long-term state building and economic development; (2) support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians; and (3) support the government of the Republic of South Sudan in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish the rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors. 78 The Abyei area was one of the bloodiest battlefields during the North-South civil war. Both the North and the South claim sovereignty over the area due to its abundant oil resources. Whether the area belongs to the North or the South remains uncertain, as a referendum that will settle the territorial issue has not yet been held. In May 2011, immediately before the independence of South Sudan, a battle began between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), which was a major military organization in southern Sudan. In June 2011, the Security Council established by its Resolution 1990 the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) in the region. 79 A vast majority of oil wells are located in South Sudan, while most pipelines and ports for export are located in Sudan. ----- period of the TFG in August 2012 and convened a new federal assembly. A new president was elected in September 2012 and a new cabinet was formed in November 2012. This newly-integrated government established for the first time in 21 years aims to stabilize the situation in the country. - 9 Situation in Mali - 8 Situation in Somalia Somalia has been in a state of anarchy since its government collapsed in 1991.[81] In 2005, the “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) was established as the product of mediation by neighboring countries, but fighting was escalated with opposing groups such as the “Union of Islamic Courts” (UIC). In 2006, Ethiopian forces intervened with assistance from the United States and drove away the UIC. In 2007, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)[82] was established based on the approval of United Nations. On the other hand, Al Qaeda-related extremist insurgents derived from the UIC, “Al-Shabaab”, gained strength in the central and southern parts of the country and resisted the TFG. In response to this, neighboring countries dispatched troops to AMISOM and other organizations, and seized Kismayo, a major stronghold of Al-Shabaab, in October 2012. In August 2014, AMISOM launched Operation Indian Ocean and successfully recaptured some of the cities in the central and southern areas which had served as the bases of Al-Shabaab. In the following month, AlShabaab‘s leader Godane was killed by the attacks of the U.S. Forces. In retaliation, Al-Shabaab frequently staged terrorist attacks on AMISOM troops and member states.[83] It has been pointed out that these attacks are designed to restrain AMISOM member countries.[84] Additionally, in Somalia, especially the northern part of it, there are considered to be outposts for pirates who are active off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The international community implements a series of initiatives to enhance the security capabilities of Somalia based on the perception that instability of Somalia triggers the piracy issues.[85] The international community has continued to implement initiatives off the Somalian coast, which have contributed to steadily reduce the number of pirate attacks. Somalia saw the end of transitional governance In Mali, an anti-government Tuareg[86] insurgent group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), triggered a riot in January 2012, joined by other groups including “Ansar Dine,” an Islamic extremist group. The MNLA conquered northern cities and declared the independence of the northern region in April 2012. Subsequently, Islamic extremist groups including Ansar Dine that expelled the MNLA, “Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa” (MUJAO), and “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), governed the country based on the sharia law, aggravating the humanitarian and security situations in northern Mali. In response to this situation, in December 2012, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2085 and approved the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA),[87] whose tasks included revitalizing the capabilities of Malian troops and security organizations and helping Malian authorities. In January 2013, France dispatched its troops to the country based on a request from the Malian provisional government following the invasion of central and southern regions by terrorists including Ansar Dine. Subsequently, the Malian provisional government recaptured its major cities in the northern part of the country, assisted by the deployment of AFISMA. In April 2013, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2100 to determine the establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),[88] whose tasks include the stabilization of densely-populated areas 81 “Somaliland” located in the Northwest declared its independence in 1991. “Puntland” located in the Northeast declared the establishment of an autonomous government in 1998. 82 AMISOM is composed mainly of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, and joined by Ethiopia in January 2013. Resolution 2124 decided to increase the number of troops from 17,731 to 22,126. 83 In January 2016, Al-Shabaab attacked an AMISOM base in El Adde, southern Somalia, killing and injuring a large number of people. 84 Al-Shabaab carried out a terror attack on a shopping mall in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi in September 2013 and a terror assault on Garissa University College in Kenya in April 2015. 85 See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 for counter-piracy initiatives implemented by the MOD and the SDF and other countries. 86 The Tuareg Tribe is a nomadic ethnic minority in the Sahara Desert. It is pointed out that the tribe has been in conflict with the government of Mali seeking for autonomy in northern Mali. 87 AFISMA receives troops from member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria. 88 In June 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2295, under which it was decided to extend the mandate period to June 2017, expand the maximum military personnel from the existing 11,240 to 13,290, and increase the maximum civilian police personnel from the existing 1,440 to 1,920. In case MINUSMA is exposed to imminent danger, based on a request from the U.N. Secretary-General, French ----- and the reconstruction of national capabilities throughout Mali. Based on this resolution, MINUSMA, which had its authority delegated by AFISMA, became operational in July 2013. With the support of MINUSMA, a presidential election was held in a peaceful manner, and a new government was established in September of the same year.[89] Later, large-scale clashes broke out between Malian troops and MNLA in May 2014. However, in the same month, a ceasefire agreement was established between the two parties under the mediation of the AU. In July 2014, under the mediation of the U.N., Algeria and other parties, peace talks commenced between the Malian government and the Tuareg insurgent group, including MNLA. In June 2015, the government and the insurgent group reached a comprehensive peace agreement. In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2227 to renew the mandate for MINUSMA.[90] Nonetheless, AQIM and other armed extremist groups have conducted intermittent attacks against MINUSMA units.[91] The situation in the region still remains unstable.[92] In August 2014, French troops integrated and reorganized its units in Mali, Chad, and Niger in order to deal effectively with the expanding threat of terrorism across the whole Sahel region including Mali,[93] and launched Operation Barkhane covering the entire region.[94] French troops are currently working with MINUSMA and the troops of the countries in the region to stabilize the Sahel region including northern Mali.[95] - 10 Situation in Burundi multi-party system and the democratic constitution in June 1993, Melchior Ndadaye from the Hutus won and assumed the presidency. As confrontation intensified between the Hutus and the Tutsis, however, President Ndadaye was assassinated by the military led by the Tutsis in October 1993 after serving as the President for only 100 days. In January 1994, Cyprien Ntaryamira from the Hutus was elected by the National Assembly (lower house) as the President. In April 1994, however, an aircraft with President Ntaryamira aboard was shot down in Rwanda and he was killed along with Rwanda President Juvénal Habyarimana also aboard the aircraft. The situation thus remained unstable. In July 1996, a new government led by Pierre Buyoya from the Tutsis emerged as a result of a coup, prompting the international community to impose sanctions on Burundi. A peace process started in June 1998, and in August 2000, most of the parties to the peace process, excluding anti-government Hutu armed groups, established the Arusha Peace Agreement as a result of mediation led by former South African President Mandela. As a result, a three-year transitional government was inaugurated in November 2001. In the first half of the three years, Pierre Buyoya from the Tutsis served as the President. In the second half, Domitien Ndayizeye from the Hutus served as the President after working as the Vice President in the first half. While the peace process made progress, antigovernment Hutu groups refused to sign the Arusha Agreement and continued to fight against the government. In November 2003, however, the transitional government concluded a ceasefire agreement with Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces de Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD-FDD), the largest among antigovernment Hutu groups. In response to the agreement, CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza joined the Cabinet as the Minister for Good Governance. In February 2005, a new constitution was established In Burundi, the majority Hutus, which account for about 85% of the total population, have continued to antagonize the minority Tutsis, which account for about 14% of the population, since its independence from Belgium in 1962. From the independence through 1993, the Tutsis ran the government. In the first presidential election under a 89 In June 2013, the provisional government and MNLA reached an agreement on such issues as allowing the northern area to participate in the presidential election and approving the dispatch of Mali troops to northern cities. 90 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2227 added a number of new missions to the mandate, including the deployment of at least 40 military observers to monitor and direct the ceasefire agreement to support the implementation of the ceasefire and peace agreements. 91 In November 2015, a rocket attack was carried out in a MINUSMA station in Kidal, killing two MINUSMA members. Ansar Dine claimed responsibility for the attack. 92 In November 2015, extremists assaulted a hotel in the Malian capital of Bamako, killing 22 hostages. 93 The Sahel region refers to the southern edge of the Sahara Desert. The countries in the Sahel region include Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. 94 Operation Barkhane consists of a total of around 3,500 personnel. The Operation’s headquarters are in Chad, and it has bases in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The operation is executed through the swift deployment of units to various areas. In northern Mali, French troops collaborate with MINUSMA units, and in other areas, collaborate with the military forces of the countries in the region. The Operation mainly conducts mop-ups of terrorists and joint patrol. 95 A U.N. Security Council resolution authorizes French troops to take every measure to support MINUSMA personnel under urgent and serious threats at the request of the U.N. Secretary General. Germany has ----- through a national referendum. From June to August 2006, the CNDD-FDD, which had become a political party, won the ensuing election, with Minister for Good Governance Nkurunziza elected as the President. In September 2006, the government established a comprehensive ceasefi re agreement with Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), the only anti-government Hutu group that had continued an armed struggle against the government. Later, a process for a peace agreement stagnated. In 2009, however, the peace process was completed through the approval of the FNL as a political party and its integration into the Burundi National Forces and police. When President Nkurunziza vowed to run for a third presidential term in April 2015 despite its unconstitutionality, this triggered protests by opposition groups in the capital city of Bujumbura. After the ruling party, police and national forces clashed repeatedly with opposition groups, President Nkurunziza was reelected in July, which escalated the clashes. The Burundi crisis resulted in approximately 200,000 people who fl ed the country. **3 Trends in the Spread of International Terrorism** - 1 Characteristics of Recent International Terrorism The international community has enhanced its engagement in Burundi since early 2016. The U.N. Security Council sent an inspection mission to Burundi in January, and U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon visited Burundi in February. In the same month, the AU also dispatched a high-level delegation to Burundi. Furthermore, the East African Community (EAC) appointed former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa as a facilitator for peace talks in Burundi, in addition to Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni as a mediator, striving to facilitate national dialogue in Burundi. In April, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2279 requesting the Secretary General to submit options to send a police mission to Burundi. In response, the Secretary General proposed three options – (1) sending some 3,000 police offi cers for missions including the protection of citizens, (2) sending a 228-member police monitoring mission, and (3) sending an assessment mission comprising several dozens of people for three months. Deliberations have been underway on these options as of the end of June. terror attacks.[97] Some organizations are said to have the potential to conduct cyber attacks.[98] While Western countries have led the War on Terror since the September 2001 terror attacks in the United States, the number of victims of terror attacks in recent years is increasing.[99] In European countries and the United States, “homegrown” terrorism in which residents are inspired by the extremism espoused by Al Qaeda or ISIL and conduct terrorist attacks has become a threat. In particular, there are concerns that their nationals would conduct terrorist attacks after accumulating combat training and combat experiences in confl ict-torn regions such as Iraq and Syria,[100] becoming indoctrinated into extremism and returning to their countries.[101] International terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda and ISIL are based primarily in countries and regions where governing systems have been weakened or collapsed mainly in the Middle East and Africa. They cross insuffi ciently controlled national borders to expand and boost their operations. Some organizations are capable of implementing terror attacks in locations far from their bases. These terrorist organizations, though alleged to differ depending on their objectives and capabilities,[96] generally tend to use cyberspace, including social media, for information sharing and coordination, and to form global networks to obtain weapons and funds. Some organizations use advanced public relations strategies to skillfully promote themselves, recruit fi ghters and inspire 96 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2012” (May 2013). 97 ISIL uses the Internet and social media to recruit young people as fi ghters. According to a U.N. report in May 2015, the international community is called on to cooperate in efforts to address the issue of women joining terrorist organizations. See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, Paragraph 3, “The Spread of International Terrorism.” 98 In January 2015, a cyber attack was lodged against the U.S. Central Command’s Twitter account. 99 The number of victims in terror attacks hit an all-time high of about 32,000 in 2014 (according to International Terrorism Report 2014 (June 2015)). ISIL and other Islamic extremists have increased attacks on soft targets, leading to a rise in the number of ordinary citizens becoming victims of terrorist attacks. 100 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 for the situation in Syria. ----- Japanese nationals were murdered, Japan is not in any way immune from the threat of international terrorism.[102] The proliferation of the threat of terrorism has gained momentum. The diversification of its perpetrators, coupled with the growing complexity of regional conflicts, has made it further difficult to prevent their occurrence. For this reason, international cooperation on counter-terrorism measures has become even more important. Currently, the international community as a whole is taking various steps, including military actions as well as cutting off the funding sources of terrorist organizations and preventing the international movement of terrorist fighters.[103] - 2 Trends of Major International Terrorist Organizations In recent years, “lone-wolf” terrorism, in which individuals or groups become extremists through information found on the Internet and elsewhere, without having any official relations with terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIL, and plan and conduct terrorist attacks, is also seen as a threat because it is difficult to detect signs of such attacks and prevent them. Given that ISIL has continued to call for terrorist attacks in Europe and other parts of the world, terrorist attacks are feared to take place in the future as well. In connection with Japan, in early 2015, when there was a terrorist incident involving the murder of Japanese nationals in Syria, ISIL declared clearly that its acts of terrorism would target Japanese nationals. In October 2015, ISIL claimed responsibility for the murder of a Japanese national in Bangladesh. An ISIL magazine has also cited Japanese nationals as terror attack targets. In light of the terrorist attack in Bangladesh in July 2016, in which 7 **(1) ISIL** ISIL, unlike traditional terrorist organizations, is said to be characterized by its substantial funding,[104] powerful and accomplished military forces,[105] developed organizational structure, and effective control of certain areas. In addition, it is deemed that ISIL has excellent military operational capabilities with the participation by Ba’ath Party members from the former Iraqi regime and former Iraqi military officers, and include numerous foreign fighters. Thanks to an adept public relations strategy,[106] about 25,000 foreign fighters including 6,900 from the West are said to be participating in ISIL’s activities.[107] Since launching the invasion of Iraq, ISIL has utilized equipment seized from the Iraqi Security 102 The seventh issue of the ISIL propaganda magazine “Dabiq” published in February 2015 included descriptions of the murder of two Japanese nationals in Syria and renewed a call for terror attacks on Japanese nationals and interests. Furthermore, the 11th issue (published in September 2015) called for terror attacks on Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia and Indonesia. The 12th issue (published in November 2015) described the murder of a Japanese national in Bangladesh and warned anew that Japanese nationals and interests would be the targets of terror attacks. 103 In September 2014, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. The Resolution requested member states to make exits from their countries for the purpose of executing acts of terrorism punishable under domestic laws. The Resolution also includes measures obligating member states to prevent entry or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that state had credible information which demonstrates reasonable grounds for believing that the individual is attempting to enter or transit through its territory for the purpose of participating in acts of terrorism. In addition, at the G7 Summit held in Germany in June 2015, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to effectively implement the established international framework for the freezing of terrorists’ assets. 104 According to a U.N. report, ISIL’s estimated revenue from crude oil ranges from US$846,000 to US$1,645,000 per day (approx. 100 to 200 million yen). The report notes that ISIL’s revenue sources also include unilaterally-imposed levies, including ransom from kidnapping and taxation (U.N. Security Council Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee report [November 14, 2014]). Amid speculations that revenue from crude oil is becoming no longer a major source of ISIL’s funding due to the Coalition’s airstrikes and fluctuations in crude oil prices, some have indicated that ISIL has diversified its revenue sources by increasing the taxes levied on residents and companies in the areas under ISIL’s control. Some also suggest that ISIL earns profits from asset management made through its overseas supporters. However, it has been noted that pay to ISIL fighters has halved as ISIL’s income from oil smuggling, which is its main income source, has been declining resulting from Coalition airstrikes that destroy ISIL-held oil facilities. 105 ISIL boasts of advanced equipment including tanks (M1A1 Abrams, T-72s, and T-55s), artillery guns and rifles. Some reports allege that ISIL has fighter aircraft. However, there is no information indicating ISIL’s operation of fighter aircraft in battlefields. 106 ISIL uses the Internet and social media to recruit young people as fighters. According to a U.N. report in May 2015, the international community is called on to cooperate in efforts to address the issue of women joining terrorist organizations. 107 According to a report on foreign ISIL fighters (December 2015) by the Soufan Group, a think tank studying regional conflicts, about 60% of foreign ISIL fighters are from the Middle East and North Africa. A country-by-country breakdown of foreign ISIL fighters indicate (1) 6,000 from Tunisia, (2) 2,500 from Saudi Arabia, (3) 2,400 from Russia, (4) 2,200 from Turkey, and (5) 2,000 from Jordan. Fighters from the West account for slightly less than 20% of the total foreign ISIL fighters, including 1,700 from France, 760 from the United Kingdom and Germany, 470 from Belgium, and 300 from Sweden and Austria. Foreign ii ----- **y** **ISIL’s Use of Cyberspace** **Column** ISIL has used cyberspace for a variety of purposes that include recruiting foreign fi ghters, raising funds, and communicating and coordinating between members. The expansion of ISIL’s activities has steered Western intelligence agencies to step up its monitoring effort, resulting in the exposure of a series of ISIL’s plots based on online communication. For example, according to media reports, a photo published online by an ISIL magazine enabled the Coalition to identify the location of ISIL’s forces and to subsequently launch airstrikes. While ISIL has been an active user of Facebook, Twitter, and other existing social networking services (SNS), recently ISIL members have given priority to using more secure ways of communicating, and thus, have been found utilizing an independently developed messaging application. In the Paris terror attacks in November 2015, for example, it is suggested that the terrorists utilized a commercially home-use video game console which offers highly secure means of communication. ISIL is also said to be acquiring software programs for cyber attacks as well as training and recruiting the necessary personnel. Furthermore, ISIL’s own manuals that call on members to conduct cyber attacks have been discovered. It is a cause for concern that ISIL could carry out new terror attacks by way of cyber attacks, whose targets include national critical backbone infrastructure such as power plants and airports. Forces and other forces, and has conducted deceptive tactics,[108] has successively taken control of key cities, oil fi eld areas, and military facilities in Iraq and Syria, at one point expanding areas under its control, and increasing its supporters in the world.[109] **(2) Al Qaeda** With regard to Al Qaeda that is believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks in 2001, Osama Bin Laden, the group’s leader who was hiding in Pakistan, as well as many executives of affi liated organizations, were killed in a U.S. operation in May 2011. The Al Qaeda core is now said to be focused on ensuring the survival of the organization. Nonetheless, the possibility of Al Qaeda attacks has not disappeared. While the command and control capabilities of Al Qaeda’s leadership have been declining, Al Qaeda affi liates have reportedly gained strength and are perpetrating terrorism from their bases mainly in North Africa and the Middle East.[110] **(3) Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)** AQAP is a Sunni extremist organization based in Yemen, established in 2009 by its founder Nasser al-Wuhayshi along with Al Qaeda members active in Saudi Arabia to found a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the entire Middle East and implement sharia law.[111] AQAP[112] is said to have been involved in attempted terrorist attacks on multiple aircraft[113] and an assault on a French weekly magazine head offi ce in January 2015. While Yemen has remained in a state of confusion,[114] AQAP has expanded operations based in Yemen and taken control of a Yemeni military base. AQAP is feared to take advantage of the power vacuum to gain further strength. Meanwhile, the United States killed AQAP leader Wuhayshi in a mopup operation using drone strikes. Arab coalition forces recaptured Al Mukalla in southern Yemen, which had been a base for AQAP since April 2015. Anti-AQAP operations have thus shown a degree of success. 108 It has been pointed out that ISIL uses combat uniforms, etc., obtained from the Iraqi Security Forces and others to approach security checkpoints and vehicles to conduct suicide bombings. ISIL is also reported to have camoufl aged seized armored personnel carriers and ordinary vehicles with armor plates for suicide bombings. 109 Recently, ISIL has established branches in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia, gaining strength from allegiances sworn by local Islamic extremists. According to a report on ISIL by the U.N. Secretary General, 34 organizations have sworn allegiance to ISIL as of December 15, 2015. According to U.S. think tank IntelCenter, ISIL is alleged to have 41 branches, including those whose operations remain unknown, in 16 countries as of January 2016. 110 U.S. Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (February 2016). 111 Sharia is an Arabic word meaning “Islamic law.” Islamic law is applied to the whole of Islam, covering ibadah, moral codes, private laws, and social relations laws, as well as criminal codes, and international and war laws. However, there is no comprehensive written law representing sharia. In practice, sharia is applied according to interpretations by clerics based on the Koran. 112 AQAP was established in 2009 by its founder Nasser al-Wuhayshi along with Al Qaeda members active in Saudi Arabia to found a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the entire Middle East and implement Sharia. 113 AQAP was reportedly involved in an attempted bombing attack on a Northwest Airlines jet in December 2009 and in an incident where explosives were found in multiple air cargoes on a fl ight from Yemen to the United States in October 2010. The fi rst issue of Inspire published by AQAP in July 2010 explained how to make a simple bomb. ----- **(4) Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)** AQIM, a Sunni extremist organization based in Algeria, has kidnapped mainly Algerians, Europeans and Americans. AQIM swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2006, with its strength peaking at about 30,000. However, Algerian forces’ counterterrorism operations have reportedly reduced the AQIM strength to around 1,000. The strength of AQIM in northern Mali has declined due to a French-led military intervention started in 2013, while it is expanding its influence in Libya and Tunisia. In November 2015, AQIM attacked a U.S. hotel in Mali. In this attack, AQIM was found to have cooperated with Al-Murabitoun, which was founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an offshoot from AQIM. In December 2015, Al-Murabitoun offered to join AQIM.[115] It has been pointed out that its integration was designed to counter ISIL, which had been gaining strength in western Africa as well and hurting AQIM’s vested interests. AQIM is reportedly expected to scale up its terror attacks. - 3 Trends in Global Terrorism Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK),[119] which has long clashed with the government, have continuously occurred.[120] Furthermore, alleged ISIL terror attacks have emerged in Turkey. Among them, a suicide bombing attack on Kurds in Suruc in July 2015 killed 31 people. In October 2015, a bombing attack was carried out at a demonstration held by Kurds at a central station in the Turkish capital of Ankara, killing 102 people. Furthermore, in June 2016, a shooting and bombing attack on Istanbul’s Ataturk International Airport killed 41 people and injured more than 200 others. Turkish authorities allege that the attack was carried out by ISIL. Among North African countries, Algeria, Egypt,[121] Libya[122] and Tunisia have seen frequent terrorist attacks in recent years, indicating that ISIL and Al Qaeda affiliates have been operating in these countries. In January 2013, a masked brigade of Al-Murabitoun led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar[123] launched an assault on a natural gas plant in In Amenas, southeastern Algeria, killing numerous people including 10 Japanese nationals. In Tunisia, an Islamic extremist group attacked the Bardo National Museum in Tunis in March 2015, killing 21 people, including foreign tourists, among which were three Japanese nationals. In June 2015, an armed man fired indiscriminately at a hotel beach in the tourist spot of Sousse, killing 38 people. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack. **(2) Sub-Saharan Africa** In Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic extremists have gained strength in countries such as Kenya, Mali,[124] Somalia, and Nigeria. In Kenya, Al-Shabaab[125] launched an assault on luxury commercial facilities killing 67 people in Nairobi in September 2013 and attacked Garissa University **(1) Middle East and North Africa[116]** Terrorist attacks by ISIL, which is gaining strength in Iraq and Syria, by Al Qaeda-affiliated groups and other Islamic extremist organizations continue to take place in various parts of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, cited by AQAP and ISIL as their attack target, has continued to crack down on those alleged to have connections with these organizations.[117] In particular, ISIL has frequently conducted terror attacks on Shiite mosques[118] and issued statements vowing to continue such attacks. Therefore, ISIL is feared to continue expanding terror attacks. In Turkey, terror attacks by such organizations as Partiya 115 Terror attacks in Burkina Faso in January 2016 and in Grand-Bassam of Cote d’lvoire in March 2016 are attributed to Al-Murabitoun. 116 The state of terrorism in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are described in Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1, Second Paragraph – “Situation in Afghanistan,” “Situations in Syria and Iraq in Response to the Rise of ISIL,” and “Situation in Yemen.” 117 In July 2015, Saudi security authorities arrested 431 people alleged to have connections with ISIL, enhancing the domestic crackdown on terrorists. 118 In 2015 alone, bombing terror attacks on mosques or security forces occurred in May, July, August and October. 119 The PKK is a separatist organization that operates from footholds in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq for the purpose of establishing a Kurdish state. Its attacks target mainly the Turkish government and security forces. 120 In February 2016, a bombing terror attack, alleged to have targeted Turkish military forces, came near the Air Force command in Ankara, killing 29 people. A PKK affiliate known as Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK) (Kurdistan Freedom Hawks) claimed responsibility for the attack, which it described as retaliation against the Turkish government continuing attacks on the PKK. 121 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-6 “Situation in Egypt” for terror attacks in Egypt. 122 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-3 “Situation in Libya” for terror attacks in Libya. 123 Whether Mokhtar Belmokhtar is alive or not after U.S. airstrikes in June 2015 remains unknown. 124 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-9 “Situation in Mali” for trends related to Islamic extremists in Mali. 125 Al-Shabaab, an official Al Qaeda affiliate, has attacked Somali military forces and foreign forces stationed in Somalia to found an Islamic state, overthrow the Somali government, and remove foreign forces. Most Al-Shabaab members are Somali and foreign fighters. In February 2015, Al-Shabaab called on Islamic followers in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada to conduct attacks at shopping ----- Fig. I-3-1-2 Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions Al Qaeda in the Islamic Islamic State of Iraq Al Qaeda Al-Nusrah Front Maghreb (AQIM) and the Levant (ISIL) Taliban ISIL Libya Branch Hizballah (Total: 3 branches) SyriaSyria Hamas Lebanon IraqIraq AfghanistanAfghanistan PalestinePalestine ISIL Khorasan Branch PakistanPakistan AlgeriaAlgeria LibyaLibya Egypt Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia ISIL Algeria Branch ISIL Bahrain Branch Tenrik-e Taliban Pakistan Mali ISIL Sinai Branch YemenYemen ISIL Yemen Branch (Total: 5 branches) ISIL Saudi Arabia Branch NigeriaNigeria (Total: 3 branches) SomaliaSomalia Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Ansar al-Dine ISIL West Africa Branch (Boko Haram) : ISIL-related group Al-Shabaab : Al Qaeda affiliate : Group whose relation with Al Qaeda has been pointed out : Other major Islamic extremist terrorist group Source: Created based on Worldwide Threat Assessment (February 26, 2015), etc. College in northeastern Kenya leaving 148 dead in April 2015. In Somalia, the same organization has continued attacks on AMISOM units[126] and coordinated an attack in which a personal computer-shaped bomb exploded on a plane from Mogadishu to Djibouti in February 2016. In Nigeria, Boko Haram,[127] which aims to create an Islamic state, has stepped up its activities since 2009, repeatedly carrying out terrorist attacks[128] in retaliation against crackdowns by police and other authorities.[129] The international community, including the U.N. Security Council, has been implementing initiatives to address the Boko Haram problem. Boko Haram is expanding into foreign countries such as Niger, Cameroon and Chad. In March 2015, Boko Haram swore allegiance to ISIL, in a move to gain further strength. However, some observers point out that anti-Boko Haram operations in neighboring countries have contributed to reducing the organization’s strength. **(3) Europe, Americas, Australia** In Europe, people inspired by Islamic extremists and fi ghters returning mainly from Iraq and Syria have been conducting terrorist attacks. In January 2015, French nationals with origins in Algeria and elsewhere who were deemed to have been inspired by Islamic extremism were involved in shooting attacks, including those at the head offi ce of the French weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in central Paris.[130] In November 2015, large-scale 126 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-8 “Situation in Somalia” for AMISOM. 127 Boko Haram, aiming to overthrow the Nigerian government, implement Islamic law and deny Western education, has repeatedly conducted suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks on military, police, and government offi cials, as well as Christian facilities, mainly in northern Nigeria (primarily Borno State where there are numerous Muslims). Recently, soft targets such as markets have come under Boko Haram attacks. At present, Boko Haram operates as ISIL’s western Africa branch. 128 Recently, Boko Haram has reportedly repeated suicide bombings using women and girls who are less likely to raise alarm. 129 In April 2014, Boko Haram abducted over 200 female students. In response, the United States dispatched drones and other assets to support the search activities of the Nigerian government. In addition, the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee added Boko Haram to its list of sanction targets. 130 Of the two brothers who conducted the shooting attack at the Charlie Hebdo head offi ce, one is known to have received training at an AQAP camp. In addition, AQAP released a statement saying it had issued instructions directly to the brothers. Amedy Coulibaly, who attacked a Jewish grocery store, is believed to have posted a video on the Internet in which he swears allegiance to ISIL, although no clear link between i ----- **(4) Southeast Asia** In Southeast Asia, while some progress has been observed in the crackdown on terrorist organizations and other anti-terror efforts,[134] it has been pointed out that moves to support ISIL nevertheless exist, as indicated by cleric Abu Bakar Bashir,[135] a spiritual leader of Islamic extremists in Indonesia, who has sworn allegiance and provided funds to ISIL from behind prison walls.[136] In addition, young people from Indonesia, Malaysia, and other countries have reportedly gone to Iraq and Syria as foreign fighters, posing a new threat to the region.[137] While Indonesia has enhanced its crackdown on ISIL supporters, a bombing/shooting incident occurred at a Western coffee shop and its vicinity in Jakarta in January 2016. ISIL Indonesia claimed responsibility for the incident alleged to represent the first ISIL terror attack in Southeast Asia. While no major terror attacks have been seen in Malaysia, more than 50 ISIL supporters have been arrested since 2014, leading some observers to believe that the layers of ISIL supporters have been expanding.[138] In Thailand, meanwhile, an explosion took place at Erawan Shrine in central Bangkok in August 2015, killing more than 20 people.[139] **(5) South Asia** South Asia is subject to frequent terror attacks. In Pakistan, particularly, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other terrorist organizations have frequently conducted terror attacks on educational, military and other facilities. TTP attacked a military school in Peshawar, northwestern Pakistan, in December 2014, killing more than 141 people. In January 2016, TTP launched an assault on a university in Charsadda, northwestern Pakistan, resulting coordinated terror attacks hit the national stadium, a theater and other facilities, killing 130 people. ISIL France claimed responsibility for these attacks in a statement. In Belgium,[131] suicide bombing attacks were carried out at an airport and a subway station in Brussels in March 2016, killing 35 people, including three suicide bombers. ISIL Belgium later claimed responsibility for the attacks in a statement. It is alleged that the groups responsible for the terror attacks in Paris and Brussels cooperated with each other. These attacks demonstrate ISIL’s intention to exercise its operational capabilities even outside Syria and Iraq, prompting European governments to grow more alert.[132] Terror threats have spread to the Americas. In December, two terrorists fired at random at a welfare facility in California, resulting in 14 deaths.[133] ISIL’s Al Bayan radio station issued a statement praising the attack. In June 2016, a man who was allegedly inspired by ISIL’s extremism shot 49 people at a nightclub in Florida. While ISIL has claimed responsibility for the shooting, a clear relationship between the perpetrator and ISIL has not been established. This series of terror attacks led to concern that the extremism espoused by ISIL and other groups is spreading in the United States. In Canada, a male convert to Islam, who is believed to have sympathized with ISIL’s extremism, shot and killed a soldier of the Canadian forces in front of the Parliament in Ottawa in October 2014. In Australia in December 2014, a man who is believed to have been inspired by ISIL took hostages at a Sydney café, resulting in the deaths of three people, including the perpetrator himself. Since the incident, those suspected of planning terror attacks have been continuously identified and arrested in Australia. 131 In May 2014, a French national who had allegedly joined an Islamic extremist group in Syria opened fire at the Jewish Museum, killing four people. 132 After the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015, the French government raised the terror alert to the highest level in Paris, mobilizing numerous police officers and troops. It has also extended its emergency declaration issued just after the U.S. terror attacks. For the French government’s response after the coordinated terror attacks in Paris, see Part I, Chapter 2, Paragraph 8. 133 Much ammunition, bombs, automatic rifles and other weapons were found at the residence of the suspect. 134 It is pointed out that the terrorist organizations have weakened in the Philippines, such as the Islamic extremist terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which have been the foremost security concern in the country. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-2 for the situation in the Philippines. 135 Cleric Bashir is the founder of Jemaah Islamiyah. 136 However, it has been pointed out that cleric Bashir withdrew his allegiance to ISIL in early 2016. 137 In Indonesia, the government banned participation in ISIL in August 2014. Under the existing legal system, however, it is said that authorities do not have the authority to arrest ISIL supporters unless there is evidence of their clear involvement in terrorism activities. 138 It has been pointed out that security force members, public servants and other government employees, as well as housewives and other ordinary citizens, were among those arrested. ----- in the deaths of more than 20 people, including students. In India, in January 2016, an armed group attacked an air force base in the northwestern state of Punjab, killing seven security force members. A local extremist group claimed responsibility for the attack. In Bangladesh, an Italian national was shot to death in September 2015, as was a Japanese national in October 2015. In addition, a terrorist attack was carried out on a restaurant in Dhaka in July 2016, in which 20 people, including 7 Japanese nationals, were murdered. ISIL Bangladesh claimed responsibility for these incidents (responsibility for the incidents in September and October 2015 was claimed in an ISIL magazine), and in particular, ISIL is said to have been involved in the attack in July. ISIL has unilaterally established a Khorasan branch in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the Indian subcontinent, in September 2014, Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri announced the establishment of a new branch in India.[140] Given these developments, Islamic extremists are feared to intensify terror attacks in South Asia. **(6) Russia** ISIL has gained strength in southern Russia, establishing a Caucasus branch in June 2015.[141] Meanwhile, ISIL issued statements in October and November 2015 calling for terror attacks on Russia for implementing airstrikes in Syria. While no major terror attack has been confirmed in Russia, there have been some terror attacks including an assault on a military facility and a suicide bombing.[142] Given that the northern Caucasus region is one of major fighter suppliers for ISIL, ISIL-inspired fighters and ISIL supporters in the region are feared to increase terror attacks. Terror threats are also feared to spread in Russia. See>> Fig. I-3-1-2 (Major Terrorist Groups Based in Africa and the Middle East Regions) 140 Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri has stated that the goal of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is to free Muslim followers who are oppressed in Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. 141 Islamic extremists in the Republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia have been organized, pledging allegiance to ISIL. 142 In September 2015, a Russian military base came under an attack in southern Dagestan. In February 2016, a suicide bombing also occurred in Dagestan. The ISIL Caucasus branch claimed responsibility for ----- **Section 2** **Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, and ballistic missiles that deliver such weapons, have been recognized as a signifi cant **1 Nuclear Weapons** During the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 raised awareness of the danger of a full-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device in or before 1966[1] from having nuclear weapons, and provided that arms control and disarmament of nuclear forces would be pursued through two-way negotiations.[2] The NPT is currently signed by 191 countries and regions.[3] While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states by abandoning these weapons,[4] India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to accede to this treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. There are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, which announced that it conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, February 2013, and January 2016.[5] U.S. President Obama’s speech in April 2009 in which he expressed his hopes for a world without nuclear weapons demonstrated U.S. determination to take concrete steps towards this world, specifi cally: the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security while maintaining nuclear deterrence; the signing threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against which traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use WMDs. of a new treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) between the United States and Russia; and pursuit of ratifi cation of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty (CTBT)[6] by the U.S. government. This in turn encouraged the international community to take initiatives towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In April 2010, the presidents of the United States and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to replace START I, which was put into effect in February 2011.[7] In addition, in June 2013, President Obama made a speech in Berlin in which he announced his intention to negotiate with Russia on the reduction of the number of U.S. deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third, among other cuts.[8] The United Kingdom also stated in the Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) in October 2010 that the country would decrease the number of its nuclear warheads.[9] In the area of “nuclear security” which addresses terrorism activities that utilize nuclear and other radioactive materials, in April 2010, the fi rst Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C. The Summit adopted a Communiqué stating that measures should be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, among other matters. The second Nuclear Security The United States, the then Soviet Union (now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China acceded to the NPT in 1992. Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith. As of June 2016. South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. After North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, it pledged that it would remain a contracting state to the NPT. However, North Korea again declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. In the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted in September 2005, North Korea pledged to return to the NPT at an early date. Nonetheless, North Korea subsequently announced the implementation of four nuclear tests. North Korea’s nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT. Adopted in 1996, this treaty bans all nuclear test explosions regardless of the location. Of the 44 nations that are required to ratify it for the treaty to enter into force, 8 nations have not yet ratifi ed the treaty (United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, and North Korea). Brunei ratifi ed the CTBT in January 2013, Chad in February 2013, Guinea-Bissau and Iraq in September 2013, Congo in September 2014, and Angola in March 2015. The United States participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2011, following on from 2009 which marked the fi rst time in 10 years that the United States participated in the Conference. The treaty stipulates that both countries would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 by seven years following the treaty’s entry into force. In April 2016, the United States reported that it had 1,481 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 741 deployed delivery vehicles, while Russia reported that it had 1,735 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 521 deployed delivery vehicles. These numbers are as of March 1, 2016. Regarding this proposal, Russia explained its position that all elements impacting strategic stability including missile defense, space weapons, and non-nuclear strategic weapons need to be taken into consideration, and that negotiations concerning the further reduction of strategic nuclear weapons require a multilateral framework involving all countries that have nuclear weapons. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (NSS-SDSR2015) unveiled in November 2015 also affi rmed that there was no change in the United Kingdom’s nuclear warhead ----- Summit that was convened in Seoul in March 2012 adopted the Seoul Communiqué, which incorporates issues to be addressed by the international community to achieve nuclear security, such as the management, transportation, and illicit traffi cking of nuclear materials, as well as nuclear forensics.[10] The third Nuclear Security Summit that was held in The Hague in March 2014 adopted a Communiqué, which included a statement that went so far as to say that the leaders encourage countries to minimize their stocks of highly enriched uranium and to keep their stockpile of separated plutonium to the minimum level, both as consistent with national requirements. The fourth Nuclear Security Summit that was held in Washington, D.C. in March-April 2016 **2 Biological and Chemical Weapons** Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at relatively low cost and are easy to disguise as most materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. For example, water purifi cation equipment used to desalinate sea water can be exploited to extract bacteria for the production of biological weapons, and sodium cyanide used for the process of metal coating can be abused for the production of chemical weapons.[12] Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states and non-state actors, such as terrorists, seeking asymmetric means of attack.[13] Biological weapons have the following characteristics: (1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive; (2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset; (3) their use is hard to detect; (4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects; and (5) they can cause mass casualties and injuries depending adopted a Communiqué outlining the need for continuous efforts to prevent nuclear materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors. The fact that the international community has begun to make steady and major strides towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation contributes to improving the international security environment, and is a welcome development. In contrast, China is deemed to have increased its inventory of nuclear warheads as well as developed and deployed their means of delivery,[11] and thereby, continued to enhance the capability of its nuclear forces. It has been pointed out that initiatives for reducing nuclear weapons involving China will be needed in the future. on the circumstances of use and the type of weapon.[14] As has been pointed out, advancements in life science could be misused or abused for the development of biological weapons. In view of these concerns, in November 2009, the United States established guidelines[15] on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. The guidelines set out that the United States would take measures to ensure the thorough management of pathogens and toxins.[16] As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun, and sarin[17] in the Iran-Iraq War. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds.[18] It is believed that other chemical weapons[19] that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds.[20] In August 2013, sarin was used in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, where Syrian troops clashed with antigovernment groups.[21] The Syrian government denied using chemical weapons, but 10 Nuclear forensics aims to provide evidence for the prosecution of perpetrators of illicit traffi cking or malicious use, through identifi cation of the source of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials. 11 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2 for China’s ballistic missile development. 12 The export of related dual-use items and technologies that can be used to develop and produce these biological and chemical weapons is controlled by the domestic laws of member states, including Japan, pursuant to an agreement of the Australia Group, a framework for international export control. 13 They refer to means of attack to strike an adversary’s vulnerable points and are not conventional means. They include WMDs, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks. 14 Then Japan Defense Agency, “Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons” (January 2002). 15 In November 2009, the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats was released. It presents guidelines on responding to the proliferation of biological weapons and their use by terrorists. In the State of the Union Address in January 2010, President Obama said that the United States was launching a new initiative to respond promptly and effectively to bioterrorism and infectious diseases. 16 U.S. Executive Order (July 2, 2010). 17 Mustard gas is a slow-acting blister agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents. 18 It has been reported that a chemical weapons attack against a Kurdish village in 1988 killed several thousand people at once. 19 Iraq joined the CWC in February 2009. 20 A weapon in which two types of relatively harmless chemicals that serve as ingredients for a chemical agent are contained separately within the weapon. It was devised so that the impact of the fi ring of the weapon or other action mixes the chemical materials in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and thereby synthesis of the chemical agent. Binary rounds are easier to store and handle than weapons containing chemical agents from the outset. ----- entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in line with an agreement between the United States and Russia. Subsequently, international efforts have been underway for the overseas transfer of chemical agents and other measures based on the decisions made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)[22] and a U.N. Security Council resolution.[23] In August 2014, the operation to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons on the U.S. Navy transport vessel Cape Ray was completed.[24] Furthermore, OPCW has indicated that ISIL,[25] which is gaining strength in Iraq and Syria, may have utilized chlorine gas against Iraqi forces.[26] In this connection, in August 2015, the U.N. Security Council **3 Ballistic Missiles** Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering WMDs, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Once launched, ballistic missiles follow an orbital fl ight trajectory and fall at a steep angle at high speed. As such, effectively countering them requires a highly advanced interceptor missile system. The deployment of ballistic missiles in a region where armed confl ict is under way runs the risk of intensifying or expanding the confl ict. Additionally, it has the risk of further heightening tension in a region where military confrontation is ongoing, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, ballistic missiles are used as a means of attacking from a distance or threatening another country that has superior conventional forces. adopted a resolution that establishes a Joint Investigative Mechanism of the U.N. and OPCW to identify users of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war, and investigation is under way. North Korea is an example of a country that is still presumed to possess these chemical weapons and which has not entered into the CWC. Furthermore, the Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained in a mail item in February 2004, showed that the threat of the use of WMDs by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities. In recent years, along with the threat of ballistic missiles, analysts have pointed to the threat of cruise missiles as a weapon which is comparatively easy for terrorists and other non-state actors to acquire and which has the potential for proliferation.[27] Because cruise missiles are cheaper to produce compared to ballistic missiles and are easy to maintain and train with, many countries either produce or modify cruise missiles. At the same time, it is said that cruise missiles have a higher degree of target accuracy and that they are diffi cult to detect while in fl ight.[28] Moreover, because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and present a serious threat if they carry WMDs in their warheads.[29] 22 (The 33rd and 34th) meetings of the Executive Council of OPCW. 23 U.N. Security Council Resolution 2118. 24 According to the OPCW, 600 tons of Category 1 extremely toxic chemical materials, including sarin and VX gas, were disposed of (August 19, 2014, Statement by the OPCW Director-General). In addition, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported to the Security Council that 97.8% of Syria’s chemical weapons have been disposed of as of October 22, 2014 (Letter dated October 27, 2014 from the U.N. SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the Security Council). 25 See Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1 for ISIL. 26 On February 10, 2015, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü formally acknowledged that Iraqi authorities had notifi ed the OPCW of ISIL’s use of chlorine gas against Iraqi soldiers in October 2014. In November 2015, the OPCW noted that at least two people were exposed to mustard gas close to Aleppo in Syria in August 2015. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 refers to ISIL’s contribution to this incident, and assesses that non-state actors are using chemicals in warfare in Syria. 27 In the July 2006 confl ict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel. Israel announced in March 2011 that it had uncovered six anti-ship cruise missiles among other items on cargo ships subject to inspection. 28 United States Congressional Research Service, “Cruise Missile Proliferation” (July 28, 2005). ----- **4 Growing Concerns about Transfer and Proliferation of WMDs and Other Technologies** Even weapons that were purchased or developed for selfdefense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred WMDs and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and attempt to offset this with WMDs. Some of these states that seek WMDs do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and furthermore, due to their weak governance, terrorist organizations are active in their countries. Therefore, it is conceivable that in general, the possibility of actual use of WMDs would increase. Moreover, since it is uncertain whether such states can effectively manage the related technology and materials, there is a concern that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states with high likelihood. For example, there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies would use a dirty bomb[30] as a means of terrorist attack so long as they gain access to radioactive materials. Nations across the world share concerns regarding the acquisition and use of WMDs by terrorists and other non-state actors.[31] The proliferation of WMDs and other related technologies has been noted in numerous instances. For example, in February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, mainly uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists in Pakistan. It has also been suggested that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear activities.[32] Furthermore, there has been signifi cant transfer and proliferation of ballistic missiles that serve as the means of delivery of WMDs. The former Soviet Union and other countries exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In addition, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles are believed to be based on North Korea’s Nodong missiles. Further still, it has been suggested that North Korea conducted missile-related trade with Syria and Egypt until recently.[33] The international community’s uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of WMDs and other technologies has put signifi cant pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading some of them to accept inspections by international organizations or abandon their WMD and other programs altogether.[34] Meanwhile, it is pointed out that, in recent years, states of proliferation concern have sustained their proliferation activities by averting international monitoring, through illicitly exporting WMDs and other technologies overseas by falsifying documentation, diversifying transport routes, and utilizing multiple front companies and intermediaries. Additionally, intangible transfer of technology has arisen as a cause for concern. Namely, states of proliferation concern have obtained advanced technologies which could be adapted for the development and manufacturing of WMDs and other technologies via their nationals—researchers and students who have been dispatched to leading companies and academic institutions in developed countries.[35] Following North Korea’s nuclear test and ballistic missile launches in January and February 2016, the U.N. Security Council adopted a new resolution in March 2016 containing sanctions banning the export and import of all items that could contribute to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and furthermore, preventing the provision of technical training related to nuclear and ballistic missiles to North Korean nationals. 30 Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive materials. 31 Based on these concerns, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which sets forth the decision that all U.N. member states would refrain from providing support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use WMDs and their means of delivery, as well as adopt and enforce laws that are appropriate and effective for prohibiting these activities. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007. 32 DNI “Worldwide Threat Assessment” from January 2014 states, “North Korea’s assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor (destroyed in 2007) illustrates the reach of the North’s proliferation activities.” The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of May 2011 states that the destroyed reactor was very likely a nuclear reactor that Syria should have declared to the IAEA. 33 The February 2016 report of the Panel of Experts of the U.N. Security Council Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee states North Korea attempted to export principal components of liquid propellants and replacement parts likely for Scuds, to Syria and Egypt until recently. 34 Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 between Libya and the United States and the United Kingdom. In December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its WMDs and to allow an international organization to carry out inspections. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratifi ed the IAEA Additional Protocol. Meanwhile, after the military activity against Libya by a multinational force, in March 2011, North Korea denounced the military attacks against Libya, saying that attacking after disarmament was an “armed invasion.” 35 The February 2016 report of the Panel of Experts of the U.N. Security Council DPRK Sanctions Committee states that over the past 20 years since 1996, North Korea has dispatched more than 30 engineers to the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacifi c, which receives technical support from the U.N. Offi ce for Outer Space Affairs. These engineers participate in research programs concerning topics such as satellite communications, space science and atmospheric chemistry, and satellite navigation systems. The report notes that such knowhow regarding space science and satellite ----- **5 Iran’s Nuclear Issues** Since the 1970s, Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that its nuclear-related activities are for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, Iran’s covert construction of facilities including a large-scale uranium enrichment plant was exposed by a group of dissidents. Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors recognized Iran’s breach of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. In September 2009, it was revealed that Iran had failed to abide by the reporting duties based on the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and was constructing a new uranium enrichment plant near Qom in central Iran. Moreover, in February 2010, Iran began enriching uranium to increase the enrichment level from below 5% to up to around 20%, saying that the reason was to supply fuel to a research reactor for medical isotope production. In December 2011, Iran started the enrichment process at the above-mentioned new enrichment plant.[36] The IAEA has expressed concerns that these Iranian nuclear activities may have military dimensions including those related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.[37] The IAEA notes that it has been unable to obtain confi rmation that the activities are for peaceful use purposes since Iran has not permitted IAEA personnel to access military facilities, which are suspected to have been involved in the experiments using high explosives, and has not offered other necessary cooperation to dispel these concerns. The international community expresses strong concerns, saying that there lacks concrete proof of Iran’s claim that it had no intent to develop nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities were for peaceful use purposes. The international community has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities through a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions[38] and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. Regarding this issue, the United States and the EU have taken individual measures to strengthen sanctions against Iran. In December 2011, the United States enacted a bill that would prohibit foreign fi nancial institutions, which conduct signifi cant transactions with the Central Bank of Iran or other Iranian fi nancial institutions, from opening or maintaining bank accounts in the United States. The EU started to ban imports of Iranian crude oil and petrochemical products in January 2012. Iran, meanwhile, started negotiations with the IAEA towards resolving pending problems. In April 2012, Iran resumed talks with the EU3+3 (United Kingdom, France, Germany, United States, China, and Russia) on its nuclear program, but no major progress was made under the former Ahmadinejad administration. However, with Hassan Rouhani winning the presidential election in Iran in June 2013, the discussions with the EU3+3 were advanced under the new administration with the consent of the supreme leader, Ali Hosseini Khamenei. This resulted in the announcement of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) towards the comprehensive resolution of nuclear issues in November 2013. The execution of the fi rst step measures of the JPOA commenced in January 2014.[39] On April 2, 2015, consultations held in Lausanne, Switzerland resulted in an agreement regarding the key parameters of the fi nal agreement. On July 14, 2015, the fi nal agreement concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was announced in Vienna. Following this, on July 20, 2015, U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 approving the 36 The IAEA Director General estimated in a report published in February 2014 that Iran had so far produced a total of 447 kg of enriched uranium with a concentration of around 20%, out of which the country had stored 160 kg in the form of uranium hexafl uoride. Furthermore, the IAEA Report by the Director General released in May of the same year contend that in accordance with the fi rst step measures elaborated later, Iran diluted to less than 5%, or converted into oxide, a total of approximately 409 kg of uranium hexafl uoride enriched up to 20%. Uranium 235 with a concentration of 20% or more is defi ned as highly enriched uranium, which is generally used for research purposes. If this substance is used for weapons, a concentration ratio is usually 90% or greater. 37 In November 2011, the IAEA published a report describing possible military aspects of Iran’s nuclear program in detail by referring to information regarding the explosion of high explosives. 38 U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1696 adopted in July 2006, UNSCR 1737 in December 2006, UNSCR 1747 in March 2007, UNSCR 1803 in March 2008, and UNSCR 1929 in June 2010. 39 First step measures include the limited relaxation of sanctions by the EU3+3, provided that for six months, Iran: (1) retains half of its current inventory of enriched uranium with a concentration of approximately 20% as oxide and dilutes the remaining half to less than 5%; (2) does not enrich uranium to a level of 5% or greater; (3) does not make any further advances of its activities conducted in uranium enrichment ----- JCPOA was adopted. In the agreement, it was decided that Iran would reduce its enriched uranium stockpile and number of centrifuges, ban the production of weapons grade plutonium, and accept IAEA inspections, among other measures, in exchange for the suspension or lifting of the sanctions based on previous U.N. Security Council resolutions and the U.S., EU, and other countries’ nuclear-related sanctions.[40] In response, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in October 2015, strongly criticized the Iranian nuclear agreement for making war more likely. In the United States, while the Republican Party that makes up the majority of Congress had been opposed to the agreement, the motion of disapproval was not supported by at least two-thirds of both the House of Representatives and the Senate necessary to override the President’s veto. Thus, the disapproval of the agreement was avoided. Subsequently, the JCPOA was adopted on October 18, 2015, 90 days after the Security Council resolution was adopted. On January 16, 2016, the IAEA released a report confirming Iran’s completion of the necessary preparatory steps to start the implementation of the JCPOA. Accordingly, the United States suspended its nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. In addition, the EU terminated some of its sanction and lifted the sanctions imposed by previous U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the nuclear issues of Iran, in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. 40 The major nuclear-related restrictions on Iran in the JCPOA include the following: with regard to uranium enrichment, limiting the number of centrifuges for uranium enrichment to 5,060 or less, keeping the level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and restricting Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg; and with regard to plutonium production, redesigning and rebuilding the Arak heavy water reactor to not produce weapons grade plutonium and shipping spent fuel out of Iran, and not engaging in reprocessing spent fuel including R&D and not constructing reprocessing facilities. According to U.S. Secretary of State Kerry, with this agreement Iran’s breakout time (the time it takes to manufacture nuclear fuel for a single nuclear weapon) will be extended from 90 days or less before the JCPOA to a year or more. ----- **Section 3** **Maritime Trends** Maritime security is of critical importance to Japan, a maritime nation surrounded by sea. For example, Japan relies on sea transport to import energy resources. Accordingly, ensuring secure sea lanes is vital for the survival of the nation. Securing the stable use of one **1 Trends Related to the “Principle of the Freedom of the High Seas” in the East and South China Seas** The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides for the principles of “freedom of navigation in the high seas” and “freedom of overfl ight over the high seas.”[2] Nevertheless, in the waters and airspace in the periphery of Japan, especially the East and South China Seas, it has become increasingly common for countries to unilaterally assert their rights or take actions, based on their unique assertions which are incompatible with the existing international law and order. This has caused situations of undue infringement upon such principles. Numerous cases of acts which go against the principle of freedom of the high seas have been recently seen in the East China Sea. In March and April 2011 and in April 2012, Chinese helicopters and other aircraft apparently of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) fl ew close to Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) destroyers which were engaged in monitoring and surveillance in the East China Sea. In January 2013, a Chinese naval vessel directed its fi re-control radar at a MSDF destroyer navigating in the East China Sea and is suspected to have directed fi re-control radar at a helicopter carried onboard a MSDF destroyer. In May and June 2014, fi ghters of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China fl ew abnormally close to aircraft of the MSDF and of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force which were fl ying over the East China Sea. In June 2016, a Chinese fi ghter is speculated to have conducted a dangerous act by approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea. On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government declared “the East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone (ADIZ)” including the Senkaku Islands as if they of the global commons, the “seas,” is a key security issue for the international community. In recent years, maritime trends in the countries concerned are drawing attention, including their compliance with relevant international norms.[1] were a part of China’s “territory.” China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that it would enforce rules it set on any aircraft fl ying in the ADIZ and that the PLA would take “defensive emergency measures” if aircraft does not follow the instructed procedures. Japan is deeply concerned about such measures, which are profoundly dangerous acts that unilaterally change the status quo in the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may cause unintended consequences in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the measures unduly infringe the freedom of overfl ight over the high seas. Japan is demanding China to revoke any measures that could go against the principle of freedom of overfl ight over the high seas. The United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, and the EU have expressed concern about China’s establishment of such zone. Such actions have been seen in the South China Sea. In March 2009, Chinese ships, including a naval vessel, a maritime research ship of the SOA, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries’ patrol ship, and fi shing vessels, approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. In addition, in December 2013, a Chinese naval vessel cut across the bow of a U.S. Navy cruiser operating in the South China Sea at point blank range. In August 2014, a Chinese fi ghter is speculated to have fl own abnormally close to and obstructed a U.S. Navy patrol aircraft over the South China Sea. In May 2016, Chinese fi ghters are speculated to have fl own abnormally close to a reconnaissance aircraft of the U.S. Navy over the South China Sea.[3] These cases go against the principles of freedom of navigation in the high seas and freedom For example, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) comprehensively sets forth the rights and obligations under international law related to the use and development of the oceans and their regulations. UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994 (Japan ratified it in 1996). UNCLOS, Article 87, Paragraph 1 (a) and (b). Some analysts have noted that these incidents occur as many countries including the United States regard an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as being equivalent to the high seas based on UNCLOS from the perspective of freedom of navigation, whereas China views EEZs as areas similar to territorial waters. It is considered that the United States respects the provisions of UNCLOS while it has not concluded the ----- of overfl ight over the high seas, and are dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences.[4] Additionally, China, on the grounds of the so-called “nine-dash line”[5] whose validity under international law has been described as ambiguous, has asserted sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, among other areas, and friction between China and ASEAN member states and other countries has surfaced over issues including sovereignty. Against this backdrop, China went ahead with land reclamation on multiple features on a rapid and massive scale, as well as proceeded to develop bases such as runways, harbors, and radar facilities without ruling out their use for military purposes. Furthermore, Chinese government vessels have obstructed fi shing and other vessels of countries approaching the features, etc. by fi ring warning shots and water cannons at the vessels. Claimants as well as the international community including the United States have repeatedly said they are deeply concerned about China’s unilateral changes of the status quo, further advancement of efforts to create a fait accompli, and assertive and dangerous acts that could cause unintended consequences. Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans, in recent years progress has been made on efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the sea. In April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, reached agreement on the Code for **2 Trends in the Arctic Ocean** The Arctic Ocean, which covers most of the Arctic Region, borders Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway.[8] In recent years, decrease in sea ice has increased the potential for utilization of the Northern Sea Route and exploration of natural resources. For these reasons, the Arctic states have been more proactively promoting efforts to secure their interests in resource development Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).[6] CUES sets forth a code of conduct for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of each country. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notifi cation of military activities, as well as on rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with UNCLOS, CUES, and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. In addition, the Fourth Joint Working Group Consultation and the Fifth Joint Working Group Consultation were held in January and June 2015, respectively, with a view to implementing the “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between Japan-China Defense Authorities”[7] for averting incidental collisions between Japan and China. Additionally, the two countries confi rmed that they would aim to quickly make this mechanism operational at the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting on the margins of the Third ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting plus (ADMM Plus) held in Malaysia in November 2015. It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international law and order, and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that heighten tension and act on the basis of the principle of the “rule of law.” See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3 (China); Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6 (Southeast Asia) and use of the sea route. On the other hand, there are unresolved issues among the Arctic states over the demarcation of maritime boundaries based on UNCLOS and extension of the continental shelf. It is considered that some of these Arctic states including Russia are promoting efforts to deploy new military capabilities for the purpose of securing their interests and defending their territories. Traditionally, the Arctic Ocean has been According to the written testimony of U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacifi c Security Affairs David Shear before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations dated May 13, 2015, the United States has enhanced its presence in and around the South China Sea to protect U.S. national interests in the South China Sea, such as peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation in the high seas, and freedom of overfl ight over the high seas. For example, U.S. military forces are conducting port calls of naval vessels, carrying out ISR activities, and exercising with neighboring countries. In addition, the U.S. Forces conduct the Freedom of Navigation Operations to counter China’s excessive claims over maritime interests. See Paragraph 3 of this section for more details (Maritime Security Efforts of Countries). See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea). CUES sets forth safety procedures and notifi cation methods for unplanned encounters at sea by the naval vessels and air force aircraft of participating countries of the WPNS. CUES is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties. During the Fourth Joint Working Group Consultation, the two sides agreed to coordinate on the mechanism’s naming to “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism” in order to clarify its coverage of aircraft. The Arctic Region is the area north of the latitude line of 66 degrees 33 minutes north latitude. There are eight countries in the Arctic Region – the fi ve countries that border the Arctic Ocean and Finland, Sweden, and Iceland that do not border it. In 1996, the Arctic Council was established, which aims to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the indigenous ----- used for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces and as their transit route. In addition, due to the decrease of sea ice, ships can navigate for a longer period of time and in wider areas than before. In this regard, the region could be used for deploying maritime forces or maneuvering military forces using the maritime transport capabilities of military forces in the future. Therefore, strategic importance of the region is increasing. In the Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy revised in December 2015, Russia continues to maintain that Russia would secure its interests in resource development and use of the sea route. Russia has been actively involved with the Arctic, underpinned by Russia’s possession of the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) among the coastal states, the potential abundance of resources in the waters of the Arctic Ocean, the geographic and security importance of the Northern Sea Route located off the coast of Russia, and Russia’s military superiority ensured by the deployment of military forces directly facing the Arctic Ocean coast.[9] In the Arctic Strategy released by the U.S. DoD in 2013, the United States expresses its desire for the Arctic to become a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. In March 2016, the U.S. Navy hosted Ice Exercise 2016, a roughly fi ve-week exercise designed to conduct research, tests, and evaluations of operational capabilities in the **3 Maritime Security Efforts of Countries** With regard to oceans, not only for economic development but also for the national security of each country, it has become even more important to promote appropriate rulemaking and to make concerted efforts by the international community to address risks and ensure freedom of navigation while respecting such rules. “Open and Stable Seas” constitute the basis for peace and prosperity of the international community as a whole. In this regard, each state has been tackling on its own or with others various issues including piracy, unidentifi ed vessels, illegal dumping, contraband, human smuggling, maritime disasters, and the removal of hazardous substances, for maintaining the stability of sea lanes of communication. Arctic. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Norway also participated in the exercise.[10] Aside from coastal states in the Arctic Ocean, 12 countries including Japan and China have observer status in the Arctic Council. Notably, China has shown active involvement in the Arctic Ocean, deploying the polar research vessel Xue Long to the Arctic Ocean for six times since 1999.[11] In August 2015, it was confi rmed for the fi rst time that fi ve Chinese naval vessels sailed in the Bering Sea between the Arctic Ocean and the Pacifi c. Focus will be on whether or not such activities would have any relation to the Chinese Navy’s future advancements into the Arctic Ocean. **1** - United States The U.S. National Security Strategy unveiled in February 2015 presents that the United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation and the safety and sustainability of the maritime environment, and therefore, would maintain the capability to ensure the free fl ow of commerce, to respond quickly to those in need, and to deter those who might contemplate aggression. Since around May 2015, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over China’s reclamation of features in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, underpinned by the U.S. position of supporting the principles of rule 9 See Part I, Chapter 1, Section 4 “Russia” regarding the Northern Joint Strategic Command in charge of the Arctic, the deployment and training of the Northern Fleet vessels, the development of military facilities, strategic patrols by strategic nuclear submarines, patrol fl ights by long-range bombers, and large-scale exercises and trainings in the Arctic. 10 Since 1958, the U.S. Forces have conducted over 26 exercises in the Arctic involving submarines (as of March 2016). As regards activities of other coastal nations, Canada states that the Arctic is a priority region under its policies in Canada’s Northern Strategy (released in 2009), and every summer since 2007, has conducted the Operation NANOOK joint exercise among the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Special Operations Forces Command designed to strengthen the capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. Denmark and Norway have also developed the Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011-2020 (released in 2011) and the Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy (released in 2006), respectively, which outline their stances of attaching importance to the Arctic, including the perspective of security. 11 In 2012, Xue Long became the fi rst polar research vessel to sail across the Arctic Ocean. In 2013, a cargo vessel Yong Sheng became the fi rst Chinese commercial ship to cross the Arctic Ocean. Currently, ----- of law and freedom of navigation.[12] In August 2015, the DoD released the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, indicating U.S. intentions to have the U.S. Pacific Command maintain a robust presence in and around the South China Sea and engage in wide-ranging activities including trainings, exercises, and port calls with allies and partners, and to have the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard conduct Freedom of Navigation operations[13] as part of routine activities. Based on this policy, in order to counter excessive claims over maritime interests asserted by coastal states in the South China Sea, the United States sent the U.S. Navy missile destroyer USS Lassen to navigate within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Spratly Islands in October 2015. In January 2016, the United States sent the U.S. Navy missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur to navigate within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island of the Paracel Islands, and in May 2016, sent the U.S. Navy missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence to navigate within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef of the Spratly Islands. In this manner, the United States has consistently made clear that it would continue its Freedom of Navigation operations. Additionally, the United States deems that its safety and economic security depend upon the secure use of the world’s oceans, and that the United States has a vital interest in maritime security. Based on this recognition, the United States leads the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)[14] to counter piracy and advance maritime safety, including tackling terrorism in waters surrounding the Middle East and Africa, such as the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. In waters surrounding Central America, the United States conducts operations to counter illicit trafficking, primarily drug trafficking with European and Western Hemisphere countries.[15] The United States thus dispatches vessels to the various sea areas of the world and takes actions to combat piracy, organized crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). - 2 NATO NATO has the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, which are a multinational, integrated force made up of vessels from member countries. Through routine exercises and maintenance of rapid deployment capability, NATO has provided deterrence in the sea to member countries. In response to the threat of piracy, NATO has deployed vessels of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. In Operation Ocean Shield that NATO has been conducting since August 2009, NATO’s mission is to carry out counterpiracy activities by boat, as well as to help countries that requested it build up their capacities to counter piracy. NATO also identifies acts of terrorism as a threat to its member countries. Following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO has conducted Operation Active Endeavour since October 2001 and has been implementing counter-terrorism activities, including maritime patrols in the Mediterranean Sea, as part of the collective defense pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Furthermore, in February 2016, NATO decided to deploy the Standing NATO Maritime Groups to the Aegean Sea to deal with the large influx of refugees and migrants, and notifies information regarding refugee boats to Greek and Turkish authorities. In January 2011, NATO unveiled the Alliance Maritime Strategy. The advancement of globalization has facilitated terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs. Based on this recognition, the Strategy outlines NATO’s intention to carry out efforts to ensure its contribution to deterrence, crisis management, collective defense, maritime security, among other areas. These efforts include: (1) deepening cooperative relations with appropriate countries and international actors, such as the EU and the United Nations; and (2) developing fully capable, flexible, rapidly deployable, interoperable, and sustainable maritime forces. The Wales Summit Declaration adopted at the NATO Summit in September 12 The United States has expressed concerns about China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea and repeatedly hinted at the possibility of conducting a Freedom of Navigation Operation. For example, the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015” unveiled in May 2015 referred to China’s land reclamation in the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, in May 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter expressed concerns about the pace and scope of land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and stated that the United States would sail, fly, and operate wherever international law allows to protect freedom of navigation and overflight. In September 2015, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs David Shear testified at a Congress hearing that the United States was considering conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations. In the same month, President Obama stated at his press conference following talks with President Xi Jinping that “the United States will continue to sail, fly, and operate anywhere that international law allows.” 13 The Freedom of Navigation Operations are operational activities conducted by the U.S. Forces for countering excessive claims over maritime interests asserted by coastal states to protect the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all states under international law. It is deemed that the Operations have been conducted on an ongoing basis since 1979. 14 CMF is a multinational force, which operates to promote maritime security, stability, and prosperity, under the U.S. Central Command. Forces from 31 countries participate in CMF, and the CMF Commander concurrently serves as the Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. CMF is comprised of three combined task forces: Combined Task Force 150 (CTF-150), which is tasked with maritime security operations; Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) with counter piracy operations; and Combined Task Force 152 (CTF-152) with maritime security operations in the Persian Gulf. The Japan Self-Defense Forces deploy units to CTF-151. 15 Fourteen European and Western Hemisphere countries, including the United States, conduct Operation Martillo to combat illicit trafficking, including the trafficking of narcotics, precursor chemicals, bulk cash, and weapons, as well as organized crime along the sea areas surrounding Central America. From the U.S. Forces, Joint Interagency Task Force South under the U.S. Southern Command carries out the operation. ----- 2014 states that NATO would continue to intensify and expand its implementation of the measures outlined in the Strategy, and further enhance the Alliance’s effectiveness in the maritime domain. - 3 EU security is synonymous with the advancement and protection of the United Kingdom’s national interests, at home and abroad. Based on this recognition, the Strategy identifies objectives, such as promoting a secure international maritime domain and upholding international maritime norms, developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance, and assuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes. To these ends, the Strategy lists measures, including: (1) attain a comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain through the use of information resources across departments and agencies, among other means; (2) work closely with maritime partners through championing regional initiatives as a proponent of freedom of navigation; (3) share information with partners and support capacity-building efforts in areas of strategic importance; and (4) coordinate joint operations between maritime departments and agencies and seek to procure common equipment. In the NSS-SDSR2015[19] released in November 2015, it was decided that the United Kingdom would introduce nine P-8 patrol aircraft to strengthen maritime patrol capabilities. - 5 France With many of its member states facing the ocean, the EU has high maritime traffic and economic activity in the sea. To date, the EU has actively engaged in counterpiracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in order to maintain maritime stability.[16] In June 2014, the European Council adopted the EU Maritime Security Strategy, for purposes including presenting a framework for the development of the maritime policies of EU member states and protecting the strategic maritime interests of the countries. The Strategy construes piracy, terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, and restrictions to the freedom of navigation as threats. It sets forth comprehensive, cross-sectoral, coherent, and efficient approaches to maritime security, including: (1) promote rules-based good governance at sea; (2) promote coordination amongst member states and with other international organizations and partners; and (3) enhance the role of the EU as an actor that conducts conflict prevention, crisis response, and management of maritime interests. - 4 United Kingdom France, with its many overseas territories, is deemed to have the second largest EEZ in the world. About 62% of this EEZ is in the Pacific region, and about 24% is in the Indian Ocean. France attaches importance to its maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacific, identifying itself as “a sovereign power and a player in the security of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific” in the White Paper on Defence and National Security. The French Armed Forces station their units in French territories, including Polynesia and New Caledonia, and deploy frigates, landing ships, and other equipment. “France and Security in the Asia-Pacific,” which the Ministry of Defense released in April 2014, underscores that France is a maritime nation and has participated in various regional cooperation forums on maritime issues.[20] It then outlines France’s intention to build strong partnership relations with Asia-Pacific countries.[21] The United Kingdom is an island nation surrounded by sea, and has a heritage of engaging actively in maritime activities, including maritime trade. Furthermore, the United Kingdom has many overseas territories and has an EEZ which extends about 25 times the U.K. terrestrial extent. Due to these factors, the United Kingdom proactively deploys its forces to NATO-and EU-led multinational forces[17] in order to ensure the maritime security of the sea areas surrounding the United Kingdom, including its overseas territories, and by extension, the seas of its neighboring countries. In May 2014, the U.K. government released the U.K. National Strategy for Maritime Security.[18] The United Kingdom considers that ensuring maritime 16 The EU has conducted the counter-piracy operation Operation Atalanta in this sea area, which became the EU’s first maritime mission, since December 2008. Vessels and aircraft that countries deploy escort ships, conduct patrols in these waters, among other activities. 17 The United Kingdom rotationally deploys forces to Operation Ocean Shield organized by NATO and Operation Atalanta organized by the EU. The headquarters of both operations are located at the Northwood Maritime Command Headquarters in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also deploys forces to CMF-led operations. 18 This Strategy is a strategy document released jointly by four departments: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office; the Home Office; the Ministry of Defence; and the Department for Transport. 19 See Chapter 1, Section 8-5 regarding the NSS-SDSR2015. 20 France has actively taken part in such forums as the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and the South Pacific Defence Ministers’ Meeting. 21 For example, France and India have established a strategic partnership. They conduct joint exercises among their land, naval, and air forces, respectively, and have equipment cooperation. In addition, France ----- the military in Djibouti. Additionally, China supports the construction of port infrastructure in Indian Ocean countries. In this regard, China is likely aiming to build bases for conducting operations in the Indian Ocean and other areas. Meanwhile, in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN member states have conflicting assertions over the sovereignty of such areas as the Spratly Islands[27] and the Paracel Islands.[28] In recent years, the countries concerned, including China, have stepped up their activities to assert their sovereignty. Developments associated with the freedom of navigation in the sea have been subject to increasing international concern. - 8 Southeast Asia - 6 Australia Australia’s Defence White Paper unveiled in 2016 considers the security of sea lanes as a strategic defense interest, along with the security and resilience of Australia. Especially as Australia depends on maritime trade with Southeast Asia and maritime trade transiting Southeast Asia, Australia sees a need to ensure the security of trade routes in the country’s proximate waters and in Southeast Asia. Based on this policy, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) conducts patrol activities called “Operation Gateway” in the North Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, which includes establishing a base at the Butterworth airbase in Malaysia.[22] The ADF also engages in expanding naval cooperation with India, providing patrol vessels to South Pacific countries,[23] and conducting coastal patrols by mobilizing ADF assets. - 7 China Southeast Asia is located at the crossroads of traffic, linking the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. This region, however, has maritime security issues, including disputes over the sovereignty of the South China Sea and piracy. In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)[29] aimed at peacefully setting the issues over the South China Sea. Currently, official consultations are held with a view to establishing the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). The COC is deemed to contain more specific content than the DOC and be legally binding. In addition, there have been developments related to settling issues through arbitral proceedings set out in UNCLOS. Furthermore, there have been developments related to settling issues through arbitral proceedings set out in UNCLOS. In January 2013, the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCLOS for the dispute between the Philippines and China over its assertions and actions in the South China Sea, and the Philippines presented oral arguments in July and November 2015. The arbitral tribunal ruled that it has jurisdiction with respect to the matters raised in some of the Philippines’ submissions, and in July 2016, rendered a final award in China also relies on sea transport for over 90% of its trade cargo.[24] Accordingly, ensuring the security of China’s sea lanes constitutes a critical part of the “basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development,”[25] one of China’s “core interests.” Therefore, as a member of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),[26] China shares information and participates in cooperative arrangements related to piracy in Southeast Asia. Since December 2008, China has deployed naval vessels to off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden and has been involved in international efforts to repress piracy. Through such activities, China has contributed to ensuring maritime security. China’s commitment to ensuring the security of its sea lanes is also considered to be connected to the Chinese Navy’s objective of building up capacity for continuous operations in more distant waters. In particular, China and Djibouti, a country facing the Gulf of Aden, have agreed that China would build facilities for providing logistics support to 22 In December 2015, the Australian Department of Defence admitted that as part of these activities, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft conducted patrol activities in the South China Sea from November to December. This was preceded by the BBC’s release of the content of the radio communications that allegedly took place between RAAF aircraft and China’s Navy, claiming that Australia was carrying out “freedom of navigation” flights in the South China Sea. 23 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 5-3-4. 24 According to the website of the Central People’s Government of China, over 90% of China’s export and import cargo, such as crude oil, iron ore, food, and container, are transported by sea. 25 Then State Councilor Dai Bingguo, “China will unswervingly follow path of peaceful development” (December 7, 2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China website). 26 As of May 2016, the contracting parties to ReCAAP are the following 20 countries: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; China; Denmark; India; Japan; the ROK; Laos; Myanmar; the Netherlands; Norway; the Philippines; Singapore; Sri Lanka; Thailand; United Kingdom; United States; and Vietnam. 27 The area surrounding the Spratly Islands is expected to have offshore resources such as oil and natural gas. In addition, the area is a maritime transport hub and is blessed with rich fishery resources. 28 China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei assert sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam assert sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. ----- which nearly all of the Philippines’ submissions were ruled in favor of the Philippines.[30] This award will be legally binding on both parties, and will be final and without appeal. Moreover, Vietnam, another claimant, has requested the tribunal to take into consideration Vietnam’s assertions over the South China Sea. In this regard, there has been a trend among some countries concerned to work towards a peaceful solution of the issue in accordance with international law. In the Southeast Asia region, multilateral cooperation has also made progress to deal with wide-ranging security issues, including piracy and other transnational issues. With regard to counter-piracy measures, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand conduct the Malacca Strait Patrols.[31] Efforts have also been under way to share information related to piracy and build a cooperation arrangement in accordance with ReCAAP. See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-4 (Trends concerning Sovereignty and Other Issues over the South China Sea) 30 See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 6-4, Footnote 52. 31 The Malacca Strait Patrols are comprised of: the Malacca Strait Sea Patrols which commenced in 2004 by the navies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to monitor piracy and other activities in the Malacca ----- **Section 4** **Outer Space and Security** **1 Outer Space and Security** Nearly 60 years have passed since a satellite was launched into outer space for the fi rst time in the history of mankind. In recent years, technology leveraging outer space has been applied to various areas. No state is allowed to own outer space, and it is freely available to all nations. Major countries thus make proactive efforts to use outer space.[1] For example, meteorological and observation satellites are used to observe weather as well as land and waters; communication and broadcasting satellites are used for the Internet and broadcasting; and positioning satellites are used to navigate aircrafts and ships. These satellites have widely prevailed in social, economic, scientifi c, and other areas as essential infrastructure for the public and private sectors. In major countries, military forces are actively involved in outer space activities and utilize a variety of satellites. There is no concept of national borders in outer space, meaning that the utilization of satellites enables the observation of, communication at, and positioning on any area on Earth. Thus, major countries make efforts to enhance the capabilities of a variety of satellites and launch them for the purpose of enhancing C[4]ISR functions.[2] Such satellites include imagery reconnaissance satellites reconnoitering military facilities and targets, satellites gathering radio wave information for military communications, communication satellites for military communication, and positioning satellites for navigating naval vessels and aircraft and enhancing the precision of weapons systems. On the other hand, in January 2007, China conducted a test to destroy its aging satellite with a ground-launched missile. The resulting space debris[3] spread across the satellite’s orbit, and came to be seen as a threat against space assets such as satellites owned by countries. Furthermore, countries including China and Russia are thought to also be developing anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) that do not directly hit and destroy a satellite by a missile, creating less space debris. For example, it has been noted that ASATs under development include an ASAT that approaches the target satellite using a “killer satellite” and utilizes a robot arm to capture the target satellite to disable its functions, as well as an ASAT that disables the functions of the target satellite by using a jammer to interfere with communications between the target satellite and the ground station. Against this backdrop, since existing frameworks, including the Outer Space Treaty that prescribes the exploration and use of outer space, do not have provisions on avoiding the destruction of space objects and actions triggering space debris, international efforts have been under way recently for the creation of the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities[4] proposed by the EU and the guidelines for “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities”[5] of the Scientifi c and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which address such matters. Moreover, countries are working on the Space Situational Awareness (SSA)[6] by monitoring the impact of accelerated solar activity on satellites, electronic equipment on Earth and threats caused by meteors reaching Earth, in addition to threats posed by anti-satellite weapons and space debris to space assets. As the above illustrates, the risk to the stable use of outer space has become one of the critical security challenges countries face. See>> Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-6 (Responses in Space) The Outer Space Treaty (The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) that came into force in October 1967 defi nes such matters as the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes, the freedom in principle of exploration and use of outer space, and the prohibition of ownership. However, no clear international agreement has been reached on the defi nition of outer space, though according to one of the concepts, outer space is considered space located 100 km or further away from the Earth’s surface. The term “C[4]ISR” stands for command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The 1991 Gulf War is considered “the fi rst high-tech war conducted in outer space in the history of mankind.” Unnecessary artifacts orbiting around the Earth, including satellites no longer in use, upper stages of launch vehicles, parts, and fragments. In 2008, the EU formulated a draft and started bilateral discussions with major countries. Discussions have been made multilateral since 2012 and have been ongoing with a view towards its adoption. In 2007, the chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (U.N. COPUOS) proposed to discuss “the long-term sustainability of outer space activities” in relation to civil space activities, for the purpose of defi ning risk reduction for long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. Based on this proposal, the Scientifi c and Technical Subcommittee of U.N. COPUOS set up a working group, which carries out discussions every year for establishing the guidelines. However, a fi nal agreement has not been reached due to political disputes and a divergence of views over the adoption method of the guidelines. In August 2015, Gen. John E. Hyten, Commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, stated, “Total number that we track is about 23,000 objects...we expect to be tracking 250,000 to 500,000 objects ii ----- **2 Trends in the Use of Space by Countries for Security Objectives** - 1 United States The United States launched its fi rst satellite, Explorer 1, in January 1958, following the satellite launches by the former Soviet Union. The country has since then proceeded with a variety of space activities in fi elds including military, science, and resource exploration, such as launching the world’s fi rst reconnaissance satellite and landing on the Moon. Today, the United States is the world’s leading space power. The U.S. Forces clearly recognize the importance of outer space for their actions, and in this regard, actively utilize outer space for security purposes. In June 2010, the United States released the National Space Policy that presents the country’s basic guidelines for space policy, including its objectives and principles. It specifi ed guidelines on security space, civil space, commercial space, and international cooperation, among other sectors. In February 2011, the country also released the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) as the security guideline regarding outer space, presenting the view that the current and future outer space environment is driven by three trends: (1) congestion caused by artifi cial objects including satellites; (2) contestation by potential adversaries; and (3) increasing competition with other countries.[7] Based on these strategic guidelines, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is presently undertaking efforts to identify threatening activities in outer space and increase the survivability of U.S. space systems to achieve the goal of maintaining and strengthening U.S. space superiority for security purposes, recognizing that the United States needs to prepare for the possibility of confl ict extending into outer space.[8] From an organizational perspective, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is responsible for non-military space development in the United States, while the U.S. DoD works on space development from a national security perspective. Recently, NASA and the U.S. Air Force announced cooperation in areas such as aircraft design and materials development. Major satellites used for military purposes include satellites for imagery reconnaissance, early warning, electronic / signals intelligence, communication, and global positioning, and their operations are wide-ranging. - 2 Russia Russia’s space activities have been continuing since the former Soviet Union era. The former Soviet Union successively launched multiple satellites after it launched the fi rst satellite in the history of mankind, Sputnik 1, in October 1957, and had the largest number of launched satellites in the world until the end of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The satellites included many military satellites, which enabled the country to compete against the United States for military expansion in outer space. Russia’s space activities have declined since the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. However, the country has recently started to expand its activities once again against the backdrop of its economic recovery. Regarding the country’s trends in security, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, approved in December 2015, states that the U.S. deployment of weapons into outer space constitutes one of the factors undermining global and regional stability. The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, a document created in February 2010 to specifi cally defi ne the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military fi eld,[9] mentions that securing supremacy in outer space is one of the decisive factors in achieving the objectives of its armed forces. It also states that the tasks of the armed forces include providing timely warning to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of an air or space attack and deploying and maintaining space systems supporting the activities of the Russian Armed Forces. In addition, it refers to the need to establish air-space defense organizations. From an organizational perspective, the Roscosmos State Corporation for Space Activities is in charge of space activities related to Russia’s scientifi c and economic areas, while the Russian Ministry of Defence is involved in space activities for security purposes. The Russian Based on this understanding, the NSSS identifi es that the U.S. strategic objectives for outer space are to: (1) strengthen safety, stability, and security in outer space; (2) maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by outer space; and (3) energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security. To meet these objectives, the NSSS states that the country will pursue the strategic approaches of (1) promoting responsible, peaceful, and safe use of outer space, (2) providing improved U.S. outer space capabilities, (3) partnering with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial fi rms, (4) preventing and deterring aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security, and (5) preparing to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment. For these efforts, the DoD’s FY2017 budget request related to space appropriated approximately US$7.1 billion, 1.4% more than the FY2016 approved budget. It is considered that, for example, next-generation GPS systems and next-generation Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communication satellites that were newly included in the development budget are not easily impacted by adversaries’ sabotage activities. ----- Aerospace Forces[10] conducts actual space activities for military purposes, manages facilities for launching satellites, among other activities. Major satellites launched by Russia are satellites for imagery reconnaissance, early warning, radio wave information gathering, communication, positioning, and others, all of which are presumed to be used for security purposes. Currently, Russia is developing a new Angara carrier launch vehicle,[11] along with building a new launch site in Vostochny in the Far East.[12] - 3 Europe It is thought that in the future, “Galileo,” a satellite positioning system planned by the EU and the ESA;[15] “Copernicus,” a global environment and security monitoring program;[16] and the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS),[17] a reconnaissance satellite project implemented by the European Defence Agency (EDA),[18] will be utilized for security in Europe. - 4 China China began work on space development in the 1950s. In April 1970, the county launched its first satellite “Dong Fang Hong I,” mounted on the transportation launch vehicle “Long March 1,” using technology enhanced through its missile development. China has thus far conducted activities such as manned spaceflight and lunar rover launches. It is speculated that China’s space development is intended to enhance national prestige and develop space resources. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development published by the Regarding European outer space activities, France succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1965, following the former Soviet Union and the United States, and the United Kingdom succeeded in launching its own satellite for the first time in 1971. Italy and Germany used launch vehicles developed by the United States to own satellites in December 1964 and July 1965, respectively. On the other hand, the European Space Agency (ESA)[13] Convention signed in May 1975 established the ESA, which launched a satellite in 1979. In Europe, the EU, the ESA, and European countries are promoting their own unique space activities and are helping each other to implement space activities.[14] The ESA signed a “framework agreement” with the EU in May 2004 to specify that they will collaborate to proceed with space development and hold regular minister-level council meetings. The joint council meeting held by the ESA and the EU in May 2007 approved the “European Space Policy.” The “European Space Policy” mentions improving synergy effects between space activities for civil and defense purposes, and the importance of implementing space activities based on coordinated efforts among member states and ensuring an internationally competitive space industry. The Policy identifies security as one of its areas of priority. 10 According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Aerospace Forces were created by merging the Air Force and the Aerospace Defence Forces, and started performing its tasks in August 2015. The tasks of the Aerospace Forces include: (1) providing focused combat command to the air force; (2) conducting aerial and missile defense; (3) launching and controlling satellites; (4) warning about missile attack; and (5) monitoring of outer space. 11 In July 2014, the first launch of “Angara-1.2PP” was conducted successfully. In December 2014, “Angara-A5” successfully put a dummy satellite into orbit for the first time. The Angara launch vehicle is considered as the first large launch vehicle that Russia developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is expected that the vehicle will be launching commercial as well as military satellites. 12 The new launch site is being built to replace the Russian-leased Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, and Russia aims to have the site fully operational by 2020. The first launch vehicle was launched in April 2016. 13 The ESA was established in May 1975 based on the ESA Convention targeting to establish a single European space organization focusing on the peaceful use of space research, technology, and application areas. The organization was formally established in October 1980. 14 In September 2000, the European Commission (EC) and the ESA created the European Strategy for Space that committed to pursuing Europe’s coherent and effective space activities. The strategy envisioned that the EC would make political and strategic decisions on space policies and that ESA would function as the implementing organization. For the satellite positioning system “Galileo” currently in operation and the environmental and security monitoring program “Copernicus,” the EU and ESA are complementing each other in carrying these projects forward, with the former mainly taking charge of the policy dimension and the latter the technical dimension. 15 The launch of fully capable operational satellites began in 2014. This system consisting of 30 satellites in total is expected to start service by 2020. Galileo reportedly has 12 satellites in orbit as of January 2016. 16 New observation satellites called “Sentinels” are being launched to collect imagery necessary for conducting Earth observations. Sentinels are classified according to their purpose into 1 (all-weather satellite that takes images of land and ocean), 2 (all-weather satellite capable of high-resolution land monitoring to provide imagery of vegetation, inland waterways, and coastal areas), and 3 (satellite measuring landand sea-surface temperature and topography). Two Sentinels are said to be in orbit as of January 2016. 17 The MUSIS was started by Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Italy, and Spain. The organization was joined later by Poland in December 2010. This is a joint project succeeding such projects as “Helios 2” (a French military reconnaissance satellite), “Pleiades” (a French Earth imaging satellite used for military and civilian purposes), “SAR-Lupe” (a German group of military radar satellites), and “COSMO-SkyMed” (an Italian constellation of Earth observation satellites). ----- State Council of China positions manned spaceflight,[19] lunar exploration,[20] and high-resolution Earth observation systems as specific critical projects in the aerospace area. Along with these medium- and long-term plans, “China’s Space Activities in 2011,” a space white paper published by China in December 2011, clarifies the country’s major challenges, policies, and international cooperation projects for the coming five years and emphasizes the peaceful use of space. With regard to the organizational setup, the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the State Council, oversees industries related to space, nuclear technology, aviation, ships, and weapons. The China National Space Administration enforces the administrative control of the space area for civil and commercial purposes and represents the Chinese government externally. In the meantime, it is regarded that China is also using space for information collection, communications, and positioning for military purposes.[21] Recently, the Air Force indicated its intention to make proactive use of space.[22] Since September 2015, China has publicized a series of its decisions on military reforms, and in January 2016, the establishment of the Strategic Support Force was announced. While the details of the Force’s tasks and organization have not been revealed, it is suggested that it is in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare. China’s defense white paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015) states that outer space is a commanding height in strategic competition among all parties. Meanwhile, China asserts that its activities in outer space constitute “peaceful use of outer space,” and underscores that China is “opposed [to] the weaponization of and arms race in outer space, and [will take] an active part in international space cooperation.” China also commits to “[keeping] abreast of the dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and secure its space assets.” In addition, China is developing new models of its “Long March” carrier launch vehicle series,[23] and completed a new launch site in Wenchang, Hainan Province which became China’s fourth launch center.[24] This launch center faces the ocean unlike China’s other launch sites and is located furthest south. In this regard, some observers note that the launch site allows launches to be conducted with a high degree of freedom.[25] Carrier launch vehicles are developed and manufactured by Chinese state-owned enterprises, which are thought to be also developing and manufacturing ballistic missiles. It is expected that China will pursue space development through close collaboration between the public sector, military, and private sector. Additionally, China is considered to have become one of the space powers through investments, research and development, and introduction of technologies from the United States and other countries. It has been suggested that China could threaten U.S. information superiority in outer space in the future.[26] Moreover, China continues to develop ASATs. In January 2007, China conducted a test using a ground-launched missile that destroyed its own satellite. In July 2014, China tested an anti-satellite missile not involving the destruction of a satellite.[27] It is also suggested that China is developing directed-energy weapons,[28] including “killer satellites,” jammers, and laser beams. - 5 India India’s space development promotes space programs aimed at social and economic development in line with the 5-year national plan. The country’s latest 12th Five 19 China launched “Tiangong-1,” a space laboratory, in September 2011 and succeeded in docking it with an unmanned spacecraft, “Shenzhou 8,” in November 2011 and with the manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 9” and “Shenzhou 10” in June 2012 and June 2013, respectively. In this regard, China is considered to have acquired the technologies needed for its space station construction project. 20 The State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense landed the lunar explorer “Chang’e-3” on the moon in December 2013. 21 By December 2012, the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System officially started its services covering most of the Asia-Pacific region. It is reported that the BeiDou system has already started to be mounted on navy vessels, government vessels belonging to maritime law enforcement agencies, fishing boats, among other vessels. BeiDou offers not only positioning services but also interactive short message features. It is suggested that these features make it possible to centrally capture and share, in real time, the position and other data related to vessels of other countries that Chinese navy vessels have detected, and improve information gathering capabilities on the ocean and other areas. 22 In April 2014, Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, inspected an Air Force agency and made reference to building an air force that “integrates air and space capabilities and balances offensive and defensive operations.” 23 In September 2015, China succeeded in its first launch of Long March-6 (for launching small satellites) and Long March-11 (for launching solid-fuel small satellites). Furthermore, China is developing Long March-5 (for launching large satellites) and Long March-7 (for launching “Shenzhou”). It is deemed that China has plans to develop Long March-9 (for launching ultra-large satellites). 24 In September 2014, China announced that the launch center was already ready for launching vehicles. In June 2016, the first launch of Long March-7 was conducted successfully. China plans to conduct the first launch of Long March-5 from this launch center in September or October 2016. 25 The launch center enables discarded stages of the launch vehicle, such as the first stage launch vehicle, to fall into sea rather than into Chinese or other countries’ territories. It is thus suggested that the launch center eliminates the restrictions on launches. In addition, latitudes close to the equator at which a launch vehicle can take advantage of the force of the Earth’s rotation are generally considered favorable for launches into a geostationary orbit and other launches. 26 According to the annual report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission of November 2015. 27 The February 2016 “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence notes that in July 2014, China tested an anti-satellite missile not involving the destruction of a satellite. In addition, it states that China has satellite jamming capabilities and is making progress on an anti-satellite system. 28 According to the U.S. DoD’s “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” of May 2015, China continues to develop a variety of capabilities, including l ----- Year Plan[29] focuses on non-military projects including communication, positioning, Earth observation (e.g., disaster monitoring, resource exploration, and weather observation), transportation systems, space science, and spinoff promotions. The Indian Space Commission (ISC) determines the country’s space policy under the leadership of the Prime Minister and assumes responsibility for preparing space development budgets and implementing space development programs. The Department of Space, managed by the ISC, oversees the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), which implements space development policy, develops and launches launch vehicles, and develops and manufactures satellites. In the area of space development cooperation with other countries, India and the United States, for example, reached agreement on future space development cooperation at the bilateral summit meeting in January 2015. The two countries are expected to cooperate on SSA and other dimensions. India reportedly launches remote sensing[30] satellites also for security purposes. Additionally, the country plans to launch positioning satellites,[31] implement planetary explorations, and conduct manned spaceflight.[32] - 6 Republic of Korea promoted space development projects in accordance with the Space Development Promotion Act (enacted in May 2005).[33] The ROK carries out space activities based on the three key plans it established in November 2013, namely: the “Mid- and Long-Term Plan for Space Development (2014-2040),”[34] which plans to move up the first launch of launch vehicles manufactured by the ROK[35] to June 2020;[36] the “Space Technology Industrialization Strategy,” which prompts the private sector to lead space development; and the “Revision of the Korean Rocket Development Plan,” which outlines the use of ROKmade launch vehicles and the ROK’s own development of planetary and space exploration satellites and high orbit satellites. On the security front, the ROK’s Defense White Paper published in December 2012 states that the ROK would secure a space surveillance system and other mechanisms for developing the Air Force into an aerospace force, and establish a Satellite Surveillance Control Group in order to secure air and space operational capabilities. On the organizational front, the ROK has the National Space Committee, which deliberates major issues related to space development under the leadership of the President; and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, which leads research and development as an implementation agency. Furthermore, the Korea Agency for Defense Development is engaged in the development and use of various satellites. Major satellites launched by the country include imagery reconnaissance and communication satellites launched using foreign launch vehicles. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is considered to have started full-scale space development by creating the first “Mid- and Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development (1996-2015)” in 1996. In recent years, the country has 29 The 12th Five-Year Plan covers the period between April 2012 and March 2017. 30 Technology enabling the observation of the size, shape, and nature of an object from a distance without making physical contact with the object. 31 In April 2016, India succeeded in launching the seventh satellite constituting the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), which completed the deployment of the constellation. 32 In December 2014, the ISRO succeeded in the test launch of a large launch vehicle carrying an unmanned capsule. 33 The Act stipulates that the country create a mid- and long-term basic plan every five years and an execution plan for each fiscal year, and establishes the National Space Committee. Based on this Act, the country established the “1st Basic Space Development Promotion Plan” and the “2nd Basic Space Development Promotion Plan” in June 2007 and December 2011, respectively. 34 This is a modified version of the “2nd Basic Space Development Promotion Plan.” 35 In January 2013, for the first time on its third attempt, the ROK successfully launched the “Naro” launch vehicle (KSLV-1) that was developed under a technical cooperation agreement with Russia. ----- **Section 5** **Trends in Cyberspace** **1 Cyberspace and Security** Owing to the advancement of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, information and communications networks such as the Internet have become essential components across all facets of life. Meanwhile, cyber attacks[1] against critical infrastructures, namely, information and communications networks, have the potential to seriously impact the lives of individuals. Types of cyber attacks include functional interference, data falsifi cation, and data theft caused by unauthorized access to information and communications networks or through the transmission of viruses via e-mail, as well as functional impairment of the networks through simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data. Internet-related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks[2] becoming more sophisticated and skillful by the day. For military forces, information and communications form the foundation of command and control, which extend from central command to ground-level forces. In this regard, ICT advancements are further enhancing the **2 Threats in Cyberspace** Under such circumstances, cyber attacks have frequently been carried out against the information and communications networks of government organizations and military forces of various countries.[4] dependence of units on information and communications networks. Furthermore, military forces rely on various social infrastructures, including electricity, to execute their missions. Accordingly, cyber attacks against such social infrastructures could become a major impediment to their missions. For this reason, cyber attacks are regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of adversaries by exploiting the weaknesses of an adversary’s forces. It is believed that many foreign military forces are developing offensive capabilities in cyberspace. In addition, actors attempting to cause harm to nations, etc. have all realized that attacking through cyberspace is often easier than attacking directly using physical means.[3] Moreover, it is said that the information and communications networks of countries are being compromised for the purpose of gathering intelligence. As more confi dential information begins to be stored in cyberspace, cyber espionage through cyber attacks is causing more serious damage. As such, cybersecurity has become one of the most important security issues for countries. Some of these cyber attacks are said to involve a range of organizations including China’s PLA, intelligence agencies, security agencies, private hacker groups, and companies.[5, 6] According to the defense white The targets of cyber attacks are wide-ranging. Beginning with large targets, they range from global-level targets, including interstate targets, as well as nations and government institutions, local communities, business communities and infrastructures, companies, and individuals. As such, it is said that measures to counter cyber attacks need to be optimal relative to the size of the target. In the Japanese MOD’s “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace” of September 2012, cyber attacks are characterized as follows: (1) diversity: cyber attacks involve diverse actors, methods, objectives, and context; (2) anonymity: actors can easily conceal and disguise their identity; (3) stealth: some cyber attacks are diffi cult to identify and can take place without causing any realization of damage; (4) offensive dominance: attack tools are easy to acquire depending on the tool, and it is diffi cult to completely eliminate software vulnerabilities; and (5) the diffi culties of deterrence: retaliatory strikes and defensive measures have minimal deterrence effect. According to the “Cybersecurity National Action Plan” unveiled by U.S. President Obama in February 2016. According to the U.S. Offi ce of Management and Budget’s “Annual Report to Congress: Federal Information Security Management Act” (February 27, 2015), the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) recorded that in FY2014 there were 69,851 incidents of cyber attacks against the U.S. government, and that a total of 640,222 incidents of cyber attacks were reported to US-CERT, including attacks against government agencies and companies. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016 names Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and non-state actors as threat actors to cyberspace, expressing the opinion that, for example: (1) Russia is assuming a more assertive cyber posture based on its willingness to target critical infrastructure systems and conduct espionage operations; (2) China continues to conduct cyber espionage against the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies, and uses cyber attacks against targets it believes threaten Chinese domestic stability or regime legitimacy; (3) North Korea is likely capable and willing to launch disruptive or destructive cyber attacks to support the achievement of its political objectives; (4) Iran conducts information theft, propaganda, and cyber attacks to support its security priorities, infl uence the situation, and counter threats; and (5) ISIL targeted and released sensitive information about U.S. Forces personnel as a new tactic to spur “lone-wolf” attacks. See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1 “Situation in Syria and Iraq” regarding the ISIL’s use of cyberspace. “APT 1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units,” released in February 2013 by Mandiant, a U.S. information security company, concludes that the most active cyber attack group targeting the United States and other countries is Unit 61398 under then Third Department of the PLA General Staff Department. The report also states that then Third Department of the General Staff Department, which constituted the cyber unit, had 130,000 personnel. The Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015) notes that the Chinese government supports large-scale cyber espionage and has stolen information from private companies and the U.S. government. The report states that China seeks to acquire offensive capabilities, identifying space and cyberspace as strategically vital realms, and is capable of standing up to ----- paper “China’s Military Strategy” (May 2015),[7] China will accelerate efforts to build up its cyber capacity. Furthermore, it has been suggested that cyber warfare units have been formed under the Strategic Support Force that was created as part of China’s military reforms[8] in late December 2015. In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that officers in “Unit 61398,” the cyber attack unit of the Chinese PLA, and others were indicted, alleging that they conducted cyber attacks against U.S. companies.[9] In June 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) became a target of a cyber attack in which, as it later came to light, personal information of about 22 million people including U.S. federal employees and U.S. Forces personnel were stolen. While Chinese involvement in this attack is also suggested,[10] China denies government involvement and explains that it was a “crime” involving Chinese hackers. Additionally, in July 2014, the Canadian government alleged that it was a target of a Chinese cyber attack, mentioning China by name for the first time.[11] As regards China’s intention behind these cyber attacks, it is suggested that the Chinese PLA and espionage services steal information from U.S. companies and feed that back into Chinese companies as part of the national strategy to win economically.[12] In October 2014, the White House’s unclassified information system was hacked.[13] In December 2015, a large-scale power outage occurred in Ukraine.[14] It is said that Russia was involved in these attacks. It has been pointed out that the Russian military, intelligence and security agencies, and other organizations engage in cyber attacks.[15] Furthermore, the Russian military is considered to be establishing its own cyber command, which will be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including inserting malware into enemy command and control systems.[16] It has been indicated that such Russian activities reflect objectives including: (1) intelligence gathering to support Russian decision-making on the issues of Ukraine and Syria; (2) operations to support military and political objectives; and (3) continuing preparation of the cyberspace environment for future contingencies.[17] In March 2013, cyber attacks hit broadcasting stations and financial institutions in the ROK. In June and July 2013, cyber attacks hit the ROK President’s Office, government agencies, broadcasting stations, and newspaper companies. In addition, a cyber attack against the Seoul subway system has been reported. The ROK government has stated that the tactics used in these incidents were the same as those used in past cyber attacks by North Korea.[18] Furthermore, from November to December 2014, a U.S. film company was hit with cyber attacks. In December 2014, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that there was 7 The defense white paper notes that, “Cyberspace has become a new pillar of economic and social development, and a new domain of national security,” “As international strategic competition in cyberspace has been turning increasingly fiercer, quite a few countries are developing their cyber military forces,” and China is “one of the major victims of hacker attacks.” 8 Since September 2015, China has publicized a series of its decisions on military reforms, and in January 2016, announced the establishment of the Strategic Support Force and other units. While the details of the Force’s tasks and organization have not been revealed, it is suggested that it is in charge of outer space, cyber, and electronic warfare. 9 On May 19, 2014, James Comey, FBI Director, stated that, “For too long, the Chinese government has blatantly sought to use cyber-espionage to obtain economic advantage for its state-owned industries.” On the same day, the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China asserted that the United States “fabricated facts” and announced that China has decided to suspend the activities of the Cyber Working Group established under the framework of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. 10 See the Annual Report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (November 2015). In addition to this attack, the report states that a U.S. airline company was attacked by the same method used in the attack against the U.S. OPM. 11 According to a Canadian government release dated July 2014. 12 According to Dennis F. Poindexter’s testimony at the hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in June 2015. The Commission’s Annual Report (November 2015) notes that the technology sectors of China’s strategic emerging industries, such as high-end manifacturing equipment, next-generation IT, new materials, and biotechnology, have become a target of interest for Chinese hackers’ activities. 13 In October 2014, the Washington Post reported that hackers with alleged Russian government involvement conducted the cyber attack. 14 In February 2016, the New York Times reported that there were doubts about the involvement of the Russian military with which Ukraine is in a standoff over the annexation of Crimea and other matters. 15 “Cyberwarfare: An Analysis of the Means and Motivations of Selected Nation States,” released in November 2004 by Dartmouth College’s Institute for Security, Technology, and Society (currently the Institute for Security, Technology, and Society), pointed out the possible involvement of the Russian military, intelligence, and security agencies in cyber attacks. 16 According to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” at the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015. 17 According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” (February 2016). 18 The ROK Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) announced in its press releases in April and July 2013 the result of an investigation made by the joint response team of public-private-military collaboration (composed of 18 organizations including the MSIP, the Ministry of National Defense, the National Intelligence Service, and domestic security companies). MSIP is a central government agency overseeing administration related to science and technology policies and ICT. This agency was established in March 2013 by transferring science and technology tasks handled by the Ministry of Education, ----- suffi cient evidence to conclude that the North Korean government was responsible for these cyber attacks.[19] It has been suggested that North Korean government organizations are involved in such cyber attacks[20] and that North Korea is training personnel on a national scale.[21] It is considered that these cyber attacks are conducted for political purposes.[22] Stuxnet, a malware designed to attack industrial control systems (ICS) was discovered in June 2010, followed by discoveries of advanced malware on multiple occasions.[23] Cyber attacks on the information and communications networks of governments and militaries,[24] as well as on critical infrastructure signifi cantly affect national security. As there have been allegations of involvement of government organizations, Japan must continue to pay close attention to developments related to threats in cyberspace. **3 Initiatives against Cyber Attacks** Given these growing threats in cyberspace, various initiatives are under way at the overall government level and the ministry level, including defense ministries.[27] A number of issues have been raised that need to be dealt with to allow for an effective response to cyber attacks, which have become a new security challenge in recent years. For instance, it is regarded that the international community has diverging views concerning the fundamental matters of cyberspace, including how Meanwhile, in Japan, the Japan Pension Service was a target of a cyber attack in May 2015, which led to the leak of the personal information of pension recipients and policyholders. Hacker groups and others have also carried out cyber attacks against Japanese government agencies and companies. In addition, supply chain risks, such as companies supplying products embedded with deliberately and illegally altered programs, have been also pointed out.[25] Furthermore, it has been suggested that the rise in devices that connect to the Internet, including “smart” devices incorporated into household appliances, can increase network complexity, and that private infrastructures and government systems could become more vulnerable, including to malicious attacks aimed at causing malfunctions to systems equipped with artifi cial intelligence.[26] international law applies. It is suggested that countries have clashing claims, with the United States, Europe, and Japan calling for maintaining a free cyberspace, while many countries including Russia, China, and emerging countries call for strengthening national control of cyberspace. Against this backdrop, there has been a movement to promote the rule of law in cyberspace in the international community. In August 2015, a UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) released a 19 The FBI presented the following three items as evidence. (1) The malware used in this cyber attack was similar to malware that North Korean actors previously used. (2) North Korean Internet protocol (IP) addresses were hardcoded into the data deletion malware. (3) The tools used in the attack had similarities to a cyber attack in March 2013 against ROK broadcasting stations and fi nancial institutions, which was carried out by North Korea. 20 In November 2013, ROK media outlets reported that the ROK National Intelligence Service made revelations about North Korean cyber warfare capabilities in the national audit of the Information Committee of the National Assembly, and that Kim Jong-un, First Secretary of the Korea Workers’ Party of North Korea, stated that, “Cyber attacks are omnipotent swords with their power paralleled with nuclear power and missiles.” In the U.S. Department of Defense’s “2015 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” published in February 2016, it is stated that North Korea has an offensive cyber operations capability. The 2014 Defense White Paper published by the ROK in January 2015 notes that North Korea has concentrated on boosting its cyber unit to nearly 6,000 personnel. 21 For example, a North Korean defector association in the ROK, “NK Intellectual Solidarity,” held a seminar entitled “Emergency seminar on cyber terrorism by North Korea 2011” in June 2011, and presented material entitled “North Korea’s cyber terrorism capabilities,” explaining that North Korean organizations conducting cyber attacks were supported by government agencies employing superior human resources from all over the country, giving them special training to develop their cyber attack capabilities. 22 According to U.S. Director of National Intelligence Clapper’s written testimony on “Worldwide Cyber Threats” to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in September 2015. 23 Stuxnet was the fi rst virus program confi rmed to target control systems with specifi c software and hardware incorporated. It is also pointed out that it has abilities to access targeted systems without being detected and to steal information or alter systems. The discovery of various malware has also been reported: “Duqu,” discovered in October 2011; “Flame” in May 2012; “Gauss” in June 2012; and “Shamoon” in August 2012. 24 CyberBerkut, a Ukrainian pro-Russian group, carried out cyber attacks against multiple websites of NATO in March 2014 and against the websites of the German government and the German parliament, the Bundestag, in January 2015. In June 2015, the “Syrian Electronic Army” attacked and hacked the U.S. Department of Defense’s Army website. Furthermore, in November 2015, the international hacker group “Anonymous” announced that it attacked accounts linked to ISIL over the terror attacks in Paris. As these examples demonstrate, there are also frequent cyber attacks by hacker groups. 25 In October 2012, the U.S. House Information Special Committee published an investigation report, entitled “Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE.” The report advised that products manufactured by Huawei Technologies and Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment (ZTE) (major Chinese communications equipment manufacturers) should not be used, due to their threats to national security based on strong concerns over China’s cyber attack capabilities and intentions targeting critical U.S. infrastructure, as well as opaque relations between Chinese major IT companies and the central government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the PLA augmenting supply chain risks. A similar move has been taken by other countries, including France, Australia, Canada, India, and Taiwan. Some countries, including the United Kingdom and the ROK, have issued warnings. 26 According to the U.S. Director of National Intelligence’s “Worldwide Threat Assessment” of February 2016. 27 Generally, the trends at the governmental level are thought to include the following: (1) organizations related to cybersecurity that are spread over multiple departments and agencies are being integrated, and their operational units are being centralized; (2) policy and research units are being enhanced by establishing specialized posts, creating new research divisions and enhancing such functions; (3) the roles of intelligence agencies in responding to cyber attacks are being expanded; and (4) more emphasis is being given to international cooperation. At the level of the defense ministry, various measures have been ----- report containing recommendations on how to apply the principles of international law to acts using cyberspace and on voluntary, non-binding norms of state behavior.[28] See>> Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-7 (Response to Cyber Attacks) - 1 The United States States faces serious cyber threats, noting that state[29] and non-state actors intend to carry out destructive cyber attacks against U.S. networks, as well as steal U.S. military technology information. In this light, the DoD has set out the following three primary missions in cyberspace: (1) defend the DoD networks, systems, and information; (2) defend the United States and its interests against cyber attacks of significant consequence; and (3) provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations.[30] Additionally, the DoD states that the aforementioned cyber capabilities include cyber operations to disrupt an adversary’s militaryrelated systems. From an organizational perspective, U.S. Cyber Command, a sub-unified command of U.S. Strategic Command, oversees the cyber forces of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and manages operations in cyberspace. U.S. Cyber Command has expanded along with the expansion of its missions, and has already established the Cyber Protection Force that operates and defends the information infrastructure of the DoD. In addition, U.S. Cyber Command has created the Cyber National Mission Forces to support U.S. defense against national-level threats, and the Cyber Combat Mission Force that supports the operations conducted by unified combatant commands on the cyber front. These three forces are collectively referred to as the Cyber Mission Force.[31] In February 2016, President Obama unveiled the Cybersecurity National Action Plan. In his FY2017 budget request, the President announced that the budget for cybersecurity investments would be increased significantly, identifying cybersecurity as one of the top national security issues.[32] According to the Cybersecurity National Action Plan, the federal government as a whole will take actions, including establishing the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity and making additional investments in the federal government’s cyber-related technologies, education, and personnel recruitment. The DoD, too, appropriated US$6.7 billion for cyber The International Strategy for Cyberspace released in May 2011 outlines the U.S. vision for the future of cyberspace, and sets an agenda for partnership with other nations and people to realize this vision. The Strategy also points out seven policy priorities. These priorities are the economy, protection of national networks, law enforcement, military, Internet governance, international capacity development, and Internet freedom. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for protecting Federal government networks and critical infrastructure against cyber attacks, and the Department’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) works to protect the networks of government agencies. In the National Security Strategy (NSS) which was released in February 2015, the United States identifies cyber attacks as one of today’s major threats. As regards the Department of Defense’s (DoD) efforts, the QDR published in March 2014 describes that cyber threats, which pose risks to U.S. national interests, are composed of the activities of a variety of actors, including individuals, organizations, and countries, and that unauthorized access to the DoD and industry networks and infrastructure threatens the critical infrastructure of the United States, its allies, and partners. Based on this understanding, the report designated the cyber warfare capabilities of the U.S. Forces as a critical element to be maintained for the defense of the homeland, and spells out that the United States continues to retain and develop the required human resources and enhance cyber forces. With regard to cyber threats, The DoD Cyber Strategy released in April 2015 expresses the view that the United 28 The U.N. GGE on Cyber Issues has continued to hold consultations since 2004, with the participation of experts from a total of 15 countries (a total of 20 countries since the July 2014 meeting), including Japan, the United States, Russia, and China. In its report released in August 2015, the GGE expresses the following views regarding the application of international law to states’ use of ICT, namely, that: (1) states must observe state sovereignty and other principles in their use of ICT; (2) the GGE must note the “inherent right” of states to take measures consistent with international law and as recognized in the U.N. Charter; (3) states must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICT; and (4) states should ensure that their territory is not used by non-state actors to commit such acts. Furthermore, with regard to voluntary norms of state behavior, the report recommends, for example, that a state should not conduct or support ICT activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure. 29 The DoD Cyber Strategy states that Russia and China have acquired advanced cyber capabilities and strategies. It goes on to say that Russian activities are carried out stealthily and their intentions are difficult to discern. The Strategy notes that China steals intellectual property to benefit Chinese companies. Furthermore, it states that while Iran and North Korea do not have developed cyber capabilities, they have displayed an overt level of hostile intent towards the United States and U.S. interests. 30 In order to execute these missions in cyberspace, the DoD presents the following five strategic concepts: (1) build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations; (2) defend the DoD information network and data, and mitigate risks to DoD missions; (3) establish arrangements to defend the United States and its interests from cyber attacks of significant consequence through collaboration with relevant departments and companies; (4) use cyber options to control conflict; and (5) build close cooperative relations with allies and partners. 31 According to a statement made in April 2015 by the commanding officers of U.S. Cyber Command to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, among other sources, the three forces are made up of several teams, and dozens of them are currently operating. Employing the National Guard and reserve units, the Cyber Mission Force is set to have 133 teams (National Mission Teams [13 teams], Cyber Protection Teams [68 teams], Combat Mission Teams [27 teams], Support Teams [25 teams]) and 6,200 personnel by September 2018. ----- operations in its FY2017 budget request, up 15.5% from the FY2016 budget. It includes the budget for developing the readiness of the U.S. Cyber Command, including continuing to organize the Cyber Mission Force, and the budget for improving defensive cyber operation capabilities[33] and offensive cyber operation capabilities.[34] The United States deems that China continues to conduct cyber-enabled theft targeting a broad set of U.S. interests ranging from information related to national security, to sensitive economic information and U.S. intellectual property. In September 2015, U.S. President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed at their summit meeting that the two countries would not conduct cyberenabled theft of intellectual property.[35] In December 2015, the U.S. and Chinese governments held their first ministerial dialogue on cyber issues and reached an agreement regarding the establishment of guidelines for combatting cybercrime, implementation of a tabletop exercise, and establishment of a hotline. - 2 NATO Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) was authorized to serve as NATO’s cyber defense-related research and training institution.[36] Since 2008, NATO has been conducting cyber defense exercises on an annual basis to boost cyber defense capabilities. - 3 The United Kingdom In November 2011, the United Kingdom announced a new “Cyber Security Strategy,” which set goals for the period until 2015 and specified action plans for capability enhancement, establishment of norms, cooperation with other countries, and personnel training. In November 2015, the United Kingdom released the NSS-SDSR2015. It commits to investing £1.9 billion over the next five years in increasing its cyber defense capabilities to strengthen the functions for identifying and analyzing cyberspace threats. It also commits to publishing the second National Cyber Security Strategy in 2016. In terms of organization, the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) was established within the Cabinet Office to form and coordinate cybersecurity strategy for the overall government, as well as the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) under the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to monitor cyberspace. In addition, the Defence Cyber Operations Group (DCOG), which unifies cyber activities within the Ministry of Defence, was established.[37] The “NSS-SDSR2015” released in November 2015 states that the National Cyber Centre would be established under GCHQ, the unit that first responds to cyber attacks, in order to respond swiftly and effectively to cyber attacks. In January 2015, Prime Minister Cameron and President Obama agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of cyber defense.[38] Furthermore, the United Kingdom and China agreed that they would not conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property and other information.[39] In such ways, the United Kingdom is working to deepen its collaboration with other countries. The new NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, and its action plan, which were adopted in June 2011: (1) clarify the political and operational mechanisms of NATO’s response to cyber attacks; (2) clarify that NATO would provide assistance to member states to develop their cyber defense, and provide assistance to member states if they are subject to cyber attacks; and (3) set out principles on cooperation with partners. Furthermore, at the NATO Summit in September 2014, agreement was reached that NATO’s collective defense applies to cyber attacks against member states. As for its organization, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) provides political oversight on policies and operations concerned with NATO’s cyber defense. In addition, the Emerging Security Challenges Division formulates policy and action plans concerning cyber defense. Furthermore, the NATO Cooperative Cyber 33 In March 2016, U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter announced that a pilot program would be launched in April 2016 that would invite private hackers to hack the DoD website in order to study the security weaknesses. Furthermore, the DoD is making innovative efforts to strengthen its defensive cyber capabilities. 34 The U.S. Forces have disclosed that their offensive cyber capabilities are already operational. For example, they place excessive burden on the networks of ISIL aimed at disrupting its chain of command. 35 During the summit meeting, President Obama allegedly expressed deep concerns over China’s cyber attacks and stated that the United States would exercise all possible tools, hinting at the application of economic sanctions. Meanwhile, the two sides agreed that they would hold U.S.-China ministerial dialogues on fighting cybercrime. 36 In June 2013, the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting placed cyber attacks at the top of the agenda for the first time. They agreed to establish an emergency response team and to implement a cyber defense mechanism on a full scale by October 2013. 37 In addition, the U.K. Ministry of Defence announced in September 2013 that it would recruit hundreds of computer experts as reserves working on the front line of British cyber defense, and approved the establishment of the Joint Cyber Reserves. 38 According to a White House release, the U.K. GCHQ and Security Service (SS) and the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will work together closely on cybersecurity and cyber defense. In addition, in November 2015, the U.K. and U.S. governments conducted a joint exercise to strengthen their bilateral cyber cooperation as well as their effective response capabilities to cyber incidents in the financial industry, with the participation of their cyber, financial, and intelligence agencies, among other participants. ----- given its reliance on information networks, and commits to strengthening the Department of Defence’s cyber capabilities and systems. - 5 Republic of Korea - 4 Australia In January 2013, Australia published its first “National Security Strategy,” which positions integrated cyber policies and operations as one of the top national security priorities. In April 2016, a new “Cyber Security Strategy” through 2020 was released, which provides that Australia will ensure the safety of the people, that private companies will participate in cybersecurity, and that threat information will be shared. In terms of organization, the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) that brings cybersecurity capabilities from across the government into a single location was established in November 2014 to respond to major cybersecurity issues related to government agencies and critical infrastructures.[40] In July 2015, the ACSC issued its first report on cybersecurity,[41] which contended that the number, type, and sophistication of cyber threats to Australia are all increasing. In addition, the Defence White Paper released in February 2016 notes that cyber attacks are a direct threat to the Australian Defence Force’s warfighting ability The ROK formulated the “National Cyber Security Master Plan” in August 2011, which clarifies the supervisory functions of the National Intelligence Service[42] in responding to cyber attacks. It places particular emphasis on strengthening the following five areas: prevention, detection, response,[43] systems, and security base. In the national defense sector, the Cyberspace Command was established in January 2010 to carry out planning, implementation, training, and research and development for its cyberspace operations, and currently operates under the direct control of the Ministry of National Defense.[44] In April 2015, to strengthen its measures against cyber attacks, the ROK government established the cybersecurity advisor post at the National Security Office of the President’s Office. 40 The ACSC, comprised of staff from the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Australian Signals Directorate, the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team, and the Defence Intelligence Organisation, analyzes threats in cyberspace and responds to both public and private sector incidents. The ACSC is set to have approximately 300 personnel by 2017. 41 According to the report, adversaries in cyberspace targeting Australia are: (1) foreign government-sponsored adversaries; (2) serious and organized criminals; and (3) groups motivated by certain issues and individuals with personal grievances. 42 Under the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the National Cybersecurity Strategy Council has been established to deliberate on important issues, including establishing and improving a national cybersecurity structure, coordinating related policies and roles among institutions, and deliberating measures and policies related to presidential orders. 43 In February 2014, the ROK Ministry of National Defense reportedly briefed the National Assembly that it planned to develop cyber weapons for attacking other countries. 44 The basic plan for national defense reform (2012-2030) that was submitted to the President in August 2012 by the Ministry of National Defense proposed significant enhancement of cyber warfare capability ----- **Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as well as** **Section 6** **Defense Production and Technological Bases** **1 Military Science and Technological Trends** Recent developments in science and technology, as represented by the dramatic advancement of information and communications technology (ICT), has impacted a variety of areas, triggering signifi cant and revolutionary changes in many areas such as economy, society, and lifestyle. The military is no exception. Developed countries, including the United States, consider that transformations driven by advances in ICT can dramatically improve combat and other capabilities, and therefore, continue to pursue a variety of ICT research and policies. For example, if information on enemy forces collected using information-gathering systems, including reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aircraft, is shared on a network, command and control can be exercised immediately, even from remote headquarters. By extension, offensive power can be directed swiftly, precisely, and fl exibly against targets. Major countries with sophisticated and modernized military forces, including the United States, engage in research and development related to improving the destructive capabilities of weapons, precision guidance technology, information-related technology including C[4]ISR, unmanned technology (e.g. drones[1]), and hypersonic technology[2] to be able to carry out more precise and effective attacks. These countries also place emphasis on R&D activities related to stealth technology[3] for increasing preemptive attacks by improving stealth capacity and reducing the risk of attrition of military power by improved survivability. Recently, reports have been published of successful tests of railguns[4] and high energy laser weapons[5] that are expected to provide effective fi repower compared to existing weapons, such as artillery, in terms of their cost per fi ring, range, precision, promptness, and other aspects. Furthermore, there have been reports about the development of high speed strike weapons (HSSW) that can strike even long-range targets with conventional weapons, quickly and with pinpoint accuracy.[6] As regards the United States, the QDR of the U.S. DoD states that the proliferation of state-of-the-art technologies[7] will transform the mode of warfare. In this vein, the country is conducting R&D of advanced technologies which could become game-changers. Recognizing that the military superiority of the U.S. Forces is gradually eroding in light of recent enhancements in “A2/AD” capabilities of China and other countries, the United States promotes the Third Offset Strategy designed to fi nd new, innovative measures to maintain and increase U.S. superiority. See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-1-4 (Third Offset Strategy) Drones for military use which have been developed include unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), and unmanned maritime vehicle (UMV) (UMVs may be classifi ed into unmanned surface vehicle (USV) and unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV)). It is suggested that these drones could shift from human-operated types to fully autonomous types, as known as Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). In May 2014, an informal meeting of the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) discussed for the fi rst time the humanitarian, legal, and other issues related to the operation of LAWS that automatically kill an enemy without human judgment. These issues were again discussed at a meeting of the high contracting parties to the Convention in November 2014. In January 2016, Gen. Paul Selva, Vice Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, reportedly made the following comment: “that brings us [military] to the cusp of questions about whether we are willing to have unmanned, autonomous systems that can launch on an enemy.” For example, in the United States, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force are engaged in joint research and development of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC), aiming to apply the technology to hypersonic missiles, etc. in the future. HAWC uses the technology of scramjet engine, which enables hypersonic fl ight by taking in air at hypersonic speed and burning it without reducing the speed to below the speed of sound. For example, China and Russia promote the development of weapons using the latest technologies, including the development of next-generation fi ghters deemed to have stealth capabilities as well as new ballistic missiles. It is believed that China is also promoting the development of hypersonic glide weapons in order to attain strike capabilities that would enable China to bypass missile defense networks. (See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2-5, Part I, Chapter 2, Section 4-3-2, and Part I, Chapter 2, Section 3-2-2) A railgun is a weapon that fi res bullets by using the magnetic fi eld generated from electric energy instead of gunpowder. The U.S. Forces have developed a railgun with a range of about 370 km, or about ten times that of the existing 5-inch (127 mm) ammunition. A single railgun shot reportedly costs 1/20th to 1/60th the price of a missile. The U.S. Forces are developing laser weapons to defend against small ships and strengthen low-altitude air defense capabilities, including defense against drones. From September to November 2014, a laser weapon was test fi red onboard the USS Ponce. It is suggested that high energy laser weapons systems would be miniaturized, with a view to placing the weapons also on light mobility vehicles. The cost of a laser shot is reported to be less than US$1. In addition, since July 2015, DARPA and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory have been jointly fi nancing and conducting tests integrating the high energy liquid laser area defense system (HELLADS) and a ground-based laser weapons system demonstrator. Their goal is to continue to carry out tests to make operational improvements and to transition to the testing and military use phase. The goal of the HSSW is to considerably shorten the time required for attack with a conventional weapon. The HSSW is deemed to travel at a low trajectory that is clearly different from the trajectory of ballistic missiles. It is suggested that the United States and China are developing HSSWs. The QDR describes that such technologies include “counter-stealth technology” that used to require large budgets, “automated and autonomous systems as well as robotics” that already have a wide range of commercial and military applications, “low-cost three-dimensional printers” that could revolutionize weapons manufacturing and logistics related to warfare, and “biotechnology breakthroughs” that could make i ----- Recent advances in military science and technology are also largely attributed to the advancement of civil technology. In recent years, as the capabilities of existing equipment are improved and new equipment is developed, dual-use technology has been leveraged frequently. For example, in order to integrate innovative civil technologies into the military sector, the U.S. DoD established the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in 2015 to serve as a bridge between the DoD and the civilian sector. On the other hand, it is expected that countries having diffi culty possessing high-tech forces for technological and economic reasons as well as non-state actors including terrorist organizations will carry out research and development on weapons and other equipment that will enable them to gain superiority in fi ghting against countries with state-of-the-art technology, and illegitimately obtain technology through ICT or other means. In short, these countries and organizations tend to focus on asymmetrical means of attack that can be developed or obtained with relatively low cost, enabling them to attack their opponents’ vulnerability without using conventional military capabilities. These asymmetrical means of attack include: WMDs, such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; ballistic missiles; terrorist attacks; and cyber attacks. As asymmetrical means of attack may spread throughout the world, the research and development of technology[9] that responds to these asymmetrical threats is also recognized as an important challenge. **2 Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases** and technological bases. Western countries have set a target to increase competitiveness through realignment of their defense industry, based on the aforementioned situation related to national defense budgets. The United States has seen repeated mergers and integrations among domestic corporations, while Europe has experienced crossborder mergers and integrations of the defense industry, especially in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.[10] The “Gremlin” unmanned aircraft system under development [U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) website] In this regard, the United States attaches importance not only to alleviating the burden on humans but also to synergistically enhancing equipment capability through human-machine collaboration. For instance, the United States has given the example of deep learning machine technology that uses artifi cial intelligence, which could analyze big data to detect signs of cyber attack and issue alerts, among serving other functions. Furthermore, recent research of the DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have included: research to develop an implantable neural interface that directly connects the human brain and the digital world, enabling quick transfer of vast data; research to develop a small unmanned aircraft capable of launch, recovery, and reuse while airborne called “Gremlin”; and research to develop an unmanned vessel called “Sea Hunter” to detect submarines.[8] Recently, Western countries in particular have continued to face diffi culties in signifi cantly increasing defense budgets. On the other hand, the sophistication of military science and technology and the greater complexity of equipment, as explained in 1 above, have escalated development and production costs and raised unit prices for procurement, resulting in a reduced number of procured units. Under these circumstances, many countries are working on a variety of initiatives in order to maintain and enhance their national defense production 8 As known as the Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) (“Sea Hunter”), this pilot vessel christened in April 2016 is a trimaran approximately 40 meters long, capable of navigating several thousand kilometers for months without crewmembers on board through constant remote supervision by humans. This vessel is drawing attention as a technology manifesting autonomous navigation and human-machine collaboration—the priorities of the Third Offset Strategy (see Part I, Chapter 2, Section 1-4). In addition, in November 2015, the Unmanned Warfare Systems Directorate was established at the Offi ce of the Chief of Naval Operations to conduct personnel training, procurement, and system design. Such organizational improvements are also under way in parallel with the research. 9 They include BMD or technologies for countering ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks, etc. as well as ICT. 10 Large corporations involved with the defense industry of Western countries have high defense business ratios in their total revenues. In particular, the United States and the United Kingdom have large ----- In response to escalating development and production costs, Western countries are also promoting joint development and production and technological cooperation related to defense equipment among their allies and partners. This move can be attributed to such factors as (1) splitting development and production costs, (2) expanding demands in all countries participating in joint development and production, (3) mutual complementarity of technologies, and (4) raising domestic technology levels by obtaining the latest technology. Furthermore, an international logistic support system called “Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment” (ALGS) was adopted for the maintenance of the F-35 fighter aircraft, with the aircraft having been developed through international collaboration. This system enables all F-35 user countries to share its parts and components globally. The establishment of such international frameworks for logistic support and the progress of international joint development and production need to be observed closely. See>> Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3 (Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) At the U.S. DoD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, DARPA, and other agencies provide funds including large-scale funding of over US$3.3 billion in FY2016 for research undertaken by entities such as companies and universities. In the United Kingdom, in March 2015, the Ministry of Defence announced that it would invest a total of 10 million pounds to contribute to promoting the development of innovative defense products, and is requesting proposals on research themes. Countries have been exporting defense equipment overseas since the Cold War era, and even in recent years, many countries have been promoting a policy of overseas exporting. As defense equipment has faced a dramatic increase in its development and production costs, countries aim to maintain and strengthen their domestic defense industry by expanding demands in foreign markets through overseas exports. Furthermore, |Country|Col2|Global shares in defense equipment export (%), 2011–2015|Comparison with 2006–2010 export values (%)| |---|---|---|---| |1|United States|33%|+27%| |2|Russia|25%|+28%| |3|China|6%|+88%| |4|France|6%|-10%| |5|Germany|5%|-51%| |6|United Kingdom|5%|+26%| |7|Spain|4%|+55%| |8|Italy|3%|+48%| |9|Ukraine|3%|+54%| |10|The Netherlands|2%|-25%| |11|Israel|2%|-6%| |12|Sweden|1%|-7%| |13|Canada|1%|+20%| |14|Switzerland|1%|-5%| |15|Republic of Korea|1%|-3%| |16|Turkey|1%|+130%| Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Fig. I-3-6-1 Arms Export (2011–2015) **Global shares in** **Comparison with** **Country** **defense equipment** **2006–2010 export** **export (%), 2011–2015** **values (%)** 1 United States 33% +27% 2 Russia 25% +28% 3 China 6% +88% 4 France 6% -10% 5 Germany 5% -51% 6 United Kingdom 5% +26% 7 Spain 4% +55% 8 Italy 3% +48% 9 Ukraine 3% +54% 10 The Netherlands 2% -25% 11 Israel 2% -6% 12 Sweden 1% -7% 13 Canada 1% +20% 14 Switzerland 1% -5% 15 Republic of Korea 1% -3% 16 Turkey 1% +130% Note: Created based on “SIPRI Arms Transfer Database.” Countries with 1% or more share are listed (decimals are rounded). it is considered that countries leverage exports as a diplomatic tool for expanding their influence in the export destination countries. In addition, countries such as China and the ROK have established the infrastructure required to manufacture weapons through their past imports of defense equipment and their improved capabilities in science and technology, enabling them to attain the status of an export country of affordable defense equipment and to increase their export volumes. In recent years, defense equipment exports to the Asia-Pacific region have increased. The underlying factors suggested include the economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region, the greater influence of China, disputes over territorial sovereignty, and addressing the enhanced military capabilities of neighboring countries. See>> Fig. I-3-6-1 (Top Ranking Countries in Major Conventional Arms Export (2011–2015)) ----- **Part** ###### II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance **Chapter 1** **Basic Concepts of Japan’s** **Security and Defense** **Chapter 2** **Building a Dynamic Joint** **Defense Force** **Chapter 3** **Development of Legislation** **for Peace and Security** **Chapter 4** **Strengthening of** **the Japan-U.S. Alliance** ----- **Chapter 1** **[Basic Concepts of Japan s ]** **Security and Defense** **Section 1** **Measures to Ensure Japan’s Security** The independent state of a nation must be protected in order for it to determine its own direction in politics, economy, and society, as well as maintaining its culture, tradition, and sense of values. However, peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by simply wishing for them. The essence of national security can be found in creating an international environment that is stable and predictable, while preventing the emergence of threats before they occur, through diplomacy. The reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside by employing only nonmilitary means such as diplomatic efforts, and in the event that the nation were to be invaded it would not be able to remove such a threat. Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means. For this reason, Japan is striving to develop appropriate defense capabilities to protect the life and properties of its nationals and to defend the territorial land, sea, and airspace of Japan. At the same time, it is strengthening the Japan–U.S. Alliance[1] with the United States, which shares basic values and interests with Japan. The peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. In addition, Japan also works domestically to enrich the backbone of the people, which is characterized by ensuring stable lives of the people and protecting the country, while also working to establish a security foundation by implementing various measures in such sectors as the economy and education so as not to allow the chance of an invasion. Moreover, from the perspective of improving the security environment surrounding Japan and preventing the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities is increasing in cooperative efforts as a member of the Asia-Pacifi c region and the international community. Upon recognizing the role of defense capabilities, Japan aims to ensure national security as well as bringing peace and safety to the Asia-Pacifi c region, and eventually to the entire world through making its utmost efforts in a variety of fi elds. Prime Minister Abe and Minister of Defense Nakatani inspecting the Special Guard of Honor In general, this refers to the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security System, whereby both nations, as countries sharing fundamental values and interests, coordinate and cooperate closely in a range ----- **Section 2** **Constitution and the Basis of Defense Policy** **1 Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense** Since the end of World War II, Japan made a decision not to repeat the ravages of war and has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifi sm is enshrined in the Constitution, Article 9 of which prescribes the renunciation of war, the prohibition of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. Of course, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not **2 The Government’s View on Article 9 of the Constitution** - 1 Permitted Self-Defense Capability deny Japan’s inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state. Thus, the Japanese Government interprets this as a constitutional right to possess the minimum armed forces needed to exercise that right. Therefore, Japan, under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, holding its exclusively defenseoriented policy as its basic strategy of defense, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations. to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of selfdefense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or the so-called basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councilors on October 14, 1972. This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the Constitution. To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the required minimum self-defense capability. The specifi c limit is subject to change according to the prevailing international situation, the level of military technologies, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided through annual budget and other deliberations by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a “war potential” that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan’s overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit. The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country is not permissible under any circumstance as it would, by defi nition, exceed the minimum necessary level. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers. - 2 Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under **Article 9 of the Constitution** In the cabinet decision[1] made on July 1, 2014, measures for self-defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution were defi ned as follows; The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears ----- light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc., in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc. Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, it has been concluded that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. The Government has reached a conclusion that although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words, for defending Japan. See>> Fig. II-1-2-1 (“Three New Conditions” for the “Use of Force” as Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution) - 3 Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of **Self-Defense may be Exercised** The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters, and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation. Nevertheless, the Government interprets that, as a general rule, the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of self-defense. - 4 Right of Belligerency Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” However, the “right of belligerency” does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather, it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force and to occupy enemy territory. On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy’s military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is not permissible. |Fig. II-1-2-1|“Three New Conditions” for the “Use of Force” as Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under A| |---|---| |❍ When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relations threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happine ❍ When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. ❍ Use of force to the minimum extent necessary.|| ----- **3 Basic Policy** Under the Constitution, Japan has effi ciently built a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defenseoriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while fi rmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. - 1 Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy - 4 Securing Civilian Control Civilian control refers to the priority of politics to the military in a democratic state or democratic political control of military strength. Japan has, by giving serious refl ection to the regrettable state of affairs that happened until the end of World War II, adopted the following strict civilian control system that is entirely different from the one under the former Constitution.[3] Civilian control aims to ensure that the SDF is maintained and operated in accordance with the will of the people. The Diet, which represents Japanese nationals, makes legislative and budgetary decisions on such matters as the allotted number of the SDF personnel and main organizations of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) / the SDF. It also issues approval for defense operations of the SDF. The function of national defense, as a general administrative function, entirely falls under the executive power of the Cabinet. The Constitution requires that the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who constitute the Cabinet be civilians. The Prime Minister, on behalf of the whole Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme command and supervision of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control and supervision over the SDF duties. In addition, the National Security Council of Japan under the Cabinet deliberates important matters on national security. At the MOD, the Minister of Defense is responsible for issues concerning national defense, and as the head The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. - 2 Not Becoming a Military Power There is no established defi nition for the concept of a military power. For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten other countries means that Japan will not possess and maintain a military capability strong enough to pose a threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary for self-defense. - 3 Three Non-Nuclear Principles The Three Non-Nuclear Principles refers to those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fi xed line of national policy. Japan is also prohibited from manufacturing and possessing nuclear weapons under the Atomic Energy Basic Law.[1] In addition, Japan ratifi ed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a nonnuclear weapons state, has an obligation not to manufacture and acquire nuclear weapons.[2] Prime Minister Abe receiving honors by men and women stationed along the rail of a ship – “manning the rails” – during the SDF Fleet Review Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that “The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management.” Article 2 of the NPT states that “Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices...” ----- of the MOD also controls and manages the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in policy planning and political affairs by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense.[4] In addition, the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense provide the Minister of Defense with advice on important issues under the jurisdiction of the MOD based on their expertise and experience. The Defense Council consisting of political appointees, civilian offi cials and uniformed SDF personnel of the MOD deliberates on basic principles concerning administrative affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Through these ways, the MOD aims to further enhance the operation of the civilian control system. As mentioned above, the civilian control system is well established. However, in order to ensure that the system achieves good results, it is necessary to continue making practical efforts in both political and administrative aspects, along with a deep interest in national defense taken by the people. **Commentary** **The Special Guard of Honor –** **Column** **Receiving the Prime Minister’s Special Award** The Special Guard of Honor, comprised of the 302nd Military Police Company and Central Band of the GSDF, received a Special Award from Prime Minister Abe at a commendation ceremony held at the Prime Minister’s Offi ce on October 21 2015. Since their fi rst performance in October of 1957 for Mr. Nehru, then Prime Minister of the Republic of India, who visited Japan as a state guest, the Special Guard of Honor has performed ceremonies for over 1,000 guests from 100 nations over the past 60 years. The Special Award was a recognition of their achievements in representing the dignity and fortitude of the SDF to the world. During his address at the ceremony, Prime Minister Abe congratulated the members of the Special Guard of Honor on their performance and encouraged them by saying “I can say with certainty that Japan’s Special Guard of Honor is the best in the world. You are clearly showing to the world just how elite and highly skilled the Japan SDF is. As the Commander-in-Chief of the SDF, you are a great source of trust and pride to me. I have high hopes that today’s award will fi ll you with confi dence and pride, and encourage you to aim ever higher.” The Special Guard of Honor receiving a certifi cate of the Special Award The Special Guard of Honor in absolute unison from Prime Minister Abe [Photo courtesy of the Cabinet’s Public Affairs Offi ce] ----- **Section 3** **Outline of the National Security Strategy** **1 National Security Council** The National Security Council that deliberates important matters with regard to national security such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) is established within the Cabinet, and the MOD and other related administrative organs provide the National Security Council with data and information pertaining to national security in a timely manner. The National Security Secretariat established within the Cabinet Secretary provides constant support to the National Security Council as its secretariat, and some MOD members, including uniformed SDF personnel, are working at additional posts at the National Security Secretariat. See>> Fig. II-1-3-1 (Organization of National Security Council) A scene from a National Security Council meeting held upon North Korea’s ballistic missile launch [photo courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Offi ce] |National Security Cou|ncil| |---|---| |ncil Prime Minister Chief Cabinet Secretary 4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Emergency Situations Minister Meeting Serves as the control tower Maintains the civilian Strengthens the response for foreign and defense control function to serious emergencies. policies concerning of the former Security Deputy Chief national security Council. Cabinet Secretary|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||| |Chief Cabin Deputy Cabinet S||et Secretary Chief ecretary|||| ||Deputy Cabinet S|Chief ecretary|||| ||||||| |Col1|Col2|Secretary General of National Security| |---|---|---| |Close C|oordination|| |||Secretariat| |Col1|Col2|Col3|ion Secretary General of National Security|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||Secretariat||||| ||||retary Assistant Chie al of (Deputy Sec riat) National Se National Security Secretariat||||| ||Assistant Chief Cabinet Sec (Deputy Secretary Gener National Security Secreta||retary al of riat)|Assistant Chie (Deputy Sec National Se|f Cabinet Secretary retary General of curity Secretariat)||| ||||||||| |||||||Foreign affairs|| |Fig. II-1-3-1|Organization of National Security Council| |---|---| |National Security Council Prime Minister Chief Cabinet Secretary 4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Emergency Situations Minister Meeting Cabinet Secretariat Serves as the control tower Maintains the civilian Strengthens the response for foreign and defense control function to serious emergencies. policies concerning of the former Security Deputy Chief national security Council. Cabinet Secretary Special Adviser to the Prime Minister Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary General of on National Security Secretary for Crisis Close Coordination National Security Management Secretariat Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Director of Cabinet (Deputy Secretary General of (Deputy Secretary General of Intelligence National Center of National Security Secretariat) National Security Secretariat) Cabinet Intelligence Incident Readiness and Research Office and Strategy for Situation response National Security Foreign Cybersecurity crisis management Secretariat affairs|| National Security Council Prime Minister Emergency Situations Chief Cabinet Secretary 4-Minister Meeting 9-Minister Meeting Minister Meeting Cabinet Secretariat Serves as the control tower for foreign and defense Maintains the civilian control function Strengthens the response to serious emergencies. policies concerning of the former Security Deputy Chief national security Council. Cabinet Secretary Special Adviser to the Prime Minister Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary General of on National Security Secretary for Crisis Close Coordination National Security Management Secretariat Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary Director of Cabinet (Deputy Secretary General of (Deputy Secretary General of Intelligence National Center of National Security Secretariat) National Security Secretariat) Cabinet Intelligence Incident Readiness and Research Office and Strategy for Situation response National Security Foreign Cybersecurity crisis management Secretariat affairs ----- **2 National Security Strategy** - 1 Japan’s National Security Policy Framework The NSS approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December of 2013 represents Japan’s fi rst-ever basic policy on national security with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. The NSS defi nes approaches that Japan should follow based on a long-term view of its national interests. It replaces the Basic Policy on National Defense, which had served as the basis for Japan’s defense policies theretofore. The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which was established based on the NSS, defi nes basic policies for Japan’s future defense, the role of its defense capabilities, and objectives for specifi c SDF equipment. The NDPG was formulated with a medium-to long-term outlook because the acquisition of defense equipment and the establishment of troop operational systems cannot be accomplished overnight and requires many years of planning. The NSS and NDPG are mainly designed for the next decade or so. The Medium Term Defense Program (MTDP) specifi es a maximum budget and the amount of mainstay defense equipment to be acquired over the subsequent fi ve-year period in order to achieve the defense capability targets defi ned in the NDPG. The fi scal year budget is drawn on the MTDP substantiated as projects, and the necessary expenses for each fi scal year will be appropriated based on relevant situations. To date, the NDPG has contained mention of nationwide basic security policies focusing on defense policy to a certain extent. The NSS carries with it great meaning as the defi nitive statement of the Government’s basic policy on national security, with a focus on diplomatic affairs and defense policy. See>> Fig. II-1-3-2 (Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP and Annual Budget) - 2 Outline of the National Security Strategy **(1) Fundamental Principle of National Security** a. Principles Japan Upholds – Proactive Contribution to Peace based on the Principle of International Cooperation Japan is committed to continuing the path it has followed to date as a peace-loving nation and, as a major player in international politics and business, it also seeks its own security as well as peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region from its stance as a proactive contributor to peace based on the principle of international cooperation. Japan will contribute more proactively than ever before to the peace, security and prosperity of the international community. b. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives In achieving the aforementioned fundamental principle of national security by implementation of concrete policies, the following national interests need to be clearly defi ned. ❍ To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity, to ensure the safety of life, person and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security grounded in freedom and democracy and preserving its rich culture and tradition; ❍ To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security; and ❍ To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. In order to safeguard these national interests and to fulfi ll Japan’s responsibilities in the international community, Japan will work to achieve the following national security objectives. ❍ Strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan, and defeating such threats and minimizing damage if by chance such threats should reach Japan. ❍ Improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacifi c region and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the JapanU.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia Pacifi c region, and promoting practical security cooperation. ❍ Improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order Relations among NSS, NDPG, MTDP, and Fig. II-1-3-2 Annual Budget Basic policy for national security centered NSS around diplomatic and defense policies (approx. 10-year time frame) based on NSS Prescribe future defense force and target levels NDPG of defense force that Japan should achieve (approx. 10-year time frame) achieve target levels of defense force Indicate (limits of) five-year total expenditures MTDP and quantity of major equipment appropriate budget, develop specific projects Examine based on the current situations, Annual budget appropriate annual budget as necessary ----- based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes. **(2) Security Environment Surrounding Japan and** **National Security Challenges** a. Global Security Environment and Challenges While China, India, and other developing nations rise, the United States has clarified its policy to shift its policy emphasis towards the Asia-Pacific region, and as such the balance between countries is changing. Rapid advancements in globalization and technological innovation have increased the relative influence of non-state-actors, and at the same time, they have led to an increase in terrorism and criminal threats from non-state actors. Issues including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by North Korea, Iran,[1] and other countries and regions are major threats to Japan and the international community. In addition, acts of terrorism have injured Japanese nationals and damaged Japan’s national interests. This means that Japan and its people are directly exposed to the threat of international terrorism at home and abroad. With regard to global commons, the risks of free access to and utilization of global commons such as seas, outer space, and cyberspace being hindered are becoming more and more serious. These risks include unilateral attempts to change the current status quo of the maritime aspect of the global commons by force, the threat of the development of anti-satellite weapons, and cyber attacks. Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country, including poverty and humanitarian crises are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security. Additionally, there is a growing risk that one country’s economic crisis can expand to involve the entire global economy. b. National Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region Against the backdrop of the existence of various political systems, the concentration of nation states that possess large-scale military force, including nuclear weapons, and the insufficiently legislated regional cooperation frameworks on national security, so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation. North Korea has enhanced the capability of its WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as well as repeatedly carried out provocative military actions, increasing tension in the region. While there is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues, it has been rapidly strengthening and expanding its military capabilities without sufficient transparency, taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the current status quo in the seas including the East China Sea and South China Sea, and rapidly expanded and intensified its activities in the seas and airspace around Japan. In addition, there is a mutual existence of stability and potential instability in the relationship between the sides of the Taiwan Strait. **(3) Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security** Japan should take a strategic approach centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy as shown in the reference. See>> Fig. II-1-3-3 (Outline of Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security) ----- Fig. II-1-3-3 Outline of Japan’s Strategic Approach to National Security **1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles** ❍ Advance vibrant diplomacy in order for Japan to play a more proactive role in achieving peace, stability and prosperity for the international community and to realize an international order and security environment desirable for Japan. ❍ Efficiently develop a highly effective and joint defense force, and operate with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations; build in peacetime a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations; reinforce structure prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective of the SDF, which plays a central role in the above initiatives; closely cooperate with the U.S. with regard to extended deterrence in response to the threat of nuclear weapons, and Japan’s own initiatives, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and the protection of its people. ❍ Enhance capabilities of law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrols and reinforce maritime surveillance capabilities; strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies; carry out constant review on issues that are relevant to ensuring the security of Japan’s territories, and take effective measures. ❍ As a maritime state, play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas” (*1); strengthen Japan’s maritime surveillance capabilities, including the use of outer space; provide assistance to coastal states along sea lanes from the Middle East to the surrounding waters of Japan that are critical to Japan due to its dependence on maritime transport, in order to enhance their maritime security capabilities; strengthen cooperation with partners that share the same strategic interests. ❍ Reinforce Japan’s national capabilities for protection of cyber space and response to cyber attacks; in peacetime, strengthen public-private partnerships; consider expansion of the pool of human resources in the security field; strengthen international cooperation and promote cyber defense cooperation. ❍ Strengthen Japan’s domestic measures against international terrorism, and reinforce measures against international terrorism, including information gathering and analysis of intelligence relating to the state of international terrorism. ❍ Fundamentally strengthen Japan’s capability to gather information from a diverse range of sources; utilize geospatial intelligence which combines various types of intelligence; promote comprehensive analysis of intelligence by developing highly-skilled intelligence experts. ❍ While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles of Arms Exports have played thus far, define clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms suited to the new security environment (*2). ❍ Enhance and reinforce the functions of information-gathering satellites; make effective use of satellites in areas such as SDF unit operation and collection, and analysis of information; enhance a system for space situational awareness; promote utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security. ❍ Strengthen Japan’s technological capabilities including dual use technologies; grasp science and technology trends in peacetime, and make effective use of technology in the area of national security by combining the efforts of industry, academia, and the government. **2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance** ❍ Revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (*3); work closely with the United States on operational cooperation and policy coordination; enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by strengthening cooperation in a wide range of areas, including BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyber space, and large-scale disaster response operations. ❍ Implement measures to reduce the cost burden of the U.S. Forces in Japan; steadily implement measures on the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in order to reduce impacts placed on local communities, including in Okinawa, while continually maintaining and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community** ❍ The ROK, Australia, ASEAN menber states, and India: Strengthen cooperative relations with these countries with which Japan shares universal values and strategic interests. ❍ China: Construct and strengthen a Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests; encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, security and prosperity; firmly but in a calm manner respond to China’s attempts to change the current status quo by coercion. ❍ North Korea: achieve a comprehensive resolution to outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction of Japanese nationals as well as nuclear and missile issues. ❍ Russia: advance cooperation in all areas, including security and energy. ❍ In promoting the initiatives mentioned above, actively utilize multilateral and trilateral frameworks for cooperation. ❍ Other partners of the Asia-Pacific region: cooperate toward ensuring stability in the region. ❍ Strengthen cooperative relations with European countries, emerging countries, Middle Eastern countries, as well as African countries. **4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community** ❍ Strengthen Japan’s U.N. diplomacy by proactively contributing to efforts aimed at maintaining and recovering international peace and security at the U.N. ❍ Proactively involve Japan in realizing and strengthening the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space, and cyberspace. ❍ Lead international initiatives on disarmament and non-proliferation. ❍ Further step up cooperation with U.N. PKO and other activities; engage in training for peace-building experts and PKO personnel in various countries. ❍ Promote consultations, etc., with other countries on the situation of international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation. **5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues** ❍ Share universal values; respond to global development and global issues; realize human security; cooperate with human resource development initiatives in developing countries; maintain and strengthen the free trade system; respond to energy and environmental issues; enhance people-to-people exchanges. **6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding** ❍ Maintain and enhance defense production and technological bases. ❍ Take a government-wide approach to uniformly and strategically disseminate information; strengthen information dissemination in foreign languages; reinforce the social base and intellectual base. Notes: 1. The NSS defines that these are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight. 2. Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology were adopted by the Cabinet on April 1, 2014. 3. Japan and the United States approved the new Guidelines in April 27, 2015. ----- **Building a Dynamic Joint** **Chapter** **2** **Defense Force** **Section 1** **Outline of the National Defense Program Guidelines** **1 Basic Approach – Building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force** The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (NDPG)[1] is the fi rst of its kind to be developed in light of the National Security Strategy (NSS), and it calls for the building of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as the cornerstone for the protection of Japan’s peace and security. Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the number and the duration of situations, including so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests, which require the SDF’s commitment are both increasing. Therefore, it is essential to regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and swiftly build a response posture in accordance with the development of the situation to prevent further escalation. In dealing with such situations, it is also essential to minimize the damage by dealing with situations by effective response through achieving necessary maritime supremacy[2] and air superiority.[3] Among these situations, the qualitative and quantitative capabilities of the defense force underpinning the SDF activities were not necessarily suffi cient. The NDPG, being fully mindful of these needs, calls for the enhancement of deterrence and response capability by pursuing further joint operations, 1 Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2013 2 See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 (Effective Deterrence and Response) improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct activities, as well as developing defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity that underpin various activities. To this end, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to the SDF’s total functions and capabilities, in order to identify the functions and capabilities that should be comprehensively prioritized. The NDPG carries great signifi cance as it has made it possible to adapt to an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, and realize a more prioritized and effi cient defense capability build-up, based on the results of these capability assessments. Additionally, it requires the build-up of the most effective operational posture, by further strengthening a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. Specifi cally, the new NDPG calls for the strengthening of various fi elds as the basic foundations for the SDF such as training and exercise, operational infrastructure, personnel and education, medical, defense production and technological bases, effi cient acquisition of equipment, research and development, collaboration with local communities, boosting of communication capabilities, enhancement of the intellectual base, and promotion of reform of the Ministry of Defense. See>> Fig. II-2-1-1 (Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability) ----- Fig. II-2-1-1 Changes of the Views regarding Defense Capability [Background] Basic ideas in 1976 NDPG 1976 NDPG Détente and Cold War coexisting in global community Balanced relationship among the United States, China, and - The concept of Basic Defense Capability (October 29, 1976 the Soviet Union in the vicinity of Japan - Maintain a minimum-necessary defense force as an independent nation the National DefenseCouncil/Cabinet Meeting) Need to show the target of defense force buildup preventing a power vacuum that destabilizes the region, rather than coping with a direct military threat to Japan 19 years [Background] Basic ideas in 1995 NDPG 1995 NDPG The end of Cold War International situation with unpredictability and uncertainty - Basically follow the concept of Basic Defense Capability (November 28, 1995 National expectations to international contribution - “Dealing with various contingencies such as major disasters” and “contributing the Security Council/ Cabinet Meeting) to building a more stable security environment” added to the roles of defense capability, joining the existing role of “defense of the nation” 9 years [Background] Basic ideas in 2004 NDPG 2004 NDPG New threats such as international terrorism and ballistic missile attacks - Capability to work independently and proactively on implementing international (December 10, 2004the Security Council/ Direct connection between world peace and Japan’s peace peace cooperation activities, as well as dealing effectively with new threats and Cabinet Meeting) Necessity to convert the policy from putting weight on diverse contingencies deterrence to handling the situation - Succeeding the effective parts of the concept of basic defense capability 6 years [Background] Basic ideas in 2010 NDPG 2010 NDPG Change in global power balance Complex military situation surrounding Japan - Build up of a Dynamic Defense Force (Not bound by the concept of Basic (December 17, 2010 Diversification of the military role in global society Defense Capability) the Security Council/ Cabinet Meeting) - Facilitating effective deterrence of and responses to various contingencies, and making it possible to proactively conduct activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and improve the global security 3 years environment in a dynamic manner [Background] Basic ideas in 2013 NDPG 2013 NDPG Security situation surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe - Build up of a Dynamic Joint Defense Force (December 17, 2013the National Security U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region - Defense force to be more thorough with the concept of joint operation, which Council/Cabinet Meeting) Lessons learned from the Self-Defense Forces experience enables the SDF to respond swiftly to the increasingly severe security of the Great East Japan Earthquake environment and carry out various activities, such as achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority, seamlessly and flexibly **2 A New Security Environment** - 1 The Global Security Environment North Korea has deployed a massive military force and continues to maintain and strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities.[4] Furthermore, North Korea has also repeatedly taken actions that heightened tension in the region. In particular, with regard to nuclear and missile development, North Korea is planning to make technological improvements to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its ballistic missiles. The possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. As such, this issue poses a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan. As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner, its military trends have caused security concerns for the Asia-Pacifi c region and the international community. The trends include continuous increases in its defense expenditures at a high level, efforts to deny access and deployment as well as prevention of military activities to As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately expand among the entire international community. Moreover, there are shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of infl uence of the United States, along with an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies, and cases of undue infringement upon freedom of the high seas. In addition, securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace is becoming a signifi cant challenge. - 2 The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacifi c Region While countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships, gray-zone situations tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations. Asymmetrical military capabilities, in this context, refer to means of attack different from those of an opponent with superior conventional military capabilities. Such measures are exploited to compensate for ----- its surrounding areas by foreign militaries, insuffi cient transparency concerning its military, rapid expansion and intensifi cation of activities in the maritime and aerial domains, and attempts to change the status quo by force in maritime areas. As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active. The United States has clearly manifested its decision on the rebalance to the Asia-Pacifi c region, and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fi scal and various other constraints while enhancing its relationships with its allies, among other efforts. - 3 Japan’s Geographical Characteristics prosperity. Japan also faces security vulnerabilities such as frequent natural disasters, concentration of population, and a large number of nuclear power plants in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, its impact may spread to the international community. It is increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake. - 4 Issues to be Tackled by Japan As various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, and it is diffi cult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Therefore, it is increasingly necessary that countries which share interests in responding to shared security and other challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability. **3 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** fl exibility and readiness based on joint operations. In the event of various situations, Japan will appropriately and promptly make decisions and seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others. Furthermore, Japan will continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people, and will enhance the capability to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals in foreign countries in an emergency situation. In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training, and exercises. Furthermore, Japan will make efforts to build up a Dynamic Joint Defense Force as mentioned above, in addition to the establishment of a comprehensive defense architecture. As Japan is a maritime state, securing the safety of maritime and air traffi c through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order constitutes the basis of peace and **3 Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** - 1 Basic policy In light of the NSS, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture, and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, thereby seeking to establish an infrastructure necessary for fully exercising its defense capabilities. Under the Constitution, Japan will effi ciently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defenseoriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Additionally, with regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the deterrence of expansion provided by the United States is indispensable. Japan will closely cooperate with the United States, and take appropriate responses through its own efforts. In addition, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. - 2 Japan’s Own Efforts - 3 Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security. Also, the Japan-U.S. Alliance functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will effi ciently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of ----- prosperity not only of Japan, but also of the Asia-Pacifi c region and the world at large. From this perspective, Japan will place emphasis on the following efforts: **(1) Strengthening Deterrence and Response Capabilities** **of the Japan-U.S. Alliance** Japan will continue revising the Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation.[5] In addition, Japan will promote joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas. Japan will also tighten the Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination. - 4 Active Promotion of Security Cooperation **(1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c Region** Japan will promote a variety of cooperative initiatives in a multi-layered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity towards one another in the Asia-Pacifi c region. In particular, with regard to the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia and India, Japan will make efforts to improve cooperation and interoperability. Japan will also endeavor to promote dialogue and exchanges with China and Russia. Additionally, with regard to capacity building assistance, Japan will promote and carry it out in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA), and Japan will expand the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope. Furthermore, in multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, Japan, in cooperation with the U.S. and Australia, will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region, and Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises. **(2) Strengthening and Expanding Cooperation in a Broad** **Range of Fields** The Japan-U.S. Alliance will strengthen cooperation not only in the fi elds of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, peacekeeping and counter terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fi elds, including intelligence, and defense equipment and technology. **(3) Steady Implementation of Measures Relating to the** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan** Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa and other local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces. **(2) Cooperation with the International Community** It is very diffi cult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversifi ed, such forces play an important role in building peace and promoting confi dence-building. Therefore, Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community. Specifi cally Japan will strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), along with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries. Furthermore, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities in a multi-layered manner, and in particular, will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities. **4 Future Defense Forces** detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate any change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring. - 1 Role of the Defense Forces **(1) Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations** Japan will achieve intelligence superiority[6] through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to 5 On April 27, 2015, new Guidelines were approved between Japan and the United States.i ----- At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations from an early stage, including gray zone situations, and establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner. In particular, the following points will be emphasized: (1) ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan; (2) response to an attack on remote islands; (3) response to ballistic missile attacks; (4) responses in outer space and cyberspace; and (5) responses to major disasters. **(2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and** **Improvement of the Global Security Environment** Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan, and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the region. Moreover, by working in partnership with its allies and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance. In order to respond appropriately to global security issues, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance. Japan will attach importance to the following in particular: (1) holding training and exercises; (2) promoting defense cooperation and exchange; (3) promoting capacity building assistance; (4) ensuring maritime security; (5) implementing international peace cooperation activities; and (6) cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization. **(2) Functions and Capabilities to be Emphasized** The SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. Forces. ❍ ISR capabilities Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR in the surrounding seas and airspace, and adopt a flexible approach for boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations. ❍ Intelligence capabilities Japan will strengthen its system for collecting intelligence, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect signs of various situations and take other actions. In doing so, the SDF will seek to enhance its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to establish a framework for the securing and nurturing of personnel in information gathering and analysis. ❍ Transport capability In order to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen its integrated transport capacity, while seeking collaboration with the civilian transport sector on a regular basis. ❍ Command and control, and information and communication capabilities In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint and integrated manner, a new central headquarters to control all regional armies will be established within the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), among other measures. The SDF will also strive to enhance and strengthen its capabilities for supporting communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services, along with other capabilities. ❍ Response to an attack on remote islands The SDF will strengthen its engagement capability for the ensuring of maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for an effective response. The SDF will strengthen the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands, and newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture, and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities so that - 2 Priorities in Strengthening Architecture of the SDF **(1) Basic Approach** Based on the results of the capability assessments conducted based on the standpoint of joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. At the same time, in terms of preparation for an invasion such as the landing of large scale ground forces ----- its units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region. In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific. ❍ Response to ballistic missile attacks To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against ballistic missiles. With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability, and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory. Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between Japan and the United States, in order to strengthen the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take necessary means. ❍ Response in outer space and cyberspace While strengthening information collection capability using satellites, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will enhance the survivability[7] of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities as well as continuously strengthen and secure personnel with expertise and the latest equipment. ❍ Responses to major disasters, etc. The SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately sized units. ❍ Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities The SDF will strengthen protective capabilities to ensure the safety of personnel and units. The SDF will also work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability, and on strengthening logistics and medical service structure. Furthermore, the SDF will enhance intelligence gathering capability as well as its education, training and personnel management systems. - 3 **Architecture of Each Service of the Self-Defense Forces** maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades, and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units capable of effectively performing amphibious and other operations. The GSDF will maintain half of these rapidly deployable basic operational units in Hokkaido, given its excellent training environment. The GSDF will implement rationalization and streamlining with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets, and review the organization and equipment of units. The number of GSDF personnel will be maintained at around 159,000, which was the same level as at the end of FY2013, in order to ensure sufficient personnel availability to respond to major disasters or other situations. **(2) Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)** The MSDF will increase the number of destroyers to 54 (14 escort divisions) by using new destroyers that offer improved response capabilities for various missions and have more compact designs, and will maintain ship-based patrol helicopter units in order to secure the defense of surrounding waters and ensure the safety of maritime traffic. Furthermore, two Aegis-equipped destroyers[8] will be added, bringing the fleet to eight. Furthermore, in order to effectively carry out regular information gathering and warning and surveillance activities, as well as patrolling of surrounding waters[9] and defense operations, the MSDF will maintain an augmented submarine fleet and patrol aircraft units. **(3) Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)** The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units in order to provide persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. By consolidating warning and control operations at air defense command centers, the ASDF will gradually change warning groups into warning squadrons as well as establish one new squadron in the air warning unit. As for Fighter Aircraft Units, the 13th squadron will be newly established, and Air Reconnaissance Unit will be abolished. In addition, one squadron will be added to the Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit, making it a twosquadron architecture. Furthermore, the ASDF will maintain surface-toair guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with **(1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)** In order to respond swiftly to an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will The capability to prevent or minimize the disconnection of or decline in the function of satellites as well as to secure alternative measures so that the satellites can be utilized continuously even in situations where risks such as space debris and anti-satellite attack are apparent. Destroyers equipped with the Aegis Weapon System that uses high performance computers to automatically process series of operations such as target search, detection, identification and attack.i ----- the Aegis destroyers, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF. See>> Fig. II-2-1-2 (NDPG Comparison Tables) See>> Fig. II-2-1-3 (Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes)) |Col1|Category|Col3|1976 NDPG|1995 NDPG|2004 NDPG|2010 NDPG|2013 NDPG| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Authorized Number of personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||180,000|160,000 145,000 15,000|155,000 148,000 7,000|154,000 147,000 7,000|159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major units|Regionally deployed units in peacetime1|12 divisions 2 combined brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Rapid Deployment Units|1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training group 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade|1 armored division Central Readiness Force|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile units|||||5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| ||Major Equipment|Tanks2 Artillery (Main artillery)2|(approx. 1,200) (approx. 1,000/vehicle)|approx. 900 (approx. 900/vehicle)|approx. 600 (approx. 600/vehicle)|approx. 400 (approx. 400/vehicle)|(approx. 300) (approx. 300/vehicle)| |MSDF|Major units|Destroyer units for mobile operations regional deployment Submarine units Minesweeper Units Patrol aircraft units|4 flotillas (Regional units) 10 units 6 divisions 2 flotillas (Land-based) 16 squadrons|4 flotillas (Regional units) 7 units 6 divisions 1 flotilla (Land-based) 13 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons| ||Major Equipment|Destroyers Submarines Combat aircraft|approx. 60 16 approx. 220|approx. 50 16 approx. 170|47 16 approx. 150|48 22 approx. 150|54 22 approx. 170| |ASDF|Major units|Air Warning & Control Units|28 warning groups 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|4 warning groups 24 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons)|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons)| |||Fighter Aircraft Units Fighter-interceptor units Support fighter units|10 squadrons 3 squadrons|9 squadrons 3 squadrons|12 squadrons|12 squadrons|13 squadrons| |||Air Reconnaissance Units|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|1 squadron|| |||Aerial refueling/ transport units Air transport units|3 squadrons|3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|1 squadron 3 squadrons|2 squadrons 3 squadrons| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups|6 groups| ||Major Equipment|Combat aircraft (Fighters)|approx. 430 (approx. 350)2|approx. 400 approx. 300|approx. 350 approx. 260|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280| |Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions3||Aegis-equipped destroyers|||4 ships|6 ships4|8 ships| |||Air Warning & Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|||7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups|11 warning groups/ units 6 groups|| |Fig. II-2-1-2|NDPG Comparison Tables| |---|---| |Category 1976 NDPG 1995 NDPG 2004 NDPG 2010 NDPG 2013 NDPG Authorized Number of personnel 180,000 160,000 155,000 154,000 159,000 Active-Duty Personnel 145,000 148,000 147,000 151,000 Reserve-Ready Personnel 15,000 7,000 7,000 8,000 Regionally deployed units in 12 divisions 8 divisions 8 divisions 8 divisions 5 divisions peacetime1 2 combined brigades 6 brigades 6 brigades 6 brigades 2 brigades Rapid Deployment Units 1 armored division 1 armored division 1 armored division Central Readiness Force 3 rapid deployment divisions 1 artillery brigade 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 airborne brigade 1 airborne brigade Central Readiness Force 1 armored division 1 armored division GSDF 1 training group 1 airborne brigade Major units 1 helicopter brigade 1 helicopter brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade 5 surface-to-ship Surface-to-Ship Guided guided missile Missile units regiments Surface-to-Air Guided 8 anti-aircraft artillery 8 anti-aircraft artillery 8 anti-aircraft artillery 7 anti-aircraft artillery 7 anti-aircraft artillery Missile Units groups groups groups groups/regiments groups/regiments Major Tanks2 (approx. 1,200) approx. 900 approx. 600 approx. 400 (approx. 300) Equipment Artillery (Main artillery)2 (approx. 1,000/vehicle) (approx. 900/vehicle) (approx. 600/vehicle) (approx. 400/vehicle) (approx. 300/vehicle) Destroyer units 4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 flotillas (8 divisions) 4 divisions 6 divisions for mobile operations 4 flotillas 4 flotillas 4 flotillas (8 divisions) regional deployment (Regional units) 10 units (Regional units) 7 units 5 divisions Major units Submarine units 6 divisions 6 divisions 4 divisions 6 divisions 6 divisions MSDF Minesweeper Units 2 flotillas 1 flotilla 1 flotilla 1 flotilla 1 flotilla Patrol aircraft units (Land-based) 16 (Land-based) 13 9 squadrons 9 squadrons 9 squadrons squadrons squadrons Destroyers approx. 60 approx. 50 47 48 54 Major Submarines 16 16 16 22 22 Equipment Combat aircraft approx. 220 approx. 170 approx. 150 approx. 150 approx. 170 Air Warning & Control Units 28 warning groups 8 warning groups 8 warning groups 4 warning groups 28 warning squadrons 20 warning squadrons 20 warning squadrons 24 warning squadrons 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 AEW group 1 AEW group 1 AEW group (2 squadrons) (2 squadrons) (3 squadrons) Fighter Aircraft Units 12 squadrons 12 squadrons 13 squadrons Fighter-interceptor units 10 squadrons 9 squadrons Major units Support fighter units 3 squadrons 3 squadrons ASDF Air Reconnaissance Units 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron 1 squadron Aerial refueling/ 1 squadron 1 squadron 2 squadrons transport units Air transport units 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons 3 squadrons Surface-to-Air Guided 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups 6 groups Missile Units Major Combat aircraft approx. 430 approx. 400 approx. 350 approx. 340 approx. 360 Equipment (Fighters) (approx. 350)2 approx. 300 approx. 260 approx. 260 approx. 280 Aegis-equipped destroyers 4 ships 6 ships4 8 ships Major equipment/units that 7 warning groups 11 warning groups/ Air Warning & Control Units may also serve for BMD 4 warning squadrons units missions3 Surface-to-Air Guided 3 groups 6 groups Missile Units Notes: 1. Units referred to as Regional Deployment Units in the 2013 NDPG. 2. Although not stated in the Attached Tables of 1976 NDPG and the 2013 NDPG, it is listed here for comparison with the NDPG Attached Table from 1995 to 2010. 3. “Major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions” are included in the number of main equipment in the MSDF or number of major units in the ASDF in the 2004 NDPG and the 2010 NDPG, but their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of destroyers (Aegis-equipped destroyers), air warning & control units, and surface-to-air guided missile units in the 2013 NDPG. 4. Additional deployment of Aegis destroyers equipped with ballistic missile defense functions may be carried out within the number of destroyers set above, depending on factors such as the development of ballistic missile defense technology and financial matters.|| ----- Fig. II-2-1-3 Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes) Structure of the Major Units of the MSDF (Changes) New Structure In order to defend the seas surrounding Japan and ensure the security of maritime traffic through effectively conducting various operations such as persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations, etc., the MSDF promotes various programs, to steadily obtain and secure maritime supremacy. Location of Headquarters, etc., of Destroyer/ Destroyer Unit Submarine/Aircraft Units, etc. Escort Division 3 Units planned to be established are shown in red. Escort Division 15 Helicopter Unit Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 25 Ominato Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Destroyer Unit Air Patrol Squadron 2 Escort Division 7 Hachinohe Escort Division 14 Destroyer Unit Helicopter Unit Escort Division 2 Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 23 Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Escort Division 5 Air Patrol Squadron 3 Escort Division 8 Destroyer Unit Escort Division 13 Maizuru Atsugi Yokosuka Escort Division 1 Escort Division 16 Escort Division 6 Kure Tateyama Escort Division 11 Komatsushima Helicopter Unit Submarine Unit Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 22 Omura Sasebo Helicopter Unit Submarine Division 2 Kanoya Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 24 Submarine Division 4 Destroyer Unit Submarine Division 6 Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Escort Division 4 Air Patrol Squadron 1 Escort Division 12 Helicopter Unit Landing Ship Unit Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 21 Landing Ship Division 1 Fixed-wing Patrol Aircraft Unit Submarine Unit Air Patrol Squadron 5 Naha Submarine Division 1 Submarine Division 3 Submarine Division 5 Structure of Destroyer Units Current situation (at the end of (approx. Future Structure of Patrol Aircraft Units FY 2013) 10 years later) Destroyers *47 destroyers as of the end of 2013 Patrol Aircraft (48 destroyers (12 divisions) in the 2010 NDPG H Maintenance of current structure (65 aircraft) of fixed-wing 54 destroyers (14 divisions) in the 2013 NDPG). patrol aircraft (P-1/3C) through continued procurement of P-1. H Increased number of destroyers by introduction of the new H Increased number of patrol helicopters (SH-60K/J) destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and **47** **54** (72 helicopters in the 2010 NDPG with a compact-type hull. **destroyers** **destroyers** 80 helicopters in the 2013 NDPG). Destroyers with detachable equipment for minesweeping and anti-submarine operations. H Establishment of an 8-destroyer structure with 2 additional Aegis-equipped destroyers. **Introduction of** **the new destroyer** H Continued procurement of **25** destroyers (DD). **mine-** **18** **sweeping** **mine-** New Destroyer **vessels** **sweeping vessels** Structure of Submarine Units Others Submarines *16 submarines as of the end of 2013. **Capabilities of New Destroyer** Other main programs (22 submarines in the 2010 NDPG Minesweeping by unmanned underwater vehicle H Refit tank landing ships (operation of 22 submarines in the 2013 NDPG). and other equipment amphibious vehicles and tilt-rotor aircraft). H Continued increase in the number of H Consider what the role should be of a submarines through construction and life multipurpose vessel with capabilities for extension. command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations. H Provide new destroyers with capabilities for anti-mine operations. Anti-submarine operations H Extend the life of existing vessels (destroyers) and aircraft (P-3C, SH-60J). by towed array sonar system (TASS) and other equipment ----- **y** **Structural Transformation of Fighter Aircraft and Other Units** **Column** In order to achieve a structure under which we can steadily maintain air superiority in Japan’s territorial airspace, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is relocating units including fi ghter aircraft units around the country based on the National Defense Program Guidelines and Mid-term Defense Program. For enhanced ASDF operational posture in the southwestern region, the F-15 unit at Naha Air Base came to have two fi ghter squadrons in FY2015 after the F-15 unit at Tsuiki Air Base was relocated to Naha, leading to the establishment of the 9th Air Wing. The Tactical Fighter Training Group, which simulates the role of an adversary unit, at Nyutabaru Air Base is scheduled to be relocated to Komatsu Air Base in FY 2016 in order to develop the necessary training environment required to improve the tactical skills of fi ghter aircraft units around the country. In addition, the defense posture in the southwestern region is to be further bolstered by moving the F-2 unit at Misawa Air Base to Tsuiki Air Base, making the F-2 unit at Tsuiki comprised of two squadrons, and swapping the F-4 unit at Nyutabaru Air Base with the F-15 unit at Hyakuri Air Base. With the deployment of F-35A at Misawa Air Base, the abolishment of the Air Reconnaissance Unit, and the establishment of the 13th fi ghter aircraft unit scheduled in the future, the ASDF aims to establish a posture of fi ghter aircraft units that can properly respond to changes in the security environment surrounding Japan while continuously and steadily carrying out air defense missions including scrambles against aircraft intruding into Japan’s territorial airspace. 2nd Air Wing (Chitose) Deployment planned in FY 2017 Planned in FY 2016 3rd Air Wing (Misawa) Planned in FY 2020 6th Air Wing Planned in (Komatsu) FY 2016 Planned in FY 2016 8th Air Wing 7th Air Wing (Tsuiki) (Hyakuri) FY 2015 Planned in FY 2016 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru) 9th Air Wing (Naha) ----- **5 Basic Foundation for SDF** To ensure that the defense force can function as the foundations underpinning the defense force. effectively as possible, it is also imperative to strengthen See>> Fig. II-2-1-4 (Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability) |Category|Main measures| |---|---| |Training and Exercises|❍ Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido; enhance and strengthen training and exercises that also involve relevant agencies and the civilian sector. ❍ Promote the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities in the southwestern region with the SDF for the purpose of securing a good training environment while paying close attention to the relationship with local communities.| |Operations Infrastructure|❍ Enhance resiliency, including the ability of camps and bases to recover so as to respond effectively to various situations, as well as to ensure the expeditious deployment of units etc.; improve facilities and dormitories of each branch of the service to ensure readiness. ❍ Discuss ways to enable the immediate use of civilian airports and ports by the SDF as the foundation of its operations in response to situations that arise. ❍ Implement various family support measures for personnel engaged in duties and for their families. ❍ Secure and store necessary ammunition; maintain equipment.| |Personnel Education|❍ Take measures to ensure an appropriate rank and age distribution given the duties and characteristics of respective branches of the service. ❍ Make use of female uniformed SDF personnel more effectively; facilitate measures to make good use of human resources including reemployment and measures related to honors and privileges; expand training and exercise opportunities, and secure personnel who can instantly cope with various situations with f lexibility based on a broad view and experience gained through working in other relevant ministries and agencies in order to enhance the joint operations structure. ❍ Facilitate various recruitment programs; promote support for the reemployment of SDF personnel through measures such as enhancing coordination with local governments and relevant agencies. ❍ Promote the use of Reserve SDF personnel in a wide range of areas and implement measures to boost the staff ing rate of Reserve SDF personnel etc. in order to support the continued operation of troops.| |Medicine|❍ Establish an eff ciient and high-quality medical system, including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. ❍ Secure and train such medical staff as medical off icers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. Improve f irst aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation.| |Defense Production and Technological Bases|❍ Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole; promote the adaptation of equipment to civilian use. ❍ Formulate clear principles that comply with the new security environment about the overseas transfer of weapons, etc.| |Eff icient Acquisition of Equipment|❍ In order to carry out effective and eff icient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system; enhance project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment; study the possibility of employing more long-term contracts. ❍ Improve readiness and response capabilities by reforming the supply system through the effective utilization of civilian capabilities; make the acquisition process transparent and optimize to the contract system.| |Research and Development (R&D)|❍ Under the constrained budget, ensure there is consistency between research and development and priority of defense buildup, while considering needs that arise in operations of the SDF. ❍ In order to respond to new threats and ensure technological advantage in strategically important areas, promote research and development based on a mid-to-long-term perspective. ❍ Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancing coordination with universities and research institutions, and transfer military technologies into civilian activities.| |Collaboration with Local Communities|❍ Advance measures aimed at the areas around defense facilities; continuously engage in proactive public relations activities aimed at local governments and residents. ❍ Give consideration to the attributes of each area when reorganizing units; give consideration to the impact that the operation of camps and so on have on local economies.| |Boosting Communication Capabilities|❍ Enhance strategic publicity; utilize a wide range of media networks.| |Enhancing the Intellectual Base|❍ Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions. ❍ Strengthen the research environment of the MOD and the SDF including the National Institute of Defense Studies; promote various forms of coordination with other national research institutes as well as universities and think tanks at home and abroad.| |Promoting Reform of the MOD|❍ Foster a sense of unity among civilian off icials and uniformed personnel; optimize the build-up of defense as a whole; enhance SDF joint operation functions; enhance policy-making and communication functions.| |Fig. II-2-1-4|Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability| |---|---| |Category Main measures ❍ Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido; enhance and strengthen training and exercises that also involve relevant agencies and the civilian sector. Training and Exercises ❍ Promote the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities in the southwestern region with the SDF for the purpose of securing a good training environment while paying close attention to the relationship with local communities. ❍ Enhance resiliency, including the ability of camps and bases to recover so as to respond effectively to various situations, as well as to ensure the expeditious deployment of units etc.; improve facilities and dormitories of each branch of the service to ensure readiness. Operations Infrastructure ❍ Discuss ways to enable the immediate use of civilian airports and ports by the SDF as the foundation of its operations in response to situations that arise. ❍ Implement various family support measures for personnel engaged in duties and for their families. ❍ Secure and store necessary ammunition; maintain equipment. ❍ Take measures to ensure an appropriate rank and age distribution given the duties and characteristics of respective branches of the service. ❍ Make use of female uniformed SDF personnel more effectively; facilitate measures to make good use of human resources including reemployment and measures related to honors and privileges; expand training and exercise opportunities, and secure personnel who can instantly cope with various situations with f lexibility based on a broad view and experience gained Personnel Education through working in other relevant ministries and agencies in order to enhance the joint operations structure. ❍ Facilitate various recruitment programs; promote support for the reemployment of SDF personnel through measures such as enhancing coordination with local governments and relevant agencies. ❍ Promote the use of Reserve SDF personnel in a wide range of areas and implement measures to boost the staff ing rate of Reserve SDF personnel etc. in order to support the continued operation of troops. ❍ Establish an eff ciient and high-quality medical system, including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. Medicine ❍ Secure and train such medical staff as medical off icers, nurses, and emergency medical technicians. Improve f irst aid capabilities on the frontline, and put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation. ❍ Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole; Defense Production and promote the adaptation of equipment to civilian use. Technological Bases ❍ Formulate clear principles that comply with the new security environment about the overseas transfer of weapons, etc. ❍ In order to carry out effective and eff icient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system; enhance project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment; study the possibility of employing more long-term contracts. Eff icient Acquisition of Equipment ❍ Improve readiness and response capabilities by reforming the supply system through the effective utilization of civilian capabilities; make the acquisition process transparent and optimize to the contract system. ❍ Under the constrained budget, ensure there is consistency between research and development and priority of defense buildup, while considering needs that arise in operations of the SDF. ❍ In order to respond to new threats and ensure technological advantage in strategically important areas, promote research and Research and Development (R&D) development based on a mid-to-long-term perspective. ❍ Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancing coordination with universities and research institutions, and transfer military technologies into civilian activities. ❍ Advance measures aimed at the areas around defense facilities; continuously engage in proactive public relations activities Collaboration with Local aimed at local governments and residents. Communities ❍ Give consideration to the attributes of each area when reorganizing units; give consideration to the impact that the operation of camps and so on have on local economies. Boosting Communication Capabilities ❍ Enhance strategic publicity; utilize a wide range of media networks. ❍ Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions. Enhancing the Intellectual Base ❍ Strengthen the research environment of the MOD and the SDF including the National Institute of Defense Studies; promote various forms of coordination with other national research institutes as well as universities and think tanks at home and abroad. ❍ Foster a sense of unity among civilian off icials and uniformed personnel; optimize the build-up of defense as a whole; Promoting Reform of the MOD enhance SDF joint operation functions; enhance policy-making and communication functions.|| **6 Additional Points** The NDPG sets out the form of Japan’s defense capabilities over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense capabilities will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verifi cation process, necessary examination considering the security environment at that time will be implemented and these guidelines will be revised adequately. In light of the increasingly severe fi scal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater effi ciency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup while ensuring harmony with other national initiatives. ----- **Section 2** **Outline of the Medium Term Defense Program** **1 Program Guidelines** Based on the NDPG, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) (MTDP) states that an appropriate defense buildup is to be achieved under the following six basic program guidelines. ❍ Emphasis will be placed on the following functions and capabilities in particular: (1) ISR capabilities; (2) intelligence capabilities; (3) transport capabilities; (4) C3I capabilities; (5) response to an attack on remote islands; (6) response to ballistic missile attacks; (7) response to outer space and cyberspace threats; (8) response to large-scale disasters; and (9) international peace cooperation efforts **2 Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** - 1 Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) ❍ Prioritize development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, development of rapid deployment capabilities, and achievement of greater effi ciency and rationalization of preparations for invasions such as landing invasions ❍ Effi ciently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quality and quantity ❍ Promote measures to reform the personnel management system ❍ Strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance ❍ Achieve greater effi ciencies and streamline the buildup of the defense forces fi eld artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies. See>> Fig. II-2-2-1 (Structure of Major GSDF Units) For the purpose of carrying out swift and fl exible nationwide operations of basic GSDF units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. As part of such efforts the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command. In order to respond swiftly to an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades. In addition, by establishing a coast observation unit[1] and area security units, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In order to enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade will be established. From the perspective of thoroughly facilitating effi ciencies and rationalization of preparations for fullscale invasions, and swift and fl exible operations, the GSDF will deploy mobile combat vehicles and remove tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. In addition, howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido will be concentrated into - 2 Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traffi c in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the MSDF will retain Christening / launching ceremony of JS Sekiryu ----- Fig. II-2-2-1 Structure of Major GSDF Units Reorganization into Rapid Deployment Divisions and Brigades 2 Example of rapid Rapid Deployment DivisionRapid Deployment Division deployment regiments Rapid deployment regiments(1st deployment) 11 5 Deployment mainly by aircraft Rapid Deployment 7 Rapid DeploymentRapid Deployment Brigade Deployment mainly Armored BrigadeBrigade by helicopter Advance deployment(rapid deployment) Legend Division : Rapid Deployment unit 9 : Regionally deployed unit Division Introduce “rapid deployment regiments” to rapid deployment divisions & brigades that will swiftly 6 respond to various situations.To enhance readiness and mobility, 12 Rapid Deployment DivisionRapid Deployment Division introduce mobile combat vehicles Rapid Deployment BrigadeRapid Deployment Brigade (MCV) suitable for air transportation. 1 13 3 10 DivisionDivision Division Brigade DivisionDivision 4 14 DivisionDivision Rapid Deployment BrigadeRapid Deployment Brigade 8 Rapid Deployment DivisionRapid Deployment Division Minister of Defense Chief of Joint Staff Overall Amamioshima Island coordination Air Defense Self-Defense Ground CentralCommand Direct U.S. Forces 15th Brigade Command Fleet (nationwide GSDF operations across Nationwide operations of GSDF units commandH Airborne brigadeCRF (abolished) Security unit all areas, logistics operations, etc.) H Amphibious rapid Overall coordination deployment brigade H Helicopter brigade Coast observation unit Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit Okinawa Logistics facilities Eastern ArmyGSDF North Northern ArmyGSDF Division Miyako Island Brigade Middle ArmyGSDF Eastern ArmyGSDF YonaguniIsland Ishigaki Western ArmyGSDF Island Deployment of Units in the Southwestern Region Command Structure of the Ground Central Command four escort fl otillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH) and two Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and fi ve escort divisions consisting of other destroyers. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be taken continuously. - 3 Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) early warning squadron at Naha Air Base. To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities and ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills. - 4 Authorized Number of SDF Personnel To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the ASDF will relocate one fi ghter squadron to Naha Air Base,[2] and newly organize and deploy one airborne The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being SDF Regular personnel, ----- **y** **Defense Equipment for Responding to Attacks on Remote Islands** **Column** Given Japan’s unique geographical features and the severe security environment, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is working on achieving a ground defense force that can respond to contingencies seamlessly and dynamically in order to build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force based on the National Defense Program Guidelines. Specifi cally, the efforts are comprised of the following three levels, and defense equipment deemed optimal for each level are being systematically furnished: regular “deployment of units”; “rapid deployment” of units necessary to interdict any invasion; and “recapturing” in case any remote islands are invaded. Tilt-rotor aircraft (V-22 Osprey) and Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV7) are examples of this important equipment. The tilt-rotor aircraft is an extremely effective form of equipment that possesses the cruising speed and long range of a fi xed-wing aircraft and the ability to perform takeoff and landing like a helicopter. The aircraft can quickly mobilize units necessary to interdict an invasion even on remote islands. In the case that a remote island is invaded, the Amphibious Assault Vehicle can land the necessary units from the sea to recapture and secure the invaded island while having enough protection for itself to withstand a certain degree of threat. Picture: Osprey (MV-22) of the U.S. Marine Corps Amphibious Assault Vehicle (reference example) and approximately 8,000 being Reserve Ready personnel. MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately The authorized number of SDF Regular personnel of the at the same levels as at the end of FY2013. **3 Major Programs Regarding SDF’s Capabilities** - 1 Effective Deterrence and Response to **Various Situations** and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities. See>> Fig. II-2-2-3 (Programs for the Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments) - 3 Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability The SDF will carry out various programs, including the buildup of defense equipment, in order to respond to each of the important situations described in “The Role of the Defense Force” addressed in the NDPG. See>> Fig. II-2-2-2 (Programs Related to Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations) - 2 Stabilization of the Asia-Pacifi c Region and **Improvement of the Global Security Environments** In order to maximize the effectiveness of functions and capabilities which are to be emphasized in seamlessly and dynamically fulfi lling the role of the defense force, the SDF will steadily develop various basic structures. See>> Fig. II-2-2-4 (Measures Related to the Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability) Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various activities including training **4** **Measures for the Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance** In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment national security, Japan will continue the revision of to Japan and the Asia-Pacifi c region and to ensure Japan’s the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.[3] ----- |Category|Col2|Main Programs| |---|---|---| |Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan||❍ Procure new airborne early warning (and control) aircraft (*1) and fixed air defense radar; introduce unmanned aerial vehicles (*2); improve airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). ❍ Steadily procure fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), submarines, and patrol helicopters (SH-60K). ❍ Introduce the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull.| |Response to attacks on remote islands|Development of a persistent ISR structure|❍ Deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island; introduce new airborne early warning aircraft; establish one squadron in the air warning unit and its deployment at Naha Air Base. ❍ Prepare a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region.| ||Obtaining and securing air superiority|❍ Increase the number of fgihter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two; steadily procure fgihter aircraft (F-35A); modernize fgihter aircraft (F-15). ❍ Procure new aerial refueling/transport aircraft (*3); equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities, and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J).| ||Obtaining and securing maritime supremacy|❍ Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers. ❍ Steadily procure patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and surface-to-ship guided missiles. ❍ Introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters.| ||Improvement of capabilities for rapid deployment and response|❍ Introduce tilt-rotor aircraft (*1); steadily procure transport aircraft (C-2). ❍ Acquire amphibious vehicles; refit Tank Landing Ships (LST). ❍ Consider active utilization of civilian transport capabilities, and implement necessary measures. ❍ Newly establish rapid deployment regiments with a focus on improvement of mobility; newly establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region; newly establish an amphibious rapid deployment brigade. ❍ Improve guidance capability of precision-guided bombs; increase friing range of ship-to-ship guided missiles.| ||Development of C3I|❍ Station GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services. ❍ Extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island; deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base.| |Response to ballistic missile attacks||❍ Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers; introduce advanced PAC-3 missiles (PAC-3 MSE); improve automated warning and control systems; procure and improve fxied air defense radar (FPS-7) systems. ❍ Promote Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles (SM-3 Block II-A). ❍ Conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of the future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. ❍ In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrently, continue procurement of a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, etc.| |Response in outer space and cyberspace||❍ Continue enhancement of information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites; steadily develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system; enhance the resiliency of satellites through space situational awareness efforts and research on satellite protection methods. ❍ Enhance survivability of the various SDF systems; strengthen information gathering functions, etc.; develop a practical training environment.| |Response to large-scale disasters||❍ Develop capabilities to respond immediately by transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establish a rotating staff posture in the event of various disasters.| |Strengthening intelligence capabilities||❍ Drastically reinforce capabilities to gather intelligence from diverse sources, including SIGINT, GEOINT, and HUMINT. ❍ Recruit and train personnel who would engage in information gathering and analysis.| |Category|Main Programs| |---|---| |Implementing training and exercises|❍ Proactively promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region.| |Promoting defense cooperation and exchanges|❍ Promote multilayered bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels, including high level exchanges and unit exchanges.| |Promoting capacity building assistance|❍ Help the militaries of countries eligible for support strengthen their capacities in various fields, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, landmine/unexploded ordinance disposal and military medicine. ❍ Work with the U.S. and Australia to carry out effective and efficient assistance while coordinating diplomatic policy.| |Ensuring maritime security|❍ Support anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and provide capacity building assistance to coastal countries in the region. ❍ Carry out joint training and exercises with other countries in waters outside the vicinity of Japan as well.| |Implementing international peace cooperation activities|❍ Strengthen information gathering capabilities in the deployed area and improve the armor performance of defense equipment. ❍ Enhance posture of engineering units and enhance posture related to telecommunications, supplies, medical services, family assistance, etc. ❍ Dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters and UN DPKO develop human resources from a long-term perspective. ❍ Expand educational content at the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center and enhance cooperation in education with related ministries and agencies.| |Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation|❍ Actively engage in the efforts to cooperate with international initiatives on arms control and arms reductions, including human contributions. ❍ Promote initiatives for non-proliferation, through participating in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises.| |Fig. II-2-2-3|Programs for the Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments| |---|---| |Category Main Programs Implementing training and exercises ❍ Proactively promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the Asia-Pacific region. Promoting defense cooperation and ❍ Promote multilayered bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels, including high level exchanges exchanges and unit exchanges. ❍ Help the militaries of countries eligible for support strengthen their capacities in various fields, including humanitarian Promoting capacity building assistance assistance, disaster relief, landmine/unexploded ordinance disposal and military medicine. ❍ Work with the U.S. and Australia to carry out effective and efficient assistance while coordinating diplomatic policy. ❍ Support anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and provide capacity building assistance Ensuring maritime security to coastal countries in the region. ❍ Carry out joint training and exercises with other countries in waters outside the vicinity of Japan as well. ❍ Strengthen information gathering capabilities in the deployed area and improve the armor performance of defense equipment. ❍ Enhance posture of engineering units and enhance posture related to telecommunications, supplies, medical services, Implementing international peace family assistance, etc. cooperation activities ❍ Dispatch SDF personnel to local mission headquarters and UN DPKO develop human resources from a long-term perspective. ❍ Expand educational content at the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center and enhance cooperation in education with related ministries and agencies. ❍ Actively engage in the efforts to cooperate with international initiatives on arms control and arms reductions, including Cooperating with efforts to promote arms human contributions. control, disarmament, and non-proliferation ❍ Promote initiatives for non-proliferation, through participating in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises.|| Fig. II-2-2-2 Programs Related to Effective Deterrent of and Response to Various Situations **Category** **Main Programs** ❍ Procure new airborne early warning (and control) aircraft (*1) and fixed air defense radar; introduce unmanned aerial vehicles (*2); improve airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). Ensuring security of the sea and airspace ❍ Steadily procure fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1), Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), submarines, and patrol surrounding Japan helicopters (SH-60K). ❍ Introduce the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull. ❍ Deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island; introduce new airborne early warning aircraft; establish one Development of a persistent squadron in the air warning unit and its deployment at Naha Air Base. ISR structure ❍ Prepare a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region. ❍ Increase the number of fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two; steadily procure fighter Obtaining and securing air aircraft (F-35A); modernize fighter aircraft (F-15). superiority ❍ Procure new aerial refueling/transport aircraft (*3); equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities, and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). ❍ Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers. Obtaining and securing ❍ Steadily procure patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and surface-to-ship guided missiles. Response to maritime supremacy ❍ Introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters. attacks on remote ❍ Introduce tilt-rotor aircraft (*1); steadily procure transport aircraft (C-2). islands ❍ Acquire amphibious vehicles; refit Tank Landing Ships (LST). Improvement of capabilities ❍ Consider active utilization of civilian transport capabilities, and implement necessary measures. for rapid deployment and ❍ Newly establish rapid deployment regiments with a focus on improvement of mobility; newly establish area response security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region; newly establish an amphibious rapid deployment brigade. ❍ Improve guidance capability of precision-guided bombs; increase firing range of ship-to-ship guided missiles. ❍ Station GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services. Development of C3I ❍ Extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island; deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base. ❍ Increase the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers; introduce advanced PAC-3 missiles (PAC-3 MSE); improve automated warning and control systems; procure and improve fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems. ❍ Promote Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles (SM-3 Block II-A). Response to ballistic missile attacks ❍ Conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of the future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. ❍ In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrently, continue procurement of a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, etc. ❍ Continue enhancement of information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites; steadily develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system; enhance the resiliency of satellites through Response in outer space and cyberspace space situational awareness efforts and research on satellite protection methods. ❍ Enhance survivability of the various SDF systems; strengthen information gathering functions, etc.; develop a practical training environment. ❍ Develop capabilities to respond immediately by transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as Response to large-scale disasters well as establish a rotating staff posture in the event of various disasters. ❍ Drastically reinforce capabilities to gather intelligence from diverse sources, including SIGINT, GEOINT, and Strengthening intelligence capabilities HUMINT. ❍ Recruit and train personnel who would engage in information gathering and analysis. Notes: 1. E-2D airborne early warning aircraft and tilt-rotor aircraft have been acquired since FY2015. 2. Acquisition of Global Hawk unmanned aircraft vehicle began in FY2015. 3. Aerial refueling / transport aircraft (KC-46A) are to be acquired in FY2016. Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue. Japan will also strengthen cooperation in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping counter terrorism maritime affairs outer ----- |Category|Main measures| |---|---| |Training and Exercises|❍ Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido by SDF units across the country; facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility; expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF; actively engage in bilateral trainings with U.S. Forces. ❍ Reinforce coordination with relevant agencies including police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard; conduct various simulation exercises and training exercises regarding various situations in a tailored manner.| |Operations Infrastructure|❍ Strengthen the SDF’s capabilities to immediately rebuild various support functions; take measures for the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations; store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations; promote measures supporting families of military personnel to enable a sustained response posture over the long term. ❍ Utilize a new contract system under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding sustainment and procurement.| |Personnel Education|❍ Achieve a composition of ranks given the characteristics of respective units; ensure an appropriate age distribution. • Secure and nurture appropriate numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers; review the retirement age of 60; research on new systems for early retirement; take measures to encourage airplane pilots to be re-employed in the private sector as pilots. ❍ Make use of SDF personnel more effectively; promote measures related to honors and privileges. • Make use of female personnel more effectively; actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills, and experience; expand the Defense Meritorious Badge program. ❍ Continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years; improve the re-employment environment for SDF personnel. • Effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times: enhance coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments; promote provision of more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel; encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector. ❍ Promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. • Appoint reserve personnel and their assignment to duties including possible opportunities to work at headquarters; improve training for call-ups; appoint reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills; promote increased public awareness of the reserve program and enhanced incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel, in order to increase the staffing rate of reserve personnel.| |Medicine|❍ Establish an efficient and high-quality medical system including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of its networks. ❍ Arrangements for prompt treatment and medical evacuation, including consideration of the revision of regulations for emergency medical treatment in response to contingencies.| |Defense Production and Technological Bases|❍ Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole; promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development with other countries. ❍ Promote the adaptation of defense equipment developed by the MOD/SDF to civilian uses.| |Efficient Acquisition of Equipment|❍ In order to carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system, and enhance consistent project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment. ❍ Actively train and appoint personnel related to the acquisition of equipment to positions. ❍ Develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost and the real value of the life-cycle costs. ❍ Ensure transparency and fairness; sort and rank, as necessary, parties available for negotiated contracts. ❍ Consider a contract system to incentivize companies to lower prices, longer-term contracts, and the use of a consortium.| |Research and Development (R&D)|❍ Technically review next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles to strengthen its air defense capabilities. ❍ Conduct strategic studies including empirical research relating to future fighter aircraft. ❍ In an effort to improve ISR capability, promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. ❍ Conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in the case of various contingencies including large- scale natural disasters, R&D to improve existing equipment. ❍ Set a vision for future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to the development of major equipment. ❍ Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions; transfer military technologies into civilian activities; strengthen the function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies.| |Collaboration with Local Communities|❍ Advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities; secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities through intensive public relations activities. ❍ Give consideration to the attributes of each area in securing the understanding of local governments and residents on the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc.; promote measures conducive to local economies.| |Boosting Communication Capabilities|❍ Provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks. ❍ Facilitate provision of information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF efforts including the overseas activities of the SDF.| |Enhancing the Intellectual Base|❍ Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, etc., including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers. ❍ Strengthen the role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as an MOD think tank through coordination with policy- making divisions and promotion of academic exchanges.| |Promoting Reform of the MOD|❍ Reform the MOD’s work methods and organization to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions, and enhance policy-making and communication functions. ❍ Take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in the acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind the option of establishing a new agency in the MOD. ❍ Conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy by such efforts as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff.| Fig. II-2-2-4 Measures Related to the Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability **Category** **Main measures** ❍ Expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido by SDF units across the country; facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility; expand the joint/shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with Training and Exercises the SDF; actively engage in bilateral trainings with U.S. Forces. ❍ Reinforce coordination with relevant agencies including police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard; conduct various simulation exercises and training exercises regarding various situations in a tailored manner. ❍ Strengthen the SDF’s capabilities to immediately rebuild various support functions; take measures for the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations; store necessary ammunition and spare parts in locations most appropriate for operations; promote measures supporting families of military personnel to enable a sustained response posture Operations Infrastructure over the long term. ❍ Utilize a new contract system under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance regarding sustainment and procurement. ❍ Achieve a composition of ranks given the characteristics of respective units; ensure an appropriate age distribution. - Secure and nurture appropriate numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers; review the retirement age of 60; research on new systems for early retirement; take measures to encourage airplane pilots to be re-employed in the private sector as pilots. ❍ Make use of SDF personnel more effectively; promote measures related to honors and privileges. - Make use of female personnel more effectively; actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills, and experience; expand the Defense Meritorious Badge program. ❍ Continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years; improve the re-employment environment for SDF personnel. Personnel Education - Effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times: enhance coordination and cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments; promote provision of more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel; encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector. ❍ Promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas. - Appoint reserve personnel and their assignment to duties including possible opportunities to work at headquarters; improve training for call-ups; appoint reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills; promote increased public awareness of the reserve program and enhanced incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel, in order to increase the staffing rate of reserve personnel. ❍ Establish an efficient and high-quality medical system including the upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of its networks. Medicine ❍ Arrangements for prompt treatment and medical evacuation, including consideration of the revision of regulations for emergency medical treatment in response to contingencies. ❍ Formulate a strategy that sets forth the MOD’s future vision for Japan’s defense production and technical basis as a whole; Defense Production and promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development with other countries. Technological Bases ❍ Promote the adaptation of defense equipment developed by the MOD/SDF to civilian uses. ❍ In order to carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, introduce a project manager system, and enhance consistent project management throughout the life-cycle of equipment. ❍ Actively train and appoint personnel related to the acquisition of equipment to positions. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment ❍ Develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost and the real value of the life-cycle costs. ❍ Ensure transparency and fairness; sort and rank, as necessary, parties available for negotiated contracts. ❍ Consider a contract system to incentivize companies to lower prices, longer-term contracts, and the use of a consortium. ❍ Technically review next-generation surface-to-air guided missiles to strengthen its air defense capabilities. ❍ Conduct strategic studies including empirical research relating to future fighter aircraft. ❍ In an effort to improve ISR capability, promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. ❍ Conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in the case of various contingencies including large Research and Development (R&D) scale natural disasters, R&D to improve existing equipment. ❍ Set a vision for future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to the development of major equipment. ❍ Actively utilize civilian technologies (dual-use technologies) by enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions; transfer military technologies into civilian activities; strengthen the function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. ❍ Advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities; secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities through intensive public relations activities. Collaboration with Local ❍ Give consideration to the attributes of each area in securing the understanding of local governments and residents on the Communities reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc.; promote measures conducive to local economies. Boosting Communication Capabilities [❍][ Provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks. ] ❍ Facilitate provision of information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF efforts including the overseas activities of the SDF. ❍ Promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, etc., including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers. Enhancing the Intellectual Base ❍ Strengthen the role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as an MOD think tank through coordination with policymaking divisions and promotion of academic exchanges. ❍ Reform the MOD’s work methods and organization to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions, and enhance policy-making and communication functions. Promoting Reform of the MOD ❍ Take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in the acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind the option of establishing a new agency in the MOD. ❍ Conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy by such efforts as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff. space and cyberspace. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation Moreover, from the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS). ----- |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |---|---|---| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (excluding mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31| |MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9| |ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education| |Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3| Fig. II-2-2-5 Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program **Service** **Equipment** **Quantity** Mobile Combat Vehicles 99 Armored Vehicles 24 Amphibious Vehicles 52 Tilt-Rotor Aircraft 17 GSDF Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) 6 Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles 9 companies Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles 5 companies Tanks 44 Howitzers (excluding mortars) 31 Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) 5 (2) Submarines 5 Other Ships 5 MSDF Total (Tonnage) 15 (approx. 52,000 t) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) 23 Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) 23 Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based) 9 New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft 4 Fighters (F-35A) 28 Fighter Modernization (F-15) 26 ASDF New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft 3 Transport Aircraft (C-2) 10 Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE) 2 groups & education Joint units Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 3 Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above. **5 Quantities of Major Procurement** The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of develop the defense forces described in the Annex Table major procurement described in Section 3. Japan aims to of the NDPG over a 10-year time frame. See>> Fig. II-2-2-5 (Annex from the Medium Term Defense Program) **6 Expenditures** The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24,670 billion in FY2013 prices. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this **7 Other** While maintaining the deterrence of the U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specifi c measures including the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan and program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23,970 billion over the next fi ve years. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, in consideration of such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fi scal conditions. SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa. ----- **Section 3** **Build-Up of Defense Capability in FY2016** Japan will steadily build up its defense capability during FY2016, which serves as the third fi scal year under the NDPG and MTDP, to establish a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, based on these programs. As part of this build-up, Japan will improve its defense capabilities, focusing on further enhancement of joint functions in order to seamlessly and dynamically fulfi ll its defense responsibilities, which include providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, and supporting stability in the AsiaPacifi c region, as well as improving the global security environment. In doing so, Japan will place particular emphasis on the following measures: ISR capabilities; intelligence capabilities; transport capabilities; command, control, communication, intelligence (C3I) capabilities; response to attacks on remote islands; response to ballistic missile attacks; response to outer space and cyberspace threats; response to large-scale disasters, etc.; and international peace cooperation efforts, etc. Furthermore, considering the increasingly severe situation in Japan’s public fi nance, Japan will strive to achieve greater effi ciencies and streamlining through efforts such as longer-term contracts, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government. See>> Fig. II-2-3-1 (Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2016) |Category|Col2|Main Programs| |---|---|---| |I. Effective deterrence and response to various situations|Ensure security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan|Acquire patrol helicopters (SH-60K), construct a submarine, acquire new airborne early-warning aircraft (E-2D), acquire part of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Global Hawk) system, etc.| ||Response to attacks on remote islands|Develop facilities for the deployment of a coast observation unit on Yonaguni Island; procure f ighter aircraft (F-35A); procure new aerial refueling / transport aircraft (KC-46A); proceed with organizational transition of f gihter aircraft units, etc.; procure the Osprey (V-22; procure amphibious vehicles (AAV7); procure maneuver combat vehicles; upgrade “Osumi” class LST to enhance transport capabilities in amphibious warfare; develop the variable depth sonar system; etc.| ||Response to ballistic missile attacks|Construct an Aegis-equipped destroyer, conduct Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced ballistic missile interceptor (SM-3 Block IIA), recertify PAC-3 missiles, develop infrastructure for the PAC-3 unit deployment in Ichigaya, etc.| ||Response in outer space|Design a system for the Space Surveillance System as a whole, etc.| ||Response in cyberspace|Strengthen capability to collect intelligence regarding cyber attacks; increase the number of analysts in the Cyber Defense Group.| ||Response to large-scale disasters|Maintain and strengthen functions of camps and bases that will serve as hubs during a disaster, carry out training on large-scale and special disasters, improve alternative functions in case the Ichigaya building gets damaged due to a disaster, etc.| ||Strengthening intelligence capabilities|Strengthen the Defense Attachés management system, etc.| |II. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacif ci region and improvement of the global security environment||Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for stabilizing the Asia-Pacif ic region, and carry out training and exercises as needed and as appropriate. More actively participate in international peace cooperation activities, etc., in order to respond appropriately to global security issues and other issues.| |III. Measures for the strengthening of the Japan- U.S. Alliance||Steadily carry out specif ic measures such as the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam, the relocation of Futenma Air Station, and return of the land south of Kadena Air Base.| |IV. Measures for personnel and education||Strengthen recruiting operations and re-employment assistance, raise the staff ing rate of SDF reserve personnel and enhance and improve the SDF reserve personnel system, and promote successful female personnel through providing support for good work-life balance and improving the work environment.| |V. Initiatives for greater eff iciency||Introduce long-term contracts for the procurement of equipment etc., review maintenance and improvement methods, purchase defense equipment in bulk, revise specif ications for the use of civilian items, etc.| |VI. Other|SDF organization|In order to provide an effective deterrence and respond to various situations, implement projects to reorganize each unit and increase the actual number of SDF personnel.| ||Promotion of base measures|Steadily implement measures around bases in order to achieve harmony between defense facilities and surrounding communities as well as carry out measures to facilitate and streamline the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.| ||Strengthening of education and research systems|Conduct next generation f ighter aircraft related projects, conduct a study on large vessels and warhead technologies for guided missiles in response to threats to remote islands, conduct a study on high mobility powered suits, establish an initiative called the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security, etc.| ||Enhancement of medical function|Carry out initiatives towards upgrading SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, improve f irst aid capabilities on the frontline in response to contingencies, conduct initiatives to contribute to smooth SDF activities in the southwestern region, etc.| ||Promotion of research and development|Conduct future f gihter aircraft-related projects, conduct a study on large vessels and warhead technologies for guided missiles in response to threats to remote islands, conduct a study on situational awareness technologies for remote control vehicles responding to CBRN, introduce systems to advance studies on technologies for security, etc.| |Fig. II-2-3-1|Main Aspects of Build-up of Defense Capabilities for FY2016| |---|---| |Category Main Programs Ensure security of the sea and Acquire patrol helicopters (SH-60K), construct a submarine, acquire new airborne early-warning aircraft (E-2D), airspace surrounding Japan acquire part of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Global Hawk) system, etc. Develop facilities for the deployment of a coast observation unit on Yonaguni Island; procure f ighter aircraft (F-35A); procure new aerial refueling / transport aircraft (KC-46A); proceed with organizational transition of f gihter Response to attacks on aircraft units, etc.; procure the Osprey (V-22; procure amphibious vehicles (AAV7); procure maneuver combat remote islands vehicles; upgrade “Osumi” class LST to enhance transport capabilities in amphibious warfare; develop the variable depth sonar system; etc. I. Effective Construct an Aegis-equipped destroyer, conduct Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced ballistic missile deterrence Response to ballistic missile interceptor (SM-3 Block IIA), recertify PAC-3 missiles, develop infrastructure for the PAC-3 unit deployment in and response attacks Ichigaya, etc. to various Response in outer space Design a system for the Space Surveillance System as a whole, etc. situations Strengthen capability to collect intelligence regarding cyber attacks; increase the number of analysts in the Cyber Response in cyberspace Defense Group. Maintain and strengthen functions of camps and bases that will serve as hubs during a disaster, carry out training Response to large-scale on large-scale and special disasters, improve alternative functions in case the Ichigaya building gets damaged due disasters to a disaster, etc. Strengthening intelligence Strengthen the Defense Attachés management system, etc. capabilities II. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacif ci region Strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation for stabilizing the Asia-Pacif ic region, and carry out training and and improvement of the global security exercises as needed and as appropriate. More actively participate in international peace cooperation activities, etc., environment in order to respond appropriately to global security issues and other issues. III. Measures for the strengthening of the Japan- Steadily carry out specif ic measures such as the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa to Guam, the U.S. Alliance relocation of Futenma Air Station, and return of the land south of Kadena Air Base. Strengthen recruiting operations and re-employment assistance, raise the staff ing rate of SDF reserve personnel IV. Measures for personnel and education and enhance and improve the SDF reserve personnel system, and promote successful female personnel through providing support for good work-life balance and improving the work environment. Introduce long-term contracts for the procurement of equipment etc., review maintenance and improvement V. Initiatives for greater eff iciency methods, purchase defense equipment in bulk, revise specif ications for the use of civilian items, etc. In order to provide an effective deterrence and respond to various situations, implement projects to reorganize SDF organization each unit and increase the actual number of SDF personnel. Steadily implement measures around bases in order to achieve harmony between defense facilities and surrounding Promotion of base measures communities as well as carry out measures to facilitate and streamline the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. Conduct next generation f ighter aircraft related projects, conduct a study on large vessels and warhead Strengthening of education technologies for guided missiles in response to threats to remote islands, conduct a study on high mobility and research systems VI. Other powered suits, establish an initiative called the Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security, etc. Carry out initiatives towards upgrading SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, improve f irst aid Enhancement of medical capabilities on the frontline in response to contingencies, conduct initiatives to contribute to smooth SDF activities function in the southwestern region, etc. Conduct future f gihter aircraft-related projects, conduct a study on large vessels and warhead technologies for guided Promotion of research and missiles in response to threats to remote islands, conduct a study on situational awareness technologies for remote development control vehicles responding to CBRN, introduce systems to advance studies on technologies for security, etc.|| ----- Maneuver combat vehicle (prototype) New type aerial refueling and transport aircraft (KC-46A) (image) **Section 4** **Defense-Related Expenditures** **1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures** Defense-related expenditures include expenses for improving defense capabilities and maintaining and managing the SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the implementation of measures against neighborhood affairs in the vicinity of defense facilities. In comparison with the previous fi scal year, defenserelated expenditures for FY2016 were increased by 38.6 billion yen to 4.8607 trillion yen. When including expenses related to Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities) and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft, defense-related expenditures were increased by 74 billion yen from the previous fi scal year to 5.0541 trillion yen. Additionally the supplementary budget for FY2015 contains an appropriation of 196.6 billion yen as necessary expenses for securing stable operations of the SDF, which includes restoring the SDF’s disaster response capabilities. See>> Fig. II-2-4-1 (Comparison Between FY2015 Budget and FY2016 Budget) See>> Fig. II-2-4-2 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years) |Category|Col2|FY2015|FY2016 Fiscal YOY growth (indicates negative growth)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||Fiscal YOY growth (indicates negative growth)| |Annual expenditure (note)||48,221|48,607|386 (0.8%)| ||Personnel and food provisions Material expenses|21,121 27,100|21,473 27,135|351 (1.7%) 34 (0.1%)| |Future obligation (note)||39,530|43,070|3,540 (9.0%)| ||New contracts Existing contracts|22,998 16,532|20,800 22,270|2,198 ( 9.6%) 5,738 (34.7%)| |Fig. II-2-4-1|Comparison Between FY2015 Budget and FY2016 Budget| |---|---| |(100 million) FY2016 Category FY2015 Fiscal YOY growth (indicates negative growth) Annual expenditure (note) 48,221 48,607 386 (0.8%) Personnel and food provisions 21,121 21,473 351 (1.7%) Material expenses 27,100 27,135 34 (0.1%) Future obligation (note) 39,530 43,070 3,540 (9.0%) New contracts 22,998 20,800 2,198 ( 9.6%) Existing contracts 16,532 22,270 5,738 (34.7%) Notes: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community), or expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft). If these are included, the f giures are 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015 and 5,054.1 billion yen for FY2016; and for future obligation, 4,363.5 billion yen for FY2015 and 4,653.7 billion yen for FY2016.|| ----- Maneuver combat vehicle (prototype) New type aerial refueling and transport aircraft (KC-46A) (image) **Section 4** **Defense-Related Expenditures** **1 Overview of Defense-Related Expenditures** Defense-related expenditures include expenses for improving defense capabilities and maintaining and managing the SDF, as well as expenses necessary for the implementation of measures against neighborhood affairs in the vicinity of defense facilities. In comparison with the previous fi scal year, defenserelated expenditures for FY2016 were increased by 38.6 billion yen to 4.8607 trillion yen. When including expenses related to Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion allocated for reducing the burden on local communities) and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft, defense-related expenditures were increased by 74 billion yen from the previous fi scal year to 5.0541 trillion yen. Additionally the supplementary budget for FY2015 contains an appropriation of 196.6 billion yen as necessary expenses for securing stable operations of the SDF, which includes restoring the SDF’s disaster response capabilities. See>> Fig. II-2-4-1 (Comparison Between FY2015 Budget and FY2016 Budget) See>> Fig. II-2-4-2 (Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years) |Category|Col2|FY2015|FY2016 Fiscal YOY growth (indicates negative growth)|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||Fiscal YOY growth (indicates negative growth)| |Annual expenditure (note)||48,221|48,607|386 (0.8%)| ||Personnel and food provisions Material expenses|21,121 27,100|21,473 27,135|351 (1.7%) 34 (0.1%)| |Future obligation (note)||39,530|43,070|3,540 (9.0%)| ||New contracts Existing contracts|22,998 16,532|20,800 22,270|2,198 ( 9.6%) 5,738 (34.7%)| |Fig. II-2-4-1|Comparison Between FY2015 Budget and FY2016 Budget| |---|---| |(100 million) FY2016 Category FY2015 Fiscal YOY growth (indicates negative growth) Annual expenditure (note) 48,221 48,607 386 (0.8%) Personnel and food provisions 21,121 21,473 351 (1.7%) Material expenses 27,100 27,135 34 (0.1%) Future obligation (note) 39,530 43,070 3,540 (9.0%) New contracts 22,998 20,800 2,198 ( 9.6%) Existing contracts 16,532 22,270 5,738 (34.7%) Notes: Does not include SACO-related expenses, U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community), or expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft based on “The Policy Concerning Government Aircraft” (August 7, 2013 decision by the Review Committee on Government Aircraft). If these are included, the f giures are 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015 and 5,054.1 billion yen for FY2016; and for future obligation, 4,363.5 billion yen for FY2015 and 4,653.7 billion yen for FY2016.|| ----- Fig. II-2-4-2 Trend in Defense-Related Expenditures Over the Past 15 Years 50,000 49,392 49,262 49,000 48,760 48,607 48,297 48,221 48,000 47,815 47,838 47,903 47,426 47,028 47,000 46,826 46,804 46,625 46,453 46,000 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community out of the U.S. forces realignment expenses, or expenses associated with the acquisition of a new government aircraft. The total defense expenditures when including these items are 4,955.7 billion yen for FY2002, 4,952.7 billion yen for FY2003, 4,902.6 billion yen for FY2004, 4,856.0 billion yen for FY2005, 4,813.6 billion yen for FY2006, 4,801.3 billion yen for FY2007, 4,779.6 billion yen for FY2008, 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009, 4,790.3 billion yen for FY2010, 4,775.2 billion yen for FY2011, 4,713.8 billion yen for FY2012, 4,753.8 billion yen for FY2013, 4,848.8 billion yen for FY2014, and 4,980.1 billion yen for FY2015, and 5,054.1 billion yen for FY2016. **2 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures** Personnel and food provision expenses as well as obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% of the total defense-related budget. The remaining 20% of the budget which is set aside for general material expenses includes spending for repairing equipment and for implementing measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan. As such, a high percentage of the budget is allocated for maintenance purposes. For this reason, the breakdown of the defense-related expenditures cannot be easily altered in a signifi cant manner on a single-year basis. See>> Fig. II-2-4-3 (Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts) Personnel and food provision expenses were increased by 35.1 billion yen from the previous fi scal year due to the revision of the remuneration of civil servants based on the FY2015 recommendation by the National Personnel Authority and other factors. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year increased by 500 million yen from the previous year, while general material expenses increased by 3.0 billion yen from the previous year.[1] See>> Fig. II-2-4-4 (Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2016)) See>> Reference 14 (Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)) In addition to the annual budget expenditure, the amount of new future obligation also indicates payments for the following year and beyond (the amount of future obligation arising in the applicable fi scal year). In the build-up of defense capabilities, it is common to take multiple years from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. Consequently, for such items, a procedure is undertaken whereby a multi-year contract is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the contract that payments will be made in the following fi scal year and beyond (within fi ve years, in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following fi scal year and beyond, based on such a multi-year contract, is called the “future obligation.” The amount of new future obligation arising in FY2016 decreased from the previous fi scal year by 219.8 billion yen (9.6%). Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis,[2] which shows the scale of operations, there is a decline from the previous fi scal year of 216.9 billion yen (6.6%). See>> Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 (Efforts toward Project Management, etc.) The comparison with the previous year is concerning expenditure excluding the SACO-related expenses and the U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (the portion for the reduction of the burden on local communities and the expenses associated with the introduction of a new dedicated government aircraft). The same applies hereinafter in regard to this section. The sum total of general material expenses and future obligation concerning new contracts, which shows the amount of the material expenses (operating expenses) that are to be contracted in the applicable ii ----- |Contract|Col2|Col3|Payment| |---|---|---|---| |Contract|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||| |Contract|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |||| ||OObblliigg|aattoorryy| |Contract|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||eexxpp|| |||| |||| |Contract ((3355|Col2| |---|---| ||| ||..33%%))| |Fig. II-2-4-4|Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures (FY2016)| |---|---| |R&D 2.2% Other 1.5% Facility development 3.0% Base measures Personnel and 9.3% food provisions 44.2% By purpose Procurement of of use equipment, etc. 15.8% Other General materials Maintenance, etc. 20.5% (9,948) 24.1% 16.4% (7,967) GSDF [0.3%] 36.0% (17,489) Personnel and By By expense food provisions organization 44.2% (21,473) ASDF [1.7%] 23.0% (11,196) Obligatory outlays 35.3% (17,187) MSDF [0.0%] 24.6% (11,954) Notes: 1. ( ) is the budget amount; unit: 100 million yen. 2. The above figure does not include SACO-related expenses (2.8 billion yen), the portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community (176.6 billion yen) out of the realignment expenses, nor the expenses associated with the acquisition of new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen) 3. Figures in square brackets [ ] indicate year on year growth rate (%)|| Fig. II-2-4-3 Relationship between Annual Expenditure and Future Obligation Due to New Contracts 2012 2013 2014 2015 **2016** 2017 2018 2019 2020 Amount of future obligation When improving defense capabilities, it is common for work in areas like the procurement of equipment and the upgrading of facilities to be carried out over several years. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the Government promises in advance at the time of the agreement to make the payment at a fixed time in the future. Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond under such contracts, which extend for multiple years. Example: A case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract that runs for four years Personnel FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 provisionsprovisionsand foodand food Contract Payment expensesexpenses expenses paid in part Obligatory outlay expenses paid in part Obligatory outlay expenses paid in part Obligatory outlay Remaining sum paid(6 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (1 billion yen) (2 billion yen) General material Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay Obligatory outlay ((44.244.2%)%) expenses expenses expenses expenses 2012 Contract Future obligation (9 billion yen) Amount of contract (10 billion yen) 2013 Contract ObligatoryObligatory outlayoutlay Existing 2014 Contract expensesexpenses contracts Future 2015 Contract obligation ((35.335.3%)%) Structure of Defense-related Expenditures ContractContract GeneralGeneral New Annual expenditure materialmaterial contracts Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expensesexpenses expenses and material expenses (operating expenses). Material expenses on contract basis (activity(activity Personnel and Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement food provisionsexpenses allowance, meals in barracks, etc. expenses)expenses) Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of ((20.520.5%)%) equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; (operating expenses)Material expenses facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; technological research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan **FY2016** General materialoutlay expensesObligatory Expenses paid in FY2016 based on contracts made before FY2015 **Defense-relatedexpenditures** expenses Expenses paid in FY2016 based on contracts made in FY2016 (activity expenses) ----- **3 Comparison with Other Countries** Monolithic understanding of the defense expenditures of each country is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an internationally unifi ed defi nition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are unclear in some countries where such data is publicly disclosed. Furthermore, in comparing the defense expenditures of each country, though there exists the method of converting their defense expenditures into dollar amounts at respective currency rates, their dollar-based defense expenses calculated in this way do not necessarily refl ect the precise value based on each country’s price levels. Therefore, the results of converting Japan’s defenserelated expenditures and those of other countries offi cially published by each government into dollar amounts, using the purchasing power parity[3] of each country reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are shown in Figure II-2-4-5 (The Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2014)). See>> Part I, Chapter 2 (Defense Policies of Countries); Reference 15 (Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries) In addition, Fig. II-2-4-6 (Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years) shows the changes in defense expenditures of Japan’s neighboring counties over the past ten years. |lion USD)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Defense budgets (100 million USD) Defense budgets as % of GDP||||||| |Japan|U. S.|China|Russia|ROK Aus|tralia UK|France| |457|5,779|2,290|1,166|405 1|99 493|475| |1.0|3.4|1.3|3.5|2.4 1|.8 1.9|1.8| |Fig. II-2-4-5|The Defense Budgets of Major Countries (FY2014)| |---|---| |(100 million USD) (%) 8,000 6.0 7,000 Defense budgets (100 million USD) 5.0 Defense budgets as % of GDP 6,000 4.0 5,000 4,000 3.0 3,000 2.0 2,000 1.0 1,000 0 0.0 Japan U. S. China Russia ROK Australia UK France 457 5,779 2,290 1,166 405 199 493 475 1.0 3.4 1.3 3.5 2.4 1.8 1.9 1.8 Notes: 1. Defense budgets are based on each country’s public documents. Dollar conversions have been made while referring to each country’s purchasing power parity for FY2014 as published by the OECD (official rate listed on the OECD website) (as of April 2016). (1 dollar=104.71517 yen=3.529838 yuan=21.261009 rubles =881.928774 won=1.470092 Australian dollars=0.699324 pound =0.818852 euros (France)) 2. Defense budgets as a proportion of GDP have been estimated based on figures published by the governments of each country. 3. Documents published by NATO show that the U.K.’s defense budgets as a percentage of GDP was 2.2% in 2014.|| |Fig. II-2-4-6|Changes in Defense Budgets in Surrounding Countries Over the Past Ten Years| |---|---| |(Times) 5.00 RRuussssiiaa 44..6622 ttiimmeess 4.00 CChhiinnaa 33..4400 ttiimmeess 3.00 2.00 RROOKK 11..7722 ttiimmeess AAuussttrraalliiaa 11..6688 ttiimmeess 1.00 UU..SS.. 11..1155 ttiimmeess JJaappaann 11..0011 ttiimmeess 0.00 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Notes: 1. Created based on the defense budgets published by each country. 2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense budgets each year, with the FY2006 value as 1 (times) (rounded to two decimal places). 3. The definition and breakdown of the defense budgets of each country are not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as foreign exchange fluctuations and price levels of each country, it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets among countries.|| ----- **Human Foundation and Organization that Supports** **Section 5** **the Defense Force** In order to exert its defense capabilities with the maximum effectiveness, it is necessary that the MOD/SDF further enhances and strengthens its human foundation, which **1 Recruitment and Employment** - 1 Recruitment supports the defense force, as well as further deepening mutual trust among local communities, the people, and the SDF. recruitment counselors. Moreover, local governments are also carrying out some of the administrative activities regarding the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel and candidates for uniformed SDF personnel, such as announcing the recruitment period and promoting the SDF as a workplace, for which the MOD allocates them the requisite budget. It is vital to secure highly qualifi ed personnel for the MOD/SDF to carry out various missions appropriately. Expectations from the public for the MOD/SDF have continued to rise. In Japan, however, due to the declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the general recruitment condition of uniformed SDF personnel is anticipated to become increasingly severe. In light of these circumstances, it is necessary to recruit personnel with superior abilities and a strong desire to enlist, after carefully explaining to them the missions, roles, duties, and working conditions of the SDF. See>> Fig. II-2-5-1 (Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF) For this reason, the MOD/SDF holds recruiting meetings at schools and also maintains Provincial Cooperation Offi ces in 50 locations throughout Japan to respond to the individual needs of applicants, with the understanding of educators and support from - 2 Employment **(1) Uniformed SDF personnel** Based on a voluntary system, respecting individuals’ free will, uniformed SDF personnel are recruited under various categories. See>> Fig. II-2-5-2 (Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel) Due to the uniqueness of their duties, personnel management of uniformed SDF personnel differs from that of general civilian government employees,[1] including Fig. II-2-5-1 Changes in the Number of People Eligible to Join the SDF The number of 18–26 year-olds Number of newly-employed (thousand people) personnel (people) 20,000 30,000 The number of 18–26 year-olds: About 17 million The number of newly-employed personnel 19,000 ⇒ About 11 million (down by about 40%) The number of 18-26 year olds (thousand people) 18,000 About 17 millionpeople 25,000 The number of newly-employed personnel: varies from year to year (approximately equal to or larger than that of FY1994) 17,000 20,000 16,000 About 13,000 15,000 people 15,000 About 12,000 people 14,000 10,000 13,000 About 11 million 12,000 people 5,000 11,000 10,000 0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (FY) Material sources: Data before FY2014 (excluding data for FY2005 and FY2010) are based on “Population Estimates of Japan 1920–2000” and “Annual Report on Population Estimates,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data for FY2005 and FY2010 are the proportionally adjusted populations of unknown age ascertained by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research based on “Population Census,” Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Data from FY2015 onward are based on “Population Projection for Japan” (medium estimates in January 2012), National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. ----- |Col1|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Leadin|g|Private| |||| Fig. II-2-5-2 Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel General (GSDF, ASDF), Admiral (MSDF) to SecondLieutenant (GSDF, ASDF), Officer Ensign (MSDF) Warrant Officer Warrant Officer (Note 1) Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) Master Sergeant (GSDF) Petty Officer First Class (MSDF) Officer Candidate Master Sergeant (ASDF) Enlisted (upper) Sergeant First Class (GSDF) Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF) Technical Sergeant (ASDF) Sergeant (GSDF) Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF) (Note 5) Staff Sergeant (ASDF) (Note 3) (Note 2) Leading Private (GSDF) Leading Seaman (MSDF) Leading Private Airman First Class (ASDF) (Note 4) SDF Personnel (u) in short-term service Private First Class (GSDF) Seaman (MSDF) 3rd Class Airman Second Class (ASDF) Candidate for SDF Private (GSDF) Personnel (u) Seaman Apprentice (MSDF) 2nd Class (3 month) Airman Third Class (ASDF) 1st Class Aged 18 or older and under 27 Senior high school, and others Junior high school, and others Notes: 1. Staff candidates for the medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy faculties will be promoted to the position of First Lieutenant if they pass the national examinations in medicine. 2. Student candidates for enlistment (upper) refers to a candidate who has been appointed as an officer with the premise that he/she will be promoted to a fixed-term position of “Enlisted (upper).” Until FY2006, there were two programs consisting of “Student candidates for enlistment (upper)” and “Enlisted (upper) candidates.” However, these two programs were reorganized and combined, and since 2007, candidates have been appointed as “General candidates for enlistment (upper)”. 3. As for the SDF candidates, in order to enhance the initial education of SDF personnel in short-term service, in July 2010, it was decided that their status for the first three months of their enlistment would be as non-SDF personnel, and they would engage exclusively in fundamental education and practice as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel. 4. GSDF High Technical School trains people to be SDF personnel who will be capable not only of operating and making full use of equipment in the GSDF but also of conducting missions in the international community. For SDF students, starting from FY2010 appointments, their status was changed from SDF officer to “students,” which is a new non-regular status. New students receive a high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning. From the FY2011 appointments, a new recommendation system was introduced in which those who are considered appropriate to be a GSDF High Technical School student are selected from among the candidates based on the recommendation of the principal of their junior high school etc., in addition to the conventional general examination. 5. A three-year program ended in FY2013. A new four-year program was established at the National Defense Medical College, Faculty of Nursing in 2014. “Early Retirement System” and “Fixed Term System” to maintain the SDF’s strength. After employment, uniformed SDF personnel are assigned their branch of service and duties at units all around Japan, in accordance with their choice or aptitude, following basic education and training at respective training units or schools of respective SDF services. See>> Reference 16 (Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel); Reference 17 (Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2015)) See>> Fig. II-2-5-3 (Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel) Prime Minister Abe delivering an address during a graduation ceremony at the National Defense Academy [Photo courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Office] |Fig. II-2-5-3|Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel| |---|---| |Rank|Designation|Mandatory Retirement Age| |---|---|---| |General (GSDF), Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)|Sho|60| |Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)|Shoho|| |Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)|Issa|56| |Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)|Nisa|55| |Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)|Sansa|| |Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)|Ichii|54| |First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)|Nii|| |Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)|Sani|| |Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)|Juni|| |Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Socho|| |Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)|Isso|| |Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Niso|53| |Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)|Sanso|| |Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)|Shicho|—| |Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)|Isshi|| |Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)|Nishi|| **Mandatory** **Rank** **Designation** **Retirement Age** General (GSDF), Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF) Sho Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), 60 Shoho Major General (ASDF) Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF) Issa 56 Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Nisa Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF) 55 Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Sansa Major (ASDF) Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain Ichii (ASDF) First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade Nii (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF) Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Sani Second Lieutenant (ASDF) 54 Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Juni Warrant Officer (ASDF) Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer Socho (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF) Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class Isso (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF) Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Niso Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF) 53 Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Sanso Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF) Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman Shicho (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF) Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Isshi — Airman Second Class (ASDF) Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Nishi Airman Third Class (ASDF) Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ADSF Chief of Staff, is 62. 2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, musician, military police officer, or information analyst, is 60. ----- **y** **Aviation Student System of the ASDF (Celebrating Its 60th Anniversary)** **Column** The aim of the aviation student system of the ASDF is to nurture pilots for aircraft of the ASDF, and the system celebrated its 60th anniversary last year. Young men and women who have begun pursuing careers as pilots after passing the aviation student examination are enrolled in the 12th Flying Training Wing for a two-year aviation student program at Hofu Kita Air Base in Yamaguchi Prefecture, from which one Pilot insignia “Wing mark” can see the Seto Inland Sea, for basic education mainly composed of classroom lectures. Upon completing the program, this time as an offi cer candidate, they go through two years of operators’ education which places an emphasis on fl ying training as an offi cer candidate. After this, they acquire qualifi cation as a pilot and the pilot insignia, “Wing mark,” is pinned on their uniform. One of the major advantages of the aviation student system is that one can become a pilot at a young age regardless of gender. Since the fl ying training starts from only two years after joining the ASDF, some begin to fl y in an aircraft at the age of twenty, and acquire “Wing mark” and national qualifi cation as “commercial pilot” at twenty three. A graduate of the system, this pilot is playing a vital role The inaugural class enrolled in training in June 1955, and currently the 71st and 72nd in his unit. classes are working hard day and night to become pilots in the future. The aviation student system has produced over 5,000 aviation offi cer candidates so far, and approximately 60% of the pilots of the ASDF are graduates of the system. They are playing a core role in the aviation units. **(2) SDF Reserve Personnel, SDF Ready Reserve** **Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel** It is essential to secure the required number of uniformed SDF personnel promptly depending on situational changes in the event of a crisis. To secure the required number promptly and systematically, the MOD maintains the following three systems: the SDF Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, and the Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel system.[2] See>> Fig. II-2-5-4 (Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel) SDF Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel after the issuance of a defense call-up order and others, and carry out logistical support and base guard duties. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel become uniformed SDF personnel, and are assigned to carry out their mission together with uniformed SDF regular personnel as part of frontline units following the issuance of a defense callup order and others. SDF Reserve Personnel candidates, some of whom are recruited among those with no prior experience as uniformed SDF personnel, are to be assigned as SDF Reserve Personnel after completing the necessary education and training to work as uniformed SDF personnel. As SDF Reserve Personnel and others work in their own civilian jobs during peacetime, they need to adjust their work schedule to participate in periodic training exercises. Therefore, understanding and cooperation from the companies that employ these personnel are essential for the smooth operation of the systems. For this purpose, the MOD provides a special subsidy to the companies that employ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and take necessary measures to allow such employees to attend training sessions for 30 days a year, by taking into consideration the burden on such companies. Moreover, the MOD takes various measures to gain understanding and cooperation from those companies, such as issuing special certifi cates[3] to offi ces that strive to create an environment for their employees to participate in training sessions. Furthermore, the MOD promotes the use of SDF Reserve Personnel in a range of fi elds, such as by appointing retired SDF pilots, who are to be reemployed in the private sector, to SDF Reserve Personnel through the reemployment system.[4] Many other countries also have reserve personnel systems. The SDF Reserve Personnel Cooperation Offi ces Display System was introduced in FY2015, and was certifi ed by the directors of Provincial Cooperation Offi ces, followed by the issuance of the special certifi cates in the same fi scal year. The Minister of Defense will be in charge of certifi cation starting in FY2016. The certifi ed offi ces are listed on the websites of the MOD and the Provincial Cooperation Offi ces. The reemployment system for SDF pilots is aiming to prevent the outfl ow of active young SDF pilots to civil aviation companies in an unregulated manner. This system is also designed to utilize SDF pilots over i ----- |Col1|SDF Reserve Personnel|SDF Ready Reserve Personnel|SDF Reserve Candidate Personnel| |---|---|---|---| |Basic concept|❍ After the issuance of defense call-up order and others, serve as SDF Regular Personnel|❍ Serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability|❍ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or MSDF upon completion of education and training| |Candidate|❍ Former SDF Regular Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|❍ Former SDF Regular Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel|(Common to General and Technical Employment Categories) ❍ Those with no experience as SDF personnel (includes those with less than a year of SDF experience)| |Age|❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18–36 years old ❍ Off icer, Warrant Off cier, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of two years added to respective retirement age|❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18–31 years old ❍ Off icer, Warrant Off icer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of three years subtracted from respective retirement age|❍ General: 18–33 years old; Technical: between the age of 18 and 52–54 depending on technical skills possessed| |Employment|❍ Employed by screening, based on application ❍ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training|❍ Employed by screening, based on application|❍ General: Employed by examination, based on application ❍ Technical: Employed by screening, based on application| |Rank|❍ Former SDF Regular Personnel: Rank at the point of retirement in principle ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Currently designated rank ❍ Former SDF Reserve Personnel and Former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel. Rank at the point of retirement in principle ❍ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel • General: Private • Technical: Designated based on skills|❍ Former Regular Personnel: Rank at the point of retirement in principle ❍ Former Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of retirement in principle|❍ Not designated| |Term of service|❍ Three Years/One term|❍ Three Years/One term|❍ General: Maximum of three years ❍ Technical: Maximum of two years| |Education/ Training|❍ Although the Self-Defense Forces Act designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year as a standard|❍ 30 days per year|❍ General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course) ❍ Technical: 10 days within two years (training to serve as SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing their special skills)| |Promotion|❍ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulf illed the service term (actual serving days)|❍ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulf illed the service term (actual serving days)|❍ Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion| |Benef its, allowances, and other terms|❍ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ❍ SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month|❍ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ❍ Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term ❍ Special subsidy for corporations employing SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month|❍ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ❍ Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty is not required| |Call-up duty and other duties|❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up|❍ Education and training call-up| Fig. II-2-5-4 Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel **SDF Reserve Personnel** **SDF Ready Reserve Personnel** **SDF Reserve Candidate Personnel** ❍ After the issuance of defense call-up order and ❍ Serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as ❍ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel in the GSDF or Basic concept others, serve as SDF Regular Personnel part of the basic framework of defense capability MSDF upon completion of education and training ❍ Former SDF Regular Personnel, former SDF ❍ Former SDF Regular Personnel, former SDF Reserve Personnel (Common to General and Technical Employment Categories) Candidate Ready Reserve Personnel, former SDF Reserve ❍ Those with no experience as SDF personnel (includes Personnel those with less than a year of SDF experience) ❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18–36 years old ❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18–31 years old ❍ General: 18–33 years old; Technical: between the ❍ Offi cer, Warrant Offi cer, Enlisted (Upper): Under ❍ Offi cer, Warrant Offi cer, Enlisted (Upper): Under the age of three age of 18 and 52–54 depending on technical skills Age the age of two years added to respective years subtracted from respective retirement age possessed retirement age ❍ Employed by screening, based on application ❍ Employed by screening, based on application ❍ General: Employed by examination, based on ❍ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is application Employment appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon ❍ Technical: Employed by screening, based on completion of education and training application ❍ Former SDF Regular Personnel: Rank at the point ❍ Former Regular Personnel: Rank at the point of retirement in ❍ Not designated of retirement in principle principle ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Currently ❍ Former Reserve Personnel: Designated rank at the point of designated rank retirement in principle ❍ Former SDF Reserve Personnel and Former SDF Rank Ready Reserve Personnel. Rank at the point of retirement in principle ❍ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel - General: Private - Technical: Designated based on skills ❍ Three Years/One term ❍ Three Years/One term ❍ General: Maximum of three years Term of service ❍ Technical: Maximum of two years ❍ Although the Self-Defense Forces Act designates ❍ 30 days per year ❍ General: 50 days within three years (equivalent to a maximum of 20 days per year, actual Candidate SDF personnel (private level) course) Education/ implementation is 5 days per year as a standard ❍ Technical: 10 days within two years (training to Training serve as SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing their special skills) ❍ Promotion is determined by screening the ❍ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of ❍ Since there is no designated rank, there is no Promotion service record of personnel who have fulfi lled personnel who have fulfi lled the service term (actual serving days) promotion the service term (actual serving days) ❍ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ❍ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day ❍ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day Benefi ts, ❍ SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ❍ Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel allowances, and ❍ Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term is not paid because defense call-up duty is not other terms ❍ Special subsidy for corporations employing required SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month Call-up duty and ❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster ❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster ❍ Education and training call-up other duties call-up, training call-up call-up, training call-up **VOICE** **Companies that Support SDF Reserve Personnel** **Column** **(SDF Reserve Personnel Cooperation Offi ces)** **Mr. Masao Yamamasu** **President, Kyodo Keibi Hosho Co., Ltd.** Ever since its foundation in 1986, our company has contributed to the safety and security of the community, mainly through providing security for machines and traffi c control with the following three basic ideas: employment creation, sound management ensuring tax payment, and participation in volunteer activities. We have been a member of the Council for the Employment of Retired SDF Personnel since the company’s foundation, and have employed SDF Ready Reserve Personnel since 2004. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are playing active roles as vital members of the company, exerting their sense of responsibility and the physical and mental strength they have acquired through their service in the SDF. It was very encouraging for us to be certifi ed as a SDF Reserve Personnel Cooperation Offi ce. We would like to continue to make further efforts as a bridge between the SDF and the local community, and do our best to contribute to national security and safety. Author receiving a special sticker from the Director of SDF Tottori Provincial Cooperation Offi ce (left) ----- **VOICE** **Five Years since the Great East Japan Earthquake** **Column** **ASDF Komaki Airbase (Komaki City, Aichi Prefecture)** **Airman First Class Suguru Koseki, Rescue Training Squadron, Air Rescue Wing** When the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred on March 11, 2011, I was working as usual on a ship under construction in a shipyard on the coast of Miyagi Prefecture, where I was employed. It was when the work was settled and I called to my co-workers around me to take a break that I felt massive shaking that was stronger than anything I had ever felt before. All I could do was crouch down on the ship and stay where I was. When I looked around after the shake had stopped, I realized the ship I was on had been thrown into the sea. I was terrifi ed that the ship might sink immediately as the ship was still being built. But when the ship started to drift out to sea, it came into contact with a crane inside the shipyard, and at that moment I jumped onto the crane. I spent the night on the crane, waiting for help in fear in the cold. In the dark with nobody around me, I thought to myself “I was always Author (center), medic candidate, and his classmates a troublemaker for my parents and others. If I get out of here alive, I want to do something good for other people!” That is why I decided to join the ASDF. It has been fi ve years since the earthquake. I am currently undergoing rigorous training in the Rescue Training Squadron at Komaki Air Base with my classmates to become a medic. Always keeping the motto of the Air Rescue Wing, “That others may live,” in mind, I am determined to work hard so that I can become a fi ne medic and save as many lives as I can. **(3) Administrative Offi cials, Technical and Engineering** **Offi cials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel** There are approximately 21,000 civilian personnel— administrative offi cials, technical and engineering offi cials, instructors, and others[5]—in addition to uniformed SDF personnel in the MOD/SDF. Civilian personnel are mainly employed from among those who have passed the Examination for National Public Offi cials for either career track or general staff run by the National Personnel Authority (NPA), and those who have passed the Examination for Defense Ministry Professional Civilian Offi cials run by the MOD. After participating in the common training course, civilian personnel recruited in this process undertake a wide range of work. Administrative offi cials are engaged in defenserelated policy planning in the Internal Bureau of the MOD and at the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA); analysis and research at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters; and a variety of administrative work at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. Technical and engineering offi cials are engaged in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), carrying out R&D, as well as effective procurement, maintenance and improvement of a range of equipment, and providing mental health care for SDF personnel at the Internal Bureau of the MOD, ATLA, as well as at the SDF bases, the Regional Defense Bureaus, and other locations throughout the country. Instructors conduct advanced research on defenserelated issues and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, the National Defense Medical College, and other organizations. See>> Reference 18 (Breakdown of Ministry of Defense personnel) Among the employees of the MOD, special national government employees are called ”SDF personnel,” which include administrative offi cials, technical and engineering offi cials, instructors, and others in ----- **2 Daily Education and Training** - 1 Education of Uniformed SDF Personnel In addition to such training for national defense, enhanced training is given in response to the diversifi ed roles required of the SDF in recent years, such as peacekeeping operations and large-scale disaster relief operations. Moreover, in order to strengthen joint operational capabilities and to respond better to various situations, efforts are being made including the expansion of the scope of joint exercises and bilateral and multilateral exercises participated in by the individual SDF services.[6] **(2) Training Environment** SDF training has been planned and conducted under conditions that are as close as possible to actual combat situations, yet many restrictions remain. Therefore, the SDF makes maximum use of its limited domestic training areas, including further use of the prime training environment of Hokkaido stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and other guidelines. They also strive to carry out more practical combat training by conducting joint exercises and other training and exercises in the United States and surrounding sea and airspace where they can secure training conditions not available in Japan. See>> Reference 20 (Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2015)) Enhancing the ability of the individual uniformed SDF personnel who comprise SDF units is essential for the execution of the units’ duties. For this purpose, the respective SDF training units and schools provide opportunities for phased and systematic education according to rank and duties to nurture necessary qualities and instill knowledge and skills. A considerable extent of human, temporal, and economic efforts such as securing instructors with special skills, and improving equipment and educational facilities, are necessary for providing education. In the event that personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or that it is diffi cult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, the MOD and the SDF commissions education to external institutions, including those abroad, as well as domestic companies and research institutes. - 2 SDF Training **(1) Training by Each SDF** Training conducted by units in each service can be broadly divided into training for individual SDF personnel to improve the necessary profi ciency for their respective fi elds, and training for units to enhance their systematic capabilities. Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classifi cation and individual ability. Training for units is conducted depending on the size of unit, from small to large; meanwhile, large-scale comprehensive training including coordination between units is also conducted. See>> Reference 19 (Major Exercises Conducted in FY2015) - 3 Safety Management Initiatives Any accidents that can cause injury to the public, damage to its property, or the loss of life of SDF personnel, must be avoided at all costs. Therefore, during routine training, the MOD/SDF makes a united effort to ensure the constant management of safety through the utmost mindfulness of ensuring safety. Newly joined members of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF giving their all during training Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response training which are to prevent and repel direct threats to Japan. Other additional training includes International Peace Cooperation Exercises that assumes SDF’s international peace cooperation activities and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the treatment of prisoners of war and ----- **3 Promotion of the Careers of Female Personnel** - 1 Expansion of the Recruitment and Appointment **of Female Personnel** The MOD/SDF has been proactively encouraging the active participation of female personnel, and the number of female personnel is on the rise. In January of 2015, the MOD formulated the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance,” which incorporated three reforms—“Working style reform,” “Reform to realize a successful career with a balanced life between childrearing and nursing, etc.,” and “Reform for promoting successful female personnel,” and the “Action Plan of the MOD Based on the Law to Promote the Role of Women in the Workforce (FY2016-FY2020)” in April 2016 in order to promote the work-life balance of the personnel in a unifi ed manner whilst further expanding the recruitment and promotion of female personnel. Along with these initiatives, the MOD is also making various efforts to advance the promotion of motivated and qualifi ed female personnel by setting up specifi c goals with regard to the recruitment and promotion of female personnel. LTC Osaki engaged in disaster relief operations CDR Otani, the fi rst female MSDF offi cer to command a destroyer **(1) Female Administrative Offi cials, Technical and** **Engineering Offi cials, Instructors, and Others** As of the end of March 2016, the number of female administrative offi cials, technical and engineering offi cials, and instructors, etc., is approximately 3,200 (about 23.4% of total administrative offi cials). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2006, at around 23.1% of total administrative offi cials), this is a rise of 0.3 percentage point, indicating that the ratio of female civilian personnel has been on an increasing trend in recent years. With regard to recruitment, in line with the central government target, the MOD has set up its goal of ensuring that women account for over 30% of newly hired staff at the ministry from FY2016 and onward. Moreover, regarding furthering the careers of women, as a goal to be achieved by the end of FY2020, the proportion of women reaching the Division-Director level at local organizations and Assistant-Division-Director or equivalent level at the ministry proper should be approximately 5%, and the proportion of women serving at the Division-Director level or equivalent level at the ministry proper should be about 2%, and the proportion of women reaching the Unit-Chief or equivalent level at the ministry proper should be around 20%. MAJ Osaka playing vital roles as a C-1 pilot **(2) Female SDF Personnel** As of the end of March 2016, the number of female uniformed SDF personnel is about 13,000 (about 5.9% of total uniformed SDF personnel). Compared with ten years ago (end of March 2006, at around 4.8% of total uniformed SDF personnel), this is a rise of 1.1 percentage point, indicating that the ratio of female uniformed SDF personnel has been on an increasing trend in recent years. In order to increase the proportion of female uniformed SDF personnel among total uniformed SDF ----- Fig. II-2-5-5 Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel (Number) (%) 14,000 6.0 Recruitment of female uniformed SDF Female uniformed SDF personnel (Medical personnel) personnel started for aviation students of 12,000 Female uniformed SDF personnel (Regular personnel) the MSDF and the ASDF 5.0 Female uniformed SDF personnel (Total number) / Total number of uniformed SDF personnel Recruitment of female uniformed SDF personneI (personnel) started for students of 10,000 the National Defense Academy 4.0 8,000 Recruitment of female uniformed SDF Recruitment of femaleuniformed SDF students of the Nationalpersonnel started for 3.0 Recruitment of female personnel started for the Defense Medical College 6,000 uniformed SDF position of medical personnel started in the officer and dental officer regular service area of the MSDF and the ASDF 2.0 4,000 Recruitment of female uniformed SDF personnel started in the regular service area of the GSDF 1.0 2,000 0 0.0 54 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 (FY) Note: As of the end of March 2016, the total number of female uniformed SDF personnel is 13,476 (approximately 5.9% of the total number of the current uniformed SDF personnel) personnel to over 9% by 2030, there are plans to ensure that women account for more than 10% of total newly employed uniformed SDF personnel starting in FY2017. In addition, with regard to furthering their careers, the proportion of women among uniformed SDF personnel with a rank of field officer or higher is planned to be increased from the current 3.1%. As for the careers of the personnel anticipated to reach a rank of field officer or higher in the future, an emphasis is given on assigning them to a command or assistant command post in a unit at the rank of company officer, with the hope of allowing them to gain experience and grow. While all service areas in the SDF are open to female uniformed SDF personnel, there are still limitations to certain assignments such as infantry companies and submarines, etc., due to the requirement for protecting motherhood and securing privacy. In order to appropriately respond to the diversified missions of the SDF in recent years, the restriction preventing women from working in the flight squadrons of anti-tank helicopter units and part of the GSDF Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit, missile boats and minesweepers as well as the Special Boarding Units of the MSDF, and fighter and reconnaissance aircraft of the ASDF was lifted in FY2015 from the viewpoint of utilizing human resources more effectively. Following this, female uniformed SDF personnel can now be assigned to all posts of the MSDF except for submarines and all posts of the ASDF In addition all Promotion tool for Work Life Balance in the MOD pilot assignments have been opened to female uniformed SDF personnel. See>> Fig. II-2-5-5 (Trends in Incumbent Female SDF Personnel) - 2 Improving the Working Environment for All Personnel Based on the “Action Plan for Promoting the Active Participation of Female Employees and Work-Life Balance at the MOD” formulated in January 2015 and the “Action Plan to Support a Good Work-Life Balance of the Personnel of the MOD” (FY2015-FY2020) formulated in March 2015 based on the Act on Advancement of Measures to Support Raising Next-Generation Children (Act No. 120 of 2003), and the “Action Plan of the MOD Based on the Law to Promote the Role of Women in the Workforce (FY2016 FY2020)” formulated inApril 2016 ----- **VOICE** **Participating in Support Operations for the 57th Antarctic Expedition** **Column** **MSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture)** **Petty Offi cer First Class Mayumi Hirakawa, Icebreaker “Shirase”** The news that female uniformed SDF personnel were going to participate in the supporting operation of the 57th Antarctic Expedition onboard “Shirase” for the fi rst time drew much attention, and as the ten female members of the crew we did our best to fulfi ll the duties given to us, in the hope that our hard work would open new doors for other women in the service. While I felt truly honored that my fi rst assignment onboard a ship was on “Shirase,” I also felt some pressure to make it a successful tour. “Shirase” was able to berth off the coast of Showa Base again, and the female crew worked with the male crew on missions such as transporting fuel and supplies as well as carrying out other work at Showa Base and on the Antarctic. We gained a wide range of experiences through our missions, including assisting the transfer of an observation crew off a stranded Australian icebreaker. Moreover, having the opportunity to admire the magnifi cent, beautiful nature of the Antarctic was an invaluable experience for me. A tour on “Shirase” was a long deployment in the harsh environment of the Antarctic with only a few port calls. It gave me great confi dence that we, the female crew, were able to fully leverage our skills. I believe we were able to pave a new path not only for female personnel currently in the service but also for women who are considering joining the SDF to serve “Shirase” berthed off the coast of Showa Base and the ten female crew onboard “Shirase.” (author: far right) the MOD/SDF encourages personnel to use the system, which supports them in their efforts to balance work with family through educational lectures, etc., in order to make the MOD a workplace where both male and female personnel with time constraints due to child rearing or nursing care for elderly relatives can play an active role. In addition, the MOD/SDF is also committed to changing the mindset of personnel, and streamlining and simplifying work through the expansion of the fl extime system, information sharing as well as publicity with the use of mascots so that a good work-life balance can be promoted. To allow personnel who are rearing children to concentrate on their duties without anxiety, internal crèche facilities have been developed to respond to the need for special working arrangements within the SDF. Including the facility opened at ASDF Iruma Air Base in April 2016, internal crèche facilities have been opened at six locations so far (GSDF Camp Mishuku, GSDF Camp Kumamoto, GSDF Camp Makomanai, GSDF Asaka dormitory district, MSDF Yokosuka Naval Base district, “Kids Garden Asaka” – Internal crèche facility in GSDF Asaka dormitory district and ASDF Iruma Air Base). Additionally, three internal crèche facilities are scheduled to be opened at Ichigaya district, ASDF Fuchu Air Base, and ASDF Hamamatsu Air Base in the future. In addition, the required supports are being enhanced on an ongoing basis, to facilitate the temporary care of children when personnel must suddenly attend to duties, such as disaster relief operations. ----- **4 Measures Aimed at Ensuring Effective Use of Human Resources** - 1 Measures for Personnel System Reform and for **the Enhancement of Pay and Conditions** similar facilities have been established to answer the various questions and concerns raised by the families. - 3 Initiatives to Maintain Strong Discipline With regard to the personnel structure of the SDF, the fi xed number of the SDF personnel has been constantly reduced. On the other hand, there has been the need for further skilled and professional personnel in order to respond to the advancement of equipment as well as diversifi cation and internationalization of SDF missions. In light of such circumstances, it is stated in the NDPG that measures are to be implemented with regard to personnel system reform in order to ensure the robustness of the SDF and to make effective use of human resources under the constrained budget. Specifi cally, the MOD will implement the following measures to ensure an appropriate age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF: the retirement age of 60 will be reviewed; an early retirement system will be proactively adopted; more suitable personnel management of personnel will be implemented; and the reemployment of aircraft pilots in the private sector will be carried out. Furthermore, fi nal promotion rates of offi cers, warrant offi cers, sergeants and petty offi cers will be reviewed, and in order to maintain the strength of the SDF, more appropriate personnel management, which takes into account physical attributes, will be adopted. Furthermore, due to the harsh environmental circumstances under which uniformed SDF personnel have to perform their duties, the MOD and the SDF strive to provide salaries, allowances, welfare and other benefi ts that refl ect the special nature of their duties in order to let uniformed SDF personnel concentrate on their duties with pride, relieved of anxiety. The MOD and the SDF also promote measures relating to awards and honors, beginning with the expansion of the system of Defense Meritorious Badges. - 2 Initiatives to Support Families The MOD/SDF strives to foster well-disciplined personnel by impressing in them an awareness of compliance with the law through setting up such campaign periods as the “Anti-Drug Abuse Month,” the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Week,” and “Self-Defense Personnel Sexual Harassment Prevention Week.” With regard to the prevention of power harassment in particular, the MOD established a directive in April 2016 with the aim of creating a healthy work environment in which its personnel can fully perform their abilities and their individuality and dignity are respected. Measures to prevent power harassment include providing education to personnel, assigning counsellors to units and organizations around the country, and setting up hotlines connected to the Internal Bureau, as well as the Staff Offi ces of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF. - 4 Initiatives to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel While a record was set in FY2005, with 101 SDF personnel suicides, subsequent fi gures have shown a decline, with 73 suicides in FY2015. The suicide of SDF members is truly a great tragedy for both the individuals themselves and their bereaved families. It also represents a great loss to the MOD/SDF in terms of the loss of capable personnel, and the MOD/SDF is taking on-going measures to prevent suicides, including the following initiatives: (1) Expansion and enhancement of the counseling system (internal/ external counselors, a 24-hour telephone counseling hotline, assignment of clinical psychotherapists at camps and bases, etc.); (2) Strengthening of education to raise awareness about mental health for commanders as well as enlisted personnel; (3) Establishment of a campaign period for enhancing mental health care, close monitoring by commanders of the mental health condition of their subordinates whose working environment has been changed due to personnel transfers, etc., and distribution of various reference materials. - 5 Commemorating Personnel who Perished in **the Line of Duty** Exchanges between units and personnel’s families, as well as between families are pursued as routine initiatives. Furthermore, specifi c welfare services for SDF personnel deployed overseas include facilitating direct communication between SDF personnel and their families in Japan by means such as e-mail and video conference systems. In addition, support for sending comfort items from their families on a later day is also provided. Moreover, briefi ng sessions for families of the dispatched personnel are held to provide them with a variety of information and family support centers and Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950 and through its evolution via the National Safety ----- resources, the MOD conducts support measures such as occupational training useful for their re-employment. The measures to support the re-employment of retired uniformed SDF personnel is also important from the perspective of enabling them to give back to society with their various skills, thereby reinforcing human resources infrastructure. As the MOD does not have the authority to provide them with employment placement, the Foundation for the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job consultation services with permission from the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. Retired uniformed SDF personnel have excellent abilities in planning, leadership, faculty, cooperativeness and responsibility gained through their work performance, education, and training. Furthermore, they have various qualifications and licenses acquired through their duties and occupational training. Therefore, they are making positive contributions in a broad range of sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, as well as the finance, insurance, real estate, and construction industries, in addition to the areas of disaster prevention and risk management at local governments. Based on the NDPG, the MOD will make further effort to improve the re-employment of retired uniformed SDF personnel by considering measures to increase incentives for private companies to hire them, and by promoting further use of retired uniformed SDF personnel in the public sector. For the purpose of ensuring an environment where uniformed SDF personnel can devote themselves to their duties without any concerns, the MOD allows uniformed SDF personnel to be reappointed for fixed terms within three years before the age of 60 (one year for SDF administration officials and others). The MidTerm Defense Program (MTDP) states that the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the SDF’s strength. See>> Reference 21 (Main Measures for Re-employment Support) Meanwhile, with regard to the re-employment of SDF personnel, new regulations about re-employment were introduced in October 2015 replacing the former prior approval system. As are the cases of other national government employees, the following three regulations were put in place in order to ensure the trust of the public regarding the fairness of official duties: 1) Regulation on A scene from the Memorial for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty held in FY2015 Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have been devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time period, however, more than 1,870 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty. In the MOD/SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by each unit to which the personnel who perished in the line of duty belonged, in order to express condolences. Moreover, in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty, and to express deep honor and condolences, memorial ceremonies are carried out in various forms, such as the Memorial for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty conducted with the participation of the Prime Minister.[7] - 6 Dealing with Retirement and Re-Employment of **SDF Personnel** In order to maintain the strength of the SDF, many uniformed SDF personnel retire in their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or in their 20s (most uniformed SDF personnel serving under the fixed-term service system). Therefore, many of them need to find another job after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods. Since supporting re-employment is the responsibility of the Japanese government (the MOD) as the employer, and is crucially important both for resolving any concerns that uniformed SDF personnel may have about their future as well as for securing qualified human The Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962 in Ichigaya. In 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was completed by combining this monument with other monuments located in the same area. The MOD holds an annual memorial ceremony for SDF personnel who perished in the line of duty with the attendance of surviving family members, the Prime Minister, high-ranking officials of the MOD/SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Defense Ministers, and others. At the Monument for SDF Personnel who Perished in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel who perished in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the MOD, they make offerings of flowers, ----- **VOICE** **Successful First Flight of the MRJ** **Column** **Mr. Yoshiyuki Yasumura** **Chief test pilot for the MRJ, Mitsubishi Aircraft Cooperation** I had been an ASDF pilot for 23 years, during which time I was on assignments that include the 8th Air Wing, and Air Development and Test Wing. After my 23 years with the ASDF, I was hired by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries through the reemployment system and have been here since. Since the MRJ’s development (Mitsubishi Regional Jet) gained momentum in 2008, I have offered ideas from the viewpoint of a pilot about navigation systems and the design of the cockpit, and I was also responsible for maneuverability tests using a simulator. After the aircraft’s fi rst fl ight in November last year, we have been carrying out fl ight tests to check the aircraft’s maneuverability, engine systems and power supply, while gradually increasing the altitude and speed of fl ight. I may be in a different fi eld now but my seniors in the SDF have ingrained in me the mindset of a pilot and attitude as a person involved in the development of an aircraft, which is helping me greatly as I work on the development of a commercial aircraft. I want to make the MRJ an aircraft that satisfi es users around the world. I wish for the success and good health of all uniformed SDF personnel on active duty who exert themselves to meet the great expectation and responsibility required of them. **Mr. Kazuo Toda** **Test pilot for the MRJ, Mitsubishi Aircraft Cooperation** I had been working as a pilot during my 35 years with the Ministry of Defense (MSDF Air Development Squadron 51, MSO, and so on). Since I had completed the MSDF test pilot course and had experience working on the development of an MSDF aircraft, I got employed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries through the reemployment system. I attend meetings on development, test the fl ight control system simulator, and conduct test fl ights of the MRJ. When I fl ew aircraft in the MSDF, I was engaged in surveillance activities with a crew of about a dozen in addition to the pilots. Similarly, with test fl ights for the MRJ, the mission is carried out in a team with a crew consisting of test fl ight engineers (engineers who collect data and other engineers who analyze the data), designers, mechanics, suppliers, and pilots, all of whom fl y together on a test fl ight. Such a fl ight mission would not be possible without the cooperation of the crew. Furthermore, the safety of a test fl ight would be at risk unless all involved in the fl ight work earnestly and coordinate closely with one another. Needless to say, the goal of a test fl ight would otherwise not be possible to reach. We must work as a team while maintaining harmony. Our urgent task is to make the MRJ, an aircraft that everyone has been dreaming of, a beloved and reliable aircraft. However, test fl ights have only just begun, so we will work as a team and overcome the challenges while collaborating closely with the public sector. We appreciate your support. Mr. Yasumura (right), chief test pilot, and Mr. Toda (left), test pilot, returning MRJ and accompanying T-4 from the MRJ’s fi rst fl ight ----- **VOICE** **Active Roles Played by Retired Uniformed SDF Personnel** **Column** **Mr. Kiminori Hiura** **President, Nichitoku Kisen Inc.** My fi rst impression of him was that he was polite and honest, and that remains unchanged even today. Being a crew member onboard a domestic vessel can be a tough job both mentally and physically, since you have to face the perils of nature and to be away from your family and society. Nevertheless, he has been operating ships safely with excellent responsibility and toughness that he gained in his duties in the SDF. In our company, you are required to have wide-ranging skills in order to operate a large 10,000-ton vessel with a small number of crew. He has been making steady progress since he joint our company. I expect him to do a great job as an executive crew member in the future. **Mr. Bunta Sawai** **Nichitoku Kisen Inc. (Retired as Leading Seaman, MSDF)** I was able to get used to my new job on domestic vessels right away thanks to my job experience on MSDF destroyers. I am enjoying my time on the ships with my colleagues now. We are all given private rooms on the ships, and we get a month-long leave period after working on the ships for three months, enriching my private life with distinct work hours and off hours. Moreover, there is a chance for us to become a ship’s captain if we get the necessary qualifi cations. That keeps me motivated and encourages me to set goals for myself. **Mr. Yuya Kawamura** **Managing Director of Kyoto Offi ce, Tokusyu Kousyo Gijutsu Inc.** Our company provides services such as surveys, inspections and repairs of infrastructure including bridges, hydroelectric plants, and wind turbine generators designed for use in high places with special technology. The physical strength and skills cultivated through my duties in the SDF are useful in my current work which requires using ropes. A strong sense of responsibility and organizational skills are also helpful when working as a team to complete the work. Mr. Masuhara, whom we employed last year, is demonstrating his physical strength, initiative and perseverance he acquired in the SDF. He stands out from the other young employees and is bringing vitality to our company. He is well trusted by his bosses, making us feel that we want to let him do various works. This job involves protecting social infrastructure, which is in common with the missions of the SDF to protect our country. I am looking forward to his continued success in the future. **Mr. Takayuki Masuhara** **(Retired as Leading Private GSDF)** **Kyoto Offi ce, Tokusyu Kousyo Gijutsu Inc.** My responsibilities here include inspections of bridges and repairs of blades on wind turbine generators. I feel that the physical strength and perseverance I gained through my duties in the SDF is a great help when I perform fi eld works bringing a sense of tension and put together survey results requiring responsibility. I still have a lot to learn from my seniors, but I am working hard every day so that they can entrust various works to me. ----- requesting re-employment of other personnel and retired personnel and requesting information; 2) regulation on seeking employment opportunities at companies in which retired personnel had a stake whilst in offi ce; and 3) regulation on re-employed personnel making requests.[8] In order to ensure strict observation of these regulations, bodies comprised of academic experts with no history serving as SDF members (Defense Personnel **5 Enhancement of Medical Functions** - 1 Enhancement of Education of Medical Offi cers **and Nurses** Review Board’s Separate Meeting for Monitoring Reemployment and Cabinet Offi ce’s Re-employment Surveillance Commission) monitor the situation and any violation will be met with penalties. Additionally, re-employment information is carefully managed in a centralized manner and appropriately disclosed to the public by institutionalizing notifi cation and announcement of such information. infectious diseases, as well as increasing their motivation for work. Furthermore, with the aim of training and securing high-quality nurses who are capable of fully responding to the diversifi cation of missions and the sophistication of medical technology, a four-year “nursing program”[9] was established in the School of Medicine at the National Defense Medical College in April 2014 for the training of public health/registered nurses. While greater abilities are required of personnel engaged in medical care, such as medical offi cers, due to the diversifi cation of missions, only 80% of medical offi cer positions in particular have been fi lled. Such low suffi ciency is caused by medical offi cers leaving the SDF, one of the major reasons of which is the lack of opportunity to engage in medical training and practice. The MOD/SDF will make efforts to implement various measures to prevent medical offi cers from leaving the SDF by enhancing clinical education after graduation from the National Defense Medical College and so on, providing them with more opportunities to engage in training and medical practice, helping them acquire and improve specialized knowledge and skills in areas such as Minister of Defense Nakatani conferring a diploma during a graduation ceremony at the National Defense Medical College - 2 SDF Hospitals as Hub Hospitals with **Enhanced Functions** SDF hospitals play the role of hospitals that are to admit SDF personnel injured while in service in response to various emergency events, and in normal circumstances, these hospitals are required to play a role in providing medical treatment and also educating medical staff. For this reason, based on the NDPG, etc., SDF hospitals will be centralized and their performance levels increased, making an active contribution to local medical care, in order to establish a high-quality medical care system, while also improving the aid capabilities on the front line when responding to contingencies and promoting the improvement of the arrangements for prompt onward transfer of patients. In addition, the function of the National Defense Medical College will be strengthened to make it a center of training and research for defense medicine, with features not available in general medical schools. Stipulated in Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 65 of the SDF Actii ----- **Chapter 3** **[Development of Legislation ]** **for Peace and Security** **Section 1** **Circumstances of the Development of Legislation** **1 Background to the Development of Legislation** The security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly severe, and we are now in an era where threats could easily spread beyond national borders, and no country can maintain its own security only by itself any longer. Against this background, it is f rst and foremost important to advance vibrant diplomacy in order to maintain peace and security of Japan, and ensure its survival, as well as to secure its people’s lives. However at the same time, it is also necessary to prepare for the worst-case scenario. Specif cally, it is essential to avoid armed conf icts beforehand and prevent threats from reaching Japan by appropriately developing, maintaining and operating Japan’s own defense capability, strengthening mutual cooperation with the United States which is Japan’s ally, and other partner countries, and in particular, further elevating the effectiveness of the JapanUnited States Security Arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the peace and stability of Japan and the Asia-Pacif c region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy **2 Background and Signifi cance of the Development of Legislation** Following the Cabinet Decision, a legislation drafting team was launched under the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Secretariat. In addition, the Ministry of Defense established “The Study Committee on the Development of Security Legislation” with the Minister of Defense as its Chairman, and conducted the deliberations toward the development of security legislation. The deliberations in the Government were conducted based on the discussions at a total of 25 meetings in the of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses. In February 2013, Prime Minister Abe resumed the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security. Following a total of seven meetings, the Advisory Panel submitted its report to Prime Minister Abe in May 2014. Following the Advisory Panel’s report and in accordance with the basic orientation for the way that further deliberations would take place as presented by Prime Minister Abe, discussions were held in the ruling parties and studies were also conducted by the Government. Following this, in July 2014, a cabinet decision was made on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People,” which set forth the basic policy for the development of legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations. See>> Fig. II-3-1-1 (Outline of the Cabinet Decision and the Development of Legislation); Reference 23 (Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People) ruling parties, and, on May 14, 2015, the Government made cabinet decisions on two bills, the Bill for the Development of Legislation for Peace and Security[1] and the International Peace Support Bill.[2] The two bills were then submitted to the 189th ordinary session of the Diet on May 15, 2015. These two bills enable seamless responses to any situations, from the protection of assets including weapons of units of the U.S. Forces and armed forces of foreign countries during peacetime, support activities Bill for Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for Ensuring Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community ----- |Items of the Cabinet Decision|Outline|Legislation Development| |---|---|---| |1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack|❍ Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations. ❍ The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Act.|→ Acceleration of procedures to issue orders for public security operations/maritime security operations → Revision of the SDF Act (Protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces)| |2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community|A. So-called Logistics Support and “Integration with the Use of Force” (*1) ❍ The Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “Integration with the use of force” of that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the international community. ❍ Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. ❍ Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation. B. Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request) and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as police- like activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with the consent from the territorial State. ❍ As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary. ❍ When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. ❍ The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained and whether the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc., based on deliberations, etc., at the National Security Council.|→ The Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations That Will Have an Important Infulence on Japan’s Peace and Security (Revision of the Act Concerning the Measures for the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan), Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Act, Enactment of the International Peace Support Act → Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Act, revision of the SDF Act (Rescue of measures for Japanese nationals overseas)| |3. Measures for Self- Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution|❍ The Government believes that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. ❍ The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under international law, a basis on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. ❍ The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations.|→ Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, revision of the SDF Act (The provisions concerning defense operations)| Fig. II-3-1-1 Outline of the Cabinet Decision and the Development of Legislation **Items of the Cabinet** **Outline** **Legislation Development** **Decision** ❍ Under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are → Acceleration of procedures to to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the issue orders for public security Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, including enhancing the operations/maritime security respective agency’s response capabilities and strengthening collaboration among agencies. In operations 1. Response to an cases of responding to a situation where police forces are not present nearby or police agencies Infringement that Does cannot respond immediately, the Government will consider measures for issuing orders swiftly Not Amount to an Armed and accelerating procedures for public security operations or maritime security operations. Attack ❍ The Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited → Revision of the SDF Act “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment (Protection of weapons and of the units of the U.S. and other countries’ Armed Forces that are, in cooperation with the SDF, other equipment of the units of currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), the U.S. and other countries’ in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Act. Armed Forces) A. So-called Logistics Support and “Integration with the Use of Force” (*1) ❍ The Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and → The Act Concerning the transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are Measures for the Peace and actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “Integration with the use of Security of Japan in Situations force” of that country. Based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing That Will Have an Important legislation which enables necessary support activities for the armed forces of foreign countries Influence on Japan’s Peace and engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for the peace and stability of the Security (Revision of the Act international community. Concerning the Measures for the ❍ Japan does not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually Peace and Security of Japan in being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. Situations in Areas Surrounding ❍ Japan will immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is Japan), Revision of the Ship conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being Inspection Operations Act, conducted” due to changes of the situation. Enactment of the International Peace Support Act B. Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities 2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability Based on the following positions, the Government will proceed with developing legislation in order → Revision of the International of the International to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to Peace Cooperation Act, the protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request) and the “use of revision of the SDF Act Community weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities (Rescue of measures for that do not involve the “use of force,” including U.N. peacekeeping operations, as well as police- Japanese nationals overseas) like activities that do not involve the “use of force,” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with the consent from the territorial State. ❍ As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” (*2) other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as an adversary. ❍ When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. ❍ The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent of acceptance is stably maintained and whether the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc., based on deliberations, etc., at the National Security Council. ❍ The Government believes that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when → Revision of Legislation for an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as Responses to Armed Attack a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s Situations, revision of the SDF right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means Act (The provisions concerning available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to defense operations) the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. 3. Measures for Self- ❍ The aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution could have, under Defense Permitted international law, a basis on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” under Article 9 of the includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they Constitution are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. ❍ The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that the prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders for operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations. Notes: 1. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “non-combat area,” etc., have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “integration with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“integration with the use of force”) by other countries. 2. Use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant units or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of the execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons is directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.” ----- to armed forces of foreign countries, etc., in situations that have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security and situations that the international community is collectively addressing for peace and security (to be discussed later), to the limited use of the right of collective self-defense as a measure for self-defense to the minimum extent necessary to defend Japan when the “Three New Conditions”[3] are satisfi ed. Following the longest extension of a Diet session in the postwar, as a result of about 116 hours of debate in the House of Representatives and about 100 hours of debate in the House of Councilors, about 216 hours, in total the longest Diet debate of security-related bills in the postwar period, the two bills were passed at a plenary session of the House of Councilors and enacted on September 19 2015, upon formation of broad consensus, with approval of not only the ruling parties but also the three opposition parties of the Assembly to Energize Japan, the Party for Future Generations and the New Renaissance Party (altogether fi ve parties out of the ten political parties). Just before the passage, these fi ve parties reached the “Agreement Concerning the Legislation for Peace and Security” (the “Five-Party Agreement”), which include matters that should be taken into consideration in judging the applicability of the Three New Conditions related to the recognition of a “survival-threatening situation,” and committed them to obtaining a conclusion on the shape of a Diet organization for the constant surveillance and postverifi cation of SDF activities based on the Legislation for **Commentary** **Why Is the Legislation for Peace and Security Needed Now?** **Column** The security environment surrounding Japan is increasingly severe, as seen in the shift in the global power balance, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as international terrorism. Also there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could have a direct impact on the security of Japan. No country can maintain its own security only by itself. Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival as well as securing its people’s lives are the primary responsibility of the Government. In order to fulfi ll its responsibility, the Government, fi rst and foremost, has to prevent the emergence of threats by advancing vibrant diplomacy and has to pursue peaceful settlement in the event of the occurrence of disputes. Moreover, it is essential to prevent threats from reaching Japan by appropriately developing Japan’s own defense capabilities, further elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-United States Security Arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, the Legislation for Peace and Security that enables seamless responses is necessary. 3 The “three new conditions” are as follows: (1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; (2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack ----- and Security, the fi ve parties are engaging in discussions on the Diet’s involvement and other issues.[4] With the security environment surrounding Japan becoming increasing severe, the enforcement of the Legislation for Peace and Security has a historical signifi cance as further ensuring peace and security of Japan through enhancing deterrence and making more proactive contributions to the peace and stability of the region and the international community. The Legislation for Peace and Security has been highly appraised around the world, drawing strong support from the United States, which is Japan’s ally, Australia, India and countries of Southeast Asia and Europe as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). This fact clearly shows that the Legislation for Peace and Security strengthens the Japan-U.S. Alliance and enhances deterrence, and also contributes to the peace and stability of the region and the international community. (See Column) Peace and Security, and the strengthening of the Diet’s involvement. The Government also made a cabinet decision to the effect that the Government will respect the Five-Party Agreement and handle these matters appropriately. The Legislation for Peace and Security was put into force on March 29, 2016. Based on the FiveParty Agreement concerning the Legislation for Peace **Commentary** **Foreign Countries’ Recognition of the Legislation for Peace and Security** **Column** The Legislation for Peace and Security has received strong support and high marks, from the United States, which is Japan’s ally, Australia, India and the countries of Southeast Asia and Europe, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), etc. At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2015, for example, U.S. President Obama expressed his congratulations on the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and said the legislation enhances Japan’s defense functions and enables Japan and the United States to further broaden their cooperation in the region and the world. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services Committee also welcomed the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security in a joint statement in September 2015, saying that it “will strengthen the vital alliance between our two countries.” Furthermore, in February 2016, Commander Harris of the U.S. Pacifi c Command, stated regarding responses to ballistic missile launches by North Korea, that the Legislation for Peace and Security and the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation enhanced the capabilities of both Japan and the United States and also improved cooperation between Japan and the United States. In the Japan-Australia Joint Statement of December 2015, Australia welcomed and supported Japan’s passage of the Legislation for Peace and Security, which enables Japan to contribute even more actively in securing the peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world in line with its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace.” At the Japan-ASEAN Summit Meeting in November 2015, the ASEAN side supported Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security and said that ASEAN has high expectations for Japan’s contribution to the region’s peace and stability. As described above, the strong support given to the Legislation for Peace and Security clearly shows that this legislation will help deter war and contribute to the peace and security of the world. The Five-Party Agreement states that “after enactment of this legislation, the fi ve parties will examine and obtain a conclusion regarding the modality of a Diet organization for the routine system of surveillance and ex post facto verifi cation of SDF activities based on the Legislation for Peace and Security and the strengthening of the Diet’s involvement in situations that have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace ----- **y** **The Relationship between the Legislation for Peace and Security and** **Column** **the Constitution** The “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution - When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close **relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally** **overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness;** - When there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its **people; and** - Use of force is limited to the minimum extent necessary. only when the Three New Conditions above are satisfi ed. Even for the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions, - The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit the “use of force” in international relations in all **forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of all peoples of the world) to live in peace” as recognized** **in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all of** **the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental** **affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of self-** **defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival.** - Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful **situations where the people’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to** **an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, the “use of force” to** **the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted.** basic logic of the constitutional interpretation presented in the Governmental view of 1972 (above) is not changed. Furthermore, the “use of force” permitted under the Three New Conditions remains within the scope of the Supreme Court decision on the Sunagawa Case. The Supreme Court decision states that - “it must be pointed out that it is natural for Japan, in the exercise of powers inherent in a state, to take measures **for self-defense that may be necessary to maintain its peace and security, and to ensure its survival.”** In other words, the decision can be interpreted as recognizing that Japan should be able to take “measures for self-defense” to maintain its peace and security and ensure its survival after stating that Japan has the right to self-defense, without making a distinction between the right to individual self-defense and the right to collective self-defense. As the Legislation for Peace and Security, which refl ects the Three New Conditions described above in just proportion, maintains the basic logic of the constitutional interpretation hitherto presented by the Government and remains within the scope of the Sunagawa Case decision by the Supreme Court, the only institution endowed with the power to fi nally determine the constitutional interpretation. It is consistent with the Constitution. **Commentary** **About the Use of Weapons and the Use of Force** **Column** In general, the “use of force” in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution means the act of combat by Japanese physical and personnel organizations as part of an international armed confl ict. In contrast to this, the “use of weapons” as referred to in the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc., means the use of equipment and machinery, etc., designed to directly kill or harm people, or to destroy things as a means of armed fi ghting, in accordance with their original usages. While the “use of force” in Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Constitution is the idea related to resorting to force, including the “use of weapons,” all sorts of the “use of weapons” do not necessarily fall under the category of the “use of force” prohibited under Article 9 of the Constitution. The “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution only in cases where the Three New Conditions (See Page 166) are satisfi ed. ----- **Section 2** **Outline of the Legislation for Peace and Security** The Legislation for Peace and Security consists of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security, (which bundles together a host of partial amendments to existing laws) and the newly enacted International Peace Support Act. See>> Fig. II-3-2-1 (Layout of the Legislation for Peace and Security); Fig. II-3-2-2 (Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security) |Fig. II-3-2-1|Layout of the Legislation for Peace and Security| |---|---| |Peace and Security Legislation Development Act （Bundling together partial amendments to the existing laws） Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security: Law Concerning Partial Amendments to the Self-Defense Forces Law and Other Existing Laws for In * Ensuring the Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community addition 1. Self-Defense Forces Act to 2. International Peace Cooperation Act those Act on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations in 3. Act Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan → Changed to Act Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security left Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security column, 4. Ship Inspection Operations Act Law Concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security and Other Situations the 5. Armed Attack Situations Response Act 10 Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in armed attack situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation existing 6. U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Act → Changed to the U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act laws Law Concerning the Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. and Other Countries’ Military Actions in armed attack situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation were 7. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities Law Concerning the Use of Specific Public Facilities and Others in Situations including Where an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs revised 8. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies and Others in armed attack situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation for technical 9. Prisoners of War Act Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in armed attack situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation 10. Act for Establishment of the National Security Council reasons. New enactment (one) International Peace Support Act: Law Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, etc. in Situations where the International Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security|| |Fig. II-3-2-2|Key Points regarding the Legislation for Peace and Security| |---|---| |Images of Situations and Conditions Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. Support activities (including logistics support) in situations Response to armed attack situations, etc [Self-Defense Forces Act] that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace [Legislation for Responses to Situations] Concerning Rescue of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. (New) and security (Expansion) Responses to “Survived-Threatening Situation” (New) [Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security ・ “Use of force” permitted under the “Three New Conditions” Protection of SDF’s weapons/other equipment of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security] [Self-Defense Forces Act] (Revision of the Act Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Japan Protection of weapons/other equipment of the U.S. and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) other countries’ armed forces (New) Provision of supplies and services to the U.S. Armed ・ C thla er i pfi uc ra pt oio sn e o of f t th he e p Au cr t）pose of the revisio（nRevision of (1) When an armed aT th tae c k“ T agh ar ie ne st N Jae pw a nC oo cn cd urit si o on r s w” hen an armed attack Japanese and Forces in peacetime [Self-Defense Forces Act] (Expansion) ・ Support activities for armed forces of foreign countries against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs ・ E a Jx asp pta ahn ned g s uit au ra dt inio gn s o fw fah ce ir le it iesu s p op f li te hs e/ s Ue .r Sv . i Ace rms eca dn F ob re c p esro sv ti ad te iod n, esu dc ih n ・ E(n xo pt a o nn sl iy o nth oe f U th.S e . s) cope of support activities (2) a f eWu nn n h sd d e a na rem s t h Jea e an r pr t eae ls nil syu l no t sv o t ue h o rr vr t tu he ivr ea an rt e p a an e p ns o p p r J pola e p r’p os r tia a ern i t cg e’ ts h im t ts stu e o par elv nif oi sev ,a a ll el vi b aa e in lr ad ty b p la eo n ts d oe p rs eu a prs ec u l l i te t h a o efr ahd taa tp an p cg i kne e ar s nt so d u a ’s l d p Nationals Ship Inspection Operations (Expansion) (3) Use of force limited to the minimum extent necessary [Ship Inspection Operations Act] ・ Enable ship inspection operations in situations that the international community is International Peace Cooperation Activities c po el ale cc et i av ne dly s a ed cd ur re its ysing for international Concerning [International Peace Cooperation Act] U.N. PKO (Addition) ・ Additional roles by Japanese Corps in operation (ensuring security of specified areas including Cooperation and Support activities to armed forces of International protection of local population) foreign countries in situations that the international ・ Review of authority to use weapons (small arms) in community is collectively addressing for international necessary cases peace and security (New) [International Peace Support Act (New)] Internationally coordinated operations for peace The exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not Cooperation and security permitted for the purpose of the so-called defense of a foreign (Multinational cooperation outside U.N. PKO framework, New) country, namely, for the purpose of turning back an attack made against a foreign country. Reorganizing the Agenda Items of the National Security Council (NSC) [Act for Establishment of the National Security Council] (Note) Cabinet Decisions on accelerating procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby (Development of no new legislation)|| Images of Situations and Conditions Transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, etc. Support activities (including logistics support) in situations Response to armed attack situations, etc [Self-Defense Forces Act] that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace [Legislation for Responses to Situations] ----- **1 Outline of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security** - 1 Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law **(1) Establishment of Provisions for Measures to Rescue** **Japanese Nationals Overseas (Article 84-3)** Previously, operations to protect Japanese nationals overseas in emergency situations were limited to transporting to safe places those who need protection of their lives or bodies, and rescue of Japanese nationals overseas involving the use of weapons was not allowed even in cases of terrorist attacks. In light of these circumstances, the newly established provisions enable the units of the SDF to take “rescue measures” that go beyond transportation and include guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals overseas whose lives or bodies could be harmed in emergency situations when the following requirements are satisfi ed: a. Procedures Upon the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and after subsequent consultations between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Defense issues an order following approval by the Prime Minister. b. Requirements for Implementation When all of the following are met, the rescue measures may be implemented: (1) It is recognized that in places where the rescue measures are taken, the competent authorities of the country concerned are maintaining public safety and order at the time, and no act of combat will be conducted; (2) The country concerned consents to the SDF taking the rescue measures (including the use of weapons); and (3) It is expected that coordination and cooperation can be ensured between the units of the SDF and the competent authority of the country concerned in order to carry out the rescue measures as smoothly and safely as possible in response to anticipated dangers. c. Use of Weapons (Article 94-5) In carrying out their duties to implement the rescue measures, SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary, depending on the situation when there are adequate grounds to recognize the compelling need to use weapons to protect the lives and bodies of Japanese nationals and others. Subject to the rescue measures as well as themselves or to eliminate actions to obstruct their duties (including the permission to resort to the so-called use of weapons for the defense of mandate.[1] However, causing harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate selfdefense and evasion of clear and present danger.) **(2) Establishment of Provisions for the Protection of** **Weapons and Other Equipment of the Units of the** **Armed Forces of the United States and Other Foreign** **Countries (Article 95-2)** The newly established provisions enable SDF personnel to protect the weapons and other equipment of the units of the armed forces of the United States and other foreign countries that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan. a. Coverage Weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States Armed Forces, armed forces of other foreign countries and other similar organizations, that are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises but excluding activities in the scene where the combat activities are actually being conducted.) b. Procedures, etc. When the request is made by the armed forces of the United States and other foreign countries, and only when the Minister of Defense deems it necessary, SDF personnel provide protection (the operational policy, setting out basic matters concerning the operation of this system, including how the Cabinet should get involved, is to be formulated.) c. Use of Weapons In protecting weapons and other equipment described in a. above as part of their duties SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are adequate grounds to recognize the need to use weapons to protect persons, weapons, and other equipment (however, causing harm to people is permitted only in cases of legitimate self-defense and evasion of present danger.) **(3) Development of Provisions concerning the Expansion** **of the Provision of Supplies and Services to the** **United States Armed Forces (Article 100-6)** Regarding the provision of supplies or services to the United States Armed Forces, the scope of the U.S. Armed Forces and the scope of supplies covered were expanded as follows: While the so-called “right to use weapons of self-preservation type” permits the use of weapons only for the protection of oneself and others (oneself, SDF members who are at the same scene as oneself, or those under the supervision of oneself), the so-called “right to use weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” allows the use of weapons beyond self-preservation, for example, to protect the lives and ----- **y** **Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Overseas** **Column** While globalization advances and a growing number of Japanese companies and Japanese nationals are active overseas today, there are more chances that Japanese nationals become subject of acts of terrorism and other emergency situations given the global rise in the number of terrorist attacks. In light of these circumstances, the newly created “Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Overseas” allow Self-Defense Forces (SDF) units, in emergency situations overseas, not only to “transport” but also “guard” or “rescue” Japanese nationals whose lives are in danger or who are at risk of suffering bodily harm, even by using weapons to protect their lives or bodies, when certain requirements are met. Specifi c scenarios envisioned for specifi c cases, for example, include a situation where a large-scale natural disaster occurs in a foreign country, when the country’s security authorities, preoccupied with the rescue of the affected people, lack resources to spare for the protection of Japanese nationals, and thus SDF units are headed to a congregation point for Japanese nationals, but the situation changes and Japanese nationals at the congregation point are surrounded by mobs. Another scenario is a situation where the Japanese embassy in a foreign country is attacked and occupied, with Japanese nationals taken hostage, and the government of that country allows the SDF to respond to the situation, considering the SDF’s response capabilities to be higher than its own. a. Scope of the United States Armed Forces Covered (1) The scope extended to the United States Armed Forces that are on fi eld sites along with the units of the SDF carrying out the following actions or activities and engaged in activities similar to those of the SDF units: - Guarding of facilities and areas of bases, etc., of U.S. Forces Japan - Counter-piracy operations - Operations necessary to take measures to destroy ballistic missiles, etc. - Removal and disposal of mines and other explosive hazardous objects - Protection measures for Japanese nationals, etc., in emergency situations in foreign countries - Activities to collect information by ships or aircraft about the movements of the armed forces of foreign countries and other information that contributes to the defense of Japan (2) The scope extended to the U.S. Armed Forces participating in multilateral exercises of three or more countries, including Japan and the United States, in addition to the U.S. Armed Forces participating in Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises (3) The scope extended to the U.S. Armed Forces that are in fi eld sites along with SDF units temporarily staying at facilities of the U.S. Armed Forces for day-to-day operations, in addition to the U.S. Forces temporarily staying at SDF facilities b. Scope of Supplies to be Provided Added ammunition (weapons remain excluded) **(4) Establishment of Provisions for the Punishment of** **Those Who Commit Crimes Overseas (Article 122-2)** Since the duties of the SDF overseas are to be expanded under the latest legal revisions, it is necessary to more adequately ensure the discipline and control of the activities of the SDF overseas. For this reason, provisions were established for the punishment of those who commit crimes overseas such as the following: (1) Colluded defi ance of superiors’ offi cial orders and unlawful command of units, (2) Defi ance of and disobedience to superiors’ orders by those given defense operation orders - 2 Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace **and Security of Japan in Situations that Will** **Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace** **and Security (Revision of the Law Concerning** **Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of** **Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)** The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan stipulated rear area support,[2] rear area search and rescue operations[3] and ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law) (discussed below) conducted by Japan as measures to respond to situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security in areas surrounding Japan (situations that, if left unattended, could result in a direct armed attack on Japan, and these situations are called “situations in areas surrounding Japan”). In accordance with changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, the latest law revision deleted “in areas surrounding Japan” from situations Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to the U.S. Armed Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who were engaged in combat and were stranded in rear ----- that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security and changed the name of situations from “situations in areas surrounding Japan” to “situations that will have an important influence,”[4] and also expanded the scope of support targets and response measures as follows. **(1) Support Targets** On top of the existing “U.S. Armed Forces engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,” the revised law added “armed forces of other foreign countries engaged in activities contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the U.N. Charter” and “other similar organizations” as armed forces, etc., responding to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. conducted.” Regarding search and rescue operations, however, when the personnel having been stranded have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured. (2) The commanding officers, etc., of the SDF units order the temporary suspension of activities, etc., if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. (3) The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed difficult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, the Minister must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. **(4) Diet Approval** As before the law revision, prior Diet approval is required, in principle, and ex-post facto approval is also allowed in emergency. **(2) Response Measures to Situations that Will Have an** **Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security** The revised law sets out measures to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security as (1) logistics support activities, (2) search and rescue activities, (3) ship inspection operations, and (4) other measures necessary to respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security, and added “lodging, storage, use of facilities and training services” as the types of goods and services provided by the SDF in (1) logistics support activities, on top of the “supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical activities, communications, airport and seaport services, and base services” previously. While the provision of weapons is not included, as before, the revised law now allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.” The revised law also made it possible to implement response measures in foreign territories, but only when the foreign country concerned consents. **(3) Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force** The revised law sets forth the following measures in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel: (1) The SDF does not carry out response measures in “the scene where combat activities are actually being - 3 Revision of the Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations mean operations to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others) and to request, if necessary, a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party, conducted based on the U.N. Security Council resolutions or with the consent of the flag state.[5] Previously, ship inspection operations were stipulated as to be conducted only in situations in areas surrounding Japan.[6] However, in light of the global accumulation of examples of ship inspection operations against international threats such as cross-border movements of weapons of mass destruction and weapons of international terrorist organizations, etc., since 2000 when the Ship Inspection Operations Law was enacted, it was made possible to conduct ship inspection operations in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing[7] (discussed below) set forth in the International Peace Support Act. In conjunction with this, the revision to the Previously, “situations in areas surrounding Japan” was understood to be an idea that focuses on the nature of situations, not a geographical idea. In light of the changes in the security environment in recent years, however, the definition was revised since it is not appropriate to use an expression that could be interpreted as geographically limiting areas where situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security may arise. In association with this, the title of the Law was amended from the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” to the “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security.” The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the time when the Ship Inspection Operations Law was enacted, the conduct of ship inspection operations in situations other than situations in areas surrounding Japan was positioned as a separate issue on the agenda (an answer given by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Kono at a meeting of the House of Councilors Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense on November 28, 2000). Situations that threaten peace and security of the international community, where the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to ----- law was made in association with the review of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. - 4 Amendment to the International Peace **Cooperation Act** Given the diversification and qualitative change of the international peace cooperation activities, Japan, in order to contribute further to peace and stability of international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, expanded the scope of tasks that can be implemented in U.N. PKOs and reviewed the authority to use weapons, and also introduced new provisions to allow for active participation in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, safetyensuring, and other operations not under the control of the United Nations (“Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security”). **(1) Requirements for Participation** a. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations While maintaining the framework of the Five Principles for Participation, consent for acceptance of the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong is deemed to be consistently maintained throughout the duration of the operation is required for the implementation of so-called “safety-ensuring” operations and so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations require that the consent of acceptance of countries to which the areas where these operations are conducted belong is stably maintained throughout the duration of the operations in addition to those required for implementing the operations. b. Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security Japan is now able to participate in Internationally Coordinated Operations for Peace and Security, on top of the existing three types of operations (U.N. PKOs, International Humanitarian Relief Operations and International Election Observation Operations), when any of the following is satisfied, in addition to the fulfillment of the Five Principles for Participation. (1) Based on resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (2) At the requests by any of the following international organizations: - The United Nations - Organs established by the U.N. General Assembly or Specialized Agencies, Funds and Programmes of the U.N. such as the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order - Regional organizations, as prescribed in Article The International Peace Cooperation Act, enacted in 1992, sets forth a framework for extending appropriate and prompt cooperation for the three categories of operations of U.N. PKOs, International Humanitarian Relief Operations, and International Election Observation Operations, and for Japan to take measures to provide Contributions in Kind for those operations, thereby enabling Japan to actively contribute to international peace efforts centering upon the United Nations. The law also stipulates a set of basic guidelines (so-called “Five Principles for Participation”) for Japan’s participation in these activities: (1) Agreements on a ceasefire have been reached among the Parties to Armed Conflict; (2) Consent for the conduct of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations as well as Japan’s participation in such operations have been obtained from the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belongs as well as the Parties to Armed Conflict; (3) The operations shall be conducted without partiality to any of the Parties to Armed Conflict; (4) Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps shall terminate the International Peace Cooperation Assignments; and (5) The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessity for the protection of the lives of personnel dispatched, in principle.[8] At the time of enactment of the Act, it was assumed that Japan was to cooperate with the ceasefire monitoring in conventional conflicts between states within the framework of U.N. PKOs under the control of the United Nations. However, the nature of conflicts for the international community to address has been transformed into intra-state conflicts and a combination of inter-state and intra-state conflicts, and as such, support for the nation-building of state parties to conflict and the creation of a safe environment necessary to achieve this end have become important tasks in international peace cooperation activities. Furthermore, there are a wide range of international peace cooperation activities implemented within the frameworks not under the control of the United Nations.[9] Following the latest amendment of the Act, additional condition; “when the consent for acceptance is deemed to be consistently maintained, the use of weapons in defense of the mission mandate is allowed for implementation of so-called “safety-ensuring” operations and the so-called ‘kaketsuke-keigo’ (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request) operations as the use of force beyond self-preservation and Article 95 of the SDF Act (the use of force for protection of weapons, etc.).” has been added to (5) of the Five Principles for Participation. These activities include the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), implemented at the request of the European Union, and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), implemented at the request ----- 52 of the U.N. Charter or organs established by multilateral treaties, acknowledged as having the actual achievements or expertise pertaining to the activities of Internationally Coordinated Operation for Peace and Security such as the European Union or otherwise specified by a Cabinet Order (3) At the requests of the countries to which the area where those operations are to be conducted belongs (limited to only those cases that are supported by any of the principal organs of the U.N. as prescribed in Article 7 (1) of the U.N. Charter.) **(2) Description of Tasks** In addition to ceasefire monitoring and humanitarian relief operations for afflicted persons, the following tasks have been added and expanded to tasks in U.N. PKOs, etc. (1) Addition of monitoring, stationing, patrol, inspections at checkpoints and security escort and protection for the purpose of safety of specified areas including prevention and suppression of injury or harm against lives, bodies and property of local population, afflicted persons and other populations requiring protection (so-called “safety-ensuring” operations) (2) Addition of protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in international peace cooperation operations or providing support for those operations, in response to urgent requests when unexpected dangers to lives or bodies of such individuals related to operations occur or are imminent (so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations) (3) Expansion of tasks such as provision of advice or guidance related to works for the purpose of assisting in establishing or re-establishing organizations of the Government relating to national defense or other organizations (4) Expansion of tasks conducted at organizations for supervision and coordination of tasks to include planning, drafting, coordination or collection and updating of information in Headquarters Office or coordination offices conducting U.N. PKOs and Internationally Coordinated Operation for Peace and Security, for the implementation of tasks (of mission headquarters’ operations) spend their time when not conducting operations outside camps, and the last bastions, so to speak, to secure the safety of lives and bodies of those inside. Thus, in the case of unexpected situations, such as attacks against camps of U.N. PKOs, etc. by armed groups, it is essential for SDF personnel stationing in the camps, even if they are not the direct targets of such attacks, to coordinate with the personnel of other countries and protect each other and deal with the common danger. In light of this, the use of weapons for the purpose of protecting individuals jointly stationing at the camps was allowed as a type of the use of weapons for self-preservation.[10] b. The Authority to Use Weapons in the So-Called “Kaketsuke-Keigo” Operations In carrying out so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations, uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives or bodies of themselves or individuals related to operations that they intend to protect (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate selfdefense and aversion of clear and present danger). c. The Authority to Use Weapons for So-Called “SafetyEnsuring” Operations In carrying out so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, uniformed SDF personnel are permitted to use weapons within the limits judged reasonably necessary according to the circumstances, when reasonable grounds are found for the unavoidable necessity to protect the lives, bodies or properties of themselves or other individuals, or to eliminate obstructive behavior for their duties (however, inflicting injury on a person is permitted only in the cases of legitimate self-defense and aversion of clear and present danger). **(4) Diet Approval** Diet approval is necessary prior to the commencement of so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, in addition to ceasefire monitoring, in principle (ex-post facto approval is permitted when the Diet is in recess or the House of Representatives is dissolved). **(5) Ensuring Safety of Personnel of the International** **Peace Cooperation Corps of Japan** The provision for the consideration to ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps was added, while the measures for ensuring the safety of personnel of the International Peace Cooperation Corps **(3) Authority to Use Weapons** a. Expansion of the Authority to Use Weapons for Selfpreservation (Joint Protection of Camps) Camps of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKOs), etc., are the bases where personnel of participating countries 10 The authority to use weapons for self-preservation is allowed in view of the existence of particular circumstances, whereby armed personnel, who protect camps which are the last bastions of safety, are in the ----- **y** **“Kaketsuke-Keigo” (coming to protection of individuals related to operations** **Column** **in response to urgent request)** In past operations of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) based on the Act on Cooperation in the U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, for example in 1994 when vehicles of a Japanese nongovernmental organization (NGO) operating in a refugee camp in Goma in former Zaire were seized by refugees, the NGO asked for help by SDF units dispatched there for the relief of refugees. Currently, at the site of the activities of SDF units, SDF offi cials are engaged in a variety of peacetime cooperation with staff of international organizations and NGOs, such as information sharing and exchanges. Given these circumstances, there is a good chance that SDF units will receive requests for rescue from people associated with such organizations at risk going forward. In the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request) incorporated in line with these ideas, SDF engineering units, in response to emergency requests, provide urgent and temporary protection to civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations and/or NGO staff involved in peacekeeping operations, ensuring safety within their capabilities, when they are at imminent risk, such as the danger of being surrounded by rioters or refugees, if such SDF units are situated closer to the scenes of problems than the security forces of a territorial State or infantry units of U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Japanese Government decided to allow the implementation of the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” when the Five Principles for Participation are satisfi ed and the consent of the territorial State and the parties to the confl ict is deemed to be stably maintained throughout the period of U.N. activities and Japan’s operations. If these conditions are met, “a state” or “a quasi-state organization” does not appear as the object of the operation. Therefore, even when weapons are used, it would not amount to the “use of force” prohibited under the Constitution and as such, would not violate the Constitution. were incorporated into the matters to be stipulated in the Implementation Procedures. **(6) Other Key Points of Amendment** (1) Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel to the United Nations (dispatch of Force Commanders of U.N. PKOs, etc.) The Act was amended to make it possible to dispatch uniformed SDF personnel and have them engage in the tasks of the United Nations and those concerning overall management of tasks implemented by units of SDF, etc., or units of armed forces of foreign states participating in U.N. PKOs, at the request of the United Nations, with the consent of the Prime Minister.[11] (2) Provision of supplies and services to the Armed Forces of the United States, etc., for their operations to cope with large-scale disaster.[12] The Act was amended to make it possible for the SDF, when the Armed Forces of the United States of America or the Australian Defense Force that is located in the area together with units of the SDF, etc., and is undertaking operations to cope with largescale disaster requests units of the SDF to provide supplies or services necessary for the activities of urgent nature to be undertaken in that area of activities, so far as it does not hinder the performance of International Peace Cooperation Assignments, etc., of the SDF, to provide the Armed Forces of the United States of America or the Australian Defense Force with the supplies or services requested. - 5 Revision of Legislation for Responses to Armed **Attack Situations** As the security environment surrounding Japan changes, it is likely that an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could threaten Japan’s survival as well, depending on its purpose, scale and manner. For this reason, in addition to the armed attack situations, etc., (an armed attack situation,[13] and an anticipated armed attack situation[14]), “Survival-Threatening Situation” (a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness) was newly added to the situations to which Japan has to respond for the defense of Japan, and responses to a such situation was defi ned as one of the SDF’s primary missions as avoidable selfdefense measures for Japan’s defense. The following amendments, including the above, were made to relevant laws, including the Armed Attack Situations Response Act and the SDF Law. 11 Consent for acceptance of the countries to which the areas where those operations are to be conducted belong is deemed to be consistently maintained throughout the duration of the operation is required for the dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel. 12 MOD and SDF participated in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) following the major earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010, were unable to provide supplies and services to the U.S. Armed Forces engaged in disaster relief operations in Haiti outside the framework of U.N. PKOs, due to the absence of the necessary domestic legislation. 13 A situation where an armed attack from outside against Japan has occurred, or an imminent danger of the armed attack occurring is acknowledged ----- **(1) Revision of the Armed Attack Situations Response Act[15]** a. Purpose Responses to survival-threatening situations were added, in addition to the responses to armed attack situations, etc. b. The Basic Response Plan to Respond to Armed Attack Situations, etc. or Survival-Threatening Situations The Basic Response Plan should include the following points: (1) Developments in the situation, the confirmation of the situation as an armed attack situations, etc., an anticipated armed attack situation or Survived-Threatening Situation, and the facts that serve as the premises supporting the confirmation; (2) When the situation is confirmed as an armed attack situations, etc., or Survived-Threatening Situation, reasons why there is no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation; and (3) An overall plan to respond to the armed attack situations, etc., or Survived-Threatening Situation. c. Diet Approval When an order is given to the SDF for defense operations to respond to a “situation where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival,” prior Diet approval is required, in principle, in the same manner as for the armed attack situations, etc. **(2) Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Law** a. Positioning as the Mission of the SDF (Article 3) The SDF’s response to Survived-Threatening Situation was defined as one of the primary missions of the SDF. b. Defense Operation (Article 76) Survived-Threatening Situation was categorized as a situation in which a defense operation will be ordered. c. Others Among the provisions setting forth a variety of authorities, etc., and special measures necessary for SDF operations, those whose purpose is entirely for responses to direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not to be applied to Survived-Threatening Situation.[16] the armed forces of other foreign countries in survivalthreatening situations were added. b. Maritime Transportation Restriction Act The provisions to restrict maritime transportation in Survived-Threatening Situation were added. Furthermore, the waters to impose the restrictions on maritime transportation are defined as Japan’s territorial waters, territorial waters of foreign countries (only when their consent is obtained) and the high seas. c. Prisoners of War Act The provisions were added for the application of the Prisoners of War Act to Survived-Threatening Situation as well. d. Act Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities The operations of the armed forces of foreign countries other than the United States in armed attack situations, etc. were added to the scope of coordination of the use of specific public facilities. - 6 Revision of the Act for Establishment of **the National Security Council** Responses to “Survived-Threatening Situation” and responses to “situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing” were added as the items for deliberation, and items for deliberation regarding “situations in areas surrounding Japan” were changed to items for deliberation regarding “situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.” Furthermore, the following items (all items are related to the stable maintenance of the consent of acceptance of hosting countries) were specified as the items the National Security Council must deliberate without fail. ❍ Regarding international peace cooperation operations, decisions on and changes in plans for implementation related to the implementation of the so-called safetyensuring operations or the so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” operations ❍ Dispatch of uniformed SDF personnel (force commanders, etc.) who are to be engaged in supervisory duties for operations conducted by units of countries participating in U.N. PKOs ❍ Implementation of protection measures, including guarding and rescue, of Japanese nationals overseas and others **(3) Revisions to Other Relevant Legislation** a. Act Related to the Actions of the U.S. Forces and Others In addition to support for the U.S. Armed Forces responding to armed attack situations, etc., support operations for the armed forces of foreign countries other than the United States in armed attack situations, etc., as well as support operations for the U.S. Armed Forces and 15 Following the addition of survival-threatening situations, the title of the Act was revised from the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc.,” to the “Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation.” 16 The examples of application include the organization of special units, and the defense call-up of SDF Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, etc., while the examples of non-application include measures ----- **2 Outline of the International Peace Support Act** The International Peace Support Act is the newly enacted law that enables Japan to conduct cooperation and support operations, for the armed forces of foreign countries engaged in operations for international peace and security in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing (situations that threaten the peace and security of the international community, and the international community is collectively addressing the situations in accordance with the objectives of the U.N. Charter to remove the threat, and Japan, as a member of the international community, needs to independently and proactively contribute to these activities) in order to ensure peace and security of the international community. - 1 Requirements Either of the following U.N. resolutions (by the General Assembly or the Security Council) is required for the operations of armed forces of foreign countries that are covered by Japan’s cooperation and support operations. (1) Resolutions that decide, call upon, recommend or authorize foreign countries subject to Japan’s support operations to respond to the situation that threatens **Commentary** **Why Is the International Peace Support Law (General Law) Necessary?** **Column** With the security environment becoming increasingly severe, we are now in an era where no country can maintain its own peace only by itself any longer and it is necessary for the international community to cooperate more than ever to secure peace. Japan has enacted the Act on Special Measures against Terrorism and other special measures laws in the past, and under these laws, Japan conducted at-sea replenishment for the vessels of the military forces of foreign countries engaged in maritime interdiction operations to prevent and deter the movements of terrorists and transportation of weapons and other related materials in the Indian Ocean. These operations by Japan have been highly praised by the international community. From the perspective of enabling seamless responses to any situation, rather than developing new legislation in response to every emergence of a specifi c need in the future, the International Peace Support Law, enacted as general law, enables Japan to conduct support operations more expeditiously and effectively for the military forces of foreign countries operating for international peace and security, making it possible to proactively contribute to international peace and security at Japan’s own initiative. The International Peace Support Law also enables Japan to conduct intelligence gathering and education/training in cooperation with other countries during peacetime and refl ect the achievements of those operations in the development of its basic preparedness. Furthermore, the law enables the prompt implementation of fi eld surveys and coordination with other countries prior to dispatch of the SDF units in order to specify the needs for their activities and the size of units to be dispatched, thereby increasing the possibility for SDF units to conduct operations they are skilled at in better locations and making it possible to conduct training, including security measures, in a more productive manner based on the information obtained. In other words, the law is also considered to be conducive to safer SDF operations with minimized risk. **Commentary** **Risk of Being Dragged into a War** **Column** The “use of force” permitted as a measure for self-defense under Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution must meet the very strict requirements of the Three New Conditions (see Page 166). They are extremely stringent requirements not seen anywhere else in the world and serve as a clear constitutional restraint. Furthermore, when the Minister of Defense issues a defense operation order to actually conduct the “use of force,” the Government must seek Diet approval in advance, in principle. As such, since the SDF conducts its activities in compliance with the Constitution and laws enacted by the Diet, it will never happen in which the “use of force” by the SDF expands endlessly, resulting in Japan being dragged against its intention into the war of another country. In addition, under the Legislation for Peace and Security, the Japan-U.S. Alliance will function more for Japan’s peace and security. By sending this message out to the world, Japan’s capability to prevent a confl ict from occurring, in other words its deterrence capability, will be further enhanced, and the risk of Japan coming under an attack will be further reduced. Furthermore, it will enable Japan to cooperate further with the international community for the maintenance of peace and development of the region and the world, making the world more peaceful. ----- **y** **Risk for SDF Members** **Column** The missions by SDF members defi nitely entail risk, but the degree of risk varies depending on the situation in the region to which they are actually dispatched and details of their activities, etc., and SDF members are dispatched only when it is judged as possible to dispatch them after assessing risk in the course of considering concrete cases of dispatches. Moreover, in dispatching SDF members, the SDF strives to minimize risks associated with their performance of missions. These processes are no different from those adopted in dispatching SDF members on disaster relief missions following the eruption of Mt. Ontake and the Great East Japan Earthquake or on UN peacekeeping operations in South Sudan. While new missions may give rise to new sorts of risks, when the SDF dispatches its members, it minimizes and localizes such risks by legal and operational mechanisms for security. For example, the legal mechanism for security includes provisions for the designation of areas of activities where SDF units can conduct their activities smoothly and safely and for the cessation/suspension of activities when areas of activities by SDF units become “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted.” In addition, the operational mechanism for security includes adequate information gathering on situations in areas of activities, carrying enough equipment to secure the safety of SDF members, and adequate education and training. Moreover, the dispatch of SDF units must go through appropriate procedures, such as the development of robust plans, cabinet decisions and approval by the Diet. The SDF is thoroughly committed to security measures for SDF members by taking a variety of measures as described above. the peace and security of the international community (2) Other than (1), resolutions that regard the situations as a threat to peace or a breach of the peace and call on U.N. member states to respond to the situation concerned - 2 Response Measures - 3 Measures to Avoid Integration with the Use of Force The revised law sets forth the following measures in order to avoid integration with the use of force by a foreign country and also to ensure the safety of SDF personnel: (1) Japan does not implement support activities in the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted. However, when the personnel having been stranded have already been found and rescue operations have commenced, search and rescue activities concerning them are allowed to continue as long as the safety of the SDF units is ensured. (2) The commanding offi cers of the SDF units, etc., order a temporary suspension of support activities if combat operations occur or are expected to occur at the site of their activities or in the vicinity. (3) The Minister of Defense designates the area for implementing activities, and if it is deemed diffi cult to implement operations smoothly and safely in the whole or part of that area, must promptly change the designation of the area or order the cessation of the activities being implemented there. - 4 Diet Approval The following response measures can be implemented in situations threatening the international peace and security that the international community is collectively addressing. (1) Cooperation and support activities Supplies and services to armed forces of foreign countries (supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, base services, lodging, storage, use of facilities, training services and construction) are to be provided. While the provision of weapons is not included as in the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security, the revised law now allows the “provision of ammunition” and “refueling and maintenance of aircraft ready to take off for combat operations.” (2) Search and rescue activities (3) Ship inspection operations (those set forth in the Ship Inspection Operations Law) Prior Diet approval required without exception, and each house of the Diet has an obligation to make efforts toward decisions within 7 days (excluding any period when the Diet is in recess). In addition, re-approval is required in the case of a lapse of more than two years since the commencement of the response measures. ----- **y** **Comments on the Conscription System** **Column** In general, the conscription system is the universal conscription system that obligates people to serve mandatory military service. Under the system, a country maintains military forces on a permanent basis, conscripts required soldiers every year, trains them for a specifi c period of time, rejuvenates the forces and prepares them as needed personnel to be ready for war-time. Under Japan’s constitutional legal framework, such a conscription system is not socially recognized as a duty that should naturally be borne by a member of society in organizing his or her life, from a public welfare perspective. The adoption of the conscription system in Japan would essentially mean the imposition of an obligation of rendering military service. Therefore, regardless of whether it is during peacetime or an emergency situation, the draft system should not be allowed in view of the intent of the provisions of Article 13 and Article 18 of the Constitution. There is absolutely no leeway to change this interpretation of the Constitution. Whatever change occurs in the security environment, it would not change the fundamental nature of the conscription system, which requires that a person serve mandatory military service even if it is against that person’s will. Thus, there is no leeway for the conscription system to become constitutionally accepted in the future. Moreover the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) is a force consist of professionals, armed with high-tech equipment, and it takes a long time and considerable work to foster and train SDF members. The conscription system, under which members of the forces are replaced within a short period of time, is not conducive to a strong SDF. Thus, the conscription system is not necessary from the perspective of security policy, either. Germany and France, which had maintained the conscription system for many years, abolished the system in their own countries at the turn of the century, and currently, no Group of Seven (G7) country has a conscription system in place. **3 Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operation** Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies (the so-called gray zone situations) are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In order to respond promptly to such situations of infringement that do not amount to an armed attack, and ensure seamless and suffi cient responses to any unlawful acts, the Government made cabinet decisions regarding the acceleration of procedures to issue orders for public security operations and maritime security operations, etc., in May 2015, particularly in the following three cases: ❍ Responses to foreign naval vessels making maritime navigation through the territorial sea or the internal waters of Japan that does not fall under the category of innocent passage under international law ❍ Responses to the unlawful landing on a remote island or its surrounding seas by an armed group ❍ Responses to acts of infringement when Self-Defense Forces ships or aircraft detect foreign ships committing said acts against Japanese private ships on the high seas Specifi cally, when an urgent decision is necessary concerning the issuance of orders for public security operations, etc., but it is diffi cult to promptly convene an extraordinary cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers of State by telephone and other means. Any Minister of State who could not be contacted in advance shall be notifi ed of the cabinet decision ex post facto. See>> Fig. II-3-2-3 (Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operation) ----- Fig. II-3-2-3 Acceleration of Procedures to Issue Orders for Public Security Operations and Maritime Security Operation H Cabinet dicision to accelerate procedures to issue orders for public security/maritime security operations in the following three cases, referring to Cabinet Decision on Government Responses when there is a Risk of Large-Scale Terrorism (November 2, 2001): Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Making Maritime Navigation that Does Not Responses to Illegal Landing on Remote Responses to Foreign Vessels Infringing on Fall under the Category of Innocent Islands by Armed Groups Japanese Commercial Vessels on the High Seas Passage under International Law H Responses are made by SDF units under H When armed groups or groups that are H When Japanese commercial vessels are orders for maritime security operations highly probable to be armed are likely to actually subject to infringement activities, in principle. illegally land or actually land on remote H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting H The Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of islands, to issue orders for (urgent) counterForeign Affairs and the Japan Coast H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting piracy operation or maritime security Guard promptly and expeditiously share to issue orders for maritime security operation. information, coordinate and cooperate. operations/public security operations. H It is necessary to hold a cabinet meeting to issue orders for maritime security operations. When an urgent decision is necessary but it is difficult to promptly convene an adhoc cabinet meeting, the Prime Minister can preside over a cabinet meeting to make the decision by obtaining the consent of the Ministers by telephone and other means (any Ministers who could not be contacted in advance shall be notified of the cabinet decision ex post facto). **4 Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation** - 1 Responses to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and **Survived-Threatening Situation** The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation specifi es items that should be stipulated as basic principles and basic policies (the Basic Response Plan) regarding responses to armed attack situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation as well as the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. See>> Fig. II-3-2-4 (Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation); References 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); References 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel) serve as the premises supporting the confi rmation b. When the situation is confi rmed as an armed attack situations, etc., or Survived-Threatening Situation, reasons why there is no other appropriate means available to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, and the use of force is necessary to respond to the situation (2) An overall plan to respond to the armed attack situations, etc., or Survived-Threatening Situation (3) Important matters related to the response measures **(2) Response Measures** When responding to an armed attack situations, etc., or Survived-Threatening Situation, the designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions will implement the required measures based on legal provisions during the period between the formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan. See>> Fig. II-3-2-5 (Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative Institutions, Local Governments or Designated Public Institutions) **(1) Basic Response Plan, etc.** In situations such as an armed attack situations, etc., or Survived-Threatening Situation, the Cabinet must decide upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic Response Plan is decided, a temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, and it will implement these measures. (1) The following items concerning situations that need to be dealt with: a. Developments in the situation, the confi rmation of the situation as an armed attack situations, etc., or Survived Threatening Situation and the facts that **(3) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments** The responsibilities of the national and local governments as defi ned in the Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and SurvivedThreatening Situation are as outlined below. See>> Fig. II-3-2-6 (Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments, etc.) ----- |Local governments|Designated public institutions| |---|---| |Fig. II-3-2-5|Measures to be Implemented by Designated Administrative Institutions, Local Governments or Designated Public Institutions| |---|---| |Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by Measures implemented according to changes in circumstances caused by armed attacks, in order to bring an armed attack situation, etc., to an end Survived-Threatening Situation in order to bring the situation to an end (1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the (1) The use of force, deployment of units, etc. and other actions taken by the SDF necessary to repel an armed attack SDF necessary to repel an armed attack against a foreign country that is in (2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures a close relationship with Japan which as a result threatens Japan’s survival implemented so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1), actions taken and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn the people’s right to by the United States Armed Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (a survival-threatening armed attack) necessary to repel an armed attack, and actions taken by armed forces of (2) Provision of articles, facilities and services, or other measures implemented other foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel an so that the actions of the SDF specified in (1) and actions taken by armed armed attack can be conducted smoothly and effectively forces of foreign countries in cooperation with the SDF necessary to repel (3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above an armed attack against a foreign country that results in threatening Japan’s survival can be conducted smoothly and effectively (3) Diplomatic and other measures on top of (1) and (2) above Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from an armed attack, or minimize the impact of an armed attack on the people’s Measures to protect the lives, bodies and properties of citizens from a lives and the national economy implemented according to changes in survival-threatening armed attack, or minimize the impact of a armed attack situations, etc. survival-threatening armed attack on the people’s life and the national economy implemented according to changes in a situation where an armed (1) Measures to announce warnings, give instructions on evacuation and the attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival rescue of injured parties, measures for the restoration of facilities and equipment, and other measures (2) Price stabilization and distribution of daily necessities etc., and other • Measures to ensure the security of public facilities and secure the stable measures supply of daily necessities, etc.|| Fig. II-3-2-4 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation Occurrence of armed attack, etc. Creation of a draft basic response plan (1) Formulation of the draft basic response plan by the Prime Minister The Government National Security Council (2) The draft basic response plan sent to Deliberation of the draft basic response plan Consultation the National Security Council for deliberation (3) Recommendation by the National Security Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning Recommendation Council to the Prime Minister concerning Specialized assistance to National Security Council the draft basic response plan Cabinet decision on the basic response plan (4) Cabinet decision on the basic response plan The Diet Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc. (note) Request for the approval of the Diet (5) Approval of the basic response plan by Diet (Task Force Chief: Prime Minister) Approval Rejection - Comprehensive promotion of response measures - Formulation of usage guidelines for specific public Terminate immediately facilities, etc. Response according to the basic Designated government institutions Local governments Designated public institutions response plan and usage guidelines Note: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for the comprehensive promotion of measures to respond to armed attack situations or a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival ----- **(5) Report to the United Nations Security Council** In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government shall immediately report measures it has taken to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the Security Council. - 2 Responses to Emergency Situations other than **Armed Attack Situations, etc.** The Act on the Peace and Independence of Japan and Maintenance of the Nation and the People’s Security in Armed Attack Situations, etc., and Survived-Threatening Situation provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations[17] other than an armed attack situation and a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival, in order for the Government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people. - 3 Initiatives for Civil Protection |Subject|Responsibility| |---|---| |Government|• Have a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people • Respond to armed attack situations, etc., and Survived- Threatening Situation by taking every possible measure and using all organizations and functions • Implement all possible measures as a whole nation| |Local Government|• Have responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, bodies and properties of the residents • Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc., in mutual cooperation with the national government, other local governments and other institutions| |Designated Public Institutions|• Implement necessary measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc., in the scope of their work, in mutual cooperation with the national government, local governments, and other institutions| |Nationals|• Strive to provide necessary cooperation when the designated administrative institutions, local governments or designated public institutions implement response measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc.| Responsibilities of the National and Fig. II-3-2-6 Local Governments, etc. **Subject** **Responsibility** - Have a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people Government - Respond to armed attack situations, etc., and Survived Threatening Situation by taking every possible measure and using all organizations and functions - Implement all possible measures as a whole nation - Have responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, bodies and properties of the residents Local - Implement necessary measures to deal with armed Government attack situations, etc., in mutual cooperation with the national government, other local governments and other institutions - Implement necessary measures to deal with armed Designated attack situations, etc., in the scope of their work, in Public mutual cooperation with the national government, local Institutions governments, and other institutions - Strive to provide necessary cooperation when the designated administrative institutions, local governments Nationals or designated public institutions implement response measures to deal with armed attack situations, etc. **(4) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures** Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as the Chief of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as the Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force. If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies or properties of the people, or to eliminating an armed attack, and particularly when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, the Prime Minister may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary response measures. In circumstances where the necessary response measures are not implemented or if there are obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies and properties of the people or to eliminating an armed attack, and emergency responses are required in light of the situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasures may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals. **(1) Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection and the Roles of** **the Ministry of Defense and the SDF** In March 2005, the Government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic Guidelines”), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Act. The Basic Guidelines presume four types of armed attack situations, including amphibious landing invasion, guerilla or special operations forces unit attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and air attacks, and prescribe matters requiring attention to implement civil protection measures in response to each of them. The MOD and the SDF established the MOD/ Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency Civil Protection Plan based on the Civil Protection Act and the Basic Guidelines. The Plan calls upon the SDF, in an armed attack situations, etc., to go all out to perform its primary mission of forcing back the armed attack, and also implement civil protection measures to support the evacuation and rescue of residents and deal with the armed attack-induced disasters to the extent possible without interfering with the primary mission. In the event of an armed attack situations, etc., and an emergency response situation, the SDF may undertake such operations as support for the evacuation of residents, relief of evacuated residents and stopgap restoration work as civil protection measures and emergency response protection 17 A contingency situation other than an armed attack situation and a situation where an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people, including an emergency response situation (a situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed ----- measures based on the civil protection dispatches. The Civil Protection Act, from the perspective of protecting the people and its livelihood from a direct attack against Japan and its physical damage, provides for necessary matters to that end, including issuance of warnings and measures for the evacuation and relief of residents. Survived-Threatening Situation and a situation that requires warning issuance and the evacuation and relief of residents is nothing less than a situation where an armed attack against Japan is anticipated or imminent. In such a case, it is recognized as an armed attack situations, etc., and necessary measures are to be implemented under the Civil Protection Act. (In the case that an armed attack against a foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival is not regarded as an armed attack situations, etc., a series of measures are to be implemented to ensure the stability of the people’s livelihood, including the stable supply of daily necessities, based on a variety of existing laws and regulations, taking thoroughgoing response measures to protect the people’s livelihood without invoking the Civil Protection Act.) See>> Fig. II-3-2-7 (Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches) **(2) Activities by the MOD and the SDF to Facilitate** **the Civil Protection Measures** (a) Participation in Training for Civil Protection In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, etc., it is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the implementation of civil protection measures in peacetime with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations. From this perspective, the MOD and the SDF have held civil protection training with cooperation from relevant government organizations, or local governments. In addition, the MOD and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training implemented by relevant government organizations, or local governments. See>> References 26 (Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY 2015)) Civil Protection Exercise held in Asahikawa, Hokkaido |Fig. II-3-2-7|Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches| |---|---| |Municipal mayors Ask for dispatch Communication (When a dispatch request cannot be sought) request Prefectural governors Task Force Chief1 Request for Ask for dispatch Notification dispatch Report (When communication is established by a Municipal mayors) Report Minister of Defense Prime Minister Approve Issue an order to Issue an order for civil gather for civil protection dispatches protection, etc.2, 3 SDF Ready Reserve Personnel SDF Reserve Personnel Report for duty Units Notes: 1. Armed Attack Situations, etc. Task Force Chief or Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief 2. If specifically needed 3. Ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel will be called on if necessary upon the approval of the Prime Minister|| Civil Protection Councils have been established in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to comprehensively promote policies related to civil protection measures, with members of the SDF and employees of the regional defense bureaus appointed as council members. In addition, in some cases, retired SDF personnel are employed by local governments as crisis management supervisors to facilitate cooperation with the MOD and the SDF and help to develop and implement disaster response plans and training programs as experts on civil protection. (b) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime During peacetime, the MOD and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division has been posted within the GSDF Regional Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation of civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments, etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office ----- **Chapter 4** **[Strengthening of ]** **the Japan-U.S. Alliance** Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the JapanU.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity, not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacifi c region and the world at large. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severe, and the United States, at the same time, maintains and strengthens its engagement and presence in the Asia-Pacifi c region, it has become more important than ever to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance for the security of Japan. The military presence of U.S. Forces in Japan not only contributes to the defense of Japan, but also functions as deterrence and response capabilities to address contingencies in the Asia-Pacifi c region, and serves as a core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. On the other hand, since the stationing of U.S. Forces in **Section 1** **Signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements** **1 Maintenance of Japan’s Peace and Security** In the current international community, a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks including the use of nuclear weapons to coercion or intimidation by military power, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. It is diffi cult even for the United States to guarantee its security on its own. Much more than that, it would be diffi cult for Japan to ensure its national security solely through its unilateral efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not necessarily contribute to regional stability. Consequently, Japan has maintained its peace and security, centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as democracy, the rule of law respect for human rights and a capitalist economy as Prime Minister Abe and U.S. President Obama shaking hands at the APEC Summit Meeting (November 2015) [Photo courtesy of the Cabinet Secretariat Public Relations Offi ce] Japan impacts the living environment of local residents, efforts that correspond to the actual situation of each region must be made to mitigate the impact on regions such as Okinawa. well as an interest in maintaining the peace and security of the world, and has strong economic ties. Specifi cally, Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan, based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan will provide facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces, based on Article 6 of the treaty. If a nation plans to attack Japan, the attacker must be prepared to confront not only the defense capability of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States, due to the U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack. As a result, the opposing nation clearly recognizes that it will suffer grievously if it carries out an invasion, and such desires will be abandoned at the planning stage. In other words, this serves as deterrence against attacks ----- Japan intends to create a seamless posture and deterrence capabilities of the U.S. military as well as secure its peace and security by effectively utilizing the maintaining its own adequate defense capability. **2 Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan** Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty states that contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East is the purpose of the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. Forces in Japan. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs. In the regions surrounding Japan, there are many states and the like with massive military power, including some states that retain nuclear weapons or continue nuclear development. In addition to issues or tension caused by changes in the balance of power, situations that we call “gray zones” over sovereignty of the territory or vested interests are likely to arise, and this risks further aggravation of the situation. In such a **3 Further Stabilization of the International Security Environment** The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in defense but also in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society. The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with these security arrangements at its core, also forms the axis of Japan’s foreign policy. It contributes to Japan’s ability to implement positive efforts to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promotion of multinational security dialogue and cooperation, and cooperation with the United Nations. Currently, we are confronted with global security challenges that are extremely diffi cult for any single country to tackle alone, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and acts of piracy, as well as new risks concerning stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace, and it is important for countries to work together from peacetime. The strong bonds forged security environment, the military presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by various security issues or unstable factors, providing a great sense of security to the nations in the region and thus fulfi lling a role as public goods. Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the JapanU.S. Security Arrangements constitute the foundation of the United States’ commitment to the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. These arrangements, complemented by the alliances established between the United States and other countries in the region such as South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines and also by the friendly relations developed with other countries, play an indispensable role in maintaining the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacifi c region. between Japan and the United States are also playing an important role in the efforts implemented by Japan to effectively respond to such challenges. In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and the U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to strengthen their cooperation. This close coordination lays the foundation for various forms of international collaboration such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, and leads to enhancement of the operational effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The peace and prosperity of the international community are closely linked to those of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance measures to further stabilize the global security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan. ----- **Section 2** **Overview of the Revision of the 1997 Guidelines** It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fulfi ll in case of an armed attack against Japan or other situation in advance, with a view to responding rapidly to such an event. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring their effectiveness provide a framework pertaining to role-sharing between Japan **1 Background to the Revision of the Guidelines** - 1 Background to the Formulation of the Guidelines and the United States. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously studied bilateral cooperation plans for the two countries, held consultations on them, and worked on the revision of the Guidelines to adapt to the current situations. at the Japan-U.S. Summit held in February 2013, Prime Minister Abe stated to U.S. President Obama that, “in response to the changing security environment, Japan would like to start reviewing the Guidelines through discussions on the two countries’ views of the roles, missions and capabilities (RMC).” The 1978 Guidelines were formulated with a focus on an armed attack on Japan against the backdrop of the Cold War, which was still ongoing then. The subsequent Guidelines were developed in 1997 in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War. The 1997 Guidelines expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The 1997 Guidelines defi ne the roles of Japan and the United States, and the cooperation of the two countries under three categories: (1) under normal circumstances, (2) in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) in situations in areas surrounding Japan. They also stipulated that they would review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner. - 2 Background to the Revision - 3 The Direction of the Revision Against the background described above, at the JapanU.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC or “2+2” Meeting) in October 2013, the Ministers directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines, and this task was to be completed by the end of 2014. The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting identified the following seven objectives of the review of the 1997 Guidelines: (1) Ensuring the Alliance’s capacity to respond to an armed attack against Japan, as a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation; (2) Expanding the scope of cooperation, to refl ect the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, encompassing such areas as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, peacekeeping, capacity building, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and equipment and technology enhancement; (3) Promoting deeper security cooperation with other regional partners to advance shared objectives and values; (4) Enhancing Alliance mechanisms for consultation and coordination to make them more fl exible, timely, and responsive and to enable seamless bilateral cooperation in all situations; (5) Describing appropriate role-sharing of bilateral defense cooperation based on the enhancement of mutual capabilities; Since the formulation of the 1997 Guidelines, various issues and destabilizing factors have emerged, and become more visible and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as more active military activities of neighboring countries, new threats including international terrorist organizations and risks against the stable use of global commons such as oceans, outer space and cyberspace. In addition, the activities of the SDF have expanded to a global scale, as exemplifi ed by antipiracy activities, PKO, and international disaster relief activities. As a result, it had become necessary for the manner of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation to be adapted to these changes in the security environment and the expansion of the SDF’s activities and missions. Against the backdrop of these changes in the security environment, Prime Minister Abe directed then Minister of Defense Onodera at the end of 2012 to work on the revision of the Guidelines and other matters In addition ----- (6) Evaluating the concepts that guide bilateral defense cooperation in contingencies to ensure effective, effi cient, and seamless Alliance response in a dynamic security environment that includes challenges in emerging strategic domains such as space and cyberspace; and (7) Exploring additional ways in which we can strengthen the Alliance in the future to meet shared objectives. Based on the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 and in line with approaches indicated in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the United States, Japan and the United States conducted **2 Content of the New Guidelines** As a result of the intensive bilateral work on the revision of the Guidelines, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the new Guidelines recommended by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) at the “2+2” Meeting held on April 27, 2015, thereby accomplishing the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. See>> Reference 27 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015)); Reference 28 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)) extensive work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines. On October 8, 2014, based on the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held on July 11, 2014, the two governments announced “The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense Cooperation.” In addition, on December 19, 2014, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), recognizing the signifi cance of ensuring consistency between the revision of the Guidelines and Japan’s legislative process, decided to further deepen the discussions to work toward fi nalizing the revision of the Guidelines during the fi rst half of 2015, taking into account the progress of Japan’s legislative process. ❍ The two governments will maintain their individual defense postures based on their national security policies. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combatready forces in the Asia-Pacifi c region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly. ❍ The Guidelines provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. ❍ The Guidelines promote domestic and international understanding of the signifi cance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. - 2 Basic Premises and Principles The basic premises and principles maintain the approaches of the 1997 Guidelines as described below: ❍ The rights and obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements will remain unchanged. ❍ All actions and activities undertaken under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law. ❍ All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. ❍ The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative budgetary administrative or other - 1 Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines The new Guidelines newly specifi ed the matters to be emphasized in security and defense cooperation. The objectives of the new Guidelines are retained in line with the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. ❍ In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacifi c region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: – seamless, robust, fl exible, and effective bilateral responses; – synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; – a whole-of-government Alliance approach; – cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and the global nature of the Japan U S Alliance ----- measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures. - 4 Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security This section presents the direction of achieving seamless cooperation, from peacetime to contingencies, in order to ensure Japan’s peace and security, the core of the Guidelines. ❍ The two governments will take measures to seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. ❍ The two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism as appropriate, for assessment of the situation, sharing of information, as well as flexible deterrent options and actions aimed at deescalation. The two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels. - 3 Strengthened Alliance Coordination Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. **(1) Alliance Coordination Mechanism** In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the SDF and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. **(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination** The two governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. **(1) Cooperative Measures from Peacetime** As described below, this section specifies ways of cooperation from peacetime to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. ❍ The two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. ❍ The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following: a. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security. b. Air and Missile Defense The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles, and will also closely coordinate in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities. c. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order **(3) Bilateral Planning** In peacetime, the two governments will develop and update bilateral plans through Bilateral Planning Mechanism. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments. ----- based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing a bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness. d. Asset Protection The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises. e. Training and Exercises The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. f. Logistic Support The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its related arrangements. g. Use of Facilities The two governments will enhance joint/shared use of facilities and areas in order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the SDF and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities, including civilian airports and seaports. **(2) Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace** **and Security** As set forth below, this section describes measures to respond to emerging threats to Japan’s peace and security. ❍ The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. ❍ In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below. a. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations The two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, including by conducting training and exercises. b. Maritime Security The two governments’ cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolution or other basis under international law. c. Measures to Deal with Refugees If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security. d. Search and Rescue The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The SDF will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. e. Protection of Facilities and Areas The SDF and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces. f. Logistic Support The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. g. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. **(3) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan** The new Guidelines state that bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. While maintaining the basic principles of bilateral responses to an armed attack against Japan described in the 1997 Guidelines the content of the new Guidelines ----- have been enhanced in view of the expansion and diversification of cooperation between Japan and the United States. a. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated The two governments will take measures to deter an armed attack and to de-escalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. b. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs (a) Principles for Coordinated Actions - Japan and the United States will take appropriate and coordinated actions to promptly repel the attack and deter any further attacks. - The SDF will have primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations, and the United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the SDF. (b) Concept of Operations (1) Operations to Defend Airspace The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the SDF will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations. (2) Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, they will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations. The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations. (3) Operations to Defend Maritime Areas The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack (4) Operations to Counter Ground Attacks The SDF will have primary responsibility to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the SDF will conduct operations to retake an island. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement SDF operations. (5) Cross-Domain Operations Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets. The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the SDF. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the SDF may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate. (c) Operational Support Activities (1) Communications and Electronics The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness. (2) Search and Rescue The SDF and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. (3) Logistic Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. (4) Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the JapanU.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas ----- (5) Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate. **(4) Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a** **Country other than Japan** When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under an armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack. The SDF will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below. a. Asset Protection The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense. b. Search and Rescue The SDF and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. c. Maritime Operations The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate. The SDF and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate. d. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches. e. Logistics Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. **(5) Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster** **in Japan** In light of the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the new Guidelines now include the following. ❍ When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SDF, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. The United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. ❍ The two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. The United States Armed Forces may participate in disaster-related drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters. - 5 Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace **and Security** The new Guidelines stipulate specific ways of JapanU.S. cooperation for regional and global peace and security, based on experiences from previous international activities. ❍ In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the AsiaPacific region and beyond. ❍ When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities the two governments will ----- cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. **(1) Cooperation in International Activities** The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. Common areas for cooperation by the two governments will include the following. a. Peacekeeping Operations The two governments will cooperate, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the SDF and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting U.N. and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate. b. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief The two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating SDF and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution. c. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities. d. Partner Capacity Building The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief (HA/DR) or peacekeeping operations. e. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals. f. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance When the two governments participate in international activities, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets. g. Training and Exercises In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the SDF and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises. h. Logistic support When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. **(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation** The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards. - 6 Space and Cyberspace Cooperation The new Guidelines now incorporate cooperation in emerging strategic domains such as outer space and cyberspace. **(1) Cooperation on Space** ❍ The two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. ❍ The two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. ❍ The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate in such areas as early-warning, ISR, positioning, navigation and timing, space situational awareness, meteorological observation, command, control, and communications. **(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace** ❍ The two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and appropriate manner. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions. ❍ The SDF and the United States Armed Forces will maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems, conduct educational exchanges, ensure the resiliency of their respective networks and ----- systems, contribute to whole-of-government efforts, and conduct bilateral exercises. ❍ In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond. - 7 Bilateral Enterprise further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. (1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (2) Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security (3) Educational and Research Exchanges - 8 Procedures for Review The two governments will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances, and will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner if deemed necessary. The new Guidelines newly incorporate the implementation of the regular evaluation while maintaining the approach of the 1997 Guidelines. The new Guidelines state that the two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve ----- **Initiatives to Build the Foundation for Strengthening** **Section 3** **the Alliance** **1 Background to the Strengthening of the Alliance** Since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in 1960, Japan and the United States have built a robust alliance based on democratic ideals, respect for human rights, the rule of law and common interests. During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements ensured the safety of Japan as a country with a liberal ideology and also contributed to the peace and stability in the region, including the formulation of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“Guidelines”) in 1978 with a focus on responses to an armed attack on Japan. Following the end of the Cold War, the leaders of Japan and the United States announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security in 1996, reaffi rming the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacifi c region following the Cold War. Upon the Declaration, the fi nal report was compiled at the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) at the end of that year. As part of the promotion of cooperative relations presented in the Declaration, the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) held in the following year (1997) approved the aforementioned 1997 Guidelines and expanded cooperation to responses in situations in areas surrounding Japan in light of changes in the security environment, such as the end of the Cold War. Afterwards, in light of further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, following the “2+2” Meeting in December 2002, Japan and the United States held working-level and other consultations as part of bilateral strategic dialogue on security from the perspective of how to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s capacity more effective to adapt to the changing times. As a result of a number of these Japan-U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan-U.S. Alliance was arranged in three stages. These stages are: confi rmation of common strategic objectives to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region (fi rst stage) in February 2005; the announcement of the results of the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage) in October 2005; and the formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation a program for implementing specific measures for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, (third stage) in May 2006. Japan and the United States at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2007 reconfi rmed and updated their common strategic objectives. In February 2009, the two countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam (the Guam International Agreement), which entered into force in May 2009. At the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011, the two countries reviewed and revalidated their common strategic objectives set forth in the Joint Statements of the previous “2+2” Meetings, including maintenance of maritime security domain by defending the principle of freedom of navigation and maintenance of bilateral cooperation with respect to protection of and access to outer space and cyberspace, and discussed a diverse range of areas, including an expansion of information sharing and joint ISR activities. In the Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, Japan and the United States announced that they decided to adjust the plans outlined in the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (Realignment Roadmap) of May 2006, considering signifi cant progress on the realignment of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan since the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 as well as the security environment in the Asia-Pacifi c region. The major accomplishments at the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013 are as follows: (1) Agreed to complete work on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines before the end of 2014 (2) Agreed to further expand and deepen bilateral cooperation in security and defense, including cyberspace and outer space, and strengthen cooperation in the region, including trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States and Australia as well as among Japan, the United States and the ROK. (3) Regarding the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, Japan and the United States renewed their strong determination to complete the relocation ----- |1958 1960 Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty|Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty) The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force| |---|---| |1968 1969 1972 1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines|(Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan) Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan) (Okinawa is returned to Japan) (Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation)| |1978 and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation|Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines)| |1991 1996 End of the Cold War and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines 1997 2001 2003 Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 2006 terrorist attacks in the United States|(Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War) Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks) SACO Final Report Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks) Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Fig. II-4-3-2|Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations| |---|---| |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|SS|ttaa|ggeess oo|ff JJaa|ppaa|nn--|UU..SS.. CCoo|nnssuu|llttaa|ttiioo| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Consultation|SSttaaggeess ooff JJaappaann--UU..SS.. CCoonnssuullttaattiioonnss|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|Col10|Col11|Col12|Col13|Col14|Col15|Col16|Col17|Col18|Col19| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||First stage||||||Second stage|||||Third stage||||||| |December 2002|The two coun|||||||||||eld of security||||||| ||||||||Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting tries agreed to further bilateral consultations in the general fi|||||||||||| |February 2005 October 2005||||||||||||||||||| ||Confirmation of Common Strategic Objectives (at the first stage)||||||Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting Roles, Missions, and Capabilities of Japan and the U.S. (at the second stage)||||||Force posture realignment (realignment of U.S. Force structure in Japan) (at the third stage)|||||| ||||||Japan-U.S. Alliance||: Transformation and Realignment for the Future S Summary of studies on roles, missions, and capabilities (at the second stage)|||||tudy Recommendation on realignment||||||| |May 2006||||||||||||Maintenance of deterrence and capabilities|||Mitigate impact on local communities|||| ||||||||Japan-U.S. Roadmap for||Realig|nment Implementation||Finalization of realignment initiatives (at the third stage)||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |May 2007||||||||||||||||||| ||Reconfirm|||ation|J /renewal Ad mmon Strategic Objectives||oint Statement at the “2+2”||Meetin|g, “Alliance Transformati||on: ion” Implementation of the realignment roadmap||||||| ||||||||vancing Japan-United States||Secur|ity and Defense Cooperat||||||||| |||||Co|mmon Strategic Objectives|||Roles, Missio|ns, and|Capabilities|||Implementation of the realignment roadmap|||||| |||Reconfirm||ation|/renewal|||||||Com||||plem|ent|| |June 2011|||||B mon Strategic Objectives||Joint Statement at the “2+2”||Meeti|ng, “Toward a Deeper an||d 2+2 Document “Progress on the Realignment ip” of U.S. Forces in Japan” Continued progress toward r Realignment Roadmap’s Obj|||||ng es|| ||||||||roader U.S.-Japan Alliance: B||uilding|on 50 Years of Partnersh||||||||| ||||||||Strengthening o Defens|||ce Security and eration||||||||| |||||Com|mon Strategic Objectives|||Strengthening o Defens|f Allian e Coop|ce Security and eration|||Continued progress toward r Realignment Roadmap’s Obj|||ealizi ectiv|ng es|| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |April 2012||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||Joint Statement||of the|“2+2” Meeting|||Decision to adjust the plans o in the Roadmap|||utlin|ed|| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |October 2013||||||||||||||||||| ||Stra in||||Joint Statement at the||“2+2” Meeting, “Toward a M||ore Ro|bust Alliance and Greater||Shared Responsibilities”|||||easures ding ies|| ||||Stra in|tegic form|concept and recognition of local ation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance||Strengthening of bila cooperation includin||teral s g revie|ecurity and defense w of the guidelines||Welcomed the progress in realignme for the U.S. Forces and the USFJ mitigating impact on local com|Welcomed the progress in realignme for the U.S. Forces and the USFJ mitigating impact on local com|||nt m inclu munit|easures ding ies|| |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| |April 2015||||||||||||||||||| ||Joint Statement a Reconfirmed the Alliance’s commitment||||||t the “2+2” Meeting, “A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Sec|||||urity Environment” Reaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan||||||| ||||||||Enhanced bilateral security and defense cooperation (e.g. release of the new Guidelines)|||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||| Fig. II-4-3-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States 1951 The former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed 1952 Years of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty The treaty enters into force 1958 Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty) Revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 1960 The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force and the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 1968 (Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan) 1969 Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan) 1972 (Okinawa is returned to Japan) 1976 Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines (Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation) 1978 and expanding Japan-U.S. defense cooperation Formulation of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978 Guidelines) 1991 (Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War) 1996 End of the Cold War Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks) and the establishment of the 1997 Guidelines SACO Final Report 1997 Formulation of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. 2003 The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context (Koizumi-Bush Talks) Japan-U.S. relations since the 9/11 2006 Formulation of the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation terrorist attacks in the United States The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks) The Japan-U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks) 2007 Irreplaceable Japan-U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks) 2010 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 2012 Japan-U.S. Joint Statement: A Shared Vision For the Future (Noda-Obama Talks) 2013 Agreement on the revision of the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1997 Guidelines) 2014 The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Abe-Obama Talks) 2015 New security environment U.S.-Japan Joint Vision Statement (Abe-Obama Talks) and the establishment of the new Guidelines Formulation of the New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (New Guidelines) Stages of Japan-U.S. Consultations Consultation First stage Second stage Third stage December 2002 Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting The two countries agreed to further bilateral consultations in the general field of security February 2005 Confirmation of Common Strategic Roles, Missions, and Capabilities of Japan Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting Force posture realignment (realignment of U.S. Force structure in Japan) Objectives (at the first stage) and the U.S. (at the second stage) (at the third stage) Japan-U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future Study October 2005 Summary of studies on roles, missions, and capabilities (at the second stage) Recommendation on realignment Maintenance of deterrence Mitigate impact on and capabilities local communities May 2006 Finalization of realignment Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation initiatives (at the third stage) Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting, “Alliance Transformation: Reconfirmation/renewal Advancing Japan-United States Security and Defense Cooperation” May 2007 Implementation of the Common Strategic Objectives Roles, Missions, and Capabilities realignment roadmap Reconfirmation/renewal Complement Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting, “Toward a Deeper and 2+2 Document “Progress on the Realignment Broader U.S.-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership” of U.S. Forces in Japan” June 2011 Common Strategic Objectives Strengthening of Alliance Security and Continued progress toward realizing Defense Cooperation Realignment Roadmap’s Objectives April 2012 Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting Decision to adjust the plans outlinedin the Roadmap Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting, “Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities” October 2013 Strategic concept and recognition of local information of the Japan-U.S. Alliance Strengthening of bilateral security and defensecooperation including review of the guidelines Welcomed the progress in realignment measures for the U.S. Forces and the USFJ including mitigating impact on local communities Joint Statement at the “2+2” Meeting, “A Stronger Alliance for a Dynamic Security Environment” April 2015 Reconfirmed the Alliance’s commitment cooperation (e.g. release of the new Guidelines)Enhanced bilateral security and defense realignment of U.S. Forces in JapanReaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to the ----- of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab, and agreed to continue to consult on other possible measures while implementing the previous agreements as early as possible and steadily from the perspective of mitigating the impact on Okinawa. The “2+2” Meeting, held in the milestone year marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, took place ahead of the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting. The major accomplishments of the “2+2” Meeting are as follows: (1) Under the U.S. policy of rebalance and Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” the Ministers reaffi rmed the Alliance’s commitment to maintaining the security of Japan as well as the peace and security of the international community and also reconfi rmed the U.S. commitment to the Senkaku Islands under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. (2) The Ministers approved the new Guidelines, and confi rmed their intent to enhance the Japan-U.S. **2 Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States** - 1 Various Policy Consultations Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities under the new Guidelines. (3) The Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress in initiatives for bilateral security and defense cooperation to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities. (4) The Ministers underscored the recent progress in regional and international cooperation. (5) The Ministers reaffi rmed the two governments’ continued commitment to the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. For the content of the new Guidelines, see Part III, Chapter 4, Section 2-2 (Content of the New Guidelines). See>> Reference 29 (United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation); Reference 30 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)); Reference 27 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015)); Reference 28 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)); Fig. II-4-3-1 (Major Milestones in Security Cooperation Between Japan and the United States); Fig. II-4-3-2 (Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations) for Defense Cooperation (SDC). As the framework for ministerial consultations among the top offi cials in charge of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting) represents such policy consultations. The SCC functions as an important consultative panel to discuss issues related to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the area of security. In addition, the MOD organizes Japan-U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on the defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation. Furthermore, the Japanese State Minister of Defense and the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense work together, and MOD offi cials, including the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, and the Chiefs of Staff of the SDF, have workinglevel meetings when necessary and exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and others under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to the increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and results in the further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the MOD is proactively engaging in these initiatives Japan and the United States have maintained close coordination at multiple levels, including the summitlevel and ministerial level, and have continually strengthened and expanded cooperative relations for the peace, stability and prosperity of not only the two countries but also the entire international community, including the Asia-Pacifi c region. Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between offi cials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels in the Governments of Japan and the United States through meetings such as the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (“2+2” Meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee Admiral Kawano, Chief of the Joint Staff, receiving a courtesy call from General Dunford, ----- |Participants|Purpose|Legal Basis| |---|---|---| |Japanese Side U.S. Side||| |U.S. Secretary of State, ster for Foreign Affairs, U.S. Secretary of Minister of Defense Defense1|Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security|Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960, in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty| |Participants are not pants are not specified2 specified2|Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States|Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and others| |Assistant Secretary General of North American of State, Assistant au, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Secretary of Defense, eneral of Bureau of Defense Representative from: y, Ministry of Defense; U.S. Embassy in Japan, entative from Joint Staff USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM|Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies|Established on July 8, 1976, as a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation on June 28, 1996| |eral of North American Affairs Deputy Commander Ministry of Foreign Affairs; of USFJ, Minister at General of Bureau of Local the U.S. Embassy, and Ministry of Defense; and others others|Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement|Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement| Fig. II-4-3-3 Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues **Consultative** **Participants** **Purpose** **Legal Basis** **Forum** **Japanese Side** **U.S. Side** Study of matters which would Established on the basis of promote understanding between letters exchanged between the Security Consultative U.S. Secretary of State, the Japanese and U.S. Governments Prime Minister of Japan and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Committee (SCC) U.S. Secretary of and contribute to the strengthening the U.S. Secretary of State on Minister of Defense (“2+2” Meeting) Defense[1] of cooperative relations in the areas January 19, 1960, in accordance of security, which form the basis of with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. security and are related to security Security Treaty Security Exchange of views on security Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Participants are not Subcommittee Participants are not specified[2] issues of mutual concern to Japan Security Treaty and others specified[2] (SSC) and the United States Assistant Secretary Study and consideration of Established on July 8, 1976, as Director-General of North American of State, Assistant consultative measures to Japan a subentry under the Japan-U.S. Subcommittee for Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Secretary of Defense, and the United States including Security Consultative Committee Defense Cooperation Director General of Bureau of Defense Representative from: guidelines to ensure consistent joint in its 16th meeting Reorganized (SDC)[3] Policy, Ministry of Defense; U.S. Embassy in Japan, responses covering the activities of at the Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial Representative from Joint Staff USFJ, Joint Staff, the SDF and USFJ in emergencies consultation on June 28, 1996 PACOM Director-General of North American Affairs Deputy Commander Consultation concerning Article XXV of the Status of Japan-U.S. Joint Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; of USFJ, Minister at implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement Committee Director General of Bureau of Local the U.S. Embassy, and Forces Agreement Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others others Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990. 2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary. 3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996. to closely cooperate on the matter. Furthermore, the Ministers agreed to enhance trilateral defense cooperation with countries including the Republic of Korea (ROK), Australia, India, and the Philippines in the future. b. Legislation for Peace and Security and Efforts to Ensure the Effectiveness of the New Guidelines Defense Minister Nakatani explained that the Legislation for Peace and Security was enacted recently and stated that Japan intends to further enhance the Japan-U.S. Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities under this legislation. Secretary Carter, for his part, stated that the United States supports and welcomes the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security. The Ministers welcomed the establishment of the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) as an important step in efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. The Ministers confirmed that they would continue to steadily undertake efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, including the enhancement of cooperation in outer space and cyberspace. c. Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan Defense Minister Nakatani explained that Japan has been making utmost efforts to realize the return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab as soon as possible. The Ministers reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of See>> Reference 31 (Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2013)); Fig. II-4-3-3 (Major Consultations on Policies Held between Japanese and U.S. Government Officials concerning Japan-U.S. Security Issues) - 2 Recent Major Policy Consultations, etc **(1) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting** **(November 3, 2015)** Minister of Defense Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter took the opportunity of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. a. Overview and Regional Situation The Ministers exchanged views on the increasingly severe security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers agreed that they oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea and also confirmed that Japan and the United States will conduct maritime activities in accordance with international law. Defense Minister Nakatani expressed his support for the operations of the U.S. Forces in the South China Sea, and the Ministers agreed to explore joint exercises and efforts to further strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian nations in areas such as capacity building and maritime security. In light of North Korea’s stance of continuing with activities to launch extended range ballistic missiles, the Ministers confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue ----- MCAS Futenma. Defense Minister Nakatani explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa, including the implementation of such measures as the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of training to locations outside of Okinawa, and sought cooperation from the United States. Secretary Carter stated that the United States would continue to cooperate. In addition, Defense Minister Nakatani requested U.S. cooperation in minimizing the impact of the operations of the U.S. Forces on the local community and the U.S. Forces’ extra consideration for safety. In response, Secretary Carter stated that the United States would constantly seek to ensure the maximum safety of the local community and U.S. Forces personnel. d. Host Nation Support (HNS) The Ministers agreed that both the Japanese and U.S. governments would continue to hold consultations and to make efforts to reach an early agreement. e. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation In light of the establishment of the Acquisition Technology & Logistics Agency, the Ministers agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology. The Ministers also confirmed that the recent decision of the U.S. Government concerning maintenance of U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys would lead to the reinforcement of the basis for repair and maintenance of common equipment, which is set forth in the new Guidelines. **(2) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (November 19, 2015)** Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Obama during his visit to Manila. An outline of their discussions on security issues is as follows: a. Opening Remarks Prime Minister Abe stated that he affirmed the robust Japan-U.S. relations during his visit to the United States in April. Prime Minister Abe also mentioned the collaboration of Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace and the United States’ rebalance policy, and stated that he intends to make this meeting a prelude to a new phase of Japan-U.S. cooperation that utilizes the robust Japan-U.S. Alliance to realize peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region as well as the international community. President Obama, for his part, stated that the JapanU.S. Alliance is the cornerstone of the security of the United States. President Obama offered his congratulations on the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, stating that the Legislation would help enhance Japan’s defense capabilities and enabled Japan and the United States to further broaden their collaboration in the AsiaPacific region as well as in the world b. Japan-U.S. relations (a) Overview Prime Minister Abe stated that in further advancing JapanU.S. cooperation, collaboration with countries that share the fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, is essential, and he intends, together with the United States, to build a network to realize peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the linchpin. President Obama responded by pointing out that the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security is a historic achievement, and that Japan and the United States need to work together in order to establish the rule of law and international norm—including the Law of the Sea—in the region. President Obama then stated that he supports Prime Minister Abe’s idea of building the network. (b) Japan-U.S. Security Prime Minister Abe stated that he intends to crystalize Japan-U.S. defense cooperation under the new Guidelines, advance with strong determination the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko, which he described as the only solution, and work together on mitigating the impact on Okinawa for the purpose of the stable presence of the U.S. Forces. In response, President Obama expressed his gratitude to Prime Minister Abe for his efforts on the relocation of MCAS Futenma, and stated that the United States will also cooperate to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. President Obama also commented on the revision of the Agreement on Host Nation Support (HNS), and Prime Minister Abe responded by stating that Japan intends to continue discussions in order to make the new HNS agreement appropriate. c. Situations in East Asia President Obama stated that he was encouraged by the discussions between Japan and China and the ROK, and the United States extends its support. In response, Prime Minister Abe expressed his gratitude. (a) China Prime Minister Abe stated that he will continue to promote the “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” and mentioned that in the East China Sea, intrusions into Japan’s territorial sea by Chinese vessels and unilateral resource development are continuing, and incidents have occurred in which Chinese naval vessels approached the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, adding that he is concerned about further escalation. President Obama stated that regarding cyber issues, the United States and China agreed not to engage in cyber theft in commercial relationships, but added that implementation is important ----- (b) South China Sea Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan supports the “Freedom of Navigation” operations by the U. S. Navy in the South China Sea, and he explained Japan’s existing stance regarding the activities of the Self-Defense Forces in the South China Sea, stating that such activities will be examined while taking into consideration the impact the situation in the South China Sea will have on the security of Japan. Prime Minister Abe added that Japan will provide support to relevant countries through a combination of ODA, capacity-building support by the Self-Defense Forces, and defense equipment cooperation. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe stated that he opposes any unilateral action that would change the status quo and heighten tensions. In response, President Obama commented that the United States will continue implementing the “Freedom of Navigation” operations routinely. (c) Republic of Korea Prime Minister Abe explained that in the Japan-ROK Summit Meeting, he engaged in a frank and constructive exchange of opinions with President Park Geun-hye, and commented that the ROK is Japan’s most important partner in building cooperative relationships in the region, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the linchpin. President Obama responded that he strongly supports Prime Minister Abe’s dialogues with President Park Geun-hye. (d) North Korea Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan-U.S. and JapanU.S.-ROK security cooperation is important given North Korea’s nuclear and missile issues, and it is also important for the security of Japan. Prime Minister Abe also mentioned that he would strengthen Japan-U.S. and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation, and strongly urge North Korea to refrain from acts of provocation, and that Japan hopes to receive continued understanding and cooperation from the United States regarding the abductions issue. President Obama stated that JapanU.S.-ROK cooperation is essential in the context of addressing the issues regarding North Korea. d. Japan-U.S. Cooperation in the Region Prime Minister Abe stated that collaboration with ASEAN is essential and relations with Australia and India are strategically important, adding that he intends to further deepen Japan-U.S.-India collaboration. Prime Minister Abe also commented that Japan intends to collaborate with the United States in order to strengthen the mechanisms of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and to make the EAS the region’s premier forum in both name and reality. President Obama stated that he supports and will cooperate with Prime Minister Abe’s idea of building networks in the region with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the linchpin, in order to realize peace and prosperity, and that he intends to advance discussions regarding cooperation with ASEAN as well. President Obama added that he also supports the idea of moving forward with strategic dialogues with India and Australia. e. Syria Prime Minister Abe commented that resolving the crisis in Syria is important from the viewpoint of counterterrorism as well and that he has a strong interest in the political process for peace and would like to actively contribute to it, including in the field of humanitarian assistance. In response, President Obama stated that the process has developed regarding Syria, but more efforts are still needed in order to resolve the crisis. f. Cooperation in the International Arena (a) Cyberspace President Obama stated that cyber issues were included in the G20 Leaders’ Communique and he intends to continue promoting cyber norms. In response, Prime Minister Abe commented that addressing cyber attacks is an important issue in terms of national security and crisis management, and he intends to continue cooperating closely with the United States and deliver strong messages through various opportunities. (b) Nuclear Security Summit President Obama stated that 2016 will be the last year of the Nuclear Security Summit, that Japan has continued to be an excellent partner throughout the summit, and that he intends to cooperate with Prime Minister Abe in order to achieve results. In response, Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan intends to cooperate closely with the United States. **(3) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (April 1, 2016)** Prime Minister Abe held the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Obama during his visit to Washington, D.C. In connection with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, concerning the lawsuits on the Henoko landfill permit, Prime Minister Abe explained that Japan’s position remains unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution and he has decided to accept a court-suggested settlement under the philosophy of “haste makes waste.” Prime Minister Abe also stated that he would like to realize the return of MCAS Futenma through the completion of the relocation to Henoko at the earliest possible time and would like to continue joint efforts with the United States to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. In response, President Obama stated that he understands the court suggested settlement on the ----- relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko as Prime Minister Abe’s strategic decision, and said that the United States would like to continue its own efforts through close cooperation with Japan. **(4) Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (May 25, 2016)** Prime Minister Abe held a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with President Obama, who was visiting Japan for the G7 Ise-Shima Summit. An outline of their discussions on security issues is as follows: a. Small Group Meeting (a) At the small meeting, the entire time was spent discussing the incident that occurred in Okinawa in April 2016. Prime Minister Abe stated to President Obama that: (1) he felt strong indignation over the incident, which was a self-centered and absolutely despicable crime, and lodged a strong protest as Prime Minister of Japan; (2) the incident caused a huge shock not only to Okinawa but to the entire nation, and he hoped President Obama would take these feelings of Japanese citizens seriously; (3) he has a responsibility to protect the lives and property of Japanese citizens; and (4) he seeks strict actions, including the full implementation of effective measures to prevent recurrences. (b) In response, President Obama stated that: (1) he expresses his sincerest condolences and deepest regrets and profoundly understands his responsibility concerning the crime committed by a person related to the U.S. Forces; and (2) the United States will cooperate fully with Japan’s investigation, and will spare no effort to cooperate in every way to achieve justice. (c) The two leaders shared the view that Japan and the United States would hold thorough consultations in order to pursue effective measures to prevent recurrence, and Japan and the United States would work together to regain the lost confidence and would make every effort to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. b. Expanded Meeting (a) Opening Remarks At the beginning of the expanded meeting, Prime Minister Abe expressed his sincere gratitude for the heartfelt sympathy from the United States and prompt and powerful assistance in response to the Kumamoto Earthquake. Prime Minister Abe also sincerely welcomed President Obama’s historic decision to visit Hiroshima, and the two leaders shared their intention to deliver a powerful message on a world free of nuclear weapons. (b) North Korea Prime Minister Abe stated that it was important for the G7 to issue a clear message that it could not tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons by North Korea becoming established as a fait accompli and the two leaders once again shared the recognition that coordination between Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea was important. With regard to the abduction issue, Prime Minister Abe expressed his gratitude for U.S. cooperation, and stated that Japan would like to seek the continued understanding and cooperation of the United States. (c) East Asia Situation Prime Minister Abe stated that he hoped to further strengthen the network of peace and prosperity that was founded on the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and expressed the view that strengthening cooperation with ASEAN members such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which President Obama just visited, was a pressing issue. Regarding the importance of the rule of law at sea, the two leaders confirmed that Japan and the United States will solidly fulfill their roles within the international community. **(5) U.S. President Obama’s Visit to Hiroshima (May 27, 2016)** President Obama, who visited Japan to attend the G7 IseShima Summit, paid a visit to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, the first such visit by an incumbent U.S. President, together with Prime Minister Abe. The two leaders also visited Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, laid wreaths at the Cenotaph for the Atomic Bomb Victims and delivered their respective statements, and President Obama then exchanged words with atomic bomb survivors. Later, the two leaders visited the Atomic Bomb Dome. President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima was an extremely important historical event in terms of commemorating the war dead and revitalizing international momentum for realizing a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the visit symbolized the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, an “Alliance of Hope,” which has been built up over the more than 70 years since the war. **(6) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (June 4, 2016)** Minister of Defense Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter took the opportunity of the Shangri-La Dialogue to hold the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. a. Arrest of a member of the civilian component in Okinawa Minister of Defense Nakatani and U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter confirmed their intent to continue to work closely together to devise a set of effective prevention measures against similar incidents and accidents. The Ministers shared an understanding that these measures would include: (1) review SOFA implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component; (2) strengthen monitoring of U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component; and (3) enhance education and training of ----- new missions. Secretary Carter welcomed these efforts by Japan and expressed his support for them. The Ministers also confirmed that the ACM is functioning effectively in dealing with a spate of provocative acts by North Korea and the earthquakes in Kumamoto Prefecture, and agreed to further enhance the ACM. Furthermore, the Ministers affirmed their intent to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance under the Legislation for Peace and Security and to continue efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. d. Defense Equipment and Technical Cooperation The Ministers welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP-MOU),[1] and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology based on the RDP-MOU. Minister Nakatani explained Japan’s plan to realize concrete cooperative efforts, such as the transfer of MSDF trainer aircraft TC-90s to the Philippines to enhance the capabilities for maritime security. Secretary Carter welcomed those initiatives, and stated his hope for close bilateral coordination between Japan and the United States in capacity building support and defense equipment cooperation with the Philippines. In addition, the Ministers confirmed that the MOD and the DOD will discuss defense and technical strategies, including the DOD’s Third Offset Strategy, looking towards the future security environment. e. USFJ Realignment, etc. Minister Nakatani explained the recent court-mediated settlement of lawsuits over the landfill approval off Henoko, and stated that the Government of Japan’s position remains unchanged that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko is the only solution that allows the return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Secretary Carter stated that he appreciates the Government of Japan’s position and that the United States will maintain close cooperation with Japan in implementing the shared plans for the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan. Minister Nakatani asked for U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including training relocation to locations outside of Okinawa Prefecture. Secretary Carter stated that the United States will continue to cooperate with Japan. The Ministers agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as over a half of the Northern Training Area. Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Singapore (June 2016) U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component. Sharing a sense of urgency, Minister Nakatani and Secretary Carter confirmed their intent to accelerate work at the highest levels of the defense and foreign policy authorities of both countries and to develop these measures at the earliest possible occasion. b. Regional Situations The Ministers agreed that they oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. They also agreed that the building of outposts and the use of these outposts for military purposes in the South China Sea in particular are unilateral actions that increase tensions in the region and are a source of concern for the international community. The Ministers pledged to continue to conduct joint exercises in the South China Sea as well as to further strengthen bilateral coordination in cooperating with Southeast Asian nations in areas such as support for capacity building and maritime security, increasing the presence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in this maritime area. In light of North Korea’s stance of continuing its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, the Ministers agreed to maintain close cooperation, including the utilization of the ACM. Furthermore, Minister Nakatani and Secretary Carter affirmed their intention to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation among Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea, among Japan, the United States and Australia, and among Japan, the United States and India. c. Peace and Security Legislation and the Initiatives to Ensure the Effectiveness of New Guidelines Minister Nakatani explained that the Legislation for Peace and Security was recently enforced and that the Government of Japan is proceeding with the preparations to carry out the The official title is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of Japan concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement. The Memorandum is designed to promote measures based on the principle of reciprocity (the provision of information to companies of the partner country necessary for making bids, safeguarding of corporate information submitted and exemption of companies of the partner country from restrictions on entry, etc.) with regard to the procurement of defense equipment by the defense authorities of Japan and the ----- **3 Major Initiatives for Strengthening the Alliance** The new Guidelines defi ne that the two countries will work on a variety of measures, including ISR activities, air and missile defense, maritime security, and joint training and exercises, and cooperate in response to a large-scale disaster in Japan in order to “seamlessly ensure Japan’s peace and security.” The Guidelines also require both countries to work on “Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security,” through cooperation in international activities and trilateral and multilateral cooperation; to cooperate for Space and Cyberspace Cooperation which are emerging as new strategic domains; and to develop and enhance “Bilateral Enterprise” through defense equipment and technology cooperation for further improving the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. Many of these items are incorporated into the National Defense Program Guidelines to “strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities” and to “strengthen and expand cooperation in a variety of areas.” For the content of the new Guidelines, see Part II, Chapter 4, Section 2-2 (Content of the New Guidelines). See>> Reference 28 (The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)) - 1 Strengthened Coordination within the Alliance as to the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. The characteristics of the mechanism include that (1) it is the standing mechanism utilizable from peacetime; (2) it can be utilized for large-scale natural disasters in Japan as well as for regional and global cooperation; and (3) it enables whole-of-government coordination while ensuring the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations. These characteristics enable the Japanese and U.S. governments to respond appropriately and promptly when the need for coordination arises. For example, in the event of a large-scale natural disaster in Japan, it would require a diversity of coordination in the policy and operational aspects related to activities of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The utilization of this mechanism makes it possible to conduct close and appropriate coordination with the involvement of relevant Japanese and U.S. organizations at various levels. See>> Fig. II-4-3-4 (The Situation Where the Alliance Coordination Mechanism Is Utilized (Image)); Fig. II-4-3-5 (The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM)) **(2) Enhanced Operational Coordination** Based on the new Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments recognize the importance of collocating operational coordination functions. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination and to support international activities. **(3) Establishment of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism** Based on the new Guidelines, the Japanese and U.S. governments established the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM) in November 2015 for the purpose of implementing the development of bilateral plans in peacetime in line with the new Guidelines in order to enable effective bilateral responses to contingencies related to Japan’s peace and security. **(1) Establishment of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism** In November 2015, the Japanese and U.S. governments established the ACM in order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response. Based on the framework shown in Fig. II-4-3-5, this mechanism coordinates policy and operational aspects related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also contributes to timely information sharing as well Fig. II-4-3-4 The Situation Where the Alliance Coordination Mechanism Is Utilized (Image) Situations in areas An armed attack surrounding Japan against Japan 97 Guidelines Bilateral Coordination Mechanism All phases from peacetime to contingencies New Guidelines Alliance Coordination Mechanism ----- |Joint Committee (JC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Side Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Representative)|U.S. Side Deputy Commander of USFJ (Representative)| |Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement|| |Alliance Coordination Group (ACG)|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Director General-level|Japan Side Representatives from Cabinet Secretariat (including National Security Secretariat), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed|U.S. Side Representatives from National Security Council,* Department of State,* American Embassy in Japan, Office of Secretary of Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States Pacific Command (USPACOM),* U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant ministries, departments, and agencies* *Representatives may participate as needed| |Director-level||| |Action Officer level||| |Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC.||| |Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2| |---|---| |Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC)|| |Japan Side Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of each SDF service|U.S. Side Representatives from USPACOM and USFJ| |Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces|| |Mutual coordination and information exchange|Col2| |---|---| |Component Coordination Centers (CCCs)|| |Japan Side Representatives from each component of SDF|U.S. Side Representatives from each component of U.S. Armed Forces| |CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination. As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs.|| |Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2”|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Foreign Minister|Security Consultative Committee (SCC)|State Secretary| |Defense Minister||Defense Secretary| |Sub Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan DG: North American Affairs Bureau MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD Joint Staff|U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, PACOM| |Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters|| |Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Representatives of Cabinet Secretariat, NSS, MOFA, MOD|U.S. Representatives of U.S. Embassy JP, PACOM, USFJ| |Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by RMAs, provision of additional information etc.|| |Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC)|Col2| |---|---| |Japan Representatives of JSDF|U.S. Representatives of PACOM, USFJ| |Conduct Bilateral Planning|| |Fig. II-4-3-6|The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)| |---|---| |Prime Minister President Bilateral Planning Mechanism Security Consultative Committee (SCC) “2+2” Foreign Minister State Secretary Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Defense Minister Defense Secretary Interagency Coordination as necessary Sub Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) Japan U.S. Interagency Coordination Forum (IACF) DG: North American Affairs Bureau Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant MOFA, Defense Policy Bureau MOD Secretary of Defense Japan U.S. Joint Staff U.S. Embassy JP, USFJ, JS, PACOM Representatives of Representatives of Cabinet Secretariat, U.S. Embassy JP, Assist SCC develop planning guidance in close coordination with BPC; advise SCC throughout NSS, MOFA, MOD PACOM, USFJ the bilateral planning; coordinate the actions of all the elements of BPM; discuss procedures and means for effective policy consultations, coordination and other relevant matters Coordination among relevant ministries and agencies (RMAs) of both countries, explanation provided by Bilateral Planning Committee (BPC) RMAs, provision of additional information etc. Japan U.S. Representatives of JSDF Representatives of PACOM, USFJ Conduct Bilateral Planning Coordination Command under the BPM JSDF/USF chain of command|| Fig. II-4-3-5 The Framework of Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) Higher levels between the two nations including Minister/Secretary level As needed Joint Committee (JC) Alliance Coordination Group (ACG) Japan Side U.S. Side Director Japan Side U.S. Side Director-General of Deputy Commander General-level Representatives from Cabinet Secretariat Representatives from National Security North American Affairs of USFJ (including National Security Secretariat), Council,* Department of State,* American Bureau of Ministry of (Representative) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Embassy in Japan, Office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs Director-level Defense/Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and Defense,* Joint Staff,* United States (Representative) other relevant ministries, departments, Pacific Command (USPACOM),* U.S. and agencies* Forces in Japan (USFJ), and other relevant Action Officer *Representatives may participate as needed ministries, departments, and agencies* level *Representatives may participate as needed Policy coordination on all matters requiring mutual Policy coordination on all matters requiring coordination in relation to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces consultation regarding the implementation of To ensure seamless responses, ACG will closely coordinate with JC. Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement Mutual coordination and information exchange Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC) Japan Side U.S. Side Representatives from Joint Staff and Staff Offices of Representatives from USPACOM and USFJ each SDF service Primary element responsible for conducting operational coordination related to activities of SDF and U.S. Armed Forces Mutual coordination and information exchange Component Coordination Centers (CCCs) Japan Side U.S. Side Representatives from each component of SDF Representatives from each component of U.S. Armed Forces CCCs will facilitate component-level bilateral coordination. As appropriate, if either Japan or the U.S., or both, establish Joint Task Forces (JTFs), JTFs may further establish CCCs. ----- In the development of bilateral plans, this mechanism performs the functions of ensuring Ministerial-level directions and supervision and the involvement of relevant government ministries and agencies, as well as conducting coordination for various forms of Japan-U.S. cooperation conducive to the development of bilateral plans. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning through this mechanism. See>> Fig. II-4-3-6 (The Framework of the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM)) - 2 Cooperative Measures to Seamlessly Ensure **Japan’s Peace and Security** U.S. Air Force’s Global Hawk in flight **1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)** **Activities** With regard to joint ISR activities, from the perspective that it is important to implement ISR activities in a broad Asia-Pacific region in cooperation between Japan and the United States to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities of both countries, the two countries set up the Defense ISR Working Group in February 2013 consisting of director-level defense officials from Japan and the United States, which is further deepening the cooperation between the two countries. The expansion of these ISR activities will function as deterrence capabilities, and will also ensure information superiority over other nations and enable the establishment of a seamless cooperation structure in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. **(2) Missile Defense** Regarding the response to ballistic missiles, bilateral response capabilities have improved, through such measures as operational information sharing and the establishment of the guidelines for responding to an attack. Accordingly, Japan and the United States closely cooperated and coordinated in responding to the missile launches carried out by North Korea respectively in April 2009, and April and December 2012, and also coordinated their responses to the launch of a ballistic missile, which was purported to be an “artificial satellite,” by North Korea in February 2016 by utilizing the ACM. Also, in the systems and technology field, the cooperative development of a new ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptor with enhanced capabilities (SM-3 Block IIA) is steadily in progress. USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), JS Izumo, and JS Teruzuki sailing after the SDF Fleet Review where appropriate for the maintenance and enhancement of the presence of Japan and the United States through ISR as well as training and exercises. The Maritime SelfDefense Force and the United States Navy plan to maintain and enhance both countries’ presence in the Western Pacific through multiple joint training and exercises. **(4) Joint Training and Exercises** Joint training and exercises in peacetime not only contribute greatly to maintaining and enhancing the Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities by improving interoperability through the deepening of mutual understanding of tactics and other aspects and the enhancement of mutual communication, but also are useful in improving tactical skills on each side. In particular, the knowledge and techniques that the Japanese side can learn from the U.S. Forces, which have vast experience in actual fighting, are invaluable and greatly contribute to improving SDF capabilities. In addition, holding bilateral exercises at effective times, places, and scales demonstrates the unified commitment and capabilities of Japan and the United States, which has a deterrent effect. In light of these perspectives, the MOD/ SDF is continuing its initiatives to enrich the contents of bilateral training and exercises. Joint training and exercises have been expanded not only within Japan but also to the United States by dispatching SDF units including field training exercises **(3) Maritime Security** The new Guidelines will allow Japan and the United States to develop and enhance the sharing of maritime surveillance information from peacetime and to cooperate ----- the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, and JapanU.S. Bilateral Fighter combat training. Since FY1985, mostly on an annual basis, command post exercises and field training exercises have been conducted alternately as the Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise, and command post exercises were carried out in January 2016. In recent years, U.S. Forces Japan have also participated in disaster drills organized by local governments, thereby deepening cooperation with relevant institutions and local governments. See>> Reference 32 (Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2015) **(5) Logistics support** Japan-U.S. cooperation is also being steadily promoted through logistical support based on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[2] signed in 1996, as a result of increased opportunities for cooperation between the two countries. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to initiatives for international peace taken under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, disaster relief activities, U.N. peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief activities, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations. If either the SDF or the U.S. Forces request the other party to provide supplies or services, the Agreement, in principle, allows the requested party to do so.[3] In addition, at the “2+2” Meeting in April 2015, the two countries confirmed that they will expeditiously work on negotiations on the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. The negotiations are currently underway between the two countries. See>> Fig. II-4-3-7 (Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA)) SDF personnel on guard during a joint field exercise (Orient Shield) with the U.S. Army A fleet of Japanese and American naval ships engaged in joint training during an MSDF exercise (field exercise) Japanese and American aircraft flying in formation during a Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training exercise (Cope North Guam) with the U.S. Army (Arctic Aurora) conducted in the U.S. State of Alaska from August 2015, and continuous efforts are being made to improve interoperability and bilateral response capabilities at the military service and unit levels, including participation in such exercises as **(6) Joint/Shared Use** The expansion of joint/shared use of facilities and areas increases bases for the SDF’s activities such as maneuver areas, ports, and airfields, which in turn enhances the diversity and efficiency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and expands the scope and raises the frequency of such activities as ISR. The SDF has only a limited number The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and ----- Fig. II-4-3-7 Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where units of allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations. **Scope of the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)** Japan-U.S. bilateral training Training, communication and other daily activities Transportation of Japanese International disaster PKO, etc. Disaster relief nationals overseas relief activities Situations in Areas Armed attack situations and situations in which armed attack is anticipated Surrounding Japan Added as a result of the 2004 revision. Added as a result of the 2012 revision. of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urban areas, which results in operational limitations. The joint/shared use of facilities and areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan in Okinawa will greatly improve the SDF’s training environment in Okinawa, and facilitate implementation of joint exercises and interoperability between the SDF and the U.S. Forces. It will also improve readiness and contribute to ensuring the safety of local people in the case of a disaster. Thus, while taking the SDF defense posture in the regions, including the Southwestern Islands, and relations with local communities into account, Japan and the United States are proactively engaged in consultations, and specific initiatives are steadily progressing. For example, the GSDF has been using Camp Hansen since March 2008 for exercises. Moreover, the relocation of the ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota in April 2012 and the relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters to Zama in March 2013 were carried out. In addition, in December 2013 and between June and July 2014, the MSDF conducted the training on the sea and training utilizing facilities in Guam and its surrounding area in cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The development of training ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands (Tinian Island, Pagan Island, etc.) for shared use by the SDF and the U.S. Forces is under consideration. - 3 Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale **Disaster in Japan** SDF singer performing to the music played by a U.S. military band at the “Commemorative Ceremony for the fifth Anniversary of Operation Tomodachi” held at the U.S. Pentagon Bilateral Training and Exercises over many years, and will lead to the Alliance being deepened further in the future. “Operation Tomodachi” involved the deployment of a large-scale force at its peak, including troops of approximately 16,000 personnel, around 15 ships, and around 140 aircraft, resulting in relief activities that were unprecedented in scale and contributing greatly to Japan’s restoration and reconstruction. Not only those affected but numerous Japanese at large were filled with a deepened sense of appreciation and trust for the U.S. Forces in Japan. On the other hand, some issues have emerged, such as clarifying the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States in the event of a disaster within Japan, as well as stipulating more concrete joint guidelines to facilitate greater participation by the U.S. Forces in disaster prevention drills, and examining mechanisms for the sharing of information and more effective coordination mechanism. In light of these issues, the December 2013 Response Plan for a Massive Earthquake in the Nankai Trough listed the Japan-U.S. Joint Response Plan and the two countries conducted a bilateral joint comprehensive disaster In the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the SDF and the U.S. Forces demonstrated their high joint response capabilities based on the strong ties they had developed. The success of the joint response between the U.S. Forces and the SDF through “Operation Tomodachi” was the result of Japan U S ----- prevention training in Kochi Prefecture in February 2014 based on the scenario of the occurrence of an earthquake in the Nankai Trough. The U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) also participated in the Wakayama Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training (October 2014) and “Michinoku ALERT 2014” (November 2014), a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Northeastern Army. This shows how the SDF and USFJ have been enhancing their cooperation for disaster readiness at home and abroad. In response to the Kumamoto Earthquake in April 2016, cases of Japan-U.S. cooperation included the transportation of daily necessities by the MV-22 Osprey aircraft and the transportation of SDF personnel by C-130 transport aircraft. In this instance, the ACM was utilized, including the Japan-U.S. Joint Coordination Office locally established by the joint task force organized for the earthquake response. - 4 Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace **and Security** October 2014, and the PSI Maritime Interdiction Training hosted by New Zealand in November 2015. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 4-2 (International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction) **(2) Trilateral and Multilateral Training and Exercises** The new Guidelines will enable Japan and the Unites States to promote and enhance trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. Thus, the SDF is participating in trilateral (e.g. Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-India, and Japan-U.S.-ROK) and multilateral training, in addition to bilateral training and exercises between Japan and the United States. - 5 Cooperation on Space and Cyberspace **(1) Cooperation on Space** With regard to cooperation on space, based on the agreement at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in November 2009 to promote cooperation in areas of space security as part of initiatives to deepen the JapanU.S. Alliance, the two countries have periodically been working together to discuss how they should cooperate in the future, such as the holding of the 1st Japan-U.S. Space Security Dialogue in September 2010 with the participation of relevant ministries and agencies. Furthermore, the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in April 2012 decided to deepen the space-based partnership for civil and security purposes and to create a whole-ofgovernment comprehensive dialogue on space, enabling relevant ministries and agencies to hold the 1st wholeof-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013. The two countries have been sharing information on their respective space policies and discussing plans for future cooperation on a regular basis. Moreover, based on the instructions given by the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting of April 2015, the two countries established the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to further promote the cooperation among bilateral defense authorities in the area of space. The SCWG held its first meeting in October 2015 and its second meeting in February 2016. Going forward, Japan and the United States will leverage this working group to deepen discussions in a wide variety of areas, including (1) promoting space policy dialogue, (2) reinforcing information sharing, (3) working together to develop and secure experts, and (4) implementing tabletop exercises. **(2) Cooperation on Cyberspace** Concerning cooperation on cyberspace, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was established in October 2013 as a framework between the **(1) Cooperation in International Activities** The SDF is conducting activities in close cooperation with the United States and other participating countries through activities pursuant to the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Act, international disaster relief activities and international peacekeeping operations in the Philippines and Haiti, and anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. Japan and the United States worked closely together at local multilateral coordination centers to respond to the typhoon disaster that hit the Philippines in November 2013. To respond to the outbreak of Ebola virus disease, Japan started to dispatch liaison officers to the U.S. Africa Command in October 2014 for close cooperation, coordinating efforts and collecting information with related countries including the United States. As for maritime security, both Japan and the United States are making efforts as maritime nations to maintain and develop “the open and stable ocean” based on fundamental rules such as the freedom of navigation, ensured safety, and the rule of law (e.g. peaceful dispute resolution based on international laws). The two countries have been working closely together on various multilateral maritime security cooperation initiatives supported by such countries as those around sea lanes, including participation in the Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 for responding to pirates since July 2013, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Maritime Interdiction Training hosted by the United States in August 2014, the International Minesweeping Exercise in the Persian Gulf hosted by the United States from ----- MOD and DoD to discuss a broad range of professional and concrete issues, including the sharing of information at the policy level, human resources development, and technical cooperation. The new Guidelines released in April 2015 and the CDPWG Joint Statement published in May 2015 cited the prompt and appropriate development of an information sharing structure and the protection of the critical infrastructure upon which the SDF and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions as examples of cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. governments. In addition, as part of cooperation between the SDF and the United States Armed Forces, the securing of the resiliency of their respective networks and systems and the implementation of educational exchanges and joint exercises were also cited. Going forward, Japan and the United States will further accelerate bilateral cyber defense cooperation in line with the direction presented by the new Guidelines and the CDPWG Joint Statement. - 6 Initiatives for Further Enhancing the Effectiveness **of Cooperation** A group of U.S. military personnel visiting the ASDF Staff College to joint technological research on BMD. Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF) and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at these forums. Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-2 (Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) explains initiatives for the common maintenance infrastructure for the 24 Ospreys deployed by the U.S. Marine Corps at MCAS Futenma and the Ospreys planned to be deployed by the GSDF[6] as well as initiatives for the onsite maintenance locations (regional depots) in the AsiaPacific region for F-35 aircraft. See>> Reference 33 (Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects) **(1) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** Japan proactively promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of the technological and production bases and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America. In view of the progress in technology cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States regardless of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related guidelines. In 1983, Japan established the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America.[4] In 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America[5] was established to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes. Under these frameworks, Japan decided to provide the United States with 20 items of arms and military technologies, including military technologies related **(2) Education and Research Exchange** The new Guidelines recognize the importance of intellectual cooperation relating to security and defense, and the two governments will deepen exchanges between members of relevant organizations, and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. To this end, the MOD/SDF has been working on education and research exchanges by accepting students from abroad and holding Japan-U.S. bilateral or multilateral seminars that include the United States so that security and defense personnel can share knowledge and enhance cooperation. See>> Reference 49 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2015)); Reference 50 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense); Reference 51 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues) The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America The official title is the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America ----- **Section 4** **Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan** Measures such as realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan are extremely important in mitigating the impact on local communities, such as those in Okinawa, while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the U.S. Forces. **1 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan** - 1 Signifi cance of the Presence of the U.S. Forces **in Japan** The MOD will advance the U.S. Forces realignment and other initiatives while making continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of local communities accommodating USFJ facilities and areas. In addition, while Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan-U.S. obligations are kept in balance. See>> Fig. II-4-4-1 (Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan) As the security environment surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, for the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, to adequately function as a deterrence that contributes to Japan’s defense as well as the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region, it is necessary to secure the presence of the U.S. military in Japan and to maintain a posture in Japan and the surrounding areas from peacetime that enables the U.S. Forces in Japan to respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies. For this purpose, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan, which is a core part of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Further, the realization of a stable U.S. military presence is necessary for a swift Japan-U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of the U.S. Forces in Japan in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and the U.S. Forces in Japan will serve as the basis of such support. In order for the U.S. Forces in Japan to carry out the abovementioned role, it is essential that all the services of the U.S. Forces, including those in Japan, are functionally integrated. For instance, the U.S. Forces hold a primarily offensive power as a “spear” when responding to armed aggression to Japan in cooperation with the SDF. When the U.S. Forces function as an offensive power, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines stationed in Japan work in an integrated manner to fully exert their functions. - 2 Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of **the U.S. Forces in Japan** The Status of Forces Agreement[1] (SOFA) stipulates matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including provisions of facilities and areas for use by the U.S. Forces (USFJ facilities and areas), and satisfying the labor requirements of the U.S. Forces in Japan. **(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and Areas** Japan provides USFJ facilities and areas for the U.S. Forces under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Joint Committee between the Governments of Japan and the United States. The Government of Japan has entered into agreements and concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public lands on which USFJ facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of these facilities and areas. However, should the government be unable to obtain the approval of landowners, it will acquire title under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release,[2] while compensating the landowners for any loss they may have suffered in the process.[3] The offi cial title is the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. The offi cial title is the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.i ----- Fig. II-4-4-1 Deployment Map of the U.S. Forces in Japan Misawa Kyogamisaki Shariki U.S. Air Force: 35th Fighter Wing, F-16 fighters U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called U.S. Army: TPY-2 (so-called X-Band Radar System) U.S. Navy: P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft and others X-Band Radar System) Atsugi Yokota U.S. Navy: Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan F/A-18 strike fighters and others U.S. Air Force: Iwakuni (Carrier-based aircraft) Headquarters, Fifth Air Force U.S. Marine Corps: Shariki Misawa 374th Airlift Wing Marine Aircraft Group 12 C-130 transport aircraft F/A-18 strike fighter C-12 transport aircraft AV-8 attackers UH-1 helicopters and others EA-6 electronic warfare aircraft Plan to deploy CV22 Osprey C-12 transport aircraft Zama KC-130 tankers and others Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan Sasebo U.S. Army: 1st Corps (Forward) Yokota U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Sasebo Kyogamisaki Atsugi Yokosuka Amphibious assault ships Iwakuni Yokosuka Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan Minesweeping ships Sasebo U.S. Navy: Fleet Activities Yokosuka Transport ships Aircraft carrier Cruisers Torii U.S. Marine Corps facilities and areas such as Camp Courtney Destroyers U.S. Army: 1st Battalion, 1st Special U.S. Marine Corps: 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force HQ Amphibious command ship Forces Group (Airborne)/10th Support Group Kadena Schwab U.S. Air Force: 18th Wing U.S. Marine Corps: F-15 fighters Futenma 4th Marine Regiment (infantry) KC-135 tankers U.S. Marine Corps: HH-60 helicopters Marine Aircraft Group 36 E-3 airborne warning and control system CH-53 helicopters Hansen (AWACS) aircraft AH-1 helicopters White Beach Area U.S. Marine Corps: U.S. Navy: P-3C, P-8A patrol aircraft and others UH-1 helicopters U.S. Navy: 12th Marine Regiment (artillery) U.S. Army: 1-1 Air Defense Artillery MV-22 Osprey and others Port facility, POL depot 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) **(2) Satisfying Labor Requirements of the USFJ** The USFJ require manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and the SOFA stipulates that the requirements of the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan. As of the end of FY2015, 25,319 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the “employees”) work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/ supply facilities, members of security guards and fire departments on base, and sales staff at welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities. The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of the SOFA. The MOD supports the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, health care, and welfare, etc. - 3 Costs Associated with the U.S. Forces Stationed **in Japan** Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report for mitigating the impact on the people of Okinawa, as well as costs for implementing measures that will contribute to mitigating the impact on local communities associated with the initiatives for the realignment of the U.S. Armed Forces. See>> Fig. II-4-4-2 (U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2016)) - 4 Host Nation Support (HNS) Host Nation Support (HNS) plays an important role to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economic situation, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs in FY1978. Then in FY1979, Japan began to bear costs for the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP). Furthermore, as labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, the employment stability of the employees was adversely influenced, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Therefore in 1987, the governments of Japan and the United States concluded an agreement that sets forth special measures regarding Article 24 of the SOFA (the Special Measures Various costs associated with the U.S. Forces in Japan include the costs of stationing the U.S. Forces in Japan, costs for implementing the stipulations of the Special ----- |Burden fro|m|t|he Special Measures Agreement (¥15|2.1 billion)| |---|---|---|---|---| |||||| Fig. II-4-4-2 U.S. Forces Japan-related Costs (Budget for FY2016) Costs for Stationing of USFJ SACO-related costs Realignment-related (MOD-Related Budget: ¥377.2 billion (1)+(2)) (¥2.8 billion) costs (¥176.6 billion) Cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ - Projects for land returns - Relocation of the U.S. Marines in ¥0.7 billion Okinawa to Guam ¥14.0 billion (¥192.0 billion (1)) - Projects for training improvement - Projects for realignment in Okinawa ¥0.1 billion ¥69.0 billion - Costs for taking measures to improve - Projects for noise reduction - Projects related to the reform of U.S. the living environment in areas - Costs for Facility Improvement Program ¥0.8 billion Army Headquarters ¥10 million surrounding the USFJ facilities ¥20.6 billion - Projects for the relocation of Carrier ¥57.0 billion - Labor costs (welfare costs, etc.) Air Wing ¥72.4 billion - Rent for facilities ¥98.8 billion ¥26.4 billion - Projects for training relocation - Relocation, etc ¥3.8 billion (Local task force-related cost) ¥20 million - Other costs (compensation for - Projects for facilitating realignment fishery, etc.) ¥25.6 billion initiatives ¥15.2 billion **Total: ¥185.2 billion (2)** **Total: ¥47.0 billion** **Total: ¥1.6 billion** **Total: ¥170.7 billion** - Non MOD-related budget Burden from the Special Measures Agreement (¥152.1 billion) - Expenditures borne by other ministries (base subsidy, etc.) - Labor costs (basic salary, etc.) - Training relocation costs: ¥1.2 billion - Training relocation costs - Estimated costs of government ¥119.4 billion (one of the projects aimed at ¥5.9 billion owned land provided for use as Utilities costs ¥24.9 billion enhancing training) USFJ facilities[3] - Training relocation costs (NLP) - Artillery live-fire training over - Aviation training relocation ¥0.7 billion Highway 104 as part of realignment **Total: ¥145.0 billion** - Parachute training initiatives Notes: 1. Training relocation costs under the Special Measures Agreement extend either into the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ or the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs. 2. The SACO-related costs refer to the cost for implementing the contents of the SACO Final Report to reduce the impact on people in Okinawa, while the realignment-related costs refers to the cost relating to a step to contribute to reducing the impact on local communities as part of the realignment initiatives. Since the cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ is Japan’s voluntary effort to bear some costs in light of the importance of ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, its nature is different from the SACO-related costs and the realignment-related costs, and is categorized separately. 3. The costs related to the stationing of USFJ include the MOD-related budget, other ministry-related budgets (base subsidy, etc.: ¥38.8 billion, FY2015 Budget) and the estimated costs of government-owned land provided for use as USFJ facilities (¥165.8 billion, FY2015 Estimated Costs). 4. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. **(1) Labor costs** The upper limit of the number of workers at welfare, recreation, and morale facilities to be funded by Japan will be reduced from 4,408 to 3,893, while the upper limit of the number of workers engaged in activities such as maintenance of assets and administrative works to be funded by Japan, will be increased from 18,217 to 19,285. As a result, the upper limit of the number of workers to be funded by Japan will be increased from the current 22,625 to 23,178. These adjustments will be phased in over the new SMA period from FY2016 to FY2020. **(2) Utilities costs** Over the new SMA period, the share of utilities costs to be borne by Japan for each fiscal year is reduced from the current 72% to 61%, with the upper limit for utilities costs to be funded by Japan set at approximately 24.9 billion yen. Agreement)[4] as exceptional, limited and provisional measures under the cost principle in the SOFA. Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan started to bear labor costs of eight categories such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance). As the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utilities costs from FY1991. The financial responsibility of the Japanese Government was further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996. The Government of Japan has been reviewing HNS while paying full attention to its tight fiscal conditions, and as a result, HNS has been on the steady decline after peaking out in the FY1999 budget on an expenditure basis. With the SMA due to expire in March 2016, the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2015 agreed to “start consultations on future arrangements to provide an appropriate level of host nation support.” Following this agreement, Japan and the United States held consultations on a new SMA, and in December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States reached agreement as follows: **(3) Costs for Facilities Improvement Program** The amount of costs for the Facilities Improvement Program will not fall below 20.6 billion yen in each fiscal year during the new SMA period. For the period of the previous SMA, any amount of reductions in the labor The official title is the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation ----- costs and the utilities costs was to be appropriated for an increase in costs for the Facilities Improvement Program. But such appropriation will not be made during the new SMA period. **(4) Scale of Host Nation Support** The amount of HNS in FY2020, the fi nal fi scal year of the new SMA period, will be approximately 189.9 billion yen, with the average amount for each fi scal year during the same period coming to approximately 189.3 billion yen (any change in wages based on recommendations by the National Personnel Authority will be refl ected appropriately in labor costs for each fi scal year). to be funded by Japan will be increased gradually from the current 22,625 to 23,178. ❍ Over the new SMA period, the share of utilities costs to be borne by Japan for each fi scal year will be reduced from the current 72% to 61%, with the upper limit for utilities costs to be funded by Japan set at approximately 24.9 billion yen. (3) Cost-saving efforts: It is clearly stipulated that the United States will make further efforts to economize the above-mentioned expenditures. See>> Reference 34 (Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ) - 6 **USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Communities** The social conditions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas have changed signifi cantly, including, for example, through urbanization over the past several decades. For USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities and be genuinely accepted by the Japanese citizens, it is vital to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible and secure the understanding and cooperation of the local communities in light of such changes. Japan’s national land is narrow with limited plains, and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas, and the takeoffs and landings of the U.S. Forces aircraft have considerable impact on the residents’ living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to mitigate the impact in a way that is responsive to the circumstances of each area. **2 Progress of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan** announced as part of the Joint Statements of the “2+2” Meeting and through other means. - 5 New Special Measures Agreement The Governments of Japan and the United States signed the new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) in January 2016. Following approval by the Diet, the new SMA took effect in April 2016. The key points of the new SMA are as follows: (1) Effective period: Five years (from FY2016 through FY2020). (2) Cost sharing: Japan shall bear all or part of labor costs, utilities costs, and the costs incurred in training relocation. The Exchange of Notes concerning the Operational Guidelines of the SMA stipulated the following policies for the calculations of the number of workers and utilities costs: ❍ Labor costs: The upper limit of the number of workers As for the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, “the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) was set forth in May 2006. Subsequently, the Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted full-fledged bilateral discussions concerning coordination of the plan for the realignment, in view of factors including the following: 1) The necessity of implementing measures to promptly and steadily enable the visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa; 2) The necessity of coordinating strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and the realignment package, which was set out in the U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance released in January 2012; and 3) The fact that a reduction in the cost associated with the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to Guam has been demanded by the U S Congress The achievements thereof have been - 1 Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2012) The 2006 Roadmap stated that, among the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) stationed in Okinawa, the main focus of the relocation to Guam would be the command elements, but the United States decided to alter the composition of the units. As a result, the U.S. government decided to deploy the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)—consisting of command, ground, aviation and logistic support elements—in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii, as well as in Australia as a rotational unit. In addition, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting ----- land returns south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). - 2 Achievements at the “2+2” Meeting (April 27, 2015) commitment to maintaining a robust and fl exible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capacity to respond effectively to future challenges and threat, while also mitigating the impact of US Forces on local communities. See>> Reference 30 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)); Reference 27 (Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015)); Fig. II-4-4-3 (Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation”) **3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** See>> Fig. II-4-4-4 (The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Signifi cance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa) The Ministers reaffi rmed the two governments’ continued commitment to implement the existing arrangements as soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process of the USFJ realignment. The Ministers underscored their **3 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa** In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located closer to potential confl ict areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, but at the same time has the advantage of having a certain distance from these areas that would not heighten military tension there unnecessarily. In addition, Okinawa, comprising a large number of small islands, is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands having a total length of some 1,200 km and close to key sea lanes for Japan, which depends on marine transportation for over 99% of its overall international trade. Furthermore, its location is extremely important from the perspective of security, as Okinawa serves as a strategically important target for neighboring countries in both making access to the Pacifi c from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacifi c to the continent. Thus, the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa—including the U.S. Marine Corps, which is in charge of fi rst response for a variety of contingencies and capable of high mobility and rapid response, and also has readiness for wide-ranging missions—with the above-mentioned geographical characteristics, further ensures the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthens deterrence, and contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacifi c region. On the other hand, Okinawa has many USFJ facilities and areas such as airbases, exercise fi elds, logistics facilities. As of January 2016, approximately 74% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) are concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 10% of the land area of the prefecture and 18% of the main island of Okinawa. Therefore, it is necessary to make utmost efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, while also considering the above-mentioned security standpoints. - 1 Initiatives for Realignment, Consolidation, and **Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa** When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km[2] for exclusive use by the U.S. Forces under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment, consolidation and reduction on the grounds that they seriously affect the lives of people in Okinawa Prefecture. Both countries have continued their initiatives to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, centering on those subject to the strong local requests, and, in relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the required adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Moreover, it was agreed in 1995 that initiatives would also be made to resolve the so-called Three Okinawa Issues, including the return of Naha Port (Naha City).[5] Subsequently, in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995, as well as the refusal of the then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release, the Government of Japan decided to devote even greater initiatives towards realignment, consolidation, and reduction, believing that the impact should be shared by the whole nation. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government of Japan established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) between Japan ----- Fig. II-4-4-3 Progress of the Realignment of Force Structure of USFJ and the SDF Described in “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” **1. Realignment in the Kanto Area1. Realignment in the Kanto Area** [Yokota related] [Relocation of the JASDF Air Defense Command] Relocation of the Air Defense Command and Establishment of the bilateral joint operations coordination relevant units (Completed on March 26, 2012) center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base Partial return of airspace, (returned on September 25, 2008) and placing the JASDF air traffic controllers besides the Tokyo Yokota RAPCON facility (started on May 18, 2007), etc. Yokota Fuchu Deliberation on civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base [Camp Zama] (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Sagamihara Reorganization of the headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan and the U.S.) Japan (Reorganized at the end of September 2008) Relocation of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central Zama Readiness Force (Completed on March 26, 2013) [U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot] Joint/shared use of heliport （Joint use started on Establishment of facilities due to the realignment of U.S. Kanagawa March 26, 2013) Army Japan Headquarters Release of portions (5.4 ha) of housing area and others (Facilities including the Training Center) (Land return completed on February 29, 2016) (Operations of the Training Center started in August 2011. Development of the Training Assistance Center completed.) Return of part of the land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (approx. 15 ha) Joint use of West Open-air Storage Area (approx. 35 ha) Legend: (Joint use started on December 2, 2015) Implemented Continuing **2. Realignment in Okinawa** MCAS Futenma (total return, about 481 ha) [Joint/Shared Use] [Relocation within Okinawa Prefecture] Transport capabilities using helicopters Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training Replacement facilities constructed in Camp Schwab - Implemented on March 17, 2008 Henokosaki and adjacent water areas JASDF uses Kadena Air Base for bilateral [Relocation of operations outside Okinawa Prefecture] training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities Operations of air-refueling aircraft → MCAS Iwakuni - Relocation to MCAS Iwakuni completed on August 26, 2014 Contingency use → Tsuiki/Nyutabaru Air Base, etc. [Land Returns] Formulated a detailed plan (Consolidation Plan) for returning of significant land area south of Camp Schwab Kadena Air Base by consolidating the remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa Replacement SDF bases in mainland, etc. - Announced the Consolidation Plan on April 5, 2013 Camp Hansen Facility Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Camp Courtney Farm No. 1 (total return, about 16 ha) Kadena Air Base [Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps] Replacement III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Facility about 8,000 personnel and about 9,000 of Makiminato Service Area their dependents will relocate to Guam (Camp Kinser) (total return, To Guam, etc. - “2+2” Joint Statement of April 27, 2012 states about 274 ha) that about 9,000 personnel and their dependents Naha would be relocated outside of Japan and the - Return of north access road Camp Kuwae (Lester) authorized strength of U.S. Marine Corps in Guam (about 1 ha) on August 31, 2013 (total return, about 68 ha) will be about 5,000. Naha Port (total return, about 56 ha) Legend: A replacement facility will be constructed in the Urasoe- Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (partial return, about 153 ha+ ) Implemented Continuing Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base Pier district under the Naha - Return of West Futenma Housing Area (Areas indicated are based on the consolidation plan. See Fig.II-4-4-8 for the current status on the Port and Harbor Plan (approx. 51 ha) on March 31, 2015 returning of land south of Kadena Air Base) ----- **3. Relocation of Aircraft, etc.** TPY-2 Rader: deployment of so-called “X-band Radar System”) (Deployment completed in June 2006) **The relocation of flight training activities** **from Kadena, Misawa and Iwakuni to ASDF** Chitose **bases, Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu,** **Tsuiki and Nyutabaru, as well as to Guam.** *The relocation to Guam, etc. was agreed Misawa upon at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in SharikiShariki January 2011. Legend: Deployment of a TPY-2 radar Implemented Relocation of carrier-based aircraft (Deployment completed in December 2014) squadrons to Iwakuni Continuing KomatsuKomatsu HyakuriHyakuri AtsugiAtsugi KyogamisakiKyogamisaki Iwakuni Tsuiki Nyutabaru Relocation of MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other units from Iwakuni to Atsugi (“2+2” Joint Statement in 2013 confirmed the continued deployment of these units in Iwakuni Air Base) KanoyaKanoya Kadena Relocation of the KC-130 squadron to Iwakuni Futenma (Recolation completed in August 2014) The KC-130 squadron will deploy on a rotational basis to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam Relocation of the functions of aircraft for contingency use to Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Mariana Islands Part of future civilian aviation facilities were established within MCAS Iwakuni Relocation of the CH-53D squadron to Guam (Civil Airport opened 2012) (Japan and the United States confirmed that the CH-530 squadron will be relocated to the U.S. mainland and then to Guam.) Saipan Guam *JC: Joint Committee: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee ----- Fig. II-4-4-4 The Geopolitical Positioning of Okinawa and the Significance of the U.S. Marine Corps Stationed in Okinawa **Okinawa holds a position of great** **strategic importance** **1. Geographical Advantage of Okinawa** The main island of Okinawa is located roughly in the center of the Southwestern Islands and also close to key sea lanes for Beijing Seoul Japan, and thus its location is extremely important from the perspective of Japan’s security. Access from continental Okinawa is located close (but not overly so) to potential conflict →Expected that passage would beAsia to the Pacific Tokyo areas that could affect Japan’s peace and security, including the ⇒ Okinawa is located at a distance that makes it possible to through waters surrounding Okinawa Izu Islands expeditiously send units to potential conflict areas and at the same time has sufficient distance so as not to heighten military Shanghai tension unnecessarily and is not overly close in terms of protecting units. 2,000km 1,000km Okinawa Adjacent to sea lanes In the eyes of neighboring countries, Okinawa’s location is strategically important in both enabling access to the Pacific from the continent and rejecting access from the Pacific to the continent. Ogasawara Center of Islands Hong Kong Taipei the Southwest Islands **2. The Significance & Roles of the U.S. Marine Corps** **in Okinawa** It is essential to maintain defense capabilities for the area of the Japan’s sea lanes Southwestern Islands in the main island of Okinawa, which is Okinotorishima Japan is dependent upon marine important as a strategic location for Japan, for the security of transportation for at least 99% of Japan. The stationing of the U.S. Marine Corps, which is capable the total volume of its trade. of rapid response and high mobility and also has readiness for a wide variety of missions, ranging from armed conflicts to natural Saipan Manila disasters, in Okinawa, which features such geographical Guam advantages, plays an important role in ensuring not only the security of Japan but also the peace and safety of East Asia. - The Marine Corps constantly utilizes all combat elements (land, sea and air) during its drills and deployments, so it is suited to providing a rapid response in the event of all kinds of situations. and the United States, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996. Following these developments, most recently, approximately 55 ha out of approximately 162 ha of Camp Hansen (Nago City, Onna Village, Ginoza Village and Kin Town) (part of a slope at the East China Sea side) were returned in June 2014. See>> Reference 35 (Outline of 23 Issues) - 2 SACO Final Report and Progress - 3 History and Progress of the U.S. Forces **Realignment in Okinawa** As for initiatives relating to the realignment of the U.S. Forces based on the Roadmap, measures have been taken to mitigate the impact on the local communities in Okinawa Prefecture while maintaining deterrence capabilities. **(1) Relocation and Return of MCAS Futenma** The Government of Japan believes that it is imperative not to allow MCAS Futenma to remain indefinitely at its current location, which is in the vicinity of houses and schools in the center of Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture. This is a fundamental idea shared between the Government of Japan and the people of Okinawa. As for the relocation of MCAS Futenma, the Government of Japan has not changed its stance that the current plan to construct the FRF at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area (Nago City) and adjacent waters is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Government of Japan plans to make further efforts to achieve the replacement and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible and to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a speedy manner. The return of MCAS Futenma is expected to eliminate danger in the area and to contribute to the further growth of Okinawa The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land, the adjustment of training and operational procedures, the implementation of noise abatement initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the Status of Forces Agreement, and also refers to the related facilities and areas covered. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km[2]) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa at that time, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43 km[2]. See>> Reference 36 (The SACO Final Report); Reference 37 (State of Progress of the SACO Final Report); Fig. II-4-4-5 (Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Final Report); Fig. II-4-4-6 (Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa) ----- the SACO Final Report in 1996, enabling a vast majority of fixed-wing aircraft located in MCAS Futenma to be moved outside Okinawa Prefecture. This move also led to the relocation of approximately 870 USFJ personnel, civilian employees, and dependents. The function of providing a base for accepting a large number of external aircraft in cases of emergency will also be transferred to mainland Japan. (b) Land-fill Area The area required for the land reclamation to build the FRF is less than one-third of MCAS Futenma and the new facility will be equipped with significantly shorter runways. (c) Flight Routes Two runways will be constructed in a V-shape, which enables the flight path for both takeoff and landing to be located over the sea, in line with the requests of the local community. In MCAS Futenma, flight paths used daily for training and other purposes are located over residential areas, whereas flight paths in the FRF will be changed to over the sea, thereby reducing noise and risks. For example, there will be zero households requiring such insulation around the FRF, while more than 10,000 households are located in areas requiring housing noise insulation near MCAS Futenma. This means that the noise levels experienced by all households will comply with the environment criteria applied to exclusive housing areas. In the case that an aircraft encounters any contingency, safety on the ground can be ensured by diverting the aircraft offshore. b. The Necessity of Relocating the Futenma Replacement Facility within Okinawa Prefecture The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consists of air, ground, logistics, and command elements. The interaction of those elements in highly mobile and responsive operations of the U.S. Marine Corps is indispensable, so it has been determined that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary-wing aircraft stationed at MCAS Futenma will be located near the elements with which they train, operate, or otherwise work on a regular basis. c. Background Concerning the Futenma Replacement Facility Considering the occurrence of the U.S. Forces helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, bilateral discussions on the realignment have been made toward realizing the relocation and return of MCAS Futenma at the earliest possible date in order to resolve the unease of the residents living in the vicinity. In the SCC document compiled in October 2005, the initiative to “locate the FRF in an ‘L’-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay” was |353|Area (km2)|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Facilities/Areas|| |278 249 242||| |226||| |144||| |83||| |46 43||| |31||| |Fig. II-4-4-6|Changes in Number and Area of the USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa| |---|---| |400 353 350 Area (km2) Facilities/Areas 300 278 249 242 250 226 200 144 150 100 83 46 43 50 31 0 Right before May 1972 End of End of As of the returning (On return) FY1980 FY1990 January 2016 of Okinawa|| Facilities and Areas Related to the SACO Fig. II-4-4-5 Final Report Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield Northern Training Area Camp Hansen Aha Training Area Senaha Communication Station Sobe Communication Site Offshore Camp Schwab Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Gimbaru Training Area Torii Communication Kin Blue Beach Training Area Station Camp Zukeran Kadena Air Base Camp Kuwae MCAS Futenma Makiminato Service Area : Facilities and areas involved in land return : Facilities and areas involved in land return Naha Port Facility (Cancellation of joint use) : Destination sites of other facilities relocation programs including Ginowan City, through the reuse of the area (approximately 481 ha with a land area 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome). a. Relocation of MCAS Futenma and Mitigation of the Impact on Okinawa The relocation of MCAS Futenma holds more significance than merely moving the facility from one location to another. Rather, it also contributes greatly to mitigating the impact on Okinawa. As such, the Government will work as one to implement this initiative. (a) Distribution of Functions Offered by MCAS Futenma MCAS Futenma fulfills the following functions relating to the aviation capabilities of the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa: (1) Operation of the Osprey and other aircraft (2) Operation of air refueling aircraft (3) Accepting a large number of transient aircraft in cases of emergency. Of these three functions, only “operation of the Osprey and other aircraft” will be relocated to Camp Schwab. All 15 KC-130 air refueling aircraft were relocated to MCAS Iwakuni (in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture) in August 2014. This marked the completion of a task that has remained unresolved for 18 years since ----- the settlement recommendation, and in March 2016, the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a settlement agreement. At the “2+2” Meetings in October 2013 and April 2015, which followed the “2+2” Meeting of April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States also confirmed that the plan to construct the FRF at Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. See>> Reference 38 (Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility); Reference 39 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena) d. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures After the MOD sent the environmental impact assessment scoping document in 2007 to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and other parties, the MOD worked on revising the document based on the opinions provided by the governor. Finally, the MOD completed the environmental impact assessment procedures by sending the revised assessment document to related parties including the governor in December 2012, while making the assessment document publicly viewable. Throughout these procedures, the MOD received a total of 1,561 opinions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on six occasions, made all the required revisions, and reflected them in the content of the environmental assessment. In this way, the MOD had taken steps to comply with relevant laws, asked opinions and ideas from Okinawa Prefecture over a sufficient period of time, and reflected them in the assessment. e. Promotion of the Futenma Replacement Facility Construction Project The Director-General of the Okinawa Defense Bureau submitted the land-fill request on public waters to Okinawa Prefecture in March 2013, and then Governor of Okinawa Nakaima approved this in December 2013. In the meantime, then Governor Nakaima sent a total of 260 questions to the Okinawa Defense Bureau on four occasions and the Okinawa Defense Bureau responded appropriately to these questions and spent sufficient time working on the procedures. The offshore boring survey started in August 2014 and construction work on the facility commenced in October 2015. However, current Governor of Okinawa Onaga revoked the land-fill permit by former Governor of Okinawa Nakaima in October 2015, leading to the filing of three suits over the revocation of the land-fill permit[6] between the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture. Aerial of the construction site of Futenma Replacement Facility approved. Then, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities including Nago City, it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a configuration that “combines Henokosaki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays.” In regard to construction of this replacement facility, “a Memorandum of Basic Understanding” was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and the then Minister of State for Defense in May 2006. After the change of government in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. After reviews conducted by the Committee, both Governments, at the “2+2” Meeting held in May 2010, confirmed the intention to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab Henokosaki area and the adjacent waters, and also agreed to take concrete measures to mitigate the impact on Okinawa. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in June 2011, it was decided that the runway would take a “V” shape, and the Ministers confirmed their commitment to complete the relocation project at the earliest possible date after 2014 in order to avoid the indefinite use of MCAS Futenma and to remove the risks as early as possible. Under these circumstances, the court mediated a settlement recommendation. The court suggested that if the legal battles between the national Government and Okinawa Prefecture persist endlessly, there would only be a stalemate and this could result in the indefinite use of MCAS Futenma, which is situated in a densely populated area surrounded by houses and schools at a city center, and the prolonging of the current situation in Okinawa. Therefore, in line with the opinion of the court that no one wishes to see that happen, the Government of Japan has decided to accept (1) The suit, filed by the Government of Japan as plaintiff based on Article 245-8 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking a court ruling instructing a retraction of the revocation of the land-fill permit by current Governor Onaga (the so-called administrative suit); (2) the suit, filed by Okinawa Prefecture based on Article 251-5 of the Local Autonomy Act, seeking to invalidate the decision to suspend the validity of the revocation of the land-fill permit (the decision to suspend execution) by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as the illegal “involvement of the state”; and (3) the suit, filed by Okinawa ----- Under these circumstances, the court came up with a settlement recommendation. The Government of Japan considered that if the legal battles between the national Government and Okinawa Prefecture unfold endlessly, there would only be a stalemate and this could result in the indefinite use of MCAS Futenma, which is situated in a densely populated area surrounded by houses and schools at a city center, and the prolonging of the current situation in Okinawa. Therefore, in line with the opinion of the court that no one wishes to see that happen, the Government of Japan has decided to accept the settlement recommendation, and in March 2016, the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture reached a settlement agreement. The key points of the settlement agreement are that (1) the three suits pending will be integrated into a single suit over the validity of the revocation of the land-fill approval by current Governor Onaga; (2) the Government of Japan will immediately suspend reclamation work; (3) the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture will hold consultations to reach an amicable settlement of the disputes over the return of MCAS Futenma and the reclamation project until the court hands down a judicial ruling; and (4) After the court ruling is handed down, both the Government of Japan and Okinawa Prefecture mutually make the firm commitment that they shall abide by the ruling and take steps in line with the spirit of the text of the ruling main sentence and the reasons conducive to the text and work together sincerely to respond to the ruling. Following the settlement agreement, the DirectorGeneral of the Okinawa Defense Bureau immediately suspended the landfill work. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to current Governor Onaga to repeal the revocation of the land-fill approval. In response, pursuant to procedures set forth in the settlement agreement, Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council, challenging the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. The Government of Japan intends to deal with the contents of the settlement in good faith and extend full cooperation so that the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council and the court can review and make a judicial ruling on the case promptly. At the same time, the Government of Japan will proceed with consultations with Okinawa Prefecture and make steady efforts to gain the understanding on the part of Okinawa Prefecture by carefully explaining the Government of Japan’s stance on the removal of the dangers posed by MCAS Futenma and its relocation to Henoko, as well as on the Government of Japan’s initiatives to mitigate the impact on Okinawa in a tangible manner. **(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam** Since the Roadmap was announced in May 2006, the Governments of Japan and the United States held a series of consultations on the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa. a. Timing and Size of Relocation The 2006 Roadmap stated that approximately 8,000 personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) and approximately 9,000 dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, but the “2+2” Meeting in June 2011 and other agreements set the timing of the relocation for the earliest possible date after 2014. Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the Governments of Japan and the United States decided to delink both the relocation of III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam and the resulting land return south of Kadena Air Base from the progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and the United States reviewed the composition of the units and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam. As a result, Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is to be stationed and deployed in Guam, approximately 9,000 personnel are to be relocated to locations outside of Japan, the authorized strength of the U.S. Marine Corps forces in Guam is to be approximately 5,000 personnel, and the end-state for the presence of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa is to be consistent with the level of approximately 10,000 personnel envisioned in the Roadmap. Accordingly, the “2+2” Meeting held in October 2013 agreed that, under the relocation plan described at the 2012 “2+2” Meeting, the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam is to begin in the first half of the 2020s. The plan is expected to promote the implementation of the consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa of April 2013. See>> Fig. II-4-4-7 (Relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and Other Locations) b. Costs of the Relocation Under the Roadmap, the two sides reached an agreement that, of the estimated $10.27 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs, Japan would provide $6.09 billion, including $2.8 billion in direct cash contribution, while the United States would fund the remaining $4.18 billion. In February 2009, the Japanese Government and the U.S. Government signed “the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of ----- Fig. II-4-4-7 Relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam and Other Locations Approximately 5,000 Hawaii, etc. Okinawa Approximately 9,000 Marine Corps personnel and their dependents Approximately 4,000 - Approximately 10,000 Marine Corps Hawaii, personnel to remain in Okinawa U.S. mainland, etc. Approximately 1,000 Guam *The relocation is to begin in the first half of the 2020s (The Joint Statement of the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013) the Relocation of the III MEF Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam” (the Guam International Agreement). The Agreement legally guarantees and ensures actions taken by Japan and the United States, such as Japan’s long-term funding for projects to which Japan provides direct cash contributions (so-called Mamizu projects). As part of measures based on this Agreement, the Japanese government has been providing cash contributions to the U.S. Government in relation to the Mamizu projects since FY2009.[7] Subsequently, at the “2+2” Meeting held in April 2012, the unit composition and the number of personnel to be relocated to Guam were revised and it was agreed that the preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation was $8.6 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2012 dollars). With regard to Japan’s financial commitment, it was reaffirmed that it was to be the direct cash contribution of up to $2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars) as stipulated in Article 1 of the Guam International Agreement. It was also confirmed that Japan’s equity investment and loans for family housing projects and infrastructure projects would not be utilized. Moreover, it was stipulated that any funds that had already been provided to the U.S. Government under the Guam International Agreement would be counted as part of the Japanese contribution. Furthermore, as a new initiative, a portion of the direct cash contribution of $ 2.8 billion mentioned above would be used to develop training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared use facilities for Japan and the United States. In addition, it was agreed that the remaining costs and any additional costs would be borne by the United States, and that the two governments were to complete a bilateral cost breakdown. At the “2+2” Meeting in October 2013, a Protocol Amending the Guam International Agreement was signed to add the stipulations concerning the development of training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the use of these training areas by the SDF. The limit on Japanese cash contributions remains unchanged at $2.8 billion (in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Both countries also completed the process of creating a detailed breakdown of required costs. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for U.S. Fiscal Year 2015 was enacted in December 2014, which lifted the freeze on the use of funds for the relocation to Guam imposed by the U.S. Congress in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012. c. Completion of Environmental Impact Assessment Procedures The Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS), conducted based on the revision of the project due to the realignment plan adjustment, was completed in August 2015, opening the way for full-scale construction for the relocation in Guam going forward. As for the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Joint Military Training Environmental Impact Statement (CJMT-EIS), it is planned to be completed in 2018. See>> Reference 40 (Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam); Reference 41 (Protocol amending the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam) ----- **(3) Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base** The Roadmap stated that following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of signifi cant land areas south of Kadena Air Base. At the “2+2” Meeting in April 2012, it was decided to delink the progress on the FRF from both the relocation of the III MEF personnel from Okinawa to Guam, and resulting land returns south of Kadena. In addition, with regard to the land to be returned, it was agreed to conduct consultations focusing on three categories, namely (1) land eligible for immediate return; (2) land eligible for return once the relocation of functions is completed; and (3) land eligible for return after the relocation abroad. The return of all these types of land will enable the return of approximately 70% of USFJ facilities and areas located in densely populated areas in the central and southern parts of the main island of Okinawa. Since the change of administration at the end of 2012, Japan and the United States have continued consultation under the basic policy of the Abe administration to dedicate all its strength to mitigate the impact of the U.S. Forces on Okinawa communities. Japan strongly requested an early return of lands south of Kadena, including Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) in Urasoe City. As a result of bilateral coordination, both countries announced the consolidation plan in April 2013, which stipulated the return schedule, including the specifi c years of return. In the consolidation plan, both sides confi rmed that they will implement the plan as early as possible. The Government of Japan will continue to work with all its strength so that lands south of Kadena would be returned at the earliest possible date. Furthermore, following the announcement of the consolidation plan, the consultations have been held since April 2013, involving Ginowan City, Ginowan City Military Land Owners Association, Okinawa Prefecture, Okinawa Defense Bureau, and **Commentary** **Progress in Land Return (Okinawa)** **Column** The number of tourists visiting Okinawa has continued to increase over the years, and reached approximately 7.76 million in 2015, a year- on-year rise of 10%. Did you know that the popular tourist sites, such as shintoshin of Naha City, Zampa Cape Park in Yomitan Village, and a large-scale shopping mall in Kitanakagusuku Village, all used to be U.S. facilities and areas? Since the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, the Governments of Japan and the United States have been making ceaseless efforts toward the realignment, consolidation and reduction of the U.S. facilities and areas, while maintaining Japan’s deterrence capabilities. In April 2013, the Governments of Japan and the United States formulated a plan that specifi es the timing of the return of approximately 1,000 ha of U.S. facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base. In accordance with this plan, approximately 51 ha of land of West Futenma Housing Area in Ginowan City was returned in March 2015, and the local communities are currently discussing the use of the site for the development of an international medical hub. In December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States confi rmed and announced the early return of the land by partially front-loading this plan, as well as the signifi cance and urgency of the return of a major portion of Northern Training Area. With the progress in the return of land, including land returns described above, U.S. facilities and areas are expected to be roughly halved from those immediately prior to the reversion of Okinawa Prefecture to Japan. The Governments of Japan and the United States will proceed further with the return of land in Okinawa in order to contribute to the development of Okinawa as a whole through the utilization of the returned U.S. facilities and areas. Former Makiminato Residential Area (Naha City) Former Awase Meadows Golf Course (Kitanakagusuku Village) [Photo courtesy of Kitanakagusuku Village Offi ce] ----- Fig. II-4-4-8 Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base The 1st Kuwae Tank Farm of the Army Oil Storage Facility Camp Kuwae FY2022 FY2025 16 ha 68 ha or later or later Camp Zukeran (Lower Plaza Housing area) Camp Zukeran (a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound) FY2024 23 ha or later FY2019 or later 10 ha Camp Zukeran - JC reached Agreement of Return on September 19, 2013 (a part of Kishaba Housing area) FY2024 Camp Zukeran (industrial corridor, etc.) 5 ha or later FY2024 or later 62 ha Camp Zukeran (additional areas) Makiminato Service Area (the remainder) α ha[note3] FY2024 or later 142 ha Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Air Base Futenma Housing area) Makiminato Service Area Makiminato Service Area (areas near Gate 5) (north access road) FY2022 or later 481 ha Returned on March 31, 2015 Returned on August 31, 2013 1 ha FY2014 or later 2 ha - JC reached Makiminato Service Area Agreement of Return (Area to include majority of storage areas) on July 11, 2013 FY2025 or later 129 ha Legend : Returned or prompt return (65 ha) Naha Port facilities : Return after the relocation of functions within the prefecture (841 ha) FY2028 56 ha : Return after the relocation of the Marine Corps outside Japan (142 ha +more) or later Total: 1,048 ha + more Notes: 1. The times and years are based on the best case scenario concerning the return of specific facilities/areas after the completion of necessary measures and procedures to be taken by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The periods may become delayed due to such factors as the progress of the preparation for relocation in Okinawa by the Government of Japan and the U.S. Government’s efforts for relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps to outside Japan. Furthermore, the times and fiscal years in parentheses do not include the time necessary for relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan because, though the conditions for returning the areas include its relocation to outside of Japan, the plan for the relocation is yet to be decided. Consequently, the times of return of these areas may be changed depending on the progress of the relocation of the Marine Corps from Japan. 2. The area of each area is an approximate figure and may be slightly modified based on the results of future surveys, etc. 3. Studies will be made in the process of developing a master plan to determine the feasibility of additional land returns. *JC: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee Okinawa General Bureau[8] in a bid to contribute to the promotion of the effective and appropriate use of West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran, and the MOD has also been providing necessary cooperation. Efforts have been made to enable the early return of land areas, including the land areas that are to be returned as soon as required procedures are completed (shown in red in Fig. II-4-4-8), since the announcement of the consolidation plan in April 2013. These efforts resulted in the realization of the return of the north entrance of Makiminato Service Area (approximately 1 ha) in August 2013 and West Futenma Housing Area within Camp Zukeran (approximately 51 ha) at the end of March 2015. In December 2015, the Governments of Japan and the United States also agreed on an early return of part of the land of MCAS Futenma for use as land for a municipal road, as well as on an early return of part of the land of Makiminato Service Area for the purpose of widening a national road. All-out initiatives are being continuously made to steadily implement the return of land areas south of Kadena Air Base under the consolidation plan and mitigate the impact on Okinawa as early as possible, and also to realize the respective returns of land in the shortest possible time for more visible mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. See>> Reference 39 (Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena); Fig. II-4-4-8 (Return of Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base) - 4 Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces in Japan **(1) MV-22 Osprey Deployment in Okinawa** The Osprey is an aircraft that combines the vertical takeoff/landing and hovering functions of rotary-wing aircraft on one hand and the speed and range of fixedwing aircraft on the other. As the primary air unit of the U.S. Marine Corps, the MV-22 Osprey that has been developed for the U.S. Marine Corps plays an important role in engaging in a broad range of activities, including transportation of personnel and goods. The U.S. Marine Corps is in the process of replacing aged rotary-wing airplanes (CH-46) with MV-22s, which have superior basic performance. In September 2013, ----- all the 24 CH-46s deployed at MCAS Futenma were replaced by MV-22s. The MV-22 is a highly capable aircraft compared with the CH-46; it can fly faster, can carry more payload, and has a longer range. Its deployment to Okinawa will strengthen the deterrence of the U.S. Forces in Japan as a whole and greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the region. **(2) CV-22 Osprey Deployment to Yokota Air Base** In May 2015, the Government of the United States announced that CV-22 Osprey aircraft, tailored to meet the requirements of the U.S. Air Force, will be deployed to Yokota Air Base (which encompasses Fussa City, Tachikawa City, Akishima City, Musashi Murayama City, Hamura City and Mizuho Town of Tokyo Prefecture), with the first three aircraft to be deployed in the latter half of 2017 for completion of the deployment of a total of 10 aircraft by 2021. The CV-22 aircraft deployed to Yokota Air Base handles tasks for transporting personnel and supplies for Special Operation Forces of the U.S. Forces to deal with crises and emergencies in the Asia-Pacific region, including humanitarian assistance and natural disasters. As Japan faces increasingly tougher security environments, the deployment of high-performance CV22 as part of the rebalancing strategy and enhancement of readiness posture of the United States will enhance the deterrence and response capabilities of the JapanU.S. Alliance and contribute to the stability of the AsiaPacific region. The Government of Japan will continue to respond to local communities in a careful and sincere manner in order to obtain their understanding and cooperation. CV-22 of the U.S. Forces in flight 22 operations in Japan. Following this agreement, the flight operations of the MV-22 aircraft commenced in Japan and safe operations have thus far been secured. In addition, the Government of Japan has confirmed, from information obtained from the United States, that the CV-22 and the MV-22 offer the same propulsion system and have a basically similar structure and that the United States will ensure complete safety in operating the CV-22 in Japan as in the case of the MV-22. Furthermore, in order to ensure that full consideration is given to local residents and that the Joint Committee agreement is properly implemented for flight operations of the MV-22 and the CV-22, the Government of Japan has been continuously engaging with the U.S. side through various opportunities, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meetings. See>> Reference 42 (Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces) **(4) Usability of Osprey Deployed by the U.S. Forces in** **Case of Disaster** In the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that hit the central part of the Philippines in November 2013, 14 MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities to support “Operation Damayan.” The MV-22s were deployed promptly to affected areas that were difficult to access, and they transported several hundred isolated victims and about six tons of relief materials in a day. In April 2014, the MV-22, deployed in Okinawa, was dispatched for search and rescue activities in the wake of an accidental sinking of a passenger ship off the coast of Jindo in the Republic of Korea. Furthermore, in response to the large earthquake that hit Nepal in April 2015, four MV-22 aircraft, deployed in Okinawa, were dispatched to the country to transport personnel and supplies. Meanwhile, the MV-22 was used in Japan to conduct training for transporting victims to an MSDF escort vessel and other locations on such occasions as “Wakayama **(3) Safety of the Osprey** Following the crash of an MV-22 in Morocco in April 2012 that occurred prior to the deployment of the MV22s to MCAS Futenma in September 2012, and the crash of a CV-22 in Florida in June 2012, a Japanese analysis and assessment team examined these accidents based on Japan’s own viewpoints and knowledge and also looked at the results of the investigations by the Government of the United States, and confirmed that these accidents were caused largely by human factors and that there were no safety problems with the aircraft itself. In relation to the flight operations of the MV-22, the two governments confirmed at the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee and on other occasions that measures have been taken to address these human factors in light of the lessons learned from the accidents and agreed to implement specific measures to ensure the safety of MV ----- |Maximum speed|Approximately 520 km/h Maximum speed Appr About twice| |---|---| |Cruising speed|Approximately 490 km/h Appr| |Range|Approximately 3,900 km App| |Radius of action|Approximately 600 km Radius of action App (With 24 troops on board) About four times (Wit| |Number of troops carried|24| |Number of crew|3–4| |Cargo (inside)|Approximately 9,100 kg App| |Cargo (outside)|Payload Approximately 5,700kg App About three times| |Rotor diameter|Approximately 11.6 m Ap| |Angle of flight|Approximately 7,500 m App| |Own weight|Approximately 16,000 kg App| |Measurement|MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. 6.7 m 17.5 m 25| Fig. II-4-4-9 Usability of Osprey Aircraft 4,000km 3,000km MV-22 radius of action North Korea Tokyo Approximately 1,100 km (1 aerial refueling) Beijing South Korea Osaka Seoul CH-46 radius of action Fukuoka 1,500km Approximately 140 km Kagoshima MV-22 radius of action China Okinawa Approximately 600 km (no refueling) Shanghai 1,000km MV-22 range Approximately 3,900 km Taipei CH-46 range Approximately 700 km Saipan Hong Kong (1) All distances are in straight-line distance Manila Guam (2) CH-46 has no aerial refueling function Comparison of Basic Performance MV-22 CH-46 Maximum speed Approximately 520 km/h Maximum speed Approximately 270 km/h About twice Cruising speed Approximately 490 km/h Approximately 220 km/h Range Approximately 3,900 km Approximately 700 km Approximately 600 km Radius of action Approximately 140 km Radius of action (With 24 troops on board) About four times (With 12 troops on board) Number of troops carried 24 12 Number of crew 3–4 3–5 Cargo (inside) Approximately 9,100 kg Approximately 2,300 kg Payload Cargo (outside) Approximately 5,700kg About three times Approximately 2,300 kg Rotor diameter Approximately 11.6 m Approximately 15.5 m Angle of flight Approximately 7,500 m Approximately 3,000 m Own weight Approximately 16,000 kg Approximately 7,700 kg MV-22 and CH-46 are not much different in size. Measurement 6.7 m 5.1 m 17.5 m 25.7 m Prefecture Tsunami Disaster Readiness Practical Training” in October 2014 and “Michinoku ALERT 2014” in November 2014, a disaster relief exercise by the GSDF Tohoku Headquarters. In addition, when the Kumamoto Earthquake occurred in April 2016, the MV-22 were dispatched to transport daily necessities to the disaster stricken area. Like the MV-22, the CV-22 can conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, including search and rescue missions, both immediately and over a large range, in the case of a large-scale disaster. As such it is expected that the superior capabilities of the Osprey deployed by the U.S. Forces can be showcased in a variety of operations in the future as well. See>> Fig. II-4-4-9 (Usability of Osprey Aircraft) - 5 Consultation Structure for Mitigating the Impact **on Okinawa** Today, a number of USFJ facilities and areas still remain in Okinawa because of the U.S. occupation of Okinawa and the slower returning progress of USFJ facilities and areas compared to other areas of Japan even after the occupation ended In order to mitigate the concentrated ----- impact on Okinawa, the Government of Japan has been implementing initiatives toward the realization of the SACO Final Report and the Roadmap. The MOD is committed to further mitigating the impact on Okinawa through the Okinawa Policy Council, its subcommittee and other means,[9] while listening to the opinions of the local residents. At the Okinawa Policy Council Meeting in December 2013, the Governor of Okinawa presented several requests, including cessation of the operation of MCAS Futenma within fi ve years and its early return, the re-deployment of about 12 MV-22s to bases outside of Okinawa, and the total return of Makiminato Service Area within seven years. The Japanese government as a whole is addressing the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa by establishing the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Okinawa and the Mayor of Ginowan. The MOD also created the Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa headed by the State Minister of Defense in January 2014 to continually work on the reduction of the impact on Okinawa. The Government of Japan is steadily promoting the relocation of MV-22 training to locations outside of Okinawa Prefecture, taking advantage of such opportunities as Japan-U.S. joint exercises. In October 2015, Japan decided to implement regular MV-22 maintenance at GSDF Camp Kisarazu (Kisarazu City, Chiba Prefecture). In January 2016, the Consultation between the Central Government and Okinawa Prefecture, consisting of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of State for Okinawa, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defense, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary and the Governor and Vice Governor of Okinawa, held its fi rst meeting and confi rmed that both sides would hold **4 Stationing of the U.S. Forces in Regions Other than Okinawa** In regions other than Okinawa, the MOD is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the U.S. Forces by maintaining its deterrence and trying to mitigate the impact on local communities. consultations on measures for the mitigation of the impact of bases on Okinawa and the prefecture’s development. At the Council’s second meeting held in March 2016, discussions centered on such subjects as the suspension of the operation of MCAS Futenma within fi ve years, the continued existence of the Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa and the early return of over half of Northern Training Area. See>> Part II, Chapter 4, Section 4-6 (Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas) - 6 Initiatives for the Use of Lands Previously **Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces** For the return of lands in Okinawa provided for use by the USFJ (hereinafter, “USFJ Land”), the “Act on Special Measures Concerning Promotion of Effective and Appropriate Use of the Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Previously Provided for Use by the Stationed Forces” stipulates various measures concerning the USFJ Land agreed to be returned. The MOD mainly conducts the following initiatives, and will continue its initiatives to promote the effective and appropriate use of returned lands by coordinating and cooperating with related ministries, the prefectural government and local municipalities. The MOD: (1) conducts mediation in relation to access for surveys, etc., to be implemented by the prefectural government and local municipalities on the USFJ Land which are agreed to be returned; (2) conducts measures applying to all the returned lands to remove impediments for use such as soil contamination and unexploded ordnance, not only those caused by the activities of the stationed forces, before handing over the land to the owners of former USFJ Land; and (3) provides fi nancial benefi ts to alleviate the impact on the owners of the returned lands and to promote use of the land. - 1 Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in **Kanagawa Prefecture** Due to the strong desire from local public bodies and other organizations, the Japanese and U.S. Governments, after bilateral consultations, agreed on the return ----- of six facilities and areas in Yokohama City and on the construction of housing units for dependents of members of the U.S. Forces in the Yokohama area of the “Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex.” Of the area of approximately 41.9 ha to be returned, approximately 37.5 ha consisting of four facilities and areas, including Kami Seya Communication Station, have to date been returned. See>> Fig. II-4-4-10 (Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture) - 2 Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the **U.S. Forces in Japan as Stipulated in the Roadmap** (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama was realized and Zama General Hospital was established on the returned site in April 2016. In addition, in December 2015, the shared use of a portion of land at SGD (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City was realized. In other areas, the realignment projects associated with the improvement of U.S. Army Japan command and control capability have been undertaken as shown in Fig. II-4-4-11. See>> Fig. II-4-4-11 (Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability) **(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace** a. Commencement of the Operation of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) and the Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command HQ Enhancement of coordination between the headquarters of both countries, combined with the transition to joint operational posture, is highly important to ensure a response of flexibility and readiness of the SDF and the U.S. Forces. Therefore, at the end of FY2011, the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)[10] commenced its operations at Yokota Air Base and the ASDF Air Defense Command HQ and its relevant units were relocated to Yokota Air Base. These arrangements have made it possible to enhance coordination between the headquarters of the SDF and the U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD. b. Yokota Airspace To facilitate the operations of civilian airplanes in Yokota airspace, where the U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control, measures have been taken since 2006 to temporarily transfer the responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to the Japanese **(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and** **Control Capability** To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (Sagamihara City and Zama City in Kanagawa Prefecture) was reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) in December 2007 and the reorganization took place at the end of September 2008. With the aim of strengthening coordination with the reorganized USARJ headquarters so as to enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF Camp Asaka (Asaka City, Wako City and Niiza City in Saitama Prefecture and Nerima Ward, Tokyo) to Camp Zama, where the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) are located, at the end of FY2012. In addition, for more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and the Sagami General Depot (SGD), measures were taken for the partial return of respective facilities and areas. In February 2016, the partial release of land |Location|Area (ha)|Plan for Land Return, etc.| |---|---|---| |Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 242 ha|Land return completed at the end of June 2015| |Izumi-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 77 ha|Land return completed in June 2014| |Naka-ku, Minami-ku and Isogo ku, Yokohama City Area|About 43 ha|To be returned upon completion of construction of dependent housing in| |Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 3 ha|Land return completed in May 2009| |Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 53 ha|Land return completed in December 2005| |Yokohama City Area|About 37 ha|Agreed in 2014 to change the number of housing units to be constructed from about 400, as initially planned, to 171| |Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama City Area|About 1 ha|Return procedures to begin upon completion of the current use| Fig. II-4-4-10 Reorganization of the USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture Location Name Location Area (ha) Plan for Land Return, etc. Kamiseya Seya-ku and Asahi-ku, Land return completed at the end of About 242 ha **Yokohama City,** Communication Station Yokohama City Area June 2015 **Kanagawa** Fukaya Izumi-ku, **Prefecture** Communication Site Yokohama City Area About 77 ha Land return completed in June 2014 **Asahi-kuAsahi-ku** Negishi Naka-ku, Minami-ku To be returned upon completion of **Seya-ku** Dependent Housing Area and Isogo ku, About 43 ha construction of dependent housing in Yokohama City Area **Izumi-kuIzumi-ku** **Minami-kuMinami-ku** **Naka-kuNaka-ku** Tomioka Storage Area Yokohama City AreaKanazawa-ku, About 3 ha Land return completed in May 2009 **Totsuka-kuTotsuka-ku** **Isogo-kuIsogo-ku** Koshiba POL Depot Yokohama City AreaKanazawa-ku, About 53 ha Land return completed in December 2005 Agreed in 2014 to change the number Ikego Housing Area Yokohama City Area About 37 ha of housing units to be constructed from **Kanazawa-Kanazawa-** and Navy Annex about 400, as initially planned, to 171 **kuku** Detached part Kanazawa-ku, Return procedures to begin upon completion of Yokohama City Area About 1 ha of the current use : Implemented : Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation 10 The BJOCC functions to contribute to providing a joint response for Japan’s defense. To that end, it works to enhance information sharing, close coordination, and interoperability between the Japanese and ----- |Time|Improvement| |---|---| |December 2007|Reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) at Camp Zama| |June 2008|Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot| |September 2008|Reorganization of the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward)| |August 2011|The operation of the Mission Command Training Center commenced| |October 2011|Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama| |June 2012|Agreed on the shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City| |March 2013|The GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF Camp to Camp Zama| |September 2014|Partial return of land (approximately 17 Ha) at Sagami General Depot| |December 2015|The shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) commenced| |February 2016|Partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama| Fig. II-4-4-11 Initiatives for Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capability **Time** **Improvement** December 2007 Reorganized into the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) at Camp Zama June 2008 Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 17 ha) at Sagami General Depot September 2008 Reorganization of the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward) August 2011 The operation of the Mission Command Training Center commenced October 2011 Agreed on the partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama June 2012 Agreed on the shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) with Sagamihara City March 2013 The GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters was relocated from GSDF Camp to Camp Zama September 2014 Partial return of land (approximately 17 Ha) at Sagami General Depot December 2015 The shared use of a portion of land at Sagami General Depot (approximately 35 ha) commenced February 2016 Partial return of land (approximately 5.4 ha) at Camp Zama **VOICE** **Message from the Mayor of Zama City, Kanagawa Prefecture** **Column** **Zama Mayor Mikio Endo** Situated roughly at the center of Kanagawa Prefecture, Zama City is a densely-populated city where approximately 129,000 people live in an area of 17.57 km[2]. Zama City hosts Camp Zama, home to the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ), etc., with its area of approximately 57 ha accounting for about 3.2% of the city. Regarding the partial release of land at Camp Zama, “the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) of May 2006 set forth the partial return of the land in conjunction with the relocation of the headquarters of the USARJ&I Corps (Forward), and with the subsequent addition of land to be released, approximately 5.4 ha of land in total is to be returned. When the city was drawing up a plan for the utilization of the returned land, several requests came in from citizens for construction of a hospital, given the circumstances at the time, whereby as many as 74% of citizens requiring emergency care had to be transported to hospitals outside Zama City because of the closing of hospitals within the city and other factors. Thus, the city decided on a plan to invite a private-sector hospital to the site that was scheduled to be returned. For the construction of the invited hospital, thanks to the extraordinary consideration of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the U.S. Forces in Japan, and particularly the U.S. Forces at Camp Zama, the commencement of construction work on the private-sector hospital was permitted by means of the joint use of the land before the land return, which was an extremely rare case. This allowed the city to open the hospital in a very short span of time only one month after the offi cial return of the land. Given the current security environment surrounding Japan, it is extremely important for Zama City, which is hosting the U.S. military base, to build a positive relationship of mutual trust with the U.S. Forces and related parties by realistically accepting that the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan is crucial for national security based on the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The city believes that a string of processes leading to the utilization of the returned land represents the major achievements of regular mutual exchanges and interactions. Zama Mayor Endo (left) receiving a report on the return of land from Zama General Hospital, established in April 2016 the Director-General of the South Kanto Defense Bureau ----- **(4) Measures relating to Atsugi Air Facility and MCAS Iwakuni** a. Relocation of Carrier-Based Aircraft Atsugi Air Facility (Ayase City, Yamato City and Ebina City in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located at the center of an urban district, the noise of carrier jets taking off and landing in particular has been a problem for a long time. It is necessary to resolve such problems as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the operations of aircraft carriers. Thus, after the completion of the runway relocation project[12] at MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture), which made aircraft operations possible with less impact on the living environment of the surrounding communities, CVW-5 squadrons were relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. In order to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to the relocation, the related measures listed in Fig. II-4-4-12 are to be taken. As a result, the noise problems are expected to be mitigated from the current situation, with the area requiring residential noise-abatement work, or the socalled first category area, decreasing from approximately 1,600 ha to approximately 500 ha. See>> Fig. II-4-4-12 (Measures Related to Atsugi Air Facility and MCAS Iwakuni) b. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) The 2006 Roadmap prescribes that a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. At the “2+2” Meeting of June 2011, it was confirmed that the Government of Japan will explain to local authorities that Mageshima is considered to be the candidate site for a new SDF facility. This SDF facility would be used to support operations in response to a variety of situations including large-scale disasters as well as regular exercises and other activities, including use by the U.S. Forces as a permanent site for FCLP. In addition, the 2005 SCC document confirmed that the U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLP at Iwo-To in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identified. c. Resumption of Civil Aviation Operations at MCAS Iwakuni Considering that the local public entities, etc., including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, had been working together to request the resumption of civil aviation operations, it was agreed in the Roadmap that “portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.” Based on this agreement, Iwakuni authorities, to deploy ASDF officers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON), and to reduce the airspace by about 40% (i.e. the release of air traffic control from USFJ). c. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base At the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in 2003, it was agreed that the joint civilian-military use of Yokota Air Base would be studied, and a Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant government ministries and agencies and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The governments of Japan and the United States are conducting a study on the specific conditions and modalities, with the understanding that both countries will not compromise the military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base. **(3) Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carrier to Yokosuka** **Naval Base** The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in ensuring maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as regional peace and stability. The U.S. aircraft carrier provides the core capability of the Fleet. The U.S. Navy affirms that it will continue to ensure that all of its forward-deployed nuclear-powered vessels,[11] including USS Ronald Reagan, while anchored at Yokosuka Naval Base (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repairing and refueling will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety. Prime Minister Abe aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) after the SDF Fleet Review, the first Prime Minister of Japan to board the carrier (fourth from right) 11 Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers do not need to replenish their fuel and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft, giving them excellent combat and operational capabilities. 12 A project to relocate the runway of MCAS Iwakuni by approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore), in response to the requests from Iwakuni City, etc. The new runway commenced its operations in May ----- |Measure|Status of Progress, etc.| |---|---| |Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni|To be completed by around 2017| |Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility|Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense system, Japan and the United States confrimed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni.| |Relocation of KC-130 air refueling aircraft from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni|Relocation completed in August 2014| |Rotational deployment of KC-130 to Kanoya Air Base and Guam|❍ In October 2015, Kanoya City expressed its understanding for rotational deployment of KC-130 to MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture). ❍ Japan and the United States are currently holding consultations over the specific timing of the commencement of rotational deployment. ❍ Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, an inquiry about the status of exercises is being made to the U.S. Forces.| |Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam|Japan and the United States confirmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam.| Fig. II-4-4-12 Measures Related to Atsugi Air Facility and MCAS Iwakuni **Measure** **Status of Progress, etc.** Relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) To be completed by around 2017 squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni Relocation of MSDF EP-3, etc. from MCAS Iwakuni Following bilateral consultations upon request from the local community and from the perspective of the defense to Atsugi Air Facility system, Japan and the United States confirmed in 2013 that EP-3 aircraft will remain at MCAS Iwakuni. Relocation of KC-130 air refueling aircraft from Relocation completed in August 2014 MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni ❍ In October 2015, Kanoya City expressed its understanding for rotational deployment of KC-130 to MSDF Kanoya Air Base (Kanoya City, Kagoshima Prefecture). Rotational deployment of KC-130 to Kanoya Air ❍ Japan and the United States are currently holding consultations over the specific timing of the Base and Guam commencement of rotational deployment. ❍ Regarding rotational deployment to Guam, an inquiry about the status of exercises is being made to the U.S. Forces. Relocation of CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Japan and the United States confirmed that CH-53D helicopters, which had been sent to the Middle East, will Iwakuni to Guam return to the U.S. mainland without returning to MCAS Iwakuni, and will then be relocated to Guam. : Implemented : Currently under implementation or scheduled for implementation Kintaikyo Airport was opened in 2012, resuming regular flights of civil aviation aircraft for the first time in 48 years. **(5) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)** Japan and the United States are set to continue close coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities. In June 2006, an AN/TPY2 radar (so-called “X-Band Radar”) system was deployed to the U.S. Shariki Communication Site (Tsugaru City, Aomori Prefecture).[13] Also in October 2006, U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 units (Patriot Advanced Capability) were deployed to Kadena Air Base (Kadena Town, Okinawa City and Chatan Town in Okinawa Prefecture) and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area (Yomitan Village, Okinawa City, Kadena Town, Onna Village and Uruma City in Okinawa Prefecture). In December 2014, the second TPY2 radar in Japan was deployed to the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site (Kyotango City in Kyoto Prefecture). In addition, the United States deployed Aegis destroyers with BMD capabilities to Yokosuka Naval Base (Yokosuka City in Kanagawa Prefecture) in October 2015 and March 2016. The additional deployment is scheduled for around July 2017. See>> Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3 (Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks) relocation has been underway since 2007.[14] The MOD has been improving its infrastructure, as required, for the training relocation. In January 2011, at the Joint Committee, based on the achievements at the “2+2” Meeting in 2010, both governments agreed to include Guam as a new training relocation site and to expand the scale of training. Moreover, at the Joint Committee in October 2011, they agreed on details for training sites. After that, training was relocated to Guam and other locations for the first time, leading to a series of training conducted at relocation sites. Furthermore, in March 2014, both governments at the Joint Committee agreed to add air-to-ground training using the Misawa Air-to-Ground Range (Misawa City and Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture). This agreement resulted in air-to-ground training using the Misawa Airto-Ground Range in June 2014. The training relocation contributes to enhancing interoperability between the two countries, and also to relocating part of air-to-ground training conducted by using Kadena Air Base. Thus, this training relocation will help noise abatement around Kadena Air Base, thereby contributing to the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa. In addition to assisting USFJ, the MOD and the SDF are conducting efforts to ensure the safety and security of the local community, such as the establishment of a liaison office, facilitating communication with related government agencies, and response to requirements from the local community. These efforts have been contributing to successful training relocation. **(6) Training Relocation** Based on the decision that U.S. aircraft from three USFJ facilities and areas—Kadena, Misawa (Misawa City and Tohoku Town in Aomori Prefecture) and MCAS Iwakuni—would participate for the time being in bilateral training with ASDF at ASDF facilities, training 13 The radar was deployed to ASDF Shariki Sub Base (in Aomori Prefecture) in June 2006, but was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site. ----- **y** **Implementation Status of the Aviation Training Relocation and Support** **Column** **by Relevant Local Municipalities** Based on “the United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (Roadmap) of May 2006, the relocation of aviation training has so far been implemented 43 times in Japan and 27 times in Guam and other overseas locations for a total of 70 times (as of the end of March 2016). The relocation of training in Japan was conducted at Self-Defense Forces (SDF) facilities at Chitose Air Base (Chitose City and Tomakomai City, Hokkaido), Misawa Air Base (Misawa City and Tohoku Town, Kamikita County, Aomori Prefecture), Hyakuri Air Base (Omitama City, Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu Air Base (Komatsu City, Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki Air Base (Chikujo Town, Chikujo County, Yukuhashi City, Fukuoka Prefecture), and Nyutabaru Air base (Shintomi Town, Koyu County, Miyazaki Prefecture). In order to ensure the security and safety of residents in the local communities, the respective regional defense bureaus have established local task forces to facilitate liaison and coordination with the U.S. Forces and related government agencies, provide information promptly, and strive for noise abatement around the air bases. Ahead of the implementation of the relocation of aviation training, relevant local municipalities render their services to inform residents in the local communities of the relocated training by sponsoring explanatory meetings for local residents, circulating documents, and uploading related information on their websites, and also to enhance the communication structure. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strive to mitigate the impact on the local communities by stepping up the relocation of aviation training to ensure the mitigation of noise problems in the local communities around the bases of the U.S. Forces in Japan, while obtaining the understanding and cooperation of relevant local municipalities. U.S. Forces aircraft participating in the Aviation Training Relocation Japan-U.S. coordination taking place at a local task force **5 Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan** In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan based on the Roadmap, the “Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in Japan (USFJ Realignment Special Measures Act)” was enacted in August 2007. Realignment grants, Special Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc. and other systems were established based on the law. During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants[15] will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects[16] which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities affected by the realignment,[17] and to stimulate local industries. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress made in the steps of U.S. Forces realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specifi ed defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment. As of April 2016, 18 defense facilities in 43 municipalities are eligible to receive the grant. In addition, under the U.S. Forces realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since these developments may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to include education and skills training, which is to help retain their employment. 15 Approximately 12.9 billion yen in the FY2016 budget 16 Under the Realignment Special Measures Act, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations integrally with U.S. air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. 17 The specifi c scope of projects includes 14 projects identifi ed by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the Act on Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of United States Forces in ----- **6 Measures to Mitigate the Impacts of USFJ Facilities and Areas** - 1 Initiatives to Conserve the Environments around **USFJ Facilities and Areas** At the “2+2” meeting in September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make it a common objective to ensure the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel, their families and other such parties, and made the “Joint Statement of Environmental Principles.”[18] To follow up on this announcement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been enhanced. Specifi cally, the MOD has been working with relevant ministries and agencies to enhance cooperation for regular reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS),[19] exchange information on the environment, and deal with environmental pollution. Additionally, at the “2+2” Meeting in May 2010, Japan and the United States discussed the possibility of taking a “Green Alliance” approach and studied the adoption of renewable energy for the U.S. Forces facilities and areas under development in Japan. Furthermore, the Governments of Japan and the United States engaged in discussions aimed at the creation of a framework for increased initiatives in managing the environment associated with USFJ facilities and areas. The Government of Japan then commenced negotiations with the United States on an agreement that supplements the SOFA on an environmental front, and they reached substantive accord in October 2014, before signing and effectuating the supplementary agreement in September 2015. This supplemental agreement represents an international commitment with legal binding force and sets forth the following provisions concerning environmental standards and access to U.S. Forces facilities and areas: (1) Japan and the United States shall share available and appropriate relevant information; (2) The United States shall release and maintain the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS), and for these standards, Japan and the United States shall adopt the more protective of Japanese, U.S. or international agreement standards; (3) Procedures shall be established and maintained to allow appropriate access for the Japanese authorities to U.S. Forces facilities and areas when an accident with an impact on the environment (leakage) actually occurs or when the Japanese authorities conduct a fi eld survey (including a survey on cultural assets) in relation to the return of U.S. Forces facilities and areas; and (4) Japan and the United States shall start consultations at the Joint Committee on matters related to the implementation of the agreement upon request from either party. This supplemental agreement is part of a more comprehensive framework for recognizing the signifi cance of environmental protection. The preparation of such an agreement that supplements the SOFA is the fi rst of its kind since the SOFA entered into force and has a historical signifi cance that differs in nature from conventional improvements in the operations of the SOFA. - 2 Other Measures The Government of Japan has been taking measures for the improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication also provides municipalities with base grants, which have alternate features in terms of municipal tax on real estate. Moreover, in the vicinities of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. Forces personnel and others have affected local areas and their residents, so the Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan is cooperating with USFJ in these prevention measures; at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incidents and accidents. The United States has also taken measures for its part, putting in place its guidelines for off-duty action (liberty policy), including measures such as nighttime alcohol restrictions as well as curfews applying to U.S. Forces personnel ranked below a certain level. In May 2016, a member of the U.S. Forces civilian component was arrested on suspicion of abandoning a body in Okinawa Prefecture. Following this incident, the Governments of Japan and the United States engaged in intensive discussions, including the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in June, to develop effective 18 Consisting of four items; (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information sharing and access, (3) response to environmental contamination, and (4) environmental consultation. 19 JEGS is an environmental standard compiled by USFJ in order to ensure that USFJ activities and installations protect the natural environment and health of people, and stipulates the handling of environmental ----- prevention measures, and announced the Japan-United States Joint Statement on Reviewing Implementation Practices of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Related to U.S. Personnel with SOFA Status, Including the Civilian Component[20] on July 5, 2016. Based on this Joint Statement, the two governments will work towards announcing respective detailed measures. On the same day, the Commander of the U.S. Forces Japan announced several steps to update drunk-driving standards and punishment and to enhance training. Meanwhile, in order to never allow a recurrence of the recent regrettable incident, it is necessary for the Government of Japan to promptly promote measures to deter crime and ensure the safety and security of the people of Okinawa. In June 2016, the Government of Japan prepared Crime Prevention Measures in Okinawa. The pillars of the Measures consist of bolstering crime prevention patrol operations and the establishment of a safe and secure environment. The MOD will cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies to ensure the implementation of the effective measures. See>> Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1-4 (Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas) **Commentary** **Exchanges between Local Residents and the U.S. Forces** **Column** For the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), it is imperative to obtain understanding and cooperation from citizens who live near U.S. Forces facilities. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) hosts Japan-U.S. friendship programs every year to promote exchanges between local residents living around USFJ facilities and USFJ personnel and their families through sports and music events as part of initiatives to help deepen the mutual understanding between Japan and the United States. Among the friendship programs held during FY2015, for example, the fourth Misawa Ice Hockey (Hokki) Event took place near Misawa Air Base (Misawa City, Aomori Prefecture). Approximately 160 children making up 16 Japanese and U.S. teams in total deepened exchanges while enjoying “hockey games,” chasing pucks shaped like surf clams (called “hokki gai” in Japanese), which move erratically around skating rinks, and trying to score goals. Near MCAS Iwakuni (Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture), the sixth IWAKUNI Japan-U.S. Exchange Joint Concert was held. Approximately 220 Japanese and U.S. children and students deepened exchanges through joint rehearsals and exchange parties, and in the fi nale, all the performers played in concert and sang in chorus, receiving generous cheers and applause from an audience of approximately 720 people. Since these Japan-U.S. friendship programs have been hugely popular among participants and local residents, the MOD plans to proactively sponsor such programs while obtaining cooperation from local municipalities and the USFJ. Sports Exchange Program (Misawa City) Music Exchange Program (Iwakuni City) The Misawa Ice Hockey (Hokki) Event is a unique Japan-U.S. The IWAKUNI Japan-U.S. Exchange Joint Concert started in 2010 exchange event only seen in Misawa City. The game is designed with the participation of MCAS Iwakuni and elementary schools to compete for points in the style of ice hockey using equipment of Iwakuni City. Subsequently, the wave of exchanges has been designed in the shapes of “garlic” (helmets), “Chinese yam” (sticks) expanding, with the participation of elementary and junior high and “surf clam” (pucks), all of which are the special local products schools in municipalities situated close to MCAS Iwakuni, including of Misawa City. Waki Town (Yamaguchi Prefecture), Suo-Oshima Town (Yamaguchi Prefecture) and Otake City (Hiroshima Prefecture). ----- **Part** ###### III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace **Chapter 1** **Organizations Responsible for** **the Defense of Japan, and Effective** **Deterrence and Handling** **Chapter 2** **Active Promotion of Security** **Cooperation** **Chapter 3** **Measures on Defense Equipment** **and Technology** **Chapter 4** **Interaction with Local Communities** **and Japanese Citizens** ----- **Chapter 1 the Defense of Japan, and** **Effective Deterrence and Handling** **Organization of the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/** **Section 1** **the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)** **1 Organizational Structure Supporting Defense Capability** - 1 Organization of the MOD/SDF equipment administration, support the Minister of Defense in accordance with their respective responsibilities, by providing the Minister of Defense assistant from a policy perspective – namely, to ensure that the affairs under the jurisdiction of the MOD are properly carried out in accordance with laws and regulations in order to accomplish the mission of the MOD. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning the operation of the SDF. The Chief of Joint Staff provides centralized support for the operations of the SDF for the Minister of Defense from a military expert’s perspective. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) acting as the topranking expert advisers to the Minister of Defense regarding these services. In this manner, the MOD has ensured that the support for the Minister from a policy perspective and the support for the Minister from a military expert’s perspective shall be provided in a well-balanced manner like the two wheels of a vehicle, so to speak, in order for the Minister of Defense to appropriately make decisions. This existing concept regarding the support system for the Minister of Defense has been made even more explicit by the Article 12 of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Act, which has been amended to stipulate that the support for the Minister of Defense provided by the Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau as well as the Commissioner of ATLA shall be conducted in cooperation with the support for the Minister by each Chief of Staff, since 2015, when the Act was amended for the establishment of ATLA and the reorganization of Joint Staff etc., as part of an initiative for the MOD reform.[2] To fulfi ll their mission of defending Japan, the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF)[1] consist of various organizations, mainly the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces as armed forces. See>> Fig. III-1-1-1 (Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense); Fig. III-1-1-2 (Outline of the Ministry of Defense) - 2 Systems to Support the Minister of Defense The Minister of Defense is responsible for issues related to the defense of Japan as the head of the MOD, and is in overall charge of the SDF duties in accordance with the provisions of the SDF Act. The Minister is supported by the State Minister of Defense, the Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) and the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense. There are also the Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense, who advise the Minister of Defense, and the Defense Council, which deliberates on basic principles concerning administrative affairs under the Ministry’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, there are the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, who organizes and supervises the administrative affairs of each bureau and organization to support the Minister of Defense, and the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs. Moreover, the Internal Bureau of the MOD, Joint Staff, Ground Staff Offi ce, Maritime Staff Offi ce, Air Staff Offi ce, and the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) as an external bureau have been established in the MOD. The Internal Bureau of the MOD is responsible for basic policy relating to the duties of the SDF. The Director-General of the Minister’s Secretariat and the Directors-General of each Bureau within the Internal Bureau shall, along with the Commissioner of ATLA who is in charge of defense The MOD and the SDF form a single organization for national defense. Whereas the term “Ministry of Defense” refers to the administrative aspects of the organization, which manages and operates the GSDF, ----- Fig. III-1-1-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense Cabinet Prime Minister Minister of Defense National Security Council State Minister of Defense Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to three people) Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (two) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense (Internal bureaus) Cooperative Cooperative Units Organizations (Excluding temporary or special positions.) - 3 Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas The MOD has Regional Defense Bureaus in eight locations across the country (Sapporo City, Sendai City, Saitama City, Yokohama City, Osaka City, Hiroshima City, Fukuoka City, and Kadena Town) as its local branch offi ces in charge of comprehensive defense administration. In addition to implementing measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting bases and inspecting equipment, Regional Defense Bureaus carry out various activities to obtain the understanding and cooperation of both local public entities and local residents toward the MOD/SDF activities. See>> Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1 (Collaboration with Local Communities) **2 Joint Operations System of the Self-Defense Forces** **1** - Outline of Joint Operations System In order to rapidly and effectively fulfi ll the duties of the SDF, the MOD/SDF has adopted the joint operations system in which the GSDF, the MSDF, and the ASDF are operated integrally. The MOD/SDF is making efforts to strengthen the foundation of the joint operations as well as to enhance the functions of the Joint Staff in light of the current security environment. **(1) Role of the Chief of Staff** a. The Chief of Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for SDF operations, and centrally supports the MOD on SDF operations from a military expert’s perspective. The Government has made remarks regarding civilian control and the role of the civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureau during the Diet deliberations on the Amendment Act, stating; “Civilian control means the priority of politics to the military in democratic countries. Civilian control in our country consists of control by the Diet, control by the Cabinet (including the National Security Council), and control within the MOD. Control within the MOD means that the Minister of Defense, a civilian, manages, operates, and controls the SDF. In addition to support from political appointees such as the State Minister of Defense and Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, support from civilian offi cials in the Internal Bureau also plays an important role in aiding the exercise of civilian control by the Minister of Defense. The role of civilian ii ----- |Organization|Outline| |---|---| |GSDF*|❍ Regional Armies • Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer briga • There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ❍ Divisions and Brigades Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others ❍ Central Readiness Force Consisting of an airborne brigade, a helicopter brigade, the Central Readiness Regiment, the Special NBC Weapon Defense Unit| |MSDF*|❍ Self-Defense Fleet • Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing p the Fleet Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations ❍ Regional Districts There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-| |ASDF*|❍ Air Defense Command • Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division • Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ❍ Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including fgi hter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Contro aircraft warning and control units ), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided mis| |National Defense Academy of Japan (Yokosuka, Kanagawa)|❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel ❍ Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master’s d| |National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama)|❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering ❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engine ❍ Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for| |National Institute for Defense Studies (Meguro-ku, Tokyo) *relocated to Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, in August 2016|❍ Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF • Conducts research and compiles data on military history • Educates SDF personnel and other senior officials • Manages books and documents of historical value| |Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|❍ Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes military data • Collects various military intelligence, including signal, imagery and other information acquired by w comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organiz • Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters| |Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)|❍ Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent| |Regional Defense Bureau (eight locations nationwide)|❍ Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, super acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborho of equipment| |Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.)|❍ External organization that integrates and consolidates the departments within the Ministry of Defens and development, etc.| Fig. III-1-1-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense **Organization** **Outline** ❍ Regional Armies - Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and antiaircraft artillery groups) - There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ❍ Divisions and Brigades GSDF* Composed of combat units and logistics support units which support combat units, and others ❍ Central Readiness Force Consisting of an airborne brigade, a helicopter brigade, the Central Readiness Regiment, the Special Operation Group, and the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit ❍ Self-Defense Fleet - Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force MSDF* - Responsible for the defense of sea areas surrounding Japan primarily through mobile operations ❍ Regional Districts There are five regional districts who mainly protect their responsible territories and support the Self-Defense Fleet ❍ Air Defense Command - Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division - Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ASDF* ❍ Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units ), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units and others) National Defense ❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF personnel Academy of Japan ❍ Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master’s or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and (Yokosuka, Kanagawa) postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master’s degree National Defense ❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical personnel, the SDF personnel and engineering personnel who are nurses Medical College ❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers who are public nurses, nurses, and SDF engineering personnel (Tokorozawa, Saitama) ❍ Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine National Institute for ❍ Organization that functions as a “think tank” of the Ministry of Defense Defense Studies - Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF (Meguro-ku, Tokyo) - Conducts research and compiles data on military history *relocated to Shinjuku-ku, - Educates SDF personnel and other senior officials Tokyo, in August 2016 - Manages books and documents of historical value ❍ Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes military data Defense Intelligence - Collects various military intelligence, including signal, imagery and other information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; Headquarters comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organizations within the ministry (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo) - Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance ❍ Organization that inspects overall tasks of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF from an independent position (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo) ❍ Ensures understanding and cooperation of local public organizations, and conducts cost audit, supervision, and inspection related to Regional Defense Bureau acquisition of defense facilities, management, construction, taking measures concerning neighborhood of the base, and procurement (eight locations nationwide) of equipment Acquisition, Technology and ❍ External organization that integrates and consolidates the departments within the Ministry of Defense related to procurement, research Logistics Agency and development, etc. (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, etc.) *See “Location of Principal SDF Units” at the end of the book. b. The Minister’s commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In doing this, the Minister’s commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force[3] is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to respond. **(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, and** **Other Chiefs of Staff** The Joint Staff undertakes functions relating to the operations of the SDF, while the Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Offices undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel affairs, building-up defense capability, and education and training. See>> Fig. III-1-1-3 (Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces) - 2 Strengthening Integrated Operational Functions In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and to make the process swifter, in October 2015, the Bureau of Operational Policy was abolished and some of this Bureau’s functions such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations relating to unit operations were transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to unite affairs concerning actual operations of the units into the Joint Staff. This change has made the Joint Staff assume work that the Internal Bureau had previously conducted, such as external explanations including remarks at the Diet and communication and coordination with related ministries and governmental agencies. Regarding this work, therefore, the Administrative Vice Chief of Joint Staff, a Vice-Chief of Joint Staff level post for civilian officials has been established to conduct external coordination duties etc., taking advantage of the expertise of civilian officials concerning actual operations of the units. In This applies to the case in which a special unit is organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops are placed partly under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure ----- |Minister|Col2| |---|---| ||| |f Defense|| |Col1|Col2|Force provider| |---|---|---| |||| ||Chief of Staff, GSDF Ground Staff Office|Chief of Staff, MSDF Maritime Staff Office| Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, Fig. III-1-1-3 and Air Self-Defense Forces Basic Rule for Joint Operation Prime Minister The Chief of Joint Staff, solely assists the Minister of Defense on SDF operations from a military expert’s viewpoint Minister of Defense The Minister of Defense commands SDF operations through the Chief of Joint Staff The Minister of Defense’s orders to the SDF are executed by the Chief of Joint Staff Responsibilities for affairs other than force operations Responsibilities for force operations (such as human resources, education, training,[1] buildup of defense capabilities) Force user Force provider Defense Intelligence Headquarters Directorate for Joint Intelligence Chief of Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Chief of Staff, Joint Staff GSDF MSDF ASDF Ground Staff Maritime Air Staff Joint Staff Office Staff Office Office Chain of command for operations Chain of command for affairs other than Joint Task Force Commanding General, Commander, Self- Commander, Air operations[2] Commander Army and Others Defense Fleet and Others Defense Command and Others Information Line Coordination Line Mobilization unit Close coordination among the Chiefs of Staff Chief of Joint Staff clearly indicates the integrated policies for rear support and other relevant activities Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF assists in rear support and other activities during operations Notes: 1. The Chief of Joint Staff is responsible for joint training 2. With respect to forces affairs other than operations in regard to the Joint Task Force, command responsibilities of the Defense Minister. addition, the Joint Staff Councilor, a post for civilian offi cials at the level of a division director and department director general has been established and staffed with necessary subordinates to assist the Joint Staff Councilor. - 3 Establishment of Foundation to Enhance the Joint **Operations Structure** communications system that uses advanced communications technology available both within and outside Japan. At the unit level, they are required to create plans to be able to respond to various situations, while at the same time they are also required to maintain conditions to be ready for executing duties through joint training and other means. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF branches are stationed at major command headquarters under normal circumstances, and the number of such staff personnel is increased as necessary. In addition, topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF Headquarter structure, the human resources development, and standardization of equipment will continue to be reviewed, aiming for a more effective joint operations system, and necessary measures will be taken to realize this. **3** **Reform of the Ministry of Defense** and the establishment of operational management that prioritizes the execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization; additionally, in 2009, the establishment of the Defense Council under law, the abolition of the post of the Director of Defense and the establishment of the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense (presently the Special Adviser to the Minister of Defense) were implemented in Within the joint operations structure, communication of accurate commands and prompt information sharing between the units in the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF are crucial. The MOD/SDF is required to maintain a command and control function utilizing an advanced communications network and a system for sharing intelligence in order to strengthen the joint operational foundation. Thus, the MOD/ SDF continues to develop a wide-ranging and fl exible **3** **Reform of the Ministry of Defense** - 1 Background and Direction of the Reform Following the considerations made by the “Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense,” which was held at the Prime Minister’s Offi ce in 2007 in response to the frequent incidence of scandals within the MOD/SDF, the MOD made various initiatives aimed at the MOD reform, including thorough adherence to rules and regulations ----- **(1) Main Initiatives in FY2014** Along with the establishment of permanent posts for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau and new posts for civilian officials in the Joint Staff and the main units of each branch of the SDF, a Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs, who is responsible for the overall coordination of duties such as those related to international affairs, has been established. **(2) Main Initiatives in FY2015** a. Strengthening Integrated Operational Functions ❍ As work related to actual operations have been unified into the Joint Staff, the Bureau of Operational Policy has been abolished, and some of the functions of the Bureau, such as the planning and drafting of laws and regulations related to unit operations have been transferred to the Bureau of Defense Policy ❍ Two new posts for civilian officials – Administrative Vice Chief of Joint Staff (Vice-Chief of Joint Staff-level) and Joint Staff Councilor (department director general/ division director-level) - have been established b. Reorganization of the Internal Bureau, etc. ❍ Due to the reorganization related to the new establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA), the procurement and research and development functions for defense equipment, etc., over which the Bureau of Finance and Equipment, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office had had jurisdiction, have been transferred to the ATLA. The departments in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Staff Offices that had conducted work related to equipment have been consolidated as the Logistics Planning Department ❍ The Strategic Planning Division has been established in the Bureau of Defense Policy in order to strengthen the policyplanning function regarding defense strategies based on mid-to long-term perspectives and new policy issues ❍ The Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning has been established in order to strengthen the defense capacities build-up function c. The Establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency The ATLA has been established as an extra-ministerial organization with the following four objectives, by bringing together and consolidating the departments of the MOD that had been related to equipment procurement, research and development (the Internal Bureau, the respective Staff Offices, the Technical Research and Development Institute, and the Equipment Procurement Office). (1) Implementation of unified project management throughout the life cycle of equipment from a comprehensive perspective; (2) Smooth and prompt reflection of the order to strengthen support for the Minister of Defense and to ensure civilian control thoroughly. Following this, in the “Direction of the MOD Reform” arranged in August 2013 at the “Committee for the Deliberations on the MOD Reform,” established in the MOD in the same year, it was determined that the following full-fledged reform would be undertaken, taking matters specified in previous considerations into account, and considering the following situational changes, such as the increasing severity of the security environment surrounding Japan, recognition of the lessons learned relating to the unit operations in the Great East Japan Earthquake and elsewhere; and the changes in the policy environment, including the establishment of the National Security Council. (1) In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts will be established for uniformed personnel in the Internal Bureau and for civilian officials in each of the Staff Offices and major commands. (2) In order to eliminate defense capabilities build-up based on individual, vertically-divided optimization for each GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and to ensure that build-up is instead conducted based on total optimization, a procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up based on the joint operations. In combination with this, equipment acquisition will be streamlined and optimized by means of management of equipment throughout its life cycle, and also organizational reform will be conducted in order to contribute to the overall optimization of defense capabilities. (3) In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and to make the process swifter, a review of the organization will be conducted so that affairs concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff. (4) Policy-planning functions will be enhanced in response to the rapid increase in international affairs-related work and the establishment of the National Security Council. In addition, public relations capability will also be strengthened. Furthermore, it is also stated as important to establish a series of truly effective reforms by avoiding stagnation and confusion in operations, and seeking changes in the mentality of both civilian officials and uniformed personnel through steady and phased implementation while the Internal Bureau and the Staff Offices equally support the Minister of Defense. - 2 Specific Initiatives In accordance with the “Direction of the MOD Reform,” the following initiatives have been implemented ----- operational needs of the units to the equipment to be procured; (3) Active engagement in new areas (such as further internationalization of defense equipment, investment in cutting edge technology research, etc.); and **Section 2** **Effective Deterrence and Response** In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense architecture. If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond (4) Simultaneously achieving procurement reform while also maintaining and strengthening the foundations of defense production and technology. seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. Therefore, it is important to ensure information superiority[1] through continuous surveillance over a wide region around Japan during peacetime. If a contingency does arise, ensuring maritime superiority[2] and air superiority[3] in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is important to respond effectively and minimize the damage. **1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan** Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The Self-Defense Force (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace during peacetime, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace. - 1 Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace **Surrounding Japan** **(2) Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-** **Defense Forces (SDF)** The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea during peacetime, using P-3C patrol aircraft and other aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and so forth. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the fl exible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, the SDF maintains a defense and security posture so that it can respond quickly to various contingencies in areas surrounding Japan. **(1) Basic Concept** The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. GSDF personnel conducting coast observation MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control system aircraft conducting warning and surveillance To have an advantage over the opponent in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing, and conveying information. Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force. ----- operational needs of the units to the equipment to be procured; (3) Active engagement in new areas (such as further internationalization of defense equipment, investment in cutting edge technology research, etc.); and **Section 2** **Effective Deterrence and Response** In order to respond to a variety of contingencies in a timely and appropriate manner, and to assure the protection of the lives and property of the people as well as territorial land, water and airspace, it is necessary to make efforts to deter the occurrence of a variety of contingencies before they happen by building a comprehensive defense architecture. If a contingency does occur, it is required to respond (4) Simultaneously achieving procurement reform while also maintaining and strengthening the foundations of defense production and technology. seamlessly to the situations as they unfold. Therefore, it is important to ensure information superiority[1] through continuous surveillance over a wide region around Japan during peacetime. If a contingency does arise, ensuring maritime superiority[2] and air superiority[3] in our sea and airspace in a timely manner is important to respond effectively and minimize the damage. **1 Ensuring Security of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan** Japan is comprised of a little over 6,800 islands, and is surrounded by wide sea space, which includes the sixth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world. The Self-Defense Force (SDF) is engaged in persistent intelligence collection and warning and surveillance over Japan’s territorial waters and airspace during peacetime, as well as the surrounding sea and airspace. - 1 Warning and Surveillance in Waters and Airspace **Surrounding Japan** **(2) Response by the Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-** **Defense Forces (SDF)** The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) patrols the waters surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea during peacetime, using P-3C patrol aircraft and other aircraft to monitor the numerous vessels that sail through those waters. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) uses radar sites at 28 locations nationwide, E-2C early warning aircraft, and E-767 early warning and control aircraft, amongst others, to carry out warning and surveillance activities over Japan and its surrounding airspace 24 hours a day. Warning and surveillance activities in major channels are also conducted 24 hours a day by MSDF guard posts, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) coastal surveillance units, and so forth. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are carried out with the fl exible use of destroyers and aircraft as required. Thus, the SDF maintains a defense and security posture so that it can respond quickly to various contingencies in areas surrounding Japan. **(1) Basic Concept** The SDF persistently engages in warning and surveillance activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan during peacetime so that it can respond to various contingencies immediately and seamlessly. GSDF personnel conducting coast observation MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft conducting warning and surveillance ASDF E-767 airborne warning and control system aircraft conducting warning and surveillance To have an advantage over the opponent in terms of quickly and correctly identifying, collecting, processing, and conveying information. Maritime superiority refers to the condition in which one side has a tactical advantage over the opposing force at sea and can carry out maritime operations without suffering substantial damages by the opposing force. ----- Fig. III-1-2-1 Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan Territorial waters (Including inland waters) around HokkaidoSea areas IslandEtrofu Contiguous zone EEZ (Including contiguous zone) E-2C Airborne E-2C Airborne Early Warning AircraftEarly Warning Aircraft P-1 Patrol Aircraft Sea of Japan Takeshima E-767 Airborne WarningE-767 Airborne Warning Joint Staff, etc. and Control System and Control System Hachijo Island P-3C Patrol Aircraft Ogasawara Minami Torishima Islands Destroyer Senkaku Islands East China Sea Ground SDF: Coast observation unit Okidaitojima Air SDF: Radar site Yonagunijima Air SDF: Radar site (BMD response) - Schematic image of a surveillance range. It does not exactly match with the actual range. Okinotorishima - Flow of information Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fujimaru inspecting a P-3C etc. at the MSDF Kanoya Air Base Following September 2012 when the Government of Japan acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands, Chinese government vessels have carried out intermittent intrusion into Japan’s territorial water surrounding the Senkaku Islands.[4] In 2015, there were eight confi rmed incidents of activities by Chinese Navy vessels including passing through the southwestern islands. In addition to these, a Chinese Navy vessel, which participated in a China-Russia joint exercise, navigated into the Bering Sea for the fi rst time Number of Incursions into the Territorial Fig. III-1-2-2 Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Government Ships (Times) 25 **21** 20 **18** 15 **13** **12** **12** **12** **11** **10** **10** 10 5 **3** **3** **2** 0 Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Apr. May-Aug. Sep.-Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. 2013 2014 2015 2016 after circling around Japanese archipelago in September 2015. Not only that, a Chinese Navy reconnaissance vessel sailed near the contiguous zone to the south of the Senkaku Islands in November 2015 as well as the contiguous zone ----- **VOICE** **Defense of the Sea Surrounding Japan** **Column** **JMSDF Naha Naval Base (Naha City, Okinawa Prefecture)** **Lieutenant (MSDF) Hiroya Matsunaga, Air Patrol Squadron 5** I work at the MSDF Air Patrol Squadron 5 located in Naha City, Okinawa Prefecture, as a P-3C fi xed-wing patrol aircraft pilot. The MSDF vessel and aircraft units conduct warning and surveillance activities concerning the situation of ships sailing around Japan night and day and even under normal circumstances. The Air Patrol Squadron 5 is mainly in charge of the southern part of the East China Sea waters, which includes the Senkaku Islands. Not only surface vessels but also underwater submarines are the subjects of our warning and surveillance activities, so we cooperate closely with MSDF destroyers, ASDF airborne warning and control systems, Japan Coast Guard patrol boats, and others in order to maintain the readiness to be able to deal with various events. As our activities have received increasing attention in recent years, every personnel in the unit remains vigilant while working. The P-3C also engages in various missions other than warning and surveillance duties, including disaster relief dispatch. In addition, two P-3C aircraft are always dispatched for counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. I was also deployed to the counter-piracy operations from February to May 2015 as a pilot of the 18th Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement, and engaged in a mission in a sea area with a high possibility of piracy occurrence, whilst cooperating with other foreign dispatched units. While I face my duty, which requires my full attention, every day, I will continue to improve myself and intend to do my duty of national defense as a national guardian “Sakimori” for the pure beautiful sea (Churaumi), thanking my family that supports me. The author boarding a P-3C as a pilot. which is to the south-east of the Bousou Peninsula in December 2015 and February 2016. Furthermore, in June 2016, a Chinese Navy vessel entered the Japan’s contiguous zone to the north of the Senkaku Islands. In the same month, a Chinese Navy reconnaissance vessel also sailed within Japan’s territorial water west of Kuchinoerabujima Island (Kagoshima Prefecture) and then entered the Kitadaitojima Island contiguous zone as well as further carried out a round trip in waters south of the Senkaku Islands. It is anticipated that the areas of activity by Chinese government vessels and Navy vessels will continue to further expand and their activities will become more active. Due to such circumstances, the MOD/SDF is working to strengthen the collaboration with relevant government ministries and agencies, for example by routinely sharing information obtained through warning and surveillance activities with the Japan Coast Guard from peacetime. See>> Fig. III-1-2-1 (Conceptual Image of Warning and Surveillance of the Sea Areas and Airspace Surrounding Japan); Fig. III-1-2-2 (Number of Incursions into the Territorial Waters around the Senkaku Islands by Chinese Government Ships) - 2 Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in **Preparation against Intrusion of Territorial Airspace** F-15 fi ghter scrambling conducted as an act to exercise the right of policing intended to maintain public order. Unlike measures taken on land or at sea, this measure can be taken only by the SDF. Therefore, the ASDF is primarily responsible for conducting the actions based on Article 84 of the SDF Act. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel) **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** The ASDF detects and identifi es aircraft fl ying in the Japanese territorial airspace using warning and control radars, the E-767 early-warning and control aircraft, and E-2C early-warning aircraft. If any suspicious aircraft heading to Japan’s territorial airspace are detected, fi ghters and other aircraft scramble to approach them to confirm **(1) Basic Concept** Under international law, countries have complete and exclusive sovereignty over their airspace. Scrambling against aircraft intruding into territorial airspace is ----- the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that a territorial airspace intrusion occurs, responses such as warning to withdraw will be conducted. In December 2012, a fi xed-wing aircraft (Y-12) of the Chinese State Oceanic Administration intruded into Japan’s territorial airspace in the vicinity of Uotsurijima, which is part of the Senkaku Islands. In September 2015, an incident occurred in which a Russian aircraft (assumed) intruded into Japanese airspace off the coast of the Nemuro peninsula in Hokkaido. Moreover, during the same year, peculiar incidents occurred such as longrange fl ights passing through between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima by Chinese military aircraft and long- range fl ights in Japan’s surrounding airspace. These cases indicate that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China and the Russian Armed Forces have become more active in the area surrounding Japan. In response to these incidents, the ASDF scrambled its fi ghters, and in FY2015 the ASDF aircraft scrambled 873 times.[5] Among these, the number of scrambles against Chinese aircraft counted for 571 times, which was an increase by 107 times in comparison with the previous fi scal year, and marked the highest since 2001, when the breakdown number of scrambles according to the opponents’ nationality and region was published for the fi rst time. Even after the establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone” by China in November 2013, the MOD/SDF has been implementing warning and surveillance activities and the like as before in the |Fig. III-1-2-3|Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War| |---|---| |(Times) 1,000 994433 944 887733 Russia China Taiwan Other countries total 812 810 800 464 567 600 415 571 425 386 400 306 311 299 96 156 220 237 200 158 31 38 359 473 264 247 248 288 193 197 124 0 1984* 1989 1993 1998 2003 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (FY) Note: The peak of the cold war|| |Fig. III-1-2-4|Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded| |---|---| |: Flight paths taken by Chinese aircraft : Flight paths taken by Russian aircraft|| |Fig. III-1-2-5|Air Defense Identif ciation Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries| |---|---| |Northern Japanese territories territorial airspace ROK ADIZ Takeshima East China Sea ADIZ * Senkaku Japan ADIZ Ogasawara Taiwan ADIZ Islands Islands Yonaguni Island *The ROK expanded its ADIZ in December 2013 Philippines ADIZ ADIZ: Air Defence Identification Zone|| ----- East China Sea, including the zone in question, and have continued to take all initiatives necessary to engage in warning and surveillance in both the sea and airspace around Japan. The MOD/SDF also engages in strict airspace anti-intrusion measures in accordance with international law and the SDF Act. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-3 (Number and Breakdown of Scrambles since the Cold War); Fig. III-1-2-4 (Example Flight Patterns of Aircraft to Which Scrambles Responded); Fig. III-1-2-5 (Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) of Japan and those of Neighboring Countries) - 3 Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan’s **Territorial Waters** Joint exercises and training conducted by the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard - 4 Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels **(1) Basic Concept** The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued and the situation will be handled by the SDF in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel) **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** In light of the lessons learned from the cases of an unidentified vessel off the Noto Peninsula in 1999, an unidentified vessel in the sea southwest of Kyushu in 2001, and other similar incidents, the MOD/SDF has strengthened cooperation with other relevant ministries and agencies by conducting joint exercises with the Japan Coast Guard on a regular basis. In particular, the MSDF has been taking the following steps: (1) deployment of guided-missile patrol boats; (2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit[7]; (3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; (4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)[8]; (5) improving the sufficiency ratio of military vessel personnel; and (6) enhancing equipment for the Vessel Boarding Inspection Team. Furthermore, based on the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels” jointly prepared by the Japan Defense Agency (then) and the Japan Coast Guard in 1999, the MSDF also makes an effort to strengthen cooperation between these two organizations. **(1) Basic Concept** With respect to foreign submarines navigating underwater in Japan’s territorial waters,[6] an order for maritime security operations will be issued. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, the SDF will request it to leave Japanese territorial waters. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel) **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** The MSDF is maintaining and enhancing capabilities for: expressing its intention not to permit any navigation that violates international law; and responding in shallow water areas by detecting, identifying, and tracking foreign submarines navigating under the territorial waters of Japan. In November 2004, the MSDF observed a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigating under Japanese territorial waters around the Sakishima Islands. In response to this incident, the MSDF issued an order for maritime security operations, and MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the submarine until it entered the high seas. In May 2013, March 2014, and February 2016, although there was no intrusion into the territorial waters of Japan, the MSDF P-3C etc. observed submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous water zone. Although international law does not forbid foreign submarines navigating underwater in the contiguous zone of coastal states, Japan maintains a posture to appropriately deal with such activities. The term “territorial waters” also includes inland waters. A special unit of the MSDF was newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of vessel boarding inspections under maritime security operations.l ----- **2 Defense of Japan’s Remote Islands** - 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF For defense posture buildup in the southwestern region, in January 2016, the ASDF newly establish the 9th Air Wing following the completion of the relocation of one fi ghter squadron at Naha Air Base so that they have two fi ghter squadrons. The GSDF newly formed the Yonaguni coast observation unit on Yonaguni in March of the same year. Going forward, the GSDF will deploy an area security unit in charge of the initial responses within the remote islands area in the southwestern region, as well as establishing an “Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (provisional name)” equipped with a full function for amphibious operations. In addition, the MSDF will acquire helicopters (SH-60K) and other equipment. Through these initiatives, the MOD/SDF will continue persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and develop an immediate response posture in the case of contingencies. Furthermore, in order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment of units, initiatives are underway to enhance rapid deployment capabilities through: the improvement of Osumi class transport LST (Landing Ship, Tank); overseas research - 1 Basic Concept Japan has a number of remote islands. In order to respond to attacks on these islands, it is important to position units and so forth in accordance with the security environment, and also to detect signs at an early stage through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) conducted by the SDF in peacetime as well as obtaining and securing maritime and air superiority. If signs of attack are detected in advance, troops will be deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be invaded ahead of the deployment of enemy units, and, through the joint operation involving all the SDF forces (the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF), deter and remove enemy attacks. If there is an invasion of the islands, the enemy will be brought under control by ground fi re from aircraft and vessels, and then tactical operations will be implemented to regain the islands by the landing of SDF forces and other initiatives. Furthermore, a precise response will be taken to attacks using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other weapons. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-6 (Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands) Fig. III-1-2-6 Conceptual Image of Defending Japan’s Offshore Islands Overall air defenseOverall air defense Secure and maintain marine superiority and air superiority Aerial refuelingAerial refueling SurfaceSurface vesselsvessels Maritime air supportMaritime air support Anti-surfaceAnti-surface warfarewarfare Strategy to recapture remote islands in the case of an invasion SDF troops will be swiftly deployed and concentrated in an area expected to be attacked ahead of the deployment Close Air SupportClose Air Support of enemy units and they will try to intercept and defeat any invasions. Landing by aircraft Response in the water Landing by amphibious Anti-submarine warfareAnti-submarine warfare vehicle Landing by boat Submarine Enemy submarines ----- The ASDF 9th Air Wing Commander receiving the fl ag of their unit from the State Minister of Defense Wakamiya at the ASDF Naha Air Base GSDF personnel participating in the U.S.-Australia Joint Exercise “Talisman Saber” for the fi rst time MOD/SDF hopes to gain understanding from the local community through providing in-depth explanations.[9] In addition, the SDF conducts various training exercises to improve the joint operation capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also training exercises with the U.S. Forces aimed at establishing mutual coordination procedures. In August 2015, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF participated in a joint exercise held on the western coast of the United States called “Dawn Blitz.” As Japan-U.S. bilateral training exercises overseas (Dawn Blitz 15), they conducted a series of tactical activities related to collaboration with the U.S. Forces, and response to island invasions. The GSDF also annually conducts a fi eld training exercise (Iron Fist) in California with the U.S. Marine Corps. In addition, in July 2015, the GSDF, for the fi rst time, participated in the U.S.-Australia joint exercise (Exercise Talisman Sabre) held in Australia and strives to strengthen amphibious operational capabilities by, for example, carrying out a fi eld training exercise with the U.S. Marines. Western Army Commanding General receiving the fl ag of the Coast Observation Unit from Minister of Defense Nakatani to review the role of multipurpose vessels; and the introduction of V-22 Ospreys. In particular, for the operation of V-22 Ospreys, the MOD determined that the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT was the best airfi eld to be used as the deployment site for V-22 Ospreys due to positional relationships with relevant units in joint operations, the length of the runway, and the geographic environment that can reduce burdens borne by the local community. The **3 Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks** Japan began developing the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in FY2004 to be fully prepared for the response against ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Act in 2005, and in the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor. To date, Japan has steadily built up its own multi-tier defense system against ballistic missile attacks, by such means as installing ballistic missile defense capability to the Aegis-equipped destroyers and deploying the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).[10] In light of the situation that the North Korea has made further progress in overall ballistic missile development, Japan will accelerate its efforts and review concerning the overall enhancement of its capacity to respond to ballistic missiles, while it 9 At the KYUSHU-SAGA International AIRPORT, the ramp, aircraft hangars, etc., are to be developed on the west side of the airport by FY2019. Approximately 70 aircraft, consisting of 17 newly acquired V-22 Ospreys and approximately 50 helicopters transferred from Camp Metabaru are expected to be deployed. 10 The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type of anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly intercepts aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are ----- **y** **Strengthening of the Southwestern Region** **Column** Japan has approximately 6,800 remote islands as part of its territory, of which approximately 1,000 islands are located in the southwestern region and form a vacuum region for SDF unit deployment. Furthermore, considering the recent severe security environment, the MOD and the SDF have reinforced their defense posture in the southwestern region in order to be able to perform an immediate and continuous response when incidents occur. Based on such a defense approach, the MOD established a coast observation unit on Yonaguni Island for the development of a constant monitoring system in the southwestern region in March 2016. In addition, the MOD selected Amamioshima Island, Miyako Island and Ishigaki Island as the locations for the area security unit, which will swiftly deal with emergency situations including disasters when they occur, and is currently conducting a review on this matter with an understanding of the local communities in these locations. **VOICE** **GSDF Camp Yonaguni (Yonaguni-cho, Yaeyama-gun, Okinawa Prefecture),** **Lieutenant Colonel Daigo Shiomitsu, Commanding Offi cer of the Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit and** **Commander of GSDF Camp Yonaguni** In March 2016, the Coast Observation Unit was newly formed on Yonaguni Island, the westernmost point of Japan, after having overcome various issues. The population of Yonaguni Island was originally only about 1,500 people. The local residents offered tremendous support toward conducting the development of the living environment of approximately 250 SDF personnel and their families, which account for nearly 20% of the total population of the island, and accepted them. In addition, Yonaguni Island is in an area where typhoons often pass through. During the preparation period for the coast observation unit, Typhoon No. 21 (maximum gust speed of 81m/s) passed through the vicinity. The deployed unit in the local area conducted activities to support the life of citizens through disaster relief, while at the same time administrative offi cials were the main actor in minimizing the impact of the disaster on the establishment of the new unit in cooperation with contractors. Henceforward, as a pioneer of the newly deployed southwestern unit, everyone in the unit will work on the warning and surveillance of the surrounding area as well as the deterrence and response to various incidents, while continuing to cherish cooperation with the local community. The author saluting at the organizing completion ceremony will continue to conduct studies on the United States’ advanced initiatives and equipments. See>> Reference 44 (History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan) - 1 Japan’s Ballistic Missile Defense launched against Japan as an armed attack, it will be dealt with by issuing a defense operation order for armed attack situations. On the other hand, if ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan, and the situation is not acknowledged as an armed attack, the Minister of Defense can order the SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles with suffi cient consideration taken to carrying out prompt and appropriate response and ensuring civilian control. As a response against ballistic missiles or other objects, the Joint Task Force-BMD is formed, with the Commander of the Air Defense Command serving as its Commander, and various postures for effective defense **(1) Basic Concept** Japan’s BMD is an effective multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis-equipped destroyers and the lower tier by Patriot PAC-3, both interconnected and coordinated by the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE).[11] In case ballistic missiles or other objects[12] are 11 JADGE is a core system for the command and control as well as communication functions. It centrally processes the information regarding aircraft captured by radars installed nationwide, and it provides fi ghters instructions required for scrambling against aircraft intruding into Japanese territorial airspace and air defense combat operations. In addition, it controls Patriot and radar, etc. in responses to ballistic missiles. ----- Fig. III-1-2-7 Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD **Mid-course phase** In this phase, the rocket engine burns out and the missile is flying in outer space (exoatmosphere) inertially **Detection/Discrimination/** **Boost phase** **Tracking** In this phase, the **Terminal phase** rocket engine is This phase covers the burning and part from atmospheric accelerating the re-entry to the impact missile **ASDF** **ASDF Air control and** **Patriot PAC-3** **warning radar** **Ballistic missile** **(FPS-5, FPS-3 Upgraded)** **JADGE (Japan Aerospace Defense** **Ground Environment)** **MSDF Aegis** **BMD destroyer** **Commander, Joint Task Force-BMD** Commander, Air Defense Command are to be taken under a unifi ed command through JADGE. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles. See>> Fig. III-1-2-7 (Build-up and Operational Concept of BMD) **(2) Response by the MOD/SDF** In March 2009, in response to North Korea’s advance notifi cation for an intended launch of an “experimental communication satellite” received through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Minister of Defense issued the “Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles” in accordance with Article 82-3, Paragraph 3 of the SDF Act and deployed destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles to the Sea of Japan and Patriot PAC-3 units in the Tohoku region and the Tokyo Metropolitan area. In addition, in March and December 2012, responding to North Korea’s advance notifi cation for an intended launch of a “satellite,” received through the IMO, the Minister of Defense issued the “Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles” in accordance with Article 82-3, Paragraph 3 of the SDF Act and the MOD/SDF deployed destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles to the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and Patriot PAC-3 units on the islands of Okinawa Prefecture and within the Tokyo metropolitan area, while simultaneously dispatching the GSDF units to the Southwestern Islands in case any debris were to fall from the sky PAC-3 units deployed on Ishigaki Island In response to North Korea’s advance notifi cation for an intended launch of an “earth observation satellite” received on February 2, 2016, through the IMO and the International Civil Aeronautics Organization (ICAO), on February 3 the MOD issued the “Order for Destruction Measures against Ballistic Missiles” in preparation for any unforeseen contingencies. Through this order, the MOD deployed destroyers equipped with SM-3 missiles in both the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, and the PAC-3 units on Ishigaki Island and Miyakojima as well as within the Tokyo Metropolitan area, while the PAC-3 units deployed on the Okinawa main island maintained their readiness at their own bases. The MOD/SDF also took every necessary measure including dispatching the GSDF units to the Southwestern Islands for collecting damage ----- U.S. Forces, and sharing intelligence gathered by assets including transportable BMD radar (TPY-2 radar) and Aegis-equipped destroyers deployed in Japan by the U.S. Forces. Maintenance, enhancement and validation of Japan-U.S. bilateral response capabilities have been actively conducted through training and other activities. Since 2010, BMD exercise has been held between the MSDF and the U.S. Navy, connecting their ships via a network and conducting a simulation of response to ballistic missiles, to improve tactical capabilities and strengthen bilateral coordination. In addition, the JapanU.S.-ROK joint missile defense drill, PACIFIC DRAGON 2016, was conducted in waters off Hawaii in June 2016. See>> Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2-1 (North Korea) - 2 Missile Defense of the United States and Japan**U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation** MSDF Aegis destroyer carrying out SM-3 missiles firing exercises information and consequence management in case any debris were to fall from the sky. With respect to the ballistic missile launch, which was purported to be a “satellite,” on the 7th of the same month, the MOD/SDF transmitted launch information collected from Shared Early Warning (SEW),[13] the various SDF radar units, and other systems to the Prime Minister’s Office and other agencies, while simultaneously carrying out information gathering to identify any damage caused by this incident. On February 8, the Minister of Defense issued the order to terminate “destruction measures against ballistic measures” in order to promptly withdraw the units. North Korea has conducted ballistic missile launches repeatedly since March of the same year as well. The MOD/SDF continues to conduct thoroughgoing intelligence collection as well as warning and surveillance activities while being alert in order to be able to respond to any situations, whilst closely cooperating with the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Further cooperation with the U.S. government including the U.S. Forces in Japan is necessary for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures including constant real-time sharing of BMD operational and relevant information, and the expansion of BMD cooperation have been agreed upon at the JapanU.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting). Furthermore, Japan has closely cooperated with the United States in responding to ballistic missiles, by means such as receiving Shared Early Warning (SEW) from the **(1) Missile Defense of the United States** The United States is developing a multi-tier missile defense system that combines defense systems suited for each of the following phases of the ballistic missile flight path to provide a mutually complementary response: (1) the boost phase, (2) the mid-course phase, and (3) the terminal phase. Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system of the United States has been deployed in our country in a step-by-step manner. Specifically, a TPY-2 radar (so-called “X-band radar”) for BMD has been deployed at the U.S. Shariki Communication Site in 2006, and BMDcapable Aegis ships have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas. In October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 units were deployed in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)[14] was deployed in Aomori Prefecture. Furthermore, the 2nd TPY-2 radar was deployed at the U.S. Kyogamisaki Communication Site in December 2014. **(2) Japan-U.S. BMD Technology Cooperation, etc.** The government commenced a Japan-U.S. cooperative research project on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999. As the result showed good prospects for resolving initial technical challenges, in December 2005, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to start Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an advanced ballistic missile interceptor by using the results of the project as a technical basis. The joint development started in June 2006 with a view to expanding the coverage of 13 Information on the area and time of launch, the projected area and time, where and when objects fall relating to ballistic missiles launched in the direction of Japan, which is analyzed and conveyed to the SDF by the U.S. Forces in a short period of time after the launch. (The SDF started to receive the information since April 1996.) ----- protection and dealing with future threats posed by increasingly advanced and diverse ballistic missiles attacks, and it is aimed to be completed by around 2017. With regard to the Japan-U.S. cooperative development, it is necessary to export BMD related arms from Japan to the United States. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary’s statement issued in December 2004, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply to the BMD system and related matters under the condition that strict controls are maintained. Based on these circumstances, it was decided that the prior consent of Japan could be given to the third party transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA under certain **4 Response to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others** In Japan where most of the towns and cities are highly urbanized, even small-scale infi ltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat against the country’s peace and security. These cases refer to various mode and forms including illegal activities by infi ltrated foreign armed agents[16] etc., and sabotage carried out by foreign guerillas or special forces, which can be deemed as an armed attack against Japan. conditions.[15] This decision was formally announced in the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2 Meeting) in June 2011. The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology (Three Principles) received Cabinet approval in April 2014. However, with regard to exceptional measures instigated before the Three Principles were decided, overseas transfers will continue to be organized in the guidelines for the principles as allowable under the Three Principles. See>> Reference 68 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) of assistance such as transportation of police offi cers and provision of equipment to the police force will be carried out. If the case cannot be dealt with by the general police force, then public security operations by the SDF will be implemented. Furthermore, if it has been confi rmed that an armed attack is being carried out against Japan, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order. See>> Fig. III-1-2-8 (Responses to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others) - 1 Basic Concept In the stage where the actual situation of intruders and the details of the ongoing case are not clear, the police primarily respond to the situation, while the MOD/SDF will collect relevant information and reinforce the security of the SDF facilities. When the situation is clearer and can be dealt with by the general police force, various forms - 2 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special **Operations Forces** Typical forms of attacks by guerrillas or special forces include the destruction of critical private infrastructure and other facilities, attacks against people, and assassinations of dignitaries. In the event that an armed attack is carried Fig. III-1-2-8 Responses to Attacks by Guerillas, Special Operations Forces and Others When police forces can deal with the case H Strengthening security at the SDF facilities H Transportation of police officers and provision of various materials and equipment to the police, as necessary In the situation where details of intruders or incident are not clear When police forces cannot deal with the case The police will respond H Strengthening security at the SDF facilities H Transportation of police officers and provision of various materials (Actions to be taken by the SDF) and equipment to the police, as necessary H Grasping the situation H Conducting intelligence gathering prior to the issuance of a public H Strengthening the security of security oparations order as necessary the SDF facilities H Response through public security operations H Transportation of police personne and provision of various materials and equipment to the police When the case is deemed an armed attack situation H Responce under / a defense operation order 15 This refers to the case where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has suffi cient policies to prevent the further transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA.i ----- Fig. III-1-2-9 Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces Patrol helicopter Enemy aircraft Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Search and destruction Observation helicopter Reconnaissance aircraft at sea by MSDF and ASDF Guerillas and Destroyer Enemy Submarine special forces landing submarine Depot ship Base for underwater vehicles used in landing operations Underwater scooters used Search and Warning and in landing operations destruction at surveillance the water’s edge Light armored Protection of Air vehicle Reconnaissance important facilities defense unit Search and Mobile Combat destruction in Fighting helicopter Vehicles Short range Tanks Obstacle mountainous areas Infantry unit surface-to-air missiles Multipurpose Base Search and helicopter destruction in urban areas Shovel car Tank Tank Bulldozer Mortar Consequence Infantry unit management Wheeled armored vehicle Base Leading local residents for evacuation, etc. Police NBC attack NBC Artillery reconnaissance vehicle Rescuing hostage Special operations unit Mortar Decontamination vehicle out against Japan by guerillas or special forces, the SDF will respond under a defense operation order. In dealing with attacks by guerrillas or special forces, the MOD/SDF responds with a particular emphasis on the establishment of a relevant information gathering posture, warning and surveillance to prevent invasions in coastal areas, protection of key facilities, and search and destroy of invading guerrillas or special forces. Efforts will be made for early detection of attacks and indications through warning and surveillance, and, as required, the SDF units will be deployed to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants and necessary posture for protection will be established at an early stage. Based on this, in the event of an infi ltration of our territory by guerrillas or special operations forces, they will be searched for and detected by reconnaissance units, aviation units and others and combat units will be promptly deployed to besiege and capture or to destroy them. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-9 (Example of Operations against the Attacks by Guerillas and Special Forces) - 3 Response to Armed Agents **(1) Basic Concept** While the police assumes primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments. When this happens, the SDF cooperates with the police force. Accordingly, with regard to public security operations of the SDF, the Basic Agreement[17] concerning cooperation procedures between the SDF and the police, as well as local agreements between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces, have been concluded.[18] **(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives** The GSDF continues to conduct exercises nationwide with the prefectural police of each prefecture and has been strengthening such collaboration by, for example, conducting fi eld exercises at nuclear power plants throughout the country since 2012.[19] Furthermore, combined exercises in dealing with suspicious vessels are also continuously conducted between the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard. 17 The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations, which was concluded between the then Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission (concluded in 1954 and fully revised in 2000). 18 In 2004, guidelines were jointly formulated between the National Police Agency and the Defense Agency concerning dealing jointly with public security operations in the event of armed agent incidents. 19 The GSDF also conducted exercises at Ikata Nuclear Power Plant (Ehime Prefecture) in 2012, at Tomari Nuclear Power Plant (Hokkaido) and Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui Prefecture) in 2013, at Shimane Nuclear Power Plant (Shimane Prefecture) in 2014, and at Higashidori Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori Prefecture) and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Niigata Prefecture) in 2015. ----- GSDF personnel conducting joint training with the Fukuoka Prefectural Police GSDF personnel conducting decontamination training when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF will cooperate with relevant organizations in information gathering concerning the extent of the damage, decontamination activities, transportation of the sick and injured, and medical activities through disaster relief dispatches and civil protection dispatches. **(2) The MOD/SDF Initiatives** The MOD/SDF possesses and maintains the GSDF Central Nuclear Biological Chemical (NBC) Weapon Defense Unit and the Countermeasure Medical Unit as well as increasing the number of chemical and medical protection unit personnel, in order to improve the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of extraordinary disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and the ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases. - 4 **Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons** In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapon proliferation, which can cause indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area, and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and countries under suspicion of proliferating such weapons. The sarin gas attack[20] on the Tokyo subway in 1995 is one of the examples of an incident in which these weapons were used. **(1) Basic Concept** In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will conduct defense operations to repel the armed attack and rescue victims. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed group and rescue victims in cooperation with related agencies. Furthermore, **5 Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security** - 1 Basic Approach by the Government by conducting bilateral/multilateral joint exercises related to maritime security. In addition, it is stated that Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities. The new Basic Plan on Ocean Policy,[21] which was given Cabinet approval in April 2013, states the following The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” and will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including counter-piracy operations, ensuring safe maritime transport and promoting cooperation with other countries 20 An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people (this number refers to the number of deaths indicated in the judgment rendered to Chizuo Matsumoto (commonly known as Shoko Asahara, a guru of Aum Shinrikyo)). The SDF conducted decontamination operations on the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics. 21 Based on changes in the situation regarding the ocean, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy specifi es the following targets for Japan as an oceanic state and has set out initiatives to be pursued intensively: (1) international cooperation and contribution to the international community, (2) wealth and prosperity through ocean development and use, (3) shift from a country protected by the ocean to a country that ----- **VOICE** **The SDF Defends a Remote Island Near the National Border** **Column** **GSDF Camp Tsushima (Tsushima City, Nagasaki Prefecture),** **Colonel Katsuya Mitsuzuka, Commanding Offi cer of Tsushima Area Security Force and Commander of GSDF Camp Tsushima** Tsushima is an island with its population of approximately 32,000 people located in the area north of Kyushu, which spreads about 80km from north to south, and about 20km from east to west. It can also be described as an island near the national borders in that on a day of clear air we can overlook Busan of the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is located approximately 50km north of the north end of the island. In Tsushima, three SDF forces are deployed, which are the GSDF Tsushima Area Security Force, the MSDF Tsushima Coastal Defense Group, and the ASDF 19th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron. These three SDF forces carry out their defense missions in Tsushima and its surrounding area such as warning and surveillance in the surrounding waters and airspace on a round-the-clock basis and in responses to frequently occurring disasters, as they mutually and closely collaborate as well as cooperate by regularly conducting trilateral SDF forces meetings and joint exercises. Partly due to the historical background that the “Sakimori” in ancient Japan (soldiers garrisoned at the border areas), the medieval samurai and the military personnel in the early modern period have been protecting Tsushima together with the islanders, the understanding of the Tsushima islanders including cooperation groups about the SDF activities is high. We also strive to maintain good relationships with them through actively supporting local events and participating in various meetings and competitions. In addition, we deepen exchanges with relevant organizations such as the police and coast guard offi ces on a regular basis to share information related to the security and safety of the area. In this sense, it is no exaggeration to say that the entire island functions as a “Sakimori of the border.” We, the three SDF forces, will continue to be aware of our great responsibility of working at the forefront of the border, and will make out best effort in conducting day-to-day training and performing our missions whilst cooperating with the islanders and other relevant organizations. GSDF Camp Tsushima Commander’s Cup Boys Kendo Tournament Overlooking Busan, ROK, across the sea. ASDF Unishima Sub Base initiatives for ensuring the security of the oceans: reinforcement of the wide-area continuous surveillance system; programmed improvement of warships, aircraft and other vehicles; strengthening of the system of collaboration between the SDF and Japan Coast Guard; and development of a system of collaboration to ensure order and safety on the coasts and isolated islands. In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that in order to contribute to the creation and development of order on the ocean, it will make use of fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences to contribute to international rules- and consensus-building. - 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF MOD/SDF promotes various kinds of initiatives such as implementing counter-piracy activities, providing capacity building assistance to coastal countries, and enhancing joint training and exercises using a variety of opportunities. Within the framework of the Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (WPNS), the MSDF has been actively engaged in and cooperating with initiatives such as the establishment of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES),[22] which was adopted at the 14th meeting in April 2014. In October of the same year, the sixth Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum hosted by the MOD took place and participants agreed to further strengthen cooperation in each fi eld such as discussion of the establishment of a hotline in preparation for unforeseen In order to maintain the order of “Open and Stable Seas” and to ensure the safety of maritime transport, the 22 This specifi es the procedures for ensuring safety, communications methods and other factors when there are unplanned encounters at sea by naval ships and naval aircraft of the participating nations in the i ----- consequences and the promotion of capacity building assistance by the MSDF. In addition, in relation to China, consultation meetings have been held between the defense authorities of both countries towards the commencement of early implementation of the maritime and air communication mechanism in order to avoid and prevent unexpected situations. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-4 (Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2 (Ensuring Maritime Security) **6 Responses in Space** For Japan whose defense force is built in line with the basic principles of maintaining and exclusively defense oriented policy, the use of space, which does not belong to any territories of any nations and which is not subject to the constraints of conditions such as the surface of the terrain, is extremely important when: collecting information to perceive signs of various incidents in advance and strengthening the surveillance activities in its surrounding seas and airspace; ensuring means of communication by the SDF in their international peace cooperation activities and other activities. Chief of Staff of the MSDF Takei (right) participating in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and strengthening of space industry and scientifi c/ technological bases. - 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF The use of space is extremely important for the MOD/ SDF to conduct a range of tasks effectively and effi ciently. Thus, the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) stipulates that the MOD/SDF ensures the effective and stable use of space by strengthening information collection capabilities using satellites, reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, and enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as Space Situational Awareness (SSA). In August 2014, the MOD revised the “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space,” which was formulated in 2008, refl ecting to the formulation of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and NDPG in 2013. Also, from the perspective of further promoting cooperation in the space fi eld between the defense authorities in Japan and the United States, the two countries established the “Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG)”in April 2015 and held the fi rst and the second meetings in October 2015 and February 2016, respectively. The SCWG will continue to further promote reviews in broader fi elds such as: (1) promotion of policyrelated consultation regarding space, (2) closer information sharing, (3) cooperation for nurturing and securing experts, (4) implementation of tabletop exercises. - 1 The Whole-of-Government Approach The Offi ce of National Space Policy[23] established in the Cabinet Offi ce in July 2012 engages in the planning, drafting, coordinating, and other policy matters relating to the government’s development and use of space. In light of the environmental changes surrounding space policy and the new security policies stated in the NSS that was approved by the Cabinet in 2013, the Basic Plan on Space Policy was decided upon in the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development established within the Cabinet in January 2015. This Basic Plan was prepared as a 10-year development plan focusing on the next approximately 20 years to improve predictability of industries’ investments, and strengthen the industrial base, and has the following goals: (1) Ensuring space security; (2) Promoting the use of space in the civilian sector; and (3) Maintaining **7 Response to Cyber Attacks** Information and communications technology has developed an essential infrastructure for socioeconomic activities. On and been rapidly and widely adopted. As a result, it is now the other hand, there is a possibility that people’s life and ----- economic activities will be severely affected if the computer systems or networks fail. The same is true of both the MOD/ SDF. If the critical functions of the SDF are intercepted by a cyber attack, there is a possibility that problems that threaten the core of Japan’s defense may arise. With regard to cyber attacks, the number of cases recognized as threats to Japanese governmental organizations and agencies in FY2014 reached approximately 3,990,000, and these threats have become increasingly serious.[24] - 1 The Whole-of-Government Approach and **Other Initiatives** - 2 Initiatives of the MOD/SDF **(1) Contribution to the Whole-of-Government Approach** Along with the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MOD, as one of the five government agencies that cooperate particularly closely with the NISC, participates in cyber attack response training and personnel exchanges, and provides information about cyber attacks, etc. to the cross-sector initiatives led by the NISC as well as sending personnel to the CYMAT. **(2) Unique Initiatives by the MOD/SDF** As unique initiatives by the MOD/SDF, the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command is monitoring MOD/SDF communications networks around the clock. In addition, the MOD/SDF is engaged in holistic measures including the introduction of intrusion prevention systems in order to increase the safety of information and communication systems, development of defense systems such as the security and analysis device for cyber defense, enactment of regulations,[26] stipulating postures and procedures for responding to cyber attacks, and improving the human resources and technological bases, as well as conducting research on cutting-edge technology. The Cyber Policy Review Committee, chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, was established in February 2013. The committee is conducting integrated deliberations regarding cooperation with other countries and relevant organizations, training and securing personnel capable of responding to cyber attacks, cooperation with the defense industry, and In light of such incidents as the cyber attacks on defense industry companies reported in 2011, the National Information Security Center (NISC) has established the Cyber Incident Mobile Assistance Team (CYMAT) to provide agile support, forming partnerships among ministries and agencies. In order to deal with the increasing threat to cyber security, in November 2014, the Cyber Security Basic Act was enacted. The Act aims to contribute to the security of Japan by clarifying the basic principles of Japan’s cyber security measures and the responsibilities of local governments, as well as by comprehensively and effectively promoting the measures regarding cyber security. In response to this, in January 2015, the Cyber Security Strategic Headquarters was established in the Cabinet and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cyber Security (NISC)[25] was established in the Cabinet Secretariat. The NISC is responsible for planning and promotion of cyber security-related policies and serves as the control tower in taking measures and responding to significant cyber security incidents in government organizations and agencies, as well as critical infrastructures. Furthermore, in September 2015, the Cyber Security Strategy was formulated for the comprehensive and effective promotion of measures pertaining to cyber security, with the aims: to create and develop free, fair and safe cyber space; to enhance the vitality of the economy and society and realize their sustainable development; to realize society in which citizens can live safely and with peace of mind; to contribute to peace and stability of the international communities as well as the security of Japan. Personnel working at the Cyber Defense Group 24 Cybersecurity Annual Report 2014 (submitted at the “Information Security Policy Council” on July 23, 2015). 25 With the enactment of the Cyber Security Basic Act in January 2015, the name of the organization was changed from the National Information Security Center (NISC) to the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). ----- Fig. III-1-2-10 MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks 2) Responses by special units to cyber attacks - 24-hour monitoring of networks and information systems as well as advanced measures against cyber attacks (virus analysis) by the Cyber 3) Development of a response posture to Defense Group (Joint Staff), System Protection Unit (GSDF), Communication cyber attacks 1) Ensuring safety of information Security Group (MSDF), and Computer Security Evaluation Squadron (ASDF) - Establishment of security measures criteria systems of information systems - Introduction of firewall and virus detection - Establishment of security measures with software which MOD/SDF staff should comply - Separate the network into the Defense - Development of response posture at the Information Infrastructure (DII) open system time of cyber attack occurrence and close system - Establishment of the Cyber Policy Review - Implementation of system audit, etc. Committee Internet DII opennetwork Comprehensive Defensive The Six Pillars of DII closed network Measures against Cyber Attacks 4) Research of cutting-edge technology 6) Coordination with other organizations and agencies - Research on technology to develop the cyber training environnent - Information sharing with the National center of Incident Cyber Training Environment readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity, the U.S. Armed Simulated attacks Simulated environment Forces, and other relevant nations 5) Development of human resources Defense - For the purpose of human resources development, implementing studying abroad programs at organizations affiliated with Carnegie Mellon University and studying programs at graduate schools in Japan, Control and evaluation as well as education at professional courses at the SDF Research - For the purpose of fostering security awareness, offering education at - Allows for counter-cyber attack workplace and professional education at the National Defense Academy training in a simulated environment responses to supply chain risks.[27] In March 2014, a “Cyber Defense Group” was established under the SDF C4 (Command, Control, Communication & Computers) Systems Command, in order to appropriately deal with the threat posed by cyber attacks, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complicated, and the relevant systems were enhanced and strengthened. In addition, in March 2015, cyber information gathering devices were installed to aid the prevention of attacks by the early detection of cyber attack indications. Going forward, the necessary systems are also scheduled to be developed, such as the development of a cyber training environment in which the SDF units can conduct more practical trainings. See>> Fig. III-1-2-10 (MOD/SDF Comprehensive Measures to Deal with Cyber Attacks) **(3) Cooperation with the United States** Since comprehensive defense cooperation, including joint response, between Japan and its ally the United States is vital, the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG) was set up as a framework between the defense authorities of Japan and the United States. Under this framework, meetings have been held four times to discuss the following topics: (1) promotion of policy discussions regarding cyber issues, (2) closer sharing of information, (3) promotion of joint exercises incorporating response to cyber attacks, and (4) matters such as cooperation for training and maintaining experts. In May 2015, a joint declaration on the specifi c future direction of the cooperation between the two countries was announced. In addition, through participation in the “JapanU.S. Cyber Dialogue,” a whole-of-government approach by both nations, holding of the “Japan-U.S. IT Forum,” a framework between the defense authorities that has been discussed repeatedly since 2002, and dispatching liaison offi cers to the U.S. Army’s cyber educational institution, Japan’s cooperation with the United States is to be further strengthened. **(4) Cooperation with Other Countries etc.** In addition to the IT Forum held between the defense authorities of Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia, cyber dialogues are also being held between the authorities of the United Kingdom, NATO, Estonia, the Republic of Korea and others, in order to exchange views on threat awareness and relevant initiatives taken by each country. In April 2015, Japan participated in a cyber defense 27 Supply chain risks refers to the risks that malicious software (malware), including computer viruses, may be inserted in the components of equipment during the design, manufacturing, procuring, or installation ----- exercise (Locked Shields) organized by the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) based in Estonia, and in November of the same year participated in another cyber defense exercise (Cyber Coalition) hosted by NATO as an observer. Japan intends to strengthen international cooperation in the cyber fi eld through continuous and active participation in these cyber defense **8 Response to Large-Scale Disasters** When disasters such as natural disasters occur, the SDF works in collaboration with municipal governments, engaging in various activities such as the search and rescue of disaster victims or missing ships or aircraft, controlling fl oods, offering medical treatment, preventing epidemics, supplying water, and transporting personnel and goods. exercises and other similar opportunities. In July 2013, the “Cyber Defense Council” (CDC) was set up, and its core members consist of around ten companies in the defense industry with a strong interest in cyber security. Efforts are being made to improve capacities to counter cyber attacks by the MOD/SDF, and the defense industry, through joint exercise and other initiatives. - 2 Response of the MOD/SDF **(1) Response to Natural Disasters** a. Disaster Dispatch relating to the Support to Re-Searches for Missing Persons on Mount Ontake With respect to the volcanic eruption occurred on Mount Ontake on September 27, 2014, the SDF, in response to the request for disaster relief dispatch from the Governor of Nagano Prefecture, conducted lifesaving operations and searches for missing persons. On July 3, 2015, responding to the request for disaster relief dispatch relating to support for re-searches from the Governor of Nagano who decided to conduct re-searches for missing persons, the SDF assisted the re-searches of missing persons by airlifting personnel from the police and fi re department as well as goods. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 1,160 personnel, 210 vehicles, and 48 aircraft. b. Disaster Relief Dispatch to the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in September 2015 On September 10, 2015, a heavy rain emergency warning was issued in Ibaraki Prefecture and the overfl owing from the Kinugawa River occurred, and fl ood occurrence information was also issued. Responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Ibaraki Prefecture, the SDF conducted rescue operations of isolated individuals, evacuation assistance using boats, fl ood control activities using sandbags, water supply activity, bathing assistance, and epidemic control operations. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 7,540 personnel, 2,150 vehicles, 180 boats, and 105 aircraft. On the same day, a heavy rain emergency warning was issued also in Tochigi Prefecture. Although the warning was withdrawn on the following day, the SDF carried out rescue operations of isolated individuals in - 1 Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches In principle, disaster relief dispatch is conducted as follows; prefectural governors or other offi cials ask the Minister of Defense, or an offi cer designated by the Minister, to dispatch the SDF units, etc. in the event of natural disaster; and then the minister or the designated offi cer will conduct the dispatch if it is deemed to be necessary for responding to the disaster.[28] This is because the course of action considered to be most appropriate is that prefectural governors and other offi cials grasp the overall conditions of the disaster and their own disaster relief capabilities fi rst, and then decide whether to make a request for the SDF disaster relief dispatch. However, when a warning declaration is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes[29] or a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation is issued based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon the request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister). The SDF has put in place arrangements for an initial response to ensure that disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. This is called “FAST-Force.” See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Fig. III-1-2-11 (Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal); Fig. III-1-2-12 (State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard)) 28 The Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Headquarters, and the Director of the Airport Administrative Offi ce may request a disaster relief dispatch. With regard to disaster relief dispatch, earthquake prevention dispatch, and nuclear disaster relief dispatch, (1) SDF personnel ordered for the dispatch may exercise authority based on the SDF Act; (2) SDF Reserve Personnel and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of disaster relief dispatch, and SDF Ready Personnel in the event of earthquake prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster relief dispatch; and (3) special units may be temporarily formed as necessary. 29 The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency ----- |Col1|Call up in such cases as disasters SDF ready reserve personnel SDF reserve personnel| |---|---| |Disaster relief operations|| |Fig. III-1-2-12|State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard)| |---|---| |Common to All The state of readiness with which SDF troops can begin gathering information immediately after an earthquake of seismic intensity five or greater occurs. FAST Force (GSDF) First response units throughout Japan (about 3,900 personnel, about 1,100 vehicles, and about 40 aircraft) are on standby around- the-clock and will be deployed in an hour (standard) upon receiving an order as a standard procedure. Various units including helicopters (video transmission), chemical protection, and bomb disposal are on standby in each regional army. FAST Force (MSDF) Vessels on standby: Designate one initial response vessel in each regional district Aircraft on standby (about 20 aircraft): Deploy in 15 minutes to two hours in each base FAST Force (ASDF) Standby for scrambling against intrusions into airspace Standby for aircraft rescue and emergency transport duties (about 20 aircraft): Deploy within 15 minutes to two hours in each base *When an earthquake of seismic intensity five or greater occurs, standby aircraft are diverted into information collecting|| Fig. III-1-2-11 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal Outbreak of a disaster In case of particular urgency with no time to wait for a request from prefectural governors Demand a request from the prefectural governor - Prefectural governors Request for withdrawal - Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard - Director General of the Regional Coast Guard Municipal mayor Headquarters 1) Procedure for request - Director of the Airport Administrative Office Direct notification - Normally requested in written (when demanding a request is not possible) Request for dispatch form - Requested verbally or by The Minister of Defense or the individuals designated by the Minister telegram or telephone in case of emergency (a written Order to dispatch Order to dispatch Call up[1] request should later follow) 2) Content of request Dispatch of units Dispatch of units Call up in such cases as - Conditions of the disaster and (discretionary dispatch) disasters reasons for the request SDF ready reserve - Desired duration for dispatch personnel - Desired area for dispatch SDF reserve personnel and desired activities - Other items for reference Disaster relief operations - Disbandment of call up[2] - Order for withdrawal Disbandment of call up[2] Withdrawal of units Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be called on by the Minister of Defense as necessary with the approval of the Prime Minister. 2. Disbandment of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel must be done by the Minister of Defense. response to the request from the Governor of Tochigi Prefecture for disaster relief dispatch received on the 11th since some areas in Nikko City were isolated by the heavy rain. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 70 personnel, 15 vehicles, and 5 aircraft. Furthermore, another heavy rain emergency warning was issued on the 11th in Miyagi Prefecture. As the heavy rain caused overflowing from part of the Yoshida River and flood occurrence information was also issued. Due to the floodwater, some areas became isolated, and the SDF conducted rescue operations of the isolated individuals responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Miyagi Prefecture. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 190 personnel, 40 vehicles, 7 aircraft, and 37 boats. Rescue activities through disaster relief dispatch relating to the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster in September 2015 c. Disaster Relief Dispatch to Water Supply Assistance in Heavy Snow Conditions Due to the impact of the record cold wave from January 23 to 25, 2016, water outage occurred throughout Japan. In response to the requests for disaster relief dispatch from the Governors of Shimane Hiroshima Fukuoka Saga ----- Nagasaki, Oita, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Prefectures, the SDF conducted water supply assistance in 29 cities within the eight prefectures to provide approximately 1,280 tons of water in einght days from January 25 to February 1 of the same year. The scale of this disaster relief dispatch was approximately 1,860 personnel and 340 vehicles including water trailers. d. Disaster Relief Dispatch to the Kumamoto Earthquake Disaster in 2016 On April 14, 2016, an earthquake with an epicenter in the Kumamoto region in Kumamoto Prefecture (M6.5) occurred. Responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, the SDF conducted lifesaving operations and livelihood support for the victims (transportation of goods, provision of food and water, bathing assistance, etc.). Moreover, on April 16 of the same year, another earthquake with an epicenter in the Kumamoto region in Kumamoto Prefecture (M7.3) occurred. The SDF, responding to the disaster relief dispatch request from the Governor of Oita Prefecture in addition to that from the Governor of Kumamoto Prefecture, formed a joint task force with the Commanding General of the Western Army Headquarters as its commander on the same day and carried out lifesaving operations and livelihood support activities by deploying the maximum of nearly 26,000 personnel. This disaster relief dispatch ended on May 30, 2016, and its scale came to be approximately 814,000 personnel, 2,600 aircraft, and 300 vessels. The SDF carried out in full force the following livelihood support activities for the victims: (1) transportation of goods – 227 places; (2) meal providing assistance – 49 places; (3) water supply assistance – 147 places; (4) bathing assistance – 25 places; (5) medical assistance – 9 places at the maximum. Considering the fact that the Kumamoto Earthquake caused an enormous damage to the affected areas, Ready Reserve Personnel were gathered for the second time since the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and the maximum of approximately 160 of them engaged in the livelihood assistance activities from April 23 through to May 2. Also from April 23 to May 29, as part of the initiative taken by the government’s Team in Charge of Assisting the Lives of Disaster Victims the private ship, Hakuo, which is on contract to make use of the PFI Act,[30] was used as a refreshment facility for the victims at the Yatsushiro Port in Kumamoto Prefecture, and the services including its use as an accommodation for one night/two days, meals, and bathing were provided for 17 times in total for approximately 2,600 people. Furthermore, the U.S. Forces in Japan provided the following assistance: (1) transportation of SDF personnel and SDF vehicles to Kumamoto Airport using C-130, (2) transportation of SDF personnel to Kumamoto Airport using UC-35, and (3) transportation of aid goods to the disaster affected areas using the MV-22 Osprey, while the ROK Forces provided instant rice packs, drinking water, blankets and tents using two C-130 aircraft. See>> Reference 46 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)); Fig. III-1-2-13 (Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2015)) |Description|Number of dispatches|Total number of personnel|Total number of vehicles|Total number of aircraft|Total number of vessels| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters|13|21,293|3,689|288|0| |Transporting emergency patients|419|2,209|2|457|0| |Search and rescue|22|1,092|180|37|2| |Assisting firefighting|61|2,164|166|71|0| |Other|26|3,277|1,133|35|0| |Total|541|30,035|5,170|888|2| |Fig. III-1-2-13|Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2015)| |---|---| |Total Total Total Total Number of Description number of number of number of number of dispatches personnel vehicles aircraft vessels Responses to storm, flood, and 13 21,293 3,689 288 0 earthquake disasters Transporting emergency 419 2,209 2 457 0 patients Search and 22 1,092 180 37 2 rescue Assisting 61 2,164 166 71 0 firefighting Other 26 3,277 1,133 35 0 Total 541 30,035 5,170 888 2|| **(2) Transportation of Emergency Patients** The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2015, out of a total of 541 cases of disaster relief operation dispatch, 419 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients, with dispatches to remote islands such as the Southwestern Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Ogasawara Islands (Tokyo), and remote islands of Nagasaki Prefecture representing the majority of such cases. In addition, the SDF carries out sea rescues upon requests by the japan Coast Guard in such occasions as transport of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland where the aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range; emergencies of vessels due to incidents such as fire, flooding or capsizing. Furthermore, the SDF conducts wide-area medical transport operations for serious-case patients, by C-130H transport aircraft, utilizing its mobile medical units in certain occasions. Furthermore, in FY2015, the SDF carried out 61 dispatches of firefighting support, with 55 cases responding to fire in the areas near SDF facilities. ----- **VOICE** **Disaster Relief Dispatch related to the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster** **Column** **in September 2015** **GSDF Camp Kitautsunomiya (Utsunomiya City, Tochigi Prefecture)** **Major (GSDF) Yasunari Matsushita, Leader of the 1st Aviation, 12th Helicopter Unit** I joined the disaster relief dispatch for the Kanto-Tohoku Heavy Rainfall Disaster as an aviation pilot of UH-60JA. On September 10, the day when the disaster occurred, I was given a reconnaissance mission and was heading to the affected area. On the way to the destination, I received an order, “Perform a rescue operation, not a reconnaissance mission,” from our leader who perceived the need for rescue activities. Actually, when I arrived at the outburst site of the Kinugawa River, there was an unimaginable severe scene unfolding in the area. A man clinging to an electric pole and calling for help was the fi rst thing I saw, followed by a boy waving a yellow towel from the balcony of the fi rst fl oor of a house with a brown roof. After that, I also confi rmed a couple holding a dog on the top of a building, and parents and children who were desperately seeking help from a white two-story house. Each of these cases was an emergency but we had to prioritize them for a rescue operation. So, we focused on one house, which was a brown house and the ground fl oor part had pillars, which were bent and jiggling, and without hesitation, we decided to rescue the people in that house fi rst. While considering the possibility that the house might be washed away whilst rescuing and shouldering the pressure that we should never cause an aviation accident, we managed to successfully rescue a family of four including the boy above from the house immediately before it was swept up by the water, based on the sense of responsibility that “we the SDF is the last resort” as the driving force. Following this, we rescued the remaining people who required our help. I believe that our success in protecting the lives of the people in this country resulted from the right judgment at the scene of the disaster and also from the fact that all of the crews bravely made efforts to perform the rescue mission working together. This made me realize that the steady training in our daily life would inevitably pay off. At the same time, this came as a fresh reminder of the necessity of readiness and training in preparation for various events and situations. UH-60JA and the author A scene of rescuing using a hoist Additionally, the SDF also conducts aerial fi refi ghting activities in locations such as mountain and forest areas where fi refi ghting conditions are severe. **(3) The MOD/SDF Response to Nuclear Disaster** In order to respond to nuclear disasters, the MOD/SDF has formulated “The SDF Nuclear Disaster Response Plan.” The SDF also participates general nuclear disaster prevention drills jointly implemented by the government, local governments, and nuclear operators, and strengthen cooperation with relevant agencies in confi rming the effectiveness of local governments’ evacuation plan and in the condition of nuclear disaster emergency. Moreover, since October 2014, fi ve personnel from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF were transferred (on temporary assignment) to a section in charge of nuclear disaster prevention within the Cabinet Offi ce as part of an effort to enhance the effectiveness of nuclear disaster response capabilities. **(4) Formulating Plans for Responding to Various Disasters** In the event of the occurrence of various disasters, the MOD/SDF will take all possible measures such as swift transportation and deployment of suffi ciently sized units in their initial response. By establishing a rotating staffi ng posture based on a joint operational approach, the MOD/ SDF will ensure that they are able to sustain a wellprepared condition for a long-term response. In doing so, the MOD/SDF will fully take into account the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake. The MOD/SDF is in the process of formulating various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council, based on the Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention plan to respond to such earthquakes. **(5) Exercises Involving the SDF** In order to respond to large-scale and various other disasters in a speedy and appropriate manner the SDF ----- Commander of the 21st Squadron welcomed by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kumada at the event for F-2 fighter aircraft returning to the ASDF Matsushima Air Base carries out various disaster prevention drills, and also actively participates in disaster prevention drills organized by the Japanese government or local government and is seeking to ensure cooperation with various ministries and agencies, and local governments. a. Joint Exercise for Rescue (JXR) From June to July 2015, the SDF conducted a command post exercise and a field training exercise in preparation for the predicted Tokyo Inland Earthquake to enhance the SDF’s earthquake response capability. At the same time, the exercise aimed to strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation through the participation of all the military services of the U.S. Forces in Japan. b. Joint Disaster Response Exercise with U.S. Forces (TREX – Tomodachi Rescue Exercise) In June, 2015, the SDF conducted a field training exercise in preparation for the predicted earthquake along the Nankai trough, and worked to enhance their earthquake response capability by practicing cooperation procedures among the SDF, the U.S. Forces in Japan and organizations relevant to disaster prevention, etc. This exercise was implemented in conjunction with a general disaster prevention training hosted by Kochi Prefecture, while it was also intended to strengthen Japan-U.S. cooperation through the first ever participation of the U.S. Army Japan in the training. c. Other The SDF worked to enhance their earthquake response capability, for example, by conducting the Nankai Rescue 27, an exercise in preparation for the predicted earthquake along the Nankai trough earthquake along the Japan and Chishima Trench implemented by the GSDF Middle Army in July 2015, and the Northern Rescue 2015, an exercise in preparation for the predicted implemented by the GSDF Northern Army in August of the same year. See>> Reference 47 (Implementation and participation record of major drills related to disaster dispatch (FY2015)) GSDF personnel measuring radiation dosage during the Hokkaido nuclear disaster drill Japanese and U.S. personnel transporting an injured person to a U.S. military aircraft during the Japan-U.S. Joint Disaster Response Exercise (TREX - Tomodachi Rescue Exercise) **(6) Coordination with Local Governments** It is also important for the SDF to strengthen coordination with local governments form peacetime for the purpose of smooth disaster relief operations smoothly. For this reason, the SDF implements various measures including: (1) Establishment of the post of Liaison Officer for Civil Protection and Disaster Management (administrative official) at the SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices; (2) Temporary assignment of SDF officers to the department in charge of disaster prevention at the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and mutual exchange between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army Headquarters and Hyogo Prefectural Government; and (3) Recommendation of retired SDF personnel with knowledge in disaster prevention in accordance with requests from local governments. As of the end of March 2016, as many as 372 retired SDF personnel are working in disaster prevention and other sections in 249 local governments in 46 prefectures throughout the country. Such cooperation in human resources is a very effective way of strengthening coordination between the MOD/SDF and local governments, and its efficacy was confirmed through the experience of the Great East Japan Earthquake In particular each GSDF regional Army ----- **y** **Resuming the F-2 Flying Training at the Matsushima Air Base** **Column** The ASDF Matsushima Air Base in Miyagi Prefecture holds the 21st squadron, which is in charge of providing fl ying training using F-2 fi ghter aircraft. The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in 2011 caused serious damage to a variety of equipment including F-2 fi ghter aircraft and facilities at the Matsushima Air Base. The 21st squadron was relocated to the ASDF Misawa Base in Aomori Prefecture to continue providing fl ying training on a reduced scale due to the situation in which the squadron was unable to conduct fl ying training at all. At the Matsushima Base, initiatives aiming to resume the fl ying training have begun, such as the repairing and procuring of affected equipment, and raising construction of aircraft hangars and a ramp as a countermeasure against tsunamis. Five years have passed since the Earthquake. As repairing and procuring of the aircraft and various equipment progressed and the raising construction of the aircraft hangars etc., was also completed, the Matsushima Air Base has restored itself to its pre-disaster condition. In addition, in March 2016, the 21st squadron, which had been providing training after the relocation to the Misawa Base, returned to the Matsushima Base after about fi ve years and resumed its fl ying training. The 21st squadron thanks the Misawa Base and all the residents in the surrounding areas that accepted the relocated training in the post-disaster period and relishes the pleasure to be able to have training at the Matsushima Base. In such a situation, the 21st squadron works on nurturing excellent and robust fi ghter pilots. F-2 fi ghter (with a special painting of cherry blossoms, which is the fl ower F-2 fi ghter returned to the Matsushima Air Base of Higashi Matsushima City) returning to the Matsushima Air Base from the Misawa Air Base establishes a forum for interaction with senior directors for crisis management and other offi cials from local governments and exchange information and opinions to **9 Transport of Japanese Nationals Overseas, etc.** In the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense can order SDF units to transport Japanese nationals and other people overseas upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations with the Minister, on the basis of Article 84 (4) of the SDF Law (transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.). In such cases, the SDF will protect the Japanese nationals and other parties in the country concerned, and safely guide them to aircraft, ships or vehicles, and safely transport them. To this end, the SDF maintains operational readiness, with the GSDF designating a helicopter unit and leading transport unit personnel, the MSDF designating vessels such as transport ships (including ship-based aircraft), and the ASDF designating on airlift units and personnel for dispatch. Since the transport of Japanese nationals overseas strengthen coordination with those local governments. See>> Reference 22 (Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government) An exercise for transporting Japanese nationals overseas carried out in Cobra Gold ----- requires close coordination among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, joint exercises are carried out under normal circumstances. In the annual multinational joint exercise “Cobra Gold” in Thailand, in February 2015, the MOD participated in the exercise for the transport of Japanese nationals overseas in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, and others, together with the staff of the embassy and their family members, and conducted the fi rst ever overseas ground transport exercise. In addition, in February 2016, a destroyer (including a ship-based aircraft) participated in this joint exercise for the fi rst time, while an SDF vehicle (a high mobility vehicle) was brought in and used in the training of land transport by vehicles. With respect to the Terrorist Attack in Dhaka, Bangladesh, which occurred in July 2016, a government aircraft was sent from the ASDF Special Aircraft Group **10 Readiness against Invasion** The NDPG states that only the necessary level of readiness against land invasions involving the mobilization of large ground forces, which was expected primarily during the Cold War, will be retained. In case Japan faces a full-scale invasion, the SDF will respond to the situation in an aligned and systematic manner based on their integrated operations. Their operations are categorized into (1) operations for aerial air defense operations, (2) defense operations protecting waters around Japan, (3) operations protecting the land, and (4) operations ensuring security in maritime communication, based on the characteristic of their purposes. In executing these operations, the U.S. Forces will assist the operations implemented by the SDF and deploy operations to complement the capabilities of the SDF, including the use of striking power, in line with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel) (belong to the Chitose Air Base) to Dhaka in Bangladesh for the purpose of transporting Japanese victims and others involved based on Article 84-4 of the SDF Act (Transportation of Japanese nationals staying abroad) and the bodies of Japanese victims (seven nationals) and their families were transported to Japan. In relation to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan in July of the same year, the ASDF transport aircraft (C-130H) were sent to transport the embassy staff from Juba to Djibouti. With regard to the protection of Japanese nationals in emergency situation in foreign countries, a provision pertaining to the protection measures of Japanese nationals overseas was added to the Legislation for Peace and Security enacted in September 2015. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Outline of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security) Operations for aerial defense[32] can be categorized into comprehensive aerial defense mainly conducted by the ASDF and individual aerial defense conducted by the GSDF, MSDF or ASDF for their bases or troops. Comprehensive aerial defense aims to deal with enemy aerial attacks at the farthest point from our territory, prohibiting enemies from gaining air superiority and preventing harm to the people and the sovereign territory of Japan. At the same time, efforts will be made to infl ict signifi cant damage on the enemy thus making the continuation of their aerial attack diffi cult. See>> Fig. III-1-2-14 (Example of Air Defense Operations) - 2 Defense Operations Protecting Waters **Surrounding Japan** If an armed attack is carried out against Japan, which is island country aerial attacks are expected to be combined with attacks against our ships and territory by enemy destroyers. In addition, transport vessels could be deployed to enable massive enemy ground forces to invade our territory. Our defense operations protecting the waters surrounding Japan are composed of measures at sea, measures in waters around our coasts, measures in major straits, and aerial defense above waters around Japan. We need to protect the waters around our country by combining these multiple operations, blocking the - 1 Air Defense Operations Based on the geographic features of Japan, in that it is surrounded by the sea, and the features of modern wars,[31] it is expected that Japan will be repeatedly hit by rapid and surprise aerial attacks by aircraft and missiles in the case where a full-scale invasion against Japan occurs. 31 Aerial attacks are important elements infl uencing the results of modern wars. It is vital to obtain air superiority before or at the same time as implementing ground or maritime operations. 32 A special characteristic of aerial defense operations is that initial response is critical and can infl uence the entirety of operations. Thus, Japan needs to maintain its readiness for a quick initial response on an ----- |Fig. III-1-2-15|Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan| |---|---| Fig. III-1-2-14 Example of Air Defense Operations Interception order Detect Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) [1] Destroy Combat air patrol (CAP) [2] Aerial refueling/transport Intercept aircraft (KC-767) Detect Warning and Detect Destroy control radar Destroy Cruise missile launched by an enemy Scrambing fighters Intercept Identification of friend or foe Flow of air defense operations Interception order Air Defense Direction Center (DC) Air wing command post Notes: 1. Aircraft with airborne warning and control functions in waters distant from its national land and with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments 2. Keeping armed fighters on an airborne alert so that they can immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft Airborne warning and control system Anti-air warfare Fighters Air defense in Enemy aircraft the surrounding waters Response in the main channel Enemy surface vessels Anti-surface Mine deployment warfare warfare Patrol helicopter Surface-to-ship Surface vessels missile Response in the waters Fixed-wing patrol aircraft Minesweeper Anti-mine warfare Anti-submarine warfare Response in coastal waters Submarine Enemy submarine ----- Fig. III-1-2-16 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces Fighters Ospreys Response in coastal waters Assault helicopter Surface-to-ship missile Surface ship Unmanned reconnaissance aircraft Surface-to-air missile Reconnaissance Combat Vehicles Response in sea waters Response to enemy heliborne units Mobile Combat Vehicles Surface-to-air missile Surveillance radar Tank Response in sea waters Armored Artillery vehicle Response in urban areas Response to enemy airborne unit Guiding evacuees invasion of our enemies, and attacking and depleting their combat capabilities. See>> Fig. III-1-2-15 (Example of the Strategy for Defending Sea Areas Surrounding Japan) - 3 Operations Protecting the Land - 4 **Operations Ensuring Security in Maritime Transportation** Japan depends upon other countries for the supply of much of its resources and food, making maritime transportation routes the lifeblood for securing the foundation of our existence and prosperity. Furthermore, if our country comes under armed attack etc., maritime transportation routes will be the foundation to maintain continuous warfare capabilities and enable the U.S. Forces to come and assist in the defense of Japan. As such, in operations to ensure the safety of our maritime transportation, the SDF combines various operations such as anti-sea, anti-submarine, anti-air and anti-mine operations to patrol,[33] defend SDF ships, and protect straits and ports, as well as setting up sea lanes[34] to directly defend Japanese ships etc. Aerial defense (anti-air operations) for Japanese ships on maritime transportation routes is conducted by destroyers, and support from fi ghter jets and other aircraft is provided as required. In order to invade the islands of Japan, invading countries are expected to gain sea and air superiority, followed by the landing of ground troops from the sea and airborne troops from the air. For invading ground and airborne troops, it tends to be diffi cult to exert systematic combat capabilities while they are moving on their vessels or aircraft or right before or after they land in our territory. As we protect our land, we need to make best use of this weakness to deal with our enemies between coastal and sea areas or at landing points as much as possible and attack them at an early stage. See>> Fig. III-1-2-16 (Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces) 33 The act of systematically monitoring a specifi c area with the purpose of gathering information and intelligence to prevent a surprise attack by an opposing force.ii ----- **11** **Response to Other Events** - 1 Response to Situations that will Have an Important **Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security** In the event of situations that will have an important infl uence on Japan’s peace and security, the MOD/SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support activities and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Law Concerning the Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that will Have an Important Infl uence on Japan’s Peace and Security and the Ship Inspection Operations Law. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Part II, Chapter 3, Section 2-1 (Outline of the Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security) - 2 Military Intelligence Collection For formulating defense policy accurately in response to the changes in the situation and for effective operation of defense capabilities in dealing with various contingencies, it is necessary to grasp the long-term military trends in the neighboring countries of Japan and to detect the signs of those situations at an early stage. For this reason, the MOD/SDF always makes efforts to collect information swiftly and accurately using various methods. Some examples of intelligence collection methods used by the MOD/SDF includes: (1) collecting, processing and analyzing signals detected from military communications and electronic weapons, in the air over Japanese territory; (2) collecting, interpreting, and analyzing data from various imaging satellites (including Information Gathering Satellite)[35]; (3) warning and surveillance activities by ships, aircraft and other vehicles; (4) collecting and organizing **Commentary** **GSDF Joint Exercises and Training for Effective Deterrence and Responses** **Column** The fi rst joint exercise conducted by the GSDF was the joint communication training joint command and post exercise with the U.S. Armed Forces at the Higashifuji Training Area (Shizuoka Prefecture) in 1981. Since then, with the aim to maintain and enhance the Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities in the event of an invasion of Japan, both “fi eld training exercises with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army” and “the Japan-U.S. joint army corps command and post exercise” have been continuously conducted. In recent years, considering the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, landing drills for remote island defense, such as Iron Fist and Dawn Blitz, and air borne operation exercises such as Arctic Aurora have been conducted to enrich the Japan-U.S. joint exercises in order to improve the interoperability with the U.S. Armed Forces as well as the tactical skills of Japan and the United States respectively in any circumstances. In addition, the JGSDF also participates in the Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise Southern Jackaroo for enhancing the tactical skills of their personnel and forces, the multinational joint exercise Cobra Gold for enhancing capabilities such as non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), and other joint exercises. This way, in addition to bilateral exercises between Japan and the United States, the GSDF aims to enhance and expand the contents with respect to multilateral exercises involving Australia and ASEAN countries. In combination with multilateral joint exercises such as the Pacifi c Partnership and Kahn Quest, which focus on the non-traditional security areas such as international peacekeeping activities and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief activities, we believe that these exercises and training will enhance our deterrence and response capabilities, which will eventually contribute to the peace and stability of Japan, its surrounding areas and the international community. Opening ceremony of the Japan-U.S. joint exercise, Yama Sakura 69 (YS-69) Combat shooting training in the exercise Southern Jackaroo. ----- a variety of open source information; (5) information exchanges with defense organizations of other nations; and (6) intelligence collection conducted by Defense Attachés and other offi cials. As the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, the strengthening of information capabilities is considered to be an increasingly important issue. For this reason, the MOD is currently promoting comprehensive enhancement of its information capabilities at all stages, including gathering, analyzing, sharing, and securing intelligence. Specifi cally, the MOD is going to implement the highlevel use of geospatial data such as by integrating various information to visualize the situation, securing highly competent analysts by integrating and strengthening educational curricula, and strengthening the dispatch system of Defense Attachés through their dispatch to the Middle East. **VOICE** **Three Personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Accredited as Defense Attachés** **Column** **to India** **Colonel (GSDF) Yoshifumi Inoue, Defense Attaché to the Japanese Embassy in India** The Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges have achieved a remarkable development, and are still growing through high-level mutual visits such as defense ministerial meetings; defense policy dialogues; regular participation of the MSDF in the bilateral naval exercise Malabar; Japan-India bilateral naval joint exercises; mutual dispatch of vessels to naval reviews; cooperation and exchanges between the GSDF and the Indian Army in United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. During the previous fi scal year, both countries started to exchange test pilots and airlift units between the ASDF and the Indian Air Force, and their defense cooperation and exchanges are progressively moving forward even at both unit and personnel levels. There used to be only one defense attaché, who was from the GSDF, but responding to the expansion of defense cooperation and exchanges, another two defense attachés were dispatched from the MSDF and the ASDF in 2014 and 2015 respectively to make it a three defense attachés formation involving personnel from all of the SDF branches. As a defense attaché at a site of defense cooperation and exchanges, I feel on a day-to-day basis the excellence of the Indian Armed Forces, which are proud to be defending their democratic country, and a further possibility of the Japan-India defense cooperation. In December 2015, the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Agreement and the General Security of Military Information Agreement were signed between Japan and India. Currently, the two countries are engaging in an ongoing consultation to realize the relocation of US-2 rescue aircraft to India. If this relocation is realized, it will open up a new horizon to the Japan-India relationship. Three defense At a reception celebrating the SDF anniversary. From the right, Colonel Inoue attachés from each SDF service are going to cooperate with each other and (GSDF) and his wife, Captain Takahashi (MSDF) and his wife, and strive to further strengthen the Japan-India defense cooperation relationship. Colonel Uemura (ASDF) and his wife ----- **Chapter 2** **[Active Promotion of ]** **Security Cooperation** Various issues and destabilizing factors have become more obvious and aggravated in the security environment surrounding Japan; such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threat of international terrorism, and increasing risks regarding the global commons such as the oceans, space and cyberspace. With structural changes such as transformation of power balance and the progress of globalization, these issues have become more complicated and diversifi ed, making it diffi cult for any single country to resolve on their own. As countries, including Japan, can no longer ensure the stability of the international community and the security of their own country independently, it has become even more important that countries sharing strategic interests can address the issues in a coordinated manner. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have also diversifi ed, there are increasing opportunities for them to play an important role in building peace and **Section 1** **Toward Strategic International Defense Cooperation** **1 Signifi cance and Evolution of Security Cooperation and Dialogue and Defense Cooperation and Exchange** Amid the ongoing change in the region, which comprises the balance of power at the global level, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacifi c region is important not only for the security of Japan, but increasingly across the international community. While some nations possess large-scale military power over the region, a framework for regional security cooperation has not yet been suffi ciently institutionalized. Also, due to the political, economic and social systems of the countries, visions of security vary from country to country. There have also been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion without paying respect to existing international law. The issues involving the South China Sea, in particular, cause concerns over the maintenance of the rule of law at sea, supporting post-confl ict reconstruction, as well as promoting confi dence-building and friendly relationships between nations. In this way, in situations where international cooperation in the security and defense areas is required, and from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, the MOD/SDF is required to actively contribute to the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability of the region. Furthermore, active contribution of the MOD/SDF is also necessary in ensuring the peace, stability, and prosperity of the entire international community. Specifi cally, Japan plans to enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and exchanges, and more actively promote the United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UN PKO), anti-piracy operations, international peace cooperation activities, and other relevant missions as avenues to address global security issues. **Toward Strategic International Defense Cooperation** freedom of navigation and freedom of fl ight over the high seas, and stability in the Southeast Asian region. Thus, responses to these issues have become an important challenge in terms of ensuring the regional stability. For such a situation, strategic international cooperation,[1] which promotes bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and exchanges more strategically and effectively, is necessary. The need for such cooperation is increasing in order to build trust between the relevant countries and establish a foundation on which each country works in cooperation to resolve shared regional security issues. Both within and outside of the region, strengthening trust and cooperation with countries who share strategic interests with Japan such as Australia, the Republic of On December 16, 2015, at the Meeting of the Ministry of Defense and SDF Senior Personnel, Prime Minister Abe said “I would like you to advance strategic international defense cooperation boldly and without ----- Fig. III-2-1-1 Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges (January 2015 – June 2016) United Kingdom MongoliaMongolia GermanyGermany Republic ChinaChina of Korea FranceFrance ItalyItaly More than 5 exchanges Number of bilateral agreements and IndiaIndia More than 3 exchanges memorandums in the field of defense concluded MyanmarMyanmar 2 exchanges 20 LaosLaos 1 exchange ThailandThailand VietnamVietnam PhilippinesPhilippines Agreement 15 Memorandum, etc. Cambodia MalaysiaMalaysia 10 SingaporeSingapore 5 IndonesiaIndonesia Timor-Leste 0 AustraliaAustralia Before FY2010- FY2013FY2009 FY2012 FY2015 Number of bilateral dialogues and consultations between defense authorities held 100 90 America (excl. the U.S.) Europe 80 Middle East and Africa 70 Former Soviet Union countries 60 South Asia 50 Pacific Southeast Asia 40 Mongolia 30 China 20 Republic of Korea 10 0 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 (FY) Korea (ROK), India, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, and European countries is most important. Japan has developed one of the most progressed cooperative bilateral relationships with Australia. Also, as allies of the United States, cooperation through JapanAustralia and Japan-U.S.-Australia frameworks in a wide range of areas is possible to form regional order and maintain and strengthen peace and stability in the international community. Similarly, with the ROK, an ally of the United States, it is important that cooperation to deal with various issues including the issues related to North Korea is based on the Japan-ROK bilateral relationship with the ROK and the Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral relationship. With respect to India, the world’s largest democratic nation positioned in the center of sea lanes of communication, Japan will strengthen cooperation for example through joint exercises in a wide range of areas such as maritime security. Furthermore, through traditional partnership, Japan seeks to strengthen its practical defense cooperation with ASEAN countries in recognition of their proximity to Japanese sea lanes and their significant influence on the peace, stability and prosperity of the region. Stable relations between Japan and China are essential for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan will encourage China to demonstrate greater transparency in its military and security activities and policies, and will work to enhance the mutual trust between the two countries through the promotion of defense exchanges. At the same time, Japan will also promote the construction of the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” between defense authorities in Japan and China to avert or prevent unexpected situations. Russia is an important neighboring country, and Japan seeks to increase the trust relationship through defense ----- |Classification|Type|Significance|Outline| |---|---|---|---| |Bilateral|Exchange between Defense Ministers and high-level officials|Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are important common interests to both sides, as well as enhancing the following defense exchanges.|• Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries • Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s State Minister of Defense; Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense; Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense; Chief of Joint Staff; GSDF, MSDF, ASDF Chiefs; and their counterparts in other countries| ||Regular consultation between defense officials|Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges through continuous and direct exchanges of views between national defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries.|• Consultations between Director-General-level officials, Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their counterparts • Dialogue between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries| ||Exchange between units|Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries through bilateral exercises and events for exchanges.|• Personnel exchanges • Mutual visits to vessels of training squadrons and aircraft, and bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations| ||Exchange of students|In addition to the original educational purposes, deepening the understanding of the other countries’ defense policies and the situation of their defense units, as well as building mutual trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel exchange and establishing human networks.|• Mutual acceptance of students • Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations| ||Research exchanges|Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of both countries through frank exchange of opinions for the maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges.|Research exchanges between Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in other countries| |Multilateral|Security dialogue|Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of situations and on security policy among related countries as well as exchanging views and discussing on a wide range of multilateral issues.|• Dialogues at the ADMM Plus and ARF • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense Japan • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by governments • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors| ||Multilateral exercises and seminars|Improving skills and contributing to enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation through multilateral exercises and seminars.|• Personnel exchanges • Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief, minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations| Fig. III-2-1-2 Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges **Classification** **Type** **Significance** **Outline** Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation - Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s Defense through frank exchanges of views on regional situations Minister and Defense Ministers from other countries Exchange between and national defense policies that are important common - Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan’s State Minister Defense Ministers interests to both sides, as well as enhancing the following of Defense; Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense; and high-level defense exchanges. Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense; Chief of Joint Staff; officials GSDF, MSDF, ASDF Chiefs; and their counterparts in other countries Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges - Consultations between Director-General-level officials, Regular consultation through continuous and direct exchanges of views Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their between defense between national defense policy-makers, and contributing counterparts officials to the enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation - Dialogue between Japan’s Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, Bilateral between related countries. and their counterparts in foreign countries Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of - Personnel exchanges Exchange between mutual trust and cooperation between related countries - Mutual visits to vessels of training squadrons and aircraft, units through bilateral exercises and events for exchanges. and bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations In addition to the original educational purposes, deepening - Mutual acceptance of students the understanding of the other countries’ defense policies - Dispatch of students to overseas military-related Exchange of students and the situation of their defense units, as well as building organizations mutual trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel exchange and establishing human networks. Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of Research exchanges between Japan’s National Institute for Research exchanges both countries through frank exchange of opinions for the Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges. other countries Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of - Dialogues at the ADMM Plus and ARF situations and on security policy among related countries - Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Ministry of Defense Security dialogue as well as exchanging views and discussing on a wide Japan range of multilateral issues. - Multilateral dialogues sponsored by governments Multilateral - Multilateral dialogues sponsored by private sectors Improving skills and contributing to enhancement - Personnel exchanges Multilateral exercises of mutual trust and cooperation through multilateral - Multilateral exercises and seminars related to disaster relief, and seminars exercises and seminars. minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations exchanges. Taking the Ukrainian situation and other factors into account, it is essential that the Government of Japan takes an appropriate response whilst recognizing the solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven), maintaining constant contact at the working level in order to mitigate any unforeseen circumstances or unnecessary conflicts. Japan will also cooperate with other partners in the Asia-Pacific region such as Mongolia and New Zealand in various areas to ensure regional stability. European countries such as the United Kingdom and France have the international influence to formulate public opinions and the capacity to develop norms and share universal values with Japan. They are partners for Japan, which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. Despite the geographical distance between Japan and Europe, both parties are facing a common security issue to establish an international order based on universal values and rules. Therefore, it is crucial that Japan further strengthens its relationship with the European countries including cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In light of the high-level defense capabilities and technologies possessed by European countries, more specific cooperation such as joint exercises as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation will be promoted. Furthermore since the stability of the Middle East is for Japan, an issue directly connected to the stable supply of energy, security and defense cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries such as the Gulf countries will also be promoted. With the advancement of globalization, there have been an increasing amount of security challenges, which are beyond the regional boundaries. Considering such a situation, as far as the resources of the MOD/SDF permit, it is necessary to expand the network of defense exchanges and cooperation by promoting exchanges with countries in regions such as Central Asia as well as Central and South America with which Japan has not conducted active defense exchanges. Regarding the form of defense cooperation and exchanges, Japan has long strived to alleviate any conditions of confrontation and vigilance, as well as fostering a collaborative and cooperative atmosphere by building face-to-face relationships through bilateral dialogues and exchanges. In addition, recognizing the increasing need for international cooperation, Japan has recently enhanced bilateral defense relationships from traditional exchanges to deeper cooperation in a phased manner by appropriately combining various means including joint exercises and capacity building assistance, defense equipment and technology cooperation, and establishing institutional framework such as the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. In addition multilateral security cooperation and ----- dialogue in the region are in the process of developing from dialogue focused on cooperation that seeks to construct order in the region. It is important to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges in a multi-layered and practical manner, leading to the improvement of the regional and global security environment. See>> Reference 48 (Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)); Reference 49 (Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2015)) See>> Fig. III-2-1-1 (Major Achievements in High-Level Exchanges (January 2015 – June 2016)) See>> Fig. III-2-1-2 (Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges) See>> Fig. III-2-1-3 (From Dialogues and Exchanges to Cooperation) See>> Fig. III-2-1-4 (Image of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) See>> Fig. III-2-1-5 (Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements) |Col1|Cold War Inception Period Developing Period Deepening Period Era (1990s - early 2000s) (Beginning of 2000 -) (2010’s -)| |---|---| |Bilateral|Substantial Partial and From “exchanges” to “cooperation” exchanges begin limited “exchanges” Promoting mutual Promoting mutual understanding and trust Toward more understanding and trust Carried specific cooperation: over ＋ • Defense equipment cooperation China, ROK, →Main focus on explaining defense Promoting security and • Strengthening of cooperation in Western policies and on facilitating mutual defense cooperation within the region the operational side ＋ Europe, etc. understanding Mainly non-traditional security (disaster relief, maritime security, • Capacity building assistance, etc. counter-terrorism, etc.), and logistics support| |Trilateral|＋ Framework for complementing bilateral/ multilateral cooperation (Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-ROK)| |Multilateral|Beginning of multilateral From “dialogue” to “cooperation “dialogue” within the region (the construction of an intraregional order)” Development of ARF, etc. 1994 1997 2003 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 ARF Disaster Terrorism/ EAS ADMM Maritime Security ADMM-Plus ARF-DiREx carried out ADMM Plus Humanitarian Commencement of ADMM Plus established Relief ISM Transnational established established ISM, established (implemented biannually Assistance/Disaster the second phase Humanitarian Crime ISM Non-proliferation since this year) Relief/Military Medicine activities by each Assistance/Disaster and disarmament ISM, Experts’ Working Groups Field Exercise conducted EWG, etc. Relief table top Exercise ARF Disaster Relief (EWG) for the five fields Second ADMM-Plus ADMM-Plus maritime Third ADMM-Plus Exercises (ARF-DiREx) of ADMM-Plus established: Meeting held security tabletop Meeting held carried out (1) Humanitarian assistance/ Humanitarian Mine exercise Japan-ASEAN Defense Disaster relief Action EWG for ADMM-Plus Observation of Vice-Ministerial Forum (2) Maritime security established antiterrorism Exercises (implemented annually (3) Counterterrorism by the Australian since this year) (4) Military medicine Defence Force (5) Peacekeeping operations Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting Main focus on fostering trust in the Reinforcement of security and defense cooperation short term with the ultimate goal of resolving conflicts through specific and practical cooperation| |Fig. III-2-1-3|From Dialogues and Exchanges to Cooperation| |---|---| |Cold War Inception Period Developing Period Deepening Period Era (1990s - early 2000s) (Beginning of 2000 -) (2010’s -) Substantial Partial and From “exchanges” to “cooperation” exchanges begin limited “exchanges” Promoting mutual Promoting mutual understanding and trust Toward more understanding and trust Carried specific cooperation: Bilateral over ＋ • Defense equipment cooperation China, ROK, →Main focus on explaining defense Promoting security and • Strengthening of cooperation in Western policies and on facilitating mutual defense cooperation within the region the operational side ＋ Europe, etc. understanding Mainly non-traditional security (disaster relief, maritime security, • Capacity building assistance, etc. counter-terrorism, etc.), and logistics support ＋ Framework for complementing bilateral/ Trilateral multilateral cooperation (Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-ROK) Beginning of multilateral From “dialogue” to “cooperation “dialogue” within the region (the construction of an intraregional order)” Development of ARF, etc. 1994 1997 2003 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 Multilateral ARF Disaster Terrorism/ EAS ADMM Maritime Security ADMM-Plus ARF-DiREx carried out ADMM Plus Humanitarian Commencement of ADMM Plus established Relief ISM Transnational established established ISM, established (implemented biannually Assistance/Disaster the second phase Humanitarian Crime ISM Non-proliferation since this year) Relief/Military Medicine activities by each Assistance/Disaster and disarmament ISM, Experts’ Working Groups Field Exercise conducted EWG, etc. Relief table top Exercise ARF Disaster Relief (EWG) for the five fields Second ADMM-Plus ADMM-Plus maritime Third ADMM-Plus Exercises (ARF-DiREx) of ADMM-Plus established: Meeting held security tabletop Meeting held carried out (1) Humanitarian assistance/ Humanitarian Mine exercise Japan-ASEAN Defense Disaster relief Action EWG for ADMM-Plus Observation of Vice-Ministerial Forum (2) Maritime security established antiterrorism Exercises (implemented annually (3) Counterterrorism by the Australian since this year) (4) Military medicine Defence Force (5) Peacekeeping operations Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting Main focus on fostering trust in the Reinforcement of security and defense cooperation short term with the ultimate goal of resolving conflicts through specific and practical cooperation|| |Level|Examples of Specific Initiatives| |---|---| |Defense Exchange Defense Cooperation|H Overseas student exchanges, research exchanges H High-level and working-level exchanges between defense authorities and between forces H Unit-to-unit exchanges between forces, mutual visits to vessels and aircraft H Goodwill training H Memorandums of defense cooperation and exchanges H Capacity building assistance H Range of cooperation in non-traditional security (including joint training) [Ex.] • Field training exercises at the ADMM-Plus and ARF, joint search and rescue exercises • JPN-AUS Cooperation (Support from the Australian Army when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, cooperation in the missing Malaysian Airplane case, Japan-U.S.-Australia joint disaster relief exercises “Michinoku ALERT”, etc.) • Pacific Partnership, cooperation with countries and organizations in counter-piracy, etc. H Conclusion of various agreements related to defense cooperation (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, Information Security Agreement, Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement, etc.) H Formulation of joint response plan H Joint exercises on the premise of joint response (Examples: Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army Command Post Exercises, Special Anti-Submarine Exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter Combat Training) H Joint response in the event of Japan’s crisis| |Fig. III-2-1-4|Image of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges| |---|---| |Level Examples of Specific Initiatives Defense H Overseas student exchanges, research exchanges Exchange H High-level and working-level exchanges between defense authorities and between forces H Unit-to-unit exchanges between forces, mutual visits to vessels and aircraft H Goodwill training H Memorandums of defense cooperation and exchanges H Capacity building assistance H Range of cooperation in non-traditional security (including joint training) [Ex.] • Field training exercises at the ADMM-Plus and ARF, joint search and rescue exercises Defense • JPN-AUS Cooperation (Support from the Australian Army when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, cooperation Cooperation in the missing Malaysian Airplane case, Japan-U.S.-Australia joint disaster relief exercises “Michinoku ALERT”, etc.) • Pacific Partnership, cooperation with countries and organizations in counter-piracy, etc. H Conclusion of various agreements related to defense cooperation (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, Information Security Agreement, Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement, etc.) H Formulation of joint response plan H Joint exercises on the premise of joint response (Examples: Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army Command Post Exercises, Special Anti-Submarine Exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter Combat Training) H Joint response in the event of Japan’s crisis|| Cold War Inception Period Developing Period Deepening Period Era (1990s - early 2000s) (Beginning of 2000 -) (2010’s -) **Substantial** **Partial and** **From “exchanges” to “cooperation”** **exchanges begin** **limited** **“exchanges”** Promoting mutual Promoting mutual understanding and trust Toward more understanding and trust Carriedover ＋ specific cooperation:• Defense equipment cooperation China, ROK, →Main focus on explaining defense Promoting security and - Strengthening of cooperation in WesternEurope, etc. policies and on facilitating mutual understanding Mainly non-traditional security (disaster relief, maritime security, defense cooperation within the region ＋ the operational side • Capacity building assistance, etc. counter-terrorism, etc.), and logistics support ＋ Framework for complementing bilateral/ multilateral cooperation (Japan-U.S.-Australia, Japan-U.S.-ROK) **Beginning of multilateral** **From “dialogue” to “cooperation** **“dialogue” within the region** **(the construction of an intraregional order)”** Development of ARF, etc. 1994 1997 2003 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 2015 ARF Disaster Terrorism/ EAS ADMM Maritime Security ADMM-Plus ARF-DiREx carried out ADMM Plus Humanitarian Commencement of ADMM Plus established Relief ISM Transnational established established ISM, established (implemented biannually Assistance/Disaster the second phase Humanitarian Crime ISM Non-proliferation since this year) Relief/Military Medicine activities by each Assistance/Disaster and disarmament ISM, Experts’ Working Groups Field Exercise conducted EWG, etc. Relief table top Exercise ARF Disaster Relief (EWG) for the five fields Second ADMM-Plus ADMM-Plus maritime Third ADMM-Plus Exercises (ARF-DiREx) of ADMM-Plus established: Meeting held security tabletop Meeting held carried out (1) Humanitarian assistance/ Humanitarian Mine exercise Japan-ASEAN Defense Disaster relief Action EWG for ADMM-Plus Observation of Vice-Ministerial Forum (2) Maritime security established antiterrorism Exercises (implemented annually (3) Counterterrorism by the Australian since this year) (4) Military medicine Defence Force (5) Peacekeeping operations Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting Main focus on fostering trust in the Reinforcement of security and defense cooperation short term with the ultimate goal of resolving conflicts through specific and practical cooperation Defense H Overseas student exchanges, research exchanges Exchange H High-level and working-level exchanges between defense authorities and between forces H Unit-to-unit exchanges between forces, mutual visits to vessels and aircraft H Goodwill training H Memorandums of defense cooperation and exchanges H Capacity building assistance H Range of cooperation in non-traditional security (including joint training) [Ex.] • Field training exercises at the ADMM-Plus and ARF, joint search and rescue exercises Defense - JPN-AUS Cooperation (Support from the Australian Army when the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, cooperation Cooperation in the missing Malaysian Airplane case, Japan-U.S.-Australia joint disaster relief exercises “Michinoku ALERT”, etc.) - Pacific Partnership, cooperation with countries and organizations in counter-piracy, etc. H Conclusion of various agreements related to defense cooperation (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, Information Security Agreement, Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement, etc.) H Formulation of joint response plan H Joint exercises on the premise of joint response (Examples: Japan-U.S. Bilateral Joint Exercise, Japan-U.S. Bilateral Regional Army Command Post Exercises, Special Anti-Submarine Exercises, and Japan-U.S. Bilateral Fighter Combat Training) H Joint response in the event of Japan’s crisis ----- |Col1|Security and Defense Cooperation Documents|Information Security Agreement|Defense Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement|Acquisition and Cross- Serving Agreement (ACSA)| |---|---|---|---|---| |United States|Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Signed in September 1951 and entered into force in April 1952 Signed in January 1960 and entered into force in June 1960|Signed and entered into force in August 2007|Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 and entered into force in May 1954 Established the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in November 1983 Established the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006|Signed in April 1996 Entered into force in October 1996 Signed the amended Agreement in February 2004 The amended Agreement entered into force in July 2004| |Australia|Signed in September 2003 Revised in December 2008|Signed in May 2012 Entered into force in March 2013|Signed in July 2014 Entered into force in December 2014|Signed in May 2010 Entered into force in January 2013| |United Kingdom|Signed in January 2004 Revised in June 2012|Signed in July 2013 Entered into force in January 2014|Signed and entered into force in July 2013|Agreed to commence negotiation concerning the conclusion at the Summit Meeting in May 2014| |France|Signed (exchange of notes) in April 2001 Revision of annex statement In August 2003 Signed statement of intent in July 2014|Signed and entered into force in October 2011|Signed in March 2015|Under consideration| |India|Signed in September 2014|Negotiation commenced in September 2015 Signed and entered into force at the Japan-India Summit Meeting in December 2015|Negotiation commenced in August 2015 Signed at the Japan-India Summit Meeting in December 2015|—| |Republic of Korea|Signed in April 2009|Agreed at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011 to promote an exchange of views * The signing was postponed by the request from the ROK side at the end of June 2012|—|Agreed to move forward with opinion exchanges at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January 2011| |Indonesia|Signed in March 2015|—|Negotiation commenced at the “2+2” Meeting in December 2015|—| |Philippines|Signed statement of intent in July 2012 Signed memorandum in January 2015|—|Broadly agreed at the Summit Meeting in November 2015 Signed in February 2016 Entered into force in April 2016|—| |Malaysia|—|—|Agreed to commence negotiation at the Summit Meeting in May 2015|—| |New Zealand|Signed in August 2013|—|—|Under consideration| |Italy|Signed statement of intent in June 2012|Substantive agreement at the Japan-Italy Summit Meeting in August 2015 Signed in March 2016|—|—| |Canada|—|—|—|Agreed to commence negotiation for conclusion at the Japan-Canada Vice- Minister level “2+2” dialogue in August 2011 Substantial agreement at the Summit Meeting in September 2013| |Russia|Signed in August 1999 Revised in January 2006|—|—|—| |NATO|—|Signed and entered into force in June 2010|—|—| Fig. III-2-1-5 Situations Concerning the Conclusion of Agreements **Security and Defense** **Information Security** **Defense Equipment and Technology** **Acquisition and Cross-** **Cooperation Documents** **Agreement** **Transfer Agreement** **Serving Agreement (ACSA)** Signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America in March 1954 Signed in April 1996 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and entered into force in May 1954 Entered into force in October Signed in September 1951 Established the Transfer of Military 1996 and entered into force in Signed and entered into force in Technologies to the United States Signed the amended United States April 1952 August 2007 of America (exchange of notes) in Agreement in February 2004 Signed in January 1960 and November 1983 The amended Agreement entered into force in June Established the Transfer of Arms entered into force in July 1960 and Military Technologies to the United 2004 States of America (exchange of notes) in June 2006 Signed in May 2012 Signed in May 2010 Signed in September 2003 Signed in July 2014 Australia Entered into force in March Entered into force in January Revised in December 2008 Entered into force in December 2014 2013 2013 Agreed to commence Signed in July 2013 United Signed in January 2004 Signed and entered into force in July negotiation concerning the Entered into force in January Kingdom Revised in June 2012 2013 conclusion at the Summit 2014 Meeting in May 2014 Signed (exchange of notes) in April 2001 Revision of annex statement Signed and entered into force in France Signed in March 2015 Under consideration In August 2003 October 2011 Signed statement of intent in July 2014 Negotiation commenced in September 2015 Negotiation commenced in August 2015 India Signed in September 2014 Signed and entered into force Signed at the Japan-India Summit — at the Japan-India Summit Meeting in December 2015 Meeting in December 2015 Agreed at the Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting in January Agreed to move forward 2011 to promote an exchange Republic of with opinion exchanges at Signed in April 2009 of views — Korea the Japan-ROK Ministerial - The signing was postponed by Meeting in January 2011 the request from the ROK side at the end of June 2012 Negotiation commenced at the “2+2” Indonesia Signed in March 2015 — — Meeting in December 2015 Signed statement of intent in Broadly agreed at the Summit Meeting July 2012 in November 2015 Philippines — — Signed memorandum in Signed in February 2016 January 2015 Entered into force in April 2016 Agreed to commence negotiation at the Malaysia — — — Summit Meeting in May 2015 New Zealand Signed in August 2013 — — Under consideration Substantive agreement at the Signed statement of intent in Japan-Italy Summit Meeting in Italy — — June 2012 August 2015 Signed in March 2016 Agreed to commence negotiation for conclusion at the Japan-Canada Vice- Minister level “2+2” dialogue Canada — — — in August 2011 Substantial agreement at the Summit Meeting in September 2013 Signed in August 1999 Russia — — — Revised in January 2006 Signed and entered into force in NATO — — — June 2010 - In addition to the countries in the table, Japan has signed documents regarding defense cooperation with Singapore, Vietnam, Mongolia, Cambodia, Spain, Bahrain, Qatar and Georgia. ----- **2** **Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue** Initiatives under the multilateral framework such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),[2] which is a security cooperation framework in the Asia-Pacifi c region, have seen steady development and serve as important foundation for cooperation and exchange in the areas of security and defense. Japan has contributed to the enhancement of multilateral cooperation in the region, for example, by annually holding the Tokyo Defense Forum and the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum. - 1 Initiatives under the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ **Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) Framework** The Third ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) |ASEAN Def Officials’ M (ADSO • Held annual • Vice-Ministe General leve|ence Senior eeting Plus M-Plus) ly r and Director l| |---|---| |Fig. III-2-1-6|Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus)| |---|---| |ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russia, • Held once every two years United States • Ministerial level ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting Plus (ADSOM-Plus) • Held annually • Vice-Minister and Director General level Experts’ Working Group (EWG) ADSOM-Plus Working Group • Held annually • Director level Overview of Experts’ Working Group (EWG) Establishing EWGs in the six specific regional security fields Co-chaired with non-ASEAN countries Promoting information sharing, workshops and seminars, and multinational joint training Submitting recommendations and reports EWG and Chair Nations (1) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Laos and Japan) (2) Maritime security (Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand) (3) Military medicine (Thailand and Russia) (4) Counter-terrorism (Singapore and Australia) (5) Peacekeeping operations (Cambodia and ROK) (6) Humanitarian Mine Action (Vietnam and India)|| Singapore served as co-chairs of the EWG on Military Medicine, and the participants in the meeting exchanged practical opinions on approaches to cooperation with each country in the fi eld of military medicine at times of a major disaster. Furthermore, at meetings of the EWG on Maritime Security, Japan emphasized the importance The countries of ASEAN hold the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), which is a ministerial level meeting between defense authorities in the ASEAN region, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ MeetingPlus (ADMM Plus), which contains an additional eight non-ASEAN countries[3] including Japan to the members. The ADMM Plus is the only offi cial meeting for the region’s defense ministers in the Asia Pacifi c region including the countries outside the ASEAN region. Thus, the establishment of the ADMM Plus is highly signifi cant from the perspective of encouraging the development and deepening of security and defense cooperation in the region, and the MOD/SDF is providing active support for its initiatives. The ADMM Plus is comprised of (1) ADSOMPlus (ASEAN Defence Senior Offi cials’ Meeting Plus), (2) ADSOM-Plus Working Groups (ADSOM-Plus WG), and (3) Experts’ Working Groups (EWG). At the third meeting of the ADMM Plus in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015, Japan stressed the importance of the international community working together to ensure the freedom of navigation and overfl ight. Japan also emphasized, as a practical guiding principle for the entire region to cooperate, the importance of “wider promotion of common rules and laws concerning regional air and water,” “maritime and aerospace security,” and “the improvement of ability to respond to disaster in the region.” Japan also actively contributes in the fi elds of EWG. From July 2011 until March 2014, Japan and The ARF, a forum aimed at improving the security environment in the Asia-Pacifi c region through dialogue and cooperation on the political and security sectors, has been held since 1994. The ARF currently comprises 26 countries and 1 organization as member states, and holds various inter-governmental meetings on security that are attended by both foreign affairs offi cials and defense offi cials to exchange opinions on the regional situation and security areas that require a particular focus. The 26 countries consist of 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (since 1995) and Myanmar (since 1996)), in addition to Japan, Australia, Canada, China and India (since 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, the United States and Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (since 2000), Pakistan (since 2004), Timor-Leste (since 2005), Bangladesh (since 2006), and Sri Lanka (since 2007), plus the European Union (EU). ----- of establishing shared customary “manners” by which all countries abide, in order to avoid unintended collisions and the escalation of situations when warships or government vessels approach and encounter each other at sea. Furthermore, Japan and Laos have served as cochairs of the EWG on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief since December 2014, and working on the on-going discussion on making Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), etc., for the establishment and operation of the Multi-National Coordination Center (MNCC), which will amplify disaster relief activities by assisting foreign forces. In August 2015, Japan conducted a tabletop exercise (TTX) on the same EWG in Laos and carried out the verification of this SOP. See>> Fig. III-2-1-6 (Organizational Chart and Overview of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus)) - 2 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) such as HADR, and maritime security, was a breakthrough opportunity, bringing together defense ministers from Japan and the ASEAN countries for the first time in the 40 years of friendship and cooperation between Japan and ASEAN. This marked an important first step towards strengthening defense cooperation in future. Moreover, in November this year, the second Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting is planned to be held. **(2) Tokyo Defense Forum etc.** As Japan’s own initiatives regarding security in the Asia-Pacific region, the MOD has held the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) each year since 1996 with the participation of officers in charge of defense policy (Director Generals of defense ministries and General-class officers) from the countries in the region. At the forum, defense policies of the participating countries and confidence-building measures in the region are discussed. 22 countries from the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, the European Union (EU), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) took part in the 20th forum in March 2016. At this forum, discussions took place on the topics; (1) “Enhance Capabilities in NonTraditional Security Areas in the Region: Efforts and Challenges”; and (2)”Defense Policies Related to the Region and Participating Countries.” In addition, since 2001, the MOD has invited key figures who are primarily involved in security policy to Japan from countries in the Asia-Pacific region, with the objective of promoting understanding of Japan’s security and defense policy as well as the current status of the SDF. Regarding the ARF, which is operated mainly by diplomatic authorities, in recent years, specific initiatives[4] in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peace building have been actively implemented, and the MOD is making active contributions to this Forum as well. For example, in the maritime security field, an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISM on MS) has been held since 2009.[5] At the ISM on MS, a collection of best practices concerning support for capacity building in the field of maritime security was formulated on the basis of a summary compiled by Japan. In the field of disaster relief, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel and aircraft to participate in ARF Disaster Relief Exercises (ARF-DiREx) (conducted every two years) since 2009. In May 2015, ARF-DiREx 2015, the fourth such exercise, was held in Malaysia, with Japan sending around 10 personnel to participate. - 3 Multilateral Security Dialogue Hosted by **the MOD/SDF** **(3) Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum** Since 2009, the MOD has annually held the Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum, with the purpose of creating a foundation for strengthening multilateral and bilateral relationships through establishing human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministeriallevel officials. The 7th meeting was held in Sapporo in September 2015, attended by the vice-ministerial level officials from ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat. They exchanged opinions on the topics of (1) Wider promotion of common rules and laws at sea and in the air; and (2) Promotion of maritime and aerospace **(1) Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting** Based on the proposal by Prime Minister Abe at the Japan-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in December 2013, the Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting took place in Myanmar in November 2014. This meeting, in which opinion exchanges were conducted regarding cooperation in non-traditional security areas In addition to Ministers’ meetings at the Foreign Minister level, the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) are held each year, as well as meetings of the Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ISG on CBM/PD) and the ARF Security Policy Conference (ASPC). Moreover, since the Ministers’ meeting in 2002, ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogues (DOD) is held ahead of the main meeting. ----- **(2) Inter-Service Branch Initiatives** a. Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD) The CHOD is a meeting of the chiefs of defense, mostly from the Asia-Pacific region, aimed at nurturing trust among countries in the region and enhancing security relations through free exchanges of opinions on regional security and bilateral dialogues, among other activities. Japan has continued to participate in each conference since the first one held in 1998, and the Joint Chief of Staff attended the 18th Conference in September 2015. b. Pacific Armies Chief Conference (PACC) PACC is a biannual conference with the aim to enhance the relationship among the ground forces in the countries in the region held jointly by the U.S. Army and the ground forces from the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) has been participating in this conference since 1999, and the Chief of the Staff of the GSDF attended the last one in September 2015. c. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) The WPNS has been held since 1988. It is attended by the chiefs of staff of the navy of countries in the Western Pacific region, and holds discussions on various maritime security issues. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has been participating since the second symposium in 1990, and the Chief of Maritime Staff attended the meeting in April 2016. The WPNS plays a substantive role in the regional maritime security by adopting the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) during the symposium held in Qingdao, China, in April 2014. d. The Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS), etc. The PACS, hosted by the United States, is held every two years. It aims to promote mutual understanding and enhance security relationships between the countries in the region through exchanges of views among the chiefs of staff of the air forces, etc. from those countries. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has been participating in PACS since the first symposium in 1989, except the 13th in 2013, and the Chief of Staff of the ASDF attended the last meeting in September 2015. See>> Reference 51 (Other Multilateral Security Dialogues) security; and (3) Improvement of disaster response capability. At the forum, participants confirmed the principle of the freedom of navigation and overflight as well as the importance of establishing a risk management system on the sea, while at the same time they also shared the perception of the necessity to increase interoperability through joint exercises for disaster responses. See>> Reference 50 (Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense) - 4 Other **(1) International Conferences Held by Private Organizations** In the field of security, inter-governmental international conferences as well as international conferences organized by private organizations in which various people such as government officials, scholars, and journalists participate, are held, and such conferences provide a forum for sharing and exchanging opinions on medium-to-long-term security issues. The leading international conferences are the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (ShangriLa Dialogue)[6] and the Munich Security Conference,[7] one of the most prestigious meetings among the security meetings in Europe and the United States. At the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2016, Minister of Defense Nakatani delivered a speech at the second plenary session entitled “Managing Military Competition in Asia,” and also held bilateral and trilateral talks with the participating countries to exchange opinions on regional situations and defense cooperation including the South China Sea situation and to confirm the plan for strengthening future cooperation with other participating countries. State Minister of Defense Wakamiya participated in the 52nd Munich Security Conference held in February 2016. Over 600 participants including national leaders, ministers, and other high-level officials from the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and other countries gathered at this meeting, and broad discussion on global security issues such as counter-terrorism, refugee problem, and the Middle East and Africa situation took place. This is a multilateral conference initiated by IISS, a private British think tank, in which defense ministers from various countries participate with the objective of discussing defense-related issues and regional defense cooperation. Since the 1st conference in 2002, it has been held in Singapore each year and is known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, from the name of the hotel at which it takes place. One of the most prestigious international meetings in Europe and the United States hosted by private organizers, which has been held annually (usually in February) since 1962. Officials at the ministerial level ----- **3 Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation** While Japan’s bilateral and multilateral relationships continue to deepen, the MOD seeks to further strengthen and deepen defense cooperation and exchanges by combining more practical and wide-ranging means such as capacity building assistance. - 1 Proactive and Strategic Initiatives for Capacity **Building Assistance** Malaysia and Laos. During FY2015, the following dispatch programs were conducted: Seminars on international aviation law in the Philippines and Malaysia, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Myanmar and Laos, vehicle maintenance in Timor-Leste, maritime security (oceanography) in Indonesia, fl ight safety and aviation medicine in Vietnam, underwater medicine in Myanmar and Vietnam, and road constructions engineering in Cambodia. In FY2016, a seminar on the international aviation law was implemented in Thailand. The invitation program involves inviting practitioners from the recipient country to Japan, providing opportunities for them to view facilities and undergo training. To date, the MOD/SDF has invited military offi cials from Vietnam, Mongolia, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, Cambodia, the Philippines, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea. During FY2015, the following dispatch programs were conducted: SDF personnel providing training on road construction in Mongolia **(1) Signifi cance of the Implementation of Capacity** **Building Assistance** In recent years, the importance of capacity building assistance has received increasing recognition. Capacity building assistance is an initiative with a purpose to actively create stability within the region and improve the global security environment by enhancing the ability of countries eligible for support through continuous human resource development and technical support in security and defense fi elds[8] during peacetime. Providing support for capacity building has the following objectives: (1) enabling the countries receiving such support to contribute to improving the global security environment; (2) strengthening bilateral relationships with the countries receiving such support; (3) strengthening the relationships with other supporting countries such as the United States and Australia; and (4) promoting Japan’s efforts to work proactively and independently to realize regional peace and stability, thereby increasing trust in the MOD/SDF, as well as Japan as a whole. In addition, these initiatives also facilitate the improvement of the SDF capabilities. **(2) Specifi c Activities** The long-term dispatch program involves dispatching a team composed of defense offi cials, SDF personnel, and staff from knowledgeable private sector groups such as NGOs for a long period in order to conduct large-scale, and systematic human resource development, such as lectures and practical training. This program has so far been conducted in Timor-Leste, Cambodia, and Mongolia. In FY2015, a long-term dispatch program took place in Mongolia, in the fi eld of road-construction engineering. The short-term dispatch program involves activities such as lectures and seminars, undertaken by knowledgeable SDF personnel. To date, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel to Mongolia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Myanmar, the Philippines, SDF personnel conducting a seminar on international aviation law in the Philippines ----- **(3) Cooperation with Relevant Countries** In efforts to stabilize the regional security environment, cooperation with other support countries is essential. In particular, capacity building cooperation between Japan, the United States and Australia is considered to be a priority area of engagement. At the joint announcement of the Japan-U.S. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation (“2+2”) in April 2015, the ministers announced the strengthening of continuous and close bilateral cooperation through capacity building assistance between the two countries to realize the peace, stability and prosperity of the region. This was also confirmed at the Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting during the same month as well as at the JapanU.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting in November 2015. At the Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting in May 2015, the ministers agreed to further continuous trilateral capacity building cooperation in the field of maritime security. In particular, from October to November 2015, the SDF and the U.S. Armed Forces participated in the Australian Defence Force-led Exercise “HARII HAMUTUK” as part of capacity building assistance to the engineering unit of Timor-Leste Defense Force, and provided technical guidance in engineering and construction. In May 2013, March 2015, and March 2016, experts from SDF personnel conducting a seminar on underwater medicine military music training with personnel from Papua New Guinea, the areas of aviation meteorology underwater medicine, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief with personnel from Myanmar, PKO with the personnel from Vietnam, and road construction engineering with personnel from Mongolia. In FY2016, aviation safety training was conducted with personnel from Thailand. See>> Fig. III-2-1-7 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) See>> Reference 52 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance) See>> Reference 53 (Status of Invitation Program) |1-7 Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program|Col2| |---|---| ||| |1. Human resourc engineering Period: July – Sept Target: Mongolian from the D Dispatched person 2 GSDF per 1 administrat 2. Sem 9. Seminar on underwater medicine Mongolia med Period: December 2015 Period: Target: Medical officers and divers etc., of Target: the Myanmar Army and Navy 7. Human resource development regarding civil Dispat Dispatched personnel: engineering 4 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau Period: November 2015 administrative officials Target: National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia. Dispatched personnel: 3. Sem 10. Seminar on humanitarian assistance and 3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau Period: disaster relief administrative official Target: Period: March 2016 Target: Staff and personnel of the Myanmar Dispat Armed Forces Dispatched personnel: 3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 9–10 11–12 Myanmar LLaaooss 1 1. dS ie sm asin tea rr ro en li eh fumanitarian assistance and 17 3 P Tae rr gio ed t:: F Se tab fr fu aa nry d 2 p0 e1 rs6 onnel from the Laos Ministry of Thailand 7 2 National Defense and Royal Lao Armed Forces Dispatched personnel: Cambodia Vietnam 1 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 13 MMaallaayyssiiaa r on international aviation law 13. Seminar on international aviation law l 2016 Period: June 2015 f and personnel from Target: Royal Malaysian Air Force. Royal Thai Armed Forces. Dispatched personnel: personnel: 3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau SDF personnel, 2 Internal administrative official 8 eau administrative officials 8. Seminar on oceanography Indonesia Period: March 2016 Target: Oceanography Office, Indonesian Navy, etc. Dispatched personnel: 6. Technical guidan 2 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau (hosted by the Au administrative official Period: October - No (2 coast guard officers) Target: Timor-Leste Dispatched personn 8 GSDF pers administrativ|| Fig. III-2-1-7 Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program 1. Human resource development regarding civil engineering [Legend] Period: July – September 2015 : Collaboration program with Target: Mongolian Armed Forces, teaching staff other assisting countries Dispatched personnel: from the Defense University of Mongolia : Long-term dispatch program 2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau : Short-term dispatch program 1 administrative official 2. Seminar on aviation safety and aviation 9. Seminar on underwater medicinePeriod: December 2015 Mongolia medicinePeriod: November 2015 Target: Medical officers and divers etc., of Target: Vietnam Air Defense and Air Force. the Myanmar Army and Navy 7. Human resource development regarding civil Dispatched personnel: Dispatched personnel: engineering 5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau 4 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials Period: November 2015Target: National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia. administrative official 12. Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 10. Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief Dispatched personnel: 3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 3. Seminar on underwater medicinePeriod: March 2016Target: Medical officers in the Vietnamese Period: June 2016Dispatched personnel: 3 Target: Staff and personnel from the Laos Ministry of National Defense Period: March 2016 Navy, etc. GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau Target: Staff and personnel of the Myanmar Dispatched personnel: administrative officials Armed Forces 3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau Dispatched personnel: 3 MSDF personnel, administrative official 1 Internal Bureau administrative official 9–10 14. Seminar on international aviation law 11–12 Period: June 2015 Target: Philippine Air Force. 11. Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief Myanmar LaosLaos17 3 1614–15 Dispatched personnel: 3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative official Period: February 2016Target: Staff and personnel from the Laos Ministry of National Defense and Royal Lao Armed Forces Thailand 7 2 Philippines 15. Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief Dispatched personnel: 1 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau Cambodia Vietnam Period: June 2016Target: Staff and personnel from the Armed administrative official Forces of the Philippines 13 Dispatched personnel: 2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau 17. Seminar on international aviation law 13. Seminar on international aviation law MalaysiaMalaysia administrative official Period: April 2016 Period: June 2015 Target: Staff and personnel from Target: Royal Malaysian Air Force. the Royal Thai Armed Forces. Dispatched personnel: 16. Japan-U.K. joint seminar on humanitarian Dispatched personnel: 3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau assistance and disaster relief 3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials administrative official 8 6 4–5 Period: January 2016Target: Staff and personnel from the Armed Forces of ASEAN countries Dispatched personnel: 8. Seminar on oceanography Indonesia 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials Period: March 2016 Timor-Leste Target: Oceanography Office, Indonesian Navy, etc. Dispatched personnel: 6. Technical guidance regarding civil engineering 4. On-site guidance regarding vehicle 5. On-site guidance regarding vehicle 2 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau (hosted by the Australian Defense Forces) maintenance and management maintenance and management administrative official Period: October - November 2015 Period: July 2015 Period: February 2016 (2 coast guard officers) Target: Timor-Leste logistic support troops Target: Timor-Leste logistic support component Target: Timor-Leste logistic support component Dispatched personnel: Dispatched personnel: Dispatched personnel: 8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau 5 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau 4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official administrative officials administrative official ----- **VOICE** **Capacity Building in Timor-Leste: Assistance by Japan, the United States** **Column** **and Australia** **Second Lieutenant Julia Da Costa, Supply Section, Material Division Timor-Leste Defense Force Headquarters** I participated in exercise “HARII HAMUTUK”, an Australian Defense Force led engineering capacity building activity in Timor-Leste, together with GSDF personnel, as a Japanese-Tetum interpreter. “HARII HAMUTUK” means “building together” in the Tetum language, the offi cial language of Timor-Leste. In this project, approximately 100 participants from Japan, the United States, Australia, and Timor-Leste, joined forces and conducted a construction work to build accommodation buildings and classrooms for the Timor-Leste Defence Force and wider community. In 2010 I started my study as a foreign student at the Japan National Defense Academy, and in the spring of 2015 I graduated as one of the fi rst female foreign students. I currently work in the supply section at the Timor-Leste Defense Force Headquarters. However, I greatly appreciated the opportunity to participate in the project as a Japanese-Tetum interpreter, using the Japanese language skills acquired whilst studying at the National Second Lieutenant Julia Da Costa(center) translating for her colleagues Defense Academy. I also enjoyed the opportunity to work alongside GSDF, the United States Armed Forces and the Australian Defence Force in the fi eld of capacity building cooperation. I was impressed by the construction work skills of the military personnel from Japan, the United States, and Australia, sweating together with the engineering unit of the Timor-Leste Defense Force. Through the interaction between our four countries on the project site, I knew that our efforts would positively impact Timor-Leste and our cooperative relationships with Japan, the United States, and Australia. In the future, I hope to continue to serve as a bridge between Japan and Timor-Leste, not only through “HARII HAMUTUK” but also other opportunities for defense cooperation and exchanges. both the United States and Australia participated in seminars on underwater medicine in Vietnam. In the Japan-U.K. Joint Statement of January 2016, it was agreed that further cooperation for capacity building in the areas of, maritime security, maritime safety, marine conservation, and cyber security in Southeast Asian countries would be pursued. In the same month, the two countries jointly held a seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for the ASEAN countries in the Philippines, and the MOD’s achievement from international disaster relief activities and capacity building assistance in the same area were shared. It is important that close coordination between relevant countries of capacity building assistance is promoted whilst being complementary and ensuring that such assistance is carried out effectively and effi ciently. - 2 Pacifi c Partnership has dispatched SDF medical personnel and units, amongst others, as part of this initiative, In 2016, it is planned that SDF medical personnel, GSDF engineering personnel, and MSDF vessels will be dispatched to Timor-Leste, Vietnam, Palau and Indonesia to conduct support activities. - 3 Multilateral Joint Training **(1) Signifi cance of Multilateral Joint Training in the Asia-** **Pacifi c Region** Since 2000, in the Asia-Pacifi c region, in addition to traditional training conducted in preparation for combat situations, multinational training in non-traditional security fi elds, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, as well as Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), has been conducted. It is important to participate in such multinational training exercises so as not only to raise the skill level of the SDF, but also to create a cooperative platform with the countries involved. In light of this perspective, the MOD/SDF continues to actively engage in such training. See>> Reference 54 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)) **(2) Initiatives toward Multilateral Training** a. Participation in, and Hosting of, Multilateral Joint Training and Exercises In April 2002, the MSDF hosted the second Western Pacific submarine rescue exercise its first time hosting the The Pacifi c Partnership (PP), which started in 2007, is an initiative in which naval vessels, primarily those from the U.S. Navy, visit countries in the region to provide medical care, to conduct civil engineering business, and to engage in cultural exchange, as well as to seek to strengthen collaboration with the participating countries and facilitate international disaster relief activities, through cooperation with the government, military, international organizations, and NGOs in each of those countries Since 2007 Japan ----- exercise. Following this, in October 2002, the MSDF also hosted a multilateral search and rescue exercise as well as the sixth Western Pacific submarine rescue exercise in September 2013. Meanwhile, in March 2011, Japan and Indonesia co-hosted ARF-DiREx2011, the second time the exercise was held, within the framework of the ARF. Moreover, since 2005, the SDF has also been involved in the annual Cobra Gold exercise, a multinational joint training exercise co-hosted by the United States and Thailand. In Cobra Gold 16 held in February 2016, the SDF participated in the command post exercises, conducted training in transporting Japanese nationals overseas, and also participated in the public health section and the construction section of humanitarian and civic assistance activities. Since 2010, the SDF has participated in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Capstone Exercise, a multinational exercise for U.N. peacekeeping operations launched by the United States. In August 2015, the SDF participated in staff exercises and field training as part of the Exercise Keris Aman held in Malaysia. The GSDF participated in the multilateral exercise, KHAAN QUEST 16, co-hosted by the United States and Mongolia from May to June 2016. The MSDF participated in the U.S.-Indo Naval Exercises (Malabar 2015) jointly hosted by the two countries in the waters around eastern India in October 2015, the Indonesiahosted multilateral joint naval exercise Komodo 16 in the waters around Indonesia and the U.S.- hosted International Minesweeper Training conducted in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula in April 2016, and the Exercise Malabar 2016 in the waters between Sasebo and the area to the east of Okinawa in June of the same year. The ASDF participated in the exercise “Corp North Guam 16,” which was hosted jointly by Japan, the United States and Australia and was held in Guam in February 2016. The ASDF also participated in the multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises. b. Multinational Tabletop Exercises, etc. Initiatives have also been made to invite observers from other foreign countries since September 2001, when observers from eight Asia-Pacific countries participated in the fourth Japan-Russia Search and Rescue training hosted by Japan. In addition, the GSDF has hosted the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP) every year since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperative initiatives, inviting officers from the respective countries involved. In 2015, 21 countries and international organizations participated in the event where discussions and training were carried out. SDF personnel engaging in construction activities in the Pacific Partnership SDF personnel explaining the situation during the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Capstone Exercise (Keris Aman) The MSDF destroyer Ise and vessels from other countries participating in the Exercise Komodo 2016 SDF personnel participating in the Kahn Quest multinational joint exercises ----- **4 Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** In promoting cooperation and exchanges in the area of security, it is necessary to strengthen them based on a combination of the most optimal means, whilst also taking into account the actual situation of the partner countries and their relationship with Japan. Therefore, not only comprehensive efforts based on a multilateral framework but also bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges also plays an important role to realize them. - 1 Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges September 2012, both countries issued a joint statement entitled Common Vision and Objectives agreeing to further expand defense cooperation between Japan and Australia. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** At the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in July 2014, Prime Minister Abe described the relationship between the two countries as a “Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century” and signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology as well as approved the proposal[11] for JapanAustralia defense cooperation that was agreed upon at the fi fth Japan-Australia “2+2” held in June 2014. In May 2015, at the Japan-Australia Defense Ministers Meeting held at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue, Minister of Defense Nakatani and Minister for Defence Kevin Andrews agreed to further strengthen Japan-Australia defense cooperation through joint exercises and other initiatives. Furthermore, at the Defense Ministerial Talks held in Tokyo in June 2015, the two ministers exchanged opinions regarding the future defense cooperation between the two countries, and at the same time agreed to strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the South China Sea, and to resolve the situation in accordance with international law. At the sixth Japan-Australia “2+2” held in November 2015, further strengthening the “Special Strategic Partnership” between the two countries was confi rmed and new initiatives for strengthening bilateral security and defense cooperation were specifi ed. In this trend, at the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in December 2015, two leaders reconfi rmed the “Special Strategic Partnership” between the two countries and emphasized the importance of deepening their special relationship based on the view of taking responsibility for the peace and prospects of the Asia-Pacifi c region and the international community. The two leaders also approved the new initiatives agreed at the Japan-Australia “2+2” Meeting in November. The two countries also actively conduct service-toservice exchanges in which the enhancement of mutual understanding as well as the trust and friendly relationship **(1) Signifi cance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with Australia** Australia is an important partner for Japan in the AsiaPacifi c region: Both Japan and Australia are allied with the United States and share not only universal values[9] but also strategic stakes and interests. In particular, in recent years, as responsible countries in the Asia Pacifi c region, Japan and Australia are strengthening mutual cooperation focused primarily on areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities. In terms of Japan-Australia bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the fi rst such joint declaration in the realm of security with a country other than the United States, was announced at the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting in March 2007. It has been making steady progress since then and has now reached the stage of more concrete and practical cooperation. In May 2010, the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[10] and its Procedural Arrangement were signed at the third Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), and they entered into force in January 2013. The ACSA enabled the reciprocal provision of supplies and services by the SDF and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) during international peace cooperation and other activities. Moreover, due to the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement that entered into force in March 2013 and the foundations for sharing information that have been developed between the two countries, it is expected that bilateral cooperation will be further strengthened. Furthermore, at the fourth Japan-Australia “2+2” in 9 Universal value: The National Security Strategy stipulates, “freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law” as universal values. 10 Offi cial title: The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the SDF of Japan and the ADF of Australia 11 This proposal deepened the bilateral security and defense relationship through the expansion and enhancement of training and exercises, extension of human exchanges, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peacekeeping and capacity building as well as Japan-Australia-U.S. trilateral cooperation. At the same time, it also determined the commencement of negotiation towards the ----- is promoted through, for example, the participation of the ASDF Chief of Staff in the Air Power Conference (APC) organized by Australia. Facilitation and strengthening of Japan-Australia cooperation have contributed to the formation of the order within the region and the effort towards international peace centered on the United Nations. For example, in August 2012, two Australian military personnel began to undertake coordination activities with the SDF’s deployed unit for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Japan-Australia joint exercises were conducted in Japanese coastal waters in October 2015 and in the sea areas surrounding Australia in April 2016 to further strengthen the bilateral cooperation in training and exercises. In addition, Japan has been working on the review of multifaceted defense equipment and technology cooperation with Australia. For example, Japan commenced joint research in the field of marine hydrodynamics in December 2015. Meanwhile, Japan submitted a proposal regarding cooperation for the Australian Future Submarine Program in November 2015, but the Australian Government announced in April 2016 that they had selected a French company as their international partner. See>> Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) See>> Reference 55 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)) **(3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the United** **States, and Australia** Japan and Australia are both allied with the United States, and share universal values. They cooperate closely in order to resolve the various challenges the Asia-Pacific region and the international community are facing. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such cooperation, it is important to promote trilateral cooperation with the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability. The Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), which is a Director General-level meeting among the three countries, has been held six times since April 2007. With regard to training and exercises, the GSDF participated in the U.S.-Australia joint exercise (Exercise Talisman Saber) for the first time in July 2015. In addition, an MSDF vessel participated in Japan-U.S.-Australia joint cruise training in January and April 2016. - 2 Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation **and Exchanges** **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchange** **with the Republic of Korea** For Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is the most important neighboring country, which shares strategic interests, and is extremely vital to Japan in geopolitical terms. In addition, the two countries share many strategic interests as allies of the United States. Therefore, even if difficult issues occasionally arise, close collaboration between the two countries on the security front has enormous significance for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Both Japan and the ROK are confronted with wideranging and complex security challenges including not only the North Korean nuclear and missile issues, but also counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, large-scale natural disasters, antipiracy measures, maritime security and so on. In order for the two countries to deal effectively with such challenges related to security, it is important to carry out not just exchanges for increasing mutual understanding and trust building but more broad-ranging and concrete defense cooperation. For this aim, it is important to conclude the Information Security Agreement and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchange** In April 2015, the Japan-ROK Security Dialogue at the foreign and defense working-level was held in Seoul for the first time in nearly five years where the security policies and defense policies of the two countries were discussed. In May 2015, Defense Minister Nakatani held the first Japan-ROK Ministerial Dialogue in four years with Defense Minister Han Min-koo on the sideline of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue. The two ministers shared a common recognition regarding the security environment The Chief of Staff of the GSDF, Iwata (center), having an exchange opportunity with the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command (left), the Commander of the United States Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (second from left), Chief of the Australian Ground i ----- The Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting in the ROK (October 2015) MSDF vessel (back) conducting training with a ROK Navy vessel (front) surrounding the two countries and exchanged opinions concerning the defense policies of Japan and the ROK. They also consulted each other regarding specific defense cooperation and exchange such as the participation of ROK naval vessels in the SDF naval review and the implementation of the Japan-ROK joint search and rescue bilateral exercise within this year, to which the ROK side responded positively. During the defense ministers meeting in Seoul in October of the same year, two ministers had the same understanding, regarding the security concerns between the two countries, that cooperation between Japan and the ROK as well as among Japan, the United States and the ROK would be important. The two ministers also agreed to strengthen defense exchanges in various areas such as human exchanges, exchanges between units, education and research exchange, and to promote cooperation in the areas of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy activities, humanitarian activities and disaster relief activity. In June 2016, the Japan-ROK Ministerial Dialogue was held on the sideline of the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue, and the Ministers affirmed the necessity of further advancing the Japan-ROK and JapanU.S.-ROK security and defense cooperation. In addition, the two ministers agreed to strengthen the emergency communication system between the MOD and the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK in order to communicate and coordinate appropriately in case of emergency such as the North Korea nuclear and missile issues. Regarding defense cooperation and exchanges, the two ministers also appreciated the reactivation of defense cooperation at various levels and agreed to continue advancing the cooperation between the two countries going forward as they seize all available opportunities. In October 2015, the SDF enhanced coordination with the ROK Navy through the participation of ROK naval vessels in the SDF naval review and the continuous implementation of the Japan-ROK search and rescue bilateral exercise, while in November the ROK Navy military band participated in the SDF Marching Festival. Also in the same month, the ASDF Chief of Staff participated in the Aerospace & Defense Exhibition (ADEX) in Seoul and exchanged opinions with the Chief of Air Staff for the first time in six years. In March 2016, the Chief of Maritime Staff visited the ROK and had an opinion exchange opportunity with the Chief of Staff of the ROK Navy, while in April of the same year the Chief of Staff of the ROK Army visited Japan and carried out opinion exchanges with the Chief of Ground Staff. As these interactions and activities indicate, the exchanges between the Chiefs of Ground, Maritime, and Air Staff of the two countries have resumed. With respect to the Kumamoto Earthquake that occurred in April of the same year, Japan received relief supplies provided by the ROK Air Force C-130 transport aircraft, which showed close cooperation between Japan and the ROK. See>> Reference 56 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)) **(3) Cooperative Relationship between Japan, the U.S.,** **and the ROK** As both Japan and the ROK are allies of the United States, which are indispensable to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, policy consultation among the defense authorities of Japan, the United States, and the ROK mainly at the working level has been conducted since 1994, and the “Information Sharing Arrangement among the Defense Authorities from Japan, the United States, and the ROK”[12] was signed in December 2014. This arrangement has worked to develop more concrete cooperation by enabling the defense authorities from the three countries to share classified information regarding the threat of the North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles. In addition, in a trilateral summit meeting held in March 2016, the leaders 12 Official name: Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement Concerning the Nuclear and Missile Threats Posed by North Korea Among the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, the Ministry of ----- affirmed necessity of further advancing the cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK in the security area. Based on the agreement reached between the foreign and defense ministries of the three countries instructions would be given to the administrative officials in their countries in order to advance specific security and defense cooperation. In this context, it is necessary to further deepen collaboration and cooperation among Japan, the United States, and the ROK. Since 2009, Japan, the United States, and the ROK have conducted Trilateral Defense Ministers’ Meetings on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue, and at the Meeting in June 2016, a Joint Press Statement was issued following discussion on the regional situations including North Korea and trilateral defense cooperation. During the meeting, the Ministers and the Secretary strongly condemned North Korea’s provocative actions, while they appreciated the close trilateral communication and cooperation that took place at various levels before and immediately after a nuclear test and ballistic missile launches and agreed to continue such efforts. The three ministers also directed their respective staff to explore ways to improve communication and coordination among the three defense authorities. At the same time, the Ministers discussed the first Japan-U.S.ROK missile warning exercise, Pacific Dragon 2016, and other topics such as defense medical related events and other cultural exchanges, enhancement of information sharing, and maritime security. At the working level, based on the framework of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (DTT), close cooperation is conducted at various levels such as the Director-General level and the Director level. Most recently, in response to the nuclear test in January 2016 and multiple ballistic missile launches that were called “artificial satellites” in February of the same year, the Director-General level video teleconferences were held to share information and exchange views. They agreed to continue close cooperation. Japan, the United States, and the ROK also promote close service-to-service cooperation. In July 2014, the Chief of Joint Staff of Japan, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff held the first chief-of-staff-level meeting in Hawaii to discuss a broad range of issues, including the increasingly strained security situation, such as nuclear and missile threats from North Korea, and measures to enhance trilateral coordination among Japan, the United States and the ROK. The chief-of-staff-level video teleconference was held again in February 2016 where information sharing and cooperation among the three countries in response to North Korea’s nuclear test etc. were discussed. - 3 Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges **(1) Significance of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges** **with India** India, which is becoming increasingly influential against a backdrop of what is projected to become the world’s largest population as well as its high economic growth and latent economic power, is located in the center of sea lanes that connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, making it an extremely important country geopolitically for Japan. Furthermore, Japan and India, which share universal values[13] as well as have a common interest in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, have established the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” In this context, Japan and India have also been strengthening their relations in the area of security in recent years. In October 2008, the prime ministers of Japan and India signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. India is the third country with which Japan signed a joint declaration specializing in security, following those with the United States and Australia. In December 2009, the prime ministers of Japan and India also formulated the Action Plan to advance security cooperation between the two countries. The declaration deepened the initiatives in various areas - meetings and dialogues at various levels such as the ministerial and Chief of Staff level, service to service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises, and promotion of cooperation in maritime security such as cooperation in anti-piracy operations. This in turn served as a subsequent guideline for cooperation in the field of security between Japan and India. Moreover, in September 2014, Memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges were signed, which strengthened the The Chief of Staff of the MSDF Takei having an exchange meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Indian Navy ----- relationship as partners that are capable of dealing with regional and global issues together. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Cooperation** **and Exchanges** During the Japan-India Summit Meeting with Prime Minister Modi held in September 2014, both prime ministers agreed on a number of approaches to be taken in order to upgrade the relationship between the two countries to a special strategic global partnership, including strengthening of the Japan-India “2+2,” continuous participation of Japan in the U.S.-Indo Naval Exercises (Malabar),launch of working level consultations between the two countries with a view to promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation. At the Japan-India Ministerial Meeting in March 2015, both ministers agreed that the two countries would hold continuous discussions regarding defense equipment cooperation concerning the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft, and the regular continuation of not only bilateral maritime training but also cooperation involving the ground and air forces. During the Japan-India Defense ministerial Meeting conducted during the ADMM Plus Meeting in November 2015 and the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2016, the two ministers confirmed the importance of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and India including the discussions on the strengthening of cooperation in the maritime security field through Japan’s participation in Malabar on a regular basis and the defense equipment cooperation concerning the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft. The two ministers also agreed upon working on building more exchanges in a wide range of fields to strengthen the bilateral cooperation. Furthermore, during the Summit Meeting in December 2015, the two Prime Ministers agreed to transform the key relationship between Japan and India into “a deep, broadbased and action-oriented partnership, which reflects a broad convergence of their long-term political, economic and strategic goals.” Moreover, the two Prime Ministers concluded the Agreement concerning the Transfer of the Defence Equipment and Technology and the General Security of Military Information Agreement in order to further strengthen the foundation of deep strategic ties. These agreements have enabled the two countries further deepening the bilateral defense equipment cooperation and information exchanges, which served as the foundation for the future development of Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges. With regard to exercises and training, responding to the agreement related to Japan’s regular participation in Malabar, the MSDF participated in Malabar 2015 in the waters east of India in October 2015 and Malabar 2016 in the waters between Sasebo and Okinawa in June 2016 to practice anti-submarine warfare as well as search and rescue activities. Also in October 2015, an Indian Navy vessel participated in the SDF naval review, while the MSDF vessel participated in the International Fleet Review organized by the Indian Navy in February 2016. Furthermore, service-to-service exchanges have become activated as well, for example, through expert exchanges in the area of test pilot involving both the Indian Air Force and the ASDF, and exchange between airlift units of the two countries. See>> Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) See>> Reference 57 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)) - 4 Japan-China Defense Exchanges and Cooperation **(1) Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation** **with China** Stable relations between Japan and China are an essential factor for the peace and stability of the AsiaPacific region. From a broad and a medium- to long-term perspective, Japan it is necessary for both countries to strive to construct and enhance a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests with China” in all areas, including security. In particular, Japan will continue to encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, to comply with international norms of behavior, as well as to improve transparency with regard to its advancing military capabilities in the context of its rapidly increasing military budget. As part of such efforts, through continuing and promoting defense exchange, Japan will urge China to demonstrate greater transparency in its military and security policies, and promote measures such as establishing a framework to avert or prevent unexpected situations. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchanges** Japan-China defense exchanges became stagnated following Japan’s acquisition and ownership of the Senkaku Islands in September 2012, but it has gradually been resumed since the latter half of 2014. The Japan-China Summit Meeting was held in November 2014, while a Japan-China Security Dialogue was held in March 2015 in which strengthening of the bilateral exchanges between the two countries was agreed. In May 2015, Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations were held and the promotion of defense exchanges between the two countries was confirmed. The second, third and fourth meetings of the HighLevel Consultation on Maritime Affairs were conducted ----- in September 2014, January 2015, and December 2015 respectively. In November 2015, the Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting was held for the fi rst time in four years and fi ve months during the ADMM Plus Meeting. The two ministers had a frank exchange of views regarding various issues standing between the two countries, and agreed to recognize the importance of early commencement of the operation of the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities” as well as the development of Japan-China defense exchanges. The “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities” aims to avoid unexpected collisions and prevent unforeseen consequences in waters and airspace from escalating into military clashes **VOICE** **Japan-India Exchanges in Progress** **Column** **– Participated in the Indian Navy Fleet Review** **MSDF Maizuru District (Maizuru City, Kyoto Prefecture)** **Commander Satoshi Takaoka, Captain of destroyer Matsuyuki, Escort Division 14 (Maizuru)** Destroyer Matsuyuki participated in the international fl eet review held in Visakhapatnam, a port city in the central southern area on the east coast of India in February 2016. It was a lavish fl eet review in which the Navies from 52 countries participated and over 150 vessels gathered together. During the visit, various relevant events were held such as a troop review by the Prime Minister of India, Indian cultural heritage training, International Maritime Conference, a parade by the crew within the city. With the purpose of promoting mutual understanding and friendship with other participating countries in the international fl eet review, all the Japanese crews attended each event having a strong spirit that “each and every one of us represents Japan.” In addition, during the outward voyage to the fl eet review, the MSDF also conducted joint exercise with the U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, while in the return path it participated in a joint exercise with Thailand. India and other countries around the Indian Ocean that participated in this fl eet review are geopolitically important to Japan. I consider that the international cooperation with these countries through defense exchanges has a deep signifi cance in the situation in which ensuring maritime security is increasingly required. The author (left) manning the rails at the International Fleet Review **VOICE** **Japan-India Exchanges in Progress** **Column** **– My Experience Visiting the Indian Air Force as a Test Pilot** **ASDF Ashiya Air Base (Ashiya-cho, Onga District, Fukuoka Prefecture)** **Colonel (ASDF) Hiroshi Senba, Commander of Flying Training Group, 13th Flying Training Wing** In January 2016, three personnel (two test pilots and one Research and Development offi cer) from the Air Development and Test Command visited the test fl ight unit and test evaluation organization of the Indian Air Force. At the site in India, we exchanged opinions regarding the process of developing aircraft, education of test pilots, test procedure of aircraft, and the safety of test fl ights with the test pilots and experts in fl ight tests from the Indian Air Force, and we were able to learn the differences between the ASDF and the Indian Air Force. The Indian Air Force operates aircraft with different operational ideas such as adopting Russian-made and European-made aircraft. We were able to see the condition in which test pilots serve as a bridge between operators and engineers to make signifi cant contributions to the stable operation of the Indian Air Force’s aircraft. In addition, we also had an interesting opportunity to learn about the unit centrally in charge of software development of equipment, which the ASDF does not have. Going forward, I will refl ect the knowledge and experience gained in this visit training on to the research and development as well as aviation safety in the ASDF. At the same time, I intend to make contributions to the promotion of the defense exchanges between the ASDF and the Indian Air Force. A scene of interaction between the author and an offi cial of the Indian Air Force ----- also taken this into account in its exchanges with Russia. Simultaneously, it is important to maintain constant contact at the working level in order not to cause any unforeseen circumstances and unnecessary conflicts with Russia, a neighboring country. The MOD considers these points in a comprehensive manner and advances exchanges with Russia accordingly. **(2) Recent Major Achievements in Defense Exchange** At the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting in April 2013, the two leaders affirmed the importance of expanding cooperation between Japan and Russia in the field of security and defense, amid the growing role of the AsiaPacific region and major changes in the international security environment, and agreed to set up a meeting between foreign and defense authorities at the ministerial level (the “2+2” Meeting). At the first Japan-Russia “2+2” Meeting in November 2013, the two countries agreed to conduct ground-to-ground unit exchanges between land forces and mutual dispatch of exercise observers on a regular basis, and bilateral exercises between counter piracy units of the MSDF and Russian Navy in the Gulf of Aden, as well as regular hosting of the Japan-Russia Cyber Security Meeting. In October 2014, the MSDF carried out the 15th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises. In addition, Japan-Russia bilateral talks were held at the Vice-Ministerial level at the timing of the 14th ShangriLa Dialogue, which took place in May 2015, and defense exchange between two countries was discussed. See>> Reference 59 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)) The Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting in Malaysia (November 2015) or political problems. It was agreed that the mechanism would be comprised of: (1) regular meetings; (2) hotlines between the defense authorities of Japan and China; and (3) direct communications between naval vessels and aircraft, while the specific contents of it are in the process of adjustment with the Chinese side. As part of initiatives to construct a “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests,” it will be essential to strive to promote mutual trust and understanding between Japan and China through dialogue at various levels and in a range of areas, while also actively promoting concrete cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as counter-piracy measures. See>> Reference 58 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)) - 5 Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges and Cooperation **(1) Significance of Defense Exchange and Cooperation** **with Russia** Russia has great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region, and is an important neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore very important for Japan to promote mutual trust with Russia through defense exchanges. As Japan-Russia relations have continuously been developing in a wide range of areas, the MOD/SDF continuously conducts, in accordance with the Memorandum on Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges drawn up in 1999 (revised in 2006), various dialogues between defense authorities, annual meetings based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, and bilateral search and rescue exercises. Regarding Japan’s relationship with Russia, the Government of Japan intends to take an appropriate response whilst emphasizing the solidarity of the G7 (Group of Seven),[14] taking the Ukrainian situation and other factors into account. In light of this, the MOD has - 6 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with **ASEAN Countries** ASEAN countries, which continue to experience rapid economic growth and are expected to play a role as a center of growth that is open to the world, and Japan are traditional partners with history of exchanges and a close economic relationship more than 40 years. In addition, ASEAN countries are located in geopolitically important areas occupying strategic points for the maritime traffic for Japanese sea lanes, are also playing an important role in ensuring the peace and prosperity of Japan as well as the entire region. Therefore, it is important that Japan strengthens cooperation in the security and defense areas and enhance the relationship of trust with ASEAN countries. In particular, since Japan and ASEAN countries share a number of issues in the non-traditional security areas such as maritime security and humanitarian ----- assistance and disaster relief, they promote cooperation based on multinational frameworks such as the ADMM Plus and the ARF, as well as strengthening bilateral cooperation and exchanges to enhance cooperation for the capacity building in the entire region with a focus on the future. In November 2015, ASEAN launched the ASEAN Community, which is comprised of three pillars, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Japan promotes substantial cooperation by conducting defense equipment and technology cooperation, capacity building assistance, joint exercises, and other initiatives with ASEAN, which promotes the regional integration. See>> Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **(1) Indonesia** Indonesia is the world largest island nation with its land and population consisting of nearly 40% of the entire Southeast Asia, and maintains close defense exchanges and cooperation with Japan. During the Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting in March 2015, President Joko Widodo of the Republic of Indonesia and Prime Minister Abe agreed to strengthen the Strategic Partnership underpinned by sea and democracy, and also re-affirmed their intention to hold the “Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation” (“2+2” Meeting). At the “2+2” Meeting held in Tokyo for the first time in December of the same year, four ministers agreed to commence negotiations on the Agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, actively participate in the multilateral naval exercise (Komodo 2016), and develop capacity building assistance, and other points. Similarly, at the working level, exchanges at various levels have been carried out, including consultations between foreign and defense authorities, consultations between defense authorities, and various educational and academic exchanges. With regard to training and exercise, following 2014, the MSDF participated in the Komodo Exercise 2016 in the waters around Indonesia in April 2016, and conducted search and rescue as well as humanitarian assistance exercises. Japan and Indonesia have also been working on strengthening cooperation through capacity building assistance. See>> Fig. III-2-1-7 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) **(2) Vietnam** Vietnam is a coastal country of the South China Sea. At the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting held in March 2014, President Truong Tan Sang of Vietnam and Prime Minister Abe agreed to elevate the relationship between the two countries to an “Extensive Strategic Partnership.” In addition, in September 2015, Dr. Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, visited Japan and the Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting was held in which the two leaders agreed to strengthen cooperation in the security and defense areas. During the Defense Ministerial Meeting in November 2015, the two ministers agreed to strengthen the defense cooperation between the two countries through a number of initiatives such as: port calls of the MSDF at the Cam Ranh Bay International Port situated at a key strategic location in the South China Sea; continuation of cooperation in the PKO area; implementation of naval exercises regarding humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; expansion and enhancement of capacity building assistance; commencement of administrativelevel consultations regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation. As for vice-ministerial consultation, three of such consultations were held by January 2015, During these consultations, the two vice-ministers exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and discussed cooperation in the field of capacity building assistance, and in September 2015 they signed the Memorandum declaring the promotion of cooperation in the PKO area. The first Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) in Tokyo (D b 201 ) Minister of Defense Nakatani receiving an honor guard and a ceremonial weapon at ----- MSDF destroyers Ariake and Setogiri made a port call at the Cam Ranh Bay international port The Chief of Staff of the ASDF Sugiyama (left) having an exchange meeting with the Chief of Staff of the Singaporean Air Force (right) In February 2015, the Vietnamese Naval Commander visited Japan and with the Chief of Staff of the MSDF agreed to strengthen Japan-Vietnam service-to-service exchanges. In May 2015, the Chief of Staff of the ASDF visited Vietnam and exchanged views on future defense cooperation and exchanges, etc. with Vietnamese Air Force Commander and others. Furthermore, progress of defense exchanges has been made through the following activities: In February 2016 the MSDF patrol aircraft unit conducted a table-top exercise with an assumption of search and rescue with Vietnam People’s Navy and Air Force officers in Da Nang, and the ASDF transport unit carried out exchange activities with the Vietnam People’s Air Force, while in April 2016, an MSDF vessel for the first time made a call at the Cam Ranh Bay. It will continue to be vital to strengthen relationships in order to achieve more concrete, practical cooperation, based on the memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange as the cornerstone of our cooperation and exchanges. See>> Fig. III-2-1-7 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) **(3) Singapore** In December 2009, Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia with which Japan signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange, and a cooperative relationship is progressing steadily based on the memorandum. In particular, discussions between the defense authorities of Japan and Singapore have the longest history of any of Japan’s defense discussions with the countries of Southeast Asia, with 14 rounds of talks in the history. Moreover, the Minister of Defence from Singapore participates in the Shangri-La Dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) almost every year, and high-level exchanges between the Japanese and Singaporean defense ministers are carried out in which Japan’s security policy is also explained. At the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue held in June 2016, Minister of Defense Nakatani held a meeting with Singaporean Defense Minister Dr Ng The ministers exchanged opinions on regional situations, defense cooperation and exchanges, and other topics and confirmed that the two countries continue to work on the strengthening of the bilateral relationship. Additionally, port calls at the time of conducting international cooperation operations such as the United Nations PKO and anti-piracy activities, and service-toservice exchanges are also actively conducted. **(4) The Philippines** Between Japan and the Philippines, as well as highlevel exchanges, there have been frequent workinglevel exchanges including visits by naval vessels and consultations between the two defense authorities and service-to-service exchanges. At the defense ministerial meeting held in January 2015, the two defense ministers signed a memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges. This memorandum shows the intentions of the two countries to conduct cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as maritime security; in addition to holding defense ministerial meetings and vice-ministerial consultations on a regular basis; reciprocal visits between the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff, Chiefs of Staff of the SDFs, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanders of each services; and participation in trainings and exercises. In addition, during the Summit Meeting with President Aquino in November 2015, the two leaders mostly agreed upon the Defense equipment and technology transfer agreement, which was later signed in February 2016. Furthermore, during the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial telephone conference in May of the same year, the two ministers confirmed to embody the transfer of up to five MSDF TC-90 training aircrafts to the Philippine Navy in order to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine concerning humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, transportation, and maritime situational awareness. At the same time, the ministers also agreed to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries ----- **VOICE** **My Experience of Participation in the Ship Rider Program** **Column** **Lieutenant Junior Grade Mckleen Gil Parejo, the Philippine Navy** Having participated in the Ship Rider Program* organized by the MSDF at this time, I learned many things required of a Navy offi cer. I think that the program worked to promote a multilateral cooperation posture very effectively not only through various kinds of technical training, such as operational training for ships, but also through opinion exchanges with Navy offi cers from other countries regarding maritime security and measures to deal with large-scale disasters. I believe that the experience of having interaction with offi cers from various countries and touching on diverse cultures on the MSDF destroyer Ise for a long period of time will surely have a positive effect when cooperating with foreign Navies in the future. Initially, until the mid-through to this program, I had only a little awareness of working in cooperation with the Navy of other countries within the international community, and had a focus only on what the Philippine Navy would do. However, this program enabled me to gain many things, The author (center) checking the use of a compass for operational training which I would not have gained through training in my own country alone. This experience seems to have expanded my fi eld of view a lot and also changed my ways of thinking. I intend to actively spread information about this experience of mine not just as my own personal experience but also as an organizational experience. If there is another opportunity like this, I would like to participate in it, and even if I cannot participate I would like the Philippine Navy offi cers younger than myself to participate in it. This program enabled me so much both in terms of improving my ability as a Navy offi cer and growing as a human. I believe that this program will strengthen the future cooperation posture between the Philippine Navy and the MSDF, and will help to bring stability and peace to the region. - The Ship Rider Program is an exchange program for the next generation offi cers hosted by the MSDF with the aims to promote mutual understanding with countries participating and to build human networks. The program conducted an opinion exchange meeting, operational training, a training tour, and other contents on the MSDF destroyer Ise, which participated in the multilateral joint exercise between Wednesday April 13 and Tuesday April 26, 2016, inviting offi cers (19 offi cers from 19 countries) from the member countries of the Western Pacifi c Naval Symposium (WPNS). including sharing recognition of the regional situation centering on the South China Sea. As for service-to-service exchanges, the MASF vessels and the MSDF patrol aircraft unit in May and June 2015, respectively, conducted joint exercise concerning humanitarian assistance and disaster relief using the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)[15] in the Philippines. **(5) Thailand** With Thailand, Japan has a long history of defense cooperation and exchanges under the traditionally good relationship between the two countries, and the dispatching of Defense Attachés and consultations between defense authorities were initiated at an early stage. As for the acceptance of foreign students to the National Defense Academy, it was a Thai student who was accepted as the fi rst foreign student in 1958, and since then Thailand has sent the largest cumulative number of students. The MOD/SDF, since 2005, has been participating in the multilateral military exercise Cobra Gold hosted by the United States and Thailand. Furthermore, in April 2016, a human resources development seminar covering the area of international aviation law was carried out as the fi rst capacity building assistance for Thailand, while in May, an invitation project regarding aviation safety was conducted for the Royal Thai Air Force Safety Center. In June 2016, Minister of Defense visited Thailand, paid a courtesy call to Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, and had a meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Mr. Prawit Wongsuwon, and agreed to strengthen the bilateral defense cooperation and exchange. See>> Fig. III-2-1-7 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) **(6) Cambodia** Cambodia is the fi rst country to which Japan dispatched the SDF for U.N. peacekeeping operations in 1992. Since then, defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries have been continuously improving: in 2008, the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was also appointed as Defense Attaché to Cambodia, and support for capacity building was started in 2013. At the Japan-Cambodia Summit Meeting in December 2013, the bilateral relationship was upgraded to “strategic partnership.” After the summit, the Minister of Defense signed the Memorandum on Defense ----- **(8) Laos** Regarding Japan’s relations with Laos, defense cooperation and exchanges have been gradually developing since 2011, when the Defense Attaché to Vietnam was also appointed as Defense Attaché to Laos. In April 2013, the National Defense Academy accepted students from Laos for the fi rst time, and in August 2013, the fi rst Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting was held. The fi rst Japan-Laos Security Dialogue was realized in April 2014. In addition, in January 2014, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Laos for the fi rst time, and as the co-chair countries of the EWG on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) of the ADMM Plus, the two countries agreed to enhance their cooperation in the area of HA/DR. At the Defense Ministerial Meeting in November 2015, the two ministers agreed to develop the defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries. Furthermore, during the visit by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs to Laos in February 2016, views and opinions were exchanged regarding the commencement of capacity building assistance in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as well as plans for further defense cooperation. In March of the same year, the ASDF transport unit visited Laos and carried out service-toservice exchanges with the Loyal Lao Air Force. **(9) Malaysia** Regarding Japan’s relations with Malaysia, Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015 and also during the Third ADMM Plus in November of the same year. The two Ministers exchanged views regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and agreed to continue cooperation in this area between Japan and Malaysia. As for service-to-service exchanges, in August 2015 vessels from the MSDF and the Royal Malaysian Navy conducted a goodwill exercise in waters west of Kota Kinabalu, and in November 2015 the Commander of the Malaysian Armed Forces visited Japan to have a meeting Cooperation and Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defence of the Kingdom of Cambodia. See>> Fig. III-2-1-7 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) **(7) Myanmar** Regarding Japan’s relations with Myanmar, Japan has been promoting exchanges since Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democratic government in March 2011, such as realizing the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense’s fi rst visit to the country, and inviting Myanmar to participate in multilateral conferences hosted by Japan. In November 2013, the fi rst consultation between defense authorities was held in the capital city Naypyidaw, during which the two countries exchanged opinions regarding the procedures for future defense exchanges between the two nations and agreed to further promote exchanges. Furthermore, in November 2014, then Minister of Defense Eto held a meeting with Minister for Defense Wai Lwin of Myanmar, the chair country, whilst attending the Japan-ASEAN Roundtable and confi rmed their intention to promote defense exchanges. In July and August 2015, the Commander of Air Force, and the Vice Commander of the Armed Forces of Myanmar and the Commander of Myanmar Army visited Japan respectively. In addition, Minister of Defense Nakatani is scheduled to visit Myanmar in June 2016 to have meetings with the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services and the Minister of Defense separately and to pay a courtesy call to State Counselor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi. All of these activities have further advanced highlevel exchange between the two countries. Moreover, in March 2016, the ASDF transport unit visited Myanmar and carried out their fi rst service-to-service exchange with the Myanmar Air Force, while Japan is also working on the strengthening of bilateral cooperation through its capacity building assistance to Myanmar. See>> Fig. III-2-1-7 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Mimura (left) having a meeting with The Chief of Joint Staff Kawano (right) having a meeting with the Commander of ----- with the Chief of Joint Staff. Based on the cooperation relationship between Japan and Malaysia developed through the search operation in the missing Malaysian Airplane case occurred in 2014, the relationship between the SDF and the Malaysian Armed Forces has been strengthening in various fields such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. **(10) Brunei** Regarding Japan’s relations with Brunei, during the 2nd ADMM Plus meeting held in Brunei in August 2013, the Minister of Defense held talks with Brunei’s Minister of Energy Mohammad Yasmin Umar and exchanged views on the initiatives of the ADMM Plus. In addition, SDF aircraft from all of its three forces participated in humanitarian and disaster relief assistance as well as a joint exercise of the EWG on military medicine held in June 2013 in Brunei for the first time based on the framework of the ADMM Plus, while in May 2016 the MSDF destroyer Ise participated in a joint exercise held in Brunei, which serves as a co-chair of the EWG on maritime security of the ADMM Plus. See>> Reference 60 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)) assistance. At the same time, the two countries have been working on the enhancement of cooperation through support for capacity building. In addition, at the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2015, the Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held and opinions were exchanged regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges. At the meeting held between the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chief of Defense in October of the same year, promotion of security cooperation in the area of peacekeeping operation was agreed. See>> Fig. III-2-1-7 (Status of Capacity Building Assistance Program) **(3) Republic of Timor-Leste** With the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste to which the SDF had been dispatched as part of the U.N. peacekeeping operations to support the country’s independence since 2002, a ministerial meeting with the Minister of Defence Mr. Cristovão was held when he visited Japan in March 2015, during which both ministers agreed to continue exchanges between their defense authorities through educational exchanges and support for capacity building. In addition, the Defense Minister of Japan visited TimorLeste for the first time in 14 years in June 2016. Between the Japanese Defense Minister and Minister Cristovão, it was agreed that the two countries would continue and deepen the exchanges between the defense authorities through capacity building assistance, dispatch of students from Timor-Leste to the National Defense Academy and other schools, and port calls by the MSDF vessels. See>> Reference 61 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years)) - 7 Defense Exchanges and Cooperation with Other **Asia-Pacific Countries** **(1) New Zealand** With New Zealand, a memorandum of Japan-New Zealand defense cooperation and exchange was signed in August 2013. During the Summit Meeting in July 2014, the two countries agreed to conduct studies on an ACSA. Also, two SDF personnel participated in the Proliferation Security Initiative interdiction exercise (Exercise MARU 2015) organized by New Zealand in November 2015. In June 2016, at the Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting held at the timing of the 15th ShangriLa Dialogue, two ministers positively evaluated the frequent human exchanges at various levels between the two countries such as defense ministerial meetings and mutual visits by vice-ministers, and then agreed to develop the bilateral relationship between Japan and New Zealand that are “strategic partners” in the Asia-Pacific region. - 8 Significance of Defense Exchange and **Cooperation with European Countries** Europe shares universal values with Japan and plays a central role in working to address common challenges to global security, focusing primarily on non-traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy, as well as international peace cooperation activities. In this regard, promoting defense cooperation and exchanges with European countries provides the foundations for Japan to become actively involved in dealing with these challenges, and is important for both Japan and Europe. **(2) Mongolia** Following the signing of a memorandum on JapanMongolia defense cooperation and exchanges in January 2012, Japan and Mongolia promoted high-level exchanges such as the Defense Vice-ministerial Level Meeting and service-to-service exchanges, as well as working on the strengthening of cooperation through capacity building **(1) The United Kingdom** The United Kingdom, being a major power that has influence not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests as the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States Given ----- relation to defense equipment and technology cooperation, along with the progress of two joint research, commencing joint research regarding a new personnel vulnerability evaluation; (2) Pursuing Eurofighter Typhoon’s visit to Japan by the end of 2016 and the Japan-U.K. joint exercise during the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise in the Persian Gulf; (3) Promoting bilateral cooperation in the capacity building assistance for Southeast Asian countries; (4) Aiming to conclude ACSA as soon as possible. In June 2016, the Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting was held at the timing of the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue. Both ministers welcomed the progress in the Japan-U.K. defense cooperation in each area including defense equipment and technology cooperation, joint exercises, and capacity building assistance, and agreed to work closely to realize the Typhoon Fighter Aircraft Unit’s visit to Japan and holding of a joint exercise during the visit. As for service to service exchanges, in July 2015, unit-to-unit exchanges in which MSDF patrol aircraft P-1 participated in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT) was held in the United Kingdom. In September of the same year, the Chief of Staff, MSDF, visited the United Kingdom and conducted opinion exchanges with the British Secretary of State for Defence and other officials. Thus, we have been seeing a steady development of exchanges including the visit of, Royal Air Force transport aircraft A-400 to the ASDF’s Miho Air Base in October 2015. See>> Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **(2) France** France is a major power that has influence not only in Europe and Africa, but also in the world. Historically it has had a close relationship with Japan, and is positioned as a special partner in various international organizations. The defense authorities of the two countries have held consultations annually since 1994 to exchange a wide range of opinions regarding regional situations and security issues. In addition, in October 2011, the Japan-France Information Security Agreement came into effect, establishing a foundation for information-sharing between the two countries. In June 2013, French President Francois Hollande visited Japan, and the two countries issued a joint statement regarding cooperation in three fields, namely politics and security, economy, and culture. In May 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited France and held talks with President Hollande. The two leaders agreed to launch dialogue on cyber security and strengthen bilateral cooperation in maritime security. In July of the same year, the French Minister of Defense visited Japan to hold the Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting and the two ministers signed The second Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) in Tokyo (January 2016) this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan to promote cooperation through working together on global issues such as international peace cooperation activities, anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations, and through exchange of views on regional situations. With regard to Japan’s relationship with the United Kingdom, in April 2012, a joint statement was issued by the prime ministers of both countries, entitled “A Leading Strategic Partnership for Global Prosperity and Security,” which stated that the two nations would begin negotiations for a government-to-government information security agreement, endorse the signing of Memorandum of Defense Cooperation and Exchange by defense ministers of both countries, and promote the identification of appropriate defense equipment for joint development and production. Based on this joint statement, Memorandum of Defense Cooperation and Exchange was exchanged in June 2012 between the defense authorities of the two countries. In addition to the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology Agreement, which came into effect in July 2013, the Japan-UK Information Security Agreement entered into force in January 2014, leading to the development of a foundation for defense equipment and technology cooperation as well as informationsharing between the two countries. At the Japan-U.K. Summit in May 2014, in order to enhance their cooperation in security fields two prime ministers agreed to hold the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, to begin negotiations toward the conclusion of an Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA), and to promote joint exercises between the SDF and the British Armed Forces. Following this, the first Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on January 21, 2015. At the meeting, the four ministers agreed to strengthen cooperation in the security and defense fields, and at the same time, shared strategic situational awareness. In addition, during the second Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting in January 2016 four ministers confirmed the following points: (1) In ----- the statement of intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges. Furthermore, during the second Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting held in Tokyo in March 2015, the four ministers discussed the threat of terrorism. It was confi rmed that the two countries strengthen information exchange and cooperation in Africa and the Middle East to work on the fi ght against terrorism in cooperation with the international community and that they would also strengthen cooperation in the fi elds of defense equipment and technology cooperation, maritime security, and other fi elds. Moreover, the four ministers signed the agreement regarding the transfer of defense equipment and technology between the Government of Japan and the Government of France. Based on these agreements, the two countries **VOICE** **Japan-U.K. Exchanges in Progress** **Column** **– MSDF Patrol Aircraft P-1’s fi rst visit to the United Kingdom** **MSDF Atsugi Air Base (Ayase City, Kanagawa Prefecture)** **Commander (MSDF) Shinichi Chiba, Air Development Squadron 51** I work as a P-1 pilot for the MSDF Air Development Squadron 51, which is in charge of aircraft testing, research and studies, and training guidance, etc. In July 2015, I had an opportunity to participate in the Royal International Air Tattoo (RIAT), an international airshow in the United Kingdom, together with other personnel including crews and maintenance personnel, in a group of 40. Partly due to the fact that it was the fi rst visit of the MSDF fi xed wing patrol aircraft to the United Kingdom, I had an actual feeling that our ground exhibition attracted a high degree of attention from the personnel of other countries to the P-1 aircraft. Although we had only limited time, I believe that at the fl ight exhibition we were successful in demonstrating part of P-1’s capabilities including quietness and mobility to other countries. During the visit to the United Kingdom, we shared our perceptions concerning the importance of the role that fi xed wing patrol aircraft play through opinion exchanges with the Royal Navy personnel. We were also able to have deeper recognition on some conditions related to Japan and the United Kingdom such as the fact that the two countries share common values as maritime nations, and that the maritime security could not be achieved Royal Air Force members, author’s colleagues, and the author without cooperation with other countries. (third from left in the front row) **VOICE** **Japan-U.K. Exchanges in Progress** **Column** **– Accepting the Royal Air Force (RAF) Transport Aircraft** **ASDF Miho Air Base (Sakaiminato City, Tottori Prefecture)** **Captain (ASDF) Kosaku Hiraki, 403rd Squadron, 3rd Tactical Airlift Group** In October 2015, the RAF’s A400M transport aircraft visited the ASDF Miho Air Base as the fi rst foreign military aircraft. The A400M transport aircraft is the RAF’s state-of-the-art transport aircraft, which has a maximum payload capacity of 37 tons and 116 transporting personnel, and is almost the same size as the ASDF’s C-2 transport aircraft. The RAF crew members who arrived at the Miho Air Base carried out various activities including a courtesy call on the commander of the Miho Air Base, opinion exchanges with the members of the 403rd Squadron, and a tour to view each other’s aircraft. In the opinion exchange, there were many parts that I could sympathize with as we were all members of the transport unit in the air force such as attitudes and ways of thinking for carrying out missions. We also received warm gratitude from the British crew members. The United Kingdom is a country very far away from Japan, but I feel that it is quite close due to this experience. From now on, the importance of unit exchanges at the fi eld level, like the one I experienced, will increase and help to further construct the trust relationship. As a C-2 transport aircraft will be deployed at the Miho Air Base in the FY2016, I am looking forward to the opportunity that the ASDF’s C-2 Offi cials of the Miho Air Base sending off the Royal Air Force crew members transport aircraft will visit the United Kingdom in the near future. who are departing from the Air Base following the exchange ----- have been promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation including the establishment of Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Committee. In June 2016, the Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting was held at the timing of the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue. Minister of Defense Nakatani expressed that he welcomes the presence of France to be strengthened in the Asia-Pacific region, for France is the only European country maintaining a constant and continuous presence in the region. In response, Minister of Defense Le Drian expressed his intention to continue maintaining their presence in the region. Also, the two ministers agreed to promote defense cooperation and exchange between the two countries in the various fields including joint exercises, port calls, defense equipment and technology cooperation. The SDF has been participating in the Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Équateur/ Croix du Sud) since 2014. See>> Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-3 (Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation) **(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** At the timing of Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Europe in April 2014, he had a meeting with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Rasmussen at the NATO Headquarters and signed the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP). Prime Minister Abe made an address before the North Atlantic Council,[16] drawing appreciation and support from European countries for Japan’s security policy, which is based on the concept of proactive contribution to peace. He also exchanged views with the permanent representatives of NATO’s 28 member countries, developing a common recognition of the security environment between Japan and Europe. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe agreed on continued and expanded cooperation with NATO and the EU relating to counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology with the United Kingdom and France. Following this, the MSDF has been conducting joint exercises with participating units of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and the EU’s Operation Atlanta since September 2014. In addition, based on the agreement between Prime Minister Abe and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen reached in May, female GSDF personnel were dispatched to NATO Headquarters for the first time in December 2014 as part of Japan-NATO cooperation in the field of women, peace and security. At the same time, in June 2015, three female SDF personnel from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF participated in the annual meeting of the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP). Japan concluded the information security agreement with NATO in June 2010. **(4) Other European Countries** With regard to Japan’s relationship with Germany, at the timing of the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in May 2015, the Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting with Minister of Defense von der Leyen was held for the first time in six years, and opinions were exchanged mainly on Japan-Germany bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the Japanese Peace and Security Legislation, and the situation in Ukraine. With Italy, Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Wakamiya and Minister of Defense Pinotti had a talk during the 52nd Munich Security Conference in February 2016, and they shared views for further promoting defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries including the strengthening of defense equipment and technology cooperation and the activation of high-level exchanges. Also, the Japan-Italy Information Security Agreement was signed in March 2016. In June 2016, the Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting was held at the timing of the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue. Welcoming the year of milestone to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Italy, the two ministers agreed to advance the Japan-Italy defense cooperation and exchanges including a port-call by the MSDF Overseas Training Cruise Unit to Italy, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. With the Czech Republic, in December 2015, Minister of Defense Stropnicky visited Japan and had the first Japan-Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting. Two defense ministers agreed to find opportunities to continue exchanging views and share the interest of both parties. Meanwhile, with the Netherlands, General Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands visited Japan in October 2015 to have a talk with the Chief of Joint Staff, and they agreed to cooperate with respect to peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy operations. Japan has conducted Military-Military Talks (MM) at the director -general level with Scandinavian countries. Most recently, in October 2015, talks were conducted with Sweden, Norway, and Finland, and a wide range of discussions such as on the regional situations and future defense exchanges were carried out. See>> Reference 62 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (Past Three Years)) ----- State Minister of Defense Wakamiya (second row, second from right) participating in MSDF vessels (center and back) conducting goodwill training with the Sri Lankan Navy (front) the 52nd Munich Security Conference - 9 Other Countries With regard to Japan’s relationship with Canada, high-level exchanges, talks between defense authorities, and other exchanges have been conducted. In August 2011, the first Japan-Canada Vice-Ministerial “2+2” was held and both sides agreed to commence the negotiation to conclude an ACSA. In June 2016, the Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Talks was held at the timing of the 15th Shangri-La Dialogue. The two ministers confirmed that both Japan and Canada are Pacific nations and partners sharing fundamental values. The ministers welcomed the fact that the defense exchanges between the two countries including regular consultations and mutual visits of vessels have steadily been carried out, and agreed to continue advancing the bilateral exchanges further under the new Canadian administration. In March 2015, the first Defense Ministerial Meeting with Minister of Defense Pinzón of the Republic of Colombia was held during his visit to Japan. The two ministers agreed to move forward with coordination aimed at signing a memorandum on defense cooperation exchange, and also to continue opinion exchanges concerning areas such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and cyber issues. With Brazil, the Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF, made his first visit to the country in February 2016 and agreed to gain momentum over the exchange between the GSDF and the Brazilian Army. With Georgia, Minister of Defense Khidasheli visited Japan in November 2015 to hold the first Japan-Georgia Defense Ministerial Meeting in which a Memorandum regarding Japan-Georgia defense exchange was signed by the two ministers. The Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense visited Kazakhstan for the first time in July 2012, and both Japanese and Kazakhstan sides concurred regarding the necessity of developing exchange between the two countries in the field of defense. Regarding Japan’s relationship with Middle Eastern countries, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense conducted talks with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defence Ümit Dündar in July 2012, where he signed a Statement of Intent to promote defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Turkey. In March 2013, Minister of National Defence Yilmaz visited Japan and held a defense ministerial meeting. At this meeting, the two ministers agreed to hold discussions between the defense authorities of the two countries (at the director general level) at the earliest possible date, and to push forward with various forms of defense exchange. Japan-Saudi Arabia Summit Meetings were held in April 2013 and February 2014. During the meetings, the two leaders reconfirmed their intention to promote dialogue and exchange in the security field, and continue engaging in consultation and cooperation at various levels including the commencement of a dialogue between the National Security Councils (NSC) of the two countries in order to enhance the comprehensive partnership between the two countries. Prime Minister Abe visited the United Arab Emirates, with Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar in succession in May and August 2013, and shared a recognition of the necessity of promoting cooperation in the security and defense field. In December 2012 and February 2015, Japan-Bahrain and Japan-Qatar memorandum of defence cooperation and exchange, respectively, were signed. With Oman, Prime Minister Abe held a meeting with His Majesty Qaboos bin Said, the Sultan of Oman, in January 2014, and both leaders agreed to enhance cooperation in the field of maritime security, including counter-piracy measures for ensuring the security and safety of maritime routes, as well as promoting defense exchanges. Meanwhile, MSDF vessels and Sri Lanka Navy vessels carried out goodwill training based on the comprehensive partnership agreed at the Summit Meeting in October 2015. See>> Reference 63 (Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)) ----- **Section 2** **Ensuring Maritime Security** For Japan, a major maritime state, strengthening order on the seas based on such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, as well as ensuring safe maritime transport, is the foundation for its peace and prosperity, which is extremely important. In cooperation with the relevant countries, the MOD/SDF engages in anti-piracy operations, as well as promoting various **1 Counter-Piracy Operations** Piracy is a grave threat to public safety and order on the seas. In particular, for Japan, which depends on maritime transportation to import most of the resources and food necessary for its survival and prosperity as a maritime nation, it is an important issue that cannot be ignored. initiatives including assistance for capacity building in this fi eld for those coastal states alongside the sea lanes, and making the most of various opportunities to enhance joint training and exercises in waters other than those in the immediate vicinity of Japan. See>> Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5 (Initiatives towards Ensuring Maritime Security) |Col1|Southeast Asia Somalia and|221188 221199 223377| |---|---|---| |surroundings 115588 114411 114477|surroundings|| |112288 110022 111111 110044||| |8833 7700 5544 7755 4488 7700 8800||| |1122 2222 5511 4466 1111 1155 0||| |Fig. III-2-2-1|Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia)| |---|---| |(Number of incidents) 250 Southeast Asia 221188 221199 223377 200 Somalia and surroundings 115588 114411 114477 150 112288 110022 111111 110044 100 8833 7700 5544 7755 4488 7700 8800 50 1122 2222 5511 4466 1111 1155 0 0 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 (Year) Notes: The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).|| have dispatched their warships to the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. As part of counterpiracy initiatives, the European Union (EU) has also commenced Operation Atalanta since December 2008, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been conducting “Operation Ocean Shield” since August 2009, in addition to the counter-piracy operations conducted by the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF)[2] that was established in January 2009. Although the number of acts of piracy occurring in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden has hovered at an extremely low level in recent years, the assumed root causes of piracy such as poverty in Somalia have still remained unsolved. In addition, considering the fact that Somalia’s capability to crackdown on piracy is also still not suffi cient, if the international community - 1 Basic Approach The Japan Coast Guard (JCG), one of the law enforcement agencies in Japan, is primarily responsible for coping with piracy. However, in cases where it is deemed extremely diffi cult or impossible for the JCG to cope with piracy by itself, the SDF is to take action as well. - 2 Circumstances Surrounding Incidents of Piracy **and Initiatives by the International Community** For Japan and the international community, the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are extremely important, connecting Europe and the Middle East with East Asia. Regarding the waters in this area, successive United Nations Security Council resolutions[1] were adopted, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, which was adopted in June 2008 in response to the frequent occurrence of and rapid increase in the piracy incidents with the purpose of acquiring ransoms by detaining hostages caused by pirates, who are armed with machine guns and rocket launchers. These resolutions have requested that various countries take actions, particularly the dispatch of warships and military aircraft, to deter piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. To date, approximately 30 countries, including the United States, Other United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for cooperation in deterring piracy are: Resolutions 1838, 1846, and 1851 (adopted in 2008), Resolution 1897 (adopted in 2009), Resolutions 1918 and 1950 (adopted in 2010), Resolutions 1976 and 2020 (adopted in 2011), Resolution 2077 (adopted in 2012), Resolution 2125 (adopted in 2013), Resolution 2184 (adopted in 2014), and Resolution 2246 (adopted in 2015). ----- reduces its counter-piracy efforts, the situation could be easily reversed. Moreover, the Japanese Shipowners’ Association and other entities are continuously requesting that the SDF continue making every effort in relation to their counter-piracy operations. Therefore, there is no great change in the situation in which Japan must carry out its counter-piracy operations. See>> Fig. III-2-2-1 (Piracy Incidents Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Comparison with the number of incidents in Southeast Asia)) - 3 Japanese Initiatives Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Fujimaru (left) participating in the returning home event for the DAPE (Deployment Airforce for Counter-Piracy Enforcement) MSDF destroyer guarding a private ship **(1) Legislation Concerning Counter-piracy Operations** In March 2009, following the order for Maritime Security Operations for the purpose of protecting Japan-affi liated vessels from acts of piracy in the waters off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, two Japanese destroyers began escorting Japan-affi liated vessels, while P-3C patrol aircraft also commenced warning and surveillance operations in June the same year. In view of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Japan subsequently enacted the AntiPiracy Measures Act[3] in July the same year in order to deal appropriately and effectively with acts of piracy. This act made it possible to protect the vessels of all nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their fl ag states. Moreover, it also enabled the use of weapons to a reasonable extent, if no other means were available, in order to halt vessels engaging in acts of piracy, such as approaching civilian vessels. Furthermore, the Act on Special Measures concerning the Security of Japanese Flagged Vessels in Areas that Are Highly Susceptible to Acts of Piracy came into force on November 2013, which made it possible to have security guards on board a Japanese ship provided certain requirements are met, enabling them to carry small arms for the purpose of security operations. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Reference 64 (Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy) **(2) Activities by the Self-Defense Forces** a. Participation in CTF 151 Due to the fact that the scope of the area susceptible to acts of piracy is spreading to areas off the coast of Oman and the Arabian Sea in recent years, there is a tendency that the area of activity of the Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), which conducts warning and surveillance activities (zone defense), has been increasingly spreading. Furthermore, the number of vessels that are directly escorted by the SDF surface force per escort operation (a method in which the destroyers provide direct escort by accompanying the convoy) was gradually reduced. In light of such a situation, in July 2013, Japan decided to participate in CTF 151 to commence zone defense in addition to direct escort missions as before, while coordinating closely with the units of other countries that are engaged in counter piracy operations in order to conduct more fl exible and effective operations. Following this, the surface force started zone defense in December 2013. In addition, air forces have been participating in CTF 151 since February 2014. This participation enabled the force to acquire information that was previously not accessible. Moreover, it became possible to conduct more fl exible warning and surveillance activities. For example, aircraft can be deployed as needed even to areas that are highly susceptible to acts of piracy, and as a result, coordination between other countries’ units was further enhanced. Moreover, that SDF personnel serving as the CTF 151 commander and command center staff enables Japan to strengthen coordination with the units of other countries engaged in counter-piracy operations and enhance the effectiveness of the SDF’s counter-piracy operations. For this reason, the SDF has dispatched command center staff to the CTF151 Headquarters where an offi cer from other ----- countries serves as a commander since August 2014, and during the period from May to August 2015 the SDF also dispatched a CTF 151 commander as well as command center staff. No member of the SDF has ever served as a commander of a multinational force since the foundation of the SDF, and it is believed that active participation in the CTF151 activities continuously going forward will enable Japan to further contribute to peace and stability in the international community. b. Achievements Two destroyers currently being dispatched operate based on two different manners - one destroyer directly escorts private vessels back and forth across the Gulf of Aden, while the other destroyer is conducting zone defense in the allocated marine area within the Gulf of Aden, which has been allocated in response to specifi c situations. In addition, there are JCG offi cers aboard the destroyers.[4] The direct escort method fi rstly places the destroyer and private vessels to be escorted at the assembly point, one each designated at the eastern and western ends of the Gulf of Aden. When the destroyer guards the convoy, the helicopter carried on the destroyer also watches the surrounding area from the sky as necessary. In this way, the ships take around two days to sail approximately 900 km,[5] all the while making absolutely certain that the convoy is safe and secure, day and night. Moreover, as for zone defense, the destroyers conduct warning and surveillance activities as they are deployed within waters designated based on coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters, and strive to ensure the safety of the vessels. As of May 31, 2016, 3,697 vessels have been escorted under the protection of the destroyers. Not a single vessel has come to any harm from pirates and they have all passed safely across the Gulf of Aden. See>> Fig. III-2-2-2 (SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations) Meanwhile, the maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) conduct warning and surveillance operations in the fl ight zone that is determined based on coordination with the CTF 151 headquarters. The P-3Cs confi rm any suspicious boats, and at the same time, they provide information to the destroyers, the naval vessels of other countries and civilian vessels, responding by such means as confi rming |Fig. III-2-2-2|SDF’s Counter-Piracy Operations| |---|---| |Direct escort is Carried set under deployment of one vessel for direct One vessel for escort and one vessel for zone defense as a basis direct escort Japan’s original framework is used for escort, while for zone defense it is implemented within the CTF 151 operation *The relationship between the CTF 151 Headquarters and participating units is that of coordination Point C One vessel for Zone Defense A b o u t 2 0 0 K m Point B * Conducting escort between point A A b o u t 1 1 0 0 K m and point B during the monsoon season (June-August, December-February) Conducting warning and surveillance operations, Djibouti and Information collection and provision Point A ● Sharing Gathering Information Information CTF 151 • Established in January 2009 for counter-piracy Merchant ship Escorted ships operations. The United States, Australia, The United Kingdom, Turkey, The ROK, Pakistan, etc. Suspicious vessel participating Deployed Maritime Force for Anti- • Participants are to be engaged in operations Piracy Operations upon liaison coordination on deployment dates, etc. with the Command.|| Direct escort is Carried set under deployment of one vessel for direct One vessel for escort and one vessel for zone defense as a basis direct escort Japan’s original framework is used for escort, while for zone defense it is implemented within the CTF 151 operation *The relationship between the CTF 151 Headquarters and participating units is that of coordination Point C One vessel for Zone Defense Point B *** Conducting escort between point A** **and point B during the monsoon season** **(June-August, December-February)** Conducting warning and surveillance operations, Djibouti and Information collection and provision - Point A Sharing Gathering Information Information CTF 151 - Established in January 2009 for counter-piracy Merchant ship Escorted ships operations. The United States, Australia, The United Kingdom, Turkey, The ROK, Pakistan, etc. Suspicious vessel participating Deployed Maritime Force for Anti - Participants are to be engaged in operations Piracy Operations upon liaison coordination on deployment dates, etc. with the Command. Eight JCG offi cers are onboard and conduct judicial law enforcement activities, including arresting and interrogating pirates, as required. During the non-monsoon seasons (March-May, September-November), when the area within which acts of piracy occur grows due to the calmer seas, the escort route is extended by approximately 200 km to ----- |Commander, Deplo for Counter Pir|yed Maritime Force acy Operations| |---|---| |Commander, De for Counter Pir|ployed Air Force acy Operations| |---|---| ||| ||| |Col1|yment Support Unit cy Enforcement|Col3|Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) Deployed unit at the Headquarters| |---|---|---|---| |||Headquarters|| ||||| ||||| |Guard units|Military Police units| |---|---| |1 destroyer|1 destroyer| |---|---| |Total approx. 400 personnel|| |Squadron (2 P-3Cs)|Support and logistics units| |---|---| |Total approx. 60 personnel|| |Fig. III-2-2-3|Structure of the Deployed Forces| |---|---| |: Structured by MSDF personnel Commander, Self Defense Fleet : Structured by GSDF personnel : Structured by MSDF and GSDF personnel Commander, Deployed Maritime Force Commander, Deployed Air Force Commander, Deployment Support Unit Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) for Counter Piracy Operations for Counter Piracy Operations for Counter Piracy Enforcement Deployed unit at the Headquarters Headquarters Headquarters Total of less than 20 personnel Squadron Support and Operation Military 1 destroyer 1 destroyer Guard units (2 P-3Cs) logistics units units Police units Total approx. 110 personnel Total approx. 400 personnel Total approx. 60 personnel (about 30 maritime, about 80 ground) Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard In addition, transport units comprised of [Deployed Maritime Force for Counter Piracy Operations] C-130H transport aircraft under the Air Escort private ships with two destroyers and conduct zone defense within CTF 151 Special Boarding Unit personnel aboard Support Commander will provide airborne [Deployed Air Force for Counter Piracy Operations] 1 or 2 patrol helicopters, as well as 1 or transportation of supplies etc. when Conduct surveillance flight over the Gulf of Aden by two P-3C patrol aircraft 2 special boats, on each vessel necessary [Deployment Support Unit for Counter Piracy Enforcement] Coast Guard Officers: 8 officials aboard Facilitate communication and coordination with relevant authorities of Djibouti and conduct duties related to necessary support for the Deployed Air Force for Counter Piracy Operations to conduct counter-piracy operations [CTF 151 Deployed Unit at the Headquarters] SDF personnel serving as CTF 151 commander and command center officers facilitate coordination among units of countries participating in CTF 151|| **VOICE** **At the Completion of the Mission of the 23rd Deployment Surface Force** **Column** **for Counter-Piracy Enforcement** **Captain (MSDF) Takeshi Yoshioka, Commander of the 23rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement** **(Commander of the Escort Division 3)** With the Commander of the Escort Division 3 as the commander of the task force, the 23rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement was formed based on two destroyers, which have Ominato as their homeport, and the Escort Division 3, and engaged in its duty for the counter-piracy operations from October 2015 to May 2016. Since many of the task force members were originally from the northern part of Japan, the heat off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden was hard on us. Nonetheless, all of us managed to complete our mission without becoming ill or having any issues, partly due to the fact that the activity period of our task force happened to fall in a period with relatively cool weather. As a result of our efforts in conducting warning and surveillance as well as direct escort day and night throughout the operation period, we were able to deter acts of piracy and therefore no attacking cases by pirates occurred. In addition, we also responded to an emergency case that occurred with a merchant ship and carried out a rescue task of a failed ship. Through all these activities, I believe that we successfully contributed to maritime security. At the opinion exchange with personnel of naval ships from other countries, Japan’s initiatives were always highly regarded. I am very proud The author (right front) exchanging opinions with the CTF465 (European Union that our task group had a chance to play a part in it. task force for counter-piracy operations) commander and personnel the safety of the surrounding area immediately, if requested. The information gathered by SDF P-3Cs is constantly shared with other related organizations, and contributes signifi cantly to deterring acts of piracy and disarming vessels suspected of being pirate ships. Since commencing duties in June 2009, the aircraft have fl own 1,568 missions as of May 31, 2016, and their fl ying hours total 12,070 hours. Approximately 130,300 ships conducted identification tasks and information was provided to vessels navigating the area and other countries engaging in counter-piracy operations on around 11,960 occasions. In particular, the activities conducted by the two MSDF P-3C patrol aircraft account for approximately 60% of the warning and surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden. Moreover, in order to improve the operational effi ciency and effectiveness of the Deployment Air Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement the MOD/SDF has ----- **y** **Voice of Gratitude to SDF’s Escort Activities** **Column** Since March 2009 when the SDF commenced its escort activities in the Gulf of Aden, numerous numbers of messages written by the crews of private ships and ship operators both from Japan and overseas (the United Kingdom, Norway, Turkey, India, China, the ROK, etc.) that were escorted by the SDF arrived. One of them is introduced below. ■ One example of appreciation messages On behalf of the shipping company and the crews of this ship, we would like to praise the excellent cooperation from the SDF, which escorted us safely. Despite the fact that we were unable to put out the speed requested by the SDF, they escorted our ship safely in the dangerous waters. We would like to thank you once again. This ship passes through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden frequently. When it happens, we hope to have your escort again. We would also like to thank the escort vessel under the SDF that escorted our ship until the end of the route. Thank you very much. Please give our best regards to the crew. Activity status of the 23rd Deployment Surface Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement (MSDF destroyer Makinami escorting a merchant ship: front) set up a base in the northwest district of the Djibouti International Airport In addition, and the Deployment Support Unit for Counter Piracy, which is formed by GSDF and MSDF personnel carries out activities for providing guards and maintenance of facilities, etc., at this operational base. Furthermore, the ASDF has formed an airlift squadron to support these activities and is engaged in transport missions. See>> Fig. III-2-2-3 (Structure of the Deployed Forces) - 4 Praise for Japan’s Endeavors highly praised by the international community. For example, national leaders and others have expressed their gratitude and the SDF has also been repeatedly well-received by the United Nations Security Council Resolution. Moreover, the destroyers, which are engaging in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains and ship owners of the vessels that its units have escorted, expressing their gratitude that the ships were able to cross the Gulf of Aden with peace of mind and asking them to continue escorting ships there. **2 Contribution to the Maintenance of Public Safety and Order on the Seas through Maritime Training** In addition, since October 2014, the SDF has conducted joint exercises also with counter-piracy units of armed forces of foreign countries and other forces.[6] These training exercises conducted in the Gulf of Aden have an essential signifi cance in that they strengthened the cooperation between the SDF and counter-piracy teams from various countries, and contributed to the maintenance of public safety and order on the seas. The counter-piracy operations by the SDF have been **2** - 1 Training Conducted by the SDF and Counter-Piracy **Teams from Various Countries in the Gulf of Aden** In accordance with the agreement made between Prime Minister Abe and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen in May 2014, the SDF deployed forces and NATO’s counter-piracy unit, with the objective of enhancing their cooperation and tactical skills required for counterpiracy activities, implemented joint exercises in the Gulf of Aden in September and November of the same year. So far, the SDF conducted its fi rst joint exercise with the EU surface forces in October 2014, the second and the third exercises in November of the same year, the fourth exercise in March 2015, and the fi fth exercise in January 2016. Furthermore, the SDF also conducted joint exercises with the Turkish Naval Forces in November 2014 and December 2015, with the Pakistan Navy in March 2015 and February 2016, ----- - 2 U.S. Hosted International Mine Countermeasures **Exercise** The MSDF has constantly participated in multilateral mine countermeasures exercise in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula hosted by the U.S. Navy since its fi rst exercise in 2012, and this includes its participation in the Fourth International Mine Countermeasures Exercise in 2016.[7] Participating in this exercise assists in the enhancement of the tactical skills of the MSDF and the strengthening of trust among the participating countries. At the same time, the exercise also contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, while also contributing to the improvement of the global security environment. See>> Reference 54 (Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)) - 3 Strengthening of Cooperation in Maritime **Security through Joint Training, etc.** In October, 2015, the MSDF conducted a joint navel exercise (Exercise Malabar 2015) organized by the United States and India in the waters east of India with the aim of improving tactical skills and strengthening cooperation in the area of maritime security.[8] Furthermore, with the Philippine Navy and the Malaysian Navy in May and August 2015, respectively, joint exercises including the communication training using CUES (Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea)[9] and tactical maneuvering were conducted. Strengthening cooperation with other participating countries through these joint exercises contributes to the maintenance of maritime security, which has extremely high signifi cance. **3 Initiatives in the Asia-Pacifi c Region** The National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines state that Japan will play a leading role in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” including maritime security cooperation with other countries. As previously described, the MOD/SDF implements capacity building assistance on maritime security for Indonesia, Vietnam and Myanmar, thereby assisting coastal states along sea lanes and others in enhancing their capabilities, and strengthening cooperation with partners that share the same strategic interests as Japan. In addition, the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy states that in order to contribute to the creation and development of order on the ocean, it will ensure international collaboration and promote international cooperation by making use of fora such as multilateral and bilateral ocean conferences to contribute to establishment of international rules and consensus. In response to this, the MOD has been working on cooperation for maritime security within the regional security dialogue such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) Plus and the Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISMMS). At the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue meeting held in May 2015, Minister of Defense Nakatani delivered a speech and proposed “Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative,” which consists of “dissemination of common rules and the laws and regulations pertaining to the seas and skies in the region” and the “security of the seas and skies,” etc. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-3 (Promoting Capacity Building Assistance and Other Practical Multilateral Security Cooperation) See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-2 (Initiatives under the Multilateral Security Framework and through Dialogue) The exercise took place in April 2016, and minesweeper tender Uraga and minesweeper Takashima carried out minesweeping training, submarine training, and other training. The MSDF escort vessel “Fuyuzuki,”the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier “USS Theodore Roosevelt,” and the Indian Navy “Shivalik Class frigate” participated in the exercise, and they will continue to participate in the exercise. ----- **Efforts to Support International Peace** **Section 3** **Cooperation Activities** The MOD/SDF is proactively undertaking international peace cooperation activities working in tandem with diplomatic initiatives, including the use of Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) for resolving the fundamental **1 Frameworks for International Peace Cooperation Activities** - 1 Framework of International Peace Cooperation **Activities and the Signifi cance of Stipulating** **such Activities as One of the Primary Missions** **of the SDF** causes of confl icts, terrorism and other problems. See>> Fig. III-2-3-1 (Record of Activities in the International Community by the Ministry of Defense / Self-Defense Forces) Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act, and the former Replenishment Support Special Measures Act. In 2007, international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities[1] were upgraded, and are now to be one of the primary missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.[2] See>> Fig. III-2-3-2 (International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF) See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces); Reference 25 (Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel); Reference 65 (Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities); Reference 66 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities) The international peace cooperation activities undertaken by the MOD/SDF to date are as follows: (1) international peace cooperation duties such as United Nations peacekeeping operations (the so-called UN PKO); (2) international disaster relief operations to respond to largescale disasters overseas; (3) activities based on the former Special Measures Act on Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq; and (4) activities based on the former |9. International disaster relief activities in India (February 2001) Learned lessons concerning collaboration with the Ministry|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |of Foreign Affairs and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) 14 13||||| |29 5 16 15 10 20 23 27 1||||| |9 17 25 23 2|27 6|||| |||||| |||||| |11 36 18 34 33 30 26||||| |12 34 21 8 34||||| |34||||| |34 n in Nepal|31|28. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (February 2010 - February 2013)||| |25. Anti-piracy activities off the t lh de ie rs coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden||Deployments in conjunction with the activities of the Japan Disaster Relief Team in Haiti Providing support for recovery and reconstruction following a major earthquake||| Fig. III-2-3-1 Record of Activities in the International Community by the Ministry of Defense / Self-Defense Forces 1. Dispatch of minesweepers 5. United Nations Disengagement 7. Transport of supplies required for a disaster 10. Relief for refugees in Afghanistan 12. United Nations Transitional 15. Transport of supplies required for to the Persian Gulf Observer Force relief operation in Turkey (October 2001) Administration in East Timor a disaster relief operation in Iran (April - October 1991)Starting point for international cooperation by the SDF2. United Nations Transitional (September 1992 - September 1993)First peacekeeping operations by the SDF Participation by GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel3. United Nations activities in Authority in Cambodia (February 1996 - January 2013)Contributing to the stabilization of the Middle East17-year deployment of units6. International disaster relief (November - December 1998)First international disaster relief activities undertaken by the SDF Carried out long-distance airliftsactivities in Honduras 8. Relief for refugees in Timor-Leste (November 1999 - February 2000)Transport of relief supplies by an ASDF transport unit9. International disaster relief activities in India(February 2001)Learned lessons concerning collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and nongovernmental organizations (NGO)(September - November 1999)First time the MSDF had carried out duties based on a long sea voyage (around 23 days) Transport of relief supplies at the request of UNHCR11. (November 2001 - November 2007)Efforts to eliminate terrorismStrengthening of collaboration with armed forces from various other countriesCooperation and support activities based on the former Anti-terrorism Special Measures Act (February 2002 - June 2004)Largest peacekeeping operation in which the SDF had participated First participation by female SDF personnel13. Relief for refugees in Iraq(March - April 2003)Transport of supplies for humanitarian relief using a government airplane14. Relief for victims in Iraq(July - August 2003) (December 2003 - January 2004)Airlift of relief supplies in partnership with JICA16. Activities based on the former Iraq (December 2003 - February 2009)Activities of the SDF to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq were highly praised by countries around the world Contributed to the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. AllianceHumanitarian Relief Support Special Measures Act Mozambique 19 Cooperation in activities at the request May 1993 - January 1995)First dispatch to a United Nations 7 14 of the World Food Programme (WFP) 17. International disaster relief activities in Thailand operational headquartersFormed the first unit to consist of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel4. Relief for refugees in Rwanda 5 1316 1 15 10 2920 3722 28 (December 2004 - January 2005)An MSDF destroyer en route home to Japan was swiftly diverted to conduct search and rescue and provide assistance (September - December 1994)First international humanitarian relief activitiesHighly praised by African and other countries 35 32 25 23 9 17 2 6 27 : Dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf: United Nations peacekeeping operations: International disaster relief activities: Activities based on the former Anti-terrorism 424 11 3626 18 34 333012 : Activities based on the former Iraq Special Measures Act (Act on Special Measures concerning Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities towards the Anti-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Operation) 34 21 8 Humanitarian Relief Support Special Measures Act 18. International disaster relief 34 : Anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia & activities in Indonesia in the Gulf of Aden (January -March 2005) Large-scale rescue operation of approx. 3 1,000 peopleFirst deployment of GSDF helicoptersEstablishment of the first joint liaison and 34 34. International disaster relief activities in Malaysia coordination center (March – April 2014) 19. International disaster relief (August 2005)Rapid response by an MSDF submarine rescue ship20. International disaster relief activities in waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia 22. United Nations Mission in Nepal (March 2007 - January 2011)First duties involving monitoring the management of weapons and soldiers 23. Replenishment support activities based on the former Replenishment Support Special 25. Anti-piracy activities off the (March 2009 - present)Carried out direct escort of private ships as well as warning and surveillance activities (zone defense).coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden 34 31 28. United Nations Stabilization (February 2010 - February 2013)Deployments in conjunction with the activities of the Japan Disaster Relief Team in Haiti Providing support for recovery and reconstruction following a major earthquake29. International disaster relief Mission in Haitiactivities in Pakistan 31. International disaster relief (February - March 2011)Transport of police, fire brigade and coast guard teams, among others32. United Nations Mission in South activities in New Zealand Provided search and rescue activities for a missing Malaysian airplane35. International disaster relief (December 2014)Airlift of personal protective equipment to the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER)activities in West Africa activities in Pakistan Measures Act 26. International disaster relief (August - October 2010) Sudan 36. International disaster relief (October - December 2005)Deployment of GSDF helicopters and ASDF transport aircraftCollaboration on the ground with JICA (January 2008 -January 2010)Resumed the activities that had been suspendedSupport for the counterterrorism activities of other countries (October 2009)Provided swift medical supportactivities in Indonesia Establishment of the first joint operations and coordination center on the groundCarried out duties in collaboration with various other countries (November 2011 - present)Contributing to the stability and civilian protection assistance in South Sudan (January 2015)Provided search and rescue activities for a missing AirAsia airplaneactivities in Indonesia 21. Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team to Indonesia 24. United Nations Mission in the Sudan 27. International disaster relief activities in Haiti 30. United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 33. International disaster relief (November – December 2013)activities in the Philippines 37. International disaster relief activities in Nepal (June 2006)Provided medical support and carried outepidemic prevention activities (October 2008 - September 2011)Dispatch of staff officers contributing to stabilization of Sudan (January - February 2010)Provided rapid transport and carried out medical care activities following a major earthquake in Haiti (September 2010 –September 2012)Contributing to the maintenance of public order and recovery in Timor-Leste Provided medical care, epidemic prevention, and transportation of affected people in responding to the Philippine typhoon (April - May 2015)Conducted medical service assistance following a major earthquake in Nepal Activities prescribed in Article 8 of the SDF Act (a miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions Missions defi ned in Article 3 of the SDF Act. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan ----- operations. For example, the GSDF promotes initiatives to enhance the conditions of the engineering units, which are in high demand in dispatch destinations, as well as procuring protection carrier vehicles that are used to protect people from mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). It also promotes the development of wheeled armored personnel carriers (modified). The MSDF is promoting the portability and deployability of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) to facilitate the effective operation of fixed-wing patrol aircraft overseas. The ASDF promotes the upgrading of its equipment and devices including aviation satellite phones, as well as countermeasure dispensers for transport aircraft, and airborne collision avoidance systems, in order to maintain command communication function between aircraft and ground controllers under a range of environments. With regard to the education necessary for engaging in international peace cooperation activities, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit at Camp Komakado (Shizuoka Prefecture) provides training for GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, as well as supports their training. In addition, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) at the Joint Staff College offers not only basic education course on international peace cooperation activities, but also specialized education to train contingent commanders of UN PKO missions and staff officers of mission headquarters. These specialized courses are conducted by using UN standard training materials and foreign instructors. Furthermore, since FY2014, the JPC has provided education not just to SDF personnel but also to personnel from foreign militaries and other Japanese ministries and agencies. This initiative represents the approach taken by the MOD/SDF, which emphasizes the necessity of collaboration and cooperation with other related ministries and foreign countries, based on the current situation of more multi-dimensional and complicated international peace cooperation activities have become more complicated and multi-dimensional. It also aims to contribute to more effective international peace cooperation activities by enhancing collaboration with those ministries and countries in the field of education. - 3 Welfare and Mental Health Care of Dispatched **SDF Units** International Peace Cooperation Activities Fig. III-2-3-2 Conducted by the SDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning Japan’s Cooperation in the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations” International Disaster Relief Activities Activities based on the “Act Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams” Cooperation and Support Activities, etc. for the Armed Forces of Foreign Countries Activities in accordance with the “Act Concerning Cooperation and Support Activities to Armed Forces of Foreign Countries, in Situations that the International Community is Collectively Addressing for International Peace and Security” Cooperation in Efforts toward the Reconstruction of Iraq Activities based on the “Act Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq” (Ended in February 2009) Activities to Respond to International Terrorism Activities based on the Act Concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for CounterTerrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities (Ended in January 2010) Legend : Activities based on time-limited acts : Activities based on permanent acts **2** - Continuous Initiatives to Promptly and Accurately **Carry Out International Peace Cooperation Activities** To be a proactive contributor to world peace, it is important for the SDF to be fully prepared for any future operations. For this purpose, the Central Readiness Regiment was established under the GSDF Central Readiness Force in March 2008. When a decision to send troops is made, an advance party will be pulled out from the regiment deployed swiftly to the planned area of deployment, and lay the groundwork before the main unit arrives. Also, the GSDF has a rotational stand-by unit, in which members are chosen from each area force of the five area forces in Japan in rotation. The MSDF and ASDF also have a designated stand-by unit, which are always ready to be deployed. In September 2015, the United Nations (UN) launched the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) with the purpose for the UN Headquarters to be able to grasp the registered items of each country more specifically in order to ensure the flexibility and readiness of international peacekeeping activities. In light of this change, Japan registered engineering units and command center staff officers in March 2016. The SDF is enhancing information-gathering abilities and protection abilities, which are required for the SDF units to carry out their missions whilst ensuring the safety of personnel and unit in international peace keeping activities, etc. In addition, in order to respond to various environments and prolonged missions, the SDF is improving its capabilities for transport, deployment, and information communication, as well as developing a structure of logistic and medical support for conducting smooth and continuous SDF personnel are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families. Therefore, it is extremely important to make necessary arrangements so that dispatched SDF personnel can effectively carry out their assigned duty while maintaining both their physical ----- and mental health. For this reason, the MOD/SDF has implemented various measures to support families to reduce anxiety for the dispatched SDF personnel and their families. See>> Part II, Chapter 2, Section 5 (Human Foundation and Organization that Supports the Defense Force) The SDF provides mental health checkups several times from the time before a dispatch to the time after a dispatch, for all the personnel to be sent. At the same time, the SDF also provides dispatched personnel with suffi cient mental care such as offering a mental health course in which the dispatched personnel acquire **2 Initiatives to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, etc.** As a means to promote peace and stability in the confl ict regions around the world, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) has expanded its missions in recent years to include such duties as the Protection of Civilians (POC), the promotion of political processes, providing assistance in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) into society of former soldiers, Security Sector Reform (SSR), the rule of law, elections, human rights, and other fi elds, in addition to such traditional missions as ceasefi re monitoring. To date, 16 U.N. peacekeeping operations and 11 political and peace building missions have been established (as of the end of March 2016). International organizations, such as the Offi ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), respective governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and restoration activities for the victims of confl icts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries. Japan has been promoting international peace cooperation activities in various regions including Cambodia, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, Nepal, and South Sudan for more than 20 years, and the results of these activities have been highly praised by both inside and outside Japan. From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, and in light of the appreciation and expectation from the international community, Japan will continue to actively engage in international peace cooperation operations in a multilayered way. In this regard, to maximize the effect of Japan’s contribution to the international community, it is necessary to deliberate more deeply about how the SDF should contribute to the international community. Therefore, regarding international peace cooperation operations and other relevant missions, the SDF will continue proactively taking part in peacekeeping activities utilizing their accumulated experiences and advanced skills necessary knowledge on stress reduction and assigning SDF personnel who have completed specialized counseling education and training to SDF units in overseas mission sites. In addition to assigning medical offi cers to SDF units engaged in overseas missions, the MOD regularly sends mental healthcare support teams and provides education on methods of dealing with stress on the spot, as well as important points to consider in terms of communication with families or fellow SDF personnel after returning to Japan. in fi elds such as engineering, as well as by expanding the dispatch of SDF personnel to further responsible positions, such as mission headquarters and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the United Nations. As such, the SDF places more emphasis on taking more of a leading role, and the MOD will be proactively involved in Japan’s initiatives for international contribution. - 1 United Nations Mission in the Republic of South **Sudan (UNMISS)** **(1) Background to the Decision to Dispatch Personnel to** **UNMISS** The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ Army in January 2005. Fig. III-2-3-3 South Sudan and Its Surrounding Area South Sudan Central Equatoria Province Western Equatoria Province Eastern Equatoria Province Juba ----- SDF personnel engaging in road maintenance for UNMISS SDF personnel providing training in South Sudan Beginning in October 2008, Japan dispatched two GSDF officers to UNMIS headquarters as staff officers (logistics and information staff officers), but UNMIS ended its mission in July 2011 following South Sudan’s independence. Meanwhile, with the objective of consolidating peace and security as well as helping establish necessary conditions for the development of South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was established. The Japanese Government was requested by the United Nations to cooperate with UNMISS, particularly through the dispatch of GSDF engineering units. The Cabinet approved the dispatch of two staff officers (logistics and information staff officers) to UNMISS in November 2011, and in December it decided to dispatch an SDF engineering unit, then the on-site Coordination Center, and an additional staff officer (engineering staff officer). In addition, the Cabinet also approved the dispatch of one staff officer (air operations staff officer) in October, 2014. The peace and stability of South Sudan is essential for the stability of Africa as a whole, and it is a crucial issue that should be dealt with by the international community. The MOD/SDF has accumulated experience through past peacekeeping operations, and we believe that it is possible for Japan to contribute to the peace and stability of South Sudan by providing personnel-based cooperation in infrastructure development, on which the United Nations places great expectations. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 1-2-7 (Situation in Sudan and South Sudan) See>> Fig. III-2-3-3 (South Sudan and Its Surrounding Area) **(2) Activities by the SDF** In January 2012, a then Coordination Center of the SDF was established for the first time in the SDF’s participation in U.N. peacekeeping operation, both in the South Sudan capital city Juba and in Uganda, in order for coordination for the activities conducted by the dispatched engineering unit to begin. Since the commencement of engineering activities within the United Nations facilities in March 2012, the SDF has gradually expanded its activities and has so far implemented engineering activities outside of the United Nations facilities; projects in cooperation with international organizations; and the “All Japan Project,” which consists of efforts in collaboration with development assistance projects. In May 2013, an SDF mobilization order regarding the expansion of areas for operation was issued, which enabled the SDF to continue its activities in and around Juba as well as conducting missions also in the areas in Eastern and Western Equatoria.[3] Since December 2013, due to the worsened security situation in South Sudan, the dispatched engineering unit conducted site preparation and maintenance activities for the internally displaced peoples (IDPs) camp within the United Nations’ facility in Juba. In addition, they also provided assistance in water supply activities and medical services, making use of the SDF management capabilities. On December, 2013, at the request of the United Nations and other organizations, Japan provided 10,000 bullets to the United |Special Representative of the U|nited Nations Secretary-General| |---|---| |Fo Comm|rce ander| |---|---| |Chief o|f Staff| |---|---| |Fig. III-2-3-4|Organization of UNMISS| |---|---| |Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General ComFo mrc ae nder Chief of Staff D S DMir u ie i vs pc is spto i ioo or rn n tof RS eR see ic dpD r er eee Cntsp a t o e ru o&ynt r -y t dHGa iS u nt eip m av ne e te a oc r no ri aa f il t l, at h U rie N an R GD e ethp ne er ep e ru Ss at ee ly cn (S Prt ea op tt le a ii tvc r ie y cia - aol l)f Logistics Branch AJ no ai ln yt s iM s i Css ei no tn er En Sg ein ce tie or ning Aviation Section Aviation Operation Logistics Staff Intelligence Staff Engineering Staff Staff Officer Officer (1 officer) Officer (1 officer) Officer (1 officer) (1 officer) (aboE un t g 3i 5n 0e e pr e U rsn oit nnel) Other Units Notes: Blue boxes show the number of Japanese personnel dispatched to UNMISS|| The SDF operation was planned to be conducted in Eastern and Western Equatoria as well in accordance with the needs of the United Nations. However, following the armed conflicts in South Sudan that started ----- |National Conting (Commander,|ent Commander Engineer Unit)| |---|---| |Unit Headquarters|Support Unit for H.Q.| |---|---| Fig. III-2-3-5 Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineer Unit Deployed in South Sudan : Orders concerning the activities and duties of the engineer unit Minister of Defense : SDF chain of command (Collaboration among each force) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff UNMISS Central Readiness Force Self Defense Fleet Air Support Command National Contingent Commander (Commander, Engineer Unit) About 350 personnel Engineer Unit Commander: Colonel Unit Headquarters Support Unit for H.Q. Engineering Equipment Platoon Engineering Platoon Garrison Liaison Section Military Police *Excludes commands relating to judicial police duties Nations in light of the urgent necessity and humanitarian nature of the situation.[4] In May 2014, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2155, which created the mandate of shifting the UNMISS role from support for nation building to the protection of civilians. Accordingly, the tasks of the deployed engineering unit also shifted from infrastructure development to mainly the provision of civilian protection support for the U.N. troops. The deployed engineering unit resumed road development and maintenance outside the U.N. facilities in June 2014 as the situation in Juba had become relatively stable, while facility-upgrading work was commenced from February 2015 as collaboration with Japan’s development cooperation projects. In August 2015, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Confl icts between the government and the antigovernment forces was signed. Following this, the United Nations also reviewed the mandate and activity period of the UNMISS, and adopted a new United Nations Security Council Resolution. Responding to the needs of the UNMISS, the deployed SDF unit commenced road development in the suburbs of Juba in September 2015 and carried out another development work jointly with the Bangladesh engineering unit in May 2016. Meanwhile, the United Nations adopted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2252 in December 2015 to extend the dispatch period of the UNMISS for further about 8 months, the dispatch period was extended until October 31, 2016. See>> Fig. III-2-3-4 (Organization of UNMISS) See>> Fig. III-2-3-5 (Overview of the Coordination Center and the Engineer Unit Deployed in South Sudan) **(3) Cooperation between Japan and Australia in UNMISS** To date, the MOD/SDF has cooperated closely with the Australian Defense Forces in the fi eld, such as in activities to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Kuroe (left) exchanging opinions regarding peacekeeping operations with the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, United Nations Secretariat (second from right) Iraq and United Nations peacekeeping operations. As both Japan and Australia are also participating in UNMISS 2012, two Australian military personnel, who were dispatched to carry out UNMISS duties, began to undertake external coordination work and other duties in August 2012. - 2 Co-Hosting of the United Nations Training of **Trainers (TOT)** In October 2015, the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) at the Joint Staff College played a central part in co-hosting the United Nations Training of Trainers (TOT), which has the theme of civil-military coordination in the U.N. peacekeeping operations, together with the United Nations. - 3 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to **the U.N. Secretariat** Currently two SDF personnel (one Division-Director level and one action offi cer-level) have been dispatched to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (U.N. DPKO) for a two-year period to serve as the primary ----- **y** **United Nations (UN) PKO Training of Trainers (TOT)** **Column** The United Nations (UN) places emphasis on enhancing the capability of deployed units from various countries engaging in UN peacekeeping operations. For this purpose, as it is necessary to train trainers who will provide training for units to be deployed in respective countries, the United Nations PKO Training of Trainers is conducted several times annually in various countries to achieve qualitative progress for personnel from various countries to be dispatched to peacekeeping operations. In response to the United Nations’ request that the Government of Japan be the co-host, the training was decided to be held in Japan in 2015. It was the fi rst time that this training took place in Japan, and the Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center (JPC) of the Joint Staff College A group photo at the opening ceremony of the training played the leading role in conducting the training. The theme of the training was civil-military coordination and 27 people from 14 countries including Japan participated in the training for nearly 2 weeks in October 2015. The training had great signifi cance in that the Government of Japan contributed to the improvement of capability of PKO personnel in other countries as well as the Japanese personnel to be participating in PKOs. The MOD will continue to cooperate in various forms from the perspective of human resources development for the UN and international community, and will strive to develop human resources for our personnel who could participate in peacekeeping operations and other activities. |Col1|Col2| |---|---| |Fig. III-2-3-6|Status of Instructors Dispatched to PKO cente| |Tunisia Morocco Is Ca PKO training Center (Mali) Libya Eg Algeria Mauritania Niger Senegal Bamako BurkiM naa l Fi aso Chad Suda Guinea Benin Cote Ghana Nigeria South Sud D’lvoire Togo Central African Liberia Accra Cameroon Equatorial Guinea Sao Tome and Republic of Congo Principe Gabon Democratic Republic of Kofi Annan International the Congo Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) Angola Zambia South African National Peace Mission Training Centre Zim (South Africa) Botswana Namibia South Africa Note: The dispatch of instructors to South Sudan ref the International Peace Support Training Centr|| Status of Instructors Dispatched to PKO centers Cyprus Syria Tunisia Lebanon Iran Morocco Israel Iraq Cairo Jordan PKO training Center (Mali) Libya Cairo Regional Center for Egypt Conflict Resolution and Algeria Peacekeeping (Egypt) Mauritania Niger Senegal Bamako Burkina FasoMali Chad Sudan Federal Democratic Republic ofEritrea Yemen Guinea Benin Ethiopia Peace Support Training Center Cote Ghana Nigeria South Sudan (FDRE-PSTC) (Ethiopia) Liberia D’lvoireAccra Togo Cameroon Central African Ethiopia Somalia Sao Tome and Equatorial Guinea Republic of Congo Uganda Kenya Principe Gabon Democratic Peacekeeping Training CentreKofi Annan International(Ghana) Angola Republic of the Congo Tanzania Support Training CentreInternational Peace (IPSTC) (Kenya) Center for United NationsPeacekeeping (India) Zambia South African National Peace Mozambique Mission Training Centre(South Africa) Botswana Zimbabwe Madagascar Namibia Lesotho South Africa Note: The dispatch of instructors to South Sudan refers to a lecture delivered in South Sudan by an instructor originally from the International Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya. contact to and for the military components within the offi ce of operations and to conduct force generation affairs for U.N. peacekeeping operations. In addition, one administrative offi cial has been dispatched to the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS) to engage in duties such as project management for the Triangular Partnership.[5] See>> Reference 67 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) - 4 Dispatch of Instructors to PKO Centers To support peacekeeping operation undertaken by African and other countries, the MOD/SDF has dispatched SDF personnel as instructors to the PKO centers to contribute to the peace and stability by enhancing the capacity of the centers. Starting with the deployment to the Cairo Regional Center for Training on Confl ict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) in November 2008, a total of 24 SDF personnel (17 deployments and eight A partnership for supporting the capability enhancement of the personnel from troop contributing countries through the cooperation among the United Nations, troop contributing countries, and third countries ----- **VOICE** **My Experience of Participating in the United Nations Project for** **Column** **Africa Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities** **GSDF Camp Katsuta (Hitachinaka City, Ibaraki Prefecture)** **Major (GSDF) Michiaki Okazaki, GSDF Engineer School** I participated in the project in Kenya as the leader of 11 training instructors. For 10 trainees who were participating from the military forces of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania, we taught the basic operations of dozers, graders, bucket loaders, and hydraulic excavators through interpreters, spending approximately 1.5 more time than usual, with the goal that every participant become capable of operating these types of equipment safely and surely. Some trainees required two weeks until they became able to move a grader straight backward. We encountered trouble such as the overheating of equipment in the intense heat, and fl ooding in the training place by bursting water pipes, which suddenly occured during the training activities. However, as a result of reviewing the education policies and the contents of subjects in detail as well as implementing rehearsals and study group meetings by all of the instructors, every trainee passed the profi ciency test for all the The author (center) receiving an award from the United Nations and the Kenya Defence Forces at the closing ceremony equipment. This also meant that the goal mentioned earlier was achieved. Best of all, though, the trainees’ enthusiasm was a source of encouragement for the instructors. The success of the project not only deepened the tie between the trainees and the instructors, but it also hugely contributed to the trusting relationship between Japan and Kenyan organizations, strengthened cooperation with the United Nations, and the friendship and goodwill relationships with the Eastern African countries. We look forward to someday learning about these trainees’ activities in future peacekeeping operations, and engaging in the same missions jointly with Japan. countries in total), including two female SDF offi cers, were dispatched over the period until May 2016. The SDF personnel provided education based on their experiences and lessons gained through SDF activities overseas, to include lectures concerning the importance of building relationships with local population in international peace cooperation activities, and the international disaster relief activities in which the SDF has engaged. From March to May at 2014, a SDF personnel was dispatched to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Peace Support Training Center (FDRE-PSTC) as an international consultant for the fi rst time besides instructors, to provide advice on education and to design curriculums for cultivating U.N. peacekeepers, which were highly appreciated by concerned local parties and students. Furthermore, in March 2015, two SDF offi cers were dispatched to Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (CUNPK) in India, one as an evaluation offi cer for evaluating the educational content of the United Nations Peacekeeping Special Military Female Military Offi cers Course, and one as an observer for this training. See>> Fig. III-2-3-6 (Status of Instructors Dispatched to PKO centers) - 5 Formulation of United Nations Military Unit **Manuals (UNMUM) for Engineers** formulation of the United Nations Military Unit Manual (UNMUM) for Engineers, which is initiated by the United Nations Headquarters, and Japan served as a chair country of the Engineering Unit Manual Working Group. In March 2014, the fi rst Engineer Unit Manual Working Group was held in Tokyo and its second meeting was held in Indonesia in June. In October 2015, the fi nal draft of the manual was distributed to the member countries. The MOD/SDF will continue to provide support towards the widespread use of the Manual. - 6 Support to the Project for Africa Rapid **Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC)** In recent U.N. PKO missions, serious shortage of personnel and equipment (heavy equipment), which plays a major role in the construction of the infrastructure for its activities, and insuffi cient personnel to operate such equipment, was revealed, causing a hindrance when launching a mission and expanding it. For this reason, Prime Minister Abe expressed Japan’s active support to the issue at the PKO Summit in September 2014, and it was embodied by through the ARDEC. In the ARDEC, the Department of Field Support (DFS) of the United Nations procures heavy equipment and carries out training for the facility personnel on the basis of the fund provided by Japan From September In order to play more of a leading role in international peace cooperation activities the MOD/SDF supports the ----- to October 2015, pilot training was conducted at the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Nairobi. Japan dispatched GSDF general personnel as instructor who provided training on the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment for 10 personnel participants from four countries in East Africa. The MOD will also actively support full-fl edged training to be implemented going forward. **3 International Disaster Relief Operations** In recent years, the role of advanced capabilities in military affairs has become more diverse, and opportunities for its use in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are growing. To contribute to the advancement of international cooperation, the SDF has also engaged in international disaster relief operations proactively from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the global security environment. To this end, the SDF maintains their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans. Based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations, which fully utilize their functions and capabilities, while taking into consideration specifi c relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries. See>> Reference 66 (The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities) - 7 United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference In March 2015, the United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference was held as a follow-up to the summit meeting on the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.[6] Over 100 countries participated in this conference. From Japan, the Chief of Staff of the GSDF attended the conference and delivered a speech expressing the SDF’s determination about fulfi lling its responsibility for international peacekeeping by actively participating in U.N. peacekeeping operations and providing support for capacity building and Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities in Africa. - 2 International Disaster Relief Operations by the **SDF and SDF’s Posture** Responding to specifi c relief requests by the governments of affected countries and the scale of disaster situations in these countries, the SDF’s capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass (1) medical services, such as fi rst-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention; (2) transport of personnel and equipment by helicopter and other means; and (3) water supply activities using water-purifying devices. In addition, the SDF uses transport aircraft and ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. The Central Readiness Force and regional units of the GSDF maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime when needed. The Self Defense Fleet of the MSDF and Air Support Command of the ASDF also constantly maintain their readiness to transport personnel and their supplies to disaster affected areas. Furthermore, in April 2015, the ASDF also An instructor from the National Defense Medical College (third from right) conducting research on epidemics in Sierra Leone in cooperation with local offi cers - 1 Outline of the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law Since the enactment of the Law Concerning the Dispatchment of the Japan Disaster Relief Team (Japan Disaster Relief Team Law) in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations. In 1992, the Japan Disaster Relief Team Law was partially amended, enabling the SDF to participate in international disaster relief activities and to transport its personnel and equipment for this purpose. See>> Reference 24 (Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces) U.S. Vice President Joe Biden called for a high-level meeting concerning the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and in response to this, Prime Minister Abe co-hosted the meeting in September 2014. ii ----- improved their readiness to be able to swiftly respond to a request for search activities using P-3C patrol aircraft. - 3 International Disaster Relief Operations for **the Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in** **West Africa** Following the outbreak reported by Guinea in March 2014, Ebola continued to primarily spread in the three countries of Guinea and its neighboring countries Liberia and Sierra Leone. The MOD dispatched a liaison officer to the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) located in Germany since October 2014 (the first was a member of the ASDF, followed by a member of the GSDF), in order to strengthen the cooperation between Japan and the United States regarding the response to EVD and to gather information on the operational status of other countries. Furthermore, in response to the request of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) for swift and reliable transport of personal protective equipment that is vital for safe medical practice, and based on consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the MOD decided to conduct international disaster relief operations in November, 2014. The MOD/SDF organized the International Disaster Relief Airlift Unit for West Africa and initially four personnel were dispatched in December of the same year to Accra, the capital city of Ghana, to conduct coordination and preparation tasks with relevant organizations such as UNMEER. At the same time, the International Disaster Relief Airlift Unit for West Africa (one KC-767 aerial refueling/transport aircraft) was also dispatched to Accra, and approximately 20,000 sets of personal protective equipment were delivered to UNMEER. Furthermore, at the request of the World Health Organization (WHO), Japan has dispatched one instructor from the National Defense Medical College (NDMC) to Sierra Leone in order to support epidemiological survey in the affected countries from April to the end of May 2015. - 4 The International Disaster Relief Operations for **the Missing AirAsia Airplane** Members of the Medical Assistance Unit conducting medical activities in the field Center. Two destroyers “Takanami” and “Onami,” as well as three helicopters, which were on their way to return to their bases following the completion of counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, were dispatched to the waters where the international disaster relief was being conducted, engaged in search and rescue activities for approximately one week, and worked to recover the remains of the deceased passengers. - 5 International Disaster Relief Activities in Nepal **(Earthquake)** A massive M7.8 earthquake struck Nepal in April, 2015. The MOD allowed an investigation team consisting of three personnel to accompany the Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched by the Government of Japan. In addition to this, responding to a request from the Government of Nepal, and based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, the MOD decided to initiate international disaster relief operations. The MOD/SDF deployed personnel to Nepal that were comprised of the Joint Operations Coordination Center (four personnel), International Disaster Relief Medical Assistance Unit (approximately 110 personnel), International Disaster Relief Air Transport Unit (approximately 30 personnel and six C-130 transport aircraft, etc.) and other units. At the same time, considering the urgent needs for medical assistance in the affected areas, part of the Medical Assistance Unit (approximately 20 personnel) was swiftly dispatched as the First Response Unit, followed by the Airlift Unit and main Medical Assistance Unit. During the operation period of approximately three weeks, the Medical Assistance Unit provided medical treatment to approximately 2,900 people within the capital Kathmandu and its suburbs, while the Joint Operations Coordination Center conducted coordination tasks with the Government of Nepal and other relevant organizations. At the same time, the Airlift Unit transported a total of nearly 9.5 tons of equipment and goods necessary for medical activities In December 2014, AirAsia Flight 8501 flying from Surabaya to Singapore lost its contact. Following the request for search and rescue assistance from the Indonesian government, and based on the consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the MOD decided to initiate SDF international disaster relief operations. The MOD/SDF organized the SDF Maritime surface Unit for the missing Air Asia airplane, and dispatched three personnel to conduct preparatory work as a Coordination ----- **Initiatives for Arms Control, Disarmament and** **Section 4** **Non-Proliferation** Causing anxiety not only to Japan, but also countries across the globe, North Korea’s launch of missiles, which was purported to be a satellite, and its nuclear test demonstrated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, which serve as their means of delivery, still posed a pressing challenge to peace and stability of the international community. Moreover, many countries are working on the regulation of certain conventional weapons, considering **1 Initiatives Focused on Treaties Relating to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation** Japan actively participates in international initiatives for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation in regard to weapons of mass destruction, in the form of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as missiles as a means of delivery and associated technologies and materials. Japan has contributed to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by offering its knowledge in the fi eld of chemical protection since it was at the negotiating stage and dispatching the GSDF personnel who are experts on protection against chemical weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established to continuously implement verifi cation measures following the entry of the Convention into force. Furthermore, small quantities of chemical substance under regulation of the Convention are synthesized at the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), in order to conduct protection research. Thus, the school has undergone inspections nine times in total since its establishment, in accordance with the Convention regulations. Moreover, the whole of the Japanese government is working on projects aimed at disposing of abandoned the need to maintain a balance between humanitarian perspectives and defensive requirements. One of the initiatives to deal with these issues is the development of an international framework for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, and Japan is playing an active role in this effort. See>> Fig. III-2-4-1 (Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.) chemical weapons in China, in accordance with the CWC, and the Ministry has seconded nine personnel, including GSDF personnel, to the Cabinet Offi ce to work on this project. Since 2000, GSDF personnel with expertise in chemicals and ammunitions have been dispatched to conduct excavation and recovery projects on a total of 15 occasions. In addition, the MOD has been cooperating in endeavors aimed at increasing the effectiveness of regulations and decisions, by dispatching offi cials to major meetings such as those of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), as well as international export control regimes in the form of the Australia Group (AG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Furthermore, from 2011 to 2012, one GSDF personnel was dispatched to the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the fi rst time. See>> Reference 67 (Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations) Japan has signed various conventions on the regulation of conventional weapons such as the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed |Fig. III-2-4-1|Framework for Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Relating to Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Materials, etc.| |---|---| |Category|Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.|Col3|Col4|Col5|Conventional Weapons| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Nuclear Weapons|Chemical Weapons|Biological Weapons|Delivery Systems (Missiles)|| |Conventions on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, etc.|Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)|Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)|Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)|The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)|Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Treaty) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)| |Export Control Frameworks Aimed at Nonproliferation|Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)|Australia Group (AG)||Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)|Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)| **Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.** **Category** **Delivery Systems** **Conventional Weapons** **Nuclear Weapons** **Chemical Weapons** **Biological Weapons** **(Missiles)** Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Treaty on the Non- Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo The Hague Code of Conventions on Arms Proliferation of Nuclear Convention) Chemical Weapons Biological Weapons Conduct Against Ballistic Control, Disarmament and Weapons (NPT) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (CWC) Convention (BWC) Missile Proliferation Nonproliferation, etc. Comprehensive Nuclear- Convention (Ottawa Treaty) (HCOC) Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms U.N. Report on Military Expenditures Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Export Control Frameworks Nuclear Suppliers Group Missile Technology Australia Group (AG) Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) Aimed at Nonproliferation (NSG) Control Regime (MTCR) New International Initiatives Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Aimed at Nonproliferation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Weapons of Mass Destruction ----- to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW),[1] based on humanitarian perspectives and security needs. Japan has also signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (Oslo Convention),[2] which was adopted outside the framework of the CCW. With the entry of this Convention into force in August 2010, it was stipulated that the use of all cluster munitions in the possession of the SDF was immediately prohibited and they must be discarded within eight years, which was completed in February 2015. Furthermore, the MOD has actively cooperated in the initiatives of the international **2 International Initiatives Aimed at Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction** - 1 Proliferation Security Initiative community that focuses on the problem of anti-personnel mines by submitting annual reports that include data on Japan’s exceptional stocks to the United Nations.[3] In addition, the MOD/SDF participates in various systems introduced by the United Nations with the aim of increasing the transparency of military preparedness and military expenditure (the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures), providing the requisite reports. They dispatched personnel as needed to governmental expert meetings for reviewing and improving these systems. well as personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, and the Ministry of Finance. Based on the proliferation cases in the areas surrounding Japan, and from the perspectives of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in peacetime and improving the response capability of the SDF, the MOD strives to conduct activities to strengthen nonproliferation frameworks including PSI, as well as participating in and holding various relevant exercises and meetings. See>> Fig. III-2-4-2 (Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2012)) Deeply concerned about the development of weapons of mass destruction and missiles by countries such as North Korea and Iran, the United States announced its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)[4] in May 2003, and sought the participation of other countries therein. Various initiatives are being undertaken based on PSI; PSI interdiction exercises aimed at improving the ability to thwart the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related items and meetings to consider issues on policies and legislations. Since the 3rd PSI Meeting in Paris (September 2003), the MOD/SDF has collaborated with relevant organizations and countries, dispatching the MOD offi cials and the SDF personnel to various meetings, as well as engaging in ongoing participation in these exercises since 2004. Japan has hosted PSI maritime interdiction exercises twice, working in partnership with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance and the Japan Coast Guard, and hosted the PSI air interdiction exercise in July 2012 for the fi rst time. In addition, during the PSI interdiction exercise, which was hosted by New Zealand in November 2015, Japan sent participants including personnel from the Joint Staff, as - 2 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 **Regarding the Nonproliferation of Weapons of** **Mass Destruction** In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 regarding the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which lays the foundations for the international community to deal with the acquisition, development, use, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. Japan supports the adoption of this resolution and hopes that all United Nations member countries will comply with it. Fig. III-2-4-2 Participation of MOD/SDF in PSI Interdiction Exercise (Since 2012) **Date** **Exercise** **Location** **Participation of MOD/SDF** Joint Staff, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Northern Army, July 2012 PSI air interdiction exercise hosted by Japan Japan Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau September 2012 PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the ROK Republic of Korea 1 destroyer, 1 patrol aircraft (P-3C) February 2013 PSI exercise co-hosted by the U.S. and UAE UAE Dispatch of observer August 2014 PSI maritime interdiction exercise hosted by the U.S. United States 1 destroyer November 2015 PSI exercise hosted by New Zealand New Zealand Joint Staff CCW: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects Major producers and owners of cluster munitions such as the United States, China and Russia have not signed the Oslo Convention. The MOD nominated retired Self-Defense Offi cials to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) from 1999 to December 2006, to support antipersonnel mine removal activities in Cambodia; these retired SDF personnel were dispatched to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) as maintenance and transport advisors within JICA’s long-term expert dispatch framework. An initiative that seeks to strengthen the relevant domestic laws of respective countries to the maximum possible extent, and considers measures that participating countries can jointly take while complying ----- **Chapter 3** **[Measures on Defense ]** **Equipment and Technology** While defense equipment has become more advanced and complex, the defense industry in Japan has been exposed to harsh conditions due to a decrease in the number of units procured caused by Japan’s severe fi nancial conditions and an increase in imports of foreign-made equipment. In addition, other countries are aiming to acquire advanced military capabilities utilizing the latest technologies. In order to ensure the quality of defense capabilities suffi ciently and to enhance deterrence as well as response capabilities amid the situation in which rapid advancements in technological innovation have a signifi cant infl uence on the global security environment, it is crucial that Japan ensure technological superiority over other countries. Hence, Japan is required to further **Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring** **Section 1** **Technological Superiority** **1 Orientation for Research and Development of Equipment and Material** In recent years, technological innovation has made rapid progress. Thus, as a nation, strategically working on the ways to ensure technological superiority has become a pressing issue from the perspective of ensuring Japan’s security. The state-of-the-art military technologies in each country are sensitive technologies that shall not be easily shared with other countries. From the perspective of Japan, for the areas, which should strategically maintain their domestic technology platforms, it is necessary to promote research and development domestically. In the case that international joint development etc. is carried out when acquiring equipment, it leads to bargaining power that Japan owns cutting-edge technology (key technology). Therefore, it is necessary to promote research and development by public and private sectors working together in unity. For the purpose of ensuring Japan’s technological superiority, carrying out the invention of advanced equipment in effective and effi cient manners, and dealing with various policy issues pertaining to defense technologies and civilian technologies, the develop defense equipment and technology policies while also taking into account these points. See>> Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6 (Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology as well as Defense Production and Technological Bases) Amid such a situation, it is indispensable to work on strategic research and development for ensuring the Japan’s technological superiority, strengthening project management, promoting defense equipment and technological cooperation, and maintaining and strengthening defense production and technological bases in order to maintain an environment in which defense equipment that meets the SDF’s operational needs will be procured into the future. **Promotion of Research and Development for Ensuring** MOD would formulate a Defense Technology Strategy (tentative), which shows specifi c directions for various measures to be strategically worked on, and conduct research and development activities. Under these ideas, the MOD develops outlooks regarding future technology based on the current trends in technology both in and outside of Japan and Medium-toLong Term Defense Technology Outlook indicating the directions of medium-to-long-term initiatives in the area of science and technology set in accordance with these outlooks. These initiatives are vital for Japan to be able to continue inventing and producing advanced equipment required by the Self-Defense Force (SDF) going forward. Furthermore, related to the Medium-to-Long Term Defense Technology Outlook, the integration of superior and advanced civilian technology, which is dual-use technology,[1] will be promoted by publicizing it. At the same time, it is expected to promote the development of key technologies and advanced technology fi elds to be focused on in the future, which have the potential for ----- playing a role as a game changer by identifying those and carrying out intensive resource investment. Based on changes in future combat modality in light of joint operations, as well as the trend in technology enabling smarter, more networked and more unmanned conditions, the MOD formulates “Research and Development Vision,” covering items that require development and improvement of technological bases, and that could potentially become Japan’s important defense equipment in approximately 20 **2 Initiatives regarding Research and Development** The MOD engages in the invention of equipment that corresponds to the needs of the SDF, including (1) improvement of air defense capability, (2) enhancement of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, (3) unmanned equipment that can be used fl exibly at times of various contingencies including largescale disasters, and (4) enhancement of the capacity of existing equipment. The MOD also makes proposals regarding highly promising technologies based on the technological trends, as well as adopting advanced technologies and dualuse technologies for prototyping, and conducts testing and evaluation of the prototype equipment. Particularly for improving air defense capability, with regard to future fi ghters, the MOD conducts demonstrational research on the high-mobility stealth fi ghter “Advanced Technology Demonstrator (ATD-X)” years. The “Research and Development Vision” is intended to realize effective and effi cient research and development by presenting a farsighted concept of defense equipment based on a technical proposal and a roadmap for research and development designed to achieve the concept. By offi cially publishing the vision, the MOD expects such effects as increasing predictability for industries, and promoting stable and effi cient capital investment as well as staff assignment. in order for the development (including the possibility of international joint development) of fi ghters to be taken into account as an option before the retirement of F-2 fi ghters. Along with this research, the MOD also carries out strategic studies such as research on a compact heat transfer system for increased heat generation of mounted avionics and thrust vectoring nozzles for ensuring high mobility and stealth capabilities. This will enable the fi ghter-related technology to be compiled and advanced within Japan. The decision on the development will be made by FY2018 and necessary measures will be taken accordingly. Furthermore, the MOD carries out a study on the element technology based on the high-power laser system, which can be applied to close air defense of vessels and bases, and a study on the technology, which induces malfunction or destruction of electronic **Commentary** **Maiden Flight of the Advanced Technology Demonstrator** **Column** On April 22, 2016, the Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2) made its maiden fl ight. The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency had been working on building its prototype. The fi rst fl ight was conducted by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., which was in charge of making the prototype. The X-2 took off from Nagoya Airport, which is adjacent to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Komaki Minami factory, and fl ew for approximately 26 minutes until it landed at the JASDF Gifu Air Base. Following this fl ight, on June 13, the X-2 was delivered to the MOD, and from now on, its test fl ights are going to be carried out at the Gifu Air Base by the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency. The X-2 is an aircraft to be used to verify feasibility and operability Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2) during its maiden fl ight of fi ghter technologies, which combine stealth capabilities, and high maneuverability. It has already been 16 years since the completion of the development of F-2 fi ghters. This fi rst fl ight will lead to the inheritance of highly skilled human resources and the know-how necessary for acquiring technologies that have the potential for developing the next generation fi ghters. Furthermore, in the situation where only a few countries other than the United States have fl own stealth manned aircraft, we can expect an increase in the international bargaining power by showcasing Japan’s technologies related to fi ghter development to the international community. It can be said that these are very important initiatives leading to the acquisition of the successor of F-2 fi ghters. In order to establish the most desirable air defense posture for Japan in the future, we will continue to promote these strategic examinations for accumulating and advancing the fi ghter-related technologies within the country. ----- equipment built into incoming missiles to neutralize the missiles by generating and irradiating high-powered directed microwaves. To improve ISR capabilities, the MOD conducts research aiming to load dual wavelength infrared sensors with superior detecting and discriminating capabilities onto “advanced optical satellites,” which are currently being planned by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), and to make them operate in the space environment. The MOD also **3 Active Utilization of Civilian Technology** The Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) and domestic research institutions, such as national research and development agencies and universities have been proactively working on research collaborations and technological information exchanges in order to ensure that superior advanced civilian technology is incorporated and effi cient research and development is conducted. In FY2015 the MOD launched competitive research funding program called “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” to discover creative promotes research on high mobility powered suits and the environmental awareness enhancement technology for remote control vehicles that can be used fl exibly at times of various contingencies including large-scale disasters. Furthermore, as advanced research, which has the potential to ensure technological superiority, the MOD conducts research regarding the element technology of the next generation of night vision devices and the one regarding electromagnetic pulse (EMP) missiles, which induce the malfunction and destruction of sensor and electronic equipment. research activities conducted in universities, research institutes, companies etc., which are expected to apply defense equipment in future and to promote promising research seeds. In the fi rst fi scal year, 9 research projects were awards from 109 applications. Since actively utilizing advanced civilian technology is essential for ensuring Japan’s technological superiority, ATLA will award new research projects in FY2016. See>> Fig. III-3-1-1 (FY2015 Selected Resarch Project for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (competitive funding)) |Fig. III-3-1-1|FY2015 Selected Research Project for the “Innovative Science & Technology Initiative for Security” (competitive funding)| |---|---| |Research Title (Representative institution for the project) Isotropic wide-band optical perfect absorber made of dark metamaterials (RIKEN) This project aims to realize optical perfect absorber using artif icial structure of sub-wavelength. Optimization of hetero-structures for improving power characteristics of high-frequency devices (Fujitsu Limited) This project aims to realize the dramatic improvement of performance of a gallium nitride (GaN) based high-frequency transistor by, for example, introducing indium-based materials, which are capable of optimizing the device structure. Improve the reliability and strength of the bonded portion research for structural weight reduction (Kanagawa Institute of Technology) This project aims to increase the strength and reliability of carbon f iber reinforced plastic and bonded part by increasing the strength of the part between f biers and resin using carbon nanotubes. Conceptual design of hypersonic combined cycle engine and an experimental verif ication of the hypersonic thrust performance (Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)) This project carries out conceptual designing of hypersonic combined cycle engine, which can operate with the f light speed range from the resting condition to mach 5, and its experimental verif ication. Wireless power transmission development for underwater (Panasonic Corporation) This project aims to realize the method of wireless power transmission a few meters apart in the sea water by transmitting energy to multiple coils using the magnetic f ield resonance method. Research of underwater optical wireless robust communication with photomultiplier tubes (Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC)) Toward the construction of future undersea network, this project will make a prototype of underwater optical wireless communication device in order to establish high-speed and stable optical communication in the sea. Research of repeat pass interferometric MTI2 using unmanned aircraft SAR1 (Tokyo Denki University) This project aims to signif icantly improve the MTI performance by cooperatively control two unmanned aircrafts equipped with SAR performance. Development of ultra-high adsorptive polymer nanof ibers sheet for adsorption of toxic gas (Toyohashi University of Technology) This project will produce polymer nanof ibers, which are capable of chemical adsorption,and evaluate adsorption properties of toxic gas. Development of portable ultra-small biomass gasif ication and power generation system (Tokyo Institute of Technology) This project aims to realize a portable micro-biomass gasif ication power generation system using a wide variety of organic matters as a possible source. 1 SAR: Synthetic Aperture Radar 2 MTI: Moving Target Indication|| ----- **Section 2** **Efforts toward Project Management, etc.** **1 Project Management throughout Its Life Cycle** - 1 Acquisition of Defense Equipment through **Focused Project Management** establishing the Integrated Project Team (IPT), which is composed of offi cials of the relevant departments. - 2 Effective and Effi cient Procurement from **a Comprehensive Perspective** Since defense equipment is becoming more advanced and complex in recent years, there is an increasing tendency in the procurement cost of defense equipment throughout its life cycle of the equipment (equipment design, Research & Development, full rate production and acquisition, and sustainment). For acquiring the necessary number of equipment in appropriate timing, it is extremely important to streamline the procurement process throughout the life cycle of equipment. Therefore, pertaining to important defense equipment, the Department of Project Management was set up within the Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency, which was launched in October 2015 to realize the most optimal acquisition in accordance with operational needs by managing the costs and schedule throughout the life cycle of equipment. Also, in November 2015, twelve types of equipment[1] have been selected as eligible for project management focused equipment. With regard to project management focused equipment, the MOD works to realize the acquisition of strategically optimal defense equipment by designating a Project Manager (PM) as the person responsible for performing the project management as well as by C-2 (one of the selected programs for project management) Procurement of defense equipment based on a comprehensive perspective is required to build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. So far, based on the integrative point of view, the Ministry has been striving to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance expenses through (1) making the equipment function integrated, (2) procuring common equipment and supplies in bulk, standardizing some components, and development of product families, etc.[2] Hereafter, the Ministry will have the viewpoint of project management from the planning stage of defense equipment and strive to reduce procurement costs through connecting information and integrating functions, standardizing some components, and developing product families, etc., to promote effective and effi cient procurement throughout the life cycle of equipment. - 3 Initiatives for Strengthening Project Management The MOD has carried out the following initiatives in order to strengthen project management. ❍ Utilizing knowledge from external audit fi rms to enhance the fairness of project management duties for the purpose of developing a system regarding project management. ❍ Working on the improvement of cost estimation evaluation methods through the creation of a database of cost information and carrying out statistical analysis for enhancing the accuracy of life-cycle cost estimation. ❍ Regularly carrying out training on project management methods used overseas and in the private sector to develop human resources pertaining to project management. SM-3 Block IIA, Middle-range SAM (improved version), Global Hawk (unmanned aerial vehicle), AAV7 (amphibious vehicle), New Destroyers, GSDF UH-X, V-22 (tilt-rotor aircraft), enhanced SH-60K, P-1, C-2, F-35A, next-generation fi ghter aircraft (being considered as a successor of F-2 fi ghter aircraft) Examples of “procuring common equipment and supplies in bulk,” “standardizing some components,” and “development of product families” are small arms, vehicles, and chemical supplies used by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), short-range surface-to-air missiles used by the GSDF and ASDF, and anti-ship missiles used by all three ----- **2 Improving the Contract System and Other Related Matters** - 1 Reviewing Acquisition Systems procurement possible, leading to the realization of the For the purpose of promoting acquisition reform, which is systematic improvement of defense capability. At the a prompt response to swiftly changing surroundings, the same time, for companies, given that the procurement MOD has been holding meetings of the Comprehensive amount will be assured, the systematic use of personnel Acquisition Reform Committee since 2007, besides the and equipment, as well as cost reductions due to bulk Contractual Systems Study Groups has been held since orders, will be made possible. Furthermore, this will 2010 to review acquisition systems. Since FY2016, a prevent subcontractors from withdrawing from the special research offi cer system[3] has been adopted in order defense industry. to surely embody the review results. For the FY2015 budget, a long-term contract for the procurement of 20 fi xed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) (expected amount of cost reduction is approximately 41.7 - 2 Long-Term Contracts, etc. billion yen on a contract basis) was concluded. For the The production of defense equipment requires a FY2016 budget long-term contracts for the procurement signifi cant amount of time. Therefore, if a certain set of 17 patrol helicopters (SH-60K) as well as the aircraft amount is to be acquired by the integrated procurement maintenance of GSDF special transport helicopters method, in many cases a contract for more than fi ve years (EC-225LP) and MSDF training helicopters (TH-135) is needed. With regard to defense equipment and services, (expected amount of cost reduction is approximately 14.8 economies of scale[4] tend not to work mainly due to the billion yen on a contract basis)[6] were concluded. following reasons: (1) the annual procurement quantity is See>> Fig. III-3-2-1 (Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect) small; (2) the MOD is the only customer; (3) companies In addition, by realizing long-term multiple-year that provide such defense equipment etc., are limited. In contracts through active utilization of the PFI Act,[7] it is addition, it is diffi cult for companies to systematically anticipated that the planned acquisition and execution move forward with their businesses with a high degree of of budgets through the standardization of investment predictability, which is peculiar to the defense industry. amounts of the national expenditure will be realized. For this reason, the upper limit of acts that incur It is also anticipated that the realization of long-term national debt prescribed in the Public Finance Act as multiple-year contracts will give rise to such benefi ts as within fi ve years in principle was changed to within cutting equipment procurement costs by reducing risks 10 years for specifi c equipment through the enactment for those taking orders and by promoting the entry of of the Long-term Contract Act.[5] Introduction of this new suppliers. In regard to the project of operation and change regarding long-term contracts will make stable management of private ships, which makes use of the PFI Act, the MOD concluded the contract for the project in March 2016.[8] In addition, regarding procurement of certain equipment with which little competitiveness can be expected due to its characteristics, and companies that work on cost reduction using the MOD’s programs, the MOD promotes limited tendering contracts while ensuring transparency and fairness as well as clarifying and putting the subject into patterns, from the perspective of the implementation of smooth and effi cient procurement, Procurement cost reduction for patrol helicopters (SH-60K) is attempted through integrated and the enhancement of the company’s predictability. procurement based on long-term contracts This is a system to conduct research, which contributes to the procurement system of defense equipment, by inviting experts such as associate professors from different universities specializing in the areas of concern in order to review and reconsider an effective procurement system, based not only on the viewpoints of the Ministry of Defense personnel but also on theories that have been proposed in the fi eld of business administration and economics. Economies of scale refer to the cost advantage that arises with an increased output of a product. For example, costs per unit can be reduced by a bulk purchase of materials. “Special Measures Law Concerning the Term of Expenditure Based on the Obligatory Assurance of National Subsidization for Specifi c Defense Procurement”(enacted in April 2015) This amount of approximately 14.8 billion yen includes the cost reduction effect (stated later) due to PBL contracts pertaining to the aircraft maintenance of EC-225LP and TH-135. Act on Promotion of Private Finance Initiative ----- Fig. III-3-2-1 Image of Long-term Contracts and the Cost Reduction Effect [Traditional procurement (image)] **FY2016** **FY2017** **FY2018** **FY2019** **FY2020** **FY2021** **Delivery of** **five aircraft** **Total of** **Conclusion of** **Delivery of** **approx. 114.0 billion yen** **a contract** **six aircraft** **Conclusion of** **Delivery of** **a contract** **six aircraft** **Reduction of** **Conclusion of** **11.4 billion yen** **a contract** **(Reduction by 10%)** [Procurement based on a long-term contracts (image)] **FY2016** **FY2017** **FY2018** **FY2019** **FY2020** **FY2021** **Total of** **approx. 102.6 billion yen** **Conclusion of** **Delivery of** **Delivery of** **Delivery of** **a contract** **five aircraft** **six aircraft** **six aircraft** - 3 Decrease Procurement Cost and Improve **Companies’ Incentives to Reduce Cost** return any excessive profi t (audit contracts incorporating a provision requiring the return of excessive profi t). However, it has also been noted that these contracts diminish the effectiveness of cost reduction incentives for the companies due to the particular condition that they might be required to return excessive profi ts after the completion of the contract payment at the end of the fi scal year. Therefore, the MOD conducts a review of a risk sharing-type incentive contract as a new contract method in which public and private sectors jointly carry out the management of contract implementation to minimize the risk of it, and in which a certain percentage will be given back to the companies if the cost reduction has been performed. **3 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives** air missiles (SM-2) and the upgrading of maintenance equipment for fi ghter aircraft (F-15), etc. In addition, the Ministry is striving to reduce development, acquisition, and maintenance expenses through integrating procurement of common equipment and supplies, standardizing some components, and developing product families, etc. With regard to the procurement of defense equipment, due to the peculiarity that there are a variety of equipment without a market price, it is necessary to achieve both the reduction of procurement cost and improvement of companies’ incentives to reduce cost simultaneously. Thus, the MOD has been striving to achieve the reduction of procurement prices by confi rming the actual costs incurred and ensuring that no excessive business profi t will be added after the execution of the contract through cost audit contracts with a special provision requiring respective companies to conduct a review of the contract sum and **3 Initiatives Aimed at Increasing the Effi ciency of Procurement, and Other Related Initiatives** - 1 Achieving Further Effi ciency in the Acquisition of **Defense Equipment** The MOD carries out the following measures in addition to a review of the contract system when acquiring defense equipment: a bulk purchase, which seeks greater effi ciency by budgeting and entering into contracts for defense equipment, supplies, and components based on the approach of consolidating the quantities required for several years into a single specifi c fi scal year; and integrated procurement, which involves the consolidated implementation of budgets for equipment used across multiple different organizations, or for components that are common to different types of defense equipment. In the FY2016 budget, approximately 46.5 billion reduction of expenses on a contract base is expected, by concluding an integrated contract of the procurement of ship-to - 2 **Effective and Effi cient Maintenance and Replenishment** With regard to periodic maintenance checks of defense equipment, the MOD has been working to achieve greater effi ciency by extending the interval between the maintenance checks, after making suffi cient effort to ensure safety. In addition, the MOD embarks on the introduction of Performance Based Logistics (PBL)[9] from the perspective PBL is a contract method that involves payment of compensation according to the level of equipment performance achieved, in terms of availability ratio and stable stock. It has achieved positive outcomes upon ----- more appropriate” across the whole government, the MOD continues to carry out the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system[11] and make bidding procedures more effi cient. In addition to these, based on refl ection on the past, Strengthening system investigation, reviewing penalties, ensuring the effectiveness of supervision and inspection, and other measures have steadily been carried out in order to prevent recurrence of incidents such as overcharging and falsifi ed results of product testing by defense-related companies. Through these measures, the MOD strives to surely prevent recurrence of scandals, enhance fairness and transparency, and make contracts more appropriate. In addition, the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) carries out multilayered checks through both internal and external checking systems for more strict checks – namely, ATLA conducts internal inspections etc., by establishing the inspection and audit department, and through deliberations in the Defense Procurement Council, which consists of inspectors and external experts, run by the Inspector General’s Offi ce of Legal Complaints. Moreover, ATLA has also improved its education department and strives to enhance compliance awareness by providing thorough education pertaining to compliance for ATLA personnel. See>> Fig. III-3-2-2 (Inspection and Audit Functions regarding the Procurement of Defense Equipment) PBL for EC-225LP (special transport helicopter) is planned based on a long-term contract of improving the equipment availability ratio and longterm cost reductions. In FY2016, approximately 9.9 billion yen[10] of cost reduction is expected on a contract basis by concluding PBL contracts on the aircraft maintenance of GSDF special transport helicopters (EC-225LP) and MSDF training helicopters (TH-135) as well as the components of GSDF attack helicopters (AH-64D). - 3 Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency The MOD implements measures for making contracts more appropriate and strengthening checking functions to promote the enhancement of fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials. As a part of the effort to “make public procurement Fig. III-3-2-2 Inspection and Audit Functions regarding the Procurement of Defense Equipment Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) Other organizations Commissioner, ATLA and agencies Third-party organization Assistant Commissioner Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance (Director,) Audit and Evaluation Division Defense Procurement Council (Deliberation to be conducted H Directly reports the results and H 25 staff members (regular staff as of the end by external experts) improvement plans of defense of FY2015) inspections to the Minister of Defense. Defense inspection H H Internal inspection: inspection carried out from of collusive bidding. Internal audit: an audit regarding research and the perspectives of compliance and the prevention H university professors, lawyers, and certified public accountants.Seven external experts including development, tasks such as procurement and H Study and deliberation will be the Minister’s SecretariatAuditing Division at Human ResourcesaccountingH 13 staff members Internalinspection conducted on rules regarding procurement, project management, single bidder projects, and H Conducts an audit of ATLA as necessary. Development Center (regular staff as of the end of FY2015) Internalaudit specifications, etc. Audit Training and education regarding compliance, etc. Study anddeliberation Internal and external multi-layered checks and mutual supervision within the organization implementationReportingstatus Project ManagementDepartment of Audit Firm Corporations Equipment development (Project Management Group) Contracts, etc. Department of officer, etc. of rulemaking andoperation statusUnderstanding Equipment PolicyDepartment of H methods and operational status, etc.Evaluation on project management Procurement Operations Department of Evaluation H Use of the results of evaluation for (Practical Development and Technology Strategy the improvement of duties and Procurement Group) Applicationfor various Procurement ManagementDepartment of enhancement of internal audit capabilities. approvals, etc. (Rulemaking Group) 10 This amount of approximately 9.9 billion yen includes the cost reduction effect related to long-term contracts pertaining to the aircraft maintenance of EC-225LP and TH-135. 11 Unlike the automatic bid system which focuses only on price, this is a system which the successful bidder is determined on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation that includes both the price and other ----- **Section 3** **Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** Based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Japan promotes cooperation in defense equipment and technology with other countries in order to contribute to promoting the maintenance and enhancement of defense production and technological bases, as well as contributing to the promotion of peace **1 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** - 1 Purpose of Establishment of the Three Principles **on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology** and international cooperation. Japan will continue to realize effective defense equipment and technological cooperation through the strengthening of intelligence gathering such as the needs of its counterparts, cooperation including assistance for maintenance and repair of equipment, and strengthening of cooperative posture between the public and private sectors. - 2 Main Contents of the New Three Principles **(1) Clarifi cation of Cases Where Transfers are prohibited** **(the First Principle)** The cases where transfers are prohibited are clarifi ed as follows: (1) in the case of violating the obligations based on agreements signed by Japan and other international agreements; (2) in the case of violating the obligations based on the Resolution of the United Nations Security Council; or (3) in the case of transferring to the countries in confl icts. See>> Fig. III-3-3-1 (The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited”) **(2) Limitation to Cases Where Transfers May Be** **Permitted As Well As Strict Examination and** **Information Disclosure (the Second Principle)** The cases where transfers may be permitted are limited to (1) cases that contribute to the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or (2) cases that contribute to the security of Japan. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user whilst ensuring transparency, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. In addition, it has been decided that important cases would be deliberated at the National Security Council and along with this, information concerning the cases that were deliberated would be disclosed. Japan has dealt with arms exports in a careful manner, in accordance with the Three Principles of Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines. On the other hand, in individual cases, such as the participation of domestic companies in the joint development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) by Japan and the U.S., it has taken separate measures in which arms exports are dealt with outside the Three Principles. Amidst this situation, in December 2011, the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment, etc. put in place exemptions from the Three Principles of Arms Exports based on the premise of strict control,[1] with regard to (1) cases related to peace contribution and international cooperation, and (2) cases regarding international joint development and production of defense equipment, etc. that contributes to Japan’s security. In April 2014, based on the National Security Strategy, the Government formulated the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology as new principles replacing the Three Principles on Arms Exports etc.[2] and its implementation guidelines. These clarifi ed the concrete standards, procedures and limitation. See>> Reference 68 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) Fig. III-3-3-1 The First Principle “The Cases Where Transfers Are Prohibited” **Situation** **Specifi c examples** (1) Violation of obligations under treaties Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Arms concluded and other international Trade Treaty, etc. arrangements (2) Violation of obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (nuclear issue of North Korea), etc. Security Council Resolutions Countries which are the target of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council to maintain or (3) Transfer to a nation which is party to a confl ict restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack The strict control refers to the duty imposed on recipient countries to gain prior consent from Japan with respect to extra-purpose use and third party transfer, within international arrangements concluded between the Governments of Japan and recipient countries. The term “defense equipment” is deemed appropriate for the title of “Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” since possible articles of overseas transfers help peace contribution and international cooperation as was seen in the example of the provision of bulldozers and other items belonging to the SDF to disaster-stricken countries. Similarly, due to the fact that there is provision of ----- Fig. III-3-3-2 The Second Principle “Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted” **Situation** **Specifi c examples** (1) Contribution to the proactive Overseas transfers that contribute to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, only if the transfers advancement of peace have positive meaning from the viewpoint of peace contribution and international cooperation and when: contribution and international ❍ the recipient is a foreign government, or cooperation ❍ the recipient is the United Nations (UN) System or organizations conducting the activities based on a UN resolution Overseas transfers that contribute to Japan’s security, only if the transfers have positive meaning from the viewpoint of Japan’s security, and that: ❍ are related to international joint development and production with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., ❍ contribute to enhancing security and defense cooperation with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including the U.S., and of the following: - Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology included in the provision of supplies and services implemented by the SDF in accordance with laws - provision of military technology as a part of mutual exchange of technology with the U.S., (2) Contribution to the security - Provision of parts or services related to a licensed product of the U.S. or provision of repair services etc. to the U.S. armed of Japan forces, or - defense equipment and technology related to cooperation concerning rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance or minesweeping with countries cooperating with Japan in security area, or ❍ are necessary for supporting activities of the governmental agencies including the Self-Defense Forces (hereinafter referred to as “the SDF etc.”), which include the activities of foreign governments or private entities etc. related to the activities of the SDF etc., or for ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals, and that are: - temporary export of equipment, return of purchased equipment or provision of technical information related to the activities of the SDF etc. including replacements of items which need repairing with non-defective items, - export of equipment for the protection or self-protection of public offi cials, or - export of equipment for the self-protection of Japanese nationals operating in danger areas consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, in cases where it is judged appropriate for the active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, cases involving participation in the international systems for sharing parts, and cases where parts are delivered to a licenser, appropriate control may be ensured with the confi rmation of the control system at the destination. **2 Deepening Relationships with the United States regarding Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** - 2 Production, Sustainment and Maintenance **of Common Equipment between Japan and** **the United States** See>> Fig. III-3-3-2 (The Second Principle “Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted”) **(3) Ensuring Appropriate Control regarding Extra-Purpose** **Use or Transfer to Third Parties (the Third Principle)** Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured, and the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior **2** - 1 Joint Research and Development, etc. Since 1992, Japan has implemented 20 joint research projects and 1 joint development project with the United States. At present, 3 joint research projects (joint research on hybrid electric propulsion, joint research on highspeed multi-hull vessel optimization, and joint research on the comparison of exposure to jet fuel and noise in unit operation) and 1 development project (Japan-U.S. cooperative development of an Advanced Ballistic Missile Interceptor) are underway. In addition, with regard to the transfer of software and parts related to the Aegis System from Japan to the United States, Japan affi rmed in July 2015 that this overseas transfer falls under the case, which may be permitted, based on deliberations at the National Security Council. See>> Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3-2 (Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-U.S. BMD Technical Cooperation) See>> Reference 33 (Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects) **(1) Participation of Japanese Industry in the Production** **of the F-35A and the Establishment of Regional** **Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade** **(MRO&U) Capability** In December 2011, Japan selected the F-35A as the next-generation fi ghter aircraft to succeed the F-4 fi ghter aircraft. At the same time, the government decided to procure 42 aircraft from FY2012 onwards and to have Japanese industries participate in its production, aside from several complete aircraft, which shall be imported. In light of this decision, the Japanese government has been working to enable the involvement of Japanese industries in the manufacturing process in preparation for the F-35A acquisition from FY2013 onwards. The Japanese government decided on the range of production participation by Japanese industries including the Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) for airframe, the manufacture of some engine parts (17 items) and ----- providing additional capability at least 3-5 years later.[5] Utilizing the FACO facility for airframe and engine, and contributing to maintenance in the Asia-Pacifi c region are signifi cant from the perspectives of securing the operational support system for F-35A in Japan, maintaining the foundation of the Japanese defense industry, strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and deepening equipment cooperation in the Asia-Pacifi c region. **(2) Initiatives towards the Establishment of a Common** **Maintenance Base of the Japan-U.S. Osprey** As the Periodic Maintenance Inspection (PMI) of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys (24 aircraft) deployed at Futenma is scheduled to commence roughly in 2017, the U.S. Forces carried out public tender to select a maintenance company and made a decision to select Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd. as the maintenance company for this purpose in October 2015. The MOD intends to establish common maintenance base for both Japan’s and the United States’ Osprey (V22) aircraft by allowing the maintenance company to use the hangars at GSDF Camp Kisarazu for aircraft maintenance of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys and also to implement the future aircraft maintenance of the GSDF Ospreys at the same camp from the following perspectives: (1) Smooth introduction of the GSDF Osprey;[6] (2) Smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement; and (3) Enhanced effi ciency in maintenance. The establishment of common maintenance base at GSDF Camp Kisarazu would be extremely signifi cant in that it will lead to the realization of the reduction of Okinawa’s burden as well as the “Strengthening the basis to repair and maintain common equipment ” stated in the new guideline. F-35A aircraft, the production of which involves the participation of Japanese industries (the aircraft shown in this photo was manufactured in the United States) radar parts (7 items) in FY2013, FACO for engines and the manufacture of some Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS)[3] parts (2 items) in FY2014, and the manufacture of some engine parts (2 items) and EODAS part (1 item) in FY2015. In terms of the skills and facilities required for FACO, it will be important for Japanese companies to have the following abilities, in order to provide effective operational support for the F-35A: ❍ The ability to offer a swift response within Japan in the event that an airframe suffers damage and requires work that cannot be carried out by the SDF unit itself, including the repair or replacement of major structural components, such as main wings and fuselage, without transporting the airframe overseas; and ❍ The ability to carry out refurbishment work domestically, in the event that performance improvements to the F-35A are sought within Japan in future. In addition, participation of Japanese companies in the implementation of FACO and parts production will have significance in that they will be able to come in contact with the system integration technology of stealth fighter as well as the cutting edge fighter technology and know-how. Due to global operation of F-35, the U.S. government plans to establish maintenance depot mainly for airframe and engine in the North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacifi c regions. In December 2014, with regard to regional Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul and Upgrade (MRO&U) Capability in the Asia-Pacifi c region for F-35, the U.S. government announced the following decisions: (1) regional MRO&U Capability for airframe will be provided to Japan and Australia with both capabilities required not later than early 2018;[4] (2) With regard to the regional MRO&U Capability for engine, initial capability will be provided by Australia by early 2018, with Japan Engineers from a Japanese maintenance company checking the structure of the U.S. Marine Corps Ospreys (Photo courtesy of Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.) Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (EODAS), comprising six cutting edge infrared sensors per aircraft for 360 degree spherical situational awareness, missile detection and tracking. The regional MRO&U for airframe in Japan is scheduled to be located at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. (Komaki-minami factory in Aichi Prefecture). The regional MRO&U for engine in Japan is scheduled to be located at IHI Corporation (Mizuho factory in Tokyo). GSDF will introduce 17 tilt-rotor aircraft (Osprey (V-22)) that can complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47J) in terms of cruising speed and range. In June 2015, a contract ----- **3 Building New Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation** - 1 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation **with Major European Countries, etc.** Defense equipment and technology cooperation with major European countries, which have competitive defense industries, will contribute to the strengthening of security and defense cooperation with these countries as well as the maintenance and strengthening of the defense production and technological base in Japan. Therefore, Japan seeks to establish and deepen relationships with these countries. - 2 Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation, **etc., with Partner Countries in the Asia-Pacifi c Region** As partner countries in the Asia-Pacifi c region have expressed their interest and expectation regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation with Japan, the MOD proactively seeks to build relationships with these countries. **(1) Australia** With Australia, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[9] was signed in July 2014. In addition, Japan commenced the joint research in the fi eld of marine hydrodynamics in December 2015. Meanwhile, at the Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial Meeting held in October 2014, it was agreed to seek multifaceted defense equipment and technology cooperation, including the following: (1) exploration of potential cooperation opportunities in the F-35 program; (2) acquisition reform dialogue with the Defence Material Organisation of Australia; (3) at the request of the Australian side, exploration of the possibility of Japanese cooperation in the Australian Future Submarine Program; (4) defense technology exchanges with the Defence Science and Technology Organisation of Australia (marine hydrodynamics fi eld and exchanges among engineers and scientists); and (5) talks between defense industries in both countries. Furthermore, during the Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial telephone conference in May 2015, the Government of Australia explained its intention to examine the possibility of jointly designing and building Australian future submarines with Japan, and therefore, requested that Japan participate in the process of selecting Australian future submarines. In May 2015, responding to this request, with the participation of private companies, consultations with the Government of Australia were commenced. At the same time, the transfer of technical information for feasibility research of the joint development and production of submarines was deliberated at the National Security Council, and it was affi rmed that this falls under the case in which the overseas transfer could be permitted. In November of the same year, Japan submitted the proposal for the **(1) United Kingdom** In July 2013, the governments of Japan and the United Kingdom concluded an intergovernmental framework agreement regarding joint development and other initiatives related to defense equipment, etc.[7] In the same month, the two countries also started joint research on chemical and biological protection technology, marking the fi rst time that Japan had engaged in such research with a country other than the United States. Also, in July 2014, information on seeker technology for joint research with the United Kingdom was determined by the National Security Council as a case where overseas transfer may be permitted. Responding to the said decision, in November of the same year, a letter of arrangement was formulated in relation to Japan-U.K. co-operative research project on the feasibility of a joint new air-to-air missile and the joint research was commenced. Furthermore, in January 2016, it was confi rmed that the joint research on personnel vulnerability evaluation (PVE) in relation to the research and development of personal equipment would be launched. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((1) The United Kingdom) **(2) France** Japan and France established a committee on cooperation in the fi eld of defense equipment and a committee on export control in January 2014, and signed the Agreement concerning the transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology[8] in March 2015. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-8 ((2) France) Offi cial name: Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies Necessary to Implement Joint Research, Development and Production of Defence Equipment and Other Related Items Offi cial name: Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of France concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technologyi ----- **(3) ASEAN Countries** Between Japan and ASEAN, opinion exchanges are taking place regarding defense equipment and technology cooperation in non-traditional security sectors, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and maritime security through the Japan-ASEAN Defense ViceMinisterial Meetings and other occasions. Participating countries have expressed their expectation for Japan’s cooperation in effectively dealing with these issues. In September 2014, as part of the Seminar on Capacity Building in Maritime Security and Disaster Relief (hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), an event to introduce defense equipment, etc., by Japanese defenserelated companies was held at the MOD. In February 2016, the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology was signed with the Philippines, while during the Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial telephone conference in May of the same year it was confirmed that the two countries would promote defense equipment and technological cooperation, and would develop the cooperation regarding the transfer of MSDF’s TC-90 training aircraft TC-90 to the Philippine Navy to be more concrete. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-6 (Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries); Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-2-3 ((3) Japan–ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum) TC-90 under consultation regarding its transfer to the Philippines Future Submarine Program. Note that, in tandem with the request to Japan, the Government of Australia was also making a request to German and French companies to participate in the selection procedure. Afterwards, in April 2016, the Government of Australia announced that they selected a French company as their international partner for the Future Submarine Program. The Government of Australia explained this decision by stating that this company had demonstrated the most suitable capabilities to fulfill the overall requests on capabilities which were specific to Australia. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-1 (Japan-Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) **(2) India** With India, which has been considering the acquisition of amphibious search and rescue aircraft, the establishment of the Joint Working Group (JWG) to facilitate bilateral cooperation for the US-2 aircraft was decided during the Japan-India Summit Meeting held in May 2013. So far, three JWG meetings have been held in total in which the Japanese representatives provided information on the performance, overview of operations, production and assembly, and maintenance, etc. of the US-2, including the offer of an opportunity to experience a US-2 flight and to visit the factory to the Indian delegation of the JWG. Furthermore, talks between the two countries are taking place to prepare the formulation of a roadmap for industry-to-industry cooperation, including technology transfer and production within India. Also, in response to the Japan-India Summit Meeting in September 2014, the first Japan-India Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Cooperation was held in March 2015 in order to promote cooperation in defense equipment and technology. At the Summit Meeting in December 2015, the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of India concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology[10] was signed. It was expressed to explore potential future defense equipment and technology cooperation such as projects including US-2. See>> Part III, Chapter 2, Section 1-4-3 (Japan-India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges) ----- **4 Adapting Defense Equipment for Civilian Use** In August 2010, the MOD compiled a set of guidelines for the development of a concrete system for converting aircraft to civilian use, while in 2011, it also developed the application procedure for private companies interested in civilian use. So far, technical data related to the civilian use of the US-2 amphibian rescue aircraft and the F7 engine that are mounted on P-1 fi xed wing patrol aircraft have been disclosed and released in response to requests from the implementing companies. The possibility of civilian use of equipment other than aircraft will be considered based on the intentions of the defense industry. **5 Technology Control** In promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation internationally, it is necessary to evaluate the sensitivity and strategic value of defense technology and dual-use technology, and protect those technologies that should be protected as strengths of Japan. At the same P-1 patrol aircraft with which there is an ongoing effort to transfer its engine to private use time, it is necessary to strengthen the technology control functions by avoiding the risk of their conversion into weapons from the perspective of Japan’s security. As such, cooperation with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry will be promoted. **6 Other** In December 2014, the “Committee on Challenges surrounding the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” consisting of external experts, was launched to review the system for smoothly and appropriately advancing cooperation in defense equipment and technology for the security of Japan, and in September 2015 reports were compiled and submitted from this Committee to the MOD. ----- **The Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases,** **Section 4** **and the Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases** **1 The Current Status of Japan’s Defense Production and Technological Bases** The term “defense production and technological bases” refers to the human, physical and technological bases for development, production, operation, sustainment and maintenance, remodeling, and refurbishment of defense equipment required for the MOD/SDF activities. As Japan has no national arsenal (state-owned munitions factory), most of those base is covered by companies (the defense industry) that manufacture defense equipment and associated items. Therefore, a broad range of companies,[1] which own specialized and advanced skills and facilities are involved in the defense production and technological bases. In addition, volume effi ciency of defense production is unlikely to be expected due to its market being limited to the demand from the MOD. The degree of defense demand dependence (the ratio of defense-related sales that accounts for the entire company sales) is approximately 5% on average, indicating that the defense business does not comprise the main business of many companies. On the other hand, increasing per unit cost and maintenance/sustainment costs due to the advances in recent defense equipment and an increase in imports of foreign-made equipment, such as U.S.-made aircraft, have caused a decrease in the number of units procured. **2 Defense Production and Technological Bases Strategy** - 1 Context of Formulation of Strategy on Defense **Production and Technological Bases, etc.** In addition, despite the trend in increasing research and development costs, the ratio of research and development expenditure to defense-related expenditure has leveled off. Furthermore, Japan’s defense production and technological bases also face challenges in retaining and passing on skills and techniques, and there has been an emerging issue that some companies, which cannot handle the reduced procurement units, have pulled out of the defense business. There has also been exposure to changes in the international security environment such as the realignment of the Western defense industries and advances in international joint development and production projects. Amidst these situations, there are new changes emerging in the framework, such as the transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, which was approved by the Cabinet in April 2014. See>> Fig. III-3-4-1 (Current Status of the Unit Price and the Acquisition Quantity of Defense Equipment); Fig. III-3-4-2 (Trends in the Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc.); Fig. III-3-4-3 (Current Status of Research & Development Budget); Part I, Chapter 3, Section 6-2 (Trends Concerning Defense Production and Technological Bases); Part III, Chapter 3, Section 3-1 (Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology) - 2 Composition of the Strategy **(1) Context of Formulation of Strategy on Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** “The Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” has made the following three points clear: (1) the context of the formulation of the strategy on defense production and technological bases and the historical positioning of this strategy; (2) characteristics of defense production and technological bases; (3) changes in the security environment surrounding defense production and technological bases. In light of the current situation, for the purpose of maintaining and strengthening Japan’s defense production and technological bases, which are important and essential elements supporting Japan’s defense capability, the “Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases” was adopted in June 2014. The Strategy responded to the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), replacing “kokusankahoshin (guideline for domestic development/production).”[2] See>> Reference 5 (National Security Strategy (Outline)); Reference 6 (NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond) For example, it is said that there are approximately 1,100 fi ghter aircraft-related companies, approximately 1,300 tank-related companies, and approximately 8,300 destroyer–related companies. ----- |110 16|Self-propelled guns|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Armored vehicles Tanks|| |47||| |54 6 41.6||| |7.6 35.6 32 35 30 7.4 6 6 24 47 21.2 16 6||| |17 12 8 18 12.8 11.2 14 13 10||| |5|Minesweepers| |---|---| ||Submarines Destroyers| |2 3.8 1.4 3 3|| |2.6 1 2.4 1 1 0.8 0.6 2|| |1 1 1 1 1 0.8|| |2 1.4 1 1 1 1 0.8|| |99|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Rotary-wing aircraft Fixed-wing aircraft|| |47|Fighter aircraft Tilt-Rotor Aircraft|| |56 42.6 29 36||| |31 31 3 22 19.4 1188 22||| |18 1166 21 14.8 8 9 9 5.8 10.8 0.8 6 2 45 6 5||| |Fig. III-3-4-2|Trends in the Maintenance and Upgrade Expenditures for Equipment, etc.| |---|---| |(100 million yen) 11,000 Maintenance and upgrade expenditures for equipment etc. (100 million yen) 9,000 8,671 8,237 8,211 8,285 7,923 7,755 7,803 7,786 7,562 7,575 7,479 7,180 6,972 7,000 6,794 6,790 6,837 6,829 6,600 6,642 6,610 6,372 6,477 6,184 5,737 5,339 5,000 4,769 4,908 4,400 0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 (FY) Note: “Maintenance and upgrade expenditure” refers to the budget for repair costs for equipment, consumable goods costs, and service costs (repair costs exclude those repair costs for the extension of vessel life and modernization of aircraft).|| Fig. III-3-4-1 Current Status of the Unit Price and the Acquisition Quantity of Defense Equipment Status of Procurement: Unit Price Type-74 Tank: Approximately 0.39 billion yen Oyashio type: Approximately 52.0 billion yen E-2C: Approximately 9.94 billion yen (contracted in FY1989) (contracted in FY1993) (contracted in FY1990) **(2.5 times increase)** **(1.24 times increase)** **(2.34 times increase)** Type-10 Tank: Approximately 1 billion yen Soryu type: Approximately 64.3 billion yen E-2D: Approximately 23.31 billion yen (contracted in FY2014) (contracted in FY2015) (contracted in FY2015) Status of Procurement: Quantity Trend in the annual average procurement Trend in the annual average procurement Trend in the annual average procurement quantity of the main vehicles quantity of the main vessels quantity of the main aircraft (Data shown for the period prior to (Data shown for the period prior to (Data shown for the period prior to FY2012 is the annual average for each period) FY2012 is the annual average for each period) FY2012 is the annual average for each period) Number of vehicles Number of vessels Number of aircraft 120 6 100 **99** **110** Self-propelled guns Minesweepers Rotary-wing aircraft 100 **16** Armored vehicles 5 **5** Submarines 80 Fixed-wing aircraft Tanks Destroyers **47** Fighter aircraft 80 4 **2** **3.8** Tilt-Rotor Aircraft **47** 60 **56** 60 **54** 3 **1.4** **2.6** **3** **3** **42.6** **6** **1** **2.4** **1** **1** 40 **29** **36** 40 **41.67.6** **35.6** **32** **35** 2 **1** **0.8** **0.6** **2** **31** **22** **31** **3** 20 **47** **30** **21.2** **7.417** **126** **166** **246** 1 **2** **1** **0.8** **1** **1** **1** 20 **18** **19.4** **16** **18** **22** 0 **18** **12.8** **11.2** **14** **13** **108** 0 **1.4** **0.8** **1** **1** **1** **1** 0 **21** **9** **14.85.8** **10.80.8** **68** **2** **459** **65** FY1983– FY1993– FY2003– FY2008– FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY1983– FY1993– FY2003– FY2008– FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY1983– FY1993– FY2003– FY2008– FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY1992 FY2002 FY2007 FY2012 FY1992 FY2002 FY2007 FY2012 FY1992 FY2002 FY2007 FY2012 ----- Fig. III-3-4-3 Current Status of Research & Development Budget **Defense R&D Budget of Major Countries (FY2015)** **Percentage of R&D Budget out of Defense Budget of Major** **Countries (FY2015)** (100 million yen) (%) - FY2014 - FY2014 80,000 15 **74,106** **11.72** 60,000 10 4,000 **7.29*** **2,848*** **2,570*** 5 **4.14*4.14*** 2,000 **3.50** **1,317** **1,107** **1,5171,517** **2.44** **2.28** **2.65** **130** 0 0 USA UK France ROK Sweden Germany Japan USA UK France ROK Sweden Germany Japan Source: “OECD:Main Science and Technology Indicators” “SIPRI Military Expenditure Databese ©SIPRI 2016” **VOICE** **Defense Industry that Supports Defense Capability Build-Up** **Column** **Business Development Offi ce Manager Fujikura Parachute Co., Ltd** **Mr. Shinya Yasuda** Our company, Fujikura Parachute Co., Ltd, is a manufacturer, which has been making parachutes and various other kinds of life-saving equipment. Since its foundation in 1939, the company has produced and sold over 400,000 parachutes, and we are proud of our contribution to the JGSDF achieving the record of 600,000 parachute drops without any accidents, and we strive to gain our customers’ trust, placing maximum priority on human life. Two years ago, we decided to exhibit at the EUROSATORY 2014 for the fi rst time. Following the delivery of the Airborne Parachute Type 13 developed by our company to the JGSDF and the formulation of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, we wondered whether the technology of our company would be accepted by the world. Thankfully, we received highly positive evaluations from many customers from all over the world, which gave us the courage to work towards entering new markets. However, it is a huge step that we enter into global market because we have done business only in Japan, so we have no time to lose for everything including overseas marketing research and global human resources development. In addition, the overseas sales of our products, which are classifi ed as defense equipment, will not move forward without intergovernmental adjustment. While it is not easy to land on new ground, we are determined to drop down on overseas countries as a fi rst batch, like the JGSDF fi rst airborne brigade, in anticipation of the future defense industry and in order to contribute to the security of Japan. Airborne Parachute Type 13 The author (left) giving an explanation at Defense & Security 2015 in Thailand ----- **(2) Goals and Significance of Maintaining and Strengthening** **Defense Production and Technological Bases** The MOD intends to (1) ensure sovereignty of security, (2) potentially contribute to deterrence enhancement, and maintain and improve bargaining power, and (3) contribute to the sophistication of the domestic industry in Japan driven by cutting-edge technology. **(3) Basic Stance for Promoting Measures** The MOD intends to promote necessary measures based on the following basic viewpoints: (1) establishing long-term partnership between the private and public sector; (2) strengthening international competitiveness; (3) ensuring consistency with effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment. based on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. **(5) Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense** **Production and Technological Bases** Considering Japan’s severe financial condition, the MOD will promote the following measures: (1) improvement of the contract system; (2) efforts regarding research and development; (3) defense equipment and technology cooperation; (4) initiatives regarding defense industrial organizations including the building of a robust production and technology platform through understanding actual conditions of supply chain; (5) strengthening of the MOD’s structure; and (6) collaborative measures with other relevant ministries. See>> Fig. III-3-4-4 (Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases) **(4) Methods of Defense Equipment Procurement** With regard to the defense equipment procurement, currently multiple methods, such as domestic development, international joint development and production, licensed domestic production, utilization of commercially produced goods, and imports, are adopted. These methods directly affect defense production and technological base. According to the characteristics of defense equipment, it is necessary to select the acquisition method appropriately, including international joint development and production, I which became more agile and flexible implementation of which became achievable **(6) Courses of Actions for Each Defense Equipment Sectors** In deciding the MOD’s principle regarding defense production and technological bases of the main defense equipment sectors (such as land equipment, supplies, etc., ships, aircraft, explosives, guided weapons, communications electronics and command control systems, unmanned equipment, space systems and cyber), the MOD will take the following flow: Based on the matters indicated in NDPG to be emphasized considering strengthening the architecture of the SDF, |Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases|Col2| |---|---| |Improve contract system|❍ Utilize negotiated contracts ❍ Introduce longer-term contracts (multi-year procurements) ❍ Establish flexible systems for taking orders such as joint ventures ❍ Decrease procurement cost and improve companies’ incentives to reduce cost ❍ Enhance project management throughout equipment’s life-cycle| |Measures regarding Research and Development (R&D)|❍ Formulate a R&D vision ❍ Develop ability to survey technological information including civilian advanced technology ❍ Strengthen cooperation with universities and research institutes ❍ Cooperation with and utilizing R&D programs including those that cover dual-use technology ❍ Fund advanced research with promising output for defense ❍ Strengthen cooperation with overseas organizations| |Defense equipment and technology cooperation|❍ Deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States ❍ Establish new defense equipment and technology cooperation ❍ Contributing to international logistics systems ❍ Improving bases for defense equipment and technology cooperation ❍ Promote application of defense equipment to civilian use ❍ Technology control and information security| |Measures regarding defense industry organization|❍ Promote understanding of significance of defense business and industry ❍ Maintain resilient supply chains ❍ Defense industrial organizations and applications of contract systems| |Strengthen MOD’s structure|❍ Implementation of efforts such as unification of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of MOD reform ❍ Implementation of strengthening inspection and audit functions as well as the training of human resources in project management and procurement| |Measures through cooperation with relevant ministries|❍ Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries| |Fig. III-3-4-4|Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases| |---|---| |Measures for Maintaining and Strengthening Defense Production and Technological Bases ❍ Utilize negotiated contracts ❍ Introduce longer-term contracts (multi-year procurements) Improve contract system ❍ Establish flexible systems for taking orders such as joint ventures ❍ Decrease procurement cost and improve companies’ incentives to reduce cost ❍ Enhance project management throughout equipment’s life-cycle ❍ Formulate a R&D vision ❍ Develop ability to survey technological information including civilian advanced technology Measures regarding ❍ Strengthen cooperation with universities and research institutes Research and ❍ Cooperation with and utilizing R&D programs including those that cover dual-use technology Development (R&D) ❍ Fund advanced research with promising output for defense ❍ Strengthen cooperation with overseas organizations ❍ Deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation with the United States ❍ Establish new defense equipment and technology cooperation Defense equipment and ❍ Contributing to international logistics systems technology cooperation ❍ Improving bases for defense equipment and technology cooperation ❍ Promote application of defense equipment to civilian use ❍ Technology control and information security Measures regarding ❍ Promote understanding of significance of defense business and industry defense industry ❍ Maintain resilient supply chains organization ❍ Defense industrial organizations and applications of contract systems ❍ Implementation of efforts such as unification of departments associated with equipment acquisition, as a part of MOD reform Strengthen MOD’s ❍ Implementation of strengthening inspection and audit functions as well as the training of human resources in project management and structure procurement Measures through cooperation with relevant ❍ Consideration of support measures through the use of policies of other ministries ministries|| ----- the MOD intends point out the future directions of the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases and the acquisition plan for each defense equipment sectors. By deciding the principle, efforts will be contributed to increasing predictability for companies. See>> Fig. III-3-4-5 (Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors (Outline)) |Ground equipment|❍ With regard to tanks and artillery, making use of its world-class level of strength in this area, the MOD will maintain its production and technological bases to the appropriate level. In addition, production and technological bases for mobile combat vehicles etc., will be built. ❍ Through further promotion of standardization (categorization), effective and efficient acquisition as well as the maintenance and strengthening of production and technology bases of wheeled vehicles will be implemented. ❍ Regarding amphibious capabilities, aspects of Japan’s technological weakness will be reinforced as necessary, while defense equipment and technology cooperation that make use of our strengths will be promoted.| |---|---| |Supplies, etc.|❍ Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, the relevant foundations will be maintained, thereby making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies. ❍ As for fields where Japan can excel, such as chemical protection equipment, adapting equipment for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be considered.| |Ships|❍ With regard to vessels, in order to enable the MOD to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, production and technological bases will be maintained and strengthened through the entry of multiple prime enterprises. ❍ Consideration will be given to the bulk order of multiple escort ships with a standardized design. In doing so, a review of the format of contracts will also be considered, taking into account the effects of lowering prices. ❍ Since the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the number of submarines will be increased to 22, the existing bases will be maintained and strengthened through continuous research and development for enhancing capabilities.| |Aircraft|❍ For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the MOD will make efforts to promote the industrial participation of Japanese companies in production and to prepare for the start of Regional MRO&U for F-35 aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region. As for future fighter aircraft, necessary measures including empirical research will be taken so as to maintain the option of the development of future fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. ❍ With regard to transport aircraft and amphibian rescue aircraft, multifaceted use of the results of development such as the possibility of adaptation for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be promoted. For rotary-wing aircraft, keeping both the civilian and defense demand in mind, international joint development and production will be considered as an option based on the technologies cultivated through licensed domestic production and domestic development.| |Explosives|❍ A certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will continue to be made possible and bases, which ensure the necessary scale of explosives in various situations, will be maintained.| |Guided weapons|❍ In order to improve air defense performance, technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant technological bases. A vision for research and development for the implementation of technological examinations of future guided weapons will be established including propulsion devices such as fixed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve the performance of various types of guided weapons such as the extension of their launch range. ❍ Regarding international joint development as one option, efficient acquisition methods will be selected based also on the enhancement of interoperability with allied and friendly nations. ❍ Along with the continuous promotion of SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) between Japan and the United States, necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases will be taken, considering the sustainment and enhancement of production and technological phases.| |Communications electronics and command control systems|❍ Research and development on cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of the detection performance of fixed warning and control radar systems as well as the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems. At the same time, the technological bases will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge civilian technology. ❍ Because systems capable of responding to battles based around network data are necessary for future command control systems, civilian technological bases, which are progressing at a significant pace, will be adopted to ensure a system replacement at the appropriate timing reflecting the latest technological standards. ❍ Defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as civilian use of wireless software technology, radar technology, which uses high-output semiconductors, and other technologies will be promoted.| |Unmanned equipment|❍ In light of the trend towards defense technology such as future battle conditions, smarter technologies and networking, a vision for research and development will be established and proactive research will be implemented for the enhancement of technological bases in order to present a direction of unmanned equipment whilst taking the perspective of integrated operation into account. ❍ Defense equipment and technological cooperation such as research collaboration with research institutions and joint research and development with other countries will be advanced in order to raise the level of Japan’s technological bases.| |Cyber and space systems|❍ While cooperating with the MOD’s initiatives to increase its capability to respond to cyber attacks and policies relating to the use of space development, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of defense production and technological bases, which will be required in the future, will be discussed.| |Fig. III-3-4-5|Direction in the Various Defense Equipment Sectors (Outline)| |---|---| |❍ With regard to tanks and artillery, making use of its world-class level of strength in this area, the MOD will maintain its production and technological bases to the appropriate level. In addition, production and technological bases for mobile combat vehicles etc., will be built. Ground ❍ Through further promotion of standardization (categorization), effective and efficient acquisition as well as the maintenance and strengthening of equipment production and technology bases of wheeled vehicles will be implemented. ❍ Regarding amphibious capabilities, aspects of Japan’s technological weakness will be reinforced as necessary, while defense equipment and technology cooperation that make use of our strengths will be promoted. ❍ Based on factors such as compatibility with the physical characteristics of the Japanese people, the relevant foundations will be maintained, thereby making it possible to continue the procurement of supplies from domestic companies. Supplies, etc. ❍ As for fields where Japan can excel, such as chemical protection equipment, adapting equipment for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be considered. ❍ With regard to vessels, in order to enable the MOD to respond to the latest technology such as stealth capabilities, production and technological bases will be maintained and strengthened through the entry of multiple prime enterprises. ❍ Consideration will be given to the bulk order of multiple escort ships with a standardized design. In doing so, a review of the format of contracts Ships will also be considered, taking into account the effects of lowering prices. ❍ Since the National Defense Program Guidelines state that the number of submarines will be increased to 22, the existing bases will be maintained and strengthened through continuous research and development for enhancing capabilities. ❍ For the acquisition of F-35A aircraft, the MOD will make efforts to promote the industrial participation of Japanese companies in production and to prepare for the start of Regional MRO&U for F-35 aircraft in the Asia-Pacific region. As for future fighter aircraft, necessary measures including empirical research will be taken so as to maintain the option of the development of future fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Aircraft ❍ With regard to transport aircraft and amphibian rescue aircraft, multifaceted use of the results of development such as the possibility of adaptation for civilian use, and defense equipment and technology cooperation will be promoted. For rotary-wing aircraft, keeping both the civilian and defense demand in mind, international joint development and production will be considered as an option based on the technologies cultivated through licensed domestic production and domestic development. ❍ A certain scale of procurement from domestic companies will continue to be made possible and bases, which ensure the necessary scale of Explosives explosives in various situations, will be maintained. ❍ In order to improve air defense performance, technological considerations regarding future SAMs will be pursued to further strengthen the relevant technological bases. A vision for research and development for the implementation of technological examinations of future guided weapons will be established including propulsion devices such as fixed rocket motors and other technologies required to improve the performance of various types of guided weapons such as the extension of their launch range. Guided weapons ❍ Regarding international joint development as one option, efficient acquisition methods will be selected based also on the enhancement of interoperability with allied and friendly nations. ❍ Along with the continuous promotion of SM-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) between Japan and the United States, necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases will be taken, considering the sustainment and enhancement of production and technological phases. ❍ Research and development on cutting-edge technology for the bases required for defense will be implemented with priority, involving the improvement of the detection performance of fixed warning and control radar systems as well as the simultaneous, parallel use of multiple sonar systems. At the same time, the technological bases will be maintained and strengthened by pursuing the applicability of cutting-edge civilian Communications technology. electronics and ❍ Because systems capable of responding to battles based around network data are necessary for future command control systems, civilian command control technological bases, which are progressing at a significant pace, will be adopted to ensure a system replacement at the appropriate timing systems reflecting the latest technological standards. ❍ Defense equipment and technology cooperation, as well as civilian use of wireless software technology, radar technology, which uses high-output semiconductors, and other technologies will be promoted. ❍ In light of the trend towards defense technology such as future battle conditions, smarter technologies and networking, a vision for research and development will be established and proactive research will be implemented for the enhancement of technological bases in order to present a Unmanned direction of unmanned equipment whilst taking the perspective of integrated operation into account. equipment ❍ Defense equipment and technological cooperation such as research collaboration with research institutions and joint research and development with other countries will be advanced in order to raise the level of Japan’s technological bases. ❍ While cooperating with the MOD’s initiatives to increase its capability to respond to cyber attacks and policies relating to the use of space Cyber and space development, from the perspective of the defense of Japan, the future outlook of defense production and technological bases, which will be systems required in the future, will be discussed.|| ----- **Chapter 4** **[Interaction with Local Communities ]** **and Japanese Citizens** **Section 1** **Collaboration with Local Communities** **1 Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society** The Ministry of Defense (MOD)/the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) conducts activities to support the lives of citizens in a range of fi elds, in response to requests from municipal governments and relevant organizations. Such activities contribute to further deepening the trust in the SDF, and provide SDF personnel with pride and confi dence. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) handles the disposal of unexploded ordnance found throughout Japan. In FY2015, there were approx. 1,392 such cases (approx. 43 tons). In particular, cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for approx. 47% of the total cases. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) clears and disposes of underwater mines and other dangerous explosives, and approx. 1,832 explosives (approx. 3.5 tons) were handled in FY2015. The SDF camps and bases allow the local residents access to their facilities to the extent that it does not interfere with unit activities, thus striving to foster friendly interaction with local communities. The SDF also provides transportation and other assistance at a variety of athletic events. In addition, it supports regional GSDF personnel carrying out the disposal of unexploded ordinance medical treatment efforts by providing general medical care at some SDF hospitals as well as conducting urgent transport for emergency patients from isolated islands. Furthermore, based on national policy,[1] the MOD/SDF ensures opportunities for local small and medium sized enterprises to receive orders, while taking effi ciency into account, by such measures as the promotion of separated/ divided ordering[2] and the securing of competition MSDF aircraft conducting a remote island emergency transportation mission ASDF Blue Impulse fl ying over JR Hakodate Station at the Hokkaido Shinkansen Launch Event “The Contract Basic Policy of the Government regarding Small and Medium Enterprises in FY2015” (Cabinet decision on August 28, 2015) ----- **y** **The SDF as an Organization Existing with Local Communities** **Column** The role of the SDF in local communities is not limited to disaster relief dispatch. The GSDF holds fi ve armies nationwide, namely Northern, North Eastern, Eastern, Middle, and Western Armies, and each of these armies conducts cooperation activities that suit the characteristics of each region. Among these cooperation activities, unexploded ordinance disposal is common across the armies, and they deal with approximately 1,400 cases on average every year. Due to the history of the Battle of Okinawa, the number of disposal cases in the Kyushu and Okinawa regions (GSDF Western Army) still account for 50% of the total disposal cases even after 70 years since the end of the battle. Transporting emergency patients also counts for over 200 cases annually (GSDF alone), and the overwhelming majority (70-80%) of these cases occur in the remote islands of Nagasaki, Kagoshima and Okinawa. Also, recently removing snow from houses where an elderly person is living alone is becoming an issue in snowy cold places. In the ongoing depopulation areas in particular, there are not many young people who can carry out such a work. For this reason, there have been increasing cases in Hokkaido (GSDF Northern Army) that the SDF that stations in the vicinity provides support for removing snow as volunteers. In addition to providing the assistance for various traditional events held in each region, in the Tohoku region (GSDF North Eastern Army), people have larger expectations on the SDF’s contribution to memorial events and town development connected to the Great East Japan Earthquake. Meanwhile, support for national events taking place in each region is also an important role of the SDF. Following the support for the National Sports Festival in Wakayama in 2015, the GSDF Army (GSDF Middle Army) provided support to transport state guests along with other support during the G7 2016 Ise-Shima Summit held in May 2016. The SDF intends to contribute to a successful Olympic Games by providing security assistance under the Ground Central Command to be newly formed and the GSDF Eastern Army during the Tokyo Olympic Games in 2020. Volunteering to remove snow in Akabira City, Hokkaido (GSDF 10th Infantry Support for the rowing competition at the National Sports Festival in Wakayama Regiment (Takikawa City, Hokkaido)) (The Third Tank Battalion (Takashima City, Shiga Prefecture)) amongst companies within the same qualifi cation and grade divisions.[3] **2 Cooperation from Local Governments and Other Relevant Organizations for the SDF** Amid the harsh recruitment and employment situation, the cooperation from local governments and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualifi ed personnel and to support the reemployment of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a relatively young age under the SDF’s early retirement system. Furthermore, SDF camps and bases maintain close relations with local communities, and therefore, See>> Reference 69 (Activities in Civic Life); Reference 70 (Activities Contributing to Society) various forms of support and cooperation from the local community are indispensable for the SDF to conduct its diverse activities, including training exercises and disaster dispatch. Moreover, units dispatched overseas for international peace cooperation missions and other duties receive support and assistance from the relevant organizations for the procedures involved.[4] Out of the bidding participation eligibility categorized into grade A-D, this refers to competition between grade C or D only, which comprise mostly of small and medium enterprises. In addition to this kind of support, many letters of encouragement are sent from the public to the SDF personnel, which raise the morale of SDF personnel and reinforce their awareness of serving the people ----- **3 Activities for Securing Understanding and Cooperation of Municipal Governments and Local Residents** Regional Defense Bureaus make efforts to build cooperative relationships with local communities, through collaboration with SDF units and Provincial Cooperation Offi ces. Specifi cally, Regional Defense Bureaus hold seminars on defense issues for local residents and provide explanations about the Annual White Paper, “Defense of Japan,” to local governments in order to gain wide understanding. They also host Japan-U.S. friendship programs for citizens who live near U.S. Forces facilities and areas in Japan, U.S. Forces personnel, and their families to interact with each other through sports and music regarding defense policies and the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan. Furthermore, Regional Defense Bureaus provide necessary explanations and conduct coordination for relevant local governments when implementing the realignments of the U.S. Forces and the reorganization of SDF units, deployment of equipment, and training, as well as conducting the necessary liaison and coordination in the event of disasters, accidents, or any other emergency situations, such as major earthquakes. It should be noted that in recent years, cases of interference against SDF and U.S. Forces aircraft via kite fl ying and laser irradiation have frequently occurred in the areas surrounding air stations in Atsugi and Futenma. These are extremely dangerous and malicious acts that may disrupt a pilot’s ability to control aircraft and result in a catastrophe such as a crash. From the viewpoint of preventing unforeseen accidents in advance, as well as ensuring the safety of the area and the safe operation of aircraft, the MOD disseminates information regarding the **4 Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas** - 1 Scale and Features of Defense Facilities A defense issues seminar held in Sapporo, Hokkaido An image of being exposed to laser irradiation in a cockpit risks involved in those acts to local residents by putting up posters and requests their cooperation in reporting to the police while closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies as well as relevant local governments. noise and other issues, impacting the living environment of local residential communities. See>> Fig. III-4-1-1 (Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots)); Fig. III-4-1-2 (Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities)) - 2 Initiatives to Promote Harmony between Defense **Facilities and Surrounding Areas** The uses of defense facilities[5] are diverse, and they often require large volumes of land. In addition, as of January 1, 2016, approx. 25% of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. Forces in Japan is jointly used by the SDF in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement, with the purpose to enhance the diversity and effi ciency of Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. Meanwhile, problems related to restricted establishment and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many of the defense facilities. Also, another problem is that frequent aircraft operations such as takeoffs and landings cause Defense facilities, as the foundation that supports the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable for our country’s security. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain conditions for constant and stable utilization by ensuring harmony ----- |Col1|Total area: Approx. 1,087km2| |---|---| |Col1|Total area: Approx. 304km2| |---|---| |Other regions 10% Approx. 111km2 Kanto region 5% Approx. 57km2 Kyushu region 12% Approx. 135km2 Tohoku region 14% Approx. 147km2 Chubu region 16% Approx. 178km2|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Hokkaido region 42% Approx. 459km2||||||||| |accounting for approx. 0.3% Total area: Approx. 1,087km2 of Japan’s land area||||||||| |Maneuver Areas 75% Approx. 812km2||||||||| |Airfields 7% Approx. 81km2 Barracks 5% Approx. 54km2 Others 13% Approx. 140km2||||||||| |Other regions 7% Approx. 22km2 Tohoku region 8% Approx. 24km2 Kanto region 11% Approx. 32km2|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Okinawa Prefecture 74% Approx. 226km2||||| |Total area: accounting for 0.08% of Approx. 304km2 Japan’s land area||||| |Maneuver Areas 54% Approx. 164km2||||| |Airfields 20% Approx. 60km2 Warehouses 13% Approx. 40km2 Others 13% Approx. 40km2||||| |Purpose|Measures|Description of Measures| |---|---|---| |Preventing Noise Problems|Subsidies to finance sound insulation work|❍ Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly ❍ Housing| ||Compensation for relocations|❍ Compensation for relocating buildings ❍ Land procurement ❍ Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated| ||Improving green belts|❍ Planting trees, installing grass fields| |Preventing Nuisances Besides Noise|Subsidies to finance trouble prevention work|❍ Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities| |Reducing Troubles Related to Living and Business|Subsidies for building facilities meant to stabilize people’s lives|❍ Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. ❍ Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities| |Reducing Impact on Surrounding Areas|Provision of specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants|❍ Improving public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities ❍ Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.*| |Fig. III-4-1-3|Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas| |---|---| |Purpose Measures Description of Measures ❍ Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical Subsidies to finance sound facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service insulation work centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly ❍ Housing Preventing Noise Problems ❍ Compensation for relocating buildings Compensation for ❍ Land procurement relocations ❍ Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated Improving green belts ❍ Planting trees, installing grass fields Preventing Nuisances Subsidies to finance trouble ❍ Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities Besides Noise prevention work Subsidies for building ❍ Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, Reducing Troubles Related facilities meant to stabilize welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. to Living and Business people’s lives ❍ Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities Provision of specified ❍ Improving public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities Reducing Impact on defense facilities environs ❍ Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance Surrounding Areas improvement adjustment for school buildings, etc.* grants * Newly added due to the partial revision of the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (effective as of April 27, 2011)|| Fig. III-4-1-1 Status of SDF Facilities (Land Plots) (as of January 1, 2016) Other regions 10% Approx. 111km[2] Kanto region 5% Approx. 57km[2] Kyushu region 12% Approx. 135km[2] Tohoku region 14% Approx. 147km[2] Chubu region 16% Approx. 178km[2] Distribution Hokkaido region by region 42% Approx. 459km[2] accounting for approx. 0.3% Total area: Approx. 1,087km[2] of Japan’s land area Distribution by use Maneuver Areas 75% Approx. 812km[2] Airfields 7% Approx. 81km[2] Barracks 5% Approx. 54km[2] Others 13% Approx. 140km[2] 0 20 40 60 80 100 (%) Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. Status of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Fig. III-4-1-2 Japan (Exclusively Used Facilities) (as of January 1, 2016) Other regions 7% Approx. 22km[2] Tohoku region 8% Approx. 24km[2] Kanto region 11% Approx. 32km[2] Distribution Okinawa Prefecture 74% by region Approx. 226km[2] Total area: accounting for 0.08% of Approx. 304km[2] Japan’s land area Distribution Maneuver Areas 54% by use Approx. 164km[2] Airfields 20% Approx. 60km[2] Warehouses 13% Approx. 40km[2] Others 13% Approx. 40km[2] 0 20 40 60 80 100 (%) Notes: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding. between the defense facilities and the surrounding areas as well as obtaining the understanding and cooperation of the local residents. For that purpose, the MOD has taken measures to promote harmony between defense facilities and surrounding areas since 1974, based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Act). See>> Fig. III-4-1-3 (Measures for Harmony Between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas); Reference 71 (Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities) **(1) Measures of the Act on Improvement of Living** **Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities** Based on the Act on Improvement of Living Environment of Areas Around Defense Facilities the MOD has implemented various measures to prevent, alleviate, and mitigate impediments such as aircraft noise in the surrounding areas caused by the SDF or U.S. Forces activities, or by establishing and operating defense facilities including airfields. Furthermore, taking into consideration the requests of the relevant municipal governments, the MOD partially revised the Living Environment Improvement Act in 2011, and conducted a review to make it possible for the specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants to be applied to so-called soft projects, such as aid for medical expenses. In addition, the MOD added defense facilities to be eligible for these grants. Focused work is also underway to provide residential sound insulation and ----- efforts are being made to ensure its further progress. Regarding the specifi ed defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants, the MOD has implemented initiatives such as the ‘PDCA Cycle’ process since April 2014, aiming to increase the effectiveness of these grants. See>> Reference 72 (Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities) **(2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense** **Facilities and Surrounding Areas** In response to the requests by related municipal governments, the MOD continues to consider practical ways to achieve more effective and effi cient measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fi scal situation. See>> Fig. III-4-1-4 (FY2016 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near Bases (Based on Expenditures)) |Project|Mainland|Okinawa| |---|---|---| |Projects for preventing disturbances|105|15| |Sound insulation projects|396|87| |Measures related to relocations|37|1| |Subsidies for stabilizing people’s livelihoods|231|22| |Road improvement projects|62|3| |Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants|180|32| |Other projects|19|2| FY2016 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas near Fig. III-4-1-4 Bases (Based on Expenditures) (100 million yen) **Project** **Mainland** **Okinawa** Projects for preventing disturbances 105 15 Sound insulation projects 396 87 Measures related to relocations 37 1 Subsidies for stabilizing people’s 231 22 livelihoods Road improvement projects 62 3 Environs Improvement Adjustment 180 32 Grants Other projects 19 2 **Commentary** **Initiatives Taken by Local Authorities in the Vicinity of Defense Facilities** **Column** To ensure the stability of the lives and the enhancement of the welfare of local residents, local authorities in the vicinity of defense facilities conduct various developments and improvements of the living environment utilizing the national subsidy provided by the MOD to deal with obstacles generated due to the presence of defense facilities. For example, to prevent and reduce the noise generated by the takeoff and landing of aircraft at the airfi eld of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan, noise insulation work is conducted in schools and hospitals that require a quiet environment (a project using the subsidy scheme by the MOD). Particularly, local authorities in municipalities situated in the vicinity of defense facilities that are signifi cantly affected in terms of their living environment and community development, various projects are carried out to ease the impact on the surrounding areas using the Provision of Specifi ed Defense Facility Environs Improvement Adjustment Grant. Example of noise Sound Example of project insulation work absorption (Operation of a community bus) Sound Ventilation and insulation temperature holding (Photo provided by Shibecha–cho, Hokkaido) (Photo provided by Shintomi-cho, Miyazaki Prefecture) Noise insulation work involves the installation of soundproof sashes (sound In Shintomi-cho, Miyazaki Prefecture, where the Nyutabaru Airfield is insulation), installation of air-conditioning equipment to keep the sealed located, the above grant is used for the purchase and operation of a indoor environment comfortable (ventilation and temperature holding), and vehicle for the stable operation of community buses, which are necessary the installation of sound absorption materials on the room walls and ceilings for the daily lives of the town residents in the area with no presence of (sound absorption). public transport. As these examples demonstrate, cooperation with relevant local authorities is essential for facilitating harmony between defense facilities and their surrounding communities. ----- **Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and** **Section 2** **Related Activities** **1 Various Public Relations Activities** As the activities of the MOD/SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the Japanese people, it is important to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations activities and to gain the trust and cooperation of the public. According to a “Public Opinion Survey on the SelfDefense Forces and Security Issues” conducted by the Cabinet Offi ce (in January 2015), the public expectations and evaluations towards the SDF have been increasing as the scope of MOD/SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally. In light of this result, the MOD/SDF will continue to conduct a variety of PR activities, thereby striving to ensure better understanding of the current status of the MOD/SDF. See>> Reference 74 (“Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Offi ce of Cabinet Offi ce)) - 1 Website, Brochures, and Other Forms of PR Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kumada exchanging opinions with local residents at a Roundtable Talk (Akita City, Akita Prefecture) The MOD/SDF conducts PR activities using the Internet such as offi cial websites, video distribution, and social media. The MOD has also been making great efforts to provide accurate information in a more extensive and timely fashion, by creating brochures, PR videos, and manga editions of the defense white paper, as well as providing assistance in editing the PR magazine MAMOR and cooperation on media coverage. Furthermore, based on the increasing interest in the MOD/SDF initiatives by the international community, the MOD has been striving to gain the understanding of people in other countries by publishing the monthly English magazine, “Japan Defense Focus.” It is proactively transmitting information to the international community through efforts such as providing international media with opportunities to cover stories, enhancement of the English section of the MOD website, publishing English versions of the defense white paper and brochures, as well as producing PR videos. - 2 Events and PR Facilities PR magazine MAMOR, which is produced with cooperation from the MOD/SDF in its editing process at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions and unit tours are held on occasions such as the anniversary of a unit’s foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades throughout the cities, with cooperation from the local communities. Furthermore, as part of the commemoration of the SDF anniversary, the SDF Marching Festival is held at Nippon Budokan arena every year. The festival attracted approximately 40,000 visitors in total in 2015. Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a fl eet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF respectively. In 2015 a fleet review was held by the MSDF at Sagami The MOD/SDF conducts activities to widely inform nationals of the current circumstances of the SDF. These activities include the GSDF Fuji Fire Power Exercise, cruises to experience MSDF vessels, and demonstration flights and boarding experiences on aircraft In addition ----- **y** **The SDF Marching Festival, an Event That Keeps on Evolving** **Column** The SDF Marching Festival is held annually in autumn, and its 52nd event will take place this year. It aims to deepen the public understanding of the SDF by introducing a wide range of SDF activities such as drill performance, by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF bands. While the fi rst SDF Marching Festival took place at the Tokyo Metropolitan Gymnasium in 1963, the Nippon Budokan arena has been the venue since 1973. Various international military bands have been invited as guest bands, and participated in the event since 1980, when the U.S. Army Band was invited for the 1st time. Japan International guest bands are how are the integral part of the SDF Marching Festival adding a glamorous atmosphere to the event. At the FY2015 SDF Marching Festival, the bands of the four services of the U.S. Forces in Japan (the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps) participated in event to commemorate the milestone of the 70th year of the post-war period, and the Republic of Korea Navy Band joined to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. It brought together Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea, and sent out the message “Moving forward hand-in-hand together.” The SDF Marching Festival is expanding its role globally, as an opportunity of event defense exchanges with foreign armed forces. As it has been said, music is a global language. The SDF will continue to further develop itself so that it can make a signifi cant contribution to the stability of Japan and the world, through this wonderful power of music. A scene from the FY2015 SDF Marching Festival Bay. Six vessels from fi ve countries and various aircraft including the U.S. Marine Corps Osprey participated in the fl eet review to promote the maintenance and promotion of international friendship and defense exchanges. The fl eet review attracted approximately 34,000 visitors, including visitors who attended the review and the rehearsal. In 2016, a troop review is planned to take place. The MOD/SDF also actively opens PR facilities to the public. For instance, the number of visitors on the facility tour at the PR facilities in the MOD at Ichigaya district (Ichigayadai Tour) reached 380,000 as of the end of March 2016. Each SDF service also has a large-scale PR facility in addition to PR facilities and archives at the SDF camps and bases open to the public. Furthermore, the MOD/SDF provides cooperation for shooting fi lms and TV programs. ----- **y** **Introduction of Historical Naval Buildings (Etajima)** **Column** Since the relocation of the naval academy from Tokyo Tsukiji in 1888, Etajima has been widely known as the location of one of the world top three naval academies. The allied forces used this location for a decade after the end of the war, but it was returned to Japan in 1956. In the same year a service school, which was in Yokosuka at that time, was relocated, and this school celebrated its 60th anniversary in January 2016. Today, Etajima accommodates the Maritime Offi cer Candidates School and the 1st Service School, while the facilities of the naval academy are still used for our education. The Student Hall of the Naval Academy, which was completed in 1893, is commonly known as the “Red Brick Building” and is used for offi cer candidate education as a government building of the Maritime Offi cer Candidate School. The Ceremonial Hall, which was completed in 1917, is a stone building with a total building area of 1655m[2] and the capacity of 2,000 people, and is used for entrance and commencement ceremonies. As this building has excellent acoustics, no microphone is required. The Greek-temple style Naval History Museum, completed in 1936, was built with the purpose to commemorate the heritage of our predecessors and foster our spiritual foundation. Many navy-related historical materials are still displayed and it is used as a site of education for MSDF personnel. In this way, Etajima has been handed down as a place of education for the MSDF personnel, whilst maintaining the appearance of a period of Naval Academy. The “Red Brick Building” and Ceremonial Hall Naval History Museum - 3 Trial Enlistment Programs The MOD/SDF offers SDF Life Experience Tours[1] and Enlistment Experience Programs.[2] These programs are intended to promote participants’ understanding of the SDF by offering the opportunity to experience the daily life and training of the SDF, as well as to have direct contact with SDF personnel. In FY2015, approximately 140 persons participated in SDF Life Experience Tours. From the private sector, the SDF received approximately 1,300 requests for Enlistment Experience Programs, and approximately 28,000 employees experienced SDF life. A scene from the summer tour with university students and others held at the GSDF Camp Zentsuji Information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, Ms. Parsley Tour (trial tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women etc. is available on the MOD/SDF website. ----- A scene from the spring tour with university students and others held in the MSDF Yokosuka Disrtict A scene from the one-day visit to SDF for women held at the ASDF Ashiya Air Base **2 Initiatives for Information Disclosure** - 2 Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower **Protection System** - 1 Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure **System and Personal Data Protection System** In accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001, the MOD discloses its administrative documents properly. In the light of respecting individual rights in line with the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs, the MOD takes measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its jurisdiction, and discloses such information upon due request. See>> Reference 73 (Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2015)) The MOD set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by its offi cials, employees and outside workers, establishing an internal contact desk for dealing with information disclosure that is in the public interest and whistleblower protection. - 3 Engagement in Policy Evaluation The MOD has been conducting the evaluation of various policies based on its policy evaluation system. In FY2015, the MOD conducted policy evaluations of Research and development (R&D) programs and the special measures concerning taxation as well as the major policies and programs of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the Mid Term Defense Program (MTDP). ----- |Year|Olympics Title|Gold medal|Col4|Silver medal|Col6|Bronze medal|Col8| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |||Event|Name|Event|Name|Event|Name| |1964|Tokyo|Weightlifting|Yoshinobu Miyake|||Marathon|Kokichi Tsuburaya| |1968|Mexico|Weightlifting|Yoshinobu Miyake||||| |||Wrestling|Masaaki Kaneko||||| |||Wrestling|Shigeo Nakata||||| |1972|Munich|||Wrestling|Koichiro Hirayama||| |1976|Montreal|||||Wrestling|Koichiro Hirayama| |1984|Los Angeles|Shooting (pistol)|Takeo Kamachi|Wrestling|Takashi Irie||| |||Wrestling|Atsuji Miyahara|Wrestling|Masaki Eto||| |1988|Seoul|||Wrestling|Atsuji Miyahara||| |1992|Barcelona|||||Shooting (rifl e)|Ryohei Koba| |1996|Atlanta||||||| |2000|Sydney||||||| |2004|Athens|||||Wrestling|Kenji Inoue| |2008|Beijing||||||| |2012|London|Wrestling|Tatsuhiro Yonemitsu|||Wrestling|Shinichi Yumoto| |||Wrestling|Hitomi Obara|||Boxing|Satoshi Shimizu| |Overall medals||8 medals||4 medals||6 medals|| **y** **SDF Personnel Performing Brilliantly on the Stage of the Olympics** **Column** **[Nurturing SDF personnel athletes and the enhancement of their competitiveness]** The SDF is promoting the acquisition of promising players such as high school students who have world-class competitiveness. At the same time, in addition to the nine events* which the SDF has placed its focus on training and fostering players, it is implementing programs to foster and train players of women’s rugby and canoeing, with the purpose to foster the SDF athletes and enhance their competitiveness towards the Rio 2016 Olympic and the Tokyo 2020 Olympic games. - Wrestling, boxing, judo, shooting, weightlifting, archery, athletics, swimming, and modern pentathlon **[List of prospective SDF personnel who will participate in the Rio 2016 Olympic Games]** (1) Modern Pentathlon: Sergeant (GSDF) Tomoya Miguchi (2) Shooting (rifl e): Major (GSDF) Toshikazu Yamashita (3) Athletics: Second Lieutenant (ASDF) Takayuki Tanii (4) Shooting (pistol): Second Lieutenant (ASDF) Eita Mori (5) Boxing: First Lieutenant (GSDF) Daisuke Narimatsu (6) Swimming: Sergeant First Class (GSDF) Naito Ehara (7) Athletics: Second Lieutenant (GSDF) Hirooki Arai (8) Modern Pentathlon: Sergeant (GSDF) Shohei Iwamoto (9) Weightlifting: Second Lieutenant (GSDF) Hiroaki Takao Sergeant (GSDF) Major (GSDF) Second Lieutenant (ASDF) Second Lieutenant (ASDF) First Lieutenant (GSDF) Tomoya Miguchi Toshikazu Yamashita Takayuki Tanii Eita Mori Daisuke Narimatsu Sergeant First Class (GSDF) Second Lieutenant (GSDF) Sergeant (GSDF) Second Lieutenant (GSDF) Naito Ehara Hirooki Arai Shohei Iwamoto Hiroaki Takao **[Number of medals received in the past Olympic Games]** Gold medal Silver medal Bronze medal Year Olympics Title Event Name Event Name Event Name 1964 Tokyo Weightlifting Yoshinobu Miyake Marathon Kokichi Tsuburaya Weightlifting Yoshinobu Miyake 1968 Mexico Wrestling Masaaki Kaneko Wrestling Shigeo Nakata 1972 Munich Wrestling Koichiro Hirayama 1976 Montreal Wrestling Koichiro Hirayama Shooting (pistol) Takeo Kamachi Wrestling Takashi Irie 1984 Los Angeles Wrestling Atsuji Miyahara Wrestling Masaki Eto 1988 Seoul Wrestling Atsuji Miyahara 1992 Barcelona Shooting (rifl e) Ryohei Koba 1996 Atlanta 2000 Sydney 2004 Athens Wrestling Kenji Inoue 2008 Beijing Wrestling Tatsuhiro Yonemitsu Wrestling Shinichi Yumoto 2012 London Wrestling Hitomi Obara Boxing Satoshi Shimizu Overall medals 8 medals 4 medals 6 medals ----- Reference **Part I** **Security Environment Surrounding Japan** Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery................................................ 385 Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)......................................................... 385 Reference 3 Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)..................................... 385 Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan.... 386 **Part II Japan’s Security and Defense Policy and the Japan-U.S. Alliance** Reference 5 National Security Strategy (Outline)........................................ 386 Reference 6 NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for FY2014 and beyond............................................................................ 390 Reference 7 Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)................. 398 Reference 8 The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned.................... 404 Reference 9 Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications...... 404 Reference 10 Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service................ 405 Reference 11 Guided Missile Specifications................................................. 405 Reference 12 Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)........................................................... 406 Reference 13 Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)............................................... 407 Reference 14 Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)........................................................... 407 Reference 15 Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries.................. 408 Reference 16 Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel.. 408 Reference 17 Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2015)................................................................ 409 Reference 18 Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel......................... 409 Reference 19 Major Exercises Conducted in FY2015................................... 410 Reference 20 Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2015)................................................. 410 Reference 21 Main Measures for Re-employment Support.......................... 411 Reference 22 Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government.... 411 Reference 23 Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People....................... 412 Reference 24 Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces........................... 414 Reference 25 Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel................................................ 416 Reference 26 Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2015)................... 418 Reference 27 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2015)...................................................................... 418 Reference 28 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015)...................................................................... 420 Reference 29 United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.................................................. 425 Reference 30 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (April 27, 2012)...................................................................... 427 Reference 31 Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2013).......... 428 Reference 32 Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2015............... 430 Reference 33 Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects............ 432 Reference 34 Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ.............. 432 Reference 35 Outline of 23 Issues............................................................... 433 Reference 36 The SACO Final Report........................................................... 434 Reference 37 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report............................. 436 Reference 38 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility.................. 438 Reference 39 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena........................................................... 439 Reference 40 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam.......................................................... 439 Reference 41 Protocol amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam.................................................................. 441 Reference 42 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces............. 442 **Part III Initiatives to Protect the Lives and Property of the People** **as well as Securing the Territorial Land, Water and Airspace** Reference 43 Direction of the MOD Reform (Outline).................................... 442 Reference 44 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan................... 443 Reference 45 Flow of Responce to Ballistic Missiles.................................... 443 Reference 46 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)............ 444 Reference 47 Implementation and participation record of major drills related to disaster dispatch (FY2015)..................................... 444 Reference 48 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)...................................... 444 Reference 49 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2015)............................................... 445 Reference 50 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense............................................................................. 445 Reference 51 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues...................................... 446 Reference 52 Status of Capacity Building Assistance................................... 448 Reference 53 Status of Invitation Program................................................... 449 Reference 54 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)........... 449 Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years).................................................................. 451 Reference 56 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years).................................................................. 452 Reference 57 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years).................................................................. 453 Reference 58 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years).................................................................. 454 Reference 59 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years).................................................................. 454 Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)................................................... 454 Reference 61 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years)................................ 457 Reference 62 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (Past Three Years)................................................... 457 Reference 63 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)................................................... 459 Reference 64 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy..................................................................... 459 Reference 65 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities.................................................. 460 Reference 66 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities.... 460 Reference 67 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations..................................................... 463 Reference 68 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology...................................................................... 463 Reference 69 Activities in Civic Life............................................................. 464 Reference 70 Activities Contributing to Society............................................ 465 Reference 71 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities............................ 465 Reference 72 Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities................................................................... 466 Reference 73 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2015).................................................................. 466 Reference 74 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)............................... 467 ----- **Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery** |Col1|Col2|United States|Russia|United Kingdom|France|China| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Missiles|ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles)|450 Minuteman III:  450|332 SS-18:  54 SS-19: 30 SS-25: 108 SS-27:  78 RS-24:  62|―|―|52 DF-5 (CSS-4):  20 DF-31 (CSS-10): 32| ||IRBM MRBM|―|―|―|―|160 DF-4 (CSS-3):  10 DF-21 (CSS-5):  134| |||||||DF-26 16| ||SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic missiles)|336 Trident D-5:  336|192 SS-N-18:  48 SS-N-23:  96 SS-N-32:  48|48 Trident D-5: 48|64 M-45: 32 M-51:  32|48 JL-2 (CSS-NX-14):  48| |Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles||14|13|4|4|4| |Aircraft||78 B-2:  20 B-52:  58|76 Tu-95 (Bear): 60 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16|―|63 Mirage2000N:  23 Rafale:  40|50 H-6K: 50| |Number of warheads||Approx. 4,760|Approx. 4,380 (including approx. 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads)|215|300|Approx. 260| Notes: 1. Data is based on “The Military Balance 2016,” the SIPRI database, etc. 2. In April 2016, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2016 —the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,481 and the delivery vehicles involved 741 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,735 and the delivery vehicles involved 521 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2015, the number of deployed U.S. nuclear warheads was approx. 2,080 (including 180 tactical nuclear warheads). 3. In November 2015, the U.K.’s Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stipulated that the number of deployed nuclear warheads is to be no more than 120, while the number of nuclear warheads possessed is to be no more than 180. 4. According to the SIPRI database, India possesses 100-120 nuclear warheads, Pakistan 110-130, Israel a maximum of 80, and North Korea 10. **Reference 3** **Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major** **Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)** |Country or Region|Military Service System|Regular (10,000 persons)|Col4|Reserves (10,000 persons)| |---|---|---|---|---| |United States|Volunteer|138||84| |Russia|Conscription / Volunteer|80||200| |United Kingdom|Volunteer|15||8| |France|Volunteer|21||3| |Germany|Volunteer|18||3| |Italy|Volunteer|17||2| |India|Volunteer|135||116| |China|Conscription|233||51| |North Korea|Conscription|119||60| |Republic of Korea|Conscription|63||450| |Egypt|Conscription|44||48| |Israel|Conscription|18||47| |Japan|Volunteer|Ground|14|3.1 (0.5)| |||Maritime|4.2|0.05| |||Air|4.3|0.05| Notes: 1. Data from “The Military Balance 2016” and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2015. The figure in parentheses shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and is not included in the total figure. 3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system. 4. In Germany, as a result of the enactment of the Military Law Amendment Act in April 2011, the conscription system was suspended effective July 1, 2011, and the volunteer system was newly introduced as a replacement of the former. 5. China has announced that the PLA would be reduced by 300,000 troops by the end of 2017. **Reference 2 Outline of Military Power of Major Countries and** **Regions (Approximate Numbers)** |Ground Forces|Col2|Naval Forces|Col4|Col5|Air Forces|Col7| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Country or Region|Ground Forces (10,000 persons)|Country or Region|Tonnage (10,000 tons)|Number of Vessels|Country or Region|Number of Combat Aircraft| |China|160|United States|625.0|944|United States|3,638| |India|115|Russia|204.9|1012|China|2,715| |North Korea|102|China|150.2|879|Russia|1,344| |Pakistan|55|United Kingdom|61.2|136|India|984| |United States|51|India|48,0|243|Republic of Korea|619| |Republic of Korea|50|France|40.3|292|Egypt|601| |Vietnam|41|Indonesia|26.7|171|North Korea|563| |Turkey|40|Italy|22.5|184|Taiwan|508| |Myanmar|38|Turkey|22.1|206|Israel|482| |Iran|35|Republic of Korea|21.1|236|Pakistan|456| |Egypt|31|Taiwan|21.0|393|France|417| |Indonesia|30|Germany|20.6|127|Turkey|407| |Thailand|25|Australia|19.4|98|Iran|336| |Russia|24|Spain|18.9|172|Saudi Arabia|336| |Colombia|24|Brazil|17.3|110|United Kingdom|295| |Japan|14|Japan|46.7|137|Japan|410| Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from “The Military Balance 2016” and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2015–2016 and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2015, and combat aircraft (Air Forces) include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings). 3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength. ----- **Reference 4 Transition of Military Power in the Area Surrounding Japan** Ground Forces Maritime Forces Air Forces (10,000 persons) (10,000 tons) (Number of Combat Aircraft) 250 250 8,000 200 150 200 150 6,000 4,000 100 50 100 50 2,000 1996 2006 2016 1996 2006 2016 1996 2006 2016 Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan Far East Russia China North Korea Japan **Reference 5** **National Security Strategy (Outline)** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) **I. Purpose** ❍ As Japan’s security environment becomes ever more severe, Japan needs to identify its national interests from a long-term perspective, determine the course it should pursue in the international community, and adopt a whole-government approach for national security policies and measures in order to continue developing a prosperous and peaceful society. ❍ In a world where globalization continues, Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community. ❍ The Strategy, as fundamental policies pertaining to national security, presents guidelines for policies in areas related to national security. ❍ With the National Security Council (NSC) serving as the control tower, as well as with strong political leadership, the Government of Japan will implement national security policies in a more strategic and structured manner through a whole-government approach. ❍ When implementing policies in other areas, the Government of Japan will give due consideration to national security so that Japan can utilize its strengths, such as its diplomatic ability and defense capability, in a smooth and fully-functional way as a whole, based on the Strategy. ❍ The Strategy will guide Japan’s national security policy over the next decade. Through the implementation of concrete policies, the NSC will regularly carry out systematic evaluation and upgrade the Strategy in a timely and appropriate manner. **II. Fundamental Principle of National Securityy** 1. Principles Japan Upholds ❍ Japan is a country with rich culture and tradition, and upholds universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law. Japan has a wealth of highly educated human capital and high cultural standards, and is an economic power with strong economic capacity and high technological capabilities. Japan has achieved its development benefiting from an open international economic system. In addition, Japan as a maritime state has pursued “Open and Stable Seas.” ❍ Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II, and has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. ❍ Japan has maintained its security, and contributed to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, by enhancing its alliance with the United States (U.S.), as well as by deepening cooperative relationships with other countries. Japan has also contributed to the realization of stability and prosperity in the international community through initiatives for supporting the economic growth of developing countries and for addressing global issues based on the principle of human security, as well as through trade and investment relations with other countries. ❍ Complying with the United Nations (U.N.) Charter, Japan has been cooperating with the U.N. and other international organizations, and has actively contributed to their activities. Japan has also continuously participated in international peace cooperation activities. In addition, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, Japan has consistently engaged in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, playing a leading role in international initiatives to realize “a world free of nuclear weapons.” ❍ Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. This is the fundamental principle of national security that Japan should stand to hold. 2. Japan’s National Interests and National Security Objectives National Interests ❍ To maintain its sovereignty and independence; to defend its territorial integrity; to ensure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals, and to ensure its survival while maintaining its own peace and security and preserving its rich culture and tradition. ❍ To achieve the prosperity of Japan and its nationals through economic development, thereby consolidating its peace and security (to this end, it is essential that Japan strengthens the free trade regime and realizes an international environment that offers stability, transparency and predictability). ❍ To maintain and protect international order based on rules and universal values, such as freedom, democracy, respect for fundamental human rights, and the rule of law. National Security Objectives ❍ To strengthen the deterrence necessary for maintaining Japan’s peace and security and for ensuring its survival, thus deterring threats from directly reaching Japan; at the same time, if by any chance a threat should reach Japan, to defeat such threat and to minimize the damage. ❍ To improve the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan, through strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia-Pacific region, and promoting practical security cooperation. ❍ To improve the global security environment and build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community by strengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing a leading role in the settlement of disputes, through consistent diplomatic efforts and further personnel contributions. **III. Security Environment Surrounding Japan and National Security** **Challenges** 1. Global Security Environment and Challenges (1) Shift in the Balance of Power and Rapid Progress of Technological Innovation ❍ The balance of power between nations is changing due to the rise of emerging countries (e.g., China and India). In particular, China is increasing its presence in the international community. The United States, which has the world’s largest power as a whole, has manifested its policy to shift its emphasis of national security and economic policy towards the Asia-Pacific region. ❍ The rapid advancement of globalization and technological innovation has increased the relative influence of non-state ----- actors, and the threat of terrorism and crimes committed by non-state actors is expanding. (2) Threat of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Related Materials ❍ The issue of the transfer, proliferation, and performance improvement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, the issue of nuclear and missile development by North Korea, and the nuclear issue of Iran remain major threats to Japan and the international community. (3) Threat of International Terrorism ❍ International terrorism has spread and become diverse in its forms due to the advancement of globalization. ❍ Terrorist attacks against Japanese nationals and interests have actually taken place overseas. Japan and its people face the threat of international terrorism both at home and abroad. (4) Risks to Global Commons ❍ In recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to global commons, such as the sea, outer space, and cyberspace, have been spreading and become more serious. ❍ In the seas, in recent years, there have been an increasing number of cases of unilateral actions in an attempt to change the status quo by coercion with respect to natural resources and the security of respective states. ❍ Due to these cases as well as piracy and other issues, there is a growing risk of the stability of sea lanes and freedom of navigation coming under threat. ❍ There exist risks that could impede the continuous and stable use of outer space, including an increasing amount of space debris caused by satellite collisions amongst others. ❍ Risks of cyber-attacks with the intent to disrupt critical infrastructure and obstruct military systems are becoming more serious. (5) Challenges to Human Security ❍ Global issues that cannot be dealt with by a single country— namely, poverty, widening inequality, global health challenges including infectious diseases, climate change and other environmental issues, food security, and humanitarian crises caused by civil wars and natural disasters—are emerging as critical and urgent issues of human security, threatening the very survival and dignity of individuals. ❍ These challenges could have repercussions on peace and stability of the international community. (6) The Global Economy and Its Risks ❍ The risk of the expansion of an economic crisis from one country to the entire global economy is growing. ❍ Signs of protectionism and reluctance towards the creation of new trade rules are becoming apparent. ❍ The rise of resource nationalism in resource rich countries as well as an intensified competition for the acquisition of energy and mineral resources by emerging countries are observed. 2. Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (1) Characteristics of the Strategic Environment of the Asia-Pacific Region ❍ The region has various political regimes and a host of countries with large-scale military forces including nuclear-weapon states. Yet a regional cooperation framework in the security realm has not been sufficiently institutionalized. (2) North Korea’s Military Buildup and Provocative Actions ❍ North Korea has enhanced the capability of WMDs including nuclear weapons and that of ballistic missiles. At the same time, North Korea has repeatedly taken provocative military actions including the use of provocative rhetoric against Japan and other countries, thereby increasing the tension in the region. The threat to the security of Japan and of other countries is being substantially aggravated. ❍ As Kim Jong-un proceeds to consolidate his regime, the domestic situation in North Korea needs to be closely monitored. ❍ North Korea’s abduction is a grave issue affecting Japan’s sovereignty as well as the lives and safety of Japanese nationals. It is an urgent issue for the Government of Japan to resolve under its responsibility. (3) China’s Rapid Rise and Intensified Activities in Various Areas ❍ There is an expectation for China to share and comply with international norms, and play a more active and cooperative role for regional and global issues. ❍ China has been rapidly advancing its military capabilities in a wide range of areas without sufficient transparency. ❍ China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea (e.g., intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands, establishment of its own “Air Defense Identification Zone”). ❍ The cross-strait relationship has deepened economically. Meanwhile, the military balance has been changing. Thus, the relationship contains both orientations towards stability and potential instability. **IV. Japan’s Strategic Approaches to National Security** 1. Strengthening and Expanding Japan’s Capabilities and Roles - To ensure national security, Japan needs to first and foremost strengthen its own capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities. Japan must also steadily fulfill the role it should play and adapt its capabilities to respond to future developments. - Enhancing Japan’s resilience in national security, through reinforcing its diplomatic power and defense force, as well as bolstering its economic strengths and technological capabilities, contributes to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community at large. - In order to overcome national security challenges and achieve national security objectives, as well as to proactively contribute to peace in cooperation with the international community, Japan needs to expand and deepen cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone. At the same time, Japan needs to make effective use of its diverse resources and promote comprehensive policies. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy for Creating a Stable International Environment ❍ The key of national security is to create a stable and predictable international environment, and prevent the emergence of threats. ❍ It is necessary for Japan to realize an international order and security environment that are desirable for Japan, by playing an even more proactive role in achieving peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. ❍ It is necessary to enhance diplomatic creativity and negotiating power to deepen the understanding of and garner support for Japan’s position in the international community. ❍ By highlighting Japan’s attractiveness, Japan needs to strengthen its soft power that would benefit the international community. Japan also needs to strengthen its capacity to promptly and accurately identify the needs of Japanese nationals and firms to support their overseas activities. ❍ Japan will make even more proactive contributions to international organizations such as the U.N., including through increasing the number of Japanese staff in such institutions. (2) Building a Comprehensive Defense Architecture to Firmly Defend Japan ❍ Amid the severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force, adapting to the change in strategic environment with consideration of its national power, and strive to ensure operations with flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. ❍ Japan will advance coordination within the government and with local governments and the private sector. In doing so, even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters. ❍ In developing the structure of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF), which plays a central role in these efforts, Japan will enhance its defense structure for deterrence and response to various situations, prioritizing important functions from a joint and comprehensive perspective. ❍ With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence of the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will work closely with the U.S., and take appropriate measures through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. (3) Strengthening Efforts for the Protection of Japan’s Territorial ----- Integrity ❍ Japan will enhance the capabilities of the law enforcement agencies responsible for territorial patrol activities and reinforce its maritime surveillance capabilities. ❍ Japan will strengthen coordination among relevant ministries and agencies to be able to respond seamlessly to a variety of unexpected situations. ❍ Japan will proactively engage in the protection, management, and development of remote islands near national borders, and from a national security viewpoint, review issues related to the use of land in areas such as remote islands near national borders and areas surrounding defense facilities. (4) Ensuring Maritime Security ❍ As a maritime state, Japan will play a leading role, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law, rather than by force. ❍ Japan will strengthen its maritime domain awareness capabilities in a comprehensive manner that involves the use of outer space, while paying attention to the establishment of international networks. ❍ Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan. (5) Strengthening Cyber Security ❍ Japan as a whole will make concerted efforts to defend cyberspace and strengthen the response capability against cyber-attacks, so as to protect cyberspace from malicious activities; to ensure the free and safe use of cyberspace; and to guard Japan’s critical infrastructure against cyber-attacks, including those in which state involvement is suspected. ❍ Japan will constantly strengthen public-private partnership, and will comprehensively consider and take necessary measures with regard to expanding the pool of human resources in the security field, etc. ❍ Japan will take measures at technical and operational levels to enhance international cooperation, and will promote cyber defense cooperation. (6) Strengthening Measures against International Terrorism ❍ Japan will first and foremost strengthen its domestic measures against international terrorism such as ensuring the security of nuclear facilities in Japan. In order to ensure the safety of Japanese nationals living abroad, Japan will strengthen such measures as collecting and analyzing intelligence on the situation of international terrorism. (7) Enhancing Intelligence Capabilities ❍ Japan will fundamentally strengthen its information-collecting capabilities from a diverse range of sources, including human intelligence and open source intelligence. ❍ Japan will enhance its intelligence analysis, consolidation, and sharing capabilities including by developing experts, and will promote all-source analysis that makes use of the array of information-collecting means at the Government’s disposal. Materials and intelligence will be provided to the NSC in a timely manner, and they will be appropriately utilized in policy formulation. (8) Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation ❍ From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to contribute more proactively to peace and international cooperation including through utilizing defense equipment, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. ❍ While giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer. (9) Ensuring the Stable Use of Outer Space and Promoting Its Use for Security Purposes ❍ Japan will engage itself in enhancing the functions of information-gathering satellites and in making effective use of satellites. Japan will also enhance a system for space situational awareness. ❍ Japan will promote the development and utilization of outer space in a manner that contributes to national security in the medium- to long-term, including the development of technologies. (10) Strengthening Technological Capabilities ❍ Japan should encourage the further promotion of technologies, including dual use technologies, thereby strengthening Japan’s technological capabilities. ❍ Japan will constantly grasp science and technology trends, and make effective use of technology in the area of security by combining the efforts of industries, academia, and the Government. ❍ Japan will proactively utilize its internationally outstanding technologies in diplomacy. 2. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance - Japan and the U.S. have persistently strengthened and expanded their cooperation on a wide range of areas for peace, stability, and prosperity of not only the two countries themselves, but also the Asia-Pacific region and the broader international community. - The U.S., based on its Defense Strategic Guidance emphasizing a rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, aspires to enhance its presence in the region and strengthen cooperation with its allies, including Japan and its partners. - In order to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain and enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community, Japan must further elevate the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and realize a stronger Japan-U.S. Alliance. (1) Further Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation in a Wide Range of Areas ❍ Japan will work with the U.S. to revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, through discussions on a variety of issues such as the concrete manner of defense cooperation and basic concepts of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, while ensuring consistency with various policies in line with the Strategy. ❍ Japan will strive to enhance the deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance through working closely with the U.S. on operational cooperation and policy coordination on issues such as response to contingencies and the medium- to long-term strategy, and strengthening its security cooperation with the U.S. in such broad areas as BMD, maritime affairs, outer space, cyberspace and largescale disaster response operations. (2) Ensuring a Stable Presence of the U.S. Forces ❍ While taking measures such as Host Nation Support and increasing deterrence, Japan will steadily implement the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan in accordance with the existing bilateral agreements, in order to reduce the impact on people in host communities including Okinawa. 3. Strengthening Diplomacy and Security Cooperation with Japan’s Partners for Peace and Stability in the International Community To improve the security environment surrounding Japan, Japan will engage itself in building trust and cooperative relations with partners both within and outside the region through the following approaches. ❍ Japan will strengthen cooperative relations with countries in the Asia-Pacific region with which it shares universal values and strategic interests. — ROK: Japan will strengthen the foundation for security cooperation. Japan, the U.S., and the ROK will work together closely in addressing North Korean nuclear and missile issues. — Australia: Japan will further strengthen the strategic partnership by steadily sharing strategic recognition and advancing security cooperation. — ASEAN countries: Japan will further deepen and develop cooperative relations with the ASEAN countries in all sectors based on the traditional partnership lasting more than 40 years. Japan will also provide further assistance to ASEAN efforts towards maintaining and strengthening its unity. — India: Japan will strengthen bilateral relations in a broad range of areas, including maritime security, based on the bilateral Strategic and Global Partnership. ❍ Japan will strive to construct a Mutually Beneficial Relationship ----- Based on Common Strategic Interests with China from a broad, as well as a medium- to long-term perspective. Japan will encourage China to play a responsible and constructive role for the sake of regional peace, stability and prosperity, and Japan will respond firmly but in a calm manner to China’s recent attempts to change the status quo by coercion. ❍ Japan will endeavor to achieve a comprehensive resolution of outstanding issues of concern, such as the abduction, nuclear and missile issues, in accordance with the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and relevant Security Council resolutions. ❍ Japan will advance cooperation with Russia in all areas, including security and energy, thereby enhancing bilateral relations as a whole. ❍ In promoting these efforts, Japan will actively utilize and engage in multilateral and trilateral cooperation frameworks. ❍ Japan will cooperate with other partners of the Asia-Pacific region towards ensuring the stability of the region. ❍ European countries are partners for Japan which together take a leading role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. Japan will further strengthen its relations with Europe, including cooperation with the EU, NATO, and OSCE. ❍ Japan will endeavor to further develop relations with emerging countries, not merely on a bilateral basis, but in cooperative efforts in tackling global challenges. ❍ Japan will engage in constructing multilayered cooperative relations with the Gulf States, encompassing political and security cooperation beyond natural resources and energy. In addition, Japan will play a proactive role in the resolution of major issues affecting the stability of the Middle East. ❍ Japan will continue to contribute to the development and the consolidation of peace in Africa through various avenues, especially the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. 4. Proactive Contribution to International Efforts for Peace and Stability of the International Community As a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will play an active role for the peace and stability of the international community. (1) Strengthening Diplomacy at the United Nations ❍ Japan will further engage in active efforts by the U.N. for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security. ❍ Japan will continue to strive to achieve the U.N. Security Council reform, including through an expansion of both permanent and non-permanent categories, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Council. (2) Strengthening the Rule of Law ❍ In order to establish the rule of law in the international community, Japan will participate proactively in international rule-making from the planning stage, so that Japan’s principles and positions are duly reflected. ❍ Japan will actively engage in realizing the rule of law relating to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, as well as in assistance for the development of legal systems. (3) Leading International Efforts on Disarmament and NonProliferation ❍ Japan will carry out vigorous efforts in pursuit of “a world free of nuclear weapons.” ❍ Japan will lead international efforts on disarmament and nonproliferation, including those towards the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile development issues and Iran’s nuclear issues, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the credibility of extended deterrence under the Japan-U.S. alliance. (4) Promoting International Peace Cooperation ❍ Japan will further step up its cooperation with U.N. PKO and other international peace cooperation activities. ❍ Japan will promote coordination between PKO and ODA projects, and make further strategic use of ODA and capacity building assistance. ❍ Japan will proactively train peacebuilding experts and PKO personnel in various countries in close consultation with countries or organizations concerned. (5) Promoting International Cooperation against International Terrorism ❍ Japan will promote consultations and exchanges of views with other countries on the situation on international terrorism and international counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as reinforcement of the international legal framework. ❍ Japan will actively extend assistance to developing countries, etc. 5. Strengthening Cooperation Based on Universal Values to Resolve Global Issues Japan will endeavor to share universal values and reinforce an open international economic system, which form the basis of peace, stability and prosperity of the international community. At the same time, Japan will advance the following measures towards the resolution of development issues and global issues that could hinder peace and stability of the international community. (1) Sharing Universal Values ❍ Through a partnership with countries with which Japan shares universal values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, Japan will conduct diplomacy that contributes to addressing global issues. ❍ Japan will actively utilize its ODA and other schemes in supporting democratization, the development of legal systems, and human rights. ❍ Japan will engage proactively in diplomatic issues on women. (2) Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security ❍ It is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts to address development issues as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. ❍ Japan will strengthen efforts towards the achievement of the MDGs, and play a leading role in the formulation of the next international development goals. ❍ Japan will engage in further efforts in mainstreaming the concept of human security in the international community. (3) Cooperating with Human Resource Development Efforts in Developing Countries ❍ Japan will invite a broad range of personnel from developing countries, including students and administrative officials, and provide them education and training. Japan will further promote human resource development in order to ensure that these personnel can contribute to development in their home countries. (4) Maintaining and Strengthening the Free Trade System ❍ Japan will promote economic partnership efforts, including through the TPP, the Japan-EU EPA, a Japan-China-ROK FTA, and the RCEP. Through these efforts, Japan will strengthen the vigor and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. (5) Responding to Energy and Environmental Issues ❍ Japan will actively utilize diplomatic tools for efforts to achieve the stable supply of energy and other natural resources. ❍ In the area of climate change, Japan will implement a proactive strategy for countering global warming. (6) Enhancing People-to-people Exchanges ❍ Japan will expand two-way youth exchanges. ❍ Japan will promote people-to-people exchanges through sport and culture. 6. Strengthening the Domestic Foundation that Supports National Security and Promoting Domestic and Global Understanding - In order to fully ensure national security, it is vital to reinforce the domestic foundation for diplomatic power, defense force, and other capabilities to be effectively demonstrated. - It is important to seek a deeper understanding of Japan’s security policies both at home and abroad to ensure national security. (1) Maintaining and Enhancing Defense Production and Technological Bases ❍ Japan will endeavor to engage in effective and efficient acquisition of defense equipment, and will maintain and enhance its defense production and technological bases, including through strengthening international competitiveness. (2) Boosting Communication Capabilities ❍ It is imperative that Japan proactively and effectively communicate its national security policy to the world and its people, deepen the understanding among the people of Japan, and build cooperative relations with other countries. ❍ With the Prime Minister’s Office serving as the control tower, Japan will enhance its public relations in an integrated and strategic manner through a government-wide approach. Fully utilizing various information technologies and diverse media, Japan will also strengthen its information dissemination in foreign languages. ❍ Japan will cooperate with educational institutions, key figures, and think tanks, and in doing so, promote Japanese language education overseas and train personnel who are capable of contributing to strategic public relations efforts and other areas. ----- those related to precision guided munitions, unmanned vehicles, stealth capability and nanotechnology. 2. In the Asia-Pacific region, including areas surrounding Japan, countries are enhancing and strengthening their cooperative relationships to resolve security challenges. Specific and practical cooperation and collaboration have progressed to settle challenges particularly in non-traditional security fields. In the meantime, grayzone situations over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests tend to linger, raising concerns that they may develop into more serious situations. North Korea is military-focused and deploys a massive military force. It is also proceeding with the development, deployment and proliferation of WMDs including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles which may be used to deliver such weapons, and it maintains a large-scale special operations force. Through these activities, North Korea is maintaining and strengthening its asymmetrical military capabilities. North Korea has also repeatedly heightened tension in the region by conducting military provocations in the Korean Peninsula and by escalating its provocative rhetoric and behavior against Japan and other countries. Such North Korean military trend constitutes a serious destabilizing factor to the security not only of Japan but of the entire region and the international community. Therefore, Japan needs to pay utmost attention to such activities. In particular, North Korea’s ballistic missile development has presumably entered a new stage, as technological improvements have been made to extend the range and increase the accuracy of its missiles through a series of missile launches. Also, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests in defiance of calls for restraint from the international community, so the possibility cannot be ruled out that it has successfully miniaturized nuclear weapons for warheads and equipped them on ballistic missiles. North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, coupled with its provocative rhetoric and behavior, such as suggesting a missile attack on Japan, pose a serious and imminent threat to Japan’s security. As for China, while it is greatly expected to play an active role in a more cooperative manner in the region and the world, it has been continuously increasing its defense expenditures and has been rapidly reinforcing its military in a wide range of areas. As part of such effort, China is believed to be making efforts to strengthen its asymmetrical military capabilities to prevent military activity by other countries in the region by denying access and deployment of foreign militaries to its surrounding areas. However, China has not clearly stated the purposes and goals of the military buildup and therefore, transparency concerning its military and security is not fully achieved. In addition, China is rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains in the region including in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In particular, China has taken assertive actions with regard to issues of conflicts of interest in the maritime domain, as exemplified by its attempts to change the status quo by coercion. As for the seas and airspace around Japan, China has intruded into Japanese territorial waters frequently and violated Japan’s airspace, and has engaged in dangerous activities that could cause unexpected situations, such as its announcement of establishing an “Air Defense Identification Zone” based on its own assertion thereby infringing the freedom of overflight above the high seas. China is also expanding and intensifying its activities in the maritime and aerial domains farther offshore than before. For example, Chinese military vessels and aircraft routinely enter the Pacific Ocean, and are expanding their operational areas which include areas north of Japan. As Japan has great concern about these Chinese activities, it will need to pay utmost attention to them, as these activities also raise concerns over regional and global security. As for Russia, it is observed that the country is proceeding to reform and modernize its military forces mainly by strengthening their readiness and introducing new equipment. The activities of Russian armed forces have been active. The U.S. has clearly manifested its strategic decision to put greater emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region (the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region) and is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region despite fiscal and various other constraints in order to maintain the stability and growth of the region while enhancing its relationships with its allies and expanding cooperation with partner countries. In addition, the U.S. has made its stance clear to prevent coercive actions that aim at ❍ By precisely and effectively communicating information on Japan’s position based on objective facts, Japan will be able to gain accurate understanding in the form of international opinion. (3) Reinforcing the Social Base ❍ It is essential that each and every Japanese national hopes to contribute to peace and stability in the region and the world, and to the improvement of the welfare of humanity, as well as that they perceive national security as a familiar and immediate issue for them, and have deep understanding of its importance and complexity. ❍ Japan will foster respect for other countries and their people as well as love for the country and region. ❍ Japan will advance measures that raise awareness with regard to security on such issues as territory and sovereignty, and that increase understanding of the activities of the SDF and the U.S. Forces in Japan. (4) Enhancing the Intellectual Base ❍ Japan will seek to enhance education on security-related subjects at institutions of higher education. ❍ Exchanges will be deepened between the Government and institutions of higher education, think tanks, etc. ❍ Japan will promote the fostering of private-sector experts and government officials. **Reference 6** **NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM GUIDELINES for** **FY2014 and beyond** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond are included in the reference. Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on December 17, 2010) are discontinued as of the end of FY2013. (Additional reference) National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond **I. NDPG’s Objective** In light of the current security environment surrounding Japan, the Government of Japan sets out the “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond” as new guidelines for Japan’s national defense, based on “Defense Capability Build-up in FY2013” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 25, 2013) and the “National Security Strategy” (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013). **II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan** 1. As interdependence among countries expands and deepens, there is a growing risk that unrest in the global security environment or a security problem in a single country or region could immediately develop into a security challenge or destabilizing factor for the entire international community. The multi-polarization of the world continues as a result of shifts in the balance of power due to the further development of countries such as China and India and the relative change of influence of the United States (U.S.). At the same time, the U.S. is expected to continue to play the role in maintaining world peace and stability as it retains the largest national power. There are ongoing regional conflicts involving various countries as well as an increase in the number of so-called “gray-zone” situations, that is, neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territory, sovereignty and maritime economic interests. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles continues to be a deep concern despite nonproliferation efforts by the international community. The presence of countries with weak governance and failed states feeds the expansion and spread of international terrorism. These problems continue to pose imminent security challenges. In the maritime domain, piracy acts have taken place in various parts of the world, and there have been cases where coastal states unilaterally asserted their rights and took action based on their own assertion concerning international maritime law, thereby unduly infringing the freedom of the high seas. Securing the stable use of outer space and cyberspace as global commons is becoming a significant security challenge for the international community including Japan against the backdrop of rapid technology innovation. In addition, military strategies and military balance in the future are anticipated to be significantly affected by the progress and proliferation of technologies such as ----- changing the status quo in the region in cooperation with allies and partners. 3. Japan is surrounded by the sea, and has a long coastline, numerous remote islands and a vast Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan is a maritime state and dependent largely on international trade for its supply of food and natural resources. Therefore, securing the safety of maritime and air traffic, through strengthening an “Open and Stable Seas” order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law and the freedom of navigation, constitutes the basis of peace and prosperity. Japan also faces security vulnerabilities resulting from concentration of industry, population and information infrastructure in urban areas and from the presence of a large number of key facilities, such as nuclear power plants, in coastal areas. In the event of another massive earthquake like the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan may suffer enormous damage and the impact may spread not only nationwide but also to other countries. The possibility of future huge earthquakes such as a Nankai Trough earthquake or a Tokyo inland earthquake makes it increasingly necessary to take every possible measure to prepare for large-scale disasters. 4. In light of the above, while the probability of a large-scale military conflict between major countries, which was a concern during the Cold War era, presumably remains low, various security challenges and destabilizing factors are emerging and becoming more tangible and acute. As a result, the security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe, since the formulation of “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011 and beyond” (approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010). As the security challenges and destabilizing factors are diverse and wide-ranging, it is difficult for a single country to deal with them on its own. Under these circumstances, it is increasingly necessary not only that the military sector cooperate with the non-military sector but also that countries which share interests in responding to shared security challenges cooperate and actively respond to maintain regional and global stability. **III. Japan’s Basic Defense Policy** 1. Basic Policy In light of the National Security Strategy, Japan will strengthen its diplomatic and defense capabilities along the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, thereby expanding the role it can play. At the same time, Japan will contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region by expanding and deepening cooperative relationships with other countries, with the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its cornerstone. Under this basic principle, Japan will build a comprehensive defense architecture and strengthen its posture for preventing and responding to various situations. In addition, Japan will strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and actively promote bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with other countries while closely coordinating defense and diplomatic policies. Japan will also seek to establish an infrastructure necessary for its defense forces to fully exercise their capabilities. When implementing these measures, under the Constitution, Japan will efficiently build a highly effective and joint defense force in line with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. With regard to the threat of nuclear weapons, the extended deterrence provided by the U.S. with nuclear deterrence at its core, is indispensable. In order to maintain and enhance the credibility of the extended deterrence, Japan will closely cooperate with the U.S. In addition, Japan will take appropriate responses through its own efforts, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and protection of the people. At the same time, Japan will play a constructive and active role in international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts so as to achieve the long-term goal of creating a world free of nuclear weapons. 2. Japan’s Own Efforts Recognizing that a country’s security depends first and foremost on its independent efforts, Japan will make full-scale efforts on its own initiative to prevent various situations and will seamlessly respond to them as the situation evolves with the National Security Council as the control tower, while maintaining cooperation with its ally, partners and other countries concerned. (1) Building a comprehensive defense architecture Given the increasingly severe security environment, Japan will efficiently develop a highly effective joint defense force and make efforts to employ it with a high level of flexibility and readiness based on joint operations. Japan will also ensure close regular interagency cooperation in normal times. In the event of various situations, the Government, under strong political leadership, will appropriately and promptly make decisions. Japan will seamlessly respond to situations as they unfold, in a whole-of-the-government approach, to ensure the protection of the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace, in coordination with local governments, private sectors, and others. Japan will also continue to develop various systems to respond to a variety of disasters and protect its people and will enhance the capability to quickly evacuate Japanese nationals from foreign countries in an emergency situation and ensure their safety. In order to take such approaches appropriately, Japan will increase the effectiveness of its situation and disaster response posture by systemizing various related plans and formulating and reviewing them as well as expanding the use of simulations, comprehensive training and exercises. (2) Japan’s defense forces – building a Dynamic Joint Defense Force Japan’s defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of national security, and represent Japan’s will and ability to deter threats from directly reaching Japan and defeat them if threats should reach Japan. In the times of an ever-changing security environment surrounding Japan, defense forces need to be constantly reviewed to adapt to the environment. To this aim, Japan needs to allocate limited resources in a focused and flexible way to prioritize the functions and capabilities from a comprehensive perspective, identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the Self-Defense Force’s (SDF’s) total functions and capabilities against various situations. Amid the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF, in addition to its regular activities, needs to respond to various situations, including “gray zone” situations which require SDF commitment. The frequency of such situations and the duration of responses are both increasing. Therefore, Japan will regularly conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (hereinafter “ISR”) activities. Moreover, the SDF will conduct strategic training and exercises in accordance with the development of the situation and swiftly build a response posture including advance deployment of units in response to the security environment and rapid deployment of adequate units. Thus Japan will demonstrate its will and highly developed capability to prevent further escalation. In dealing with situations, depending on their development, minimizing damage by effective response through achieving maritime supremacy and air superiority is essential in safeguarding the lives and property of the Japanese people, and the sovereignty of Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace. Therefore, Japan will enhance its deterrence and response capability by improving the mission-capable rate of equipment and its employment to conduct tailored activities swiftly and sustainably based on joint operations, as well as by developing defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality that underpin various activities to realize a more robust defense force. At the same time, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will strengthen its bilateral and multilateral cooperative relationships in order to ensure the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, which is closely related to its own security. Japan will also engage in international peacekeeping and other similar activities (peacekeeping operations by the United Nations, non-traditional security initiatives including Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and other internationally collaborative activities to improve the international security environment) and other efforts more proactively than before as efforts to address the global security challenges, in light of the diversified roles and increased opportunities of the defense force. From these viewpoints, given the changes in the security environment, the defense force based on this NDPG should prioritize particularly important functions and capabilities ----- through optimal resource allocation as a whole. The defense force also must be an effective one which enables conducting a diverse range of activities to be seamless as well as dynamic and adapting to situations as they demand. To that end, Japan will build a Dynamic Joint Defense Force, which emphasizes both soft and hard aspects of readiness, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and capability for C3I, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support the SDF’s operation. 3. Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, together with Japan’s own efforts, constitute the cornerstone for Japan’s national security. The Japan-U.S. Alliance centered on bilateral security arrangements functions as public goods that contribute to the stability and prosperity not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large. Under its policy of strategic rebalancing towards the AsiaPacific region, the U.S. is maintaining and strengthening its engagement and presence in the region while enhancing its partnerships and cooperation with its allies, including Japan, and partner countries. As the security environment surrounding Japan becomes increasingly severer, it has become more important than ever for Japan’s security to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance and make it more balanced and effective. (1) Strengthening deterrence and response capabilities of the JapanU.S. Alliance In order to ensure Japan’s national security by maintaining and strengthening the commitment of the U.S. towards Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, further enhance Japan-U.S. defense cooperation and reinforce the deterrence provided by the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the alliance’s contingency response capabilities, while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts. At the same time, in response to the increasingly severe security environment, while increasing the presence of Japan and the U.S. in the western Pacific region, Japan will build seamless cooperation with the U.S. ranging from situations on a day-to-day basis to various situations, including cooperation in responding to “gray-zone” situations. To that end, Japan will continue to expand joint training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas with the U.S. It will also tighten the JapanU.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination including contingency response and medium-to long-term strategies, such as BMD, bilateral planning, and Extended Deterrence Dialogue. (2) Strengthening and expanding cooperation in a broad range of fields The Japan-U.S. Alliance will contribute to the peace and stability of the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, by strengthening cooperation not only in the fields of anti-piracy efforts, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter terrorism but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. As for disaster response, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation between the SDF and the U.S. forces within and outside Japan in light of the fact that the U.S. forces, including its USFJ facilities and areas, greatly contributed to the safety of the Japanese people during the Great East Japan Earthquake. In addition, Japan will constantly strengthen and expand the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including efforts for intelligence cooperation and information security, and cooperation in the field of defense equipment and technology, to build a firmer and effective alliance. (3) Steady implementation of measures relating to the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan Japan will provide stable support for the smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan through various measures, including Host Nation Support (HNS). At the same time, efforts will be made to steadily implement the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and mitigate the impact on local communities while maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces. In particular, Japan will seek to mitigate the impact on Okinawa, located in a critically important location in terms of national security and where the stationing of U.S. forces significantly contributes to the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, by realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas including through the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma as well as the dispersion of the impact and other measures, in light of the heavy concentration of such facilities and areas there. 4. Active Promotion of Security Cooperation (1) Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region In the Asia-Pacific region, specific cooperative measures have been taken mainly in non-traditional security fields, including disaster relief. Multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have been developed and the regional integration initiative led by ASEAN has been making progress. However, security challenges are becoming more serious than ever in North East Asia. Japan will promote a variety of further cooperative initiatives in a multilayered manner to ease the atmosphere of confrontation and the sense of curiosity toward one another in the region. Japan will promote close cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), which is in a position to support the U.S. presence in North East Asia together with Japan, and will make efforts to establish a foundation for further cooperation with the ROK, for example by concluding an agreement on security information protection and an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Japan will further deepen its relationship with Australia, with which Japan shares security interests and security cooperation has been advancing, and strengthen cooperation in fields such as international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also actively conduct joint training and other activities so as to improve interoperability with Australia. Moreover, efforts will be made to promote the partnerships among U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region by strengthening cooperative relationships under trilateral frameworks among Japan, the U.S. and ROK and among Japan, the U.S. and Australia. As Chinese activities have a significant impact on regional security, Japan will promote security dialogue and exchanges with China in order to enhance mutual understanding and will develop confidence-building measures to prevent unexpected situations. Japan will maintain a calm and firm stance in dealing with the rapid expansion and intensification of Chinese activities on the sea and in the air surrounding Japan. Japan will promote security dialogues with Russia, including the Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”), highlevel exchanges, and unit-to-unit exchanges in order to deepen understanding about the intention of Russian military activities and develop mutual trust with Russia. In addition, Japan will enhance bilateral training and exercises with Russia to promote regional stability. Japan will also further strengthen its relationships with partner countries in the region, including Southeast Asian countries, and will actively promote joint training and exercises and capacity building assistance. In addition, Japan will strengthen its cooperation with these countries in the field of disaster management in light of the increasing frequency and growing scale of disasters in the region. Japan will strengthen its relationship with India in a broad range of fields, including maritime security, through joint training and exercises as well as joint implementation of international peacekeeping activities. As capacity building assistance is effective in stabilizing the security environment and strengthening bilateral defense cooperation, Japan will promote it in full coordination with diplomatic policy initiatives, including the Official Development Assistance, and aligning it with joint training and exercises and international peacekeeping activities. Japan will also strengthen cooperation with relevant countries which actively provide such support, thereby expanding the range of countries receiving support as well as its scope. Under ongoing multilateral security cooperation and dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan in cooperation with the United States and Australia will proactively contribute to building cooperative relationships in the region. Moreover, Japan will actively participate in multilateral joint training and exercises and play a major role in enhancing confidence-building measures among countries in the region, attaching importance to multilateral frameworks such as the ARF and the ADMM Plus. (2) Cooperation with the international community It is very difficult for a single country to respond to global security challenges on its own. Moreover, as the roles of military forces have diversified, there are increasing opportunities for such forces to play an important role not only in preventing and responding to conflicts and maintaining peace but also in ----- supporting post-conflict reconstruction, building peace and promoting confidence-building and friendly relationships. Therefore, Japan will promote various initiatives to improve the global security environment on a regular basis in cooperation with the international community. Japan will continue and strengthen various initiatives concerning arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation and capacity building assistance in order to respond to global security challenges, including regional conflicts, expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and problems related to the sea, outer space and cyberspace, while regularly cooperating with its ally and relevant countries with which it shares security interests and with international organizations and other relevant bodies. In this respect, Japan will further strengthen its cooperation with the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and with the United Kingdom, France and other European countries and will work with them in responding to these challenges. Japan will also promote cooperation and exchanges with regard to equipment and technology with these countries and organizations. In order to stabilize the security environment in the AsiaPacific region and improve the global security environment based on the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan will actively promote various international peace cooperation activities, including international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities, in a multi-layered manner. To this end, Japan will ensure close cooperation between the defense and foreign affairs authorities, with comprehensive consideration given to the significance of the dispatch of SDF units, the situation of countries accepting SDF units and Japan’s political and economic relationships with recipient countries. With regard to international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities in particular, Japan will continue to actively conduct activities utilizing the SDF’s capabilities and will increase the number of SDF personnel it dispatches to assume positions of responsibility at organizations such as the local mission headquarters and the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, Japan will conduct a study on various challenges it has to overcome to enable the dispatch of SDF personnel in a broad range of fields, and take necessary measures. Japan will also contribute to the training of domestic and foreign personnel engaging in peacebuilding by making use of the SDF’s experience and knowledge. **IV. Future Defense Forces** 1. The Role of the Defense Force Japan’s future defense forces will be developed as described in III. 2 (2) above, and will be capable of effectively fulfilling the expected roles in the following fields, and will maintain the necessary posture. (1) Effective deterrence of and response to various situations In order to respond to various situations in a timely and appropriate manner, and certainly protect the lives and property of its people and the sovereignty of its land, sea and airspace, Japan will achieve intelligence superiority through persistent ISR activities in an extensive surrounding area to constantly gain an understanding of military developments in other countries and to detect any signs of development at an early stage. Through such activities, Japan will clearly express its resolve not to tolerate the change of the status quo by force, thereby preventing various situations from occurring. At the same time, Japan will swiftly and seamlessly respond to situations including gray zone situations, and will establish the necessary posture to continuously address a protracted situation. Moreover, Japan will implement an effective response tailored to each situation, even in cases when multiple events occur in a consecutive or concurrent manner. When implementing the initiatives above, the following points are emphasized in particular: a. Ensuring security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan In addition to persistent ISR in an extensive area around Japan, Japan will immediately take appropriate measures to deal with any incursions into its territorial airspace. Japan will respond effectively and promptly to gray-zone situations or any other acts that may violate its sovereignty. Furthermore, should the acts in question become protracted or escalate, Japan will respond seamlessly as the situation evolves, taking all possible measures for the defense and security of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. b. Response to an attack on remote islands In responding to an attack on remote islands, Japan will intercept and defeat any invasion, by securing maritime supremacy and air superiority, with the necessary SDF units swiftly deployed to interdict, in addition to the units deployed in advance in accordance with the security environment. Moreover, should any remote islands be invaded, Japan will recapture them. In doing so, any ballistic missile or cruise missile attacks will be dealt with appropriately. c. Response to ballistic missile attacks Japan will promptly detect any signs of a ballistic missile launch and facilitate a swift, sustained response by establishing a multi-layered defense posture. Should any damage result, Japan will take steps to minimize it. Moreover, in the event of an attack by guerrillas or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, Japan will protect key facilities including nuclear power plants and search and destroy the infiltrating units. d. Responses in outer space and cyberspace In regard with outer space and cyberspace, Japan will build up persistent ISR capabilities to prevent any acts that could impede efficient action by the SDF. Furthermore, should any situation arise, Japan will identify the event without delay and swiftly repair any damage, while taking necessary steps to contain it. Moreover, in light of society’s growing dependence on outer space and cyberspace, Japan will make effective use of the SDF’s capabilities when endeavoring to strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations and clarify the division of roles, thereby contributing to comprehensive, government-wide initiatives. e. Responses to major disasters Should a major disaster occur, Japan will swiftly transport and deploy the requisite units and take all possible measures as part of its initial response, and maintain its presence in the longer term, when required. Moreover, as well as providing a meticulous response to the needs of disaster-stricken citizens and local government bodies, Japan will engage in appropriate partnerships and cooperation with local governments and the private sector, in order to save lives, carry out emergency repairs, and provide livelihood support. (2) Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific and improvement of global security environments Through persistent ISR in the area surrounding Japan and the timely and appropriate implementation of training, exercises, and various other activities, Japan will ensure the stability of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole including the vicinity of Japan. Moreover, working in partnership with its ally and partners, Japan will promote multi-tiered initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchange, joint training and exercises, and capacity building assistance, effectively fulfilling its key role in initiatives focused on the stabilization of the security environment, including the building and strengthening of intra-regional cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region. As the roles played by military capacity diversify, in order to respond appropriately to global security issues including regional conflicts, the expansion and spread of international terrorism, failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Japan will strengthen various initiatives focused on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as actively promote international peace cooperation activities, anti-piracy initiatives and capacity building assistance, thereby working on improvement of the global security environment. Japan will attach importance to the following in particular, when engaging in the aforementioned initiatives. a. Holding training and exercises As well as the timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral joint training and exercises in the AsiaPacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will build and strengthen cooperative relationships with relevant countries. b. Promoting defense cooperation and exchange Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust ----- with other countries and international organizations is the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote multi-layered defense cooperation and exchange, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HADR and ensuring the stable use of the seas, outer space and cyberspace. c. Promoting capacity building assistance Utilizing the capabilities of the SDF, Japan will continuously engage in capacity building assistance such as human resource development and technical support on a regular basis in order to enhance the ability of developing countries themselves, thereby improving the security environment with particular focus on active creation of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. d. Ensuring maritime security As it is particularly vital for Japan as a maritime state to maintain an “Open and Stable Seas” order which serves as the cornerstone of peace and prosperity, Japan will take all possible measures to secure the safety of maritime traffic. Japan will also conduct anti-piracy activities in cooperation with countries concerned, and will promote various efforts including capacity building assistance of coastal states in this field and enhancement of joint training and exercises by taking various opportunities in waters other than those surrounding our country. e. Implementing international peace cooperation activities Working in partnership with non-governmental organizations and other relevant organizations, Japan will actively engage in international peace cooperation assignments and emergency relief activities to meet diverse needs, from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, placing greater emphasis on playing more of a leading role. In doing so, as well as enhancing its readiness posture to facilitate rapid overseas dispatch according to the situation, Japan will strengthen its sustainable preparedness for a protracted overseas deployment. f. Cooperating with efforts to promote arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation Japan will be actively involved in arms control and disarmament activities undertaken by the United Nations and other bodies. In doing so, Japan will make active, effective use of the SDF’s knowledge, including through personnel contribution. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can serve as their means of delivery, as well as the proliferation of arms and goods and technology which could be diverted to military use pose severe threats to the peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the international community as a whole. Thus, Japan will cooperate with relevant countries and international organizations and other relevant bodies in promoting nonproliferation initiatives. 2. Priorities in strengthening architecture of the Self Defense Forces (1) Basic approach The SDF will maintain an appropriate structure to effectively fulfill the abovementioned roles of defense forces. As such, Japan has conducted capability assessments based on joint operations in relation to various potential contingencies to identify the functions and capabilities that should be prioritized in order to pursue more effective build-up of the defense force. Based on the results of the capability assessments, in the defense capability buildup, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response in various situations, including defense posture buildup in the southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities with a consideration to establishing a wide-ranging logistical support foundation. At the same time, in terms of preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will possess the minimum necessary level of expertise and skills required to respond to unforeseen changes in the situation in the future and to maintain and inherit them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization. (2) Functions and capabilities to be emphasized From the perspective of efficiently developing an effective defense force, the SDF will selectively strengthen the following functions and capabilities in particular, paying attention to enhance joint functions with interoperability with the U.S. forces. a. ISR capabilities In order to ensure effective deterrence and response to various situations, while utilizing unmanned equipment, Japan will implement extensive persistent ISR on objectives such as aircraft and vessels in the seas and airspace surrounding it, and the SDF will adopt a flexible approach to boosting its ISR posture according to the developments of situations. b. Intelligence capabilities Japan will strengthen its system for intelligence collection, processing information, and analyzing and sharing the collected information, so that the SDF can promptly detect and swiftly respond to signs of various situations and take necessary measures based on medium-to long-term military trends mainly in its vicinity. In doing so, the SDF will seek to augment its various information collection capabilities, including HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, and IMINT, as well as persistent ISR capabilities using unmanned aerial vehicles. Also, the SDF will engage in integrated efforts to strengthen its geospatial intelligence capabilities to combine various types of intelligence on images and maps to exploit them in a sophisticated manner, while establishing a framework for the integrated and systematic nurturing of highly capable personnel in information gathering analysis. c. Transport capability In order to secure swift and large-scale transport and deployment capability, and to swiftly deploy and move necessary units, the SDF will strengthen integrated transport capacity including maritime and airborne transport capacity, with collaboration with the civilian transport sector. In doing so, the SDF will avoid redundancy in functions by clarifying roles and assignments among various means of transport, considering their respective characteristics. d. Command and control, and information and communications capabilities In order to establish a command and control system that can manage units nationwide in a mobile, joint integrated manner, the SDF will take steps to deploy the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) personnel in the main headquarters of each service, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. Furthermore, the SDF will facilitate swift, resilient nationwide operation of the GSDF’s units such as basic operational units (divisions and brigades) through the establishment of a new central headquarters to control all of the regional armies, as well as greater efficiency and streamlining of the command and control function in each regional army headquarters, and other measures. Moreover, the SDF will strive to enhance and strengthen its information and communications capabilities that are prerequisites for supporting nationwide operation, starting with the communications infrastructure on remote islands and data link functions among the three services. e. Response to an attack on remote islands In order to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority which is a prerequisite for effective response to an attack on remote islands, the SDF will strengthen its ability to deal with attacks by aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles, etc. Moreover, while strengthening the integrated capabilities to seek to interdict any attack on Japan’s remote islands at sea, the SDF will newly develop sufficient amphibious operations capability, which enables the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay in the case of an invasion of any remote islands. Furthermore, the SDF will enhance its logistical support capabilities, so that SDF units can swiftly and continuously respond in the event of a situation in the southwestern region. In addition, the SDF will also examine the desirable air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific. f. Response to ballistic missile attacks To counter North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capability, Japan will pursue comprehensive improvement of its response capability against the threat of ballistic missiles. With regard to the BMD system, Japan will enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory. Based on appropriate role and mission sharing between ----- Japan and the U.S., in order to strengthen the deterrent of the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole through enhancement of Japan’s own deterrent and response capability, Japan will study a potential form of response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and take means as necessary. g. Responses in outer space and cyberspace While strengthening information collection capability using satellites equipped with a variety of sensors, and reinforcing command, control and telecommunications capabilities, the SDF will secure effective, stable use of outer space so that satellites can continuously exercise their capabilities even in contingencies by enhancing the survivability of satellites through such initiatives as space situational awareness. In implementing such initiatives, the SDF will form organic partnerships with research and development institutions in Japan, as well as with the U.S. As for cyberspace, Japan will enhance integrated persistent surveillance and response capabilities and expertise and latest equipment will be continuously developed and secured in order to prevent actions that hinder efficient SDF activities. h. Responses to major disasters, etc. In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as a Nankai Trough earthquake, or an atypical disaster such as a nuclear emergency, it is of vital importance to respond swiftly from the initial stages of the impact and carry out such tasks as information gathering on the extent and nature of the damage from the air by aircrafts, rescue operations and emergency repairs. In this regard, the SDF will develop a response posture sustainable for long-term operation, through swift transportation and deployment of appropriately size units, and by establishing a rotating staffing posture based on a joint operational approach. i. Responses focused on international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities In international peace cooperation activities and other similar activities, the SDF will strengthen the necessary protective capabilities to carry out its operations, ensuring the safety of personnel and units. Moreover, the SDF will work on enhancing transport and deployment capability, information communication capability with a view to long term activities in Africa and other remote locations, and strengthening logistic and medical service structure for smooth and continuous operation. From the standpoint of carrying out international peace cooperation activities more effectively, Japan will consider measures for making more effective use of the SDF Operational Facility for Deployed Air Force for Anti-Piracy Operation in Djibouti. Furthermore, while strengthening intelligence gathering capability required for operations, the SDF will enhance its education, training and personnel management systems in order to facilitate the continuous dispatch of adequate personnel for overseas cooperation activities. 3. Architecture of each service of the Self-Defense Forces The organization, equipment and disposition in each service of the SDF are outlined in (1) to (3) below. The specifics of major organizations and equipment in the future are as shown in the Annex table. (1) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) a. In order to be able to respond swiftly and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on offshore islands and various other situations, the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions, rapid deployment brigades and an armored division) furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. In addition, the GSDF will maintain mobile operating units sustaining specialized functions in order to effectively perform such operations as airborne operations, amphibious operations, special operations, air transportation, defense against NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, and international peace cooperation activities. Keeping in mind that the role of these highly-proficient rapidly deployable basic operational units is to swiftly deploy and move via the integrated transport capacity referred to in 2 (2) c. above, the GSDF will maintain half of these in Hokkaido, given the excellent training environment there. The defense posture in the remote islands of the southwestern region will be enhanced and strengthened via the permanent stationing of the units where the SDF is not currently stationed, the deploy ability of the aforementioned units, and the establishment of organic partnerships and networks with the MSDF and ASDF. b. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship guided missile units in order to prevent invasion of Japan’s remote islands while still at sea, as far as possible. c. The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units in order to effectively provide air defense to protect operational units and key areas, working in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below. d. The GSDF will review the organization and equipment of the basic operational units (divisions and brigades) other than the rapidly deployable ones referred to in a. above, with a particular focus on tanks/howitzers and rockets. Following thorough rationalization and streamlining, these units will be deployed appropriately, according to geographical characteristics. (2) Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) a. The MSDF will maintain destroyer units and ship-based patrol helicopter units strengthened by increased numbers of equipment, including the new destroyers, with additional multifunctional capability and with a compact-type hull, in order to effectively conduct persistent ISR and antisubmarine operations etc., thereby facilitating agile response in such areas as the defense of the seas surrounding Japan, the security of maritime traffic, and international peace cooperation activities etc. Along with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (3) d. below, the destroyer units will maintain Aegisequipped destroyers capable of providing Japan with multilayered defense against ballistic missile attacks. b. The MSDF will maintain submarine units strengthened by increased numbers of them, in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad underwater intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas. c. The MSDF will maintain fixed-wing patrol aircraft units in order to effectively conduct patrol and defense of the seas surrounding Japan, as well as regularly engage in broad maritime intelligence gathering and warning and surveillance in those seas. d. The MSDF will maintain minesweeper units in order to effectively conduct minesweeping operations in the seas surrounding Japan in collaboration with the new destroyers with additional multifunctional capability and with the compact-type hull referred to in a. above. (3) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) a. The ASDF will maintain air warning and control units consisting of warning and control units and air warning units. Warning and control units will be equipped with groundbased warning and control radar that can detect and track any ballistic missiles flying into Japanese air space, as well as providing persistent ISR in most air space over Japan and the surrounding areas. Air warning units will be enhanced in order to conduct effective warning, surveillance and control in the air over long periods in the event of “gray zone” situations. b. The ASDF will maintain fighter aircraft units reinforced by highly capable fighter aircrafts in order to provide aerial defense for Japan based on a comprehensive posture that brings together fighter aircrafts and relevant support functions. In addition, the ASDF will maintain enhanced aerial refueling and transport units that will enable fighter aircraft units and air warning units, etc. to carry out various operations sustainably in the air space surrounding Japan. c. The ASDF will maintain air transport units in order to effectively carry out the mobile deployment of ground-based units etc., and international peace cooperation activities etc. d. The ASDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units providing multi-layered defense for Japan against ballistic missile attacks, together with the Aegis destroyers referred to in (2) a. above, as well as protecting key areas in tandem with the surface-to-air guided missile units referred to in (1) c. above. **V. Basic Foundations for SDF** To ensure that the diverse activities required of the SDF are carried out in a timely and appropriate manner, it is not sufficient simply to ----- upgrade the main elements of the organization and its equipment; it is also imperative to strengthen the various foundations underpinning the defense force, in order to ensure that it can function as effectively as possible. The key aspects of this are as follows. 1. Training and Exercises Through routine training and exercises, the SDF will ceaselessly review and examine various plans for dealing with situations, as well as strive to enhance and strengthen its training and exercises in order to improve the tactical skills in each of its branches. In doing so, as well as making more effective use of the excellent training environment in Hokkaido, the SDF will work in partnership with relevant organizations and the civilian sector, in order to ensure systematic implementation of more practical training and exercises. In the southwestern region, where there are limitations on the exercise areas, etc. of the SDF, the SDF will secure a favorable training environment through the joint use of U.S. military facilities and areas, while remaining sensitive to relationships with the local community, so that timely and appropriate training and exercises can be carried out, including Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises. 2. Operational Infrastructure The SDF will improve survivability, including the recovery capabilities of military camps and bases, etc., in order to maintain the support functions that serve as the operational infrastructure for units, so that units can be deployed swiftly and respond to various situations effectively. Moreover, in light of the fact that some SDF facilities are currently dilapidated, the SDF will implement a steady repair and maintenance program, as well as expansion of the necessary quarters in order to ensure an emergency call-up of personnel in the event of various situations, thereby enhancing readiness. The SDF will undertake necessary deliberations concerning civilian airports and ports, including approaches to the various systems on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that such facilities can be used as part of the operational infrastructure for the SDF, etc. from an early stage, depending on the situation. Furthermore, it will implement various family support measures, in order to alleviate the anxieties both of troops serving away from home and of their families while they are away. The SDF will enhance and strengthen the operational infrastructure in terms of equipment and materials, such as improving the operational availability of equipment, by taking all possible measures to maintain and upgrade SDF equipment, as well as securing and stockpiling the necessary ammunition. 3. Personnel and Education Given that equipment has become more advanced and complex, and missions more diverse and internationalized in recent years, the SDF will implement measures to reform the personnel management system, in order to ensure the edge of its troops and the effective use of human resources amid a severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale. Accordingly, the SDF will implement measures to ensure an appropriate composition of ranks and age distribution, taking into account the various missions and characteristics of each branch of the SDF. The SDF will implement measures to make effective use of human resources, such as more effective use of female SDF personnel and expansion of reappointment, and measures related to honors and privileges. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondments to the Joint Staff and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to various situations as part of the government. In light of the deterioration of the recruiting environment resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and popularization of higher education, the SDF will promote a diverse range of recruitment measures to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option. Furthermore, as it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan to secure the livelihoods of the SDF personnel, who are compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, the SDF will promote support for re-employment by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations. In order to support sustainable operation of units in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote utilization of reserve personnel in broad areas, including those with professional skills such as aviators, and will take measures to improve the sufficiency of reserve personnel. 4. Medical In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance their ability to engage in a diverse range of missions, such as various situation responses and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, through endeavors including upgrading of SDF hospitals into hubs with enhanced functions, and improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. The SDF will also attach greater importance to securing and training of such medical staff as medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians. The SDF will consider such matters as revisions of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve first aid capabilities on the frontline, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the viewpoints of enhanced joint capabilities. 5. Defense Production and Technological Bases Retaining an adequate level of defense production and technological bases is essential not only for the production, operation, maintenance and upkeep of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. At the same time, against the backdrop of the severe fiscal situation and rises in the equipment unit price as it becomes increasingly sophisticated and complex, the numbers of units of procured equipment are on the decline. Moreover, the environment surrounding Japan’s defense production and technological bases is becoming more severe. For instance, the competitiveness of foreign companies is growing, as a result of the advance of large-scale and cross-border restructuring and consolidation of the defense industry. In this kind of environment, the Ministry of Defense will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and technological bases as a whole and will promote participation in international joint development and production and adapting defense equipment to civilian use, in order to maintain and reinforce such bases without delay. With regard to contribution to peace and international cooperation, there are increasing opportunities to cooperate in a more effective manner through, for example, the utilization and provision to disaster-stricken countries and others of heavy machinery and other defense equipment carried to sites by the SDF. Moreover, internationally, it has become the mainstream to participate in international joint development and production projects in order to improve the performance of defense equipment while dealing with the rising costs of the equipment. In this context, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan is required to engage more proactively in peacebuilding efforts and international cooperation by utilizing defense equipment in various ways, and to participate in joint development and production of defense equipment and other related items. Against this backdrop, while giving due consideration to the roles that the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines have played so far, the Government of Japan will set out clear principles on the overseas transfer of arms and military technology, which fit the new security environment. In this context, considerations will be made with regard to defining cases where transfers are prohibited; limiting cases where transfers could be allowed with strict examination; and ensuring appropriate control over transfers in terms of unauthorized use and third party transfer. 6. Efficient Acquisition of Equipment In order to achieve effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, including in research and development activities, the Ministry of Defense will strengthen project management throughout the lifecycle of equipment through introducing a project manager system, as well as through considering the possibility of further introducing long-term contracts and further upgrading the contract system to provide cost reduction incentives to companies, aiming to improve cost-effectiveness throughout the life-cycle of equipment. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense will try to improve readiness and response capabilities through reforms of the logistics posture through effective use of capacity in the private sector. Furthermore, it will ceaselessly pursue greater transparency in the acquisition ----- process and increased rationalization of the contract system, and strive to achieve more rigorous procedures for the acquisition of equipment. 7. Research and Development The Ministry of Defense will ensure consistency with the priorities for upgrading defense capability when commencing research and development, in order to guarantee that research and development that meets the operational needs of the SDF is prioritized in view of the severe fiscal situation. In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Defense will promote research and development based on a medium- to long-term perspective, taking into account the latest trends in science and technology, changes in combat modality, cost-effectiveness and the potential for international joint research and development, with a view to implementing research and development that can ensure Japan’s technological superiority against new threats in strategically important areas. From the aspect of security, it is necessary to utilize civilian technology effectively also in the field of security through regularly assessing the trend in science and technology including information related to technological development as well as consolidating the capabilities of the government, industry and academia. Under such recognition, the Ministry of Defense will strive to make effective use of civilian technology that can also be applied to defense (dualuse technologies), by enhancing partnerships with universities and research institutes, while strengthening technology control functions to prevent the outflow of advanced technologies. The Ministry of Defense will examine its research and development initiative for achieving the aforementioned objectives. 8. Collaboration with Local Communities The Ministry of Defense and the SDF will further strengthen collaboration with relevant organizations, including local governments, the police and the fire service, in order to enable the SDF to provide accurate response to various situations. Such close partnerships with local governments, etc. are exceedingly important from the perspective not only of the effective improvement and smooth operation of defense facilities, but also of the recruitment of SDF personnel, as well as the provision of re-employment support for them. Accordingly, as well as continuing to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, with a view to their improvement and operation, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will routinely engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities. Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports community medicine through emergency patient transport using SDF search and rescue aircraft in others, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units and deployment of military camps and bases, etc., in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. At the same time, in operating the military camps and bases, etc., the Ministry of Defense will pay attention to the contribution of the operation to the local economy. 9. Boosting Communication Capabilities The Ministry of Defense and SDF will strengthen strategic public relations and communication to enhance the dissemination of information via a diverse range of media, in order to secure domestic and overseas understanding which is vital to effectively conduct SDF duties. 10. Enhancing the Intellectual Base The Ministry of Defense will promote education on security-related matters at educational institutions, in order to enhance understanding of security and crisis management among the populace. Moreover, in addition to strengthening the Ministry of Defense and SDF research systems, with a particular focus on the National Institute for Defense Studies, the Ministry of Defense will promote various partnerships, including education and research exchange with other research and educational institutions within the government, as well as universities and think-tanks both within Japan and overseas. 11. Promoting Reform of the Ministry of Defense The Ministry of Defense will further promote reforms by constantly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, total optimization in building up defense capability, strengthening SDF’s joint operation functions and enhancing policy-making and communication functions. **VI. Additional Points** 1. These Guidelines set out the form of Japan’s defense force over the next decade or so. The National Security Council will conduct regular, systematic review over the course of implementation of the various measures and programs. Smooth, swift and accurate transition to the future defense force will be facilitated through validations based on joint operational capability assessment while advancing such initiatives in a timely and appropriate manner. 2. When major changes in the situation are anticipated during the review and verification process, necessary examination of the security environment at that time will be taken into account and these guidelines will be revised adequately. 3. In light of the increasingly tough fiscal conditions, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiency and streamlining in the defense capability buildup to curb costs, and harmonize with other initiatives in other fields to ensure that Japan’s defense force as a whole can smoothly fulfill its expected function. |Category|Col2|Col3|Present (as of the end of FY2013)|Future| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Authorized Number of personnel Active-Duty Personnel Reserve-Ready Personnel||approx. 159,000 approx. 151,000 approx. 8,000|159,000 151,000 8,000| ||Major units|Rapid Deployment Units|Central Readiness Force 1 armored division|3 rapid deployment divisions 4 rapid deployment brigades 1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 amphibious rapid deployment brigade 1 helicopter brigade| |||Regional Deployment Units|8 divisions 6 brigades|5 divisions 2 brigades| |||Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile Units|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments|5 surface-to-ship guided missile regiments| |||Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments|7 anti-aircraft artillery groups/regiments| |MSDF|Major units|Destroyer Units Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Patrol aircraft Units|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 5 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons|4 flotillas (8 divisions) 6 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons| ||Major equipment|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Combat Aircraft|47 (6) 16 approx.170|54 (8) 22 approx.170| |ASDF|Major units|Air Warning & Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Refueling/Transport Units Air Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units|8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 1 squadron 3 squadrons 6 groups|28 warning squadrons 1 AEW group (3 squadrons) 13 squadrons — 2 squadrons 3 squadrons 6 groups| ||Major equipment|Combat aircraft Fighters|approx. 340 approx. 260|approx. 360 approx. 280| Notes:The current number of tanks and howitzers/rockets (authorized number as of the end of FY2013) are respectively approx. 700 and approx. 600, which will be reduced respectively to approx. 300 and approx. 300 in the future. Regarding major equipment/units that may also serve for BMD missions, their acquisition/formation will be allowed within the number of Destroyers (AegisEquipped Destroyers), Air Warning & Control Units and Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units specifi ed above. ----- **Reference 7** **Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)** (December 17, 2013 Approved by National Security Council and the Cabinet) The Five-Year Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) has been established as shown in the attached document. (Attachment) Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018) **I. Program Guidelines** In carrying out the Defense Program for FY2014 to FY2018 in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond (approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2013) (hereinafter “NDPG2013”), Japan will develop a Dynamic Joint Defense Force. It will provide an effective defense which enables the SDF to conduct a diverse range of activities based on joint operations seamlessly and dynamically, adapting to situations as they demand, while prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities through optimal resource allocation. At the same time, the Dynamic Joint Defense Force will serve as a defense force which emphasizes soft and hard readiness capabilities, sustainability, resiliency and connectivity, reinforced by advanced technology and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) capabilities, with a consideration to establish a wide range of infrastructure to support operations by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). In strengthening the SDF structure, a highly effective joint defense force will be efficiently developed by comprehensively prioritizing particularly important functions and capabilities identified through joint operation-based capability assessments of the SDF’s overall functions and capabilities against various scenarios. Given the considerations mentioned above, the SDF will effectively and efficiently build, maintain and operate defense forces based on the following program guidelines: 1. The defense forces will seamlessly and dynamically fulfill its responsibilities including providing an effective deterrence and response to a variety of security situations, supporting stability in the Asia-Pacific, and improving the global security environment. With a focus on enhancement of joint operability, the SDF will place particular emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, transport, and C3I capabilities. In addition, defense forces will enhance their capabilities to respond to an attack on remote islands, ballistic missile attacks, outer space and cyberspace threats, large-scale disasters, and international peace cooperation efforts (activities cooperatively carried out by the international society to improve the international security environment such as U.N. Peace Keeping Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and others in the fields of nontraditional security). The SDF will steadily develop the foundations for maximizing the effectiveness of these functions and capabilities. 2. In relevant efforts, the SDF will prioritize the development of capacities to ensure maritime supremacy and air superiority, which is the prerequisite for effective deterrence and response to various situations, including defense posture buildup in Japan’s southwestern region. Furthermore, the SDF will emphasize the establishment of rapid deployment capabilities. At the same time, regarding preparation for a Cold-War era style invasion such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the SDF will establish the minimum necessary level of expertise and skill required to respond to unforeseen changes in its security situation in the future and to maintain them, and thereby further promote efforts to achieve even greater efficiency and rationalization of its activities. 3. Regarding equipment acquisition and maintenance, by properly combining the introduction of new, high-performance equipment, with life extension and improvement of existing equipment etc., the SDF will efficiently secure defense capabilities adequate both in quantity and quality. In this effort, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will strengthen its project management throughout its equipment life-cycle, including during its research and development activities, and reduce the life-cycle costs to improve cost-effectiveness. 4. Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, to ensure SDF’s strength and the effective use of defense force personnel, the SDF will implement measures, including the more effective use of female SDF personnel and reserve personnel, in order to reform its personnel management system. 5. In order to address an increasingly severe security environment and to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, in conjunction with the U.S. policy of strategic rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will further promote a variety of cooperation and consultations with the United States in a wide range of areas including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Japan will also actively facilitate measures for furthering smooth and effective stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. 6. Considering the increasingly difficult situation in Japan’s public finance, Japan will strive to achieve greater efficiencies and streamline the buildup of its defense forces, while harmonizing these efforts with other measures taken by the Government. **II. Reorganization of the Major SDF Units** 1. Regarding the reorganization of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), given the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, for the purpose of carrying out swift and flexible nation-wide operations of basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/ brigades, an armored division, and divisions/brigades) and various units under the joint operations, the GSDF will establish the Ground Central Command. In addition, the GSDF promote efficiency and rationalize the command and control function of each regional army headquarters, as well as review other functions of some regional army headquarters. As part of such efforts, the Central Readiness Force will be disbanded and its subsidiary units will be integrated into the Ground Central Command. In order to be able to respond swiftly to and deal effectively and nimbly with an attack on remote islands and various other situations, the GSDF will transform two divisions and two brigades respectively into two rapid deployment divisions and two rapid deployment brigades that are furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities. By establishing a coast observation unit, area security units in charge of initial response activities and so on, the defense posture of the remote islands in the southwest region will be strengthened. In a bid to develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities, which enable the SDF to land, recapture and secure without delay any remote islands that might be invaded, an amphibious rapid deployment brigade consisting of several regiment-scale units specializing in amphibious operations will be established. From the perspective of enabling swift and flexible operations, while thoroughly facilitating efficiency and rationalizing preparations for invasion, such as the landing of large-scale ground forces, the GSDF will steadily implement programs towards successive formation of units equipped with newly-introduced mobile combat vehicles and removal of tanks deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido and Kyushu. It will also concentrate tanks located in Kyushu into newly organized tank units under direct command of the Western Army. In addition, the GSDF will steadily carry out programs that concentrate howitzers deployed in basic operational units stationed in locations other than Hokkaido into field artillery units to be newly organized under the direct command of the respective regional armies. 2. For the purpose of defending the seas surrounding Japan and ensuring the security of maritime traffic in the region, through the effective conduct of various operations such as persistent ISR operations and anti-submarine operations, as well as for agile response in international peace cooperation activities, the Marine Self-Defense Force (MSDF) will retain four flotillas mainly consisting of one helicopter destroyer (DDH), and two Aegisequipped destroyers (DDG). Five divisions will consist of other destroyers as well. Necessary measures to increase the number of submarines will also be continued. 3. To enhance the air defense posture in the southwestern region, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) will relocate one fighter squadron to Naha Air Base, and newly organize and deploy one airborne early warning squadron at Naha Air Base. To prevent the relative decline of Japan’s air defense capabilities and ensure sustained air superiority, ASDF units equipped with training support functions will be integrated for further effective enhancement of advanced tactical skills. 4. The total number of authorized GSDF personnel at the end of FY2018 will be approximately 159,000, with approximately 151,000 being active-duty personnel, and approximately 8,000 being reserve-ready personnel. The authorized number of active ----- duty personnel of the MSDF and ASDF through FY2018 will be approximately at the same levels as at the end of FY2013. **III. Major Programs regarding SDF’s Capabilities** 1. Effective Deterrence and Response to Various Situations (1) Ensuring Security of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan In order to strengthen the posture to conduct persistent ISR in broad areas and to detect any signs of significant development at an early stage, the SDF will procure additional Aegisequipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixedwing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K), and conduct service-extension work on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J), as well as take necessary measures after fully reviewing the value of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles with patrol capabilities. With a view to increasing the number of destroyers, the SDF will also introduce new, compact-type hull destroyers with additional multifunctional capabilities. The SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft, and fixed air defense radar, as well as continuously improve its existing airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) (E-767). In addition, the introduction of unmanned aerial vehicles will support the establishment of a joint unit with persistent ISR capabilities in broad areas. The SDF will also undertake organizational reform that integrate groundbased aerial search and rescue functions into the ASDF, which are currently performed by both the MSDF and ASDF. (2) Response to an Attack on Remote Islands (a) Development of a Persistent ISR Structure With a view to organizing the structure required to carry out regular and persistent ISR activities which enable an immediate response in the case of various contingencies, the SDF will deploy a coast observation unit to Yonaguni Island. Considering the current operational situation of the existing AWACS (E-767) and airborne early warning aircraft (E2C), the SDF will procure new airborne early warning and control aircraft or airborne early warning aircraft as stated in (1), and establish one squadron consisting of airborne early warning aircraft (E-2C) in the air warning unit and deploy it at Naha Air Base as stated in Section II-3. By preparing a deployment structure for mobile air defense radar on remote islands in the southwestern region, a fully-prepared surveillance posture will be maintained. (b) Obtaining and Securing Air Superiority For overall improvement of air defense capabilities including cruise missile defense capability, the SDF will increase the number of fighter aircraft units at Naha Air Base from one squadron to two as stated in Section II3, continue to facilitate procurement of fighter aircraft (F-35A), modernize its fighter aircraft (F-15), and improve the air-to-air combat capabilities and network functions of its fighter aircraft (F-2). In addition, after considering its options, it will take necessary measures to replace fighter aircraft (F-15) unsuitable for modernization with more capable fighter aircraft. Along with continuing to procure middle-range surface-to-air guided missiles, the SDF will further improve its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT systems by equipping them with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for ballistic missile defense (BMD). The SDF will also procure new aerial refueling/ transport aircraft, and continuously work to equip transport aircraft (C-130H) with aerial refueling capabilities and procure rescue helicopters (UH-60J). In addition, the SDF will examine what is the appropriate air defense posture in remote islands in the Pacific. (c) Obtaining and Securing Maritime Supremacy In defense of the seas surrounding Japan and to ensure the security of maritime traffic, the SDF will effectively conduct various activities including holding persistent ISR and anti-submarine operations; procuring Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), destroyer (DD), submarines, fixedwing patrol aircraft (P-1) and patrol helicopters (SH-60K); and conducting service- extension activities on existing destroyers, submarines, fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C) and patrol helicopters (SH-60J) as stated in (1). At the same time, it will introduce new compact-type hull destroyers with multifunctional capabilities. In addition, the SDF will introduce ship-based multipurpose helicopters required for enabling destroyer units to sustainably conduct activities as situations demand, and continue to procure Mine Sweeper Ocean (MSO) vessels, amphibious rescue aircraft (US-2), and surface-to-ship guided missiles. (d) Improvement of Capabilities for Rapid Deployment and Response In order to secure capabilities for swift and large-scale transportation and deployment operations and improve effective response capabilities, transport aircraft (C-2) and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) will continue to be procured. Besides the ship-based multipurpose helicopters mentioned in (c), the SDF will introduce tilt-rotor aircraft that complement and strengthen the capabilities of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in terms of cruising speed and range. In addition, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering the possibility of new multipurpose helicopters that will success the existing multipurpose helicopters (UH1J). In developing such aerial transport capabilities, the SDF will avoid functional redundancy by clarifying the roles and assignments among the various means of transportation. The SDF will reinforce transportation and deployment capabilities, by such means as acquiring amphibious vehicles that support units’ amphibious landing efforts on remote islands, and refitting existing Tank Landing Ships (LST). The SDF will consider what the role should be of a multipurpose vessel with capabilities for command and control, large-scale transportation, and aircraft operations, which can be utilized in various operations such as amphibious operations, and reach a conclusion regarding its acquisition. With a view to efficiently conducting large-scale transportation movements in coordination with the SDF’s transport capabilities, the SDF will take necessary measures after considering active utilization of civilian transport capabilities including methods for utilizing the funds and know-how of the private sector and reserve personnel. Mobile combat vehicles transportable by airlift will be introduced in the rapidly deployable basic operational units (rapid deployment divisions/brigades) highlighted in Section II-1, and rapid deployment regiments that immediately respond to various situations will be organized. The SDF will also establish area security units in charge of initial responses on remote islands in the southwestern region, as well as conduct maneuver deployment training for prompt unit deployment to remote islands. While improving guidance capability of existing precision-guided bombs and procuring surface-to-ship guided missiles, the SDF will also promote the development of improved capabilities of shipto-ship guided missiles, such as increasing their firing range. (e) Development of C3I From the perspective of improving joint force capabilities, aimed at establishing a command and control system which enables the dynamic operation of units across the country so as to immediately concentrate necessary units into the area to be dealt with, such as remote islands, the SDF will take steps to station GSDF, MSDF and ASDF personnel in the main headquarters of each of the other services, making effective use of the knowledge and experience held by each respective service. In addition, as stated in Section II-1, the SDF will expedite the establishment of the Ground Central Command, while promoting efficiency and rationalizing the command and control functions of each regional army headquarters, as well as reviewing the functions of some regional army headquarters. With regard to the information and communications capabilities which serve as a foundation for nationwide operations, and the goal of strengthening the communications infrastructure on remote islands, the SDF will extend the secured exclusive communication link for the SDF to Yonaguni Island, and newly deploy mobile multiplex communication equipment at Naha Air Base. The SDF will strive to enhance data link functions among the three services, upgrade the field communications systems, continue to promote the utilization of outer space for defense-related purposes, and develop an X-Band ----- communications satellite with high performance. The SDF will take additional necessary measures after considering the necessity of further enhancements to its communications systems. (3) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks Given North Korea’s improved ballistic missile capabilities, the SDF will pursue the comprehensive improvement of its response capabilities against the threat of ballistic missiles. For reinforcing its multi-layered and sustainable defense posture for the entire territory of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the SDF will procure additional Aegis-equipped destroyers (DDG), and continue to improve the capabilities of its existing DDGs. As stated in (2)(b), the SDF will pursue further improvement of its surface-to-air guided missile PATRIOT system so as to equip it with new advanced interceptor missiles (PAC-3 MSE) that can be used both for response to cruise missiles and aircraft and for BMD. In addition, to reinforce its ballistic missile detecting and tracking capabilities, the SDF will promote the improvement of its automated warning and control systems (Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment), as well as procurement and improvement of its fixed air defense radar (FPS-7) systems. Along with the continuous promotion of Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptor missiles for BMD (SM-3 Block IIA), the MOD will, after examining options, take necessary measures for the transition to the production and deployment phases. The SDF will conduct bilateral training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. bilateral BMD response posture, and make an effort to establish the basis for deployment of the SDF to respond to a ballistic missile attack. The MOD will conduct studies on the best mix of the overall posture of its future BMD system, including the new BMD equipment. Also, based on appropriate role-sharing between Japan and the U.S., with a view to strengthening the deterrence capacity of Japan-U.S. Alliance as a whole by enhancing Japan’s own deterrence and response capabilities, the MOD will study its possible response capability to address the means of ballistic missile launches and related facilities, and will take necessary measures. In preparation for an attack by guerrilla or special operations forces concurrent with a ballistic missile attack, the SDF will continue to procure a variety of surveillance equipment, light armored vehicles, NBC reconnaissance vehicles, and transport helicopters (CH-47JA) in order to improve its ISR posture, and its ability to protect key facilities such as nuclear power plants, and search and destroy infiltrating units. In sensitive locations such as where a number of nuclear power plants are located, the SDF will conduct training with relevant agencies to confirm coordination procedures, and take necessary measures after considering the basis for deployment in areas neighboring nuclear power plants. (4) Response in Outer Space and Cyberspace (a) Promoting Utilization of Outer Space The SDF will continue to enhance information gathering capabilities through the use of various space satellites equipped with diverse sensors, and strengthen C3I capabilities by continuing to develop a sophisticated X-Band satellite communications system. With a view to ensuring the constant availability of these capabilities in a variety of contingencies, the SDF will actively promote space situational awareness efforts, and research on satellite protection, and work to enhance the resiliency of its satellites. In making such efforts, given that relevant domestic organizations and the United States possess the latest technologies and knowledge related to outer space, the MOD will facilitate cooperation including in the area of personnel development with such organizations. (b) Response to Cyber Attacks To continuously ensure sufficient security against cyber attacks, with consideration to enhancing capabilities through joint operations and efficiency in resource allocations, the SDF will establish the necessary system by such measures as to enhance the survivability of the command and control systems and information communication networks of the three services, to strengthen capabilities for information gathering and research and analysis, and to develop a practical training environment where response capabilities against cyber attacks can be tested. Through its efforts to secure response capabilities in cyberspace where attackers have an overwhelming advantage, the SDF may consider the acquisition of capabilities to prevent them from using cyberspace. In addition, the SDF will strive to keep abreast of the latest risks, response measures and technological trends, including through cooperation with the private sector, and strategic talks and joint exercises with allies. Given that it is essential to employ personnel with expertise on a continuing basis and that methods of cyber attack are increasingly sophisticated and complicated, the SDF plans to develop personnel with strong cyber security expertise, through efforts such as improving the in-house curriculum for specialized education, expanding learning opportunities at institutions of higher education at home and abroad, and cultivating expertise through personnel management efforts. To enable a comprehensive response to cyber attacks through a whole-of-government approach, the SDF will enhance close coordination with relevant government agencies by regularly providing expertise and MOD/SDF personnel, and improve training and exercises. (5) Response to Large-scale Disasters In the event of a large-scale natural disaster such as the Nankai Trough earthquake, or a special disaster such as a nuclear emergency, the SDF will respond by immediately transporting and deploying sufficient numbers of SDF units, as well as establishing a rotating staff posture based on a joint operational approach. These efforts will enable a sustained response over the long term. In these efforts, the SDF will leverage lessons of vital importance learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, to gather information on the extent and nature of the damage by aircraft from the initial stages of the impact and immediately engage in rescue activities, for the purpose of protecting people’s lives, In addition, it will implement prompt emergency reconstruction activities including elimination of road obstacles indispensable for the private sector’s efforts including the smooth transportation of relief materials. With close coordination and cooperation with relevant government agencies, local governments and private sector organizations, the MOD will promote such measures as to establish contingency planning and to conduct training and exercises, and secure alternative capabilities when the basis for the SDF’s disaster and deployment operations is affected. (6) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities Given that advanced intelligence functions lay the foundation for MOD/SDF to sufficiently fulfill their roles, the MOD will strengthen all stages of its intelligence capabilities, including gathering, analyzing, sharing and securing intelligence. With regards to the methods for intelligence gathering and analysis, with a view to flexibly meeting the demands of changes in the security environment, the MOD will promote the development and improvement of its intelligence gathering facilities, and actively utilize the outer space and unmanned aerial vehicles so as to drastically reinforce its capability to gather intelligence from the diverse sources including SIGINT and IMINT. In a related move, the MOD will develop the ability to utilize sophisticated GEOINT by such means as visualization and prediction of situations with a variety of information and intelligence overlaid on a map or image, while promoting the comprehensive and efficient geospatial database development. The MOD will take measures to enhance its HUMINT gathering capabilities including by increasing the number of personnel to be newly dispatched as Defense Attachés. It will also reinforce its posture for gathering and analyzing information from overseas through cooperation with the ally and partners, and use of advanced system for collecting public information. In an effort to meet the increasingly complex and diverse needs from policy departments and operational sides, in a timely and precise manner, in the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, the MOD will strengthen its comprehensive information gathering and analysis capabilities, through such efforts as the review of its recruitment efforts and the composition of its human resources to develop highly competent analysts, integration and enhancement of its crossorganizational intelligence curriculum, and regularization of the efforts to place the intelligence side personnel for a given period ----- in the policy departments and operational sides. Considering the importance of information security, under the current severe fiscal situation, and in pursuit of more efficient intelligence gathering, the MOD will promote the all-source analysis expected to create great synergies, through seeking to enhance the posture of and the effective collection management, and facilitating complete information sharing between those who need to know, including relevant government agencies. 2. Stabilization of the Asia-Pacific Region and Improvement of the Global Security Environments From the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, aimed at stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region, Japan will enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperative relations and conduct various activities including training and exercises in a timely and appropriate manner, as well as actively engage in international peace cooperation activities to properly address global security challenges. The following elements will be particularly important to these efforts: (1) Holding Training and Exercises In addition to timely and appropriate implementation of SDF training and exercises, Japan will promote bilateral and multilateral combined training and exercises in the AsiaPacific region, proactively and visibly demonstrating our nation’s resolve and advanced capabilities focused on regional stabilization. In addition, it will seek to improve interoperability and build and strengthen practical cooperative relationships with relevant countries. (2) Promoting Defense Cooperation and Exchanges Enhancing mutual understanding and relationships of trust with other countries and international organizations is important as the cornerstone of efforts to stabilize the security environment. Japan will take further steps to promote bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation and exchanges on various levels not limited to high-level exchanges, but including unit-level exchanges, such as building and strengthening cooperative relationships focused on wide-ranging security issues of common interest including HA/DR, maritime security, and ensuring the stable use of outer space and cyberspace. (3) Promoting Capacity Building Assistance By utilizing the capabilities the SDF has accumulated, the MOD will help countries concerned to enhance their military capabilities in such fields as HA/DR, disposal of landmines and unexploded ordnance, and military medicine, so as to stabilize the security environment, as well as strengthen relations with defense authorities of those countries. Cooperating with partners actively engaged in capacity building such as the United States and Australia, with due consideration for coordination with diplomatic policies such as the Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan will provide effective and efficient support in capacity building. (4) Ensuring Maritime Security For the purpose of maintaining “Open and Stable Seas”, which serve as the cornerstone of Japan’s peace and prosperity efforts as a maritime state, and ensuring security of maritime traffic, the MOD will further cooperate with allies to engage in anti-piracy activities off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, as well as help gulf countries improve their own capabilities. In other ocean not surrounding Japan such as the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the SDF will also leverage a variety of opportunities to promote combined training and exercises with countries which share Japan’s goal of maintaining maritime security. (5) Implementing International Peace Cooperation Activities To immediately commence international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will reinforce its emergency response and transport capabilities. To steadily engage in its activities for the long term, the SDF will work to further ensure the safety of its activities by strengthening information-gathering and equipment protection capabilities, as well as continue efforts to improve communications, supplies, military medicine, and support for families of military personnel. By improving the capacity of the engineer units which are highly appreciated at the SDF’s activity areas, the SDF will work to facilitate international peace cooperation activities that more effectively meet the needs of the SDF’s activity areas. Japan will strengthen the development of personnel who can play an active role in the field of international peace cooperation activity, and will send more personnel to mission headquarters of the U.N. Peace Keeping Operation and U.N. Department of peacekeeping operations which would help Japan in making more contribution in the field. The Japan Peacekeeping Training and Research Center will expand its curriculum, and strengthen cooperation with relevant government agencies, foreign countries, and non-governmental organizations through efforts such as providing educational opportunities to not only SDF personnel, but also candidates from various backgrounds. To correspond to the reality of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, Japan will continue to consider how it might expand its participation in such operations. (6) Cooperating to Promote Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation In order to contribute to various activities in the field of arms control and disarmament undertaken by the United Nations and other organizations, Japan will continue its active engagement including its contribution of personnel to these efforts. Given that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that serve as their means of delivery pose a severe threat to the peace and stability not only to Japan, but also to the international community as a whole, in cooperation with relevant countries and international organizations, Japan will facilitate efforts towards nonproliferation such as participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 3. Basic Structure to Maximize Defense Capability (1) Training and Exercises To effectively respond to various contingencies and enhance its deterrence effectiveness, the SDF’s joint training and exercises and Japan-U.S. bilateral training and exercises will be conducted in a tailored and visible way. Leveraging the lessons learned from these training and exercises, the SDF will conduct regular studies and reviews of its plans to address contingencies. Along with these efforts, the SDF will expand the use of the good training environment in Hokkaido, by SDF units across the country, to conduct effective training and exercises. In addition, the SDF will facilitate active use of LSTs and transport capabilities of the civilian sector, and improve unit mobility. Doing so will enable nation-wide deployment of well-trained units stationed in Hokkaido. To carry out effective training and exercises in the SDF’s southwestern region, where only limited space is available for SDF training, and accounting for relations with local communities, the MOD will continue effort to expand the joint/ shared use of U.S. Forces facilities with the SDF. In addition, actively engaging in bilateral trainings at home and abroad with U.S. Forces such as the U.S. Marines, the SDF will strive to promptly develop sufficient amphibious operational capabilities. Seeking to respond to various situations with a wholeof-government approach, coordination with relevant agencies including police and firefighters, and the Japan Coast Guard will be reinforced. In addition, the government will conduct various simulation exercise and comprehensive training and exercises regarding various situations including civil protection on a regular basis in a tailored manner. (2) Operational Infrastructure Given that SDF camps and bases are indispensable for rapid deployment and response to various contingencies as well as for ensuring a sustained response posture for the long term, the resiliency of military camps and bases will be enhanced. In particular, the SDF will strengthen its capabilities to immediately rebuild various camp and base support functions such as runways, information-communication infrastructure, and stable fuel supply. For the SDF to immediately utilize civilian airports and ports in contingency situations, necessary measures will be taken with consideration especially to developing a deployment structure in the southwestern region. In addition, for the purpose of establishing readiness capabilities, the SDF will store necessary ammunition and spare ports in locations most appropriate for operations, as well as steadily construct and maintain necessary living quarters surrounding SDF camps and bases. From the perspective of enabling a sustained response posture over the long term, various measures supporting families of military personnel will be promoted. To keep availability ratio of equipment at higher standards with lower costs, the MOD will conduct research as to what ----- activities hamper improvement of availability ratio. In addition, given that longer-term contracts raise predictability and enhance cost-effectiveness, the MOD will expand the use of its new contract system, Performance Based Logistics (PBL), under which the price is to be determined according to realized performance. (3) Personnel and Education Given the more advanced and complex equipment, and more diverse and internationalized missions in recent years, the SDF will, from a long-standing perspective, promote feasible measures to ensure the strength of its troops and the effective use of personnel amid the severe fiscal situation, taking into consideration a variety of elements, including skills, experience, physical strength and morale. (a) Composition of Ranks and Age Distribution Given the characteristics of respective units, for the purpose of achieving a composition of ranks that enables the three services to accomplish their respective missions in the most appropriate and sustainable way, the SDF will promote measures to secure and nurture appropriate-numbers of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers equipped with necessary capabilities, as well as recruit in a planned manner high-quality privates/seaman/airman. To ensure an appropriate age distribution, in addition to reviewing the retirement age of 60, the SDF will work to adjust the age distribution in the respective officer, warrant officer, sergeant/petty officer, and private/seaman/ airman ranks, by encouraging early retirement and more appropriately managing its privates/seaman/airman. While taking into consideration the status guarantee of SDF personnel, the SDF will conduct research on new systems for early retirement including systems used by other countries. With a view to maintaining the proper age distribution among airplane pilots, the SDF will take measures to allow them to be re-employed in the private sector. In addition, the SDF will review the final promotion rate of officers, warrant officers and sergeants/petty officers, and manage personnel more appropriately with consideration to personnel’s physical strength so as to maintain SDF’s strength. (b) Effective Utilization of Human Resources In order to more effectively make use of its personnel, including its female personnel, the SDF will actively reappoint retiring personnel possessing advanced knowledge, skills and experience where such personnel prove beneficial to the overall SDF’s strength. To enable SDF personnel to pursue their missions with high morale and a strong feeling of pride, the SDF will promote measures related to honors and privileges including expansion of the Defense Meritorious Badge program. In order to strengthen the joint operations structure, the SDF will enhance education and training, and, through secondment to the Joint Staff Office and relevant ministries and agencies, retain adequate personnel in the government who have a broad outlook and ideas, as well as wide-ranging experience in Japan’s security-affairs, and who can respond flexibly and rapidly to a variety of situations. (c) Recruitment and Re-employment Support In light of the deteriorating recruiting environment, resulting from social factors such as the declining birthrate and the increased pursuit of higher education, in order to continue to secure competent personnel in the coming years, the SDF will work to enhance public understanding of national defense and security issues, effectively engage in public relations to adjust to the changing times, and coordinate and cooperate with relevant ministries and agencies and local governments, so as to spread the perception that the SDF is an attractive job option. As it is the responsibility of the Government of Japan (GOJ) to provide financially for SDF personnel, compelled to resign at a younger age than ordinary civil servants, by strengthening collaboration with local governments and relevant organizations, through sharing the knowledge, skills and experience of retired SDF personnel with society, the GOJ will facilitate such efforts as measures to provide more incentives for companies to employ retired SDF personnel, and encourage employment of retired SDF personnel in the public sector, so as to improve their re-employment environment. (d) Utilization of Personnel including Reserve Staff In order to support sustainable unit operations in situations that are becoming increasingly diversified and protracted, the SDF will promote the use of ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel in broad areas To that end, the SDF will facilitate the appointment of reserve personnel and their assignment to duties commensurate with their specialized knowledge and skills including possible opportunities to work at headquarters, and will also improve training for callups. Aiming at active use of the private sector’s transport capabilities, necessary measures will be taken to utilize reserve personnel including those who have experience as ship crew. The SDF will also encourage the appointment of reserve personnel equipped with specialized skills, including airplane pilots who the SDF releases to the private sector for re-employment. Other necessary measures will be taken as well with broad consideration to using reserve personnel, including for call-ups in various situations. Furthermore, to increase the adequacy of reserve personnel, the SDF will seek to increase public awareness of the reserve program, and take measures to provide more incentives for reserve personnel themselves and companies to employ reserve personnel. (4) Medical In order to keep SDF personnel in good health and enhance its military medicine capabilities to enable the SDF to cope with a diverse range of missions in responses to various situations and international peace cooperation activities, the SDF will upgrade its hospitals to hubs with enhanced functions, and promote the formation of networks across hospitals and medical treatment rooms. Along with contributions to medical services in local communities, the SDF will establish an efficient and high-quality medical care structure, including improvements in the management of the National Defense Medical College Hospital. By reinforcing education for medical officers, nurses and emergency medical technicians, the SDF will make efforts to secure personnel with more specialized and advanced skills. In addition, the SDF will consider such matters as revision of regulations of emergency medical treatment on situation responses, and improve frontline first aid capabilities, and will put in place a posture for rapid medical evacuation that takes into account the need for enhanced joint service capabilities. Furthermore, the SDF will also reinforce the functions of the National Defense Medical College, establishing it as a hub for education, and research in the field of defense medical science. (5) Defense Production and Technology Base Retaining an adequate level of defense production and a technology base is essential not only for the production, operation, sustainment of equipment, but also for research and development of equipment that fits the operational environment in Japan, and for the expected potential to contribute to enhancing deterrence. Given that and Japan’s intention to maintain and reinforce abovementioned base, the MOD will formulate a strategy that sets forth its future vision for Japan’s defense production and technology base as a whole. With a view to enhancing the technological capability and improving productivity of Japan’s defense production and technology base, as well as increasing global competitiveness, Japan will actively promote cooperation on defense equipment and technology development, such as through international joint development and production with other countries including the United States and the United Kingdom, utilizing the technological fields where Japan enjoys an advantage. In coordination with relevant government agencies, the MOD will promote adapting defense equipment, such as aircraft developed by the MOD/SDF, to civilian uses. The MOD will promote international joint development and production and civilian uses of defense equipment in a way that benefit both manufacturers and the government. (6) Efficient Acquisition of Equipment To carry out effective and efficient acquisition of equipment, a project manager system will be introduced so as to enhance consistent project management including insertion of a technological perspective throughout the life-cycle of equipment design, R&D, full rate production, acquisition, sustainment, capability upgrade and eventual disposal. In relevant efforts, the ----- MOD will establish a database of past contracts, which it will use to develop a simulation model for price estimation, so as to enable independent estimates of more appropriate acquisition prices. While utilizing the private sector’s knowledge, the MOD will actively train and appoint personnel to positions that require knowledge, skills and specialized expertise in the acquisition of equipment, such as specialists in cost analysis. In addition, the MOD will develop a system that allows for reconsideration, including review of specifications and project plans, when there is a significant discrepancy between the estimated life-cycle cost derived from the analysis concerned and the real value of the life-cycle costs. To allow for prompt and efficient acquisitions, while ensuring transparency and fairness, parties available for negotiated contracts will be sorted and ranked as necessary so as to be useful. To diversify contract types and allow for the efficient acquisition of various equipment, the government will take necessary measures after considering further development of its contract system, to incentivize companies to lower prices, introduce longer-term contracts, which raise the predictability for companies and lead to lower costs, and establish a flexible system for accepting orders such as, the use of a consortium that enables convergence of technologies from respective, globally competitive companies. (7) Research and Development (R&D) Taking cost-effectiveness into account under Japan’s severe fiscal situation, the MOD will prioritize R&D projects that best meet the operational needs of the SDF. In order to strengthen its air defense capabilities, the MOD will promote technical review of next-generation surface-toair guided missiles in view of replacing the functions both of the GSDF middle-range surface-to-air guided missile and the ASDF PATRIOT surface-to-air guided missiles. In addition, the MOD will promote strategic studies including empirical research to accumulate and enhance fighter aircraft-related technologies in Japan so as to keep an option for development of next-generation fighter aircraft including the possibility of international joint development of an aircraft to replace the F-2 when it is time to retire it. Based on the findings, the MOD will take necessary measures. In an effort to improve ISR capability, the MOD will promote development of SIGINT aircraft as well as research on new fixed air defense radar, and sonars with higher detecting capabilities through simultaneous use of multiple sonars. In addition, the MOD will conduct research on unmanned equipment available for flexible operations in case of various contingencies including large-scale natural disasters, and promote R&D to improve existing equipment including vehicles, ships and aircraft. With a view to addressing emerging threats and securing technological advantage in the areas of strategically important fields, the MOD will set a vision of future equipment which shows a direction of medium- and long-term R&D with regard to development of major equipment, in order to systematically conduct advanced research from medium and long term perspectives. It will do this while considering the latest trends in science and technology, changes in battle field techniques, the potential for international joint research and development, and availability of effective joint operations among major pieces of equipment. From a security standpoint, the MOD will also make an effort to actively utilize civilian technologies applicable to defense needs (dual-use technologies) by such means as enhancement of coordination with universities and research institutions, while strengthening the function of technology control to prevent outflow of advanced technologies. In doing so, the MOD will always pay attention to keeping abreast of scientific technological trends including information relevant to technological development and gathering industry-academic-government strengths. In a related effort, the MOD will also promote to have military technologies employed in civilian activities. In order to achieve effective and efficient R&D in consideration of the items stated above, the MOD will reexamine its research and development posture, and take necessary measures. (8) Collaboration with Local Communities As it is essential to closely coordinate with local governments in such efforts as effective response to various contingencies, and recruitment and re-employment support for SDF personnel, in pursuit of facilitated harmonization between defense facilities and their surrounding local communities, the MOD will continue to advance measures targeting the areas around defense facilities, as well as engage in various measures such as intensive public relations activities focused on their policies and activities, in order to secure the understanding and cooperation of local governments and communities. Given that the presence of SDF units makes a substantial contribution to the maintenance and revitalization of local communities in some areas, and supports medical services in communities through emergency patient transport by SDF search and rescue aircraft, etc., the MOD/SDF will give consideration to the attributes of each area in the reorganization of units, and deployment and administration of SDF camps and bases, etc. in order to secure the understanding of local governments and residents. In these efforts, based on the governmental contract policies vis-a-vis small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while considering efficiencies, the MOD will promote various measures conducive to local economies such as securing opportunities for local SMEs to receive orders. (9) Boosting Communication Capabilities Given that understanding and support from Japanese people and foreign countries are of utmost importance for successful accomplishment of SDF missions, the MOD will strive to provide information actively and effectively via various media sources such as social media networks with due consideration to consistency in the information content. Efforts to provide information to foreign countries about MOD/SDF activities abroad will be facilitated by such means as improvement of its English web site. (10) Enhancing its Intellectual Base To enhance understanding among Japanese citizens on security and crisis management, the MOD will contribute to the promotion of education on security-related matters at educational institutions, including by MOD personnel presenting academic papers and sending MOD lecturers as experts in security and crisis management. The role of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) as a think tank associated with the MOD will be strengthened, through such efforts as facilitating coordination with policy-making divisions by relocating the institute to the Ichigaya district (where the MOD’s headquarters is located), and to by promoting academic exchanges with foreign research institutions. The MOD will also strive to administer the NIDS in such a way that it is capable of dealing with policy issues that the MOD faces in a timely and appropriate manner. (11) Promoting Reform of the MOD The MOD will further promote its reforms by regularly reviewing its work methods and organization in order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, and to optimize the build-up of defense capabilities, promote SDF joint operation functions and enhance policy-making and communication functions. In doing so, with the intention of optimizing its defense force build-up, the MOD will establish a planning system for defense build-up with a focus on joint operation-based capability assessments, and take measures to facilitate efficiency and optimization in acquisition of equipment, keeping in mind an option to establish a new agency in the MOD. Also, to enhance the prompt and efficient operation of the SDF, by such effort as integration of duties related to actual unit operations into the Joint Staff Office, the MOD will eliminate overlapping duties in the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff Office, and conduct an organizational review including the reorganization or disbanding of the Bureau of Operational Policy. **IV. Measures for Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance** 1. Strengthening Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation In order to maintain and strengthen the U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region and to ensure Japan’s national security, Japan will continue the revision of and revise the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation while strengthening Japan’s own capabilities as a premise for these efforts. Meanwhile, Japan will expand bilateral training and exercises, joint ISR activities and the joint/shared use of facilities and areas by the SDF and the U.S. forces. In addition, Japan will further deepen various Japan-U.S. operational cooperation and policy coordination ----- in areas such as BMD, bilateral planning, and bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue. Japan will also strengthen cooperation not only in the fields of counter-piracy, capacity building assistance, HA/DR, peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, but also in maritime affairs, outer space and cyberspace. Furthermore, Japan will strengthen and expand Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship over a broad range of fields, including intelligence cooperation and information security, and defense equipment and technology cooperation. 2. Measures for furthering Smooth and Effective Stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan From the perspective of making the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan more smooth and effective, Japan will steadily ensure the Host Nation Support (HNS). **V. Quantities of Major Procurement** The Annex Table shows details of the quantities of major procurement described in Section III. With a view to developing the defense forces described in the Annex Table of NDPG2013 over 10-year time frame, this program will focus on build-up of defense forces the best adapted to the current security environment. **VI. Expenditures** 1. The expenditures required to implement the defense force developments described in this program amount to approximately ¥24, 670 billion in FY2013 prices. 2. For the duration of this program, in harmony with other measures taken by the Government, approximately ¥700 billion will be secured by means of further streamlining and rationalization through efforts such as equipment procurement reform. The annual defense budgets for the implementation of this program will be allocated within a limit of approximately ¥23, 970 billion over the next five years. 3. This program will be reviewed after three years as necessary, with consideration to such factors at home and abroad as the international security environment, trends in technological standards including information communication technology, and fiscal conditions. **VII. Other** While maintaining the deterrence of U.S. Forces, Japan will steadily implement specific measures including the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan and SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) related programs to mitigate the impact on local communities, including those in Okinawa. |Service|Equipment|Quantity| |---|---|---| |GSDF|Mobile Combat Vehicles Armored Vehicles Amphibious Vehicles Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Transport Helicopters (CH-47JA) Surface-to-Ship Guided Missiles Mid-Range Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles Tanks Howitzers (expect mortars)|99 24 52 17 6 9 companies 5 companies 44 31| |MSDF|Destroyers (Aegis-Equipped Destroyers) Submarines Other Ships Total (Tonnage) Fixed-Wing Patrol Aircraft (P-1) Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) Multipurpose Helicopters (Ship-Based)|5 (2) 5 5 15 (approx. 52,000 t) 23 23 9| |ASDF|New Airborne Early Warning (Control) Aircraft Fighters (F-35A) Fighter Modernization (F-15) New Aerial Refueling/Transport Aircraft Transport Aircraft (C-2) Upgrade of PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (PAC-3 MSE)|4 28 26 3 10 2 groups & education| |Joint units|Unmanned Aerial Vehicles|3| Note: Acquisition of ship-based unmanned aerial vehicles will be allowed within the number of Patrol Helicopters (SH-60K) specifi ed above. **Reference 8** **The Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned** (As of March 31, 2016) |Type|Recoilless Guns|Mortars|Field Artillery|Rocket Launchers, etc.|Anti-aircraft Machine Guns|Tanks|Armored Vehicles| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Approximate number owned|2,500|1,100|450|100|50|690|960| Notes: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns. **Reference 9** **Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications** ||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|Col8|Col9|(As of March 31, 2016)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Service|Type|Model|Use|Number Owned|Maximum Speed (knots)|Crew (number)|Full Length (m)|Full (m)|Engine| |GSDF|Fixed-wing|LR-1|Liaison and Reconnaissance|1|290|2(5)|10|12|Turboprop, twin-engines| |||LR-2|Liaison and Reconnaissance|7|300|2(8)|14|18|Turboprop, twin-engines| ||Rotary-wing|AH-1S|Anti-tank|60|120|2|14|3|Turboshaft| |||OH-6D|Observation|48|140|1(3)|7|2|Turboshaft| |||OH-1|Observation|38|140|2|12|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-1H /J|Utility|131|120|2(11)|12/13|3|Turboshaft| |||CH-47J/JA|Transport|58|150/140|3(55)|16|4/5|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||UH-60JA|Utility|39|150|2(12)|16|3|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |||AH-64D|Combat|12|150|2|18|6|Turboshaft, twin-engines| |MSDF|Fixed-wing|P-1|Patrol|9|450|11|38|35|Turbofan, quadruple-engine| |||P-3C|Patrol|68|400|11|36|30|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| ||Rotary-wing|SH-60J|Patrol|42|150|3|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engine| |||SH-60K|Patrol|49|140|4|20|16|Turboshaft, twin-engine| |||MH-53E|Minesweeping and transport|4|150|8|30|24|Turboshaft, triple engine| |||MCH-101|Minesweeping and transport|8|150|4|23|19|Turboshaft, triple engine| ----- |Service|Type|Model|Use|Number Owned|Maximum Speed (knots)|Crew (number)|Full Length (m)|Full (m)|Engine| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |ASDF|Fixed-wing|F-15J/DJ|Fighter|201|mach 2.5|1/2|19|13|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||F-4EJ|Fighter|54|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||F-2A/B|Fighter|92|mach 2|1/2|16|11|Turbofan, single-engine| |||RF-4E/EJ|Reconnaissance|13|mach 2.2|2|19|12|Turbojet, twin-engine| |||C-1|Transport|22|440|5(60)|29|31|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||C-130H|Transport|14|340|6(92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| |||KC-767|Aerial refueling Transport|4|460|4-8(200)|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| |||KC-130H|Addition of aerial refueling functions|2|340|6(92)|30|40|Turboprop, quadruple- engine| |||E-2C|Early warning|13|330|5|18|25|Turboprop, twin-engine| |||E-767|Early warning and control|4|450|20|49|48|Turbofan, twin-engine| ||Rotary-wing|CH-47J|Transport|15|150|3(55)|16|4|Turboshaft, twin-engine| Notes: 1. Parenthetical figures in the item “Crew” represents the number of people transported. 2. F-4EJs include 48 improved versions of the F-4EJ. 3. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2015. **Reference 10** **Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service** ||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2016)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|Destroyer|Submarine|Mine warfare ship|Patrol combatant craft|Amphibious ship|Auxiliary ship| |Number (vessels)|47|17|27|6|11|29| |Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)|240|48|26|1|28|125| Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. **Reference 11** **Guided Missile Specifications** ||Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|(As of March 31, 2016)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Use|Name|Service|Weight (kg)|Full Length (m)|Diameter (cm)|Guidance System| |Antiballistic|Patriot (PAC-3)|ASDF|Approx.300|Approx.5.2|Approx.26|Program + command + radar homing| ||SM-3|MSDF|Approx.1,500|Approx.6.6|Approx.35|Command + IR image homing| |Antiaircraft and antimissile|Patriot (PAC-2)|ASDF|Approx.900|Approx.5.3|Approx.41|Program + command + TVM| ||Improved Hawk|GSDF|Approx.640|Approx.5.0|Approx.36|Radar homing| ||Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle- range SAM)||Approx.570|Approx.4.9|Approx.32|Radar homing| ||Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (C) (SAM-1C)||Approx.100|Approx.2.7/ 2.9|Approx.16|Image + IR homing Radar homing| ||Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)|GSDF/ ASDF|Approx.100|Approx.2.7|Approx.16|IR homing| ||Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)|GSDF|Approx.12|Approx.1.4|Approx.8|Image + IR homing| ||Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (B) (SAM-2B)||Approx.13|Approx.1.5|Approx.8|IR image homing| ||Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)||Approx.12|Approx.1.4|Approx.8|Image + IR homing| ||Type-11 short-range surface-to-air missile||Approx.100|Approx.2.9|Approx.16|Active radar homing| ||Surface-to-air missile for base air defense|ASDF|Approx.100|Approx.2.9|Approx.16|Active radar homing| ||Standard (SM-1)|MSDF|Approx.590|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Radar homing| ||Standard (SM-2)||Approx.710|Approx.4.7|Approx.30|Command + radar homing| ||Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)||Approx.230|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)||Approx.300|Approx.3.8|Approx.25|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||RAM (RIM-116)||Approx.73|Approx.2.8|Approx.13|Passive radar homing + IR homing| ||Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)|ASDF|Approx.230|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Sidewinder (AIM-9L)||Approx.89|Approx.2.9|Approx.13|IR homing| ||Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)||Approx.91|Approx.3.0|Approx.13|IR homing| ||Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)||Approx.220|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Type-99 air-to-air missile (B) (AAM-4B)||Approx.220|Approx.3.7|Approx.20|Radar homing| ||Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)||Approx.95|Approx.3.1|Approx.13|IR homing| ----- |Use|Name|Service|Weight (kg)|Full Length (m)|Diameter (cm)|Guidance System| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Antiship|Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)|GSDF|Approx.660|Approx.5.1|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-12 surface-to-ship missile||Approx.700|Approx.5.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing + GPS| ||Harpoon (SSM)|MSDF|Approx.680|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Harpoon (USM)||Approx.680|Approx.4.6|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Harpoon (ASM)||Approx.530|Approx.3.8|Approx.34|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)||Approx.660|Approx.5.1|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)||Approx.510|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)|ASDF|Approx.600|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + radar homing| ||Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)||Approx.540|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + IR image homing| ||Type-93 air-to-ship missile (B) (ASM-2B)||Approx.530|Approx.4.0|Approx.35|Inertial guidance + IR image homing + GPS| |Antitank|Type-87 anti-tank missile|GSDF|Approx.12|Approx.1.1|Approx.11|Laser homing| ||Type-01 light anti-tank missile||Approx.11|Approx.0.9|Approx.12|IR image homing| ||TOW||Approx.18|Approx.1.2|Approx.15|IR semi-automatic wire guidance| |Antilanding craft and antitank|Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile|GSDF|Approx.33|Approx.1.6|Approx.15|IR semi-automatic wire guidance| ||Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)||Approx.59|Approx.2.0|Approx.16|Inertial guidance + IR image Optic f iber TVM| ||Middle range multi-purpose missile||Approx.26|Approx.1.4|Approx.14|IR image homing Laser homing| ||Hellf ire|MSDF|Approx.47|Approx.1.6|Approx.18|Laser homing| ||Maverick||Approx.300|Approx.2.5|Approx.31|IR image homing| **Reference 12** **Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |IItteemm FFiissccaall YYeeaarr|GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)|Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|General Annual Expenditures (C)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Defense- Related Expenditures (D)|Growth Rate from Previous Year|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)|Ratio of Defense- Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/ B)|Ratio of Defense- related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |1955|75,590|9,915|△0.8|8,107|△2.8|1,349|△3.3|1.78|13.61|16.6| |1965|281,600|36,581|12.4|29,198|12.8|3,014|9.6|1.07|8.24|10.3| |1975|1,585,000|212,888|24.5|158,408|23.2|13,273|21.4|0.84|6.23|8.4| |1985|3,146,000|524,996|3.7|325,854|△0.0|31,371|6.9|0.997|5.98|9.6| |1995|4,928,000|709,871|△2.9|421,417|3.1|47,236|0.9|0.959|6.65|11.2| |2008|5,269,000|830,613|0.2|472,845|0.7|47,426 47,796|△0.8 △0.5|0.900 0.907|5.71 5.75|10.0 10.1| |2009|5,102,000|885,480|6.6|517,310|9.4|47,028 47,741|△0.8 △0.1|0.922 0.936|5.31 5.39|9.1 9.2| |2010|4,752,000|922,992|4.2|534,542|3.3|46,826 47,903|△0.4 0.3|0.985 1.008|5.07 5.19|8.76 8.96| |2011|4,838,000|924,116|0.1|540,780|1.2|46,625 47,752|△0.4 △0.3|0.964 0.987|5.05 5.17|8.62 8.83| |2012|4,796,000|903,339|△2.2|512,450|△5.2|46,453 47,138|△0.4 △1.3|0.969 0.983|5.14 5.22|9.06 9.20| |2013|4,877,000|926,115|2.5|527,311|2.9|46,804 47,538|0.8 0.8|0.975|5.05 5.13|8.88 9.02| |2014|5,004,000|958,823|3.5|564,697|7.1|47,838 48,848|2.2 2.8|0.956 0.976|4.99 5.09|8.47 8.65| |2015|5,049,000|963,420|0.5|573,555|1.6|48,221 49,801|0.8 2.0|0.955 0.986|5.01 5.17|8.41 8.68| |2016|5,188,100|967,218|0.4|578,286|0.8|48,607 50,541|0.8 1.5|0.937 0.974|5.03 5.23|8.41 8.74| Notes: 1. The fi gures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates. 2. The upper fi gures for defense-related expenditures for FY2008 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen inFY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2016), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, and 176.6 billion yen in FY2016), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015 and 14.0 billion yen in FY2016), while the lower fi gures include them. ----- **Reference 13** **Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |IItteemm FFiissccaall yyeeaarr|Annual Expenditures on General Accou|National Defense|Composition Ratio|Social Security|Composition Ratio|Education and Science|Composition Ratio|Public Works|Composition Ratio| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |2008|830,613|47,426 47,796|5.7 5.8|217,824|26.2|53,122|6.4|67,352|8.1| |2009|885,480|47,028 47,741|5.3 5.4|248,344|28.0|53,104|6.0|70,701|8.0| |2010|922,992|46,826 47,903|5.1 5.2|272,686|29.5|55,872|6.1|57,731|6.3| |2011|924,116|46,625 47,752|5.0 5.2|287,079|31.1|55,100|6.0|49,743|5.4| |2012|903,339|46,453 47,138|5.1 5.2|263,901|29.2|54,057|6.0|45,734|5.1| |2013|926,115|46,804 47,538|5.1 5.1|291,224|31.4|53,687|5.8|52,853|5.7| |2014|958,823|47,838 48,848|5.0 5.1|305,175|31.8|54,421|5.7|59,685|6.2| |2015|963,420|48,221 49,801|5.0 5.2|315,297|32.7|53,613|5.6|59,711|6.2| |2016|967,218|48,607 50, 541|5.0 5.2|391,738|33.1|53,580|5.5|59,737|6.2| Notes: 1. The education and science expenditures for FY2010 are post-overhaul fi gures. 2. The upper fi gures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, 16.9 billion yen in FY2010, 10.1 billion yen in FY2011, 8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2016), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009, 90.9 billion yen in FY2010, 102.7 billion yen in FY2011, 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, and 176.6 billion yen in FY2016), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015 and 14.0 billion yen in FY2016), while the lower fi gures include them. **Reference 14** **Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)** (Unit: 100 million yen, %) |FFiissccaall yyeeaarr IItteemm|2012|Col3|2013|Col5|2014|Col7|2015|Col9|2016|Col11| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio|Budget|Composition Ratio| |Personnel and provisions|20,701|44.6 43.9|19,896|42.5 41.9|20,930|43.8 42.8|21,121|43.8 42.4|21,473|44.2 42.5| |Materials|25,751 26,437|55.4 56.1|26,908 27,642|57.5 58.1|26,909 27,918|56.2 57.2|27,100 28,680|56.2 57.6|27,135 29,069|55.8 57.5| |Equipment acquisition|7,565|16.3 16.0|7,442|15.9 15.7|7,964|16.6 16.3|7,404|15.4 14.9|7,659|15.8 15.2| |R&D|944|2.0 2.0|1,541|3.3 3.2|1,477|3.1 3.0|1,411|2.9 2.8|1,055|2.2 2.1| |Facility improvement|999|2.1 2.1|950|2.0 2.0|950|2.0 1.9|1,293|2.7 2.6|1,461|3.0 2.9| |Maintenance|11,057|23.8 23.5|11,134|23.8 23.4|11,361|23.7 23.3|11,808|24.5 23.7|11,707|24.1 23.2| |Base countermeasures|4,418|9.5 9.4|4,381|9.4 9.2|4,397|9.2 9.0|4,425|9.2 8.9|4,509|9.3 8.9| |The cost for SACO-related projects|86|0.2|88|0.2|120|0.2|46|0.1|28|0.1| |U.S. Forces realignment related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)|599|1.3|646|1.4|890|1.8|1,426|2.9|1,766|3.5| |Introduction of government aircraft|—|—|—|—|—|—|108|0|140|0.3| |Others|769|1.7 1.6|1,460|3.1 3.1|760|1.6 1.6|758|1.6 1.5|744|1.5 1.5| |Total|46,453 47,138|100|46,804 47,538|100.0|47,838 48,848|100|48,221 49,801|100|48,607 50,541|100| Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures. 2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships. 3. R&D expenses include those of equipment. 4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfi elds and barracks. 5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training. 6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ. 7. The “others” category in FY2013 includes an expenditure amounting to 68.9 billion yen which is necessary to be carried over to the Special Account for Reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake. 8. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally. 9. The upper fi gures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (8.6 billion yen in FY2012, 8.8 billion yen in FY2013, 12.0 billion yen in FY2014, 4.6 billion yen in FY2015, and 2.8 billion yen in FY2016), U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 59.9 billion yen in FY2012, 64.6 billion yen in FY2013, 89.0 billion yen in FY2014, 142.6 billion yen in FY2015, and 176.6 billion yen in FY2016), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen in FY2015 and 14.0 billion yen in FY2016), while the lower fi gures include them. ----- **Reference 15** **Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries** |FFiissccaall yyeeaarr CCoouunnttrryy|2012|2013|2014|2015|2016| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Japan (100 million yen)|46,453 47,138 △0.4% △1.3%|46,804 47,538 0.8% 0.8%|47,838 48,848 2.2% 2.8%|48,221 49,801 0.8% 2.0%|48,607 50,541 0.8% 1.5%| |U.S. (U.S. 1 million dollar)|650,851 △4.0%|607,795 △6.6%|577,897 △4.9%|562,499 △2.7%|576,329 2.5%| |China (100 million yuan)|6,503 11.4%|7,202 10.7%|8,082 12.2%|8,896 10.1%|9,544 7.6%| |Russia (100 million RR)|18,124 19.6%|21,036 16.1%|24,791 17.9%|31,814 28.3%|31,493 △1.0%| |Republic of Korea (100 million won)|329,576 5.0%|344,970 4.7%|357,057 3.5%|374,560 4.9%|387,995 3.6%| |Australia (1 million Australian dollar)|24,217 △8.8%|25,434 5.0%|29,303 15.2%|32,695 11.6%|32,882 0.6%| |U.K. (1 million GBP)|34,260 △7.8%|34,800 1.6%|34,500 △0.9%|35,200 2.0%|35,000 △0.6%| |France (1 million euro)|38,001 1.6%|38,092 0.3%|38,921 2.1%|36,791 △5.5%|—| Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others. 2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year. 3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the Historical Table. Figures for FY2016 are estimated values. 4. The figures for China are based on the initial budget for the central government expenditure in the Finance Budget Report to the National People’s Congress (However, in FY20152016, only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure [a portion of the central government expenditure] was released. For FY2015, the defense expenditure of the central government expenditure was calculated by combining the local transfer expenditure, etc. that were separately released.) In addition, through FY2015, the rate of growth over the previous year was calculated from the central government expenditure. For FY2016, as only the defense expenditure in the central ministry expenditure was released, the rate of change was calculated by comparing with the FY2015 defense expenditure (886.9 billion yuan) in the central ministry expenditure. 5. Russia’s defense expenditure is based on the FY2012-2015 expenditures and the FY2016 budget amount (as of February 2016) in the Information on Excecution of Budgets of the Russian Federation released by the Federal Treasury. 6. The figures for Australia are based on the initial budget in the Defence Portfolio Budget Statements published by the Australian Department of Defence. 7. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2012 are based on U.K. Defence Statistics 2013 published by the Ministry of Defence. The figures for FY2013 and after are based on the initial budget in the budget message. 8. The French defense expenditure for FY2016 is undisclosed as of June 2016. 9. In Japan, the figures in the upper row exclude SACO-related expenditures (8.6 billion yen for FY2012, 8.8 billion yen for FY2013, 12.0 billion yen for FY2014, 4.6 billion yen for FY2015, and 2.8 billion yen for FY2016), the expenditures associated with the U.S. Forces realignment from which the expenses to reduce the burden on the local community (59.9 billion yen for FY2012, 64.6 billion yen for FY2013, 89.0 billion yen for FY2014, 142.6 billion yen for FY2015, and 176.6 billion yen for FY2016), as well as expenses associated with the introduction of a new government aircraft (10.8 billion yen for FY2015 and 14.0 billion yen for FY2016), while the figures in the lower row are based on the initial budget and include them. **Reference 16** **Authorized and Actual Strength of Uniformed SDF Personnel** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|(As of March 31, 2| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Category|GSDF|MSDF|ASDF|Joint Staff etc.|Total| |Authorized|150,863|45,364|46,940|3,987|247,154| |Actual|138,610|42,052|43,027|3,650|227,339| |Staffing Rate (%)|91.9|92.7|91.7|91.5|92.0| |Category|Non-Fixed-Term Personnel|Col3|Col4|Col5|Fixed-Term Personnel| |---|---|---|---|---|---| ||Off icer|Warrant Off icer|Enlisted (upper)|Enlisted (lower)|| |Authorized|45,427|4,954|140,136|56,637|| |Actual|42,478 (2,118)|4,491 (39)|137,898 (7,613)|18,897 (1,280)|23,575 (2,426)| |Staffing Rate (%)|93.5|90.7|98.4|75.0|| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value. 2. The number of authorized personnel is determined based on the budget. (As of March 31, 2016) ----- **Reference 17** **Status of Application and Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel (FY2015)** |Classification|Col2|Col3|Col4|Number Applied|Number Recruited|Competition Ratios| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Officer candidates|||GSDF|3,201 ( 434)|165 ( 14)|19.4 ( 31.0)| ||||MSDF|1,714 ( 259)|111 ( 14)|15.4 ( 18.5)| ||||ASDF|2,419 ( 475)|46 ( 4)|52.6 (118.8)| ||||Total|7,334 (1,168)|322 ( 32)|22.8 ( 36.5)| |Non- commissioned officers|Technical Petty Officer||MSDF|56 ( 17)|6 ( 2)|9.3 ( 8.5)| ||Technical Sergeant||ASDF|0|0|—| ||GSDF personnel (Nursing)||GSDF|6 ( 5)|4 ( 3)|1.5 ( 1.7)| |Aviation students|||MSDF|606 ( 54)|83 ( 6)|7.3 ( 9.0)| ||||ASDF|2,820 ( 255)|52 ( 1)|54.2 (255.0)| ||||Total|3,426 ( 309)|135 ( 7)|25.4 ( 44.1)| |Non-commissioned officer candidates|||GSDF|13,939 (1,940)|2,638 (199)|5.3 ( 9.7)| ||||MSDF|4,183 ( 603)|993 ( 42)|4.2 ( 14.4)| ||||ASDF|6,970 (1,368)|697 (227)|10.0 ( 6.0)| ||||Total|25,092 (3,911)|4,328 (468)|5.8 ( 8.4)| |Uniformed SDF personnel candidates (Privates)|||GSDF|18,018 (2,114)|5,215 (564)|3.5 ( 3.7)| ||||MSDF|4,389 ( 486)|987 ( 79)|4.4 ( 6.2)| ||||ASDF|5,730 ( 885)|1,636 (171)|3.5 ( 5.2)| ||||Total|28,137 (3,485)|7,838 (814)|3.6 ( 4.3)| |National Defense Academy Students||Recommended|Humanity and social science|159 ( 49)|21 ( 5)|7.6 ( 9.8)| ||||Science and engineering|256 ( 29)|86 ( 10)|3.0 ( 2.9)| ||||Total|415 ( 78)|107 ( 15)|3.9 ( 5.2)| |||Selective exam|Humanity and social science|111 ( 26)|12 ( 3)|9.3 ( 8.7)| ||||Science and engineering|122 ( 15)|31 ( 2)|3.9 ( 7.5)| ||||Total|233 ( 41)|43 ( 5)|5.4 ( 8.2)| |||General exam (first term)|Humanity and social science|6,454 (2,696)|65 ( 21)|99.3 (128.4)| ||||Science and engineering|8,930 (1,781)|236 ( 19)|37.8 ( 93.7)| ||||Total|15,384 (4,477)|301 ( 40)|51.1 (111.9)| |||General exam (second term)|Humanity and social science|208 ( 49)|14 ( 2)|14.9 ( 24.5)| ||||Science and engineering|527 ( 60)|28 ( 1)|18.8 ( 60.0)| ||||Total|735 ( 109)|42 ( 3)|17.5 ( 36.3)| |National Defense Medical College students||||6,723 (2,046)|85 ( 30)|79.1 ( 68.2)| |National Defense Medical College nursing students (SDF regular personnel candidate and nursing school students)||||2,302 (1,848)|75 ( 60)|30.7 ( 30.8)| |GSDF High Technical School Students||Recommended||188|63|3.0| |||General exam||2,972|283|10.5| |||Total||3,160|346|9.1| Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate numbers of females. 2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2015. **Reference 18** **Breakdown of Ministry of Defense Personnel** | (As of March 31, 2016)|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Personnel of the Ministry of Defense||||| |Special Service|||Regular Service|| |Minister of Defense State Minister of Defense Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense (2) Senior Adviser to the Minister of Defense Special Advisers to the Minister of Defense (up to 3)|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength|Authorized Strength|Non-Authorized Strength| ||Private Secretary of the Minister of Defense||Administrative Officials, and others  29|Part-Time Officials| ||SDF Personnel|||| ||Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense|Candidates for SDF Personnel||| ||Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs|Reserve Personnel  47,900||| ||Director General, and others  624|Ready Reserve Personnel 8,075||| ||Administrative Officials, and others 20,505|Candidate Reserve Personnel 4,600||| ||SDF Regular Personnel 247,154|National Defense Academy students||| |||National Defense Medical College students||| |||GSDF High Technical School students||| |||Part-Time Officials||| Note: Number of personnel refers to the numbers specified in the laws and regulations (As of March 31, 2016) ----- **Reference 19** **Major Exercises Conducted in FY2015** |❍ Integrated training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note| |SDF joint exercise (field training exercise)|Oct. 23 - Nov. 13, 2015|Waters and airspace surrounding Japan, SDF and U.S. Force bases, etc.|Each Joint Staff, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Armies of the GSDF, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, etc. Approximately 25,000 personnel|To maintain and enhance the SDF’s joint operations capabilities through studying and practicing SDF joint operations| |Training for transportation of overseas Japanese nationals and others|Dec. 17 - 18, 2015|Soumagahara Training Area, Iruma Airbase, etc.|Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force, Self- Defense Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, etc. Approximately 450 personnel, 3 aircraft, and 1 transport aircraft|To enhance joint operations capabilities relating to transport of overseas Japanese nationals and others, and strengthen coordination between SDF and relevant organizations| |❍ GSDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note| |Army Corps field training exercise (Northern Army)|Oct. 1 - 12, 2015|Northern District|Northern Army Headquarters, 7th Division, 1st Artillery Brigade, 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, etc. Approximately 4,500 personnel|To maintain and enhance Army’s capability to respond to various situations| |Army Corps field training exercise (Western Army)|Oct. 19 - Nov. 19, 2015|Western District|Western Army, Central Readiness Force, 2nd Division, 5th Brigade, etc. Approximately 15,000 personnel|| |Army Corps field training exercise (Eastern Army)|Dec. 6 - 19, 2015|Eastern District|Eastern Army Headquarters, 1st Division, 12th Brigade, 1st Engineer Brigade, Eastern Army Combined Brigade, etc. Approximately 4,000 personnel|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for divisions)|Jun. 22 - Jul. 16, 2015|Central-Northern Districts (Hamataiki Training Area, Yausubetsu Training Area, etc.)|13th Brigade Headquarters Approximately 2,000 personnel and 600 vehicles|To enhance control capability and adjustability necessary for long-range mobility| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Sep. 29 - Oct. 19, 2015|Eastern-Northern Districts (Hokkaido-Dai Maneuver Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 12th Brigade Approximately 1,000 personnel and 350 vehicles|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Sep. 30 - Oct. 19, 2015|Central-Eastern Districts (Higashi- and Kita-Fuji Training Areas, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 14th Brigade Approximately 890 personnel and 190 vehicles|| |Joint relocation exercises (camp relocation for regiments)|Oct. 20 - Nov. 17, 2015|Northern-Western Districts (Oyanohara Training Area, Kirishima Training Area, etc.)|One Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division and 5th Brigade, 1st Artillery Brigade, Northern Army Engineer Troop, etc. Approximately 1,600 personnel and 500 vehicles|| |❍ MSDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise|Period|Location|Main Participating Units, etc.|Note| |MSDF exercise (map exercise)|Aug. 31 - Sep. 4, 2015|MSDF Staff College and the locations of other participating Units|Commands of the Self-Defense Fleet, District Headquarters, Material Command, etc. Approximately 3,000 personnel|To conduct drills for unit operations, maritime operations, etc.| |MSDF exercise (field training exercise)|Nov. 16 - 25, 2015|Waters and airspace surrounding Japan|Self-Defense Fleet Approximately 25 vessels and 60 aircraft U.S. Navy Approximately 10 vessels|To conduct joint training with the U.S. Navy to strengthen coordination for anti-submarine, anti-surface, and anti- air warfares| **Reference 20** **Results of Firing Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2015)** |Col1|Name of Training|Date|Location|Dispatched Unit| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training|Oct. 5 – Dec. 14, 2015|McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|14 anti-aircraft companies Approximately 470 personnel| ||Surface-to-ship missile unit level live- fire training|Oct. 9 – 31, 2015|Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.|3 surface-to-ship missile regiments and others Approximately 240 personnel| |MSDF|Training in the U.S. by dispatch of aircraft|Aug. 10 – 24, 2015|Airspace surrounding Guam|2 aircraft| ||Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer and others|Sep. 15 – Oct. 20, 2015|Sea areas surrounding Hawaii|2 destroyers 2 aircraft| ||(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Sep. 23 – Dec. 19, 2015|Sea areas surrounding Hawaii|1 submarine| ||(First) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of group of destroyers|Jan. 9 – 30, 2016|Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam|7 destroyers 1 aircraft| ||(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine|Jan. 18 – Apr. 9, 2016|Sea areas surrounding Hawaii|1 submarine| ||(Second) Training in the U.S. by dispatch of group of destroyers|Feb. 28 – Mar. 20, 2016|Sea areas and airspace surrounding Guam|4 destroyers| |ASDF|Annual practice by antiaircraft units|Sep. 1 – Nov. 19, 2015|McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.|12 Air Defense Missiles (6 groups), Air Defense Missile Training Group Approximately 380 personnel| ----- **Reference 21** **Main Measures for Re-employment Support** |Items|Measures for employment support|Description| |---|---|---| |Measures for retiring uniformed SDF personnel|Occupational aptitude testing|Testing aimed to provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with guidance based on individual aptitudes| ||Technical training|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with skills usable in society after retirement (large sized vehicle operation, large sized special motor vehicle operation, information processing, crane operation, motor vehicle repair, boiler maintenance, nursing care [home helper], etc.)| ||Disaster prevention and risk control training|Provide uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age with technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan| ||Correspondence courses|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with the capability to acquire public qualification (certified insurance labor consultant, health supervisor, real estate transaction specialist, etc.)| ||Business management training|Support uniformed SDF personnel retiring at an early age to cultivate social adaptability, as well as provide necessary knowledge to lead a stable life after reemployment and retirement| ||Career guidance|Provide retiring uniformed SDF personnel with knowhow to choose new occupation and attitude toward reemployment| ||Outsourcing career counseling, etc.|Outsource career counseling, etc. to external experts to meet the needs of each retiring uniformed SDF personnel| |Measures for internal support personnel|Training for support personnel|Training of labor administration, support activities, etc. to improve quality of support personnel| |Measures for promotion outside of SDF|Support publicizing to business owners|Publicizing to business owners, etc. the effectiveness of retiring uniformed SDF personnel who plan to retire| ||Inviting business owners on unit tours|Invite business owners to SDF units, etc. and provide them with tours, explanations of the employment support situation, etc.| **Reference 22** **Employment situation of retired uniformed SDF Personnel in disaster prevention-related bureaus in local government** |Prefectural Government|Employment situation| |---|---| |Hokkaido|Hokkaido Prefectural Government (three persons), Obihiro City Government (two persons), Chitose City Government (three persons), Bibai City Government, Sapporo City Government (two persons), Shikabe Town Offcie, Bihoro Town Offcie, Tomakomai City Government, Hokuto City Government, Iwamizawa City Government (two persons), Asahikawa City Government (two persons), Eniwa City Government (two persons), Kushiro City Government, Kushiro Town Offcie, Nayoro City Government, Kitami City Government, Nanae Town Offcie, Rumoi City Government, Engaru Town Offcie, Takigawa City Government, Akabira City Government, Kitahiroshima City Government, Noboribetsu City Government, Shibecha Town Offcie, Shiraoi Town Offcie, Teshikaga Town Offcie, Shikaoi Town Offcie, Hakodate City Government (two persons), Muroran City Government, Memuro Town Offcie, Shinhidaka Town Offcie, Naganuma Town Offcie, Ashibetsu City Government, Kamifurano Town Offcie, Matsumae Town Offcie| |Aomori|Aomori Prefectural Government, Hachinohe City Government (two persons), Aomori City Government (three persons), Hirosaki City Government, Oirase Town Office, Misawa City Government, Sannohe Town Office| |Iwate|Iwate Prefectural Government, Hanamaki City Government, Shiwa Town Office, Takizawa City Government, Tono Town Office, Hachimantai City Government, Kuji City Government, Morioka City Government, Miyako City Government, Yamada Town Office| |Miyagi|Miyagi Prefectural Government, Sendai City Government (two persons), Ishinomaki City Government (two persons), Tagajo City Government, Oohira Village Office, Iwanuma City Government| |Akita|Akita Prefectural Government, Daisen City Government, Yokote City Government, Senboku City Government, Odate City Government, Yuzawa City Government| |Yamagata|Yamagata Prefectural Government (two persons), Higashine City Government, Sakata City Government, Tendo City Government| |Fukushima|Fukushima Prefectural Government, Fukushima City Government (two persons), Koriyama City Government| |Ibaraki|Ibaraki Prefectural Government, Ushiku City Government (two persons), Ryugasaki City Government, Shimotsuma City Government| |Tochigi|Tochigi Prefectural Government, Utsunomiya City Government| |Gunma|Gunma Prefectural Government, Maebashi City Government (two persons), Shibukawa City Government, Numata City Government| |Saitama|Saitama Prefectural Government, Soka City Government, Saitama City Government, Wako City Government, Asagiri City Government, Fukaya City Government| |Chiba|Chiba Prefectural Government, Urayasu City Government, Ichikawa City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Isumi City Government, Narashino City Government, Funabashi City Government, Matsudo City Government (two persons), Katsuura City Government, Narita City Government, Oamishirasato City Government, Nagareyama City Government, Tateyama City Government| |Tokyo|Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons), Itabashi Ward Office (two persons), Arakawa Ward Office, Adachi Ward Office, Shinagawa Ward Office (two persons), Toshima Ward Office| |Kanagawa|Kanagawa Prefectural Government (three persons), Yokohama City Government (eight persons), Kawasaki City Government (two persons), Fujisawa City Government (two persons), Chigasaki City Government, Zushi City Government, Sagamihara City Government, Zama City Government, Ebina City Government, Yokosuka City Government, Kamakura City Government| |Niigata|Niigata Prefectural Government, Tainai City Government, Jouetsu City Government, Sado City Government| |Toyama|Toyama Prefectural Government, Toyama City Government| |Ishikawa|Ishikawa Prefectural Government, Kanazawa City Government, Komatsu City Government, Kaga City Government| |Fukui|Fukui Prefectural Government (two persons), Fukui City Government, Awara City Government, Takahama Town Office| |Yamanashi|Yamanashi Prefectural Government (two persons), Minami-alps City Government, Fujiyoshida City Government| |Nagano|Nagano Prefectural Government, Ina City Government, Matsumoto City Government, Chino City Government| |Gifu|Gifu Prefectural Government (two persons), Kaizu City Government, Kakamigahara City Government, Gifu City Government| - Provided by the Ministry of Defense as of March 31, 2016 (part-time personnel included). |Col1|(as of March 31, 2016: 372 persons)| |---|---| |Prefectural Government|Employment situation| |Shizuoka|Shizuoka Prefectural Government (fvie persons), Hamamatsu City Government, Gotenba City Government (two persons), Susono City Government, Oyama Town Offcie, Fukuroi City Government, Shizuoka City Government, Makinohara City Government, Izunokuni City Government, Shimada City Government, Atami City Government| |Aichi|Aichi Prefectural Government, Seto Town Office, Kitanagoya City Government (two persons), Miyoshi City Government, Mihama Town Office, Taketoyo Town Office, Aisai City Government, Toyohashi City Government, Gamagori City Government, Tobishima Village Office, Ama City Government, Obu City Government, Kiyosu City Government, Oharu Town Office, Nishio City Government, Tokai City Government, Handa City Government, Toyoake City Government, Toyoyama Town Office, Minamichita Town Office (two persons), Yatomi City Government, Nagakute City Government, Hagashiura Town Office, Kanie Town Office| |Mie|Mie Prefectural Government, Tsu City Government, Ise City Government, Kameyama City Government, Nabari City Government, Shima City Government, Toba City Government, Kuwana City Government, Owase City Government| |Shiga|Shiga Prefectural Government, Konan City Government| |Kyoto|Kyoto Prefectural Government, Seika Town Office, Kizugawa City Government, Yawata City Government, Kyotango City Government| |Osaka|Osaka Prefectural Government, Sakai City Government, Ikeda City Government, Osaka City Government (two persons), Kawachinagano City Government, Matsubara City Government, Izumi City Government, Hirakata City Government, Izumisano City Government, Toyono Town Office, Osakasayama City Government, Takaishi City Government, Shijonawate City Government, Tondabayashi City Government| |Hyogo|Hyogo Prefectural Government, Akashi City Government, Toyooka City Government, Miki City Government, Yabu City Government, Nishiwaki City Government| |Nara|Nara Prefectural Government (three persons), Nara City Government (four persons), Gojo City Government| |Wakayama|Wakayama Prefectural Government, Wakayama City Government, Koya Town Office| |Tottori|Tottori Prefectural Government (two persons), Tottori City Government, Yurihama Town Office, Hokuei Town Office, Yonago City Government| |Shimane|Shimane Prefectural Government, Matsue City Government, Hamada City Government| |Okayama|Okayama Prefectural Government, Kurashiki City Government, Asakuchi City Government| |Hiroshima|Hiroshima Prefectural Government (two persons), Hatsukaichi City Government, Hiroshima City Government| |Yamaguchi|Yamaguchi Prefectural Government, Yamaguchi City Government, Iwakuni City Government, Shimonoseki City Government, Shunan City Government, Nagato City Government| |Tokushima|Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons), Komatsushima City Government, Anan City Government, Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons), Miyoshi City Government| |Kagawa|Kagawa Prefectural Government, Marugame City Government, Sakade City Government, Zentsuji City Government| |Ehime|Ehime Prefectural Government, Matsuyama City Government, Imabari City Government| |Kochi|Kochi Prefectural Government, Konan City Government| |Fukuoka|Fukuoka Prefectural Government, Kurume City Government, Iizuka City Government, Nogata City Government, Kasuga City Government, Tagawa City Government, Nakagawa Town Offcie, Dazaifu City Government, Chikuzen Town Offcie, Onojo City Government, Munakata City Government, Kasuya Town Offcie, Itoshima City Government| |Saga|Saga Prefectural Government (three persons), Karatsu City Government| |Nagasaki|Nagasaki Prefectural Government (fvie persons), Sasebo City Government (two persons), Nagasaki City Government, Omura City Government (three persons), Minamishimabara City Government, Shimabara City Government, Matsuura City Government| |Kumamoto|Kumamoto Prefectural Government (three persons), Kumamoto City Government, Kikuchi City Government, Ozu Town Office, Takamori Town Office| |Oita|Oita Prefectural Government (two persons), Saiki City Government, Kitsuki City Government| |Miyazaki|Miyazaki Prefectural Government (five persons), Miyazaki City Government, Miyakonojo City Government (three persons) , Nobeoka City Government, Ebino City Government, Tsuno Town Office, Kobayashi City Government, Saito City Government, Hyuga City Government, Kushima City Government, Nichinan City Government| |Kagoshima|Kagoshima Prefectural Government (four persons), Satsuma-Sendai City Government, Kirishima City Government (two persons), Tarumizu City Government| ----- **Reference 23** **Development of Seamless Security Legislation to** **Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on July 1, 2014) Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation under the Constitution of Japan. While adhering to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defenseoriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan has flourished as an economic power through continuous efforts of its people and built a stable and affluent livelihood. Japan, as a peace-loving nation, has also been cooperating with the international community and international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.), and has proactively contributed to their activities, adhering to the Charter of the United Nations. The course that Japan has taken as a peace-loving nation has garnered significant praise and respect from the international community, and Japan must continue these steps to further fortify such a position. During the 67 years since the Constitution of Japan came into effect, the security environment surrounding Japan has fundamentally transformed and is continuing to evolve, and Japan is confronted by complex and significant national security challenges. There exist no prospects of the realization of the so-called formal “U.N. forces”, an ideal proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, even when considering only the quarter-century since the end of the Cold War, the shift in the global power balance, rapid progress of technological innovation, development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and threats such as international terrorism have given rise to issues and tensions in the Asia-Pacific region, and there exists a situation in which any threats, irrespective of where they originate in the world, could have a direct influence on the security of Japan. Furthermore, in recent years, risks that can impede the utilization of and free access to the sea, outer space and cyberspace have been spreading and become more serious. No country can secure its own peace only by itself, and the international community also expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national capability. Maintaining the peace and security of Japan and ensuring its survival as well as securing its people’s lives are the primary responsibility of the Government. In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and to fulfill its responsibility, the Government, first and foremost, has to create a stable and predictable international environment and prevent the emergence of threats by advancing vibrant diplomacy with sufficient institutional capabilities, and has to pursue peaceful settlement of disputes by acting in accordance with international law and giving emphasis to the rule of law. Moreover, it is important to appropriately develop, maintain and operate Japan’s own defense capability, strengthen mutual cooperation with the United States, which is Japan’s ally, and deepen trust and cooperative relations with other partners both within and outside the region. In particular, it is essential to avoid armed conflicts before they materialize and prevent threats from reaching Japan by further elevating the effectiveness of the Japan-United States security arrangements and enhancing the deterrence of the Japan-United States Alliance for the security of Japan and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. On that basis, in order to resolutely secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situation and contribute even more proactively to the peace and stability of the international community under the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to develop domestic legislation that enables seamless responses. In accordance with the basic orientation presented by Prime Minister Abe at the May 15 press conference which took place after the report of “the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security” was submitted on the same day, discussions have been repeatedly held in the ruling parties and examination has also been conducted by the Government. Based on the result of the discussions of the ruling coalition, the Government will promptly develop domestic legislation necessary for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people, in accordance with the following basic policies: 1. Response to an Infringement that Does Not Amount to an Armed Attack (1) Considering the increasingly severe security environment surrounding Japan, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies are liable to occur, posing risks which could develop into more serious situations. In such situations of infringement that does not amount to an armed attack, it is an even more important task to prepare and ensure seamless and sufficient responses to any unlawful acts through closer cooperation between relevant agencies, including police organizations, and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), premised on the basic allocation of their roles. (2) Specifically, in order to respond to various unlawful acts, under the basic policy that relevant agencies including the police and Japan Coast Guard are to respond in close cooperation in accordance with their respective duties and authorities, the Government will further strengthen necessary measures in all areas, which include enhancing the respective agency’s response capabilities, strengthening collaboration among agencies including information sharing, examining and developing concrete response guidelines, accelerating procedures to issue orders, and improving exercises and training. (3) As for accelerating procedures, in cases of responding to a situation where an infringement from the outside that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in areas surrounding remote islands, etc., and police forces are not present nearby or police agencies cannot respond immediately (including situations in which police agencies cannot respond because of the weapons possessed by the armed groups, etc.), the Government will thoroughly examine the application of related provisions to order public security operations or maritime security operations in advance and establish a common understanding among relevant agencies. At the same time, in order to avoid the spread of damages caused by unlawful acts while internal administrative procedures are taken, the Government will also make concrete considerations on measures for issuing orders swiftly and accelerating procedures in light of circumstances. (4) Moreover, for ensuring Japan’s security, it is important for the SDF and the United States armed forces to respond seamlessly in close cooperation to a situation where an attack occurs against the units of the United States armed forces currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan and such situation escalates into an armed attack depending on its circumstances. Assuming a situation where an infringement that does not amount to an armed attack occurs in the course of various peacetime activities carried out in coordination between the SDF and the United States armed forces and referring to the concept of “use of weapons” for the purpose of protecting its own weapons and other equipment under Article 95 of the SDF Law, the Government will develop legislation that enables the SDF to carry out very passive and limited “use of weapons” to the minimum extent necessary to protect weapons and other equipment of the units of the United States armed forces, if they are, in cooperation with the SDF, currently engaged in activities which contribute to the defense of Japan (including joint exercises), in line with the provisions of Article 95 of the SDF Law, premised on request or consent by the United States. 2. Further Contributions to the Peace and Stability of the International Community (1) So-called Logistics Support and “Ittaika with the Use of Force” A. So-called logistics support is an activity that does not in itself constitute a “use of force”. For instance, when international peace and security are threatened and the international community is united in responding to the situation in accordance with a U.N. Security Council resolution, there exist situations in which it is necessary for Japan to conduct such support activities to armed forces of other countries carrying out legitimate “use of force” based on the resolution. As for Japan’s support activities, however, legal frameworks limiting the area of such activities to “rear area” or so-called “noncombat area”, etc. have been established in past legislations to ensure that the issue of “ittaika with the use of force” (forming an “integral part” of the use of force) does not arise, in relation to Article 9 of the Constitution. This is intended to avoid Japan from being legally evaluated as carrying out by itself the “use of force” which is not permitted under the Constitution because its support activities would form an “integral part” of the use of force (“ittaika with the use of force”) by other countries. B. The SDF, even under such legal frameworks, has steadily accumulated its records of various support activities, and ----- the expectations to and trust in Japan have been growing. Amid a major change in the security environment, from the perspective of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, it is necessary to enable the SDF to play sufficient roles in wide-ranging support activities for peace and stability of the international community. It is also vital from the viewpoint of ensuring Japan’s peace and security to enable the carrying out of such activities more than before without hindrance. C. The Government, while premising on the theory of socalled “Ittaika with the use of force” itself, based on the accumulation of discussions related to the “ittaika with the use of force” and considering factors such as the SDF’s actual experiences to date and the reality of U.N. collective security measures, no longer takes the current framework uniformly limiting SDF’s activities to such areas as “rear area” or socalled “non-combat area” where the issue of “ittaika with the use of force” does not arise. Instead, the Government takes the recognition that Japan’s support activities such as supply and transportation conducted at a place which is not “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by a foreign country are not regarded as “ittaika with the use of force” by that country. From the viewpoint of the following positions which is based on that recognition, the Government will proceed with developing legislation which enables necessary support activities to armed forces of foreign countries engaging in activities for ensuring Japan’s security or for peace and stability of the international community: (a) Do not conduct support activities in “the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted” by armed forces of a foreign country to which Japan provides support. (b) Immediately pause or cease support activities if the place where Japan is conducting support activities becomes “the scene where combat operations are actually being conducted” due to changes of the situation. (2) Use of Weapons Associated with International Peace Cooperation Activities A. To date, Japan has developed necessary legislation and has conducted international peace cooperation activities for over 20 years. In conducting such activities, Japan has limited the right of SDF personnel to use weapons when engaging in international peace cooperation activities to so-called self-preservation type and protection of its own weapons and other equipment since use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” (coming to the aid of geographically distant unit or personnel under attack) or “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” could constitute the “use of force” prohibited by Article 9 of the Constitution, if such use of weapons are directed against “a state or a quasi-state organization.” B. From the perspective of a “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, Japan needs to enhance its efforts to promote the peace and stability of the international community. To that end, it is important to be able to participate in international peace cooperation activities including peace keeping operations (PKOs) sufficiently and proactively. Moreover, given that many Japanese nationals are actively working overseas and face risks of being involved in emergency situations such as terrorism, it is necessary to enable the rescuing of Japanese nationals abroad by use of weapons subject to the consent of acceptance from the territorial State which, under international law, has the obligation to extend protection to foreigners who are within its territories. C. Based on the above, the Government will proceed with developing legislation based on the following positions in order to enable the SDF’s use of weapons associated with so-called “kaketsuke-keigo” and the “use of weapons for the purpose of execution of missions” in international peace cooperation activities that do not invoke “use of force” including U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as policelike activities that do not invoke “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals with a consent from the territorial State, through ensuring that “a state or a quasi state organization” does not appear as the adversary: (a) As for U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc., since “consent by the State to which the areas in which activities are conducted belong” and “consent by the parties to the conflict to activities conducted” are necessary under the framework of the Five Principles for PKOs, “a quasi-state organization” other than parties to the conflict who have given consent of acceptance is, in principle, not expected to appear as the adversary. For more than 20 years, this has been demonstrated by Japan’s experience of U.N. peacekeeping operations, etc. When the use of weapons for the execution of missions is expected to exceed selfpreservation and protection of its own weapons and other equipment including when the SDF is tasked with the maintenance of order such as the protection of population, which is deemed as an important mission in recent U.N. peacekeeping operations, it is necessary that consent from the parties to the conflict is stably maintained, especially because of the nature of the activities. (b) When the SDF units conduct police-like activities that do not involve “use of force” including the rescuing of Japanese nationals in a foreign country based on the consent of the territorial State’s Government, it is natural that the activities be conducted in the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, i.e. the area within which its authority is maintained. This means that no “quasi-state organization” exists in that area. (c) The Cabinet will make a decision on whether the consent ofacceptance is stably maintained or the area within which the consent of the territorial State’s Government is valid, etc. based on deliberations etc. at the National Security Council. (d) Use of weapons in these activities is subject to the inherent constraint of the strict principle of proportionality which is similar to the principle of police proportionality. 3. Measures for Self-Defense Permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution (1) In order to adapt to the changes in the security environment surrounding Japan and secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people under any situations, the Government has examined what constitutional interpretation would be appropriate, as sufficient responses would not necessarily be possible if the constitutional interpretation to date were maintained. In this regard, logical consistency and legal stability are required for the Government’s constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, it is necessary to draw a logical conclusion for securing the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people within the limit of the basic logic of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution as expressed by the Government to date. (2) The language of Article 9 of the Constitution appears to prohibit “use of force” in international relations in all forms. However, when considered in light of “the right (of the people) to live in peace” as recognized in the Preamble of the Constitution and the purpose of Article 13 of the Constitution which stipulates, “their (all the people’s) right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” shall be the supreme consideration in governmental affairs, Article 9 of the Constitution cannot possibly be interpreted to prohibit Japan from taking measures of selfdefense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to ensure its survival. Such measures for self-defense are permitted only when they are inevitable for dealing with imminent unlawful situations where the people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally overturned due to an armed attack by a foreign country, and for safeguarding these rights of the people. Hence, “use of force” to the minimum extent necessary to that end is permitted. This is the basis, or so-called the basic logic, of the view consistently expressed by the Government to date with regard to “use of force” exceptionally permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution, and clearly shown in the document “Relationship between the Right of Collective Self-Defense and the Constitution” submitted by the Government to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councilors on October 14, 1972. This basic logic must be maintained under Article 9 of the ----- Constitution (3) To date, the Government has considered that “use of force” under this basic logic is permitted only when an “armed attack” against Japan occurs. However, in light of the situation in which the security environment surrounding Japan has been fundamentally transformed and continuously evolving by shifts in the global power balance, the rapid progress of technological innovation, and threats such as weapons of mass destruction, etc. as mentioned at the outset, in the future, even an armed attack occurring against a foreign country could actually threaten Japan’s survival, depending on its purpose, scale and manner, etc. Japan, as a matter of course, will make the utmost diplomatic efforts, should a dispute occur, for its peaceful settlement and take all necessary responses in accordance with the existing domestic laws and regulations developed based upon the constitutional interpretation to date. It is still required, however, to make all necessary preparations in order to ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people. Under such recognition and as a result of careful examination in light of the current security environment, the Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date. (4) As a matter of course, Japan’s “use of force” must be carried out while observing international law. At the same time, a legal basis **Reference 24** **Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces** in international law and constitutional interpretation need to be understood separately. In certain situations, the aforementioned “use of force” permitted under the Constitution is, under international law, based on the right of collective self-defense. Although this “use of force” includes those which are triggered by an armed attack occurring against a foreign country, they are permitted under the Constitution only when they are taken as measures for self-defense which are inevitable for ensuring Japan’s survival and protecting its people, in other words for defending Japan. (5) Moreover, even when “use of force” is permitted under the Constitution, since they are carried out to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of the people, it is natural to require an assurance of democratic control. The Government will stipulate in the draft legislation that prior approval of the Diet is in principle required upon issuing orders of operations to the SDF for carrying out “use of force” permitted under the Constitution when an armed attack occurs not against Japan but against a foreign country, in the same manner as the procedures related to defense operations stipulated in the current laws and regulations. 4. The Way Forward for Developing Domestic Legislation When these activities are to be conducted by the SDF, the Cabinet shall make a decision in accordance with deliberations, etc. at the National Security Council. Including such procedures, domestic legislation which serves as the legal basis is necessary in order to enable the SDF to actually conduct such activities. Based on the basic policies described above, the Government will herewith commence the tasks of drafting legislation that enables seamless responses to any situations in order to secure the lives and peaceful livelihood of its people. The Government will give adequate consideration, and as soon as it completes its preparation, it will submit the draft legislation to the Diet for its deliberations. |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)|(1) When there is a situation in which armed attack against Japan from outside occur or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of armed attack, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against these attacks. (2) When there is a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, which in turn poses an imminent and clear danger of Japan’s survival to be threatened and fundamentally overturns people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and therefore it is necessary to defend Japan against such a situation.|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)|❍ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense) ❍ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation)1 ❍ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, civil protection etc.)1| |Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations (only for armed attack situations) is likely to be issued|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)1 (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister|❍ Establishment of positions and defense facilities in the intended deployment area ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |Measures to be taken before a defense operation Order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law and U.S. and Others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act)|When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation|(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services — Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies — not required; services — required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)2|❍ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act ❍ Provision of services as a related measure ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister|❍ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents, emergent pursuant to the provision of the Civil Protection Law ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law weapons (Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.)3 ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons| ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the law enforcement force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergencies|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order’s issuance)|❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons ❍ Control over the Japan Coast Guard| |Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather Information|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life and body or other personnel on duty| |Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission|❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (Questioning, Measures for Refuge, etc. Prevention and Suppression of Crime, Entry, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons| |Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan|(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor|❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control) ❍ Use of weapons| |Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister|❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons| |Counter-Piracy Operations (Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law and Anti-Piracy Law)|When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counterpiracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (the Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister)|❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on- the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons| |Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan’s territory from the damage caused by the missiles|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)|❍ Use of weapons| |Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property in the event of natural calamities or other disasters4|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)|❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (Refuge, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (Designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; only when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)| |Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)|❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)| |Nuclear disaster relief Dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director- General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)|❍ Same as in disaster relief dispatch| |Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)|When a foreign aircraft intrudes Japan’s territorial airspace in violation of international law and/ or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required|❍ The action necessary to make intruding aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.)5| |Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)||(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required|❍ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea| |Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Overseas (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)|Emergency situations overseas|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to conduct rescue measures such as guarding and rescue of Japanese nationals who are at risk for harm to their life or body, and the approval of the Prime Minister|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty, and to execute duties.| Emergency situations overseas (1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense ❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body Evacuation of Japanese nationals (2) Consent of the Diet: not required or other personnel on duty residing abroad (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister (Article 84-4, Self-Defense for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese Forces Law) nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened ----- |Operation|Applicable Situations|Conditions Required for Operations|Main Type of Authorized Actions| |---|---|---|---| |Logistics support and other activities (Article 84-5, Self-Defense Forces Law Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security|(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister; services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Consent of the Diet: prior consent required in principle (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister in accordance with the implementation guidelines|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |Logistics support and other activities (Article 84-5, Self-Defense Forces Law International Peace Support Act, Ship Inspection Operations Act)|Situations where the peace and security of the international community is threatened, where the international community is collectively addressing the situation to remove the threat in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations Charter, and where Japan needs to make independent and proactive contributions to these activities as a member of the international community|(1) Authorized by: supplies — Minister of Defense or person who is a delegated authority by the Minister; services, search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations (2) Consent of the Diet: prior consent required with no exception (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister in accordance with the implementation guidelines|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty| |International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Disaster Relief Law)||(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs|| |International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-5, International Peace Cooperation Law)|When a request is made from the United Nations or other international organizations and agencies to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law|(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: prior consent required in principle only in the cases where the SDF units, etc. conduct ceasefire monitoring and security of specified areas as well as implementing tasks such as providing protection for the purpose of security of specified areas requiring protection (3) Additional requirements: Request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)|❍ Use of weapons to protect one’s own life or body or other personnel on duty ❍ Use of weapons to defense of mandate (when implementing tasks such as providing protection for the purpose of security of specified areas requiring protection as well as providing protection of lives and bodies of individuals engaging in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, etc. or support for those Operations, in response to urgent requests| (All authority referred to in the table is prescribed by applicable law) Notes: 1. Measures based on an assumption of direct armed attacks against Japan and physical damage are not applicable to the situations where an armed attack against a foreign country results in threatening Japan’s survival. 2. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack). 3. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present. 4. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry’s facilities. 5. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.” **Reference 25** **Statutory Provisions about Use of Force and Use of Weapons by SDF Personnel** |Type of Operation|Provision|Content| |---|---|---| |Defense operation|Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.| ||Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.| |Establishment of defense Facilities|Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming existing danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Civil protection dispatch|Article 92-3 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including assistant cast guard officers, are not present.| |Public security operation|Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of the Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.| ||Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it other than the use of weapons.| ||Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.| |Information- gathering duties before public security operation order|Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons within the limit judged to be reasonably necessary depending on situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Guarding operation|Article 91-2 (2), Self- Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.| ||Article 91-2 (3), Self- Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.| |Maritime security Operation|Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.| ||Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows stopping the progression of the vessel that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.| |Counter-piracy operations|Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law|Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.| |||If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.| ----- |Type of Operation|Provision|Content| |---|---|---| |Destruction Measures against ballistic missiles|Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles flying headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.| |Action against violation of Territorial airspace|Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law|The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of necessary actions to make aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.1| |Measures to Rescue Japanese Nationals Overseas|Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties related to rescue measures for Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations when: (1) there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of Japanese nationals and others, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties stated above; (2) there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad|Article 94-6, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese nationals to be evacuated under the management of SDF personnel or of those granted permission to ride the same means of transport. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations that Will Have an Important Influence on Japan’s Peace and Security - Logistics support activities, etc.||SDF personnel ordered to provide services as logistics support activities or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as the U.S. Forces personnel, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law - Ship inspection operations||SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 25 and 26, International Peace Cooperation Act – International peace cooperation operations||SDF personnel engaged in duties in international peace cooperation operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, of International Peace Cooperation Corps, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as personnel of foreign armed forces’ units, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps; (3) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “safety-ensuring” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives, bodies or assets, or those of other individuals, or to eliminate actions which obstruct their duties, in addition to (1) and (2) above; (4) with regard to SDF personnel engaged in so-called “kaketsuke-keigo (coming to protection of individuals related to operations in response to urgent request)” operations, when there are reasonable grounds for judging that there are no appropriate means of overcoming such situations other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, or those of other individuals involved in the operations whom they intend to protect, in addition to (1) and (2) above. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Protection of SDF’s Weapons and Other Equipment|Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties of protecting weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Protection of the weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Forces, armed forces of other countries|Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the U.S. Forces and other foreign armed forces, which are actually engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in cooperation with the SDF (including joint exercises and training, and excluding the activities carried out in the scene where combat activities are actually being conducted), may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary depending on the situations when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Guarding facilities|Article 95-3, Self-Defense Forces Law|SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding the SDF facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably necessary in the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Maintenance of internal order|Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law|Article 7 of The Police Duties Execution Act applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.| |Article 12, The U.S. and others’ Military Actions Related Measures Act||SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent judged to be reasonably depending on necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies of themselves, those of other the SDF personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 37, Maritime Transportation Restriction Act||Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.| |Article 152, Prisoners of War Act||SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| |Article 11, International Peace Support Act||SDF personnel ordered to provide services as cooperation and support operations or to conduct search and rescue operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situations: (1) when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel; (2) in the case where there are attacks against camps, which were established within foreign territories and where SDF units and SDF personnel jointly stationed with personnel from other countries such as those of foreign armed forces, when there are no other places but the camps in the vicinity to ensure the safety of the SDF units and others, and when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons jointly with those foreign personnel to protect their own lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel stationed together at the camps. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.| Note: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under “necessary actions.” ----- **Reference 26** **Record of Joint Exercises for Civil Protection Implemented by the National and Local Governments (FY2015)** **Prefectures that Conducted Joint Exercises More than Once** |Types of Exercise|Date|Location| |---|---|---| |Field exercise|November 19, 2015|Hokkaido Prefecture| ||January 20, 2016|Yamanashi Prefecture| ||January 26, 2016|Kanagawa Prefecture| |Simulation exercise|October 23, 2015|Shizuoka Prefecture| ||November 11, 2015|Akita Prefecture| ||November 12, 2015|Tokyo| ||November 26, 2015|Ehime Prefecture| ||December 18, 2015|Hyogo Prefecture| ||January 13, 2016|Toyama Prefecture| ||January 14, 2016|Mie Prefecture| ||January 19, 2016|Iwate Prefecture| ||January 22, 2016|Tokushima Prefecture| ||January 25, 2016|Nara Prefecture| ||February 3, 2016|Yamaguchi Prefecture| ||February 15, 2016|Fukui Prefecture| Notes: Implemented in 15 Prefectures in FY2007. Implemented in 18 Prefectures in FY2008. Implemented in 14 Prefectures in FY2009. Four times Implemented in 10 Prefectures in FY2010. Implemented in 12 Prefectures in FY2011. Implemented in 11 Prefectures in FY2012. Six times Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) Implemented in 13 Prefectures in FY2014. Eight times Ehime Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) |Number of Times Conducted|Location| |---|---| |Twice|Tochigi Prefecture (2009, 2014), Chiba Prefecture(2007, 2013), Nagano Prefecture (2007, 2008), Aichi Prefecture (2007, 2013), Kyoto Prefecture(2007, 2010), Okayama Prefecture (2008, 2012), Kagawa Prefecture (2009, 2013), Nagasaki Prefecture (2008, 2011), Oita Prefecture (2008, 2014), Kagoshima Prefecture (2007, 2012)| |Three times|Hokkaido Prefecture (2006, 2011,2015), Aomori Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2013), Iwate Prefecture (2009, 2010, 2015), Akita Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2015), Kanagawa Prefecture (2008, 2010, 2015), Saitama Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2010), Niigata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2013), Mie Prefecture (2008,2012, 2015), Gifu Prefecture (2007, 2011, 2014), Hyogo Prefecture (2009, 2011, 2015), Shiga Prefecture (2008, 2012, 2014), Yamaguchi Prefecture (2007, 2008, 2015), Fukuoka Prefecture (2006, 2011, 2014), Kumamoto Prefecture (2007, 2010, 2013), Okinawa Prefecture (2009, 2012, 2013)| |Four times|Yamagata Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014), Ibaraki Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2010, 2014), Tokyo (2006, 2009, 2013, 2015), Tottori Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2006, 2008), Saga Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2011, 2014), Miyazaki Prefecture (2008, 2011, 2012, 2014)| |Six times|Toyama Prefecture (2005, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)| |Eight times|Tokushima Prefecture (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015), Ehime Prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)| |Ten times|Fukui Prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)| **Reference 27** **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative** **Committee** **** **(April 27, 2015)** **A STRONGER ALLIANCE FOR A DYNAMIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT** **The New Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** **1. OVERVIEW** Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter convened the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in New York on April 27, 2015. In light of the evolving security environment, the Ministers reconfirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Ministers announced the approval and release of new, revised “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (the Guidelines), which update the roles and missions of the two countries and promote a more balanced and effective Alliance to meet the emerging security challenges of the 21st century. The Ministers discussed a variety of regional and global challenges, initiatives to enhance bilateral security and defense cooperation in various areas, promotion of enhanced regional cooperation, and moving forward on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. As articulated in its 2015 National Security Strategy, the United States is actively implementing its rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Central to this is the ironclad U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional. Japan highly values U.S. engagement in the region. In this context, the Ministers reaffirmed the indispensable role of the JapanU.S. Alliance in promoting regional peace, security, and prosperity. As Japan continues its policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace,” based on the principle of international cooperation, the United States welcomes and supports Japan’s recent monumental achievements. Among these are: the cabinet decision by the Government of Japan on July 1, 2014, for developing seamless security legislation; the creation of its National Security Council; the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets; the Basic Act on Cybersecurity; the new Basic Plan on Space Policy; and the Development Cooperation Charter. The Ministers affirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance, strengthened by the new Guidelines and the two countries’ respective security and defense policies, continues to serve as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment. The Ministers also reaffirmed that the Senkaku Islands are territories under the administration of Japan and therefore fall within the scope of the commitments under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and that they oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. **2. THE NEW GUIDELINES FOR JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION** The Guidelines, which were first approved on November 27, 1978, and revised on September 23, 1997, have provided a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination. At the SCC meeting in Tokyo on October 3, 2013, the Ministers shared views on the evolving security environment and directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to draft recommended changes to the 1997 Guidelines to ensure that the Alliance continues its vital role in deterring conflict and advancing peace and security. Today, the SCC approved the SDC’s recommended new Guidelines, which accomplishes the objectives outlined by the Ministers in October 2013. The new Guidelines, which replace the 1997 Guidelines, update the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and manifest a strategic vision for a more robust Alliance and greater shared responsibilities by modernizing the Alliance and enhancing its deterrence and response capabilities in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. Recognizing the significance of ensuring consistency between the new Guidelines and Japan’s efforts to develop seamless security legislation, the Ministers acknowledged that such legislation would make bilateral efforts under the new Guidelines more effective. The United States welcomes and supports the ongoing efforts to develop the legislation, which is to reflect Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contributions to Peace” and its July 2014 cabinet decision. The core of the Guidelines continues to be the steadfast commitment to Japan’s peace and security. The new Guidelines detail the ways and means through which the two governments continue to strengthen their ability to fulfill that commitment through seamless, robust, flexible, and effective Alliance responses while expanding bilateral cooperation across a range of other areas, such as: Alliance Coordination Mechanism: Under the new Guidelines the two countries are establishing a standing, whole-of-government mechanism for Alliance coordination, enabling a seamless response in all phases, from peacetime to contingencies. Regional and Global Cooperation: The new Guidelines enable ----- the Alliance to make greater contributions to international security initiatives wherever appropriate in a way consistent with Japanese laws and regulations, such as peacekeeping operations, maritime security, and logistic support. The Ministers reiterated the importance of cooperating with regional and other partners as well as with international organizations. New Strategic Cooperation: A dynamic world requires a modern Alliance, and the new Guidelines lay a foundation for the two countries to cooperate in space and cyberspace and in conducting operations intended to have effects across domains. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: The new Guidelines describe ways the two governments can work together to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation in responding to a large-scale disaster in Japan or around the world. A Strong Foundation: The new Guidelines also describe programs and activities that pay dividends in every aspect of bilateral cooperation, including defense equipment and technology cooperation, intelligence cooperation and information security, and educational and research exchanges. The Ministers confirmed their intention to start bilateral work under the new Guidelines. In this context, the SCC directed the SDC to implement the new Guidelines, including establishing the standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism and upgrading the Bilateral Planning Mechanism, thereby strengthening bilateral planning. The Ministers also expressed their intention to negotiate expeditiously an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement to operationalize the mutual logistics cooperation envisioned by the new Guidelines. **3. BILATERAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION** The Ministers noted with satisfaction ongoing progress to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and response capabilities by enhancing bilateral security and defense cooperation in a variety of areas. The Ministers: - confirmed the strategic importance of deploying the most modern and advanced U.S. capabilities to Japan, which enhances Alliance deterrence and contributes to the security of Japan and the AsiaPacific region. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the deployment of U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to Kadena Air Base, the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base, the deployment of the USS Green Bay, an upgraded amphibious transport ship, and U.S. plans to deploy Marine Corps F-35B aircraft to Japan in 2017. In addition, the Ministers welcomed U.S. plans to deploy additional Aegis ships to Yokosuka Naval Base by 2017, as well as the swap-out of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington with the more advanced USS Ronald Reagan later this year; - committed to continued engagement through the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue, which reinforces the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, including through discussion of nuclear and conventional capabilities; - stressed the importance of sustained cooperation in enhancing Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities, particularly the deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar (X-band radar) system to Kyogamisaki in December 2014 and the planned deployment of two additional BMD-capable destroyers to Japan by 2017. Working in concert, these assets are to directly contribute to the defense of Japan and the United States; - highlighted enhanced collaboration on space security, particularly in the areas of resiliency and developing capabilities, through the whole-of-government Japan-U.S. Comprehensive Dialogue on Space and the Space Security Dialogue. The Ministers also highlighted increased cooperation resulting from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s provision of space situational awareness (SSA) information to the United States, as well as the establishment of a new framework to discuss space-related issues between the two defense authorities; - called for continued progress in cooperation on cyberspace issues, particularly in the areas of threat information sharing, mission assurance, and critical infrastructure protection, through the wholeof-government Japan-U.S. Cyber Dialogue and the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group; - lauded enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation, particularly the rotational deployment of U.S. Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles to Misawa Air Base and Japan’s plans to procure advanced ISR platforms; - praised expanded logistics and defense equipment cooperation, as reflected by Japan’s new Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology and the recent U.S. decision to establish an F-35 regional maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade capability in Japan. The Ministers highlighted strengthened defense equipment cooperation through the linkage of the Systems and Technology Forum and the Alliance Roles, Missions, and Capabilities dialogue, which facilitates joint research and development of advanced capabilities; and - affirmed the importance of enhanced information security cooperation, as reflected by continued progress through the Bilateral Information Security Consultations and by Japan’s implementation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets. As a result of this legislation, the Government of Japan has put in place the policies, practices, and procedures necessary to facilitate the secure exchange of sensitive information in peacetime and during contingencies. In addition, the Ministers affirmed that host nation support has demonstrated continued Japanese support for the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces in Japan, which contributes to Japan’s peace and security in an increasingly complex security environment. The Ministers, noting that the current host nation support commitment, as stipulated in June 2011 SCC documents, expires in March 2016, expressed their intention to start consultations on future arrangements to provide an appropriate level of host nation support. Recognizing the expanding scope of bilateral activities, the Ministers affirmed their intent to consider at the earliest opportunity an appropriate bilateral consultation framework that would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Alliance management processes. **4. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION** Recognizing the Japan-U.S. Alliance as the cornerstone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region as well as a platform for promoting a more peaceful and stable international security environment, the Ministers highlighted recent progress in the following areas: - Increased cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations, as reflected by close coordination in responding to the November 2013 typhoon in the Philippines; - Continued close coordination on partner capacity building, particularly in Southeast Asia, including through the provision of coastal patrol vessels and other maritime security capacity building endeavors; and - Expanded trilateral and multilateral cooperation, particularly with key partners such as the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Australia, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Ministers highlighted the recent signing of a trilateral information sharing arrangement with the ROK concerning the nuclear and missile threats posed by North Korea, and resolved to utilize the framework as the foundation for expanded trilateral cooperation into the future. The Ministers also affirmed their intention to pursue closer cooperation with Australia on capacity building activities in Southeast Asia, and on security and defense issues through the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum. **5. REALIGNMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN** The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ continued commitment to implement the existing arrangements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan as soon as possible, while ensuring operational capability, including training capability, throughout the process. The Ministers underscored their commitment to maintaining a robust and flexible force posture that enhances deterrence by strengthening the capability to respond effectively to future challenges and threats, while also mitigating the impact of U.S. forces on local communities. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the relocation of the KC-130 squadron from Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni and confirmed their commitment to continue aviation training relocation, including to locations outside of Okinawa, through efforts such as the development of training areas and facilities. As an essential element of this effort, the Ministers reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma. The Ministers reaffirmed the two governments’ unwavering commitment to the plan and underscored their strong determination to achieve its completion and the long-desired return of MCAS Futenma to Japan. The United States welcomes the steady and continuing progress of FRF construction projects. The Ministers also reconfirmed the importance of land returns south of Kadena Air Base based on the 2006 “Roadmap” and the April 2013 Consolidation Plan, and reiterated the two governments’ determination ----- to work continuously on the implementation of the plan and anticipated the update of the plan by Spring 2016. The Ministers highlighted the on-time return of the West Futenma Housing Area of Camp Zukeran on March 31 of this year, which marked the most significant land return completed to date in accordance with the plan. The Ministers confirmed that the two governments are steadily implementing the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, including Guam, based upon the amended Guam International Agreement. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to protect the environment and confirmed the importance of making further efforts in environmental matters. To that end, the Ministers welcomed progress on a supplementary Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship and confirmed their intention to continue negotiating the ancillary documents of the Agreement as expeditiously as possible. **Reference 28 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation** **(April 27, 2015)** **I. Defense Cooperation and the Aim of the Guidelines** In order to ensure Japan’s peace and security under any circumstances, from peacetime to contingencies, and to promote a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region and beyond, bilateral security and defense cooperation will emphasize: - seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; - synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; - a whole-of-government Alliance approach; - cooperation with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations; and - the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The two governments will continuously enhance the JapanU.S. Alliance. Each government will maintain its individual defense posture based on its national security policy. Japan will possess defense capability on the basis of the “National Security Strategy” and the “National Defense Program Guidelines”. The United States will continue to extend deterrence to Japan through the full range of capabilities, including U.S. nuclear forces. The United States also will continue to forward deploy combat-ready forces in the AsiaPacific region and maintain the ability to reinforce those forces rapidly. The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (“the Guidelines”) provide the general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of Japan and the United States, as well as ways of cooperation and coordination, with a view to improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation. In this way, the Guidelines advance peace and security, deter conflict, secure the basis for economic prosperity, and promote domestic and international understanding of the significance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. **II. Basic Premises and Principles** The Guidelines, as well as actions and activities under the Guidelines, are and will be consistent with the following basic premises and principles. A. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, will remain unchanged. B. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States under the Guidelines will be consistent with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and its provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of States, as well as other relevant international agreements. C. All actions and activities undertaken by Japan and the United States will be in accordance with their respective constitutions, laws, and regulations then in effect, and basic positions on national security policy. Japan will conduct actions and activities in accordance with its basic positions, such as the maintenance of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles. D. The Guidelines do not obligate either government to take legislative, budgetary, administrative, or other measures, nor do the Guidelines create legal rights or obligations for either government. Since the objective of the Guidelines, however, is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgment, in their specific policies and measures. **III. Strengthened Alliance Coordination** Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require the two governments to conduct close, consultative dialogue and sound policy and operational coordination from peacetime to contingencies. The two governments must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral security and defense cooperation. To that end, the two governments will take advantage of all available channels to enhance information sharing and to ensure seamless and effective whole-of-government Alliance coordination that includes all relevant agencies. For this purpose, the two governments will establish a new, standing Alliance Coordination Mechanism, enhance operational coordination, and strengthen bilateral planning. A. Alliance Coordination Mechanism Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on the peace and security of Japan and the United States. In order to address seamlessly and effectively any situation that affects Japan’s peace and security or any other situation that may require an Alliance response, the two governments will utilize the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. This mechanism will strengthen policy and operational coordination related to activities conducted by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in all phases from peacetime to contingencies. This mechanism also will contribute to timely information sharing as well as the development and maintenance of common situational awareness. To ensure effective coordination, the two governments will establish necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems) and conduct regular training and exercises. The two governments will tailor to the situation the procedures for coordination as well as the exact composition of participating agencies within the Alliance Coordination Mechanism structure. As part of these procedures, contact information will be shared and maintained from peacetime. B. Enhanced Operational Coordination Enhanced bilateral operational coordination for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States. In this context, the two governments recognize the continued importance of collocating operational coordination functions to strengthen cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange personnel to ensure robust information sharing, to facilitate coordination from peacetime to contingencies, and to support international activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in close cooperation and coordination, will take action through their respective chains-ofcommand. C. Bilateral Planning The two governments will continue to develop and update bilateral plans to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated operations by the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. To ensure the effectiveness of the plans and the ability to make flexible, timely, and appropriate responses, the two governments will exchange relevant information, including identifying operational and logistic support requirements and sources in advance, as appropriate. The two governments will conduct bilateral planning in peacetime for contingencies relevant to Japan’s peace and security through an upgraded Bilateral Planning Mechanism, which includes relevant agencies of the respective governments. Bilateral plans will be developed with input from relevant agencies, as appropriate. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) will continue to be responsible for presenting directions, validating the progress of the planning under the mechanism, and issuing directives as necessary. The SCC will be assisted by an appropriate subordinate body. Bilateral plans are to be reflected appropriately in the plans of both governments. ----- **IV. Seamlessly Ensuring Japan’s Peace and Security** Persistent and emerging threats can have a serious and immediate impact on Japan’s peace and security. In this increasingly complex security environment, the two governments will take measures to ensure Japan’s peace and security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies, including situations when an armed attack against Japan is not involved. In this context, the two governments also will promote further cooperation with partners. The two governments recognize that these measures need to be taken based on flexible, timely, and effective bilateral coordination tailored to each situation and that interagency coordination is essential for appropriate Alliance responses. Therefore, the two governments will utilize the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to: - assess the situation; - share information; and - develop ways to implement the appropriate Alliance response, including flexible deterrent options, as well as actions aimed at deescalation. To support these bilateral efforts, the two governments also will coordinate strategic messaging through appropriate channels on issues that could potentially affect Japan’s peace and security. A. Cooperative Measures from Peacetime In order to ensure the maintenance of Japan’s peace and security, the two governments will promote cooperation across a wide range of areas, including through diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the deterrence and capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will enhance interoperability, readiness, and vigilance to prepare for all possible situations. To these ends, the two governments will take measures, including, but not limited to, the following: 1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance In order to identify at the earliest possible stage any indications of threats to Japan’s peace and security and to ensure a decisive advantage in intelligence gathering and analysis, the two governments will share and protect information and intelligence, while developing and maintaining common situational awareness. This will include enhancing coordination and cooperation among relevant agencies. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities based on the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect Japan’s peace and security. 2. Air and Missile Defense The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain and strengthen deterrence and their defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. The two governments will cooperate to expand early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and realtime information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles. Moreover, the two governments will continue to coordinate closely in responding to provocative missile launches and other aerial activities. 3. Maritime Security The two governments will cooperate closely with each other on measures to maintain maritime order based upon international law, including freedom of navigation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, on various efforts such as maintaining and enhancing bilateral presence in the maritime domain through ISR and training and exercises, while further developing and enhancing shared maritime domain awareness including by coordinating with relevant agencies, as necessary. 4. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual protection of each other’s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner, including during training and exercises. 5. Training and Exercises The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct effective bilateral and multilateral training and exercises both inside and outside of Japan in order to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. Timely and realistic training and exercises will enhance deterrence. To support these activities, the two governments will cooperate to ensure that training areas, facilities, and associated equipment are available, accessible, and modern. 6. Logistic Support Japan and the United States are primarily responsible for providing logistic support for their respective forces in all phases. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide mutual logistic support where appropriate, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services, for such activities as set forth in the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) and its related arrangements. 7. Use of Facilities In order to expand interoperability and improve flexibility and resiliency of the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, the two governments will enhance joint/ shared use and cooperate in ensuring the security of facilities and areas. Recognizing the importance of being prepared for contingencies, the two governments also will cooperate in conducting site surveys on facilities including civilian airports and seaports, as appropriate. B. Responses to Emerging Threats to Japan’s Peace and Security The Alliance will respond to situations that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. Such situations cannot be defined geographically. The measures described in this section include those that may be taken, in accordance with the two countries’ respective laws and regulations, in circumstances that have not yet amounted to such a situation. Early recognition and adaptable, resolute decision-making on bilateral actions will contribute to deterrence and de-escalation of such situations. In addition to continuing cooperative measures from peacetime, the two governments will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to ensure the peace and security of Japan. Utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, the two governments will take additional measures, based on their own decisions, including, but not limited to, those listed below. 1. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations When Japanese and U.S. noncombatants need to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals, as well as dealing with the authorities of the affected area. As appropriate, the two governments will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out evacuations of Japanese or U.S. noncombatants. These evacuations will be carried out using each country’s capabilities such as transportation means and facilities in a mutually supplementary manner. The two governments may each consider extending evacuation assistance to third-country noncombatants. The two governments will conduct early-stage coordination through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, to carry out cooperation in fields such as the safety of evacuees, transportation means and facilities, customs, immigration and quarantine processing, safe havens, and medical services. The two governments will enhance coordination in noncombatant evacuation operations from peacetime, as appropriate, including by conducting training and exercises. 2. Maritime Security Taking into account their respective capabilities, the two governments will cooperate closely to enhance maritime security. Cooperative measures may include, but are not limited to, information sharing and inspection of ships based on a United Nations Security Council resolution or other basis under international law. 3. Measures to Deal with Refugees If a situation develops such that a flow of refugees into Japan becomes likely or actually begins, the two governments will cooperate to maintain Japan’s peace and security while ----- handling refugees in a humane manner consistent with applicable obligations under international law. Primary responsibility for such refugee response lies with Japan. The United States will provide appropriate support upon a request from Japan. 4. Search and Rescue The two governments will cooperate and provide mutual support, as appropriate, in search and rescue operations. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will provide support to combat search and rescue operations by the United States, where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 5. Protection of Facilities and Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces are responsible for protecting their own facilities and areas in cooperation with relevant authorities. Upon request from the United States, Japan will provide additional protection for facilities and areas in Japan in close cooperation and coordination with the United States Armed Forces. 6. Logistic Support The two governments will enhance mutual logistic support (which includes, but is not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services), as appropriate, to enable effective and efficient operations. This includes rapid validation and resourcing of operational and logistic support requirements. The Government of Japan will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies as well as private sector assets. The Government of Japan will provide logistic or other associated support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. 7. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, temporary use of facilities, including civilian airports and seaports, in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. C. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation. When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will take steps to deter the armed attack and to deescalate the situation, while making preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan occurs, the two governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage and to deter any further attacks. The two governments also will take necessary measures including those listed earlier in Chapter IV. 1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Anticipated When an armed attack against Japan is anticipated, the two governments will intensify, through a comprehensive and robust whole-of-government approach, information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and will pursue all avenues, including diplomatic efforts, to deter the attack and to de-escalate the situation. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will assume appropriate postures for bilateral operations, including the execution of necessary deployments. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for its support of U.S. deployments. The preparations by the two governments may include, but would not be limited to: joint/shared use of facilities and areas; mutual logistic support, including, but not limited to, supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering, and medical services; and reinforced protection of U.S. facilities and areas in Japan. 2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Occurs a. Principles for Coordinated Actions If an armed attack against Japan occurs despite diplomatic efforts and deterrence, Japan and the United States will cooperate to repel promptly the attack and deter any further attacks to return peace and security to Japan. Such coordinated actions will contribute to the reestablishment of peace and security in the region. Japan will maintain primary responsibility for defending the citizens and territory of Japan and will take actions immediately to repel an armed attack against Japan as expeditiously as possible. The Self-Defense Forces will have the primary responsibility to conduct defensive operations in Japan and its surrounding waters and airspace, as well as its air and maritime approaches. The United States will coordinate closely with Japan and provide appropriate support. The United States Armed Forces will support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces to defend Japan. The United States will take actions to shape the regional environment in a way that supports the defense of Japan and reestablishes peace and security. Recognizing that all instruments of national power will be required to defend Japan, the two governments respectively will employ a whole-of-government approach, utilizing their respective chains-of-command, to coordinate actions through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism. The United States will employ forward-deployed forces, including those stationed in Japan, and introduce reinforcements from elsewhere, as required. Japan will establish and maintain the basis required to facilitate these deployments. The two governments will take actions as appropriate to provide defense of each other’s forces and facilities in response to an armed attack against Japan. b. Concept of Operations i. Operations to Defend Airspace The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend airspace above and surrounding Japan. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting air defense operations while ensuring air superiority. For this purpose, the SelfDefense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, defense against attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. ii. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ballistic missile attacks against Japan. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will exchange real-time information for early detection of ballistic missile launches. When there is an indication of a ballistic missile attack, the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will maintain an effective posture to defend against ballistic missile attacks heading for Japan and to protect forces participating in ballistic missile defense operations. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting ballistic missile defense operations to defend Japan. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. iii. Operations to Defend Maritime Areas The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to defend waters surrounding Japan and to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan and of ships and vessels in waters surrounding Japan and for other associated operations. For this purpose, the Self-Defense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, coastal defense, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, anti-air warfare, and air interdiction. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries ----- involved in the armed attack. The effectiveness of these activities will be enhanced through information sharing and other forms of cooperation among relevant agencies. iv. Operations to Counter Ground Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations to counter ground attacks against Japan by ground, air, maritime, or amphibious forces. The Self-Defense Forces will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to prevent and repel ground attacks, including those against islands. If the need arises, the Self-Defense Forces will conduct operations to retake an island. For this purpose, the SelfDefense Forces will take necessary actions, including, but not limited to, operations to prevent and repel airborne and seaborne invasions, amphibious operations, and rapid deployment. The Self-Defense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, also will have primary responsibility for defeating attacks by special operations forces or any other unconventional attacks in Japan, including those that involve infiltration. The United States Armed Forces will conduct operations to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces’ operations. v. Cross-Domain Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct bilateral operations across domains to repel an armed attack against Japan and to deter further attacks. These operations will be designed to achieve effects across multiple domains simultaneously. Examples of cooperation across domains include the actions described below. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, as appropriate, will strengthen their respective ISR postures, enhance the sharing of intelligence, and provide protection for each other’s ISR assets. The United States Armed Forces may conduct operations involving the use of strike power, to support and supplement the Self-Defense Forces. When the United States Armed Forces conduct such operations, the SelfDefense Forces may provide support, as necessary. These operations will be based on close bilateral coordination, as appropriate. The two governments will cooperate to address threats in the space and cyberspace domains in accordance with bilateral cooperation set out in Chapter VI. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces’ special operations forces will cooperate during operations, as appropriate. c. Operational Support Activities The two governments will cooperate in the following activities in support of bilateral operations. i. Communications and Electronics The two governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will ensure effective communication between the two forces and maintain a common operational picture for bilateral operations under common situational awareness. ii. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide mutual support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. iii. Logistic Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. iv. Use of Facilities The Government of Japan will provide, as needed, additional facilities in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The two governments will enhance cooperation in joint/shared use of facilities and areas. v. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Protection The Government of Japan will maintain primary responsibility for emergency responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents or attacks in Japan. The United States retains primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring the mission capability of the United States Armed Forces in Japan. At Japan’s request, the United States will support Japan in CBRN incident or attack prevention and response-related activities in an effort to ensure the protection of Japan, as appropriate. D. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan When Japan and the United States each decides to take actions involving the use of force in accordance with international law, including full respect for sovereignty, and with their respective Constitutions and laws to respond to an armed attack against the United States or a third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack, they will cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the United States will cooperate as appropriate with other countries taking action in response to the armed attack. The Self-Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people. Examples of cooperative operations are outlined below: 1. Asset Protection The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in asset protection, as appropriate. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or Ballistic Missile Defense. 2. Search and Rescue The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue, as appropriate. 3. Maritime Operations The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in minesweeping, as appropriate, including to secure the safety of sea lines of communication. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack, as appropriate. 4. Operations to Counter Ballistic Missile Attacks The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles, as appropriate, in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two governments will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches. 5. Logistics Support When operations require supplementing their respective logistics resources, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will provide flexible and timely mutual logistic support, based on their respective capabilities and ----- availability. The two governments will make appropriate use of the authorities and assets of central and local government agencies, as well as private sector assets, to provide support. E. Cooperation in Response to a Large-scale Disaster in Japan When a large-scale disaster takes place in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility for responding to the disaster. The SelfDefense Forces, in cooperation with relevant agencies, local governments, and private actors, will conduct disaster relief operations. Recognizing that immediate recovery from a largescale disaster in Japan is essential for Japan’s peace and security and that such a disaster could affect the activities of the United States Armed Forces in Japan, the United States, in accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities. Such support may include search and rescue, transportation, supply, medical services, incident awareness and assessment, and other specialized capabilities. The two governments will coordinate activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate. To improve the effectiveness of the United States Armed Forces’ cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in Japan, the two governments will work together closely, including through information sharing. In addition, the United States Armed Forces also may participate in disasterrelated drills, which will increase mutual understanding in responding to large-scale disasters. **V. Cooperation for Regional and Global Peace and Security** In an increasingly interconnected world, Japan and the United States will take a leading role in cooperation with partners to provide a foundation for peace, security, stability, and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. For well over half a century, both countries have worked together to deliver effective solutions to challenges in diverse regions of the world. When each of the two governments decides to participate in international activities for the peace and security of the region and beyond, the two governments, including the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces, will cooperate closely with each other and with partners, as appropriate, such as in the activities described below. This cooperation also will contribute to the peace and security of both countries. A. Cooperation in International Activities The two governments will participate in international activities, based on their own judgment. When working together, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate to the maximum extent practicable. The two governments may coordinate the activities through the Alliance Coordination Mechanism, as appropriate, and also will pursue trilateral and multilateral cooperation in these activities. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will share procedures and best practices, as appropriate, for smooth and effective cooperation. While the two governments will continue to cooperate on a broad array of issues that may not be explicitly included in the Guidelines, common areas for cooperation by the two governments in regional and international activities will include: 1. Peacekeeping Operations When the two governments participate in peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations (UN) in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate, to maximize interoperability between the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces. The two governments also may cooperate in providing logistic support for and protecting UN and other personnel who participate in the same mission, as appropriate. 2. International Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief When the two governments conduct international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale humanitarian and natural disasters, the two governments will cooperate closely to provide mutual support, as appropriate, maximizing interoperability between participating Self-Defense Forces and United States Armed Forces. Examples of cooperative activities may include mutual logistic support and operational coordination, planning, and execution. 3. Maritime Security When the two governments conduct activities for maritime security, the two governments will cooperate closely, as appropriate. Examples of cooperative activities may include efforts for: safe and secure sea lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and counterterrorism activities. 4. Partner Capacity Building Proactive cooperation with partners will contribute to maintaining and enhancing regional and international peace and security. The two governments will cooperate in capacity building activities, as appropriate, by making the best use of their capabilities and experience, with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. Examples of cooperative activities may include maritime security, military medicine, defense institution building, and improved force readiness for HA/DR or peacekeeping operations. 5. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations In circumstances when international action is required for the evacuation of noncombatants, the two governments will utilize, as appropriate, all possible avenues including diplomatic efforts to ensure the safety of noncombatants, including those who are Japanese or U.S. nationals. 6. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance When the two governments participate in international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate in ISR activities, as appropriate, based on the respective capabilities and availability of their assets. 7. Training and Exercises In order to enhance the effectiveness of international activities, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will conduct and participate in joint training and exercises, as appropriate, to strengthen interoperability, sustainability, and readiness. The two governments also will continue to pursue opportunities to work with partners in training and exercises to contribute to enhancing interoperability with the Alliance and the development of common tactics, techniques, and procedures. 8. Logistic support When participating in international activities, the two governments will cooperate to provide mutual logistic support. The Government of Japan will provide logistic support where appropriate, subject to Japanese laws and regulations. B. Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation The two governments will promote and improve trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation. In particular, the two governments will reinforce efforts and seek additional opportunities to cooperate with regional and other partners, as well as international organizations. The two governments also will work together to strengthen regional and international institutions with a view to promoting cooperation based upon international law and standards. **VI. Space and Cyberspace Cooperation** A. Cooperation on Space Recognizing the security aspects of the space domain, the two governments will maintain and strengthen their partnership to secure the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space. As part of such efforts, the two governments will ensure the resiliency of their space systems and enhance space situational awareness cooperation. The two governments will provide mutual support, as appropriate, to establish and improve capabilities and will share information about actions and events that might affect the safety and stability of the space domain and impede its use. The two governments also will share information to address emerging threats against space systems and will pursue opportunities for cooperation in maritime domain awareness and in space-related equipment and technology that will strengthen capabilities and resiliency of the space systems, including hosted payloads. To accomplish their missions effectively and efficiently, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will continue to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing space in such areas as: early-warning; ISR; positioning, navigation, and timing; space situational ----- awareness; meteorological observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of relevant space systems that are critical for mission assurance. In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities. B. Cooperation on Cyberspace To help ensure the safe and stable use of cyberspace, the two governments will share information on threats and vulnerabilities in cyberspace in a timely and routine manner, as appropriate. The two governments also will share, as appropriate, information on the development of various capabilities in cyberspace, including the exchange of best practices on training and education. The two governments will cooperate to protect critical infrastructure and the services upon which the Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces depend to accomplish their missions, including through information sharing with the private sector, as appropriate. The Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces will: - maintain a posture to monitor their respective networks and systems; - share expertise and conduct educational exchanges in cybersecurity; - ensure resiliency of their respective networks and systems to achieve mission assurance; - contribute to whole-of-government efforts to improve cybersecurity; and - conduct bilateral exercises to ensure effective cooperation for cybersecurity in all situations from peacetime to contingencies. In the event of cyber incidents against Japan, including those against critical infrastructure and services utilized by the SelfDefense Forces and the United States Armed Forces in Japan, Japan will have primary responsibility to respond, and based on close bilateral coordination, the United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. The two governments also will share relevant information expeditiously and appropriately. In the event of serious cyber incidents that affect the security of Japan, including those that take place when Japan is under an armed attack, the two governments will consult closely and take appropriate cooperative actions to respond. **VII. Bilateral Enterprise** The two governments will develop and enhance the following areas as a foundation of security and defense cooperation, in order to improve further the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation: A. Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation In order to enhance interoperability and to promote efficient acquisition and maintenance, the two governments will: - cooperate in joint research, development, production, and test and evaluation of equipment and in mutual provision of components of common equipment and services; - strengthen the basis to repair and maintain common equipment for mutual efficiency and readiness; - facilitate reciprocal defense procurement to enhance efficient acquisition, interoperability, and defense equipment and technology cooperation; and - explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on defense equipment and technology. B. Intelligence Cooperation and Information Security Recognizing that common situational awareness is essential, the two governments will enhance intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels, including the national strategic level. In order to enable robust intelligence cooperation and information sharing, the two governments will continue to promote cooperation in strengthening policies, practices, and procedures related to the protection of classified information. The two governments also will explore opportunities for cooperation with partners on information sharing. C. Educational and Research Exchanges Recognizing the importance of intellectual cooperation concerning security and defense, the two governments will deepen exchanges of members of relevant organizations and strengthen communication between each side’s research and educational institutions. Such efforts will serve as the enduring foundation for security and defense officials to share their knowledge and reinforce cooperation. **VIII. Processes for Review** The SCC, assisted by an appropriate subordinate body, will regularly evaluate whether the Guidelines remain adequate in light of the evolving circumstances. The two governments will update the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. Alliance relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time. **Reference 29** **United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment** **Implementation**  (Washington, DC, May 1, 2006) **Overview** On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, “U.S.– Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future.” In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs “to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006.” This work has been completed and is reflected in this document. **Finalization of Realignment Initiatives** The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan. The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities. **Key Implementation Details** 1. Realignment on Okinawa (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)  The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a “V”-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.  In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.  Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.  Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.  Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.  Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.  In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.  The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility. (b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam  Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, ----- 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.  The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.  The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.  Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road. (c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities  Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.  Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:  Camp Kuwae: Total return.  Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.  MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).  Makiminato Service Area: Total return.  aha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).  Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.  All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.  While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.  Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.  ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities. (d) Relationships among Initiatives  Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.  Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.  The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam. 2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability  U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.  Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.  In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.  Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.  A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.  Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate. 3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace  ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.  A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared use equipment and systems.  The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.  Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.  Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.  Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.  Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.  The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.  The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.  Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilianmilitary dual-use. 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni  The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.  Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.  The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.  U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam. -----  Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.  A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent fieldcarrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.  Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni. 5. Missile Defense  As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.  The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.  The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.  U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time. 6. Training Relocation  Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.  Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities — Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni — will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.  The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.  Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.  In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.  At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.  The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness. (Attached conceptual diagram omitted) **Reference 30 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative** **Committee** **** **(April 27, 2012)** **Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (Outline)** **Preamble** (1) The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap. (2) The Ministers decided to delink both the relocation of the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility. (3) The Ministers affirmed that the new posture of the U.S. Marine Corps, coupled with the enhancement of Japan’s defense posture and promotion of bilateral dynamic defense cooperation, would strengthen the deterrence capabilities of the overall U.S.-Japan Alliance. **I. Unit Composition in Guam and Okinawa** (1) The United States will locate Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii and establish rotational deployment in Australia. (2) Approximately 9,000 Marines will be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan. (3) The end-state for the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa will be consistent with the levels in the Realignment Roadmap. (4) There will be approximately 5,000 Marines in Guam. (5) The preliminary cost estimate by the U.S. Government for the relocation of Marines to Guam is $8.6 billion. Japan’s financial commitment will be the fiscal spending in the 2009 Guam International Agreement (up to $2.8 billion in U.S. fiscal year 2008 dollars). Other forms of financial support (investment or loan) will not be utilized. Any contributions under the cooperation in 2. (2) below will be a part of the aforementioned commitment. **II. New Initiatives to Promote Regional Peace, Stability, and Prosperity** (1) The Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The government of Japan will take various measures, including strategic use of ODA (ex: providing coastal states with patrol boats). (2) The two governments will consider cooperation for developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands for shared-use by the two countries, and will identify areas of cooperation by the end of 2012. **III. Land Returns in Okinawa** (1) (i) Areas eligible for immediate return upon completion of procedures: Portions of Camp Zukeran (West Futenma Housing area and a portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound), portions of Makiminato Service Area (north access road, area near Gate 5) (ii) Areas eligible for return following relocation within Okinawa: Portions of Makiminato Service Area (including the preponderance of the storage area), portions of Camp Zukeran (Industrial Corridor, etc.), Camp Kuwae, Naha Port, Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 (iii) Areas eligible for return following Marine Corps’ relocation to locations outside of Japan: Portions of Camp Zukeran, the remainder of Makiminato Service Area (2) The two countries will jointly develop a consolidation plan for facilities and areas remaining in Okinawa by the end of 2012. **IV. Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and MCAS Futenma** (1) The Ministers reconfirmed that the existing relocation proposal is the only viable solution. (2) The two countries will contribute mutually to refurbishment projects necessary to safely operate MCAS Futenma until the FRF is fully operational and to protect the environment. (END) For the full text of the Joint Statement, see the MOD website. (http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/anpo/kyougi/js20120427.html) ----- **Reference 31** **Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2013)** |Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results| |---|---|---|---| |Apr. 29, 2013|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Agreed on the significance of taking the Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship up to the next step • Confirmed from the U.S that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands and statement against unilateral actions forcefully trying to change the status quo on it • Welcomed the progress of discussion on perceptions of strategic environment, which were presupposed for reviewing the Guidelines, and agreed to continue intensive discussions • Confirmed the establishment of defense ISR working group and confirmed progress in deliberation on joint warning and surveillance activities from peacetime • Agreed to accelerate the works toward early deployment of TPY-2 radar to Japan • Agreed to steadily make progress on the USFJ realignment| |Aug. 28, 2013|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Brunei|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue • Confirmed the importance of further promotion of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation in the area of cyber security • Welcomed the progress of bilateral discussions on strategic environment perspective, which serve as a basis for the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and agreed to vigorously continue their discussion • Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan • Following the crash accident of an HH-60 helicopter, Japan requested the U.S. to pay due consideration for public safety, take safety measures and investigate the cause of the accident. Secretary Hagel stated that he will ensure utmost safety of local areas • Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey.| |Oct. 3, 2013|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue • Confirmed to develop trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK • Welcomed the establishment of the “Cyber Defense Policy Working Group (CDPWG)” as a framework between Japanese and U.S. defense officials • Agreed to vigorously continue their discussion on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Agreed to accelerate work for the early deployment of a TPY-2 radar system • Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan • Exchanged views on safe operation of the MV-22 Osprey| |Oct. 3, 2013|Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”)/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Onodera Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Hagel Secretary of State Kerry|• Resolve to be full partners in a more balanced and effective Alliance • Welcomed Japanese efforts to prepare to establish its National Security Council (NSC) and issue its National Security Strategy (NSS), to reexamine the legal basis for its security, to expand its defense budget, to review its National Defense Program Guidelines, and to strengthen its capability to defend its sovereign territory • Directed the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to complete work on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation before the end of 2014 • Agreed to strengthen bilateral cooperation in security and defense, including cyberspace and space • Agreed to strengthen cooperation in the region, including trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia as well as among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK • Confirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area is the only solution that avoids the continued use of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma • Announced the signing of a Protocol to amend the 2009 Guam International Agreement • Confirmed that deployment of more advanced capabilities in Japan, such as U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and Global Hawk unmanned aircraft, has strategic significance| |Apr. 6, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands issue • Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Agreed to advance trilateral cooperation, including cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and Australia and among Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, and also to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Secretary Hagel stated that he plans to deploy two additional BMD (ballistic missile defense)-equipped Aegis ships to Japan by 2017 • Minister Onodera explained the gist of “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology,” and secretary welcomed Japan’s effort in this area • Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. would further accelerate specific cooperation in efforts to mitigate the impact on Okinawa • Welcomed the recent progress in the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan| |May. 31, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Minister Onodera welcomed the temporary deployment of Global Hawk to Misawa Air Base and the additional deployment of a second AN/TPY-2 radar system to Japan • Agreed to continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Minister Onodera explained that the Japanese government has begun domestic discussions on Japan’s defense policy. The U.S. welcomed and supported such efforts by Japan • Agreed to strengthen deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance by steadily making progress in broad bilateral defense cooperation, including the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation • Agreed to steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan • Agreed to promptly and steadily make progress on the realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan, including construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility • Confirmed that Japan and the U.S. will accelerate specific cooperation in mitigating the impact on Okinawa| |Jul. 11, 2014|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Onodera Secretary of Defense Hagel|• Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands • Agreed to oppose any coercive attempt to alter the status quo in the East China Sea and other areas • Agreed in addition to close bilateral cooperation between Japan and the U.S. to advanc trilateral cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and the ROK and Japan, the U.S., and Australia • The Japanese side explained the purport of the Cabinet decision on the development of a new security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. • Agreed to release an interim report on the work to revise the Guidelines at an appropriate timing • Agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology in light of the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology • Agreed to proceed swiftly and steadily with the realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Camp Schwab • Welcomed the relocation of KC-130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni • The Japanese side raised the issue of noise caused by the flight of transient aircrafts at MCAS Futenma, among other matters. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.| ----- |Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results| |---|---|---|---| |Apr. 8, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Tokyo|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Confirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands • Agreed that they would continue to oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in any area, including the East China Sea • Confirmed strong intent to further deepen the Japan-U.S. Alliance through the process of the revision of the Guidelines • The Japanese side explained the status of discussions pertaining to the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported this effort. • Instructed their respective authorities to consider establishing a new framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities, bearing in mind that risks to the stable use of space and cyberspace are common security challenges to the two countries • Welcomed the progress on the efforts to develop a maintenance base shared by the two countries, namely, the U.S. decision to establish a regional depot for the F-35 in Japan, and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation on equipment and technology • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side requested continued cooperation to mitigrate impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side expressed its commitment to discuss measures to mitigate the impact of the presence of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa.| |Apr. 27, 2015|Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Meeting/ New York|Minister of Defense Nakatani Minister for Foreign Affairs Kishida Secretary of Defense Carter Secretary of State Kerry|• Released the new Guidelines, and confirmed that they would further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance • Reaffirmed U.S. position on the Senkaku Islands (reiterated in the Joint Statement) • Shared recognition on the importance of “rule of law,” including the recent situation in the South China Sea, and agreed that unilateral attempts to alter the status quo cannot be neglected and they would work with the international community to advance various efforts • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side requested cooperation to mitigaty the impact on Okinawa. The U.S. side is committed to mitigating impact. • Confirmed intent to continue negotiation on the ancillary documents of a supplementary Agreemet on cooperation in the Field of Environmental Stewardship as quickly as possible| |Apr. 28, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Washington, D.C.|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Exchanged views on the situation in the South China Sea, and agreed to continue to strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries • Agreed to further advance Japan-U.S.-ROK defense cooperation • Confirmed that the new Guidelines will strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the importance of swiftly implementing the new Guidelines • The Japanese side explained the development of the security legislation. The U.S. side welcomed and supported Japan’s efforts in this regard. • Welcomed the establishment of the “Space Cooperation Working Group” as a framework for cooperation related to space between the two defense authorities • Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue efforts such as realizing bilateral plans pertaining to U.S. base the consolidation in Okinawa. • Agreed to seek early agreement on a framework for reciprocal defense procurement and to further deepen equipment and technology cooperation.| |May 30, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Agreed that they would oppose any coercive attempt that would alter the status quo in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and other areas • Agreed to further advance trilateral defense cooperation, such as Japan-U.S.-ROK and Japan-U.S.-Australia cooperation • Agreed to continue strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in terms of contributing to regional peace and stability • The Japanese side explained the recent Cabinet decision on the Peace and Security Legislation and the commencement of Diet deliberations. Confirmed that the legislation would lead to ensuring the effectiveness of the new Guidelines. • Confirmed that they would continue to make steady efforts to ensure the effectiveness of the new Guidelines, such as establishing the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism, developing bilateral plans, and expeditions negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement • Welcomed the fact that the outcome of the discussions in the Cyber Defense Policy Working Group was compiled, and agreed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation on cyberspace • The Japanese side explained that it will continue to make every effort to realize the return of MCAS Futenma and its relocation to Camp Schwab as quickly as possible, and stated that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on mitigating the impact on Okinawa. • The Japanese side stated that it is explaining to the Japanese people that the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey to Japan from 2017 would enhance deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and contribute to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. However, in light of the accident in Hawaii, the Japanese side requested provision of necessary information focused on ensuring safety, including information on the accident. The U.S. side stated that it would provide necessary information and ensure safe operation of the Osprey, including the MV-22 already deployed to Japan.| |Nov. 3, 2015|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Malaysia|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Agreed that they would oppose any attempt to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and South China Sea and confirmed that they would carry out maritime operations in accordance with international law. • The Japanese side stated that it will support the U.S. Force’s activities in the South China Sea. Confirmed that they will continue to carry out the Japan-U.S. joint exercises, and that they will also continue to strengthen cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. • In light of North Korea’s posture to continue activities for launching extended range ballistic missiles, confirmed that Japan and the United States will continue to closely cooperate on this matter. • Agreed to reinforce trilateral defense cooperation with ROK, Australia, and the Philippines. • The Japanese side explained the recent enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security, and stated its intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance under this legislation. The U.S. side stated that they would support and welcome the enactment of this legislation. • Welcomed the establishment of the new Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) and the Bilateral Planning Mechanism (BPM). Confirmed that they would continue to steadily make progress to the initiatives for ensuring effectiveness of the new Guidelines including the strengthening of cooperation with respect to space and cyber security. • The Japanese side explained that it continues to make its utmost efforts to realize the return of MCAS Futenma and its relocation to Camp Schwab as soon as possible. Reaffirmed that the relocation to Camp Schwab is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma. • The Japanese side explained the importance of mitigating the impact on Okinawa including the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps personnel in Okinawa to Guam and the implementation of exercises and trainings outside Okinawa Prefecture, and requested U.S. cooperation. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate on this matter. • The Japanese side requested that the U.S. Force minimize the impact on the local residents in the relevant areas associated with their operation and give maximum consideration to the aspect of safety. The U.S. side expressed its intention to always ensure maximum safety of both the local residents and the U.S. Forces personnel. • Regarding the Host Nation Support (HNS), agreed that they would continue to hold consultations between the two countries, and make efforts to reach an early agreement. • In light of the establishment of the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology. Confirmed that the recent decision of the U.S. Government with respect to the maintenance of the Marine Corp’s Osprey aircraft would lead to the reinforcement of the foundation of repair and maintenance of common equipment listed in the new Guidelines.| ----- |Date|Type of Consultation/Place|Participants|Outline and Results| |---|---|---|---| |Jun. 4, 2016|Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting/ Singapore|Minister of Defense Nakatani Secretary of Defense Carter|• Regarding the arrest of a member of the U.S. civilian component in Okinawa, confirmed their intention to devise a set of effective prevention measures, including the review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) implementation practices related to U.S. personnel with SOFA status, including the civilian component. • Agreed to oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. • With regard to North Korea’s provocative actions, confirmed that Japan and the United States would continue to closely cooperate on this matter, including utilizing the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). • Confirmed their intention to further strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance under the recently enacted Legislation for Peace and Security, and also confirmed that they would continue efforts to ensure effectiveness of the new Guidelines. • Welcomed the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP-MOU), and agreed to further deepen bilateral cooperation for equipment and technology. • The Japanese side explained the court-mediated settlement over the Henoko landfill permit, and stated that Japan’s position would remain unwavering that the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko is the only solution. The U.S. side stated that it understands Japan’s position and would maintain close cooperation with Japan. • The Japanese side requested U.S. cooperation for the mitigation of the impact on Okinawa, including training relocation to outside of Okinawa Prefecture. The U.S. side stated that it would continue to cooperate with Japan. • Agreed to address the early return of the facilities and areas south of Kadena Air Base as well as the majority of the Northern Training Area.| **Reference 32** **Record of Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2015** |Joint Training|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |Joint Exercise in the U.S. (field training)|Jul. 20–Oct. 20, 2015|Camp Pendleton, California, U.S. Marine Corps San Clemente island training area, as well as surrounding sea and airspace|Ground Staff Office, Western Army, Central Readiness Force, Minesweeper Division, Air Defense Command, etc. Totaling approximately 1,100 personnel|U.S Third Fleet, 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit, etc.|Training on a series of activities pertaining to amphibious operations strategy and army command activities pertaining to amphibious operations strategy| |Japan-U.S. Joint Exercise (field exercise)|Jan. 12–Feb. 2, 2016|Ichigaya district, U.S. Forces Japan Yokota Air Base, locations of other participating units, etc.|Internal Bureaus, Staff Offcie of each Force, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, regional armies, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Ground Material Control Command, Self-Defense felet, regional units, Communication Command, MSDF Maritime Materiel Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Communications and System Wing, ASDF Air Material Command, SDF Supervised Units of Communication Systems, etc. Totaling approximately 6,500 personnel|United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), Headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), Headquarters of the U.S. Army in Japan, Headquarters of the U.S. Naval Forces in Japan, U.S. Air Force in Japan, U.S. Navy in Japan, etc. Totaling approximately 600 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Ground Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |Japan-U.S. joint District Army command post exercise (YS-68)|Jun. 1–13, 2015|Fort Shafter|Middle Army, Ground Staff Office, etc. Totaling approximately 150 personnel|First Army; U.S. Army, Pacific Command, etc. Totaling approximately 100 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Australia|Jul. 7–21, 2015|Bradshaw Field Training Area, Fog Bay, as well as surrounding sea and airspace|Western Army Headquarters, Western Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 40 personnel|31st Marine Expeditionary Unit Totaling approximately 2,000 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Army in the U.S. Part 2|Jul. 27–Aug. 28, 2015|Joint Base Elmendorf– Richardson, Alaska, surrounding training area, as well as Donnelly training area|1st Airborne Brigade Totaling approximately 50 personnel|Major units of 4-25 Brigade Combat Team Totaling approximately 500 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Marines in Japan Part 1|Sep. 6–18, 2015|Aibano exercise area and Nihonbara exercise area|14th Brigade Totaling approximately 350 personnel|Major units of 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division Totaling approximately 200 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Army in the U.S. Part 1|Sep. 8–25, 2015|Yakima Training Center, Washington|Tenth Brigade Totaling approximately 300 personnel|2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, major units of 4-23 Infantry Battalion Approximately 300 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Army in the U.S.|Sep. 10–21, 2015|Ohjojihara exercise area and Camp Yamato|Sixth Division Totaling approximately 1,280 personnel|1-25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, major units of 5-1 Infantry Battalion Approximately 430 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Japan-U.S. joint District Army command post exercise (YS-69)|Dec. 1–13, 2015|Camp Itami and other locations|Middle Army, etc. Totaling approximately 4,500 personnel|First Army, U.S. Army, Pacifci Command, U.S. Army in Japan, Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade, etc. Totaling approximately 2,000 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| ----- |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Field training with U.S. Marines in the U.S.|Jan. 18–Mar. 7, 2016|Camp Pendleton, California, etc.|Western Army Infantry Regiment, etc. Totaling approximately 270 personnel|1st Marine Expeditionary Force Totaling approximately 500 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Field training with U.S. Marines in the U.S. Part 2|Jan. 26–Feb. 6, 2016|Yausubetsu exercise area, Shikaribetsu exercise area, and Camp Obihiro|Fifth Brigade Totaling approximately 400 personnel|3rd Battalion, 5th Regiment, 1st Marine Division Totaling approximately 300 personnel|Exercise and training for Japan-U.S. coordination| **Maritime Self-Defense Force** |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training for escort flotillas in the United States|Mar. 14–Apr. 4, 2015|Guam|4 vessels, 2 aircraft|Several vessels, several aircraft|Offshore training| |Minesweeping special training|Jul. 16–31, 2015|Mutsu Bay|18 vessels, 9 aircraft|2 vessels, 3 aircraft, eight underwater disposal personnel|Minesweeping training| |Training in the United States (aircraft)|Aug. 10–24, 2015|Guam|2 aircraft|5 aircraft|Antisubmarine training, etc.| |Antisubmarine special training|Sep. 21–24, 2015|Sea areas surrounding Okinawa|2 vessels, several aircraft|3 vessels, several aircraft|Antisubmarine training| |Japan-U.S. Joint Cruise Training|Oct. 19–31, 2015|Between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea|1 vessel, 1 aircraft|Several vessels, several aircraft|Joint cruise training| ||Oct. 15–Nov. 15, 2015|Between Yokosuka and the East China Sea|1 vessel|Several vessels, several aircraft|| ||Mar. 7–10, 2015|Between off the coast of Okinawa and the East China Sea|2 vessels|Several vessels, several aircraft|| |Antisubmarine special training|Jan. 26–Feb. 2, 2016|Off the coast of the East Sea|12 vessels, several aircraft|1 vessel|Antisubmarine training| |Japan-U.S. joint command post exercise|Feb. 16–25, 2016|U.S. Naval Academy|Maritime Staff Office, etc. Totaling approximately 35 personnel|U.S. Navy, Japan, Headquarters, etc. Totaling approximately 60 personnel|Training and exercise for Japan-U.S. coordination| |Air Self-Defense Force|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |Training Designation|Date|Location|Japan|United States|Reference| |Air defense combat training Aerial refueling training Tactical air transport training|Jul. 27–Aug. 28, 2015|Elmendorf Air Force Base and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, as well as surrounding airspace, etc.|Aircraft 12|Aircraft Approx. 80|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Aug. 21–Sep. 3, 2015|Airspace off Shikoku and airspace west of Kyushu|Aircraft 12|Aircraft 12|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Sep. 7–18, 2015|Airspace off Hyakuri|Aircraft 4|Aircraft 5|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Dec. 3–16, 2015|Airspace east of Misawa and airspace west of Akita|Aircraft 8|Aircraft 12|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Japan-U.S.-Australia humanitarian assistance and disaster relief/trilateral disaster relief exercises|Dec. 4–11, 2015|Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, as well as surrounding airspace|Aircraft 1|Aircraft 3|Enhancement of interoperability| |Fighter combat training|Dec. 8–11, 2015|Airspace off Shikoku and airspace west of Kyushu|Aircraft 4|Aircraft 4|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Jan. 12–22, 2016|Airspace west of Hokkaido and airspace east of Misawa|Aircraft 5|Aircraft 5|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Jan. 26–Mar. 8, 2016|Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, air-to-ground launch site on Tinian Island and Farallon de Medinilla island in the Northern Mariana Islands, as well as surrounding airspace|Aircraft 22|Aircraft 4|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Fighter combat training|Mar. 7–18, 2016|Airspace off Komatsu|Aircraft 6|Aircraft 6|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| |Aerial fueling training|Feb. 22–Mar. 1, 2016|Airspace around Okinawa|Aircraft 2|Aircraft 2|Enhancement of joint response capabilities, enhancement of combat skills| ----- **Reference 33** **Japan-U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects** |Item|Summary|Date of conclusion of Intergovernmental agreement to implement joint research and development|Completion date| |---|---|---|---| |Ducted Rocket Engine, Advanced Steel Technology, Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials, Eye-Safe Laser Radar, Ejection Seat, Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology, Shallow Water Acoustic Technology, Ballistic Missile Defense Technology, Low-Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery, Software Radio, Advanced Hull Material/Structural Technology, Sea-Based Radar System, Combat System for Ship, Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector, Human effects of exposure to aircraft fuel and their engine exhaust, Image gyro for airborne applications||Completed|| |SM-3 Block IIA|Development of advanced missile interceptor|June 2006|Ongoing| |Hybrid electric propulsion|Research on technologies that enable vehicles to be electrically powered using a motor, and technologies that enable both an engine and a battery to function as power sources for the motor|November 2012|Ongoing| |High-speed multi-hull vessel optimization|Research aiming to design a multi-hull (trimaran, in particular) vessel featuring high-speed, adequate stability and large deck area|March 2014|Ongoing| |Comparison of operational jet fuel and noise exposures|Research on the combined effects of exposures to both jet fuel and noise on the risk of hearing loss for flight line personnel|November 2015|Ongoing| **Reference 34** **Outline of Cost Sharing of the Stationing of the USFJ** |Item|Outline|Grounds| |---|---|---| |Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)1|Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ|Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement| |Labor costs|Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)|Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement| ||Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987|Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)| ||Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1996)|Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)| ||The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be reduced in stages from 23,055 to 22,625 during the SMA period|Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)| ||The upper limit of the number of workers that the GOJ funds is to be increased in stages from 22,625 to 23,178 during the SMA period|Special Measures Agreement (FY2016)| |Utilities costs|Electricity, gas, water supply, sewage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)|Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)| ||The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001|Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)| ||The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel, etc., equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010|Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)| ||The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ will be phased in from current 76% (approximate) to 72% over the new SMA period.|Special Measures Agreement (FY2011)| ||The GOJ will provide the annual utilities costs up to approximately 24.9 billion yen each year. The adjustment borne by the GOJ each year will be reduced from 72% to 61%.|Special Measures Agreement (FY2016)| |Training relocation costs|Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the GOJ have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996|Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)| Notes: Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the “Criteria for adopting FIP projects” to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows: 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors. 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others). In Japan-U.S. agreements including the Special Measures Agreement (FY2016), it was agreed that the amount of FIP funding will not be less than 20.6 billion yen each year. ----- **Reference 35** **Outline of 23 Issues** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5|Col6|Col7|(As of March 31, 2016)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Facility|Scope|Area (ha)|Classification||||Remarks| ||||SCC|Gun-Ten- Kyo|Governor|U.S. Forces|| ||||||||| |Army POL Depots|1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City|4|||◎||Returned on December 31, 1990| |Camp Zukeran|2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)|0.1||◎|||Returned on September 30, 1991| ||20. Awase Meadows Golf Course|47|||◎||Returned on July 31, 2010| |Northern Training Area|3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district|480||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1993| ||4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago- Kunigami line|(256)|◎||||| |Camp Schwab|5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)|1|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Makiminato Service Area Annex|6. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on March 31, 1993| |Naha Cold Storage|7. In whole|Building|◎||||Returned on March 31, 1993| |Sunabe Warehouse|8. In whole|0.3||||◎|Returned on June 30, 1993| |Yaedake Communication Site|9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)|19|◎||||Returned on November 30, 1994| |Onna Communication Site|10. In whole|62|||||Returned on September 30, 1995| ||11. Eastern part|(26)|◎||||| |Kadena Air Base|12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)|2||◎|||Returned on January 31, 1996| |Chibana Site|13. In whole|0.1||||◎|Returned on December 31, 1996| |Camp Hansen|14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)|3||◎|||Returned on December 31, 1996| ||(23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City))|55|○||||Returned on June 30, 1993| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area Torii Communication Station|(22. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))|74|○||||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)|3|○|◎|||Returned on March 25, 1999| ||(22. Kurahama: site for waste incineration facilities)|9|○||||Returned on March 31, 2005| ||(22. Continuing use area for GSDF)|58|○||||Returned on October 31, 2006| ||16. Kadena bypass|4||◎|||Returned on March 31, 1999| |Deputy Division Engineer Office|17. In whole|4|◎||||Returned on September 30, 2002| |Camp Kuwae|(19. Southern side of the eastern part)|2|○|○|||Returned on December 31, 1994| ||18. Northern part (Ihei)|38||◎|||Returned on March 31, 2003| ||(19. Along Route 58)|(5)|○||||| ||16 facilities, 19 issues|866|6|7|3|3|| ||||||||| |Camp Kuwae|19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)|0.5|◎||||Change agreed on December 21, 2001| |MCAS Futenma|21. Lands along eastern side|4||◎|||Release agreed on March 28, 1996| |Kadena Ammunition Storage Area|22. Old Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area|43|◎||||Release agreed on March 28, 1996| |Camp Hansen|23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)|107|◎||||Release agreed on September 5, 2013| ||4 facilities, 4 issues|155|3|1|0|0|| |Total|17 facilities, 23 issues|1,021|9|8|3|3|| Notes: 1. For the “Area” column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above. 2. A single circle in the “Classification” column expediently indicates that the scope of the case overlaps that of another issue. 3. The numbers in the “Scope” column were assigned only for the purpose of classifying 23 issues. 4. “SCC” in the “Classification” column indicates issues for which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. “Gun-Ten-Kyo” indicates issues for which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa’s governor. “Governor” indicates issues for which then-Governor Nishime of Okinawa requested the U.S. government to release facilities and areas. “U.S. Forces” indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa. ----- **Reference 36 The SACO Final Report** (December 2, 1996) The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance. The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year. The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996. The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned. Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary. The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee. The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject. In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa related issues at the same time. **Return Land:** — Futenma Air Station — See attached. — Northern Training Area Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions: - Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean. - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area. — Aha Training Area Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided. — Gimbaru Training Area Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Sobe Communication Site Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen. — Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated. — Camp Kuwae Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa. — Senaha Communication Station Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained. — Makiminato Service Area Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area. — Naha Port Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha /87 acres). — Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran) Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.). **Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:** — Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997. — Parachute drop training Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield. — Conditioning hikes on public roads Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated. **Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:** — Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented. — Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed. — Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of ----- Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996. — Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998. — Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces. **Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:** — Accident reports Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996. In addition, as part of the U.S. forces’ good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces’ assets or facilities. — Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements. — Visits to U.S. facilities and areas Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all nontactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997. — Supplemental automobile insurance Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997. — Payment for claims Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner: - Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible. - A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities. - In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount. — Quarantine procedures Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996. — Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States. — Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee **The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station** **(an integral part of the SACO Final Report)**  (Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996) 1. Introduction a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield’s critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF). b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary. c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work. 2. Decisions of the SCC a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station’s flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) — capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations. b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions. c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base. d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available. e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational. 3. Guiding Principles a. Futenma Air Station’s critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities. b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station’s operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas. c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing. d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include ----- reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision. f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation. 4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods Studies have been conducted by a “Technical Support Group” comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a “Technical Advisory Group” comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible. a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules) — supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed. **Reference 37 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report** b. Pontoon Type — platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater. c. Semi-Submersible Type — platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea. 5. The Next Steps a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection. b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility. c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility. |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |Aha Training Area (Return of total area)|• December 1998: Total return completed (release of joint use)| |Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)|• January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the helicopter landing zone (HLZ) is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen • July 2011: Total return completed (approximately 60 ha)| |Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)|• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others are relocated to Camp Hansen • June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m2) was returned • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Sobe Communication Site [approximately 53 ha])| |Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)|• October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the Sobe Communication Site is relocated • July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha) • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (total return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield [approximately 191 ha])| |Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)|• March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on return of most land after communication systems including the antenna facilities and others are relocated to Torii Communication Station • September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) • October 2006: The microwave tower portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station| |Northern Training Area (Return of major portion)|• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after seven HLZs are relocated, etc. • December 1998–March 2000: Environmental survey (past year survey) • November 2002–March 2004: Environmental survey (continuous environmental survey) • February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on changes to the agreement of April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) • February–March 2007: Environmental impact assessment document was released and examined • March 2007: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (three out of six) • January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (the remaining three) • February 2015: HLZs (two sites) were furnished| |MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| ----- |Name of Facility (Project)|State of Progress| |---|---| |Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*|• July 2002: Youth center was furnished • March 2003: Northern side returned (approximately 38 ha) • January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities • December 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital • February 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (HLZ, etc.) of the Naval Hospital • December 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of support facilities (Utility) of the Naval Hospital • May 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BEQ, etc.) • October 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (First water tank facility) • October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (Second water tank facility) • September 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) • February 2013: 13 buildings including the Naval Hospital were furnished • March 2013: The Naval Hospital opened • December 2013: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (preventive medical center and alcohol rehabilitation center, etc.) • December 2015: Related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BOQ and blood storage facility, etc.) were furnished * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*|* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*|(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two high rises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two high rises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished| |Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*|(Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Futenma and Upper Plaza Area were furnished * May 2006: Camp Zukeran was described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation| |Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104|• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan in FY1997| |Parachute Drop Training|• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000| |Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base|• July 2000: Furnished| |Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base|• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp • October 2010: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on site preparation, implementation of construction of parking apron and taxiway • April 2011: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of parking and utilities • February 2013: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of maintenance hangar type II • July 2013: Parking space, etc. were furnished • July 2014: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on implementation of construction of hangars, etc.| |Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base*|* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. * August 2014: Relocation of all 15 aircraft from MCAS Futenma to Iwakuni Air Base was completed| ----- **Reference 38 Background of the Futenma Replacement Facility** |Month & Year|Background| |---|---| |April 1996|Then Prime Minister Hashimoto and then U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting, and the full return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. → The airfield will be returned within five to seven years, following the completion of an adequate replacement facility.| |December 1996|SACO Final Report → A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled).| |November 1999|Then Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago City as a candidate for the facility relocation on condition that it would be for joint military-civilian use| |December 1999|Then Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF “Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma” (Cabinet decision) → Construction in the Nago City Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab| |July 2002|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities” concluded between the Director General of Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. “Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma” was prepared. → Scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided.| |November 2003|Then Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Okinawa.| |April 2004|The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started (abolished in 2007).| |August 2004|A U.S. Forces helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa.| |October 2005|“2+2” Joint Statement → Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)| |April 2006|“Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza. → Agreement was reached by creating flight paths avoiding overflight of the surrounding region (the V shape plan).| |May 2006|• “2+2” Joint Statement → Final adjustments made for the “U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation,” V shape plan approved “Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa” concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the Governor of Okinawa. • “GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others” (Cabinet decision) → The cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished.| |August 2006|Establishment of “the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma”| |August 2007|The EIA scoping document was sent to the governor, municipal mayors etc. of Okinawa.| |April 2009|Draft Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |September 2009|Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People’s New Party. → Agreement on reviewing the status of the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan.| |November 2009|Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan-U.S. summit meeting → Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group.| |December 2009|Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue was established.| |May 2010|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirmed the intention to locate the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab Henokosaki and adjacent water areas Cabinet approval of “immediate actions by the Government of Japan on items decided by the Japan-United States Security Consultative Committee on May 28th, 2010”| |August 2010|Futenma Replacement Facility Bilateral Experts Study Group Report| |June 2011|“2+2” Joint Statement → Confirming the commitment that a replacement plan should be completed as early as possible after 2014, while deciding that the shape of the runway in the replaced facility should be V-shaped.| |December 2011– January 2012|The Environmental Impact Statement report was sent to the governor of Okinawa.| |February 2012|The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement was announced on the realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan. → Official discussion was initiated to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.| |April 2012|“2+2” Joint Statement → The current plan to relocate the air base from Futenma to Henoko was reconfirmed to be the only viable solution. Agreement reached to delink two issues—the movement of Marines to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena—from progress on the FRF.| |December 2012|Revised Environment Impact Statement was sent to the governor and municipal mayors of Okinawa.| |March 2013|Application for approval of public water body reclamation was submitted to the governor of Okinawa.| |April 2013|Release of “the consolidation plan of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa” → Return of facilities and areas to be completed in or after Fiscal Year 2022| |October 2013|“2+2” Joint Statement → Recognition was reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids continued use of MCAS Futenma| |December 2013|Governor of Okinawa approved reclamation of the public water body related to the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project| |July 2014|Started the construction of replacement facilities| |October 2014|Joint press release by Japan and the United States → Reaffirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution to avoid the continued use of MCAS Futenma| |April 2015|“2+2” Joint Statement → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma| ----- |Month & Year|Background| |---|---| |October 2015|• Governor of Okinawa revoked the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project • The Okinawa Defense Bureau requested the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism to review the governor of Okinawa’s revocation of the landfill permit for the Futenma Replacement Facility project, and requested the suspension of its execution • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism recognized the request of the Okinawa Defense Bureau and decided to suspend execution of the revocation of the landfill permit| |November 2015|• Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism filed a lawsuit with the Fukuoka High Court’s Naha Branch, seeking a judgment that orders the correction (retraction of the revocation) of the violation of the law by the governor of Okinawa • Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting → Reconfirmed that constructing the Futenma Replacement Facility in Henoko is the only solution that avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma| |December 2015|• Implementation of Bilateral Plans for Consolidating Facilities and Areas in Okinawa: Japan-U.S. Joint Press Release → Reconfirmed that the plan to construct the Futenma Replacement Facility at the Camp Schwab-Henokosaki area and adjacent waters is the only solution that addresses operational, political, financial, and strategic concerns and avoids the continued use of MCAS Futenma| |March 2016|• The government announced it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation • Landfill work was suspended • The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issued a correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture over its revocation of the landfill permit • Okinawa Prefecture applied for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council of the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism| **Reference 39 Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena** |List of Estimated Timelines for the Return of Facilities and Areas|Col2|Col3| |---|---|---| |Areas Eligible for Immediate Return Upon Completion of Necessary Procedures West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) Returned The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) Returned Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2014 or later A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2019 or later 1||| ||West Futenma Housing area of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|Returned| ||The north access road of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|Returned| ||Area near Gate 5 on Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2014 or later| ||A portion of the warehouse area of the Facilities and Engineering Compound in Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2019 or later 1| |Areas Eligible for Return Once the Replacement of Facilities in Okinawa are Provided Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester) JFY2025 or later Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later A part of Kishaba Houising area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) JFY2024 or later 2,3 Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area JFY2025 or later Naha Port JFY2028 or later Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 JFY2022 or later Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma JFY2022 or later||| ||Camp Kuwae (Camp Lester)|JFY2025 or later| ||Lower Plaza Housing area, Comp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||A part of Kishaba Houising area, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later| ||The Industrial Corridor, Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|JFY2024 or later 2,3| ||Elements of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser), including the preponderance of the storage area|JFY2025 or later| ||Naha Port|JFY2028 or later| ||Army Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1|JFY2022 or later| ||Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma|JFY2022 or later| |Areas Eligible for Return as USMC Forces Relocate from Okinawa to Locations Outside of Japan Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) － The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) JFY2024 or later 4||| ||Additional elements of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster)|－| ||The remainder of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)|JFY2024 or later 4| Note: 1: Shirahi River area can be returned at the same timing. 2: Part of the logistics support units in this area are scheduled to be relocated to locations outside of Japan. Efforts will be made to minimize the impact of the relocation on the approximate timing for return. However, the relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. 3: Area south of the Industrial Corridor (Camp Foster) can be returned at the same timing. 4: Plans for USMC relocation to locations outside of Japan have not yet been determined. The relocation sequence is subject to change depending on the progress of relocation. **Reference 40 Agreement between the Government of Japan and** **the Government of the United States of America** **Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of** **III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their** **Dependents from Okinawa to Guam**  (Signed on February 17, 2009) The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, Affirming that Japan–the United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–the United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, “United States – Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (hereinafter referred to as “the Roadmap”) will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance, Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States’ commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa ----- to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena, Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self- Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam, Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar ($10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars ($6,090,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly, Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars ($3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars ($1,000,000,000) for a road, Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan’s financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as “the Relocation”) subject to paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement. 2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as “the further arrangements”). Article 2 The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to paragraph 2 of Article 9 of this Agreement. Article 3 The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America. Article 4 The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation. Article 5 The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably. Article 6 The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in paragraph 1. (a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects. Article 7 1. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements. (b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year. 2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars). 3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 3. (b) of this Article. (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year. 4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in paragraph 4. (b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions. (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions. 5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions. Article 8 The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration. Article 9 1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred ----- to in Article 2 of this Agreement. 2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan’s financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap. Article 10 The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement. Article 11 This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged. Recalling that, under the plans outlined in the Roadmap as adjusted, the Joint Statement, and the Consolidation Plan for Facilities and Areas in Okinawa published in April, 2013, a part of the consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depends on the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on Japan’s direct cash contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure as well as necessary measures by the Government of the United States of America,” Article 2 The phrase “approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents” in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “the III MEF personnel and their dependents”. Article 3 The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 2 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”. Article 4 Article 3 of the Agreement shall be deleted. **Reference 41 Protocol amending the Agreement between the** **Government of Japan and the Government of** **the United States of America Concerning the** **Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine** **Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents** **from Okinawa to Guam**  (Signed on October 3, 2013) The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, Recalling the Joint Statement of Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee, dated April 27, 2012, which announced, inter alia, that the two governments are to consult regarding further actions to be taken in light of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam, signed at Tokyo on February 17, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”), Desiring to amend the Agreement, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 The fifth to ninth paragraphs of the preamble of the Agreement shall be deleted, and the following six paragraphs shall be inserted immediately after the fourth paragraph: “Recalling that Japan-the United States Security Consultative Committee decided to adjust the plans outlined in the Roadmap and, as part of the adjustments, decided to delink both the relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as “III MEF”) personnel from Okinawa to Guam and resulting land returns south of Kadena Air Base from progress on the Futenma Replacement Facility, in its Joint Statement dated April 27, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as “the Joint Statement”), Recognizing that the Joint Statement confirmed that a total of approximately 9,000 personnel of III MEF, along with their dependents, are to be relocated from Okinawa to locations outside of Japan, Reaffirming that the Joint Statement confirmed that, of the preliminarily estimated eight billion, six hundred million United States dollars ($8,600,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan is to provide up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars) (equivalent to three billion, one hundred twenty-one million, eight hundred eighty-seven thousand, eight hundred fifty-five United States dollars ($3,121,887,855) in U.S. Fiscal Year 2012 dollars) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be completed as soon as possible, Reaffirming further that the Joint Statement confirmed that the United States is to fund the remaining costs and any additional costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Recalling that the Joint Statement announced that the two Governments are to consider cooperation in developing training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands as shared-use facilities by the Japan Self-Defense Forces and United States forces, Article 5 The phrase “facilities and infrastructure on Guam” in Article 4 of the Agreement shall be replaced by the phrase “facilities and infrastructure in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”, and the following sentence shall be inserted at the end of Article 4 of the Agreement: “Such facilities may include training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.” Article 6 Article 4 of the Agreement shall be renumbered as Article 3, and the following Article shall be inserted immediately after renumbered Article 3: “Article 4 The Government of the United States of America, with the intent to provide reasonable access, shall favorably consider requests by the Government of Japan to use training areas in Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, including those whose development has been funded with Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest.” Article 7 Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of the Agreement shall be deleted and replaced by the following: “2. United States’ measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds for the Relocation, which may include (1) United States funds and (2) Japanese cash contributions referred to in paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement. Article 8 It is confirmed that the Agreement as amended by this Protocol applies to cash contributions made either before or after the entry into force of this Protocol by the Government of Japan in accordance with paragraph 1. of Article 1 of the Agreement, their accrued interest, and the projects funded by the cash contributions. Article 9 This Protocol shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Protocol shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement. ----- **Reference 42 Chronology of Osprey Deployment by the U.S. Forces** |June 6, 2011|Provided information to relevant local governments and other organizations on the announcement made by the U.S. Department of Defense to replace the CH-46 deployed at MCAS Futenma with the MV-22 in the latter half of 2012.| |---|---| |June 13–26|Provided safety/noise information that GOJ had obtained so far to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 24|Received a letter with 29 questions from the Okinawa Governor and others.| |September 1|The first written response was handed to the Okinawa Governor and others by Administrative Vice-Minister.| |September 2–13|Provided an explanation on the first written response to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |December 20|The second written response was handed to the Okinawa Governor by chief of the Okinawa Defense Bureau.| |December 20–January 17, 2012|Provided an explanation on the second written response above to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |April 12|A prompt report on the accident involving an MV-22 in Morocco was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 13–|Provided an explanation on the results of the Environment Review, MV-22 pamphlet, and the content of the third response to the questions to Okinawa Prefecture, relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 14|A prompt report on the accident involving a CV-22 in Florida was provided to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 26–|Provided an explanation on the information provided from the U.S. side regarding the accidents in Morocco and Florida to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |June 29–|Provided an explanation on the content of the Host Nation Notification and the press release to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |July 20|Provided information from the U.S. side stating that the MV-22 would be offloaded on MCAS Iwakuni on July 23 to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |August 1–September 18|Received four questionnaires regarding the Environment Review etc., from the Okinawa Governor and others.| |August 28–|Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the MV-22 Accident in Morocco” to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |September 11–|Provided an explanation on the “Analysis and Evaluation Report on the CV-22 Accident in Florida” to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |September 14–|Q&A session on Osprey deployment with members of the Iwakuni City Council full member committee.| |September 19–|Provided an explanation on the report “MV-22 Osprey deployment in Okinawa” to relevant local governments and other organizations.| |September 21|Provided Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City with the information that function check flights, etc. were commenced at MCAS Iwakuni.| |September 27-28|Provided information on the contents of the responses to the questionnaires from Okinawa Prefecture and others received from August 1 to September 18 to Okinawa Prefecture, other relevant local governments and other organizations.| |November 2|In the nationwide prefectural governors meeting hosted by the Government, the Minister of Defense explained the initial training plan with the MV- 22 Osprey, and the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense asked for the governors’ cooperation in relocating the training to outside Okinawa.| |December 10|The MOD received another letter of questions from the Governor of Okinawa in response to the answers to his initial questions which the MOD submitted to him in September.| |December 12–14|The MOD provided explanations to Okinawa Prefecture and relevant local governments in Okinawa regarding the content of the second set of answers the MOD prepared, since some of these answers did not satisfactorily address the letter of questions from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture on environmental review.| |December 25|Received a letter requesting information on the flight operation of the MV-22 etc. from the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture.| |January 28, 2013|The Okinawa Citizens’ Council, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, and other organizations sent a statement to the Prime Minister.| |April 30|The MOD provided explanation to the relevant local governments and other organizations regarding the U.S. explanation on the deployment of the MV-22 squadron (unloaded at MCAS Iwakuni in summer 2013).| |July 1|Announcement of plans to unload the MV-22 squadron to MCAS Iwakuni in the final week of July| |September 25|Relocation to MCAS Futenma was completed.| |May 12, 2015|The U.S. Department of Defense provided related municipalities and organizations with information related to the announcement of the deployment of the CV-22 Osprey at Yokota Air Base starting in the latter half of 2017.| **Reference 43 Direction of the MOD Reform (Outline)** (August 30, 2013 Ministry of Defense) The security environment surrounding Japan has become increasingly severe; there has been awareness of the lessons learned from the operations of units through the Great East Japan Earthquake and other incidents; and the political environment has been changing, such as the move towards establishing the National Security Council (NSC), and taking comprehensive, exceptional measures relating to the Three Principles on Arms Exports. The MOD reform will undertake full-fledged reform based on these changes in the situation, taking into adequate account the matters highlighted in previous considerations. The direction of the reform is as follows: (1) Remove the barriers between civilian officials and uniformed personnel In order to foster a sense of unity among civilian officials and uniformed personnel, permanent posts for uniformed personnel will be established in the Internal Bureau while permanent posts for civilian officials will be established in each of the Staff offices and major commands. (2) From partial to total optimization (defense capabilities build-up) Vertical divisions between the Ground, Maritime and Air SelfDefense Forces will be eliminated, and a procedure will be established for defense capabilities build-up based on joint operations. In addition, further efficiency and optimization in equipment acquisition will be attempted, based on consistent management across the life-cycle of the equipment, contributing to the total optimization of defense capabilities. (3) Make accurate decisions more swiftly (joint operations) In order to ensure the accuracy of decision-making relating to the operations of the SDF and make the decision-making process swifter, a review of the organization will be conducted so that duties concerning actual operations will be unified into the Joint Staff. (4) Further enhancement of policy-planning and public relations capability The policy-planning capability will be strengthened to cope with the drastic increase in international affairs-related work and the founding of the NSC. Together with this, the public relations capability will be enhanced. In order to ensure that reforms are truly effective, it is vital to change the mentality of both the civilian officials and the uniformed personnel. Furthermore, it is necessary to advance reforms smoothly, to avoid disruption and stagnation in response to contingencies. Accordingly, it is important to establish a series of reforms through steady and phased implementation while the Internal Bureau and Staff offices concurrently support the Minister of Defense. Reform is, ultimately, something that is implemented without end. It is natural that it should be constantly examined, while efforts are made for further reform and improvement. ----- **Reference 44 History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan** |1995|Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense| |---|---| |1998|North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory| ||The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the commencement of the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) for parts of the sea-based upper-tier system| |1999|Started the Japan-U.S. joint cooperative technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles| |2002|Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD| |2003|The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started| |2005|Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Act (ballistic missile destruction measures) The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced interceptors for BMD| |2006|North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan| |2007|The deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units started SM-3 launch tests by Aegis destroyers started| |2009|North Korea launched one ballistic missile toward the Pacific Ocean in April and seven toward the Sea of Japan in July. Order for ballistic missile destruction measures was issued for the first time (March).| |2012|North Korea launched missiles claimed as “Satellites” in April and December April: The missile was in flight for over a minute before disintegrating and landing in the Yellow Sea December: Passed through Okinawa airspace toward the Pacific Order for ballistic missile destruction measures was issued.| |2014|North Korea launched several ballistic missiles in March, June, and July March 3: Two missiles were launched and landed in the Sea of Japan March 26: Two missiles were launched and flew over 600 km before landing in the Sea of Japan June 29: Several missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km at most before landing in the Sea of Japan July 9: Several missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km at most before landing in the Sea of Japan July 13: Two missiles were launched and flew about 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan July 26: One missile was launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan| |2015|March 2: Two missiles were launched and flew approx. 500 km before landing in the Sea of Japan| |2016|North Korea launched a missile claimed as a “Satellite” February 3: Order for ballistic missile destruction measures was issued. February 7: The flying object separated into five pieces. The first piece flew about 500 km before landing in the Yellow Sea about 150 km west of the Korean Peninsula. The second and third pieces flew 800 km before landing in the East China Sea about 250 km west of the Korean Peninsula. The fourth piece flew 2,500 km before landing in the Pacific Ocean about 2,000 km south of Japan. The remaining object appears to have continued flight.| **Reference 45 Flow of Responce to Ballistic Missiles** |SDF takes measures on the order of the Minister of Defense|Col2|SDF takes measures on the order| |---|---|---| |||of the Minister of Defense| Not recognized as armed attack When the possibility that ballistic Although the ballistic missiles are not expected to missiles may fly toward Japan is fly over Japan, a rapid change in circumstances acknowledged may create an emergency situation which makes it difficult to obtain an approval from the Prime Minister in time Minister of Defense orders destruction Minister of Defense orders destruction measures measures upon approval of in advance as provided in the emergency response the Prime Minister procedure (approved by the Cabinet in 2007) Article 76 of the SDF Act (Paragraph 1) Article 82-3 of the SDF Act (Paragraph 3) (Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) (Destruction measures against ballistic missiles) If armed attack is recognized (Declared intent to attack, imminent missile launch) An armed attack situation is recognized and a defense operation order is issued Take measures in the framework of defense operation Article 76 of the SDF Act (Issuance of Defense Operations Orders) Concept of ensuring civilian control of the military ❍ Response against ballistic missiles requires the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, interagency actions are required, for example, measures for civil protection such as alert and evacuation, diplomatic activities, information gathering by related agencies, and enhancement of readiness for emergencies. ❍ In view of the importance of the matter and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities upon the Prime Minister’s approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense. Furthermore, the supervision of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law stipulating reporting to the Diet. ----- **Reference 46 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)** |FY|2011|2012|2013|2014|2015|Great East Japan Earthquake (2010 – 2011)| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |Number of Dispatches|586|520|555|521|541|—| |Personnel|43,494|12,410|89,049|66,267|30,035|10,664,870| |Vehicles|12,177|2,068|7,949|9,621|5,170|—| |Aircraft|968|684|1,255|1,232|888|50,179| |Vessels|2|1|51|0|2|4,818| - FY2011 excludes dispatches for disaster relief operations associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake. **Reference 47 Implementation and participation record of major drills related to disaster dispatch (FY2015)** (1) Implementation of integrated disaster prevention exercises by (8) Participation in training for medical responses in case of largethe Self-Defense Forces (training for responding to Tokyo Inland scale earthquakes Earthquake) (9) Participation in training in collaboration with the Shizuoka (2) Implementation of operational training by the Ministry of Defense Prefecture comprehensive disaster reduction drills Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (10) Participation in training in collaboration with the Nine Cities and (3) Participation in “Disaster Prevention Day” operational training by Prefectures joint disaster prevention training the Government Headquarters (11) Participation in training in collaboration with the Tokai Region (4) Participation in government’s role-playing simulation exercise wide-area collaboration disaster prevention training (5) Participation in Comprehensive Nuclear Emergency Response Exercise (12) Participation in other general disaster prevention training (6) Participation in integrated training in preparation for large-scale tsunamis implemented by local government, etc. (7) Participation in nuclear disaster prevention training **Reference 48 Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)** ||Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2011 – Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---|---| ||Dialogue||Date| |Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia- Paci i fc Region|Intergovernmental|❍ ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) • Ministerial Meeting • Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM Plus) • Senior Officials’ Meeting Working Group (ADSOM Plus WG) • Experts’ Working Group (EWG) • Maritime Security EWG • Military Medicine EWG • Counter-Terrorism EWG • Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief EWG • Peacekeeping Operations EWG • Humanitarian Mine Action EWG ❍ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Meeting among defense authorities|(Aug. 2013, Nov. 2015) (Apr. 2011, Apr. 2012, Apr. 2013, Apr. 2014, Feb. 2015, Apr. 2016) (Feb. 2012, Feb. 2013, Mar. 2013, Feb. 2014, Jan. 2015, Feb. 2016) (Jul. 2011, Feb. 2012, Sep.2012, Nov. 2012, May 2013, Sep. 2013, Feb. 2014, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, Feb. 2015, Sep. 2015, Oct. 2015, Mar. 2016) (Jul. 2011, Jul. 2012, Oct.2013, Jun. 2014, Oct. 2014, May 2015, Sep. 2015) (Sep. 2011, Apr. 2012, Mar. 2013, Oct. 2014, Oct. 2015) (Nov. 2011, Aug. 2012, Jan. 2014, Jul. 2014, Dec. 2014, Aug. 2015, Dec. 2015, May 2016) (Nov. 2011, Jun. 2012, Nov. 2012, Apr. 2013, Feb. 2014, Sep. 2014, Mar. 2015, Sep. 2015) (Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, Oct.2015) (Apr. 2011, Dec. 2011, May 2012, Nov. 2012, Apr. 2013, May 2013, Dec. 2013, Apr. 2014, Jun. 2014, Dec. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2015, Apr. 2016, May 2016)| ||Hosted by the private sector|• IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Dialogue)|(Jun. 2011, Jun. 2012, Jun. 2013, Jun. 2014, May 2015, Jun. 2016)| |Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense|❍ Japan-ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting ❍ Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum ❍ Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges ❍ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) ❍ International Seminar for Military Science ❍ International Conference of Cadets||(Nov. 2014) (Sep. 2011, Mar. 2013, Feb. 2014, Oct. 2014, Sep. 2015) (Sep. 2011, Mar. 2013) (Mar. 2012, Oct. 2012, Oct. 2013, Mar. 2015, Mar. 2016) (Jul. 2011. Jul. 2012, Jul. 2013, Jul. 2014, Jun. 2015) (Feb. 2012, Feb. 2013, Mar. 2014, Mar. 2015)| ----- **Reference 49 Exchange Student Acceptance Record (Number of Newly Accepted Students in FY2015)** |CCoouunnttrryy IInnssttiittuuttiioonn|Thailand|Philippines|Indonesia|Singapore|Malaysia|Vietnam|Cambodia|Timor- Leste|Laos|Myanmar|India|Pakistan|Republic of Korea|Mongolia|Australia|United States|United Kingdom|Germany|France|Sub total| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |National Institute for Defense Studies||||||1|||||1||2||1|2||1||8| |National Defense Academy|5|2|1|1||9|2|2|2|2|||4|2|1|9|||8|50| |Ground Self- Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|1||||||||||1|4|4|1|1|4|1|||17| |Maritime Self- Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|1|1||||||1|||||1|||||||4| |Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)|3||||||||||1||2|||||||6| |Joint Staff College|||||1||||||||||2|||||3| |Total|10|3|1|1|1|10|2|3|2|2|3|4|13|3|5|15|1|1|8|88| **Reference 50 Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense** (Number of students) United Kingdom [Germany] France Sub total 1 8 8 50 1 17 4 6 3 1 1 8 88 |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|(Apr. 1, 2011 – Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Security Dialogue|||Outline|Recent Situations| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|Internal Bureau and others|Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. Vice-ministerial level off icials from Defense authorities of ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.|The 7th forum was held in Sapporo in September 2015, with the participation of vice-ministerial-level off icials from the defense authorities of ASEAN countries. Candid and constructive opinions were exchanged among participants regarding the topics of “Wider promotion of common rules and laws at sea and in the air in the region,” “Maritime and aerospace security,” and “Improving disaster response capability in the region.”| |||Tokyo seminar on common security challenges|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense since 2009. It is a seminar open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as common security challenges and policies for promoting regional cooperation thereby making a venue for open discussion toward the promotion of regional cooperation.|With the participation of intellectuals from inside and outside Japan and defense authorities, discussions were held on the topic entitled “Security in the Asia-Pacif ci Region: The Future Role of Japan and ASEAN.” The event contributed to efforts to improve the security environment and promoted regional dialogue and cooperation in March 2013.| |||Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacif ic Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)|Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level off icials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacif ic region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense off icials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote conf idence building focusing on the defense f ield.|With the participation of 22 countries in the Asia-Pacif ic region (including Japan), the ASEAN secretariat, the EU, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as the United Nations Off ice for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the 20th Forum was held in March 2016. Opinions were exchanged on “Enhance Capabilities in Non-Traditional Security Areas in the Region: Efforts and Challenges” and “Defense Policies of Participating Countries and Regional Architecture to the Region and Participating Countries.”| ||GSDF|Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacif ic|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 2014, inviting off icers in charge of actual work of the militaries from major countries in the Asia-Pacif ci region to provide them with opportunities to exchange multinational views on concrete cooperation and initiatives toward issues each country in the region has in common.|In August 2015, with the participation of 21 countries from the Asia- Pacif ic region and other regions, group discussions took place on the theme of “Civil-military coordination for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).” In addition, training for areas affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake, joint disaster prevention training by nine prefectures and cities, and other activities were held.| |||Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)|Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting off icers in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacif ic region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.|The 18th MLST meeting was held in November 2014. The participants were working-level off ciers in charge of logistics sent from armies in 14 countries in the Asia-Pacif ci region and the EU. Keynote speech and opinion exchanges were held on topics regarding logistic cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacif ci region.| |||Army Command and General Staff College seminar|Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army colleges from the Asia-Pacif ic region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.|With the participation of students from army colleges in 16 countries in Asia-Pacif ic region, the 15th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held on August 2015. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of the leadership teamwork in the multinational peace cooperation activities in the multilateral environment.| ||MSDF|Asia Pacif ic Naval College Seminar|Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with staffs of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacif ic region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange between participating countries and mutual understanding.|The 18th seminar was held in February 2015 with participants, which included Navy military personnel from 14 countries, the Ocean Policy Research Institute, and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI). Presentations by the participants and active opinion exchanges were conducted on the theme of “Pursuing ‘Open and Stable Seas.’” In addition, unit and cultural training were also held to deepen the culture and history, etc., of the MSDF and Japan.| ||ASDF|International Air Force Education Seminar (Japan Air Self-Defense Force Air Staff College Seminar)|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996, with participation by off ciials related to air staff colleges mainly from the Asia-Pacif ci region. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on off cier’s education.|The 20th International Air Force Education Seminar was held in November 2015, inviting four countries and NATO. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Lessons Learned Processes.”| |||International Air Command and Staff Seminar|Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air staff colleges from the Asia-Pacif ci region participating. This program is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on security and roles of nations.|With the participation of students from air staff colleges in 17 countries, the 15th seminar was held in October 2015. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Your Nation’s Air Force; Overview of National Defense Policy, Current State of Affairs, Challenges, and Future Direction” and “The Direction of Air Forces in Multilateral Cooperation.”| ----- |Security Dialogue|Col2|Col3|Outline|Recent Situations| |---|---|---|---|---| |Hosted by Ministry of Defense|National Defense Academy|International Seminar on Defense Science|Hosted by the National Defense Academy since 1996, this seminar provides opportunities to discuss international affairs and security by inviting instructors of military academies in the Asia-Pacific regions.|The 20th International Seminar on Defense Science was held in July 2015, inviting 16 countries. Opinions were exchanged on the theme of “The Role of the Military Suited to Changes in the Strategic Environment and Challenges.”| |||International Cadets’ Conference|Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with the participation of cadets from the Asia-Pacific region. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.|In March 2016, 15 countries were invited to the 19th conference, and opinions were exchanged on the theme of “Near future: When we are commanders.”| ||National Institute for Defense Studies|International Symposium on Security Affairs|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold debates and offer reports on security in the public for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.|In November 2015, notable researchers and practitioners from the United States, France and Japan were invited to this symposium to exchange opinions on the theme of “Outer Space Security: Trends and Challenges.”| |||International Security Colloquium|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with offciials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities for advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.|In December 2015, researchers and practitioners from the United States and France were invited to this colloquium, and opinions were exchanged among the invited foreign experts together with Japanese experts on the theme of “Outer Space Security: Trends and Challenges.”| |||International Forum on War History|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.|In September 2015, researchers from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Singapore and Japan were invited to this forum to exchange opinions on the theme of “Termination of Wars in Historical Perspective.”| |||Asia-Pacific Security Workshop|Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this workshop-style group study session has been held annually since 2010 to discuss emerging security issues that the Asia- Pacific region faces in common.|In January 2016, researchers were invited from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Australia, and Mongolia, to exchange opinions on the theme of “Security outlook of the Asia Pacifci countries and its implications for the defense sector.”| **Reference 51 Other Multilateral Security Dialogues** |Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Col2|Col3|Overview| |---|---|---|---| |Hosted by the Government|Internal Bureau and others|Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)|ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated on the forum since the second meeting in 1993.| ||Putrajaya Forum||This event, hosted by the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security and participated in by national defense experts from ADMM Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its first event in 2010.| ||Jakarta International Defense Dialogue (JIDD)||This event, hosted by the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia (organized by the Indonesian Defence University) and participated in by the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staff from ADMM Plus countries, provides a place for exchanging opinions regarding regional security. Japan has been a participant since its first event in 2011.| ||Seoul Defense Dialogue (SDD)||This event, hosted by the Ministry of National Defense of the ROK and participated in by the defense vice ministers of Asia- Pacific and Western countries, is a forum for exchanging opinions regarding regional security issues, including the issues of the Korean Peninsula. Japan has been a participant since the first meeting in 2012.| ||Joint Staff|Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)|CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.| |||Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)|PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan’s participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24th session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.| ||GSDF|Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.| |||Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)|PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.| |||Land Forces Pacific (LFP)|LANPAC is a symposium hosted by AUSA, the first event of which was held in April 2013. The GSDF Chief of Staff was officially invited to the second symposium held in 2013 as a guest speaker and he gave a speech on the theme of the “Current situation and the future of Japan-U.S. Cooperation on HA/DR,” which gained support from the U.S. Army Pacific Commander and other participants from different countries.| |||Chief of Army’s Exercise (CAEX)|CAEX is an exercise hosted by the Australian Army every other year. Senior officers of the Australian Army as well as the heads of land forces in the Asia-Pacific region and experts attend and exchange a wide range of views on the issues facing the land forces in the region. The GSDF participated in CAEX for the first time in 2012. In September 2014, the GSDF Chief of Staff attended for the first time and delivered an address.| |||PACOM Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS)|The first PALS was hosted by U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific and held in May 2015.| |||Annual Meeting of the Association of U.S. Army (AUSA)|Hosted by AUSA, the annual meeting provides opportunities for exchanging opinions among the General-class officers from the U.S. Army, and since 2014 the Chief of the Staff of the GSDF participated in the meeting twice to deliver speeches.| ----- |Other Multilateral Security Dialogue|Col2|Col3|Overview| |---|---|---|---| |Hosted by the Government|MSDF|International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)|ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.| |||Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)|WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.| |||International MCM Seminar|This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan’s MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.| |||Asia Pacific Submarine Conference|Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated on the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The MSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.| |||Indian Ocean Naval Symposium|This symposium is held every two years hosted by a different participating country on a rotational basis. It is a platform for the Navy Chief of Staff from the Indian Ocean coastal countries to exchange their opinions concerning the maritime security of the Indian Ocean. Japan has participated since the third event in 2012.| ||ASDF|Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)|PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.| |||PACRIM Airpower Symposium|This symposium is held every year and hosted by the U.S. and other participating countries on a rotational basis (it was held twice in 1996 and 1997). It is a platform for the Chiefs of Air Operations in the Pacific Rim to exchange their opinions. Japan has participated in this symposium since the first event held in 1995.| |||Air Power Conference (APC)|APC is a conference hosted by Australia every other year to exchange international views on air power. Japan has participated in this conference six times since 2000.| |||International Conference on Air & Space Power (ICAP)|These international conferences on air and space are hosted by Turkish Air War College. ICAP, on the theme of the future of the air forces, and ISAW, on the theme of the history of the air forces, are respectively held every other year. Japan has participated since their first conferences in 2013.| |||International Symposium on the history of Air Warfare (ISAW)|| ||Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence|Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference (APICC)|Hosted in turn by the United States Pacific Command and participating countries, the Conference serves as a place for the exchange of opinions among intelligence chiefs and other officials from the defense ministries of countries in the Asia Pacific region and other areas. Alongside exchanges of opinions on issues pertaining to regional security, the Conference is also aimed at contributing to the nurturing of relationships of trust between the respective countries, as well as at the sharing of information. It was hosted for the first time in February 2011 by the Department of Current and Crisis Intelligence, and was attended by 28 countries.| ||National Institute for Defense Studies|ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Heads of Defence Universities, Colleges and Institutions Meeting|Defense universities and other educational institutions from the ARF member countries take turns and hold a meeting once a year. The host plays the central role in making a decision on the themes with respect to global security issues in the Asia-Pacific region and the role of defense educational and research institutions, and the meeting takes place in the form of presentations and question-and-answer sessions based on certain themes. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending all of the meetings since the first meeting in 1997, and hosted the fifth meeting in Tokyo in 2001.| |||NATO Defense College Conference of Commandants (CoC)|CoC is an annual international conference hosted by the NATO Defense College, defense educational institutions from NATO member countries and NATO partner countries taking turns. During the meeting, the heads of participating educational institutions exchange opinions from the perspective of improving advanced defense education, while at the same time the meeting focuses on the promotion of educational exchange among the heads of the educational institutions, NATO member countries, and the dialogue partners in the Central and Eastern Europe as well as the Mediterranean region. From Japan, the National Institute for Defense Studies has been attending most of the conferences since FY2009 (no invitation in FY2013).| |Hosted by the Private Sector|IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-La Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.| ||Regional Security Summit (Manama Dialogue)||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010. The Summit did not take place in 2011.| ||Munich Security Conference||Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2004. Foreign and defense ministers, national security advisors and chiefs of intelligence from the Gulf countries participated to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan participated at the senior official’s level for the first time in the 6th conference in 2009, sending the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. The Parliamentary Vice-Minister of the Defense participated in the 7th Conference in 2010.| ||Halifax International Security Forum||Hosted by Halifax International Security Forum with the support of the Canadian Department of National Defense, the Forum is attended by many government officials from the United States and Europe (including NATO Ministers and Defense Ministers from each country), who exchange opinions on security at the Forum. Japan has participated since the first Conference in 2009.| ||The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)||Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants — private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States) — to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.| ----- **Reference 52 Status of Capacity Building Assistance** |Col1|Col2|Col3|Col4|(June 2015 – June 2016)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Country|Period|Description|Beneficiary|Dispatched personnel| |Mongolia|October 2012|Seminar on military medicine|Medical officers at the central hospital of the Mongolian Armed Forces, etc.|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||June 2013|Human resource development in civil engineering (Field research)|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineer Unit|5 GSDF personnel, 3 Internal Bureau administrative officials| ||July - August 2013|||6 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||June - July 2014|Human resource development in civil engineering|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineering Unit|9 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 3 private-sector organization members| ||July 2014|Seminar on military medicine|Mongolian Armed Forces Engineer Unit|3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||July - September 2015|Human resource development in civil engineering|Mongolian Armed Forces, Mongolian National Defense University instructor|15 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| |Vietnam|October 2012|Seminar on underwater medicine|Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, etc.|3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||May 2013|||4 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||September 2013|Seminar on aviation safety|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|5 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| ||March 2014|Seminar on underwater medicine|Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, etc.|3 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| ||November 2014|Seminar on aviation safety|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||February 2015|Seminar on international aviation laws||2 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||March 2015|Seminar on underwater medicine|Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, etc.|4 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||November 2015|Seminar on flight safety and aviation medicine|Vietnam Air Defence and Air Force|5 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||March 2016|Seminar on underwater medicine|Medical officers in the Vietnamese Navy, etc.|3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| |Timor-Leste|December 2012 - March 2013|Human resource development in vehicle maintenance skills|Timor-Leste Defence Force Headquarters, etc.|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 4 private-sector organization members| ||October 2013 - March 2014|||8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members| ||September - November 2014|||8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 3 private-sector organization members| ||July 2015|Seminar on vehicle maintenance skills|Logistics support unit, Timor-Leste Defence Force|5 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| ||February 2016|||4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||October - November 2015|Technical instruction of engineering activities (hosted by the Australian Defence Force)||8 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| |Cambodia|January - March 2013|Human resource development in civil engineering|National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia|4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members| ||December 2013 - March 2014|||4 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 6 private-sector organization members| ||October - November 2014||Royal Cambodian Armed Forces Peacekeeping Training School|3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||November 2015||National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces, Mines and ERW Clearance in Cambodia|3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| |Indonesia|February 2013|Seminar on oceanography|Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Office|3 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||July 2013|||1 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials, 1 Maritime Safety official| ||February 2015|Seminar on international aviation laws|Indonesian Ministry of Defense|2 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||March 2016|Seminar on oceanography|Indonesian Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Office|2 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official, 2 Maritime Safety officials| |Myanmar|December 2014|Seminar on underwater medicine|Medical officers and divers etc., of the Myanmar Army and Navy|4 MSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||January 2015|Seminar on aviation meteorology|Myanmar Air Force|4 ASDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||March 2015|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Myanmar Army|2 GSDF personnel| ||December 2015|Seminar on underwater medicine|Medical officers and divers etc. of the Myanmar Army and Navy|4 MSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| ||March 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Myanmar Army personnel|3 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| |Papua New Guinea|July 2014|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Papua New Guinea Defence Force|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| |Philippines|June 2015|Seminar on international aviation laws|Philippine Air Force|3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| ||June 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Philippine Army personnel|2 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| |Malaysia|June 2015|Seminar on international aviation laws|Royal Malaysian Air Force|3 ASDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| |ASEAN member states|January 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for ASEAN member states hosted by Japan and the United Kingdom|ASEAN governments, militaries, and civil organizations|2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| |Laos|February 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People’s Army|1 GSDF personnel, 1 Internal Bureau administrative official| ||June 2016|Seminar on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief|Laos Ministry of National Defence and Lao People’s Army|3 GSDF personnel, 2 Internal Bureau administrative officials| 3 GSDF personnel, Thailand April 2016 Seminar on international aviation laws Royal Thai Armed Forces personnel ----- **Reference 53 Status of Invitation Program** |Country|Period|Description|Beneficiary|Dispatched personnel| |---|---|---|---|---| |Vietnam|March 3-4, 2014|Training in flight safety and other fields|Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Air Defence-Air Force of Vietnam|5 personnel| ||March 14-18, 2016|PKO capacity building training at United Nations|Officers from Peacekeeping Center of Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People’s Army|4 personnel| ||April 4-15, 2016|PKO capacity building training by engineering unit dispatched to South Sudan|Officers from Peacekeeping Center of Ministry of National Defence of Vietnam and Vietnam People’s Army|2 personnel| |Mongolia|March 10-13, 2014|Engineering training|General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces|5 personnel| ||March 4-9, 2015|Military Medicine training at GSDF Sapporo Hospital|General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces and Mongolian Armed Forces and Police Hospital|5 personnel| ||February 23-March 20, 2015|Engineering training at GSDF Engineer School|Mongolian Armed Forces|6 personnel| ||February 11-20, 2016|Basic training on asphalt pavement at GSDF Engineer School|Mongolian Armed Forces|1 personnel| |Indonesia|February 3-7, 2014|Oceanography and Marine Charting training at related MSDF units, facilities of Japan Coast Guard’s Hydrographic and Oceanographic Department, and private company|Oceanography and Marine Charting Department, Indonesian Navy|5 personnel| |Timor-Leste|June 10-13, 2014|Training on GSDF logistic support troops|Timor-Leste Defence Force|6 personnel| |Cambodia|September 21-October 5, 2014|Engineering training at related GSDF units and facilities|Engineering Department Royal Cambodian Armed Forces|5 personnel| |Philippines|February 17-20, 2015|Airlift training at related GSDF and ASDF units and facilities|Philippine Air Force|4 personnel| |Papua New Guinea|June 23-August 7, 2015|Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|2 personnel| ||March 9-16, 2016|Training on military band organization and military service operations; methods of conducting, playing musical instruments, marching and playing music; and music theory|Papua New Guinea Defence Force Band|3 personnel| |Myanmar|August 3-7, 2015|Aviation weather training at related ASDF units and facilities|Myanmar Air Force|4 personnel| ||September 7-11, 2015|Underwater medical training at related MSDF units and facilities|Myanmar Navy|4 personnel| ||October 5-9, 2015|HA/DR training at related GSDF units and facilities|Myanmar Army|5 personnel| |Thailand|May 26, 2016|Training on ASDF flight safety efforts|Royal Thai Air Force|5 personnel| **Reference 54 Participation in Multilateral Training (Last Three Years)** (March 2014–June 30, 2016) Dispatched personnel 5 personnel 4 personnel 2 personnel 5 personnel 5 personnel 6 personnel 1 personnel 5 personnel 6 personnel 5 personnel 4 personnel 2 personnel 3 personnel 4 personnel 4 personnel 5 personnel 5 personnel ||Col2|Col3|Col4|(Apr. 1, 2013 – Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Exercise||Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |Cobra Gold||February 2014 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, China, etc.|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.| |||February 2015 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, China, India, etc.|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.| |||February 2016 (Thailand)|Japan, U.S., Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, China, India, etc.|Joint Staff Offcie, Ground Staff Offcie, Self- Defense Fleet, Air Support Command, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau, etc.| |Pacific Partnership||June – July 2013 (Tonga, Papua New Guinea)|Japan, U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.|1 vessel, 2 aircraft Approximately 40 personnel| |||May – July 2014 (Vietnam, Cambodia, Philippines)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Malaysia, Chile, ROK|1 vessel, 1 aircraft (personnel transportation), Approximately 40 personnel| |||May – July 2014 (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Philippines)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, ROK, Malaysia, Singapore, etc.|1 vessel Approximately 60 personnel| |ARF-DiREx||May 2013 (Thailand)|Japan, Thailand, ROK, ARF countries|1 aircraft Approximately 50 participants from Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Internal Bureau, Central Readiness Force, Middle Army, and Air Support Command, SDF Hanshin Hospital| |||May 2015 (Malaysia)|Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Mongolia, Laos, China, India, Cambodia, U.S., etc.|Approximately 10 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Internal Bureau, Eastern Army, Air Training Command, SDF Yokosuka Hospital, SDF Ominato Hospital| |Asean Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exercises||April – May 2014 (Thailand)|Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, Cambodia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, China, U.S., France, EU, Canada|7 personnel| |ADMM Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief/ Military Medicine Exercise Military Medicine Meeting||June 2013 (Brunei)|Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, Central Readiness Force, Self-Defense Fleet, Northeastern Army| ||Military Medicine Meeting|October 2013 (Singapore)|Japan, Brunei, Singapore, China, Vietnam, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, ROK, Thailand, U.S., Cambodia, Russia, Laos|Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Air Staff Office| ----- |Exercise|Col2|Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |---|---|---|---|---| |ADDM Counter Terrorism Exercise||September 2013 (Indonesia)|Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Russia, U.S., ROK, Philippines, Myanmar, Japan|3 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Central Readiness Force, Internal Bureau| |Global Peace Operations Initiative Capstone Exercise|Shanti Prayas-2|March – April 2013 (Nepal)|Japan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, ROK, Thailand, Vietnam, etc.|Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force, Northern Army| ||Garuda Canti Dharma|August – September 2014 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Philippines, ROK, Vietnam, Pakistan, etc.|Approximately 40 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force| ||Keris Aman|August 2015 (Malaysia)|Japan, U.S., Indonesia, Cambodia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, ROK, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Australia, etc.|5 personnel from Joint Staff Office, Joint Staff College, Central Readiness Force| |Multilateral Training (Khaan Quest)||August 2013 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., Mongolia, ROK, Australia, Canada, Germany, U.K., France, India, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Nepal|Approximately 2 personnel| |||June – July 2014 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Canada, Germany, U.K., India, Indonesia, ROK, Nepal, Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, France, Tajikistan|Approximately 6 personnel| |||June – July 2015 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Canada, Cambodia, China, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, ROK, Tajikistan|Approximately 40 personnel| |||May – June 2016 (Mongolia)|Japan, U.S., Mongolia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cambodia, Canada, China, Ghana, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Poland, ROK, U.K.|Approximately 51 personnel including observers| |Australian Army–Hosted Shooting Convention||May 2013 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, China, Canada, France, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, U.K.|Approximately 40 personnel| |||May 2014 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, France, Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor- Leste, Tonga, U.K.|Approximately 30 personnel| |||April 2015 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, ROK, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore|Approximately 30 personnel| |||April 2016 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., China, ROK, UAE, etc. (18 countries)|Approximately 30 personnel| |Australian Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013)||September 8 – November 8 2013 (Australia)|Japan, Brunei, Singapore, Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Thailand, U.S., France, Spain, Tonga, Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan|1 vessel| |ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (part of the Australian Navy-Hosted Multilateral Training described above)||September 29 – October 1 2013 (Australia)|Japan, Australia, U.S., New Zealand, China, Thailand, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines, Singapore|1 vessel| |ADMM Plus Maritime Security Field Training Exercise (Counterterrorism Exercise)||May 2016 (Brunei, Singapore)|Japan, U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, ROK, Russia, Thailand, Vietnam|1 vessel| |Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise||September 20 – 28, 2013 (Yokosuka, Sagami Bay)|Japan, U.S., ROK, Australia, Singapore, etc.|3 vessels, etc.| |KOMODO Multilateral Joint Naval Exercise organized by the Indonesian Navy||March 20 – April 9, 2014 (Indonesia)|Japan, U.S., Russia, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.|1 vessel| |||April 12 – 16, 2016 (Indonesia)|Japan, Indonesia, U.S., etc.|2 vessels 1 aircraft| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training||June 22 – 26, 2013 (Waters and airspace around Guam)||2 vessels 1 aircraft| |||August 9-15, 2014 (Waters and airspace around Guam)||2 aircraft| |||September 20-21, 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii)||1 vessel| |||December 2015 (Waters around Micronesia)||1 aircraft Approximately 20 personnel| |||January – February 2016 (Waters around Singapore to India)||1 vessel| |Japan-U.S.-Korea Trilateral Training||May 15, 2013 (Waters west of Kyushu)||2 vessels| |||October 10 –11, 2013 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel| |||December 11, 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)||2 vessels| |||July 21 –22, 2014 (Waters west of Kyushu)||1 vessel| |U.S. and India-Hosted Maritime Joint Exercise (Exercise Malabar 2015)||September 26 – November 10, 2015 (Waters and airspace east of India)|Japan, U.S., India|1 vessel| |Multilateral Training (TGEX KOA KAI EAST)||September 20 – December 14, 2014 (Waters around San Diego)|Japan, U.S., Canada|1 vessel| |Australian Navy-Hosted Multinational Maritime Exercise (Kakadu)||August-September 2014 (Waters around Australia)|Japan, Australia, etc.|1 vessel 2 aircraft| |U.S.-Hosted International Mine Countermeasures Exercise||May 4 – 29, 2013 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|6 personnel| |||October 27 – November 13, 2014 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|2 vessels| |||February 26 – June 7, 2016 (Waters around Arabian Peninsula)|Japan, U.S., etc.|2 vessels| |Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise||August 25 – 31, 2015 (Singapore and waters around Indonesia)|Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, etc.|3 vessels| ----- |Exercise|Period (Venue)|Participating countries|Participating SDF units, etc.| |---|---|---|---| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Training (Cope North Guam)|February 2014 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||20 aircraft Approximately 430 personnel| ||February 2015 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel| ||February 2016 (U.S. Guam Island and surrounding airspace)||20 aircraft Approximately 460 personnel| |Field Training with U.S. and Australian Forces in Australia (Exercise Southern Jackaroo)|May 2013, May 2014, May 2015, May 2016 (Australia)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Approximately 50 personnel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Exercise Talisman Saber)|July 2015 (Australia)||Approximately 40 personnel| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Michinoku Alert)|November 2014 (Tohoku)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Northeastern Army Headquarters Approximately 12,500 personnel, approximately 1,700 vehicles| |Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Training (Northern Rescue 2015)|August 2015 (Hokkaido)|Japan, U.S., Australia|Northern Army Headquarters Approximately 3,300 personnel, approximately 300 vehicles| |RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Joint Exercise)|June-August 2014 (Waters and airspace around Hawaii, and waters around U.S. West Coast)|Japan, U.S., Australia, Canada, France, China, ROK, U.K., etc.|2 vessels, 3 aircraft Western Army, etc.| |Japan-Australia-New Zealand Joint Training|August 30, 2014 (Surrounding airspace of Darwin)|Japan, Australia, New Zealand|2 aircraft| |Multilateral training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Croix du Sud)|August 25-September 5, 2014 (New Caledonia)|Japan, France, U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Tonga, U.K., Vanuatu|4 personnel| |Multilateral training hosted by French Forces in New Caledonia (Exercise Équateur 2015)|September 28-October 7, 2015 (New Caledonia)|Japan, France, Singapore, Australia, Tonga, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, U.S., Canada, Chile, U.K.|7 personnel| |Japan-U.S.-France Joint Training|May 2015 (Waters west of Kyushu)|Japan, U.S., France|1 vessel, 2 aircraft| **Reference 55 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Australia (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(Apr. 1, 2013 – Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Jun. 2013 Jul. 2013 Apr. 2014 Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jun. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015|Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Agreement reached to advance Japan-Australia defense cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Confirmed the regional situations and the progress of Japan-Australia defense cooperation, and exchanged views regarding the future Japan-Australia defense cooperation as well as Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral cooperation Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) and attendance of Prime Minister of Australia at a special meeting of the National Security Council (Four Ministers’ Meeting) ✰ Agreement was reached on 1) Strengthening of defense cooperation in a real term, 2) Commencement of negotiation towards the agreement of a framework regarding defense equipment and technical cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Perth) ✰ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation including the areas of equipment and technologies Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation 5th Japan-Australia “2+2” Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ 1) Agreement reached to strongly oppose the use or force of power to change the status quo unilaterally, 2) Confirmed a substantive agreement on the Agreement negotiation regarding the transfer of the defense equipment and technology Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Agreement reached to promote the strengthening of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia defense cooperation such as an expansion of Japan-Australia and Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Canberra) ✰ Issued Joint Statement (signed defense equipment transfer agreement, approved proposals to enhance bilateral defense cooperation, and decided to commence negotiations to create an agreement for facilitating Japan-Australia joint activities and training, etc.) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Examined possibility of potential cooperation on F-35, examined possibility of submarine cooperation, technical exchanges (e.g., marine hydrodynamics), etc. Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Exchanged opinions concerning Japan-Australia defense cooperation Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (3rd ADMM Plus)) ✰ Confirmed the importance of joint exercises and further deepening defense equipment and technology cooperation 6th Japan-Australia “2+2” Meeting (Sydney) ✰ 1) Shared grave concern over large-scale land reclamation activities in the South China Sea, and agreed to comply with freedom of navigation and of overflight, 2) Agreed to further enhance joint exercises and promote cooperation in the fields of capacity building assistance, cyber, and outer space Japan-Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Issued Joint Statement (Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond)| ||Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff (Sep 2014, Jun.2015), Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff (Nov 2014), Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff (Mar 2014, Feb 2015), Visit to Australia by Chief of Joint Staff (Aug 2014)|| ||Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army(Jun 2013), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy (Mar 2015), Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force (Oct 2014), Visit to Japan by Chief of Australian Army(Apr.2016)|| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Japan-Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM) (Sep. 2015)|| ----- |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Implementation of Japan-Australia joint exercises (MSDF) (Jun. 2013, Sep. 2013, Aug. 2014, Oct. 2015, Apr.2016), Dispatching ASDF aerial refueling/ transport aircraft (KC-767) to Australia (Feb. 2015), Shooting competition organized by the Australian Army (May 2013, May 2014, Apr. 2015)|Col3| |---|---|---| ||Sep. 2013 Aug. 2014 Aug. – Sep. 2014 Jan. – Feb. 2016|Participation of an Australian Navy fleet in the Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Training hosted by Japan Japan participated in the International Fleet Review to commemorate the centenary of the Royal Australian Navy’s fleet into Sydney, Australian Navy-hosted Multilateral Training (Triton Centenary 2013) and ADMM Plus Visit to Hamamatsu and Chitose Air Bases by Royal Australian Air Force aircraft (E-7A) Participation in the Royal Australian Navy hosted multinational joint maritime exercise “Kakadu 14” Participation in Japan-U.S.-Australia joint cruising exercise| |Japan – U.S.– Australia trilateral cooperation|Jun. 2013 May 2014 May 2015 Feb. 2016|Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued and promotion of dynamic and versatile trilateral defense cooperation confirmed Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Japan-U.S.-Australia Joint Statement issued Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Joint Statement issued and agreement reached to further deepen the trilateral defense cooperation Japan-U.S.-Australia Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)| ||Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (GSDF) (May 2013, May 2014, May 2015, Jul. 2015), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF) (Jun. 2013, Aug. 2014, Sep. 2014, Feb. 2016), Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral exercises (ASDF) (Feb. 2014, Feb. 2015, Feb. 2016)|| ||Jul. 2013 Mar. 2014 Jul. 2014 Feb. 2015 Jun. 2015|1st Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Canberra) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force) 2nd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Hawaii) (GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff) Japan-U.S.-Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Melbourne) (ASDF Chief of Staff, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force) 3rd Japan-U.S.-Australia Senior-level Seminar (Townsville) (GSDF Chief of Staff)| **Reference 56 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with the ROK (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2013–Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Nov. 2013 Mar. 2014 Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 May 2015 Sep. 2015 Oct. 2015 Jan. 2016 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016|Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Jakarta) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Seoul) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial-Level Meeting (Halifax) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-ROK Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) ✰ The first joint press release was issued. With regard to the outstanding security issues between the two countries, the two ministers shared the view that Japan-ROK and Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation were important. Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Teleconference Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ The two ministers agreed to strengthen the system for emergency communication between the MOD and the ROK Ministry of National Defense.| ||Oct. 2015 Mar. 2016 Apr.2016|Visit to the ROK by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to the ROK by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the ROK Army Chief of Staff| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Sep. 2014 Apr. 2015 Aug. 2015 Jan. 2016|5th Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue Working Group Meeting (Director-level talks) (Seoul) 10th Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul) 21st Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue (Seoul) Japan-ROK Working-level Defense Dialogue Working Group Meeting (Director-level talks) (Tokyo)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Apr. 2013 Sep. 2013 Oct. 2013 Oct. 2013 Dec. 2013 Mar. 2014 Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Dec. 2014 Mar. 2015 Mar. – Apr. 2015 Oct. 2015 Oct. 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015 Apr. 2016 May 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016|Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Participation of Korean Navel vessel in a submarine rescue training in the western Pacific Ocean hosted by Japan Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF) Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (Japan) (GSDF) Japan-ROK bilateral search and rescue exercise (MSDF) Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF) Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF) Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF) Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (ROK) (GSDF) Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Japan-ROK commander’s course student exchange (ROK) (MSDF) Japan-ROK joint search and rescue exercise (MSDF), participation of ROK naval vessels in Fleet Review Participation of the ROK Navy Band in Japan Self-Defense Force Marching Festival Japan-ROK lower enlisted exchange (Japan) (GSDF) Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (Japan) (ASDF) Japan-ROK mid-level officer exchange (ROK) (ASDF) Participation of MSDF vessels in Pacific Reach (MSDF) hosted by the ROK Visit to the ROK by the Western Army Commanding General (GSDF) Visit to the ROK by the Sasebo District Commandant (MSDF)| ----- |Japan – U.S.– ROK trilateral Cooperation|Jun. 2013 Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015 Jan. 2016 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016|Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The three ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation, while agreeing to expand the Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral defense cooperation. Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ A joint statement of the Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was issued. The Ministers shared a recognition on the regional security situation including North Korea, while agreeing to continue the close Japan-U.S.-ROK trilateral cooperation. Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff level Meeting Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ The three ministers once again emphasized their resolute position that they do not accept North Korea’s continued possession and development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. They agreed to continue to hold consultations on the security issues facing the three countries and to coordinate among the three countries. Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Trilateral Talks Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Chief of Staff Video-Teleconference Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ The three ministers instructed their working-level officials to study ways of promoting communication and coordination among the trilateral defense authorities. They agreed to conduct the first Japan-U.S.-ROK missile warning exercise Pacific Dragon 2016 (exercise held in June 2016).| |---|---|---| ||Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Exercise (MSDF) (May 2013, Oct. 2013, Dec. 2013, Jul. 2014) Japan-U.S.-ROK Basic Level Officer Exchange (GSDF) (Apr. 2013 (ROK), Dec. 2013 (Japan), Apr. 2014 (ROK), Dec. 2014 (Japan), Apr. 2015 (ROK), Dec. 2015 (Japan), Apr. 2016 (ROK))|| **Reference 57 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with India (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2013–June 30, 2016)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|May 2013 Jan. 2014 Sep. 2014 Mar. 2015 Nov. 2015 Dec. 2015 Jun. 2016|Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and establishment of working group to facilitate bilateral cooperation concerning regular exercises between MSDF and Indian Navy as well as US-2 decided. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) ✰ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries, bilateral defense cooperation and exchange, as well as regional and global security issues, etc. Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi) Japan-India Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Japan-India Joint Statement issued, and both sides reaffirmed the importance of their bilateral defense relationship and agreed to launch working-level consultations on defense equipment cooperation. Memorandum on Japan-India defense cooperation and exchanges was signed. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Opinions exchanged widely and frankly regarding defense policies of both countries which have shared interests in the maritime security domain, as well as defense cooperation and exchange, etc. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur) ✰ The Japanese side requested cooperation on advancing US-2 cooperation. Both sides confirmed importance of promoting defense cooperation and exchanges. Japan-India Summit Meeting (Delhi) ✰ Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology and Agreement concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information were signed. Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Agreement reached to strengthen Japan-India and Japan-U.S.-India cooperation, including regular participation in Exercise Malabar as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.| ||May 2013 Oct. 2014 Nov. 2015 Feb. 2016|Visit to India by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force Visit to Japan by the Chief of the Army Staff, Indian Army Visit to India by the MSDF Chief of Staff| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Dec. 2013 Apr. 2014 Aug. 2014 Mar. 2015 Apr. 2015|First meeting of the US-2 Joint Working Group Second meeting of the US-2 Joint Working Group Third meeting of the US-2 Joint Working Group Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation Third Vice-Minister/Secretary level “2+2” dialogue, Fourth Defence Policy Dialogue| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Dec. 2013 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2015 Oct. 2015 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016|Second Japan-India bilateral exercise (MSDF) Exercise Malabar (in waters around Japan) Exercise Malabar (in waters east of India) Participation of Indian naval vessels in Japan Self-Defense Forces Fleet Review MSDF Participation in International Fleet Review hosted by the Indian Navy (in waters east of India) Exercise Malabar (Sasebo and in waters east of Okinawa)| ----- **Reference 58 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with China (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2013–June 30, 2016)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Apr. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015 Nov. 2015 Jun.2016|Visit to China by MSDF Chief of Staff (Western Pacific Naval Symposium (Qingdao)) 13th Japan-China Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense deputy ministers) (Tokyo) Japan-China defense vice-ministerial meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-China defense ministerial meeting (Kuala Lumpur) ✰ The two sides confirmed that they would swiftly begin operations of the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism and on the importance of deepening bilateral defense exchanges Japan-China defense vice-ministerial meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Apr. 2013 Jan. 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015|1st Japan-China senior working-level defense consultations (Beijing) 4th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Tokyo) 2nd Japan-China defense director-general-level consultations (Tokyo) 5th Joint Working Group meeting on the Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.||| **Reference 59 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Russia (Past Three Years)** (April 1, 2013–June 30, 2016) |Col1|Col2|(April 1, 2013–June 30, 2016)| |---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Apr. 2013 Nov. 2013 Nov. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2015|Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Moscow) ✰ Agreement reached to hold Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2) Agreement reached to expand exchanges between defense officials and forces of the two countries as well as to seek new areas of cooperation including counter-terrorism and counter-piracy measures Japan-Russia Defense Ministerial Meeting ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding future Japan-Russia defense cooperation and exchange as well as defense policies of both countries Japan-Russia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding security and defense policies of both countries based on the security situation in Asia-Pacific region, cooperation within the region based on a multilateral framework, and deployment of a missile defense system in the region, etc. Japan-Russia Summit Meeting (Sochi) Japan-Russia vice-ministerial meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Visit to Russia by the MSDF Chief of Staff (Aug. 2013), Visit to Russia by the GSDF Chief of Staff (Feb. 2014)|| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives||| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Jul. 2013 Mar. 2014 Dec. 2014|Visit to Japan by the delegation of the Russian Ground Forces, Eastern Military District Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army Visit to the Eastern Military District by Commander of the ASDF Northern Air Defense Force| ||14th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Dec. 2013), 15th bilateral Japan-Russia search and rescue exercises (Oct. 2014)|| **Reference 60 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with ASEAN Countries (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2013 – Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Cambodia|Aug. 2013 Oct. 2014 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2016|Japan-Cambodia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM Plus)) Visit to Japan by the Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) Japan-Cambodia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Cambodia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Cambodian Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense (Vice Minister) Visit to Cambodia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| ||Indonesia|Jun. 2013 Nov. 2013 Dec. 2013 Mar. 2014 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 May 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Dec. 2015 Dec. 2015 Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016 Apr. 2016|Japan-Indonesia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Indonesian Deputy Minister of Defense Visit to Indonesia by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Indonesia by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Indonesia by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Indonesia by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Visit to Indonesia by the MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Indonesia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchange Visit to Indonesia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Indonesia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Indonesia by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense of Indonesia First Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Agreement reached to initiate negotiations for an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, and on MSDF’s participation in multilateral exercise KOMODO 2016 Visit to Japan by the Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Indonesian Army Chief of Staff Visit to Indonesia by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Indonesian Army Chief of the General Staff| ----- |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Laos|Aug. 2013 Jan. 2014 Feb. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 Feb. 2016 Apr. 2016|Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM Plus)) Visit to Laos by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos Visit to Laos by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Defence of Laos Japan-Laos Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (Third ADMM Plus)) ✰ Concurred that the two countries would continue to coordinate and cooperate with each other through the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief EWG Visit to Laos by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Laos by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| |---|---|---|---| ||Malaysia|Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 May 2015 Nov. 2015 Nov. 2015|Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur) Visit to Malaysia by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Malaysia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Defence Force, Malaysian Armed Forces Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (Third ADMM Plus)) Visit to Malaysia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| ||Myanmar|Feb. 2014 Apr. 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jul. 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Apr. 2016 Jun. 2016|Visit to Japan by the Myanmese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Myanmar by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Myanmar by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Myanmar by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services of Myanmar Visit to Japan by the Myanmese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Myanmar by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by the Minister of Defense (Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Roundtable) Visit to Japan by the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Air Force Visit to Japan by the Deputy Commander-in-chief of Defence Services of Myanmar and the Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army Visit to Japan by the Myanmese Deputy Minister of Defence Visit to Myanmar by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Myanmar by the Minister of Defense| ||Philippines|May 2013 Jun. 2013 Dec. 2013 Jan. 2014 Feb. 2014 Sep. 2014 Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Jun. 2015 Aug. 2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 May 2016|Visit to the Philippines by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Manila) Visit to Japan by the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy Visit to the Philippines by the Minister of Defense (Visit to international disaster relief operations) Visit to the Philippines by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Signed memorandum on defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to the Philippines by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to the Philippines by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force Visit to the Philippines by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Commanding General of the Philippine Army Visit to Japan by the Philippine Secretary of National Defense (accompanied President’s visit to Japan) Visit to the Philippines by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by the Philippine Undersecretary of National Defense Visit to the Philippines by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (Third ADMM Plus)) ✰ Concurred that the two countries would enhance capacity building assistance and deepen defense equipment and technology cooperation Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Teleconference| ||Singapore|May 2013 Jun. 2013 Aug. 2013 Sep. 2013 Dec. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2014 Oct. 2014 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Feb. 2016 Jun. 2016|Visit to Singapore by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM Plus)) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Navy of the Republic of Singapore Navy Visit to Singapore by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Singapore by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Singapore by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Air Force of the Republic of Singapore Air Force Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Japan-Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Singapore by the Chief of Joint Staff (14th Shangri-La Dialogue) Visit to the Singapore by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Singapore by the ASDF Chief of Staff Japan-Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ----- |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Thailand|Sep. 2013 Oct. 2013 Feb. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jul. 2015 Feb. 2016 Mar. 2016 May 2016 Jun. 2016|Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situation as well as Japan-Thailand defense cooperation and exchange Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Air Force Commander Visit to Thailand by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by the Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Visit to Japan by the Thai Chief of Defence Forces Visit to Thailand by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Thailand by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Thailand by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Royal Thai Army Commander Japan-Thailand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Bangkok)| |---|---|---|---| ||Vietnam|Apr. 2013 May 2013 Aug. 2013 Sep. 2013 Feb. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 May 2015 Sep. 2015 Oct. 2015 Nov. 2015|Visit to Japan by the Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army Visit to Vietnam by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Vietnam by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Vietnam by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM Plus)) Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Hanoi) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situation as well as Japan-Vietnam defense cooperation and exchanges Visit to Japan by the Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by the Vietnam Commander of Air Defense and Air Force Visit to Vietnam by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnam People’s Navy Visit to Vietnam by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Vietnamese Vice-Minister of National Defence Visit to Japan by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting| ||Brunei|Jun. 2013 Aug. 2013 Feb. 2014 Nov. 2014 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2016|Visit to Brunei by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Brunei Vice-Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Brunei by the Minister of Defense (Second ADMM Plus) Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei Visit to Brunei by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of Brunei Visit to Brunei by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| |Regular discussions between defense ministry High-level talks between heads of state and defense representatives|Cambodia|May 2013 Sep. 2014|2nd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Brisbane) 3rd Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 4th Japan-Cambodia Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Tokyo)| ||Indonesia|Jul. 2013 Nov. 2014|2nd Japan-Indonesia Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 5th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Jakarta) 6th Japan-Indonesia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Philippines|May 2013 Apr. 2014 Mar. 2015|6th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 6th Japan-Philippines Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 7th Japan-Philippines Politico-Military Consultation (PM) (Manila) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Manila)| ||Singapore|Jul. 2013 Dec. 2014|13th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo) 14th Japan-Singapore Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Singapore)| ||Thailand|Mar. 2015|12th Japan-Thailand Politico-Military Consultation (PM), 12th Japan-Thailand Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Vietnam|Nov. 2013 Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Dec. 2015|4th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo) 5th Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Hanoi) Vice-Defense Ministerial Consultation (Hanoi) Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue (Tokyo)| ||Malaysia|Oct. 2013|5th Japan-Malaysia Military-Military Consultation (MM) (Tokyo)| ||Myanmar|Nov. 2013|1st Japan-Myanmar-Military Consultation (MM) (Naypyidaw)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Southeast Asian Member States and Multilateral Exchanges etc.|May 2013 Jun. 2013 Feb. 2014 Mar. 2014 Aug. 2014 Feb. 2015 May 2015 May 2015 Jun. 2015 Aug. 2015 Jan. – Feb. 2016 Feb. 2016 Apr. 2016 May 2016|ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREX2013) ADMM Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise (Brunei) Participation in Cobra Gold 14 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Multilateral joint exercise Komodo hosted by the Indonesian Navy (Indonesia) GPOI Capstone exercise (Indonesia) Participation in Cobra Gold 15 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Participation in 4th ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx2015) hosted by Malaysia and China (Malaysia) Participation in Japan-Philippines joint exercise (coast of Manila) Participation in Japan-Philippines joint exercise (coast of Palawan) Participation in Pacific Partnership 2015 (Philippines) GPOI Capstone exercise (Malaysia) Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures Exercise (Singapore, Indonesia) Participation in Cobra Gold 16 hosted by the United States and Thailand (Thailand) Participation in Japan-Vietnam goodwill exercise (Vietnam) (MSDF) Multilateral joint exercise Komodo hosted by the Indonesian Navy (Indonesia) ADMM Plus Maritime Security Exercise (Brunei, etc.)| ----- **Reference 61 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Asia-Pacific Countries (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2013 – Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|Timor-Leste|Mar. 2015 Jun. 2016|Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Timor-Leste)| ||Mongolia|Aug. 2013 Nov. 2013 Apr. 2014 Jun. 2014 Mar. 2015 May 2015 Jul. 2015 Oct. 2015|Visit to Mongolia by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-Mongolia Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Mongolia by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Vice Minister of Defense of Mongolia (19th Tokyo Defense Forum) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Mongolia by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Chief of the General Staff, Mongolian Armed Forces Visit to Mongolia by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs| ||New Zealand|May 2013 Jul. 2013 Aug. 2013 Sep. 2013 Jun. 2014 Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015 May 2015 Jul.2015 Sep. 2015 Sep. 2015 Nov. 2015 Jun. 2016|Visit to Japan by the New Zealand Air Force Commander Visit to Japan by the New Zealand Chief of Defence Force Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Brunei (Second ADMM Plus)) Visit to New Zealand by the GSDF Chief of Staff Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of Army of the New Zealand Defence Force Visit to New Zealand by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to New Zealand by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Japan by the New Zealand Secretary of Defence Visit to Japan by the New Zealand Air Force Commander Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia (Third ADMM Plus)) Japan-New Zealand Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))| ||Sri Lanka|Jun. 2014|Visit to Sri Lanka by the MSDF Chief of Staff| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|New Zealand|Oct. 2013 Sep. 2014 Sep. 2015|7th Japan- New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo) 8th Japan- New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Auckland) 9th Japan- New Zealand Bilateral Defence Talks (Tokyo)| ||Pakistan|Nov. 2014|7th Japan-Pakistan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Mongolia|Dec. 2014 Jan. 2016|2nd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 2nd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense authorities (Ulan Bator) 3rd Consultation between foreign affairs, defense, and security authorities, 3rd Japan-Mongolia Consultation between defense and security authorities (Tokyo)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|New Zealand|Aug.2014 Nov. 2015|Japan-Australia-New Zealand joint exercise PSI Exercise| ||Pakistan|Mar.2015 Feb. 2016|Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise Japan-Pakistan bilateral exercise| ||Sri Lanka|Apr. 2015 Nov. 2015 Mar. 2016 May 2016|Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise Japan-Sri Lanka goodwill exercise| ||Maldives|Aug. 2014 Apr. 2015|Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise Japan-Maldives goodwill exercise| **Reference 62 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries (Past Three Years)** (Apr. 1, 2013 – Jun. 30, 2016) (Apr. 1, 2013 – Jun. 30, 2016) |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|United Kingdom|Jun. 2013 Jul. 2013 Sep. 2013 Dec. 2013 Mar. 2014 Apr. 2014 May 2014 May 2014 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Oct. 2014 Jan. 2015 Jan. 2015 Sep. 2015 Jan. 2016 Jun. 2016|Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Japan by the U.K. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence Equipment, Support and Technology Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the First Sea Lord and U.K. Chief of Naval Staff Visit to Japan by the U.K. Chief of the General Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of the Defence Staff, British Army Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to the U.K. by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to the U.K. by the ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the U.K. Chief of the Air Staff Visit to the U.K. by the State Minister of Defense 1st Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London) ✰ Confirmed the progress of defense equipment and technology cooperation, and exchanged opinions regarding strengthening cooperation on global security issues, regional situations, etc. Visit to the U.K. by the MSDF Chief of Staff 2nd Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting, Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Confirmed the two countries would strengthen cooperation on defense equipment and technology, joint exercises, capacity building assistance for Southeast Asia, ACSA, etc. Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue))| |---|---|---|---| ----- |High-level talks between heads of state and defense|France|Jun. 2013 Aug. 2013 Jan. 2014 Mar. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jun. 2014 Jul. 2014 Jul. 2014 Mar. 2015 Jan. 2016 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016|Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (12th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding the situation of Japan-France defense cooperation exchange and regional situations Visit to France by the MSDF Chief of Staff Japan-France foreign and defense ministers’ meeting, Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Paris) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding the regional situations and Japan-France security and defense cooperation Visit to France by the Chief of Joint Staff Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (13th Shangri-La Dialogue)) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and security policies Visit to France by the State Minister of Defense Visit to the France by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-France foreign and defense ministers’ meeting, Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Signed defense equipment and technology transfer agreement, and exchanged opinions regarding Japan-France security and defense cooperation, security policies, regional situations, etc. Visit to France by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to France by the State Minister of Defense| |---|---|---|---| ||Germany|Apr. 2013 Mar. 2014 May 2015 Sep. 2015 Feb. 2016|Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of German Army Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of German Navy Japan-Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (14th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Germany by the Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs Visit to Germany by the State Minister of Defense| ||Italy|May 2013 Mar. 2014 May 2014 Feb. 2015 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016|Visit to Italy by the State Minister of Defense Visit to Italy by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Italy by the Minister of Defense Visit to Italy by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) Visit to Italy by the State Minister of Defense| ||Spain|Aug. 2014 Nov. 2014|Visit to Spain by the State Minister of Defense Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Belgium|Mar. 2014 Feb. 2015|Visit to Belgium by the Chief of Joint Staff Visit to Belgium by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Netherlands|Oct. 2015|Visit to Japan by the Netherlands Chief of Defence| ||Sweden|Mar. 2015|Visit to Japan by the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces| ||Finland|Jul. 2013 Sep. 2013 Oct. 2014 Feb. 2015 Mar. 2015|Visit to Finland by the Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Visit to Finland by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland| ||Estonia|May 2015|Visit to Estonia by the State Minister of Defense| ||Lithuania|Feb. 2014|Japan-Lithuania Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Bulgaria|May 2015|Visit to Bulgaria by the State Minister of Defense| ||Latvia|May 2015|Visit to Japan by the State Secretary of Defence of Latvia| ||Poland|Jun. 2015|Visit to Japan by the Under-Secretary of State for Defence of Poland| ||Georgia|Nov. 2015|Japan-Georgia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, and signed a memorandum on defense exchanges| ||Czech Republic|Dec. 2015|Japan-Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) ✰ Exchanged opinions regarding regional situations and bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|United Kingdom|Dec. 2013 Sep. 2015|13th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (London) 14th Japan-U.K. Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 10th Japan-U.K. Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||France|Nov. 2014 Sep. 2015|17th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities,16th Japan-France Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 18th Japan-France Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Germany|Oct. 2014|14th Japan-Germany Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 12th Japan-Germany Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Italy|Jun. 2013 Dec. 2015|2nd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 3rd Japan-Italy Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Poland|Sep. 2014|1st Japan-Poland Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||NATO|Feb. 2014 Feb. 2016|13th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo) 14th Japan-NATO Senior Officials Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Norway|Nov. 2014|2nd Japan-Norway Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|NATO|Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014|Japan-NATO bilateral exercise Japan-NATO bilateral exercise| ||EU|Oct. 2014 Nov. 2014 Mar. 2015 Jan. 2016|Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise (twice) Japan-EU bilateral exercise Japan-EU bilateral exercise| ||United Kingdom|Apr. 2016|Japan-U.K. goodwill exercise| ----- **Reference 63 Recent Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Other Countries (Past Three Years)** |Col1|Col2|Col3|(Apr. 1, 2013 – Jun. 30, 2016)| |---|---|---|---| |High-level talks between heads of defense and others|Turkey|Nov. 2014 May 2015 May 2016 May 2016|Visit to Turkey by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Turkish Naval Forces Visit to Turkey by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Turkey by the MSDF Chief of Staff| ||Kazakhstan|Jul. 2012|Visit to Kazakhstan by the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Azerbaijan|Aug. 2013|Visit to Azerbaijan by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| ||Canada|Mar. 2014 Nov. 2014 Oct. 2015 Jun. 2016 Jun. 2016|2nd Japan-Canada 2+2 deputy ministerial dialogue (Ottawa) Japan-Canada vice-ministerial meeting (Halifax) Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force Japan-Canada Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore (15th Shangri-La Dialogue)) 3rd Japan-Canada 2+2 deputy ministerial dialogue (Tokyo)| ||Brazil|Aug. 2014 Feb. 2016|Visit to Brazil by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to Brazil by the GSDF Chief of Staff| ||Colombia|Mar. 2015|Japan-Colombia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)| ||Middle East/ Africa|Apr. 2013 Feb. 2014 May 2014 Aug. 2014 Sep. 2014 Nov. 2014 Jan. 2015 May 2015|Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman by the MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by the Minister of Defense Visit to South Africa by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Visit to South Sudan and Djibouti by the GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by the Chief of Djibouti Navy Visit to Djibouti and South Sudan by the Minister of Defense Visit to Uganda, Djibouti, South Sudan, and Bahrain by the Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense| |Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives|Canada|Apr. 2012 Jun. 2014|7th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo) 8th Japan-Canada Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, 9th Japan-Canada Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Turkey|Jan. 2015|2nd Japan-Turkey Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Jordan|Apr. 2015|1st Japan-Jordan Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Saudi Arabia|Jun. 2015|1st Japan-Saudi Arabia Consultation between defense authorities (Tokyo)| ||Egypt|Oct. 2015|1st Japan-Egypt Consultation between foreign affairs and defense authorities, Japan-Egypt Consultation between defense authorities| ||Kuwait|Mar. 2016|1st Japan-Kuwait Security Dialogue (Tokyo)| ||UAE|Dec. 2015|1st Japan-UAE Security Dialogue (Abu Dhabi)| ||Bahrain|Dec. 2015|2nd Japan-Bahrain Security Dialogue (Manama)| |Unit-level exchange, etc.|Turkey|Nov. 2014 Jun. 2015 Dec. 2015|Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise Japan-Turkey goodwill exercise Japan-Turkey bilateral exercise| than 3 years **4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy** (1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy. (2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, maritime safety officials may use weapons to the extent that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation. **5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy** (1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency). (2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters. (3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded. (4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel. **Reference 64 Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and** **Response to Acts of Piracy** **1. Purpose of the Legislation** To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the economy of Japan and the people’s lives. **2. Definition of Acts of Piracy** Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan’s territorial waters, etc.: (1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/ destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons **3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy** A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows: (1) 2 (1) – (4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death. (2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 5 years (3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less ----- **Reference 65 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities** |Item|International Peace Support Act|International Peace Cooperation Act|Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)|Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)| |---|---|---|---|---| |Purpose|❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community|❍ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts towards international peace|❍ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self- reliant efforts by the Iraqi people towards the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq|❍ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan| |Provisions in the SDF Law|❍ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|❍ Provision under Article 84-5 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law|❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law|❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law| |Major Activities|❍ Cooperation and support activities1 ❍ Search and rescue activities1 ❍ Ship inspection operations3|❍ International peacekeeping activities ❍ Internationally coordinated operations for peace and security ❍ International humanitarian assistance ❍ International election monitoring activities ❍ Supplies cooperation for the abovementioned activities|❍ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ❍ Support activities for ensuring security|❍ Replenishment support activities| |Areas of Operation|❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration (in such countries) is required. ❍ High seas and the airspace above|❍ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)|❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq)2 ❍ High seas and the airspace above2|❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required)2 ❍ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above2| |Diet Approval|❍ Prior approval required without exception|❍ To be discussed in advance in the Diet in principle, only for cases where SDF units, etc. conduct so-called ceasefire monitoring and safety-ensuring operations4|❍ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures4|(Note 5)| |Diet Report|❍ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|❍ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay|❍ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay|❍ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay| Notes: 1. Limited to sites where combat is not taking place. 2. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan’s activities are being implemented. 3. Operations shall be conducted in waters where the activities can be clearly distinguished from ship inspection operations carried out by foreign countries. 4. In cases where the Diet is in recess, etc., an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session. 5. As prescribed by Law, (1) the category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) As the area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to re-obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to Diet approval. **Reference 66 The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities** **(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq** (As of June 30, 2016) |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |GSDF|Southeast Iraq, etc.|Jan. 2004 – Jul. 2006|Approx. 600|• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.| ||Kuwait, etc.|Jun.– Sep. 2006|Approx. 100|• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others| |MSDF|Persian Gulf, etc.|Feb. 20 – Apr. 8, 2004|Approx. 330|• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF’s activities| |ASDF|Kuwait, etc.|Dec. 2003 – Feb. 2009|Approx. 210|• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance| **(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF|Indian Ocean|Nov. 2001– Nov. 2007|Approx. 320|• Materials supplies for foreign vessels| |ASDF|U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.||−|• Transportation of materials| **(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF|Indian Ocean|Jan. 2008 – Feb. 2010|Approx. 330|• Materials supplies for foreign vessels| ----- **(4) Anti-Piracy Operations (including dispatches as Maritime Security Operations)** |Col1|Place of Dispatch|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |MSDF (Maritime Force)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden|Mar. 2009 –|Approx. 400|Escort of vessels, zone defense, etc.| |MSDF (Air Unit)|Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|May 2009 – Jul. 2014|Approx. 120 (*)|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden and tasks related to general affairs, accounting, public relations, health, etc.| ||Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Jul. 2014 – Jul. 2015|Approx. 70|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.| ||Off the coast of Somalia / Gulf of Aden Djibouti|Jul. 2015 –|Approx. 60|Surveillance activities in the Gulf of Aden, etc.| |MSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul. 2014 –|Approx. 30|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.| |MSDF (Combined Task Force 151 Command Unit)|Bahrain, etc.|Aug. 2014 –|Under 20|Communication and coordination with units of various countries participating in CTF151| |MSDF (Local Coordination Center)|Djibouti|Jul. 2012 – Jul. 2014|3|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities necessary for Maritime Force and Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation| |GSDF (Air Unit)|Djibouti|May. 2009 – Jul. 2014|Approx. 70 (*)|Security of activity base and P-3C| |GSDF (Support Unit)|Djibouti|Jul. 2014 –|Approx. 80|Communication and coordination with the relevant authorities of the Republic of Djibouti and other authorities and supports necessary for Air Unit to conduct anti-piracy operation, etc.| **(5) International Peace Cooperation Activities** *Number of personnel as of July 2014 |Col1|Col2|Col3|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |PKO|United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)|Ceasefire monitors|Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993|8|16|• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border| |||Engineer unit|Sep. 1992 – Sep. 1993|600|1200|• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities| |PKO|United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)|Headquarters staff|May 1993 – Jan. 1995|5|10|• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters| |||Transport coordination unit|May 1993 – Jan. 1995|48|144|• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport related technical coordination in the allocation of transport| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees|Rwandan refugee relief unit|Sep.– Dec. 1994|260||• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies| |||Air transport unit|Sep.– Dec. 1994|188||• Air transport of Rwandan refugee relief unit personnel and supplies between Nairobi (in Kenya) and Goma (in former Zaire and current Republic of the Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations| |PKO|United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (Golan Heights)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 1996 – Feb. 2009|1st-3th personnel:  2|38|• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters| ||||Feb. 2009 – Jan. 2013|14th-17th personnel:  3||| |||Transport unit|Feb. 1996 – Aug. 2012|1st-33rd personnel:  43|1463|• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance| ||||Aug. 2012 – Jan. 2013|34th personnel:  44||| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste|Air transport unit|Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000|113||• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR related personnel| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees|Air transport unit|Oct. 2001|138||• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR| |PKO|United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor- Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor- Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004|1st personnel: 10 2nd personnel: 7|17|• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters| |||Engineer unit|Mar. 2002 – Jun. 2004|1st and 2nd personnel: 680 3rd personnel:  522 4th personnel:  405|2287|• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations Civic assistance • Public welfare support operations| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees|Air transport unit|Mar. – Apr. 2003|50||• Air transport of relief supplies for UNHCR| |Humanitarian aid|Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims|Air transport unit|Jul. – Aug. 2003|98||• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims| |PKO|United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)|Arms monitors|Mar. 2007– Jan. 2011|6|24|• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force| |PKO|United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)|Headquarters staff|Oct. 2008– Sep. 2011|2|12|• Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector • Database management| ----- |Col1|Col2|Col3|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Total Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| |PKO|United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)|Headquarters staff|Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013|2|12|• MINUSTAH headquarters carries out coordination of overall military logistics, which includes the prioritization of engineering activities such as coordinating facility- related duties, and procurement and transport of military items| |||Engineer unit|Feb. 2010 – Jan. 2013|1st personnel:  203 2nd personnel:  346 3rd and 4th personnel: 330 5th and 6th personnel: 317 7th personnel:  297 Removal support personnel:  44|2184|• Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.| |PKO|United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)|Military liaison officer|Sep. 2010 – Sep. 2012|2|8|• Intelligence gathering on the security situation across Timor-Leste| |PKO|United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)|Headquarters staff|Nov. 2011 –|4|25|• Coordination within the UNMISS units regarding the demand of overall military logistics • Management of database • Planning and coordination of engineering duties| |||Engineer Unit|Jan. 2012 –|1st personnel: approx. 210 2nd – 4th personnel:  approx. 330 5th and 6th personnel:  approx. 400 7th personnel:approx. 350|approx. 3400|• Development of infrastructure such as roads (The following duties were added after 5th personnel) • Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics| |||Joint Coordination Center|Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2013|1st personnel: approx. 30 2nd – 4th personnel:  approx. 20|approx. 90|• Consultation and coordination with UNMISS regarding engineer unit activities • Coordination regarding logistics| Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan). 2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort. |(6) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF|Col2|Col3|Col4|Col5| |---|---|---|---|---| |||Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)|Medical support unit|Jun. 1 – 22, 2006|149|• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics| ||Air transport unit||85|• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake disaster)|Medical support unit|Oct. 5 – 17, 2009|12|• Medical treatment| ||Joint liaison office||21|• Coordination with relevant Indonesian organizations and others| |International disaster relief activities in Haiti (earthquake disaster)|Medical support unit|Jan. 18 – Feb. 16, 2010|104|• Medical treatment| ||Air transport unit||97|• Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams • Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit| ||Joint liaison office||33|• Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others| |International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (floods)|Air support unit|Aug. 20 – Oct. 10, 2010|184|• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies by air| ||Joint operations coordination center||27|• Coordination with related organizations in Pakistan and other related countries| ||Marine convoy||154|• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by sea| ||Air transport unit||149|• Transportation of GSDF international disaster relief teams by air| |Transportation of resources and personnel necessary for the implementation of international disaster relief activities in New Zealand (earthquake disaster)|Air transport unit|Feb. 23 – Mar. 3, 2011|40|• Transportation of international disaster relief teams by air| |International disaster relief activities in Philippines (typhoon disaster)|Local operations coordination center|Nov. 12 – Dec. 13, 2013|1,086|• Coordination with relevant Philippine organizations and others| ||Medical assistance unit/Air support unit|||• Medical treatment, prevention of epidemics and air transportation of personnel and aid materials| ||Maritime dispatched unit|||• Transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.| ||Airlift unit|||• Air transportation of personnel and relief supplies, etc.| |International disaster relief activities for the missing Malaysian airplane (search)|Local support coordination center|Mar. 11– Apr. 28, 2014|137|• Coordination with relevant Malaysian organizations and relevant countries.| ||MSDF Patrol aircraft unit|||• Rescue operations including searching| ||ASDF Airlift unit|||• Rescue operations including searching| |International disaster relief activities in response to Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa (infectious disease)|Local coordination center|Dec. 5 – 11, 2014|4|• Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, JICA, UNMEER, and other relevant organizations engaged in international disaster relief activities| ||Air transport unit||10|• Transport activities| ||Epidemiological study support|Apr. 21 – May 29, 2015|1|• Support for WHO’s epidemiological study and other activities in Sierra Leone| |International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (airplane accident)|Local support coordination center|Jan. 3 – 9, 2015|3|• Information gathering related to rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501, coordination with relevant organizations and countries| ||International disaster relief surface force||Approx. 350|• Rescue operations including search of missing AirAsia Flight 8501| ----- |Col1|Col2|Period of Dispatch|Number of Personnel|Description of Principal Tasks| |---|---|---|---|---| |International disaster relief activities in Nepal (earthquake disaster)|Joint operations coordination center|Apr. 27 – May 22, 2015|4|• Coordination with relevant organizations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and relevant countries| ||Medical support unit||Approx. 110|• Medical treatment for affected people| ||Air transport unit||Approx. 30|• Transport of equipment and supplies needed for medical treatment| Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran. 2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities. **Reference 67 Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations** ||Col2|(As of June 30, 2016)| |---|---|---| |Period of Dispatch|Position in the Dispatched Organization|Dispatched Personnel| |Jun. 9, 1997 – Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004 – Aug. 1, 2007|Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major General)1| |Jun. 23, 1997 – Jun. 25, 2000|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)| |Oct. 1, 2002 – Jun. 30, 2007|Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)| |Jul. 11, 2005 – Jul. 11, 2009|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Jan. 9, 2009 – Jan. 8, 2013|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF personnel (Major)| |Aug. 27, 2013 –|Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)|1 GSDF officer (Captain)| |Dec. 2, 2002 – Jun. 1, 2005|Military Planning Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Nov. 28, 2005 – Nov. 27, 2008|Military Planning Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jan. 16, 2011 – Jan. 15, 2014|Military Planning Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Sep. 18, 2013 –|Force Generation Service, Offcie of Military Affairs, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)| |Jun. 1, 2015 –|Senior Communications Officer, Senior Africa Division I, Office of Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)|1 GSDF personnel (Captain)| Notes: 1. The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007. **Reference 68 Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment** **and Technology** (Approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet on April 1, 2014) The Government has made it its basic policy to deal with overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology in a careful manner in accordance with Prime Minster Eisaku Sato’s remarks at the Diet in 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the Three Principles on Arms Exports”) and the collateral policy guideline by the Miki administration in 1976. These policy guidelines have played a certain role as Japan has been following the path of a peace-loving nation. On the other hand, these policy guidelines including the non-permission of arms exports to communist bloc countries have increasingly proved unsuitable for the current situation. Also, the Government has repeatedly taken exemption measures depending on the individual necessity of each case since arms exports to substantially all areas were not permitted, as a result of not promoting arms exports regardless of the destinations. Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Japan has adhered to a basic policy of maintaining an exclusively national defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. At the same time, surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it has become essential for Japan to make more proactive efforts in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace and stability in the world commensurate with its national capabilities. Against this backdrop, under the evolving security environment, Japan will continue to adhere to the course that it has taken to date as a peace-loving nation, and as a major player in world politics and the world economy, contribute even more proactively in securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. From the view point of achieving the fundamental principle of national security by implementing concrete policies, the Government, in accordance with the National Security Strategy adopted on December 17, 2013, decided to review the Government’s existing policy guidelines on overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology, and set out clear principles which fit the new security environment while giving due consideration to the roles that the existing policy guidelines have played so far and by consolidating the policy guidelines comprehensively with consideration on the past exemption measures. An appropriate overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology contributes to further active promotion of the maintenance of international peace and security through timely and effective implementation of contribution to peace and international cooperation such as international peace cooperation, international disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, responses to international terrorism and piracy, and capacity building of developing countries (hereinafter referred to as “peace contribution and international cooperation”). Such transfer also contributes to strengthening security and defense cooperation with Japan’s ally, the United States as well as other countries. Furthermore, it contributes to maintaining and enhancing Japan’s defense production and technological bases, thereby contributing to Japan’s enhancement of defense capability, given that international joint development and production projects have become the international mainstream in order to improve the performance of defense equipment and to deal with their rising costs. On the other hand, since the distribution of defense equipment and technology has significant security, social, economic and humanitarian impact on the international community, the need for each government to control the transfer of defense equipment and technology in a responsible manner while taking various factors into account is recognized. In light of the above, while maintaining its basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation, Japan will control the overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology based on the following three principles. The overseas transfer of facilities related to arms production will continue to be treated in the same manner as defense equipment and technology. ----- **1. Clarification of cases where transfers are prohibited** Overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will not be permitted when: 1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other international agreements that Japan has concluded, 2) the transfer violates obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions, or 3) the defense equipment and technology is destined for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the United Nations Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in the event of an armed attack). **2. Limitation to cases where transfers may be permitted as well as** **strict examination and information disclosure** In cases not within 1. above, cases where transfers may be permitted will be limited to the following cases. Those cases will be examined strictly while ensuring transparency. More specifically, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology may be permitted in such cases as the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, or to Japan’s security from the viewpoint of—implementing international joint development and production projects with countries cooperating with Japan in security area including its ally, the U.S. (hereinafter referred to as “the ally and partners”), —enhancing security and defense cooperation with the ally and partners, as well as—supporting the activities of the Self-Defense Forces including the maintenance of its equipment and ensuring the safety of Japanese nationals. The Government will conduct strict examination on the appropriateness of the destination and end user, and the extent the overseas transfer of such equipment and technology will raise concern for Japan’s security. Then the Government will make a comprehensive judgment in light of the existing guidelines of the international export control regime and based on the information available at the time of export examinations. Significant cases that require especially careful consideration from the viewpoint of Japan’s security will be examined at the National Security Council (NSC). As for the cases that were **Reference 69 Activities in Civic Life** deliberated at the NSC, the Government will disclose their information in accordance with the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs (Law No. 42 of 1999). **3. Ensuring appropriate control regarding extra-purpose use or** **transfer to third parties** In cases satisfying 2. above, overseas transfer of defense equipment and technology will be permitted only in cases where appropriate control is ensured. More concretely, the Government will in principle oblige the Government of the recipient country to gain its prior consent regarding extra-purpose use and transfer to third parties. However, appropriate control may be ensured with the confirmation of control system at the destination in such cases as those where the transfer is judged to be appropriate for active promotion of peace contribution and international cooperation, when the transfer involves participation in an international system for sharing parts etc., and when the transfer involves delivery of parts etc. to a licenser. Implementation guidelines for the policy described above will be decided by the NSC. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry will implement the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Law No.228 of 1949) appropriately in accordance with the decision. For the purpose of this policy, “defense equipment and technology” refers to “arms and military technologies”; “arms” refers to items listed in Section 1, Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949), and are to be used by military forces and directly employed in combat; and “military technologies” refers to technologies for the design, production or use of arms. The Government will contribute actively to the peace and stability of the international community as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Under such policy, it will play a proactive role in the area of controlling defense equipment and technology as well as sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to achieve the early entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty and further strengthen the international export control regimes. |Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records| |---|---| |Disposal of Unexploded Bombs1|❍ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ❍ Disposal operations in FY2015: a total of 1,392 disposal operations (average of approximately 27 operations per week), weighing approximately 43.0 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled approximately 20.2 tons, (accounting for about 47% of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible in regard to disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Removal of Underwater Mines2|❍ The MSDF undertakes minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II, as well as removes and disposes of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments and others. ❍ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. ❍ Disposal operations in FY2015: a total 1,832 units were disposed of, weighing approximately 3.5 tons in total (0 underwater mines disposed). (If explosive hazardous materials are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)| |Medical Activities3|❍ Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (six out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ❍ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services. ❍ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide travelling clinics, quarantines and so forth when a disaster occurs. ❍ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. ❍ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.| |Cooperation in Supporting Athletic Meetings4|❍ At the request of concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of the Olympics and Asian games in Japan as well as national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services, and emergency medical services. ❍ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and ekiden road relays.| |Exchanges with Local Communities|❍ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. ❍ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.| Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others. 4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc. ----- **Reference 70 Activities Contributing to Society** |Items|Details of Activities and Their Past Records| |---|---| |Acceptance of Other Parties for Education and Training1|❍ The SDF, responding to requests from other parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel ❍ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, and education on chemical disasters response are provided to police officers, Japan Coast Guard Personnel and firefighters. Aircraft-maneuvering training is provided to police officers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy accept employees of private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries for education.| |Transportation Work2|❍ GSDF, MSDF and ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister. ❍ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)| |Ceremonial Work at National Events3|❍ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard4 forming a line for guests5 and firing a gun salute for them6 ❍ Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.| |Cooperation in Antarctic Research Expedition7|❍ Since the seventh expedition in 1965, the SDF has extended cooperation such as operating its icebreaker and has contributed significantly to Antarctic research projects, which marked their 50th anniversary in FY2007. The new icebreaker “Shirase” went into service in 2009, and the SDF will continue to provide support for such projects in the future. ❍ In cooperating in the 7th Antarctic Research Expedition since November 2015, the SDF has transported expedition members and approximately 1,040 tons of supplies to Showa Station, and provided cooperation for the hydrographic survey planned by the expedition team.| |Other Cooperation|❍ Acting on requests from the Japan Metrological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions. ❍ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps. ❍ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)8 ❍ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support for flights of private chartered aircraft to Iwoto island, and the dispatch SDF of music bands.| Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others. 3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others. 4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect. 5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them. 6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests. 7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. 8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. **Reference 71 Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities** (Cause of Disturbance) Activities by SDF and others (Cause of Disturbance) (Measures) Devastation of training areas Subsidy for disturbance prevention (Noise abatement works): Subsidy for noise-abatement work for schools, hospitals, etc. Class 1 Area Subsidy for noise-abatement work for housing[1] Compensation for relocation and others Subsidy for improvements of public facilities at relocation site noise Class 2 Area Purchase of land Free use of purchased land Class 3 Area Maintenance of greenbelts Loss sustained in running agricultural, fisheries, and forestry businesses Compensation for loss[2] (Restricted to loss resulting from SDF activities) Disruption of everyday life or business activities Subsidy for improvement of public welfare facilities Establishment and operation of defense facilities Effect on living environments and development projects Cities, towns, and villages related to Specified Defense Facilities Provision of Specified Defense Facility Environs Improvement Adjustment Grant Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area Areas around bases are classified as follows according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise: Class 1 Area: Areas where WECPNL is 75 or higher Class 2 Area: Section of Class 1 Areas where WECPNL is 90 or higher Class 3 Area: Section of Class 2 Areas where WECPNL is 95 or higher - Criteria used for area classifications until 2012 are: WECPNL at 75 or higher, 90 or higher, and 95 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively. Criteria used for area classifications in 2013 and beyond are: Lden at 62 or higher, 73 or higher, and 76 or higher for Class 1 Areas, Class 2 Areas, and Class 3 Areas, respectively. (2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels. (3) Lden The equivalent noise level over a day being assessed by weighing noises measured early evening and at night. Notes: 2. If losses are caused due to acts of the U.S. Forces in Japan, they are compensated according to the Act on Compensation of Special Losses Caused by Act of United States Forces and Other Forces. ----- **Reference 72 Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities** **Review of the calculation of the ordinary amount issued under the Financial** **Equalization Grants for Improvement of Surroundings of Specified Defence** **Institutions** (1) Revision of calculation method **Review of the uses of Financial Equalization Grants for Improvement of** **Surroundings of Specified Defence Institutions** Background Diversification of local needs (demand for allocation to soft business) Evaluation results of the “business classification” by the Government Revitalization Unit  “To make the uses more free and improve usability”  Change in the budget allocation for calculation elements (budget allocation for “operation” will be increased)  Establishment of new training points relating to large-scale or specific training (amount will be increased if joint Japan-US training, large scale exercises, etc., are held) Before revision After revision Special grant Special grant amount: 30% 5/10 Operation points Ordinary grant amount: 70% 2.5/10 Area points Population 2.5/10 points Special grant 5/10 Operation points 0.5/10 Training points 2.0/10 Area points Population 2.5/10 points (2) Consideration for cities, towns and villages with high population density (population density points will be added) (3) Consideration for the particularity of US Forces operations (points will be added to facilities used by stationed forces) elementary / junior-high school buildings, etc.) (4) Appropriate reflection of the effects of operations (number of flights point (4) Appropriate reflection of the effects of operations (number of flights point and exercising personnel points will be subdivided) **Before revision** Improvement of public-use facilities Public-use facilities: Transportation and communications facilities, sports and recreational facilities, environmental health facilities, education and cultural facilities, medical facilities, social welfare facilities, facilities associated with fire-fighting, facilities that contribute to the stimulation of industry **After revision** Improvement of public-use facilities So-called soft business (Newly added) Soft businesses such as the following are envisioned: - Assistance for medical expenses (medical expenses for elementary school pupils and younger, examination costs for pregnant women, etc.) - Assistance for the cost of running community buses (operational costs for welfare buses, etc.) - Assistance for the cost to conduct a diagnosis of earthquake resistance for schools and other facilities (cost of diagnosing the earthquake resistance of elementary / junior-high school buildings, etc.) Defense facilities and cities, towns and villages newly designated as Specified Defense Facilities and Specified Defense Facility-Related Cities, Towns and Villages, respectively |Specif ied Defense Facilities|Specif ied Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages| |---|---| |Matsushima Air Field|Ishinomaki| |Iwo Jima Airport|Ogasawara, Tokyo| |Naval Air Facility Atsugi|Fujisawa| |Ashiya Air Field|Mizumaki, Onga District, Fukuoka Prefecture| |Torishima Range|Kumejima, Shimajiri District, Okinawa Prefecture| |Shimokita Test Center|Higashido¯ri, Shimokita District, Aomori Prefecture| |Specif ied Defense Facilities|Specif ied Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages| |---|---| |Sagami General Depot|Sagamihara| |Tokushima Airf ield|Matsushige, Itano District, Tokushima Prefecture| |Metabaru Air Field|Yoshinogari, Kanzaki District, Saga Prefecture| ||Kamimine, Miyaki District, Saga Prefecture| |Camp Gonsalves|Kunigami, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture| ||Higashi, Kunigami District, Okinawa Prefecture| |Specif ied Defense Facilities|Specif ied Defense Facility- Related Cities, Towns and Villages| |---|---| |Kasumigaura Air Field|Tsuchiura| ||Ami, Inashiki District, Ibaraki Prefecture| |Utsunomiya Air Field|Utsunomiya| |Soumagahara Airf ield|Shinto¯, Kitagunma District, Gunma Prefecture| |Kisarazu Air Field|Kisarazu| |Camp Zama|Sagamihara| ||Zama| **Reference 73 Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2015)** |Col1|Col2|Ministry of Defense Headquarters|Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches|Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency|Total| |---|---|---|---|---|---| |1. Number of disclosure requests||2,074|2,389|95|4,558| |2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure Requests accepted Requests partially accepted Requests declined||2,117|2,290|71|4,478| ||Requests accepted|1,190|1,228|46|2,464| ||Requests partially accepted|744|1,053|24|1,821| ||Requests declined|183|9|1|193| |3. Number of administrative protests||947|1|3|951| |4. Number of lawsuits||1|0|0|1| ----- **Reference 74 “Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues” (excerpt)** **(Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office)** Outline of the survey period: January 8–18, 2015 Respondents: Japanese citizens aged 20 years or older in Japan Valid responses (rate): 1,680 (56.0%) Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel For details, refer to http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/index.html 1 Interest in the SDF and defense issues (%) 80 60 40 30 20 10 2 Impression toward the SDF (%) 60 50 40 0 Good impression (subtotal)[1] 91.7 82.2 84.9 92.2 68.8 69.2 75.4 74.3 [76.7] 76.8 80.5 80.3 80.9 71.3 67.5 58.9 Bad impression (subtotal)[2] 24.3 17.5 19.4 11.7 12.9 14.1 14.1 17.6 13.4 16.7 15.6 13.4 10.5 10.0 4.8 5.3 Notes: 1. Total of “good impression” and “somewhat good impression” (Total of “good impression” and “do not have bad impression” until the survey of February 2006). 2. Total of “somewhat bad impression” and “bad impression” (Total of “do not have good impression” and “bad impression” until the survey of February 2006). Interested (subtotal)[1] 69.8 71.5 67.3 67.4 57.0 57.8 64.7 59.4 50.4 49.6 50.3 54.9 56.8 47.7 48.1 47.8 43.4 40.8 41.6 41.2 38.9 34.4 31.9 30.2 29.2 28.2 Not Interested (subtotal)[2] Notes: 1. Total of “very interested” and “somewhat interested” (Total of “very interested” and “slightly interested” until the survey of November 1984). 2. Total of “hardly interested” and “not at all interested.” 3. For gender- and age-specific information, see: http://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-bouei/zh/z01.html. 3 Defense capabilities of the SDF 4 Evaluation of the SDF disaster relief activities Appreciate (Total) 98.0 Do not appreciate (Total) 1.3 Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not (Eligible number of people) Total (1,680) (Eligible number of people) |very mu appreciated a certain degree|Col2|uch apprecia| |---|---|---| |Don’t know||－| |64.9|33.2|| |||| 6 Efforts in international peace cooperation activities |Should be decreased|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |Should be decreased Should be increased Current strength is sufficient|||| ||||| |29.9|59.2||| ||||| 5 Evaluation of overseas activities by the SDF Appreciate (Total) 89.8 Do not appreciate (Total) 7.3 Highly Appreciate to Do not appreciate Do not of people) 6.5 0.7 1.3 － (Eligible number of people) Total (1,680) 1.0 |apprec|very muc ciated a certain degree|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| ||Don’t know||| |39.2||50.6|| |2.9|||| |Should make more efforts Should maintain Should reduce the amount|Col2|Col3|Col4| |---|---|---|---| |more efforts maintain the amount in engaging current of efforts in proactively engagement engaging from level current level|||| ||||3.| |25.9|65.4||| |4.6|||| ----- Defense Chronology |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1945|Aug.15 Aug.17 Aug.17 Aug.28 Sep.02 Oct.09 Oct.15 Oct.24 Nov.30|World War II ends Higashikuninomiya Cabinet established Republic of Indonesia declares independence Provisional government of People’s Republic of Vietnam established GHQ established Shidehara Cabinet established General Staff Office and Military Command abolished United Nations established Army and Navy Ministries abolished| |1946|Jan.04 Jan.10 Jan.27 Feb.26 Mar.05 Apr.05 Apr.24 May 03 May 22 Oct.01 Nov.03 Dec.19|GHQ orders purge from public office First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14) GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands Far East Commission formed Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech First meeting of Allied Council on Japan Civil administration of Okinawa established International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened Yoshida Cabinet established International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg renders judgment The Constitution of Japan promulgated First Indochina War starts (through 1954)| |1947|Mar.12 May.03 Jun.01 Jun.05 Aug.15 Aug.15 Oct.05 Dec.17|Truman Doctrine announced The Constitution of Japan takes effect Katayama Cabinet established Marshall Plan announced India and Pakistan gain independence First India–Pakistan conflict (through 1965) Cominform established Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)| |1948|Mar.10 Apr.01 Apr.27 May 14 Jun.11 Jun.26 Aug.15 Sep.09 Oct.19 Nov.12|Ashida Cabinet established USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949) Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated Israel gains independence; First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949) U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution Berlin airlift starts Republic of Korea (ROK) declares independence North Korea established Second Yoshida Cabinet established International Military Tribunal for the Far East renders judgment| |1949|Jan.25 Feb.16 Apr.04 Apr.21 May 06 Jul.05 Jul.15 Aug.17 Sep.24 Oct.01 Oct.07 Dec.07|Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) established Inauguration of third Yoshida Cabinet North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) (NATO established) Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany) Shimoyama incident Mitaka incident Matsukawa incident USSR declares possession of atomic bomb People’s Republic of China established German Democratic Republic established (East Germany) Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan| |1950|Jan.27 Feb.14 Jun.21 Jun.25 Jun.28 Jul.07 Jul.08 Aug.10 Aug.13 Aug.14 Sep.07 Sep.15 Oct.25 Nov.24 Dec.18|U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan Korean War (ends July 27, 1953) Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Police Reserve National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima U.N. troops land at Inchon Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces| |1951|Jan.23 Jan.29 Mar.01 Apr.11 Jul.04 Aug.30 Sep.01 Sep.08 Oct.20 Oct.26 Dec.26|Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations) Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins MacArthur was dismissed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers Inauguration of third reshuffled Yoshida Cabinet (second term) Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers dismissed U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed Australia– New Zealand–U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty 49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan; Japan–U.S. Security Treaty concluded Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councilors approval given November 18) Inauguration of third reshuffeld Yoshida Cabinet (third term)| 1952 Jan.19 ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1952|Feb.28 Apr.26 Apr.28 Apr.28 Apr.28 May 01 May 26 May 27 Jul.21 Jul.26 Jul.31 Aug.01 Oct.15 Oct.30 Oct.31 Nov.01 Nov.12|Japan–U.S. Administrative Agreement signed Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard Japan–Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded Japan–U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty enter into force Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ Abolished May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Germany European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force Japan–U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed National Safety Agency Law promulgated National Safety Agency established; Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency; Coastal Safety Force inaugurated National Safety Force inaugurated Inauguration of fourth Yoshida Cabinet; Kimura becomes Director-General of the National Safety Agency U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Japan–U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed| |1953|Jan.01 Jan.20 Mar.05 Apr.01 May 21 Jul.27 Aug.12 Sep.27 Oct.01 Oct.30 Dec.25|Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated Eisenhower becomes U.S. President USSR General Secretary Stalin dies (Malenkov takes over March 6) National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established Inauguration of fifth Yoshida Cabinet Korean War Armistice Agreement signed USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed Ikeda–Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored| |1954|Jan.21 Mar.01 Mar.01 Mar.08 Mar.14 May 14 Jun.02 Jun.09 Jul.01 Jul.21 Sep.03 Sep.08 Dec.02 Dec.10|U.S. launches world’s frist nuclear submarine (USS Nautilus) U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed Khrushchev becomes Soviet Union Communist Party General Secretary Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels House of Councilors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self- Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed Chinese People’s Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed Hatoyama Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1955|Mar.19 Apr.18 May 05 May 06 May 08 May 14 Jul.31 Aug.06 Aug.31 Nov.14 Nov.22 Dec.19|Inauguration of second Hatoyama Cabinet; Sugihara becomes Minister of State for Defense Africa–Asia conference held at Bandung West Germany formally admitted to NATO Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies Protests begin at Sunagawa Base Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO starts) Sunada becomes Minister of State for Defense First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held in Hiroshima Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Japan–U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed Inauguration of third Hatoyama Cabinet; Funada becomes Minister of State for Defense Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated| |1956|Feb.09 Feb.14 Mar.23 Apr.17 Apr.26 Jul.02 Jul.26 Sep.20 Oct.19 Oct.23 Oct.29 Dec.18 Dec.23|House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councilors, February 10) Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki USSR announces dissolution of Cominform First Japan-made destroyer Harukaze completed National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese–Soviet relations Hungarian Revolution Second Middle East War (Suez War; through November 6) Japan joins the U.N. Ishibashi Cabinet established; Prime Minister concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense| 1957 Jan.31 Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense Feb.02 Kotaki becomes Minister of State for Defense Feb.25 Kishi Cabinet established Mar.15 House of Councilors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs May 15 U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test May 20 Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet Jun.14 First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet Jun.21 Kishi–Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued Jul.10 Inauguration of reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Tsushima becomes Minister of State for Defense Aug.06 Japan–U.S. Security Council inaugurated A 26 USSR f l ICBM |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1957|Aug.27 Sep.10 Oct.04 Nov.23|Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura National Defense Council decision to produce P2V-742 aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17 USSR launches the world’s frist artifciial satellite, Sputnik 1 World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration| |1958|Jan.01 Jan.01 Jan.14 Jan.31 Feb.17 Apr.18 Jun.12 Aug.23 Sep.11 Oct.04 Oct.23 Dec.17|Japan becomes non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council European Economic Community (EEC) starts First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28) U.S. successfully launches an artificial satellite ASDF begins airspace anti-intrusion measures House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs Inauguration of second Kishi Cabinet; Sato becomes Minister of State for Defense Chinese People’s Liberation Army attack on Quemoy intensifeis Fujiyama–Dulles talks (Washington, D.C.); agreement on revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Commencement of Japan–U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty Dulles talks with Chiang Kaishek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM| |1959|Jan.12 Mar.30 Mar.31 Jun.18 Aug.25 Sep.18 Sep.26 Sep.27 Nov.06 Dec.01 Dec.16|Ino becomes Minister of State for Defense Tokyo District Court rules the stationing of U.S. Forces to be unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case 14th Dalai Lama is exiled to India Inauguration of second reshuffled Kishi Cabinet; Akagi becomes Minister of State for Defense China–India border dispute USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete military reductions at U.N. Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon Vera U.S.–Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David National Defense Council decision to produce 200 F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on November 10 Antarctica Treaty signed Supreme Court reverses original ruling in the Sunagawa case| |1960|Jan.11 Jan.19 Feb.13 Apr.27 May 01 May 24 Jul.19 Jul.20 Dec.08 Dec.20|Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho New Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed (enters into force June 23) France conducts its first nuclear test in the Sahara Rhee resigns as President of ROK U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace Disaster relief teams dispatched after the earthquake and tsunami in Chile Ikeda Cabinet established; Esaki becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM Inauguration of second Ikeda Cabinet; Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense Formation of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front| |1961|Jan.13 Jan.20 Apr.12 May 16 Jul.06 Jul.11 Jul.18 Jul.18 Aug.13|National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20 Kennedy becomes U.S. President USSR successfully launches manned spacecraft Military junta seizes power in a coup in ROK Soviet–North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Fujieda becomes Minister of State for Defense Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet Construction of Berlin Wall| |1962|Jul.18 Jul.23 Aug.15 Oct.15 Oct.20 Oct.24 Oct.28 Nov.01 Nov.09|Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (second term); Shiga becomes Minister of State for Defense International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva International Conference GSDF completes 13 division organization Type 61 tank first introduced China–India border dispute (through November 22) U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20) Premier of the Soviet Union Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba Defense Facilities Administration Agency established Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)| |1963|Jun.20 Jul.18 Aug.08 Aug.14 Sep.16 Nov.22 Dec.09 Dec.17|Agreement signed for U.S.–Soviet hotline Inauguration of second reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet (third term); Fukuda becomes Minister of State for Defense Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.–USSR– U.K. (enters into force on October 10) Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Malaysian Federation established U.S. President Kennedy assassinated, Johnson becomes U.S. President Inauguration of third Ikeda Cabinet ROK transits to civilian government, Park Chung-hee becomes President| |1964|Jun.15 Jul.18 Aug.02 Oct.16 Oct.16 Nov.09 Nov.12|Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan Inauguration of third reshuffled Ikeda Cabinet; Koizumi becomes Minister of State for Defense Gulf of Tonkin incident China successfully carries out its first nuclear test Brezhnev becomes USSR General Secretary Sato Cabinet established U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time| 1965 Feb.07 U.S. starts bombing of North Vietnam Feb.10 Diet debate on Mitsuya study Jun.03 Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Matsuno becomes Minister of State for Defense J 22 J ROK B i T t i d ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1965|Sep.01 Nov.10|Second India–Pakistan conflict (to September 22) Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)| |1966|May 16 Jul.01 Aug.01 Oct.27 Nov.29 Dec.03|Cultural Revolution starts in China France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined April 4, 2009) Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Kambayashiyama becomes Minister of State for Defense China successfully carries out its first nuclear missile test Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet Inauguration of reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuda becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1967|Jan.27 Feb.17 Mar.14 Mar.29 Jun.05 Jun.17 Jul.01 Aug.08 Nov.25|Outer Space Treaty signed Inauguration of second Sato Cabinet Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan agreed by National Defense Council; adopted by Cabinet on March 14 Sapporo District Court renders judgment on Eniwa Case Third Middle East War (through June 9) China successfully carries out its first hydrogen bomb test Formation of European Community (EC) Formation of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet| |1968|Jan.16 Jan.19 Jan.23 Feb.26 May 13 Jun.26 Jul.01 Aug.20 Aug.24 Nov.30|Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. troops east of Suez U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea New Japan–U.S. nuclear agreement signed First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific Inauguration of second reshuffled Sato Cabinet (second term); Arita becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1969|Jan.10 Jan.20 Mar.02 Apr.04 Apr.15 Jun.10 Jul.25 Nov.21|National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet Nixon becomes U.S. President Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island) Japan–U.S. memorandum signed for Japanese production of F-4EJ North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane South Vietnam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government U.S. President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine) Sato–Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)| |1970|Jan.14 Jan.24 Feb.03 Feb.11 Mar.05 Mar.31 Apr.16 Apr.24 Jun.23 Aug.12 Oct.20 Nov.25|Inauguration of third Sato Cabinet; Nakasone becomes Minister of State for Defense Formation of integrated WPO (Warsaw Pact) forces (involving seven countries) Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force Yodo hijacking U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks China successfully launches its first satellite Automatic extension of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty West Germany–USSR sign non-aggression pact Publication of “The Defense of Japan,” the first white paper on defense Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya| |1971|Feb.11 Jun.17 Jun.29 Jul.05 Jul.30 Aug.02 Aug.09 Sep.30 Oct.25 Nov.24 Nov.27 Dec.03 Dec.03 Dec.05|Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed Inauguration of third reshuffled Sato Cabinet; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi) Nishimura becomes Minister of State for Defense India–Soviet Friendship Treaty signed U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan House of Representatives resolution on nonnuclear weapons ASEAN declares SEA neutrality Third India–Pakistan conflict Ezaki becomes Minister of State for Defense ASDF frist domestic supersonic aircraft ASDF XT-2 delivered| 1972 Jan.07 Sato–Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases Feb.08 National Defense Council adopts Outline of 4th FiveYear Defense Build-up Plan, approved by Cabinet on February 8 Feb.27 U.S. President Nixon visits China; China–U.S. Joint Communique Apr.10 Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Apr.18 National Defense Council decision on SDF deployment in Okinawa, presented to Cabinet on April 18 May 15 Return of Okinawa May 26 SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit of U.S. President Nixon to USSR Jul.03 India–Pakistan truce signed Jul.04 ROK and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peaceful unification Jul.07 Tanaka Cabinet established; Masuhara becomes Minister of State for Defense Sep.29 Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of di l ti l ti b t J d Chi |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1979|Jan.01 Jan.07 Jan.11 Feb.11 Feb.17 Mar.26 Jun.18 Jul.17 Jul.25 Oct.26 Nov.09 Dec.27|U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifies termination of the U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty after one year Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced Introduction of E-2C approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran Sino–Vietnamese War (through March 5) Egypt–Israel peace treaty signed SALT II signed Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980– FY1984) Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26) Assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee Inauguration of second Ohira Cabinet; Kubota becomes Minister of State for Defense Soviet Union invades Afghanistan| |1980|Feb.04 Feb.26 Apr.11 May 18 Jul.17 Jul.17 Aug.18 Aug.19 Aug.21 Sep.03 Sep.22|Hosoda becomes Minister of State for Defense Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18) Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific Ocean for the first time House of Councilors establishes special committee for Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Territories issues Suzuki Cabinet established; Omura becomes Minister of State for Defense Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced Soviet nuclear submarine has an accident off the main island of Okinawa First meeting of the Japan–U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (Washington, D.C., through September 4) Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war| |1981|Jan.06 Apr.22 Jul.07 Jul.13 Oct.01 Nov.30 Dec.13|February 7 decided as Northern Territories Day (Cabinet understanding) Defense Agency announces classifciation of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation Tokyo High Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court renders judgment in 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits (GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3) Inauguration of reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet; Ito becomes Minister of State for Defense Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military Council of National Salvation| |1982|Feb.15 Apr.02 Apr.25 May 15 Jun.06 Jun.08 Jun.09 Jun.29 Jul.23 Aug.17 Sep.09 Oct.12 Oct.20 Nov.12 Nov.27|(GSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Takigahara, through February 19) Falklands dispute (ends June 14) Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula Use of some sections of land within facilities and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law Israeli forces invade Lebanon BWC enters into force in Japan Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.–Soviet Union (Geneva) 1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and approved by National Defense Council U.S.–China Joint Statement about U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan Supreme Court renders judgment on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case China successfully tests SLBM water launch Yokohama District Court renders judgment in 1st Atsugi Air Facility noise suit Andropov becomes Soviet General Secretary Nakasone Cabinet established; Tanigawa becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1983|Jan.01 Jan.14 Mar.23 Jun.12 Sep.01 Oct.09 Oct.25 Nov.08 Dec.12 Dec.27|U.S. establishes new Unified Combatant Command (Central Command) Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S. (Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary) U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Director Tanigawa first Minister of State for Defense to inspect Northern Islands KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fighters near Sakhalin 19 ROK government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorists U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada Signing of negotiation statement for sharing military technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Fuchu, through December 15) Inauguration of second Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1984|Jan.01 May 23 Jun.11 Oct.16 Nov.01|Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN on January 7) Kim Il-sung visits USSR (through May 26) (MSDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral command post exercise (staged at Yokosuka, through June 15) Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet; Kato becomes Minister of State for Defense| 1985 Mar.12 U.S.–Soviet Union arms control talks begin Apr.02 USAF begins to station F-16 fighters at Misawa Jun.04 China announces the reduction of one million personnel from the People’s Liberation Army Aug.12 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the JAL i ft h |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1972|Oct.09 Dec.21 Dec.22|Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan, National Defense Council determines key matters for inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan and measures to enhance civilian control, adopted by Cabinet East–West Germany Basic Treaty signed Second Tanaka Cabinet established| |1973|Jan.23 Jan.27 Feb.01 Feb.21 Mar.29 May 29 Jun.22 Jul.01 Sep.07 Sep.21 Oct.06 Oct.08 Oct.17 Nov.07 Nov.25|14th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program) Vietnam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect on January 28) Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength Laos Peace Treaty signed U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Vietnam Yamanaka becomes Minister of State for Defense General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgment) Japan–North Vietnam establish diplomatic relations Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25) Japan–Soviet summit (Moscow) Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO Inauguration of second reshuffled Tanaka Cabinet| |1974|Jan.05 Jan.18 Apr.20 Apr.25 May 18 Jul.03 Aug.09 Oct.08 Nov.11 Nov.13 Nov.15 Nov.23 Dec.09|Japan–China Trade Agreement signed Israel and Egypt sign Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Treaties Japan–China Aviation Agreement signed National Defense Medical College opens India carries out its first underground nuclear test U.S. President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed Ford becomes U.S. President Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize Inauguration of second reshuffled second Tanaka Cabinet (second term); Uno becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan–China Marine Transport Agreement signed U.N. forces in Korea discovers a North Korean infiltration tunnel U.S. President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement on SALT II Miki Cabinet established; Sakata becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1975|Apr.01 Apr.23 Apr.30 Aug.01 Nov.17|Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29) U.S. President Ford declares end of Vietnam War South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki) First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), held annually since| |1976|Apr.05 Jun.04 Jun.08 Jul.02 Jul.08 Aug.05 Aug.18 Sep.06 Sep.09 Sep.15 Oct.06 Oct.29 Nov.05 Dec.24|Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident) Publication of second white paper on defense, “The Defense of Japan” (henceforth published annually) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan Socialist Republic of Vietnam (unified Vietnam) proclaimed Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) established Sapporo High Court renders judgment in Naganuma Nike suit U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom by North Korea MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport Death of Chairman of Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong Inauguration of reshuffled Miki Cabinet Group of Four arrested (Cultural Revolution ends) National Defense Council, Cabinet decision on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977 National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt Immediate- term Defense Build-up, National Defense Council, Cabinet decision on handling major items in preparations for defense forces Fukuda Cabinet established; Mihara becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1977|Jan.02 Feb.17 Jun.30 Jul.01 Aug.01 Aug.10 Nov.28 Dec.29|Carter becomes U.S. President Mito District Court renders judgment in Hyakuri Base suit South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective) Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200- mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study Inaguruation of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Kanemaru becomes Minister of State for Defense National Defense Council decides on introduction of “F-15s and P-3C,” approved by Cabinet on December 29| 1978 Apr.12 Chinese fishing fleet infringes on waters around Senkaku Islands Aug.12 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China signed in Beijing Sep.21 Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study Nov.03 Vietnam–Soviet Friendship Agreement signed Nov.27 (ASDF) First Japan–U.S. bilateral training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1) Nov.27 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28 Dec.05 Afghanistan–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Relations and Cooperation signed Dec.07 Ohira Cabinet established; Yamashita becomes Minister of State for Defense Dec.25 Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia (withdrawal l t d S t b 26 1989) ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1985|Sep.18 Nov.19 Dec.27 Dec.28|Mid-Term Defense Program approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet, National Defense Council decision to introduce Patriots, Cabinet agreement U.S.–Soviet summit meeting, Joint Statement (Geneva, through November 21) Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded Inauguration of second reshuffled Nakasone Cabinet (second term)| |1986|Feb.24 Apr.09 Apr.26 Jul.01 Jul.22 Aug.10 Aug.15 Sep.05 Sep.22 Oct.15 Oct.27|First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint command post exercise (Hinoki-cho, headquarters of USFJ, etc., through February 28) Tokyo High Court renders judgment in first Atsugi Air Facility noise suit Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union Security Council Establishment Law enacted Inauguration of third Nakasone Cabinet; Kurihara becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San Francisco, through August 11) Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm) USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan First Japan–U.S. bilateral joint field training exercise (eastern and southern part of Honshu island, etc., through October 31)| |1987|Jan.24 Jan.30 May 27 May 29 Jul.20 Aug.26 Oct.06 Oct.21 Nov.06 Nov.29 Dec.08 Dec.18|Security Council of Japan and Cabinet agree on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas Director Kurihara first incumbent Director to visit China (through June 4) U.N. Security Council adopts Iran–Iraq Conflict Cease Fire resolution (Number 598) Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted First Japan–U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7) Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and announced Takeshita Cabinet established; Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists over the Bay of Bengal INF Treaty signed Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas| |1988|Mar.02 Mar.13 Mar.14 Apr.12 May 29 Jun.01 Jul.23 Aug.17 Aug.20 Aug.24 Sep.20 Oct.17 Nov.29 Dec.07 Dec.27|Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1) Aomori–Hakodate Undersea Tunnel opens Armed clashes between China and Vietnam in the waters around the Spratly Islands Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries U.S.–Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged) Supreme Court renders judgment on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka) First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada) Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran–Iraq War Tazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised Military Bases Agreement Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops Inauguration of reshuffled Takeshita Cabinet| |1989|Jan.07|Demise of Emperor Showa| 1989 Feb.15 Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan Feb.24 Emperor Showa’s funeral Mar.09 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started (Vienna) Mar.09 Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) started (Vienna) Mar.15 Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court renders judgment in the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit Mar.30 New BADGE system begins operations Apr.01 Consumption Tax Law enforced May 10 START-I reopened at U.S.–Soviet foreign ministers conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through May 11) Jun.03 Uno Cabinet established; Yamazaki becomes Minister of State for Defense Jun.04 Chinese martial law units fire on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident) Jun.20 Supreme Court renders judgment in the Hyakuri Base suit Jun.22 Yokohama District Court renders judgment in the Atsugi Air Facility suit to vacate the premises Jun.24 Zhao Ziyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin Aug.10 Kaifu Cabinet established; Matsumoto becomes Minister of State for Defense S 26 Vi t l t l ithd f C b di |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1989|Nov.09 Dec.02|GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall) U.S.–Soviet summit talks (Malta, through December 3)| |1990|Feb.13 Feb.20 Feb.28 Mar.03 Mar.15 May 29 Jun.19 Jun.21 Aug.02 Aug.02 Oct.03 Oct.16 Oct.24 Nov.10 Nov.12 Nov.23 Dec.20 Dec.29|U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. troops in Europe Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide “military technology related to FS-X” to U.S. Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ishikawa becomes Minister of State for Defense Japan–U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, G.H.W. Bush, Palm Springs, through March 4) Gorbachev appointed first president of USSR Naha District Court renders judgment in administrative handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Japan–U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items) Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security Iraq invades Kuwait U.S. President G.H.W. Bush gives speech at Aspen German unification Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet USSR conducts underground nuclear tests in the Arctic Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled Coronation of Emperor Great Thanksgiving Festival Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet Inauguration of second reshuffled Kaifu Cabinet; Ikeda becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1991|Jan.17 Jan.17 Jan.24 Jan.25 Mar.13 Mar.31 Apr.11 Apr.24 Apr.26 Jun.03 Jul.31 Sep.06 Sep.11 Sep.17 Sep.26 Oct.09 Nov.05 Nov.26 Dec.05 Dec.08 Dec.25|Cabinet approves the establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled April 19) Kanazawa District Court renders judgment on the first and second trials for the lawsuit pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base WPO (Warsaw Pact structures) dismantled Gulf War formally ended Security Council and Cabinet decide on “Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf” Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Fugendake on Mt. Unzen U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states Miyazawa Cabinet established U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations Aegis destroyer launching ceremony SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time House of Representatives establishes the Committee on National Security Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of Ukrainian Republic CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at summit (Brest, Belarus) Soviet President Gorbachev resigns| 1992 Feb.07 Twelve EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty) Feb.25 China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China Apr.01 Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency Apr.01 First female students enter National Defense Academy of Japan Apr.27 Tokyo District Court renders judgment in suits pertaining to the surrender of land for Atsugi Air Base May 22 North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fire guns May 23 START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet States including Russia May 25 IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities (through June 5) Jun.19 Announcement of “International Peace Cooperation Law” (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of “Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams” Jun.29 Law Revising Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams comes into force Aug.10 International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force Aug.24 China and the ROK establish diplomatic relations Sep.17 Departure commences of 1st Cambodia Dispatch Facilities Battalion (All units returned to Japan by September 26, 1993) Sep.19 Departure of Electoral Observer to Cambodia (Narita) Sep.30 U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines) Oct.23 Emperor and Empress visit China (through October 28) Nov.09 CFE Treaty becomes formally effective Nov.24 U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal from Philippines complete) Dec.03 U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military action by multinational forces in Somalia Dec.11 Inauguration of reshuffled Miyazawa Cabinet; Nakayama becomes Minister of State for Defense Dec.16 U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy k i ti i M bi |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1992|Dec.18|Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) adopted by Security Council of Japan and Cabinet| |1993|Jan.03 Jan.13 Jan.20 Mar.12 Mar.25 Apr.08 May 04 May 04 May 11 May 14 May 29 Jun.01 Jun.09 Jun.11 Jul.12 Aug.04 Aug.09 Sep.01 Sep.13 Sep.23 Oct.12 Nov.01 Dec.02|U.S.–Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed Japan signs CWC U.S. President Clinton assumes office North Korea announces secession from NPT Aegis ship (Kongo) enters service Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Cambodia Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II) Death of Superintendent Haruyuki Takada, a civilian police officer in Cambodia Mozambique Dispatch Transport Coordination Unit begin departing for Mozambique (All units returned home by January 8, 1995) United Nations Operation in Mozambique headquarters staff depart for Mozambique North Korea conducts a ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.– North Korea consultations Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12) Signing of peace treaty in Rwandan civil war Hosokawa Cabinet established; Nakanishi becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. DoD announces the Bottom Up Review Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Japan–Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed Maastricht Treaty comes into effect; European Union established Aichi becomes Minister of State for Defense| |1994|Feb.23 Feb.25 Mar.01 Mar.23 Mar.24 Apr.28 Jun.08 Jun.30 Jul.08 Jul.25 Sep.22 Oct.21 Nov.09 Dec.01 Dec.01 Dec.05 Dec.18 Dec.20|“Advisory Group on Defense Issues” inaugurated under the Prime Minister Defense Agency’s “Defense Posture Review Board” inaugurated First Japan–China security dialogue (Beijing) First female aviation students join MSDF First female aviation students join ASDF Hada Cabinet established; Kanda becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. DoD submits “Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation” pertaining to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons Murayama Cabinet established; Tamazawa becomes Minister of State for Defense North Korean President Kim Il-Sung dies 1st ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok) U.S. DoD announces “Nuclear Posture Review” U.S.-North Korea talks, both sides sign “Framework Agreement” relating to support for North Korean light water reactors, and provision of substitute energy First Japan-ROK working-level defense policy dialogue (Seoul) First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17) Commander of U.S.–ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces START-I comes into force Russia starts military operations against Chechnya First visit to Japan by the ROK’s naval training vessel (Harumi, through December 23)| 1995 Jan.17 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great HanshinAwaji Earthquake (through April 27) Mar.09 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established Mar.20 SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23) May 11 NPT extended indefinitely May 19 Enactment of “Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use by United States Forces in Japan” (effective June 20) Jun.05 The defense authorities of Japan and the ROK both issue the “letter concerning the prevention of accidents between aircraft of the Japan Self-defense Forces and military aircraft of the Republic of Korea” Jul.11 NATO, aerial bombing of Serbian forces Jul.28 Vietnam officially joins ASEAN Aug.01 1st KEDO Meeting (Japan–U.S.–ROK) held (New York) Aug.08 Inauguration of reshuffled Murayama Cabinet; Eto becomes Minister of State for Defense Sep.04 Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa Sep.15 Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention Oct.27 Announcement of “Law Relating to the Treatment of Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International Organizations” (effective January 1, 1996) Nov.17 Cabinet approves the establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa Nov.19 Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) Nov.28 Security Council of Japan and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996 Dec.14 Security Council of Japan adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) (Cabinet Decision of D b 15) ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1995|Dec.14 Dec.14 Dec.15 Dec.20|Security Council of Japan makes decision “Regarding upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter” (December 15, Cabinet approval); Model of Next-Generation Support Fighter “F-2” decided Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris 10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non- Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations| |1996|Jan.11 Jan.26 Jan.31 Mar.08 Mar.23 Apr.12 Apr.15 Apr.16 Apr.17 Jul.12 Jul.20 Jul.26 Jul.29 Aug.28 Sep.10 Sep.18 Sep.26 Sep.27 Oct.03 Oct.29 Nov.07 Nov.18 Dec.02 Dec.13 Dec.24|Hashimoto Cabinet established; Usui becomes Minister of State for Defense START-II ratified by U.S. Senate SDF units dispatched to United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) China carries out three missile firing exercises in total, naval and air force live-fire drills and, ground, naval and air force integrated exercises in the waters close to Taiwan March 8–25 Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections; Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied) Signing of Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective October 22) Cabinet approves the promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna) U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30, Russian Navy’s 300th anniversary naval review) China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45th), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6) U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) North Korean minisubmarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory (clearing operation completed November 7) Hong Kong protest vessels (Baodiao) etc., intrude into Japan’s territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of the provisional government Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed First Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo, through October 31) Inauguration of second Hashimoto Cabinet; Kyuma becomes Minister of State of Defense Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina SACO final report approved by Japan–U.S. Joint Security Council First Consultations Between Japanese and Russian Defense Authorities (Tokyo) Security Council and Cabinet decisions on responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters| |1997|Jan.02 Jan.20 Apr.29 May 12 Jun.09 Jul.01 Jul.03 Jul.16 Sep.11 Sep.23 Oct.08 Nov.10 Dec.03 Dec.03 Dec.04 Dec.19|Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Russian Nakhodka shipwreck and oil spill disaster (through March 31) Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters CWC enters into force Russia–Chechnya peace treaty signed Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (through June 2002) Hong Kong reverts to China The first artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa conducted on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji, through July 9) North Korean soldiers cross the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops Inauguration of second reshuffled Hashimoto Cabinet Guidelines for New Japan–U.S. defense cooperation approved by Security Consultative Committee (SCC) North Korean Workers’ Party Secretary Kim Jong-il assumes the post of General Secretary China–Russia summit talks: China–Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China– Russian eastern border declared Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony in Ottawa (121 nations) Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996– FY2000) approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet| 1998 Mar.26 Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel Apr.28 The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement May 11 India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13) May 12 Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch renders judgment in the first through third Kadena base noise suits May 28 Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30) Jun.06 U.N. Security Council resolution adopted that condemns nuclear tests by India and Pakistan Jun.12 Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Government Reform Jun.12 Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12) Jun.22 A North Korean submarine intrudes into the east coast of ROK, seized by ROK forces Jul.27 China publishes its first comprehensive defense white “D f f Chi ” |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |1998|Jul.29 Jul.30 Aug.31 Aug.31 Sep.01 Sep.02 Sep.24 Sep.30 Oct.21 Nov.14 Nov.15 Nov.20 Dec.17 Dec.22 Dec.22 Dec.25|Bilateral search and rescue exercise between MSDF/ ASDF and Russian Navy — the first full-fledged bilateral exercise between Japan and Russia Obuchi Cabinet established; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost sharing after North Korean missile launch Temporary freezing of Japan–North Korea normalization talks Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented Japan–ROK Fisheries Agreement concluded (Takeshima Issue shelved) Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded KEDO signed Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations in region November 18–December 1, return to Japan December 5) First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima) Norota becomes Minister of State for Defense U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20) Cabinet decision on the introduction of information gathering satellite Aha Training Area returned (the frist resolved issue of SACO) Security Council approves Japan–U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies| |1999|Jan.14 Mar.01 Mar.23 Mar.29 Apr.01 May 24 May 28 Jun.15 Jul.23 Aug.05 Aug.16 Aug.16 Aug.25 Sep.02 Sep.23 Sep.29 Sep.30 Oct.05 Nov.22 Nov.22 Dec.17 Dec.20 Dec.27 Dec.27 Dec.28|Inauguration of reshuffled Obuchi Cabinet Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force in Japan Discovery of a suspicious ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24) GSDF establishes first brigade Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet) Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the “Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement” (adding cooperation for operations to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan) approved in Diet (effective September 25) Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan promulgated (enters into force August 25), Act for Partial Revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act promulgated and enters into force Shooting incident between North Korean Naval ships which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South Korean Naval ships Tokyo High Court renders judgment in second Atsugi Air Facility noise suit First Bilateral Exercise of Search and Rescue Exercise between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu) Signing of a memorandum on developing infrastructure for the development of exchange and dialogue between Japan’s and Russia’s Ministries of Defense (Moscow) Signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Japan and the U.S. on Japan–U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a new military demarcation line on the sea SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22) Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura (through October 3) Kawara becomes Minister of State for Defense SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for Timor-Leste Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000) Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in place of UNSCOM Rule over Macao transferred to China Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the “Joint Response Manual for Suspicious Ships” Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station Cabinet decision on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station| 2000 Jan.17 Anti-personnel mine disposal begins Feb.16 First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17) Apr.01 Enactment of the “Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act” Apr.05 Mori Cabinet established Apr.14 Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II) May 07 Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President May 08 Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building Jun.16 The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force Jul.04 Inauguration of second Mori Cabinet; Torashima becomes Minister of State for Defense Jul.21 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23) Jul.21 U.S.–Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Strategic Stability announced Aug.25 Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of F t Ai St ti t bli h d |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2000|Sep.13 Oct.12 Oct.12 Nov.20 Dec.05 Dec.15|SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.–North Korea Joint Communique Terrorist attack on the U.S.S Cole, an American destroyer, in Yemen The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF Inauguration of second reshuffled Mori Cabinet; Saito becomes Minister of State for Defense Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005)| |2001|Feb.05 Feb.09 Feb.10 Mar.01 Mar.07 Apr.01 Apr.01 Apr.26 May 14 Jun.15 Aug.08 Sep.11 Sep.12 Sep.19 Sep.21 Oct.01 Oct.02 Oct.06 Oct.07 Oct.08 Oct.29 Nov.02 Nov.16 Nov.25 Nov.27 Dec.05 Dec.20 Dec.22 Dec.22 Dec.29|SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11), following the major earthquake which hit western India on January 26 Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005) Collision between Ehime Maru and U.S. submarine The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect Former Maritime Self-Defense official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes Koizumi Cabinet established; Nakatani becomes Minister of State for Defense Diplomatic relations established between North Korea and EU Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) established Disaster relief teams dispatched for submarine rescue ship Chihaya to cooperate in raising the Ehime Maru (returned December 16) Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur U.N. Security Council adopts resolution condemning the terrorist attacks Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S. First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality of National Defense U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12) U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan (October 19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, first ground fighting) Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti- Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the first meeting Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councilors plenary session Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002) A Cabinet decision is made for a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities Exchange of fire in the Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba| 2002 Jan.29 U.S. President G.W. Bush depicts “Axis of Evil” in the State of the Union Address Feb.15 Cabinet decision on international cooperation execution plan for Timor-Leste Mar.02 680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to Timor-Leste (through June 25, 2004) Mar.27 Introduction of Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel System Apr.22 2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2) May 04 Independence of Timor-Leste May 20 The United Nations Transitional Administration in TimorLeste (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) May 24 Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions Jun.13 U.S. withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Jun.29 Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL Jul.16 U.S. government releases "National Strategy for Homeland Security" Jul.29 Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed Sep.17 Japan–North Korea Summit held Kim Jong-il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions Sep.20 U.S. government announces "National Security Strategy" Sep.30 Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ishiba becomes Minister of State for Defense Oct.01 Personnel deployed to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Head of Operations and Planning Branch) (through July 6) Oct.13 First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay) Oct.15 Five of those abducted return to Japan Oct.16 U.S. government announces that North Korea admitted the fact that they had a uranium enrichment plan for nuclear weapons during Assistant Secretary of State Kerry’s visit Nov.01 Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect classified information (defense secrets) Nov.14 KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December Nov.18 First SDF and police authority hold joint command post i i H kk id ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2002|Nov.21 Dec.02 Dec.12 Dec.16 Dec.17|NATO Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe, announces the Prague Declaration, and agrees to establish its high- readiness unit SDF personnel dispatched for the first time to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (December 5) in Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system| |2003|Jan.10 Jan.24 Jan.28 Feb.08 Mar.14 Mar.20 Mar.27 Mar.30 Apr.21 May 01 May 31 Jun.01 Jun.06 Jun.13 Jul.04 Jul.17 Jul.26 Jul.29 Aug.27 Sep.11 Sep.12 Sep.14 Sep.22 Sep.30 Oct.07 Oct.10 Oct.15 Nov.03 Nov.15 Nov.19 Nov.29 Dec.04 Dec.13 Dec.18 Dec.19 Dec.19 Dec.26 Dec.30|North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) U.S. Department of Homeland Security established Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air Station Replacement Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some exceptions) U.S. President G.W. Bush announces the lifting of economic sanctions against Pakistan U.S. and U.K. Forces begin military operations in Iraq Act for Partial Revision of the Defense Agency Establishment Act, etc. (changes in SDF personnel quota and number of Ready Reserve personnel) enters into force International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2) ASDF in-flight refueling training (through May 1) U.S. President G.W. Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan U.S. President G.W. Bush proposes Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) for the first time U.S.–Russia leaders talk, enforcement of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws passed in the House of Councilors plenary session Cabinet decision on the Bill Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Cabinet approval for “Implementation Plan for International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi Afflicted Persons” International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18) Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed in the House of Councilors plenary session Cabinet decision on changes to the implementation plan of the International Peace Cooperation Operations in the Golan Heights First Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through August 29) Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial Zone First joint exercise of PSI held in the Coral Sea northeast of Australia (through September 14) Government survey mission dispatched to Middle East countries, including Iraq Inauguration of reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet (second term) Cabinet decides to newly establish, in its decoration system, an award for people engaged in dangerous activities Joint communique signed for the first time at Japan– China–ROK Summit meeting Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years China launches its first manned spacecraft Shenzhou 5 Former SDF officials decorated for their engagement in dangerous activities SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq Inauguration of second Koizumi Cabinet Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq Australia decides to participate in missile defense program U.S. forces capture former President Hussein in Iraq Iran signs IAEA agreement Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet meeting) ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (January 1–2, 2004)| 2004 Jan.12 Japan and India release "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" (NSSP) statement Jan.22 ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait Feb.03 Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities Feb.09 Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet Feb.09 MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8) Feb.25 Second Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through February 29) Mar.04 Disaster relief teams dispatched for the first time in response to bird flu (Tanbacho, Kyoto Prefecture, through March 11) Mar.22 EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development of the structure and organization of EU rapid response capabilities Mar.26 Diet decides on installation of ballistic missile defense system (FY2004 draft budget passed in the House of Councilors plenary session) Apr.15 First transport of Japanese nationals living overseas implemented, 10 nationals transported from Iraq to Kuwait Apr.15 Ceremony commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Defense Agency/SDF Apr.28 U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass d t ti |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2005|Nov.11 Nov.16 Nov.27 Dec.01 Dec.14 Dec.16 Dec.24|The Cabinet approves “the government’s actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan–U.S. Security Consultation Committee held on October 29, 2005” India and Pakistan complete the opening of five areas on the effective control line in Kashmir to enable disaster rescue activities for the sufferers from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc. Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture Partial revision of the Act on Remuneration of Defense Agency Personnel (revised remuneration) enters into force The first East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur) U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the human rights situation in North Korea The Security Council and the Cabinet approve “Japan– U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense”| |2006|Jan.10 Feb.03 Feb.04 Mar.06 Mar.16 Mar.27 Apr.23 May 01 May 05 May 11 May 15 May 27 May 29 Jun.01 Jun.16 Jun.19 Jun.20 Jun.23 Jun.29 Jul.05 Jul.19 Jul.31 Aug.16 Aug.29 Aug.29 Sep.20 Sep.26 Oct.09 Oct.13 Dec.19 Dec.30|Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment The United States releases "Quadrennial Defense Review" (QDR) Japan–North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/ missile issues are held (through February 6) At the Japan–China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (through March 7) The United States announces the National Security Strategy Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles, etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ The Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) announces the “United States– Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” Peace agreement between Sudanese government and certain rebel forces in Darfur Conflict The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State for Defense sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ U.S. rescinds designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Java, Indonesia First P-3C visit to Australia SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java (through June 22) Nepalese government and Maoists sign peace accord Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announces that the authority to maintain public order in the province of Muthannna is transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces Agreement concerning provision of arms and military technologies to the United States is signed Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting, joint document “The Japan- U.S. Alliance of the New Century” announced North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan Decision made to transfer weapons and their technologies to the U.S. to jointly develop a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, and the memorandum concluded with the U.S. Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (inc. reinforcement of facilities administration function of the agency, establishment of the Equipment headquarters and reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices) A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia U.S. Navy, deploys Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 at Yokosuka naval facility The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station established, and its first meeting held Chinese Navy performs joint search and rescue exercises with U.S. Navy (sea around San Diego) Abe Cabinet established; Kyuma becomes Minister of State for Defense North Korea conducts an underground nuclear test Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test U.N. General Assembly adopts draft resolution condemning abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea Iraqi government executes death sentence of former Iraqi President Hussein| 2007 Jan.09 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law (reorganization of the Defense Agency into the Ministry of Defense and stipulation of the SDF’s international peace cooperation activities as its primary mission) Jan.12 China conducts an anti-satellite test Jan.23 U.N. Security Council decides to set up the U.N. Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to oversee disarmament in Nepal Feb.13 North Korea agrees to disable all of its nuclear facilities during the Six-Party Talks Mar.05 First Aviation Training Relocation associated with realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan (Tsuiki, through March 8) Mar.13 Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed Mar.23 Emergency response procedures for destruction measures against ballistic missiles are prepared Mar.28 Establishment of the Central Readiness Force M 30 A P t i t PAC 3 t i d l d t th ASDF I B Year Date Major Events |2004|May 20 May 22 Jun.01 Jun.01 Jun.14 Jun.14 Jun.18 Jun.23 Jun.28 Jul.20 Aug.13 Sep.10 Sep.27 Oct.06 Oct.25 Oct.25 Nov.07 Nov.10 Nov.16 Dec.26 Dec.27 Dec.10 Dec.28|United Nations Mission of Support to East Timor (UNMISET) transfers defense and security authority to Timor-Leste Japan–North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang). Five family members of abductees return to Japan Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated (sovereignty transferred on June 28), and Iraqi Governing Council dissolved U.N. Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in House of Councilors plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed Cabinet agreement for SDF’s activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces) Third Round of the Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through June 26) Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, patrols commenced by the navies of three countries, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa FPDA (Five Power Defense Arrangements) conducts the first antimaritime terrorism exercise in the South China Sea (-September 25) Inauguration of second reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Ohno becomes Minister of State for Defense The U.S. and ROK announce a plan of three stage reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in the ROK by 2008 PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan for the first time (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27) EU leaders sign the EU Constitution Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary commemorative troop review Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan’s territorial waters–Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12) Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine’s intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster China releases a white paper, “China’s National Defense in 2004” “National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005” and “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005–FY2009” adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand’s Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia’s Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)| |---|---|---| 2005 Jan.04 SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (All teams returned home by March 23) Jan.19 The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged submarines in Japan’s territorial waters Feb.10 North Korean Foreign Ministry releases a statement implying its manufacture of nuclear weapons (May 11, announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods) Feb.19 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) — common strategic objectives confirmed Mar.08 “ROK’s government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft approaching Takeshima without authorization” Mar.14 National People’s Congress adopts “Anti-Secession Law” Mar.14 A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20) Mar.16 Shimane Prefecture establishes “Takeshima Day” Mar.25 Cabinet decision made on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians Apr.25 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the railroad accident on JR West’s Fukuchiyama Line May 02 SDF officially takes part for the first time in the multinational exercise Cobra Gold 2005 conducted in Chiang Mai, Thailand (through May 13) Jul.14 Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in the East China Sea Aug.05 An MSDF vessel dispatched to conduct international disaster relief activity in Connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (All units returned home by August 10) Sep.09 First China-Russia joint military exercises “Peace Mission 2005” (through August 25) Sep.09 Five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class,are navigating in the sea area surrounding “Kashi” gas field near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea Sep.19 Joint statement adopted at Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks Sep.21 Inauguration of third Koizumi Cabinet Oct.12 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched for international emergency assistance activities in response to largescale earthquake in Pakistan, etc. (All teams returned home by December 2) Oct.20 GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attacks for the first time Oct.29 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) joint announces “Japan–U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” Oct.31 Inauguration of third reshuffled Koizumi Cabinet; Nukaga becomes Minister of State for Defense Oct.31 Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year) Nov.09 First session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks held (B iji th h N b 11)” ----- |Year|Date|Major Events| |---|---|---| |2009|Oct.01 Oct.05 Oct.20 Oct.27 Nov.10 Nov.11 Nov.12 Nov.23 Dec.01 Dec.03 Dec.05 Dec.17|China conducts 60th Anniversary Military Parade SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia (though October 17) 1st Ministry of Defense Policy Meeting Destroyer Kurama collides with ROK cargo ship Carina Star in the Kammon Straits North and South Korean ships engage in fire in the Yellow Sea Government Revitalization Unit “project screening” (through November 27) Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Emperor of Japan’s coronation Deployment Surface Force for Counter Piracy Enforcement (DSPE) receives the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea Lisbon treaty comes into effect Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Supreme Court) START I lapses Security Council and Cabinet approve the document on the building up of defense capability for FY2010| |2010|Jan.01 Jan.12 Jan.17 Jan.19 Jan.29 Feb.05 Feb.27 Mar.07 Mar.11 Mar.26 Mar.26 Apr.01 Apr.02 Apr.06 Apr.12 May 01 May 19 May 26 May 27 May 28 Jun.08 Jun.09 Jun.25 Jun.28 Jul.01 Jul.13 Aug.01 Aug.31 Sep.07 Sep.07 Sep.10 Sep.17 Sep.28 Oct.01 Oct.12 Oct.19 Nov.01 Nov.19 Nov.23 Dec.07 Dec.17|China announces that it has performed missile interception test M7 earthquake occurs in Haiti Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in Haiti (February 14, operation completed) “2+2” joint statement on the 50th anniversary of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty First test flight of Russian fifth-generation fighter PAK FA Decision made to dispatch SDF units to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (February 6, deployment commences) (January 25, 2013, operation completed) U.S. announces “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) and “Ballistic Missile Defense Review” (BMDR) Russia publishes new Navy doctrine ASDF Hyakuri Base, joint civilian use of runway ROK naval patrol ship “Cheonan” sank in the Yellow Sea by a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (new establishment of the 15th Bridge and reorganization of the Youth Technical School) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of GSDF students) In Thailand, Thaksin supporters occupy the center of cities such as Bangkok. On April 10, they clash with Thai government security forces (through May 19) U.S. announces “Nuclear Posture Review” (NPR) 1st Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C., through April 13) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to foot and mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27) Japan–Australia 2+2 (signing of Japan–Australia ACSA), Japan–Australia “2+2” Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Kitazawa and Faulkner, Tokyo) Enactment of the “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” U.S. announces “National Security Strategy” (NSS) Joint Statement of Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) Kan Cabinet established U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding additional sanction on Iran Conclusion of the “Japan–NATO Information Security Agreement” Release of the U.S. "National Space Policy" (NSP) Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of the job status of SDF recruits) Cabinet approves “Act on the Preservation of the Law-Water Line and Development of Basic Infrastructure of Remote Islands for the Maintaining and Promoting Utilization of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf” Coming into effect of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Air transport activities by helicopter in aid of flood disaster in Pakistan (through October 10) Release of the “Future Direction of Procurement Reform” by the Comprehensive Procurement Reform Promotion Committee Chinese fishing boat collides with Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel in waters near the Senkaku Islands Cabinet approves dispatch of SDF officers as key military contact personnel (military observers) to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (dispatched on September 27) Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet North Korea holds conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea and a Plenary Meeting of Central Committee; Kim Jong-un is appointed Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (abolition of the lowest enlisted ranks) 1st ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) convenes (Hanoi) The United Kingdom releases "Strategic Defence and Security Review" (SDSR) Russian President Medvedev visits the Kunashiri Island NATO adopts New Strategic Concept North Korea shells the ROK’s Yeonpyeong island Establishment of a governmental committee to review information security, as a result of the leakage of the video showing the fsihing boat collision off the Senkaku Islands Security Council and Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2011 and Beyond, and the Mid-term Defense Program (FY2011 to FY2015)| 2011 Jan.11 China conducts test flight of fighter aircraft touted as the t ti t lth i ft Year Date Major Events |2007|Mar.30 Apr.11 Apr.16 Apr.16 May 01 May 18 May 28 May 29 Jun.01 Jun.02 Jun.06 Jun.28 Jul.04 Jul.14 Jul.20 Jul.31 Aug.10 Aug.27 Aug.29 Sep.01 Sep.26 Sep.27 Oct.03 Oct.17 Nov.01 Nov.16 Nov.21 Nov.28 Dec.13 Dec.18 Dec.19 Dec.24|SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers (through January 18, 2011) First Japan-India Vice-Ministerial level talks on defense policy Japan–U.S.–India naval drill conducted for the first time Nagoya District Court, Kanazawa Branch renders judgment on the third and fourth trials for the suit pertaining to noise generated by the Komatsu Air Base Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2,” Washington, D.C.) announces the joint statement “Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States–Japan Security and Defense Cooperation” ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility U.S and Iran begin official talks for the first time in 27 years (ambassadorlevel) Russia announces that it succeeded in launching a new intercontinental ballistic missile Partial amendment (abolition of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and its consolidation into the Ministry of Defense, establishment of the Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance and the Local Defense Bureau, joint units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, etc) of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law enacted Japan–U.S.–Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting held for the first time (Minister of Defense Kyuma, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, and Minister of Defense Nelson, in Singapore) Japan–Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations held for the first time (“2+2,” Tokyo) Russia succeeds in the experimental launch of new submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM), Bulava. Koike becomes Minister of State for Defense Russian President Putin signs presidential order on the termination of the execution of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Enactment of the “Basic Act on Ocean Policy” The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1769 on the dispatch of the U.N./AU Joint PKO Unit (UNMID) to the Darfur region in Sudan Conclusion of the General Security of Military Information Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States (GSOMIA) Inauguration of reshuffled Abe Cabinet; Koumura becomes Minister of State for Defense Enactment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General’s Office of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created Fukuda Cabinet established; Ishiba becomes Minister of State for Defense Second session of the Sixth Round of the Sixth Six-Party Talks held (Beijing) (through September 30) (October 3, Sixth Six-Party Talks Agreement “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” published) The Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, the “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” is announced First Japan–U.S.–Australia trilateral exercises (MSDF, U.S. Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force) Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Council for MOD Reform established The USS Kitty Hawk is denied docking in Hong Kong and returns to Yokosuka via the Taiwan Strait (through November 25) Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the first time (through December 1) Russia seizes four Japanese fishing vessels off Kunashiri Island Review of USFJ Local Employee Wages (Abolishment of USFJ Differential, etc.) Aegis vessel MSDF Kongo conducts a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S. forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ realignment Cabinet decisions on “Improvement of next fixedwing aircraft,” “Important issues among contents of Defense Capability Buildup in FY2008,” “Changes of emergency response measures on destruction measures by ballistic missiles”| |---|---|---| 2008 Jan.16 Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January 24, 25) Jan.25 New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed Feb.19 Collision between Aegis vessel MSDF and fishing boat Feb.20 U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down outof-control satellite outside the earth’s atmosphere with an SM-3 Feb.21 Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean (through January 15, 2010) Mar.14 Demonstration by Buddhist monks in the regional capital of Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region, China Mar.18 Cabinet approval for the “Basic Plan on Ocean Policy” Mar.26 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. reorganization of the SDF Command and Communication Unit) Apr.24 Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack May 12 M7.8 earthquake occurs in Sichuan Province, China May 30 The Convention on Cluster Munitions is adopted at an international conference in Dublin Jun.24 First visit of MSDF vessel to China (through June 28) Jun.26 Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea Jun.26 North Korea submits its nuclear program Jul.07 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through July 9) Jul.12 Publication of the Press Communique of the Heads of D l ti M ti f th Si th R d f th Si P t T lk |2008|Jul.15 Aug.02 Aug.08 Aug.10 Aug.29 Sep.09 Sep.24 Sep.25 Sep.25 Oct.03 Oct.10 Oct.19 Oct.22 Oct.24 Nov.02 Dec.02 Dec.03 Dec.20 Dec.23 Dec.26|Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Hayashi becomes Minister of Defense Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1 U.S. President G.W. Bush announces reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and increase of troops in Afghanistan Aso Cabinet established; Hamada becomes Minister of Defense Commissioning of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington China launches a manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 7,” and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the first time U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism Four Chinese naval warships including a destroyer sail through Tsugaru Strait for the first time Japan–India Summit Meeting: Japan–India Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed SDF personnel dispatched to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (through September 30, 2011) Four Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean for the first time U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1846 on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia Convention on Cluster Munitions signed Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005– FY2009) adopted by Security Council of Japan and Cabinet ASDF Airlift Wing that was deployed under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq returns to Japan Chinese naval fleet of three destroyers sets off to Somalia for escort mission| |---|---|---| Year Date Major Events 2008 Jul.15 Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense released Aug.02 Inauguration of reshuffled Fukuda Cabinet; Hayashi becomes Minister of Defense Aug.08 Russian Armed Forces intervene in military clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian forces Aug.10 Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China Aug.29 TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1 Sep.09 U.S. President G.W. Bush announces reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and increase of troops in Afghanistan Sep.24 Aso Cabinet established; Hamada becomes Minister of Defense Sep.25 Commissioning of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington Sep.25 China launches a manned spacecraft “Shenzhou 7,” and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the first time Oct.03 U.S. DoD informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan Oct.10 U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism Oct.19 Four Chinese naval warships including a destroyer sail through Tsugaru Strait for the first time Oct.22 Japan–India Summit Meeting: Japan–India Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed Oct.24 SDF personnel dispatched to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (through September 30, 2011) Nov.02 Four Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean for the first time Dec.02 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1846 on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia Dec.03 Convention on Cluster Munitions signed Dec.20 Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005– FY2009) adopted by Security Council of Japan and Cabinet Dec.23 ASDF Airlift Wing that was deployed under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq returns to Japan Dec.26 Chinese naval fleet of three destroyers sets off to Somalia for escort mission 2009 Jan.08 ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri) Jan.15 Ministry of Defense decides on “Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space” Jan.27 Japanese fishing boat No. 38 Yoshimaru caught by Russian Coast Guard in Sea of Japan Jan.31 Provisional government in Somalia, Ahmed elected as new president Feb.10 Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the redeployment group Feb.17 Signing of the “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” Feb.17 U.S. President Obama decides to increase the number of troops dispatched to Afghanistan by approximately 17,000 Mar.06 U.S.–Russia Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, agreement to “reset” bilateral relations (Geneva) Mar.13 Cabinet approval for Anti-Piracy Measures Law Mar.13 SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security operations as part of anti-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden Mar.17 First Japan-ASEAN Defense Vice-Ministerial Forum Mar.27 SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued Apr.03 Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti Apr.05 North Korea launches a ballistic missile which flies through Japanese airspace Apr.05 U.S. President Obama delivers speech in Prague Apr.06 SDF action order for termination of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued Apr.11 Cancellation of ASEAN Summit due to invasion by protestors in Thailand. State of emergency declared in Bangkok on April 12 May 04 1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines) May 15 Order issued for P-3Cs to be dispatched to Djibouti international airport May 19 “Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam” comes into force May 25 North Korea conducts the underground nuclear test May 30 First Japan–U.S.–ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Hamada, Gates, Lee, in Singapore) Jun.02 Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated Jun.11 Commencement of warning and surveillance flights in the Gulf of Aden by P-3Cs Jun.16 Provisional government of Somalia declares a state of emergency due to outbreak of fighting Jul.04 North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan Jul.14 Ratification of Convention on Cluster Munitions Jul.17 Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their Possession Jul.24 Anti-Piracy Measures Law enacted, Order issued for anti-piracy operations Jul.28 The exterior of the body of oil tanker “M. STAR” damaged in an explosion at the Straits of Hormuz Jul.31 Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq Aug.01 Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (inc. establishment of the Defense Council and the Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the Defense Councilors System) Sep.16 Hatoyama Cabinet established; Kitazawa becomes Minister of Defense Sep.17 U.S. President Obama announces review of MD deployment in Europe S 30 M 6 h k ff h f S I d i ----- Year Date Major Events Year Date Major Events |2011|Jan.14 Jan.14 Jan.21 Jan.28 Feb.04 Feb.05 Feb.08 Feb.12 Feb.23 Mar.11 Mar.11 Mar.11 Mar.12 Mar.16 Mar.16 Mar.17 Mar.19 Apr.05 Apr.11 Apr.14 Apr.15 Apr.27 May 02 Jun.01 Jun.21 Jun.22 Jun.24 Jun.28 Jul.08 Jul.09 Jul.11 Jul.14 Aug.10 Aug.24 Sep.02 Sep.09 Sep.19 Sep.27 Sep.29 Sep.30 Oct.10 Oct.14 Oct.24 Oct.31 Nov.11 Nov.12 Nov.15 Nov.22 Dec.18 Dec.19 Dec.20 Dec.20 Dec.20 Dec.27 Dec.28 Dec.31|U.N. Security Council chairman’s statement concerning the conclusion of the UNMIN mandate is adopted Inauguration of reshuffled Kan Cabinet (second term) Signing of the new Special Measures Agreement in connection with cost-sharing arrangements on the stationing of U.S.Forces in Japan (comes into effect on April 1) Prime Minister Kan attends the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Davos meeting) (through January 30) The United States releases "National Security Space Strategy" (NSSS) New START comes into effect The United States releases the "National Military Strategy" Egyptian President Mubarak resigns Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the earthquake in New Zealand (through March 3) Four pirates that had shot at Japanese vessels off the Oman Coast in the Arabian Sea were arrested under the Anti-Piracy Law Great East Japan Earthquake strikes Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through August 31) Nuclear disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (through December 26) Cabinet decision regarding first disaster call-up of SDF reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch GSDF ready reserve personnel and reserve personnel (through August 31) U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1973 allowing use of force against Libya The coalition force led by the U.S., U.K., and France commence military operations against Libya U.S. President Obama gives speech in Prague Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake established First BRICS (five emerging economies) summit is held Disaster relief call-up order is issued to dispatch MSDF and ASDF reserve personnel (through August 31) Partial revision to the Environmental Improvement Law (extended target projects for subsidies to improve the environment surrounding specified defense facilities) U.S. President Obama announces the killing of Osama bin Laden, leader of the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda SDF activity base in Djibouti initiates operation Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2” in Washington, D.C.) joint statement; release of “Toward a Deeper and Broader Japan–U.S. Alliance: Building on 50 years of Partnership” U.S. President Obama announces guidelines to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan Exercise of the Basic Act on Reconstruction First meeting of the headquarters for reconstruction measures U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1996 to establish UNMISS Independence of the Republic of South Sudan U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1997 to terminate UNMIS U.S. DoD releases “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace” Conducts its frist navigation Chinese aircraft carrier Varyag The Chinese fisheries patrol ships enter Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Noda Cabinet established; Ichikawa becomes Minister of Defense 24 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait Detection of cyber attacks against defense industry Japan-Philippines Summit (Tokyo), Japan-Philippines joint statement made Chinese space laboratory “Tiangong 1” launched Cabinet decision on “Promotion of the operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System project” and “Promoting development and utilization of aerospace” ATR to Guam as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through October 28) Decision made on next transport plane (C-130R) replacing MSDF’s YS-11 Conclusion of the “Japan-France Information Security Agreement” NATO ends operations in Libya U.S.-Philippines sign “Manila Declaration” Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Honolulu) Cabinet decision made on dispatch of SDF personnel as headquarters staff for the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) (departing Japan on November 28) Six Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Completion of U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq North Korea announces the death of Chairman of the National Defense Commission Kim Jong-il (December 17) Decision made by the Security Council and seconded by the Cabinet regarding “acquisition of the next-generation fighter aircraft” F-35A decided to be the next-generation fighter aircraft Decision made by the Cabinet on dispatching engineer units, etc. for United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (deployed from on January 11, 2012) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defense Equipment etc. Environmental impact statement for the Futenma Replacement Facility construction project is submitted to Okinawa Prefecture (through January 6, 2012) Third supplementary budget approved Japan-India Summit (Delhi), Joint statement on strengthening “Japan-India strategic global partnership” signed| |---|---|---| 2012 Jan.05 U.S. announces the defense strategic guidance J 11 Ad t f UNMISS d t J |2012|Jan.13 Feb.10 Mar.16 Mar.26 Mar.27 Mar.30 Apr.10 Apr.11 Apr.13 Apr.13 Apr.17 Apr.27 Apr.29 May 17 Jun.03 Jun.04 Jun.28 Jul.01 Jul.03 Jul.11 Jul.12 Jul.12 Aug.10 Aug.19 Sep.07 Sep.11 Sep.23 Sep.25 Oct.01 Oct.16 Nov.15 Nov.26 Dec.04 Dec.07 Dec.12 Dec.13 Dec.26 Dec.31|Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet; Tanaka becomes Minister of Defense Establishment of the Reconstruction Agency Chinese government ship “Haijian” enters Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands Transfer of ASDF Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base Prime Minister Noda attends the Nuclear Security Summit SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated April 13) Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Tokyo), Japan-U.K. joint statement is announced Kim Jong-un becomes North Korea’s First Secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” Kim Jong-un becomes the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission Ten-month extension of SDF dispatch to support the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (through February 28, 2013) Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee “2+2” joint statement Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean “Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement” signed Exchange of memorandum regarding Japan-U.K. defense cooperation Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (second term); Morimoto becomes Minister of Defense Third working-level talks on maritime communication mechanisms between Japan and China’s defense authorities (Beijing) (through June 29) 26 Russian vessels sail through Soya Strait (through July 2) PSI Air Interdiction Exercise hosted by Japan (Hokkaido, through July 5) Three vessels of Chinese Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) enter Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands One FLEC vessel enters Japanese waters near the Senkaku Islands Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Law for Establishment of Cabinet Office South Korean President Lee Myung-bak visits Takeshima UNSMIS ended “Toward Stable and Effective Use of Cyberspace by the MOD/JSDF” is released Government’s purchase of the three Senkaku Islands SDF dispatch to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) ended The first Chinese aircraft carrier “Liaoning” commissioned Inauguration of reshuffled Noda Cabinet (third term) Seven Chinese warships pass through the waters between the Yonaguni Island and the Nakanokami Island for the first time Xi Jinping elected as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the first plenary session of the 18th Central ommittee of the Communist Party of China Promulgation and partial enforcement (regarding Japan-U.S. ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Launch of capacity building program in East Timor SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued (terminated December 12) North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” A Chinese aircraft violates Japanese airspace for the first time (airspace surrounding the Senkaku Islands) Inauguration of second Abe Cabinet; Onodera becomes Minister of Defense UNMIT ends| |---|---|---| 2013 Jan.11 France’s military intervention in Mali Jan.16 Abduction of Japanese nationals in Algeria Jan.16 Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Hanoi) Jan.17 Japan-Thailand summit meeting (Bangkok) Jan.18 Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Jakarta) Jan.19 A Chinese naval vessel may direct fire-control radar at a helicopter based on a JMSDF destroyer Jan.20 SDF dispatch to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) ended (ceremony to return unit flag) Jan.20 As a measure for the Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas (TJNO) prescribed in the Self-Defense Forces Act, SDF transports Japanese victims of the Algerian hostage crisis from Algeria to Japan (return home on January 24) Jan.23 Australia announces the National Security Strategy Jan.25 Security Council and Cabinet approve the document on the building up of defense capability for FY2013 Jan.27 China announces that it has performed missile interception test Jan.30 A Chinese vessel directs fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer in the East China Sea Jan.31 Three Chinese vessels sail northeast of Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean Jan.31 Japan–Australia ACSA enters into force Jan.31 Partial enforcement (regarding Japan-Australia ACSA) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Feb.01 Partial enforcement (regarding pilot allowance) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Feb.07 Russian fighters intrude into Japan’s airspace Feb.12 North Korea’s underground nuclear test Feb.15 First meeting of a panel of experts on the establishment of a Japanese National Security Council (NSC) Feb.20 Naha District Court renders judgment on Henoko environmental assessment case Feb.23 Meeting between U.S. President Obama and Prime Minister Abe Mar.01 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on participation f J ’ i d t i i th d ti f th F 35A Year Date Major Events 2013 Mar.15 SDF dispatch for the MINUSTAH mission ended (ceremony to return unit flag) Mar.22 Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement enters into force Mar.26 Partial enforcement (regarding shift of Air Rescue Wing’s affiliation) of partially amended laws, including the Self- Defense Forces Act, etc. Mar.30 Four Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Apr.02 North Korea announces that it will readjust and restart the graphite moderated reactor that was mothballed and disabled under an agreement reached at the Six-Party Talks in October, 2007 Apr.29 France releases "White Paper on Defence and National Security" May 07 Two Chinese vessels sail northeast of the Yonaguni Island to the Pacific Ocean May 27 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Jun.17 Japan-Russia summit meeting Jun.18 Afghanistan starts final phase of transition of security responsibilities from the International Security Assistance Force Jul.04 Japan-U.K. Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies and Information Security Agreement signed Jul.05 China-Russia joint naval exercise. “Naval Interaction 2013” (through July 11) Jul.13 Chinese naval fleets sail through Soya Strait to the Sea of Okhotsk Jul.22 China Coast Guard sign put up Jul.24 Chinese early warning aircraft fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Aug.21 Many civilians die in outskirts of Damascus, Syria due to use of chemical weapons Aug.21 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Aug.22 Russian bombers intrude into Japan’s airspace Aug.27 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Aug.29 2nd ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) (Bandar Seri Begawan) Aug.30 “Direction of the MOD Reform” released Sep.01 Council on Security and Defense Capabilities holds first meeting Sep.05 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (St. Petersburg) Sep.08 Chinese bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Sep.09 Unmanned aircraft (presumed) of unidentified nationality flies over the East China Sea Sep.10 1st meeting of MOD/SDF Special Action Committee on the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games held Sep.27 U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2118 on elimination of Syrian chemical weapons Oct.03 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”, Tokyo) Oct.03 Signing of the “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam” Oct.16 Disaster relief teams dispatched after Typhoon No. 26 (through November 8) Oct.23 Five Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Oct.25 Chinese early warning aircraft and bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (through October 27) (three consecutive days) Oct.30 Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Nov.02 First Japan-Russia “2+2” (Tokyo) Nov.08 Typhoon No. 30 Haiyan hit Leyte Island, Philippines Nov.12 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to typhoon disaster in the Philippines (through December 18) Nov.15 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) decides on detailed terms of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, etc. Nov.22 Revisions of the Self-Defense Forces Act (e.g., expanded category of people who may be transported by the JSDF, in the event of disasters, insurgencies, and other emergencies overseas) promulgated and entered into force Nov.23 China announces establishment of the “East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone” Nov.24 Iran and EU3 (U.K., France, Germany) +3 (U.S., China, Russia) reach first phase agreement for the comprehensive settlement of the nuclear issue Dec.04 National Security Council established Dec.05 French forces launch military intervention in the Central African Republic Dec.08 The ROK announces establishment of new Air Defense Identification Zone Dec.13 ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit (Tokyo) (through December 15) Dec.13 Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets promulgated Dec.13 North Korea announces execution (December 12) of Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission Jang Song-thaek Dec.15 Chinese lunar probe successfully achieves soft lunar landing Dec.15 Confrontations occur between forces aligned with the president and forces aligned with the former vice president Dec.15 Japan-Cambodia summit meeting (Tokyo). Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges signed. Dec.17 National Security Council and Cabinet approve “National Security Strategy,” “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and beyond,” and “Medium Term Defense Program (FY2014-FY2018)” Dec.23 Three Chinese vessels sail southwest of the main island of Okinawa to the Pacific Ocean Dec.23 Second Russian Borey-class SSBN commissioned (incorporated into Pacific Fleet) Dec.27 Governor of Okinawa Prefecture approves application for public water reclamation for the Futenma Replacement F ilit t ti j t ----- Year Defense Domestic International |2014|Jan.06 Jan.09 Jan.15 Jan.22 Feb.15 Mar.11 Mar.19 Apr.01 Apr.06 Apr.14 Apr.17 Apr.28 Apr.29 May 07 May 08 May 09 May 31 May 31 May 31 Jun.11 Jun.11 Jun.19 Jun.21 Jul.08 Jul.11 Jul.25 Jul.29 Jul.29 Aug.01 Aug.06 Aug.10 Aug.17 Aug.17 Aug.20 Sep.03 Sep.11 Sep.27 Oct.16 Oct.26 Oct.28 Nov.04 Nov.04 Nov.06 Nov.19 Nov.21 Nov.23 Nov.28 Dec.01 Dec.06 Dec.19 Dec.24 Dec.31|Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (New Delhi) First Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Paris) Collision accident between transport vessel and fishing vessel Committee for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of Bases on Okinawa established Disaster relief teams dispatched after heavy snowfall disaster (through February 23) Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to the missing Malaysian Airplane (through April 28) A submarine seen navigating underwater in Japan’s contiguous zone (waters east of Miyako Island) Partial enforcement (establishment of Faculty of Nursing at National Defense Medical College) of partially amended laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act, etc. Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the bird flu outbreak in Kumamoto Prefecture (through April 16) Japan-Mongolia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Perth) Japan-Malaysia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala Lumpur) Japan-Italy Defense Ministerial Meeting (Rome) Japan-South Sudan Defense Ministerial Meeting (Juba) Japan-Djibouti Defense Ministerial Meeting (Djibouti) Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister Onodera attend 13th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting (Singapore) Japan-Australia “2+2” (Tokyo) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Strategy on Defense Production and Technological Bases released Partial enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (response to early retirement system) Japan-Australia Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, D.C.) Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of Vice-Minister of Defense for International Affairs) Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-France declaration of intent on defense cooperation and exchanges is signed Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (quota for SDF personnel posts of Internal Bureau, establishment of Air Tactics Development & Training Wing, etc.) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rainfall in Yamaguchi Prefecture (through August 8) Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply supports in Kochi Prefecture (through August 14) Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Fukuchiyama City, Kyoto Prefecture Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Tamba City, Hyogo Prefecture Disaster relief teams dispatched for lifesaving activities in Hiroshima City, Hiroshima Prefecture (through September 11) Eto becomes Minister of Defense Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply supports in Ebetsu City, Hokkaido (through September 13) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption of Mt. Ontake (through October 16) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Air Review commemorating the 60th anniversary of the MOD/SDF Japan-Finland Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Spain Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Memorandum on Japan-Spain Defense Cooperation and Exchanges is signed Japan-U.S.-Australia joint exercise (Michinoku ALERT 2014) (through November 9) First Japan-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting (Bagan) “Global Hawk” is decided as the model of unmanned aerial vehicle Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to an earthquake with an epicenter in northern Nagano Prefecture Transport of supplies necessary for Japan Disaster Relief operations in response to the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Africa (Republic of Ghana, through December 11) SDF personnel dispatched to NATO for the first time Disaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy snowfall in Tokushima Prefecture (through December 11) Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) Nakatani becomes Minister of Defense Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to disappearance of AirAsia plane (through January 11)|Jan.01 Jan.07 Feb.14 Mar.18 Mar.24 Mar.25 Apr.01 Apr.07 Apr.24 May 14 May 15 Jul.01 Jul.01 Jul.07 Jul.08 Jul.10 Jul.22 Jul.25 Jul.29 Jul.31 Aug.01 Sep.01 Sep.03 Sep.06 Sep.07 Sep.26 Oct.03 Oct.16 Oct.24 Nov.10 Nov.12 Nov.16 Nov.20 Dec.10 Dec.17 Dec.24 Dec.26|Japan-U.K. Information Security Agreement enters into force National Security Secretariat launched Council for Promoting the Mitigation of the Impact of MCAS Futenma on Okinawa established Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Tokyo) Prime Minister Abe attends Nuclear Security Summit Japan-U.S.-ROK summit meeting Cabinet decision on “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” Japan-Australia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Tokyo) “Protocol to amend the agreement concerning the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam” comes into force The Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security submits its report Cabinet decision on “Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People” Japan-Macedonia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Auckland) Japan-Australia summit meeting (Canberra) Japan-Papua New Guinea summit meeting (Port Moresby) Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Japan-Mexico summit meeting (Mexico City) Japan-Colombia summit meeting (Bogota) Japan-Chile summit meeting (Santiago) Japan-Brazil summit meeting (Brasilia) Japan-India summit meeting (Tokyo) Inauguration of the second Abe Cabinet Japan-Bangladesh summit meeting (Dhaka) Japan-Sri Lanka summit meeting (Colombo) Prime Minister Abe attends U.N. Summit Meeting on UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York) Cabinet decision on “Establishment of the Headquarters for Creating a Society where All Women Shine” 10th ASEM Summit (Milan, Italy, through October 17) Japan-Georgia summit meeting (Tokyo) APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Beijing, China, through November 11) ASEAN-related summit meetings (Naypyidaw, Myanmar, through November 13) Candidate Onaga defeats incumbent Governor Nakaima in Okinawa gubernatorial election Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Tokyo) Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets enters into force Japan-Palau summit meeting (Tokyo) Inauguration of the third Abe Cabinet Deployment of U.S. Forces TPY-2 (“X-band radar”) to Kyogamisaki is completed|Jan.28 Feb.11 Mar.01 Mar.03 Mar.04 Mar.09 Mar.18 Mar.24 Mar.26 Apr.10 Apr.12 Apr.13 Apr.28 May 02 May 07 May 10 May 19 May 20 May 24 May 27 Jun.07 Jun.10 Jun.11 Jun.29 Jun.29 Jul.8- Jul.09 Jul.13 Jul.14 Jul.17 Jul.17- Jul.26 Aug.08 Aug. 8- Aug.12 Aug.19 Aug.26 Sep.04 Sep.05 Sep.08 Sep.10 Sep.18 Sep.19 Sep.20 Sep.22 Sep.29 Sep.30 Oct.03 Oct.5- Oct.22 Nov.12 Nov.13 Nov.15 Nov.24 Dec.01 Dec.01 Dec.04 Dec.4- Dec.06 Dec.24 Dec.31|U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2134 approving deployment of EU units to Central Africa First ministerial consultation between China and Taiwan Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean North Korea launches two ballistic missiles The United States releases QDR, releases FY2014 budget proposal China’s Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft and H-6 bomber fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Russian “annexation” of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea 3rd Nuclear Security Summit (Hague, through March 25) North Korea launches two ballistic missiles U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2149 approving PKO deployment to Central Africa Separatist armed groups occupy government buildings in Eastern Ukraine Russian aircraft fly near Japanese airspace for seven consecutive days (through April 19) U.S. and Philippines sign Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement: (EDCA) Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Collision and confrontation between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels occur 24th ASEAN Summit (through May 11) U.S. Department of Justice indicts Chinese PLA officers and others for conducting cyber attacks China-Russia joint maritime military exercise “Naval Interaction 2014” (East China Sea) (through May 26) Chinese Su-27 fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2155 that extends UNMISS mandate and limits it to four areas including civilian protection, etc. Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean ISIL seizes Mosul Chinese Su-27 fighter jets fly abnormally close to SDF aircraft ISIL declares establishment of “Islamic State” and caliphate North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Israel Defense Forces start Operation Protective Edge against Gaza North Korea launches two ballistic missiles North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Russia-India joint naval exercise (Indra-2014) (through July 19) Malaysian airliner is shot down (Ukraine) Israel Defense Forces begin ground invasion of Gaza North Korea launches a ballistic missile WHO issues declaration of state of emergency over Ebola virus disease U.S. Central Command begins airstrikes on ISIL in Northern Iraq Russian Armed Forces conduct exercises in the Northern Territories and Chishima Islands Chinese J-11 fighter jets fly abnormally close to U.S. Forces’ patrol aircraft Israel and Hamas agree on ceasefire NATO Wales Summit (through September 5) Minsk agreement (ceasefire in Ukraine, etc.) Iraq’s new Cabinet is formed U.S. President Obama announces strategy to counter ISIL U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 2177 on Ebola virus disease countermeasures; UNMEER’s establishment is announced Russia begins large-scale exercise “Vostok 2014” (through September 25) Ukrainian government and separatist armed groups reach ceasefire agreement The United States and other coalition countries begin airstrikes on ISIL in Syria Afghanistan’s new government is launched U.S.-Afghanistan bilateral security agreement and NATO-Afghanistan states of force agreement are signed Flight of China’s Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft in the East China Sea is confirmed for the first time Shelling between India and Pakistan in Kashmir Shooting incident at Canada’s Parliament U.S.-China summit meeting East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Summit G20 Summit (through November 16) ROK Armed Forces conduct military drill in waters near Takeshima Russia establishes the Northern Joint Strategic Command Over 60 countries attend Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial Meeting (Brussels) Five Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Chinese People’s Liberation Army begins exercise in Western Pacific. Subsequently, some vessels transit Soya Strait (December 24) and Tsushima Strait (December 27) and circle Japan Chinese Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft, Y-8 early warning aircraft, and H-6 bomber fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (December 7, 10, and 11) Arms Trade Treaty comes into effect ISAF’s combat mission in Afghanistan ends| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| 2015 Jan.12 Fourth Joint Working Group meeting on the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities (Tokyo) Jan.15 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the bird flu outbreak in Okayama Prefecture (through January 19) Jan.18 Disaster relief teams dispatched in response to the bird flu outbreak in Saga Prefecture (through January 20) Jan.18 Defense Minister Nakatani visits Djibouti Jan.19 Defense Minister Nakatani visits South Sudan Jan.21 First Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (London) 2015 Jan.21 Japan-U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting J J Phili i D f Mi i i l M i (T k ) Jan.16 Japan-Egypt summit meeting (Cairo) Jan.17 Japan-Jordan summit meeting (Amman) Jan.18 Japan-Israel summit meeting (Jerusalem, through January 19) Jan.26 Convocation of the 189th Ordinary Diet Session (through September 27) Feb.09 Japan-Thailand summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb.10 Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb.20 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (Tokyo) Feb.27 Japan-Poland summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar.06 Japan-Laos summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar.09 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar.20 The Ruling Coalition on the Development of Security Legislation presents “Concrete Vision for Jan.01 NATO begins “Resolute Support Mission” Jan.07 Shooting incident against a publisher (Charlie Hebdo), etc. in Paris Jan.20 ISIL releases video of Japanese hostages (videos of the murder of the Japanese nationals subsequently released on January 24 and February 1) President Obama delivers States of the Union address Jan.29 African Union decides to establish a Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram Feb.02 U.S. President Obama presents his budget for FY2016 Feb.06 The United States releases "National Security Strategy" (NSS) Feb.12 Minsk agreement II (German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian leaders agree on new ceasefire agreement) Feb.13 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Feb.14 China’s Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island (February 15) ----- Year Defense Domestic International Jan.29 Memorandum on Japan-Philippines Defense Mar.23 Japan-Indonesia summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar.02 North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Cooperation and Exchanges is signed Mar.24 Japan-New Zealand summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar.05 China announces FY2015 defense budget Feb.02 Disaster relief teams dispatched to help remove Mar.27 Japan-Portugal summit meeting (Tokyo) Mar.07 Nigeria’s Boko Haram pledges loyalty to ISIL (ISIL accepts on March 12) snow to eliminate isolated areas as a result of the Apr.28 Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Mar.18 An armed group attacks Bardo Museum in Tunisia (three Japanese nationals killed) severe snowstorm in Rausu Town, Hokkaido (through May 13 Japan-Belgium summit meeting (Tokyo) Apr.01 The Rome Statue entered into force for Palestine February 3) May 14 Cabinet decision on “Bill for the Development Apr.02 EU3+3 and Iran agree on “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” Mar.13Mar.13Feb.08Feb.20 Inaugural airborne exercise under Japan-U.S. joint exercise (North Wind 2 (through February 22)Memorandum on Japan-Qatar Defense Exchange is signedSecond Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting (2+2) (Tokyo)Japan-France Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) May 14 of Legislation for Peace and Security” and “International Peace Support Bill”Cabinet decisions on “Responses to Foreign Naval Vessels Carrying Out Navigation through the Territorial Sea or the Internal Waters of Japan that Does Not Fall Under Innocent Passage in International Law,” “The Government’s Responses MayMayApr.23Apr.260809 U.S. DoD releases “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China”Russia holds parade commemorating capitulation of Nazi Germany and showcases new Armata tank modelU.S. DoD releases “The DoD Cyber Strategy”ASEAN Summit (Kuala Lumpur) (through April 27) Mar.13 Japan-France Agreement concerning the Transfer of to Illegal Landing on a Remote Island or its May 09 North Korea announces SLBM launch test was conducted successfully Defense Equipment and Technology is signed Surrounding Seas by an Armed Group,” and May 11 China-Russia naval combined exercise Joint Sea 2015 (I) is held (Mediterranean Sea) Mar.14 Japan-Colombia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) “Responses to Acts of Infringement When Self- (through May 21) Mar.19 Japan-China Security Dialogue (Tokyo) Defense Force Ships or Aircraft Detect Foreign May 21 Two Chinese H-6 bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island Mar.20Mar.23 Japan-Timor Leste Defense Ministerial MeetingMemorandum on Japan-Indonesia Cooperation and Ships Committing Said Acts Against Japanese Private Ships on the High Seas” to the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson announces first flight by Chinese Air Force aircraft in this airspace) Exchanges in the Field of Defense is signed May 20 Japan-Mongolia summit meeting (Tokyo) May 25 Signing of India-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Cooperation (Vietnamese Mar.30 Japan-India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) May 25 Japan-Malaysia summit meeting (Tokyo) Minister of National Defence visits India) Apr.08 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) May 29 Japan-EU Summit (Tokyo) May 26 China releases defense white paper, “China’s Military Strategy” Apr.14Apr.21 Japan-ROK Security Dialogue (Seoul)National Defense Medical College instructor dispatched to support WHO’s epidemiological studies on the outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in West Jun.04Jun.07Jun.07Jun.08 Japan-Philippines summit meeting (Tokyo)Japan-France summit meeting (Germany)Japan-Germany summit meeting (Germany)Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Germany) Jun.01Jun.03 Signing of U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations (U.S. Secretary of Defense visits Vietnam)Signing of Framework for the India-U.S. Defense Relationship (U.S. Secretary of Defense visits India) Africa, etc. (through May 29) Jun.11 Naha District Court’s Okinawa Branch renders Jun.12 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and Apr.27 Japan Disaster Relief Team dispatched in response to judgment in 3rd Futenma Air Station noise suit advance to the Pacific Ocean earthquake in Nepal (through May 22) Jul.30 Tokyo High Court renders judgment in 4th Atsugi Jul.01 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey releases National Military Strategy Apr.27 The new “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Air Facility noise suit Jul.07 Signing of U.S.-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement (General Secretary of the Vietnamese Cooperation” is approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Aug.03 Japan-Italy summit meeting (Tokyo) Communist Party pays first visit to the United States) Consultative Committee meeting (“2+2,” New York) Sep.15 Japan-Vietnam summit meeting (Tokyo) Jul.07 Oral arguments in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the Apr.28 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Washington, Sep.19 Legislation for Peace and Security ("Bill for Philippines (The Hague) (through July 13) D.C.) the Development of Legislation for Peace and Jul.18 Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and Apr.30 Promulgation and enforcement of the Special Security" and "International Peace Support Bill") is advance to the Pacific Ocean Measures Act on the Number of Years of the National passed in the House of Councilors plenary session Jul.29 China’s Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft, Y-8 early warning aircraft, and two H-6 Subsidization of Specific Defense Procurements Sep.26 Prime Minister Abe visits the United States bombers fly between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island towards the Pacific (socalled “Long-term Contract Act”) (through September 29) Ocean (July 30) May 18 Japan-China Defense Director-General-level Sep.27 Japan-Qatar summit meeting (New York) Aug.01 Russia creates Aerospace Force by merging the Air Force and Aerospace Defense Forces Consultations (Tokyo) Sep.27 Japan-Iran summit meeting (New York) Aug.04 Landmines explode in the ROK’s area of the DMZ, injuring two ROK Force personnel May 29 Disaster relief teams dispatched after the eruption at Sep.28 Japan-Russia summit meeting (New York) Aug.05 France and Russia agree to annul agreement on France’s delivery of two Mistral-class Kuchinoerabu Island (through June 1) Sep.28 Japan-Ukraine summit meeting (New York) amphibious assault ships May 30 Defense Minister Nakatani attends 14th Asia Security Sep.28 Japan-Bangladesh summit meeting (New York) Aug.17 Seven Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait northward. Subsequently, China-Russia naval MayMay 3030 Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) (through May 31)Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)Japan-U.S.-ROK Defense Ministers’ Meeting and Japan-U.S.-Australia Defense Ministers’ Meeting Sep.28Oct.05Oct.06 Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (New York)Japan-France summit meeting (Tokyo)Japan-Sri Lanka summit meeting (Tokyo) combined exercise, Joint Sea 2015 (II), is held (Sea of Japan) (August 20-28). Following the exercise, five vessels sail Soya Strait eastward (August 29), sail in the high seas in the Bering Sea (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 2), and enter into U.S. territorial waters near the Aleutian Islands (statement by U.S. DoD official, September 4). (Singapore) Oct.07 Inauguration of the third reshuffled Abe Cabinet Aug.17 Bombing in Thailand (Bangkok) (20 people are killed) May 31 Pacific Partnership 2015 (through August 14) Oct.08 Japan-Turkey summit meeting (Tokyo) Aug.20 Shelling incident occurs between North Korea and the ROK May 31 Dispatched MSDF personnel as commander of Oct.15 Yamaguchi District Court’s Iwakuni Branch renders U.S. DoD submits Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy to Congress Combined Task Force (CTF 151) for counter-piracy judgment in 1st Iwakuni Air Base noise suit Aug.22 Prime Minister Medvedev visits Etorofu Island operations (through August 27) Oct.27 Cabinet verbal understanding regarding Aug.25 Agreement on inter-Korean joint press statement (August 25 agreement) Jun.03 Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) “Revocation of reclamation approval based on Aug.26 Signing of agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan the Act on Reclamation of Publicly-owned Water Jun.07 Joint disaster response exercise with U.S. Forces Surface pertaining to the Futenma Replacement Sep.03 China holds commemorative event for the 70th anniversary of the victories against (TREX) Facility construction project” Japanese aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. In an address, President Xi Jinping Jun.19 Fifth Joint Working Group negotiation meeting on Oct.28 Written notice regarding start of construction announces reduction in troop strength by 300,000. the “Maritime and Air Communication Mechanism” work related to Futenma Replacement Facility Sep.15 Turnbull sworn in as Australian Prime Minister between Japan-China Defense Authorities (Beijing) construction project is submitted to Okinawa Sep.15 Presumed Russian aircraft intrudes into Japanese territorial airspace over the coast of Jun.29 SDF Joint Exercise for Rescue (through July 3) Prefecture the Nemuro Peninsula Jul.03 Disaster relief teams dispatched to support search of Nov.01 Japan-China summit meeting (Seoul) Sep.25 U.S.-China summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) missing persons in Mt. Ontake (through August 7) Nov.02 Japan-ROK summit meeting (Seoul) Sep.30 Russia’s second Borey-class SSBN Alexander Nevsky arrives in Kamchatka Aug.18 Combined exercise in the United States (Dawn Blitz Nov.10 Japan-Netherlands summit meeting (Tokyo) Sep.30 Russia begins airstrikes on ISIL forces, etc. in Syrian territory 2015) (through September 9) Nov.13 Japan-Turkey summit meeting (Istanbul) Oct.02 The leaders of Russia, France, Germany, and Ukraine agree to postpone local elections in Sep.01Sep.10 Exercise for medical activities in the aftermath of large-scale earthquakesDisaster relief teams dispatched after the heavy rain in Kanto and Tohoku in September 2015 (through September 19) Nov.15Nov.15Nov.15Nov.15 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey)Japan-EU summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey)Japan-U.K. summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey)Japan-Russia summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Oct.03Oct.10 pro-Russian regions (eastern Ukraine)Shooting attack in Bangladesh (one Japanese national is killed; ISIL Bangladesh claims responsibility for the attack in a statement)North Korea holds commemorative event of the 70th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Sep.29 Japan-U.S. Agreement on Environmental Stewardship Nov.16 Japan-Germany summit meeting (Antalya, Turkey) Oct.10 Suicide bombings at a protest staged by supporters of a Kurdish political party in Ankara, Cooperation Supplementary to Status of Forces Nov.16 Japan-Saudi Arabia summit meeting (Antalya, the capital of Turkey Agreement is signed Turkey) Oct.26 U.S. naval destroyer USS Lassen sails within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, Spratly Oct.01 Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Nov.26 Suit is instituted for “Case regarding retraction Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (unification of actual unit operations into Joint Staff, establishment of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency, etc.) order request for revocation of the landfill permit based on provisions of Article 246-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act” (“administrative suit”) Oct.26 U.S.-Indonesia joint statement (Indonesian President visits the United States; includes maritime cooperation in defense field, etc.) Oct.01 Technical Research and Development Institute and Equipment Procurement and Construction Office Dec.04 Japan-U.S. Joint Press Release "Implementation of Bilateral Plans for Consolidating Facilities and Oct.29 The tribunal rules that it has jurisdiction with respect to some of the matters in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the Philippines (The Hague) are abolished; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Areas in Okinawa" Oct.31 A Russian jetliner crashes in the Sinai Peninsula, killing all passengers and Agency is established Dec.12 Japan-India summit meeting (New Delhi) crewmembers. ISIL’s Sinai Province claims responsibility for the incident. Oct.18 FY2015 SDF Fleet Review Agreement Between the Government of Japan Nov.03 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus) (Kuala Lumpur) (through Oct.20 Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Seoul) and the Government of the Republic of India November 4) Oct.23 SDF Joint Exercise (Field Training Exercise) (through concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Nov.05 U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Malaysian Minister of Defence board U.S. aircraft November 23) Classified Military Information carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in the South China Sea Nov.03 Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Malaysia) Dec.18 Japan-Australia summit meeting (Tokyo) Nov.07 China and Taiwan hold first summit meeting since their split Nov.03 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM Nov.08 Myanmar general election (opposition party NLD wins majority) Plus) (Kuala Lumpur) (through November 4) Nov.11 A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly conducts east-west passages near the Nov.04 Japan-China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Kuala contiguous zone south of the Senkaku Islands (through November 12) Lumpur) Nov.13 Terror attacks in Paris, France. ISIL France claims responsibility for the attacks in a Nov.06 Japan-Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Vietnam) statement. Nov.12 Japan-Georgia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Nov.15 G20 Antalya Summit (Antalya, Turkey) (through November 16) Nov.22 Japan-Australia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Nov.18 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting (Manila) (through November 19) Consultations (Sydney) Nov.22 East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Summit (November 21-22) Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Sydney) Nov.23 The United Kingdom releases "National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Dec.04 Japan-Czech Republic Defense Ministerial Meeting Security Review 2015" (NSS-SDSR 2015) (Tokyo) Nov.24 Oral arguments in the South China Sea arbitral tribunal proceedings instituted by the Dec.12 Japan-India Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Philippines (The Hague) (through November 30) Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (New Nov.24 CMC Reform Work Conference is held, and President Xi Jinping delivers address on the Delhi) direction of military reforms (through November 26) Dec.17 Japan-Indonesia Foreign and Defense Ministerial Nov.24 Turkish Armed Forces shoots down Russian Armed Forces aircraft saying it violated Meeting (Tokyo) Turkish airspace Nov.27 China’s four H-6 bombers, a Tu-154 intelligence gathering aircraft, and a Y-8 intelligence gathering aircraft pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and fly over the Pacific Ocean (Air Force spokesperson announces flight by PLA Air Force aircraft). At around the same time, four H-6 bombers and a Y-8 early warning aircraft conduct operations near the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island. Nov.28 Two FA-50 light fighters the Philippines purchased from the ROK arrive at Clark Air Base Dec.02 Shooting terror attack in California, United States Dec.07 Three Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean Dec.07 U.S. P-8 aircraft are deployed to Singapore (through December 14) Dec.08 U.S.-Singapore Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is signed (Minister for Defence Ng visits United States) Dec.13 Two Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Dec.16 The United States decides to sell weapons including two missile frigates to Taiwan and notifies Congressl ----- |Year|Col2|Defense|Col4|Domestic|Col6|International| |---|---|---|---|---|---|---| ||||||Dec.23 Dec.24 Dec.26 Dec.30 Dec.31 Dec.31 Dec.31 Dec.31|A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI repeatedly conducts northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through December 26) Russia-India joint statement (includes cooperation on military technology, joint development of military equipment, etc.) A China Coast Guard vessel carrying weapons that appear to be cannons intrudes into Japanese territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time The leaders of Russia, France, Germany, and Ukraine agree to extend ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine that was set to expire in end of 2015 China announces its first domestic aircraft carrier is being built in Dalian, Liaoning Province China establishes PLA Army Headquarters, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Force ASEAN Community inaugurated (Political-Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural) Russia revises National Security Strategy| |2016|Jan.06 Jan.08 Jan.08 Jan.09 Jan.12 Jan.19 Jan.25 Jan.27 Jan.31 Feb.03 Feb.07 Feb.08 Feb.10 Feb.12 Feb.29 Mar.16 Mar.28 Mar.30 Apr.12 Apr.14 Apr.17 Apr.17 Apr.18 Apr.22 May 02 Jun.03 Jun.04 Jun.04 Jun.04 Jun.06 Jun.13|Special survey of radioactivity related to North Korea's nuclear test (through January 15) Japan-U.K. Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conference 1st escort flotilla U.S. deployment exercise in FY2015 (Guam direction) (through January 30) Japan-U.S. bilateral exercise (command post exercise) (through February 2) MOD/SDF participate in multinational exercise Cobra Gold 2016 (through February 19) Disaster relief teams dispatched to provide water supply supports due to heavy snowfall, etc. (through February 1) "X-2" is established as the Advanced Technology Demonstrator model Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of 9th Air Wing) SDF action order for implementation of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Telephone Conference SDF action order for termination of destruction measures against ballistic missiles is issued Japan-U.S.-ROK Trilateral Joint Chiefs of Staff Video- Teleconference is held Defense State Minister Wakamiya attends Munich Security Conference (through February 14) Japan-Philippines Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology is signed (Manila) 20th Tokyo Defense Forum (Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region) is held (through March 18) Enforcement of the Law for Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (establishment of JGSDF Camp Yonaguni, etc.) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the forest fire in Ryozen, Date City, Fukushima Prefecture (through April 1) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the forest fire in Beppu City, Oita Prefecture (through April 13) Disaster relief teams dispatched after the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake (through May 30) Cabinet decision regarding disaster relief call-up of ready reserve personnel in the wake of the 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake Disaster relief call-up order to ready reserve personnel is issued (through May 9) Disaster relief teams dispatched to remove fallen trees in Hiroo Town, Hiroo District, Hokkaido (through April 21) First flight of Advanced Technology Demonstrator (X-2) Japan-Philippines Defense Ministerial Telephone Conference Prime Minister Abe and Defense Minister Nakatani attend 15th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore) (through June 5) Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Japan-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting and Japan- U.S.-ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore) Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. DoD and the Japanese MOD concerning Reciprocal Defense Procurement is signed Defense Minister Nakatani visits Myanmar, Thailand, and Timor-Leste (through June 10) MOD/SDF participate in Pacific Partnership 2016 (through August 24)|Jan.04 Jan.22 Jan.22 Jan.27 Feb.02 Feb.19 Feb.29 Mar.04 Mar.16 Mar.19 Mar.23 Mar.29 Mar.31 Apr.01 Apr.14 May 25 May 26 May 27|Convocation of the 190th Ordinary Diet Session Cabinet decision on 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan The New Special Measures Agreement (SMA) between Japan and the United States is signed Private company conducts test flight of Zero fighter from MSDF Kanoya Air Base Judgment is rendered on appeal suit requesting termination of the monitoring activities of the Appeal Intelligence Security Command Decision is rendered on the immediate appeal against decision to dismiss petition against order of provisional disposition to suspend construction of SDF camp in Yonaguni Island Japan-Egypt summit meeting The government announces it would accept the court’s settlement recommendation in the “Case regarding retraction order request for revocation of the landfill permit based on provisions of Article 246-8, Paragraph 3 of the Local Autonomy Act” (“administrative suit”) and suspends landfill work Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism issues correction instruction to Okinawa Prefecture for revocation of the landfill permit Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Italian Republic on the Security of Information is signed Okinawa Prefecture applies for a review by the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council regarding the correction instruction issued by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism Enforcement of Legislation for Peace and Security ("Act for the Development of the Legislation for Peace and Security" and "International Peace Support Act") Japan-U.S.-ROK summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) 2016 Kumamoto Earthquake strikes (main shock on April 16) Japan-U.S. summit meeting (Ise Shima) G7 Ise-Shima Summit (through May 27) U.S. President Obama visits Hiroshima|Jan.02 Jan.06 Jan.10 Jan.11 Jan.12 Jan.14 Jan.16 Jan.16 Jan.20 Jan.21 Jan.25 Jan.26 Jan.27 Jan.30 Jan.31 Feb.01 Feb.02 Feb.04 Feb.07 Feb.07 Feb.09 Feb.10 Feb.11 Feb.12 Feb.15 Feb.15 Feb.16 Feb.17 Feb.22 Feb.25 Mar.05 Mar.07 Mar.10 Mar.18 Mar.18 Mar.22 Mar.28 Mar.31 Mar.31 Apr.07 Apr.08 Apr.15 Apr.17 Apr.20 Apr.20 Apr.23 Apr.28 Apr.29 May 02 May 06 May 10 May 14 May 17 May 19 May 20 May 22 May 23 May 24 May 25 May 31 Jun.03 Jun.06 Jun.07 Jun.08 Jun.09 Jun.12|China conducts aircraft test flights to Fiery Cross Reef (January 3 and 6) North Korea conducts fourth nuclear test which it called a “hydrogen bomb test” U.S. Force B-52 bomber conducts low-level flight near Osan Air Base in the ROK Chinese Ministry of National Defense announces organizational realignment of the Central Military Commission (dismantlement of four general departments, CMC’s introduction of multiple section system) U.S. President Obama delivers State of the Union address U.S.-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) (Washington, D.C.) Terror attacks occur in Jakarta, Indonesia. ISIL Indonesia claims responsibility for the attacks in a statement. Legislative Yuan and presidential elections are held in Taiwan, confirming change in government to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the first time in eight years. Western countries lift sanctions against Iran related to its nuclear development program Shooting terror attacks occur at a university in Pakistan The United States begins airstrikes on ISIL in Afghanistan At the National Maritime Work Conference, China’s State Oceanic Administration Director announces priorities of the next five years would include building a “Spratly Island reef ecological protected area” Russian bomber conducts flight along the perimeter of Japan Four Chinese vessels sail Tsushima Strait northward U.S. naval destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur sails within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island, Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation China’s Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft and Y-8 early warning aircraft pass Tsushima Strait for the first time and fly over the Sea of Japan Chinese Ministry of National Defense dismantles seven Military Regions and announces the establishment of five theaters of operations Four Chinese vessels sail through Tsugaru Strait to the Pacific Ocean A Chinese Navy Dongdiao-class AGI conducts round-trip northeast-southwest passages near the contiguous zone southeast of the Boso Peninsula (through February 8) North Korea launches a ballistic missile disguised as a “Satellite” ROK decides to begin formal consultations on THAAD deployment by U.S. Forces Korea U.S. President Obama presents his budget for FY2017 The ROK decides to completely suspend operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex in response to North Korea’s nuclear test and long-range missile launch North Korea declares the Kaesong Industrial Complex a military control zone and expels all ROK nationals from the zone U.S. DoD submits “Annual Report: Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” to Congress U.S.-ASEAN summit meeting (California) (through February 16) A submerged submarine sails Tsushima Strait southwestward from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea Locations of equipment deemed to be surface-to-air missile in Woody Island, Paracel Islands are confirmed Terror attack occurs in Ankara, Turkey U.S.-Russia agreement on Syrian ceasefire Australia releases "2016 Defence White Paper" China announces FY2016 defense budget U.S.-ROK Key Resolve and Foal Eagle combined exercise (through April 30) North Korea launches two ballistic missiles North Korea launches a ballistic missile The United States and the Philippines agree to utilize five Philippine bases for carrying out defense cooperation based on the EDCA Terror bombing attacks occur in Brussels, Belgium Two Chinese vessels sail through Osumi Strait to the Pacific Ocean U.S.-China summit meeting (Washington, D.C.) Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, D.C.) (through April 1) Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean Three Chinese vessels pass between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island and advance to the Pacific Ocean North Korea launches a ballistic missile Chinese naval patrol aircraft lands in Fiery Cross Reef in Spratly Islands and evacuates sick people China’s Y-8 early warning aircraft flies between the main island of Okinawa and Miyako Island to the Pacific Ocean China releases images from President Xi Jinping’s visit to the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center North Korea launches an SLBM North Korea launches two ballistic missiles Transitional Government of National Unity of South Sudan is established China deploys landing ship to Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands 7th KWP Congress (through May 9) U.S. naval destroyer USS William P. Lawrence sails within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef, Spratly Islands in the South China Sea An expedition unit comprised of approximately 200 personnel led by the Deputy Commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet arrives in Matsuwa Island of the Chishima Islands and subsequently begins survey activities A Chinese PLA fighter jet flies abnormally close to a U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea Russia-ASEAN summit meeting (through May 20) Tsai Ing-wen, Chairperson of DPP, becomes President in Taiwan U.S. President Obama visits Vietnam (through May 25), fully lifts arms embargo on Vietnam China and Russia hold first joint missile defense exercise (through May 28) ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) (through May 27) Hibatullah Akhundzada is chosen as new Emir of the Taliban in Afghanistan North Korea launches a ballistic missile 15th Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore) (through June 5) 8th U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (Beijing) (through June 7) A Chinese PLA fighter jet conducts dangerous flight, approaching a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft at a high speed over the East China Sea New Zealand releases "Defence White Paper 2016" A Chinese combatant vessel enters the contiguous zone near the Senkaku Islands for the first time Shooting terror attack in Florida, United States| ----- Chief of Staff, GSDF Ground Staff Office Northern Army Headquarters (Sapporo) Middle Army Headquarters (Itami) 5th Field Artillery Regiment (Obihiro) 10th Logistics Support Regiment (Kasugai) 14th Field Artillery unit (Matsuyama) 18th Infantry Regiment (Makomanai) Middle Army 4th Field Artillery Regiment (Kurume) Northern Army Combined Brigade (Higashi Chitose) 52nd Infantry Regiment (Makomanai) Other units 20th Infantry Regiment (Jinmachi) 8th Field Artillery Regiment (Kita Kumamoto) 22nd Infantry Regiment (Tagajo) 8th Logistics Support Regiment (Kita Kumamoto) Other units 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (Yaese) 9th Artillery Regiment (Iwate) 9th Logistics Support Regiment (Hachinohe) Western Field Artillery Unit (Yufuin) 5th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Kengun) Other units 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka) 3rd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Iizuka) Northeastern Field Artillery Unit (Sendai) 4th Surface-to-Ship Missile Regiment (Hachinohe) Western Air Wing (Takayubaru) 9th Engineer Group (Ogori) 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka) Other units Western Army Other units Central Readiness Force Headquarters (Zama) Eastern Army Headquarters (Asaka) Central Readiness Force 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) 1st Logistics Support Regiment (Nerima) 2nd Infantry Regiment (Takada) 13th Infantry Regiment (Matsumoto) Other units Central Readiness Force 30th Infantry Regiment (Shibata)12th Field Artillery unit (Utsunomiya) Signal Brigade (Ichigaya) 12th Helicopter Unit (Somagahara)12th Logistics Support Unit (Shinmachi) Ground Research & Development Command (Asaka) Other units Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo) Other units and organizations Eastern Air Wing (Tachikawa) 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) 4th Engineer Group (Zama) 5th Engineer Group (Takada) Eastern Army Combined Brigade 31st Infantry Regiment (Takeyama) (Takeyama) 48th Infantry Regiment (Somagahara) Other units *Refers to a regional directly controlled unit, but is placed under the commander of the 4th division Northern Army Northeastern Army Eastern Army ----- **Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces** Minesweeper Division 41 Other units Other units Minesweeper Division 44 Other units Boat Division 1 Air Training Squadron 211 (Kanoya) Training Division 1 (Kure) MSDF Ship Supply Depot (Yokosuka) MSDF Air Supply Depot (Kisarazu) Minister of Defense Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Joint Staff Chief of Staff, MSDF Maritime Staff Office Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force Escort Flotilla 1 (Yokosuka) Escort Division 1 (Yokosuka) Escort Division 5 (Sasebo) Yokosuka District Escort Flotilla 2 (Sasebo) Escort Division 2 (Sasebo) Escort Division 6 (Yokosuka) Kure District Sub Area Activity Hanshin (Kobe) Escort Flotilla 3 (Maizuru) Escort Division 3 (Ominato) Escort Division 7 (Maizuru) Escort Flotilla 4 (Kure) Escort Division 4 (Kure) Sasebo District Sub Area Activity Shimonoseki Escort Division 8 (Sasebo) Sub Area Activity Okinawa (Uruma) Fleet Training Command Yokosuka Fleet Training Group (Yokosuka) Kure Fleet Training Group Coastal Defense Group Tsushima Sasebo Fleet Training Group Other units Maizuru Fleet Training Group Ominato Fleet Training Group (Mutsu) Maizuru District Missile System Training Center (Yokosuka) Escort Division 11 (Yokosuka) Ominato District Sub Area Activity Hakodate Escort Division 12 (Kure) Coastal Defense Group Yoichi Escort Division 13 (Sasebo) Base Facility Wakkanai Escort Division 14 (Maizuru) Other units Escort Division 15 (Ominato) Landing Ship Division 1 (Kure) Air Training Command Air Training Group Shimofusa (Kashiwa) Replenishment-at-Sea Squadron 1 (Yokosuka) Air Training Group Tokushima Drone Support Squadron 1 (Kure) (Itano-gun Matsushige Town) Air Training Squadron Ozuki Other units (Shimonoseki) Fleet Air Force Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya) Air Patrol Squadron 1 (Kanoya) Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe) Air Patrol Squadron 2 (Hachinohe) Training Squadron Fleet Air Wing 4 (Ayase) Air Patrol Squadron 3 (Ayase) Other units Air Station Iwo-to (Ogasawara) Fleet Air Wing 5 (Naha) Air Patrol Squadron 5 (Naha) Communications Command (Ichigaya) Fleet Air Wing 21 (Tateyama) Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 21 (Tateyama) Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 23 (Maizuru) MSDF Maritime Materiel Air ASW Helicopter Squadron 25 (Mutsu) Command (Jujo) Helicopter Rescue Squadron 73 (Tateyama) Other units and organizations Fleet Air Wing 22 (Omura) Air ASW Helicopter 22 (Omura) Air ASW Helicopter 24 (Komatsushima) Helicopter Rescue Squadron 72 (Omura) Fleet Air Wing 31 (Iwakuni) Air Rescue Squadron 71 (Iwakuni) Air Reconnaissance Squadron 81 (Iwakuni) Air Training Support Squadron 91 (Iwakuni) Air Development Squadron 51 (Ayase) Air Transport Squadron 61 (Ayase) Mine Countermeasure Helicopter Squadron 111 (Iwakuni) Other units Fleet Submarine Force Headquarters (Yokosuka) Submarine Flotilla 1 (Kure) Submarine Division 1 (Kure) Submarine Division 3 (Kure) Submarine Division 5 (Kure) Submarine Flotilla 2 Submarine Division 2 (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Submarine Division 4 (Yokosuka) Training Submarine Division 1 (Kure) Submarine Training Center (Kure) Mine Warfare Force Minesweeper Division 1 (Kure) (Yokosuka) Minesweeper Division 2 (Sasebo) Minesweeper Division 51 (Yokosuka) Minesweeper Division 101 (Kure) Mine Warfare Support Center (Yokosuka) Fleet Intelligence Command Operational Intelligence Center (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Basic Intelligence Center (Ichigaya) Electronic Intelligence Center (Yokosuka) Oceanography ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare Center (Yokosuka) Support Command ASW Evaluation Center (AEC) (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Oceanographic Observation Okinawa (Uruma) Oceanographic Observation Shimokita (Higashidoori Shimokita-gun, Aomori Prefecture) Other units Fleet Research and C4I Systems Center (Yokosuka) Development Command Surface Systems Center (Yokosuka) (Yokosuka) Air Systems Programming Center (Ayase) Other units ----- (As of March 31, 2016) 1st Tactical Airlift Group (Komaki) 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma) 3rd Tactical Airlift Group (Miho) Air Traffic Control Service Group (Fuchu, Each region) Air Weather Service Group (Fuchu, Each region) Flight Check Squadron (Iruma) Special Airlift Group (Chitose) Aeromedical Evacuation Air Support Command Squadron (Komaki) 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu) 4th Air Wing (Matsushima) 11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama) 12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita) 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya) Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami, Kumagaya) Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru) Other units and organizations Air Training Command Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu) Electronics Development and Test Group (Fuchu) Aero-Medical Laboratory Air Development and Test Command (Iruma, Tachikawa) Air Communications and System Wing (Ichigaya, Each region) Aero Safety Service Group (Tachikawa) Air Material Command (Jujo, Each region) Other units and organizations Chief of Staff, ASDF Air Staff Office 2nd Air Wing (Chitose) 3rd Air Wing (Misawa) Northern Aircraft Control and 42nd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Ominato) Warning Wing (Misawa) 45th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Tobetsu) 18th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Wakkanai) 26th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Nemuro) 28th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Abashiri) 29th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okushiritou) 33rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kamo) 36th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Erimo) 37th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Yamada) 1st Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Chitose) Other units Northern Air Civil Engineering Group (Misawa, Chitose) Other units 6th Air Wing (Komatsu) 7th Air Wing (Hyakuri) Central Aircraft Control and 1st Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Kasatoriyama) Warning Wing (Iruma) 23rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Wajima) 27th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Ohtakineyama) 5th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kushimoto) 22nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Omaezaki) 35th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kyogamisaki) 44th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mineokayama) 46th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Sado) 2nd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Iruma) Other units 1st Air Defense Missile Group 1st Fire Unit (Narashino) (Iruma) 2nd Fire Unit (Takeyama) 3rd Fire Unit (Kasumigaura) 4th Fire Unit (Iruma) 4th Air Defense Missile Group 12th Fire Unit (Aibano) (Gifu) 13th, 15th Fire Unit (Gifu) 14th Fire Unit (Hakusan) Central Air Civil Engineering Group (Iruma, Each region) Other units 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru) 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) Western Aircraft Control and 13th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Takahatayama) Warning Wing (Kasuga) 43rd Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Sefuriyama) 7th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Takaoyama) 9th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Shimo-Koshikijima) 15th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Fukuejima) 17th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Mishima) 19th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Unishima) 3rd Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kasuga) Other units (Kasuga) 7th Fire Unit (Tsuiki) 8th Fire Unit (Kouradai) Western Air Civil Engineering Group (Ashiya, Each region) Other units 9th Air Wing (Naha) Southwestern Aircraft Control 56th Aircraft Control and Warning Group (Yozadake) and Warning Wing (Naha) 53rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Miyakojima) 54th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Kumejima) 55th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Okinoerabujima) 4th Mobile Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron (Naha) Other units (Naha) 17th Fire Unit (Naha) 19th Fire Unit (Onna) Southwestern Air Civil Engineering Group (Naha) Other units Air Rescue Wing (Iruma, Each region) Tactical Air Training Group (Yokota, Each region) Tactical Reconnaissance Group (Hyakuri) Airborne Warning and Control Wing (Hamamatsu, Each region) Other units Northern Air Defense Force Central Air Defense Force Western Air Defense Force Southwestern Composite Air Division ----- Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2016) Yonagunijima ----- ----- Abbreviation List and Index (Note) 1. This index is complied aiming at terms used in the main text (including footnotes), columns, and figures. 2. Numbers indicate the page number where the term appears. For terms that are frequently used, only major page numbers are listed. BPM / Bilateral Planning Mechanism A2/AD / anti-access/area-denial 241, 246, 247, 248 5, 10, 11, 42, 43, 48, 51, 58, 159 BWC / Biological Weapons Convention ACSA / Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 354 233, 249, 250, 313, 314, 315, 323, 324, 334, 335, 338 ACM / Alliance Coordination Mechanism **C** 232, 233, 235, 241, 245, 246, 247, 248, 251 CAP / Combat Air Patrol ADIZ / Air Defense Indentif cation Zone 55 5, 39, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 87, 141, 286, 287 C[4]ISR / Command, Control, Communication, Computer, ADMM / ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 101, 102, 314, 316 148, 159 ADMM Plus / ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus CARAT / Cooperation Af oat Readiness and Training 5, 6, 102, 142, 241, 313, 314, 316, 317, 327, 328, 92, 94, 95, 96 330, 333, 334, 344 CBRN / Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear ALGS / Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment 189, 235 161 CCW / Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the ANZUS / Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may the United States of America be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have 86, 87, 89 Indiscriminate Effects AQAP / Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 159, 354, 355 121, 130, 131, 132 CDPWG / Cyber Defense Policy Working Group AQIM / Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 251, 252, 299 126, 127, 131, 132 CHOD / Chief of Defence ARF / ASEAN Regional Forum 318, 334 5, 32, 35, 66, 80, 101, 102, 313, 314, 316, 317, 322, CICA / Conference on Interaction and Conf dence-Building 330 Measures in Asia ASAT / Anti-Satellite 42, 63 5, 7, 48, 148, 151, 171, 178 CIS / Commonwealth of Independent States ASBM / Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 79, 82 46, 48 COC / Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ASEAN / Association of Southeast Asian Nations 97, 100, 146 3, 5, 32, 56, 58, 66, 84, 91, 95, 98, 100, 101, 102, CTBT / Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 103, 142, 146, 172, 211, 241, 243, 244, 296, 309, 135, 354 312, 314, 316, 317, 320, 321, 329, 330, 333, 334, CTF151 / Combined Task Force151 344, 367 340, 341 AU / African Union CUES / Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 67, 117, 125, 126, 127, 128 60, 142, 296, 318, 332, 344 CWC / Chemical Weapons Convention 23, 116, 136, 137, 354, 363 **B** BMD / Ballistic Missile Defense CYMAT / Cyber incident Mobile Assistanse Team 12, 15, 17, 33, 48, 70, 104, 160, 172, 178, 179, 186, 298 234, 235, 248, 252, 270, 273, 284, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 363, 364 ----- **D** **J** DMZ / Demilitarized Zone 18, 19, 33, 36 DOC / Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 97, 100, 146 **E** EAS / East Asia Summit 80, 243 EEZ / Exclusive Economic Zone 53, 60, 64, 101, 141, 143, 145, 283, 284 EU / European Union 5, 7, 67, 71, 94, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 119, 120, 125, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 148, 150, 176, 211, 316, 317, 337, 339, 343 EWG / Experts’ Working Group 314, 316, 317, 333, 334 FACO / Final Assembly and Check Out 364, 365 FPDA / Five Power Defence Arrangements 92, 95 F-35A / 37, 181, 186, 188, 189, 359, 364, 365, 373 **H** HA/DR / Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief 92, 96, 102, 186, 236, 333, 337 **I** IAEA / International Atomic Energy Agency 22, 138, 139, 140, 354 ICBM / Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 15, 23, 27, 30, 46, 47, 71, 73, 74, 77, 87, 165 ICT / Information and Communications Technology 3, 7, 8, 153, 154, 156, 159, 160 IISS / The International Institute for Strategic Studies 93, 97, 145, 318, 331 IMO / International Maritime Organization 291 ISAF / International Security Assistance Force 82, 89, 107, 111, 122, 123 ISIL / Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 13, 68, 80, 81, 83, 84, 87, 89, 91, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 153, 154, 155, 157 ISR / Inteligence Surveillance Reconnaissance 11, 12, 37, 86, 87, 92, 96, 112, 142, 173, 176, 177, 178, 180, 183, 186, 189, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 246, 248, 249, 288, 357, 358 JICA / Japan International Cooperation Agency 345, 355 KFOR / Kosovo Force 111 **L** LAWS / Lethal Autonomous Weapons System 159 LCS / Littoral Combat Ship 12, 17, 95, 98 **M** MAGTF / Marine Air Ground Task Force 256, 263 MCAP / Multinational Cooperation program in the Asia Pacif c 322 MD / Missile Defense 15, 72, 74, 82, 83, 84 MEF / Marine Expeditionary Force 91, 204, 256, 258, 263, 265 MRBM / Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 46, 47, 48 MSO / Maritime Security Operation 40 NATO / North Atlantic Treaty Organization 10, 71, 72, 83, 84, 89, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 122, 144, 145, 155, 157, 176, 193, 299, 300, 313, 315, 337, 339, 343 NBC / Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 7, 135, 186, 201, 280, 294, 295 NEO / Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation 309, 321 NGO / Non-Governmental Organization 219, 319, 321, 345, 347 NISC / National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity 298 NLL / Northern Limit Line 33 NPR / Nuclear Posture Review 13 NPT / Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 135, 139, 167, 354 NSC / National Security Council 213, 338 ----- NSS / National Security Strategy 9, 10, 11, 112, 135, 145, 156, 157, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175, 247, 295, 297 NSSS / National Security Space Strategy 149 **O** ODA / Off cial Development Assistance 176, 243, 345 OECD / Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 90, 193, 371 OPCW / Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 116, 137, 354 OSCE / Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 71, 80, 84, 176 **P** PAC-3 / Patriot Advanced Capability-3 37, 69, 70, 186, 188, 189, 254, 273, 289, 290, 291, 292 PBL / Performance Based Logistics 360, 361, 362 PFI / Private Finance Initiative 302, 360 PKO / UN Peacekeeping Operations 39, 41, 61, 68, 96, 103, 114, 116, 172, 209, 213, 217, 218, 219, 220, 230, 250, 311, 319, 320, 330, 331, 345, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351 PSI / Proliferation Security Initiative 186, 251, 334, 354, 355 QDR / Quadrennial Defense Review 9, 10, 11, 12, 64, 115, 156, 159, 231 **R** RAP / Readiness Action Plan 84, 109 RMC / Role Mission Capability 230 **S** S&TF / Systems and Technology Forum 252 SACO / Special Action Committee on Okinawa 90, 188, 190, 191, 238, 239, 254, 255, 257, 260, 261, 269 SCO / Shanghai Cooperation Organization 66, 80 SCWG / Space Cooperation Working Group 251, 297 SDCF / Security and Defense Cooperation Forum 324 SDSR / Strategic Defence and Security Review 109, 112, 135, 145, 157 SEW / Shared Early Warning 292 SLBM / Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 15, 25, 27, 29, 47, 73, 74, 77, 87 SM-3 / Standard Missile-3 15, 186, 189, 248, 291, 292, 293, 359, 373 SOFA / Status of Forces Agreement 122, 241, 244, 245, 253, 254, 255, 260, 275, 276, 376 SOM / Senior Off cials Meeting 316, 317 SSA / Space Situational Awareness 11, 87, 148, 152, 172, 178, 186, 236, 297 SSBN / Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered 47, 74, 77 SSR / Security Sector Reform 111, 116, 347 START / Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 7, 15, 74, 82, 83, 135 **T** TTP / Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan 106, 133 **U** UNCLOS / United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 41, 60, 66, 94, 99, 100, 101, 141, 142, 146, 216, 340 UNDOF / United Nations Disengagement Observer Force 117, 124, 345 UNHCR / Off ce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 345, 347 UNMISS / United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan 40, 61, 117, 125, 324, 347, 348, 349 UNTSO / United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 117, 124 VJTF / Very High Readiness Joint Task Force 84, 109 **W** WPNS / Western Pacif c Naval Symposium 60, 142, 296, 297, 318, 332 -----